diff --git a/nj/1016862.json b/nj/1016862.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..338e60c4315c2f80bc507af5163b206f795f8f1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1016862.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1016862\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. TRAVIS MOORE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Moore\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-03-12\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"241\", \"last_page\": \"253\", \"citations\": \"358 N.J. Super. 241\", \"volume\": \"358\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:25:04.289692+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. TRAVIS MOORE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"817 A.2d 419\\nSTATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. TRAVIS MOORE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nSubmitted January 8, 2003\\nDecided March 12, 2003.\\nBefore Judges KING, LISA and FUENTES.\\nYvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Alyssa Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).\\nPeter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent {Steven J. Zweig, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).\", \"word_count\": \"3940\", \"char_count\": \"24158\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nLISA, J.A.D.\\nThis appeal requires us to determine whether eluding an officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b, is elevated from a third-degree to second-degree crime where the defendant's unlawful conduct creates a risk of death or injury to himself, but to no one else. We hold it does not.\\nAfter a trial by jury, defendant was convicted of second-degree eluding and sentenced to seven-years imprisonment. The jury acquitted defendant of possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(l), and possession of a CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(l) and -5b(3). The judge who presided over the jury trial adjudicated the motor vehicle charges arising out of the incident. R. 3:15-3(a)(2). The judge found defendant guilty of careless and reckless driving, but merged the careless with the reckless conviction, and the reckless with the second-degree eluding conviction. The judge found defendant not guilty of failure to wear a seatbelt, operating a motor vehicle with tinted windows and possession of a CDS in a motor vehicle.\\nA person is guilty of third-degree eluding who operates a motor vehicle on a street or highway, who knowingly flees or attempts to elude a police or law enforcement officer after receiving a signal from the officer to bring the vehicle to a full stop. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b. The offense is elevated to a second-degree crime \\\"if the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any person.\\\" Ibid. The State tried the case on the theory that defendant created a risk of death or injury to himself, but to no one else. The judge denied defendant's motion at the end of the State's case, R. 3:18-1, to dismiss the second-degree eluding charge (and, implicitly, to submit only the third-degree charge to the jury).\\nThe judge instructed the jury that the enhancing element would be satisfied if \\\"the flight or attempt to elude created a risk of death or injury to any person and that person would include and is alleged to be the defendant himself.\\\" He reiterated, \\\"In order to find this element, you must determine that there was at least one person put at risk by the defendant's conduct and that would be according to the State's allegations the defendant himself.\\\" The jury verdict sheet correspondingly asked the jurors, if they found defendant guilty of third-degree eluding, to further determine if defendant's conduct \\\"created a risk of death or injury to the defendant.\\\"\\nOn appeal, defendant contends the trial judge's instruction on second-degree eluding improperly broadened the scope of the offense, thereby violating defendant's right to due process of law. We agree with this contention and now reverse.\\nAt 12:15 a.m. on January 12, 2001, Lt. Auker, in uniform and patrolling in a marked police car, observed a car traveling at a high rate of speed in the opposite direction on Industrial Road in Carteret. Auker made a U-turn and activated his overhead lights. He estimated the vehicle's speed at close to sixty miles per hour in a forty miles per hour zone. The vehicle pulled over without incident. The distance from the point of Auker's initial observation of the vehicle to the point of the stop was about one-half of a mile, and the elapsed time between those events was less than one minute.\\nAs Auker exited his ear and approached the stopped vehicle, he observed a lone occupant, later determined to be defendant. According to Auker, as he approached defendant's car he placed his hand on his gun and unsnapped the restraint, but never removed it from the holster. He did this for his safety because of the late hour and because defendant leaned towards the glove compartment. According to defendant, Auker unholstered his gun, pointed it in defendant's face and addressed him using a racial epithet. Under either version of this interaction, defendant then sped away from the scene. Defendant contends he panicked and left in fear of the officer. The State urges an inference that defendant left because there was CDS in the car, which he did not want to be discovered.\\nAuker returned to his car and began a pursuit, with his overhead lights and siren on. Auker knew of a sharp curve in the roadway and consciously held down his speed to about fifty to fifty-five miles per hour. He \\\"backed off' hoping defendant would slow down. Auker radioed for back-up, who he instructed to proceed to an intersection beyond the curve, where they could intercept defendant. Defendant accelerated rapidly, reaching a speed estimated by Auker of sixty to seventy miles per hour. After traveling about one-half of a mile from the initial stop in less than one minute, defendant did not successfully negotiate the curve. His car left the road, striking a utility pole and severing it in half. There may have been some snow or ice on the roadway that may have contributed to the crash. Defendant was seriously injured and was removed to the hospital by a medivac helicopter.\\nCDS was found in the wrecked car. The car was owned by defendant's brother. Defendant testified he had just borrowed it to drive home and had no knowledge of the presence of CDS. The jury apparently accepted this testimony.\\nAuker testified that traffic in the area was \\\"very light.\\\" There was no testimony about any other vehicles actually in the area during the course of the eluding, nor of any pedestrians. This portion of Industrial Road is a \\\"fairly wide roadway\\\" in an industrial area. The State did not contend that Auker, who prudently drove at a safe speed, was placed at risk.\\nThus the circumstances do not provide a basis upon which an inference could reasonably be drawn that \\\"people were likely to be in the area and that they were put at risk of death or injury by defendant's eluding.\\\" State v. Wallace, 158 N.J. 552, 560, 730 A.2d 839 (1999). Certainly, there was no direct proof of people in the area. The State did not seek to avail itself of the permissive inference in N.J.S.A 2C:29-2b, which allows a jury to infer that a defendant creates a risk of death or injury to any person if the defendant's conduct involves a violation of chapter 4 of Title 39. The only such violation the State alleged during the course of the eluding was reckless driving, based only on excessive speed. A permissive inference charge was not given. Therefore, whether \\\"any person\\\" in N.J.S.A 2C:29-2b includes the defendant is squarely presented.\\nThe term \\\"any person\\\" seems simple. Literally, it encompasses all natural persons, N.J.S.A 2C:l-14g, without exclusion. The literal meaning of the term, therefore, without regard to its context, does not exclude defendant, and therefore includes him. Context, however, cannot be disregarded. The Code of Criminal Justice uses the same term in contexts where the defendant is plainly not included. See, e.g., N.J.S.A 2C:12-1.2a (Endangering an injured victim is accomplished by defendant causing bodily injury to \\\"any person.\\\"); N.J.S.A. 2C:12-2b(2) (Although N.J.S.A 2C:12-2 is entitled \\\"Recklessly Endangering Another Person,\\\" subsection b(2) makes it a crime to entice \\\"any person\\\" to take \\\"any treat, candy,----\\\"); N.J.S.A 2C:13-5a(3) (Criminal coercion is committed if, with purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action, defendant exposes a secret which would tend to subject \\\"any person\\\" to hatred, contempt or ridicule, etc.); N.J.S.A. 2C:21-16 (Securing execution of documents by deception is accomplished where it affects or is likely to affect the pecuniary interest of \\\"any person.\\\"); N.J.S.A 2C:27-3a(l) (A defendant who threatens unlawful harm to \\\"any person\\\" with purpose to influence a decision, etc. by a public official, etc., commits an offense); N.J.S.A. 2C:37-2a(l) (A defendant promotes gambling who accepts money or property pursuant to an agreement with \\\"any person\\\" to participate in gambling activity). Defendant points to such Code sections to support his argument that the terms \\\"any person,\\\" \\\"anyone,\\\" \\\"another,\\\" and \\\"another person\\\" are used interchangeably throughout the Code.\\nWhere statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it is our duty to enforce it as written. State v. Toth, 354 N.J.Super. 13, 19, 804 A.2d 565 (App.Div.2002). Where the language of a statute is susceptible of more than one meaning, however, resort must be had to extrinsic sources to determine the correct meaning. State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 578, 695 A.2d 236 (1997). In these circumstances, such items as \\\"legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction may be used to help resolve any ambiguity and to ascertain the true intent of the Legislature.\\\" Ibid. We conclude that the term \\\"any person,\\\" in the context of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b, is susceptible to two meanings, one which includes the defendant and one which does not.\\nOur conclusion is premised on (1) examples such as those we have listed which demonstrate different meanings for the term throughout the Code; (2) the use by the Legislature, in some instances, of language specifically including a defendant, rather than using the \\\"any person\\\" language. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 (Official misconduct is committed when a defendant engages in the proscribed activity with purpose to obtain a benefit \\\"for himself or another\\\"); and (3) the general and common notion that victim-oriented criminal conduct is typically measured by harm or a threat of harm caused by the actor to others, not to him or herself. We therefore look beyond the literal meaning of the term to glean its correct meaning.\\nWhen the Code was originally adopted in 1979, eluding was not a separate offense, but was encompassed within the offense of resisting arrest under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2. State v. Wallace, supra, 158 N.J. at 557, 730 A.2d 839. By L. 1981, c. 290, \\u00a7 28, effective September 24, 1981, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b was added to create the separate offense of eluding, which was restricted to the use of motor vehicles and was graded only as a disorderly persons offense. Ibid.\\nBy L. 1989, c. 84, \\u00a7 1, effective May 31,1989, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b was strengthened by adding a mandatory loss of driving privileges for violators. The grading of the offense was not changed, and no enhancement was added if the violator created a risk of death or injury. The legislative history accompanying this enactment evidenced concern for danger to the violator as well as others. The sponsors' statement stated:\\nA motorist fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer may create a dangerous situation for himself, the police officer and other drivers in the vicinity. Fatal accidents have been caused by persons driving a motor vehicle in an attempt to evade police officers. The purpose of this bill is to discourage persons from placing themselves and others in danger by using a motor vehicle to elude police or law enforcement officers.\\n[Sponsor's Statement, Assembly No. 1825.]\\nA Star-Ledger article, included in the bill's official legislative history, quotes the bill's co-sponsor, Assemblyman Robert Franks, as stating, \\\"A driver who flees or speeds off in an attempt to escape apprehension can create a dangerous situation for himself, the police and other motorists in the vicinity.\\\" Matthew Reilly, Governor enacts law permitting hearsay evidence in child abuse cases, Star-Ledger, June 2, 1989. The desired deterrent effect was accomplished, however, by increasing the penalty, not by enhancing the offense if the undesirable risk was created.\\nBy L. 1991, c. 341, \\u00a7 3, effective January 7, 1992, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b was amended to introduce, for the first time, an enhanced offense if the offender's eluding conduct \\\"creates a risk of death or injury to any person.\\\" This amendment also included the permissive inference provision. Eluding remained a disorderly persons offense, and the enhanced offense was graded as a fourth-degree crime. As originally proposed, the amendatory language was: \\\"except that, if the flight or attempt to elude creates a substantial risk of injury to another, the person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.\\\" (Emphasis added). Senate, No. 1192, PreFiled For Introduction in the 1990 Session, First Reprint. The bill passed the Senate in this form on March 29, 1990 and was then referred to the Assembly Judiciary, Law and Public Safety Committee. Legislative Index.\\nOn March 7, 1991, that Committee recommended a change in the amendatory language, to provide: \\\"except that, a person is guilty of a crime of the fourth-degree if the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any person.\\\" (Emphasis added) Senate, No. 1192, Pre-Filed For Introduction in the 1990 Session, First Reprint. On December 2, 1991 the Assembly passed the bill in its amended form; the Senate passed the amended bill on December 9, 1991; and it was finally approved in that form on January 7, 1992. Legislative Index. The State argues: \\\"The fact that the Legislature specifically rejected the term 'to another,' replacing it with the phrase 'to any person,' conclusively establishes that it specifically intended that creating a risk of death or injury to the eluding party be included within the [enhanced] offense.\\\"\\nOther portions of the legislative history of this bill contradict the State's position. The March 7, 1991 Committee Statement explaining the Committee's recommended amendments states the bill would upgrade eluding to a fourth-degree offense if it creates a risk of death or injury to \\\"any person.\\\" The Statement continues, \\\"As amended, there shall be a permissive inference that a flight or attempt to elude in a motor vehicle creates a risk of death or injury to another if the conduct involves a violation of chapter 4 of Title 39.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Assembly Judiciary, Law and Public Safety Committee Statement to Senate, No. 1192, with committee amendments, Dated: March 7,1991. The amended bill uses the \\\"any person\\\" term in the permissive inference provision. The Committee Statement thus provides support for defendant's position that the Legislature uses the terms interchangeably.\\nThe State also relies on a News Release issued by the Office of the Governor on January 7, 1992, which states: \\\"The law aims to address a problem that has grown more severe in recent years: deaths and injuries caused by people fleeing from police.\\\" Office of the Governor, New Release, January 7,1992. The State argues \\\"[t]here is no indication that the Legislature was less concerned if the death and injury caused by people fleeing from police happened to occur to the people doing the fleeing.\\\"\\nBut a closer look at the News Release and another item in the legislative history reveals otherwise. The News Release states that \\\"[t]he legislation was supported by county prosecutors and by police organizations\\\" and that even \\\"[i]n cases where no one is killed or injured, but the risk of that happening is created\\\" the new law upgrades the eluding offense from a disorderly persons offense to a fourth-degree crime. Ibid. A news article contained in the official legislative history sheds light on the incident that inspired the bill and the kind of risks that underlie the support of the law enforcement community:\\n[The sponsors'] bills were proposed because of police chases in the late 1980's that ended with the deaths of innocent drivers who were killed by fleeing suspects. One was Desere M. LaCrosse, 19, who was driving through Toms River one night in November 1988 when her car was struck by a vehicle whose driver was fleeing from a Seaside Heights officer.\\nCounty prosecutors and police organizations supported the new law because they saw a growing willingness by criminal suspects to risk other people's lives by leading police on car chases, officials with the governor's office said.\\n[Press Statehouse Bureau, Drivers who run from, police face harsher penalties, Asbury Park Press, Jan. 8,1992 (emphasis added).]\\nContrary to the State's contention, the history accompanying this bill includes no concern for the well-being of the offender, but only for that of others. The history relates an overriding concern for the well-being of innocent third parties as the impetus and purpose of the bill. Thus, while the bill's amendment during the legislative process is significant, it is by no means conclusive of the intention proffered by the State. The legislative intent is somewhat mixed.\\nN.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b was next amended by L. 1993, c. 219, \\u00a7 5, effective August 2, 1993, which upgraded disorderly eluding to a third-degree offense and upgraded the enhanced offense from fourth-degree to second-degree. There is no change in the \\\"any person\\\" language in the statute. Thus the statutory amendments themselves add nothing to our analysis of the legislative intent. We do find significance, however, in the legislative history of this amendment.\\nThe Sponsor's Statement, the Assembly Judiciary, Law and Public Safety Committee Statement and the Senate Judiciary Committee Statement all say this:\\nUnder present law, the offense of eluding a law enforcement officer while in operation of a motor vehicle is punishable as a disorderly persons offense----If the eluding results in the creation of a risk of injury or death to another person, eluding is presently graded as a crime of the fourth degree____This bill would upgrade eluding from a disorderly persons offense to a crime of the third degree____ If the offense creates a risk of injury or death, the bill would grade eluding as a crime of the second degree....\\n[Sponsor's Statement to Senate, No. 1205 (emphasis added); Assembly Judiciary, Law and Public Safety Committee Statement to Senate, No. 1205 with committee amendments, Dated April 5, 1993 (emphasis added); Senate Judiciary Committee Statement to Senate, No. 1205, Dated: October 8,1992 (emphasis added).]\\nThese official statements indicate that the legislators amending the law deemed its present status, after the previous amendment, to require creation of the risk of death or injury to \\\"another person\\\" to sustain the enhanced offense. The Governor's bill-signing statement echoed this sentiment: \\\"This bill puts the brakes on a frightening and dangerous act. Suspects who lead police on high speed chases put everyone around them at risk of injury or death.\\\" Office of the Governor, News Pelease, August 2,1993 (emphasis added).\\nAt best, the legislative history is ambiguous. The difference between a third and second-degree crime is substantial. The two grades of crimes do not constitute a mere continuum, the former carrying a potential ordinary term prison sentence of three to five years and the latter five to ten years. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(3) and - 6a(2). A defendant convicted of third-degree eluding is not subject to a presumption of imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1e; State v. Pineda, 227 N.J.Super. 245, 250-51, 546 A.2d 578 (App.Div.1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 119 N.J. 621, 575 A.2d 855 (1990). A defendant convicted of second-degree eluding, even if a first offender, is subject to a presumption of imprisonment, which is rarely overcome. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d; State v. Jabbour, 118 N.J. 1, 570 A.2d 391 (1990). The substantial disparity in consequences emphasizes the need for clarity in differentiation of the offenses. See N.J.S.A. 2C:l-2a(4) and (5).\\nDefendant argues that interpretation of the \\\"any person\\\" term to include him is an overbroad construction which denies him of due process. Penal statutes must be strictly construed. State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14,17, 519 A.2d 322 (1987). This rule \\\"has at its heart the requirement of due process. No one shall be punished for a crime unless both the crime and its punishment are clearly set forth in positive laws.\\\" Id. at 17-18, 519 A.2d 322 (quoting In re Suspension of DeMarco, 83 N.J. 25, 36, 414 A.2d 1339 (1980)). \\\"Penal laws cannot be extended by implication or intendment. Where more than one reasonable interpretation may be made, or where the language is ambiguous \\u2014 and the ambiguity is not manufactured by the defendant \\u2014 the construction must be drawn against the state.\\\" State v. Valentin, supra, 105 N.J. at 18, 519 A.2d 322 (citing State v. Carbone, 38 N.J. 19, 23-24, 183 A.2d 1 (1962); 3 Sands Sutherland Statutory Construction \\u00b6 59.03 at 6-7.)\\nOur Supreme Court has commented on the Legislature's intended scope of protection in the eluding statute:\\nWe are satisfied that the Legislature intended to protect all persons by the eluding statute, including the police officers occupying the chasing vehicle and any person in the eluding vehicle, as well as any people who could potentially be exposed to death or injury along the chase route. In our view, the statute was designed to punish those who elude the police and actually cause injury or death, as well as those whose unlawful conduct creates a possibility of injury to others.\\n[State v. Wallace, supra 158 N.J. at 560, 730 A.2d 839 (emphasis added).]\\nThe State relies on the first quoted sentence; the defense on the second. The Court in Wallace did not have the occasion to consider the issue now before us. We read the passage in its entirety and its context. In the sentence preceding the quoted passage, the Court expressed its disagreement with the conclusion in State v. Dorko, 298 N.J.Super. 54, 688 A.2d 1109 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 150 N.J. 28, 695 A.2d 670 (1997), that the State must prove the presence of a member of the public in the vicinity of the chase who was exposed to injury. The Court thus expressed in the first quoted sentence a more expansive view, to include the pursuing police officers and occupants of the eluding vehicle. The second quoted sentence states that those subject to enhanced punishment are individuals whose unlawful conduct creates a possibility of injury to others. It is illogical that the two are one and the same. Thus the expansive view stops short of including the defendant. We therefore conclude that \\\"any person in the eluding vehicle\\\" refers to that vehicle's passengers.\\nIn its present form, in light of the legislative history and correlative Code provisions, we cannot find a legislative intent to include the offender in the protected class. In the absence of an express and definitive provision making clear that the offender is subject to enhanced punishment as a result of creating a risk of harm to him or herself, we decline to impute such a meaning. We doubt that an ordinary citizen of average intelligence would ascribe such a meaning to the statute as presently written. State v. Valentin, supra, 105 N.J. at 19, 519 A.2d 322. This is an appropriate ease in which to invoke the doctrine requiring strict construction against the State of a penal statute.\\nDefendant's conviction of second-degree eluding is vacated. Defendant's motion to withhold from the jury second-degree eluding and submit to it only third-degree eluding should have been granted. The jury's finding of defendant's guilt of third-degree eluding is not challenged and remains undisturbed. The matter is remanded for resentencing on the third-degree eluding offense.\\nReversed and remanded.\\nThe prosecutor described the area in her opening as \\\"that portion oi Carteret when you are heading north on the Turnpike you see all the oil, the big round oil tankers right in that area.\\\"\\nThe careless driving charge, also based only on excessive speed, was for defendant's driving before the initial stop.\\nVacation of the second-degree eluding conviction may result in \\\"unmerging\\\" the reckless driving conviction and imposing a separate sentence for that offense. State v. Pennington, 273 N.J.Super. 289, 295, 641 A.2d 1085 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 313, 645 A.2d 141 (1994).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/103372.json b/nj/103372.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cbf96521c9345830a06ecfec1c84777e1baa4a3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/103372.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"103372\", \"name\": \"Jane M. Wright, administratrix &c. of George M. Wright, deceased, et al., appellants, v. William L. Wright, respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wright v. Wright\", \"decision_date\": \"1893-11\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"637\", \"last_page\": \"637\", \"citations\": \"51 N.J. Eq. 637\", \"volume\": \"51\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:10:21.548441+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Jane M. Wright, administratrix &c. of George M. Wright, deceased, et al., appellants, v. William L. Wright, respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"Jane M. Wright, administratrix &c. of George M. Wright, deceased, et al., appellants, v. William L. Wright, respondent.\\nOn appeal from a decree advised by Vice-Chancellor Pitney, whose opinion is reported in Wright v. Wright, 6 Dick. Ch. Rep. 476.\\nMessrs. Grey & Grey, for the appellants.\\nMr. John W. Wescott and S. Morris Waln (of Philadelphia), for the respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"88\", \"char_count\": \"563\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nDecree affirmed, for reasons given in the court of chancery.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 The Chief-Justice, Abbett, Depue, Reed, Van Syckel, Krueger, Smith \\u2014 7.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 Dixon, Phelps \\u2014 2.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/12124174.json b/nj/12124174.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9f4e817e27027fbd4d79fb2aa9e47fe63c2d3631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/12124174.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12124174\", \"name\": \"THE STATE v. JAMES R. NUGENT ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Nugent\", \"decision_date\": \"1908-11-09\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"84\", \"last_page\": \"89\", \"citations\": \"77 N.J.L. 84\", \"volume\": \"77\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:38:58.411774+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Justices Ruud, Beegek and Vooi\\u00fctees.\", \"parties\": \"THE STATE v. JAMES R. NUGENT ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"THE STATE v. JAMES R. NUGENT ET AL.\\nArgued June 3, 1908\\nDecided November 9, 1908.\\n1. An indictment charging that defendants unlawfully combined, united, federated, conspired and bound themselves to do an unlawful act, charges a conspiracy without the use of the words \\u201cthe defendants did agree \\u2018together.\\u2019 \\u201d\\n2. Fraudulent voting at an election, whether consisting of - voting disqualified persons, repeating, or voting under the names of other voters, is a perversion or obstruction of the due administration of law, which, by the Crimes act (Pamph. L. 1808, p. 805. \\u00a7 37). as amended\\u2019by the act of 1899 (Pamph. L.. p. 214), is made the subject of a criminal conspiracy.\\n3. Aiding and abetting in the false registration of a person is a sufficient overt act in the execution of conspiracy to have such a person fraudulently vote at: the following election.\\nOn application for a writ of certiorari to bring into this court an indictment found by the Essex county grand jury against several defendants for conspiracy.\\nBefore Justices Ruud, Beegek and Vooi\\u00fctees.\\nFor the application, Samuel Kalisch.\\nFor the state, Louis flood.\", \"word_count\": \"1902\", \"char_count\": \"10968\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nReed, J.\\nThe indictment in question charges that the defendants did unlawfully and wickedly combine, unite, confederate. conspire and bind themselves by agreement to unlawfully and corruptly procure one W. B. to vote at a specified general election in the sixth election district of the second ward of the city of Newark, well knowing the said W. B. not to be a qualified voter in said election district at that election.\\nIt is insisted that regardless of other objections to the indictment, the words employed are not apt to charge a crim inal conspiracy. The alleged defect pointed out is that the words \\\"the defendants did bind themselves by an agreement\\\" docs not necessarily import that the agreement was between themselves, but leaves open the possibility that the agreement might have been between each defendant and some third person or persons.\\nThere is no doubt that the forms in indictments for conspiracy contain the charge that the defendants did agree together, or that the defendants did among themselves conspire and agree together, but it seems impossible to ascribe to the other words, \\\"combine, confederate, conspire\\\" any meaning other than that the defendants mutually engaged to accomplish the purposes charged. When it is said that A and B confederated or conspired to do an act, the words seem to have a well defined significance. The etymological, technical and popular significance of these words when predicated of iwo or more persons is that they reciprocally engage to assist in a common enterprise, and the enterprise being common, and the will of all the defendants being common, the agreement is common and between each and all of the defendants. This is the equivalent for agreeing together to perform the act.\\nBesides, the charge is couched in the language of section 37 of the Crimes act as amended by the act of 1899. Pamph. L., p. 214. This section does not merely indicate the punishment for a crime known to common law, but defines the crime itself.\\nI therefore think the statement of conspiracy from the point of view in which it is attacked is sufficient.\\nIt is again insisted that the indictment does not show that the defendants conspired to commit a crime in the county of Essex. Assuming that such a charge was essential under the statute, it nevertheless appears in the indictment. The general purpose of the conspiracy, as set out, was to procure disqualified persons to vote, and to procure qualified persons to vote in more than one election district, and to vote upon names other than their own upon a general election held in this state on a certain date, but the specific charge is that they conspired to procure a certain person to vote in a certain election district in Essex county. This fixes the place where the purpose of the conspiracy was to be executed.\\nConspirators may be indicted in the jurisdiction where the conspiracy was entered into (Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539), and this indictment charges it to have been in the county of Essex. The rule is that conspirators may be indicted either in the county in which they first entered into the unlawful combination, or in any other county in which, in pursuance of it, an overt act was performed. 1 Bish. Cr. L., \\u00a7 61.\\nBut it is said that it is not charged that the conspiracy was to commit a crime; that as the crime of conspiracy is limited by section 37 of the act concerning crimes, as that section was amended in 1899 (Pamph. L., p. 214), the only ground upon which this indictment can stand is that the purpose to be accomplished by the conspiracy is the commission of a crime, and it is insisted that while the purposes to be accomplished were crimes under section 2 of the act of 1905 (Pamph. L., p. 224), yet that section has been repealed by a later act passed in 1905 (Pamph. L., p. 386), the thirty-fifth section of which later act, it is insisted, provides for the sole punishment of acts, which under the previous acts were crimes, the punishment being a penalty to be recovered in a civil action.\\nIt is to be observed that the legislation contained in section 35 of the later act seems to be entirely aside from the purpose indicated in the title of the act. The purchase of voting machines and the regulation of the use of voting machines can hardly be said to express a purpose to legislate for the punishment of illegal voting, which punishment has always been provided for in the Crimes act, or in the act to regulate elections.\\nBut the question of repealer is unimportant. It is unimportant because the assumption that the indictment is valid only if it charges a design to commit a crime is untenable. Assuming for the purpose of defendants' argument that section 37 of the Crimes act as amended in 1899, page 214, covers the whole field of criminal conspiracy; that this section, notwithstanding State v. Norton, 3 Zab. 33, excludes any matter as the subject for a criminal conspiracy save those pointed out in the statute, yet the matters included within this statute are not confined to a combination to commit a crime. One of the purposes, a combination to effect which is a conspiracy is, in the language of this section, \\\"a design to commit an act for the perversion or obstruction of justice, or the clue administration of the laws.\\\"\\nNow the fraudulent voting at an election, whether in the shape of voting disqualified persons, repeating, or voting upon the names of other voters, is a perversion or obstruction of the due administration of law. It is as palpably so as was the tampering with ballot boxes, dealt with in the case of State v. Moschell, 24 Vroom 498; affirmed, 25 Id. 390. In that case an indictment for conspiracy was sustained upon these grounds. Therefore, it would not matter whether these acts of fraudulent voting were criminal or penal acts, or neither criminal nor penal, they were in any respect per-versive of the due administration of the law. It is true that the instrument does not charge that the defendants conspired to commit an act for the perversion or obstruction of justice, or the due administration of the law. But it does charge specific facts which bring the defendants within the ban of the statutory language, and charges those facts so as to inform them with absolute certainty of the character and nature of the specific charges, and this was all that was requisite. State v. Thatcher, 6 Vroom 445; State v. Startup, 10 Id. 423.\\nAgain, it is insisted that no overt act is properly pleaded. The overt acts pleaded are that the defendants in pursuance of their conspiracy, aided and abetted the disqualified persons, whom they had conspired to have vote, to falsely register their names, or the names of others, on a certain registry list, as persons qualified to vote.\\nIt is first said that there is no charge that such persons voted or offered to vote, and secondly said that there is a distinct statutory provision for punishing a person who shall counsel the registration of any name of any person knowing him not to be entitled to a vote, and that there is also a distinct. provision for punishing anyone who shall counsel a person to vote on election date\\nIn the first place, the act which the defendants conspired to effect need not be accomplished. If there was a design to procure a disqualified person to vote, followed by an overt act in pursuance of that design, the conspiracy was complete, although for some reason its purpose failed and the person did not actually vote.\\nSecondly, the fact that there is a provision for punishing ihe counseling to false registration, or counseling to false voting, in no way impairs lire charge of a conspiracy to procure a disqualified person to vote, and the charge of procuring such person to register, as an overt act. Indeed, it may be observed that counseling by a single person is quite distinct from the combined counseling of several persons.\\nIt is the power and consequently the danger that springs from tire union of influence of many minds and wills to bring about the result that constitutes the criminality of a conspiracy.\\nRespecting the essential act in execution of the joint design required by the statute, we think that ihe registration is such a step in the assertion of the right to vote, and in the equipment of the person asserting the right, with the privilege of voting, that where there is a design to vote fraudulently, then a fraudulent registration is an act taken in the execution of that purpose.\\nIt follows that the aiding and abetting in the false registration of W. B. was an overt act in carrying into execution the design to procure W. B. to vote at the following election.\\nIt is again objected that an election district is not a political division of the state of which the court will take judicial notice; that therefore the charge of a design to procure a person to vote in a certain numbered election district in a certain ward in a city, is insufficient for want of certainty.\\nWhether the court will take judicial notice of the location of an election district, is one of evidence and not of pleading, and we think that a description of the election district by number and ward was sufficiently certain without setting out the boundaries of the district.\\nIt is again insisted that the indictment is multifarious, in that it charges a design having a multitude of objects to be accomplished. But this objection is answered by the opinion of Chief Justice Beasley in Noyes v. State, 12 Vroom 418. The requirements of an overt act in no way modifies the principle that the confederacy is a single act, and that it may include in its purpose any number of particulars.\\nOur consideration, therefore, of these and other points urged on behalf of the application leads us to the conclusion that the application must he refused.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/12144741.json b/nj/12144741.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f73b2ffdbe97fb24498e6a0082ec098d81db3a20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/12144741.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12144741\", \"name\": \"MATILDA L. VAN NESS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF LEVI VAN NESS, DECEASED, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. NORTH JERSEY STREET RAILWAY COMPANY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Van Ness v. North Jersey Street Railway Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1909-06-14\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"551\", \"last_page\": \"556\", \"citations\": \"77 N.J.L. 551\", \"volume\": \"77\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:38:58.411774+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"For reversal\\u2014The CHANCELLOR, GARRISON, Swayze, TRENCHARD, PARKER, BergeN, Yooriiees, MlNTlTRN, Bo-gert, VredeNburgh, Yeoom, Dill, J.J. 18.\", \"parties\": \"MATILDA L. VAN NESS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF LEVI VAN NESS, DECEASED, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. NORTH JERSEY STREET RAILWAY COMPANY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR.\", \"head_matter\": \"MATILDA L. VAN NESS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF LEVI VAN NESS, DECEASED, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. NORTH JERSEY STREET RAILWAY COMPANY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR.\\nSubmitted December 7, 1908\\nDecided June 14, 1909.\\n1. Plaintiff\\u2019s intestate, while crossing a trolley track at a crosswalk on foot, was struck and killed by a trolley car. Evidence given during the course of the trial justified the inference that deceased and the motorman saw each other ; that deceased stopped before going on the track and the motorman applied the brake and reduced the speed of the car, and then, observing that deceased had halted, released the brake and applied the power just as deceased, who had observed the reduced speed of the car, again started to cross. Held, following Van Gott v. JSforth Jersey St. Ry. Co., 43 Vroom 229, that the questions of negligence of the motorman and contributory negligence of deceased were both properly submitted to the jury.\\n2. Error in refusing to nonsuit at the close of plaintiff\\u2019s case for lack of proof is rendered harmless when such proofs are after-wards supplied during the trial.\\nOn error to the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 46 Vroom 273.\\nFor the plaintiff in error, Edward Kenny.\\nFor the defendant in error, Leonard J. Tynan.\", \"word_count\": \"1862\", \"char_count\": \"10207\", \"text\": \"The opinion of.the court was delivered by\\nPARKER, J.\\nIf it were conclusively shown that the accident that caused the death of plaintiff's intestate took place in the manner and under the circumstances set forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court, we should in all probability concur in the finding of that court.\\nA careful examination of the evidence, however, satisfies us that the Supreme Court erred in holding that the plaintiff's presentation of the case was not helped by any evidence given for the defendant.\\nThe plaintiff's evidence indicated that the deceased, while^ attempting to cross the street on a crosswalk, was prevented from doing so by a car going northwardly on the nearer track and had to wait until it had passed, and without paying any attention to a southbound car on the further track, or being unaware of its approach, stepped across the nearer track and directly in front of the southbound car. This state of facts would probably bring the case within the lines of Eagen v. Jersey City, Hoboken and Paterson Street Railway Co., 45 Vroom 699; Shuler v. North Jersey Street Railway Co., 46 Id. 824, and Hageman v. North Jersey Street Railway Co., 45 Id. 279, cited in the opinion below, and since affirmed in this court, 46 Id. 939.\\nEven on the plaintiff's case, however, we think the Supreme Court assumed one fact as conclusively shown as to which there was at least a substantial dispute. The opinion stated that the accident occurred about seven-thirty p. m., when it was yet quite light. One witness, Carnelli, testified for plaintiff that it was between eight and half-past eight. Winant, a cabman, who saw the man being dragged under the car, testified that he was on his way to the Central railroad station just below to answer a call for eight-thirty, and, as he did not have much time, had sent his partner ahead to get the call while he took the blanket off his horse. If, as the jury might well have found in view of this evidence, the hour was nearly eight-thirty p. m., it is plain that it could not have been so light as was assumed by the court below, and if, by reason of the dusk, the car was not so plainly visible, it may have been a jury question as to whether the deceased saw it or ought to have seen it in season to avoid the accident.\\nBut it is unnecessary to dwell on this aspect of the case, because, in our judgment, the evidence for the defendant cured the error, if there was error, in the trial court's refusal to nonsuit, and justified a submission of the case to the jury. On that evidence there were two theories open to the jury\\u2014 one, that the deceased waited until the northbound car passed him, and then undertook to cross the track when the southbound car was about fifty feet away, going about six miles an hour. This was the testimony of the witness Niedemeier and of the witness Tracy, except as to the distance of the car, to which Tracy did not testify. The other theory is that arising from the motorman's testimony, that the northbound car had not passed at all before the accident, but that the car which struck deceased was in plain sight; that deceased evidently saw it while standing on the northbound track, and, while the northbound car was also approaching him, undertook to exercise his judgment as to crossing in front of the southbound car. It may be that the motorman was right as to the northbound car; it may be that he confused it with another car that followed, for cars are very frequent at that point; but all the defendant's testimony points to the inference that Van Ness did see the car that struck him; that he halted as if to let it go by and at about the same instant the motorman applied his brake, and then seeing Van Ness, standing, released it and put on his power again just as deceased, apparently having observed the slowing of the car, started again to cross in front of it and was caught because the car took on increased speed instead of continuing to slow up. Samuel Kalisch, who was inside the car, testified to a burst of speed; the conductor said the car slackened, and he thought a wagon was in the way, and looked out for one, then heard the brake ratchet, and noticed a little burst of speed and then the car came to a stop. The motorman and Tracy both testified on direct examination that deceased stopped on the northbound track and the car slowed up, and then the car started ahead again before deceased attempted to cross. Examined by the court, the motorman testified further as follows :\\n\\\"Q. You say that this man that was crossing the street stopped and looked at you?\\n\\\"A. Yes, sir.\\n\\\"Q. Where was he when he stopped and looked at you?\\n\\\"A. He was on the rail.\\n\\\"Q. On what rail ?\\n\\\"A. I was on two over here and he was on this third one [indicating].\\n\\\"Q. He was on the rail of the northbound track that was nearest to your track ?\\n\\\"A. Nearest to my car; yes, sir.\\n\\\"Q. And then what did he or you do next?\\n\\\"A. What did he do next after he stood?\\n\\\"Q. Or what did you do\\u2014what next happened ?\\n\\\"A. When I seen him stand, then I started\\u2014I was winding the brake when he was crossing and I saw he was standing, and I thought it would be all right.\\n\\\"Q. When you saw him stand what did you do ?\\n\\\"A. Then I started to feed the ear up again; I thought he would stand there.\\n\\\"Q. You mean you gave it more speed ?\\n\\\"A. More power; I had shut off entirely at that time, and when I seen him standing I fed the car up.\\n\\\"Q. As you gave the car more speed and went on, what did he do ?\\n\\\"A. He stepped right in front of me; lie made about two or three steps, right in the middle.\\n\\\"Q. And where did he get to?\\n\\\"A. He got right in the middle of the car, right in the middle of the fender.\\\"\\nTracy also modified his testimony on cross-examination.\\n\\\"Q. You saw him stop for one car to pass?\\n\\\"A. Yes, sir.\\n\\\"Q. And then what else?\\n\\\"A. Well, he kind of stopped, and then the motorman slacked up, you know, and he started over in front of the car.\\n\\\"Q. As he was coming over the car that hit him stopped, did it ?\\n\\\"A. It didn't exactly stop; it slacked up.\\n\\\"Q. Slacked up ?\\n\\\"A. Yes, sir.\\n\\\"Q. Slacked up right there, and then the man went on?\\n\\\"A. Yes, sir.\\n\\\"Q. And then the car hit him?\\n\\\"A. Yes, sir.\\\"\\nFrom this testimony it is a fair inference that deceased, led by the action of the motorman in slackening speed, to believe that he was to be allowed to cross, attempted to do so before speed was again put on. It was for the jury to say which version they believed. Hayward v. North Jersey Street Railway Co., 45 Vroom 678. But even if deceased did not start until just after the power was applied, the court would not be justified in nonsuiting for contributory negligence. We are unable to distinguish the case in this aspect, either in principle or in material facts, from Van Cott v. North Jersey Street Railway Co., 43 Id. 229, decided by this court, in which it appeared that plaintiff stopped at the sounding of the bell, the car slackened and then increased its speed, and plaintiff then started forward again. Plaintiff was a minor, but this fact is not adverted to in the opinion as bearing on the question of contributory negligence. A similar state of facts, except that plaintiff was driving a horse and wagon, was considered in Weinberger v. North Jersey Street Railway Co., 44 Id. 694, also decided in this court in which the Van Cott case was cited and approved.\\nWe think the evidence above quoted justified the jury in drawing inferences similar to those stated in the opinion in the Van Cott case, pages 230, 231, and that the negligence of the motorman and of the deceased were both questions for the jury. In that case, as in this, the evidence to support the witnesses came into the case after a motion to nonsuit, and the rule there applied is applicable here. Bostwick v. Willett, 43 Vroom 21.\\nThe fact, if it was a fact, that the northbound car had not passed at the time of the accident, would make no difference in this result. If it was approaching, it was still too far away to require any. inference of negligence in law to be drawn from the act of deceased in standing on the track in front of it, for according to the motorman's testimony the fenders of the two cars were together when he stopped, and all the proof showed that the car had gone from the First Church crossing, where the accident occurred, to a point in front of a restaurant, some seventy-five to one hundred feet away, before stop ping, and at the time of the accident the northbound car must have been much further away.\\nThe case was submitted to the jury under general instructions appropriate to this state of facts. This submission, under the circumstances, was proper. The judgment of the Supreme Court reversing that of the Circuit Court will be reversed, and the judgment of the Circuit Court affirmed.\\nFor affirmance\\u2014None.\\nFor reversal\\u2014The CHANCELLOR, GARRISON, Swayze, TRENCHARD, PARKER, BergeN, Yooriiees, MlNTlTRN, Bo-gert, VredeNburgh, Yeoom, Dill, J.J. 18.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/12460665.json b/nj/12460665.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..85ec32d0e3297738f9074be5b688c0ca727529a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/12460665.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12460665\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JOSE CARRANZA, A/K/A JOSE LACHIRA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Carranza\", \"decision_date\": \"2017-10-16\", \"docket_number\": \"079348\", \"first_page\": \"208\", \"last_page\": \"208\", \"citations\": \"231 N.J. 208\", \"volume\": \"231\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:45:40.615522+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JOSE CARRANZA, A/K/A JOSE LACHIRA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.\", \"head_matter\": \"174 A.3d 510\\nSTATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JOSE CARRANZA, A/K/A JOSE LACHIRA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.\\nC-190 September Term 2017\\n079348\\nOctober 16, 2017\", \"word_count\": \"65\", \"char_count\": \"443\", \"text\": \"ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION\\nTo the Appellate Division, Superior Court:\\nA petition for certification of the judgment in [ A-XXXXXX-XX ] having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having considered the same;\\nIt is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/12460701.json b/nj/12460701.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4b397e3fb9bc54b2ab02b71a677ab918e31d78cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/12460701.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12460701\", \"name\": \"ROBERT D. FERGUSON, KANSA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, LTD., BANKRUPTCY ESTATE, MILO FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, IMIPOLEX LLC, AND OMPHALOS, LLC, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER, AND EXECUTIVE RISK SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Ferguson v. Travelers Indemnity Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"2017-10-16\", \"docket_number\": \"079243\", \"first_page\": \"229\", \"last_page\": \"229\", \"citations\": \"231 N.J. 229\", \"volume\": \"231\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:45:40.615522+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"ROBERT D. FERGUSON, KANSA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, LTD., BANKRUPTCY ESTATE, MILO FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, IMIPOLEX LLC, AND OMPHALOS, LLC, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER, AND EXECUTIVE RISK SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"174 A.3d 523\\nROBERT D. FERGUSON, KANSA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, LTD., BANKRUPTCY ESTATE, MILO FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, IMIPOLEX LLC, AND OMPHALOS, LLC, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER, AND EXECUTIVE RISK SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT.\\nC-135 September Term 2017\\n079243\\nOctober 16, 2017\", \"word_count\": \"86\", \"char_count\": \"633\", \"text\": \"ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION\\nTo the Appellate Division, Superior Court:\\nA petition for certification of the judgment in [ A-XXXXXX-XX ] having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having considered the same;\\nIt is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied, with costs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/12511236.json b/nj/12511236.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..86a1c5f380a73c1cb0622bc51a4edcd408712aa1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/12511236.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12511236\", \"name\": \"STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Arthur F. WILDGOOSE, Defendant-Petitioner.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Wildgoose\", \"decision_date\": \"2019-07-11\", \"docket_number\": \"C-1061 September Term 2018; 082429\", \"first_page\": \"166\", \"last_page\": \"166\", \"citations\": \"213 A.3d 166\", \"volume\": \"213\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-27T20:58:09.224733+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"Fastcase\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent,\\nv.\\nArthur F. WILDGOOSE, Defendant-Petitioner.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent,\\nv.\\nArthur F. WILDGOOSE, Defendant-Petitioner.\\nC-1061 September Term 2018\\n082429\\nSupreme Court of New Jersey.\\nJULY 11, 2019\\nORDER\", \"word_count\": \"56\", \"char_count\": \"372\", \"text\": \"A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002303-17 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having considered the same;\\nIt is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1310855.json b/nj/1310855.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8df648821d21e3f6ef53f22bae3a581e78964123
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1310855.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1310855\", \"name\": \"ELLIOTT ROBBINS AND JERSEY CITY ASSOCIATION FOR THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ET ALS., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Robbins v. City of Jersey\", \"decision_date\": \"1957-01-21\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"229\", \"last_page\": \"243\", \"citations\": \"23 N.J. 229\", \"volume\": \"23\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:01:45.126834+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"For affirmance \\u2014 Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Heher, Oliphant, Wachenfeld, Burling, Jacobs and Weintraub \\u2014 7.\", \"parties\": \"ELLIOTT ROBBINS AND JERSEY CITY ASSOCIATION FOR THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ET ALS., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"ELLIOTT ROBBINS AND JERSEY CITY ASSOCIATION FOR THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ET ALS., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.\\nArgued December 3, 10, 1956\\nDecided January 21, 1957.\\nMr. Aaron Marder argued the cause for the plaintiffs-appellants.\\nMr. James F. X. O\\u2019Brien argued the cause for the defendant-respondent Seton Hall College of Medicine and Dentistry (Messrs. James F. X. O\\u2019Brien and James P. Mylod, attorneys).\\nMessrs. McCarter, English & Studer, attorneys for defendant-respondent George A. Fuller Co. (Mr. Augustus C. Studer, Jr., of counsel).\\nMr. James A. Tumulty, Jr., Corporation Counsel of the City of Jersey City, attorney for defendant-respondent City of Jersey City (Mr. Francis X. Hayes, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel).\\nMr. Frederick J. Gassert, Hudson County Counsel, attorney for defendant-respondent County of Hudson (Mr. Lewis B. Eastmead, Assistant County Counsel, of counsel).\", \"word_count\": \"4029\", \"char_count\": \"24471\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nBurling, J.\\nThe instant complaint in lieu of prerogative writ sought to attack the validity of certain leases negotiated between defendants. City of Jersey City and Seton Hall College of Medicine and Dentistry, a body corporate of this State and an educational institution. Following entry of summary judgment for the defendants the plaintiffs pursued an appeal in the Superior Court, Appellate Division, and we certified the cause prior to a review below.\\nJersey City owns and operates a large Medical Center. It is a vast physical plant consisting of ten main buildings. The financial burden attending the operation of the center has not been a light one. Enormous \\\"yearly deficits\\\" have been the rule without exception.\\nEarly in 1954 the city officials caused a study to be made, the end in view being to economize the operation through consolidation of services into compact building units. The facilities of the Center were in excess of the public requirements. Inefficiency resulted by spreading the operation throughout the numerous buildings rather than concentrating the use to an area proportionate to the need. Heating and maintenance of an entire building proved unwarranted where only half the building was in use.\\nBy effecting a consolidation of the operation it was thought that the large Clinic building might be vacated and leased. The city was interested in renting this 16 story structure to a public or private interest which would use the facility as a medical and dental school. There had been previous attempts to lease a part of the center to the Federal and State Governments for this purpose. With this project in mind the city, through public advertisement, invited any duly accredited college or university to submit proposals for the use of the Clinic building as a medical and dental school. A prospectus was compiled and distributed to interested parties.\\nThere were responses to the invitation. Among them was that of Seton Hall College of Medicine and Dentistry. Negotiations were entered into between this institution and the city which resulted in the entire Clinic building being leased to the college for a term of 50 years at an annual rental of $275,000.\\nThe date of the Clinic building lease was December 10, 1954. On the following December 16 a complaint in lieu of prerogative writ was filed by one John Gimenez, a taxpayer of Jersey City, attacking the validity of the lease. Gimenez was the nominee of a group called the \\\"Jersey City Fact Finding Committee\\\" which sponsored and paid for the suit.\\nThe complaint in the Gimenez suit sought to have the lease voided on several grounds: absence of competitive bidding, inadequate consideration, and a charge that the Clinic building was presently needed for a public use. The suit ended in a summary judgment for the city and college and no appeal was taken. A further charge that the city was illegally delegating the management and operation of the Medical Center to a sectarian institution (the college being associated with the Roman Catholic Church) was, in effect, dismissed without prejudice for the reason that the city and the college had not entered a management agreement although the lease contemplated a working accord for the management of or the rendition of professional services to the Center.\\nFollowing the termination of the Gimenez action the city sought to interest the college in surrendering three floors of the Clinic building and to accept in lieu thereof an equal amount of space in the nearby Isolation building which at the time was completely vacant. This plan, the record advises, would save the city an estimated expenditure of some $300,000 in transferring the out-patient clinics from the Clinic building to other buildings and would also serve to benefit both patients and students alike if the clinics were operated in the same building as the medical school. It was proposed that the Isolation building be used as the dental school and the city would reserve space there for a dental clinic. This suggestion was the subject of negotiation between the respective parties, the college at first rejecting the overture. Finally, on November 28, 1955, the change in plan was effected by a lease of a portion of the Isolation building to the college and a release by the latter of the first three floors of the Clinic building.\\nThe college authorities geared their plans to the fall of 1956 as the opening date for classes. Renovations were commenced in December 1955, and by February 1956 the cost of alterations had reached $187,000. The architectural firm submitted a bill on account for $50,000. The college obligated itself for laboratory equipment in a sum over $200,000, and clerical and administrative expense approximated $50,000.\\nThe instant complaint was filed on February 8, 1956, sponsored by the same interests who underwrote the Gimenez suit but now incorporated as the Jersey City Association for the Separation of Church and State. The present attack presents the same contentions raised in the Gimenez suit but now has two targets \\u2014 the Clinic building lease and the Isolation building lease. Defendants did not file an answer but moved for summary judgment with supporting affidavits. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court gave judgment to defendants, generally upon the ground that the Gimenez suit was res judicata as to the lease of the Clinic building and that the same decision had a stare decisis effect upon the validity of the Isolation building lease. The question of whether the city was illegally delegating management control of the medical center to a sectarian institution, which is plaintiffs' principal cause of concern, was again thought to be premature inasmuch as no management agreement had yet been resolved.\\nOn this appeal plaintiffs contend the leases to be void (1) for lack of advertising and competitive bidding; (2) because the declaration by resolution that the buildings are not needed for a public use is untrue; (3) because the consideration received for the leases was inadequate, thereby constituting a municipal gift in violation of N. J. Const. 1947, Art. VIII, Sec. III, pars. 2 and 3. The charge that the city is illegally delegating the management of the Medical Center is renewed, and the constitutionality of L. 1955, c. 22 (N. J. S. A. 30:9-23.6 et seq.), providing for various types of hospital affiliation agreements between governmental bodies and colleges of medicine and dentistry, is attacked. Defendants' position is simply to raise a bar to these charges through invocation of res judicata, estoppel and laches, and the 30 day rule of the in-lieu procedure. They insist the issue of a management contract is still premature.\\nIt is necessary to consider three basic questions in the disposition of this appeal:\\n1\\u2014 Was advertising and competitive bidding required in the execution of these leases?\\n2\\u2014 Is there a procedural bar which would foreclose consideration of questions going to the adequacy of the monetary consideration and the alleged public need for retaining these buildings for municipal hospital services? And, if not, do the supporting affidavits on the motions for summary judgment present a genuine issue of fact on these matters?\\n3\\u2014 Are the issues surrounding a management agreement and the constitutionality of L. 1955, c. 22 premature?\\n(Initially it may be noted that the defense of res judicata pertains only to the lease of the Clinic building by virtue of the former Gimenez suit. Defendants concede there is no res judicata effect attributable to the lease of the Isolation building. Both leases are inseparably intertwined from a factual aspect. Because the case is resolved upon other grounds in favor of the defendants it is not necessary or essential to consider the sufficiency of this defense.)\\nQuestion 1.\\nJersey City contends the instant leases were executed under the authority of B. S. 40:176-11 which empowers \\\"first class cities\\\" to lease any land or building not needed for public use for a term not exceeding 50 years. The statute in terms does not require advertisement and competitive bidding. Plaintiffs argue that B. 8. 40:60-26 and 42, originating in the Home Rule Act, L. 1917, c. 152, supply the necessary procedural steps which require public competition. They strongly rely upon our decision in Asbury Park Press v. City of Asbury Park, 19 N. J. 183 (1955).\\nAsbury Park Press is not controlling. There we were dealing with a particular type of municipal property, i. e., public parks, recreation grounds or place of public resort which had received special statutory treatment. R. S. 40:61-36 (L. 1937, c. 172); R. S. 40:61-l(y) and (li) (L. 1917, c. 152, Art. XXXVI, sec. 13, as am. L. 1933, c. 355, sec. 1). The holding was that these aforementioned enactments (which required advertisement and competitive bidding) were to be read in pari materia with R. S. 40 \\u00a1179-116 which did not in terms require that procedure.\\nThe question remains, however,- whether plaintiffs are correct in stating that R. S. 40 :60-26 and 42 require adherence to a bidding procedure and if so, the effect of these statutes upon the first-class city provision, R. S. 40 :176-11.\\nIn Waring Realty Co. v. Murphy, 125 N. J. L. 360 (Sup. Ct. 1940) the former Supreme Court recognized that R. S. 40:176-11 fixed no particular form for the exercise of the leasing power. See also Child v. Board of Comm'rs of City of Newark, 8 N. J. Misc. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1930). R. S. 40:60-42, originating in the Home Rule Act of 1917, empowers every municipality to lease unneeded property to one who will pay the \\\"highest rent therefor,\\\" but the decision in Asbury Park Press, supra, 19 N. J., at page 192, noted that bidding was not expressly required under that statute. R. S. 40:60-26, as am. L. 1948, c. 245, also originat ing in the Home Rule Act, concerns the sale of lands or buildings not needed for public use \\\"or any right or interest therein.\\\" The latter statute provides several methods of negotiating disposition of public property, all geared to manifest the best interest of the municipality. Two methods require advance advertising.\\nThe crucial inquiry is whether the lawmakers intended a sale of \\\"any right or interest therein\\\" (B. S. 40:60-26) to encompass a lease of public property. It may be fairly argued that B. S. 40:60-42 as well as B. S. 40:176-11 merely define a basic power, and that B. 8. 40:60-26 denominates the procedure to be followed. This interpretive possibility, used in a different statutory context, was a major factor in Asbury Park Press, supra, 19 N. at page 197. Plaintiffs have not traced their argument to this point of inquiry and we feel it unnecessary to decide the matter at this time.\\nWe discern from the record that the desire of Jersey City to effect a lease of a portion of the Medical Center to an educational institution which would bring Hew Jersey its first medical school was well known. Proposals were invited through advertisement in many newspapers. Extensive renovations were undertaken following the disposition of the Gimenez suit and, as previously noted, Seton Hall College had invested a large sum of money in this undertaking by the time the present plaintiffs saw fit to challenge the legality of the program. Here the power of lease was within Jersey City's essential jurisdiction by virtue of statute, B. 8. 40:176-11. Any arguable defect in the procedure of negotiation, if indeed advertising and competitive bidding were required, is foreclosed from attack by the plaintiffs for their failure to promptly present their case which would have served as a warning signal to the college in the huge expenditure involved in a project of such magnitude. See Summer Cottager's Ass'n of Cape May v. City of Cape May, 19 N. J. 493 (1955). Further, the complaint was filed more than 60 days following the accrual of the right which stemmed from the execution of the Isolation building lease. Plaintiffs do not contend that they were uninformed of this event. R. R. 4:88-15 (a) required action within 30 days of the accrual of the right and the defendants are entitled to the protection of the rule.\\nQuestion 2.\\nPlaintiffs contend that the 30-day limitation of R. R. 4:88-15 (a) does not preclude a meritorious consideration of the alleged inadequacy of the yearly rental under the leases because if the charge is sustained a constitutional prohibition against gifts by municipalities is violated. N. J. Const. 1947, Art. VIII, Sec. III, pars. 2 and 3; see Jamouneau v. Local Government Board, 6 N. J. 281 (1951). Similarly, it is said that because the two buildings were in fact needed for a public use the leases are completely void as ultra vires the municipal power.\\nWe have recognized that the time limitations on the in-lieu procedure may not apply where substantial constitutional questions are raised. Holloway v. Pennsauken Township, 12 N. J. 371 (1953); McKenna v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 19 N. J. 270 (1955). The doctrine of estoppel may be applicable, however, In re Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 13 N. J. 385 (1953). An inquiry of considerable importance is the measure and nature of the actor's reliance which has been placed upon the non-action of the party who brings the belated challenge; and so far as a municipal body is concerned it is significant for purposes of estoppel to examine the basic jurisdiction relied upon. Compare V. F. Zahodiakin Engineering Corp. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of City of Summit, 8 N. J. 386 (1952), with Summer Cottagers' Ass'n of Cape May v. City of Cape May, supra. But see Marini v. Borough of Wanaque, 37 N. J. Super. 32, 40-41 (App. Div. 1955). The general proposition that exceptions to the time limitations imposed upon the in-lieu procedure should be but exceptionally condoned, and only in the most persuasive circumstances, remains the same. Consider B. B. 1:27B(d). See the provocative editorial note at 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 673 (1956). The attainment of substantial justice in particular cases should not be interpreted as dilution of the principle. For example, the fact that plaintiffs have also sought injunctive relief in the instant matter does not persuade us that the 30-day limitation should not be applicable. Compare Thornton v. Village of Ridgewood, 17 N. J. 499, 508-510 (1955).\\nInvocation of time limitations in the instant case will not preclude substantial justice, for any supposed merit to the plaintiffs' cause of action was stripped of significance when their position was revealed on the cross motions for summary judgment.\\nThe two allegations raised in the complaint which might have been the focal point fox a genuine factual dispute were the charges of inadequate consideration and untruth in the conclusion of the city's governing body that the buildings were not needed for a public use. Defendants filed no answer but gave notice of motion for summary judgment with supporting affidavits.\\nThese moving papers pointed out that the operation of the Medical Center resulted in enormous yearly deficits. In 1954, when the Clinic building was leased, the city was using but eight floors of this 16-story structure. The Isolation building was completely vacant when it was declared unneeded for public use. The record states that the subsequent reshuffling of lease accommodations whereby the city retained three floors of the Clinic building to house the outpatient clinics obviated an expenditure of $300,000 in moving and installation costs. From this it can hardly be concluded that the Clinic building was in fact essential to the public use. For are we free to state unequivocally that a consideration of $275,000 annual rental is per se inadequate. It is a return which the city would not otherwise have realized through a continued municipal operation.\\nPlaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The only moving paper having any relevance here is that of George G. Hollingshead, the president of the Jersey City Association for the Separation of Church and State. Based upon \\\"information and belief\\\" the affidavit alleges that the Clinic building has a value of $3,000,000 and that the city, after performing certain obligatory services under the lease, will net no more than $125,000 annually; that the dental clinic in the Medical Center has been closed and the psychiatric facilities have been removed to another location. The source of the information is not revealed and we have no other alternative but to place it in the category of hearsay, and thus it is insufficient to oppose defendants' motion for summary judgment. R. R. 4:58-6; see Ash v. Frazee, 37 N. J. Super. 542, 547-548 (App. Div. 1955).\\nThe Hollingshead affidavit also alleges that the matters set forth therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the officials of Jersey City and the college. In certain situations there may be reason to be solicitous of this factor. See, e. g., Monmouth Lumber Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 21 N. J. 439 (1956). This is not always the case. R. R. 4:58-7 provides:\\n\\\"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may deny the motion or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had, or may make such other order as is just.\\\"\\nDenial of a motion for summary judgment is not required where something more than hearsay opposition might well have been developed through additional affidavits or the taking of depositions, thereby engendering a genuine factual dispute. See Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N. J. 67, 76 (1954).\\nThe summary judgment procedure, R. R. 4:58, brings two opposing philosophies of the judicial process into focus. On the one hand is the desire to afford every litigant who has a bona fide cause of action or defense the opportunity to fully expose his case. In support of this philosophy our appellate courts have taken the position that summary judgments are to be cautiously granted, Devlin v. Surgent, 18 N. J. 148, 154 (1955), and the party opposing the motion indulgently treated by resolving all doubts in favor of trial, West Side Trust Co. v. Gascoigne, 39 N. J. Super. 467, 470 (App. Div. 1956).\\nOil the other hand, protection is to be afforded against groundless claims and frivolous defenses, not only to save antagonists the expense of protracted litigation but also to reserve judicial manpower and facilities to cases which meritoriously command attention. See, generally, Asbill and Snell, \\\"Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules\\u2014 When an Issue of Fact is Presented,\\\" 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1143, 1143 to 1145 (1953).\\nIt is often difficult to foster the necessary balance between these opposing principles. Where, however, a prima facie right to a summary judgment exists, neither principle is sacrificed in requiring the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to demonstrate by competent evidential material that a genuine issue of fact exists, or, where this is impossible within the time allowed, to seek a continuance of the motion for the purpose of submitting additional affidavits or depositions. Accord, Taub v. Taub, 9 N. J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 1950); Fvans v. Rohrbach, 35 N. J. Super. 260, 268-269 (App. Div. 1955); certification denied Fvans v. Matthews, 19 N. J. 362 (1955); VanDyke v. Carol Building Co., 36 N. J. Super. 281, 287-288 (App. Div. 1955). It should be a rare case where nothing whatsoever is submitted to contest the motion. See Asbill and Snell, supra, 51 Mich. L. Rev., at 1165-1166.\\nHere the Hollingshead affidavit did not measure up to the evidential standard required by R. R. 4:58-6 and plaintiffs did not request a continuance for the purpose of substantiating their charge of inadequate consideration or that the leased property was needed for a public use. The appropriate time to make a request for continuance is at the very outset of the hearing on the motion by an unequivocal statement to that effect. Here, however, plaintiffs' counsel informed the trial court that he was prepared to argue the summary judgment issue at any time, and the theory of the presentation was that defendants' motion should be denied and plaintiffs' motion granted. At one stage of the argument it was suggested that plaintiffs had not had time to substantiate their allegations by taking depositions of the city and college officials, but little countenance can be given to this utterance, coming as it did after counsel had previously and categorically advised the conrt that deposition of the motions was in order.\\nWe conclude that entry of summary judgment on defendants' motion therefor- was properly granted, not only in view of procedural limitations but also because no genuine factual dispute existed upon the matter which might arguably have overcome the 30-day rule.\\nQuestion 3.\\nThe main thrust of plaintiffs' case and apparently their chief concern is the belief that certain religious dogmas of the Eoman Catholic Church will be manifested in the operation of the city's clinics should management of these public facilities be delegated to the college. This anxiety has led to the allegation that the city is illegally delegating the management and operation of the Medical Center to the college.\\nClearly the lease contemplates a working accord between the city and the college in the management of or the rendition of medical services to the Medical Center. Eor example, paragraph 20 of the Clinic building lease provides:\\n\\\"20. It is further understood and agreed that if, at any time after the commencement date of this lease, there should fail to exist an agreement between City and College, providing for the management by College of the Jersey City Medical Center, or providing for professional services to be rendered by College to the Jersey City Medical Center, then and in that event College shall have the option to terminate this lease by giving ninety (90) days' notice in writing to City of its intention to so terminate for the aforesaid reason, and if within said 90 day period City and College shall not enter into an agreement as aforesaid, satisfactory to both City and College, then on the tenth day following said 90-day period this lease and the term thereof shall expire and come to an end.\\\"\\nThe moving papers of defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment and the representation of counsel established that no management agreement has been entered. The purported issue is thus premature and there is no occasion to presently consider the matter. Eor the same reason it is unnecessary to presently assay the constitutional validity of L. 1955, c. 22 (N. J. S. A. 30:9-23.6) which provides for various types of hospital affiliation agreements between governmental bodies and schools of medicine and dentistry. It is sufficient to state that if such an agreement is reached it will not be beyond the pale of judicial review as to any constitutional questions which plaintiffs may conceive to be present. The defendants have been fully aware of the plaintiffs' concern on this point ever since the Gimenez suit.\\nThe judgment will be affirmed for the reasons stated in this opinion.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Heher, Oliphant, Wachenfeld, Burling, Jacobs and Weintraub \\u2014 7.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 Hone.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1310931.json b/nj/1310931.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ae7d780f39d8920d4b5797ee06c2ec9ad09b49be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1310931.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1310931\", \"name\": \"EVA HARTMAN, ADMINISTRATRIX, ETC., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENT, v. CITY OF BRIGANTINE AND COUNTY OF ATLANTIC, DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hartman v. City of Brigantine\", \"decision_date\": \"1956-12-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"59\", \"last_page\": \"59\", \"citations\": \"23 N.J. 59\", \"volume\": \"23\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:01:45.126834+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"EVA HARTMAN, ADMINISTRATRIX, ETC., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENT, v. CITY OF BRIGANTINE AND COUNTY OF ATLANTIC, DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS.\", \"head_matter\": \"EVA HARTMAN, ADMINISTRATRIX, ETC., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENT, v. CITY OF BRIGANTINE AND COUNTY OF ATLANTIC, DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS.\\nDecember 10, 1956.\\nSee same ease below: 42 N. J. Super. 247.\\nMessrs. Lloyd, Horn, Megargee & Steedle and Mr. Harry Miller for the petitioners.\\nMr. Josiah E. DuBois, Jr., and Mr. Madison S. DuBois for the respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"52\", \"char_count\": \"353\", \"text\": \"Granted.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1315419.json b/nj/1315419.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..02dd43bb2fc120a45ed485233790378aa7f6d30e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1315419.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1315419\", \"name\": \"ALENE S. AMMOND v. MICHAEL KEATING\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Ammond v. Keating\", \"decision_date\": \"1977-05-17\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"285\", \"last_page\": \"285\", \"citations\": \"74 N.J. 285\", \"volume\": \"74\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:20:57.493825+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"ALENE S. AMMOND v. MICHAEL KEATING.\", \"head_matter\": \"ALENE S. AMMOND v. MICHAEL KEATING.\\nMay 17, 1977.\", \"word_count\": \"19\", \"char_count\": \"110\", \"text\": \"Petition for certification denied. (See 150 N. J. Super. 5)\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1315865.json b/nj/1315865.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1c803b1b287ed0653884955789fb77db42106f41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1315865.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1315865\", \"name\": \"MARK T. ENSSLIN, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Ensslin v. Board of Trustees\", \"decision_date\": \"1998-05-11\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"333\", \"last_page\": \"339\", \"citations\": \"311 N.J. Super. 333\", \"volume\": \"311\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:29:29.853816+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"MARK T. ENSSLIN, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN\\u2019S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"709 A.2d 1344\\nMARK T. ENSSLIN, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN\\u2019S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued November 6, 1997\\nDecided May 11, 1998.\\nBefore Judges MUIR, Jr., KESTIN and CUFF.\\nJoseph Licata, argued the cause for appellant (Loccke & Correia, attorneys; Mr. Licata, of counsel and on the brief).\\nSusanne Culliton, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter Vemiero, Attorney General, attorney; Mary C. Jacobson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Culliton, on the brief).\", \"word_count\": \"1682\", \"char_count\": \"10871\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nKESTIN, J.A.D.\\nPetitioner appeals from a final decision of the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS) denying his application for an ordinary disability retirement. We reverse.\\nBackground facts relating to the matter are recited at length in a prior opinion, Ensslin v. Township of North Bergen, 275 N.J.Super. 352, 646 A.2d 452 (App.Div.1994) (Ensslin I). In that consolidated appeal, we affirmed the decision of the Merit System Board upholding petitioner's termination from service as a police officer, as modified to reflect a resignation in good standing. We also affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's Law Division action alleging handicap discrimination in violation of the Law Against Discrimination (LAD). The Supreme Court denied certification. 142 N.J. 446, 663 A.2d 1354 (1995).\\nOn February 17, 1995, shortly after certification was denied, petitioner filed his application for an ordinary disability retirement. On May 17, the Board rejected the application on the ground that petitioner was ineligible because he was not \\\"a member in service.\\\" The Board secretary advised petitioner that he was entitled to request formal review of the determination. On June 28,1995, petitioner sought formal reconsideration. The final decision denying the application followed on August 20, 1996.\\nThe material facts are undisputed. Petitioner's last pension contribution as a member of PFRS was July 31,1988, the effective date of his termination as a North Bergen police officer. More than four years later, on September 22, 1992, while petitioner's suits were still pending before the Merit System Board and the Law Division, the Division of Pensions and Benefits sent petitioner a letter advising that his membership account would expire if he did not return to public service by November 22,1992. The letter was sent to an old address and never reached petitioner.\\nThe Board denied petitioner's application for an ordinary disability retirement on the ground it was untimely. That determination was expressed as based on the interplay of two statutes which the Board characterized as clear and unambiguous. N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3) provides that membership in PFRS ceases, inter alia, \\\"if more than 2 years have elapsed from the date of [the member's] last contributions to the system[.]\\\" N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1) provides that an application for an ordinary disability retirement is to be made \\\"by a member in service\\\" or on his behalf. The Board held, as a matter of law, that petitioner did not meet these statutory requirements, and ruled that it was \\\"without discretion or authority to deviate from the statutory mandate.\\\"\\nThe gravamen of petitioner's joined claims in his prior actions was \\\"that his disability, although preventing him from performing all of the functions of a police sergeant, did not prevent him from performing the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation.\\\" Ensslin I, supra, 275 N.J.Super. at 359, 646 A.2d 452. On that basis, he resisted North Bergen's effort to terminate his employment, and contended that, under the LAD and on other grounds, he was entitled to such reasonable accommodation as would enable him to continue functioning as a police officer with the rank of sergeant.\\nPetitioner's fundamental contention in asserting his claims before the Merit System Board and the Law Division, based upon his rights under both the statutes and regulations governing public employment and the standards of the LAD, may be expressed in the language of N.J.S.A 43:16A-6(1). He argued that he was not so \\\"incapacitated for the performance of his usual duty and of any other available duty\\\" as to be considered disabled, if reasonable accommodations were made. In applying for an ordinary disability retirement, petitioner would have been required to establish the contrary proposition, ie., that he was disabled and could not function in his position even with reasonable accommodation. The statutory standard provides, in full, that a member qualifies if:\\nmentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of his usual duty and of any other available duty in the department which his employer is willing to assign to him and that such incapacity is likely to be permanent and to such an extent that he should be retired.\\n[Ibid.]\\nIn order to be considered for an ordinary disability pension, petitioner was required to file a verified application containing his own \\\"statement supporting [his] claim for disability retirement\\\" which would satisfy the requirements of N.J.S.A 43:16A-6(1). No extraordinary exercise of imagination is involved in envisioning that any such sworn statement, made before the employment action and ciyil suit were concluded, could have been used effectively to defeat petitioner's claims in those proceedings. Moreover, petitioner's claims in his litigation could have been used, as effectively, to negate the proposition he was required to establish in order to qualify for an ordinary disability pension. Clearly, therefore, while the central issue of fact and law in petitioner's termination proceeding and civil action remained in dispute \\u2014 through the conclusion of the appellate process \\u2014 he was effectively precluded from taking the contrapositive position in a pension application. See, e.g., Division of Gaming Enforcement v. Gonzalez, 142 N.J. 618, 632, 667 A.2d 684 (1995) (\\\"[T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel . 'bar(s) a party to a legal proceeding from arguing a position inconsistent with one previously asserted.' \\\"). A result requiring petitioner to have forfeited the employment and LAD claims he was actively pursuing in order to preserve his pension entitlement, before any decision was made in either connection, would negate both the liberality required in construing the public employee pension statutes, see Uricoli v. Police and Firemen's Retirement Sys., 91 N.J. 62, 70-73, 449 A.2d 1267 (1982); Masse v. Public Employees Retirement Sys., 87 N.J. 252, 259-61, 432 A.2d 1339 (1981), and the pensions systems' obligations to deal fairly with their members. See Fiola v. New Jersey Treas. Dept., 193 N.J.Super. 340, 351, 474 A.2d 23 (App.Div.1984). Cf. Galligan v. Westfield Centre Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 192-93, 412 A.2d 122 (1980) (\\\"Unswerving, 'mechanistic' application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing . legislative purposes. On numerous occasions we have found 'such particular circumstances as to dictate not the harsh approach of literally applying the statute of limitations but the application of the more equitable and countervailing considerations of individual justice.' A 'just accommodation' of individual justice and public policy requires that 'in each case the equitable claims of opposing parties must be identified, evaluated and weighed.' Whenever dismissal would not further the Legislature's objectives in prescribing the limitation, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to assert his claim.\\\") (citations omitted); SMB Assocs. v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J.Super. 38, 59, 624 A.2d 14 (App.Div.1993), aff'd, 137 N.J. 58, 644 A.2d 558 (1994) (\\\"[A]n agency has inherent power to waive de minimis violations of objective standards.\\\"). Manifestly, had the issue of petitioner's substantive entitlement to an ordinary disability pension come before the Board while his litigation was pending, it would have been appropriate and fair for action on the pension application to have been deferred until common questions relating to petitioner's employment rights were resolved by adjudication.\\nAside from considerations of fairness and equity, it is clear enough that the two-year standard of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3) is not jurisdictional, especially in the circumstances presented here. See SMB Assocs., supra, 264 N.J.Super. at 59, 624 A.2d 14; Fiola, supra, 193 N.J.Super. at 348, 351, 474 A.2d 23. If it were, the September 22, 1992 letter from the Division of Pensions and Benefits, more than four years from the date of petitioner's last contribution, advising him that his membership would expire sixty days thence if he did not return to public service before, would not have been possible. In this regard, we are guided by the agency's construction of its own statute in the day-to-day administration of its affairs. See In re Union County Prosecutors, 301 N.J.Super. 551, 561, 694 A.2d 289 (App.Div.1997); Lally v. Public Employees' Ret. Sys., 246 N.J.Super. 270, 273, 587 A.2d 303 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 332, 598 A.2d 890 (1991); Szczepanik v. New Jersey Treas. Dept., 232 N.J.Super. 491, 504, 557 A.2d 705 (App.Div.1989).\\nWe have, furthermore, been given no reason to apprehend that a determination favoring petitioner would in any way impair the fiscal integrity of the PFRS system or fund or stretch them beyond fair legislative design. See Stevens v. Public Employees' Ret. Sys., 309 N.J.Super. 300, 303, 706 A.2d 1191 (App.Div.1998); DiMaria v. Public Employees' Ret. Sys., 225 N.J.Super. 341, 354, 542 A.2d 498 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 638, 552 A.2d 164 (1988); Fiola, supra, 193 N.J.Super. at 350, 474 A.2d 23. In the absence of any such likelihood, the Board's decision in this matter must be seen to have been unduly rigid. See Cammarata v. Essex County Park Comm'n, 26 N.J. 404, 411, 140 A.2d 397 (1958) (\\\"Authority delegated to an administrative agency should be construed so as to permit the fullest accomplishment of the legislative intent. The purpose of the statute is not to be frustrated by an unduly, narrow interpretation.\\\") (citation omitted); New Jersey Housing & Mtge. Fin. Agency v. Moses, 215 N.J.Super. 318, 324, 521 A.2d 1307 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 638, 527 A.2d 460 (1987).\\nFinally, we note that, in response to our inquiry at oral argument, counsel for the Board has advised that petitioner may choose to apply the balance of his PFRS account to purchase credits in his current Public Employee's Retirement System account. This is an option available to petitioner if he elects to withdraw his application for an ordinary disability retirement from PFRS.\\nReversed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1317834.json b/nj/1317834.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..62d5fb6ca27888a29f7ffd3bc82710787301bf4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1317834.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1317834\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JAY MIZRAHI\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Mizrahi\", \"decision_date\": \"1977-11-22\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"590\", \"last_page\": \"590\", \"citations\": \"75 N.J. 590\", \"volume\": \"75\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:42:49.989075+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JAY MIZRAHI.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JAY MIZRAHI.\\nNovember 22, 1977.\", \"word_count\": \"20\", \"char_count\": \"117\", \"text\": \"Petition for certification denied. (See 149 N. J. Super. 143)\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1351331.json b/nj/1351331.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..facd49539efc530f24b56fb8fac25242a2c15d26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1351331.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1351331\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. BRIAN STEIGLER\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Steigler\", \"decision_date\": \"1984-11-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"179\", \"last_page\": \"179\", \"citations\": \"99 N.J. 179\", \"volume\": \"99\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:03:02.250418+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. BRIAN STEIGLER.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. BRIAN STEIGLER.\\nNovember 7, 1984.\", \"word_count\": \"14\", \"char_count\": \"92\", \"text\": \"Petition for certification denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1353204.json b/nj/1353204.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a0d782ab68e230fc44eedebf0c23dbd19fd1db13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1353204.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1353204\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. THOMAS PARKS v. BOARD OF FIRE COMMISSIONERS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Parks\", \"decision_date\": \"1986-07-11\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"510\", \"last_page\": \"510\", \"citations\": \"105 N.J. 510\", \"volume\": \"105\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:08:39.507104+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. THOMAS PARKS v. BOARD OF FIRE COMMISSIONERS.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. THOMAS PARKS v. BOARD OF FIRE COMMISSIONERS.\\nJuly 11, 1986.\", \"word_count\": \"19\", \"char_count\": \"118\", \"text\": \"Petition for certification denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1353360.json b/nj/1353360.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b53c5f0ae4b5c89db15e91569e5bb483bb6b4f5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1353360.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1353360\", \"name\": \"JUDY COLEMAN, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, v. CYCLE TRANSFORMER CORP., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Coleman v. Cycle Transformer Corp.\", \"decision_date\": \"1986-11-14\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"285\", \"last_page\": \"297\", \"citations\": \"105 N.J. 285\", \"volume\": \"105\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:08:39.507104+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JUDY COLEMAN, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, v. CYCLE TRANSFORMER CORP., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"JUDY COLEMAN, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, v. CYCLE TRANSFORMER CORP., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.\\nArgued May 13, 1986\\nDecided November 14, 1986.\\nGeorge J. Kenny argued the cause for appellant (Connell, Foley & Geiser, attorneys; Frank A. Lattal, on the brief).\\nDavid S. Sussman argued the cause for respondent (Ralph B. Sussman, attorney).\", \"word_count\": \"3842\", \"char_count\": \"23225\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the Court was delivered by\\nCLIFFORD, J.\\nIn this workers' compensation case the judge of compensation dismissed the claim petition because \\\"the accident did not arise out of the employment The Appellate Division, in an unreported opinion, reversed and remanded on the strength of Chen v. Federated Dep't Stores, 199 N.J.Super. 336 (App. Div.1985). We granted certification, 102 N.J. 399 (1986), to review that determination. We reverse.\\nI\\nOn December 21, 1983, petitioner, Judy Coleman, was employed as an inspector-tester by respondent, Cycle Transformer Corporation (Cycle). As was her custom she had lunch, which she had brought with her from home, in the lunchroom set aside by her employer on its premises for that purpose. The dining area was not an elaborate facility: it contained only tables, chairs, a coffee and soda machine, and a refrigerator. The employer neither served nor provided any food. Petitioner, who was free to dine on or off the premise\\u00e1, was not paid for her half-hour lunch break. It was after she had finished her lunch that petitioner experienced a bizarre mishap, which she described as follows:\\nI was done eating. I went to light a cigarette. I struck the match and as I went to turn my head to the right to talk to one of my co-workers, you know, the tip of my hair caught the match and my hair went up in flames.\\n*\\n[A] couple of the co-workers there beat out the fire, put the fire out. Once the fire was out I \\u2014 I had this chemical on my hair.' I had a new growth of hair underneath, so the hair burned down so much and then burned out, the fire went out with them beating it.\\nThe chemical to which petitioner referred was actually two products \\u2014 one, called S Curl Activator, is \\\"something like a perm\\\" and had been applied by a beauty parlor some five months previously; the other, Stay Soft Flow Activator, had been put on by petitioner that morning, to \\\"keep the curl in [her] hair in place.\\\" Although we gather that petitioner has brought suit against the manufacturers of those products, their role, if any, in causing the accident or injury is not evidenced by this record. We therefore attach no significance on this appeal to the presence of those preparations.\\nPetitioner's workers' compensation claim sought benefits for facial and head burns, scarring, and neuropsychiatric and dermatological disabilities. Judge McNatt concluded that the accidental touching of a lighted match to the petitioner's hair by the petitioner's own hand was not \\\"reasonably incidental\\\" to her employment. He concluded: \\\"Neither the tasks of her employment, nor the place where she was eating her lunch at the time, nor any act on the part of any of her co-employees caused her injury,\\\" and therefore \\\"the accident did not arise out of\\\" the employment.\\nOn appeal, the Appellate Division read Chen v. Federated Dep't Stores, supra, 199 N.J.Super. 336, to hold \\\"unequivocally\\\" that \\\"injuries occurring on the employer's premises during a regular lunch hour arise in the course of employment and are solely remediable under the Workers' Compensation Act.\\\" Because the court below viewed the facts in this case as \\\"legally indistinguishable\\\" from those in Chen, in which plaintiff was injured while shopping on her employer's premises during a lunch break, it concluded that Chen was \\\"dispositive\\\" and held that \\\"Coleman's injuries in this case arose out of and in the course of employment.\\\" The Appellate Division therefore reversed and remanded to the Division of Workers' Compensation for a determination of the nature and extent of disability.\\nII\\nDean Larson reminds us that \\\"[t]he heart of every compensation act, and the source of most litigation in the compensation field, is the coverage formula.\\\" 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, \\u00a7 6.10 (1985) (hereinafter Larson). New Jersey, like most other states, adopted its formula from the British Compensation Act, with its requirement of \\\"accident arising out of and in the course of employment.\\\" Larson, supra, at \\u00a7 6.10. Our Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -127, provides in pertinent part:\\nWhen employer and employee shall by agreement, either express or implied, accept the provisions of this article compensation for personal injuries to such employee by accident arising out of and in the course of employment shall be made by the employer without regard to the negligence of the employer .\\n[N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 (emphasis supplied).]\\nAccording to Dean Larson, \\\"[f]ew groups of statutory words in the history of law have had to bear the weight of such a mountain of interpretation as has been heaped upon this slender foundation.\\\" Larson, supra, at \\u00a7 6.10.\\nThe task of construction is made easier by breaking the phrase \\\"in half, with the 'arising out of' portion construed to refer to causal origin, and the 'course of employment' portion to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident in relation to the employment.\\\" Ibid; see Rafferty v. Dairymen's League Coop. Ass'n, 16 N.J.Misc. 363 (Dep't of Labor, Workmen's Comp. Bureau 1938):\\nThe words \\\"out of\\\" relate to the origin or cause of the accident; the words \\\"in the course of,\\\" to time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. The former words relate to the character of the accident, while the latter words relate to the circumstances under which the accident takes place. An accident comes within the latter words if it occurs while the employee is doing what a man so employed may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed and at a place where he may reasonably be during the time to do that thing. The accident, in order to arise \\\"out of\\\" the employment, must be of such nature the risk of which might have been contemplated by a reasonable person when entering the employment, as incidental to it. A risk is incidental to the employment when it belongs to or is connected with what a workman has to do in fulfilling his contract of service.\\n[Id. at 366.]\\nAs Dean Larson cautions, even though each test must be \\\"independently applied and met[,] it should never be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the term 'work connection.' \\\" Larson, supra, at \\u00a7 6.10.\\nIll\\nThe burden of construction is eased somewhat in this case, for we do not discern a difficult problem in respect of the \\\"in the course of\\\" component of the formula. We need pause on it only long enough to observe that our law on this point is well settled: \\\"[a]n employee need not actually be working in order to meet the 'course of employment' test.\\\" Mikkelsen v. N.L. Indus., 72 N.J. 209, 212 (1977). The court in Mikkelsen cited with approval a line of New Jersey cases that have extended the protection of the Workers' Compensation Act to \\\"injuries sustained within the scope of the work-period and the work-place while the employee was engaged in personally motivated, but customary, or reasonably expectable activities.\\\" Ibid. Here, petitioner's injuries were sustained on the employer's premises and during a regular lunch hour, circumstances that have long been held to fall within the course of employment. See Chen v. Federated Dep't Stores, supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 338, and authorities cited there. The mishap was occasioned by petitioner's smoking \\u2014 a personally-motivated activity, to be sure, but one that was customary and reasonably to be expected. See Secor v. Penn Serv. Garage, 19 N.J. 315, 321 (1955) (injuries that occur during minor deviations such as smoking are generally sufficiently related to employment as not to be barred by the \\\"in the course of\\\" requirement); Larson, supra, at \\u00a7 21.40 (\\\"practically all cases hold that smoking does not constitute a departure from the employment .\\\"). Hence, petitioner was \\\"in the course of\\\" her employment when the accident occurred.\\nIY\\nThe more substantial question is whether petitioner's accident \\\"arose out of\\\" her employment. This simply worded phrase has given rise to \\\"a mass of decisions turning upon nice distinctions and supported by refinements so subtle as to leave the mind of the reader in a maze of confusion.\\\" Note, \\\"Arising 'out of' and 'in the Course of' the Employment Under the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act,\\\" 20 Rutgers L.Rev. 599 (1966) (hereinafter Note) (quoting Herbert v. Samuel Fox & Co., [1916] 1 A.C. 405, 419). We view this appeal, however, as relatively straightforward, not encumbered by such distinctions, refinements, or confusion.\\nThe requirement that a compensable accident arise out of the employment looks to a causal connection between the employment and the injury. It must be established that the work was at least a contributing cause of the injury and that the risk of the occurrence was reasonably incident to the employment. Note, supra, 20 Rutgers L.Rev. at 601. Although a number of tests have been devised for determining the requisite connection, see Larson, supra, at \\u00a7 6.20 to 6.60, the \\\"but for\\\" or positional-risk test is now a fixture in New Jersey law. E.g., Howard v. Harwood's Restaurant Co., 25 N.J. 72, 82 (1957). Essentially, that test asks \\\"whether it is more probably true than not that the injury would have oc curred during the time and place of employment rather than elsewhere.\\\" Id. at 83. Unless it is more probable that the injury would not have occurred under the normal circumstances of everyday life outside of the employment, the necessary causal connection has not been established. Ibid.\\nThe \\\"but for\\\" or positional-risk doctrine includes as one of its components the nature of the risk that causes injury to the employee. Those risks that are \\\"distinctly associated\\\" with the employment are easy to identify: they include\\nall the obvious kinds of injury one thinks of at once as \\\"industrial injury.\\\" All the things that can go wrong around a modem factory, mill, mine, transportation system or construction project \\u2014 machinery breaking, objects falling, explosives exploding, tractors tipping, fingers getting caught in gears, excavations caving in and so on \\u2014 are clearly in this category and constitute the bulk of what not only the public but perhaps also the original draftsmen of compensation acts had in mind as their proper concern.\\n[Larson, supra, at \\u00a7 7.10, quoted in Howard v. Harwood's Restaurant Co., supra, 25 N.J. at 84.]\\nNew Jersey recognizes a second category of risks \\u2014 those described as \\\"neutral.\\\" Howard v. Harwood's Restaurant Co., supra, 25 N.J. at 84. Neutral risks have been defined as \\\"uncontrollable circumstances\\\" and \\\"do not originate in the employment environment\\\" but rather \\\"happen to befall the employee during the course of his employment.\\\" Ibid.; see also Larson, supra, at \\u00a7 6.50 (neutral risks are \\\"neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment.\\\"). As common examples of neutral risks the Howard opinion offers \\\"acts of God, such as lightning,\\\" and the fallen arrow in Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 13 N.J. 8 (1953). In Gargiulo, an employee, while at work in the back yard of his employer's store, was injured when struck by an arrow that a neighborhood boy had shot in the general direction of a tree on the employer's property. The employee received compensation because \\\"but for\\\" the employment, he would not have been in the line of fire and therefore would not have been hit. Id. at 13.\\nIn addition to the risks \\\"distinctly associated\\\" with the employment and the \\\"neutral\\\" risks there is a third category of risks \\u2014 those personal to the employee. Risks falling within this classification do not bear a sufficient causative relationship to the employment to permit courts to say that they arise out of that employment. Howard v. Harwood's Restaurant, supra, 25 N.J. at 84; Larson, supra, at \\u00a7 7.20. As this Court said in Howard, \\\"[i]n these situations, the employment connection with the injury is minimal; it is the personal proclivities or contacts of the employee which gives rise to the harm, so that even though the injury takes place during the employment, compensation is denied.\\\" 25 N.J. at 85.\\nFor reasons that will apjpear, we conclude that petitioner's case falls into this last category.\\nV\\nThe principles in the foregoing section, although easily articulated, have not lent themselves to consistent ease of application. See generally Note, supra, 20 Rutgers L.Rev. at 601-03 (discussing \\\"troublesome\\\" cases under the \\\"arising out of\\\" requirement). The cases involving idiopathic falls \\u2014 those brought on by a purely personal condition unrelated to the employment, such as a heart attack or epileptic seizure \\u2014 illustrate the point. See, e.g., George v. Great Eastern Food Prods., Inc., 44 N.J. 44 (1965); Henderson v. Celanese Corp., 16 N.J. 208 (1954); Reynolds v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs., 130 N.J.L. 437 (Sup.Ct.1943), aff'd o.b., 131 N.J.L. 327 (E. & A.1944).\\nIn Reynolds the employee, a watchman, suffered an epileptic seizure, which caused him to fall against a small pot stove in a shanty furnished by the employer, as a result of which his face was seared by the hot stove. Both the Compensation Bureau and the Common Pleas Court found as a fact that \\\"the cause of the petitioner's face coming in contact with the stove was not his tripping over the chair in the shanty or other like occurrence but was an epileptic seizure which he suffered and which was unconnected with his employment.\\\" 130 N.J.L. at 440. On appeal the Supreme Court applied the \\\"sound rule\\\" that \\\"whenever conditions attached to the place of employment or otherwise incident to the employment are factors in the catastrophic combination, the consequent injury arises out of the employment.\\\" Id. at 443. The record disclosed that \\\"[t]he pot stove was furnished by the employer\\\" and \\\"[t]he thing that occurred was connected with the service the employee had to perform in fulfilling his contract Id. at 441-442. Therefore, \\\"the use of the shanty, with the pot stove, was incidental to his employment.\\\" Id. at 442. The Supreme Court concluded that the accident arose out of the employment, ibid, a conclusion adopted by the Court of Errors and Appeals, 131 N.J.L. 327.\\nIn Henderson v. Celanese Corp., supra, 16 N.J. 208, the petitioner-employee again experienced an epileptic seizure, as a result of which he fell. Unlike the employee in Reynolds, however, Henderson struck nothing on his way down. He simply fell unimpeded to the concrete floor. This Court held that the accident did not arise out of the petitioner's employment, and differentiated Reynolds on the basis that the concrete floor was neither one of the conditions attached to the place of employment nor, in the language of Reynolds, a factor in the \\\"catastrophic combination.\\\" Id. at 212. The Court concluded that it was just as probable that the same injury would have occurred outside of the employment, id. at 214. A minority of the Court would have awarded compensation because \\\"the accidental injury here was attributable in a substantial part to one of the conditions of employment, the concrete floor Id. at 215.\\nThe view of the Henderson dissenters ultimately prevailed in George v. Great Eastern Food Prods., Inc., supra, 44 N.J. 44. There the employee's fall, in which he suffered a fractured skull that later caused his death, originated in a cardiovascular condition. Id. at 45. Again, as in Henderson, the employee struck nothing until his head hit the level concrete floor. Ibid. The Court, however, found little rational support for Henderson's distinction between those falls that involved striking a machine or a table on the way down and those in which the fall was directly to a concrete floor. Id. at 47. \\\"Either no consequence of an idiopathic fall should bring compensability or the nature of the result alone should be looked to as the determinant.\\\" Ibid. In allowing recovery the Court overruled Henderson and held that an accident arises out of the employment \\\"when it is due to a condition of the employment \\u2014 i.e., a risk of this employment The petitioner's impact with the concrete floor \\\"clearly [met] that test.\\\" Id. at 48.\\nThe same cannot be said of the accident and injury in the case before us. No condition of the lunchroom played any role, in petitioner Coleman's setting her hair on fire or in the nature and extent of her injury. No employment-related instrumentality, such as the stove in Reynolds, supra, 130 N.J.L. 437, or the concrete floor in Henderson, supra, 16 N.J. 208, and George, supra, 44 N.J. 44, influenced the occurrence itself or the nature and extent of the resultant injury. Unlike Gargiulo, supra, 13 N.J. 8, in which the requirements of the employee's task took him into the line of fire of an errant arrow, no circumstances of this petitioner's employment was causally related to the unhappy introduction of match to hair. The fact that the accident happened while she was on her employer's premises was the sheerest happenstance, wholly insufficient to supply the necessary nexus between the employment and the accident.\\nTo hold otherwise would be to equate an \\\"incident of employment\\\" with a coincidence. There is not the slightest suggestion that it is more probable that the accident would not have occurred under the normal circumstances of everyday life outside of the employment, or that if it had occurred at, say, petitioner's home or in a public restaurant's smoking section or in any of the various other places that those who choose to smoke are still permitted to do so, the resultant injury would somehow have been less severe. See Howard v. Harwood's Restaurant Co., supra, 25 N.J. at 83. Quite simply, it was the respondent's personal proclivity for smoking, coupled with an unfortunate bit of inattention, that produced the harm. See Howard, supra, 25 N.J. at 85. That the harm was encountered in the course of petitioner's employment serves to satisfy only the first part of the test; the arising out o/requirement cannot be met in the circumstances presented by this record.\\nThe so-called \\\"smoking\\\" cases are consistent with our analysis and with the result on this appeal. In Secor v. Penn Serv. Garage, supra, 19 N.J. 315, the petitoner, a garage attendant, spilled gasoline on his work clothes while performing his employment duties. According to petitioner, when he lit a match preparatory to lighting a cigarette, his clothes burst into flames and he was injured. This Court held that the accident arose out of the petitioner's employment: \\\"The spilling of gasoline on his clothes was a risk incident to his employment and but for its occurrence Secor would not have been injured Id. at 323. In Steel Sales Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 293 Ill. 435, 127 N.E. 698 (1920), the accident arose out of employment when petitioner's clothing, coated with oil from his job, caught fire when matches in his pocket were lit by petitioner's bumping into a locker. In Hill-Luthy v. Industrial Comm'n, 411 Ill. 201, 103 N.E.2d 605 (1952), however, compensation was denied when petitioner, while engaged in his employment of driving a truck, attempted to light a cigarette and the match head flew off into his eye. The Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that \\\"[t]he use of matches or the act of smoking was in no way incidental to the employment. The risk encountered was entirely divorced from it, and was one to which the general public is equally exposed while performing such acts in homes or elsewhere for personal enjoyment and comfort.\\\" Id. at 202, 103 N.E.2d at 606. The result in each of the foregoing was determined by the presence or absence of a risk of the employment or a condition thereof but for which the accident would not have happened \\u2014 oily clothes, gasoline, matches striking an employee locker \\u2014 an element that is essential to an award of compensation but one that is entirely absent from this case. But see Puffin v. General Elec. Co., 132 Conn. 279, 43 A.2d 746 (1945) (divided court held dangers of smoking while wearing fluffy angora sweater to be incident of employment).\\nThere remains only the need to address Chen v. Federated Dep't Stores, supra, 199 N.J.Super. 336. Unlike the court below, we do not find Chen dispositive of the instant appeal. Indeed, if Chen is of any pertinence, it is only in the limited sense that the case involves the issue of whether the Workers' Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy for an employee who sustained an accident during her lunch break while shopping on her employer's department store premises, when she tripped over a clothes hanger that lay on the floor. Plaintiff, seeking to bring a civil action against her employer, argued that the employment relationship had been severed by reason of the fact that she was shopping at the time of the accident. In affirming summary judgment for the store-employer, the Appellate Division concluded that nothing in the 1979 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act, which contain a \\\"new definition of travel to and from work in most circumstances.\\\" 199 N.J.Super. at 338, affected the compensability of on-premises lunchtime injuries. Here is the heart of the opinion:\\nThe occasion of plaintiff's shopping at Abraham & Straus was her employment there. It was convenient for her and beneficial to her employer. No doubt, lunchtime shopping was encouraged by the employer, perhaps even by the allowance of price discounts. An injury in these circumstances was ruled compensable in Wilson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 14 Utah 2d 360, 384 P.2d 400 (1963). In our view, lunchtime shopping is an on-premises activity that benefits the employer and should not militate against compensability.\\n[Ibid.]\\nNowhere does Chen approach the \\\"arising out of employment\\\" issue on which the instant appeal hinges; indeed, that critical phrase is not to be found in the Chen opinion, and nothing in that opinion suggests that the issue that engages our attention here was raised there, even tangentially. We have no reason on this appeal, therefore, to disturb Chen's holding.\\nVI\\nThe judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the judgment of the Division of Workers' Compensation in favor of respondent-appellant is reinstated.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN \\u2014 7.\\nOpposed \\u2014 none.\\nDean Larson observes that\\n[illustrations of [neutral risk] may be drawn from a wide variety of controversial cases. A man hard at work in the middle of a factory yard may be hit by a stray bullet out of nowhere, bit by a mad dog, stabbed by a lunatic running amuck, struck by lightning, thrown down by a hurricane, killed by enemy bomb, injured by a piece of tin blown from someone's roof, shot by a child playing with an air rifle, murdered as a result of mistaken identity, felled by debris from a distant explosion, or blinded by a flying beetle.\\n[Larson, supra, at \\u00a7 7.30.]\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1356350.json b/nj/1356350.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..541c3ba339c9c31ff6c7dbae1e6435adee69719d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1356350.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1356350\", \"name\": \"GARALD T. LEE v. CNA INSURANCE COMPANY AND ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lee v. CNA Insurance\", \"decision_date\": \"1986-03-11\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"489\", \"last_page\": \"489\", \"citations\": \"103 N.J. 489\", \"volume\": \"103\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:59:53.031188+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"GARALD T. LEE v. CNA INSURANCE COMPANY AND ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.\", \"head_matter\": \"GARALD T. LEE v. CNA INSURANCE COMPANY AND ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.\\nMarch 11, 1986.\", \"word_count\": \"18\", \"char_count\": \"122\", \"text\": \"Petition for certification denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1372329.json b/nj/1372329.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b28abd421e07015afbd56f444f5c491dd99e8538
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1372329.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1372329\", \"name\": \"AMERICAN FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT (TWO CASES); WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT, v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT (TWO CASES); OHIO CASUALTY CO., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT; PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"American Fire & Casualty Co. v. New Jersey Division of Taxation\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-03-09\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"434\", \"last_page\": \"462\", \"citations\": \"375 N.J. Super. 434\", \"volume\": \"375\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:40:47.116708+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"AMERICAN FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT (TWO CASES). WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT, v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT (TWO CASES). OHIO CASUALTY CO., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEFENDANTRESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"868 A.2d 346\\nAMERICAN FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT (TWO CASES). WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT, v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT (TWO CASES). OHIO CASUALTY CO., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEFENDANTRESPONDENT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued December 8, 2004\\nDecided March 9, 2005.\\nBefore Judges FALL, PAYNE and C.S. FISHER.\\nRichard D. Pomp of the Connecticut bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellants American Fire and Casualty Company, Ohio Casualty Company and West American Insurance Company, (McDermott, Will & Emery, attorneys; Mr. Pomp and Margaret C. Wilson, on the brief).\\nMichael A. Guariglia, argued the cause for appellant Prueo Life Insurance Company (McCarter & English, attorneys; Mr. Guar-iglia, of counsel, and Open Weaver Banks, on the brief).\\nCarol Johnston, Senior Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney; Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Johnston, on the brief).\\nAlthough Judge Payne was not present at oral argument, she listened to the audio recording of the argument before participating in the decision.\", \"word_count\": \"8929\", \"char_count\": \"55787\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nPAYNE, J.A.D.\\nIn American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J.Tax 155 (2003), a judge of the Tax Court affirmed, against challenges by foreign domiciled insurers, the methodology utilized by the Director, New Jersey Division of Taxation (Director) for calculating the State's retaliatory insurance tax* so as to recapture the benefits to foreign insurers that otherwise would be provided by the State's premium tax cap. The decision, applied in principle in thirteen actions, was appealed in the actions before us, which we decide together. We reverse.\\nNew Jersey imposes two taxes of relevance to this appeal: a premium tax and a retaliatory tax. The premium tax statute, codified at N.J.S.A. 54:18A-1 to -11, requires that all domestic and foreign insurance companies pay an annual tax \\\"based on net premiums on contracts of insurance covering property and risks located within this State written during the calendar year ending December 31 next preceding.\\\" N.J.S.A. 54:18A-l(a). The tax for non-life insurers is presently set at 2.1% of taxable premiums in this State. N.J.S.A. 54:18A-2(a). The same rate applies to life and health insurance companies. N.J.S.A. 54:18A-3(a).\\nHowever, the premium tax statute contains a premium cap provision, applicable both to property and casualty and to life and health insurers, that is unique to New Jersey. See N.J.S.A. 54:18A-6. That statute, enacted in 1945 (L. 1945, c. 132, \\u00a7 6) provides in essence that if the premiums collected by a company and its affiliates that are taxable in New Jersey exceed twelve and one-half percent of the \\\"total premiums collected by the company and all of its affiliates during the same year on all policies and contracts of insurance, whenever and wherever issued,\\\" then the premiums taxable in New Jersey \\\"shall not exceed\\\" twelve and one-half percent of the company's total premiums. The manifest intent of the cap is to attract capital and \\\"provide!] insurance companies with incentive to voluntarily write significant amounts of business in New Jersey.\\\" Senate Committee on Labor, Industry and Professions Statement to Senate Bill No. 2395 \\u2014 L. 1985, c. 294. Because the statute, which creates a tax incentive, is not limited to New Jersey companies, it does not constitute a preference that, as we will explain in Part IV of this opinion, would be constitutionally prohibited on equal protection grounds.\\nIn 1985, when the statute was amended to require that an insurer include not only its own taxable premiums wherever earned, but also those of its affiliates, so as to prevent the recent phenomenon of centralization of New Jersey business in a single New Jersey domiciled affiliate that would technically qualify for the cap, the true purpose of the statute was expressed in the following terms:\\nThe limitation on the maximum amount of premium tax payable was intended to be available to those insurance companies, domestic or foreign, which made a substantial commitment to New Jersey and contribution to its economy as evidenced by the percentages of overall business written in this State compared to elsewhere. Typically, insurance companies qualifying for the limitation had significant numbers of New Jersey employees providing service to policyholders and claimants residing here, paid substantial sums of real property taxes, maintained deposits in local banks, invested considerable funds in local securities and companies and generally contributed to the economy by utilizing other local services and businesses.\\n[Ibid.]\\nNew Jersey's retaliatory tax, enacted in 1950 and codified at N.J.S.A. 17:32-15, has a wholly different purpose. That statute, stripped to its essentials, provides:\\nWhen by the laws of any other state . any premium or income or other taxes . are imposed upon New Jersey insurance companies . doing business in such other state . which are in excess of such taxes . imposed upon insurance companies . of such other state . doing business in New Jersey . so long as such laws continue in force the same premium or income or other taxes . shall be imposed upon insurance companies . of such other state . doing business in New Jersey.\\nThis retaliatory tax applies solely to foreign (out-of-state) or alien (out-of-U.S.) insurers.\\nAlthough the manner of implementation of the statute is not entirely clear from its language, what the statute in effect is intended to do is to permit the imposition of an additional tax upon foreign insurers domiciled in states whose premium tax rate exceeds that of New Jersey in an amount equivalent to the difference between the foreign and the New Jersey tax rate. Thus if, for instance, Ohio imposed a premium tax at a rate of 2.5% and New Jersey imposed a premium tax at a rate of 2.1%, Ohio domiciled insurers writing business in New Jersey would be subject to an additional retaliatory tax at a rate of 0.4%.\\nSuch retaliatory taxes have now been enacted in all states except Hawaii, and their constitutionality has been affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. See Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 648, 101 S.Ct. 2070, 68 L.Ed.2d 514 (1981). As explained by Justice Brennan in that decision, the retaliatory tax at issue (as here) was based upon a model statute drafted by the insurance industry and adopted in similar form elsewhere. Id. at 669, 101 S.Ct. at 2083, 68 L.Ed.2d at 531.\\nAlthough variously expressed, the principal purpose of retaliatory tax laws is to promote the interstate business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes. A survey of state retaliatory tax laws summarized:\\n\\\"[Wlhatever their character, it is obvious . that their ultimate object is not to punish foreign corporations doing business in the state, or retort the action of the foreign state in placing upon corporations of the enacting state doing business therein burdens heavier than those imposed upon corporations of such foreign state doing business in the enacting state, but to induce such foreign state to show the same consideration to corporations of the enacting state doing business therein as is shown to corporations of such foreign state doing business in the enacting state.\\\" Annot., 91 A.L.R. 795 (1934).\\n[Id. at 668-69, 101 S.Ct. at 2083, 68 L.Ed.2d at 531.]\\nIn essence, the purpose of retaliatory taxes is to alleviate tax burdens for those companies conducting interstate insurance business by placing pressure upon states to lower their tax rates to levels encountered elsewhere, thereby promoting interstate commerce. Their purpose is not to raise revenue. Id. at 669-70, 101 S.Ct. at 2083-84, 68 L.Ed.2d at 531. As we stated in Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 6 N.J.Tax 613 (App.Div.1984):\\nRetaliatory tax laws are a fact of life in the existence of any insurance company that does business on a national level____Although such statutes may incidentally produce revenue, the primary purpose sought to be achieved is to compel the foreign state imposing greater costs to lower the \\\"premium or income or other taxes, . fees, fines, penalties, licenses, deposit requirements or other obligations,\\\" or to remove any \\\"prohibitions or restrictions . imposed upon\\\" the insurance companies of the domiciliary state.\\n[Id. at 615-16 (citations omitted).]\\nThe State's retaliatory tax and premium cap provisions thus have different goals: the former is designed to operate so as to level the playing field for insurance companies engaged in interstate business thus encouraging that business; the latter, to give New Jersey a competitive advantage in attracting foreign insurer investment and increased insurance capacity.\\nNew Jersey's premium tax cap and retaliatory tax statutes do not provide an explicit mechanism for their implementation in instances in which both are applicable, and nothing in the legislative history suggests that the Legislature considered the issues potentially arising from possible variations in the method of their dual implementation. This litigation has brought those issues into focus.\\nTo illustrate them, we adopt the numerically simplified examples set forth in the brief submitted on behalf of plaintiffs American Fire and Casualty Company and West American Insurance Company, since their essential accuracy has not been disputed.\\nIf a foreign insurer received premiums of $500,000 on its New Jersey business and was ineligible for the premium tax cap, its premium taxes would be $10,500 (2.1% x $500,000).\\nIf a foreign insurer received New Jersey premiums of $500,000 and nationwide premiums of $1,000,000, thereby qualifying it for New Jersey's premium tax cap, its taxes would be reduced by $7,875. (12.5% of $1,000,000 = 125,000 x 2.1% = $2,625; $10,500-$2,625 = $7,875.)\\nIf a foreign insurer, eligible for the benefits of the premium tax cap, is domiciled in a state with a higher premium tax rate than that of New Jersey (assume 2.5%), then that insurer should be subject to New Jersey's retaliatory tax. However, an issue arises as to how that tax should be computed.\\nThe Director takes the position that utilization of the premium tax cap reduces the effective rate of New Jersey's premium taxes below 2.1%, since a smaller amount of premiums is being taxed than has actually been written in the State. He then contends that this reduction in New Jersey's effective tax rate must be recaptured by increasing the rate of retaliatory tax assessed or by applying a retaliatory tax to the full amount of premiums written by the foreign insurer in New Jersey and then subtracting the actual taxes paid pursuant to the cap. Thus, utilizing the prior example of a foreign insurer with $1,000,000 premiums nationwide and $500,000 premiums in New Jersey, subject to a retaliatory tax as the result of a tax rate of 2.5% in its state of domicile, the Director would calculate the retaliatory tax as $500,000 (total New Jersey premiums) x 2.5% (domiciliary tax rate) = $12,500-$2,625 (New Jersey tax as capped) = $9,875.\\nUnder the Director's interpretation, a partial recapture of the premium tax cap would occur even if the state of domicile of the foreign insurer had a lower tax rate than that of New Jersey (assume 1.8%). Utilizing the prior example, the Director would calculate the tax payable in the domiciliary state as $500,000 (total New Jersey premiums) x 1.8% = $9,000-$2,625 (New Jersey tax as capped) = $6,375 in retaliatory taxation.\\nThe Director does not treat a tax credit in a manner similar to his treatment of the tax cap for retaliatory tax purposes, although the tax cap in many respects resembles a credit, which is the common financial incentive utilized by states to attract the business of foreign insurers. Unlike his treatment of the cap, he does not seek to apply a retaliatory tax to recapture any credits. Thus an inconsistency in his position arises for which no sound justification can be discerned.\\nThe plaintiff insurers, in contrast, contend that the benefits of the tax cap should be preserved. Accordingly, American Fire, West American and the other appellant insurers forming part of the Ohio Casualty group argue that the retaliatory tax should be calculated by subtracting New Jersey's rate from that of the domiciliary state, resulting in 0.4% and multiplying it by the amount of New Jersey gross premiums ($500,000) to yield $2,000. Alternatively, they calculate the retaliatory tax by subtracting the gross premium taxes in New Jersey absent the cap ($500,000 x 2.1% = $10,500) from Ohio's taxes on that amount ($500,000 x 2.5% = $12,500) for a total retaliatory tax of $2,000.\\nWhereas the Ohio Casualty insurers utilize taxes on gross premiums as the basis for their computation, Pruco advocates a symmetrical comparison of its capped premiums as taxed in New Jersey and as theoretically taxed in its domiciliary State, thereby utilizing a net premium tax approach. Neither has directly opposed the view of the other.\\nBy calculating the tax utilizing the Director's methodology, the foreign insurer with a domiciliary rate of 2.5% loses $7,875 ($9,875-$2,000), which is the exact amount that the insurer benefited as the result of the applicability of the premium tax cap in the Ohio Casualty example. The foreign insurer with a domiciliary rate of 1.8% loses $6,375, since it would not otherwise be subject to a retaliatory tax. Accordingly, the benefit of the tax cap is wholly recaptured or significantly reduced. Because a domestic insurer is not subject to New Jersey's retaliatory tax, no such recapture can occur. Thus, the issues become whether New Jersey's statutory scheme requires that result and whether that scheme, as applied, is constitutional.\\nI.\\nBefore further addressing the issues raised by this appeal, we briefly set forth the factual and procedural history leading to this litigation.\\nPlaintiffs American Fire and West American are insurers in the Ohio Casualty group of companies. American Fire is an Ohio corporation, whereas West American is an Indiana corporation. Both are eligible to claim a premium tax cap. American Fire is incorporated in a state that has a tax rate higher than that of New Jersey of 2.5%. Although West American was incorporated in a state with a statutory tax rate that is lower than New Jersey's (2.0%), the rate is higher than the effective rate in New Jersey as calculated by the Director. Thus, West American, too, was deemed subject to a partial recapture of savings resulting from the premium tax cap.\\nIn 2001, the two insurers recognized that the manner in which the Director calculated premium and retaliatory taxes deprived them of some or all of the benefit of New Jersey's premium tax cap. Accordingly, they sought refunds for retaliatory taxes paid in prior years. After their refund requests were denied by the Director in final determinations issued on July 12, 2001, they appealed to the Tax Court. Other insurance companies in the Ohio Casualty group that were likewise denied refunds by the Director also challenged his determination. Their appeals, along with other appeals by American Fire and West American, were stayed while the court consolidated and then resolved the actions instituted by American Fire and West American under docket numbers 4714-01 and 4715-01. On December 2, 2003, after considering cross-motions for summary judgment premised on stipulated facts, the court affirmed the determination of the Director in the written decision cited at the beginning of this opinion. Thereafter, the court consolidated the remaining ten Ohio Casualty cases, and on January 30, 2004, again affirmed the Director's determination for the reasons given in its December 2, 2003 opinion. On appeal, the lead American Fire and West American matters were assigned docket number A-2708-03T2, whereas the other Ohio Casualty cases were assigned docket number A-3676- 03T3. We address the issues raised in those appeals, which are identical, simultaneously.\\nAn appeal arising in the same fashion and raising similar issues was filed by Pruco Life Insurance Company, an Arizona corporation, challenging a March 28, 2003 determination by the Director, affirmed in a March 23,2004 Tax Court decision based substantially on the grounds set forth in its December 2, 2003 decision in the Ohio Casualty cases. Pruco's case was docketed in the Tax Court as 4508-03 and has been assigned appellate docket number A-4455-03T2. It, too, will be addressed in this opinion.\\nThe main difference between the Pruco case and the two lead Ohio Casualty cases is that the retaliatory tax provision applicable to life and health insurance companies such as Pruco is N.J.S.A. 17B:23-5. The text of that statute is in relevant respects substantially similar to that of N.J.S.A. 17:32-15, applicable to the Ohio Casualty companies. Pruco, like West American, is incorporated in a state with a lower statutory premium tax rate (2.0%) than New Jersey's and thus would not ordinarily be required to pay retaliatory taxes. The premium tax cap set forth in N.J.S.A. 54:18A-6 is applicable to Pruco as well as the other appellants.\\nII.\\nIn reaching its decision to affirm the determination of the Director, the tax judge first sought to interpret the intent of the Legislature in passing the premium tax cap and retaliatory tax statutes, and from that analysis, he concluded that \\\"[t]he history of the cap and retaliatory tax statutes suggests that neither statute should affect the interpretation of the other.\\\" American Fire, supra, 21 N.J.Tax at 166. The conclusion was based upon the maxim that the Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing legislation when enacting another statute (see Mahwah Tp. v. Bergen Cty. Bd. of Taxation, 98 N.J. 268, 279, 486 A.2d 818, 823-24, cert. denied sub nom., Borough of Demarest v. Mahwah Tp., 471 U.S. 1136, 105 S.Ct. 2677, 86 L.Ed.2d 696 (1985)) and on the fact that, despite sequential passage of the cap and retaliatory tax statutes and the existence of amendments to each, neither referred to the other. Further, the court noted the participation of members of the insurance industry in proposing amendments to the cap statute enacted in 1985, yet the absence in a contemporaneous memorandum by the Commissioner of Insurance, Hazel F. Gluck, to the Chief of Staff and Counsel to the Governor, dated April 22, 1985, of any reference to the policy of the cap or retaliatory tax or any potential conflict between the two. American Fire, supra, 21 N.J.Tax at 166.\\nThe failure of the Legislature, in enacting the retaliatory tax statute and in amending it and the cap statute, to address the conflict between the statutes asserted by plaintiffs, and the omission of any discussion of the issue in the Gluck Memorandum, in combination suggest a legislative intent to have the cap statute and retaliatory tax statute function in the manner adopted by the Director. [Id. at 167.]\\nThe tax judge also supported his conclusion by characterizing the plaintiffs' position as contending \\\"that enactment of the retaliatory tax effected an implied partial repeal of N.J.S.A. 54:18A-6 so that its cap provisions would not apply in calculating retaliatory tax,\\\" id. at 167; invoking the rule of statutory construction that implied repealers are not favored, ibid.; and determining that, because the two statutes were not repugnant to each other, an implied repeal of one could not be found, id. at 168. The retaliate- ry tax statute, the court held, could fulfill its function even if the benefits of the cap were recaptured, since by recapturing the cap and expanding the spread between the effective tax rate in New Jersey and the rate of a foreign state, that state might be encouraged to lower its rates, thereby lessening the tax burdens on New Jersey insurers doing business in that state. Id. at 170-71.\\nIn response to the plaintiff insurers' arguments that the Director's interpretation of the two statutes \\\"(i) represents bad policy, (ii) defeats the purpose of the cap statute to induce foreign insurance companies to do increased business in New Jersey, and (iii) does not fulfill the purpose of the retaliatory tax,\\\" the court observed:\\nPlaintiffs' policy arguments and the analyses by their experts are logical, sensible, and appealing. However, my responsibility is not to interpret the cap and retaliatory tax statutes based on my notions of appropriate policy, but to interpret the statutes based on my analysis of legislative intent. \\\"The judiciary has no power to devise tax programs or to qualify the existing legislative mandate with a judge's private view of what is just or sensible.\\\" Village of Ridgefield Park v. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation, 31 N.J. 420, 431, 157 A.2d 829[, 835] (1960). [Id. at 171-72.]\\nAs a final matter, the court found that the statutes as interpreted did not violate the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause by creating a preference for domestic insurers, finding a rational basis to exist for the classifications created by the interplay between the premium tax cap and retaliatory tax statutes as applied, depending on whether the taxpayer was a domestic insurer, in which case the insurer received the full benefit of the cap, or whether it was a foreign insurer subject to New Jersey's retaliatory tax, in which case the insurer received little or no benefit from the cap. \\\"New Jersey's retaliatory tax, when calcu lated by applying the 12.5% cap, can accomplish [the objective of deterring other states from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes] and, therefore, satisfies both elements of the rational basis test \\u2014 the tax serves a legitimate state purpose (influencing the tax burden imposed by foreign states on New Jersey insurers), and the Legislature reasonably could have believed that the tax, as so calculated, could achieve this purpose.\\\" Id. at 175-76.\\nIII.\\nUnlike the Tax Court judge, we are persuaded by the \\\"logical, sensible, and appealing\\\" policy arguments of plaintiffs' counsel and their experts. The application of rules of statutory construction by the tax judge to glean legislative intent, in our view, achieves a counterintuitive result that fails to recognize that the statutes at issue can be jointly applied so as to give effect to the language and purpose of each, and that nothing in statutory history or elsewhere prevents that reconciliation. See James Const. Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 18 N.J.Tax 224, 232 (1999) (\\\"In the absence of an express repeal, the new provision is presumed to be in accord with the legislative policy embodied in prior statutes. Accordingly, they should be construed together and even if in apparent conflict, construed in harmony if reasonably possible.\\\"). See also Palmer v. Kingsley, 27 N.J. 425, 429, 142 A.2d 833, 835 (1958) (construing statutes in pari materia although enacted at different times and codified in different statutory titles). It is clear from the foregoing portions of this opinion that the retaliatory tax and premium tax cap statutes have wholly different purposes. In his determination to affirm the decision of the Director, the tax judge gave effect to the retaliatory tax provisions, while eviscerating the purpose of the premium tax cap. We find no solid grounds for doing so in the logic of the court's decision, the language of the relevant statutes, or their evident purposes.\\nWe commence by noting that the premium tax cap statute explicitly and unambiguously states that the premiums of a compa ny eligible for the cap that are taxable in New Jersey \\\"shall not exceed twelve and one-half pereentum.\\\" N.J.S.A. 54:18A-6. As our prior example illustrates, the Director effectively taxes a higher percentage of premiums, contrary to this statutory language. That result was affirmed by the tax judge. However, a court \\\"should strive for an interpretation that gives effect to all of the statutory provisions and does not render any language inoperative, superfluous, void, or insignificant.\\\" In re Green Brook Flood Control Project, 370 N.J.Super. 122, 130, 850 A.2d 596, 601 (App.Div.2004) (quoting G.S. v. Dept. of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 172, 723 A.2d 612, 617 (1999)).\\nWe note additionally that the tax cap statute, as enacted in 1945 and as amended in 1985 and 1989, makes specific reference to its applicability to foreign insurers, as does the 1985 legislative history, quoted previously. It is thus contrary to statutory language and the rules of statutory construction that we have set forth to eliminate the benefits of the cap for most if not all foreign insurers. Ibid.\\nThat legislative history further demonstrates a concern that tp.e cap not be formulated in a fashion that would be viewed as discriminating against foreign competition either under the Commerce Clause, in 1945 (see Statement to Assembly No. 190, introduced February 5, 1950, noting that the former retaliatory tax act had been repealed because of Commerce Clause concerns) or after the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, under equal protection analysis. The 1985 Gluck memorandum that we previously cited discusses a suggestion by the Chubb Insurance group for a statutory amendment resulting in disparately favorable treatment to domestic insurers and specifically rejects that suggestion because of the high probability that it could not withstand equal protection challenge. Gluck, supra, at 6. Thus, an imple mentation of the retaliatory tax statute so as to recapture the benefits of the premium tax cap solely from foreign insurers appears contrary to analyses of the law circulated at the time of relevant statutory amendments. We have no evidence that the Legislature sought to ignore constitutional concerns, or that they were ignored by the Governor in signing the legislation into law.\\nFurther, although we can presume that the Legislature was aware of the cap statute when it passed the retaliatory tax law in 1950, Mahwah Tp., supra, 98 N.J. at 279, 486 A.2d at 823-24, we find nothing in the legislative history provided by the parties in these appeals to suggest that the Legislature was apprised of the Director's position as to the manner of interaction of the two statutes, that the effects of that position were known to affected insurers at any time prior to the submission of the present refund requests \\u2014 something that occurred several years after the last amendments to the statutes at issue \\u2014 or that the insurers ever called the anomaly created by the Director's position to the attention of the Legislature. The amounts involved, when viewed individually, were relatively small, and there is no evidence in the record to dispute the fact, asserted by the Ohio Casualty insurers, that because the tax returns were not inspected by them with this problem in mind, its existence was overlooked.\\nEven the 1985 Gluck memo, relied upon by the court in sustaining the position of the Director that his method of computation accorded with legislative intent, American Fire, supra, 21 N.J.Tax at 166-67, does nothing to support that position. As we have stated, at the time of the amendments at issue, attention was focused on the recent creation by foreign insurers of independent New Jersey domiciled affiliates for the purpose of taking advantage of the tax cap, thereby reducing New Jersey tax revenues, and upon means for avoiding this result \\u2014 eventually effectuated by requiring that the worldwide premiums of a foreign insurer and its affiliates be considered jointly for purposes of the application of the cap. The Gluck memorandum summarizes, comments upon and makes recommendations with respect to the suggestions of New Jersey domiciled insurers to close the statutory loophole. Because of their New Jersey domicile, those New Jersey companies had never been subject to New Jersey's retaliatory tax, and thus they had no reason to have knowledge of or challenge the position taken by the Director (assuming it was the same then as now). The New Jersey affiliates that were the focus of the amendment, while not providing comments, had similarly been insulated from the imposition of New Jersey retaliatory taxes. There is nothing in the Gluck memorandum to otherwise suggest that any insurer raised the issue of the interaction between the premium tax cap and the retaliatory tax statutes. Indeed, as the tax judge acknowledged, \\\"[njeither party presented any evidence that the insurance industry actually lobbied the New Jersey Legislature with respect to [this] issue[ ].\\\" American Fire, supra, 21 N.J.Tax at 167.\\nAdditionally, we find no recognized practical justification for a construction of the two statutes that would result in the implementation of the retaliatory tax statute at the expense of the premium tax cap. Indeed, the court's logic in that regard, as the plaintiff insurers point out, appears wholly flawed. See American Fire, supra, 21 N.J.Tax at 170-71. According to the Director, the existence of a premium tax cap reduces the effective rate of taxation in New Jersey, increasing the spread between New Jersey's tax rate and that of any other state, including those states whose tax rate, without consideration of the cap, is equal to or lower than that of New Jersey. The Director seeks to recapture this spread through the imposition of increased retaliatory taxes. The tax judge found \\\"the retaliatory tax as calculated by the Director (with the 12.5% cap included in the calculation) can function to encourage other states to lower their tax burdens on New Jersey insurers doing business in those states.\\\" American Fire, supra, 21 N.J.Tax at 171.\\nHowever, the imposition of these additional taxes on foreign insurers in this circumstance does nothing to effect the stated purpose of the retaliatory tax statute \\u2014 to level the playing field or to reduce the incidence of excessive taxes in foreign states while preserving a reasonable level of taxation \\u2014 since, if the New Jersey retaliatory tax is applied as the Director suggests, it would not serve just to reduce high taxes or equalize them, but rather to precipitate a downward spiral in taxation as each state sought to protect its domestic insurers' interstate operations by lowering the effective rate of taxation. If, for instance, a foreign state adopted a 1.8% premium tax rate, that rate could be undercut by New Jersey's effective tax rate as lowered through taxation of only those premiums subject to the cap, thereby invoking New Jersey's retaliation against insurers domiciled in that foreign state, despite the fact that New Jersey's stated rate was 2.1%. We have illustrated this result previously. For domiciliaries of the foreign state to escape the effects of New Jersey's retaliatory tax, that state would have to reduce its tax rate to one considerably below that of New Jersey. However, if it were to do so, then New Jersey domiciled insurers writing business in the foreign state would be subject to that state's retaliatory tax. A negative impact on New Jersey would thus be created. We find no evidence that any legislature has determined that premium taxes should thereby be reduced to a de minimis level, depriving states of a legitimate source of revenue, or that retaliation of the type that we have illustrated was contemplated when retaliatory taxes were conceived as a means of lessening or equalizing tax burdens nationwide.\\nFurther, we discern no legitimate purpose to be served by utilizing the retaliatory tax to encourage other states to enact a premium tax cap, thereby lowering their effective rate of taxation. At present, we are informed, New Jersey is the only state to have enacted such a cap as a means of attracting insurance business to this state. It certainly cannot seek competition among other states for scarce insurance resources through their adoption of a similar mechanism.\\nMoreover, the result achieved by the Director nullifies the purpose of the premium tax cap, in that it removes any incentive on the part of a foreign insurer to write a substantial amount of its business and otherwise invest in the economy of this State.\\nIn a case such as this in which it is evident that the Legislature did not consider the manner of interaction of elements of a statutory taxation scheme, it is essential that we look to the purposes of the relevant statutes in determining their manner of implementation. Stryker Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 18 N.J.Tax 270, 279 (1999), aff'd, 19 N.J.Tax 115 (App.Div.2000), aff'd, 168 N.J. 138, 773 A.2d 674 (2001). We are unaware of any rule of statutory construction that requires that the policy goals of one statute be ignored in order to effectuate the purposes of another, if in fact the operation of the two statutes can be reconciled. As the Supreme Court observed in Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 128 N.J. 218, 227, 607 A.2d 1281, 1286 (1992):\\nIn construing a statute the court's primary task is to \\\"effectuate the legislative intent in light of the language used and the objectives sought to be achieved.\\\" Merin v. Maglaki 126 N.J. 430, 435, 599 A.2d 1256[, 1259] (1992) (quoting State v. Maguire, 84 N.J 508, 514, 423 A.2d 294[, 297] (1980)). \\\"[T]he Court fulfills its role by construing a statute in a fashion consistent with the statutory context in which it appears.\\\" Waterfront Comm'n v. Mercedes-Benz, 99 N.J. 402, 414, 493 A.2d 504 (1985). In construing legislation \\\"every effort should be made to harmonize the law relating to the same subject matter.\\\" Superior Air Prods. Co. v. NL Indus., 216 N.J.Super. 46, 63-64, 522 A.2d 1025[, 1035] (App.Div.1987).\\nHere, the Director's interpretation neither fulfills the stated purpose of the retaliatory tax statute, since it subverts its use as a tax equalization mechanism; acts as a potentially unconstitutional revenue producing device, contrary to the representations of the industry at the time such statutes were enacted and considered by the United States Supreme Court; and further acts to \\\"punish\\\" a class of foreign insurers writing significant business in this State in a manner contrary to the purposes of the statute. The interpretation also fails to effectuate the investment and business- attracting purposes of the tax cap statute, and thus is inconsistent both with the Legislature's intent and the entire statutory scheme of taxation of insurance premiums. Ibid.\\nAdoption of the Director's interpretation is not statutorily required; the harmonization that should be our ultimate goal can be achieved. Superior Air Prod. v. NL Indus., 216 N.J.Super. 46, 63-64, 522 A.2d 1025, 1035 (App.Div.1987). The retaliatory tax statutes at issue, N.J.S.A. 17:32-15 (applicable to the Ohio Casualty companies) and 17B:23-5 (applicable to Pruco), permit great leeway in determining how they shall be applied, since they are wholly nonspecific as to the manner in which, in the language of N.J.S.A. 17:32-15, the \\\"premium or income or other taxes, or any fees, fines, penalties, licenses, deposit requirements or other obligations, prohibitions or restrictions\\\" imposed by a foreign state or New Jersey are to be calculated or compared. Thus, the statute can be construed, as the plaintiff insurers argue, so as to compare either the statutory rate of taxes on gross premiums in New Jersey and the foreign domicile in order to determine the amount of the retaliatory tax, before taking the cap into account or the net premiums as taxed in New Jersey and theoretically taxed elsewhere. Indeed, this is essentially what occurs in instances in which foreign insurers are not eligible for the premium tax cap. Thus, both groups of foreign insurers would be treated similarly for purposes of retaliatory taxation. Such an interpretation, unlike that adopted in the Tax Court, would give effect to the purposes of both statutes, while diminishing the effect of neither.\\nAs we have stated, New Jersey is the sole state to have adopted a tax cap as a means of attracting insurance business. However, decisions elsewhere construing retaliatory tax statutes in light of tax credit provisions aimed at attracting foreign insurance business have reached similar results to those espoused by the insurers here. See, e.g., Lee R. Russ, Annot., Construction, Application, and Operation of State \\\"Retaliatory\\\" Statutes Imposing Special Taxes or Fees on Foreign Insurers Doing Business Within the State, 30 A.L.R.4th 873 (1984).\\nIV.\\nThe insurers argue as well that the manner in which the Director has interpreted the retaliatory tax statute, so as to deprive foreign insurers of the benefit of the premium tax cap, unconstitutionally discriminates against foreign insurers in violation of principles of equal protection, thereby creating a constitutional problem that can and should be resolved by adoption of the insurers' proposed application of the retaliatory tax statute. See Garfield Trust Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 102 N.J. 420, 433, 508 A.2d 1104, 1111 (finding that it is the duty of the court to construe a statute in a manner that would render it constitutional, if reasonably susceptible to such interpretation), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 925, 107 S.Ct. 390, 93 L.Ed.2d 345 (1986).\\nThe tax judge found that New Jersey's statutory scheme passed constitutional muster since a rational basis for its enactments could be found. On appeal, the Director urges our affirmance of this principle; the insurers claim that the United States Supreme Court has abandoned a strict rational basis analysis in considering challenges of this sort, and that under the more stringent analysis adopted by it, New Jersey's statutes are unconstitutional as applied because they discriminate between foreign and domestic insurers.\\nIt is well recognized that the Commerce Clause is not applicable to the business of insurance as the result of the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.A. \\u00a7 1011 to -15. See State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 452, 82 S.Ct. 1380, 1381, 8 L.Ed.2d 620, 622 (1962). Further, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, \\u00a7 2, is inapplicable, because corporations are not held to be \\\"persons\\\" to which that clause applies. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548-50, 48 S.Ct. 577, 578, 72 L.Ed. 978, 983-84 (1928). As a consequence, modern insurance cases raising issues such as presented here are decided under equal protection principles.\\nAs we have already noted, in Western and Southern Life Insurance Co., supra, the Supreme Court held on equal protection grounds that California's retaliatory tax provisions did not violate equal protection principles. 451 U.S. at 668-74, 101 S.Ct. at 2083-86, 68 L.Ed.2d at 530-35. That decision, although determined by use of the \\\"rational basis\\\" test traditionally applicable in instances in which no suspect classification is involved, turned in large measure upon the recognition that the insurance industry itself had proposed adoption of retaliatory taxes on a nationwide basis, not as a means of producing significant revenue at the expense of out-of-state insurers, but \\\"as a means to apply pressure on other States to maintain low taxes on California insurers.\\\" Id. 451 U.S. at 669-70, 101 S.Ct. at 2084, 68 L.Ed.2d at 531. On this basis, the Court held that: \\\"There can be no doubt that promotion of domestic industry by deterring barriers to interstate business is a legitimate state purpose\\\" and \\\"[t]he mere fact that California seeks to promote its insurance industry by influencing the policies of other States does not render the purpose illegitimate.\\\" Id. at 671, 101 S.Ct. at 2084, 68 L.Ed.2d at 532. The Court thus found that the purpose of enacting the retaliatory tax \\u2014 \\\"to promote the interstate business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes,\\\" Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 877, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 1681, 84 L.Ed.2d 751, 759 (1984) \\u2014 was legitimate, and found as well that the California Legislature rationally could have believed that the retaliatory tax would promote its objective. Id. 451 U.S. at 671, 101 S.Ct. at 2085, 68 L.Ed.2d at 533.\\nHowever, it is notable that the Court also observed:\\nWe consider it now established that, whatever the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose.\\n[Id. at 667-68, 101 S.Ct. at 2083, 68 L.Ed.2d at 530.]\\nThe narrow context in which Western and Southern Life Insurance has precedential value is illustrated by the Court's decision three years later in Ward, supra, 470 U.S. 869, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 84 L.Ed.2d 751, a case in which an Alabama gross insurance premium tax scheme that differentially and more severely impacted upon foreign insurers than it did upon domestic insurers was held unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, despite the rational relationship of the tax scheme to the encouragement of domestic insurance business.\\nThe Ward decision has been widely commented upon as the result of its seeming departure from the strict rational basis analysis traditionally employed when non-suspect classifications are challenged. What the Court did in that case has variously been characterized as the adoption in this context of \\\"rational basis with a bite,\\\" (see, e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 Ind. L.J. 779 (1987)), as some level of intermediate scrutiny (see, e.g., Hartwin Bungert, Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations: Towards Intermediate Scrutiny for a Quasi-suspect Classification, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 569, 611 (1994)), or as \\\"Commerce Clause rhetoric in equal protection clothing.\\\" Ward, supra, 470 U.S. at 880, 105 S.Ct. at 1683, 84 L. Ed.2d at 761 (repeating Alabama's characterization). Whatever the label, it is clear that the Court departed in Ward from a traditional analysis that would, almost inevitably, have validated Alabama's differential tax scheme as rationally related to a legitimate state purpose, finding illegitimate a tax scheme that discriminated against foreign insurers. Ward's analysis has not been repudiated. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Racing Assn. of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 107, 123 S.Ct. 2156, 2159, 156 L.Ed.2d 97, 103 (2003) (distinguishing Ward's equal protection analysis from that applicable to the different context of the case before the court).\\nAs characterized by Justice O'Connor writing in dissent on behalf of herself and Justices Brennan, Marshall and Rehnquist: \\\"This tax seeks to promote both a domestic insurance industry and capital investment in Alabama.\\\" 470 U.S. at 884, 105 S.Ct. at 1684, 84 L.Ed.2d at 763. The Justice continued:\\nOur precedents impose a heavy burden on those who challenge local economic regulation solely on Equal Protection Clause grounds. In this context, our long-established jurisprudence requires us to defer to a legislature's judgment if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Yet the Court evades this careful framework for analysis, melding the proper two-step inquiry regarding the State's purpose and the classification's relationship to that purpose into a single unarticulated judgment. This tactic enables the Court to characterize state goals that have been legitimated by Congress itself as improper solely because it disagrees with the concededly rational means of differential taxation selected by the legislature.. . Most troubling, the Court discovers in the Equal Protection Clause an implied prohibition against classifications whose purpose is to give the \\\"home team\\\" an advantage over interstate competitors even where Congress has authorized such advantages.\\n[Id. at 884-85, 105 S.Ct at 1685, 84 L.Ed.2d at 763.]\\nWe have quoted the dissent in Ward at length to illustrate the divergence of the majority decision from traditional rational basis analysis. The majority found that the parties had waived a hearing to determine whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute bore a rational relationship to the two purposes identified by the state court: (1) encouragement of the formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama; and (2) encouragement of capital investment in the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the statute. It therefore focused on whether the stated purposes were legitimate. Id. at 875, 105 S.Ct. at 1680, 84 L.Ed.2d at 757-58. Neither could found to be so, the Court held, because, rather than attempting \\\"to influence the policies of other States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to operate interstate . it has erected barriers to foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.\\\" Id. 470 U.S. at 877-78, 105 S.Ct. at 1681, 84 L.Ed.2d at 759. The State may not, the Court held, \\\"favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at a higher rate solely because of their residence.\\\" Id. at 878, 105 S.Ct. at 1682, 84 L.Ed.2d at 759. The encouragement of investment in Alabama, the Court found, did not constitute a legitimate state purpose \\\"when furthered by discrimination.\\\" Id. at 882, 105 S.Ct. at 1684, 84 L.Ed.2d at 762.\\nWhen we view New Jersey's statutory scheme, as applied by the Director, in light of the precedent established by Western and Southern Life Insurance and Ward, its potential constitutional infirmity becomes evident. First of all, that scheme bears no rational relationship whatsoever to the goals of the premium tax cap statute, since it eliminates the incentive of foreign insurers (a category that the statute by its terms was enacted to benefit, along with domestic insurers) to write business and invest in New Jersey and thus constricts the market for insurance in the State and associated investment by foreign insurers here. Moreover, as the plaintiff insurers argue, it subverts the purposes of the retaliatory tax statute by either (1) transforming the statute into a likely-forbidden revenue producing measure, instead of a tax equalization one or (2) inducing a downward spiral of tax rates, thereby depriving the State of needed revenue and potentially harming domestic New Jersey insurers. As stated by the Supreme Court in Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 79 S.Ct. 437, 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959):\\n[T]here is a point beyond which the State cannot go without violating the Equal Protection Clause. The State must proceed upon a rational basis and may not resort to a classification that is palpably arbitrary. The rule often has been stated to be that the classification \\\"must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.\\\"\\n[Id. at 527, 79 S.Ct. at 441, 3 L.Ed.2d at 485 (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561, 64 L.Ed 989, 990-91 (1920)).]\\nWe do not find that standard to have been met.\\nWe note as well the emphasis of the Western and Southern Life Ins. Court upon the promotion of interstate business as a justification for an otherwise suspect or forbidden retaliatory tax. Here, that laudatory goal is not met, but is instead eroded by the Director's application of New Jersey's taxing scheme. We note as well the unusual factual circumstances underlying Western and Southern Life Ins., created by a nationally adopted taxation regime enacted to pressure states into achieving parity in taxation, and the Court's reliance on those circumstances in legitimating the taxes at issue. No such scheme inheres to the Director's interpre tation of New Jersey's tax laws, nor does his application of those laws have the effect that was demonstrated in Western and Southern Life Ins.\\nThe tax judge found that New Jersey's retaliatory tax, when calculated by applying the 12.5% cap can accomplish the objective of deterring other states from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes and that it thus both served a legitimate state purpose (influencing the tax burden imposed by foreign states on New Jersey insurers) and the Legislature reasonably could have believed the tax, as calculated, could achieve that purpose. American Fire, supra, 21 N.J.Tax at 175-76. We reject this rationale, finding for reasons previously stated that the tax as applied cannot reasonably be expected to produce these results, nor could the Legislature (if it had known of the Director's interpretation, which it apparently did not) reasonably have believed it could.\\nIn Ward's terms, we find no legitimate purpose in the Director's approach to the two statutes, since that approach, by creating an unjustifiable domestic preference, is purely and completely discriminatory in its application. It is this type of discrimination that the Ward Court found to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 470 U.S. at 878, 105 S.Ct. at 1681-82, 84 L.Ed.2d at 759. As a consequence we reverse the determination upholding the Director's interpretation of the retaliatory tax statute so as to recoup part or all of the benefits of New Jersey's premium cap.\\nReversed with the direction that the Director, Division of Taxation recalculate refunds due to plaintiffs in accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion.\\nThis methodology is \\\"not embodied in regulations or a written statement of internal policies.\\\" American Fire, supra, 21 N.J.Tax at 162. In light of our resolution of the issues raised in these appeals, we do not find it necessary to address the challenge by appellant Pruco Life Insurance Company to the Director's actions as violative of the Administrative Procedures Act. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to-15.\\nThe statute actually refers to taxes and fees of various sorts, which are aggregated for purposes of determining retaliatory taxes. We refer to this aggregate as \\\"premium taxes\\\" for ease of reference.\\nThe Director supplied forms for use by the insurers. The manner in which the forms were organized inevitably led to the challenged result.\\nThe relevant monetary figures are set forth in the Tax Court's opinion. American Fire, supra, 21 N.J.Tax at 160-61.\\nThe following Ohio Casualty group appeals were determined by the Tax Court: American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Director, Division of Taxation, Docket Nos. 2366-01, 4714-01 and 4721-01; West American Insurance Co. v. Director, Division of Taxation, Docket No. 2365-01 and 4715-01; Ohio Casualty of New Jersey, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, Docket Nos. 2934-01, 4711-01, 4713-01, and 4464-02; and The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Director, Division of Taxation, Docket Nos. 2357-01, 4712-01 and 4716-01.\\nN.J.S.A. 17B:23-5 compares \\\"any taxes, licenses and other fees, in the aggregate, and any fines, penalties, deposit requirements or other obligations, prohibitions or restrictions\\\" in New Jersey and any other state or Canada, whereas N.J.S.A. 17:32-15 compares \\\"any premium or income or other taxes, or any fees, fines, penalties, licenses, deposit requirements or other obligations, prohibitions or restrictions\\\" in New Jersey and any other state or foreign country.\\nThe cap statute was enacted in 1945 (L. 1945, c. 132 \\u00a7 6); the retaliatory tax statute in 1950 (L. 1950, c. 231, \\u00a7 1). Amendments to the cap statute occurred in 1985 (L. 1985, c. 294, \\u00a7 1) and 1989 (L. 1989, c. 315, \\u00a7 1) to preclude use of the cap by New Jersey domiciled affiliates of foreign insurers and to exempt a number of existing companies, including Pruco, from the effects of the closure of this statutory loophole. The retaliatory tax statute was amended in 1985 (L. 1985, c. 88, \\u00a7 1).\\nThe court noted that \\\"the actual effective rate will vary inversely with the amount by which an insurer's premium revenue in New Jersey exceeds 12.5% of its total premium revenue.\\\" Id. at 173 n. 3. Thus, if an insurer derived 25% of its premium revenue from New Jersey, the effective premium tax rate would be 1.05%; if it derived 37.5% of its total premium revenue from New Jersey, the effective premium tax rate would be 0.7%.\\nSee Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 84 L.Ed.2d 751 (1985) (striking down a domestic tax preference as violating the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against foreign insurers).\\nTo the extent that the retaliatory tax statute is ambiguous, it should be construed in favor of the taxpayer. Fedders Fin. Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 96 N.J. 376, 385, 476 A.2d 741, 745 (1984); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State, Dept. of Treasury, Div. of Taxation, 17 N.J.Tax 457, 481-82 (1998).\\nThe plaintiff insurers thus do not obtain an exemption from retaliatory taxation, nor do they seek a determination that there has been an implied partial repeal of the retaliatory tax statute. They advocate a harmonization of the application of the statutes, by which they their acknowledged retaliatory tax obligation is not adversely affected by the operation of the premium tax cap so as to eliminate the cap's benefits. The retaliatory tax statute is not thereby impliedly repealed, as the court held. American Fire, supra, 21 N.J.Tax at 167-70.\\nIf Pruco's net tax approach is adopted, the notion of an implied repeal has no foundation whatsoever.\\nThe tax statute imposed a higher rate of taxation on gross premiums generated in Alabama by foreign insurers, which could be lessened by investment \\u00f3f stated percentages of the insurer's worldwide assets in designated Alabama assets and securities. However, a tax differential remained even if such investments were made.\\nThe Ward Court found this characterization to be inapt, stating:\\nUnder Commerce Clause analysis, the State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish.\\nThe two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons from unconstitutional discrimination by the States.\\n[470 U.S. at 881, 105 S.Ct. at 1683, 84 L.Ed.2d at 761 (footnote omitted).]\\nJustice O'Connor appears to refer in this regard to the McCanran-Ferguson Act, relegating the regulation of the business of insurance to the states.\\nThe Court in Western and Southern Life Ins., supra, laid the groundwork for this conclusion when it observed:\\nThe retaliatory tax is not imposed on foreign corporations qua foreign corporations, as would be expected were the purpose of the tax to raise revenue from noncitizens; rather, it is imposed only on corporations whose home States impose more onerous burdens on California insurers than California otherwise would impose on those corporations.\\n[Id 451 U.S. at 670 n. 23, 101 S.Ct. at 2084 n. 23, 68 L.Ed.2d at 532 n. 23.]\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/138681.json b/nj/138681.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..068993ef720f2238aa1077341ed8f25d1e63086c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/138681.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"138681\", \"name\": \"The Rector, Wardens and Vestrymen of St. James Church v. Edmund Wilson, attorney-general, et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. James Church v. Wilson\", \"decision_date\": \"1913-05-13\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"546\", \"last_page\": \"549\", \"citations\": \"82 N.J. Eq. 546\", \"volume\": \"82\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:43:12.243264+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The Rector, Wardens and Vestrymen of St. James Church v. Edmund Wilson, attorney-general, et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"The Rector, Wardens and Vestrymen of St. James Church v. Edmund Wilson, attorney-general, et al.\\n[Decided May 13th, 1913.]\\nTestator bequeathed $14,000, after the death of certain life-tenants, to complainants, the rector, wardens and vestrymen of a certain Episcopal church, in trust, to erect a church on a tract conveyed by testator to complainants during his lifetime. When testator died, the neighborhood was a flourishing one by -reason of a racetrack there, but, this having been terminated, the village stagnated, and there was no prospect of any reasonable growth of such population or that a new Episcopal church could be maintained there if erected.\\u2014Held, that such fact did not cause a failure of the charity, but that the fund would be paid over to complainants, to be used for the benefit of the Episcopal church in the neighborhood in a manner to be determined by the court.\\nOn pleadings and proof.\\nMr. Gilbert Gollins and Mr. Thomas V. Arrowsmith, for tlie complainant.\\nMr. Edmund Wilson, attoi'nejr-general, defendant pro se.\\nMr. William J. Leonard, for the other answering defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"1305\", \"char_count\": \"7466\", \"text\": \"Lewis, Y. C.\\nThe bill is filed to obtain direction and a construction of the will of Edmund West, who died May 8th, 1885, leaving a last will and testament duly executed and admitted to probate in the office of the surrogate of the county of Monmouth, whereby he gave the sum of fourteen thousand dollars ($14,000) to his executors therein named to pajr the income thereof to one Rufus T. West, and to one Emma D. West, during their joint lives, and upon the death of the survivor, without either of them leaving issue, then to pay the said sum of fourteen thousand dollars ($14,000) to the complainants, the rector, wardens and vestrymen of St. James Church, in trust, for the purpose of building and erecting a church to be named \\\"St. Mary's Episcopal Church,\\\" on a certain tract of land conveyed by the testator to the complainants during his lifetime, which tract of land is situated near Wolf Hill, in the township of Eatontown, in the county of Monmouth and State of New Jersey; the said church to be built within the space of three years after the happening of the contingency upon which, the said gift was to take effect. Emma D. West died on the 31st day of December, in the year 1896; Rufus T. West died on the 8th day of February, in the year 1908, neither of them leaving any issue, and upon the death of the said Rufus T. West, the said sum of fourteen thousand dollars ($14,000) came into the hands of the complainants. At the time of the death of the said testator, the neighborhood of Wolf Hill was a growing and flourishing one by reason of the Monmouth Park Association, which were used during many months of the 3rear for the racing of horses, furnishing emplo3rment to large numbers of persons in the vicinity and attracting large numbers of transient visitors, and of persons who resided there during the whole of the summer months in the vicinity. After the year 1892 the Monmouth Park Association ceased to hold race meetings upon its grounds and the buildings thereon were dismantled and torn down and the railroad tracks running thereto were taken up and carried away, and the lands of said association were sold and conveyed to other persons. The proofs show that the discontinuance of the said race meetings has resulted in the complete stagnation of the village of Oceanport, which had grown up in the vicinity of Wolf Hill by reason of the large business and trade which had arisen by reason of the numbers of persons attracted to the vicinity by the said race meetings, that the population of the said village had stagnated, if not declined. There is no prospect of any reasonable growth of such population, and as a result, an Episcopal church erected on the said lot at Wolf Hill could not reasonably be expected to be supported, either financially or by the attendance of a com gregation, because of the veri' few members of the Protestant Episcopal Church in or near the locality of Wolf Hill. The proofs also show that such members as do reside in the vicinity are affiliated with other congregations of the Protestant Episcopal Church now in existence. No new parish can be created at such place under the canons and laws of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America for lack of assurance that sufficient money could be raised to pay the annual salary of a priest to conduct the services in such church, and for lack of a sufficient number of male communicants of the Protestant Episcopal Church to comprise a lawful vestry of governing body thereof under the laws of the State of New Jersey.\\nIn view of these facts it seems to me highly undesirable and contrary to public policy to carry out the particular intent of the testator to complete a church building to be named \\\"St. Mary's Episcopal Church\\\" on the tract of land in question.\\nThe learned and exhaustive opinion of Judge Green, in the ease of MacKenzie v. Trustees of Presbytery of Jersey City, 67 N. J. Eq. (1 Robb.) 652, clearly establishes the doctrine of cy pres in the jurisprudence of this state. In this case the New Jersey decisions on the subject are considered with the greatest of care and are examined in detail. The rule to be gathered from such consideration seems to be that the general charitable intent of a testator may be carried out in case it should be undesirable, impraoticable or against public policy, although not impossible under altered circumstances to carry out the special intent. The subject has been dealt with in several decisions of the court of chancery since the MacKenzie Case, and while in the case of Brown v. Condict, 70 N. J. Eq. (4 Robb.) 440, the court refuses to make cy pres application on the ground that it was impossible at the time of the death of the testator to carry out his actual charitable intention, yet it avows that cy pres application can be had even in this event, if the general intent of the testator can be accomplished.\\nThe suggestion of the solicitor of the residuary legatees, that the trust is void for impossibility, does not appear by the facts in this case. The charitable legatee here not only exists but is able to carry out the trust, and applies to this court for an application of cy pres, so that the terms of the trust should be modified so as to meet conditions which have changed since the making of the will.\\nIt appears from the last will and testament of the testator that his general charitable intent in making the gift was to benefit the Protestant Episcopal Church in the neighborhood of Wolf Hill, and I am satisfied that it was his will that such general charitable intent be carried out in the event that it should prove undesirable, impracticable or contrary to public policy to carry out the particular intent.\\nMy conclusion is that the defendants, the next of kin of the testator, are not entitled to any of the fund, and that the said fourteen thousand dollars ($14,000), with its accumulations, must be disposed of by the complainants for the benefit of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America in the neighborhood of Wolf Hill, in such a manner as will most nearly effect the general charitable intention of said testator, Edmund West, and the complainants must propose a scheme in this court for the disposition of the said fund in accordance with the findings of the court.\\nThe cross-bill of the defendants will be dismissed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/140797.json b/nj/140797.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..96a661a8d1994e4f33bfd1c256d9bb3553730ec4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/140797.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"140797\", \"name\": \"Edward V. Goerz, appellant, v. Mathilda Goerz, respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Goerz v. Goerz\", \"decision_date\": \"1914-05-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"342\", \"last_page\": \"342\", \"citations\": \"83 N.J. Eq. 342\", \"volume\": \"83\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:37:25.074689+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Edward V. Goerz, appellant, v. Mathilda Goerz, respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"Edward V. Goerz, appellant, v. Mathilda Goerz, respondent.\\n[Submitted March 23d, 1914.\\nDecided May 4th, 1914.]\\nOn appeal from a decree of the court of chancerjr advised by Advisory Master Hartshorne.\\nMessrs. McDermott & Enright, for the appellant.\\nMessrs. Weller & Lichtenstein, for the respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"87\", \"char_count\": \"608\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe decree appealed from will be affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion filed in the court below by Advisory Master Hartshorne.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 The Chief-Justice, Garrison, Swayze, Trenohard, Bergen, Minturn, Kalis oh, Bogert, Yredenburgh, White, Hepp\\u00e9nheimer \\u2014 11.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/140847.json b/nj/140847.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f69ff21e7ad8e53e940da0a3134b97a1d23dc636
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/140847.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"140847\", \"name\": \"The Mayor and Council of the Town of Boonton v. United Water Supply Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mayor of Boonton v. United Water Supply Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1914-07-25\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"536\", \"last_page\": \"538\", \"citations\": \"83 N.J. Eq. 536\", \"volume\": \"83\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:37:25.074689+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The Mayor and Council of the Town of Boonton v. United Water Supply Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"The Mayor and Council of the Town of Boonton v. United Water Supply Company.\\n[Decided July 25th, 1914.]\\n1. Where a contract by a water company to supply water to the inhabitants of a town provided that the town might purchase the works and \\u201cat any and all times\\u201d might inspect the books and vouchers of the company, the town was entitled to exercise such right of inspection, though it did not exercise its option to purchase; nor was it a valid objection that the inspection privilege was not mutual.\\n2. Where a water company\\u2019s contract with a town provided that the town at any and all times should have the right to inspect the water company\\u2019s books and papers, the town was not limited to mandamus to enforce such right, but properly sought such relief by suit in equity.\\nMr. Frank II. Pierce, Mr. Charles E. Scribner and Mr. Robert II. McCarter, for the complainant.\\nMr. Elmer King, for the defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"786\", \"char_count\": \"4439\", \"text\": \"Lewis, Y. C.\\nThis is an application by the town of Boonton for an inspection of the books and vouchers of the United Water Supply Company. This right is claimed under the terms of a contract made between complainant and Lewis Yan Duyne and the Boon-ton Water Company. The defendant succeeded to the Boonton Water Company by purchasing all its property, including the contract with the town, at a sale in foreclosure proceedings.\\nErom my examination of the case I have reached the conclusion that the relief prayed for by the complainant should be granted. There is no doubt in my mind that read in connection with the other provisions of the contract the words \\\"at any and all times,\\\" which appear in paragraph 11, mean that the water company bound itself to give the inspection, even if The town did not exercise its option to purchase. The privilege, it appears, was incorporated in the contract to give Boonton a chance to know the true conditions before it should agree to exercise its option. This is frequently done where the public is concerned and is to be the purchaser. And it is no doubt true, that without such right it would be difficult to get the people at large to sanction the making of a contract such as the one under consideration. There is, of course, consideration for the agreement to give this inspection as the town has been using the water supplied by the water company and paying for the same under the agreement ever since-it was executed.\\nThe suggestion made by counsel for the defendant, that the relief should not be granted because there is a want of mutuality if this is done before the town exercises its option, cannot prevail in view of our decisions, and further, this contract by its terms' gives this right of inspection to the town authorities \\u2014 a right not given to the company.. In other words, one party to this contract has a right which the other has not. The principle of mutuality cannot apply under these circumstances. The opinion of Chief-Justice Gummere in Marvel v. Jonah, which Mr. McCarter called to the court's attention upon argument and which ivas filed on July 17th last, deals with this sub ject with great clarity and is very much in point. See, also, Page v. Martin (Court of Errors and Appeals), 46 N. J. Eq. 585; Madison, &c., Association v. Brittin, 60 N. J. Eq. 160; Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 51 Atl. Rep. 973.\\nI have given consideration also to the argument made by counsel for defendant, that mandamus was the proper procedure for complainant in this issue, but I think that the action has been properly taken in the court of chancery, and that the remedy for the town is not as urged by counsel for the defendant. In the case of State v. Elizabethtown Water Co., ante p. 216, which was cited, it was the statute that gave the state water commission the right to inspect the books of the water, company. Proceedings to enforce the said right in a court of competent jurisdiction were provided for by the statute. The right in the case now before us arises out of the contract between the parties; in the Elizabethtown Case the right to examine arose purely out of a legal statutory duty enforceable only in the supreme court by mandamus.\\nFo hardship is suffered by the water company by an order for inspection, as such order can be so framed as to prevent the inquisitive but disinterested person or any competitor, if there be one, from coming to knowledge of the company's affairs.\\nIn accordance with these views an order for inspection may be entered.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/140923.json b/nj/140923.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e29dde554ee2e49d6629ed2b1a503300fc8932c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/140923.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"140923\", \"name\": \"Virginia Lee Welch, petitioner-respondent, v. Henry Bainbridge Baker, defendant-appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Welch v. Baker\", \"decision_date\": \"1914-06-15\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"330\", \"last_page\": \"333\", \"citations\": \"83 N.J. Eq. 330\", \"volume\": \"83\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:37:25.074689+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Virginia Lee Welch, petitioner-respondent, v. Henry Bainbridge Baker, defendant-appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Virginia Lee Welch, petitioner-respondent, v. Henry Bainbridge Baker, defendant-appellant.\\n[Argued March 24th, 1914.\\nDecided June 15th, 1914.]\\nAn order made in the court of chancery in divorce proceedings respecting the temporary custody of the petitioner\\u2019s child (its welfare being regarded as of prime consideration with the court) was held to have been a proper exercise of the discretion committed by the law to the chancellor.\\nOn appeal from an order of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Howell.\\nOn petition of Virginia Lee \\\"Welch against Henry Bainbridgv Baker. The order appealed from directed that respondent during the year 1915, and succeeding summers, have custody of her child for one-half of the summer vacation during which the regular sessions of the school are closed, the first half being-that division to which the petitioner is entitled, and the second half that to which the defendant shall be entitled.\\nMessrs. Edward A. & William T. Day, for the appellant.\\nMessrs. Lum, Tamblyn & Colyer, for the respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"1012\", \"char_count\": \"5891\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was- delivered by\\nVredenburgh, J.\\nThis appeal brings up a very narrow subject for determination. It is from an order of the court of chancery made December 16th, 1913, directing that the respondent during the approaching year of 1915, and the succeeding summers, should be entitled to have her child, Henry Martyn Baker (a boy at school, between thirteen and fourteen years of age), given into her custody for one-half of the summer vacation, with a prohibition that she should not take him outside of the Hnited States.\\nEmbraced within the grounds of appeal is an objection that the decree is erroneous in that it compelled the appellant to pay the costs of the proceedings, and a counsel fee of $500.\\nThe parties to this controversy were duly married on November 19th, 1898, and from that date for several years lived and cohabited together resulting in the birth of their said child on July 11th, 1900. Afterwards they became estranged, and during portions of the years of 1905, 1906, 1907,-1908 and 1910, the mother visited Europe, leaving the father and boy living at home in this country.\\nIn March, 1910, the mother brought suit for divorce against the husband in the court of chancery on the ground of his desertion of her for a period of two years or more, and obtained in that suit on October 27th, 1911, a final decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony. On October 31st, 1911, she married Thomas Carey Welch, her present husband, and is living with him in his home at Manilla, in the Philippine Islands.\\nA decree nisi in the divorce .suit had been obtained by her on April 17th, 1911. On September 20th, 1911, she filed a petition reciting that by the decree nisi it was ordered that further order as to the custody of said child be reserved, and concluded with a prayer that, as regards the custody of the child, provision be made in the decree in accordance with a written agreement between herself and the defendant set forth in her petition. That agreement was signed by both parties, was dated June 1st, 1910, under seal, and provides, as follows:\\n\\\"It is hereby agreed that Henry B. Baker shall have the custody of his child, Henry Martyn Baker, and that, at the earliest opportunity, an order of the court shall be made to that effect, either in the pending divorce suit or otherwise as counsel for the parties may agree. This agreement is made because Virginia Bee Baker, the mother of the child, has no criticism to make of the way the father has acted toward the child and believes that it is better for his financial welfare to be in the custody of his father, who has no intention of casting any reflection upon the mother.\\\"\\nIt will be observed that this paper was made a part of the record of the divorce suit, and was a solemn admission by the parties that even so late as June, 1910, the conduct of each toward the child had been beyond criticism by the other, or in other words, that neither party had cause of complaint against the other respecting the treatment of the child.\\nNo useful purpose can be served by specific references to the proofs before the learned vice-chancellor which led him to make the order in question. The propriety of such orders for the custody of infant children of divorced and separated parents is necessarily committed very largely to the discretion of the court of chancery.\\nAfter examination of the- case and the evidence, we think the vice-chancellor was entirely justified in making the order awarding the little boy to the keeping and care of the mother during the short period mentioned in it. Her residence in her far dis- taut home will require her, in order to reach the child, to devote many weeks of travel over sea and land, attended with personal risk and large expense, and in view of these circumstances the time given for her visit to the child does not seem to us to be excessive.\\nThere is nothing in the case which stamps the mother as immoral, or unfit to have the custody, temporarily, of her son.\\nThe vice-chancellor was evidently convinced by the mother's testimony, taken in his presence, and by her bearing, and by the other circumstances in evidence before him, that her anxiety to see her boy was genuine; that the confidence of the court in her would not be violated, and that she was worthy oh the trust reposed in her by the terms of the order. A mother's love for her child comes from a higher than human source, and cannot be measured nor weighed by precise judicial calculations. We coincide with the result the vice-chancellor has reached.\\nThe costs and counsel fee allowed below we do not deem excessive, nor unreasonable, under the circumstances, and the order should be affirmed.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 The Ci-iiee-Justice, Trenci-iard, Bergen, Minturn, Kalisctt, Bogert, Vredenburgh, White, Heppenheimer \\u2014 9.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/143754.json b/nj/143754.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2d6a9897ea31b66b0cc2e128909188b5aca3259e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/143754.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"143754\", \"name\": \"Jennie R. Adrain et al., appellants-respondents, v. Jean Livingston Koch et al., appellants-respondents\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Adrain v. Koch\", \"decision_date\": \"1915-03-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"195\", \"last_page\": \"195\", \"citations\": \"84 N.J. Eq. 195\", \"volume\": \"84\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:23:46.367887+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"For affirmance \\u2014 The Chief-Justice, Garrison, Swayze, Trenchard, Parker, Bergen, Minturn, Kalisch, Black, Bogert, Vredenburgh, White, Terhune, Heppenheimer, Williams \\u2014 15.\", \"parties\": \"Jennie R. Adrain et al., appellants-respondents, v. Jean Livingston Koch et al., appellants-respondents.\", \"head_matter\": \"Jennie R. Adrain et al., appellants-respondents, v. Jean Livingston Koch et al., appellants-respondents.\\n[Argued December 2d, 1914.\\nDecided March 1st, 1915.]\\nOn appeal .from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Howell, whose opinion is reported in 83 N. J. Eq. 484.\\nMessrs. Pitney, Hardin & Skinner and Messrs. Linddbury, Depue & Faulks, for the complainants.\\nMr. Edward M. Colie, for the defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"112\", \"char_count\": \"772\", \"text\": \"Pee Curiam.\\nThe decree order appealed from will be affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion filed in the court below by Vice-Chan5 \\u2022cellor Howell.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 The Chief-Justice, Garrison, Swayze, Trenchard, Parker, Bergen, Minturn, Kalisch, Black, Bogert, Vredenburgh, White, Terhune, Heppenheimer, Williams \\u2014 15.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/144651.json b/nj/144651.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7e5afb5a67cb4d0490e2ce255a11e76f4c92bee5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/144651.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"144651\", \"name\": \"JAMES GOODMAN ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. FRANK H. EGGERS, JUDGE, ETC., RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Goodman v. Eggers\", \"decision_date\": \"1934-05-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"33\", \"last_page\": \"33\", \"citations\": \"113 N.J.L. 33\", \"volume\": \"113\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:41:06.561643+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JAMES GOODMAN ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. FRANK H. EGGERS, JUDGE, ETC., RESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"JAMES GOODMAN ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. FRANK H. EGGERS, JUDGE, ETC., RESPONDENT.\\nSubmitted February 16, 1934\\n\\u2014 Decided May 4, 1934.\\nFor the appellants, Raslcin & Hornstein.\\nFor the respondent, James A. Hamill.\", \"word_count\": \"77\", \"char_count\": \"513\", \"text\": \"Pee Curiam.\\nThe judgment under review herein should be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinion delivered in the Supreme Court.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 The Chancellor, Chief Justice, Trenchard, Hehee, Yan Buskirk, Heteield, Dear, Dill, JJ. 8.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 Parker, Lloyd, Perskie, Kays, Wells, JJ. 5.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/146764.json b/nj/146764.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d6961f980d9d5bb88329323cbd40dac2a2241b49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/146764.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"146764\", \"name\": \"Lilla M. Flournoy, appellant, v. William H. Tichenor, respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Flournoy v. Tichenor\", \"decision_date\": \"1915-11-15\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"214\", \"last_page\": \"214\", \"citations\": \"85 N.J. Eq. 214\", \"volume\": \"85\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:19:38.271063+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"For affirmance\\u2014Ti-ie Chief-Justice, Garrison, Swayze, Trenchard, Parker, Bergen, Minturn, Kalisoh, Black, Vredenburgi-i, Heprenheimer, Williams, Taylor\\u201413.\", \"parties\": \"Lilla M. Flournoy, appellant, v. William H. Tichenor, respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"Lilla M. Flournoy, appellant, v. William H. Tichenor, respondent.\\n[Submitted July 6th, 1915.\\nDecided November 15th, 1915.]\\nOn appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Stevens.\\nMessrs. Coult & Smithy for the appellant.\\nMr. Walter H. Tiehenor and Messrs. Lehlbach & J ohnson, for the respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"93\", \"char_count\": \"647\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe decree appealed from will be affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion filed in the court below by Vice-Chancellor Stevens.\\nFor affirmance\\u2014Ti-ie Chief-Justice, Garrison, Swayze, Trenchard, Parker, Bergen, Minturn, Kalisoh, Black, Vredenburgi-i, Heprenheimer, Williams, Taylor\\u201413.\\nFor reversal\\u2014None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1480374.json b/nj/1480374.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f68db2955224b0efd393a0a2c3872ab7f3ef0811
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1480374.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1480374\", \"name\": \"IN THE MATTER OF BARRY J. BERAN, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 019301980)\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Beran\", \"decision_date\": \"2004-10-20\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"535\", \"last_page\": \"535\", \"citations\": \"181 N.J. 535\", \"volume\": \"181\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:56:31.024237+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"IN THE MATTER OF BARRY J. BERAN, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 019301980).\", \"head_matter\": \"859 A.2d 449\\nIN THE MATTER OF BARRY J. BERAN, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 019301980).\\nOctober 20, 2004.\", \"word_count\": \"150\", \"char_count\": \"920\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThe Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its decision in DRB 04-167, concluding that BARRY J. BERAN of CHERRY HILL, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1981, should be reprimanded for violating RPC 1.8(e) (improperly advancing funds to clients), RPC 1.15(d) (negligent misappropriation of client trust funds), and Rule 1:21-6 (failure to comply with recordkeeping requirements), and good cause appearing;\\nIt is ORDERED that BARRY J. BERAN is hereby reprimanded; and it is further\\nORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter; and it is further\\nORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this State.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/159142.json b/nj/159142.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c5679e6b3e467c3255e8743ba8ffc9ee1e60cb05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/159142.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"159142\", \"name\": \"LEONARD INVESTMENT COMPANY, PROSECUTOR, v. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE CITY OF TRENTON ET AL., DEFENDANTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Leonard Investment Co. v. Board of Adjustment\", \"decision_date\": \"1939-03-15\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"308\", \"last_page\": \"313\", \"citations\": \"122 N.J.L. 308\", \"volume\": \"122\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:24:02.493602+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"LEONARD INVESTMENT COMPANY, PROSECUTOR, v. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE CITY OF TRENTON ET AL., DEFENDANTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"LEONARD INVESTMENT COMPANY, PROSECUTOR, v. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE CITY OF TRENTON ET AL., DEFENDANTS.\\nSubmitted October 4, 1938\\nDecided March 15, 1939.\\nBefore Brogan, Chief Justice, and Justices Bodine and Heher.\\nFor the prosecutor, Walscheid & Rosenkranz (J. Emil Walscheid, of counsel).\\nFor the defendants, Sidney Goldmann.\", \"word_count\": \"1616\", \"char_count\": \"9989\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nHeher, J.\\nThis certiorari brings up for review the action of the Board of Adjustment of the city of Trenton in revoking a permit, issued by the municipal building inspector on March 15th, 1938, for the erection of a one-story brick building, to be used for store purposes, on lands of prosecutor\\u2014 one hundred and seventy-five feet by one hundred feet \\u2014 situate on the easterly side of Chambers Street, between Tioga Street and Euclid Avenue, in the City of Trenton.\\nThe local zoning ordinance then in force, adopted on July 8th, 1927, placed the lands on either side of Chambers street, at the point in question, to a depth of one hundred feet, in a \\\"No. 1 Business Zone,\\\" as defined therein. The surrounding territory is largely residential. Immediately upon learning, after the grant of the permit, that the design of prosecutor was to devote the proposed building to the conduct of a self-service food market, employing approximately fifty people, neighboring property owners appealed the action thus taken by the building inspector to the board of adjustment. And that body, after hearing, ruled that the zoning ordinance established \\\"minimum requirements for the promotion of the public health, safety', comfort, convenience and general welfare;\\\" that a duty rested upon it, in a case such as this, to \\\"interpret and apply the provisions of the ordinance so that its general purposes and intent may be realized and substantial justice done;\\\" that the specification of prohibited uses in business zones, contained in section III of the ordinance, \\\"must be read in the light of the general purposes and intent of the ordinance, that is to lessen congestion in the streets, to promote health, morals and the general welfare, to secure safety from fire and other dangers;\\\" that, while \\\"not specifically prohibited as a use under section 3 of the ordinance, the food market\\\" to be erected \\\"comes within ihat class of trades and uses which section 3 excludes from business zones,\\\" notably \\\"certain businesses employing more than four (4) persons , garages for more than five (5) motor vehicles and motor vehicle service stations \\u2014 both being trades inimical to the public health, safety and welfare,\\\" and \\\"certain amusement businesses which invariably attract crowds;\\\" that the proposed market \\\"is intended to attract a large clientele,\\\" and \\\"is to be erected in a neighborhood devoted to residences of the better type,\\\" at a distance of approximately two hundred and fifty feet from the Central High School, \\\"where over three thousand children attend classes daily,\\\" and \\\"a short block away\\\" from \\\"the fifth most dangerous corner, in point of view of accidents, in the city;\\\" that nine hundred and seventy-five cars pass that intersection per hour, four hundred and fifty-five of which pass the site of the food market, and that the devotion of the property to such use will substantially increase traffic hazards, and also \\\"unfavorably affect the entire neighborhood and those who dwell in it,\\\" and decrease the \\\"valuation\\\" of neighborhood properties; and that the proposed use \\\"will not promote the public health, safety, comfort, convenience and general welfare, but will definitely impair them,\\\" and therefore the building inspector \\\"erred in issuing the permit in question.\\\"\\nThe primary question therefore is whether the Board of Adjustment was invested with the authority thus exercised. Prosecutor maintains the negative of this proposition, while defendants insist that it is derived from section IX of the ordinance, conferring upon the board power, \\\"in a specific case, after public notice and hearing, and subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards,\\\" to \\\"determine and vary the application of the regulations\\\" therein \\\"established in harmony with their general purpose and intent, without changing the boundaries of the respective zones, as follows: 6. Vary any requirement\\\" of the ordinance \\\"in harmony with its general purposes and intent, so that substantial justice may be done;\\\" and also from section XIY of the ordinance, providing that \\\"in their interpretation and application the provisions\\\" of the ordinance \\\"shall be held to be the minimum requirements adopted for the promotion of the public health, safety, comfort, convenience and general welfare.\\\" The latter provision in particular was invoked by the board as conferring the power exercised.\\nWe are of the view that the action thus taken by the board was coram non judice.\\nThe ordinance established the zones; and it is provided by section I that \\\"No building or premises shall be erected, altered or used for any other than a purpose permitted in the. zone in which such building shall bo erected except in conformity with the regulations herein prescribed for the zone in which such building is located.\\\" Section II enumerates the buildings and uses permissible in residence zones. Section III specifies the uses prohibited in business zones. Viewing subdivision 19 thereof in relation to the whole, it plainly evinces an intention to permit the use of premises in such zones for retail store purposes. The character of the detailed prohibitions is clearly indicative of this design. A retail food market, such as that proposed in the instant case, falls into this category. There is revealed no purpose to make such use of premises in a business zone dependent upon either the size of the establishment, the volume of business, or the number of employes. The residential character of the surrounding territory is beside the point. After all, the lands are in an area zoned for business, with certain definite exceptions not embracive of the use under consideration; and there must be uniformity of application. Arbitrary distinctions are inadmissible.\\nSection IX (a-6), supra, does not confer the claimed authority. It merely vests in the board power to \\\"vary any requirement\\\" of the ordinance \\\"in harmony with its general purposes and intent, so that substantial justice may be done.\\\" This does not embrace the broadening of the restrictions laid down in the ordinance. It is expressly provided that \\\"this authority shall be exercised solely in instances where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the way of carrying out the strict letter\\\" of the ordinance, and \\\"in a manner to secure the public health, safety and general welfare.\\\" And the associated specifications of power in this section reveal a design to authorize a variance from the requirements of the ordinance in certain cases, not to vest in the board power to enlarge its inhibitions. Lutz v. Kaltenbach, 102 N. J. L. 718; Losick v. Binda, 102 Id. 157.\\nNor is the authority exercised comprehended by section XIV of the ordinance. It simply provides that, in the inter pretation and application of the regulations therein prescribed, they \\\"shall be held to be the minimum requirements adopted for the promotion of the public health, safety, comfort, convenience and general welfare.\\\" Viewed in the light of the explanatory statement of intention embodied in that section, the manifest design was to make clear that, in the interpretation of the ordinance, such regulations were to be regarded as minimum requirements only, and not as an impairment of the greater requirements imposed by \\\"existing provisions of the law or ordinance,\\\" or \\\"rules, regulations or permits previously adopted or issued, or which shall be adopted or issued pursuant to law, relating to the use of buildings or premises,\\\" or \\\"any easements, covenants or other agreements between parties.\\\"\\nChapter 274 of the laws of 1928 (incorporated in the Revised Statutes of 1937 as sections 40:55-30, et seq.), adopted pursuant to the zoning amendment of the State Constitution ratified on October 18th, 1927, delimited the essential powers of the local Board of Adjustment in language substantially like that contained in the zoning statute of 1924 (Pamph. L., p. 324), and provided that all existing zoning ordinances should \\\"remain in full force and effect, except in so far as they were inconsistent with the provisions\\\" of the act, \\\"until they shall have been amended, or repealed by the governing body or board of public works.\\\" And this is what our court of last resort has said respecting the scope of these provisions: \\\"This court, in H. Krumgold & Sons v. Jersey City, ante, p. 170, held: \\\"Where a zoning ordinance is ineffective to deprive an owner of property of his right to use the same for store purposes, no appeal to a board of appeals constituted under said ordinance is necessary as a prerequisite for an application for a writ of mandamus ' And in Losick v. Binda, ante, p. 157, we further held that boards, such as boards of adjustment, are created for, and have jurisdiction, only for the purpose of dealing with properties peculiarly situated with reference to zoning requirements and to provide for equitable modifications where it is apparent unnecessary hardship would result to the owner if the provisions of the ordinance were literally enforced, as in Allen v. Paterson, 98 N. J. L. 661; affirmed, 99 Id. 532, and have no authority or jurisdiction to act as an appellate body for the purpose of reviewing the legal or equitable character of the building inspector's act in allowing or rejecting an application for a building permit, nor to pass upon the question as to whether the provisions of the zoning ordinance are in furtherance of the proper exercise of the police power of the municipality.\\\" Lutz v. Kaltenbach, supra.\\nThe resolution of revocation adopted by the Board of Adjustment is therefore vacated, but without costs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/161472.json b/nj/161472.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..116d9a4e7aeda55611f021f196eea592efc3267e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/161472.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"161472\", \"name\": \"Thomas J. Clement, appellant, v. Young Amusement Company and Theodore J. Lapres, respondents\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Clement v. Young Amusement Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1906-11-19\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"258\", \"last_page\": \"260\", \"citations\": \"71 N.J. Eq. 258\", \"volume\": \"71\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:35:23.983965+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"For affirmance-\\u2014The Chief-Jus tice, Garrison, Fort, Garretson, Hendrickson, Pitney, Swayze, Eeed, Bogert, Vredenburgh, Vroom, Green, Gray, Dili\\u201414.\", \"parties\": \"Thomas J. Clement, appellant, v. Young Amusement Company and Theodore J. Lapres, respondents.\", \"head_matter\": \"Thomas J. Clement, appellant, v. Young Amusement Company and Theodore J. Lapres, respondents.\\n[Submitted March 27th, 1906.\\nDecided November 19th, 1906.]\\nAn unsigned draft of lease of property for a term of six years does not satisfy the statute of frauds so as to authorize the court of chancery to decree its execution and performance.\\nOn appeal from a final decree advised by Vice-Chancellor Grey.\\nMr. Howard (\\u00a1arrow and Mr. Joseph B. Wilson (of the Philadelphia bar), for the appellant.\\nMessrs. Thompson & Cole, for the respondents.\", \"word_count\": \"977\", \"char_count\": \"5510\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nGarretson, J'.\\nThis case involves the application of the statute of frauds.\\nThe appellant alleges that he entered into an agreement with the defendant for a lease of certain premises, for a term of six years, at an annual rental of $3,000, and that a lease in writing was prepared containing the terms of the letting, which was assented to both by the appellant and the defendant, the amusement company, and although the same was never signed by either of the parties to the lease it, in connection with the circumstances in the case, sufficiently satisfied the statute of frauds. The appellant by the bill in this case seeks to enforce this lease.\\nThe amusement company admits negotiations with the appellant for a lease, but denies that any agreement was ever reached by the parties.\\nIt denies thg.t William E. Shackelford, its manager, was authorized by the compa^ to make an agreement for this lease, and it nowhere appears that John L. Young, its treasurer, was so authorized.\\nThe appellant testified that on the 29th of June, 1903, he negotiated with Shackelford for a lease upon the terms above stated, paid $50 on account of the rent and took from Shackelford the following receipt;\\n\\\"June 29th, 1903.\\n\\\"Received of M. J. Clement fifty dollars on account of candy stand now being occupied by T. Lapres for the year nineteen hundred and four.\\n\\\"Youngs Amusement Co.,\\n\\\"$50. W. E. Shackeleobd, Mgr.\\\"\\nThe appellant further testifies that he caused a draft ,of a lease to be prepared by his counsel, which embodied the agreement he had made with' the defendant's manager; that he took it to Young, its treasurer, and left it with him, and he made some alterations in it, and that appellant and Young went over it together and some other alterations were made; Young expressed his satisfaction with it and appellant was also satisfied with it and said he would sign it; that he would go and fix it up and would meet Young at the office of the company's counsel to sign that lease, saying there was no use changing'it, having agreed upon it- It does not appear whether the appellant procured a new. copy of the lease which had been altered or took that same copy with him, or in fact had any copy of the lease with him, but he testifies as follows:\\n\\\"I went to Thompson & Cole's office, and; there sat the three [assuming he means the counsel, Shackelford and Young] in there; Shackelford jumped up with another lease; shoved that in my face, and said, 'You sign this lease or nothing; you shan't change a letter or word in it;' I said, T came to sign the lease me and the captain had agreed upon,' and he said, 'You sign that or nothing;' I said, T don't know whether the captain will let me sign, that\\u2014will you, Captain?' he said, 'Oh, yes, I will let you sign it;' I said, 'Let me take this up to my lawyers; I want to get a little advice on it. Will you let me take it out?' Shackelford said, 'I don't know whether the captain will let you take it out\\u2014will you, Captain?' 'Yes, I will let you take it.' I said, 'You know I want to get a little legal advice in these things.' \\\"\\nHe says lie carried it up to Carson & Godfrey, bis attorneys; tliey looked over the lease, and in pursuance of what they did he did not sign it.\\n'It seems, from this testimony, that the appellant and the company never reached any agreement as to the terms of the lease.\\nBut, assuming- that the draft of the lease which the appellant says was altered and-agreed to by Young, and which he is now-seeking to enforce, set forth the terms of the agreement between the parties, and that Shackelford was authorized to make the agreement and Young was authorized to make alterations in it, it was never signed by either of the parties to it, and so did not satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds.\\nThe receipt above mentioned is some evidence of negotiations between the parties and'an agreement as to something, but it contains none of the terms of the lease which the appellant claims was agreed upon.\\nThere was never any delivery of possession of the premises in question to the defendant, nor any evidence to show any expenditure of money under the contract or in part performance of the contract. There is some testimony as to the purchase of two movable machines to be used in connection with the business proposed by the appellant to be carried on in the premises, and also some expenditure in connection with the removal of some glass doors or screens from another place of the appellant to be used in the premises in question, but these were no more-expenditures in the carrying out the contract than would be the cost of a stock of goods to be placed in a store agreed to be leased or of the furniture intended to be used therein.\\nThe decree dismissing the bill is affirmed.\\nFor affirmance-\\u2014The Chief-Jus tice, Garrison, Fort, Garretson, Hendrickson, Pitney, Swayze, Eeed, Bogert, Vredenburgh, Vroom, Green, Gray, Dili\\u201414.\\nFor reversal\\u2014None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/166577.json b/nj/166577.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..95bc1d8cf8bc68ab1a6a38c65ab39bc1507ee669
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/166577.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"166577\", \"name\": \"C. WILLIAM CARUSO, PROSECUTOR, v. NEWTON H. PORTER ET AL., RESPONDENTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Caruso v. Porter\", \"decision_date\": \"1925-10-26\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"71\", \"last_page\": \"73\", \"citations\": \"102 N.J.L. 71\", \"volume\": \"102\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:08:42.424004+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"C. WILLIAM CARUSO, PROSECUTOR, v. NEWTON H. PORTER ET AL., RESPONDENTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"C. WILLIAM CARUSO, PROSECUTOR, v. NEWTON H. PORTER ET AL., RESPONDENTS.\\nSubmitted May 29, 1925\\nDecided October 26, 1925.\\nBefore Justices Trenchard, Katzenbach and Lloyd.\\nFor the prosecutor, John A. Bernhard.\\nFor the respondent, Edward L. Katzenbach.\", \"word_count\": \"872\", \"char_count\": \"5055\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nLloyd, J.\\nThe prosecutor in this writ was convicted in the recorder's court of Bloomfield of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and sentenced to serve thirty days in the common jail or workhouse. On appeal to the Essex Common Pleas and a retrial in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicle act of 1921 and the amendment of 1924, the prosecutor was again convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of thirty days in the common jail.\\nThe conviction and sentence are sought to be set aside for various reasons, which will be taken up in their order.\\nIt is contended in the prosecutor's brief that the Court of Common Pleas was without legal jurisdiction to try the case, because (1) the statute violates the provisions of the constitution requiring every law to embrace but one object, which shall be expressed in its title; (2) because the Court of Common Pleas has no constitutional or legislative power to try criminal cases; (3) because the right of trial by jury is invaded by the act, and it was further claimed that the right of trial by jury was infringed by providing in the act for compulsory imprisonment in the workhouse.\\nNone of these contentions appear to us to be well founded. The title of the act of 1921 contains, as part of its title, this language: \\\"Prescribing and regulating process and the service thereof and proceedings for the violation of the provisions of the act and penalties for said violations.\\\" It is quite apparent that the body of the act is well within the title when it prescribes the process to apprehend, the tribunal to hear the case and the punishment to be imposed upon offenders. These are clearly expressed in the words quoted. Nor .do the act or its title embrace more than one object. The whole scheme of the legislation is to provide for the safe use of an instrument of transportation which, without regulation, would become a dangerous menace to persons and property. All of the provisions of the act are directed to the attainment of the one object, and all are properly incident and appropriate thereto. Paragraph 4 of article 4, section 7 of the constitution, clearly indicate the scope of the prohibited legislation, when it declares its purpose to be to \\\"avoid improper influences which may result from intermingling in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other.\\\" It certainty cannot be said that any part of the act is extraneous or foreign to its general object.\\nThe objection that the Court of Common Pleas has no power to hear the' case, because it is a court for the trial of civil issues only, is equalty without substance. Under the statute invoked it sits as a statutory tribunal, and it was competent for the legislature to select as it chose the forum in which to vest the jurisdiction.\\nThe claim that a constitutional right of trial by jury is invaded is disposed of by reference to the decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals in State v. Rodgers, 91 N. J. L. 212. The defendant in that case, as here, was convicted of driving an automobile while intoxicated. The trial and conviction were before the recorder of Paterson without a jury, and that the validity of the conviction without the intervention of a jury was in the mind of the court is apparent from this language of Mr. Justice Trenchard: \\\"No doubt the legislature wished to provide for punishment for those who drove motor vehicles upon the public streets while under the influence of intoxicating liquors without the delay necessarily incident to indictment and trial by jury.\\\" The right of trial by jury is not universal. In the early case of State v. Anderson, 40 N. J. L. 224, Chief Justice Beasley, speaking for the Supreme Court, said of a sale of intoxicating liquors contrary to law, that \\\"independently of a prohibition by the legislature such a sale is neither immoral nor illegal, and the lawmaker can therefore put it under such control as may be thought best. Not being in its nature an indictable offense, it can be punished by a penalty without indictment.\\\" Upon a like distinction pointed out in State v. Rodgers, supra, the driving of an automobile while intoxicated could be properly subjected to trial and punishment in a summary proceeding.\\nAs to the final contention that the provision of the statute under which the prosecutor was convicted authorizes the sentence to be served in the county jail or workhouse, and thereby provides a punishment applicable only to persons convicted of crime, it is sufficient to say that the prosecutor was not sentenced to the workhouse but to the jail. The broader provision of this phase of the act is, consequently, not involved in the case.\\nThe judgment will be affirmed, with costs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/179199.json b/nj/179199.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b744ede9ad1ace8a65c23477d97aec610a0876ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/179199.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"179199\", \"name\": \"THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR, v. GEORGE SGRO, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Sgro\", \"decision_date\": \"1932-02-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"528\", \"last_page\": \"534\", \"citations\": \"108 N.J.L. 528\", \"volume\": \"108\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:38:17.520816+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR, v. GEORGE SGRO, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.\", \"head_matter\": \"THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR, v. GEORGE SGRO, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.\\nSubmitted October 30, 1931\\nDecided February 1, 1932.\\nFor the plaintiff in error, J. Victor D\\u2019Aloia.\\nFor the defendant in error, Joseph L. Smith, prosecutor of the pleas, and Joseph E. Conlon, assistant prosecutor of the pleas.\", \"word_count\": \"1794\", \"char_count\": \"10226\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nKays, J.\\nThe plaintiff in error was tried before the Essex County Court of Oyer and Terminer upon an indictment charging him with murder. The trial was heard before Daniel J. Brennan, judge of the Court of Common Pleas. The j'ury rendered a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree with the recommendation of mercy. The court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor in the New Jersey state prison. A writ of error was taken under the one hundred and thirty-fifth and one hundred and thirty-sixth sections of the Criminal Procedure act.\\nThe defendant was charged with killing one Louis Balducci who apparently was a bootlegger. The shooting took place on September 12th, 1930, at about ten-thirty in the morning on Seventh avenue, in the city of Newark, about opposite the' store of one Harry Mayer. Deceased was removed, to a city hospital and about four and a half months later died. The direct cause of his death, according to the testimony of Dr. Martland, was a bullet wound received at the aforesaid time.\\nThe evidence shows that the defendant and the decedent had been acquaintances for several years; that the deceased owed the defendant about $200 which the defendant had attempted to collect on several occasions without success. The proofs also showed that at the time of the shooting the defendant, while driving his Nash sedan along Seventh avenue, Newark, saw the deceased in Mayer's store and called him out after stopping his own car on the opposite side of the street. The evidence further shows that the deceased walked across the street to the side of defendant's car and stood at the left side of the car conversing in loud tones with the defendant, and that after such conversation, or argument, the deceased turned and walked back toward the store and was shot down just as he reached the sidewalk. There was no direct evidence by any witness as to the proof who fired the shots. There was, however, circumstantial evidence that the shooting came from the defendant who was in the automobile and that such shooting caused the death of the decedent.\\nThe first ground of reversal is that, \\\"the trial court erroneously permitted the prosecutor to make a statement, in his opening to the jury, which was prejudicial to the defend^ant.\\\" The statement was as follows: \\\" at the end of the case I am going to ask you to bring in a verdict for the extreme penalty, not only as a punishment to him, but as an example to others.\\\" It is contended that the last few words, \\\"as an example to others,\\\" were improper and without justification and were injurious to such an extent to the defendant as to justify the court in reversing the conviction. It appears from the record of the case that counsel for the defendant asked for an exception to the statement. He did not request the court to direct a mistrial or to instruct the jury to disregard the statement. The statement by the prosecutor was justified for the reason that the punishment of a criminal is not only intended as a punishment to such criminal but also as a warning to others for the benefit of society. However, even though it was improper, the mere taking of an exception to a statement by the prosecutor affords no ground for reversal.\\nThe next point raised is that, \\\"the court erroneously permitted the prosecutor of the pleas to plead surprise thereby allowing the state to use an alleged prior self-contradictory statement of a state's witness, Gabriel Contaldi, as evidence against the defendant.\\\" This witness, Contaldi, gave testimony on behalf of the state while on the witness stand which was contradictory to an earlier statement made to the officers of the state prior to the trial. The earlier contradictory statement was offered for the purpose of neutralizing the testimony given by the witness while being examined by the prosecutor. This prior statement was admissible for such purpose. In the case of State v. D'Adame, 84 N. J. L. 386, it was held, that where a party is \\\"surprised\\\" by adverse testimony of a witness called by him, the trial court may in the exercise of its sound discretion permit such party to offer proof of self-contradictory statements previously made for the purpose of neutralizing the effect of such adverse testimony. The admission of the prior statement made by the witness, Contaldi, was within the discretion of the court to admit it in evidence for the purpose of neutralizing the testimony of that witness. The point raised by the plaintiff in error is without merit.\\nThe next point raised by the plaintiff in error is that the trial court should have directed a verdict of acquittal. It is contended that there was nothing in the statement made by the prosecutor in his opening of the case which tended to show the truth of the charge laid against the defendant in the indictment. We find no merit in this contention. The ease of the state was given to the jury in the opening and if proved would have justified the jury in convicting the defendant. A similar motion was made at the close of the case. This motion was also refused by the court. We think that the refusal was justifiable, as there was abundant testimony, if true, which indicated that the defendant was guilty. Whether the testimony was true and whether the defendant was guilty according to the testimony produced were matters to be determined by the jury and not by the court.\\nThe next point raised by the plaintiff in error is that the trial court refused to charge the following request submitted by counsel for the defendant, \\\"it is the law in this state that the failure of the defendant to take the stand does not of' itself give rise to any presumption of guilt.\\\" The court charged the jury on this point as follows: \\\"In this case there is no direct evidence connecting the defendant with this crime, and under the law of this state his failure to take the stand creates no presumption of guilt, providing that, if facts are testified to which concern the acts of the. defendant which he could by his oath deny, his failure to testify in his own behalf raises a strong presumption that he cannot truthfully deny them.\\\" This was an accurate statement of the law upon the point involved and covered the request made. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there was no merit in this contention.\\nThe next point raised by the plaintiff in error is that the trial court permitted the jury to have read to it the testimony of the witness, Russo, sometime after the jury had retired to deliberate upon their verdict. The jury requested the court to have the testimony of this witness read to them and the court granted the request. We are of the opinion that this judicial action was proper and is justified under the decisions of this state. The jury, however, after the reading of Russo's testimony discovered that such testimony was not what they wanted, one of the jurors asked to have the testimony of some other witnesses read relating to the number of cars on Seventh avenue after the shooting. The juror, however, did not indicate whose testimony it was that he or the other members of the jury desired to have read. Such a request' placed upon the court, if it had been granted, the examination of the testimony of all the witnesses in the case for the purpose of dis covering which witness or witnesses had given testimony on this subject, and then, after making such discovery, to have the testimony read to the jury. We are of the opinion that it is not the duty of the court and that there is no legal obligation resting upon the court to compel the court to undertake such a burden. It might entail the consumption of hours or even days for a court to examine all the testimony offered in a ease bearing on some particular point or points and then have such testimony sorted out and read to the jury. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no merit in this contention.\\nThe next and last point argued is that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. The proofs in this case were circumstantial. There was proof that the defendant's car was parked within a few feet of the scene of the shooting; that the deceased and the defendant were talking together in loud tones; that the deceased left the defendant's car and walked away from it toward the opposite side of the street; that two or three shots were fired from the car whereupon the deceased fell to the road or sidewalk on his face, and that the car then was immediately driven away down Seventh avenue; that the ear was a dark sedan bearing a license number H4017 according to one witness, and according to the confession of the defendant H410T7; that the deceased owed the defendant about $200; that the deceased and defendant had known each other for several years; that the defendant left the place in which he was living immediately after the shooting and did not return until sometime the latter part of October. There was a statement made by Balducci a short time before his death to the effect that the defendant was his friend and did not shoot him. During all the period which the deceased spent in the hospital ho had been visited by the wife of the defendant once or twice weekly. It is not for this court to determine, in order to support the verdict in this case, that the testimony shows the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The function of this court on review is merely to determine whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence and we are of the opinion that such verdict was not against the weight of the evidence as produced in this case.\\nThere being no prejudicial error the judgment of the court below is affirmed.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 The Chief Justice, Trenchard, Parker, Campbell, Lloyd, Case, Bodine, Daly, Donges, Van Buskirk, Kays, Hetfield, Dear, Wells, Kerney, JJ. 15.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/179235.json b/nj/179235.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..87dc01f517279101335d56ee0fc637f4208cd547
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/179235.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"179235\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR, v. THOMAS FLEMMING, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Flemming\", \"decision_date\": \"1931-05-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"16\", \"last_page\": \"19\", \"citations\": \"108 N.J.L. 16\", \"volume\": \"108\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:38:17.520816+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR, v. THOMAS FLEMMING, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR, v. THOMAS FLEMMING, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.\\nSubmitted October 17, 1930\\nDecided May 7, 1931.\\nBefore Gummere, Chief Justice, and Justices Trenchard and Lloyd.\\nFor the plaintiff in error, Michael Breitkopf and Joseph Kraemer.\\nFor the state, Joseph L. Smith, prosecutor of the pleas, and Felix Forlenza, assistant prosecutor.\", \"word_count\": \"902\", \"char_count\": \"5217\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nGummere, Chief Justice.\\nThomas Flemming, the plaintiff in error, and one Charles'Connor were convicted upon an indictment charging them with the commission of an assault and battery upon one Harry Peck. Flemming alone has sued out the present writ'of error.\\nThe defendants and Peck, upon whom the assault was committed, were each of them members of a labor union, of which Flemming was the business'agent. Peck and Connor had been employed at the Fairfield Airport, in Caldwell, working on different shifts. The managers of the airport, concluding that only one man was'needed for this work, discharged Connor and retained Peck. Subsequently the union held a meeting, apparently for the purpose of determining whether Peck should not be required 'to abandon the work also. He was notified of this meeting and attended it. According to the proofs submitted on the part of the state,'when the meeting ended and he was leaving, he was assaulted by Flemming, Connor and several others, and 'was severely beaten. Flemming's defense was that he was not present at the time of the assault.\\nThe first ground upon which we are asked to reverse the conviction against Flemming is that 'the court improperly permitted testimony to be given relating to conversations between various members of the union and Peck, at which Flemming was not present. Assuming that 'the conversations testified to were not had in the presence of the plaintiff in error, and, therefore, were improperly admitted, we are satisfied from a reading thereof that the admission of these conversations did not work manifest wrong and injury to the plaintiff in error, and that, consequently, as the case comes before us under the one hundred and thirty-sixth section of the Criminal Procedure act, their admission does not justify a reversal. State v. Matarazza, 93 N. J. L. 47; S. C. on error, 94 Id. 263.\\nThe next contention is that the court in its charge to the jury erroneously instructed them as follows: \\\"The state contends that this assault grew out of a difficulty in connection with the employment of Peck and Connor on a job in Caldwell. The state produced evidence to the effect that there was a controversy with regard to these men working. The state further contends that there was a motive on the part of this union to beat up this complainant, and that no other motive is indicated in the case.\\\" This instruction lays down no legal principle, but is merely a statement of the contention on the part of the state, and is an accurate statement of that contention. There was no error of law, therefore, in this portion of the charge.\\nIt is next argued that the court erred in refusing to charge the following request: \\\"To prove motive, it is not sufficient for the state to show that these defendants were members of the union, but they must go further, and prove there was such a relationship between the union and these defendants that they became the agents of the union, and if the state is unable to prove this, then the proof of motive fails.\\\" This request is apparently based upon the claim of the state recited in that portion of the charge just quoted; namely, that the defendants were acting as the agents of the union in committing an assault upon Peck, the theory of the request being that, unless this was shown to be the fact, the state had failed to prove the existence of any motive which induced the defendants to commit the assault. Whether the theory of the state was sound or not is, in our opinion, quite immaterial, and for this reason: No obligation rested upon the state to prove the existence of the particular motive (if any existed) which led to the commission of the crime charged in the indictment. As is declared by the Court of Errors and Appeals in the case of State v. Ehlers, 98 N. J. L. 236, 240, proof of motive is not an essential element in determining whether or not a defendant is guilty of a crime such as that now under consideration. If the proved facts establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed by him, the defendant is guilty, no matter what his motive may have been. This being so, we conclude that the refusal to charge the request submitted was not harmful error.\\nThe only other contention on the part of the plaintiff in error is that the finding of the jury that the plaintiff in error had failed to sustain by a preponderance of proof his defense of an alibi was in disregard of the testimony in the case, and that, for this reason, the conviction under review should be reversed. Our examination of all the testimony bearing upon this point satisfies us that the finding of the jury upon the question of the defendant's alibi is not against the weight of the evidence.\\nEor the reasons indicated, we conclude that the conviction under review should be affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/181713.json b/nj/181713.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..726653d44eecd4b66fa32056b16d814640bf5e80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/181713.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"181713\", \"name\": \"EMMA WHITE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. PUBLIC SERVICE CO-ORDINATED TRANSPORT, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"White v. Public Service Co-ordinated Transport\", \"decision_date\": \"1932-10-17\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"325\", \"last_page\": \"327\", \"citations\": \"109 N.J.L. 325\", \"volume\": \"109\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:18:08.595116+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"EMMA WHITE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. PUBLIC SERVICE CO-ORDINATED TRANSPORT, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"EMMA WHITE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. PUBLIC SERVICE CO-ORDINATED TRANSPORT, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.\\nSubmitted May 27, 1932 \\u2014\\nDecided October 17, 1932.\\nFor the plaintiff-appellant, Alexander Simpson.\\nFor the defendant-respondent, Henry H. Fryling (James O. Boyd, of counsel).\", \"word_count\": \"475\", \"char_count\": \"2839\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nCase, J.\\nThe case comes to us on the plaintiff's appeal from a judgment for the defendant rendered at the Essex Circuit on a jury verdict before Judge Mountain. The action was for the recovery of damages for personal injuries and incidental losses alleged to have been caused by the negligent operation of one of defendant's buses in the city of Newark.\\nThere are eight grounds of appeal, the first three of which relate to rulings on evidence and the last five to refusals of the court to charge on plaintiff's requests. All three of the evidence rulings were in the allowing of questions, asked on cross-examination, to stand. The questions embraced within the first and third of these rulings were not answered. Consequently, no harm was done. The question covered by the second ruling was as follows: \\\"Q. And when you were on the witness-stand you didn't say anything at all about the injuries which you had sustained two weeks before the time you were on the stand?\\\" That question was not answered. Another question was framed, to which no objection was made, and the new question and the answer thereto were: \\\"Q. You didn't say anything on the stand at that time about having met with an accident two weeks before? A. I was not asked about my accident, my second accident.\\\" Obviously no harm followed upon the admission of this testimony.\\nThe last five grounds of appeal are not properly before us for the reason that no exceptions were taken at the trial. Eight requests to charge were made by the plaintiff, some of which the court charged, others of which the court considered were comprehended within directions already given the jury, and others of which were denied. Clearly it was the duty of the plaintiff, if she desired to maintain her right to a review, on appeal, of the court's disposition of these requests, forth with to take exception or otherwise properly note her objection so that the court might be apprised of her purpose and be governed accordingly. Kargman v. Carlo, 85 N. J. L. 632. Moreover, we consider that all of the requests were properly refused. The grounds of appeal are on the refusals of the third to the seventh requests, inclusive. The third, fifth and seventh requests were substantially charged by the court, as were also the fourth and sixth to the extent that they were sound in law.\\nThe judgment below will he affirmed.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 The Chancellor, Trenchard, Parker, Lloyd, Case, Bodine, Donges, Brogan, Van Buskirk, Kays, Dear, Wells, Kerney, JJ. 13.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/183892.json b/nj/183892.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..711d0dc02282bca840c1d9afbb90fabb71cb42d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/183892.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"183892\", \"name\": \"Harry Minck et al., trustees, &c., v. Mary Jane Walker et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Minck v. Walker\", \"decision_date\": \"1912-10-23\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"112\", \"last_page\": \"114\", \"citations\": \"81 N.J. Eq. 112\", \"volume\": \"81\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:40:44.522932+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Harry Minck et al., trustees, &c., v. Mary Jane Walker et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Harry Minck et al., trustees, &c., v. Mary Jane Walker et al.\\n[Submitted September 16th, 1912.\\nDetermined October 23d, 1912.]\\nA bill by complainants as trustees under a void trust contained in a will, which bill sets forth the provisions of such trust, the acts done by the complainants, in the performance thereof, whereby they realized certain moneys, and which bill seeks a settlement in this court of such a nature that proper allowances may be made to the complainants for their services and expenditures, and asks that the funds then remaining in their hands may be distributed by decree of this court amongst the. persons entitled thereto, and that an injunction be issued restraining the testator\\u2019s heirs-at-law from disturbing the grantees of the complainants by actions of ejectment or otherwise, exhibits no ground of equitable jurisdiction, and will be dismissed for want of equity, upon motion.\\nThe bill discloses that Joshua W. Bishop, deceased, devised and bequeathed certain real and personal \\u00e9state to complainants in trust, and that complainants, in the performance of the trust duties imposed by the will, in good faith sold and conveyed cer tain real estate so devised and in like manner conveyed certain other real estate in fulfillment of contracts made by testator in his lifetime, and also collected rents of other real estate covered by the trust provisions of the will. The provisions of the will which so devised and bequeathed the property to complainants in trust have since been by the supreme court of this state declared void because violative of the law against the creation of perpetuities. The moneys received by complainants as rents and proceeds of sale of real estate are still in complainants\\u2019 hands, and complainants now by their bill seek a settlement in this court of such a nature that proper allowances may be made to them for their services and expenditures, and that the funds then remaining in their hands be distributed by decree of this court to the persons who are entitled to the same; an injunction is also sought to restrain the heirs-at-law from disturbing the grantees of complainants by actions of ejectment against them or otherwise. The heirs-at-law and administrator cum testamento annexo of testator and also the several grantees of. complainants are made defendants. Motions are now made by the administrator cum testamento annexo of testator and by his heirs-at-law to dismiss the bill for want of equity and for other reasons specified in the motions.\\nMr. Charles I.. Wooster, for the complainants.\\nMr. Adam B. Sloan, opposed.\", \"word_count\": \"921\", \"char_count\": \"5580\", \"text\": \"Leamjstg, V. C.\\nI am unable to discern any theory upon which the bill can be maintained. The conveyances made by complainants cannot vest a title'in their grantees; as against the heirs-at-law these conveyances are clearly void. The heir or heirs-at-law to whom the real estate descended, as land of which testator died intestate^ cannot be brought into this court to litigate their claim of title or possession of the land conveyed by complainants or their claims to the rents collected by complainants, nor can the grantees of complainants be brought into this court to here assert their claim against complainants for a return of the purchase moiiey by them paid to complainants, unless some branch of equitable jurisdiction can be found to enable complainants to compel these defendants to submit to the adjudication of these purely legal rights in this court. The bill calls complainants de facto trustees and claims equitable jurisdiction by reason of the analogy of a trusteeship; the motion to dismiss the bill calls complainants executors de son tort, and claims that as such they are entitled to no equitable relief. Complainants are neither de facto trustees nor executors de son tort. There was no trusteeship, and there can be no de facto officer without a de jure office. So far as the bill discloses, the only assets which complainants have received were either real estate or its revenues; such assets go to heirs; a person becomes an executor de son tort only when intermeddling with assets which affect the administration. The right of the grantees of complainant to come into a court of equity in an effort to impress a trust upon the purchase-money paid by them, if such right can be said to exist, affords no support to the present bill. Nor is the bill in form or substance a bill of interpleader. Nor can the jurisdiction of this court over the settlement of estates of deceased persons be here invoked; such settlements belong primarily to another court, and the bill does not seek such a settlement. It might serve convenience if the heirs-at-law, administrator cum testamento annexo and the grantees of complainant could be brought in and compelled to submit to a decree directing the complainants to restore to the several purchasers their purchase-money and to the heirs the rents collected and to the administrator any personal assets which conrplainants maj' have received, and directing the purchasers to restore to the heirs the possession of the real estate by them purchased and adjudicating and apportioning equitable allowances for services performed and expenditures made by complainants ; but I find no warrant for the assumption of such ]jower or authority by this court, and no precedent has been cited to sustain such a jurisdiction. The rights of the respective parties are such that the remedies afforded by the law courts must be deemed adequate, even though they may not be found entirely convenient.\\nI will advise an order dismissing the bill.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1902949.json b/nj/1902949.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b510d9cf646c3a954bac5b7cc310cc0cebf394da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1902949.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1902949\", \"name\": \"IN THE MATTER OF EUGENE F. HAYDEN, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW AND FORMER MAGISTRATE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE BOROUGH OF SAYREVILLE, RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Hayden\", \"decision_date\": \"1964-02-03\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"443\", \"last_page\": \"445\", \"citations\": \"41 N.J. 443\", \"volume\": \"41\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:36:58.046443+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"IN THE MATTER OF EUGENE F. HAYDEN, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW AND FORMER MAGISTRATE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE BOROUGH OF SAYREVILLE, RESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"IN THE MATTER OF EUGENE F. HAYDEN, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW AND FORMER MAGISTRATE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE BOROUGH OF SAYREVILLE, RESPONDENT.\\nArgued January 7, 1964\\nDecided February 3, 1964.\\nEor the order: Mr. Edward J. Dolan.\\nEor the respondent: Mr. Warren W. Wilentz.\", \"word_count\": \"668\", \"char_count\": \"4130\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered\\nPee Cubiam.\\nRespondent is a member of the bar and a former magistrate for the Borough of Sayreville. On December 4, 1963 we issued an order to show cause why respondent should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined for engaging in partisan political activity while serving as a magistrate in violation of Canon 28 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the policies established by this Court which preclude judges from engaging in partisan political activity. See R. R. 8:13-7.\\nCanon 28 provides:\\n\\\"While entitled to entertain his personal views of political questions, and while not required to surrender his rights or opinions as a citizen, it is inevitable that suspicion of being warped by political bias will attach to a judge who becomes the active promoter of the interests of one political party as against another. He should avoid making political speeches, making or soliciting payment of assessments or contributions to party funds, the public endorsement of candidates for political office and participation in party conventions.\\nHe should neither accept nor retain a place on any party committee nor act as party leader, nor engage generally in partisan activities.\\\"\\nThe admitted facts are as follows. While the respondent was serving as magistrate for the Borough of Sayreville, his first cousin, John Kierst, Councilman Joseph Ziemba and others were enbroiled in a bitter primary fight against the incumbent Mayor Harold Boehm and his followers for the nomination of borough councilmen. Respondent favored his cousin's faction. The rival group had made verbal charges that one Frank Caprio, respondent's former client, had paid money to Ziemba to let him remove sand from borough property\\u2014 implying extortion by Ziemba. On April 14, 1962, three days before the primary election, Kierst and Ziemba, who were being hurt politically by the charges, asked the respondent for his help. At their request, respondent immediately contacted Caprio for the purpose of getting a statement from him denying that he had told the Mayor that he had paid Ziemba for letting him take the sand. Respondent prepared and typed the following statement which Caprio signed:\\n\\\"To whom it may concern, I deny that I ever told Harold Boehm that I ever paid Joseph Ziemba for permission to take sand from the Borough of Sayreville property.\\\"\\nThis statement was circulated in the community and broadcast over the local radio station as a paid political announcement.\\nThe respondent readily admits violating the canon. He says that he made a gross mistake in judgment which was motivated by his affection for his cousin and his interest as a private citizen in the election of men he considered superior to the opposition.\\nThe personal interests of a magistrate cannot excuse a violation of the canon. Under no circumstances should a judge engage in partisan political activity. The reason for the canon as expressed therein is the necessity for a judge at all times so to conduct himself as to avoid any suspicion that his judicial activities may be influenced by his political preferences. Such a suspicion is the inevitable consequence when a judge becomes the active promoter of those seeking public office.\\nWe are seriously concerned with any infraction of the letter and spirit of Canon 28 and generally we would severely discipline an offender. However, in determining the quantum of discipline in the present matter, we note that the charge against the respondent involves a single indiscretion and not a continued course of partisan political activity. Cf. In re Pagliughi, 39 N. J. 517 (1963). Under the circumstances we have decided that respondent should be sharply reprimanded for his conduct.\\nFor reprimand\\u2014Chief Justice Weinteaub, and Justices Jacobs, Ebancis, Peoctoe,, Hall, Schettikto and Habte-MA3ST-7.\\nOpposed\\u2014None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1925623.json b/nj/1925623.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f36c4c598207d0aa8725389a80253c98ce6657ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1925623.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1925623\", \"name\": \"CONRAD J. RINGLIEB, HELEN ELAINE RINGLIEB AND FRIEDA RINGLIEB, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. THE TOWNSHIP OF PARSIPPANY-TROY HILLS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, GEORGE F. KUGLER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, DEFENDANTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Ringlieb v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills\", \"decision_date\": \"1971-10-26\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"348\", \"last_page\": \"354\", \"citations\": \"59 N.J. 348\", \"volume\": \"59\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:09:12.710241+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CONRAD J. RINGLIEB, HELEN ELAINE RINGLIEB AND FRIEDA RINGLIEB, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. THE TOWNSHIP OF PARSIPPANY-TROY HILLS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, GEORGE F. KUGLER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, DEFENDANTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"CONRAD J. RINGLIEB, HELEN ELAINE RINGLIEB AND FRIEDA RINGLIEB, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. THE TOWNSHIP OF PARSIPPANY-TROY HILLS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, GEORGE F. KUGLER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, DEFENDANTS.\\nArgued October 12, 1971\\nDecided October 26, 1971.\\nMr. Robert G. Garofalo argued the cause for appellant (Messrs. Ryan, Foster & Garofalo, attorneys).\\nMr. Harold A. Price and Mr. Garret A. Hobart, IV, argued the cause for respondents, Ringlieb (Messrs. Schenclc, Price, Smith & King, attorneys).\\nMr. Richard M. Pisacane, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents, George E. Kugler, Jr., et al (Mr. George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General, attorney).\", \"word_count\": \"2812\", \"char_count\": \"17394\", \"text\": \"Pee Ctjeiam.\\nThe judgment is affirmed for the reasons expressed by Judge Joseph H. Stamler in his oral opinion which reads as follows:\\nThis matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment. On May 6, 1970 the Legislature approved two pieces of legislation concerning solid waste. Chapter 39 of the Laws of 1970 concerned itself with solid waste management and the title of that statute read that it was \\\"An Act Concerning Solid Waste Management creating an Advisory Council on Solid Waste Management in the State Department of Environmental Protection and Relating to the Department's Functions, Powers and Duties\\\".\\nThis statute, Chapter 39, was incorporated into our laws as N. J. 8. 13:1E-1 et seq. and in Section 2 the Legislature expressed its concern when it made the following findings and declarations: \\\"The collection, disposal and utilization of solid waste is a matter of grave concern to all citizens and is an activity thoroughly affected with the public interest; that the health, safety and welfare of the people of this State require efficient and reasonable solid waste collection and disposal service or efficient utilization of such waste, and that the current solid waste crisis should be resolved not only by the enforcement of more stringent and realistic regulations upon the solid waste industry but also through the development and formulation of statewide, regional, county and intercounty plans for solid waste management and guidelines to implement the plans.\\\"\\nThroughout that statute there is no mention of the concern of the Legislature below the inter-county level but by that statute, 13 :lE-9, the Legislature provided that the codes, rules and regulations shall be observed throughout the State and shall be enforced by the Department and every local Board of Health. Thereafter the procedure for penalty provisions is set forth in actions commenced by the Commissioner of Environmental Control or by a local Board of Plealth. The rules and regulations have already been promulgated and adopted and these appear as Chapter 8, \\\"Refuse Disposal.\\\"\\nThese were the rules and regulations adopted by the Department and/or Commissioner of Plealth and although it had been adopted on a day prior to the passage of the legislation here in question by the department of Health of the State of New Jersey, its functions were transferred and the Environmental Protection Department accepted these in accordance with the authority set forth in the statute here in question and R. J. 8. A. 26 :lA-7.\\nOn the same day the Legislature passed the Solid Waste Utility Control Act of 1970, and there are legislative findings made there in R. J. S. 48:13A-2 which restate the grave concern of all citizens and of the Legislature in the industry affected and makes a public utility out of those people who are engaged in solid waste collection and disposal and it gives to the Public Utility Commission the duty of establishing and enforcing standards and rates for the regulating of the economic aspects of the solid waste collection, disposal and utilization service. Under the two statutes anyone seeking to engage in this operation would be required to comply with stringent requirements and would first, before qualified as a public utility, be required to bo found by the Board of Public Utilities Commissioners as qualified by experience, training or education to engage in the business, to furnish proof of financial responsibility and, most importantly, hold a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Board of Public Utility Commissioners.\\nThis is found in R. J. 8. 48:13A-6, which concludes with the following sentence: \\\"No certificate shall be issued for solid waste collection or solid waste disposal until the proposed collection or disposal system has been registered with and approved by the State Department of Environmental Protection as provided by law.\\\"\\nIn Section 8 of the same statute the Public Utility Commission (the Board) can order any person in this State engaged in the solid waste collection business or the solid waste disposal business to extend his collection or disposal service into any area of the State where service has been discontinued in accordance with sections of the Public Utility Act heretofore enacted, R. 8. 48:2-27.\\nA reading of both acts together with the regulation adopted seems to be a comprehensive plan on the part of the State to control all facets of this industry.\\nAll counsel have acknowledged on this motion that the need was great for the State to step in and do something, that the concern was partially economic and rising costs, but there was also concern in the Department of Environmental Protection about where our land was going when it would be overwhelmed with sewage and disposal problems.\\nSo that this act was in existence when on October 13th, 1970 Parsippany-Troy Plills passed an ordinance. The ordinance was entitled \\\"An Ordinance Providing for Establishing, Licensing, Operating, Regulating, Maintaining, and Controlling Sanitary Landfills in the Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills.\\\" There is no question but that the industry there sought to be regulated, the type of industry, was well within the limitations and requirements as imposed by Chapter 39 and Chapter 40.\\nAfter the passage of the ordinance heretofore referred to plaintiffs, Conrad J. Ringlieb, Helen Elaine Ringlieb and Frieda Ringlieb \\u2014and as the complaint was amended by order of this Court, Sharkey Farms, Inc.\\u2014brought an action against the Township of ParsippanyTroy Hills, George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, the Department of Environmental Protection and the Board of Public Utility Commissioners.\\nIn relevant part, so far as this motion is concerned, plaintiffs, who were owners and operators of the sanitary land site in Parsippany-Troy Hills, asked this Court to determine that the Legislature by Chapter 39 and Chapter 40 preempted the entire industry and the regulation of that industry of sanitary landfills by the enactment of the two statutes heretofore referred to. The Attorney General, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, and the Department of Environmental Control, notwithstanding that they were named defendants \\u2014 and it was necessary that they be so named because a state statute was asked to be construed by this Court in accordance with the declaratory judgment act, were necessary parties to the suit; at least the Attorney General was \\u2014\\u2022 these three defendants join in plaintiffs' motion and support in all respects and adopt the position that there has been a preemption by the State to the exclusion of the municipality.\\nThe defendant municipality cross moves for summary judgment and takes the position that the statutes do not preclude the municipality from passing an ordinance regulating the same industry.\\nThe Court has examined the ordinance and feels that absent state statutes such ordinance would serve a very useful purpose in protecting the health of individuals in the municipality hut the state statute, admittedly by defendant, in one or another respect, conflicts with or duplicates that which is required by the ordinance.\\nI have compared the ordinance with the statutes in question and with the regulations under the statute in question, Chapter 8, \\\"Refuse Disposal\\\" and there is much duplication and overlapping, requiring double effort and serving no useful purpose.\\nIt is well-established that municipalities in our State have no power other than those delegated to them by the Legislature and by our State Constitution. The State may withhold from or grant a given power to a municipality. The question of preemption must be determined absent an express exclusion from the field by the State by tlie Courts ascertaining the legislative intent.\\nIn our Constitution, Article 4, Section 7, Paragraph 11, our Courts are enjoined by this constitutional provision, to liberally construe all laws in favor of municipal corporations. Local government should be given every advantage to manage and operate its affairs but the Constitution expressly states that the municipalities have not only the powers granted in express terms but also those of necessary or fair implication or incident to powers expressly conferred or essential thereto, but it concludes with the following limitation: that none of these powers, whether they are express or by implication inconsistent with or prohibited by the Constitution or state statute, shall be inferred as going from the State. Attached to every ordinance there is an implied condition that it must yield to the predominant power of the State.\\nThe Supreme Court in Wagner v. [Mayor and Municipal Council of City of] Newark, 24 N. J. 467, Chief Justice Vanderbilt speaking for the Court, stated the principle that I have just set forth in language a little different from that which I have stated but the effect is the same, and then said, \\\"To hold otherwise would lead to confusion and absurd results.\\\"\\nThere they were dealing with the control of rents by a municipality and the Court went on to say, \\\"And so it is that if the control of rents by a municipality independent of a state enactment covering the same subject is incompatible with the public policy of the State or with the intent and purpose of the Legislature manifested by its enactment, the attempt at control on a local level is void.\\\"\\nHere the fair reading of Chapter 39 and of Chapter 40, and especially with a view of close scrutiny on the legislative findings, there is an -intention disclosed certainly by the Legislature to make uniform this industry throughout the State.\\nIn the Weehawhen case [Board of Health of Tp. of Weehawken in Hudson County v. New York Cent. R. Co.], which I don't have here before me now, 4 N. J. [293], at 298, the Supreme Court said, \\\"There cannot be in the nature of things a delegation of regulative power which in its varying local applications would render function under the State's charter impracticable.\\\"\\nThis then would be the situation here if each municipality in the state could place and restrict in a manner similar to that which is restricted by the ordinance passed by the Parsippany-Troy Hills, and the conflicting ordinances and requirements of the separate municipalities would bring to a complete halt the sanitary landfill operations in this state, the refuse disposal business, all to the detriment of the general health of the general public.\\nI have searched to find whether or not there is some statute which specifically regulated or delegated the power to a municipality to regulate sanitary landfills. I could find none. The statutes to which the defendant municipality has referred me in its brief deals with the municipality's right to engage in the collection and disposal of gaz'bage, the establishment of authorities to operate incinerators and solid waste management authorities.\\nThere is no statutory power granted to a municipality directly which permits it to control the solid waste as the State seeks to control it here. There is no question, it is acknowledged on the part of counsel, that the industry here involved with these two statutes is cloaked with a public interest.\\nIn In Re Public Service Electric & Gas Co. the Supreme Court at page 371 of 35 N. J. [358] said that an ordinance which conflicted, though it was passed under the zoning power and the general police power granted to a municipality, with the operations of the public utility there involved, the Public Service Electric & Gas Co., and the municipality requirement that it bury all new power lines underground, the Court held that the State through the Legislature \\\"has delegated in most sweeping terms 'general supervision and regulation of and jurisdiction and control over all public utilities' and 'their property, property rights, equipment, facilities and franchises' to the Board.\\\"\\nIn the same ease, a little later on in the opinion, the Court held that the Public Utilities Law was a recognition by the Legislature that public interest and proper regulation of public utilities transcends municipal or county lines and that a centralized control must be entrusted to an agency whose continually developing expertise will assure uniformly safe, proper and adequate service by utilities throughout' the state.\\nThe Court went on to say at page 372, \\\"Where the state has thus established an agency of its own with plenary power to regulate utilities, it is universally recognized that municipalities cannot properly interpose their local restrictions unless and only to the extent any power to do so is expressly reserved to them by statute.\\\"\\nIn the recent case of Summer [Summer] v. Teaneck Chief Justice Weintraub said \\u2014 and this is at 53 N. J. 548, at page 554: \\\"A municipality may not contradict a policy the Legislature establishes. Hence, an ordinance will fall if it permits what a statute expressly forbids or forbids what a statute expressly authorizes. Even absent such evident conflict, a municipality may be unable to exercise a power it would otherwise have if the Legislature has preempted the field.\\\"\\nIn Woodside Homes, Inc. v. Town of Morristown, 26 S. J. 529, a decision of our Supreme Court in 1958, there was the Town of Morris-town who was a defendant in an action and the Court there held that this municipality of the Town of Morristown, operating a water company which it originally acquired from a private source that was under an exclusive franchise service area outside the limits of the Town of Morristown, was subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners in respect to the extension of water mains, and I noted before that the new statute grants to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners in respect to the extension of water mains, and I noted before that the new statute grants' to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners the right to demand of any franchised public utility the right to extend its services in refuse disposal where it deems it necessary.\\nI find here that the plaintiff, when approved and certificated by the board under the two statutes, operates under the regulations. I find him to be a public utility according to constitutional state legislation, serving a function which is plainly essential to public health. For this the certificate of necessity so provides and requires; and that he is an instrumentality, the plaintiff is an instrumentality, who operates not only with the express approval but under a charged duty with stringent penalties under the eye of the Department of Environmental Protection and the Public Utilities Board.\\nThis is not to say that the municipality has no right. An examination of the Public Utility Act preserves to the municipality a right to intervene in any action taken by the Public Utility Commission.\\nIt. 8. 48:2-32.2 reads: \\\"Every municipality may intervene in any hearing or investigation held by the board which involves public utility rates, fares or charges, service or facilities, affecting the municipality or the public within the municipality.\\\"\\nI road this to mean, although I found no cases so interpreting it, that it is not limited to the economic aspects. I think that when the words \\\"service or facilities\\\" are used they are talking about the public convenience and necessity. This Court concludes that the Legislature by Chapter 39 of the Laws of 1970 and Chapter 40 of the Laws of 1970 has preempted the field of solid waste collection and disposal and management under both statutes and that municipalities who are protected in part under the statute generally for every operation requires a certification that it does not violate the land use provisions of the municipality before approval. It is protected to that extent and can take such steps as it deems necessary when the occasion arises to impose upon the Department of Environmental Control or the Public Utilities Commission the additional protection that it feels it needs but it cannot do so by an ordinance which involves penalties or requires a person to go through the same procedures, the same requirements, almost word for word the same, as is required by the State.\\nAn order for summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and the defendants, Attorney General, Public Utilities Commission, Department of Environmental Protection and Control, will be entered. The motion of defendant Parsippany-Troy Hills for summary judgment in its favor is denied.\\nFor affirmance\\u2014Chief Justice Weintraub and Justices Jacobs, Francis, Proctor, Hall, Schettino and Mountain\\u20147.\\nFor reversal\\u2014Hone.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1925747.json b/nj/1925747.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fe7bec8b5302e4bd4d8a9e60ebd430f681077cce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1925747.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1925747\", \"name\": \"THOMAS W. KELLY, AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF THORNTON C. LAND, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. SIDNEY GLASER, ACTING DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kelly v. Glaser\", \"decision_date\": \"1971-11-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"355\", \"last_page\": \"355\", \"citations\": \"59 N.J. 355\", \"volume\": \"59\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:09:12.710241+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THOMAS W. KELLY, AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF THORNTON C. LAND, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. SIDNEY GLASER, ACTING DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"THOMAS W. KELLY, AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF THORNTON C. LAND, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. SIDNEY GLASER, ACTING DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.\\nArgued October 13, 1971\\nDecided November 8, 1971.\\nMr. Thomas W. Kelly, a member of the New York bar, argued pro se (Messrs. Milton, Keane & DeBona, attorneys).\\nMr. Herbert K. Gliclcman, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Mr. George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).\", \"word_count\": \"162\", \"char_count\": \"1005\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe judgment is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed by the Appellate Division. Kelly v. Glaser, 112 N. J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 1970), certif. granted 57 N. J. 597 (1971). We do not pass upon the implications of the earlier cases of Bente v. Bugbee, 103 N. J. L. 608 (E. & A. 1927) or Sullivan v. Margetts, 9 N. J. Super. 189 (App. Div. 1950).\\nFor affirmance\\u2014-Chief Justice Weinteaub and Justices Jacobs, Francis, Peoctoe, Hall, Schettino and Mountain\\u20147.\\nFor reversal\\u2014None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1926930.json b/nj/1926930.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e7b724f21fc9d0d994a09a38fb832ac57e1ec545
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1926930.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1926930\", \"name\": \"LONGPORT ASSOCIATES v. LEON LEOPARDI\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Longport Associates v. Leopardi\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-06-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"348\", \"last_page\": \"348\", \"citations\": \"71 N.J. 348\", \"volume\": \"71\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:12:49.944822+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"LONGPORT ASSOCIATES v. LEON LEOPARDI.\", \"head_matter\": \"LONGPORT ASSOCIATES v. LEON LEOPARDI.\\nJune 4, 1976.\", \"word_count\": \"18\", \"char_count\": \"130\", \"text\": \"Petition for certification is dismissed as having been improvidently granted.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1944328.json b/nj/1944328.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..29629faf6ba1b63c1716755e7507a02d7ace79e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1944328.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1944328\", \"name\": \"WILLIAM E. KENNY v. BRENDAN T. BYRNE, GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kenny v. Byrne\", \"decision_date\": \"1977-01-18\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"56\", \"last_page\": \"56\", \"citations\": \"73 N.J. 56\", \"volume\": \"73\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:53:38.832223+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"WILLIAM E. KENNY v. BRENDAN T. BYRNE, GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY.\", \"head_matter\": \"WILLIAM E. KENNY v. BRENDAN T. BYRNE, GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY.\\nJanuary 18, 1977.\", \"word_count\": \"24\", \"char_count\": \"143\", \"text\": \"Petition for certification granted. (See 144 N. J. Super. 243)\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/19447.json b/nj/19447.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fe913f84f7f0aeba9ed76f84101a85099a9b9cb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/19447.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"19447\", \"name\": \"Catharine M. Hands, complainant, v. Helen R. Russell et al., defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hands v. Russell\", \"decision_date\": \"1933-12-20\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"55\", \"last_page\": \"58\", \"citations\": \"115 N.J. Eq. 55\", \"volume\": \"115\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:43:19.899892+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Catharine M. Hands, complainant, v. Helen R. Russell et al., defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Catharine M. Hands, complainant, v. Helen R. Russell et al., defendants.\\n[Decided December 20th, 1933.]\\nMessrs. Luce, Kipp \\u25a0& Ashen, for the petitioner.\\nMessrs. Qonkling, Smith ,& Towe, for the respondents.\", \"word_count\": \"1091\", \"char_count\": \"6267\", \"text\": \"Eieldek, Y. C.\\nThe complainant filed her bill April 8th, 1933, to foreclose a real estate mortgage. The suit was uncontested, a final decree was entered for over $10,000 and the property was sold October 18th, 1933, to complainant for $100. Thereafter she filed a petition in this cause, alleging that the mortgaged premises were, prior to filing her bill of complaint, occupied by a tenant of the mortgagor at a monthly rent of $65; that on March 30th, 1933, she served the tenant with a written notice that she demanded possession of the mortgaged premises and payment of the rent then due and thereafter to fall due; that the first rent falling due after service of said notice was for May, 1933, and that the tenant has not recognized petitioner's demand. The petition prays that this court order the tenant to pay petitioner the rent for the months of May to October both inclusive, presumably because he occupied the premises for said months, although the petition does not so allege. Upon filing the petition an order was entered directing the tenant and mortgagor to show cause why the prayer should not be granted, service of which order and of a copy of the petition was made on the tenant personally, and upon the mortgagor by mailing the same to her postoffice address in Indiana. Upon the return of the order, appearance was made by counsel for both tenant and mortgagor in opposition to the petition.\\nThe complainant's petition should be dismissed for any one of the following reasons:\\n1. The bill of complaint contains no allegation that a tenant is in possession of the mortgaged premises and the tenant was not a party to the suit. I know of no practice which permits a complainant, by order to show cause, to bring in a stranger to the suit and require that person to litigate a question which is foreign to the cause of action set out in the bill.\\n2. If the demand served on the tenant was sufficient to put the mortgagee in possession, the mortgagee's right to receive rent from the tenant could have been enforced by distress on the tenant's goods and chattels, or by a suit at law. If the petitioner here is entitled to the rent she now seeks, she has an adequate remedy at law.\\n3. After default by a mortgagor in payment of the mortgage debt, the mortgagee has the right to enter on the mortgaged premises, or bring ejectment proceedings. If he enters and takes possession, he is entitled to the profits, but until he has taken possession the mortgagor is entitled to the rents. Cohn v. Plass, 85 N. J. Eq. 153; Stewart v. Fairchild-Baldwin Co., 91 N. J. Eq. 86. Possession may be taken by the mortgagee either personally, or by a receiver appointed to collect rents in a suit brought by the mortgagee to foreclose. Stanton v. Metropolitan Lumber Co., 107 N. J. Eq. 345; Bermes v. Kelley, 108 N. J. Eq. 289; Del-New Co. v. James, 111 N. J. Law 157.\\nIn the instant case it does not appear that the mortgage in question contained an assignment of rents after default, or a consent that the mortgagee might forthwith enter and take possession, so that the mortgagee's claim to possession during the time she was foreclosing her mortgage, is solely by virtue of her written demand for possession, served (so far as the record shows) on the tenant only. But even had demand been, made on the mortgagor also, I cannot regard a mere demand as an entry and taking possession. \\u2022 To obtain the possession to which a mortgagee is entitled by reason of the mortgagor's default, a mortgagee must do more than declare his claim to possession, no matter how publicly he may make his declaration. His claim to possession- must be followed by something which amounts to an ouster of, or surrender of possession by the mortgagor. The mortgagee must actually enter and he has the right to do so by any means which does not constitute a breach of the peac\\u00e9 and once in possession he may hold as against every one, including the mortgagor, until the latter redeems by paying the mortgage debt. If the mortgagee cannot obtain peaceable possession, he is left to his remedy of ejectment or a foreclosure suit to cut off the mortgagor's equity of redemption by sale.\\nIn the instant case the mortgagor was in possession through her tenant when the mortgagee demanded that the tenant recognize the mortgagee's claim to enter by paying rent to her. The tenant refused and continued to hold possession under the mortgagor's title and therefore the mortgagee never had even constructive possession. Indeed, the bill of com.plaint, filed eight days after the mortgagee's demand, states that the mortgagor and her husband have always been in possession of the mortgaged premises. Since the mortgagee never had possession she cannot enforce rent from the tenant on a claim which must be based on possession.\\nAfter default under a mortgage and the mortgagee's right to possession has accrued, a tenant may if he chooses, recognize the mortgagee's right to possession and may with safety, attorn to the mortgagee for the rent thereafter falling due, and it would seem that such attornment would amount to an eviction of the mortgagor by a paramount title and would put the mortgagee in constructive possession. Shields v. Lozear, 34 N. J. Law 496; Hinck v. Cohn, 86 N. J. Law 615; Del-New Co. v. James, supra. But it is my opinion that when demand is made on the tenant by one who asserts that he is a mortgagee and that his mortgage is in default and claims the rent thereafter due, the tenant should not be compelled to determine the sufficiency of the demand or whether the claim is well founded and that he should be fully protected in refusal to recognize the demand, until the mortgagee has secured the appointment of a receiver in proceedings to foreclose his mortgage. In the instant case the mortgagee could have applied for such receiver but did not and the notice served on the tenant did not state that the mortgagor was in default; it merely stated that the mortgagee's demand for possession was based on the mortgagor's failure to make an interest payment.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/1945172.json b/nj/1945172.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3e0c7b74ecd60798cfe0d40080963d588ffb9208
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/1945172.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1945172\", \"name\": \"IN THE MATTER OF JOHN W. YENGO, JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY, COUNTY OF HUDSON\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Yengo\", \"decision_date\": \"1977-03-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"425\", \"last_page\": \"452\", \"citations\": \"72 N.J. 425\", \"volume\": \"72\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:00:41.720330+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"IN THE MATTER OF JOHN W. YENGO, JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY, COUNTY OF HUDSON.\", \"head_matter\": \"IN THE MATTER OF JOHN W. YENGO, JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY, COUNTY OF HUDSON.\\nArgued January 11, 1977\\nDecided March 4, 1977.\\nMr. John DeCicco, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for designated counsel (Mr. William, F. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey, designated counsel; Mr. De-Cicco, Mr. Anthony J. Parrillo and Ms. Sally Fields, Deputy Attorneys General, on the brief).\\nMessrs. Bernard S. Glide and Louis Saunders argued the cause for respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"8936\", \"char_count\": \"53593\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nHughes, C. J.\\nThe Court considers in this ease the matter of removal of a Judge of the Municipal Court of Jersey City, John W. Yengo, for cause involving his judicial conduct. Our jurisdictional role in examining that question rests upon a foundation of constitutional and statutory responsibility. N. J. Const. (1947), Art. VI, \\u00a7 II, par. 3; N. J. S. A. 2A :1B-1 et seq.\\nIn fairness to respondent, we note at the outset that no suggestion is made of judicial corruption, personal dishonesty or conflict, or irregularities such as the \\\"fixing\\\" of traffic tickets, tampering with court records or misconduct of that sort. As will be seen, the gravamen of the charge has to do with persistent misbehavior in his judicial performance so bizarre as to amount to \\\"misconduct in office, willful neglect of duty, or other conduct evidencing unfitness for judicial office, or incompetence,\\\" designated by N. J. S. A. 2A:1B-2, as statutory causes for removal.\\nPBOCFBDINGS AND JURISDICTION\\nThe 1947 Constitution vested the judicial power of the State in a Supreme Court, a Superior Court, County Courts and \\\"inferior courts of limited jurisdiction,\\\" and provided that \\\"[t]he inferior courts and their jurisdiction may from time to time be established, altered or abolished by law.\\\" Art. VI, \\u00a7 I, par. 1. The Legislature thereupon authorized the establishment of the Municipal Court, N. J. S. A. 2A :8-1 et seq., first designating its presiding officer as \\\"municipal magistrate,\\\" 2A:8-5, and later as \\\"judge of the municipal court.\\\" 2A:8-5.1. That is the office occupied by respondent, from which he has been temporarily suspended.\\nThe statute which provides for the removal of such a judge, for one or more of the causes mentioned, outlines further procedures as follows:\\n2A:lB-3. Institution of removal proceedings\\nA proceeding for removal may be instituted by either house of the Legislature acting by a majority of all its members, or the Governor, by the filing of a complaint with the clerk of the supreme court, or such proceeding may be instituted by the Supreme Court on its own motion.\\n2A :lB-4. Prosecution of removal proceedings\\nThe Attorney General or his representative shall prosecute the proceedings unless the Supreme Court shall specially designate an attorney for that purpose.\\n2A:lB-5. Suspension pending determination\\nThe Supreme Court may suspend a judge from office, with or without pay, pending the determination of the proceeding; provided, however, that a judge shall receive pay for the period of suspension exceeding 90 days.\\n2A :lB-6. Preparation of defense; counsel; production of witnesses and evidence\\nThe judge shall be given a reasonable time to prepare his defense and shall be entitled to be represented by counsel. The prosecuting attorney and the judge shall have the right of compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence at the hearing.\\n2A:lB-7. Taking of evidence\\nEvidence may be taken either before the Supreme Court sitting en banc, or before three justices or judges, or a combination thereof, specially designated therefor by the Chief Justice.\\n2A :lB-8. Rules governing\\nExcept as otherwise provided in this act, proceedings shall be governed by rules of the Supreme Court.\\n2A :lB-9. Removal\\nIf the Supreme Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that there is cause for removal, it shall remove the judge from office. A judge so removed shall not thereafter hold judicial office.\\nThe proceedings are further governed, as provided in N. J. S. A. 2A:1B-8, by Rules of Court, B. 2:14-1 et seq., as amplified and largely superseded by R. 2:15 et seq., adopted in July 1974, describing detailed mechanisms for judicial removal, as well as alternatives, and preliminary proceedings with respect thereto. See Pressler, Current New Jersey Court Rules, Comment R. 2:14.\\nR. 2:15-1 et seq. created the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct. That Committee received and processed complaints against respondent. Its Presentment and Recommendation for Institution of Formal Removal Proceedings, read in part as follows:\\nThis matter was brought to the attention of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct when several transcripts of trials before the respondent John W. Yengo who was appointed Judge of the Municipal Court of Jersey City on July 11, 1974, were referred to the Committee. After a preliminary investigation was conducted, a verified seventeen count complaint and supplemental complaint were filed with the Committee and served on the respondent. Following the receipt of respondent's answer to the complaint, the matter was set down for hearing before the Committee on June 23, July 8, and September 12, 1975 and at the hearings numerous witnesses testified, transcripts of testimony of the cases being studied, and other pertinent documents were marked in evidence. Respondent cross-examined the witnesses, produced witnesses in his defense, and testified extensively in his own behalf. At the conclusion of the hearings, the Committee reserved decision, and after a full study of the matter, concluded that the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that (a) Judge Yengo is by temperament unsuited for judicial office, (b) he is unable to perform the duties of his office impartially, dispassionately and with the dignity required of a judge of a municipal court, (c) he is unable to understand or unwilling to accept and apply the basic doctrine in criminal and quasi-criminal eases that the State has the burden of proving the charge against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the accused on being charged does not have an initial function of establishing his innocence. For these reasons, the Committee feels strongly that the public interest in the administration of justice can be served only by the removal of Judge Yengo from the Municipal Court of Jersey City.\\nThis Court issued an order to show cause which led to the voluntary suspension of respondent from his judicial office pending the outcome of the proceedings. Following a hearing, respondent's motion to dismiss was denied. On the basis of the Presentment of the Committee the Court ordered the issuance of a complaint instituting formal removal proceedings. Three judges of the Superior Court were appointed to take evidence, in accordance with N. J. S. A. 2A:1B-7.\\nThereafter that \\\"statutory court\\\" conducted hearings encompassing many days, fully participated in by respondent and counsel representing him. Testimony was taken of witnesses including respondent and those called by him. Court records and transcripts of cases heard before respondent were admitted and scrutinized, and the statutory court listened to many tapes of actual proceedings in his courtroom. It determined and reported facts and conclusions related to his fitness to continue in judicial office, and filed with this Court transcripts of the voluminous testimony, and exhibits admitted before it.\\nThis Court thereupon reached independent conclusions of its own on the evidence so taken, as will be mentioned hereafter, on the focal question assigned to it by statute: \\\"If the Supreme Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that there is cause for removal, it shall remove the judge from office.\\\" N. J. S. A. 2A:1B-9. We observe that throughout all these extensive hearings and proceedings, including respondent's appearances with counsel in answer to several show cause orders and the Court's consideration and denial of several motions, careful attention has been paid, as should be, to the full due process rights of respondent.\\nTHE NEW JERSEY MUNICIPAL COURT SYSTEM\\nA look at the history of the local administration of justice before and after the 1947 Constitution is important in order to assess respondent's judicial performance in the context of constitutional, legislative and public expectations of the judicial conduct required of the present-day municipal judge.\\nThe earlier period of the administration of criminal justice at the local level was described by then Chief Justice Vanderbilt at an Annual Conference of Municipal Magistrates and Attorneys, reprinted at 10 Rutqers L. Rev. 647-48 (1956):\\nUnder our revolutionary Constitution of 1776 the justices of the peace, along with the judges of the other courts, were elected by the Legislature for a term of years. Their position in the community was roughly comparable to that of the English justices of the peace of the same period who [were] generally the leading citizens of the county with a tradition of public service. One of the ways in which our second Constitution, that of 1844, reflected the democratic revolt of the Jacksonian era was in providing for the popular election of justices of the peace by townships and in the cities by wards. Such elections, here and elsewhere throughout the country generally, reflected the popular demand of the period for the direct election of judges who would be \\\"close to the people,\\\" and no thought was given to imposing any standards or qualifications for the office. Thus the New Jersey Constitution of 1844 put the justice of the peace in local politics with the undesirable results that inevitably flow from mixing judicial work and politics. The election of a justice of the peace as a prank of his neighbors was not unknown, and the of Bce shrank in dignity and usefulness. [ ]\\nHe recalled that in the cities the police judges had taken over the bulk of the criminal jurisdiction of the justices of the peace under a mass of statutes varying in application from municipality to municipality. Thus there was created a jurisdictional chaos. The low estate of the police courts, the \\\"justly maligned\\\" justices of the peace, as well as the confusing, inefficient and frequently condemned system by which the compensation of those judges depended in part on the penalties they assessed against defendants they found guilty of some offense (a practice that had been responsible for bringing many a local court into disrepute), were conditions noted with disapproval by Chief Justice Vanderbilt as well as the public at large.\\nHe then contrasted developments after the new Constitution was adopted:\\nEl] t was no wonder that there was no storm of protest over the exclusion of the justice of the peace from the 1947 Constitution, but instead general acquiescence in the resolution of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention memorializing the Legislature\\nto take such action as may be deemed necessary to establish a modern and efficient inferior court system to be presided over by qualified persons and to provide that all judges of the inferior courts receive reasonable fixed compensation which shall have no relation to fees received.\\nThe Legislature acted promptly in response to this mandate by enacting [a law] which abolished not only the justices of the peace, but also \\\"the existing police, magistrate, or recorder's courts, by whatever name called\\\" and provided for the establishment of our present system of municipal courts. [10 Rutgers L. Rev. at 648-49].\\nIn light of this reform in the municipal court system, Chief Justice Vanderbilt stressed the importance of these courts, expressing a caveat to the constitutional characterization of them as \\\"inferior\\\" courts (actually a term of art, not implying any disrespect). He believed that the local courts of first instance are the very foundation of the enforcement of the criminal law; that upon them rests primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the various communities of the State, for safety on our streets and highways, and most important of all, for the development of respect for law on the part of our citizenry, upon which in the last analysis all of our democratic institutions depend. He said \\\"[t]his is the underlying reason why I have repeatedly called the municipal courts the most important in our state.\\\" Id. at 650. He rejoiced at their post-Constitution accomplishments which had brought about legislative enlargement of their jurisdictional power, and he said \\\"[t]he manner in which the municipal courts over a period of seven years have exercised their growing powers makes a proud record.\\\" Id. at 6'53. He emphasized outward symbolism as a spur to judicial probity and impartiality and consequent public confidence in the courts:\\nThe wearing of a judicial robe by a judge is important in part because it reminds all concerned of the fact that the judge represents the law on which liberty depends, but \\u2014 and this is even more important \\u2014 the robe is even more significant as a constant reminder to the judge that he does not have the freedom of the ordinary individual but is himself bound to submerge his personal feelings in the impartial administration of the law. The judicial robe is a constant reminder to the magistrates that they, like all other judges, are subject to the Canons of Judicial Ethics as rules of court. It is not enough that a judge be honest and impartial; it is essential that he have the reputation in his community for being a man of absolute integrity, whose judgment is not and cannot be influenced by other than the proofs introduced before him in court. [Id. at 653],\\nLater, Chief Justice Weintraub expressed a similar view as to the importance of the local courts:\\n[I]n terms of human experiences our magistrates preside in the most important courts in the state. To appreciate that this is so, we need but look at the nature and number of the matters they handle.\\n3 [A] very substantial percentage of our citizens are directly involved with our municipal courts, to say nothing of the thousands who appear as witnesses or spectators. For most of them, it is their only contact with the judicial process. The impressions they receive serve to shape their opinion of the judicial system, our laws and law enforcement. We cannot permit that opinion to be anything but one of confidence and respect. [81 N. J. L. J. 597 (1958)].\\nChief Justice Weintraub would often repeat this theme. In greeting Municipal Judges at the Eleventh Annual Conference of Magistrates in 1959, he reminded them that they \\\"represent [ed] by far the most productive, the most active part of the judicial system, and in terms of citizen exposure, the most important one\\\"; that \\\"all of us\\\" must have \\\"active concern\\\" with the standing and reputation of the municipal court; that \\\"anything that happens in just a few of the courtrooms casts a shadow upon all of us.\\\"\\nIn In re Mattera, 34 N. J. 259, 275 (1961), he stressed:\\nIn many respects the municipal court is the most important in our judicial'system. No other court can match its volume of causes. Our municipal courts dispose annually of approximately one and one-half million matters, a number which dwarfs the total proceedings in all other courts of the State. For all practical purposes, the judgments of the municipal court are final. It is there that most citizens have their sole exposure to the judicial process. The respect they have for the judiciary hinges upon that experience. Thus the magistrate has a unique responsibility for the popular image of the entire system.\\nIn another context, but equally relevant, this Court noted in In re Spitalnick, 63 N. J. 429, 431-32 (1973), that:\\nThis Court cannot allow the integrity of the judicial process to be compromised in any way . A community without certainty in the true administration of justice is a community without justice.\\nNowhere can the community be more sensitive to the regularities \\u2014 and irregularities \\u2014 of judicial administration than at the local level.\\nThe same view was expressed during the unfortunately brief tenure of the late Chief Justice G-arven. During his last illness his speech to the Judicial Conference of Municipal Court Judges was read for him by Justice Mark Sullivan, and he reminded those judges that:\\nYou, judges of tlie municipal courts of this State, represent the first bastion of our judicial system. Thousands of our citizens are exposed to justice in New Jersey through the municipal courts. They are unaware of the activities of any other court. To these people, you are the judicial system. This alone places a heavy burden upon you. [96 N. J. L. J. 1237 (1973) (emphasis added)].\\nThe members of the present Court are equally convinced that the municipal courts, from the standpoint of contact, observation and acceptance by the public, are in a preeminent position for the sustaining of universal respect for the administration of justice. That is why we have persisted, through the Administrative Office of the Courts, in training and orientation, not only of judges but other municipal court personnel. Our rules deal extensively with municipal court practice. R. 7:1 et seq. Seminars are conducted at frequent intervals. A municipal court bulletin issues monthly, discussing recent decisions and procedural reforms. Regular audits of municipal court accounts are filed with and examined by the Administrative Office of the Courts, which office maintains a special municipal court section. Local trial court administrators conduct periodic visitations of municipal courts at the direction of the respective Assignment Judges, who are responsible administratively for the proper functioning of the municipal courts.\\nEor the proper administration of justice and public confidence therein, this Court created the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct, pointing out our adoption of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Appendix to Part 1, Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey). We expressed the view that:\\nWhile many fundamental guides to the conduct of judges are included, the observance of two provisions would enhance mightily, [we] think, public trust and confidence in our system:\\nCanon 3(A)(3) provides:\\n\\\"A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom he deals in his official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers and of his staff, court officials and others subject to his direction and control.\\\"\\nCanon 3(A)(4) provides:\\n\\\"A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law \\\"\\nIn a free society, the court's influence, acceptance and power alike rest, not only on Constitution and statutory law but upon public confidence in its probity, objectivity and freedom from outside pressure of whatever kind. This applies to all courts, including the hundreds of Municipal Judges who, as Chief Justice Vanderbilt used to say, were those nearest to the people.\\nIt is to guai'd this reputation and to strengthen this public confidence, not only in the courts but in our profession in general, that the Supreme Court is establishing its Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct. This Committee will investigate and consider complaints as to judicial misconduct of whatever kind and report its findings to the Supreme Court for appropriate remedial action. [97 N. J. L. J. 278 (1974)].\\nIt is therefore apparent, despite the many societal changes which have occurred in recent years, that the policy of the Supreme Court continues unaltered in its insistence that all courts within its constitutional and administrative direction shall so comport themselves as to dignify the administration of justice and deserve the confidence and respect of the public.\\nSuch is the purpose of the rule of court (R. 1:18, originally B. 8:13-5 (a) (1948)), which subjects all judges, including municipal court judges, to the strictures of the Code of Judicial Conduct: \\\"It shall be the duty of every judge to abide by and to enforce the provisions of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,\\\" (now known as the Code of Judicial Conduct). See Pressler, Current New Jersey Court Rules, Comment R. 1:18.\\nWe therefore pass to a brief review of that Code of Judicial Conduct against which to measure respondent's behavior in office.\\nTEE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT\\nThe Code contains the following significant provisions:\\n(1) An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independents of the judiciary may be. preserved.\\n(2) A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.\\nCommentary\\nPublic confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. He must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. He must therefore accept restrictions on his conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.\\n(3) A. (3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom he deals in his official capacity\\nCommentary\\nThe duty to hear all proceedings fairly and with patience is not inconsistent with the duty to dispose promptly of the business of the court. Courts can be efficient and business-like while being patient and deliberate.\\n(3) A. (4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding.\\n(3) B. (1) A judge should maintain professional competence in judicial administration .\\n(3) C. (1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:\\n(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings.\\nThe Code of Judicial Conduct would effectuate the aphorism of Sir Eraucis Bacon \\u2014 \\\"The place of justice is an hallowed place.\\\" We turn to the examination of events in respondent's courtroom in the context of that ideal.\\nTHE FACTUAL BASIS FOR REMOVAL\\nWhile it would be uuduly cumbersome in this opinion to examine all of the proceedings described in the evidence taken by the statutory court, it is useful to mention a few which we have determined represent a pattern of respondent's conduct as a judge.\\nOne of the counts involved a disorderly persons complaint against a Mary Ann Cronin, unrepresented by counsel and, as appears by the record, an inebriate, probably sick, disrespectful in her attitude, but standing defenseless before the court. There were also other unanswered \\\"disorderly persons\\\" complaints, on which another judge had issued warrants for failure to appear, Judge Yengo considering such failures as \\\"contempts.\\\" The court greeted the defendant with a preconception:\\nThe Court: This looks like one of those habitu\\u00e1is.\\n\\nYou ought to be ashamed of yourself.\\nMrs. Cronin: Well it's my family's fault too.\\nThe Court: Yes, your family's fault.\\nMrs. Cronin: Yes, and my husband.\\nThe Court: Your mother was in bed when the child was conceived. Huh?\\nMrs. Cronin: How come my husband gets away with it?\\nThe Court: Shut up.\\nThis coarse exchange was followed by threats by the court, concerning the \\\"contempt\\\" charges:\\nThe Court: You don't [need] a lawyer and you don't get any adjournments. I'm going to do something about you today and you're not going to be so smart.\\n\\nOkay. On the contempt citations, there are three against you. You failed to appear in the Municipal Court on hearings.\\nMrs. Cronin: I was sick.\\nThe Court: S' \\u2022 * Do you have anything to say for yourself?\\nMrs. Cronin: Yes, your Honor.\\nThe Court: Say it. All of a sudden it's not so funny. Is it? Well I'm listening. Tell me some good things about yourself.\\nMrs. Cronin: Well you know how it goes.\\nThe Court: No, I don't. I'm going to tell you how you're going to go. You're going to the Hudson County Penitentiary or wherever they place people like you for a period of 90 days.\\nAfter Mrs. Cronin made an impertinent remark to her mother (the complaining witness), the court reacted:\\nThe Court: I'm going to reconsider the sentence. I'm adding 30 more days. That is 120 days. All right? She is not to be released under any circumstances unless I am apprised of any possible request.\\nMrs. Cronin: I want to go to a mental hospital. I want to go to a mental hospital.\\nThe Court: Get her out of here .\\nWe have not attempted to repeat the whole interchange in this \\\"hearing,\\\" but our scrutiny fully supports the statutory court finding that:\\nAt no time was defendant advised that she had a right to an attorney nor was she advised she might be sentenced to six months in jail on each of the [contempt] complaints. No witnesses were sworn; no testimony was taken. The proceedings were highly irregular.\\nThe statutory court saw some mitigation in the court's possible concern with a dependent child of defendant, her impertinent and defiant attitude and the crowded calendar of the courtroom. We see no such mitigation, as though the antagonists in this disgraceful colloquy were equal. She was disadvantaged and defenseless as she stood in an American courtroom; whereas he was a judge and his conduct must be evaluated as such.\\nIn this count respondent was charged with the following: (1) failing to advise the defendant of her constitutional rights; (2) failing to advise Mrs. Cronin of her right to an attorney; (3) failing to swear witnesses or take testimony, and summarily sentencing Mrs. Cronin to 120 days in the Hudson County Penitentiary; (4) comments and conduct that \\\"were harsh, arbitrary and contrary to law\\\"; and (5) an attitude that was \\\"undignified, discourteous and partial to the interests of the State.\\\"\\nWe find that -these charges have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\\nIn another case, one Timmons was charged by his mother with annoying and harassing her. The court attendant called him before the bar but he did not answer, although he appeared soon thereafter and entered a plea of \\\"not- guilty.\\\" In his absence the judge had said \\\"he probably took it on the lam\\\" and proceeded to interrogate the defendant's mother about defendant's conduct:\\nSponging and freeloading on his mother. He gives you a lot of trouble too, I'll bet. Huh?\\n\\nYou need that like \\u2014 if I can get my hands on him we'll see if he's guilty or innocent.\\nThe factual basis for the complaint by defendant's mother consisted of hearsay, - \\u2014 \\u2022 what another child had told her about defendant's visit to her home. Aside from her testimony to that effect and the explanation of defendant, the \\\"trial\\\" consisted of this:\\nThe Court: Well all right. Is that all you have to say?\\nMr. Timmons: Yes.\\nThe Court: Were you told to stay away from there when you appeared in Court the last time?\\nI find you guilty. Now we have to decide what we're going to do with you.\\nYou know, I've listened to a lot of malarkey in my day. I've been around a long time. I've listened to a lot of bull sessions, I've listened to a lot of fellows that think they can con a fellow. You can't con a man like me because I started right from the bottom, right from the bottom. You know, in my day we used to go to the dumps to scheme to make a nickel or a dime. I did all that so you're not conning me. You have a decent mother but she has a rotten\\nson. You will stay away from your mother. She doesn't want you there.\\nNow you didn't listen the last time. This time I'm going to give you something to go by and you are going to listen. I sentence you to 15 days in the Hudson County Pen. That's it. The next time if your mother files a complaint and you come back here will be a lot longer. I was going to make it 30 and suspend but I'm going to be straight with you. 15 days.\\nMr. Timmons: May I say something now that you've already sentenced me?\\nThe Court: You can say all you want while I'm writing but don't insult me because I'm telling you now \\u2014\\nMr. Timmons: Well in the first place well like you stand here telling me that I'm trying to eon you. I don't understand how you feel that I'm trying to con you \\u2014\\nThe Court: I don't believe that bull about you and your brother looking for somebody \\u2014 stay away from your mother's home. That's how you're conning me. You were told before.\\nMr. Timmons: Had I knew that I needed witnesses to prove this I would have had them here in Court this morning. I can verify what I was saying.\\nThe Court: 15 days in the Hudson County Pen. I believe your mother.\\nThe statutory court made the following findings: (1) the respondent improperly discussed the case with the complainant while the defendant was not present and developed a bias against the defendant contrary to law; (2) hearsay evidence was improperly allowed; (3) respondent's remarks \\\"were made in a loud, angry voice\\\"; (4) respondent's remarks were \\\"imprudent, injudicious and not in keeping with the desired conduct of a judge\\\"; (5) respondent failed to advise the defendant of his right to counsel and his right not to testify; (6) respondent engaged in the improper practice of making general announcements of the right to counsel and the right not to testify at the opening of court; and (7) respondent's \\\"actions were improper, contrary to law and not befitting a judge.\\\" We agree.\\nAnother matter involved a defendant named Lott, who had been released on his own recognizance by another mu nieipal judge and who duly appeared before Judge Yengo to answer the charge. The State requested a postponement because of the non-appearance of the complaining witness. Respondent seized the opportunity to revoke the existing order and hold defendant in bail. The public defender pointed out:\\nA fellow Municipal Court Judge set the bail in reference to Mr. Lott. Tour Honor, he comes to Court. He's appeared. He's never failed to appear, and the complainant doesn't appear and now when [defendant] appears his bail is being upped. It doesn't strike me as justice in this particular ease.\\nThe Court subsequently stated:\\nI'm running this Court, not the public defender. Remove this man. Incarcerate him until he posts the bail.\\nThe statutory court found from the evidence before it, inter alia, \\\"that respondent's actions in setting bail under the circumstances before him were arbitrary, an abuse of discretion and not supported by a credible factual basis. His conduct in this respect was injudicious.\\\"\\nWe agree, but are not surprised because the record shows that respondent considered bail as an arbitrary weapon for harassment of defendants. For instance, a case involving an Alice Martin arose from a drunken and disorderly street fracas with one Henderson, quelled by arresting policemen. She stood before the court charged with simple assault and battery. She was hurriedly persuaded to a trial without an attorney, although respondent took care to have the record denote a waiver. She admitted she was fighting and apologized to the Court. The Judge stated:\\nAlice Martin, I have no sympathy for you whatsoever. Tou disgust me, and the decent living people of Jersey City, and we are not going to tolerate your nonsense any longer. If I'm around to see to it. Tou are hereby sentenced to the Hudson County Penitentiary for a period of SO days on this complaint.\\nAfter sentencing, Mrs. Martin's brother-in-law sought leniency for her, because he was financially unable to care for her small children. Respondent was adamant. A public defender, Mr. Gold, appeared then and indicated to the 'Court:\\nShe has no prior criminal record. She is the mother of two children, ages 6 and 8. She lives in Jersey City and has done so for the last 17 years. She has two part time jobs by which she supports herself and her family. She works for the Merit Wholesale Shirt Company and she works in a bar part time. She had meager earnings of $75 or $80 a week and your Honor has sentenced her to a 30 day custodial sentence. I would ask for reconsider, reconsideration of sentence. I'm asking this in her behalf and I would ask for a noncustodial sentence in light of the facts I have just presented to the Court.\\nRespondent's rejoinder discloses the motivation for his peculiar judicial philosophy, \\u2022 \\u2014 \\u2022 the seeking of public approbation. He exhibited his prejudice by addressing the public defender as follows:\\nThe facts presented to the Court don't impress the Court. I feel that this woman is a menace to society. I feel she's a disgrace. I feel she has harmed not only the police, the public at large and yours truly. I have no compassion for people who start trouble. She's separated from her husband. She knows Henderson is married and she engaged in folly, and you can include a lot of other stuff with folly. He was up at her apartment a short while before. It .seemed like it was a pleasant relationship until something went wrong. I am not impressed with this type of person. I'm sorry. The sooner the Court \\u2014 the press has taken pot shots at the Court. The press never said: This does not apply to John W. Tengo, it only applies to this Judge and that Judge. But when the person reads it they say: \\\"Oh, Tengo's a Judge in that Court. He's one of the culprits who won't bear down on the defendants.\\\" Somehow or other the people are getting the message and know that Tengo is not taking it sitting back. And I'm going to continue, continue until the defendants know it, until these guilty people know it, until the poor victim is protected.\\nBut the public defender, the knight in shining armor comes here and he says: Please, be lenient. To that I say no. She'll serve 30 days in the Hudson County Jail. If you want to appeal, go up there. If they have no room for her there, as far as I'm concerned they can pitch tents.\\nThe proceedings continued:\\nMr. Gold: Now that I'm going to appeal this matter I would like to ask \\u2014\\nThe Court: You still don't impress me.\\nMr. Gold: I'd like' to ask the Court for bail pending appeal. Or bail after conviction and pending appeal . And I would ask the Court for a reasonable bail, so an appeal can be presented.\\nThe Court: I will not stay the sentence pending appeal.\\nMr. Gold: I'm not asking for a stay of the sentence. I'm asking for bail pending appeal.\\nMr. Fox: [The municipal prosecutor] Your Honor, the State has no objections to bail being set in this matter.\\nThe Court: I will set bail. Bail in this case will be $3,000.\\nMr. Gold: Your Honor, this is a disorderly persons offense at this point.\\nMr. Fox: Your Honor, may the State be heard with counsel?\\n' * Your Honor, I believe a more reasonable bail should be set in view of the attendant circumstances. The State would recommend a $100 cash bail.\\nThe Court: No good. Absolutely not. I'll reduce the bail to $2,500. Keep pounding the hammer. Maybe I'll come down to $2,000. Do you want to try again?\\nMr. Fox: Your Honor.\\nThe Court: $2,000 and that's it. The auction is over. I don't want to hear anything else.\\nThe statutory court reports that \\\"[i]t should also be kept in mind that the Prosecutor joined in Mr. Gold's request for 'more reasonable bail' but that respondent in refusing such request conducted a mock auction accompanied by the banging of a gavel in the style of an auctioneer.\\\" It is not surprising that the panel found, as do we, that the remarks and conduct of respondent were harsh and arbitrary and that his attitude was undignified and discourteous to counsel.\\nRespondent seemed to relish his judicial power to imprison others than defendants on occasion. In State v. Perry, he refused to permit a complaining witness to explain confusion about tbe date o\\u00ed an incident involved in a complaint filed by Mm.\\nThe Court: Come back here. I'm holding you in contempt for perjury. What have you got to say? Tou committed it in the presence of this Court.\\nMr. Grant: As far as I know it happened on May 24th.\\n\\nThe Court: Tou gave them the 10th of July, '74 in court. Tou signed an affidavit that it happened on July 10, 1974. I hereby find you guilty and sentence you to 10 days in the Hudson County Penitentiary. Bailiff \\u2014 Hudson County Penitentiary.\\nThe statutory court concluded, and we agree, that:\\nIt is clear that the witness was held in contempt because respondent was of the opinion that he made inconsistent statements under oath.\\nIf there was deliberate false swearing or perjury, respondent should have referred the matter to the Prosecutor rather than hold the witness in contempt. Furthermore, there is strong indication that if there were inconsistent statements, they stemmed from confusion rather than a deliberate attempt to falsify. Finally, there is also strong indication that there may very well have been separate incidents and that Mr. Grant did not in fact make any inconsistent allegations. The tape which the panel heard in open court reveals that Mr. Grant was completely respectful and was merely trying to clear up the confusion as to dates. He should not have been held in contempt of Court.\\nThe conduct of respondent in this matter was intemperate, harsh, arbitrary and contrary to fundamental law.\\nRespondent considered Mmself part of the prosecution structure rather than an impartial judge. On a complaint in State v. Whitehead, this exchange occurred:\\nProsecutor: The state wishes to move contemplating dismissal. I know the court is familiar with the ease.\\nThe Court: Well we can make it stick if the police officer wants to go ahead, but all right you make a motion to dismiss.\\nA 21 year old named Shinholster was accused of an offense involving no violence, which charge had been down graded to a disorderly persons accusation. Having no previous criminal record, he had been free on $500 bail. A quick conviction before respondent resulted in a 90 days sentence to the Hudson County Penitentiary. The public defender addressed the Court:\\nMr. Gold: Judge, I'm going to file an appeal in this ease.\\nThe Court: I won't stay the sentence. Let him smell the jail. It might help him.\\nMr. Gold: I would just like to ask the Court if it's seen the directive admitting a defendant to bail at the same bail that was given to him prior to the trial and \\u2014\\nThe Court: I saw the directive. I'm sending him- to jail. Tou can make your appeal \\u2014\\nMr. Gold: The Court will not honor that?\\nThe Court: Nope. I will not.\\nThe directive referred to is embodied in N. J. S. A. 2A:162 \\u2014 11, which provides:\\nIn every case where a person has been convicted in a municipal court of a disorderly persons violation, and he has not violated or forfeited his bail such bail shall continue in the same terms and effect pending appeal to a County Court in lieu of posting a new bond in connection with the appeal .\\nThe respondent's disrespect for law extended to the Constitution and cases decided under it by the United States Supreme Court, representing the supreme law of the land. The following colloquy took place in State v. Jiminez, a trial on charges downgraded to disorderly conduct. A question had been asked by counsel as to whether an arresting police officer had informed the defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). This ensued:\\nThe Court:. Was he given his rights?\\nMr. Campbell: Tes, your Honor.\\nThe Court: Well when do you give the rights? When are you supposed to are these alleged \\u2014 are we talking about the last Bights or \\u2014\\nMr. Campbell: No, I was saying \\u2014\\nThe Court: The Miranda bit and all that? Is that what you're saying?\\n\\nNow when they arrest they give them, their rights. Isn't that right? If they want rights, that's when they get the last rights.\\nThis heavy-handed humor with respect to the last rites, a religious ceremony associated with the onset of death, was inexcusable. And sneering at and deriding the supreme law of the land will not be tolerated in a New Jersey courtroom.\\nThe statutory court determined that respondent improperly found the defendant guilty of an indictable offense which Avas not before him and over which he had no jurisdiction. It attributed this error to confusion, but it is clear that his actions in this regard demonstrate an inability to follow established law. We have determined upon our view of the evidence that aside from the other misconduct in this case, the respondent abused his discretion in his refusal to stay sentence pending appeal. His conduct in whole demonstrated judicial incompetence.\\nIn State v. Albigese, the actions of respondent were particularly discordant with the judicial process. A defendant, charged with violations of the Municipal Housing Code for some electrical deficiencies, received notice on July 31, 1974, that his case would be heard on August 2, 1974. On August 1 his attorney, then out of the state, telephoned respondent seeking postponement, which was refused. On the hearing date defendant appeared and asked postponement because of the unavailability of his counsel. Respondent refused, telling defendant to have a lawyer in the courtroom to defend him within 20 to 30 minutes. At that hearing, respondent found defendant guilty and fined him $400. At a second hearing on August 9, 1974, after holding defendant's counsel in contempt of court, the Judge found defendant guilty of 136 violations and fined him $100 per violation or $13,600. During the first hearing the Judge exhibited gross disrespect for counsel, who pleaded he had not been able to prepare in the 20 to 30 minutes allotted as above:\\nCounselor, you know I'm getting a little tired of you. I let you sit down because you told me you were tired, perhaps a little ill. You're trying to make a mockery of this court. You're not going to do it. I made myself clear, and no one in this town has a louder voice than John W. Yengo. I don't even need this microphone.\\nAs the court began to announce its decision, the attorney, Mr. Silverstein, rose to his feet:\\nThe Court: Do you want to go to the mens room?\\nMr. Silverstein: I want to sum up, Your Honor is making a decision before hearing us.\\nWhen Mr. Silverstein had appeared after the abrupt \\\"20 to 30 minute\\\" demand, he had apparently told the court that his client had advised him that he believed the Judge would jail him unless he could defend with counsel after 20 to 30 minutes. The Judge held Albigese in contempt for this out-of-court statement.\\nIn the interval between the two hearings, the Judge took the trouble to inspect the involved premises personally, later refusing to disqualify himself, a questionable practice at least without consent of parties and counsel. Cf. James v. State, 56 N. J. Super. 213 (App. Div. 1959); State v. Muraski, 6 N. J. Super. 36 (App. Div. 1949); Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(1) (a) (\\\"A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including instances where: (a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding\\\").\\nWhen substituted counsel suggested such disqualification and made other observations, the court held him in contempt and bullied him into a forced apology, to avoid punishment by the court. A sample:\\nMr. Mullica: I have the duty \\u2014 I have a duty as an attorney representing a client and \\u2014\\nThe Court: All right, Mr. Mullica. Tou are an attorney? Then listen to me now. Shut up.\\n\\nMr. Mullica: But I have further reasons for objections.\\nThe Court: You are held in contempt. For disrupting this Court you are held in contempt.\\nThe statutory court concluded, and we agree:\\nIn none of the holdings of contempt of court or threats of such holdings in this matter was the action or conduct of respondent justified. Defendant did not do or say anything contemptuous. However, even if he did, it is clear that such contempt would in no way constitute a contempt in the presence of the Court such as to justify the way the respondent summarily dealt with the matter. The conduct of the respondent was arbitrary and contrary to established law and procedure.\\nIn view of the lack of adequate notice to defendant respondent's insistence of going forward with the hearing on August 2 was inexcusable. The conduct of the two hearings evidenced a bias against defendant apparently acquired by respondent's personal examination of the area. The conduct at the hearings evidenced unfitness for judicial office.\\nWe note a final aberration. Fot only was respondent contemptuous of Constitution and law, but markedly disrespectful of higher judicial authority.\\nOn March 31, 1975, Richard Griffin and Clarence Hart were arrested, charged with possession of small quantities of marijuana or derivative. Respondent fixed bail in each case at $5,000 to be supplied by a surety bond. In accordance with usual practice, an attorney for defendants, after inquiring from the Police Department as to the nature of the charges, called the Hudson County Bail Unit to request a reduction of bail. He related to the person in charge that Griffin was 37 years old, married with four children, the owner of property in Jersey City, employed by the Post Office and had no previous criminal record; and that Hart had once been arrested as a juvenile but had no adult record. This information and the reduction request were telephoned at 10 p.m. to Hudson County Judge Richard E. Connors, who was working at his home preparing a charge to a jury. Judge Connors ordered reduction of the bail to $2,500 or ten percent ($250) cash bail. Respondent refused to accept this decision, stormed to the Central Booking Unit, refused to speak to Judge Connors on the telephone and blocked the posting of the reduced bail long enough for defendants to be detained in jail overnight. Described as distraught and screaming, he told Sergeant Bennett (in charge of the Central Booking Unit) to \\\"tell the son-of-a-b\\\" (Judge Connors) to come to Central Booking and \\\"do things proper.\\\" Respondent asserted that accused would get out on bail \\\"over his dead body\\\" and that he did not give \\\"a good goddamn about Larner\\\" (Hudson County Assignment Judge Samuel A. Larner, having a supervisory administrative authority over the municipal courts).\\nThe statutory panel concluded, and we agree, that:\\nThe statements made by respondent concerning Judge Larner and Judge Connors were unreasonable. His actions and conduct in the face of a bail reduction ordered by higher authority and known by him to have been so ordered were unworthy of one who holds judicial office. He was unable to accept the decision of higher authority in the judicial system and engaged in an unseemly dispute over the order made by such higher authority.\\nThis dreary recitation need not be continued. The Attorney General's brief identifies manifold abuses of the judicial process by respondent (irregularity in proceedings; deprivation of defendants' constitutional rights; discourtesy to counsel; disparagement of defendants; abuse of contempt power; arbitrary bail; insubordination; injudicious attitudes) and the evidence contained in the record amply portrays the shambles into whi\\u00e9h justice was thus reduced in this respondent's courtroom. So it was that a parade of alleged miscreants, some poor, some undefended, some sick, some unstable and bewildered (and some, no doubt guilty), passed through an American courtroom with but scant atten tion being paid to rights possessed by them under Constitution and the common law.\\nAs mentioned by Chief Justice Weintraub in In re Mattera, supra, 34 N. J. at 274: \\\"Justice is the right of all men and the private property of none. The judge holds this common right in trust, to administer it with an even hand in accordance with law.\\\"\\nRespondent seems unable to understand the relationship between justice and the defendant. The poorest, weakest, most hapless or illiterate defendant, standing before an American court, is entitled to exactly the same respect, rights and hearing as would be the Chief Justice of the United States standing before the court and similarly accused. This is part of what our Constitution means by \\\"equal protection of the laws.\\\"\\nAn intoxication with judicial power which would ignore basic constitutional precepts is a wholly unacceptable syndrome that cannot be tolerated in New Jersey courts. To brook it in a single courtroom would not only degrade the courts in general, but would affront the vast majority of municipal judges who perceive their courtrooms as \\\"place [s] of justice,\\\" rather than arenas for exhibitionism by display, before an intimidated audience, of naked and illegal judicial power.\\nThis is not to say that judicial response to crime, and particularly violent crime, should be excessively lenient. Our Court has urged administratively just the opposite for protection of the community, which is wholly consistent with observance of Constitution and law.\\nNor should a judge ever forfeit control of his courtroom. But he should maintain it as a judge and not by unseemly, unjudicial and illegal suppression of individual rights. This despite the convenient weapons of bailiff, \\\"contempt,\\\" penitentiary or jail, or bail abuse, as well as the lure of supposed public applause in which as we have seen the respondent seems to be interested.\\nIt has been argued for respondent that the number of eases in which his conduct has been found wanting is but a minute percentage of the thousands of cases he has handled without complaint from anyone and that he is entitled to be judged on the totality of his conduct, not the selected instances presented by the Advisory Committee alone. Assuming the dubious proposition that respondent's conduct has been free from fault in all the cases not explored by the record before us, the instances of misconduct and incompetence found in the record before us are amply sufficient, in themselves, to justify the adjudication here made.\\nUpon all of the evidence presented we find respondent totally unsuited, by temper and temperament, for judicial office. We find by his continuous abuse of the judicial process that he is guilty of misconduct in office, of conduct evidencing unfitness for judicial office, and that he is incompetent to be a judge. For such causes, the existence of which we find on the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, he is hereby removed from office.\\nSo ordered.\\nFor removal from office \\u2014 Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman and Clieeokd and Judge CONFOKD \\u2014 6.\\nOpposed \\u2014 None.\\nORDER\\nA complaint and order to show cause why JUDGE JOHN W. YENGO should not be removed from judicial office having been issued pursuant to R. 2:14 and N. J. S. A. 2A-1B, et seq., and this Court having determined that cause for removal exists beyond a reasonable doubt;\\nIt is hereby ORDERED that, pursuant to N. J. S. A. 2A :lB-9, said JUDGE JOHN W. YENGO be removed from the office of judge of the municipal court of the City of Jersey City, effective immediately.\\nN. J. S. A. 2A :8-1 provides for the establishment of single muieipal courts by ordinance. The judge of a municipal court of a single municipality is appointed by the local governing body pursuant to N. J. S. A. 2A :8-5. Various urban communities, including Jersey City, have more than one municipal court judge, likewise appointed locally. The statute (N. J. S. A. 2A:8-1 and -3) also provides for the establishment of inter-municipal courts by two or more municipalities by appropriate ordinances. This step is gen erally decided upon in smaller or rural communities. The judge of such a joint municipal court is appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. N. J. S. A. 2A:8-5.\\nAs of the most recent court year statistics, there were functioning 382 municipal court judges in the 567 municipalities of New Jersey. Many judges are appointed to preside in more than one municipal court, particularly in smaller communities. In the court year ending August 31, 1976, the municipal courts in New Jersey processed 3,826,998 complaints.\\nThe justice of the peace was sometimes mentioned in humorous verse:\\nI'm important in the County\\nI'm a Justice of the Peace,\\nAnd I disbelieve Defendants\\nWhen they contradict the P'lice.\\n[Nordberg, Farewell to Illinois J. P.'s,\\nChicago Bar Record, Volume XLIV (No. 10),\\nSeptember 1963, p. 469],\\n\\\"The municipal court as an institution has made remarkable strides in the last seven years in earning the respect of the people in this State and as a result it has been entrusted with greatly enlarged jurisdiction In re Klaisz, 19 N. J. 145, 148 (1955) (Vanderbilt, C. J.).\\n\\\"[N]o threats, nothing that has happened, nothing that can happen, will weigh a feather against allowing the defendant, upon this and every other question *\\\" the whole advantage he is entitled to from substantial law and justice Lord Chief Justice Mansfield in Rex v. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 347 (K. B. 1770).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/199154.json b/nj/199154.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e3844ed9fef824719eda179f36eab2f7d04952b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/199154.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"199154\", \"name\": \"FRIEDA H. ARNING, PLAINTIFF, v. GEORGE DRUDING, DEFENDANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Arning v. Druding\", \"decision_date\": \"1921-06-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"47\", \"last_page\": \"48\", \"citations\": \"96 N.J.L. 47\", \"volume\": \"96\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:06:47.714037+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"FRIEDA H. ARNING, PLAINTIFF, v. GEORGE DRUDING, DEFENDANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"FRIEDA H. ARNING, PLAINTIFF, v. GEORGE DRUDING, DEFENDANT.\\nSubmitted March 17, 1921\\nDecided June 10, 1921.\\nThe sidewalk in front of defendant\\u2019s property was partly covered with a paved walk, there being a curb along the outer side of the sidewalk and a hedge along the other side; the defendant, after a snowstorm, removed the snow from the stone paving and placed it partly along the curb and partly along the hedge side of the stone walk. During the day the snow melted and the water ran over the stone paving which froze during the night. The plaint- . iff in passing over this walk was thrown by the ice thus formed and was injured.' Held, that the act of the defendant was not such an artificial accumulation of snow as to make the defendant liable. Aull v. Lee, 84 N. J. L. 155, distinguished.\\nOn rule to show cause.\\nBefore Gummbre, Chief Justice, and Justices Bergen and Katzenbaoh.\\nFor the plaintiff, Harry H. Weinberger.\\nFor the respondent, Stanton T. Lawrence.\", \"word_count\": \"476\", \"char_count\": \"2613\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nBergen, J.\\nDefendant was the owner of a property in Rutherford, in front 'of which there was a sidewalk. Along one side of the sidewalk was a curb and along the other a hedge and in the centre was a stone pavement. The proofs show that the defendant had caused snow, which had fallen in a storm, to be taken from the stone flagging and piled partly on one side next to the curb and partly on the other side next to the hedge; that this snow melted in the middle of the day and froze at night and that in the morning between half-past eight and nine o'clock the plaintiff, in undertaking to walk along this sidewalk, to her place of business, fell and was seriously injured. The trial court nonsuited the plaintiff, who was allowed a rule to show cause, which she now moves be made absolute.\\nThe single question is whether the removal of the snow from the flagging and placing it on each side was such an artificial'accumulation and storage of snow in such a position and under such circumstances as would from natural causes render the adjoining sidewalk dangerous. We do not think so. The situation would be very much like Aull v. Lee, 84 N. J. L. 155, if the snow had been removed from1 the sidewalk and placed on the lawn for the convenience of the defen da.nt, but that is not the present posture of affairs. The acts of the defendant did not cause any more snow to be accumulated on the sidewalk than had fallen thereon from natural sources, and the Aull ease does not apply.\\nWe think the nonsuit was right and that the rule to show cause should be discharged, with costs, and it is so ordered.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/207270.json b/nj/207270.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..abd951dbabc8a519d0174ac10d8ac2ec649564e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/207270.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"207270\", \"name\": \"LOUIS N. MACKEY, PROSECUTOR, v. THE MAYOR AND COMMON COUNCIL OF THE TOWN OF BELVIDERE, IN THE COUNTY OF WARREN, RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mackey v. Mayor of Belvidere\", \"decision_date\": \"1925-04-29\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"250\", \"last_page\": \"253\", \"citations\": \"101 N.J.L. 250\", \"volume\": \"101\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:51:46.120278+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"LOUIS N. MACKEY, PROSECUTOR, v. THE MAYOR AND COMMON COUNCIL OF THE TOWN OF BELVIDERE, IN THE COUNTY OF WARREN, RESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"LOUIS N. MACKEY, PROSECUTOR, v. THE MAYOR AND COMMON COUNCIL OF THE TOWN OF BELVIDERE, IN THE COUNTY OF WARREN, RESPONDENT.\\nArgued April 16, 1925\\nDecided April 29, 1925.\\nBefore Justice Trenchakd, sitting alone, by consent.\\nFor the prosecutor, William- H. Morrow.\\nFor the respondent, John H. DaTilhe.\", \"word_count\": \"859\", \"char_count\": \"5143\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nTrenchard, J.\\nThe prosecutor of this writ desired to challenge one item only of the appropriations in the budget of the town of Belvidere for the fiscal year 1925, and, accordingly, the writ was allowed, as expressly provided in the allocatur, \\\"to be effective only as to second item of appropriations, to wit, 'preservation of life and property, $12,150.' \\\"\\nThat item is now challenged for the reason (among others) that it fails to meet the requirements of the law that the amount to be appropriated for each purpose shall be stated, the appropriations itemized, and the several items set forth accurately, according to the respective and particular objects, departments or subdepartments for which the respective amounts are to be expended.\\nI am constrained to think that the prosecutor's position is well taken.\\nThe Budget act of 1917 (Pamph. L., p. 548), as amended in 1918 (Pamph. L., p. 912) and 1919 (Pamph. L., p 371), in its first section declares that \\\"hereafter annually\\\" there \\\"shall be adopted\\\" by the governing body of each municipality a \\\"budget,\\\" as described in section 6 of the act.\\nSection 6, paragraph (b) under the head of \\\"appropriations,\\\" requires that \\\"the several purposes and the amount to be appropriated for each purpose for which the anticipated revenues are to be expended for local purposes\\\" shall be stated in the budget.\\nPrior sections provide a method of ascertaining, approximately, the total revenues, and among such revenues is the amount to be raised by taxes. Every taxpayer in the municipality is therefore interested in the matter of the budget. He contributes a part of the money raised by the taxes, and, generally speaking, he has a right to know for what purposes the taxes paid are to be devoted.\\nThe subsequent sections, to and including number 10, are devoted to the method of ascertaining the total revenues of the municipality for the year. Section 11 declares that \\\"under the heading of 'appropriations* in the budget, as provided in section 6 of this act, there shall be set forth the appropriations, itemized according to the respective objects, departments or subdepartments for which they are to be expended, with the amount to be devoted to said object, department or subdepartment. The several items of appropriations shall be set forth accurately according to the particular object, department or subdepartment for which the respective amounts are to be expended.** (There is an exception as to \\\"contingent expenses*' with which we are not now concerned.)\\nBy section 12, paragraph (a), it is declared that \\\"the purpose of the budget as set forth in this act is to control all expenditures for the year under budget appropriations\\\" (excepting certain special or emergency matters with which we are not now concerned).\\nThe act requires much publicity to be given of the items in the budget, and provides for a hearing and final action upon the budget. Indeed, the purpose of the Budget act was, not only to secure greater uniformity in municipal financing, but to give the members of the public a better understanding of the financial condition and affairs of municipalities in which they are interested, and to place at the disposal of the governing bodies the data necessary for intelligent action on financial matters, and thereby safeguard the public interests. Chamber of Commerce v. Essex County, 96 N. J. L. 238.\\nI turn now to a consideration of the appropriation item in question, namely, \\\"preservation of life and property, $12,-150.\\\" Several questions naturally arise: How much of this money is to be expended for the preservation of life? How much of it is to be expended for the preservation of property? What are the methods for the preservation of either life or property to be made use of in disbursing this money ? Is life to be preserved through the instrumentality of the police department, or in some other way? Is property to be preserved through the instrumentality of the fire department or by some other means ?\\nNo light, not even the slightest, is thrown upon any one of these questions by the language of the item in question, nor by any other language of the budget, nor by anything in the proceedings returned with the writ. And I, therefore, think there was no compliance with the requirements of the law that the amount to be appropriated for each purpose for which the anticipated revenues are to be expended for local purposes shall be stated, the appropriations itemized, and the several items set forth accurately, according to the respective and particular objects, departments or subdepartments for which the respective amounts are to be expended. There being no compliance with these requirements of the law, the item in question will be set aside. Royal Holding Co. v. City of Beverly, 1 N. J. Mis. R. 453.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/207314.json b/nj/207314.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..74f5a41eb5ff6eec74bcad3b126ab73d13af615b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/207314.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"207314\", \"name\": \"TOWNSHIP OF NORTH BERGEN, IN THE COUNTY OF HUDSON, APPELLANT, v. STATE BOARD OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENT ET AL.. RESPONDENTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Township of North Bergen v. State Board of Taxes & Assessment\", \"decision_date\": \"1925-01-19\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"235\", \"last_page\": \"235\", \"citations\": \"101 N.J.L. 235\", \"volume\": \"101\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:51:46.120278+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"TOWNSHIP OF NORTH BERGEN, IN THE COUNTY OF HUDSON, APPELLANT, v. STATE BOARD OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENT ET AL.. RESPONDENTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"TOWNSHIP OF NORTH BERGEN, IN THE COUNTY OF HUDSON, APPELLANT, v. STATE BOARD OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENT ET AL.. RESPONDENTS.\\nSubmitted November 7, 1924\\nDecided January 19, 1925.\\nEor the appellant, J. Emil Walscheid.\\nEor the respondents, Gaede & Gaede.\", \"word_count\": \"83\", \"char_count\": \"556\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe judgment under review herein should be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinion delivered bjr the Supreme Court.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 The Chancellor, Chief Justice, Mimturn, Black, Katzenbach, Lloyd, White, Gardner, Yan Buskirk, Clx\\u00ed.rk, McGlennon, Kays, JJ. 12.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 -None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/219768.json b/nj/219768.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8dfc30af9e22e1aa198b062f4de59c633e928a1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/219768.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"219768\", \"name\": \"EDWARD C. SCHNITZER v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Schnitzer v. Western Union Telegraph Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1913-03-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"63\", \"last_page\": \"65\", \"citations\": \"84 N.J.L. 63\", \"volume\": \"84\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:40:01.241384+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"EDWARD C. SCHNITZER v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.\", \"head_matter\": \"EDWARD C. SCHNITZER v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.\\nSubmitted December 6, 1912\\nDecided March 1, 1913.\\nLosses incurred in speculative dealing in \\u201cdifferences\\u201d cannot legally be made the measure of damages in an action against a telegraph company for delay in delivery of a telegram from plaintiff\\u2019s brokers.\\nOn appeal from the East Orange. District Court.\\nBefore Justices Swayze, Voorhees and Kalisch.\\nFor the plaintiff-appellant, William A. Lord.\\nFor the defendant-respondent, Kinsley Twining and William K. Flanagan.\", \"word_count\": \"463\", \"char_count\": \"2649\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nSwayze, J.\\nThis is an action for damages for delay in the transmission of a telegram. The plaintiff was speculating in cotton-seed oil. The telegram was from his brokers with reference to the condition of the market. The plaintiff's claim is that by reason of the delay in the delivery he did not buy until the next day when the price had gone up. He testified that he had been trading on a margin of $2,600; that the purchase in question amounted to $27,352; that he would buy and sell and when he made it was credited and when he lost he put up more margin. He also testified distinctly that he was dealing in differences. The trial judge found that he was dealing in differences and that any loss in such dealings could not legally be made the measure of damages in this action. We think that the trial judge was right and are unable to make the distinction which the plaintiff asks us to make between the enforcement of a contract as in Flagg v. Baldwin, 11 Stew. Eq. 219, and the allowance of damages for the breach of a contract as in the present case. The ground upon which Elagg v. Baldwin was decided, was that the enforcement of a contract of this character would violate the plain public policy of this state. That policy is violated quite as much when damages are allowed to be recovered as when the contract or securities given in connection therewith are enforced. Ordinarily the only wa3r in which contracts are enforced in a court of law is by an award of damages for their breach.. In justification of our result we need cite no other authority than those cited by the respondent in his brief. Cothran v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 83 Ga. 25; Kiley v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 39 Hun (N. Y.) 158; Gist v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 45 So. Car. 344; Morris v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 94 Me. 423; Weld v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 199 N. Y. 88. The last case is particularly important because it establishes that under the law of Yew York such contracts are illegal, even when the transactions are in another state.\\nThe judgment is affirmed, witli costs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/2205321.json b/nj/2205321.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cedc255ec4b06fb393853735ffd22b1fe0cc1456
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/2205321.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"2205321\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. M.J.K., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. M.J.K.\", \"decision_date\": \"2004-06-09\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"532\", \"last_page\": \"552\", \"citations\": \"369 N.J. Super. 532\", \"volume\": \"369\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:52:04.547304+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. M.J.K., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"849 A.2d 1105\\nSTATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. M.J.K., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey-Appellate Division\\nArgued December 15, 2003\\nDecided June 9, 2004.\\nBefore Judges HAVEY, NEWMAN and HOENS.\\nJohn R. Klotz argued the cause for appellant.\\nSteven E. Braun, Chief Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (James F. Avigliano, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Braun, of counsel and on the brief).\", \"word_count\": \"6282\", \"char_count\": \"39294\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nHOENS, JAD.\\nDefendant M.J.K. was charged in Passaic County Indictment No. 98-03-0329-1 with second-degree attempted aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(4); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d; third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-lb(2); and third-degree criminal restraint, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2a. A superceding indictment, No. 98-11-1031-1, added a charge of first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A 2C:13-lb(l) and N.J.S.A. 2C:13-lb(2).\\nIn pre-trial proceedings, certain statements defendant made to police investigators were suppressed. The judge determined, following a hearing, that because of defendant's neurological impairment and significant deficiencies in ability to understand verbal and written material, the State had not met its burden of demonstrating that he had the cognitive ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. At the same time, other statements defendant made and evidence found in a vehicle searched based on defendant's consent were deemed admissible because the judge determined that the statements were made voluntarily and that the discovery of the evidence would have been inevitable.\\nAfter extensive pre-trial hearings, the judge issued a written opinion finding defendant competent to stand trial. Following a jury trial thereafter, defendant was found guilty of third-degree criminal restraint, N.J.S.A 2C:13-2a, and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d. He was acquitted by the jury of all of the other charges. His post-trial motion for acquittal on the weapon possession charge was denied.\\nThereafter, defendant was sentenced on the third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose charge to a term of five years probation with 364 days to be served in the county jail, conditioned upon no contact with the victim or her family. In addition, defendant was ordered to undergo psychological or psychiatric counseling, to participate in vocational training and to reside with his father pending further order of the court upon his release from jail. He was also sentenced to the same term and the same conditions on the third-degree criminal restraint charge, to be served concurrently. The sentence was thereafter stayed pending disposition of this appeal.\\nOn appeal, defendant raises the following points.\\nPOINT I\\nTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL.\\nPOINT II\\nTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ITEMS SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WERE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY RULE.\\nPOINT III\\nTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE APPLICATION OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS AT SENTENCING.\\nPOINT IV\\nTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STATE COULD CROSS-EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT'S EXPERT PSYCHOLOGIST, IF CALLED AS A WITNESS, REGARDING AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES NOT INTRODUCED BY THE DEFENDANT.\\nPOINT V\\n[THE TRIAL COURT] ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL FOR POSSESSION OF A WEAPON FOR AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE INASMUCH AS DEFENDANT WAS FOUND NOT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED AS THE UNLAWFUL PURPOSE.\\nBecause we find merit in defendant's arguments concerning the judge's finding that he was competent to stand trial and because we reverse based on our analysis of that argument, we need not address the other arguments included in defendant's appeal. We turn then to our consideration of the issues relating to defendant's competence.\\nThe facts that gave rise to defendant's arrest and indictment, as presented by the State, may be summarized as follows. On January 6, 1998, S.R., who was a student at Lakeland Regional High School, was leaving school after participating in a fencing meet. At some time between 6:15 p.m. and 6:30 p.m., S.R. was outside of the school, standing between the so-called new and old school buddings. She was waiting for her father to arrive, having telephoned him for a ride home. She saw defendant, a former student, who was also outside of the school, and who was pacing back and forth. At the time, she knew who defendant was although she did not personally know him. As she was standing facing the street, he approached her from behind, put one hand on her mouth and held a knife to her throat.\\nS.R. asked defendant what he wanted, to which he responded \\\"Just start walking, you'll know soon enough.\\\" He then pushed her toward a dark alcove, a distance later measured to be approximately three hundred and seventy-four feet. S.R. believed that if she crouched down she might be able to get away from him, so she intentionally fell to the ground, with the result that defendant tripped and fell on top of her. The two struggled on the ground, as S.R. called for help and began to kick defendant in the groin. During the struggle, she noticed that defendant was wearing thick glasses which she grabbed off of his face, prompting him to tell her not to hurt his glasses. As the struggle continued, S.R. saw her father's car and called to him for help, which startled defen dant who then released her, at which point she kicked him in the face and ran away.\\nS.R. then told her father that defendant had tried to rape her and she used her father's cell phone to call the police. Her father, B.R., saw defendant, who was still near the alcove and who was holding a knife with a red handle. B.R. and another adult who had arrived then began to chase defendant. A short time later, aided by one of the teachers who was at the school for a basketball game, they found defendant in the parking lot. The teacher recognized defendant as a former student. When the teacher asked him why he had dirt and leaves on his clothes, defendant said that he had been wrestling with a girl. The teacher, noticing that defendant had an object in his hand, asked him what it was and asked defendant to give it to him. Defendant complied and gave the teacher a Swiss Army knife.\\nThe question of defendant's competence to stand trial was extensively studied, with four different experts offering opinions on the subject. For purposes of this opinion, we first note that much of the factual background concerning defendant and relevant to his competence was revealed in his school records and is undisputed. We therefore summarize that background evidence as follows. Defendant was first referred for an evaluation in 1983 when he entered kindergarten. That evaluation revealed that defendant suffered from a significant delay in acquisition of language skills, perseverative behaviors and difficulty in gross and fine motor skills. As a result, he was classified for educational purposes as neurologically impaired, a classification later changed to perceptually impaired. At about the same time, he was diagnosed as suffering from minimal brain dysfunction. Defendant was placed in special education classes and continued to be so classified throughout his years in school.\\nOver the years, his school records indicate that he was found to have difficulty processing information. At age twelve, he was tested and found to have an IQ in the Borderline range. At age fifteen, as a part of a re-evaluation in connection with his edu cational placement, he was found to \\\"be at a severe disadvantage when he attempts to master any higher level academic task . the implication of these data is that [M.J.K.] will likely have difficulties relating to same-age peers because his understanding of the complexities of their social interactions will be deficient.\\\" Another report issued in connection with that re-evaluation described his \\\"considerable deficits in receptive and expressive language functioning\\\" and noted that his \\\"awareness and understanding of figurative language is virtually non-existent and exacerbates his pragmatic difficulties.\\\"\\nM.J.K. remained in special education classes through high school and completed the requirements for graduation from high school that were included in his Individualized Educational Plan (IEP). He was awarded a high school diploma which the judge aptly described in his written opinion respecting defendant's inability to knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights as \\\"geared to his specific ability and not that of any State standard.\\\" M.J.K. then attempted to continue his education through a county community college. He failed, however, to perform with sufficient proficiency on the placement examination to be admitted even to remedial college-level courses in English. He only achieved a minimal score for admission into remedial classes in math.\\nOther information relating to defendant and his general level of functioning had been disclosed in pretrial proceedings. For example, one of the conditions of defendant's release on bail was a requirement that he be supervised at all times by one of a list of approved supervisors, who were required to ensure that he report in person and by telephone for bail supervision. As a practical matter, the obligation to supervise or accompany M.J.K. at all times fell upon his father, who ensured that M.J.K. was present at all court proceedings and who accompanied him to the appointments with the forensic examiners. In addition, although he was prohibited from reporting to his job as a further condition of his bail, the record reflects that M.J.K. had been employed following his graduation from high school at a variety of menial jobs. His last employment prior to the events in issue was as a cart boy or bagger at a grocery store where he had worked a few hours each week.\\nPrior to trial, the judge conducted a hearing to determine defendant's competence, during which four experts offered their opinions. The first witness was Christine Joseph, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist who testified on behalf of the State. First licensed as a psychologist in 1993, she has been employed at the Anne Klein Forensic Center since 1999. She received her training concerning competency determinations from a licensed psychologist at the Anne Klein Center.\\nJoseph met with defendant to assess his competence in January 2001. She was surprised, based on the background material she had read about him, that her interview with him took only one- and-a-half hours. After reading that material, she had expected defendant to have difficulty answering questions, but found that he did not. In the interview, defendant reported information which was consistent with the background material. He understood the purpose of their meeting, and was oriented to time, place, and person.\\nJoseph learned that defendant had been in special education classes in school and that he had been classified as perceptually impaired. He told her that in high school, he had been the manager of the basketball, volleyball and softball teams. He also told her that he worked three to five hours each day at a supermarket, although she did not ask about his specific job assignment. Joseph was impressed with defendant's language skills.\\nJoseph testified that she was not convinced that defendant met the criteria for mental retardation, as there was no evidence that he had been classified as mentally retarded. Instead, she diagnosed him with borderline intellectual functioning related to his learning disability, which she testified is not the same as mild mental retardation.\\nNevertheless, she administered the Competence Assessment for Standing Trial for Defendants with Mental Retardation (CAST-MR), which is a test designed to aid in determining whether a mentally retarded person is competent to stand trial. She did so because the records she reviewed included information that defendant's IQ was 73, which made it appropriate to administer the CAST-MR.\\nDuring the hearing, Joseph explained the CAST-MR test. The first part is a multiple choice test for familiarity with basic legal terminology. When Joseph administered the test, defendant scored 100% on that section. In the second part of the test, the subject is asked questions requiring that he make reasonable choices in order to determine whether the person has the skills needed to assist in his own defense. When Joseph administered the test, defendant scored 80% on that section. In the third part of the test, the subject is asked about the specific charges against him. Joseph testified that defendant's answers indicated that he understood the charges against him and she awarded him a score of 95% on that part of the test. Defendant's overall score was 93%, the highest score Joseph had ever had any subject achieve on the test. Joseph opined that there was \\\"very little doubt in my mind that he is competent to stand trial.\\\" She further noted that if she had had any doubts about defendant's competence, she had the authority to hospitalize him for thirty days in order to make an accurate assessment, a step she considered to be unnecessary in defendant's case.\\nOn cross-examination, Joseph was challenged about her familiarity with the CAST-MR test, the adequacy of her training to administer it, the level of her experience with the use of the test for mentally retarded individuals and the manner in which she administered the test to defendant. She contended that she was qualified to administer the CAST-MR test according to its accompanying manual. She acknowledged that when she first started administering the CAST-MR, she had no specialized training in or experience with mental retardation and that she had received all of her training in the use of that test from others on the staff at the Anne Klein Center. She testified that she had administered the test for competence more than 200 times, including between ten and twelve times specifically involving mentally retarded individuals. She denied using inappropriate methods, she specifically denied using leading questions and she defended the way in which she had scored defendant's performance on the test.\\nThree other experts were called to testify, all on behalf of defendant. The first, Dr. Paul Dasher, a licensed psychologist since 1990, had initially evaluated defendant at the request of the court. Dasher testified that based on defendant's relatively sophisticated vocabulary, he thought at first that defendant was competent. Eventually, however, he concluded that defendant was not. Dasher interviewed defendant twice and administered the WAIS-R, which is more commonly known as the IQ test. Dasher found that defendant's full-scale IQ was 73, an indication of mild mental retardation. Dasher also administered the Projective Drawings test, which showed that defendant had \\\"underlying neurological impairment in conjunction with major indicators of impulsivity.\\\" Dasher did not administer the CAST-MR because he was not familiar with it.\\nDasher testified that because defendant has a good memory, he gives the impression that his cognitive functions are higher than they actually are. He also found that defendant's ability \\\"to abstract\\\" was poor. Based on his interviews, testing and evaluation, Dasher opined that defendant did not have the capacity to relate to defense counsel sufficiently to assist in his own defense or to help plan legal strategy. As examples, Dasher noted that defendant could not understand a plea agreement, had no ability to weigh and consider various rights including his right not to testify, and that he did not understand the concept of a defense. Based upon the results of his testing and based upon the interviews he conducted, Dasher determined that defendant was not competent to stand trial and that he would never achieve a level of intellectual functioning that would allow him to adequately assist in his own defense.\\nDr. Mark Siegert, who has held a doctorate in clinical psychology since 1984, testified thereafter. His background included five years as a clinical instructor in psychology and psychological testing and assessment at Harvard Medical School, service as the Supervisor of Psychological Testing and Psychotherapy at Columbia University, where he taught graduate students, and experience as the Chief of the Division of Psychology for St. Barnabas Hospital in Livingston, during which time he also served on the staff at Mountainside Hospital. In addition, he spent a year working at a rehabilitation center for multiply-handicapped children, who suffered from mental retardation along with one or more other handicaps.\\nSiegert interviewed both defendant and his father. He found that on the surface, the depth of defendant's disability was not apparent. Siegert opined that while defendant was oriented to time, place and things and thus met the criteria for proceeding to trial under the first prong of the competency statute, he did not meet the criteria established in the second part of the statute for a finding of competence. According to Siegert, defendant did not have the ability to understand and weigh the decision about whether or not to testify, did not understand the consequences of his answers and had no capacity to understand plea negotiations. Defendant therefore did not have the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of a defense and lacked the ability to understand specific defenses. Although defendant could sometimes identify witnesses who were favorable or unfavorable to him, he could not do so consistently. Moreover, defendant lacked the ability to abstract and generalize. Siegert also found that defendant had a full-scale IQ of 73, a score that indicates that defendant has mild mental retardation in accordance with the DSM-IV, the diagnostic manual used by mental health professionals.\\nSiegert also offered opinions about Dr. Joseph, the State's expert. He opined that Joseph was not qualified to administer the CAST-MR because the test protocol requires that it be given by those who have specific experience working with people with mental retardation, a qualification Joseph lacked. Moreover, Siegert opined that this shortcoming on Joseph's part had the capacity to affect the administration of the test and thus the validity of the results. As an example, Siegert noted that, based upon the raw data that Joseph supplied, she had used a leading question and guided defendant to an answer, but had then scored the answer as if defendant had spontaneously given it correctly. In addition, he found that Joseph improperly gave defendant more information to help him answer questions, but then gave him full credit as if he had answered correctly without assistance. Further, he found that Joseph also gave defendant full credit for incomplete answers rather than scoring those responses as partially correct answers.\\nSiegert also testified that after he read Joseph's report and reviewed the test methodology that led to her conclusion that defendant was competent, he contacted Dr. Caroline Everington, one of the originators of the CAST-MR. He asked Everington to evaluate defendant, because he was concerned that Joseph had not done so properly. According to Siegert, Everington is not only the \\\"foremost authority of competency and mental retardation,\\\" but a \\\"very brilliant forensic psychologist and quite a scholar,\\\" who had \\\"impeccable credentials\\\" as well. Siegert did not administer the CAST-MR to defendant himself because he had never given it.\\nDr. Caroline Everington did thereafter evaluate defendant and she also testified on his behalf. She earned her Ph.D. in special education and worked with mentally retarded people for twenty-five years. At the time of trial, she was a professor and Associate Dean at Richard Riley College of Education, Winthrop University, South Carolina. She authored over twenty articles on mental retardation and its relationship to one's competence to stand trial which had been published in professional psychological journals. She received numerous grants and fellowships to pursue research in the subject and has made numerous presentations on the topic over the years. Everington also wrote a Guide for Psychologists, which is used by psychologists in assessing mental retardation.\\nEverington was the co-originator of the CAST-MR test. Prior to developing the CAST-MR, Everington had developed five versions of an educational assessment test for mentally retarded persons used in New Mexico. In addition, even before developing the CAST-MR, Everington had an extensive background in testing, including validation and construction methodologies.\\nEverington testified that the co-author of CAST-MR was Ruth Luckasson, a professor of special education and an attorney. Everington considered her co-author to be a \\\"leader\\\" in the field of mental retardation, who served on the President's Committee for Mental Retardation and who was the lead author of the definition for mental retardation adopted by the American Association for the Mentally Retarded (AAMR) which has come to be called the \\\"Luckasson Definition\\\" and which is also used in the DSM and by the World Health Organization.\\nEverington explained that the CAST-MR is a test used to assist an evaluator in determining whether a defendant with mental retardation is competent to stand trial. It indicates what a defendant knows relative to the standard for competence to stand trial. The test manual sets forth the qualifications of those eligible to give the test. One of the criteria required for the individual administering the test is previous experience or training in the area of mental retardation. , Everington testified that this qualification is important because persons with mental retardation frequently master testing ability so it may be difficult to detect a disability unless one is an experienced examiner. The kind of questioning used by an examiner is also important because mentally retarded people display acquiescence and a very strong desire to please. They are likely to answer \\\"yes\\\" and are easily led because they do not want to admit to the examiner that they do not understand. According to Everington, if a person without experience in dealing with this population allows suggestibility into the testing process, \\\"you may not get an accurate assessment of the person's understanding.\\\"\\nEverington determined that it was appropriate to give the CAST-MR test to defendant because he met the definition for mental retardation under both the AAMR and the DSM-IV standards. Specifically, defendant has substantial limitations in his present functioning as evidenced by his IQ of 73, his cognitive deficiencies and his language problems. Furthermore, while a diagnosis of mental retardation requires demonstration of deficits in two out of a possible ten adaptive skills areas, defendant showed deficits in seven of those areas, including home living, community use, self care, work skills, self direction, social skills and communication.\\nTo make the adaptive skills determination, Everington administered several tests, including the TOAL-3 (Test of Adolescent and Adult Language). Defendant scored below the first percentile in all areas except one, which was listening, in which he scored in the third percentile. His overall score was also below the first percentile when compared with others of his age. The TOAL-3 test therefore showed that defendant had significant problems in processing what was said to him as well as in expressing what he knew.\\nAfter determining that defendant was mentally retarded and therefore deciding that it was appropriate to do so, Everington administered the CAST-MR test to defendant. On the first part of the CAST-MR test, defendant scored 92%, which showed that he had a good understanding of the terminology required to participate in a legal proceeding. On the second section, which tests skills needed to assist in a defense, however, he scored only 53%. On the third section, which tests the individual's understanding of case events, defendant scored only 60%. Based on Everington's testing, therefore, defendant scored below the established cut-off level for competence in both the second and third sections of the CAST-MR test.\\nIn addition to her testing of defendant, Everington interviewed defendant for six-and-one-half hours. She also interviewed defendant's father for two hours and defendant's special education teacher for one hour. Everington also reviewed documents relevant to defendant and to the case. After considering all of this evidence, Everington determined that defendant was not competent to stand trial. In her opinion, defendant did not have adequate comprehension, and thus did not satisfy three of the statutory criteria for competence. She concluded that he was unable to assist in his own defense because he could not communicate important information or relate events to his attorney, could not understand abstract information, and could not make decisions. She further concluded that he did not have an adequate understanding of entering a guilty plea and thus could not engage in meaningful plea negotiations. Everington opined that defendant appeared to be higher-functioning than he is because he has some good vocabulary skills, but that he often only \\\"parrots\\\" what he hears around him.\\nIn addition, Everington reviewed the CAST-MR test that had been administered by Joseph, and opined that it was likely that Joseph had used a leading question with defendant. She also evaluated Joseph's scoring of the test and found it to be inaccurate, resulting in a higher score than should have been awarded. Specifically, she noted that Joseph gave one point credit for answers where only one-half point should have been given. Everington found that in no instance did Joseph score an answer lower than it should have been.\\nFollowing the hearing, the trial judge issued his written opinion in which he concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial. In part, he relied on facts in the record including defendant's graduation from high school, ability to read and write, success in receiving a driver's license, part-time employment and attendance at all court proceedings. Respecting the experts who had testified, the judge wrote:\\nI also place great weight on Dr. Joseph's evaluation because of her experience in dealing with competency evaluations for the Slate of New Jersey... All except Dr. Everington agree that [defendant] will be expected to tell to the best of his ability the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed. I disagree with Dr. Everington's findings. Defendant gave the police a factually explicit description of the incident.\\nI am satisfied that defendant understands his right not to testify, he could participate in plea negotiations and has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense. I am also satisfied that he can communicate with his attorney and has the ability to comprehend his advice. After evaluating defendant's capabilities and his attorney's role in assisting, I have no doubt that the State has established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant is competent to stand trial.\\nThe test for competence to stand trial arises from our basic concepts of due process. As the United States Supreme Court has held, a defendant tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial has been deprived of his due process right to a fair trial. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 838, 15 L.Ed.2d 815, 818 (1966); State v. Cecil, 260 N.J.Super. 475, 480, 616 A.2d 1336 (App.Div.1992), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 431, 627 A.2d 1138 (1993). Consequently, a court must hold a competency hearing where the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to a defendant's competence. See Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. at 385, 86 S.Ct. at 842, 15 L.Ed.2d at 822; State v. Cecil, supra, 260 N.J.Super. at 480, 616 A.2d 1336. We have previously held that the State bears the burden of establishing competence by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Lambert, 275 N.J.Super. 125, 129, 645 A.2d 1189 (App.Div.1994).\\nThe minimum requirements for determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial were first established by the United States Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824, 825 (1960). There, the Court defined the test as follows: \\\"whether [defendant] had sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding \\u2014 and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.\\\" Ibid. In New Jersey, the test for competence to stand trial on criminal charges has been codified in N.J.S.A. 2C:4\\u2014 4, which provides:\\na. No person who lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures.\\nb. A person shall be considered mentally competent to stand trial on criminal charges if the proofs shall establish:\\n(1) That the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and things; and\\n(2) That his elementary mental processes are such that he comprehends:\\n(a) That he is in a court of justice charged with a criminal offense;\\n(b) That there is a judge on the bench;\\n(c) That there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of a criminal charge;\\n(d) That he has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him against that charge;\\n(e) That he will be expected to tell to the best of his mental ability the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed if he chooses to testify and understands the right not to testify;\\n(f) That there is or may be a jury present to pass upon evidence adduced as to guilt or innocence of such charge or, that if he should choose to enter into plea negotiations or to plead guilty, that he comprehend the consequences of a guilty plea and that he be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon such entry of a guilty plea; and\\n(g) That he has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense.\\n[NJ.S.A 20:4-4.]\\nAs we have recently noted, this statute, effective in 1979, replaced the \\\"generalizations of prior case law with more precise and detailed standards for determining a defendant's competency____\\\" State v. Moya, 329 N.J.Super. 499, 506, 748 A.2d 604 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 529, 760 A.2d 783 (2000); see State v. Khan, 175 N.J.Super. 72, 82-83, 417 A.2d 585 (App.Div.1980).\\nWe have previously described our role in reviewing the decisions of a trial judge respecting competence as \\\"typically, and properly, highly deferential.\\\" State v. Moya, supra, 329 N.J.Super. at 506, 748 A.2d 604. Moreover, we have recognized that the decision regarding competence is for the judge and not for the experts to make. Ibid. Bearing that general guidance in mind, however, our review of this record compels us to conclude that the judge's evaluation of the evidence and the testimony of the experts was fundamentally flawed and that his conclusion that this defendant was competent to stand trial cannot be sustained.\\nWe note first the role we ascribe to experts and to their opinions. \\\"Expert testimony is needed where the factfinder would not be expected to have sufficient knowledge or experience and would have to speculate without the aid of expert testimony.\\\" Torres v. Schripps, Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 419, 430, 776 A.2d 915 (App.Div.2001). Expert testimony, however, \\\"need not be given greater weight than other evidence nor more weight than it would otherwise deserve in light of common sense and experience.\\\" Ibid, (citing In re Yaccarino, 117 N.J. 175, 196, 564 A.2d 1184 (1989)). Indeed, a judge is not obligated to accept an expert's opinion, even if the expert was \\\"impressive.\\\" State v. Carpenter, 268 N.J.Super. 378, 383, 633 A.2d 1005 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 467, 640 A.2d 848 (1994). The factfinder may therefore accept some of the expert's testimony and reject the rest, Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J.Super. 387, 401, 633 A.2d 1009 (App.Div.1993), and may do so even if that testimony is unrebutted by any other evidence. Johnson v. American Homestead Mortgage Corp., 306 N.J.Super. 429, 438, 703 A.2d 984 (App.Div.1997). Respecting expert opinions of psychiatrists or psychologists, the court, sitting as a factfinder, must use its \\\"common sense and ordinary experience.\\\" In re Yaccarino, supra, 117 N.J. at 196, 564 A.2d 1184. This is particularly true when, as here, the factfinder is confronted with directly divergent opinions expressed by the experts.\\nWhile the judge, therefore, was empowered to accept or reject from among the various opinions and was permitted to evaluate those opinions in light of all of the evidence in the record, the grounds he articulated for his choice here demonstrate an obviously mistaken exercise of discretion. We reach this conclusion for several reasons.\\nFirst, while placing \\\"great weight\\\" on Joseph's opinion because of \\\"her experience in dealing with competency evaluations for the State,\\\" the judge overlooked the fact that her experience in evaluating mentally retarded individuals like defendant was minimal. He evidenced, as well, no awareness of the fact that her familiarity with the diagnostic criteria for mental retardation was also limited. He overlooked the fact that she lacked the credentials which would have made her qualified to administer the CAST-MR test. Most telling, we think, is the fact that Joseph's very lack of experience with this population led her to make precisely the error that the test's originator warned of, namely, perceiving relatively strong language skills, coupled with a good memory and an eagerness to please, to be evidence of far greater mental capacity than defendant actually has.\\nBeyond that, the judge overlooked Joseph's improper administration of the CAST-MR test evidenced by her use of at least one leading question, her assistance to defendant to increase his score and her inappropriate scoring, all of which made her opinion suspect. In addition, Joseph's abbreviated personal interview, her failure to inquire about the nature of defendant's employment and her apparent lack of familiarity with the high school graduation criteria utilized for students in special education programs plainly caused her to overstate the few achievements defendant had managed to make in the real world. It is axiomatic that an expert's opinion is only as strong as the facts on which it rests. See Higgins v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 282 N.J.Super. 600, 614, 660 A.2d 1252 (App.Div.1995); State v. Freeman, 223 N.J.Super. 92, 115-16, 538 A.2d 371 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 525, 555 A.2d 637 (1989); Polyard v. Terry, 160 N.J.Super. 497, 511, 390 A.2d 653 (App.Div.1978), aff'd, 79 N.J. 547, 401 A.2d 532 (1979). Judged against this standard, Joseph's opinion was built on an inadequate factual foundation.\\nSecond, while the judge was free to reject the opinions of the other three experts, he gave no reason for doing so except for his observation that he disagreed with Dr. Everington's findings. Objectively analyzed, the dispute among the experts focused not on defendant's ability to accurately relate facts, but upon his ability to understand and participate in his own defense. It was in these aspects of the experts' analyses that the divergence of opinions most clearly exposed the flaws in Joseph's methodology. Properly tested, defendant fell below the established cut-off of the CAST-MR test for competence both in terms of skills needed to assist in his defense and in his understanding of the events of his case. The opinion of the originator of that test both as to defendant's competence and as to the flaws in Joseph's methodology and opinion should not have been so lightly rejected.\\nThird, while the judge was entitled to rely on one opinion out of the four, his failure to give any reasons for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Siegert and Dr. Dasher was inappropriate. Each of them conducted a careful and thoughtful analysis of defendant's abilities to understand and participate in his defense. Each of them, when compared with Dr. Joseph, was eminently better qualified to evaluate a mentally retarded individual like defendant. Their contrary opinions, if they were to be rejected, were entitled to the judge's careful analysis and consideration and were deserving of an explanation of the judge's reasons for his apparent disagreement with their conclusions.\\nWe do not intend to imply that the judge should have simply counted the experts on each side of the issue in some sort of a \\\"majority rules\\\" analysis. Nor do we intend to imply that Dr. Joseph is not, in general, qualified to determine competence to stand trial. We do conclude, however, that given the particular deficits of this defendant, her ability to accurately evaluate his competence, when compared with the experience and credentials of the other three experts, was lacking.\\nFourth, even the real world evidence in the record which the judge mentioned in order to bolster his conclusion on defendant's competence was vastly overstated. In truth, defendant can read at about a fourth or fifth grade level. His high school diploma, awarded based on his IEP criteria, does not in any sense equate with a normal high school education. The proof of that, of course, is the fact that when he tried to continue his education, he did not even qualify for non-credit remedial classes at the community college. His IQ tests reveal that he is mentally retarded. His only employment has been at menial part-time jobs, most recently as a cart boy or bagger at the grocery store. His ability to attend court and to arrive on time is merely a testament to his father's supervision of him.\\nNone of these facts bespeak sufficient competence to appreciate the significance of or to exercise the right to testify or remain silent. N.J.S.A 2C:4~4b(2)(e). None of them demonstrates a comprehension of the consequences of a guilty plea, of the wisdom of entering into negotiations for a plea or of the advisability of accepting a plea offer. N.J.S.A 2C:4-4b(2)(f). None of them suggests even a minimal ability to participate in \\\"an adequate presentation of his defense.\\\" N.J.SA 2C:4-4b(2)(g).\\nThe record is abundantly clear that defendant M.J.K. was not competent to stand trial. We therefore reverse the order of April 8, 2002, finding defendant competent, and we vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence dated February 6,2003.\\nReversed.\\nMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).\\nAs Everington explained, part two of the test consists of fifteen questions, for which a raw score of ten is required, and part three of the test consists of ten questions, for which a raw score of seven is needed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/221258.json b/nj/221258.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8ce424b1c48834cee599cf8f660a2ff9ad8ea86d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/221258.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"221258\", \"name\": \"HUDSON MILLING COMPANY, RESPONDENT, v. WILLIAM P. HIGGINS, APPELLANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hudson Milling Co. v. Higgins\", \"decision_date\": \"1913-11-17\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"268\", \"last_page\": \"272\", \"citations\": \"85 N.J.L. 268\", \"volume\": \"85\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:39:32.798793+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"HUDSON MILLING COMPANY, RESPONDENT, v. WILLIAM P. HIGGINS, APPELLANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"HUDSON MILLING COMPANY, RESPONDENT, v. WILLIAM P. HIGGINS, APPELLANT.\\nSubmitted July 7, 1913\\nDecided November 17, 1913.\\nThe organization of a new corporation being contemplated to take over the property and business of an insolvent corporation, one B, the capitalist furnishing the funds, agreed in writing with D, the president, and his wife, principal stockholders of the old company, that debits found on its books against D should be canceled and discharged by, the new company so far as said company should be enabled to cancel and discharge the same. Subsequently the assets of the old company were transferred to the new company in hulk and without reservation of the D account. Hold, that as the new company presumably paid full value for such assets, and received no benefit of the agreement between B and D, it was in no way bound by such agreement.\\nOn appeal from Hudson County Circuit Court.\\nFor the appellant, Roberson & Dema/resi.\\nFor the respondent, Robert 8. Hudspeth.\", \"word_count\": \"1387\", \"char_count\": \"8115\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nParker, J.\\nThe suit is by the assignee of a book account for lumber and mill work sold and delivered by plaintiff's assignor, a corporation called the Boyne Lumber and Milling Company. The plaintiff had verdict and judgment for the amount claimed, less a credit thereon of $52.\\nThe defence was rested on the claim that the account was incurred at the instance of William Boyne, president and active manager of the Boyne Lumber and Milling Company, and that he had induced defendant to undertake the erection of some houses and to purchase of the company the mill work therefor, under an agreement that defendant, who was a plumber, should do plumbing work for the company and also for Boyne's wife on houses belonging to her, and that his account, both for the company's work and for Mrs. Boyne's, should be credited to him on the books of the milling company, and the amount applicable to Mrs. Boyne's work then recharged by the company on its books to Boyne, the company thus paying Mrs. Boyne's plumbing bill by goods sold and expecting to get its money back through settlement of Boyne's account with it. If this defence existed in fact, and was valid, it was of course maintainable as against the subsequent assignee of the account. Practice act of 1903, Pamph. L., p. 540, \\u00a7 19. The trial court left to the jury the question whether the agreement between Boyne and defendant had actually been made, and charged in effect that if made it would be binding on the Boyne company (and of course on its assignee) if Doyne had the authority in his capacity of president to extend credit on behalf of the company, because he could then extend that credit to himself; and that such authority could be inferred from a course of practice, or the acquiescence of the directors, without formal corporate action. The verdict necessarily implied either that Doyne did not possess such authority, or that he had not made the agreement claimed, or both.\\nThe first two grounds of appeal relate to the rejection by the court of evidence relating to the contents of an agreement between William Doyne and his wife, and one Julius Berghoff, in March, 1910. It appeared that the Doyne company had become insolvent and a receiver had been appointed; that Doyne was trying to continue the business, and that the scheme was to have Berghoff buy its property and assets from the receiver and transfer them to a new corporation to be formed. This was in fact done In April, by an assignment and bill of sale from the receiver to BerghofPs agent, named Weller, of all the property and assets including accounts receivable, and another bill of sale from Weller to the plaintiff, Hudson Milling Company, covering the same subject-matter. The rejected agreement provided for this course of action, and defendant relied on a clause in it providing that \\\"all claims and demands found on the books of the Doyne Lumber and Milling Company against said William Do3me shall as soon as the new corporation secures control of the new company (sic), be canceled and .discharged so far as the new company may be enabled to cancel and discharge the sdme.\\\" The argument was and is that this was evidential to show that Berghoff, and through him the new company, had agreed to wipe out Doyne's debit account, and that if as claimed, that account showed a debit corresponding to defendant's plumbing bill for work done on Mrs. Doyne's property, the new corporation was bound by the agreement and could not recover for the goods sold to the defendant up to that amount. We fail to see any force whatever in this proposition. Assuming that an agreement by the Doyne company to pay Mrs. Doyne's debt or that of her husband to defendant by turning over goods to that amount and charging them to Doyne was not ultra vires (which is at least questionable), and that if ultra vires the transaction, is within the rule laid down in Camden and Atlantic Railroad Co. v. May's Landing Railroad Co., 19 Vroom 530, 559, still the agreement related solely to Doyne's account and in nc way to that of defendant. Moreover, it is plain that Berghoif in agreeing for an unformed corporation was acting substantially in the capacity of a promoter, and that unless and until his action was adopted by the new company when formed or was connected with some special benefit to it, such company was in no way hound thereby. Thomp. Corp. Off. (2d ed.), \\u00a7 91 et seq.; Cook Corp. (7th ed.), \\u00a7 707; 10 Cyc. 262; Braddock v. Philadelphia, &c., Railroad Co., 16 Vroom 363; Joslin v. Stokes, 11 Stew. Eq. 31.\\nNo such adoption or benefit appears. The accounts of the Doyne company were, as stated, afterwards assigned without reservation to BerghofPs agent, and reassigned by him to the plaintiff. Presumably full value was paid. It would have been a simple matter to except the Doyne debit (if one existed) from the property transferred to. the new company; hut this was not done. As the trial judge remarked, if defendant has any remedy on this agreement it is by aeiion against Berglioff. Still again, the clause quoted speaks of claims and demands found on the hooks against William Doyne. The evidence seems to show without contradiction that the debit to Doyne of $708.91 in June, 1910, was placed there some two or three months after the agreement, and two months after the formation of the plaintiff corporation and the assignment from Weller; and plainly the clause should not; he held to cover any debits that did not exist on the books at the time the agreement was made. For all these reasons the agreement, was irrelevant and inoperative as to defendant, and was properly excluded.\\nThe .other grounds of appeal may be dismissed in a, few words. The other rulings on admission of evidence were correct, or If there was error it was harmless. Exception is taken to some rather forcible remarks by the court, prompted by what the judge evidently considered an improper char acterization by counsel of the general conduct of the trial. If the language used by the judge was stronger than necessary, it was at least provoked by counsel, and the disagreement was adjusted by an explanation or apology by counsel and its acceptance by the court before the case went to the j\\u2122-y-\\nThe nonsuit was properly denied. It is argued that the plaintiff's books of account were discredited by mutilation; but this goes to their credibility rather than their competency.\\nDeclarations by William Doime after the insolvency of his company were properly excluded. His official powers were terminated or suspended, and his admissions therefore could not bind the new company.\\nThe last point made is that the verdict is contrary to the undisputed evidence. But there was no motion to direct a verdict and no exception or objection to the charge, which left the case to the jury. The point is therefore without support in tire record..\\nThe judgment will be affirmed.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 The Chief Justice, Garrison, Swayze, Trenchabd, Parker, Bergen, Voorhees, , Minturn, Kalisch, Vredenburgi-i, Congdon, White, Teri-iune, HepPENHEIMER, JJ. 14.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/227063.json b/nj/227063.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..54170546f41b415c9a39a54247e7170d893f71d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/227063.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"227063\", \"name\": \"JOHN FERRIS v. JEROME O'KEEFE\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Ferris v. O'Keefe\", \"decision_date\": \"1915-06-17\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"341\", \"last_page\": \"344\", \"citations\": \"87 N.J.L. 341\", \"volume\": \"87\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:56:57.427640+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JOHN FERRIS v. JEROME O\\u2019KEEFE.\", \"head_matter\": \"JOHN FERRIS v. JEROME O\\u2019KEEFE.\\nSubmitted December 3, 1914\\u2014\\nDecided June 17, 1915.\\nIn each of the cities governed by a board of commissioners under the Walsh act, that member of the board who is clxosen to preside at all meetings thereof and is designated \\u201cmayor\\u201d by the statute, luis the jxower to appoint the members of the board of education of sxiclx city under section 38 of the State School law of 1903. Pamph. L. 1904, p. 1.\\nOn quo warranto. Tenmrror to information.\\nBefore Guam ere, Chief Justice, and Justices Garrison and Minturn.\\nFor the relator, John Bentley and John Milton.\\nFor the defendant, J. Fisher Anderson.\", \"word_count\": \"1029\", \"char_count\": \"5944\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nGummere, Chief Justice.\\nThe question presented by the record in this case is whether the relator, or the defendant, is entitled to membership in the board of education of Jersey City.\\nThe material facts are as follows: In April, 1913, the electors of Jersey City adopted the act entitled \\\"An act relating to, regulating and providing for the government of cities, towns, boroughs and other municipalities within this state,\\\" approved April 25th, 1911, providing for the commission form of government in -municipalities adopting the statute, and generally known as the Walsh act. Pursuant to the provisions of the:statute referred to an election was held in Jersey City on June 10th, 1913, and five commissioners were elected as the governing body of that municipality. At the first meeting held after their election, these commissioners chose one of their number, namely, Mark M. Eagan, to preside at all meetings of the commission. By the provisions of \\\" the third section of the act the commissioner so chosen is designated \\\"mayor.\\\" At the end of January, 1914, a vacancy having occurred in the membership of the board of education of Jersey City, Mr. Eagan appointed O'Keefe, the defendant, to fill that vacancy. The board of commissioners, claiming that the power to fill such vacancy resided in the whole body of commissioners, and not in Mr. Eagan, held a meeting-on the 29th of January, and, by a majority vote, appointed the relator to the vacant position.\\nErom a recital of the above facts it is apparent that the right of the relator, or of the defendant, to membership in the board of education depends upon whether the power of appointment rests in Mr. Eagan as mayor, or in the board of commissioners as a body.\\nSection 38 of the State School law of 1903 (Pamph. L. 1904, p. 1) provides that \\\"in each city the mayor or other chief executive officer of such city\\\" shall appoint the members of the board of education of such city school district; and the seventy-third section of that act provides that \\\"in every city school district the board of education shall appoint two of its members, and the common council, board of finance or other body in such city having the power to make appropriations of money raised by taxes in said city, shall appoint two of its members, and the four persons so appointed, together with the mayor or other chief executive officer of the city, shall constitute a board to be known as the 'Board of School Estimate' of said school district.\\\"\\nThe contention on behalf of the relator is that, because the Walsh act provides that the board of commissioners created 1 hereby shall \\\"have and possess all administrative, judicial and legislative powers and duties\\\" theretofore had, possessed and exercised by the /mayor and city council and all oilier executive or legislative bodies in said city, and shall \\\"have complete control over the affairs of the city,\\\" tlie power of appointment conferred upon the mayors of cities constituting school districts by the thirty-eighth section of the School law is vested in the whole board. We cannot concur in this view, for to do so would, we think, attribute to the legislature the intention of destroying by the Walsh act the harmonious scheme which it created for the establishment and maintenance of an efficient system1 of public schools in the cities of the state. A fundamental part of that scheme, as appears from an examination of sections 38 and 73, was that the board of school estimate should be composed of five members, two of whom should be members of the board of education, and a third of whom should bo the executive officer who appointed (he members of that board, and who is designated in both of these sections as the \\\"mayor or other chief executive officer of the city.\\\" To yield to the contention made by the relator would be, in effect, to bold that tlie school districts in cities adopting the scheme of government provided by the Walsh act should have boards of school estimate consisting, not of five, but of nine members, two to be members of the board of education, two to be selected by the board of commissioners, and five to be the members of that board. We think no such legislative intent can be discerned from the Walsh act. On tlie contrary, we think that this act itself makes the member of the board of commissioners who shall be chosen to preside at all meetings thereof the chief executive officer of the cityr; the third section declares that he shall be designated \\\"mayor;\\\" the fifth section provides that \\\"the mayor shall be president of the board, and shall preside at all its meetings, And supervise dll departments!' Each member of the board is an executive officer, but that member who is designated the mayor is the chief executive officer, and is the person who, under section 38 of the School law, is to appoint members of the board of education, and who, under section 73 of that law, is to be a member of the board of school estimate.\\nWe conclude, therefore, that Mr. O'Keefe, the appointee of Mayor Eagan, by virtue of his appointment, is entitled to membership in the board of education, and that the act of the board of commissioners in appointing Mr. Eerris was without warrant of law.\\nThe defendant is entitled to judgment on the demurrer.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/23042.json b/nj/23042.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f6448de897c1305a3bc49ba5b3a39ff723c793a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/23042.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"23042\", \"name\": \"In the matter of Elihu H. Cooley et al., charged with contempt\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Cooley\", \"decision_date\": \"1924-01-29\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"485\", \"last_page\": \"491\", \"citations\": \"95 N.J. Eq. 485\", \"volume\": \"95\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:49:18.207244+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In the matter of Elihu H. Cooley et al., charged with contempt.\", \"head_matter\": \"In the matter of Elihu H. Cooley et al., charged with contempt.\\n[Decided January 29th, 1924.]\\n1. Where a defendant who has been directed to convey lands to complainant, conveys instead to a stranger, such disobedience to the decree constitutes both a civil and a criminal contempt.\\n2. Neither the belief that complainant\\u2019s conduct had been such as legally to result in an abandonment or loss of complainant\\u2019s rights under the decree, nor the advice of counsel, constitutes excuse for the contempt; although both factors are to be considered in determining the degree of the offense.\\n8. An attorney is privileged to state to his client his opinion that a certain course of conduct will be proper and not in violation of a decree; but if the attorney goes beyond this and participates in the client\\u2019s conduct, or even advises the client to do the act in question, he does so at his peril, and if the client be guilty of \\u2022 contempt the attorney is likewise guilty.\\n4. Whether acquiescence or consent by bomplainant to the disobedience of the decree may constitute complete excuse in proceedings for criminal contempt\\u2014Qucere?\\n5. If complainant-vendee, after decree for specific performance, refuses to perform on his part, defendant-vendor (if not desirous of enforcing the decree) may apply, in the cause, for relief from the decree and permanent stay of proceedings.\\nOn prosecution for alleged contempt.\\nMr. Augustus 0. Nash, for the prosecution.\\nMr. Gonover English and Messrs. Smith & Slingerland, for the respondents.\", \"word_count\": \"2245\", \"char_count\": \"12765\", \"text\": \"Buchanan, V. C.\\nBy the final decree of this court, entered February 24th, 192.2, the respondent Elihu H. Cooley was directed to make conveyance of certain lands and premises to Mary E. McVoy, by good and sufficient deed of conveyance. From this decree Cooley appealed, but unsuccessfully, and decree of affirmance was entered in the court of errors and appeals on June 19th, 1922, and remiiiiiur was filed in this court on July 24th, 1922.\\nShortly thereafter Cooley executed and tendered to Mrs. McVoy a deed which purported to convey the premises subject to an inchoate right of dower of Bertha Baumann. The decree was by way of specific enforcement of a contract of sale made by Karl Baumann alone\\u2014his wife, Bertha, not having joined therein\\u2014and the premises having thereafter been conveyed by Baumann to his wife and by her to Cooley, with -no reservation of any inchoate right of dower. See McVoy v. Baumann, 98 N. J. Eq. 360; Ibid. 638. This deed Mrs. McVoy refused to acc.ept.\\nOn August 29th, 1922, Cooley executed and acknowledged a deed for the premises in question to Ruth Naugle (another of the present respondents), notwithstanding the decree aforesaid. Mrs. Naugle, notwithstanding she knew of the decree . (having been informed thereof by her counsel, M\\u2014), accepted the deed and thereafter asserted ownership thereunder and resisted the efforts of Mrs. McVoy to obtain possession.\\nNaugle's counsel, M\\u2014, was the same individual who had been solicitor and counsel for Cooley in the specific performance suit. He advised and participated in the drafting, execution and delivery of the deed of August 29th, 1922, by Cooley' and the acceptance thereof by Mrs. Naugle. This course of action, it will be observed, was more than a nonperformance of the command of the decree\\u2014more than a negative disobedience\\u2014it was a positive disobedience, and by it Cooley put it out of his power to comply with the decree.\\nThat this conduct in fact constituted a contempt is, it seems to me, so clear as practically to admit of no argument. The contention which was put forward on the hearing was that by reason of certain facts (hereinafter mentioned) there had been an abandonment by Mrs. McYoy of her rights under the decree, and that hence disobedience to, and active disregard and violation of, the directions of that decree would not constitute contempt.\\nAssuming\\u2014but by no means deciding\\u2014that acquiescence or consent by Mr. McYoy to the doing of the. acts in question would constitute a valid excuse and! defence in a punitive proceeding for contempt (as the present proceeding is), the evidence utterly fails to show any such consent or acquiescence. There had in fact been no, abandonment by Mrs. McYoy of her rights under the decree. It has heretofore been adjudicated upon substantially the same evidence that there had been no such abandonment even as long thereafter as September, 1923. See McVoy v. Baumann, 1 N. J. Adv. R. 1529 (the opinion in this court has not yet been reported). The most that can be said is that M\\u2014 and his clients believed that there had been an abandonment, and, even so, it must be observed that they arrived at such belief upon very scanty grounds\\u2014apparently the wish was father to the thought. It is pointed out in Kempson v. Kempson, 61 N. J. Eq. 303 (at p. 326), that, assuming that acquiescence or consent by complainant may excuse disobedience of a decree, it is at least requisite that such acquiescence or consent be very clearly and positively proven. M\\u2014 assumes responsibility in the matter. He says, as do the Naugles, that they acted on his advice and had no thought that their conduct was a contempt. (Cooley has at all times been a non-resident and did not appear.) That respondents acted on the advice of counsel is no defence to contempt proceedings (West Jersey Traction Co. v. Camden, 58 N. J. Law 536); neither is the fact that they had no disrespectful intent necessarily a defence; although both of these factors may well be considered in extenuation and mitigation of punishment. That the act done was a violation of the court's decree and that respondents intended to do that act, are facts sufficient to establish a contempt; the other factors may influence the determination -of the degree or character of the contempt.\\nThe evidence shows that Mr. and Mrs. Naugle were acting together in the matter; that they intended to and did accept the deed in question and refuse delivery of the premises to Mrs. McYoy; that they knew of the decree, and hence, that they knew that they were participating in an act which was an active violation of the decree and a contempt, even though they did not realize or comprehend the legal significance of their conduct in that behalf. I am satisfied that they had no such realization or comprehension; that they were guilty of no intentional disrespect to the court; that they acted on .the advice of their counsel and believed that Mrs. McYoy had abandoned her rights under the decree. I find them guilty of contempt, but entitled to lenience in the matter of punishment.\\nAs to the respondent Cooley, jurisdiction not having been acquired over his person in this proceeding, no adjudication of contempt can now be made as to him.\\nWith regard to the respondent M\\u2014, it is evident from what has been said that he was the prime mover in this violation of the decree, both as to the making of the deed by Cooley and the acceptance by the Naugles. His explanation of his conduct is most singular. He says that he thought there had been an abandonment by Mrs. McYoy of her rights under the decree and that therefore the decree was at an end. He knew, of course, that there had been no express or explicit abandonment by Mrs. McYoy; he knew that at most his idea that there had been such abandonment by her was a judgment or conclusion of his own as to the result or effect of the intermediate circumstances. Those circumstances, as he explained them, were that Mrs. McYoy's solici tor liad refused to accept the deed tendered by him on June 23d, 1922; that lie thereafter notified her solicitor that the tender of that deed would be kept open until some time in \\u2022July, but no longer; that the deed was not accepted within this time, nor was there any payment into court by Mrs. McYoy of the balance of the purchase price as required by the decree; that inasmuch as the decree directed performance by both parties within ten days from its date he felt justified in deciding and declaring that Mrs. McYoy had no further rights, and in acting upon that assumption, as he thereafter did in the matter of conveying to the Naugles; he disavows any intentional disrespect toward the court and earnestly contends that there was no violation of the decree, and hence no contempt.\\nHe offered in evidence the correspondence between himself and Mrs. McYoy's solicitor, covering a period from June 24th, 1922, to September 15th, 1922. By these letters it appears as explicitly as can possibly be imagined that M\\u2014 was insisting that Mrs. McYoy should accept the deed, subject to the dower encumbrance, and do so promptly, otherwise Cooley would consider her rights as ended and that on the other hand Mrs. McYoy's solicitor was rejecting that deed as improper and demanding a deed in accordance with the decree. He knew therefore that there was no intentional abandonment by Mrs. McVoy, and no matter how strong was his own belief that she had lost her rights, he knew she did not believe she had lost them; he knew that he was assuming to act, not on a thing he knew as a fact, but on his opinion-es to a matter of law. Indeed, in his last letter (September 15th, 1922) he says, after speaking of the tender of the deed and its refusal: \\\"This, in my opinion, constitutes & rejection of the terms of the decree by complainant, and leaves the title to, and ownership of, the lands in Cooley.\\\" (The italics are mine.)\\nNow, in the face of the facts as he knew them, and of the judicial opinions in the case, and the terms of the decree, how could any competent solicitor arrive at the opinion that a deed subject to a dower right in Mrs. Baumann was a deed in compliance with the decree? She and her husband had both conveyed to Cooley, without reserving any such dower right. Her equitable right, if any she had, to a portion of the purchase price had been provided for, by her own request and consent, under the clause of the decree that the purchase-money be paid into court so that she might have opportunity to prove how much, if any, of it should be paid to her as compensation for her dower right. However, I cannot doubt but that M\\u2014, in fact, had this opinion, and that he also had the opinion that Mrs. McVoy, by refusing this deed, had lost her rights.\\nBut even so, he knew, as I have said, that these were only his opinions, and that he was matching his opinion against that of Mrs. McVoy's solicitor. It had just been demonstrated to him in the result of the suit, that in that instance the latter's opinion as to matters of law had been better than his own. Iiow could he dare to advise and instruct his clients to act in disobedience to a decree upon the strength of what he knew was only his own opinion. He knew, or as a lawyer ought to have known\\u2014especially since he was assuming to give his clients legal advice upon this -point\\u2014that in so doing they would act at their peril, and that he in advising them so to do was acting likewise at his own peril. An attorney may advise his client that in his opinion an order is invalid, or has become ineffective, or that rights under it have been lost, or that a certain act will not be a disobedience or a contempt. This is both his privilege and his duty as a lawyer to his client. But when he goes further and advises the client to do the act he goes beyond his privilege, and if the. act is a disobedience and contempt he is equally guilty with his client. Cf. In re Noyes, 121 Fed. Rep. 209; Anderson v. Comptois, 109 Fed. Rep. 971.\\nA decree for specific performance is, of course, operative and binding upon both parties; the decree is that complainant perform as well as defendant. Where either party desires to avoid the effect of the decree because of matters arising subsequent to the decree (such asu settlement between the parties, refusal or neglect of the other party to perform, or inequitable conduct of the other party), the proper course is to apply in the cause for a permanent stay of all proceedings. Rosenstein v. Burr, 83 N. J. Eq. 491. Cf., also, Hudson Trust Co. v. Boyd, 80 N. J. Eq. 267; Smith v. Smith, 84 N. J. Eq. 13; Barnett Foundry Co. v. Iron Works Co., 85 N. J. Eq. 359. That is the course which M\\u2014 should have advised his clients to pursue in the present instance, instead of assuming himself the right to determine the legal result of the conduct of the parties subsequent to the decree.\\nM\\u2014's explanation therefore is not a valid excuse for his conduct. I believe, however, his explanation in fact is true, and I acquit him of intentional disrespect or flagrant contempt. He is nevertheless guilty of an actual contempt.\\nThis disposes of the findings as against all the respondents. The determination of the punishment which should be imposed may await somewhat further consideration.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/238721.json b/nj/238721.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ea88d7b6a2c3315a0fb99bdb4071b710fbe1636c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/238721.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"238721\", \"name\": \"LONG DOCK COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. STATE BOARD OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENT, ETC., RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Long Dock Co. v. State Board of Taxes & Assessment\", \"decision_date\": \"1917-05-24\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"701\", \"last_page\": \"701\", \"citations\": \"90 N.J.L. 701\", \"volume\": \"90\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:01:02.474624+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"LONG DOCK COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. STATE BOARD OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENT, ETC., RESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"LONG DOCK COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. STATE BOARD OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENT, ETC., RESPONDENT.\\nArgued March 13, 1917\\nDecided May 24, 1917.\\nOn appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 89 N. J. L. 1.08.\\n(In re reassessments on second-class property for 1911.)\\nFor the appellant, Collins & Corbin.\\nFor the respondent, John W. Wescott, attorney-general, John Bentley and John B. Hardin.\", \"word_count\": \"151\", \"char_count\": \"945\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nLegal questions were first dealt with in the opinion of Mr. Justice Parker in the court below, so as to lay a foundation for the consideration of the facts, and those questions were, in our opinion, rightly decided. As there was evidence to support the finding of facts made by the Supreme Court, that finding is not reviewahle-in this court.\\nThe judgment under review will be affirmed.\\nFor affirmance\\u2014The Chancellor, Garrison, Swayze, Trenchard, Bergen, Black, White, Heppbniteimer, Williams, Taylor, Gardner, JJ. 11.\\nFor reversal\\u2014Hone.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/246568.json b/nj/246568.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3bf3a0f827ca47f7cae6e2e33e7fd076a745493f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/246568.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"246568\", \"name\": \"IN THE MATTER OF AUGUSTINE U. UZODIKE, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Uzodike\", \"decision_date\": \"2002-01-30\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"395\", \"last_page\": \"396\", \"citations\": \"170 N.J. 395\", \"volume\": \"170\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:38:46.206051+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"IN THE MATTER OF AUGUSTINE U. UZODIKE, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.\", \"head_matter\": \"789 A.2d 643\\nIN THE MATTER OF AUGUSTINE U. UZODIKE, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.\\nJanuary 30, 2002.\", \"word_count\": \"320\", \"char_count\": \"1935\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThe Disciplinary Review Board having filed a report with the Court in DRB 01-223, recommending that AUGUSTINE U. UZO-DIKE formerly of EAST ORANGE, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1990, and who thereafter was suspended from the practice of law effective August 11, 1999, by Order of the Court filed July 16, 1999, and who remains suspended to this date, be disbarred for violating RPC 1.15(a) and RPC 8.4(c) (knowing misappropriation of trust funds), RPC 1.15(d) (failure to comply with the recordkeeping requirements of Rule 1:21-6, and RPC 8.1(b)) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities), and said AUGUSTINE U. UZODIKE having failed to appear on the return date of the Order to show cause issued in this matter, why he should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined, and good cause appearing;\\nIt is ORDERED that AUGUSTINE U. UZODIKE be disbarred, effective immediately, and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys;\\nORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further\\nORDERED that any funds currently existing in any New Jersey financial institution maintained by AUGUSTINE U. UZO-DIKE, pursuant to Rule 1:21-6, shall be restrained from disbursement except upon application to this Court, for good cause shown, and shall be transferred by the financial institution to the Clerk of the Superior Court who is directed to deposit the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund, pending further Order of the Court; and it is further\\nORDERED that AUGUSTINE U. UZODIKE be and hereby is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it is further\\nORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/287990.json b/nj/287990.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..77cf065ff273b74ea4192bf1d24f0094983fddaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/287990.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"287990\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. RUGGERIO BOIARDO, ANDREW N. GERARDO, ANTHONY DEVINGO, JAMES VITO MONTEMARANO, LOUIS FERRARI, ANGELO CARMEN SICA, THOMAS DEPHILLIPS, AND ANTHONY LARDIERE, JR., DEFENDANTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Boiardo\", \"decision_date\": \"1980-01-21\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"528\", \"last_page\": \"533\", \"citations\": \"172 N.J. Super. 528\", \"volume\": \"172\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:55:10.821805+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. RUGGERIO BOIARDO, ANDREW N. GERARDO, ANTHONY DEVINGO, JAMES VITO MONTEMARANO, LOUIS FERRARI, ANGELO CARMEN SICA, THOMAS DEPHILLIPS, AND ANTHONY LARDIERE, JR., DEFENDANTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. RUGGERIO BOIARDO, ANDREW N. GERARDO, ANTHONY DEVINGO, JAMES VITO MONTEMARANO, LOUIS FERRARI, ANGELO CARMEN SICA, THOMAS DEPHILLIPS, AND ANTHONY LARDIERE, JR., DEFENDANTS.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Law Division\\u2014Somerset County\\nDecided January 21, 1980.\\nG. Michael Brown, Assistant Attorney General, for the State (John J. Degnan, Attorney General).\\nMichael A. Querques for defendant Ruggerio Boiardo.\\nJohn Vantuno for defendant Andrew N. Gerardo.\\nMiles R. Fienstein for defendant Anthony DeVingo.\\nJohn P. Doran for defendant James Vito Montemarano. Peter B. Shaw for defendant Louis Ferrari (Smith & Shaw, attorneys).\\nMr. Joseph A. Ferrante for defendant Angelo Carmen Sica.\\nLouis C. Esposito for defendant Thomas DePhillips.\\nAnthony T. Colasanti for defendant Anthony. Lardiere, Jr.\", \"word_count\": \"1119\", \"char_count\": \"6819\", \"text\": \"IMBRIANI, J. S. C.\\nDefendants seek to personally interview a critical and important witness whose whereabouts is unknown because he is in federal protective custody and hidden under a Witness Relocation Program. The State says the witness does not want to be interviewed by defendants and should be allowed to say so without a personal interview but simply by affidavit or a telephone . conversation. Defendants, who are charged with several criminal offenses, including murder, have requested and been denied the right to personally interview the witness, one Patrick Pizuto.\\nBoth sides have an equal right to interview witnesses since they are not parties, are not partisan and do not belong to either side. See State v. Roszkowski, 129 N.J.Super. 315 (App. Div.1974); United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799 (5 Cir. 1979); Wilson v. State, 93 Ga.App. 229, 91 S.E.2d 201 (Ct.App.1956); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d 308 (Sup.Jud.Ct.1965). But this right is subject to the acquiescence of the witness, Lewis v. Ct. of Common Pleas of Lebanon Cty., 436 Pa. 296, 260 A.2d 184, 189 (Sup.Ct.1969), who has the right to refuse an interview, United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364 (5 Cir. 1977). And the State may inform a witness of his right to decide for himself whether or not to grant an interview. Coppolino v. Helpern, 266 F.Supp. 930, 935 (S.D.N.Y.1964).\\nDefendants say' that an affidavit or telephone conversation is not sufficient and it constitutes reversible error to deny them personal access to a material witness. Wilson r. State, supra; Commonwealth v. Balliro, supra; Byrnes v. United States, 327 F.2d 825 (9 Cir. 1964).\\nWe are not confronted with a claim by the State that it has the right to deny any access by defendants to the witness. The State merely seeks to limit the nature of the interview where, as here, it is alleged the witness does not want to be interviewed by defendants and, moreover, the witness fears defendants. Such fear is obviously shared by others, as evidenced by his being placed in a federal Witness Relocation Program, whereby the witness and his family are given new names and relocated at an unknown location (generally out-of-state) to protect them from reprisals.\\nObviously, a personal interview should be denied if it creates a danger to the safety and well-being of the witness. But is that the case here? Or can conditions be imposed to assure his safety? Where special circumstances exist it is \\\"appropriate for the court to impose reasonable conditions and restrictions on the interviews.\\\" Commonwealth v. Balliro, supra at 316. This court cannot perceive how the safety and well-being of the witness would be endangered if we adopted a simple procedure. It can be arranged for the interview to be conducted at a place and time selected by the State, which need not disclose in advance the place of the interview. Counsel for defendants can be notified 24 hours in advance to be at a predetermined place from which they can be taken to an undisclosed location where the personal interview can be conducted.\\nCounsel for defendants are entitled to interview a material witness in a fashion which they deem sufficient to enable them to properly defend their client. This court cannot say that an interview by way of affidavit or a telephone conversation is sufficient. The State says that Pizuto will refuse to speak then. \\\"If that be so, and the court has no reason to doubt it, [Pizuto] should be permitted to speak for [himself].\\\" People v. Paskowitz, 151 Misc. 171, 270 N.Y.S. 799, (Cty.Ct.1984). It is entirely possible that, if given the opportunity for a personal interview, one or more of counsel for defendants may develop a rapport with the witness and acquire facts and information which the witness might otherwise hesitate or refuse to divulge in an affidavit or telephone call. There is too much at stake to assume that a personal interview will be fruitless. And since a personal interview would present neither prejudice to the State, nor harm to the witness, fairness and justice dictate that the witness be personally interviewed.\\nThe court is influenced by the fact that eventually Pizuto will have to surface and appear as a witness in the trial. It will undoubtedly take s\\u00e9veral days to complete his testimony, and during that time the State will have to provide for his protection and well-being. There is no reason why the State cannot also secure his safety and well-being when the personal interview is conducted.\\nThe witness shall be personally interviewed outside the presence of any representative of the State of New Jersey or any other persons. As said in Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C.Cir.1966):\\nWe know of nothing in the law which gives the prosecutor the right to interfere with the preparation of the defense by effectively denying defense counsel access to the witnesses except in his presence. Presumably the prosecutor, in interviewing the witnesses, was unencumbered by the presence of defense counsel, and there seems to be no reason why defense counsel should not have an equal opportunity to determine, through interviews with the witnesses, what they know about the case and what they will testify to. [at 188]\\nCf. United States v. Dryden, 423 F.2d 1175 (5 Cir. 1970).\\nPizuto shall be informed that he has an absolute and personal right to either grant or deny the interview. He shall also be informed that whenever he wishes to terminate the interview all he need do is leave the interview room and return to the presence of law enforcement agents, who can be positioned by the door outside the room.\\nIt is important that this interview be conducted sufficiently in advance of the trial, now scheduled for March 3, 1980, so that defendants shall have ample opportunity to complete any fur ther investigation or research necessitated by the information received in the interview. Accordingly, the interview of Pizuto shall be completed not later than Friday, February 22, 1980.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/299190.json b/nj/299190.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..806e1fd8b2784c5cfba8c700cd52337e4548fa68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/299190.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"299190\", \"name\": \"KENNETH P. DINICOLA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CROSS-RESPONDENT, v. WATCHUNG FURNITURE'S COUNTRY MANOR, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, CROSS-APPELLANT. and TEMPLE STUART, DEFENDANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Dinicola v. Watchung Furniture's Country Manor\", \"decision_date\": \"1989-04-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"69\", \"last_page\": \"73\", \"citations\": \"232 N.J. Super. 69\", \"volume\": \"232\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:02:21.109189+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"KENNETH P. DINICOLA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CROSS-RESPONDENT, v. WATCHUNG FURNITURE\\u2019S COUNTRY MANOR, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, CROSS-APPELLANT. and TEMPLE STUART, DEFENDANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"KENNETH P. DINICOLA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CROSS-RESPONDENT, v. WATCHUNG FURNITURE\\u2019S COUNTRY MANOR, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, CROSS-APPELLANT. and TEMPLE STUART, DEFENDANT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued March 20, 1989\\nDecided April 5, 1989.\\nBefore Judges J.H. COLEMAN and BAIME.\\nAllan Marain argued the cause for appellant, cross-respondent.\\nJames A. Mella argued the cause for respondent, cross-appellant (Weiseman, Mella & Ruotolo, attorneys; Seamus Boyle on the brief).\", \"word_count\": \"1147\", \"char_count\": \"7337\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nCOLEMAN, J.H., P.J.A.D.\\nThis appeal arises from claims for breach of warranties and Consumer Fraud Act violations related to the purchase of household furniture. At the conclusion of a jury trial, plaintiff was awarded $600 in compensatory damages for breach of warranties. The damages were tripled because of an alleged violation of a regulation promulgated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-4. Counsel fees of $1,875 were allowed plaintiffs attorney pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. Plaintiff has appealed contending the award of counsel fees was inadequate. Defendant has cross-appealed contending the Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to this case. We agree with defendant cross-appellant and reverse.\\nThe facts essential to our decision are not in dispute. On September 17,1984, plaintiff contracted to purchase a credenza, china deck, two captain's chairs and four mate's chairs from defendant Watchung Furniture's Country Manor (Watchung) for the sum of $2,571.56. Plaintiff made a down payment of $600. As promised, Watchung tendered delivery of the furniture on October 10, 1984. Plaintiff rejected delivery because the furniture was defective. Watchung refused to refund plaintiff's deposit.\\nLeft with no other alternative, plaintiff filed a complaint against Watchung on October 18, 1985. Under the first count, plaintiff sought a return of the $600 deposit because the items of furniture \\\"were in non-conformity with express warranties made by Watchung \\u2014 \\\" In the second count, plaintiff alleged Watchung's \\\"tender of merchandise in non-conformity with the express warranties made by Watchung constitutes a failure to deliver promised merchandise within the meaning of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(a).\\\" Plaintiff sought treble damages and counsel fees under the second count.\\nThe case was submitted to a jury on special interrogatories. The jury was asked:\\n1. Do you find from the facts that the plaintiff, Kenneth P. Dinocola[,j had reasonable basis to reject delivery of the furniture on October 10, 1984?\\nYES X NO_\\nIf \\\"YES\\\" go on to Question No. 2.\\nIf \\\"NO\\\" STOP and return your verdict.\\n2. Do you find from the facts that the furniture delivered was so defective it did not not substantially conform to the contract made between the parties?\\nYES X NO_\\nBased on the jury's answers, the judge concluded that N.J.A. C. 13:45A-5.1(a) was violated.\\nThat regulation provides:\\nIt shall be a deceptive practice in connection with the sale of household furniture, for which contracts of sale or sales orders are used for merchandise ordered for future delivery, to consumers resident in New Jersey and by persons engaged in business in New Jersey, unless, when the promised delivery date has been reached, the person (including any business entity) who is the seller either:\\n1. Delivers the promised merchandise; or\\n2. Notifies the customer of the impossibility of meeting the promised delivery date by written notice, mailed on or prior to the delivery date, offering the consumer the option to cancel with a prompt, full refund of any payments already received; or\\n3. Notifies the consumer of the impossibility of meeting the promised delivery date by written notice, mailed on or prior to the delivery date, offering the consumer the option of accepting delivery at a specified later time.\\nUnder the evidence presented, it is clear that Watchung tendered delivery of the furniture ordered on the date specified in the contract. It is also clear that Watchung did not attempt to conceal the defects found in the furniture. It simply delivered furniture that was defective and therefore not in conformity with its warranties. We conclude that a claim arises under N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(a) only when there is an untimely delivery of household furniture. The regulation is not applicable in a simple breach of warranty case. Plaintiff relies upon State v. Hudson Furniture Co., 165 N.J.Super. 516, 519 (App.Div.1979), which is to be distinguished from this case. There, the furniture company's delivery was untimely and the consumer was not provided with notice and informed of his options, as required by the regulation when delivery will not be timely.\\nThe Consumer Fraud Act is not violated absent any \\\"unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact____\\\" N.J.S.A. 56:8-2; Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 535, 541-548 (1971). The words \\\"promised merchandise\\\" used in N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(a) refer to the quantity and description of merchandise ordered and not its quality. Otherwise, any breach of warranty or any breach of contract concerning the quality of household furniture would expose the breaching party to treble damages even where substantial aggravating factors are absent. We do not perceive the Legislature intended such a far-reaching result.\\nWe are persuaded that a breach of warranty in a sales transaction not involving an unconscionable commercial practice is not a violation of the Act. D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 206 N.J.Super. 11, 25-31 (App.Div.1985). N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(a) contemplates an unconscionable commercial practice in the form of untimely delivery of ordered household furniture where the customer has not consented. Although Watchung breached its warranties when it delivered defective furniture and then denied that the furniture was defective, its conduct does not equate with any unconscionable commercial practice absent other aggravating factors not present in this case. See generally Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 110 N.J. 464, 472-474 (1988). We therefore reverse that portion of the judgment which granted treble damages and counsel fees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.\\nWe are aware that this is a case in which there may be some conflict between the attorney's desire to obtain a higher counsel fee award and the client's wish to retain his judgment for treble damages. See Coleman v. Fiore Bros., Inc., 113 N.J. 594, 601-03 (1989). With this possible conflict in mind, we asked counsel for plaintiff at the beginning of oral argument whether he has made his client aware that an appeal for higher fees places at risk the treble damages judgment. He assured us he has informed his client and that his client has consented to the appeal even in the face of the cross-appeal. Finally, we note that counsel for plaintiff has not sought counsel fees pursuant to the Magnunson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. \\u00a7 2310(d)(1). We express no opinion regarding the possible success of such a claim if made.\\nSo much of the final judgment which allowed treble damages and counsel fees is reversed. The matter is remanded to the Law Division for the entry of an amended judgment consistent with this opinion.\\nReversed in part and remanded.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/309630.json b/nj/309630.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..54e94c08c5f15abb2e9c1d4e18cbcc73a33cf84a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/309630.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"309630\", \"name\": \"NICOLE AUGUSTA v. ALEXANDER J. ZITO, M.D.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Augusta v. Zito\", \"decision_date\": \"1988-05-24\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"592\", \"last_page\": \"592\", \"citations\": \"111 N.J. 592\", \"volume\": \"111\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:41:31.008027+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"NICOLE AUGUSTA v. ALEXANDER J. ZITO, M.D.\", \"head_matter\": \"NICOLE AUGUSTA v. ALEXANDER J. ZITO, M.D.\\nMay 24, 1988.\", \"word_count\": \"14\", \"char_count\": \"91\", \"text\": \"Petition for certification denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/311077.json b/nj/311077.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3101b8611e302bc1e89d9d3f4a8ef50d050eea84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/311077.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"311077\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LUCIO W. PATINO AND GUILLERMO BARRIGA\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Patino\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-01-16\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"477\", \"last_page\": \"477\", \"citations\": \"79 N.J. 477\", \"volume\": \"79\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:17:12.062204+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LUCIO W. PATINO AND GUILLERMO BARRIGA.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LUCIO W. PATINO AND GUILLERMO BARRIGA.\\nJanuary 16, 1979.\", \"word_count\": \"24\", \"char_count\": \"143\", \"text\": \"Petition for certification granted. (See 163 N. J. Super. 116)\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/311113.json b/nj/311113.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fea436bbda377daf6608e18ccf0ac1d2446ae40a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/311113.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"311113\", \"name\": \"SANDRA J. MEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. KARL R. MEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mey v. Mey\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-02-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"121\", \"last_page\": \"125\", \"citations\": \"79 N.J. 121\", \"volume\": \"79\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:17:12.062204+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"SANDRA J. MEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. KARL R. MEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"SANDRA J. MEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. KARL R. MEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\\nArgued October 17, 1978\\nDecided February 5, 1979.\\nMr. G. Bobert Wills argued the cause for appellant (Messrs. Strauss, Wills and Baxendale, attorneys).\\nMs. Barbara Ulrichsen argued the cause for respondent ,(Messrs. Mason, Griffin and Pierson, attorneys; Mr. Bussell W. Annich, Jr., of counsel).\", \"word_count\": \"1111\", \"char_count\": \"6758\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nMountain, J.\\nThis case presents an issue as to which this Court has not yet spoken, in the developing law of equitable distribution.\\nPlaintiff, Sandra J. Mey, was divorced from her husband, Karl E. Mey, by judgment entered March 23, 1975. Sometime thereafter the question of equitable distribution was heard and decided and the determination embodied in a separate judgment. It is from this judgment that the present appeal has been taken.\\nDefendant's grandfather died September 1, 1961 and by his will established separate trusts for the benefit of defendant, his mother and his brother and sister. His mother was named trustee of each trust. Under the terms of each of the children's trusts, upon attaining the age of twenty-one, he or she would receive outright the then accumulated income. The income thenceforth arising from the trust was to be paid to the child as it accrued until he or she reached the age of twenty-five, at which time the principal was to be distributed to the child outright. The mother was to receive outright distribution of her share simultaneously with the distribution of principal to the youngest child. In the event of death before age twenty-five, a child's share was to be paid to his or her issue, and if the child died without\\u00bb issue, it was to be divided equally among the beneficiaries of the other trusts. The trustee was empowered to invade any trust, either in respect of income or principal, for the care, support, maintenance and education of the beneficiary.\\nPlaintiff and defendant were married on November 16, 1968. Shortly before that date, defendant had become twenty-one and at that time had received the income that had accrued in respect of his trust. On September 24, 1972, his twenty-fifth birthday, he became entitled to the principal of his trust which was then distributed to him. Approximately two years later, in September, 1974, plaintiff initiated an action for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty. The principal issue presented on appeal is whether the trust assets received by defendant during his marriage are subject to equitable distribution.\\nThe trial judge determined that these assets were eligible for such distribution, concluding that they had been \\\"acquired . . . during the marriage\\\" within the meaning of N. J. S. A. 2A:34-23. The Appellate Division affirmed, with one judge dissenting. 149 N. J. Super. 188 (1977). In view of the dissent, this ease reaches us as an appeal as of right. B. 2:2-1 (a).\\nWe affirm substantially for the reasons given by Judge Horn in his majority opinion.\\nEor convenience we set forth below the statutory language which is here applicable. As noted by the courts below, whether the defendant's interest in the corpus of this trust is subject to equitable distribution depends on the meaning attributed to the words \\\"legally and beneficially.\\\" In his opinion Judge Horn stated that,\\n. . . we regard the phrase \\\"legally and beneficially,\\\" as did the trial judge, to mean that the spouse acquires the property within the intention of N. J. S. A. 2A :34r-23 when he or she acquires a title which carries with it the effective power to control or use or enjoy. [149 N. J. Super, at 193-94]\\nWe approve this interpretation of the statutory language. This construction, we believe, more nearly comports with the apparent intent of the Legislature than would a more literal reading of the phrase \\\"legally and beneficially.\\\" Furthermore, we think the word \\\"beneficially\\\" itself is used in the sense of being subject to present enjoyment.\\nThe susceptibility of an income interest to equitable distribution is not at issue in this case. Cf. Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N. J. 464, 468-69 (1977) (income interest subject to equitable distribution). We are concerned here only with the principal of defendant's trust. At the time of his marriage he had no power to control, use or enjoy this asset. It was something he might control, use and enjoy only at a later date dependent upon his survival. These powers of control, use and enjoyment became his only upon his reaching his twenty-fifth birthday \\u2014 at which time he was married.\\nThis Court's recent opinion, written by Justice Schreiber, in Gauger v. Gauger, 73 N. J. 538 (1977) supports the result we reach here. In Gauger a mother and son acquired property as joint tenants prior to the son's marriage. The mother died during the son's marriage, as a result of which the latter became sole owner. We held that although the right of survivorship came into being at the original creation of the tenancy, \\\"it did not become effective and meaningful until the mother's death.\\\" 73 N. J. at 544. This qualitative change \\\"in the interest, ownership or right to possession\\\" thus prompted us to conclude that the son had \\\"legally and beneficially acquired,\\\" at the time of his mother's death, a substantive interest in the property within the contemplation of the statute permitting equitable distribution. Id. Similarly, the defendant in this case did acquire an interest in the corpus of the trust at the time of his grandfather's death. Technically speaking, at that time he became a vested remainderman whose interest was subject to divestment. During coverture, a significant qualitative change took place in that interest. He ceased to be the holder of a future interest with no present right of enjoyment. On his twenty-fifth birthday he acquired unimpaired control and totally free use and enjoyment. Only then was the asset \\\"legally and beneficially acquired.\\\"\\nWith respect to the trial court's manner of distribution, we agree with the Appellate Division that it is amply supported by credible evidence and evinces a careful regard for the guidelines laid down in Painter v. Painter, 65 N. J. 196 (1974).\\nFor the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Appellate Division is hereby affirmed.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman, Clifford, Schreiber and Handler \\u2014 7.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 None.\\nIn all actions where a judgment of divorce or divorce from bed and board is entered the court may make such award or awards to the parties, in addition to alimony and maintenance, to effectuate an equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by them or either of them during the marriage. [N. J. S. A. 2A:34-23]\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/313026.json b/nj/313026.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6d28ba7d233e2fe6b1767b0b5ac1c14c8530b389
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/313026.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"313026\", \"name\": \"ANTHONY ALIMENA v. UNIVERSAL WAREHOUSE, INC. v. NATIONAL FREIGHT INC.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Alimena v. Universal Warehouse, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-01-25\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"260\", \"last_page\": \"260\", \"citations\": \"93 N.J. 260\", \"volume\": \"93\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:46:05.175622+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"ANTHONY ALIMENA v. UNIVERSAL WAREHOUSE, INC. v. NATIONAL FREIGHT INC.\", \"head_matter\": \"ANTHONY ALIMENA v. UNIVERSAL WAREHOUSE, INC. v. NATIONAL FREIGHT INC.\\nJanuary 25, 1983.\", \"word_count\": \"17\", \"char_count\": \"123\", \"text\": \"Petition for certification denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/313142.json b/nj/313142.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ea46f2bbaec551aae52b1fced1bf5827d5564120
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/313142.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"313142\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Rodriguez\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-03-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"288\", \"last_page\": \"288\", \"citations\": \"93 N.J. 288\", \"volume\": \"93\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:46:05.175622+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ.\\nMarch 1, 1983.\", \"word_count\": \"14\", \"char_count\": \"91\", \"text\": \"Petition for certification denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/317084.json b/nj/317084.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3f0df174196c5a5526c5dc4d221da34d11ebd524
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/317084.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"317084\", \"name\": \"YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF CAMDEN, A CORPORATION OF NEW JERSEY; CHARLES NICKLES AND RAYMOND CONOVER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE DRIVERS EMPLOYED BY YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF CAMDEN, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, THROUGH THE DIRECTOR OF WAGE AND HOUR BUREAU, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Yellow Cab Co. of Camden v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1973-11-27\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"81\", \"last_page\": \"96\", \"citations\": \"126 N.J. Super. 81\", \"volume\": \"126\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:15:10.896058+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF CAMDEN, A CORPORATION OF NEW JERSEY; CHARLES NICKLES AND RAYMOND CONOVER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE DRIVERS EMPLOYED BY YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF CAMDEN, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, THROUGH THE DIRECTOR OF WAGE AND HOUR BUREAU, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF CAMDEN, A CORPORATION OF NEW JERSEY; CHARLES NICKLES AND RAYMOND CONOVER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE DRIVERS EMPLOYED BY YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF CAMDEN, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, THROUGH THE DIRECTOR OF WAGE AND HOUR BUREAU, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued October 24, 1973\\nDecided November 27, 1973.\\nBefore Judges Carton, Seidman and Goldmann.\\nMr. James J. Shrager argued the cause for appellants (Messrs, Hannoch, Weisman, Stern & Besser, attorneys; Mr. Henry J. Tyler, on the brief).\\nMr. Howard S. Simonoff filed a statement in lieu of brief, amicus curi\\u00e6, on behalf of Teamsters Local 676 (Messrs. Tomar, Parks, Seliger, Simonoff & Adourian, attorneys).\\nMs. Mary Ann Burgess, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Mr. George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Mr. Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel).\", \"word_count\": \"4284\", \"char_count\": \"25699\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nCarton, P. J. A. D.\\nThe principal question to be resolved on this appeal is whether taxi companies are subject to the overtime provisions of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, N. J. S. A. 34 :ll-56a4. Related issues presented are whether these provisions represent a valid exercise of legislative power and whether the Pair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. A., \\u00a7 201 et seq., has preempted the area.\\nPlaintiff Yellow Cab Company of Camden and individuals representing themselves and all other drivers of the company sought a declaratory judgment to determine that the overtime provisions were; inapplicable. The trial court held that such provisions did apply; that they represented a valid exercise of legislative power, and that there was no preemption. Plaintiffs challenge each of these determinations.\\nThe facts are brief and undisputed. Yellow Cab is a corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey, with its principal place of business in Camden. The two individual plaintiffs are employees of Yellow Cab and members and shop stewards of Local 676 of the Teamsters Union.\\nYellow Cab is a carrier of passengers for hire. It operates under franchises which are issued and regulated by the State of New Jersey. N. J. S. A. 48:16-2. Its drivers are compensated on a commission basis which was negotiated by collective bargaining so as to include compensation for overtime work. A driver with six months experience receives a commission of 48% of all revenues taken in. Fringe benefits to the drivers and employee taxes constitute an additional 12% of revenues collected.\\nA driver for Yellow Cab, after reporting to the garage and punching a time card, is free to operate entirely on his own. Each driver's earnings are completely dependent upon his own efforts. Earnings vary from a low of $3,100 to a high of $8,400 a year.\\nIn 1970 the State of New Jersey filed a complaint in the Camden Municipal Court charging Yellow Cab with multiple criminal violations of N. J. S. A. 34:ll~56a4. That litiga tion precipitated the present declaratory judgment action. Prosecution of the criminal portion was then stayed by consent of the parties, with approval of the Camden Municipal Court, pending determination of the action for declaratory judgment.\\nAPPLICABILITY OF OVERTIME PROVISIONS TO TAXICAB INDUSTRY\\nYellow Cab's basic argument is that it is a common carrier by motor bus and thereby exempted from the overtime provisions of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law. The statute (N. J. S. A. 34:ll-56a4) specifically provides that the overtime provisions shall not apply to employees of such a carrier. In pertinent part it reads:\\nEvery employer shall pay to each of his employees wages at a rate 1 and % times such employee's regular hourly wage for each hour of working time in excess of 40 hours in any week The provisions of this section shall not apply to an employee of a common carrier of passengers by motor bus *' . [Emphasis added]\\nPlaintiffs' thesis is that the words \\\"motor bus\\\" as used in the statute must be construed to include taxicabs, thereby making the statutory exemption applicable to company drivers.\\nWe deem such construction strained and unnatural in light of the legislative history of the provision, the salutary public policy embodied in it, and the specific language used in the statute.\\nIn 1966 the Legislature enacted the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, N. J. S. A. 34:ll-56a et seq., declaring it to be\\nthe public policy of this State to establish a minimum wage level for workers in order to safeguard their health, efficiency, and general well-being and to protect them as well as their employers from the effects of serious and unfair competition resulting from wage levels detrimental to their health, efficiency and well-being.\\nAt the time the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law was enacted the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act exempted not only motor bus carriers, but also specifically excluded \\\"any employee of an employer engaged in the business of operating taxicabs.\\\" 29 U. S. C. A., \\u00a7 213(a) (12); (b)(7); thereafter amended, P. L. 89-601, 80 Stat. 833, 834, 836-838 (Sept. 23, 1966). The New Jersey statute; however, although exempting \\\"common carriers of passengsrs by motor bus,\\\" contains no such exclusion for either taxicab operators or for the taxicab industry.\\nThe exemptions from the Fair Labor Standards Act were matters of great public interest and aroused spirited debate at the time of the enactment of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law. Presumably the Legislature was well aware of the distinct exclusions from the federal law for \\\"motor buses\\\" and for \\\"taxicabs\\\" and deliberately determined that the interests of the citizens of New Jersey were best served by not granting a similar exclusion to the taxicab industry from the provisions of the Wage and Hour Law. Cf. Male v. Pompton Lakes Mun. Util. Auth., 105 N. J. Super. 348, 355-356 (Ch. Div. 1969).\\nThe humanitarian and remedial nature of this legislation requires that any exemption therefrom be narrowly construed, giving due regard to the plain meaning of the statutory language and the intent of the Legislature. See A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490, 65 S. Ct. 807, 89 L. Ed. 1095, 157 A. L. R. 876 (1945). The remedial nature of this law suggests also that the burden of proving that the employees' activities fall within the claimed exemp tion should be imposed on the employer. Sherman v. Coastal Cities Coach Co., 4 N. J. Super. 283, 290 (App. Div. 1949).\\nThe words \\\"taxicab\\\" and \\\"motor bus\\\" are words of common use. Such words are to be taken in their natural, plain, obvious and ordinary signification. A subtle or forced construction for the purpose of either extending or limiting their operation should not be indulged. Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N. J. 500 (1954), cert. den. 349 U. S. 904, 75 S. Ct. 580, 99 L. Ed. 1241 (1955). See N. J. S. A. 1:1-1.\\nThe term \\\"motor bus\\\" is not specifically defined in the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law's special definition section, N. J. S. A. 34:ll-56al. Thus, the term must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. \\\"Motor bus\\\" does not normally include the type of vehicle commonly called a \\\"taxicab.\\\" Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1966) defines \\\"motor bus\\\" as \\\"an automotive omnibus,\\\" with \\\"omnibus\\\" in turn defined as \\\"a public vehicle usually automotive and 4-wheeled and designed to carry a comparatively large number of passengers: bus\\\"; whereas a \\\"taxicab\\\" is termed \\\"a chauffeur-driven automobile available on call to carry a passenger between any two points (as within a city) for a fare determined by taximeter (Emphasis supplied).\\nIt is undeniable that in everyday use a distinction is made between taxicabs and buses. Indeed, plaintiffs readily admit that such is the case. However, plaintiff Company cites in support of its exemption claim definitions which appear in the Public Utilities Code (N. J. S. A. 48:4-l) and the Motor Vehicles Traffic Act (N. J. S. A. 39:1-1).\\nIn rejecting plaintiff's contention that it is a \\\"common carrier of passengers by motor bus,\\\" and therefore exempt from the overtime provisions of N. J. S. A. 34:ll-56a4, Judge Wick held that such definitions in those statutes shed no light on the meaning of \\\"motor vehicle\\\" as it is used in the Wage and Hour Law since they were enacted for entirely different purposes. In so holding he followed State v. Comfort Cab, Inc., 118 N. J. Super. 162 (Cty Ct. 1972), which involved a fact situation essentially the same as the one before us. We agree with the conclusions stated in Comfort that\\ns- there is no reason for giving the term \\\"motor bus\\\" in the foregoing exemption any meaning other than ordinarily given to the term. \\\"Motor bus\\\" normally does not include a taxicab.\\n% s>\\u00bb\\nThus, the statutory exemption for a motor bus, which is to be strictly and narrowly construed as well as defined by its ordinary and plain meaning, does not include \\\"taxicabs.\\\" [at 175-176]\\nEqually unpersuasive is plaintiffs' alternative argument that taxi operators are \\\"outside salesmen,\\\" as defined by Regulation 4.4 (N. J. A. C. 12:56-4.4), and therefore exempt from overtime provisions of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law. Those provisions, in pertinent part, read:\\nThe wage rates fixed in this section shall not be applicable to employees engaged in domestic service in the home of the employer, to persons under the age of 18 or to persons employed as outside salesmen as such term shall be defined and delimited in regulations adopted by the commissioner.\\nThe Commissioner of Labor and Industry is specifically authorized by N. J. S. A. 34:ll-56a5 to\\nmake such administrative regulations as he shall deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this act or necessary to prevent the circumvention or evasion thereof, and to safeguard the minimum wage rates hereby established. Such regulations may include regulations defining and governing outside salesmen \\u00ae .\\nRegulation 4.4 promulgated by the Commissioner defines \\\"outside salesmen\\\" as follows:\\n[Any employee]\\n(a) Who is employed for the purpose and who is customarily and regularly engaged away from his employer's place or places of business in:\\n(1) Making sales, or\\n(2) Obtaining orders, or contracts for services or for the use of facilities for which a consideration will be paid by the client or customer; and\\n(b) Whose hours of work of a nature other than that described in paragraph (a) (1) or (a) (2) of this section do not exceed 20 per cent of hours worked in the workweek by the outside salesman:\\nProvided, that work performed incidental to and in conjunction with the employee's own outside sales or solicitations, including incidental deliveries and collections, shall be regarded as exempt work. Employees who basically drive vehicles and who only incidentally or occasionally makes sales do not qualify for this exemption.\\nPlaintiffs stress the first portion of the qnoted regulation, maintaining that since the drivers are regularly engaged away from the employer's place of business in furnishing services for which they are paid a consideration by the customer, they fall within the category \\\"outside salesmen.\\\" On the other hand, defendant relies on the last sentence of the regulation, asserting that such individuals are basically drivers who only incidentally or occasionally make sales. Hence they urge that such drivers do not qualify for the exemption.\\nWe believe that the trial court properly decided that taxicab drivers are primarily service personnel whose primary function is driving, not selling. Consequently, the Yellow Cab iaxicah drivers cannot rightly be described as \\\"outside salesmen\\\" within the meaning of the regulation.\\nYellow Cab's arguments as to the administrative difficulties which would arise, and the adverse economic effect wffiich would accrue, from making it subject to the overtime provisions are not convincing. We see no insurmountable problem. N. J. S. A. 34:11 \\u2014 56a4 mandates that covered employees he paid 1times their \\\"regular hourly wage\\\" for each hour of working time in excess of 40 hours in any week. \\\"Kegular hourly wage\\\" is defined as \\\"the amount that an employee is regularly paid for each hour of work as determined by dividing the total hours of work during the week into the employee's total earnings for the week, exclusive of overtime premium pay.\\\" N. J. S. A. 34 :ll-56al (e). Pursuant to N. J. S. A. 34:11 \\u2014 56a5, the Commissioner promulgated the following regulation regarding determination of \\\"regular hourly wage\\\":\\nThe law does not require employers to compensate employees on an hourly rate basis. Employees earnings may be determined on a piece-rate, salary, bonus, commission or other basis, but the overtime compensation due to employees must be paid on the basis of the hourly rate derived therefrom. Therefore, the regular hourly wage of an employee is determined by dividing his total remuneration for employment, exclusive of overtime premium pay, in any work week, by the total number of hours worked in that work week for which such compensation was paid. [N. J. A. C. 12:56-3.5(b)]\\nApplication of the formula contained in the regulation to the taxicab drivers' situation places them on the same level as other employees who are paid on a piece-rate basis.\\nPlaintiffs' contention that 12% of every dollar of fares goes toward payment of employee tax and fringe benefits does not appear to be borne out by the record. The agreement between Yellow Cab and the taxi drivers' union provides for definite fringe benefits and in no wise conditions such benefits on the fluctuating earnings of driver employees. Increased earnings to employees of plaintiff company in the form of overtime compensation would increase the amounts of money to be paid by the company in the form of fringe benefits.\\nThe assertion that the taxicab company will be \\\"financially destroyed\\\" should the provisions be applied to it is likewise unsupported by anything in the record. The agreement itself makes provision for negotiation of a revised method or rate of pay should the drivers become subject to the overtime pay provisions of the Pair Labor Standards Act or similar state or local law. It is there provided that in such event:\\nVI. * s * [T]ke parties will negotiate a revised method or rate of pay for such employees where necessary, to the end that the employee's pay for each work week after such revision will be the same as for a similar work week before such revision, and that the company will be in full compliance with such law or laws.\\nMoreover, pursuant to N. J. S. A. 34 :ll-56al3,\\nThe wage board [of the Department of Labor and Industry] may recommend establishment or modification of the number of hours per week after which the overtime rate established in section 5 [section 34 :ll-56at] shall apply and may recommend the establishment or modification oj said overtime rate [Emphasis added].\\nProvision is thereby made for those industries falling within the purview of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law where, due to their unique status, application of said act could conceivably work undue hardship. This section will permit a more particularized approach to the overtime problem consonant with the remedial scope of pertinent regulatory legislation. Plaintiff company's election to pursue this administrative remedy could well alleviate, in large measure, the very inequities of which it now complains.\\nPREEMPTION OF AREA BY FEDERAL LEGISLATION\\nPlaintiffs argue that by virtue of the Fair Labor Standards Act (ELSA) (29 U. S. C. A. 201 et seq.) the Federal Government has preempted the field of wages and hours, and, therefore, the New Jersey statute (N. J. S. A. 34:11 \\u2014 56a4 et seq.) does not apply. The trial court took judicial notice of the fact that Yellow Cabs cross the Delaware River Bridge into Pennsylvania and would therefore be subject to the federal act.\\nThe overtime provisions of the FLSA appear in 29 U. S. C. A. \\u00a7 207. 29 \\u00fc. S. O. A. \\u00a7 213(b) (17) specifically exempts taxicab drivers from those provisions.\\nThe United States Constitution gives Congress the exclusive power \\\"to regulate commerce among the several states \\\" U. S. Const., Art. I, \\u00a7 8, cl. 3. The FLS\\u00c1 and the amendments thereto were adopted pursuant to this grant of power.\\nA state, however, may concurrently exercise its police power as derived from the Tenth Amendment's reservation to the states of powers not delegated to the Federal Government nor prohibited to the states. Such an exercise of power \\\"will be sustained even though it may affect inter state commerce incidentally, so long as it does not unduly burden it.\\\" Moyant v. Paramus, 30 N. J. 528, 545 (1959); Burton v. Sills, 99 N. J. Super. 516, 526 (Law Div. 1967), aff'd 99 N. J. Super. 459 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd 53 N. J. 86 (1968), app. dism. 394 U. S. 812, 89 S. Ct. 1486, 22 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1969).\\nThe Legislature of this State, in enacting the overtime provision of the Wage and Hour Law requiring payment of time and a half for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in a work week (N. J. S. A. 34:ll-56a4), did so in a permissible exercise of the police power. The New Jersey act does not exclude taxicab drivers from the protective ambit of its overtime provisions.\\nPlaintiff drivers argue that ELSA has preempted them by way of its exemption. Preemption is governed by the intent of Congress regarding the federal act. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 80 S. Ct. 813, 4 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1960). In Huron the court stated:\\nIn determining whether state regulation has been pre-empted by federal action, \\\"the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of its police power as to matters not covered by the Federal Legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress, fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the state.\\\" [at 443, 80 S. Ct. at 816]\\nThe doctrine was further refined in Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 10 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1963), in which the Supreme Court said that such preemptive intent will not be implied unless \\\"either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has unmistakenly so ordained.\\\"\\n29 U. S. C. A. \\u00a7 218(a), in pertinent part, reads as follows:\\nNo provision of this Chapter ' ^ shall excuse non-compliance with any Federal or State I,aw or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under this Chapter, or a maximum workweek lower than the maximum workweek established under this Chapter.\\nPlaintiffs argue that this section permitting a higher minimum wage, or shortening of the work week, cannot be interpreted as permitting the State to regulate exempt occupations. We do not read that provision as clearly evidencing a congressional intention to displace all state regulation in the field of hours and wages.\\nCongress has been silent on the question of state regulation of occupations exempted from the federal act. We are not convinced that simply because the federal act exempts this area, state regulation is precluded. The purpose of Congress in enacting the ELSA was to improve substandard labor conditions. Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657, 66 S. Ct. 413, 90 L. Ed. 383 (1945). The purpose in enacting the maximum hour-overtime provisions was to induce employers, by reason of increased labor costs, to reduce the hours of work and employ more men, and to compensate the employees for the burden of a long week. Waling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U. S. 419, 65 S. Ct. 1242, 89 L. Ed. 1705 (1944), The New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, by including taxicab drivers, does not present any obstacle to the accomplishment of those objectives and purposes. Rather, it extends these same considerations to this occupation.\\nThis is not a ease where compliance with both the federal and state acts would be a physical impossibility demanding preemption. Cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U. S. 520, 79 S. Ct. 962, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1959). The regulation of overtime pay for taxicab drivers is not a subject by its very nature admitting only of national supervision. Cf. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U. S. 299, 12 Haw. 299, 13 L. Ed 996 (1851). Nor is it a subject demanding exclusive federal regulation in order to achieve uniformity vital to na tional interest. Cf. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 241, 79 S. Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1959).\\nWe conclude that there is no conflict between the state and federal act and therefore no preemption, and that the State may properly regulate in this area.\\nCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONSTRUING WAGE AND HOUR LAW TO INCLUDE TAXICABS\\nFinally, plaintiffs urge that construction of the Wage and Hour Law to include taxicab companies and exclude \\\"bus\\\" companies violates the Constitutions of New Jersey and of the United States.\\nWe perceive no merit in the argument that such a distinction is demonstrably an arbitrary and unfair classification, in violation of the equal protection clauses of the New Jersey and United States Constitutions. N. J. Const. (1947), Art. I, pars. 1 and 5; U. S. Const., Amend XIV, \\u00a7 1.\\nAn act of the Legislature is presumed to be constitutional ; the burden of showing otherwise is on the party asserting its unconstitutionality. David v. Vesta Co., 45 N. J. 301, 315 (1965). Authority to make classifications and exemptions is generally a legislative and not a judicial function. Hotel Suburban System v. Holderman, 42 N. J. Super. 84, 93 (App. Div. 1956). Unless the statute plainly exceeds the constitutional power of the Legislature, a court should not adjudge it invalid. Thomas v. Kingsley, 43 N. J. 524, 530 (1965). As the court pronounced in the case of N. J. Chapt., Am. I. P. v. N. J. State Bd. of Prof. Planners, 48 N. J. 581 (1967), app. dism. 389 U. S. 8, 88 S. Ct. 70, 19 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1967),\\nThe Legislature has wide discretion in the creation of or recognition of classes for different treatment. Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically. If there is some reasonable basis for the recognition of separate classes, and the dis parate treatment of the classes has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law makers, the constitution is not offended. *\\u2022 * [48 2V. J. at 601]\\nPlaintiffs argue that in light of the purpose of the statute, the inclusion of taxi drivers, while bus drivers are excluded, is arbitrary and irrational.\\nDefendant Director asserts that the Wage and Hour Law was enacted to protect workers from the effects of working long hours, as well as to regulate compensation. He points out that bus drivers generally work an eight-hour day, on a definite schedule. Taxicab drivers, however, work generally a longer day, and the demands of the occupation are such that the efficiency of the taxicab operator is significantly affected by excessive hours of work. This, defendant maintains, endangers not only the operator but the general public, and the inclusion of taxi drivers within the ambit of the overtime provisions was to encourage the taxi industry to reduce this danger.\\nConstitutional challenges similar to those made by plaintiffs herein were rejected in Hotel Suburban System v. Holderman, supra, where the exemption of hotel employees from the Wage and Hour Law was attacked as discriminatory, and in N. J. Restaurant Ass'n v. Holderman, 24 N. J. 295 (1957), where the constitutionality of a minimum wage standards order differentiating between hotel and other restaurants was questioned;\\nTims it is not enough to demonstrate that the legislative objective might be more fully achieved by another, more expansive classification, for the Legislature may recognize degrees of harm and hit the evil where it is most felt. The Legislature may thus limit its action upon a decision to proceed cautiously, step by step, or because of practical exigencies, including administrative convenience and expense, or because of \\\"some substantial consideration of public policy or convenience or the service of the general welfare.\\\" [at 300; citations omitted].\\nIt is certainly true that the taxicab industry and the bus industry have a great deal in common. It is equally true that there exist differences which would have induced the Legislature to treat them in different fashions.\\nMass transportation has beeii a continual concern of legislatures, and has often been the object of special legislative treatment. This fact, when considered with the differences that do exist between the two occupations, in our view presents a reasonable ground for the different treatment in carrying out the objectives of the Wage and Hour Law. Plaintiffs have not shown that the classification used for the exception in question is arbitrary and unreasonable, and without relevance to the legislative goal. N. J. Chapt., Am. I. P. v. N. J. State Bd. of Prof. Planners, supra.\\nAffirmed.\\nWe note that on February 14, 1972, Assembly Bill 694 was introduced in the Legislature. This bill would exclude \\\"employee [s] of a common carrier of passengers by taxicab\\\" from the overtime provisions of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law. This bill, recently released by the committee, after progressing to a second reading, was then recommitted. This proposed legislation tends to confirm the conclusion that the Wage and Hour Law, as it currently stands, contains no taxicab exemption.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/331264.json b/nj/331264.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..11e370dc199992fc935c53cf5eee7ef265b10837
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/331264.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"331264\", \"name\": \"JAMES SYNEAR v. JOSEPH WHARTON\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Synear v. Wharton\", \"decision_date\": \"1886-02\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"97\", \"last_page\": \"99\", \"citations\": \"48 N.J.L. 97\", \"volume\": \"48\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:35:42.309358+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JAMES SYNEAR v. JOSEPH WHARTON.\", \"head_matter\": \"JAMES SYNEAR v. JOSEPH WHARTON.\\n1. When the plaintiff in an action before a District Court, involving more than 5200, applies for a certiorari to review a judgment of nonsuit rendered therein, it is not necessary for him to tender a bond.\\n2. A plaintiff, employed to work in defendant\\u2019s glass-factory, from September to July, testified that he went to work in September and worked until December 22d, and was then discharged and ordered not to come around the factory; that the gates were all locked up the next day, and another man was put in his place, so that he could not get in. He was not cross-examined. Held, that the evidence should have been submitted to the jury on the questions whether the plaintiff was discharged by competent authority, and whether he was willing to continue in defendant\\u2019s employ, and that a nonsuit for want of evidence on these points was erroneous.\\nOn certiorari to the District Court of the city of Camden.\\nArgued at November Term, 1885, before Justices Van Syckel and Dixon.\\nFor the plaintiff, J. W. Westcott and T. B. Harned.\\nFor the defendant, P. L. Voorhees and D. J. Pancoast.\", \"word_count\": \"875\", \"char_count\": \"4997\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nDixon, J.\\nThis certiorari brings up a judgment of non-suit rendered by the Camden District Court in a suit wherein the plaintiff claimed $300 damages for the defendant's breach of a contract to employ the plaintiff.\\nThe defendant moves to dismiss the writ for want of a bond, in pursuance of section 88 of the District Court act of March 9th, 1877, (Rev., p. 1315,) and because the return is made by the clerk of the District Court instead of the court itself.\\nThe act of 1877 is not applicable to the point. It did not confer the jurisdiction which was exercised by the District Court in this cause. That jurisdiction was granted by the District Court act of March 27th, 1882, (Pamph. L., p. 195,) the thirteenth section of which specifies the terms whereon certiorari is to be allowed in cases involving more $200. These terms, we think, indicate that when the plaintiff below is the plaintiff in certiorari, no bond is required. Whether the spirit of the section would exact a bond from a nominal plaintiff against whom the nominal defendant had recovered an affirmative judgment on set-off, we do not decide.\\nThe objection made to the form of attesting the return was waived by the defendant's stipulation that the return should be filed without objection.\\nThe question on the merits is whether the judgment of non.uit was proper. The defendant endeavors to maintain it on three grounds : first, that the testimony did not agree with the declaration as to the terms of the bargain; second, that there was no evidence of a discharge by the defendant; and third, that there was no evidence of plaintiff's willingness to continue in the employment.\\nAs to the first, the contract declared on was that about September 1st, 1882, defendant hired plaintiff to take out hollow ware from defendant's ovens in his glass manufacturing houses, in Camden, for the period of one fire, to wit, from the time of hiring to July 2d following, for $10.50 per week. The proof was that in August, 1882, defendant's agent engaged plaintiff to work at defendant's glass-house in Camden, in taking out ware for the next season, which ran until July 1st following, for $10.50 a week. These allegata and probata substantially agree.\\nAs to the second and third grounds, the evidence was that plaintiff went to work under the contract, and continued to work until the Wednesday before Christmas of 1882, and did not go on working after that because (in the words of his testimony) \\\" I was discharged and ordered not to come around the factory; the gates were all locked up the next day, and \\u2022another man was put in my place, so that I couldn't get in ; Wednesday afternoon my money was given me.\\\" The plaintiff was not cross-examined.\\nThis evidence should, we think, have been submitted to the jury on the questions now raised. The facts, that plaintiff was ordered not to come around the factory and the gates were locked against him, and that another man was put in his place, warranted an inference, in the absence of any attempt at explanation or denial, that he was discharged by some one whom defendant had placed in control of his factory and workmen, some one who had authority to discharge the plaintiff. The facts that plaintiff worked until he was discharged, and quit work because he was discharged, and could not get in to work the next day because the gates were locked up and another man was put in his place, indicated that his willingness to work continued up to and after the time of his dismissal. How long after that time it continued was not important on the motion to nonsuit.\\nThe judgment of nonsuit must be reversed.\\nIt appears to be equitable and just that there should be a rehearing of the case before the District Court, and therefore the cause is remanded to that court for a new trial on five days' notice to the defendant.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/331300.json b/nj/331300.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2628cd0101d11e40ce91a38dc2bf08cad6aff160
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/331300.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"331300\", \"name\": \"MARILYN R. LILLY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lilly v. Prudential Insurance\", \"decision_date\": \"1991-01-18\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"280\", \"last_page\": \"280\", \"citations\": \"246 N.J. Super. 280\", \"volume\": \"246\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:02:43.322870+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"MARILYN R. LILLY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"587 A.2d 629\\nMARILYN R. LILLY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued January 8, 1991\\n\\u2014Decided January 18, 1991.\\nBefore Judges MICHELS, BRODY and GRUCCIO.\\nJohn T. Petras argued the cause for appellant (Weiner Lesniak, attorneys; John T. Petros, of counsel and on the brief).\\nThomas E. Hood argued the cause for respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"137\", \"char_count\": \"925\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM.\\nThe summary judgment of the Law Division which declared that plaintiff Marilyn R. Lilly was entitled to personal injury protection benefits under a policy of insurance issued by defendant Prudential Insurance Company (more properly referred to as Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company) is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Menza in his written opinion which is reported as Lilly v. Prudential Insurance Company, 246 N.J.Super. 357, 587 A.2d 672 (Law Div.1990).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/333199.json b/nj/333199.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..72dad9b5160a352b1e7931a244dcc09a83d74299
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/333199.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"333199\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JAMES McCLARY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. McClary\", \"decision_date\": \"1991-12-06\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"222\", \"last_page\": \"230\", \"citations\": \"252 N.J. Super. 222\", \"volume\": \"252\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:48:54.872360+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JAMES McCLARY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"599 A.2d 600\\nSTATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JAMES McCLARY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued October 22, 1991\\n\\u2014Decided December 6, 1991.\\nBefore Judges MICHELS, O\\u2019BRIEN and HAVEY.\\nLawrence S. Lustberg argued the cause for appellant (Wilfredo Caraballo, Public Defender, attorney; Alison Stewart Kerber, Designated Counsel, on the brief).\\nJack J. Lipari, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Jeffrey S. Blitz, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney; Jack J. Lipari, of counsel and on the letter brief).\\nJames McClary, appellant, submitted a supplemental pro se brief.\", \"word_count\": \"2199\", \"char_count\": \"13390\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nO'BRIEN, J.A.D.\\nDefendant appeals from his conviction of first degree armed robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1), fourth degree possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d), and third degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d). After merging the weapons offenses into the armed robbery, defendant was sentenced as a persistent offender to an extended term, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3a, of thirty years with a fifteen-year period of parole ineligibility. We affirm.\\nAt approximately 6:30 a.m. on November 15, 1988, Lynne Baumgartner Guthrie (Guthrie) arrived at her place of business in Atlantic City. After proceeding through the warehouse, she went upstairs to her office on the second floor where she placed her purse and briefcase on her desk. She returned downstairs to speak to the foreman, Bill Preston (Preston), regarding the day's work. While she was downstairs, other employees arrived including Roberto Arroyo (Arroyo), Paul Cross (Cross), and John Hudnell (Hudnell), who were scheduled to begin their day's work at 7:00 a.m.\\nShortly after 7:00 a.m., Guthrie went back upstairs to her office. Through sliding-glass doors she observed defendant standing at her desk going through her purse. When she asked defendant what he was doing, he replied he was looking for personnel, gesturing toward an adjoining office. Although Guthrie did not believe him, she wisely gestured to him there was no problem and left her office, returning downstairs quickly. Fortunately, she caught the employees before they left for their job sites and all four workers ran upstairs with her.\\nGuthrie was behind Arroyo, who asked defendant what he was doing, and defendant replied he was looking for personnel. Cross told him there was no such office and told defendant twice to lie down on the ground. At this point, defendant ran in the direction of a storage area on the second floor. Guthrie called the police and went downstairs to await their arrival. Preston, Cross, Hudnell and Arroyo followed defendant into the storage area. Finally, Preston knocked defendant off balance and he stumbled toward a wall into some rubber which was stored there. As defendant kept moving toward a nearby ramp and doorway, Arroyo grabbed him around the neck, catching his own arm in a roll of rubber. At this point, Cross and Hudnell grabbed defendant, which enabled Arroyo to free himself. Hudnell grabbed defendant's right arm, Cross held defendant around the neck and shoulders from the left side, and Preston grabbed one of defendant's legs. According to Arroyo, defendant \\\"was fighting the whole way, pushing, trying to kick, moving his arms and everything.\\\" Preston described defendant as \\\"trying to punch and trying to kick everybody in sight.\\\" Arroyo then observed defendant reach underneath his shirt and pull out a knife, at which time Guthrie's purse fell to the floor. Defendant pulled the knife out with the blade down. Arroyo grabbed defendant's hand, twisted it, and pulled the knife out of his hand, throwing the knife behind defendant while defendant was still fighting. Finally, the four men got defendant face down on the floor and held him until the police arrived. An officer testified to finding the knife on the floor about five feet from defendant and the black purse, which he returned to the victim.\\nOn this appeal, defendant raises the following legal arguments:\\nPOINT I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REQUEST TO CHARGE THE JURY ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT.\\nPOINT II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.\\nPOINT III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE ELEMENT OF FORCE (NOT RAISED BELOW).\\nPOINT IV THE SENTENCE IMPOSED REPRESENTS AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION AND MUST BE VACATED.\\nA careful review of the record and a consideration of the contentions by defendant in light of the applicable law satisfies us that all of said contentions and issues raised clearly are without merit. R. 2:ll-3(e)(2).\\nThe only issue with any semblance of merit concerns the trial judge's denial of defendant's request that he charge theft as a lesser included offense. In support of his contention, defendant cites our decision in State v. Jordan, 240 N.J.Super. 115, 118-119, 572 A.2d 676 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 328, 585 A.2d 345 (1990), where we said theft is both a lesser included offense and an essential element of robbery. Id. at 119, 572 A.2d 676. Although the circumstances presented in Jordan are similar to those presented here, we are satisfied that the principles of Jordan did not require a charge of theft as a lesser included offense in this case.\\nIn Jordan, defendant had been observed shoplifting merchandise at a Bradlees store by two store detectives, Berger and Brosmer. They notified another store detective, Polk, that Jordan was attempting to leave the store. After Polk showed Jordan his identification and asked if he had a receipt for the merchandise, Jordan threw a punch at Polk. When Polk avoided Jordan's punch, Jordan swung the bag containing the stolen merchandise and ran past him. However, another store employee grabbed Jordan. Although he continued to struggle, Jordan was finally subdued and brought back into the store. Once inside the store, Jordan pushed Polk out of the way and \\\"bodyslammed\\\" Berger. When Brosmer stepped in his way, he punched her in the mouth. As employees attempted to subdue Jordan and put handcuffs on him, he full-force punched Bros-mer between her legs causing severe pelvic trauma, and he punched Berger in the stomach. Finally, he was again subdued.\\nUnder those facts, we concluded that theft of movable property and shoplifting should have been charged as lesser included offenses. We based that conclusion on our view that there was a rational basis in the evidence to convict defendant of either of those offenses and to acquit him of second degree robbery. We said,\\nThe jury might have rejected the State's proofs that defendant used force against Polk when he was stopped after leaving the store and it might have found that defendant's infliction of bodily injury on Brosmer and Berger after he was returned to the store occurred after flight had been concluded and defendant was in custody. Cf. State v. Mirault, 92 N.J. 492, 500-501, 457 A.2d 455 (1983). Thus, the jury might have found that the bodily injury to the two store detectives was not inflicted in the course of committing a theft. While such a result would have been extraordinary, it nevertheless could have been reached by the jury. Consequently, the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of either theft of movable property or shoplifting.\\nIn reaching that result, we noted that the applicable standard for determining whether the trial court should charge a jury with respect to a lesser included offense is set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(e) of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (Code):\\nThe court shall not charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict convicting the defendant of the included offense.\\nWhere the evidence provides a rational basis upon which the defendant may be found guilty of an included offense and not guilty of the encompassing offense, it is reversible error for the court to refuse upon request to charge the jury with respect to the included offense. Id. at 118-119, 572 A. 2d 676 and cases cited. We further observed that in State v. Crisantos (Arriagas), 102 N.J. 265, 278, 508 A.2d 167 (1986), our Supreme Court emphasized that the code formulation of the rational-basis test is more restrictive than the pre-code Powell guidelines under which a charge of a lesser included offense was proper when there existed \\\"a scintilla of evidence\\\" with respect to that charge. Nonetheless, Crisantos noted that the rational-basis test \\\"imposes a low threshold . for permitting a charge on a lesser included offense.\\\" Id.\\nThe Code has broadened the concept of robbery. It specifically includes within the phrase \\\"in the course of committing a theft\\\" both the attempt before and immediate flight after the theft. This was not the common law rule, but it has been adopted by statute or by decision in most jurisdictions. Cf. State v. Zupkosky, 127 N.J.L. 218, 222, 21 A.2d 771 (E. & A. 1941) (shooting of clerk in pursuit of defendant outside store sustains felony murder based on robbery); \\\"[H]e was not through with the crime.\\\" See State v. Mirault, 92 N.J. 492, 500, 457 A.2d 455 (1983). In the latter case, our Supreme Court also noted that the word \\\"another\\\" would include an investigating police officer attempting to apprehend a criminal after a theft, as it would include Arroyo and the other workers who subdued defendant in this case.\\nThus, the issue in this case is whether flight after the theft had concluded and defendant was in custody when he tried to punch and tried to kick everybody in sight and pulled out the knife from underneath his shirt, which Arroyo observed and took from him. We conclude it had not. Furthermore, there was no rational basis upon which a jury could conclude that defendant had not used force upon another. N.J.S.A. 2C:15-la. In fact, during the entire flight and apprehension defendant retained the purse which he had stolen. It fell out when he displayed the knife in support of his efforts to avoid apprehension. We conclude that in this case, as distinguished from the Jordan case, the flight had not concluded and, indeed, all of defendant's actions testified to by the witnesses were part and parcel of the immediate flight from the theft of the purse, and thus there was no rational basis upon which defendant could be found guilty of an included offense of theft from the person and not guilty of the encompassing offense of robbery or armed robbery. We find no error in the denial of defendant's request that theft be charged as a lesser included offense.\\nDefendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied. Evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming and there was obviously no miscarriage of justice under Rule 2:10-1.\\nAlthough we agree with defendant that appropriate and proper charges are essential to a fair trial, State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287, 430 A.2d 914 (1981), we disagree that it was necessary for the trial judge to define the word \\\"force\\\" in his charge on robbery. Furthermore, we note there was no exception to the charge based upon the alleged omission. See Rule 1:7-2. Failure to object to the omission supports the conclusion that counsel did not find the absence of a definition of force in the judge's charge to be of any consequence, nor do we.\\nAlthough the sentence imposed upon defendant was substantial, there is no question he qualified for the imposition of an extended term as a persistent offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3a. The sentencing judge in this case followed the procedure outlined by the Supreme Court in State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80, 527 A.2d 1346 (1987). The judge did not impose the presumptive term of fifty years required by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-lf(l), in recognition of the fact that defendant's crime started out as a theft, but elevated to robbery during the course of his flight. We find no merit to defendant's contention that this display of leniency precluded the court from imposing a period of parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7b. We recognize that although the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6b is not repeated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7b, our Supreme Court has concluded that the Legislature intended the same balancing process, i.e., that the court be clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors. State v. Dunbar, supra, 108 N.J. at 92, 527 A.2d 1346. Although not using the specific language, it is clear the trial judge was clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors since he found there were no mitigating factors. His conclusion that the maximum sentence of life imprisonment or the presumptive extended term of fifty years were not necessary because the event started out as a theft was not defining a mitigating circumstance, but simply a recognition of the crime for what it was. We find no inconsistency in the finding of no mitigating circumstances and the imposition of a period of parole ineligibility at the same time that the judge imposed the minimum extended term of thirty years.\\nAffirmed.\\nWe note that the judge accepted defendant's argument that the jury may disbelieve Arroyo's and the police officer's testimony about the knife and thus charged second degree robbery.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/333235.json b/nj/333235.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..542660394a2c103faa3e9b0513f920e5a68268f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/333235.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"333235\", \"name\": \"LA MAR-GATE, INC., PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. EUGENE B. SPITZ AND ELEANOR S. SPITZ, H/W, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"La Mar-Gate, Inc. v. Spitz\", \"decision_date\": \"1991-12-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"303\", \"last_page\": \"312\", \"citations\": \"252 N.J. Super. 303\", \"volume\": \"252\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:48:54.872360+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"LA MAR-GATE, INC., PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. EUGENE B. SPITZ AND ELEANOR S. SPITZ, H/W, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"599 A.2d 928\\nLA MAR-GATE, INC., PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. EUGENE B. SPITZ AND ELEANOR S. SPITZ, H/W, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nSubmitted October 17, 1991\\n\\u2014Decided December 4, 1991.\\nBefore Judges KING, DREIER and GRUCCIO.\\nObermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell & Hippel, attorneys for appellants (Frederick T. Cunningham, on the brief).\\nJames E. Rafferty, attorney for respondent (James E. Rafferty, on the brief).\", \"word_count\": \"2539\", \"char_count\": \"15605\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nDREIER, J.A.D.\\nDr. Eugene B. Spitz appeals from a directed verdict holding him responsible for a partnership note signed by him as a general partner. We here examine the responsibility of a partner for the contractual obligations of the partnership, and the necessity to join or attempt to join all responsible partners if any is to be held individually liable. We hold such joinder or attempted joinder is required.\\nDr. Spitz is a pediatric neurosurgeon who in the early 1980's formed a partnership known as CS Associates. The other original equal partners were Drs. Nicholas Canuso, Raymond Silk and Abraham Cohen. The partnership intended to build and operate a nursing home. In 1983, the partners needed additional financing for the nursing home; however, their bank withdrew its letter of credit. The partnership turned to plaintiff, La Mar-Gate, Inc., a corporation wholly-owned by Dr. Canuso, which agreed to advance the funds. La Mar-Gate in turn borrowed the million dollars from the bank, additionally pledging as security a motel that it owned. The note in question, with interest to the date of judgment, had a balance due of $1,329,789.\\nThe indebtedness to La Mar-Gate was represented by a note of CS Associates, signed by three of the four partners, Dr. Canuso, Dr. Cohen and Dr. Spitz, as general partners. Dr. Spitz also was requested to sign a form of guarantee which additionally provided for his wife's guarantee of the obligation. The guarantee in turn was to be secured by certain mortgages on property owned by Dr. and Mrs. Spitz.\\nDr. Spitz asserted that the guarantee was signed by him on the express (and allegedly untrue) representation by Dr. Canu-so that he and Dr. Cohen had already signed such guarantees, and that Dr. Silk would be signing a similar guarantee in the near future. Furthermore, Dr. Spitz contended that Dr. Canu-so represented that Dr. Spitz would be responsible solely for one-quarter of the loan, in proportion to his 25% partnership interest, and that in any event the guarantee was a mere formality and would never be used against him. He sought exoneration from all of his obligations under the note and guarantee by reason of Dr. Canuso's fraud in making these representations.\\nWhen CS Associates became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy, plaintiff determined to institute this action solely against Dr. and Mrs. Spitz. As noted, the jury accepted Dr. Spitz' representation that Mrs. Spitz had not signed or authorized the signing of the guarantee and accompanying mortgage documents. .When plaintiff moved for a directed verdict against Dr. Spitz, however, the judge determined that notwithstanding his factual assertions concerning his personal liability on the guarantee and accompanying security, there were no defenses to his liability on the note. The judge reasoned that since any liability on the note would be coextensive with any liability on the guarantee, there was no reason for plaintiff to press both theories. The court, therefore, directed a verdict against Dr. Spitz solely on the note, and the issue of his liability on the guarantee and his fraud defenses concerning the guarantee and accompanying security were never submitted to the jury.\\nDr. Spitz moved for a new trial or in the alternative reconsideration of the directed verdict. At first the motion was denied on procedural grounds, but was then renewed with a showing that procedurally the motion was properly before the court. The earlier order denying the motion was vacated and the court afforded counsel oral argument, after which the judge adhered to his original determination. The then-pending notice of appeal was amended to encompass the denial of the motion for a new trial.\\nThe trial judge at both the motion for a directed verdict and at the motion for a new trial clearly stated that Dr. Spitz' signature on the note, rather than the guarantee, obligated him on a joint and several basis to pay the partnership obligation. Since we here determine that this statement of the law was incorrect and the jury had never been given the opportunity to pass upon Dr. Spitz' fraud claim, we must reverse and remand for a new trial concerning Dr. Spitz' liability on the guarantee and accompanying security. If the joinder issue, discussed later, is resolved, Dr. Spitz' liability on the note as a partnership obligation may also be resolved.\\nN.J.S.A. 42:1-15 provides:\\nAH partners are liable:\\na. Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under sections 42:1-13 and 42:1-14 of this title.\\nb. Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership; but any partner may enter into a separate obligation to perform a partnership contract.\\nN.J.S.A. 42:1-13, incorporated by reference in N.J.S.A. 42:1-15a, relates to tort claims or other wrongful acts of a partner. See Malanga v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N.J. 220, 226-227, 146 A.2d 105 (1958). N.J.S.A. 42:1-14 relates to a partner's breach of trust involving misapplication of money or property received from a third person. The partnership note in issue here, however, is one of \\\"all other debts and obligations of the partnership\\\" for which a partner is only jointly (rather than jointly and severally) liable under N.J.S.A. 42:1\\u201415b.\\nWhile plaintiff has urged that there should be joint and several liability for all partnership debts and that this is a time-honored common-law rule in New Jersey, the case cited by plaintiff, Edison Elec. Illuminating Co. v. De Mott, 51 N.J.Eq. 16, 19, 25 A. 952 (Chan.1893), predated the 1919 Uniform Partnership law, N.J.S.A. 42:1-1 et seq. See also Wisham v. Lippincott, 9 N.J.Eq. 353, 354 (Chan.1853); Randolph v. Daly, 16 N.J.Eq. 313, 316 (Chan.1863); Greene v. Butterworth, 45 N.J.Eq. 738, 739 (Perog.Ct.1889), all of which predate the adoption of the Uniform Partnership law. The later cases cited by plaintiff, Mazzuchelli v. Silberberg, 29 N.J. 15, 148 A.2d 8 (1959), and Lyon v. Barrett, 89 N.J. 294, 445 A.2d 1153 (1982), both involve responsibility outside of the contract setting. While a few states (Arizona, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee and Texas) have departed from the Uniform Act in order to make contractual as well as tort responsibility joint and several, New Jersey has not chosen this option.\\nIt is true that under N.J.S.A. 42:l-40d, upon dissolution of a partnership individual partners are responsible according to the share of profits (in this case 25% for Dr. Spitz). But, if another partner is insolvent, or not being subject to process, refuses to contribute, \\\"the other partner shall contribute their share of the liabilities, and, in the relative proportions in which they share the profits, the additional amount necessary to pay the liabilities.\\\" Ibid. This rule was recognized in Mazzuchelli v. Silberberg, 29 N.J. at 21, 148 A.2d 8.\\nWhile we can find no case directly on point in New Jersey, cases determined under the Uniform Partnership law have upheld the statutory direction that contractual claims against a partner are joint rather than joint and several. See, e.g., Cunard Line Ltd. v. Abney, 540 F.Supp. 657, 659-660 (S.D.N.Y.1982). There, Judge Knapp stated that the defendant joint-obligor has \\\"the right to insist that the plaintiff join other such obligors if joinder is possible.\\\" Id. at 659. The judge further explained\\nThe individual joint obligor is a necessary party (not an indispensable one) in an action against one or more of the joint individual obligors____ By contrast, if the obligors are also 'severally' liable\\u2014as in the case of partners charged with a partnership tort liability . then they are merely proper parties to an action against them individually____ Consequently, they don't even have the right to insist on joinder and the plaintiff may freely 'pick his target.' Caplan v. Caplan, supra, 268 N.Y. [445] at 448, 198 N.E 23 [(1935)].\\n540 F.Supp. at 659, n. 3. See also Concra Corp. v. Andrus, 141 Vt. 169, 446 A.2d 363, 365 (Vt.1982), where the court stated:\\nPartners are both jointly and severally liable for torts and breaches of trust, . but they are only jointly liable for contract liability; [citing 11 V.S.A. \\u00a7 1207(2), the Vermont equivalent of N.J.S.A. 42:l-15b].\\nIn that case, however, the difference between joint and joint and several liability was held to be academic since all jointly responsible parties were joined. See also Deist v. Timmins, 32 Ohio App.3d 74, 78-79, 513 N.E.2d 1382, 1386 (Ct.App.1986); White v. Jackson, 252 S.C. 274, 166 S.E.2d 211, 214 (1969) (recognizing the joinder requirement where there is a joint obligation, but questionably imposing a similar joinder requirement of all partners when the partnership asserts a claim as a plaintiff); Merchant's Nat'l Bank of Los Angeles v. Clark-Parker Co., 215 Cal. 296, 9 P.2d 826, 827 (Cal.1932) (same). In the case before us we have a contract rather than a tort claim, and the plaintiff may not in the words of Cunard Line Ltd. v. Abney, supra, 540 F.Supp. at 659, n. 3, \\\"pick [its] target.\\\"\\nRule 4:28-l(a)(l) requires the joinder of a person subject to service of process if \\\"in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties.\\\" In the case before us, given the provisions of N.J.S.A. 42:l-15b and 42:1-40d, the remaining partners should have been made parties to this action.\\nThe difficulty with this analysis is that if all of the jointly responsible parties are joined and the partnership is in dissolution, a contract creditor may still reach the individual assets of any partner. As noted earlier, each partner must pay any additional amount to the extent that other \\\"partners are insolvent, or not being subject to process, refused to contribute.\\\" N.J.S.A. 42:l-40d. However, in such a proceeding, a partner has a right to have the other responsible partners joined. Therefore a suitable cross-claim for contribution can be made, and in fact, must be made under the entire controversy doctrine. See Cogdell v. Hosp. Center at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 26, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989). In fact, since the Cogdell decision, a defendant is required to make a germane claim against even a nonparty to the action. Id. at 28, 560 A.2d 1169; see also Reno Auto v. Prospect Park Sav. & Loan, 243 N.J.Super. 624, 630, 581 A.2d 109 (App.Div.1990).\\nWe will not apply any entire controversy preclusion here against Dr. Spitz since plaintiff's claim asserting Dr. Spitz' joint and several responsibility was deficient; its only viable claim on the note was for joint responsibility and could be asserted only in a proceeding in which the other responsible partners were joined, or their absence explained. Certainly, as to Dr. Canuso's 50% personal responsibility as a joint obligor, his presence as a witness at the trial (absent some other valid defense) is presumptive evidence of his availability as a codefendant, notwithstanding his ownership of the plaintiff corporation. Similarly, claims might be asserted against Drs. Cohen and Silk, although Dr. Cohen's responsibility might have been affected by any agreements made at the time his interest was transferred to Dr. Canuso. In summary, therefore, insofar as the claim was limited by the court to Dr. Spitz' responsibility on the note, his obligation might well be limited in this action to 25% of the indebtedness, augmented by the uncollectible portion attributed to another partner.\\nThe trial court determined that plaintiff's claim based upon Dr. Spitz' alleged contemporaneous guarantee of the obligation was mere surplusage, and terminated the litigation before the enforceability of the guarantee and the contrary claim of Dr. Spitz of fraud could be determined by the jury. While there has been no cross-appeal by plaintiff from this determination, we note that the trial was terminated by the court on different grounds before the issue could be resolved. We therefore will not consider plaintiff to be collaterally es-topped from asserting this claim at any retrial, nor will Dr. Spitz be precluded from reasserting his defense of fraud.\\nThe judgment appealed from is reversed. The matter is remanded to the Law Division for retrial in accordance with this opinion.\\nPrior to the institution of this action Dr. Canuso acquired Dr. Cohen's interest in the partnership, and thus became a 50% owner.\\nAt the trial both Dr. and Mrs. Spitz contended that her purported signature on the guarantee and mortgages had in fact been signed by Dr. Spitz without Mrs. Spitz' knowledge or authority. This issue was presented to the jury which exonerated Mrs. Spitz.\\nUnder N.J.S.A. 42:1-31, \\\"Dissolution is caused . 5. By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership.\\\"\\nIn that case, however, the partners were deemed individually and directly responsible for workers' compensation as individual employers. While not explicitly stated, we assume that the workers' compensation liability discussed in Mazzuchelli stands in place of general tort responsibility, which would be governed by the joint and several responsibility rules of N.J.S.A. 42:l-15a. See also Lyon v. Barrett, 89 N.J. at 303, 445 A.2d 1153 (explaining the tort basis of the workers' compensation claim against an individual partner).\\nWe note that the Vermont court stated at the conclusion of its opinion that notwithstanding the imposition of solely a joint judgment \\\"payment of the entire judgment may be levied against and satisfied by any one of the parties held jointly Iiahle.\\\" 446 A.2d at 366. The authority cited for this statement is Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 672, 332 A.2d 651, 672 (1975). A reading of that case, however, shows the proposition not to be as definite as stated by the Vermont court. The Maryland court noted that Pennsylvania law might apply and that a joint obligor entitled to contribution might require the obligee \\\"to levy upon or make sale of the real property of [the other joint obligor], in proportion to or in the succession in which, the properties of the several joint obligors might be liable to contribute toward the discharge of the common encumbrance.\\\" 332 A.2d at 673 (citations omitted). The Maryland court merely entered judgment against the defendants jointly, and did not provide for individual responsibility to discharge the judgment. In fact, one of the cases the court cited, Wilner v. Croyle, 214 Pa.Super. 91, 252 A.2d 387 (Super.Ct.1969), held specifically that the property of each of the joint obligors should be sold and the judgment satisfied ratably from the proceeds. 252 A.2d at 392.\\nIf all joint obligors are made parties-defendant, and only one or more are served, the plaintiff still can proceed against those served. See N.J.S.A. 2A:55-1. To that extent, a plaintiff may pick a target. Note also that under N.J.S.A. 2A:55-2 if a joint debtor dies during the lifetime of another joint debtor, a representative of the deceased debtor can be charged as if the joint debtors had been jointly and severally liable. The distinction made by the Legislature in this latter statute indicates the viability of the dichotomy between a joint as opposed to a joint and several obligation.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/333351.json b/nj/333351.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7f85c97ed274287fefbff21a04048635d075e57e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/333351.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"333351\", \"name\": \"MARY CHENG LIN WANG, AS ASSIGNEE OF RONALD FIORI, AND THERESA FIORI, HIS WIFE, RICHARD FIORI, AND WILLIAM D. FRANKS, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. THE ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., AN INSURANCE COMPANY LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, FRANK METZGER, AND NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE CO., AN INSURANCE COMPANY LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, AND THE ABC AGENCY (FICTITIOUS NAME), A CORPORATION OR PROPRIETORSHIP PROVIDING INSURANCE SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC, JOHN DOE (FICTITIOUS NAME), AND RICHARD ROE (FICTITIOUS NAME), DEFENDANTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mary Cheng Lin Wang v. Allstate Insurance\", \"decision_date\": \"1991-06-26\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"2\", \"last_page\": \"19\", \"citations\": \"125 N.J. 2\", \"volume\": \"125\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:42:22.948771+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"MARY CHENG LIN WANG, AS ASSIGNEE OF RONALD FIORI, AND THERESA FIORI, HIS WIFE, RICHARD FIORI, AND WILLIAM D. FRANKS, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. THE ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., AN INSURANCE COMPANY LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, FRANK METZGER, AND NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE CO., AN INSURANCE COMPANY LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, AND THE ABC AGENCY (FICTITIOUS NAME), A CORPORATION OR PROPRIETORSHIP PROVIDING INSURANCE SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC, JOHN DOE (FICTITIOUS NAME), AND RICHARD ROE (FICTITIOUS NAME), DEFENDANTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"592 A.2d 527\\nMARY CHENG LIN WANG, AS ASSIGNEE OF RONALD FIORI, AND THERESA FIORI, HIS WIFE, RICHARD FIORI, AND WILLIAM D. FRANKS, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. THE ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., AN INSURANCE COMPANY LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, FRANK METZGER, AND NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE CO., AN INSURANCE COMPANY LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, AND THE ABC AGENCY (FICTITIOUS NAME), A CORPORATION OR PROPRIETORSHIP PROVIDING INSURANCE SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC, JOHN DOE (FICTITIOUS NAME), AND RICHARD ROE (FICTITIOUS NAME), DEFENDANTS.\\nArgued February 25, 1991\\nDecided June 26, 1991.\\nDavid J. D\\u2019Aloia argued the cause for appellants The Allstate Insurance Co., and Frank Metzger (Saiber, Schlesinger, Satz & Goldstein, attorneys; David J. D\\u2019Aloia and Dorothy J. Nemetz, on the briefs).\\nEdward B. Deutsch argued the cause for appellant New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co. (McElroy, Deutsch & Mulvaney, attorneys; William T. McElroy, of counsel; Moira E. O\\u2019Connell, on the briefs).\\nGary C. Algeier argued the cause for respondents (Rand, Algeier, Tosti & Woodruff, attorneys; Ellen S. Bass, on the brief).\", \"word_count\": \"5628\", \"char_count\": \"35038\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the Court was delivered by\\nO'BRIEN, J.A.D.\\n(temporarily assigned).\\nThis appeal concerns the duty of insurance companies and their agents to advise their insureds, on renewal of a homeowner's policy, of the potential inadequacy of their personal liability coverage.\\nI\\nOn February 3, 1983, Mary Cheng Lin Wang sustained substantial personal injuries when her car collided with a tree allegedly because two dogs ran into the roadway in front of her. One of the dogs was owned by Ronald, Theresa, and Richard Fiori, and the other by William and Dorothy Franks. In January 1985, Wang instituted suit for damages for her personal injuries against the Fioris and the Frankses because of their failure properly to control their dogs.\\nBoth the Fioris and the Frankses had homeowner policies containing liability coverage for bodily injury and property damage. The Fioris had purchased their home for $17,500 in 1963, at which time they obtained their homeowner's policy from defendant The Allstate Insurance Co. (Allstate) through its agent, defendant Frank Metzger. The policy contained \\\"family\\\" liability coverage in the amount of $25,000. The Frankses purchased their home for $49,000 in 1977, at which time they obtained their homeowner's policy from defendant New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co. (NJM), a direct provider. Their policy too contained personal liability coverage in the amount of $25,000. Both policies had been renewed over the years, with the $25,000 limit in each for personal liability coverage remaining unchanged and were in effect when Wang suffered her injuries.\\nThe Fioris and Frankses notified their respective insurance carriers, Allstate and NJM, of the Wang suit. Each carrier conceded coverage, assigned counsel, and provided a defense for its insured. Because of the substantial injuries claimed by Wang, the potential liability of the Fioris and the Frankses exceeded the liability coverage in their homeowners' policies and they retained personal counsel. Both insurance carriers agreed to deposit their policy limits with the Clerk of the Superior Court. Hence, by separate orders dated April 12, 1985, $25,000 was deposited with the Clerk on behalf of the Fioris and $25,000 was deposited on behalf of the Frankses, creating a fund in the total amount of $50,000.\\nBecause Wang's counsel considered the deposited sum inadequate to compensate for her injuries, settlement negotiations were begun with personal counsel for the Fioris and Frankses. Counsel for Wang met with the Fioris and their personal attorney on March 25, 1986. According to a certification of Wang's counsel, the Fioris informed him they had \\\"never received any information regarding increasing their liability coverage from either Allstate or Mr. Metzger,\\\" and they had \\\"relied on Metzger's expertise and knowledge regarding available insurance coverages and the limits of coverage appropriate in determining their insurance needs.\\\" On November 25, 1985, Wang's counsel had met with the Frankses and their personal attorney, at which time Mr. Franks told him he had received no information or advice from NJM suggesting that he increase his liability coverage, characterized in the certification as \\\"unusually low.\\\" Franks further said he \\\"had no expertise in the area of insurance and [NJM] had been recommended to him as a carrier which could adequately meet his insurance needs.\\\" Based on that information, Wang's counsel concluded that the Fioris and Frankses had viable causes of action against their respective insurance carriers under the standards set forth in Rider v. Lynch, 42 N.J. 465, 201 A. 2d 561 (1964), and other cases establishing the duty owed by brokers and insurance companies to their insureds.\\nNegotiations continued, culminating in a settlement agreement in March 1987. Under the terms of that agreement, judgments were to be entered in favor of Wang and against the Fioris and Mr. Franks in the sum of $600,000 plus prejudgment interest. Mrs. Franks chose not to be a party to the proposed settlement agreement and thus negotiations concerning the Frankses were with Mr. Franks only. For their part, the Fioris and Mr. Franks would assign to Wang any claim or cause of action they had against their insurance carriers, Allstate and NJM, and any agents of those carriers. In consideration for the assignments, Wang agreed to forbear from execution on the consent judgment and, upon conclusion or settlement of her suit as assignee against the insurance carriers, she would provide the Fioris and Mr. Franks with a warrant for satisfaction of the judgment.\\nIn March 1987, Ronald Fiori, his wife, Theresa, and their son, Richard (an additional insured under the Allstate homeowner's policy), executed separate assignments to Wang, for all claims, demands and causes of action against Allstate and its agent. Each assignment describes the acts of Allstate and its agent as\\ninclud[ing] their willful, wanton and intentional violation of my rights under a policy issued for protection from personal liability for damages arising from an occurrence, including a failure to provide appropriate, adequate and professional advice and counsel relating to the terms of renewal of the insurance policy issued to me for coverage on my home, including liability for negligent acts of me and my family, and for the failure to properly counsel and advise regarding the need or advisability to increase liability coverage limits and the failure to put my interest, as the policyholder and client, ahead of their own self-interest; which actions were unreasonable, wrongful, negligent, a breach of duty, a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a breach of fiduciary duty, and resulted unnecessarily in uninsured exposure, and underinsured status, and potential personal liability to me[.]\\nEach assignment incorporates the terms of the settlement. In addition, each of the Fioris agreed to cooperate\\nas reasonably may be required of me in any case which may be brought by Ms. Wang involving said insurance coverage; said cooperation includes testifying at deposition and/or trial, but is not limited solely to those facets of cooperation.\\nOn April 8, 1987, Mr. Franks signed an identical assignment.\\nAll the settlement negotiations culminating in the execution of the assignments in March and April 1987 were conducted without the knowledge of Allstate and NJM or the lawyers who had been assigned by the carriers to represent the insureds. However, Wang's counsel and personal counsel for the Fioris and the Frankses decided that the terms of the settlement should be discussed in a conference before the court. Thus, on June 9, 1987, the attorney for Wang, private counsel for the Fioris and Mr. Franks, as well as counsel assigned by Allstate and NJM, who were of record in the Wang suit against the Fioris and the Frankses, appeared before the assignment judge to discuss the terms of the settlement. At that conference, the Fioris and Mr. Franks agreed to provide their respective carriers with a release of the covenant to defend and investigate. In return, counsel assigned by the insurance companies agreed to provide substitutions of attorney in favor of the insureds' personal counsel, who would in turn affix their consents to the proposed consent judgments.\\nOn November 19, 1987, Mr. Franks executed a release and indemnification agreement to NJM. Mr. Franks acknowledged in the release that NJM had fully and properly performed its obligations under the policy, and had retained competent legal counsel to defend him against those claims. He further acknowledged that NJM and assigned counsel had properly and fully investigated and defended the lawsuit and prepared his defense in time for the trial which had been scheduled for June 15,1987. The release contained a further acknowledgment that NJM and the assigned counsel had not been informed of the negotiations leading to the settlement or execution of the assignment until one week prior to the status conference on June 8, 1987. In consideration of the release, the NJM designated counsel executed a substitution of attorney in favor of Franks' personal attorney. Allstate did not obtain a similar release from the Fioris; nonetheless counsel assigned by Allstate to represent them apparently gave their personal counsel a similar substitution of attorney.\\nPursuant to the settlement, the court entered separate consent orders for judgment on March 4, 1988, against the Fioris and Mr. Franks, each in the amount of $600,000 plus prejudgment interest in the amount of $194,983.87, for a total of $794,983.87 plus costs. The orders provide that both judgments represent joint and several liability for the entire amount of the judgment for all defendants except Dorothy Franks. The record does not disclose the disposition of the case as to her. By separate order of March 4,1988, the court released to Wang the $50,000 deposited with the Clerk, together with any interest it may have earned.\\nII\\nWang, as assignee of the Fioris and Mr. Franks, filed a six-count complaint in the Chancery Division against Allstate, Metzger, NJM, and three fictitious parties, seeking reformation of the insurance policies \\\"to provide personal liability coverage limits in an amount sufficient to insure against personal exposure for the losses sustained by plaintiff.\\\" The complaint also seeks compensatory damages, attorneys' fees, interest, and costs.\\nThe first count identifies the parties and sets forth the facts of Wang's accident and injuries, and her lawsuit, the insurance policies issued by Allstate and NJM, and the terms of the settlement of Wang's suit. It further states that the settlement was entered into in good faith and that the amount of the consent judgments represent reasonable and fair compensation for Wang's injuries. It also alleges that when the Fioris and Mr. Franks purchased their insurance, \\\"it was their intention that their personal liability coverage carry limits sufficient to adequately protect them against exposure to personal liability for third party losses\\\" and that that intention had continued through each renewal, \\\"giving due consideration to the appreciated value of their homes, inflationary trends, and the increasing recoveries of tort victims.\\\" It further alleged that Allstate and NJM \\\"did not adequately protect the Fioris and Mr. Franks from personal exposure to liability and accordingly, did not provide the coverage intended by\\\" them. The complaint alleges that as a proximate result of that conduct the Fioris and Franks were exposed to personal liability for Wang's injuries.\\nThe second count is against only Allstate and Metzger and asserts that the Fioris relied on the knowledge and expertise of Metzger, \\\"who held himself out to the public as an insurance broker knowledgeable about policies of insurance and available coverage, and the amounts of coverage appropriate to insure adequate protection against liability losses.\\\" It then alleges breach of the following duty:\\nIn his capacity as an insurance broker, Metzger owed the Fioris a duty to advise them of the limits of insurance coverage necessary to protect their interests, including, but not limited to a duty to periodically and regularly advise them of a need to increase the limits on that insurance coverage in light of the appreciated value of their home, inflationary trends in the area, and increased recoveries being awarded to tort victims.\\nThe third count alleges breach of that same duty by Allstate. The fourth count asserts similar allegations concerning NJM. The fifth count asserts a breach of fiduciary duty, and the sixth count alleges a breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing.\\nNJM filed an answer, a third-party complaint against Mr. Franks for indemnification, and a counterclaim against Wang. Allstate also filed an answer.\\nIll\\nBefore any discovery had been conducted, Allstate, Metzger, and NJM moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. While the motions refer to Rule 4:6-2(c), they actually sought dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e). In response, Wang filed the certification of her attorney and the documents executed pursuant to the settlement. Pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), the court treated the motion as one for summary judgment.\\nDefendants' motion set forth three bases:\\n(1) plaintiff irrevocably released the insureds from liability, thereby terminating the insurers' obligation to pay; (2) the insurers had no legal duty to review and advise the insureds continuously as to the sufficiency of coverage; and (3) New Jersey law prohibits assignments of tort claims.\\nBefore the Chancery Division, Wang's .counsel argued that the form of settlement used in this case had been sanctioned by us in Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347, 443 A.2d 163 (1982). He described the alleged duty as \\\"simply at some point during the course of this insurance broker's relationship with the Fioris [he would] at least advise them there's inflation, verdicts are going up, you might at least think about increasing liability coverage on your home.\\\"\\nThe court found defendants did not have the duty alleged by Wang. Concluding that no prior ease had established a duty as Wang alleged, the court stated:\\nI don't find that there is decisional authority that supports that suggestion that the Court ought, on its own to create a new super duty applicable in these situations where there is an unfortunate tort that creates horrible injuries as apparently was the case with Miss Wang and for which, unless somebody like a court after the fact raises the insurance limit she will be left uncompensated for the injuries that she suffered. I say it's for a different and higher court to decide that this super duty does exist and the Court finds there is no decisional authority for its extant and declines to create it itself and on Point Two grants summary judgment.\\nAs a separate and independent basis for dismissal of the complaint, the Chancery Division also found that the irrevocable release granted to the insureds by Wang resulted in their having no legal liability to her, in effect discharging the insurance companies. It did not decide whether the assignment was barred as being an assignment of a tort claim.\\nThe Appellate Division reversed the judgment and remanded. Because it disagreed with the Chancery Division's conclusion on the two points decided, the Appellate Division addressed all three points defendants had raised. The court concluded that the assignment of the claims against the insurance companies, whether denominated tort or contract, did not violate public policy because the assignments had been made to a party who has been injured to the same extent as the insured by the insurance company's or agent's inaction, stating: \\\"In effect, the assignee is asserting his or her own claim to which has been added an assurance that the insured will not separately hold the defendant liable.\\\"\\nAlthough recognizing that Griggs involved the virtual abandonment of an insured by a carrier, the Appellate Division observed that an assignment similar to those used here had been used in Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Security Insurance Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A. 2d 864 (1976), in which the carrier had been found to have breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not considering an offer to settle for an amount in excess of its policy limit. The Appellate Division concluded that the conduct of the insurance carriers as ' alleged in this case was sufficient to authorize the insureds to enter into that type of settlement with Wang. It further concluded that that procedure did not violate the \\\"no action\\\" clause of the policy, which generally precludes suit against the carrier before the insured's obligation has been fully determined by final judgment or by agreement among the claimant, the insured, and the carrier.\\nConcerning the existence of the duty alleged by Wang, which the court characterized as \\\"[t]he harder issue in this case and one of first impression in the public liability area,\\\" the Appellate Division framed the issue as, \\\"whether at the time of the reissuance of a policy an agent has a duty to inform the insured at best generally concerning the inadequacy of the former coverage.\\\" It then observed that plaintiff alleged the negligence of the insurance companies and the agent in failing to inform of the need to increase liability coverage despite three factors: \\\"the appreciated value of their [homes], inflationary trends in the area, and increased recoveries being awarded to tort victims.\\\" The Appellate Division concluded: \\\"On the pleadings alone we cannot say that no duty exists under the principles of Rider v. Lynch, 42 N.J. 465, 476, 201 A.2d 561 (1964), Sobotor v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 200 N.J. Super. 333, 341, 491 A.2d 737 (App.Div.1984), and their progeny.\\\" The court recognized that the weight of out-of-state authority tended to negate liability, citing Hardt v. Brink, 192 F.Supp. 879, 880-881 (W.D.Wash.1961); Jones v. Grewe, 189 Cal.App 3d 950, 956-957, 234 Cal.Rptr. 717, 720-721 (1987); Gabrielson v. Warnemunde, 443 N. W. 2d 540, 544 (Minn.1989); Fleming v. Torrey, 273 N. W.2d 169, 171 (S.D.1978), but concluded that \\\"the issue should be determined here only on a full record.\\\"\\nIV\\nWe granted the insurance companies' and Metzger's petitions for certification, \\u2014 N.J.-(1990), and now reverse the Appellate Division and reinstate the judgment of the Chancery Division dismissing the complaint. We conclude there is no common law duty of a carrier or its agents to advise an insured concerning the possible need for higher policy limits upon renewal of the policy. If such a duty would be in the public interest, it is better established by comprehensive legislation, rather than by judicial decision. Because of those conclusions, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the insureds' hybrid claims against the carriers are legally assignable and whether the settlement terms, including the assignments agreed upon without participation by the carriers, violated the \\\"no action\\\" provisions of the policies. Nor need we address the effect of the terms of the settlement on the liability of the insurance carriers. Although the Chancery Division adopted as a separate basis for summary judgment the contention that the carriers were fully released as a result of the settlement, we express no opinion on that proposition. We therefore turn to the duty alleged by Wang.\\nA\\nWang's brief suggests neither that carriers or agents should be responsible for reviewing every insured's personal circumstances and on that basis make personalized insurance coverage recommendations, nor that carriers should provide coverage that will protect an insured against any eventuality \\u2014 an insurance policy \\\"without limits\\\" as described by one of the carriers. Nor does Wang seek to establish a new and expansive duty. Rather, she argues that defendants breached previously-recognized duties of care owed by insurance companies and/or their agents. She contends that\\n[insurance agents, who hold themselves out as having expertise in the area of insurance, owe some duty to their insureds to advise them of basic trends in insurance protection and to periodically advise them, in general terms, of the need to continually review the adequacy of their coverage as economic conditions change.\\nThe seminal case in this jurisdiction concerning a broker's liability to an insured is Rider v. Lynch, supra, 42 N.J. 465, 201 A.2d 561, in which we said:\\nOne who holds himself out to the public as an insurance broker is required to have the degree of skill and knowledge requisite to the calling. When engaged by a member of the public to obtain insurance, the law holds him to the exercise of good faith and reasonable skill, care and diligence in the execution of the commission. He is expected to possess reasonable knowledge of the types of policies, their different terms, and the coverage available in the area in which his principal seeks to be protected. If he neglects to procure the insurance or if the policy is void or materially deficient or does not provide the coverage he undertook to supply, because of his failure to exercise the requisite skill or diligence, he becomes liable to his principal for the loss sustained thereby. [Id. at 476, 201 A.2d 561]\\nThe duty ascribed to the broker in Rider was the foundation for the Appellate Division's decision in Sobotor v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., supra, 200 N.J.Super. 333, 491 A.2d 737, in which the court ordered an automobile insurance policy reformed to increase the uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage because of the agent's failure to have provided the insured with the \\\"best available\\\" package of insurance, as the insured had requested. In dictum the Appellate Division said: \\\"We see no reason why the duty owed by a broker to a client should differ from the duty owed by an agent. The difference between a broker and an agent lies in the duties and responsibilities owed to the insurance carrier, not to the insured.\\\" Id. at 337 n. 1, 491 A.2d 737. The Appellate Division concluded that a \\\"duty arises when there is a special relationship between the insurance agent and the client which indicates reliance by the client on the agent.\\\" Id. at 338, 491 A.2d 737 (emphasis added).\\nA proliferation of cases dealing generally with the duty of brokers and agents to insureds concerning UM/UIM coverage followed, the majority of which involved renewal policies. See, e.g., Walker v. Atlantic Chrysler Plymouth, 216 N.J.Super. 255, 523 A.2d 665 (App.Div.1987); Wasserman v. Wharton, Lyon & Lyon, 223 N.J.Super. 394, 538 A.2d 1270 (App.Div. 1988); Johnson v. MacMillan, 233 N.J.Super. 56, 558 A.2d 24 (App.Div.), rev'd on other grounds, 118 N.J. 199, 570 A.2d 962 (1989). Other eases address the duty in light of section 17(b) of The New Jersey Automobile Insurance Freedom of Choice and Cost Containment Act of 1984, L. 1983, c. 362, and other statutory requirements. See Dancy v. Popp, 114 N.J. 570, 556 A.2d 312 (1989), aff'g 232 N.J.Super. 1, 556 A.2d 331 (App.Div. 1988); Avery v. Arthur E. Armitage Agency, 242 N.J.Super. 293, 576 A.2d 907 (App.Div.1990); Sikking v. Nelson, 242 N.J.Super. 185, 576 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1990). But see Bruce v. James P. Mac Lean Firm, 238 N.J.Super. 408, 570 A.2d 1 (App.Div.1989), aff'g 238 N.J.Super. 501, 570 A.2d 49 (Law Div.) (agent has no affirmative duty to inform insured regarding UM/UIM coverage when insurer provides notice of availability of additional UM/UIM coverage by mailing of requisite statutory notices); Pinto v. Garretson, 237 N.J.Super. 444, 568 A.2d 119 (App.Div.1989) (agent not liable for failure to communicate directly with insured to recommend purchase of additional UM/UIM coverage where insured received the requisite statutory notice and specifically selected coverage options, and where coverage selection form clearly stated that insured should contact agent to inquire about higher limits of UM/UIM coverage); cf. Andriani v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 245 N.J.Super. 252, 584 A.2d 875 (App.Div.1991) (no duty to inform on renewal of an automobile policy with minimum UIM coverage when the trial court found insurer notified insured of coverage rights and options and plaintiff never requested \\\"the best insurance available\\\").\\nB\\nAlthough we agree with the Appellate Division that the record in this case is sparse, it is not \\\"devoid of any factual references other than those asserted in the pleadings by plaintiff.\\\" The record includes the settlement documents and the certification of Wang's counsel. Both the Appellate Division and we review the matter on the record made before the Chancery Division. While discovery had not yet begun when the motion was made, plaintiff responded with matters outside the pleadings which were not excluded by the court and the motion then became one for summary judgment. Hence, our review proceeds as one of a motion for summary judgment. See Rule 4:6-2(e).\\nThe question of whether a duty exists is a matter of law properly decided by the court, not the jury, and is largely a question of fairness or policy. Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 529, 538 A.2d 346 (1988). \\\"The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solutions.\\\" Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984); accord Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291 (1962). Of course, the legal determination of the existence of a duty may differ, depending on the facts of the case.\\nWe do not doubt that the principles of Sobotor and its progeny dealing with UM/UIM coverage may be applied to public liability coverage in a homeowner's policy. Nor do we exclude the possibility that there might be a set of circumstances under which the duty alleged in this case would arise, based on the \\\"special relationship\\\" found in the Sobotor case. However, in this case, no allegations of special relationship were contained in plaintiff's complaint, the assignments themselves, or the certification of Wang's counsel. As the Appellate Division noted, the assignment described the insurance carriers' dereliction as \\\"[fjailure to provide appropriate, adequate and professional advice and counsel relating to the terms of renewal of the insurance policy . and for the failure to properly counsel and advise regarding the need or advisability to increase liability coverage limits.\\\"\\nIn her complaint, Wang alleged that the duty breached by the insurers required them \\\"to periodically and regularly advise [the insureds] of a need to increase the limits of [their] insurance coverage in light of the appreciated value of their home[s], inflationary trends in the area, and increased recoveries being awarded to tort victims.\\\" In the certification of Wang's counsel, he simply reiterated the hearsay statements he had been told by the Fioris and Mr. Franks. Hence the certification provides no evidence to support the allegations. See Murray v. Allstate Ins. Co., 209 N.J.Super. 163, 169, 507 A.2d 247 (App. Div.1986) (affidavits must be limited to the affiant's personal knowledge of such facts as to which he is competent to testify and are admissible in evidence). R. 1:6-6.\\nThe assignments required the Fioris and Mr. Franks to cooperate with plaintiff in maintaining her claim against the insurance companies. Neither the Fioris nor Mr. Franks, however, submitted an affidavit setting forth the circumstances under which their homeowners' policies had been renewed prior to February 3, 1983. They presented nothing to show the existence of any special relationship, such as that found to be a significant factor in the imposition of liability in the UM/UIM cases. Nor was the report of any expert presented to the Chancery Division, notwithstanding counsel's representation at oral argument before that court that evidence in the form of expert opinion could be presented. Plaintiff had every opportunity to submit any factual matters or expert opinion in defense against the motion, or to ask for additional time to present such material. See R. 4:6-2, R. 4:46-5(a). The absence of any affidavits from the insureds, as well as the statements attributed to them in counsel's certification, suggest there was no special relationship; rather that the policies had been routinely renewed, probably without any contact between the parties other than the issuance and receipt of the new policy and the issuance and payment of an invoice.\\nAccepting as true all the allegations in the pleadings, the statements in the assignments, and even the hearsay certification of Wang's counsel concerning the Fioris and Mr. Franks, we are left with the naked contention that when their homeowners' policies were renewed for the period including February 3, 1983, the day Wang was injured, Mr. Metzger and NJM had a duty to inform their insureds that $25,000 was inadequate to protect their assets from potential personal injury or property damage claims because of the appreciated value of their homes, inflationary trends in the area, and increased recoveries being awarded to tort victims. On the record in this case we are not prepared to find as a matter of law that insurance companies and their agents have such a duty.\\nThat is not to say that a sound basis for the creation of such a duty may not be stated. We disagree with the insurers' contention at oral argument before us that fulfillment of such a duty would be impossible or even substantially inconvenient. In the present age of automation, a form of notice could certainly be generated and sent to an insured with the notice of renewal of his policy suggesting that the limits contained in the existing policy may be inadequate in light of inflation or other economic or social factors. In fact, such a notice would probably represent sound business practice. For example, in this case, the Fioris' policy had been in effect since 1963, when they purchased their home. Presumably, the fire and extended coverage portion of the homeowner's policy issued in 1963 was based on the purchase price of $17,500. The record does not reveal whether that coverage had been increased over the intervening years to reflect the obvious inflationary increase in the value of the home. In response to our inquiry at oral argument, counsel for Allstate told us that if the insurance company automatically increased fire and extended coverage limits, or suggested that insureds do so, that was because that coverage was based on market value coverage. However, if notice of such an increase in fire and extended coverage can readily be given to the insured, either as an accomplished fact or for an insured's decision to purchase, we see no reason why a similar notice could not be given with respect to personal-liability coverage. We recognize that insurance agents and their companies are not necessarily experts in the economy, and it may also be fair to say, as argued by the insurers, that any consumer is, or should be, aware of inflationary factors that have come to bear on all consumer products. However, an insurance company may be in a better position to relate those factors to insurance coverage than is the insured.\\nThe difficulty, however, with finding a duty to give such notice in the setting of a lawsuit, after the insured has become exposed beyond the policy limits is obvious. Initially, insurance companies have not been alerted to the existence of such a duty by prior case law or legislation so as to factor such a risk into premiums. Rider, Sobotor, and the many succeeding cases all deal with first-party UM/UIM coverage, not third-party liability coverage in a homeowner's policy. Furthermore, in those cases there usually was evidence of a special relationship, either in the form of an inquiry or request by the insured or a specific representation by the agent or broker. There is no such evidence in this case.\\nMoreover, the more recent UM/UIM cases consider statutory and regulatory dictates such as N.J.S.A. 39:6A-23 and N.J.A. C. 11:3-15.1 to 15.11 requiring insurance companies, brokers, and agents to provide written notice, a buyer's guide, and coverage selection forms for new automobile insurance, and N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1, requiring minimum UM coverage and providing for increased coverage for UM/UIM as an option. We note that N.J.A. C. 11:3-15.6, establishing the minimum standard in preparation of the buyer's guide, requires that, after stating the required minimum coverages, the explanation of liability coverage must include the following:\\nHigher limits of liability coverages are available at relatively low cost. If you cause an accident and don't have enough insurance to cover your legal responsibilities, you then are personally responsible and could lose some of your assets or spend years paying this debt.\\nThere is no comparable statutory duty to notify or provide a buyer's guide or coverage selection form for a homeowner's policy. Of course, the Legislature could create such a duty. For example, N.J.S.A. 17:36-5.29 requires every homeowner's policy or other policy providing comprehensive personal-liability insurance to afford coverage against liability for payment of any obligation that the policyholder may incur to an injured domestic servant or household employee or the dependents thereof.\\nFinally, it is difficult to fix the limits of such a proposed duty. The areas of potential liability are many and growing. Defining the scope of the duty would require us to address issues such as whether a broker or agent should be required to inform the insured of the availability of an umbrella policy to increase the coverage limits. Those and other difficult questions are best left to the legislative process. In that setting, such questions can be fully explored and debated with input from the public and the insurance industry before creation of such a duty.\\nY\\nWe reiterate that the many variables arising out of such a duty suggest that its creation and limitations should more properly be the subject of full adjudication or legislation. In the limited context presented to us in this appeal, we are disinclined, as a matter of sound public policy, to announce an absolute duty, henceforth to be adhered to by all affected insurance companies. See Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 142, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).\\nThe judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and that of the Chancery Division dismissing the complaint is reinstated.\\nFor reversal and remandment \\u2014 Chief Justice WILENTZ, Justices HANDLER, O'HERN and GARIBALDI, and Judges O'BRIEN, HAVEY and SHEBELI^-7.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/334254.json b/nj/334254.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3cac1ec25d26f85df407ebafb96b45ec8271cb89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/334254.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"334254\", \"name\": \"DWAYNE R. DICKS AND CAROLINE DICKS, PLAINTIFFS, v. NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE FULL UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION, DEFENDANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Dicks v. New Jersey Automobile Full Underwriting Ass'n\", \"decision_date\": \"1992-01-24\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"748\", \"last_page\": \"753\", \"citations\": \"254 N.J. Super. 748\", \"volume\": \"254\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:27:38.509295+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"DWAYNE R. DICKS AND CAROLINE DICKS, PLAINTIFFS, v. NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE FULL UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION, DEFENDANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"604 A.2d 239\\nDWAYNE R. DICKS AND CAROLINE DICKS, PLAINTIFFS, v. NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE FULL UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION, DEFENDANT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Law Division Union County\\nDecided January 24, 1992.\\nAndrew V. Clark {Seaman, Clark, Addy & Clark, Esqs.), for plaintiffs.\\nSteven H. Isaacson {Isaacson, Dougherty & Zirulnik, Esqs.), for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"1745\", \"char_count\": \"10787\", \"text\": \"MENZA, J.S.C.\\nThe question presented in this case is whether the trial judge or an arbitrator decides the issue of whether an insured has met the verbal threshold where the insured seeks arbitration under the uninsured motorist (UM) provision of his policy.\\nThere are no New Jersey cases which have decided this issue.\\nThe facts are these:\\nPlaintiff was injured as a result of an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist. He now seeks, by way of an Order to Show Cause, to compel defendant to arbitrate his claim under the UM provision of his policy. Defendant refuses to arbitrate contending that the plaintiff has failed to meet the verbal threshold.\\nThe policy provides:\\nWe do not provide coverage under this endorsement for property damage or bodily injury sustained by any person:\\n2. For non-economic loss for bodily injury caused by an accident involving an uninsured motor vehicle unless that person has sustained an injury or incurred the medical expenses described under the tort option that applies in accordance with the NJ no-fault law.\\nThe policy also provides:\\nIf we and a covered person do not agree:\\n1) whether that person is legally entitled to recover damages under this endorsement; or\\n2) as to the amount of damages; either party may make a written demand for arbitration.\\nDefendant refuses to arbitrate arguing that the issue of whether the insured has met the verbal threshold is an issue of law which must be resolved by the courts before arbitration may begin. Plaintiff responds that New York law, the recommended reference for the interpretation of New Jersey law , as well as New Jersey law, holds that an arbitrator decides whether the verbal threshold has been met.\\nAt first blush the case law of New Jersey seems to indicate that an arbitrator may only decide the issues of an uninsured's negligence and that of the claimant's damages. In Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Schulz, 136 N.J.Super. 185, 345 A.2d 349 (App.Div.1975), the court said:\\n. the arbitration provision in the policy [is] to be limited to a determination of two fact questions, namely, the issue of fault and damages, (at 187 [345 A 2d 349]).\\nIn Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dierolf, 138 N.J.Super. 287, 350 A.2d 526 (Ch.Div.1975), the court reiterated this proportion.\\nThe basis for arbitration is disagreement as to legal entitlement to recover the amount of recovery. Based upon the holding of Schulz, this court interprets the term legal entitlement to be synonymous with the factual issue of fault. Arbitration of legal entitlement does not encompass consideration of a statute of limitation, (at 293 [350 A2d 526]).\\nAnd in Satzinger v. Satzinger, 156 N.J.Super. 215, 383 A.2d 753 (Ch.Div.1978), the court said:\\nThus, our courts have uniformly held that when the question of the insured's \\\"legal entitlement\\\" is submitted to arbitration, the only issues to be determined are \\\"the uninsured motorists negligence and the amount of damages.\\\" (at 220 [383 A2d 753]).\\nThis was emphasized by the court in Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Bovit, 142 N.J.Super. 268, 361 A.2d 100 (App.Div.1976) in holding that the existence of a \\\"phantom\\\" hit and run vehicle was an issue of coverage which had to be resolved by the court before arbitration proceedings could begin. The court stated:\\n. questions of coverage, even when depending for their resolution upon pure questions of fact, equally related to the concededly arbitrable questions of the insured's liability and fault, must be determined in a court of law, before the arbitration (if there is to be any) is to be commenced, (at 273 [361 A2d 100]).\\nThe Bovit case was distinguished in the case of Korshalla v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 154 N.J.Super. 235, 381 A.2d 88 (Law Div.1977), which addressed the question of whether the monetary threshold was a question for the arbitrator or the judge. The court said:\\nBovit held that questions Of coverage are not arbitrable under an uninsured motorists provision but must be submitted to a court. The issue of coverage was the hotly disputed one whether a \\\"phantom car\\\" existed at all. If it did, the provision applied. If it did not, the provision was unavailable to the claimant and there was nothing to arbitrate.\\nThis case is different. Here, the existence and liability of the uninsured driver is not questioned. The issue, rather, is whether the injured person could recover damages from the uninsured, for his claim against the insurer could be no better, (at 239 [361 A2d 100]).\\nThe court then concluded without explanation:\\nIf he did not meet the no fault dollar threshold, he had no right to recover against either the uninsured driver of the insurer. Thus, the threshold question was arbitrable and did not go to the invocability of the policy provision itself. (Id.).\\nIn Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Benson, 87 N.J. 191, 432 A.2d 905 (1981), the Supreme Court considered the question decided in Bovit. The court said:\\nThis court has never expressly considered whether the liability of a hit and run driver to the insured subsumes the issue of the existence of a hit and run driver, (at 194 [432 A2d 905]).\\nThe court overruled Bovit stating:\\nThe present case, however, does not present the broad issue of whether arbitrators can decide questions of coverage.\\nAs Justice Sullivan noted: [in the case of Perez v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 81 N.J. 415 [409 A.2d 269] (1979)]:\\nIt is difficult to see how the arbitrator could decide whether the accident was a contact or non-contact accident without deciding whether or not a hit and run vehicle was involved in the first place.\\nAs in Perez, we believe that the arbitrable issue subsumes the subordinate issue, whether a hit and run driver existed____to the extent that Bovit conflicts with our holding we overrule Bovit. (at 198-199 [432 A. 2d 905]).\\nAnd the court concluded:\\nA modern system of judicial administration should provide not only for the efficient disposition of cases within the judicial system, but also should contemplate alternative methods of dispute resolution outside the system. One such alternative method is arbitration. Just as we view piecemeal litigation as anathema, we also look with disfavor upon the unnecessary bifurcation of disputes between judicial resolution and arbitration, (citations omitted). Thus, our construction of the scope of arbitration clauses is consistent with the policy of favoring commercial arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method of settling disputes. (Id. at 199 [432 A2d 905]).\\nThis dicta is reflected in New York case law which holds that whether the insured motorist has met the statutory thresh old requirements is an issue properly determined by an arbitrator rather than a judge.\\nIn Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Eugene, 467 N.Y.S.2d 125, 120 Misc.2d 1065 (Sup.Ct.1983), the trial court concluded that a judicial determination that the insured had met the verbal threshold was not a condition precedent to arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim. The court stated:\\n. [T]he questions of liability and damage are questions for arbitration pursuant to standard uninsured motorist endorsements. The issue of serious injury falls squarely within the question of damage and would therefore be an issue for the arbitrator. (467 N.Y.S.2d at 126).\\nThe New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, reached the same determination two years later. In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cochrane, 486 N.Y.S.2d 915, 476 N.E.2d 314, 64 N.Y.2d 796 (N.Y.Ct. of App.1985), the court addressed the exact issue and the same UM provision presented in the instant case. The court first noted:\\n[There is] . no dispute that the agreement contained in the endorsement obligates claimant and insurer to arbitrate whether claimant is legally entitled to recover damages, and the amount of payment. (486 N. Y.S.2& at 916 [476 N.E.2d at 315]).\\nIt then concluded:\\nAn agreement to arbitrate legal entitlement to recover damages \\\"is at least as encompassing as a broad arbitration clause.\\\" (citations omitted). To require that the courts determine \\\"serious injury\\\" notwithstanding the broadly worded formulation of the endorsement is to involve them in the merits of the claim . and runs counter to the Legislature's purpose to reduce significantly the burden of automobile personal injury litigation upon the courts. (Id), (citations omitted).\\nThis court is cognizant of the fact that there is a split of authority on whether issues other than liability and damages may be decided by an arbitration. (See generally \\\"What issues are arbitrable under the arbitration provision of the uninsured motorist insurance.\\\" 29 A.L.R.Zd 328 (1970). Some commentators, for example, believe that \\\"it is the better position that coverage questions are to be determined by the court and not arbitration.\\\" Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law (1982), \\u00a7 50:175 at 283). Undoubtedly, this argument has validity in standard contract cases. But since the thrust of no fault legislation is to reduce significantly the burden of automobile personal injury litigation upon the courts, it would seem that in order to effectuate this purpose, that questions regarding the verbal threshold would be better decided by the arbitrator.\\nThis court is also aware of the Governor's message which specifically states that the verbal threshold question is a question to be decided by the court.\\nWhether a plaintiff has sustained a \\\"serious injury\\\" must be decided by the court and not the jury. Otherwise, the bill's essential purpose of closing the court house door to all lawsuits except those involving bona fide serious injuries will be diluted and the bill's effectiveness will be greatly diminished. (Governor's Reconsideration and Recommendation Statement to the Senate, No. 2637, L. 1988 c. 119).\\nThis statement relating to legal actions and not arbitration, is itself an important vehicle to effect the \\\"closing [of] the court house door\\\" to persons without serious injury.\\nThe rationale of the New York cases makes sense and the dicta of the Supreme Court in Ohio Casualty strongly suggests its application in New Jersey. Under the circumstances, this court concludes that whether the verbal threshold is met is a question to be decided by the arbitrator and not by a judge. The parties must therefore proceed to arbitration in accordance with the policy.\\nSee Governor's Reconsideration and Recommendation Statement to the Senate, No. 2637, L.1988 c. 119.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/334330.json b/nj/334330.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..62f286b0194e1c0402281b4d661aff3589542018
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/334330.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"334330\", \"name\": \"HAROLD O. BOUCHER v. MARTIN J. DRUKER\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Boucher v. Druker\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-05-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"255\", \"last_page\": \"255\", \"citations\": \"81 N.J. 255\", \"volume\": \"81\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:10:27.055218+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"HAROLD O. BOUCHER v. MARTIN J. DRUKER.\", \"head_matter\": \"HAROLD O. BOUCHER v. MARTIN J. DRUKER.\\nMay 1, 1979.\", \"word_count\": \"14\", \"char_count\": \"87\", \"text\": \"Petition for certification denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/337297.json b/nj/337297.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..12e66794e7bc0fe3c9755cdf460f530c77b4d3d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/337297.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"337297\", \"name\": \"COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"County of Gloucester v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1992-04-29\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"143\", \"last_page\": \"154\", \"citations\": \"256 N.J. Super. 143\", \"volume\": \"256\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:24:22.547018+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"606 A.2d 843\\nCOUNTY OF GLOUCESTER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued March 18, 1992\\nDecided April 29, 1992.\\nBefore Judges KING, DREIER, and GRUCCIO.\\nEugene P. Chell argued the cause for appellant (Eugene P. Chell, on the brief).\\nPatricia T. Leuzzi, Deputy Attorney General argued the cause for the cause for respondents (Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General, attorney; Patricia T. Leuzzi, on the letter brief).\\nW. Randall Bush, Assistant County Counsel, Morris County argued the cause amicus curiae (W. Randall Bush, on the brief).\", \"word_count\": \"3676\", \"char_count\": \"22394\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nDREIER, J.A.D.\\nThe County of Gloucester here seeks to compel the Governor of the State of New Jersey and the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections to increase the per diem reimbursement rate for State prisoners housed in the Gloucester County Jail. The County of Morris has intervened as amicus curiae, claiming that the same underpayment exists in Morris County, and that the problems of overcrowding and underpayment is pervasive throughout the State. Alternatively, plaintiff contends that the State prisoners in excess of the 20 prisoners that the Gloucester County is contractually bound to house (40 in Morris County), should be removed from the county jail. Originally this action was filed in the Law Division by a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs, but the State successfully moved to transfer this matter to the Appellate Division. The County here pursues both its primary action transferred to the Appellate Division and an appeal from the order of transfer, contending that the matter properly should have been heard in the Law Division so that a more complete record could have been made. We have consolidated these appeals.\\nIn 1981 former Governor Byrne issued Executive Order No. 106 declaring a Statewide emergency due to over-crowded conditions in the correctional institutions of the State, and authorizing the Commissioner of Corrections to house State prisoners in county jails. The early history of the order and its renewals has been thoroughly explored in Worthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J. 183, 440 A.2d 1128 (1982) (upholding the emergency order), and Shapiro v. Fauver, 193 N.J.Super. 237, 473 A.2d 112 (App.Div.1984), certif. denied sub nom., Shapiro v. Albanese, 97 N.J. 668, 483 A.2d 186 (1984) (where presuming the validity of the emergency orders through 1983, the court, over a strong dissent by Judge Joelson, upheld the appropriateness of the amount of reimbursement established by the Commissioner). Suffice it to say that throughout the administrations of Governor Byrne, Governor Kean and Governor Florio, 16 successive emergency declarations have been entered by Executive Order, culminating in the current Executive Order No. 52 entered January 17, 1992.\\nThe level of reimbursement was raised from $42.95 per prisoner per day to $45 for the 1985 fiscal year. Notwithstanding the County's assertion of escalating costs, there has been no increase in the reimbursement rate in the past seven years. In sworn testimony in a federal action involving Camden County, the Commissioner stated that the average cost for housing State prisoners in 1989 was approximately $63 per inmate. In his letter to this court he estimates the per diem cost at $50 per day, explaining that the discrepancy in the figures stems from the inclusion in the $63 figure of \\\"costs for treatment, education and care programs which are provided at the State level which are not, in many instances, being provided at the county level.\\\"\\nThe County contends that whatever the costs may be for housing State prisoners in a State facility, the proper measure of support should be the cost of maintaining the prisoner in the particular county facility. It is the difference between the level of reimbursement and cost of maintaining the prisoners in the county jail that is being borne by the county taxpayers. Furthermore, since each county has a different tax base to defray such costs, the burden is unequally spread among the counties and their taxpayers. The County has been provided with the State's own figures for housing prisoners in the various State facilities during 1990. They vary from a low of $51.46 to a high of $86.32 per prisoner, and average $66.49. The Morris County amicus brief represents that the United States Marshall's Service agreed as of October 1, 1991 to reimburse Morris County for federal prisoners housed in the Morris County Jail at the rate of $65 per day.\\nThere is no question that there is a significant problem of over-crowding in all of the State and county facilities. When Gloucester County built its jail 10 years ago it was designed to hold 104 prisoners. Since then it has been ordered to double-up the prisoners and to convert additional space to housing, raising its capacity to 225 prisoners. It is still over-crowded and the jail population is constantly subject to orders reducing the jail time of offenders because of a lack of space. The County therefore seeks removal of 55 State prisoners. Morris County has similar problems. Its jail is operating at 211% of its capacity, including 101 State prisoners, 61 more than the 40 the County is contractually bound to house. It estimates the actual cost of housing its jail population at $88 per inmate per day, for which it is reimbursed at the $45 rate.\\nThe State urges that there still is an emergency. When the original Executive Order took effect in June 1981, the State Prison system held 7,637 prisoners, including 569 juveniles and 470 prisoners in County facilities. According to the last available statistics for July 1991, the total inmate population had risen to 23,111, including 678 juveniles and 3,430 prisoners held in county facilities. The State intake therefore has risen threefold over this ten-year period. To accommodate this increase the State has constructed new prisons and has tripled its own capacity, yet its continued reliance on county facilities wherein the number of State prisoners has also tripled, has caused the county jails throughout the State to be operating at an average of 167% of capacity (utilizing March 1990 figures). State prisons, however, operated at 104.97% of their capacity in 1990, and are projected to have operated at 108.6% of their capacity in 1991. The 1991 State Corrections Report recommended additional funding to pay for the cost of State inmates in county jails, since the budget account for this purpose was in a deficit position as of the date of the report. The State cites the State fiscal crisis as a basis for its inability to do more to defray the cost of State prisoners in county jails.\\nThere are three principal points raised by these appeals. First, is the matter properly before us, or should it have been retained in the Law Division for the creation of a more extensive record? Second, is the State authorized to impose the housing of State prisoners upon the counties by the annual promulgation of an emergency order? Third, may this court grant any relief to the counties for the State's underpayment of per diem inmate costs?\\nWe affirm Judge DeSimone's transfer of the matter to this court. Under R. 2:2-3(a)(2) appeals may be taken to this court as of right \\\"to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer, and to review the validity of any rule promulgated by such agency or officer____\\\" Such review vests exclusively in the Appellate Division. Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 52, 362 A.2d 566 (1976). There is an exception to this rule where an additional record is necessary. Township of Monclair v. Hughey, 222 N.J.Super. 441, 446, 537 A.2d 692 (App.Div.1987). But as an alternative to our declining jurisdiction in favor of the Law Division or remanding to the Law Division for the creation of an additional record, we may, and in this case did by our order of May 9, 1991, grant a motion to supplement the record. At that time we permitted the County to provide documentation of its claims, and also authorized the Department of Corrections to submit a supplemental statement which was filed shortly thereafter. There is now a sufficient record before us to pass upon the questions presented.\\nThe action of the State in proceeding under successive Executive Orders pursuant to the Disaster Control Act, N.J.S.A.App. A:9-30 et seq., to remedy an ongoing continuing problem is of questionable validity. The Supreme Court traced the history of the Act in Worthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J. at 192-194, 440 A.2d 1128. The term \\\"emergency\\\" both includes the \\\"war emergency\\\" for which the Act was originally intended, (it was enacted during the Second World War), and also includes \\\"disaster,\\\" defined as \\\"any unusual incident resulting from natural or unnatural causes which endangers the health, safety or resources of the residents of one or more municipalities of the State, and which is or may become too large in scope or unusual in type to be handled in its entirety by regular municipal operating services.\\\" Ibid (quoting N.J.S.A.App. A:9-33.1(1)(4)). The Supreme Court noted in Worthington v. Fauver that the Act has been employed \\\"to handle a wide variety of crises, including storms, . energy shortages, . labor strikes, . factory explosions, . and water shortages____\\\" Id. at 195, 440 A.2d 1128. The Court held that the Act could be applied to authorize the Executive Order for housing of State prisoners in county facilities, since the \\\"problem of prison overcrowding in New Jersey has reached dangerous proportions, and that there is a substantial likelihood of a disastrous occurrence in the immediate future.\\\" Id. at 197, 440 A.2d 1128 (emphasis added). The Court later stated that \\\"[t]he statutory validity of executive actions pursuant to emergency power will depend on the nature of the emergency and the gravity of the threat to the public.\\\" Id. at 201, 440 A.2d 1128. But the Court also stressed the temporary nature of the order:\\nWe are particularly cognizant of the limited time span involved in these orders. The original order was to be in effect for only 90 days. As matters now stand, the order applies only until January 20, 1982. These time limits appropriately limit the exercise of executive power in light of the predictive nature of the emergency.\\nSince the threat of damage is extensive and the exercise of emergency power rather limited, it can hardly be disputed that the measures authorized by the executive orders are properly tailored to the magnitude of the current emergency.\\nId. at 202, 440 A.2d 1128.\\nIn Shapiro v. Fauver, after two years of \\\"emergency\\\" orders, the majority of this court assumed the continued soundness of the then-current Executive Order, and focused solely on the level of reimbursement. It determined that once the Commissioner had taken jurisdiction over the county facilities it was a matter of State discretion how much would be paid to the counties for State inmates. We there stated:\\nIn directing the Commissioner to formulate an \\\"appropriate\\\" program of compensation the Governor evidently chose to leave the entire question of how much the counties should be paid to the expertise of the department of corrections. If it was the Governor's intention that the counties should be fully reimbursed for their actual cost the executive order could readily have said so. Taking into consideration the fact that he did not direct such a result and the further fact that the counties were legally entitled to nothing in compensation for the emergency takeover of their jail facilities except what the Governor chose to allow, we cannot perceive any criterion by which the Commissioner's level of reimbursement could be other than appropriate.\\n193 N.J.Super. at 240-241, 473 A.2d 112. This court further explained that even if it was mistaken and the level was inappropriate, there was no judicial remedy available. Id. at 241, 473 A.2d 112.\\nJudge Jpelson in his dissent stated that he was \\\"of the opinion that in view of what may now be given the anomalous label of a 'permanent emergency,' it would be manifestly unfair and arbitrary to foist upon the counties the entire cost of maintenance of prisoners who normally should be the responsibility of the State.\\\" Id. at 242, 473 A.2d 112 (footnote omitted). In footnote 1 to his dissent, he restated his prophetic comment in his earlier dissent to the Appellate Division decision in Worthington v. Fauver, 180 N.J.Super. 368, 382, 434 A.2d 1134 (App.Div.1981), rejected by the Supreme Court when it reviewed that decision. He had there raised the \\\"distinct possibility that, after testing the judicial waters and obtaining our imprimatur on the constitutionality of his action, the Governor may decide to extend or later renew his Executive Order for another 90-day term and then for another and another, indefinitely.\\\" 193 N.J.Super. at 242, n. 1, 473 A.2d 112.\\nThe New Jersey Constitution (1947) provides that property must \\\"be assessed for taxation under general laws and by uniform rules.\\\" N.J. Const. of 1947 art. VIII, \\u00a7 1, para. 1(a). Robinson v. Cahill (I), 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 US. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973). The Supreme Court made it clear that a State function may not be delegated to the counties or municipalities where the burden falls unequally upon the taxpayers. Although the operation of a State prison system is not constitutionally imposed upon the State, as is the educational system appraised in Robinson v. Cahill, the State has assumed this function by statute. In fact, one of the principal departments of the Executive Branch of State government is the Department of Corrections N.J.S.A. 30:1B-1 et seq. The State certainly has the power to act by statute either to absorb the county jails into the State system or to require that county jails house State prisoners, with the State bearing the cost of their maintenance. As the Supreme Court stated in Robinson v. Cahill:\\n[T]he tax clause was not intended to say that a State function may not be delegated to local government to be met by local taxation. As we noted in Point I, local government is simply an arm of the State with respect to many State functions which the State decides shall be performed through local government. The tax clause does not restrict the State with respect to that decision. Rather it means that if the State decides to handle a service at the State level and to do so on the basis of a property tax, it must tax all taxable property in the State rather than only property in a part of the State; and that if the responsibility for the State function is assigned to local government, the local tax must fall uniformly upon all taxable property within the county or the municipality as the case may be.\\n62 N.J. at 502-503, 303 A.2d 273 (emphasis added).\\nOf course, under Worthington v. Fauver, if a true \\\"emergency\\\" exists the Governor may authorize the temporary takeover of county jail facilities by the Department of Corrections, with \\\"appropriate\\\" reimbursement. But as we noted earlier, the \\\"emergency\\\" as defined in the Disaster Control Act, including the temporary problem of overcrowding, may well not include a permanent or semi-permanent condition. This definition does not imply a vehicle to circumvent the general plan of the State's statutes governing the county and State correction systems over such an extended period of time.\\nJudge Joelson's fear of the Executive Order becoming a permanent fixture, stated as a possibility in his dissent to Worthington v. Fauver, and reiterated as a strong suspicion in his dissent in Shapiro v. Fauver, now stands before us as a reality. As the parade of annual Executive Orders passes before us, it is our function to state that \\\"the emperor has no clothes;\\\" there is no \\\"emergency.\\\" There is, rather, an ongoing condition that must be recognized by the State. County jails are bursting at their seams, partially because the State has not absorbed the prisoners who properly belong in State facilities. The State, by reason of its fiscal crisis or otherwise, has chosen to decrease the State's overall cost of corrections by forcing the counties to bear not only the physical overcrowding and its concomitant risk of violence, but also excessive and varying tax burdens caused by inadequate reimbursement. When the authority to do so through emergency action fails, it is incumbent upon the State to correct this situation.\\nNotwithstanding our recognition of this problem, we cannot and should not direct the State concerning how it should meet its obligations. Putting to one side the question of adequate reimbursement, which has the constitutional overtones noted earlier in the analogy we drew to the school funding case of Robinson v. Cahill, both the Legislature and the Governor are free to regulate the correction system according to law, without direction from the courts. Our function is to point out when legal authorization has been exceeded, not to direct what is essentially a legislative or executive remedy. Prisoners could be administratively absorbed in the State system; the county jails could be placed legislatively under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner; agreement could be negotiated for full reimbursement; or any other appropriate remedial action could be devised and implemented.\\nWe also realize that the action of this court cannot be expected to cause an immediate change in a complex and expensive system of county and State correctional facilities. Some considerable period of time for compliance must be given. Although we note that the initial Executive Order was for a mere 90 days, all of the recent orders have been for a period of one year. We therefore make our decision declaring that the State may no longer rely upon the ongoing overcrowded conditions in the State prisons as an \\\"emergency\\\" under the Disaster Control Act, effective as of one year from the date of this decision.\\nWe next turn to the question of the amount of reimbursement. As we noted earlier, this court in Shapiro v. Fauver determined that while the Commissioner had jurisdiction over the county jails, the reimbursement was a discretionary matter, since \\\"the counties were legally entitled to nothing in compensation for the emergency takeover of their jail facilities except what the Governor chose to allow____\\\" 193 N.J.Super. at 241, 473 A.2d 112. As Judge Joelson noted, however, each of the Executive Orders mandated \\\"an appropriate compensation program for the counties.\\\" Since the foundation of Shapiro v. Fauver was the continued effectiveness of the emergency declaration, and as of one year from the date of this opinion that foundation will have crumbled, bringing down with it the authority to pay the counties less than their actual out-of-pocket costs for maintaining the State prisoners.\\nAgain, we have no authority to direct an appropriation to pay any sums that may be due the county. We merely can declare that there is a legal duty to make such payment. The power and authority to appropriate funds is vested in the Legislative branch of government. N.J. Const. of 1947 art. VIII, \\u00a7 2, para. 2; Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483, 489, 479 A.2d 403 (1984). The \\\"ultimate legislative authority over appropriations is subject to checks and balances from the executive.\\\" Ibid. We must remain outside this process because \\\"[w]ith the ultimate constitutional responsibility for appropriations vested in the Legislature, and with executive responsibilities so clearly involved in the budget process, the judiciary has accepted its own absence of authority to compel either the Legislature to make a specific appropriation or the Governor to recommend or approve one.\\\" Id. at 490, 479 A.2d 403 (citations omitted); see also City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 149, 411 A.2d 462 (1980). While we may declare these rights, we do not wish to imply any judicial redress to overcome the Legislature's action or refusal to act pursuant to its constitutional power over State appropriations. City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. at 149, 411 A.2d 462.\\nWe also by no means wish to imply that we adopt the counties' cost estimates. For instance, when Morris County urges that the Federal Marshall's computation which calculates prisoner per diem costs as the total jail budget divided by the total prisoner days, we note that such a simplistic approach does not provide a marginal economic analysis. Certainly, the addition of a single State prisoner would not require any fixed cost adjustment if there is bed space available for that prisoner. The cost of heating would remain the same, the warden would receive the same salary, and most probably no additional personnel would be necessary. As the number of State prisoners increases, expenses not immediately associated with an individual prisoner's care (food, clothing, bedding and the like) begin to appear incrementally. Additional guards, recreational equipment, staff services or even coordinate programs necessary to supervise displaced county jail inmates would have to be reassessed.\\nThe State's present figure of $45 per day per prisoner might be too low, adequate, or even excessive. When the State adds prisoners to a county jail, it does not become necessarily responsible for a percentage of all jail expenses based upon a per capita prisoner ratio. The State may become responsible solely for the extra expenses foisted upon that county to house and provide services to the State prisoner. If the eventual solution to the county-State correction problem is legislatively or administratively resolved by the payment of the county's actual expenses, the State should be liable for no more than the actual costs it has imposed upon each county.\\nThe relief sought by plaintiff is denied. This matter is remanded to the Commissioner of Corrections for such future actions as may be necessary in conformity with this opinion.\\nOur cases abound with claims by prisoners that their enforced retention in County jails deprives them of work credits, recreation, psychiatric services, job training and other rehabilitation opportunities, and the like.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/351451.json b/nj/351451.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..92efc87ace8aa654e9031d6b6ca9286ab5bd6c3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/351451.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"351451\", \"name\": \"THE STATE, GARRET ACKERSON, Jr., PROSECUTOR, v. THE INHABITANTS, &c., OF NORTH BERGEN, IN THE COUNTY OF HUDSON\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Inhabitants of North Bergen\", \"decision_date\": \"1877-11\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"694\", \"last_page\": \"696\", \"citations\": \"39 N.J.L. 694\", \"volume\": \"39\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:47:55.659675+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE STATE, GARRET ACKERSON, Jr., PROSECUTOR, v. THE INHABITANTS, &c., OF NORTH BERGEN, IN THE COUNTY OF HUDSON.\", \"head_matter\": \"THE STATE, GARRET ACKERSON, Jr., PROSECUTOR, v. THE INHABITANTS, &c., OF NORTH BERGEN, IN THE COUNTY OF HUDSON.\\n1. In an assessment for benefits, it need not affirmatively appear that the commissioners took into consideration each fact and circumstance necessary to enable them to come to a proper determination.\\n2. Where lands of a prosecutor assessed are those contained in what, in the proceedings, is called plot J, and it appears from the evidence that the plot embraces other lands than those of the prosecutor\\u2014held, that the assessment could not be sustained on the ground that it cannot be known what proportion of the assessment is properly chargeable to the prosecutor.\\n3. This error is not remedied by the act of April 21st, 1876 (Pamph. Laws, 1876, p. 291); that act applying only to assessments properly assessed in the name of the right owners.\\nOn certiorari.\\nArgued at June Term, 1877, before Justices Dalrimple and Woodi-iull.\\nFor the prosecutor, William, Brinherhoff.\\nFor the defendant, John O. Besson.\", \"word_count\": \"790\", \"char_count\": \"4680\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nDalrimple, J.\\nThis writ brings up botli the ordinance and assessment for the improvement of a street in the township of North Bergen, in the county of Hudson. The ordinance was before this court in the case reported in 8 Vroom 402. The decision in that case set aside the whole assessment then in question. The ordinance remained unreversed. New commissioners have been appointed, and a second assessment made under the same ordinance. The prosecutor in this case questions as well the legality of the ordinance as the assessment. For the reasons given in the case referred to, and for others which might, perhaps, be suggested, it is too late to call in question the legal sufficiency of the ordinance. The writ, as to it, must be considered as dismissed.\\nAgainst the assessment it is objected that the report of the commissioners does not show that the amount assessed against the lands of the prosecutor is not in excess of the benefits conferred. An examination of the report will show that it expressly states that the lands assessed are severally and respectively benefited by said improvement, td the full amount levied thereon. This seems to be all that is required by the ruling in the case of Village of Passaic v. State, 8 Vroom 538.\\nIt is urged that the assessment is defective, because it does not appear that the commissioners took into consideration as well the damages as the benefits to prosecutor's lands, by reason of the improvement. The general allegation in the report, that the lands have been benefited to the full amount assessed, is sufficient. We have not been referred to any case which holds that, in an assessment for benefits, it must affirmatively appear that the commissioners took into consideration each fact and circumstance necessary to enable them to come to a proper determination.\\nAnother objection to the proceedings is, that due notice of the meeting of the town committee to hear objections to the commissioners' report and map was not given. The charter required ten days' notice. The construction is, that notice given on the 25th day of August, of a meeting on the 4th of September then next, was not a notice of ten days. I think it was according to the recognized method of computation in such cases. State v. Jackson, 1 South. 323; Den v. Fen, 3 Halst. 303; Gillespie v. White, 16 Johns. 117; Vandenburgh v. Van Rensselaer, 6 Paige 147.\\nThe lands of prosecutor assessed are those contained in what, in the proceedings and evidence, is called plot \\\" J.\\\" The evidence taken shows that plot \\\" J,\\\" properly surveyed and located, embraces lands other than those belonging to the prosecutor. The assessment against plot \\\"J\\\" is in gross. It cannot, therefore, be known what proportion of the assessment is properly chargeable against the prosecutor. I do not think the error in this assessment can be remedied by proceedings under the act of April 21st, 1876 {Laws, 1876, p. 291.) That act seems to relate to the apportionment of taxes, assessments, and water rents among subdivisions of a plot or parcel of land which has been properly assessed in the name of the right owner. If, however, that act, fairly construed, applies to the case before us, it does not matter because no proceedings have been taken to correct the case by making the proper apportionments.\\nThe evidence taken quite clearly shows that the'assessment against the prosecutor, in point of fact, is far in excess of the benefits derived from the improvement.\\nFor the two-reasons last above stated, the assessment against prosecutor must be set aside, with costs of printing case and making return to writ.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/351535.json b/nj/351535.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..09f1c7a1b6cbb088e3ae992d85f5f76db24eb92a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/351535.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"351535\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY (BY THE BOROUGH OF MILLTOWN), PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. DONALD L. MILLER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Miller\", \"decision_date\": \"1980-07-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"402\", \"last_page\": \"417\", \"citations\": \"83 N.J. 402\", \"volume\": \"83\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:24:46.118663+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY (BY THE BOROUGH OF MILLTOWN), PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. DONALD L. MILLER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY (BY THE BOROUGH OF MILLTOWN), PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. DONALD L. MILLER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.\\nArgued October 23, 1979\\nDecided July 8, 1980.\\nRobert J. Lecky argued the cause for appellant.\\nArthur H. Miller argued the cause for respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"3946\", \"char_count\": \"24759\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the Court was delivered by\\nCLIFFORD, J.\\nThis case questions the extent to which a municipality may constitutionally regulate signs in a residential neighborhood.\\nIn August, 1976 defendant, Donald L. Miller, placed a four by eight foot sign on the lawn in front of his home, located in a residentially zoned district of the Borough of Milltown. The sign contained the following message:\\nWELCOME!!\\nPROSPECTIVE RESIDENTS OF\\nLAWRENCE BROOK GLEN\\nTHIS RESIDENT AND OTHERS OF RIVA AVE.\\nWANT TO WELCOME YOU TO THIS\\nFLOOD HAZARD AREA.\\nGOOD LUCK!!\\nINFORMATION AVAILABLE.\\nDefendant was charged with violating section 20-9.1(a) of the Borough of Milltown's zoning ordinance, which permitted only the following types of signs in residential zones:\\n1. A decorative sign showing name or address of house or family, no larger than two square feet in area.\\n2. Signs advertising the prospective sale or rental of the premises upon which it is maintained, or signs identifying firms working at a site (one sign per firm), or indicating the future use of the site. Sale or rental signs shall be removed within one month after the new construction has been occupied. Maximum sign area per sign in square feet shall not exceed 15 per cent of the frontage of the lot along the street [which the] sign is to be locatedf,] measured in feet.\\n3. A sign erected by the borough, county, state or federal government.\\n4. Identification signs for and signs announcing events of churches, schools, playgrounds, parks and public utility installations. Total area of signs shall not exceed 25 feet in area on each lot.\\nSubsection 20-9.1(d)(4), which applies to signs in business and industrial zones as well as in residential zones, states that \\\"[a]ll signs with an area exceeding six square feet shall require a permit.\\\" The complaint filed by the building inspector charged defendant with erecting a sign exceeding six square feet in a residential zone without first obtaining a permit. The Borough stipulated that a permit would have been denied because the sign did not fall within any of the categories set out in Section 20-9.1(a) above.\\nDefendant was convicted in municipal court and again after a trial de novo in the Middlesex County Court. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the municipal ordinance violated the first amendment by absolutely prohibiting \\\"political and public interest expression\\\" and was unconstitutional as applied to this defendant's sign. 162 N.J.Super. 333, 339 (1978). The Borough appealed as of right under R. 2:2-l(a)(l). We now affirm.\\nI\\nThe goals of the Borough sign ordinance here are the maintenance of aesthetic charm in the residential neighborhoods and the preservation of property values. The Borough pursues these goals under the zoning component of the police power to promote the general health, safety and welfare of the community-\\nUnder early case law in this state, such goals would have been improper as beyond legitimate municipal powers. See, e. g., Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 287 (E. & A.1905); O'Melia Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Rutherford, 128 N.J.L. 587,591 (Sup.Ct.1942); Cooper Lumber Co. v. Dammers, 2 N.J.Misc. 289, 393, 125 A. 325, 327 (Sup.Ct.1924); Romar Realty Co. v. Haddonfield, 96 N.J.L. 117 (Sup.Ct.1921). The general rule was enunciated by the Court of Errors and Appeals in 1905: \\\"Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power to take private property without compensation.\\\" Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co., supra, 72 N.J.L. at 287, 62 A. at 268 (municipal ordinance regulating size and location of signs held invalid).\\nMore recently, however, our courts have acknowledged the value and importance of aesthetic concerns in municipal land use law. See United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 5 (1964) (prohibition of outdoor off-site advertising); Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 248 (1962), appeal dismissed and cert. den., 371 U.S. 233, 83 S.Ct. 326, 9 L.Ed.2d 495 (1963) (prohibition of trailer camps and parks in an industrial zone); Napierkowski v. Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 494 (1959) (regulation of trailer parking); Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 30 (1955) (prohibition of hotels and motels in residential district); Fischer v. Bedminster Twp., 11 N.J. 194, 204 (1952) (minimum lot size of five acres upheld); Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919, 73 S.Ct. 386, 97 L.Ed. 708 (1953) (minimum square feet for homes upheld); State v. J. & J. Painting, 167 N.J.Super. 384 (App.Div.1979) (regulation of signs in residential zone); Township of Livingston v. Marchev, 85 N.J.Super. 428, 433 (App.Div. 1964), certif. den., 44 N.J. 412 appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 382 U.S. 201, 86 S.Ct. 393, 15 L.Ed. 2d 269 (1965) (regulation of trailer parking); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Westfield, 129 N.J.Super. 528, 535 (Law Div.1974) (regulation of signs in business district); Farrell v. Teaneck, 126 N.J.Super. 460, 465 (Law Div.1974) (regulation of signs in residential zone); Klotz v. Board of Adjustment, 90 N.J.Super. 295, 298 (Law Div.1966) (regulation of height of front yard fences); cf. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106, 111 (1980) (zoning law designed to protect residents from ill effects or urbanization legitimate exercise of police power).\\nConsideration of aesthetics in municipal land use and planning is no longer a matter of luxury or indulgence. To the extent that our earlier cases may hold to the contrary, they no longer represent sound zoning law. The development and preservation of natural resources and clean, salubrious neighborhoods contribute to psychological and emotional stability and well-being as well as stimulate a sense of civic pride. We therefore hold that a zoning ordinance may accommodate aesthetic concerns. As has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court, consideration of aesthetics may be a legitimate pursuit of the police power of a state:\\nThe concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. [Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,33, 75 S.Ct 98, 102, 99 L.Ed. 27, 38 (1954) (citations omitted).]\\nAccordingly, we have recently recognized that the preservation of family-style living, the \\\" 'blessings of quiet seclusion' \\\" and \\\" 'refreshment of repose and tranquility of solitude' \\\" are legitimate zoning goals. State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 106 (1979) (quoting Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 223 (1976)).\\nConcern with aesthetics has been a subject of legislative activity as well. Among the purposes of Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -92, are the provision of \\\"adequate light, air, and open space\\\", N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(c), and the promotion of \\\"a desirable visual environment through creative development techniques and good civic design and arrangements\\\", N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(i). See Home Builders League v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 145 (1979). The conservation of property values is subsumed within the purposes of the Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a), (e) and (i). Home Builders League v. Township of Berlin, supra, 81 N.J. at 145. Indeed, at least one state court has noted that considerations of aesthetics and economics are intimately related in this context, Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 592 P.2d 728, 735, 154 Cal.Rptr., 212, 219 (1979), and that \\\"[t]o hold that a city cannot prohibit off-site commercial billboards for the purpose of protecting and preserving the beauty of the environment is to succumb to a bleak materialism.\\\" Id. at 748, 592 P.2d at 748, 154 Cal.Rptr. at 232. The California court went on to quote Ogden Nash:\\nI think that I shall never see\\nA billboard lovely as a tree.\\nIndeed, unless the billboards fall,\\nI'll never see a tree at all. [Id]\\nHowever, the injection of aesthetic considerations and values into the zoning law process is not without problems. See generally Williams, \\\"Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of Aesthetic Regulation,\\\" 62 Minn.L.Rev. 1 (1977). Nor is the power to zone based on aesthetics a limitless one. Cf. Home Builders League v. Berlin Twp., supra, (minimum floor area requirements unrelated to legitimate zoning purposes); State v. Baker, supra (zoning regulation limiting residency based on number of unrelated persons in single housekeeping unit unconstitutional). The case before us now is a fine illustration of the problems in and the limits to aesthetic zoning, particularly when it conflicts with beauty of a different sort\\u2014free speech.\\nII\\nThe only signs allowed in the residential zones here are those expressly set forth in Section 20-9.1(a) of the Borough's ordinance, i. e., (1) decorative name and address plates; (2) \\\"for sale\\\" or \\\"for rent\\\" signs, signs indicating future use, and signs identifying firms doing work on the premises; (3) signs maintained by the local, state or federal government; and (4) identification signs for churches, schools, playgrounds, parks, and public utility installations. Although the defendant was cited for erecting a sign exceeding six square feet without first obtaining a permit, in violation of Section 20-9.1(d)(4), it is apparent that the sign violated the provisions of Section 20-9.-1(a) irrespective of its size.\\nSo construed, and as conceded before us by the Borough, the ordinance precludes a residential property owner from communicating any other than an extremely limited message by the use of stationary signs on his or her property. In particular, the ordinance's restrictions on the manner and place of defendant's speech, so severe as to amount to an absolute ban on political speech, offend the First Amendment.\\nThe message on the defendant's sign concerned a matter of public interest. As such, it is political speech and occupies a preferred position in our system of constitutionally-protected interests. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115, 63 S.Ct. 870, 876, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 1300 (1943). As the Appellate Division here correctly noted: \\\"Political expression obviously includes any fair comment on any matter of public interest, whether or not the subject of an election campaign, whether or not embarrassing to the local governing body, and whether or not irritating to one's neighbors.\\\" 162 N.J.Super. at 338. Where political speech is involved, our tradition insists that government \\\"allow the widest room for discussion, the narrowest range for its restriction.\\\" Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 323, 89 L.Ed. 430, 440 (1945). As a result a regulation restricting the time, place or manner of speech will survive constitutional scrutiny only if it (1) can be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech; (2) serves a significant government interest; and (3) leaves open ample alternative channels for the communication of the information. See, e. g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771,96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830, 48 L.Ed.2d 346, 363-64 (1976). The governmental interest to be protected must be balanced against the effect of the restriction on protected activities. See, e. g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). In such situations\\nthe courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. [Id. at 161, 60 S.Ct. at 151, 84 L.Ed. at 165.]\\nDuring the last ten years many states have enacted statutes regulating and even banning signs and billboards as part of zoning laws designed to further aesthetics, preserve property values and promote traffic safety. See, e. g., Markam Advertising Co. v. State, supra (Washington State Highway Advertising Control Act of 1961) (cited with approval in Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310, reh. den., 429 U.S. 873, 97 S.Ct. 191, 50 L.Ed.2d 155 (1976)). The constitutionality of such statutes has generally been sustained where political speech is exempted from the ban. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, supra; John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, supra; John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., supra. But see, State v. Lotze, 92 Wash.2d 52, 593 P.2d 811, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 257, 62 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979) (ban pertains only to highway billboards, adequate alternative fora for political speech available elsewhere); Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. Baltimore, 279 Md. 660, 370 A.2d 1127 (1977) (ban encompasses only signs in limited section of city subject to urban renewal project). However, ordinances which exclude political signs from residential districts have uniformly been held unconstitutional. Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. den., sub. nom. Leipzig v. Baldwin, 431 U.S. 913, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 53 L.Ed.2d 223 (1977); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F.Supp. 949 (D.Haw.1972); Peltz v. South Euclid, 11 Ohio St.2d 128, 228 N.E.2U 320 (1967).\\nThe constitutionality of the ordinance here cannot be sustained. Significant First Amendment interests are at stake. Adequate alternative means of political communication are not available to owners who are precluded from putting signs and posters in their yards.\\n[M]eans of political communication are not entirely fungible; political posters have unique advantages. Their use may be localized to a degree that radio and newspaper advertising may not. With exception of handbills, they are the least expensive means by which a candidate may achieve name recognition among voters in a local election. [Baldwin v. Redwood City, supra, 540 F.2d at 1368 (footnote omitted).]\\nAs defendant points out, the most effective and least expensive way to reach his intended audience\\u2014prospective Riva Avenue home purchasers and his neighbors\\u2014was to place a sign in front of his house. While personal contact with neighbors might have been an alternative means of communication, even that would not be a realistic alternative for reaching prospective purchasers of homes in the affected area.\\nIll\\nBecause the ordinance so directly cuts to the heart of the First Amendment, we decline to perform judicial surgery or to adopt a narrow construction in an effort to save it. The ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. However, for the benefit of municipalities concerned with the impact of community aesthetics on zoning, we offer for guidance the following comments on the permissible scope of sign regulation.\\nAs noted below, some regulation of signs in municipalities may be permissible if within constitutional limits. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that \\\"[preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value.\\\" Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2295, 65 L.Ed.2d 263, 276, (1980).\\nTo withstand the strict constitutional scrutiny required here, the restriction on signs must be tied to a compelling municipal interest as well as to the uses permitted in a given zone. Schoen v. Hillside, supra, 155 N.J.Super. at 297. This is illustrated in a different context by Taxpayers Assoc, v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6 (1976), appeal dismissed and cert. den., sub nom. Feldman v. Weymouth, 430 U.S. 977, 97 S.Ct. 1672, 52 L.Ed.2d 373 (1977), where this Court upheld zoning of a mobile home park exclusively for the elderly. In that case Justice Pashman, writing for the Court, held that ordinances adopted under the zoning enabling act \\\"must bear a real and substantial relationship to the regulation of land within the municipality.\\\" 80 N.J. at 21. While recognizing the municipality's desire to satisfy the social and psychological needs of the elderly, id. at 28-31, we required the municipality to articulate tangible, specific objectives promoted by the zoning measure\\u2014there the unusual physical and economic needs of the elderly. Id. at 31. We then carefully examine the factual bases of the municipality's conclusion that reserving mobile homes for the elderly in fact served those specific ends. Id. at 33-37. See generally \\\"Developments\\u2014Zoning\\\", 91 Harv.L.Rev. 1427, 1456-57 (1978).\\nAs we have announced herein, preservation of aesthetics and property values is a legitimate end for a municipal zoning ordinance. However, to satisfy the analysis called for by Weymouth Twp., described above, the municipality must demonstrate more than a mere desire to preserve property values. It must show that the particular restrictions on signs in fact relate to the stated goal.\\nIn keeping with this analysis a municipality may distinguish between commercial and political speech in imposing restrictions on signs. See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949). Certain commercial enterprises may be excluded from residential zones, see, e. g., Pierro v. Baxendale, supra, and residents should therefore not be compelled to live with commercial advertisements in the form of signs publicizing those excluded uses. This distinction has been endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in Young v. American Mini Theaters, supra :\\nWe have recently held that the First Amendment affords some protection to commercial speech. We have also made it clear, however, that the content of a particular advertisement may determine the extent of its protection. A state statute may permit highway billboards to advertise businesses located in the neighborhood but not elsewhere . The measure of constitutional protection to be afforded commercial speech will surely be governed largely by the content of the communication. [427 U.S. at 68-69, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d at 325 (footnotes omitted).]\\nSee also n. 5 supra.\\nIt should be emphasized, however, that the regulation of sign content must be limited to a general distinction between commercial speech as tied to commercial uses permitted in a given zone, and political speech which is and must be permitted everywhere. Specific types of speech or particular messages may not be prohibited. Consolidated Edison Co. v. New York Public Service Commission,- U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). See also Mitchell Family Planning, Inc. v. Royal Oak, 335 F.Supp. 738 (E.D.Mich.1972); People v. Mobil Oil, 48 N.Y.2d 192, 397 N.E.2d 724, N.Y.S.2d (1979). However, they may of course be subjected to reasonable restrictions on their time, place and manner.\\nLimitations on the size of a sign may be imposed if the allowable square footage is not determined in an arbitrary manner. The size limits, if any, must be large enough to permit viewing from the road, both by persons in vehicles and on foot. Inadequate sign dimensions may strongly impair the free flow of protected speech. Schoen v. Hillside, supra, 155 N.J.Super. at 298. In the context of the Milltown Borough ordinance here, the limitation to six square feet imposed in Section 20-9.1(d)(4) is probably inadequate. See Baldwin v. Redwood City, supra (16 square foot limitation on signs does not offend First Amendment); Ross v. Goshi, supra (18 square foot limitation upheld).\\nOther restrictions commonly placed on signs include durational limitations, set-back restrictions and restrictions on the aggregate number of signs permissible on a given piece of property. See, e. g., Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, supra; Ross v. Goshi, supra. At least one court has held that no duration limitation on the posting of pre-election campaign signs is constitutional. Orazio v. North Hempstead, 426 F.Supp. 1144 (E.D.N.Y.1977). We are not faced with such restrictions today and specifically decline to determine their constitutionality, emphasizing only that restrictions upon the time, place and manner of signs must serve a significant government interest and be tied to the uses permitted in that zone.\\nAffirmed.\\nFor affirmance\\u2014Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices SULLIVAN, PASHMAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER and POLLOCK\\u20147.\\nFor reversal\\u2014None.\\nSubparagraphs (b) and (c) of section 20-9.1 are more expansive with respect to signs permitted in business and industrial zones in the Borough.\\nDefendant does not question the statutory authority of the municipality to regulate signs. Such authority is found when N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a) is read with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-65(a). Cf. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144 (1952) (municipalities have right to legislate on subject of billboards). In recent decisions under the Municipal Land Use Law, trial courts have correctly assumed that a municipality has the statutory authority to regulate signs. Berg Agency v. Maplewood, 163 N.J.Super. 452 (Law Div.1978); Schoen v. Hillside, 155 N.J.Super. 286 (Law Div.1977). See also Farrell v. Teaneck, 126 N.J.Super. 460 (Law Div.1974).\\nOver a century ago Henry David Thoreau gave voice to an aspect of this notion:\\nShall that dirty roll of bunting in the gun-house be all the colors a village can display? A village is not complete, unless it have [these] trees to mark the season in it. They are important, like the town clock. A village that has them not will not be found to work well. It has a screw loose, an essential part is wanting. Of course, there is not a picture-gallery in the country which would be worth so much to us as is the western view at sunset under the elms of our main street.\\nA village needs these innocent stimulants of bright and cheering prospects to keep off melancholy and superstition. [Thoreau, \\\"Autumnal Tints\\\" (Atlantic Monthly, October 1862).]\\nThis holding is squarely in line with the modern trend to recognize aesthetics as a proper basis for land use regulation. See John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 221, 339 N.E.2d 709, 718 (1975). See also John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F.Supp. 1272, 1278 (S.D.Me.1978); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. Inc. v. Hulse, 43 N. Y.2d 483, 373 N.E.2d 263, 265, 402 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1977); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash.2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed 393 U.S. 316, 92 S.Ct. 1126, 31 L.Ed.2d 512, reh. den., 393 U.S. 1112, 89 S.Ct. 854, 21 L.Ed.2d 813 (1969). See generally Annotation, \\\"Aesthetic Objectives or Considerations as Affecting Validity of Zoning Ordinance,\\\" 21 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1968).\\nPolitical speech may be distinguished from commercial speech, defined by the United States Supreme Court as follows:\\nOur pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political. He does not wish to report any particularly newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations even about commercial matters. The \\\"idea\\\" he wishes to communicate is simply this: \\\"I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.\\\" [Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1825, 48 L.Ed.2d 346, 358 (1976).]\\nAlthough commercial speech is protected under the First Amendment, there is a \\\"common-sense\\\" distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction and other varieties of speech, including political speech, and thus the constitutional protection accorded to commercial speech is less than is provided to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. New York Public Service Commission,U.S.-, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980).\\nThus, \\\"for sale\\\" signs, although commercial in character, may not be excluded from a residential neighborhood, see Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977), inasmuch as they relate to a use permitted in a residential zone. By contrast the commercial signs of contractors working on homes may be excluded in keeping with the analysis described above. State v. J. & J. Painting, supra.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/369005.json b/nj/369005.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e0cf8e52d07b937d04ea4e37fe9539e6f1afdbce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/369005.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"369005\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. ANTONIO VEGA, DEFENDANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Vega\", \"decision_date\": \"1984-11-27\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"448\", \"last_page\": \"454\", \"citations\": \"200 N.J. Super. 448\", \"volume\": \"200\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:05:20.855423+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. ANTONIO VEGA, DEFENDANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. ANTONIO VEGA, DEFENDANT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Law Division Criminal Mercer County\\nDecided November 27, 1984.\\nJanetta Marbrey for state (Philip S. Carchman, Prosecutor, Mercer County).\\nCharles J. Casale, Jr. for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"1637\", \"char_count\": \"10140\", \"text\": \"BARLOW, J.S.C.\\nOn June 10, 1984, at 9:05 in the evening, a Trenton police officer observed a motor vehicle being driven without its head lights on. The vehicle then made a wide left turn at an intersection, at which time the officer stopped it and requested the operator, defendant Vega, to produce his driving credentials. Defendant was unable to produce a license or insurance card and was slow in producing his registration. The officer detected an odor of alcohol on the driver's breath and in response to questioning by the officer the driver admitted he had several beers; his eyes were bloodshot and his pupils did not react to the officer's flashlight. He was ordered out of his vehicle and as he exited he was unsteady and unable to perform the \\\"finger to nose test\\\" requested by the officer. He was then placed under arrest, handcuffed and transported to police headquarters. At the scene of the arrest defendant was not given his Miranda warnings.\\nAt headquarters he was searched and a small manila envelope containing suspected marijuana was taken from his pants pocket. Defendant was then read the statutory requirements for the taking of a breathalyzer test, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2, and informed of the penalties that would be imposed in the event he refused to take the test. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a).\\nThese proceedings were recorded on video tape. It was clear at this point the defendant refused to take the test and informed the officer that he wanted an attorney. He was told by the officer that he had no right to consult with an attorney. Despite his repeated statements to the effect that he did not want to take the test, defendant was asked a number of questions from a standardized administrative form (apparently used routinely when a defendant consents to take the breathalyzer prior to the test being administered). Many of defendant's responses were inculpatory. In addition, defendant was required to perform several psycho-physical tests with incriminating results.\\nDefendant does not challenge the lawfulness of the motor vehicle stop, however, he contends that once he was placed under arrest at the scene of the stop, he should have been given his Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He further contends that at the police station, despite his repeated requests to consult with an attorney, he was required to answer questions and perform a number of balancing tests, all of which should be suppressed.\\nDefendant relies upon the recent decision in Berkemer v. McCarty, \\u2014 U.S. \\u2014, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (July 2, 1984), in which the United States Supreme Court held inter alia, \\\"that a person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he was arrested.\\\" The Court made it clear that the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda only arise at a road side stop when the treatment by the officer of the driver is \\\"the functional equivalent of formal arrest.\\\"\\nAs noted previously the stop in question occurred on June 10, 1984, prior to the decision in Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, which was rendered on July 2, 1984. Defendant argues that this Court should give limited retroactive application to Ber-kemer to the present case, as it was pending at the time of that decision, and therefore, suppress any statements or conduct engaged in after the defendant was arrested as he did not receive his Miranda warnings.\\nIn determining the question of retroactivity, this court must decide whether or not the Berkemer decision is a new principle of law representing a clear break with the past. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 2587, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). In State v. Gervasio, 94 N.J. 23 (1983), our Supreme Court adopted the clear break with the past test enunciated in Johnson. In Gervasio the court held that Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed. 2d 660 (1979), represented a clear break with State Constitutional adjudications and therefore was not required to be given retroactive effect. Relying on Johnson, the Court ruled that when a decision constitutes a sharp break with prior case law, prospective application of the new rule is required because of the \\\"reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards and [the] effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule.\\\" Gervasio, supra, 94 N.J. at 26.\\nDefendant contends that Berkemer is not a clear break with the past since the United States Supreme Court has long held that once a person is the subject of custodial interrogation, he must be given his Miranda rights. Accordingly, the decision in Berkemer is merely a reaffirmation of that rule in the context of a custodial interrogation following an arrest for a motor vehicle violation. This argument has a fatal flaw. The law in New Jersey, prior to Berkemer, clearly was to the contrary with regard to motor vehicle arrests. Our Supreme Court in State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1 (1970), held that \\\"absent contrary indication by the United States Supreme Court Miranda rules are inapplicable to all motor vehicle violations.\\\" Id. at 15-16. See also State v. Lewin, 163 N.J.Super. 439 (App.Div.1978) [statements obtained during police investigation at the scene and at police headquarters concerning circumstances of the accident and consumption of intoxicants held admissible]; and State v. Mann, 171 N.J.Super. 173 (App.Div.1979) [Macuk applied although vehicle was believed to be stolen and defendant was stopped for further investigation].\\nWithin the schema of constitutional adjudication, where the United States Supreme Court has not acted, our Supreme Court was entitled to make its own determination whether the-principles in Miranda would apply to motor vehicle arrests in this state. State v. Dilley, 49 N.J. 460, 470 (1967); State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 37 (1965). Indeed, certiorari was granted in Berkemer specifically \\\"to resolve [the] confusion in the Federal and state courts regarding the applicability of our ruling in Miranda to interrogations involving minor offenses and to questioning of motorists detained pursuant to traffic stops.\\\" \\u2014 US. at \\u2014, 104 S.Ct. at 3144, 82 L.Ed.2d at 326.\\nThe Court, therefore, concludes that the holding in Berkemer must be given prospective application only and does not apply to the present case.\\nIt should be noted that even if Berkemer were to be given limited retroactive application to the present case, defendant's statements at the scene of the stop, prior to being placed under arrest, are still admissible. The Court in Berkemer emphasized that motorist stops are temporary and brief in nature and commented:\\n\\\"the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop', see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), than to a formal arrest____\\nThe comparatively non-threatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not 'in custody' for the purposes of Miranda. [Berkemer, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 3150-51.]\\nJustice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the Court in Ber-kemer, made it clear that a single police officer asking a modest number of questions and requesting the performance of simple balancing tests \\\"at a location visible to passing motorists, cannot be characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrests.\\\" Id. at 3152.\\nThe defendant's final contention is that his statements and conduct at the station house should be suppressed as his requests to consult with counsel were denied, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.\\nThere is no question that defendant was not entitled to consult with counsel in order to make his decision as to whether he would take the breathalyzer. In State v. Pandoli, 109 N.J.Super. 1, 4 (App.Div.1970), the Appellate Division held, \\\"as a matter of law, defendant had no right to have the advice of an attorney before determining whether he would accede to the test, insofar as the sanction of revocation for refusal is concerned.\\\" Moreover, the breathalyzer test is nontestimonial in nature and therefore, does not involve the constitutional prohibition against compelled testimony. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). State v. Kenderski, 99 N.J.Super. 224, 228-29 (App.Div.1969).\\nLikewise, the nonverbal conduct which defendant was required to engage in, i.e., various psycho-physical tests, would not be subject to suppression as they were also nontestimonial in nature. Macuk, supra, 57 N.J. at 14.\\nIn addition to the breathalyzer test, defendant was questioned from a standardized form used in conjunction with the breathalyzer (this form has no statutory authorization). This questionnaire clearly elicited testimonial responses, a number of which were incriminatory: i.e., would be used against him in a subsequent drunk driving hearing. Therefore, once defendant in that custodial setting invoked his right to counsel it was improper for the arresting officer to ignore that request. Further questioning concerning the incident for which he was arrested should have been terminated at that point. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Accordingly, those verbal responses must be suppressed.\\nDefendant does not contest the legality of the seizure of the manila envelope from his person at the station since it was incidental to a valid arrest.\\nDefendant had recently been convicted of drunk driving and was facing a possible second conviction.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/375784.json b/nj/375784.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a63694b8ee47240c61155fa9721076ed7b25c9af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/375784.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"375784\", \"name\": \"PINCUS ROSENBERG, PLAINTIFF, v. D. KALTMAN & CO., INC., DEFENDANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Rosenberg v. D. Kaltman & Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1953-11-12\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"459\", \"last_page\": \"466\", \"citations\": \"28 N.J. Super. 459\", \"volume\": \"28\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:50:39.534527+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"PINCUS ROSENBERG, PLAINTIFF, v. D. KALTMAN & CO., INC., DEFENDANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"PINCUS ROSENBERG, PLAINTIFF, v. D. KALTMAN & CO., INC., DEFENDANT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Chancery Division\\nDecided November 12, 1953.\\nMr. Isaac C. Ginsburg for plaintiff.\\nMr. Milton Rosenkranz for defendant (Messrs. Walscheid & Rosenlcranz, attorneys).\", \"word_count\": \"1893\", \"char_count\": \"11540\", \"text\": \"Haneman, J. S. C.\\nThe complaint herein seeks a declaratory judgment under N. J. S. 2A :16-50 to declare the rights, status and legal relations of the plaintiff in connection with two certain contracts entered into between him and the defendant. The plaintiff desires to have particularly adjudicated the effect of two apparently conflicting negative covenants contained in each of said contracts.\\nThe defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint and the plaintiff has moved for a summary judgment.\\nThe question of whether the plaintiff's motion is premature is now academic, since under a stipulation, both motions were to be simultaneously considered by the court.\\nThe facts in connection herewith, as elicited from the respective pleadings and affidavits filed, are as follows:\\nOn or about July 1, 1937 plaintiff became employed by the defendant, which corporation was engaged in the wholesale drug business. On or about December 1, 1950 plaintiff became a sales supervisor for the defendant corporation in a so-called South Jersey division territory, consisting generally of the geographical sections recited in paragraph 9 of said contract. On that date he entered into a contract with the defendant corporation which provided, in part, as follows:\\n\\\"(9) \\u2014 It is further expressly agreed that in the event of the termination of this contract or of the employment herewith for any cause, the Employee shall not, in all the Counties in the State of New Jersey, and the counties of Philadelphia, Bucks, Montgomery, Delaware in the State of Pennsylvania and the county of New Castle in the state of Delaware enter into the Wholesale Drug Business or any branch of the Wholesale Drug Business then conducted by the Employer either as salesman, principal or agent, employer, or employee, officer, director or otherwise, directly or indirectly for a period of one year after the said termination of this contract or of the employment thereunder, or of any extensions, renewals or continuations thereof, as in the next succeeding paragraph hereof provided.\\\"\\nThereafter, on or about March 1, 1953 the plaintiff ceased to be a sales supervisor for defendant, but was employed by the defendant as a salesman in a less extensive territory than theretofore, and as more particularly set forth in paragraph 9 of said contract, post. On that date the said parties entered into a contract which provided, in part, as follows:\\n\\\"(9) \\u2014 It is further expressly agreed that in the event of the termination of this contract or of the employment herewith for any cause, the Employee shall not, in the Counties of Atlantic, Ocean and Cape May, all in the State of New Jersey, enter into the Wholesale Drug Business or any branch of the Wholesale Drug Business then conducted by the Employer either as a salesman, principal or agent, employer, or employee, officer, director or otherwise, directly or indirectlj' for period of one year after the said termination of this contract or of the employment thereunder, or of any extensions, renewals or continuations thereof, as in the next succeeding paragraph hereof provided.\\\"\\nReduced to its simplest statement, the plaintiff now contends that the negative covenant contained in the contract of March 2, 1953 is the sole effective covenant and that the said contract of 1953 supersedes the contract of 1950 in all of its parts.\\nThe defendant, on its motion, first alleges that this is not the type of action upon which relief can be granted under the above-cited statute, and second, takes issue with plaintiff on his construction of said contract.\\nN. J. S. 2A :16-50 et seq. is a remedial statute and should be liberally construed. ' There must be an actual controversy between the parties and the action must be adversary in character. The defendant argues that the plaintiff here has another remedy available and is seeking to \\\"bag in advance an imminent and impending law suit.\\\" Weissbard v. Potter Drug and Chemical Corp., 6 N. J. Super. 451 (Ch. Div. 1949), affirmed 4 N. J. 115 (1950). It alleges, in effect, that if the plaintiff conceives that he is not bound by the negative covenant contained in the first of the above referred to contracts, then he should obtain employment and upon a suit by the defendant, advance the argument now affirmatively advanced, as a defense.\\nThe difficulty with sustaining such a position is self-evident upon a consideration of the plaintiff's position. It is highly improbable that with the impending threatened law suit by the defendant that he could obtain employment elsewhere and then be accorded the opportunity of properly litigating tire contracts involved.\\nIt is patent that we have in the matter sub judice concrete contested issues conclusively affecting adversary parties in interest. It is an actual and bona fide controversy vitally affecting both the plaintiff in his future employment and the defendant in the conduct of its business in the delineated territories. The very briefs and arguments of the plaintiff and defendant demonstrate that the court is not here called upon to render an advisory opinion, to decide a moot case or to function in the abstract. It is therefore here held, in the light of the above-cited statute, that a \\\"justiciable\\\" controversy exists that is ripe for judicial determination. New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, 3 N. J. 235 (1949); Weissbard v. Potter Drug & Chemical Co., supra; Hungerford & Terry v. Geschwindt, 24 N. J. Super. 385 (Ch. Div. 1953), affirmed 27 N. J. Super. 515 (App. Div. 1953).\\nThe question of the reasonableness of the provision insofar as the period during which the plaintiff agreed not to engage or be employed in the wholesale drug business and the territory so proscribed has not been raised upon this argument. It therefore becomes necessary to consider the primary argument which involves the construction of the two contracts here involved.\\nThe remaining issue is comparatively narrow. The plaintiff argues that the second contract is inconsistent with the first contract and therefore replaces and revokes the first contract in tolo.\\nThe general rule is that a subsequent contract covering the same subject matter and made by the same parties, but containing terms inconsistent with the former contract so that the two cannot stand together, rescinds, supersedes and substitutes for the earlier contract and becomes the only-agreement on the part of the parties on the subject matter. Winans v. Asbury Park N. B. & T. Co., 13 N. J. Super. 577 (Ch. Div. 1951).\\nIt is primarily a question of the intention of the parties to be ascertained from the contracts themselves whether the earlier contract is discharged and superseded by a new contract. Lester Agricultural Chemical Works v. Selby, 68 N. J. Eq. 271 (Ch. 1904); Magna Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty, &c., Co., 129 N. J. Eq. 142 (Ch. 1941); 17 C. J. S., Contracts, \\u00a7 394, page 885; 6 Williston on Contracts, p. 5170.\\nThe terms of the second contract must be so inconsistent with those of the former contract that they cannot stand together. 12 Am. Jur. 1013. The parties may or may not, at the time of the execution of the second contract, agree to rescind all of the other provisions of the earlier contract. Whether they do this is a question of interpretation. Restatement of the Law, Contracts, sec. 408.\\nIt must be conceded that the two contracts here involved were made by the same parties. Plaintiff argues that there was an identity of subject matter, i. e., the employment of the plaintiff. He contends that this inconsistency in his employment status under the two contracts serves to revoke all the provisions of the first contract, including the negative covenant. Such a conclusion is erroneous.\\nThe employment in the first instance was as a sales supervisor and in the second instance as a salesman. The territory allotted to the plaintiff in the first contract was far greater in extent than the territory allotted to him in the second contract.\\n'Had the defendant continued the original provision against competitive employment in the second contract it might well have invalidated the entire covenant as being unreasonable in extent, since the proscribed territory would not then have been coextensive with that in which plaintiff was actually employed as a salesman. The mere fact that under the later contract the plaintiff was prevented from competing in only a portion, of the territory described in the negative covenant of the first contract does not, in and of itself, demonstrate that the parties intended to revoke the prior provision. The two covenants could have a concurrent existence, the first and greater to expire by its own terms one year after the date of plaintiff's termination of employment as sales manager, and the second, one year after the termination of his employment as a salesman. If there were any reasonable basis for defendant to require this protection in the original contract for one year after the termination of employment thereunder by reason of complete disaffiliation of the plaintiff with the defendant, there is no sound reason for imputing an intent to waive such protection from the fact that although the employment in one capacity was terminated, the plaintiff continued to be affiliated with the defendant in a limited capacity and in a limited territory.\\nIf the rationale of the plaintiff's argument were to be followed, the plaintiff would have been free the day after the termination of his employment as a sales manager and his re-employment as a salesman to have competed in the greater territory where he had functioned as a manager or supervisor. It would seem that the answer to such a suggestion is found in the mere statement of such a hypothesis.\\nThe terms of the two covenants are not so inconsistent that they cannot stand together.\\nIn addition, it is to be noted that the first contract provided in express language \\\"it is further expressly agreed that in the event of the termination of this contract or of the employment herewith for any cause that then the said plaintiff should not engage in the wholesale drug business in the described territory. Patently, the execution of the second contract and the employment of the plaintiff as a salesman terminated his employment as a sales supervisor and the provisions of paragraph 9 of the original contract thereupon became operative. The express words here employed meant \\\"for whatever reason\\\" the employment was terminated. A. Fink & Sons v. Goldberg, 101 N. J. Eq. 644 (Ch. 1927).\\nIt therefore follows, from the precise phraseology of the covenant itself, that the plaintiff's contention is without merit, and that the very verbiage of the covenant not only showed an intent not to revoke the litigated clause of the first contract, but actually caused, by the signing of the second contract, a termination of the employment of plaintiff, and the genesis of the negative covenant contained in said first contract.\\nIt is therefore here held that it was not the intention of the parties that that portion of the second contract describing the territory in which the negative covenant was to operate superseded that portion describing the territory in the prior contract.\\nJudgment will be entered accordingly for defendant on its motion.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/375854.json b/nj/375854.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ef5927263eb45dc5cd186fec8a7eb288b4176441
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/375854.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"375854\", \"name\": \"COUNTY OF CAMDEN, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE VOCATIONAL SCHOOL IN THE COUNTY OF CAMDEN, &c., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. THE PENNSAUKEN SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, A PUBLIC BODY POLITIC AND CORPORATE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"County of Camden v. Pennsauken Sewerage Authority\", \"decision_date\": \"1953-12-15\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"586\", \"last_page\": \"590\", \"citations\": \"28 N.J. Super. 586\", \"volume\": \"28\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:50:39.534527+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"COUNTY OF CAMDEN, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE VOCATIONAL SCHOOL IN THE COUNTY OF CAMDEN, &c., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. THE PENNSAUKEN SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, A PUBLIC BODY POLITIC AND CORPORATE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"COUNTY OF CAMDEN, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE VOCATIONAL SCHOOL IN THE COUNTY OF CAMDEN, &c., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. THE PENNSAUKEN SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, A PUBLIC BODY POLITIC AND CORPORATE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued November 30, 1953\\nDecided December 15, 1953.\\nBefore Judges Jayne, Euancis and Freund.\\nMr. Edward T. Gurry argued the cause for the plaintiff-appellant Board of Education of the Vocational School in the County of Camden {Mr. Vincent L. Gallaher, attorney for plaintiff-appellant County of Camden).\\nMr. Arthur W. Lewis argued the cause for the defendant respondent {Messrs. Lewis and Hutchinson, attorneys).\", \"word_count\": \"1157\", \"char_count\": \"7279\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nFreund, J. S. C.\\n(temporarily assigned). The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment for the defendant on the ground that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiffs in levying and collecting sewer service charges for the plaintiffs' institutions, while exempting from such charges the public schools and other public buildings of the Township of Pennsauken.\\nThe plaintiffs maintain within the Township of Pennsauken the County Detention Home and the County Vocational School, both of which serve the entire county, as well as some municipalities outside the County of Camden. Each institution is supported by county funds; in addition, the vocational school receives funds from the state and federal governments. Formerly, the Township of Pennsauken owned the sewerage system now owned and operated by the defendant, and for over 20 years furnished sewerage disposal service to the plaintiffs at a nominal charge. The Pennsauken Township schools and other public buildings of the township were not charged for sewerage disposal service.\\nIn 1950, pursuant to R. S. 40:1421-1 et seq., the Township of Pennsauken created the Pennsauken Sewerage Authority and conveyed to it the sewerage disposal system and 14 acres of vacant land, of a valuation of more than $2,500, 000, paid for by the taxpayers of the township. The Sewerage Authority is an agency of the Township of \\u2022Pennsauken and holds title to its property for the township. By resolution adopted on April 5, 1951 the authority formally adopted a schedule of annual sewer service charges for all facilities, and by resolution of February 19, 1952 it exempted therefrom the public schools, fire houses and other buildings owned by the township.\\nThe appellants argue that the resolution of February 19, 1952 was contrary to R. S. 40:14A-8(&) in that either no exemption should have been granted to the township-owned buildings or the same exemption should have been made applicable to all public buildings including the plaintiffs', and that, accordingly, the resolution was invalid as constituting an arbitrary discrimination.\\nConcededly, the sewerage authority was created by the Township of Pennsauken by an ordinance adopted pursuant to R. 8. 40:14A-1 et seq., and was thus constituted \\\"an agency and instrumentality of said municipality,\\\" R. 8. 40:14A-4(&). The legislation is not challenged, but the appellants argue that the statute indicates a legislative intent that all users of the same type, class and amount shall be charged substantially on the same basis and such charges shall be uniform for the same type, class and amount of use or service. Therefore, the appellants reason that the authority is not authorized to exempt the township public buildings while charging other public buildings, and that uniformity of application of charges would require either that all public buildings of the township be charged for sewerage service or that all public buildings be exempt from such charges.\\nHere, we have two separate public bodies \\u2014 the County of Camden and the Township of Pennsauken. The sewerage system was, and is, the property of the Township of Pennsauken, and its acquisition and cost was paid for by the taxpayers of that municipality, for whose benefit the sewerage authority was established. Prior to the creation of the sewerage authority, the custom of the Township of Pennsauken, in accordance with long-established municipal public policy, was to exempt its public buildings from sewer service charges. The appellants fail to show any contribution by the County of Camden toward the cost and operation of the sewerage system. While there is a dearth of authority in this State on the subject, the following is of interest:\\n\\\"Although at common law a public utility was under no duty to furnish service at free or reduced rates for public or charitable purposes, the view frequently supported is that discriminations in favor of the public are not opposed to public policy, because they benefit the people generally by relieving them of part of their burdens, and that, in the absence of legislation upon the subject, such discriminations cannot be held illegal as a matter of law. In a number of cases, therefore, it has been held that it does not constitute an unlawful discrimination for public utility or municipal corporations furnishing public service to give free service or reduced rates to or for public, municipal, charitable, or religious institutions or purposes.\\\" 43 Am. Jur., Public Utilities and Services 685, \\u00a7 174.\\nR. S. 40:14A-35 states that the Sewerage Authority Law \\\"shall be construed liberally.\\\" We think that when the Legislature authorized service charges and used the words \\\"as the sewerage authority shall deem practicable and equitable,\\\" R. S. 40:14A-8(&), that provision, when read with other parts of the legislation, conferred upon the authority an element of discretion in defining classes of customers and of services, and the rates payable by any class, as well as the authority to exempt township property from payment of sewerage service charges. The right of a municipality owning its own sewerage disposal plant to exempt its own public buildings from payment of sewerage disposal charges can hardly be doubted. Why should a municipality take money from its own taxpayers and with it pay itself for the disposal of its own sewerage? Gericke v. City of Philadelphia, 353 Pa. 60, 44 A. 2d 233 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1945).\\nThe appellants further argue that the action of the township constituted an arbitrary discrimination against them. It is obvious that the authority in establishing rates classified differently the township's buildings and the plaintiffs' county institutions. But such action was not unlawful discrimination, for the township's buildings are maintained by funds derived from the taxpayers of the township, while the county institutions, although located within the township, are for the use, benefit and service of not only the entire County of Camden, but in some instances municipalities outside the County of Camden. Ring v. North Arlington, 136 N. J. L. 494 (Sup. Ct. 1948), affirmed 1 N. J. 24 (1948); Lane Distributors, Inc. v. Tilton, 7 N. J. 349 (1951). Although the statute does not expressly provide for exemptions, we are satisfied that it vests the authority with broad discretion, and we see no abuse thereof. Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Board of Education of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 13 N. J. 172 (1953).\\nJudgment affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/377479.json b/nj/377479.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..90272880f936425f37ee167c29e6379713eaaba1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/377479.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"377479\", \"name\": \"IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF LUCY WEEKS, DECEASED\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re the Estate of Weeks\", \"decision_date\": \"1954-02-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"533\", \"last_page\": \"544\", \"citations\": \"29 N.J. Super. 533\", \"volume\": \"29\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:04:55.014268+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF LUCY WEEKS, DECEASED.\", \"head_matter\": \"IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF LUCY WEEKS, DECEASED.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued December 7, 1953\\nDecided February 5, 1954.\\nBefore Judges Clapp, Goldmann and Ewakt.\\nMr. Joseph J. DeLuccia argued the cause for proponents-respondents (Messrs. DeLuccia and A. Lawrie Young, attorneys).\\nMr. Arthur J. O\\u2019Dea argued the cause for contestant-appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"3397\", \"char_count\": \"19177\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nClapp, S. J. A. D.\\nThis is an appeal from probate. Contestant-appellant, testatrix' stepson, raises the three matters usually raised in such a case: undue influence, mental incapacity and improper execution of the will.\\nJohn Karl and his wife, testatrix' sister, are charged with exerting the undue influence. Mental enfeeblement had brought testatrix to such a state of dependency and reliance upon them in point of mind, as to create a confidential relationship between them and her. In re Hopper's Estate, 9 N. J. 280 (1952); Stroming v. Stroming, 12 N. J. Super. 217 (App. Div. 1951). This relationship, taken with other circumstances here, raises up a presumption of undue influence. In re Hopper, supra. Chief among the circumstances rousing our suspicions is that here is a will signed four days after the Karls had been enabled, through a hateas corpus proceeding, to remove testatrix by ambulance to their home from a nursing home, where she had been under contestant's custody. The will not only benefits Mrs. Karl but cuts off contestant, who was almost the sole beneficiary under testatrix' preceding will.\\nThis brings us to the question, what is the minimum quantum of proof needed to rebut this presumption. On this matter, in connection with all presumptions, there is, it is said, an \\\"intolerable confusion.\\\" Model Code of Evidence, p. 57 (1942). However, in New Jersey it has been laid down broadly that a presumption disappears as a factor in the case \\\"where there is an adduction of substantial evidence by way of contradiction or explanation.\\\" Meltzer v. Division of Tax Appeals, 134 N. J. L. 510 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Grand View Gardens, Inc. v. Borough of Hastrouck Heights, 14 N. J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 1951). Bearing in mind that in the Meltzer case the court was speaking of the review of an administrative determination, we infer that by \\\"substantial evidence\\\" is meant such evidence, as would \\\"justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict.\\\" Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U. S. 474, 71 S. Ct. 456, 459, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1950), and cases cited; cf. Model Code, supra, p. 310.\\nAuthority fully in accord with this general rule as to presumptions will be found in excerpts from the Model Code, supra, Rule 704 and 9 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), \\u00a7 2491, cited at length in Kirschbaum v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 133 N. J. L. 5 (E. & A. 1945). The rule was first expounded in ail \\\"epoch-making\\\" treatise (Hughes v. Atlantic City, etc., R. R. Co., 85 N. J. L. 212, 216 (E. & A. 1914)), Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 336 (1898). Eor the contrary views of Professor Morgan, see Model Code, pp. 57-60; 47 Harvard L. Rev. 59 (1933); 44 Harvard L. Rev. 907 (1931).\\nThere are other cases in this State which seem to bear out the rule stated. They hold that where a presumption is raised as to a fact, the issue over that fact will go to the jury \\\"only\\\" where the evidence thereon is contradictory or reasonably subject to contradictory interpretations. Nicosia v. Marangi, 13 N. J. Super. 550, 554 (App. Div. 1951); Coopersmith v. Kalt, 119 N. J. L. 474 (E. & A. 1938); cf. Schultz v. Hinz, 20 N. J. Super. 346, 349, 352 (App. Div. 1952); Venghis v. Nalhanson, 101 N. J. L. 110 (E. & A. 1925); Tischler v. Steinholtz, 99 N. J. L. 149, 152 (E. & A. 1923); City Bank of Bayonne v. O'Mara, 88 N. J. L. 499 (Sup. Ct. 1916); but see Wallace v. A. R. Perine Co., 113 N. J. L. 20 (E. & A. 1934). When the issue does go to the jury, the presumption has by then disappeared as a factor in the proceedings; indeed a presumption is not even to be mentioned to the jury. Dunn v. Goldman, 111 N. J. L. 249 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Kirschbaum v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 133 N. J. L. 5 (E. & A. 1945), supra, and cases cited; but see McCormack v. Williams, 88 N. J. L. 170 (E. & A. 1915). These cases, holding that contradictory evidence on the issue must go to the jury, dovetail into the entirely settled rule that where the evidence submitted by way of rebuttal of a presumption is uncontradicted, the court must direct a judgment on the issue contrary to the presumption. Gaudreau v. Eclipse Pioneer, etc.,, Bendix Air Corp., 137 N. J. L. 666 (E. & A. 1948). On the other hand, if the presumption is unrebutted, the court must of course direct a verdict on the issue in accordance with the presumption.\\nThus the pattern of the law emerges, delineating and laying out on all sides the general rule, already adverted to. By that rule where a presumption is raised as to a fact and then sufficient evidence is adduced so that (apart from the presumption) reasonable men might honestly differ as to whether or not that is the fact, the presumption loses all its force and, indeed, ceases to exist.\\nThere are exceptions to this rule in the case of presumptions which, because of policy considerations, are held not rebuttable except by proof equal to or stronger than that usually required upon a civil issue. For example, see the presumptions dealt with in: Strong v. Strong, 136 N. J. Eq. 103 (E. & A. 1945) \\u2014 proof beyond \\\"reasonable doubt\\\"; Bacon v. Bacon, 6 N. J. 117, 125 (1951); Beach v. Palisade Realty and Amusement Co., 86 N. J. L. 238 (E. & A.\\n1914) \\u2014 \\\"clear and satisfactory evidence\\\"; Aydelotte v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 124 N. J. L. 266 (E. & A. 1940). In all such cases, whether a preponderance of the evidence or a stronger measure of proof is required to rebut the presumption, the law, if it is to be practicable, must establish an exception to the rule that the burden of proof never shifts. Hughes v. Atlantic City, etc., R. R. Co., 85 N. J. L. 212, 216 (E. & A. 1914), supra; Kresse v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 111 N. J. L. 474 (E. & A. 1933).\\nIn the case of a presumption of undue influence, apparently because the presumption is fortifled by policy, the proponent must, according to the language of the cases, prove, to the satisfaction of the trier of fact, that there was no undue influence. In re Davis' Will, 14 N. J. 166 (1953); In re Hopper's Estate, 9 N. J. 280 (1952), supra; In re Fleming's Estate, 19 N. J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 1952); Stroming v. Stroming, 12 N. J. Super. 217 (App. Div. 1951), supra; Gellert v. Livingston, 5 N. J. 65 (1950); In re Nixon's Estate, 136 N. J. Eq. 242 (E. & A. 1945); In re Heim's Will, 136 N. J. Eq. 138 (E. & A. 1945); In re Bartles' Will, 127 N. J. Eq. 472 (E. & A. 1940); In re Smalley's Estate, 124 N. J. Eq. 461 (Prerog. 1938), affirmed 126 N. J. Eq. 217 (E. & A. 1939); Loveridge v. Brown, 98 N. J. Eq. 381, 392 (E. & A. 1925); In re Tutty's Will, 87 N. J. Eq. 647, 649 (E. & A. 1917); In re Cooper's Will, 75 N. J. Eq. 177 (Prerog. 1909), affirmed Harrison v. Axtell, 76 N. J. Eq. 614 (E. & A. 1910); In re Anastasia Davis, 73 N. J. Eq. 617 (Prerog. 1908); In re Sparks' Case, 63 N. J. Eq. 242 (Prerog. 1901); Barkman v. Richards, 63 N. J. Eq. 211 (Prerog. 1901); Claffey v. Ledwith, 56 N. J. Eq. 333 (Prerog. 1897); Boisaubin v. Boisaubin, 51 N. J. Eq. 252 (Prerog. 1893); Carroll v. Hause, 48 N. J. Eq. 269 (Prerog. 1891); Dale v. Dale, 38 N. J. Eq. 274 (E. & A: 1884); Morgan, supra, 44 Harvard L. Rev., at p. 920, n. 21. In connection with this presumption, unlike other presumptions, the courts do not speak as to the burden of going forward with the evidence. However, we conclude, the moment this presumption is erected, both the burden of proof (which otherwise would have been upon the contestant, Gellert v. Livingston, 5 N. J. 65, 1950, supra) and the burden of going forward with proof, shift to proponent and are identical and coincident. To meet each of these assignments, the proponent must establish by the same quantum of proof \\u2014 that is, by a preponderance of the proof\\u2014 that there is no undue influence.\\nThere are cases where the presumption of undue influence is so heavily weighted with policy that the courts have demanded a sterner measure of proof than that usually obtaining upon civil issues. That is the situation, for instance, where an attorney benefits by the will of his client, and especially where he draws it himself. In re Babette Davis' Will, 14 N. J. 166 (1953); In re Hopper's Estate, 9 N. J. 280 (1952), supra; In re Heim's Will, 136 N. J. Eq. 138 (E. & A. 1945), supra. However, this is not such a case. Here, it is true, the circumstances which give rise to the presumption, are graver than those sometimes met with (it takes only \\\"slight\\\" circumstances in addition to a confidential relationship to raise a presumption. Gellert v. Livingston, 5 N. J. 65, 1950, supra). Even so, the usual standard of'proof suffices \\u2014 that which puts upon proponent the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the proof that there was no undue influence. In a case where the evidence raising up the presumption of undue influence weighs heavily in the balance of proofs, the evidence upon which proponent relies must, if he is to succeed, be of greater weight.\\nThere is another matter to be borne in mind. The presumption of undue influence is of that class of presumptions by which a litigant (here the proponent) is called upon to make known facts more easily accessible to him than to his adversary. See, generally, Morgan, supra, 47 Harvard L. Rev., at p. 77; cf. Brinkman v. Urban Realty Co., Inc., 15 N. J. Super. 354 (App. Div. 1951). Therefore, where a presumption of undue, influence is created, the law puts upon proponent the burden of coming forward with credible \\\"evidence satisfactorily explaining his conduct\\\" and stating what he knows as to the making of the will. In re Colton's Estate, 11 N. J. Misc. 410 (Prerog. 1933), affirmed on other grounds 115 N. J. Eq. 327 (E. & A. 1934), citing, in the Prerogative Court opinion, In re Morrisey's Will, 91 N. J. Eq. 480 (Prerog. 1920); Brick v. Brick, 43 N. J. Eq. 167 (Prerog. 1887) \\u2014 \\\"a clear and natural explanation\\\" \\u2014 affirmed 44 N. J. Eq. 282 (E. & A. 1888).\\nSo, the proponents here are called upon to establish, by a preponderance of the proof, a lack of undue influence and, further, to explain satisfactorily that which they know concerning the making of the will. With this rule in hand, we can intelligently measure against it the circumstances of the case.\\nIn September 1947 testatrix had a cerebral hemorrhage and was taken to the hospital. Two months before, over a trivial matter, she had had a misunderstanding with Mrs. Karl, as a result of which they did not see each other in September. While at the hospital in September testatrix made a will, giving two parcels of property to her stepson and the bulk of her estate to two sisters of hers other than Mrs. Karl, these sisters and Mrs. Karl being her sole next of kin. Two months later she was hospitalized ag\\u00a7in, and her stepson engaged attorneys who drew a will, cutting off the three sisters and giving nearly all her estate to the stepson.\\nTestatrix then came to live with her stepson and his wife, and from the evidence we catch a glimpse, here and there, of what went on in that household. Once the wife, hit testatrix, and apparently at other times testatrix said to her, \\\"I hope you fall and break your neck, you scullery maid.\\\" The stepson had a power of attorney over testatrix' estate, and during this period she accused him of stealing her money and other things. Although this seems to have been an unjust charge, nevertheless later when she revoked the power, it took seven months, lawyers on both sides and a waiver on her part of mortgage interest due her by him, before he turned back her assets. When he returned home after a vacation she, then in the nursing home in which he had placed her, did not want to return to his home. He himself asserted she was then \\\"very cool\\\" to him and his wife, and this was before the Karls had had an opportunity to exert undue influence upon her.\\nContestant seems to have given orders not to let the Karls see testatrix, or not to let them see her alone. At any event, she asked Mr. Karl to secure a lawyer to get her out of the nursing home, but not to obtain a lawyer from Nyack where she was, \\\"because they all know\\\" contestant (he was the chief of police there), \\\"and I don't trust them.\\\" Thus it was that Mrs. Karl instituted a habeas corpus proceeding to remove her from the nursing home.\\nTestatrix wanted the above-mentioned power of attorney revoked, and had Mr. Karl write the attorney who conducted the habeas corpus proceeding (theretofore a stranger to the Karls), to come to see her. He arrived at the Karls' home two or three days after she had been taken there from the nursing home, and she then made plans to make the will propounded. However, Mr. Karl did not know of these plans until the attorney asked him to get witnesses for the will. A notary public, who at the time notarized the revocation of (\\u00bfhe power of attorney, was told by her that the people she had been staying with (apparently her stepson and his wife) were \\\"not good to her.\\\"\\nBy the instrument propounded, the testatrix' three sisters took nearly her entire estate in equal shares, appointing Mr. Karl executor and cutting off the stepson. This, under the circumstances, as we find them to be, was an entirely natural will. The fact that it was made so soon after testatrix had moved to the , Karls' home was but a natural reaction not only to the situation existing at her stepson's home and the nursing home, but perhaps also- to the somewhat questionable will, made a year before, in his favor.\\nProponents have carried the burden of proof, establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that the will was not the product of undue influence, and satisfactorily explaining what they knew of the matter. Undue influence is exerted where a testator is coerced to do that which he would not have done if left to himself (Gellert v. Livingston, 5 N. J. 65 (1950), supra), or wher.e there is importunity which cannot be resisted and is yielded to for the sake of peace (Den d. Trumbull v. Gibbons, 22 N. J. L. 117, 136, 158 (Sup. Ct. 1849)). The clarifying test of the matter, as laid out in Wingrove v. Wingrove, 11 P. D. 81 (High Court 1885), is whether the testator's mind, when he made the will, was such that, had he expressed it, he would have said: \\\"This is not my wish, but I must do it.\\\"\\nStress is put upon the failure of Mrs. Karl to take the stand. However, this matter was not brought to the attention of the court below, and therefore should not be considered here. Ex-Cell-o Corp. v. Farmers Coop. Dairies Ass'n., 28 N. J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 1953). Besides, there is not the slightest suggestion Mrs. Karl had knowledge of anything concerning the making of the will which was not fully brought out by hex husband. Moreover, she was a lady, it is said, o\\u00ed advanced years; and the record gives some indication that she was present at the trial and upset by questions put to her husband by contestant's attorney toward the end of the hearings and that the court refused to grant a recess because she was upset, saying to counsel \\\"you can probably finish\\\" the case that afternoon. The case was closed not long after, at 4:30 in the afternoon.\\nUpon the second issue in the case, that of mental incapacity, there is cast upon contestant under the New Jersey rule not only the burden of proof (In re Heim's Will, 136 N. J. Eq. 138 (E. & A. 1945), supra), but also the burden of rebutting a presumption that every person is of sound mind (Gellert v. Livingston, 5 N. J. 65 (1950), supra). The presumption is of that class of presumptions which operates \\\"to make more likely a finding in accord with the balance of probability.\\\" Morgan, supra, 47 Harvard L. Rev., at p. 77. The rule, here, putting the burden of proof upon contestant and this presumption both work in the same direction. If, therefore, to rebut the presumption, no more than a preponderance of the proof is required, the presumption is of no consequence whatsoever in the case, except as it stands as a telling reminder that testators usually are possessed of the requisite mental capacity.\\nIn this case we need not determine whether contestant has the burden of establishing mental incapacity merely by the preponderance of the evidence or, as one case holds (In re Hoover's Estate, 21 N. J. Super. 323 (App. Div. 1952)), by a heavier burden. Contestant's case on this point is so plainly insufficient as not to warrant a full discission of the matter. A woman physician, called by him, stated that she thought it was \\\"very doubtful\\\" whether testatrix had sufficient capacity; that testatrix\\u2014\\n\\\" was so changeable, and her mind \\u2014 her memory was so poor. Everything seemed to be confused at times; and I don't think she was quite capable of knowing what she was doing.\\\"\\nContestant lays stress not only upon this statement which indicated much doubt on the matter, but also upon the testimony of another doctor who had attended testatrix. But all that doctor said was that he did not feel he could answer on the broad question of her mental competency. On the other hand, there was substantial testimony of a specific sort (including some from the doctor last mentioned) indicating that she was competent. Indeed 7% months after the will was made, contestant and testatrix exchanged releases, she waiving mortgage interest he owed her; and contestant testified as to this transaction that he believed she understood it. Indeed he even testified that she (perhaps shortly after the will was made) had told her attorney \\\"exactly what was in\\\" her safe deposit box in contestant's custody, and \\\"everything was there just as it was said.\\\" At the very most, contestant raised a doubt on the matter; he clearly did not carry the burden of proof.\\nUpon the next issue in the ease \\u2014 'the question whether the will was duly executed \\u2014 the perfect attestation clause here raises a presumption of the sort above spoken of, namely, one heayily fortified in policy. To rebut it, contestant must establish by strong and convincing evidence, or perhaps beyond all reasonable doubt, that the will was not properly executed. In re DuBois's Estate, 9 N. J. Super. 280 (App. Div. 1950). To state the test is to decide the issue here. Contestant relies only upon matters affecting in trivial respects the credibility of the subscribing witnesses and the attorney who attended to the execution of the will. The presumption clearly stands unrebutted.\\nThe last issue is raised by proponents' cross-appeal as to a counsel fee allowed to contestant's attorney. We are satisfied that there was reasonable cause below for contesting the validity of the will, R. R. 4:55-7 (e), and that the allowance was warranted. Contestant's attorney had asked for a fee of $3,500 as to this estate of $45,000, and the court allowed him $750.\\nAffirmed with costs to proponents.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/389200.json b/nj/389200.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..82386dae494aa516c9bf2d9f38df68abaaa8aef9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/389200.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"389200\", \"name\": \"CRANBURY TOWNSHIP, PLAINTIFF, v. MIDDLESEX COUNTY BOARD OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cranbury Township v. Middlesex County Board of Taxation\", \"decision_date\": \"1984-07-13\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"501\", \"last_page\": \"513\", \"citations\": \"6 N.J. Tax 501\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Tax Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Tax Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:12:08.731031+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CRANBURY TOWNSHIP, PLAINTIFF, v. MIDDLESEX COUNTY BOARD OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"CRANBURY TOWNSHIP, PLAINTIFF, v. MIDDLESEX COUNTY BOARD OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT.\\nTax Court of New Jersey\\nJuly 13, 1984.\\nWilliam C. Moran, Jr., for plaintiff (Huff, Moran & Balint, attorneys).\\nHarry Haushalter, for defendant (Irwin I. Kimmelman, Atty. Gen. of the State of N.J., attorney).\", \"word_count\": \"3392\", \"char_count\": \"21052\", \"text\": \"ANDREW, J.T.C.\\nThis is an appeal by Cranbury Township from the 1984 county equalization table promulgated by the Middlesex County Board of Taxation. Cranbury contends that the ratio of 53.70% assigned to it is incorrect.\\nPlaintiff challenges the failure of the Middlesex County Board of Taxation to use a sale of property known as the Firestone Warehouse and Distribution Center (designated as SR-1A# 4879933) located at Station Road, Cranbury and more particularly identified as Block 10, part of Lot 1 and Block 10, Lots 5, 6 and 8 on the Cranbury tax map, in arriving at an equalization ratio for Cranbury. Plaintiff contends that the sale meets all of the required elements for inclusion and that its omission by defendant in fixing the county equalization table was incorrect and unjust.\\nDefendant maintains that the sale is not usable and was correctly excluded from defendant's equalization study because: (1) the property sold was less than an entire assessment parcel and therefore there was no comparative relationship between assessment and sales price for sales-ratio purposes and (2) the property sold partially included property preferentially assessed under the Farmland Assessment Act of 1964, N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.1 et seg., and therefore the comparative relationship between assessment and sales price necessary for sales-ratio purposes was lacking.\\nPrior to the December 15, 1982 sale in question, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company owned Block 10, Lot 1 and Block 10, Lots 5, 6 and 8. Block 10, Lot 1 was assessed as three line items on the Cranbury assessment list, while Block 10, Lots 5, 6 and 8 were assessed as one parcel. These assessments appeared as follows on Cranbury's 1982 tax list:\\nBlock Lot Class Land Area Assess. Improv. Assess. Total\\n1 10 13,000 44,500 3A 1 $ 13,000 $ 31,500 (nonqualified acre farmland)\\n10 1 4A 3 $ 50,700 $ 64,700 $ 115,400 (commercial) acres\\n10 1 3b 175 $ 87,500 $ \\u2014 $ 87,500 (qualified acres farmland)\\n10 5,6 4B 63 $783,900 $13,650,000 $14,433,900 & 8 (industrial) acres\\nOn April 15, 1982 the Cranbury Planning Board approved a minor subdivision involving the assessed parcels. As a result of the subdivision, approximately 62 acres of Block 10, Lot 1 were partitioned and became part of Block 10, Lots 5, 6 and 8. The combined area was then redesignated as Block 10, Lot 19. This subdivision was reflected in a deed dated May 17, 1982 by which Firestone Tire and Rubber Company transferred to itself a 62-acre portion of Block 10, Lot 1 and also Block 10, Lots 5, 6 and 8, which as noted above then constituted the newly-created Block 10, Lot 19. Subsequent to the completed subdivision the properties were as follows:\\nBlock Lot Class Area Land Assess. Improv. Assess. Total\\n10 1 3A (nonqualified farmland) 1 acre $ 13,000 $ 31,500 $ 44,500\\n10 10 4A (commercial) 3B (qualified farmland) 3 acres 117 acres $ 50,700 $ 64,700 $ 115,400 to be determined\\n10 19 3B (qualified farmland) 62 acres to be determined\\n10 19 4B (industrial) 63 acres $783,900 $13,650,000 $14,433,900\\nIt was the property that was designated as Block 10, Lot 19 (a total of approximately 125 acres) that was the subject of the sale from Firestone Tire and Rubber Company to Mackman Realty Corp. As can readily be seen, that portion of Block 10, Lot 1 which was subdivided consisted of 175 acres of vacant land which was preferentially assessed under the Farmland Assessment Act of 1964, N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.1 et seq. The subdivision accomplished a partition of approximately 62 acres assessed as farmland, which when merged with the 63 acres in Block 10, Lots 5, 6 and 8 constituted Block 10, Lot 19.\\nAfter the subdivision was completed the improvements located on Block 10, Lot 1 were removed. The assessor developed his 1983 assessments as follows:\\nBlock Lot Class Land Area Assess. Improv. Assess. Total\\n10 1 $ 13,000 3A 1 $ 13,000 \\u2014 (nonqualified acre farmland)\\n10 1 4A 3 $ 50,700 - $ 50,700 (commercial) acres\\n10 1 3B 117 $ 59,000 $ 59,000 (qualified acres farmland)\\n10 19 3B 62 $ 31,000 $ 31,000 (qualified acres farmland)\\n10 19 4B 63 $783,900 $13,650,000 $14,433,900 (industrial) acres\\nIn accordance with N.J.S.A. 54:3-17 and -18 each county's equalization table is prepared on an annual basis. In this regard N.J.S.A. 54:3-17 requires that:\\nEach county tax administrator shall annually ascertain and determine, according to his best knowledge and information, the general ratio or percentage of true value at which the real property of each taxing district is in fact assessed according to the tax lists laid before the board. On or before March 1 of each year, he shall prepare and submit to the county board an equalization table____\\nN.J.S.A. 54:3-18 directs that each county board of taxation shall: (a) review the equalization table prepared pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:3-17; (b) determine the accuracy of the ratios; and (c) confirm or revise the table accordingly. The Legislature has not specified any particular method to be utilized by a county board in arriving at its final county equalization table; any reasonable and efficient method may be used. Willingboro v. Burlington Cty. Bd. Tax., 62 N.J. 203, 220, 300 A.2d 129 (1973); Woodbridge v. Middlesex Cty. Bd. Tax., 96 N.J.Super. 532, 536, 233 A.2d 650 (App.Div.1967); Perth Amboy v. Middlesex Cty. Bd. Tax., 91 N.J.Super. 305, 308, 220 A.2d 119 (App.Div.1966), certif. den. 48 N.J. 112, 223 A.2d 491 (1966).\\nIn the formulation of its equalization table defendant relies in part on a sales ratio study conducted by the Local Property Bureau of the Division of Taxation. This study consists generally of the collection of sales data relative to the transfers of real property within each taxing district. The bureau reviews the data and determines whether each sale is usable for sales-ratio purposes based on 27 categories of specific valuation criteria as expressed in N.J.A.C. 18:12-1.1 et seq. This is done to eliminate any transactions which may have been influenced by nonmarket-oriented factors and also, as defendant asserts, to discard those sales which \\\"fail to establish a comparative relationship between the assessment and sales price.\\\"\\nDefendant also utilizes the 27 categories of nonusable sales transactions in order to eliminate sales which are not suitable for sales-ratio purposes. However, in its calculation of the equalization ratios for each municipality in Middlesex County, defendant, deviating from the methodology of the Local Property Bureau, utilizes a judicially approved one-year, unweighted and unclassified ratio procedure. Perth Amboy v. Middlesex Cty. Bd. of Tax., supra.\\nPlaintiff does not challenge the ratio procedure utilized by defendant nor does it question the validity of the 27 categories of nonusable sales transactions as outlined in N.J.A.C. 18:12\\u2014 1.1 et seq. Rather, plaintiff contends that the sale in question meets all of the requisites of a usable sale within the confines of the cited regulation.\\nInitially plaintiff maintains that even though the sale in question \\\"appears at first glance to be a 'split-off' \\\" further investigation by defendant would enable it to ascertain the assessment of the parcel sold and therefore \\\"fairness and equity\\\" to plaintiff require that the sale be included in defendant's sales-ratio study. Plaintiff relies upon Kearny v. Tax Appeals Div., 35 N.J. 299, 173 A.2d 8 (1961) and Kingsley v. Bayonne, 89 N.J.Super. 549, 215 A.2d 769 (App.Div.1965) to support its position that the assessment of the parcel sold can be restructured and then reasonably compared with the sales price. Both of these cases dealt with the subject of nonusability of sales because they constituted \\\"split-offs\\\" as delimited in N.J.A.C. 18:12-1.1(a), which provides as follows:\\nThe deed transactions of the following categories are not usable in determining assessment-sales ratios pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54.1-35.1 et seq.:\\n6. Sales of property conveying only a portion of the assessed unit, usually referred to as apportionments, split-offs or cut-offs; for example, a parcel sold out of a larger tract where the assessment is for the larger tract.\\nPlaintiff points out that this exclusionary provision is subject to a general qualification appearing in N.J.A.C. 18:12-1.1(b) which provides:\\nTransfers of the foregoing nature should generally be excluded but may be used if after full investigation it clearly appears that the transaction was a sale between a willing buyer, not compelled to buy, and a willing seller, not compelled to sell, and that it meets all other requisites of a usable sale.\\nThe first issue therefore is whether the county board should have included the sale in question- in its sales-ratio study even though the sale constituted a split-off. In Kearny v. Tax Appeals Div., supra, the Court considered sales which were technically split-offs and therefore were excluded by the Director of the Division of Taxation in his sales-ratio study. One sale designated as \\\"Congoleum-Nairn, Inc. to Kearnyland, Inc.,\\\" involved property that had been part of a larger tract but had been subdivided prior to the date of the sale. Within the same month of the subdivision of the property on December 18, 1958, the assessor prepared informal assessments reflecting the subdivision but failed, through inadvertance or mistake to include the revision on Kearny's assessment list for 1959. The sale of the subdivided parcel occurred on January 15, 1959 and was undoubtedly a bona fide transaction. Had the informal assessment revisions been placed on the 1959 assessment lists the sale would have been usable since the sales price of the subdivided property could have been compared with an assessment of the same parcel of property. The Court held that the sale should not be excluded because the old assessment prior to subdivision was continued on the official record solely by mistake.\\nIt is conceded in this case that the subject sale was bona fide in nature. In contrast to Kearny, however, the assessor here did not prepare informal assessments which could have been used for the tax year 1982, nor did his records indicate sufficient data which would permit a mechanical reconstruction of an appropriate assessment and thus enable a comparison to be made between sales price and assessment. Plaintiffs assessor conceded that his judgment would be required to determine an assessment for the newly-created Block 10, Lot 19 rather than simply an arithmetical or mathematical application of record data.\\nIn Kingsley v. Bayonne, supra, the court was also confronted with a sale that was technically a split-off. The sale involved a transfer of approximately 13 acres out of a much larger tract of land which had not been separately assessed. However, it was factually shown that there was a firmly established assessment policy which provided that vacant land in the area of the 13-acre parcel was to be assessed at $20,000 an acre. The court concluded that a simple arithmetical calculation would have permitted the construction of an appropriate assessment for the 13-acre tract and therefore since the assessment of the parcel sold could have been ascertained by recourse to the public records, fairness and equity required that the sale be used. Id. at 557, 215 A.2d 769.\\nHere it is not possible to establish the assessed valuation of the subdivided parcel \\\"by recourse to the public records and a simple arithmetical calculation.\\\" Ibid. As previously mentioned, the Cranbury Assessor indicated that there was no established policy as to the assessment of the subdivided land in question reflected in the public records which would have permitted an appropriate assessment-sales price comparison for the same property unit. He testified that any assessment of the newly-created parcel would have required his judgment. Therefore, as of the date of the sale in question, the sale price of Block 10, Lot 19 could not be related to an identical parcel that had been assessed for the 1982 tax year.\\nPlaintiff argues that the subsequent assessment for the year 1983 should be utilized for the purpose of constructing an assessment for comparison with the sale in question. Neither the Kearny nor the Bayonne decision supports this position. If this court were to adopt plaintiff's method it would be tantamount to an elimination of the nonusable split-off category of sales.\\nPlaintiff's proposal offends the essential purpose of the split-off category of nonusable sales. The goal is to insure that sales prices are measured against existing assessments.' The assessment with which plaintiff seeks a comparison is the 1983 assessment rather than the 1982 assessment because there was no 1982 assessment for the exact parcel which was sold by Firestone in December 1982.\\nThe split-off category was implicitly sanctioned by our Supreme Court in Kearny. In that case in the second set of sales considered by the Court, designated as \\\"the duPont sales,\\\" 25 separately assessed parcels were sold in two arms-length transactions occurring within six weeks of each other. Each of the sales involved subdivided portions of assessment units and therefore no ratio between sales price and assessment was determined for each individual sale. Hence both sales appeared to be split-offs. However, the Court held that since the two sales occurred within the same sales-ratio study period they need not be considered separately but could instead be utilized in the aggregate. This would thus permit a comparison of total existing assessments against total sales price.\\nThe Court expressed it this way:\\nA significant circumstance, apparently given no weight by the agencies, is that the sales disposing as they did of all the duPont property occurred within about six weeks of each other in the same year \\u2014 a year whose sales were forming the base for the Director's ratio. If one transaction was completed within the year of the table in question, and the second during the year of the succeeding table, obviously there would be no disagreement with application of the split-off rule to each of them. But occurrence of the two in a single year puts the matter in a different light from the standpoint of achieving a more realistic appraisal of the relation between the aggregate of assessments and the aggregate fair value of the real estate ratables. There should be no difficulty at all at the end of the particular table year, in such cases where all the assessed units are sold, in adding the assessments together, then adding the purchase prices and comparing the total of each to find the ratio between assessment and market value. [35 N.J, at 314, 173 A.2d 8; emphasis supplied]\\nEven assuming that plaintiff is correct in its assertion that a rational comparison can be made between assessment unit and sales price based on the 1983 assessment of the newly-created Block 10, Lot 19, there still remains the difficulty of comparing a sales price based on market value with an assessment partially based on preferential treatment pursuant to the Farmland Assessment Act. See N.J. Const. (1947), Art. VIII, \\u00a7 1, par. 1(b); Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566, 182 A.2d 841 (1962); Princeton Tp. v. Bardin, 147 N.J.Super. 557, 566-567, 371 A.2d 776 (App.Div.1977), certif. den. 74 N.J. 281, 377 A.2d 685 (1977). No legitimate comparison can be made between the two. The 62-acre portion of the newly-created parcel was assessed at its value for agricultural or horticultural use rather than at its highest and best use. The Cranbury Assessor candidly admitted that a market value assessment was neither in existence at the time of the subject sale nor capable of being computed by resort to public records and simple arithmetical calculation as in Kingsley v. Bayonne, supra.\\nAs defendant has set forth, the Director of the Division of Taxation does not utilize sales of qualified farmland in his formulation of the equalization tables (used as the basis for the distribution of state school aid) because of a lack of comparability. This court has recognized this procedure for the very reasons expressed by defendant in this case. In Union Tp. v. Taxation Div. Director, 176 N.J.Super. 239, 1 N.J.Tax 15, 422 A.2d 803 (Tax Ct.1980) Judge Conley noted that:\\nThe Director routinely applies the class 2 ratio to farmland assessed under the Farmland Assessment Act (N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.1 et seq.) because the lower assessments on such properties are not comparable to sales prices and any resulting assessment-sales ratio would be meaningless. See N.J.A.C. 18:15-9.1(c). Thus, in the case . of qualified farmland . the Director's practice is to use the most reliable current ratio of assessment to sales in a municipality in order to determine a hypothetical true value for each class of property. [Id. 1 N.J.Tax at 23]\\nPlaintiff emphasizes the fact that sales of farmland-qualified properties are not officially and specifically designated as a nonusable category of sales. This argument fails to recognize that catchall category 26 of the nonusable deed transactions is very broad in scope and that the subject sale is one which \\\"for some reason other than specified in the enumerated categories\\\" is not usable for sales-ratio study purposes. N.J.A.C. 18:12-1.-1(a)(26). Plaintiff offers no logical method by which a rational comparison can be made between a sales price reflecting market value at highest and best use and an assessment, or a large portion of an assessment, reflecting an artificially low value for agricultural use.\\nPlaintiff does assert that \\\"use of the farmland assessment as part of the overall assessment for the purpose of determining a ratio, works against the municipality since it has the effect of producing a lower ratio than would be produced if a true value assessment was used rather than the farmland assessment.\\\" In spite of this, the argument proceeds, plaintiff will accept the farmland assessment in determining its assigned ratio. All plaintiff is really saying is that if the sale increases the assigned ratio, even though it involves farmland assessment, it should be included. It is extremely doubtful that plaintiff would be willing to accept a sale involving a farmland assessment if the result were to diminish its applicable ratio. This is usually the result, however, since farmland sells at market prices greatly in excess of its artificially assessed value thereby producing unreasonably low assessment-sales ratios. For example, if a 62-acre parcel in Cranbury assessed for farmland at $500 an acre were sold for $10,000 an acre the resulting assessment-sales ratio would be 5%. Although the municipalities in Middlesex County with the exception of Cranbury would not object to the use of such a sale in determining Cranbury's equalization ratio it is readily apparent that Cranbury would obviously oppose inclusion of the sale.\\nPlaintiff has offered no authority to support its contention that it would be plainly unfair to permit defendant to exclude the sale in question.\\nHaving failed to establish that the county equalization ratio of 53.70% assigned to it for the tax year 1984 is either incorrect or unjust, plaintiffs complaint must be dismissed. The Clerk of the Tax Court will enter judgment affirming the determination of the Middlesex County Board of Taxation.\\nAt the pretrial conference defendant also indicated that the sale was not usable because the material influence of the subdivision of the property on the sales price had not been reflected in the applicable assessment. Apparently defendant abandoned this argument since it neither briefed the contention nor raised the issue at trial.\\nTestimony at the trial did not establish the precise acreage, but this does not preclude a determination of the issue presented.\\nBy a judgment of the Tax Court dated May 8, 1983, this assessment was subsequently reduced to:\\nLand $ 783,900\\nImprovements 7,216,100\\nTotal $8,000,000\\nAs defendant asserts, \\\"a sale is usable if the property sold can be related to the identical property as assessed.\\\" Several of the 27 categories of nonusable property transactions demonstrate this principle, e.g., sales of property substantially improved subsequent to assessment but prior to the sale, sales of an undivided interest in real property, etc. Ibid.\\nThis procedure is explicated in Gaynes v. Edison Tp., 179 N.J.Super. 373, 2 N.J.Tax 500, 507-508, 432 A.2d 127 (App.Div.1980).\\nThe assessor's obligation is to ascertain the value of each parcel of real property in the taxing district based on a valuation date of October 1 of the pretax year. N.J.S.A. 54:4-23. However, even though the valuation date is October 1 of the pretax year the assessor has until January 10 of the tax year to complete and submit his assessment list to the county board of taxation. N.J.S.A. 54:4-35.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/3901165.json b/nj/3901165.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c5eee8016400c3e21d0f99c45a6d6a9079edd29f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/3901165.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3901165\", \"name\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DAVID RIVERA A/K/A DAVID J. RIVERA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Rivera\", \"decision_date\": \"2010-01-28\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"492\", \"last_page\": \"500\", \"citations\": \"411 N.J. Super. 492\", \"volume\": \"411\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:00:45.637973+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DAVID RIVERA A/K/A DAVID J. RIVERA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"987 A.2d 618\\nSTATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DAVID RIVERA A/K/A DAVID J. RIVERA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nSubmitted December 1, 2009\\nDecided January 28, 2010.\\nBefore Judges CARCHMAN, LIHOTZ and ASHRAFI.\\nSills, Cummis & Gross, P.C., attorneys for appellant (.Richard J. Sapinski, of counsel and on the brief).\\nCamelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Christopher W. Hsieh, Special Deputy Attorney General, Acting Senior Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).\", \"word_count\": \"2432\", \"char_count\": \"15195\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nLIHOTZ, J.A.D.\\nOn February 6, 2008, defendant, David Rivera, was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Defendant had submitted to a breath test, which was administered using the Alcotest 7110 MK III-C system with Firmware Version 3.11 software (Alcotest). The Supreme Court has concluded the Alcotest is \\\"generally scientifically reliable\\\" and, with the implementation of specified modifications, a properly performed test provides blood alcohol concentration (BAC) readings admissible to support a per se violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 943 A.2d 114, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 158, 172 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008); see also State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J.Super. 91, 96, 984 A.2d 450 (App.Div.2009).\\nThe Alcotest is an embedded system, which utilizes two separate methods of measurement on each provided breath sample: electric chemical oxidation sensing (EC) and infrared sensing (IR). Chun, supra, 194 N.J. at 78, 943 A.2d 114. A test subject provides two breath samples, resulting in four separate BAC measurements. Ibid. The IR and EC readings are reported on a printed Alcohol Influence Report (AIR). Id. at 79, 943 A.2d 114.\\nAfter defendant's first attempted breath sample was rejected for insufficient breath volume, the next test recorded an EC of .109 and an IR of .107. A third test recorded an EC of .117 and an IR of .114. Following the municipal court's denial of his motion to exclude the Alcotest results as invalid, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. The municipal court sentenced defendant, a first-time offender, for a per se violation, suspended his driving privileges for seven months, required him to spend twelve hours at the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, and imposed a $300 fine, $33 in court costs, a $50 Victims of Crime Compensation Board assessment, a $200 DWI surcharge, and a $75 Safe Neighborhood Fund penalty. The municipal court judge stayed execution of that sentence pending appeal. After de novo review, the Law Division denied defendant's motion to suppress the Alcotest results and again convicted defendant of DWI, imposing the same sentence, which was stayed pending our review.\\nIn his appeal defendant relies upon an interpretation of Chun, asserting:\\nPOINT i\\nTHE LOWER COURT'S ALLOWANCE OF A FOUR DECIMAL PLACE AVERAGING METHODOLOGY IN COMPLETING WORKSHEET A IN RIVERA'S CASE IS CONTRARY TO THE REMEDIAL PURPOSES OF WORKSHEET A AS SET FORTH IN STATE V. CHUN.\\nPOINT II\\nTHE RULE OF LENITY SUPPORTS RIVERA'S METHOD OF CALCULATING WORKSHEET A AND IS NOT LIMITED TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.\\nFollowing our consideration of the arguments presented on appeal and our examination of the record in light of applicable legal standards, we affirm the order denying defendant's motion to suppress the Acotest results. Consequently, we do not interfere with defendant's conviction and the sentence imposed.\\nPrior to review of defendant's challenge on appeal, it is instructive to recite the basic operation of the Acotest as discussed in Chun.\\nThe Acotest's process for ascertaining BAC is not \\\"operator-dependent\\\"; that is, it is fully computerized. Chun, supra, 194 N.J. at 79, 943 A.2d 114. This automation is a benefit associated with the Acotest, \\\"which is intended to reduce the role of the operator and thereby minimize the potential for human error\\\" to impact the results. State v. Ugrovics, 410 N.J.Super. 482, 490, 982 A.2d 1211 (App.Div.2009).\\nThe Acotest is programmed to prohibit operation until it performs controlled test samples to assure accurate operation. Chun, supra, 194 N.J. at 80, 943 A.2d 114. Thus, prior to testing a subject, the Acotest runs a controlled vapor sample with a known alcohol concentration of .10. Ibid. In order for the machine to be used, the Firmware program requires control test results be within specified parameters, not less than .095 nor more than .105. Ibid. Additionally, for a subject's breath samples to be valid, the subject must provide a continuous sample of sufficient duration, volume and flow rate, and each sample must fall within the range of certain minimum fixed criteria. If not met, the machine will generate an error message. Id. at 82, 943 A.2d 114.\\nThe Acotest calculates the BAC using only valid samples. \\\"In the event that the administration of the test resulted in errors because of, for example, insufficient breath volume or duration, the AIR will report those errors and will not attempt to calculate the BAC from an inadequate sample.\\\" Ibid. The AIR reports the valid results of each EC and IR reading to three decimal places. Id. at 83, 943 A.2d 114. The measurements for the first breath test must be within the \\\"accepted range of tolerance with the measurement for the second breath test[.]\\\" Id. at 81, 943 A.2d 114. The BAC used is the lowest of the four readings within the acceptable tolerances, truncated to two decimal places. Id. at 83, 943 A.2d 114. \\\"The effect of truncating, as opposed to rounding, is to underreport the concentration, to the benefit of the arrestee.\\\" Ibid.\\nChun ordered the programmed Alcotest range of tolerance be revised such that the benchmark for a true reading of BAC must be set at plus or minus five percent or, in absolute terms, \\\"0.005 percent BAC from the mean or plus or minus five percent of the mean, whichever is greater[.]\\\" Id. at 116, 943 A.2d 114. This requires two calculations when setting the upper and lower limits. Id. at 116, 119, 943 A.2d 114. Because the Firmware version 3.11 at issue utilized a plus/minus ten percent range of tolerance, manual calculations on a worksheet developed by the Court (Worksheet A) were required to assure accuracy. Id. at 118, 943 A.2d 114.\\nDefendant's assertions on appeal challenge the State's methodology when calculating the relative and absolute upper tolerance limits to discern whether the Alcotest readings obtained were valid. He argues for an alternative methodology that will place his EC reading of .117 outside the upper range of tolerance and nullify the overall calculation of his BAC.\\nIt is agreed that the actual mean of defendant's four Alcotest readings, reached by dividing the sum of the four readings by four, is .11175. In performing the calculations set forth on Worksheet A, the State truncated that mean to .1117 and proceeded with the remaining calculations, ultimately resulting in a BAC of .10, a reading that subjected defendant to the increased penalties provided in N.J.S.A. 39:4\\u201450(a)(1).\\nBefore the Law Division, defendant argued the mean must be truncated to three decimal places, or .111. In support of this position, defendant relied upon expert testimony, which noted truncating the mean to .111 lowers the upper limit of tolerance. Consequently, defendant's overall Alcotest results would be invalid because the EC reading of .117 falls outside the recalculated upper range; that is, .111 x 1.05 = .11655. Defendant again presents this argument on appeal to this court. Although unable to point to any specific language in Chun to support his proposed methodology, defendant argues reduction to three decimal places is consistent with Chun's adoption of truncating the lowest score to benefit defendants charged with per se violations of the DWI statute.\\nAs further support for adoption of his method of calculation, defendant suggests a court, when faced with \\\"two reasonable constructions\\\" that affect the degree of criminal punishment of a \\\"per se violation,\\\" must use the rule of lenity. Therefore, defendant's proposed method of truncation must prevail.\\nWhere a municipal court judgment has been appealed to Superior Court, we ordinarily review the Law Division judgment under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. In conducting the review required under Rule 3:23-8(a), \\\"the Law Division's judgment must be supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.\\\" Ugrovics, supra, 410 N.J.Super. at 487, 982 A.2d 1211 (citing State v. Segars, 172 N.J. 481, 488, 799 A.2d 541 (2002)); see also State v. Kashi, 180 N.J. 45, 48, 848 A.2d 744 (2004). However, because the Law Division's judgment rested entirely on its interpretation of the Court's opinion in Chun, our scope of review is de novo, without affording any special deference to the trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Manalapan Tp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995).\\nDefendant maintains truncating the mean to three decimal places is consistent with the Court's express remedial purpose in ordering the use of Worksheet A \\\"to remedy the State's intentional reprogramming of the original [Alcotest] device . to try to capitalize on a doubling of the accepted tolerance [range] in the AIR result . [to] redue[e] the number of invalid results[,]\\\" particularly at the lower result ranges. We are not persuaded by this contention and determine it misreads the Court's pronouncements regarding truncation of certain calculations.\\nIn a historical discussion of the acceptance of a range of tolerance for the Alcotest, the Chun Court noted an inadvertent miscalculation articulated in State v. Foley, 370 N.J.Super. 341, 851 A.2d 123 (Law Div.2003). Rather than a ten percent range between the highest and lowest Alcotest readings, Foley mistakenly authorized readings within a tolerance range of ten percent above and ten percent below the mean. Chun, supra, 194 N.J. at 111-12, 943 A.2d 114. Firmware version 3.11 incorporated this impermissibly wider tolerance range, which the Court found unsustainable. Id. at 116, 943 A.2d 114. As we noted above, the Court confirmed the permissible range as \\\"0.005 percent BAC from the arithmetic mean or plus or minus five percent of the mean, whichever is greater.\\\" Ibid.\\nAlthough the Court suggested the State took advantage of the error set forth in Foley, correction of this error was unrelated to the truncation of the lowest individual Alcotest reading when reporting an arrestee's BAC. Id. at 113, 943 A.2d 114. The i'emedy employed by the Court was to reprogram the Firmware and, in the interim, order all BACs from Alcotest readings to be hand calculated using Worksheet A. Id. at 116-20, 943 A.2d 114.\\nWe also reject as gross overstatement defendant's broad inference that truncation of all interim calculations, when computing a BAC, properly reflects the Court's policy of leniency towards defendants who face stiff penalties as the result of a per se violation. See id. at 83, 943 A.2d 114. This conclusion, drawn from the directed truncation of the final BAC result, is unsupport able. The Supreme Court did not express preference for truncating the various interim calculations on Worksheet A. Truncation was limited to \\\"the lowest of the four acceptable readings\\\" when reporting the final BAC. Ibid. Following the plain language of the opinion, the Court simply stated the mean was to be ascertained by dividing the sum of the four breath readings by four. This direction contains no possible ambiguity or confusion.\\nHere, the State truncated the five digit arithmetic mean (.11175) to four decimal places. Defendant suggests the result be truncated to three decimal places because the Court's illustrations used a three decimal place mean. In Chun, Justice Hoens posits two BAC calculations illustrating readings falling within and outside a set tolerance range. In these examples, when calculating the mean of the four Alcotest readings, the sum is divisible by four. Id. at 119-20, 943 A.2d 114. Thus, the mathematical result is reported to three decimal places without the need for rounding or truncation. Chun neither authorizes nor supports a methodology requiring the mean not to exceed three decimal places or the truncation of an arithmetic mean to three decimal places.\\nWhen a limit on a numeric calculation is required, the Court included express instructions in that regard. For example, in the two illustrations to determine the validity of the readings as within the tolerance limits, id. at 119-20, 943 A.2d 114, the relative and absolute tolerance limits are carried to four decimal places. Even though the actual mathematical result of the examples is to four decimal places, Worksheet A includes a direction requiring this result. Worksheet A specifically states the upper tolerance limit is to be calculated by multiplying the mean by 1.05 or adding .005 BAC and selecting the greater result calculated \\\"to four digits after [the] decimal point.\\\" Similarly, the lower tolerance limit is computed by multiplying the mean by .95 or subtracting .005 BAC and selecting the lower result taken \\\"to four digits after [the] decimal point.\\\"\\nNo similar instruction limiting the mean to three decimal places is found. There is no evidence supporting a further need to truncate the mean or other interim calculations to achieve an accurate final BAC. Moreover, the unnecessary truncation of the arithmetic mean to three decimal places artificially narrows the tolerance range below that accepted by the Court. The concomitant result would falsely increase the number of invalid Aleotest results and thus preclude justifiable prosecutions for per se violations of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.\\nWe also reject defendant's argument maintaining the rule of lenity applies to these facts. In criminal cases, the rale applies to the judicial construction of penal statutes. See, e.g., State v. Froland, 193 N.J. 186, 194, 936 A.2d 947 (2007) (noting that interpretation of a statute is restricted by the rale of lenity); State v. Brannon, 178 N.J. 500, 505, 842 A.2d 148 (2004) (stating that the rule \\\"requires courts to construe ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant\\\"). The rule has no application in this matter, where we glean the intention of the Court from the Chun opinion and its attached Worksheet A.\\nFor these reasons, we conclude the State's manual calculations of the tolerance ranges set forth on Worksheet A correctly followed the requirements articulated in Chun. Consequently, the AIR report was properly determined admissible evidence of defendant's BAC of .10 in support of his conviction of a per se violation of the statute. We, therefore, affirm defendant's judgment of conviction entered by the Law Division.\\nAffirmed.\\n\\\"Tolerance is the range of any set of measurements that is accepted as being representative of a true reading.\\\" Chun, supra, 194 N.J. at 110, 943 A.2d 114.\\nOur conclusion suggests this too is not authorized by Chun. However, the limited truncation had no impact on the calculation of the upper range taken to four decimal places.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/4140587.json b/nj/4140587.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2801e34667f61ab316db6d41565ad6e64dff8488
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/4140587.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4140587\", \"name\": \"IN THE MATTER OF DEBBIE ANN CARLITZ, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Carlitz\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-02-11\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"4\", \"last_page\": \"4\", \"citations\": \"198 N.J. 4\", \"volume\": \"198\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:17:04.502968+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"IN THE MATTER OF DEBBIE ANN CARLITZ, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.\", \"head_matter\": \"965 A.2d 113\\nIN THE MATTER OF DEBBIE ANN CARLITZ, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.\\nFebruary 11, 2009.\", \"word_count\": \"191\", \"char_count\": \"1195\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThe Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its decision in DRB 08-250, concluding that as matter of reciprocal discipline pursuant to Rule l:20-14(a)(4)(E), DEBBIE ANN CAR-LITZ of NORTH BRUNSWICK, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1987, should be reprimanded based on discipline imposed in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that in New Jersey violates RPC 5.5(a) (practicing law while ineligible), RPC 7.1 (false and misleading communication about the lawyer's services), RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), and RPC 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and good cause appearing;\\nIt is ORDERED that DEBBIE ANN CARLITZ is hereby reprimanded; and it is further\\nORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further\\nORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in Rule 1:20-17.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/439586.json b/nj/439586.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..22399d3b850f1215baf5f7266f45ea88514bd91a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/439586.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"439586\", \"name\": \"EDWARD DOOLING, WILLIAM DOOLING, DENNIS DOOLING AND JOHN DOOLING, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. FELIKE DRAGRIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Dooling v. Dragrin\", \"decision_date\": \"1925-10-20\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"1073\", \"last_page\": \"1074\", \"citations\": \"3 N.J. Misc. 1073\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Miscellaneous Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:05:26.186579+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"EDWARD DOOLING, WILLIAM DOOLING, DENNIS DOOLING AND JOHN DOOLING, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. FELIKE DRAGRIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"EDWARD DOOLING, WILLIAM DOOLING, DENNIS DOOLING AND JOHN DOOLING, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. FELIKE DRAGRIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\\nDecided October 20, 1925.\\nBefore Gummere, Chief Justice, and Justices Kaliscii and Campbell.\\nEor the appellant, Arthur B. Seymour.\\nEor the respondents, Joseph F. L. Fitzpatrick.\", \"word_count\": \"409\", \"char_count\": \"2404\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe plaintiffs below obtained a judgment by default against the defendant below ill the County Common Pleas of Hudson county, from which judgment he gave notice of appeal to this court.\\nThe grounds of appeal are stated to be as follows:\\n1. The judgment is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. 2. It is contrary to law. 3. It is excessive. 4. It is not in conformity with the complaint and is not justified by the complaint. 5. The plaintiff is not entitled to judgment for more than $875 upon the pleadings and evidence.\\nThe state of tho case discloses that judgment was entered on December 23d, 1924, and it was not until March 20th, 1925, that the defendant-appellant caused a notice to be given to the plaintiffs of an application to be made on the 26th day of March, 1925, to the Court of Common Pleas for a rule to show cause why the judgment should not be set aside upon the following grounds:\\n\\u2022 1. That the judgment was improvidently entered. 2; That the judgment is unjust. 3. That the said judgment is improperly entered and is more than can lawfully be entered under the pleadings in ,the action. 4. Upon the grounds shown in the affidavit hereto annexed.\\nThe matter came on for a. hearing before that court, practically as a motion to set aside the judgment, which motion was refused and an exception was taken and allowed. Counsel of appellant relies on his stated five grounds of appeal, the first three of which, namely, that the judgment is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, contrary to law and is excessive, have no proper place in a ease upon appeal. Upon the assumption that the two remaining grounds of appeal, namely, that the judgment is not in conformity with the complaint, and' that upon the pleadings the plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment for more than $875, and, therefore, there was error in the record, and thus laid a basis for an appeal,, an inspection of the complaint and judgment entered thereon conclusively contradicts the appellant's assertion and proves the appeal to be frivolous.\\nThe appeal is dismissed, with costs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/446595.json b/nj/446595.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5f61b1c68205b8d7c4ffdd0d1bd0dceab0f735f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/446595.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"446595\", \"name\": \"AEOLIAN COMPANY, APPELLEE, v. MORRIS W. SHAPIRO, APPELLANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Aeolian Co. v. Shapiro\", \"decision_date\": \"1929-10-14\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"852\", \"last_page\": \"855\", \"citations\": \"7 N.J. Misc. 852\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Miscellaneous Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:53:15.997020+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"AEOLIAN COMPANY, APPELLEE, v. MORRIS W. SHAPIRO, APPELLANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"AEOLIAN COMPANY, APPELLEE, v. MORRIS W. SHAPIRO, APPELLANT.\\nSubmitted January 25, 1929\\nDecided October 14, 1929.\\nBefore Gu.umeee, Chief Justice, and Justices Parker aud Bobine.\\nEor the appellant, Olto A. S lief el.\\nFor the appellee, Samuel G. Meisierman.\", \"word_count\": \"975\", \"char_count\": \"5621\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe suit is oil a written guarantee which reads in lull as follows: \\\"In consideration of the extension of credit by the Aeolian Company and shipments of merchandise to the Music Box and George II. Kahn under a separate agreement, we (I) Morris W. Shapiro, of 207 Market street, Newark, New Jersey, do hereby guarantee the payment to The Aeolian Company, of 29 West Forty-second street, New York City, or any of its allied or subsidiary companies, to the extent of six hundred dollars, for such indebtedness as may be incurred by the George II. Kahn of Music Box and we agree to settle for the obligations of the said George II. Kahn of Music Box on request.\\n\\\"This guarantee majr be canceled by either party upon sixty (60) days written notice to the other, providing all indebtedness outstanding at the time of cancellation is liquidated by the expiration of the sixty (60) day period.\\n\\\"Signed\\u2014Morris W. Shapiro,\\nThe Assouan Company, per\\nWitness\\u2014Ira Sciiaef.\\nWitness\\u2014.\\\"\\nThe evidence shows that this paper, which is not dated, was executed about the 3d or 4th of February, 1922, or perhaps a day or two earlier. At the same time or a day or two previously the plaintiff had made a written agreement with George H. Kahn named in the guarantee which bears date January 31st, 1922, and bears generally on the matter of sales, purchases, discounts, terms of credit, &c. The plaintiff, regarding the guarantee as a continuing one, kept a running account with Kahn for goods sold over a period of some four years, and finally Kahn became bankrupt owing the plain tiff about $780. The defendant was called upon to make good his guarantee to the extent of $600 and refused to do so, claiming in the first place that the guarantee had by its terms applied only to the first $600 of credit which had long since been paid; secondly, that the plaintiff's agent who was present when defendant signed it, assured the defendant that it was only intended for the first $600; thirdly, that the same agent gave him another paper to sign which was represented to be a sixty daj^s' notice of cancellation and that he signed it and gave it back to the agent; and fourthly, that the guarantee had become invalid because of certain extensions of time given by the creditor.\\nThe questions of fact were fully and fairly laid before the jury by the trial judge and the jury evidently resolved them against the defendant. The judge distinctly told the jury that if the agent had made any such representations with regard to the effect of the guarantee or its contents as was claimed by the defendant they should find a verdict for the defendant. The latter testified about these other papers that he had signed an alleged notice of cancellation and sent it forward to the agent for the plaintiff. A man named Lake-man also testified for the plaintiff that he had received the papers purporting to be signed by the defendant, and there was nothing except the guarantee itself and a letter. This letter is printed as an exhibit, and reads \\\"Enclosed please find copy of guarantee as per your request,\\\" &c., and is signed by George H. Kahn. It is a legitimate inference that the defendant left everything to Kahn and either that defendant never did sign any such notice of cancellation, or if he did that Kahn suppressed it and sent on the guarantee without the cancellation; all of which is no fault of the plaintiff.\\nPoint 1 for the appellant is that the guarantee cannot be construed as relating to the later sales between September, 1923, and March, 1924. We construe it as a continuing guarantee relating to the written agreement for sales and purchases and effective until properly revoked.\\nPoint 2 is that the earlier sales ha'd all been paid for. This is of course true.\\nPoint 3 is that the guarantor has the right to expect that he will not be held to guarantee any other contract than the one which he guarantees. This may well be conceded.\\nPoint 4 is that the nonsuit should have been granted. We think there was clearly a jury question.\\nPoint 5 is that the court refused to charge that if the plaintiff made any agreement with Kahn for the postponement of Kahn's indebtedness plaintiff cannot recover, &c. We think the charge was properly refused under the case of Pfeifer v. Crossley, supra. The word \\\"agreement\\\" in the request is ambiguous, but there was nothing in the evidence to indicate any agreement based on valid consideration or anything more than a voluntary extension of credit.\\nPoint 6 is that the proofs make it plain that between September and March aforesaid plaintiff dealt with Kahn solely on the basis of his own credit without regard to the guarantee and hence there should have been a direction for the defendant. This seems to be based upon the testimony that during the period in question the plaintiff received trade acceptances from Kahn for goods purchased. It seems quite immaterial to us whether the plaintiff did or did not. We construe the guarantee as an absolute guarantee of payment of indebtedness incurred by virtue of the purchase and sales agreement between plaintiff and Kahn, so long as that and the guarantee remained in force; and under the rule laid down in Pfeiffer v. Crossley, supra, it was immaterial whether plaintiff extended the term of credit or accepted defendant's bills for what was owing.\\nThe judgment will be affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/446639.json b/nj/446639.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cc74591ee6436799da2124fb8be43cd8bd132f47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/446639.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"446639\", \"name\": \"DONATO LATTANZI, PLAINTIFF, v. PUBLIC SERVICE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, DEFENDANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lattanzi v. Public Service Transportation Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1929-05-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"458\", \"last_page\": \"458\", \"citations\": \"7 N.J. Misc. 458\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Miscellaneous Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:53:15.997020+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"DONATO LATTANZI, PLAINTIFF, v. PUBLIC SERVICE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, DEFENDANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"DONATO LATTANZI, PLAINTIFF, v. PUBLIC SERVICE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, DEFENDANT.\\nDecided May 4, 1929.\\nBefore Gummere, Chief Justice, and Justice Parker.\\nEor the rule, Henry H. Fryling.\\nContra, William C. French.\", \"word_count\": \"162\", \"char_count\": \"970\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe plaintiff brought the present suit to recover compensation for personal injuries received by him in a collision between a motor truck which belonged to him, and in which he was riding, and a bus of the defendant company, and also for damages done to his truck. The plaintiff's truck was being driven by his son, a boy eighteen years old, who had no driver's license. The trial resulted i'n a verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the jury awarding him $10,000.\\nOur examination of the testimony in the case satisfies us that the finding of the jury, which exonerates the plaintiff's driver from negligence contributing to the accident, is contrary to the great weight of the evidence.\\nEor this reason the rule to show cause will be made absolute.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/509405.json b/nj/509405.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..89bc2a75c58245422312e5a8bf1396d54cbe729a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/509405.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"509405\", \"name\": \"AUSTIN L. McCARTHY, APPELLANT, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF NEW JERSEY, RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"McCarthy v. Board of Trustees\", \"decision_date\": \"1964-12-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"502\", \"last_page\": \"509\", \"citations\": \"85 N.J. Super. 502\", \"volume\": \"85\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:51:00.098123+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"AUSTIN L. McCARTHY, APPELLANT, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES\\u2019 RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF NEW JERSEY, RESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"AUSTIN L. McCARTHY, APPELLANT, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES\\u2019 RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF NEW JERSEY, RESPONDENT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued October 13, 1964\\nDecided December 8, 1964.\\nBefore Judges Gaulkiit, Foley and Collestee.\\nMr. Robert 8. Miller argued the cause for appellant.\\nMr. Richard Newman, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Arthur J. Sills, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).\", \"word_count\": \"2301\", \"char_count\": \"13527\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nGaulkin, S. J. A. D.\\nThe Board of Trastees of the Public Employees' Betirement System (hereafter Board) refused to pay to Austin L. McCarthy (hereafter Austin) death benefits which Austin claims are payable to him by virtue of the death of his brother Frank V. McCarthy (hereafter Frank), and Austin appeals.\\nThe facts are stipulated. Frank was employed by Highland Park for over 30 years, and in 1955 he was superintendent of streets. In January of that year he became a member of the Public Employees' Betirement System under the provisions of L. 1954, c. 84 (hereafter chapter 84). In his application for membership Frank named Austin as beneficiary and, in the event Austin did not survive him, Eleanor K. Sabino. Under section 41(c) of said chapter 84 his membership entitled his beneficiary to\\n\\\"(1) His accumulated deductions at the time of death, together with regular interest; and (2) An amount equal to 1% times the compensation received by [him] in the last year of creditable service.\\\"\\nIt is agreed that (2) was \\\"noncontributory\\\"\\u2014i. e., section 24 of said chapter 84 provided that this benefit was to be paid out of a \\\"contingent reserve fund\\\" made up entirely of money contributed by the State. Section 51 of said chapter 84 per mitted a member to buy additional \\\"contributory\\\" death benefits, but Prank did not elect to buy any. Section 28 provided that such additional contributory death benefits were to be paid to the beneficiaries of members who elected to buy them out of a \\\"members' death benefit fund\\\" made up of the contributions of such members.\\nThereafter L. 1955, c. 214 (hereafter chapter 214) was passed. Section 1 of said act provided that the Board \\\"is hereby authorized to purchase a policy or policies of group life insurance to provide for the benefits specified in section 41 and 57 of chapter 84 of the laws of 1954.\\\" Section 4 of chapter 214 provided that the premiums for the coverage of the noncontributory death benefits were to be \\\"paid from the contingent reserve fund established by section 24 of chapter 84 of the laws of 1954,\\\" while the premiums for the \\\"optional contributory death benefits shall be paid from the members' death benefit fund established by section 28 of chapter 84\\nSection 5 of said chapter 214 provided that \\\"each member selecting the additional death benefit coverage shall agree to the deduction of a percentage of his compensation\\\" to pay for it. Section 6 provided that the group policies must contain the conversion privileges \\\"prescribed by the law\\\" relating to group life insurance. (See N. J. S. A. 17:34-31. No such benefits were obtainable under chapter 84.) Sections 7 and 8 of chapter 214 provided, as far as is here pertinent:\\n\\\"7. Benefits under such group policy or policies shall be paid by the company to such person, if living, as the member shall have nominated by written designation duly executed and filed with the insurance company through the board of trustees, otherwise to the executors or administrators of the member's estate; except that if the board of trustees accepts from the member during his lifetime a request directing that the retirement system rather than the insurance company make payment of any death benefit in equal annual installments over a period of years or as a life annuity and such request is effective upon his death, or if the board of trustees accepts from a beneficiary to whom payment would otherwise be made by the insurance company in one sum a similar request for payment by the retirement system in equal annual installments over a period of years or as a life annuity, the insurance company shall make payment of the death benefit to which such request for payment pertains in one sum directly to the retirement system, and the retirement system shall thereupon make payment to the beneficiary in the manner directed by the member or the beneficiary as the case may be, and except, further, that if a member dies in active service as a result of accident and claim is made and allowed under section 49 of chapter 84 of the laws of 1954, the death benefit payable under the policy in such case, exclusive of any additional death benefit provided by section 57 of said chapter, shall, in lieu of being paid as aforesaid be paid to the retirement system to be credited to the contingent reserve fund established by section 24 of chapter 84 of the laws of 1954 and paid therefrom in accordance with said section 24. A member may file with the insurance company through the board of trustees and alter from time to time during his lifetime, as desired, a duly attested written nomination of his payee for the death benefit.\\n8. Any arrangement for payment under the group policy to a beneficiary shall be in lieu of that provided by sections 41 and 57 of chapter 84 of the laws of 1954.\\\"\\nThe Board did arrange to purchase a policy of group insurance from the Prudential Insurance Company, covering the contributory as well as the noncontributory benefits. On October 4, 1956 Frank signed a card entitled \\\"Enrollment Card State of New Jersey Group Life Insurance Plan.\\\" In it he checked the first of the two following squares:\\nI wish to enroll for the full amount of life insurance for which I am eligible and I hereby authorize my employer to deduct from my wages the contributions required of me for the contributory insurance.\\n\\u25a1 I wish to enroll for the free life insurance only and I understand that my right to enroll for additional contributory insurance will expire one year from the date of my eligibility for contributory insurance.\\nFrank V. McCarthy\\nOct 4/56 Date Signature of Employee\\\"\\nThe card contained no space for a witness, nor was there anything in it to suggest that attestation was necessary.\\nThis enrolled Frank for the noncontributory benefit of iy2 times his salary and the contributory benefit of y2 his salary. On this card he named Mary A. Hefferman and said Eleanor R. Sabino jointly as Ms beneficiaries. He made no mention of Austin.\\nThe Prudential issued its policy on December 1, 1956. On August 9, 1957 Frank died. He was then earning $6,300 per year. The Prudential paid to the two named beneficiaries the benefits due under the policy, totalling $12,600. The Board tendered to Austin the \\\"accumulated deductions at the time of death together with regular interest,\\\" mentioned above as being one of the benefits due under section 41(c) of chapter 84 of the Laws of 1954. This amounted to $545.22. Austin rejected it.\\nAustin's argument is based on sections 41(c) and (d) of chapter 84, which were in force when Frank became a member of the retirement system. 41 (e) provided that the original designation of beneficiaries was to be \\\"by written designation duly executed\\\" and filed with the Board. 41(d) provided:\\n\\\"A member may file with the board of trustees and alter from time to time during his lifetime, as desired, a duly attested written new nomination of. the payee of the death benefit provided under this section. \\\" (Emphasis ours)\\nSection 57 of chapter 84 (relating to optional contributory death benefits) also provided for the nomination of beneficiaries \\\"by written designation duly executed and filed with the board of trustees,\\\" and also said:\\n\\\"f. A member selecting the additional death benefit coverage under this section may file with the board of trustees, and alter from time to time during his lifetime, as desired, a duly attested, written new nomination of the payee of the death benefit provided under this section. \\\" (Emphasis ours)\\nAustin argues that when Frank named him beneficiary, he obtained a vested right of which he could be divested only in the fashion specified in said sections 41 and 57\\u2014that is, by a writing \\\"duly attested\\\"; the \\\"Enrollment Card\\\" was not witnessed or acknowledged, and so was not \\\"duly attested\\\"; he therefore concludes he is entitled to all death benefits or, at least, to the noncontributory 1% times Frank's annual salary ($6,300 per annum) provided lor by section 41(e) of said chapter 84.\\nThe Board answers that Frank's designation of beneficiaries under the newiy instituted group life insurance plan was made in accordance with the express provisions of section 7 of said chapter 214, (N. J. S. A. 43:15A\\u201494); that it was in lieu of the benefits afforded by chapter 84, and that it constituted a new and original designation under chapter 214 and not a change of beneficiary under chapter 84. We agree.\\nAlthough the title of chapter 214 termed it a supplement to chapter 84, chapter 214 brought into the law something new \\u2014-group insurance. We need not pause to consider whether a member of the system had the right to refuse the group insurance and to insist upon the payment of benefits by the Board itself pursuant to chapter 84, for here Frank did request the group insurance.\\nAs we have said, when Frank enrolled for the group insurance, section 7 of chapter 214 provided:\\n\\\"7. Benefits under such group policy or policies shall be paid by the company to such person, if living, as the member shall have nominated by written designation duly executed and filed with the insurance company through the board of trustees, otherwise to the executors or administrators of the member's estate;\\nIt will be noted that this language, as to the designation of a beneficiary, is almost identical with section 41(c) of chapter 84, quoted above.\\nAnd said section 7 of chapter 214 concluded:\\n\\\" A member may file with the insurance company through the board of trustees and alter from time to time during his lifetime, as desired, a duly attested written nomination of Ms payee for the death benefit.\\\"\\nPlaintiff admits that under said section 41(c) of chapter 84 the original designation of beneficiaries did not have to be acknowledged or attested. However, says plaintiff, under the language of section 7 of chapter 214 even an original designation of a beneficiary of the group insurance must be \\\"duly attested,\\\" and here Frank's enrollment for group insurance was not attested at all. If Frank's designation of the beneficiaries of the group insurance were to fail for this reason, the benefits would not be payable to Austin but to Frank's estate. However, since Austin says that he is the administrator of Prank's estate (although the record does not show it, and he does not sue in that capacity) we shall pass upon this contention.\\nPlaintiff predicates his argument that section 7 of chapter 214 requires that the original designation be duly attested upon the fact that the word \\\"new,\\\" which appears in sections 41(d) and 57(f) of chapter 84, is omitted from the last sentence, above quoted, of section 7 of chapter 214. Plaintiff argues that the word \\\"new\\\" was deliberately omitted by the Legislature with the intention that all designations of beneficiaries of the group insurance, original or subsequent, were to be \\\"duly attested.\\\"\\nWe disagree. If that is what the Legislature intended to do, it easily could have used the word \\\"attested\\\" instead of \\\"executed\\\" in the first sentence. Instead, as to original designations the Legislature used the same language in section 7 of chapter 214 as it used in many other comparable sections of the statutes. Compare, for example, N. J. S. A. 43 :15A-45 (c), 46(c), 48(d). In short, we hold that the last sentence of section 7 of chapter 214 (N. J. S. A. 43 :15A-94) does not apply to the original application for group insurance, which need not be attested, but onfy to later designations, in those cases in which no person had been named as a beneficiary in the original enrollment, or where the member wishes to change the beneficiary.\\nAs we have said, section 8 of chapter 214 (N. J. S. A. 43:15A-95) provided that \\\"Any arrangement for payment under the group policy to a beneficiary shall be in lieu of that provided by sections 41 and 57 of chapter 84 .\\\" As to so much of the \\\"enrollment card\\\" as related to the noneontributory life insurance, Austin's arguments plainly do not apply, and to that insurance he obviously has no claim. When Prank applied for the contributory insurance, it was a new application for a new contract of coverage, providing new benefits. As to that new coverage, there was no change of beneficiary and section 7 of chapter 214 alone governed the validity of Prank's designation of beneficiaries.\\nWe hold that, as to the noneontributory benefits as well, there was an election by Prank to accept the new and broader benefits provided by chapter 214 and the group policy issued thereunder; that those benefits were \\\"in lieu of\\\" the benefits provided by chapter 84, and that therefore there was no change of beneficiary of the chapter 84 death benefits but a new tripartite arrangement between Prank on the one side and the Board and the insurance company on the other, under chapter 214. Cf. Woehr v. Travelers Insurance Co., 134 N. J. Eq. 38, 45 (Ch. 1943); Spina v. Consolidated Police, etc., Pension Fund Com., 41 N. J. 391 (1964).\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/513377.json b/nj/513377.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c8c713721df4bf1fc95b260d584bf1c5bd678ce9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/513377.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"513377\", \"name\": \"NEW JERSEY HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, A CORPORATION, NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION OF REAL ESTATE BOARDS, A CORPORATION, AND JOSEPH V. MONTORO, PLAINTIFFS, v. DIVISION ON CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"New Jersey Home Builders Ass'n v. Division on Civil Rights in the Department of Education\", \"decision_date\": \"1963-11-13\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"243\", \"last_page\": \"266\", \"citations\": \"81 N.J. Super. 243\", \"volume\": \"81\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:18:15.307523+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"NEW JERSEY HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, A CORPORATION, NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION OF REAL ESTATE BOARDS, A CORPORATION, AND JOSEPH V. MONTORO, PLAINTIFFS, v. DIVISION ON CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"NEW JERSEY HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, A CORPORATION, NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION OF REAL ESTATE BOARDS, A CORPORATION, AND JOSEPH V. MONTORO, PLAINTIFFS, v. DIVISION ON CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Chancery Division\\nDecided November 13, 1963.\\nMr. W. Louis Bossle for the plaintiffs.\\nMr. Arthur J. Sills, Attorney General of New Jersey, for defendant (Mr. Joseph A. Hoffman, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel).\", \"word_count\": \"6578\", \"char_count\": \"39467\", \"text\": \"Wick, J. S. C.\\nThis is a suit wherein plaintiffs New Jersey Home Builders Association, New Jersey Association of Beal Estate Boards and Joseph Montoro seek by declaratory judgment to invalidate certain portions of the Law Against Discrimination (N. J. S. A. 18:25-1 et seq).\\nThe New Jersey Home Builders Association is a nonprofit corporation of the State of New Jersey. Its membership is comprised of persons, partnerships, associations and corporations of this State engaged in the business of home building. It was formed for the purpose of representing the home builders industry for \\\"mutual advantage and cooperation.\\\" The New Jersey Association of Beal Estate Boards, a coplaintiff, is also a nonprofit association whose membership is composed of most of the real estate brokers and many real estate salesmen licensed to do business in the State of New Jersey. The individual coplaintiff, Montoro, is engaged in the business of building dwellings and other structures. He is also a licensed real estate broker, with licensed salesmen in his employ at his place of business in Pleasantville, Atlantic County, New Jersey. Montoro is a member of the New Jersey Home Builders Association, a coplamtiff in this action.\\nThe Law Against Discrimination (N. J. S. A. 18:25-l et seq.) requires that all persons shall have an equal opportunity to obtain all the advantages of\\n\\\" publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other real property without discrimination subject only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons. This opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.\\\" (N. J. S. A. 18:25-4; emphasis added)\\nIt is an unlawful discrimination for an owner, real estate broker, real estate salesman, or their agents or employees to refuse to sell, rent, lease, assign or sublease, or otherwise to deny to or withhold from any person or group of persons, any real property or land or part or portion thereof because of race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry of such person or group of persons. N. J. S. A. 18:25-12(g) and (h).\\nThe law covers these classifications of properties:\\n(1) All publicly assisted housing accommodations. This category includes housing erected with public funds or assistance pursuant to certain State laws enumerated in N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(k) and\\n\\\" an housing financed in whole or in part by a loan, whether or not secured by a mortgage, the repayment of which is guaranteed or insured by the Federal Government or any agency thereof.\\\" (N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(k))\\n(2) All vacant lands. N. J. S. A. 18:25-5 (l).\\n(3) All multiple dwellings containing accommodations for more than four families, regardless of the type of financing. N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(0(1).\\n(4) All three-family dwellings where one of the units or apartments is not \\\"maintained by the owner at the time of sale or rental as the household of his family.\\\" N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(Z)(1).\\nAn exception from the operative provisions of the law exists if the dwelling is not subject to any indebtedness \\\"the repayment of which is guaranteed or insured by the Federal Government or any agency thereof.\\\" N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(k), if it is in one of the following classes:\\n(1) All one and two-family dwellings\\n\\\"except, however when they are part of a group of 10 or more dwelling houses constructed or to be constructed (exclusive of public streets) and are offered for sale or rental by a person who owns or has owned or otherwise controls or has controlled the sale or rental of such group of dwelling houses.\\\" N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(Z) (2).\\n(2) All three-family dwellings where one unit or apartment is\\n\\\"maintained by the owner at the time of sale or rental as the household of his family.\\\" N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(Z) (1).\\nThe Law Against Discrimination is based on the express legislative finding that discrimination is a threat to the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of the State and is a menace to free democracy. N. J. S. A. 18 :25-3.\\nIf the State Commissioner of Education finds (in accordance with the statute) an act of discrimination by a person subject to the provisions of the statute, he has the power to serve an order on the respondent requiring him to cease and desist from further action in violation of the law. N. J. S. A. 18 :25-17. Upon a failure of the respondent to comply therewith, enforcement must be sought through the courts. N. J. S. A. 18:25-19 and 21.\\nThe complaint sets forth six objectionable features of N. J. S. A. 18:25-1 et seq.:\\n(1) The Commissioner of Education is authorized to compel a home owner, under pain of fine or imprisonment, to sell or rent his home to a person without discrimination solely because the home is financed in whole or in part by a loan, whether or not secured by a mortgage, the repayment of which is guaranteed or insured by the Federal Government or any agency thereof.\\n(2) Home owners not having such loans, and not otherwise obligated to the Federal Government, are accorded special immunities and privileges not accorded to home owners having such loans. The allegation in regard to this matter is that the result is arbitrary and invidious discrimination.\\n(3) This invasion amounts to the taking of private property for private use.\\n(4) The statute constituted an invasion of the fundamental rights of man.\\n(5) The classification is discriminatory in result because it is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious and bears no relationship to the police power or the purposes sought to be attained by the enactment.\\n(6) The act is not within the public domain under the definition found in N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(k), in that it is violative of man's inalienable rights to property.\\nFor these reasons it is alleged that the exceptions embodied in N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(1) also render the classification arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory and constitute an invasion of the fundamental rights of man, all in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.\\nFurther, it is alleged that the Law Against Discrimination, N. J. S. A. 18:25-l et seq., insofar as it authorizes the Commissioner to compel builders, real estate brokers, real estate salesmen, or their employees and agents, to sell and/or build a dwelling, creates an involuntary servitude or a form of peonage, in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and of several federal statutes.\\nI.\\nThe plaintiffs prosecute this action under N. J. S. 2A:16-53 of the Declaratory Judgments Law. The preliminary procedural requirement is a determination that a real controversy be found to exist. Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 20 N. J. 451 (1956). The court should not \\\"decide or declare the rights or status of parties upon a state of facts which is future, contingent, and uncertain.\\\" Tanner v. Boynton Lumber Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 85, 89 (Ch. 1925).\\nThe Declaratory Judgments Law (N. J. S. 2A:16-50 et seq.) is expressly declared to be remedial in nature. N. J. S. 2A:16-51. Its mandate is to afford relief from uncertainty with respect to a person's rights\\u2014\\\"person\\\" including partnerships, unincorporated associations and corporations. N. J. S. 2A:16-50. It is incumbent on the court to liberally construe and administer the law in order to effectuate this general purpose. N. J. S. 2A:16-51; Central Hofbrau Corp. v. 200 River St. Corp., 11 N. J. Super. 463 (Law Div. 1951); Rosenberg v. D. Kaltman & Co., 28 N. J. Super. 459 (Ch. Div. 1953).\\nThat the complaint does not allege a past violation or damage already suffered is not destructive of the cause of action. No wrong need be proved. The existence of a claim, or the threat of a possible claim, disturbing the peace of the plaintiffs' freedom by casting doubt or uncertainty upon their rights or status, establishes the requisite condition of justiciability. N. J. S. 2A:16-52; Trustees of Rutgers College in N. J. v. Richman, 41 N. J. Super. 259 (Ch. Div. 1956); compare Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N. J. 500 (1954), certiorari denied 349 U. S. 904, 75 S. Ct. 580, 99 L. Ed. 1241 (1955); Blackman v. Iles, 4 N. J. 82 (1950); Abelson's, Inc. v. New Jersey State Board of Optometrists, 5 N. J. 412 (1950). In fact, an action under the Declaratory Judgments Law is ordinarily limited in its application to \\\"cases where rights had not yet been invaded or wrongs yet committed to the extent of actionable damage.\\\" Adams v. Atlantic City, 26 N. J. Misc. 259, 261, 59 A. 2d 825, 826 (Sup. Ct. 1948). A controversy exists in the case sub judice if any or all of the plaintiffs will be affected by enforcement of the Law Against Discrimination (N. J. S. A. 18:25-1 et seq.).\\nA plaintiff must have an interest in the subject matter in order to maintain a suit for declaratory judgment. Bergen County v. Port of New York Authority, 33 N. J. 303 (1960). This relation to the canse is necessary to a finding that a controversy, or at least uncertainty, exists as to the status or right of the plaintiffs. It is the finding of both justiciability and standing which forms the basis for relief under the Declaratory Judgments Law.\\nTwo of the three plaintiffs herein are associations incorporated under Title 15 of the Revised Statutes of this State. As distinct legal entities, these two corporations having nothing to do with the building, sale, lease or rental of real property. They are merely private interest organizations created for the \\\"mutual advantage and cooperation of its members.\\\" Although the Declaratory Judgments Law empowers a corporation to invoke its provisions, N. J. S. 3A:16-50,\\n\\\" proceedings thereunder are necessarily restricted by the general rule of law requiring the prosecution of all actions to be in the name of the real party in interest\\u2014a person 'whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected' [N. J. S. 2A:16-53] by the statutes in question \\\" New Jersey Bankers Ass'n v. Van Riper, 1 N. J. 193, 196 (1948).\\nIt is difficult to envision how the two corporate plaintiffs, apart from their individual members, can bring themselves as violators within the enforcement provisions of the Law Against Discrimination. The law in question has to do solely with the rights and obligations of builders, owners, lessors, brokers and developers of land. It thus appears that the corporations are not legally competent to maintain this action.\\nFurther, the prosecution of this suit byr the plaintiff corporations cannot be justified on the theory that they sue as representatives of a class.\\n\\\"Implicit in the doctrine of virtual representation is the requirement that the representative be in fact a member of the class he is undertaking to represent \\\" New Jersey Bankers Ass'n v. Van Riper, supra, 1 N. J., at p. 197; R. R. 4:36-2.\\nThat the plaintiff corporations are not themselves members of the class affected by the subject matter in controversy is self-evident.\\nIn Newark Twentieth Century Taxicab Ass'n v. Lerner, 11 N. J. Super. 363 (Ch. Div. 1951), the plaintiff, a corporate association, had been formed by a number of taxicab drivers for the good and welfare of its members. The corporation negotiated for the purchase of liability insurance for taxicabs owned by individual members of the corporation. These policies were issued by the defendant mutual insurance company to the individual members of the plaintiff corporation who severally and directly paid premiums to the defendant. The corporation owned no taxicabs and held no insurance issued by the defendant. The corporation brought an action against the insurance company, charging that its officers had committed alleged wrongs against the members of the plaintiff association. The court held that the association was not entitled to maintain the action because it had no property right or interest in respect to the funds, property or assets of the insurance company, and that the action could not be maintained as a class action. It was emphasized that \\\"One may not have judicial redress in respect of a matter in which he is without interest, right or duty.\\\" 11 N. J. Super., at p. 366.\\nIt was considered \\\"fundamental\\\" in the case of Baxter v. Baxter, 43 N. J. Eq. 82, 86 (Ch. 1887), affirmed 44 N. J. Eq. 298 (E. & A. 1888), that \\\" [cjourts do not listen to parties who complain of wrongs done to others but not to them. In such a case there is no justiciable controversy between the parties before the court.\\\" Brown v. Ramsey, 185 F. 2d 225, 227 (8 Cir. 1950).\\nThe court is cognizant of the fact that it is convenient to have the two corporate associations prosecute the case sub judice on behalf of the many builders, developers and real estate brokers, etc., who belong to these member organizations, but the law as it exists in this State does not permit a plaintiff so remotely related to sue, either on behalf of itself or on behalf of its members. This is true even though suit is brought under the liberal provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Law. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed as to the plaintiffs New Jersey Home Builders Association and the New Jersey Association of Real Estate Boards, for a lack of standing to sue.\\nThe individual coplaintiff, Montoro, is engaged in the business of constructing dwellings and other structures. He is also a licensed real estate broker with licensed salesmen in his employ. By virtue of the Law Against Discrimination he runs the risk of being found guilty of violating its provisions. Enforcement by the State through appropriate legal proceedings could very well cause Montoro irreparable harm. See Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, supra.\\nIn the case of New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, 3 N. J. 235 (1949), plaintiff Turnpike Authority brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of the constitutionality of the Turnpike Authority Act (N. J. S. A. 27:23-1 et seq.) prior to the issuance of up to $175,000,000 in bonds to finance the Turnpike. The Authority alleged in its complaint that the Turnpike Authority Act was in contravention of Article YIII, Section II, paragraph 3, of the Constitution of 1947, which limited the state debt. No litigation was pending at the time of the suit for declaratory judgment. Our Supreme 'Court held that the Authority had a sufficient interest to maintain the suit and, further, that an actual controversy existed which was ripe for judicial determination.\\nAs in the Turnpike case, plaintiff Montoro makes no pretense of complying with the questioned legislation. Admittedly, there has been no attempt to enforce the Law Against Discrimination with respect to Montoro. However, public officers and agents are duty-bound to carry out the functions of their offices by enforcing the law. State v. Winne, 12 N. J. 152 (1953). It would be a meaningless act to require Montoro to violate the Law Against Discrimination, either intentionally or unintentionally, in order to allow him the opportunity of seeking a determination of its constitutionality. It is in this very type of situation that the Declaratory Judgments Law has its greatest significance.\\nIt is the opinion of the court that Montoro, as a builder, has a sufficient interest in the outcome of this case to maintain this action. Further, an actual controversy does exist in regard to the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Law Against Discrimination and is found by the court to be ripe for determination.\\nII.\\nThe plaintiff contends the Law Against Discrimination represents an invidious and discriminatory exercise of the legislative function, contrary to organic law, state and federal.\\nArticle I, paragraph 5, of the Constitution of 1947 provides that\\n\\\"No person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil right because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin.\\\"\\nThis constitutional mandate is implemented by N. J. S. A. 18:25-4, which declares that the opportunity to obtain all the accommodations and facilities of publicly-assisted housing and other real property shall be a civil right.\\nThe Law Against Discrimination was twice held constitutional by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The first case to arise was Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, etc., 31 N. J. 514 (1960), appeal dismissed for lack of a federal question, 363 U. S. 418, 80 S. Ct. 1257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1515 (1960). There our Supreme Court expressly held that the law prohibiting discrimination in \\\"publicly assisted housing\\\" is not an unreasonable and arbitrary classification in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I, paragraph 1 of the Neiv Jersey Constitution. The questions of due process and the exercise of the police power, although not considered in the Levitt case, were squarely faced in Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N. J. 384 (1962). There the Supreme Court determined that the Law Against Discrimination, as it applies to \\\"publicly assisted housing,\\\" is a reasonable exercise of the police power and hence not violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.\\nThe Leviit and Jones cases are dispositive of any challenge to the Law Against Discrimination on the basis of a violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights, as the law applies to publicly-assisted housing. The mere fact that the complainant in the instant case is a builder and real estate broker, rather than a housing developer, is not a basis for further challenge on the same grounds raised in the prior two cases.\\nBefore considering the merits of the plaintiffs' claims remaining, it must be observed that a presumption arises in favor of the constitutionality of a statute and the burden of proof and persuasion rests heavily on the party contesting. Gibraltar Factors Corp. v. Slapo, 23 N. J. 459 (1957); see Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457, 77 S. Ct. 1344, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1485 (1957). In addition to this already difficult burden, one who assails a statute on the ground that it contravenes the equal protection clause \\\"must contend with principles of unusual elasticity.\\\" New Jersey Restaurant Ass'n v. Holderman, 24 N. J. 295, 300 (1957).\\nThe initial inquiry by the court is whether the Legislature can act with regard to discrimination in private housing, for it is onty if this question is answered in the affirmative that the court can then proceed to the question of the reasonableness of the means adopted to effectuate the legislative intent in the area dealt with.\\n\\\"To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear\\u2014First, that the interests of the public require such interference; and, second, that the mean\\u00ae are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.\\\" Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 137, 14 S. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385 (1894).\\nHistorically, racial, religious and national prejudices, which show themselves in a variety of overt forms of discrimination, have been the subject of major concern to government on the federal, state and local levels. It is a well recognized fact that discrimination in housing, as an evil, cannot be distinguished from the evils of discrimination in education and business.\\nThe problems born of discrimination in housing, particularly against Negroes, are particularly acute.\\n\\\"They are compelled in large numbers to live in circumscribed areas under substandard, unhealthy, unsanitary and crowded living conditions. These conditions in turn produce disease, increased mortality, unstable family life, moral laxity, crime, delinquency, risk of fire, loss of tax revenue and intergroup tensions. See Levitt, supra, 31 N. J., at p. 531; Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 32, 75 S. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27 (1954) ; 5 N. Y. City Charter & Code \\u00a7 W41-1.0; Report, United States Commission on Civil Rights, Housing, supra, 1\\u20144; Report, United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1959, p. 534. Standards of sanitation have to be sacrificed because strict enforcement of building and health codes will simply make a great many people homeless. See 'State Action,' 14 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 47 (1961). All of these things imperil the tranquillity of a community. In addition, substandard and segregated housing seriously complicates the problem of public school integration.\\\" Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., supra, 37 N. J., at p. 392.\\nBeyond question, the evil here sought to be corrected is one which directly affects the public health, safety, morals and welfare. See \\\"Minority Housing,\\\" 46 Cornell L. Q. 194 (1961); U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Housing, (1961), City of Newark v. Charles Realty Co., 9 N. J. Super. 442, 453-456 (Law Div. 1950).\\nA state may not, in any way, participate in discriminatory acts, nor may it use its courts to enforce obligations which result in discrimination in housing violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948). It is but a logical step from the state's negative role in this field to its positive role of actively prohibiting discrimination in housing.\\nThe significant issue remaining is whether the legislative intent to eradicate discrimination in housing has been reasonably placed into effect. Plaintiff contends that the Law Against Discrimination is unconstitutional in that: (1) the cited exceptions to the operation of the declared statutory policy, N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(l) (1), (2) and (3), applicable to \\\"other real property,\\\" as defined in N. J. S. A. 18:25\\u20145(Z), are expressly made inapplicable to \\\"publicly assisted housing accommodations,\\\" as defined in N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(k); and (2) considering \\\"other real property\\\" as a separate and distinct class in itself, the exemption of the properties defined in N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(Z) from the force of the expressed policy renders such classification equally void and ineffective as arbitrary and capricious, making for a difference in treatment at odds with the essential principle to be served.\\nIt is the function of the court to determine if there has been a reduction of constitutional guarantees by virtue of the Law Against Discrimination. Care must be taken in this dilemma to preclude any whittling away of constitutional rights. Simply calling a categorization of persons or things a \\\"classification\\\" does not satisfy the requirements of equal protection. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 S. Ct. 255, 41 L. Fd. 666 (1897). The inclusions and exceptions of the Law Against Discrimination must be based upon material and substantial distractions and differences reasonably related to the purpose and subject matter thereof. Washington National Ins. Co. v. Board of Review, 1 N. J. 545 (1949); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U. S. 459, 57 S. Ct. 838, 81 L. Ed. 1223 (1937); Morey v. Doud, supra. Only by the court's strict adherence to this requirement will individuals and their property be safeguarded from an abuse of the police power of the State. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 128 N. J. L. 611 (Sup. Ct. 1942), affirmed 130 N. J. L. 173 (E. & A. 1943).\\nThe Legislature has included within the sphere of the Law Against Discrimination certain classes of private housing, as previously set forth. Undeniably, this step has not exhausted the entire area, as evidenced by the listed exceptions. Nevertheless, it does represent a legislative choice to proceed in a manner consistent with what is believed to be the immediate public need. In essence, plaintiff's objection is that the enumerated classes are too small and should have included the entire area of .discrimination in private housing.\\nIn Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 34 S. Ct. 281, 58 L. Ed. 539 (1914), an alien contested the constitutionality of a state law which prohibited the killing of wild game by unnaturalized foreign-born residents. Because the statute did not apply to anyone else, the defendant made the same objection repeated here by plaintiff builder, i. e., that the statute denied equal protection in that it arbitrarily imposed restrictions on a few people without imposing similar restrictions on others who were indistinguishable in their likelihood to commit the offense. Notwithstanding the fact that there was no evidence to offset defendant's argument, the conviction was affirmed. Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority, observed:\\n\\\"A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The question is a practical one, dependent upon experience. The demand for symmetry ignores the specific difference that experience is supposed to have shown to mark the class. It is not enough to invalidate the law that others may do the same thing and go unpunished, if, as a matter of fact, it is found that the danger is characteristic of the class named.\\\" (232 U. S. at p. 144, 34 S. Ct., at p. 282, 58 L. Ed. 539, emphasis added)\\nThe boldness of Justice Holmes' position when considering the complete and utter lack of evidence distinguishing the affected from the unaffected persons weighs heavily in the decision of this court. Although there was dictum in the Patsone ease to mitigate the rigor of the quoted phrase, the case has generally been followed. Morey v. Doud, supra; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942); McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U. S. 151, 35 S. Ct. 69, 59 L. Ed. 169 (1914); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, 69 S. Ct. 463, 93 L. Ed. 533 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464, 69 S. Ct. 198, 93 L. Ed. 163 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U. S. 552, 67 S. Ct. 910, 91 L. Ed. 1093 (1947); New Jersey Restaurant Ass'n, Inc. v. Holderman, supra; Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, supra; cf. Two Guys from Harrison, Inc. v. Furman, 32 N. J. 199 (1960).\\nIn the case of Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, 69 S. Ct. 463, 93 L. Ed. 533 (1949), a municipal regulation forbade the use of panelled delivery vehicles for advertising purposes. An exception was made when the advertisement was connected with the business of the trucking company itself. The purpose of the law was to lessen road hazards by reducing eye-catching distractions. The ordinance was attacked as a denial of equal protection. Although it was not denied that trucks advertising their own products or services were no less likely to distract attention than vehicles advertising the products of other businesses, the United States Supreme Court sustained the ordinance, employing language followed in the Levitt case: \\\"It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.\\\" (336 U. S., at p. 110, 69 S. Ct., at p. 466, 93 L. Ed. 533.)\\nA careful analysis of N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(1) reveals that the Legislature is aiming, at the present, toward the eradication of discrimination of that portion of private housing which, in some of its aspects, is colored by \\\"public\\\" considerations ; for instance, the inclusion of ten or more dwellings in a contiguous area, and those dwellings containing accommodations for four or more families, or three or more families if the owner is not the occupant. Conversely, the law is geared to exclude dwellings where, the owner occupant would be placed in a relative position of personal proximity to the buyer or tenant. Eor instance, a room in a private home is excluded. Also, one- or two-family houses are excluded unless they are so grouped as to form a large housing development. The same is true of three-family houses where the owner is an occupant. (All of these presuppose a Jack of public assistance.)\\nThe same harmful consequences which flow from discrimination in the sale of dwellings also flow from the rental of housing. This is manifested in the efforts of government to eliminate slums and provide for new middle-income rental projects. Cf. Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N. J. 500 (1954), which upheld rent controls as a valid exercise of the police power.\\nWhat has been said thus far as to the three- or four-family dwelling is equally applicable to developments of one- or two-family houses in a contiguous area containing ton or more such dwellings. The greater evil exists in developments of substantial size. In the interest of clarity, a minimum number of ten contiguous dwellings has been set. See Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 344 Mass. 387, 182 N. E. 2d 595 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1962), upholding a similar statute prohibiting discrimination in contiguously located housing accommodations.\\nThe included classes of dwellings are, as a general rule, investment properties offered to the public for rental or sale as a commercial venture. This category of housing is clearly distinguishable from small private homes used primarily as private residences.\\nOrdinarily, vacant land is a commercial asset offered to the public at large for a profit. As investment property, it is devoid of most of the personal proximity which exists in the excluded categories of dwellings. It is of legitimate legislative concern that minority groups should not be deprived of the potential of undeveloped land merely because of their race, color, national origin, etc.\\nThe legislative decision to approach the problem of housing discrimination on a \\\"stop by step\\\" basis has been expressly upheld by the highest court of the State. Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, supra. The portions of the Law Against Discrimination here challenged are but the next logical step as the Legislature advances towards the eventual total eradication of discrimination in housing.\\nPlaintiff claims that he has been unjustly deprived of private rights including the free alienability and use of his property. Such rights have often been limited by the reasonable exercise of the police power. In the case of Jamouneau v. Harner, supra, rent controls were upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. Therein it was stated that:\\n\\\"The basic right of private property yields to au overriding public need. There is an ever-increasing demand for accommodation of the right of property and of contract to the inexorable needs and pressures of our complex economy and intricate social organism. The vital community interest is paramount.\\\" 16 N. J., at p. 514.\\nRestrictions on private property rights through the imposition of prohibitions on discrimination are not unique. N. J. S. A. 18:25-4 and 5. N. J. S. A. 18:25-5(j) forbids discrimination in such privately owned businesses as hotels, restaurants, taverns, bowling alleys, etc. Employers are forbidden to discriminate in hiring and other procedures. Private labor organizations are similarly restricted. N. J. S. A. 18:25-12 (b). Although it was in another context, the United States Supreme Court, in 1962, considered and declared valid a town ordinance prohibiting any excavation below the water table. In effect, the ordinance confiscated the entire mining utility of the defendant's property, its only practical use. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 82 S. Ct. 987, 8 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1962). See Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, supra, and 16 Vand. L. Rev. 199 (1962), for lists o\\u00ed regulated private rights in other states.\\nEven if it be conceded that this issue is in fact a close one, it is consistent with judicial enlightenment to resolve the doubt according to the felicitous words of Justice Frankfurter in the case of Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 98, 65 S. Ct. 1483, 89 L. Ed. 2072 (1945) (concurring opinion) :\\n\\\"[A] State may leave abstention from such discriminations to the conscience of individuals. On the other hand, a State may choose to put its authority behind one of the cherished aims of American feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prejudice to another's hurt. To use the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword against such State power would stultify that Amendment. Certainly the insistence by individuals on their private prejudices as to race, color or creed, ought not to have a higher constitutional sanction than the determination of a State to extend the area of non-discrimination beyond that which the Constitution itself exacts.\\\"\\nA lack of public assistance does not prohibit the application of anti-discrimination laws to housing as the plaintiff contends. The basis for state action in this area is not primarily that public assistance may be supplied. Eather, it is the existence of a form of discrimination mimical with the institutions and principles of free democratic society. Similar statutes have been found to be a constitutional exercise of the police power in New York, California and Colorado. See Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, supra; Martin v. City of New York, 22 Misc. 2d 389, 201 N. Y. S. 2d 111 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P. 2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Colorado Anti Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, Colo., 380 P. 2d 34 (Sup. Ct. 1962); New York State Comm. v. Pelham Hall Apartments, 10 Misc. 2d 334, 170 N. Y. S. 2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958). It is only in the State of Washington that a statute prohibiting racial discrimination in the sale of publicly assisted housing was held to be unconstitutional. O'Meara v. Washington State Board Against Discrim., 365 P. 2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Since the Levitt and Jones cases reached the opposite conclusion, the O'Meara case is not even persuasive authority in this State.\\nThe Law Against Discrimination is operative against members of majority groups and minority groups alike. It specifically prohibits discrimination in the sale of real property because of race, creed, color or national origin. N. J. S. A. 18:25-4, 12. Thus, a member of a minority race can be guilty of discrimination against a member of the majority. That prevalent circumstances would make such discrimination less likely does not infect the law with inequality. The law itself is aimed at the protection of all races, colors and creeds.\\nSurely, the interest of the seller or lessor of realty in barring undesirables from their neighborhoods should not be extended beyond the realm where the actual conduct of the supposed undesirable would constitute a ground for constructive eviction or a nuisance action. \\\"[T]he greater good for the greater number must prevail and individual inconveniences must be suffered as the price to be paid for living in a well-ordered society.\\\" Gundaker Central Motors v. Gassert, 23 N. J. 71, 78 (1956).\\nIII.\\nPlaintiff contends, finally, that the Law Against Discrimination, insofar as it purports to authorize the Commissioner of Education to compel builders to erect homes for persons designated by him, the Law creates an involuntary servitude or a form of peonage, in disregard of the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States 'Constitution and the pertinent federal statutes.\\nThe powers of the Commissioner to make findings and issue orders are delineated in N. J. S. A. 18:25-17, which states in part as follows:\\n\\\"If, upon all the evidence at the hearing the commissioner shall find that the respondent has engaged in any unlawful discrimination as defined in this act [sections 18:25-1 to 18:25-28], the commissioner shall state his findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such respondent an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such unlawful discrimination and to take such affirmative action, including, but not limited to, extending full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges to all persons, as, in the judgment of the commissioner, will effectuate the purpose of this act, and including a requirement for report of the manner of compliance.\\\"\\nShould the Commissioner's order be ignored, he must seek its enforcement through the courts.\\n\\\"Observance of an order of the commissioner may be enforced by a civil action in the County Court to compel the specific performance of the order or of the duties imposed by law upon the respondent named in the order.\\\" N. J. S. A. 18:25-19.\\nIn addition, any decision of the Commissioner is the subject of judicial review.\\n\\\"Any person aggrieved by a final order of the commissioner may take an appeal therefrom to the County Court of the county in which the alleged unlawful discrimination took place.\\\" N. J. S. A. 18:25-21.\\nN. J. S. A. 18:25-26 declares that a willful violation of a Commissioner's order shall be a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. This section also states that procedure for the review of the order shall not be deemed to be such willful conduct.\\nThe Commissioner has been given broad authority to effectuate the worthy objective of the Law Against Discrimination. However, a detailed study of the statute reveals that nowhere in the terms is the Commissioner given the power, right or duty to compel a builder to construct a new dwelling for a particular complainant. Notwithstanding this fact, it is strenuously urged by plaintiff that the \\\"existence\\\" of this power is a basis for declaring the law unconstitutional. He is simply assuming that such an order will be issued by the Commissioner.\\nThe substantive content of an order cannot be determined until the Commissioner has gathered the evidence and made his findings N. J. S. A. 18:25-17. Only after the order has been issued do the questions of whether it is a valid exercise of the Commissioner's power and its constitutionality come into being. That plaintiff is curious or even fearful about a possible future order is not a basis for imposing upon the court, by virtue of the Declaratory Judgments Law (N. J. S. 2A:16-50 et seq.), the burden of answering questions of law which may or may not arise in the future. 1 Anderson, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1951), \\u00a7 224; accord First Camden Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilentz, 129 N. J. Eq. 333 (Ch. 1941); West v. Bank of Commerce and Trusts, 153 F. 2d 566 (4 Cir. 1946).\\nThe Thirteenth Amendment issue is considered only with reference to the statute on its face. See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 1538, 91 L. Ed. 1877 (1947). It clearly does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment. Within its terms, there is no compulsion towards involuntary servitude or peonage. That the Commissioner may act in a manner in excess of the authority vested in him, by virtue of the Law Against Discrimination, is not a basis for declaring the statute unconstitutional. The question concerning the validity of an order compelling a builder to erect a new home will not be passed upon until it is appropriately presented.\\nJudgment is rendered in favor of defendant on all other counts for the reasons hereinbefore stated.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/514272.json b/nj/514272.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2b50eae63c3db06aacedbda8e5d1e94a68dd633d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/514272.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"514272\", \"name\": \"Elbert L. Burnham and wife vs. Robert Dalling\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Burnham v. Dalling\", \"decision_date\": \"1863-02\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"144\", \"last_page\": \"146\", \"citations\": \"16 N.J. Eq. 144\", \"volume\": \"16\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:50:58.286796+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Elbert L. Burnham and wife vs. Robert Dalling.\", \"head_matter\": \"Elbert L. Burnham and wife vs. Robert Dalling.\\njn an attempted settlement by a guardian of his account, either under the act respecting th.e Orphans Court, Nix. Dig. 575, or under the act relative to guardians, Nix. Dig. 341, there must be a compliance with the requirements cf the statute, to render the account exhibited by the guardian prima facie evidence of its correctness, and to impose upon the ward the burden of proving, or showing the falsity or injustice of any item of the account, to which he may afterwards take exceptions.\\nThe case was heard upon bill and answer.\\nGilchrist, for complainants.\\nThe order of the Orphans Court was void, because not pursuant to the statute. Gray v. Fox, Saxton 260.\\nAlso because no notice was given. Nix. Dig. 580, \\u00a7 24; Hess v. Cole, 3 Zab. 116, 125; Boulton v. Scott\\u2019s Adm\\u2019r, 2 Green\\u2019s Ch. R. 231; Fennimore v. Fennimore, Ibid. 292.\\nUntil final account, this court will treat accounts as open. Merselis v. Ex\\u2019rs of Merselis, 3 Halst. Ch. R. 573; Exton v. Zule, 1 McCarter 501.\\nBarkalow, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"921\", \"char_count\": \"5277\", \"text\": \"The Chancellor.\\nThe bill is filed by husband and wife against the guardian of the wife for a discovery and an account. William Bale, the father, died on the twenty-seventh of September, 1849, leaving three infant children, two of whom were under the age of fourteen years.\\nThe defendant was appointed guardian of the three children by the Orphans Court of Passaic county, in March, 1850. In October, 1853, during the minority of the wards and while they were living under his guardianship, the guardian filed his account in the surrogate's office of the county of Passaic, under oath, whereupon the following order was made:\\nPassaic Orphans Court, October Term, 1853.\\nEobort Dalling, guardian of Eliza-) beth Bale, a minor under twenty-one V Intermediate account. years of age. j\\nThe surrogate having audited and stated the account of the above named guardian, and placed the same on the files of his office twenty days previous to this time, and being now reported for settlement, the same is in all things allowed as reported.\\nThe only question submitted for decision is, whether this settlement can be regarded as prima facie evidence of the truth of the charges contained therein, so as to render it incumbent upon the ward to prove or show the falsity or injustice thereof.\\nIt is admitted that no notice was given of the settlement by public advertisement, as was required by the statute, upon the settlement of the accounts of executors, administrators, guardians and trustees, in force at the date of the settlement.\\nNor was any citation issued to the wards to appear at the said Orphans Court, as required by law. Nix. Dig. 580, \\u00a7 24.\\nIt is obvious that the attempted settlement of the guardian's accounts was not made in compliance with the requirements of the statute, and that the decree of allowance is nugatory and void, as against the wards.\\nNor can the exhibition and filing of the account, and the allowance of it by the court, be of any avail against the ward under the provisions of the third section of the act relative to guardians. Nix. Dig. 341. The proceeding was not con ducted in accordance with the requirement of that act. No notice by public advertisement or citation of the ward is required. The account is not to be audited or stated by the surrogate. No decree of allowance is to be made. There is in fact no settlement of the account within the meaning of the statutes directing and regulating the settlement of the accounts of trustees and guardians. The account of the guardian is to be exhibited under oath, to be examined by the court, or by such person or persons as they shall appoint, and being found and certified or reported to be properly and fairly stated, and the articles thereof to be supported and justified by the vouchers, and the report, in case of a reference, being approved and confirmed by the court, is, with such certificate or confirmation, to be entered of record in a book to be kept by the clerk for that purpose. It is obvious that the proceeding in the Orphans Court was not conducted in reference to these requirements. There is no certificate that the accounts were examined by the court, or that they were found to be properly and fairly stated, and the items thereof supported and justified by the vouchers. Nor is there any order directing it to be recorded. It is only a compliance with these requirements that renders the account thus exhibited by the guardian prima facie evidence of its correctness, and imposes upon the ward the burden of proving or showing the falsity or injustice of any item of the account to which he may afterwards take exceptions.\\nIn taking and stating the accounts of the guardian, the attempted settlement in the Orphans Court not having been made as required by law, cannot be regarded as presumptive, and much less as conclusive evidence of the truth of any of the .charges contained therein.\\nFrom the view which has been taken of the case, it is unnecessary to express any opinion upon the question suggested upon the argument, how far any settlement made by a guardian of his accounts during the minority of his wards and the continuance of his guardianship, will be regarded in a court of equity as binding upon the infants.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/529616.json b/nj/529616.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..66d559f32fe5a4cd8efcbe31a7b6b5b031f3b255
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/529616.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"529616\", \"name\": \"Denton and wife vs. Leddell\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Denton v. Leddell\", \"decision_date\": \"1872-02\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"64\", \"last_page\": \"71\", \"citations\": \"23 N.J. Eq. 64\", \"volume\": \"23\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:18:21.400128+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Denton and wife vs. Leddell.\", \"head_matter\": \"Denton and wife vs. Leddell.\\n1. dSTo one can have an easement in his own lands; and if an easement exists, if the owner of the dominant or servient tenement acquire the other, the easement is extinguished.\\n2. But if the owner of a tract of land, of which one part has had the benefit of a drain, water-pipe, or water-course, or other artificial advantage in the nature of an easement through or in the other part, sells or devises either part, an easement is created by implication in or to the other part. And this is the case even if it is the servient part that is sold or devised. But this is confined to continuous and apparent easements.\\n3. The testator devised to the defendant a tract of land on which were a saw-mill, dam, and mill-pond. He devised to the complainant a farm through which the mill-stream flowed to the defendant\\u2019s land. By a subsequent clause in the will, he gave to the defendant, as appurtenant to the saw-mill upon the tract devised to him, \\u201c the right to the owners of the mill at all times thereafter to raise the water in the pond till the surface of the water should reach a mark * * on a rock, &c.\\u201d The testator directed that the lands devised to the complainant should \\u201cbe subject to said right and privilege as aforesaid, and subject to such ilowage and damage as might be consequent on such raising of the water.\\u201d JHeld, that the defendant is restricted to the mark on the rock as the limit to which he can raise the water on the complainant\\u2019s land. The clause limiting the right of ilowage restricts the defendant from raising the water to the height to which it was raised by the dam at the testator\\u2019s death.\\n4. The clause restricting the height to which the defendant may raise the water on complainant\\u2019s land, does not limit the height at which defendant may keep his dam, except that he cannot keep it at any height in such state that it throws back water higher than the limit so fixed.\\n5. Where a question was one proper to be tried on an issue directed, if such-issue had been applied for, but both parties have proceeded to take testimony at great length, and allowed the hearing to be brought on, without applying for an issue, it is the province and duty of this court to decide it, if the evidence is such that the court can arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.\\n6. When the fact of a nuisance is clear, especially when it is not disputed, a court of equity will interfere without a trial at law.\\nArgued upon bill, answer, and proofs.\\nMr. Pitney, for complainants.\\nMr. V(media, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"3103\", \"char_count\": \"16571\", \"text\": \"The Chancellor.\\nThe complainant, Mrs. Denton, owns a farm through which a stream runs upon the adjoining lands of the defendant, William Leddell, where it is used to drive a mill. The complaint is that the defendant maintains his dam, and flows back water on the complainant's lands higher than he is entitled to do. The object of the suit is to compel him to lower both the clam and the water, and to fix and settle the height to which the water may be raised.\\nThe complainant and the defendant both derive title to their respective lands from the will of their father, John W. Leddell, who died April 15th, 1865. The will was dated July 1st, 1859 ; the last codicil, March 18th, 1863. He had, some veai's before his death, put each of them in possession of the property which he devised to them, respectively. In 1850, by the direction of the testator, a mark had been made by the defendant on a rock in the stream at the upper side of the lands devised to Mrs. Denton, and on the boundary between this and the lands of Elias Vance. This mark was for the purpose of showing the height of the water at its ordinary state. A certificate of making this mark, and describing the rock and the mark, was signed by the defendant and J. B. Mellen and J. P. Sutton, who were present and aided in making the mark \\u2022 this certificate is dated October 26th, 1850.\\nThe defendant, in the lifetime of his father, had raised the dam on the lands devised to him, so as to raise the water above the mark on the rock and above the rock itself, and had purchased from the owner of the lands along the stream above Mrs. Denton's farm, the right to raise the water on these lands. This raising was done and purchase made with the knowledge of his father before the date of the will, and Avithout any remonstrance by his father.\\nThe third clause of the will devised to the defendant, .among other tracts of land, the tract on which the mill, the \\u2022dam, and mill-pond Avere. The fourth clause devised several tracts to the complainant, including the farm through which the mill-stream flowed to the lands of the defendant.\\nThe ninth clause gave to William, as appurtenant to the \\u2022saAV-mill upon the lands before devised to him, \\\" the right to the owners' of the mill at all times thereafter to raise the Avater in the pond till the surface of the Avater should reach a mark made by his son William, in the presence of James Mellen and Joseph Sutton as witnesses, on a rock on the loAver or east side of the road from Washington corner to the house of Mellen ;\\\" stating^ that this mark had been made on this rock Avhere the surface of the stream struck and ran round said rock from time immemorial, to sIioav what had been the height of said stream at said rock. And he directed that the lands thereinbefore devised to his daughter should \\\" be subject to said right and privilege as aforesaid, and subject to such flowage and damage as might be consequent on such raising of the water.\\\"\\nThe first question in the case is upon the effect of these deA\\u00dases. The complainant contends that the defendant is restricted to the mark on the rock as the limit to which he can raise the Avater on her land. The defendant claims the right to raise it to the height to Avhich it Avas raised by the dam at the death of the testator, Avhen the Avill took effect.\\nThe deA\\u00dase of the mill lot in the third clause, standing alone, would convey, as part of the mill lot, the right to keep the water on Mrs. Denton's lot at the height at Avhich it stood at the death of the testator, that being the time when the . devise took effect. No one can have an easement in his own lands; and if an easement exists, if the OAvner of the dominant or servient tenement acquire the other, the easement is extinguished. For an easement is a right in the lands of another.\\nBut if' the owner of a tract of land of which one part has had the benefit of a drain, water-pipe, or water-course, or other artificial advantage in the nature of an easement through or in the other part, sells or devises either part, an easement is created by implication in or to the other part. And this is the case even if it is the servient part that is sold or devised. But this is confined to continuous and apparent easements. This doctrine was established in England in the reign of James I., in the case of Nicholas v. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 150, and is well established by subsequent decisions in England and in this state. These views are considered and assented to in the opinion in this court in Fetters v. Humphreys, 3 C. E. Green 260, and in the opinion of the Court of Appeals where the decree was affirmed, izz 4 C. E. Green 471.\\nBut fixiizg the height to which the defendant should be entitled to keep the water in the ninth clause of the will, although it does not expressly limit that as the height, must be held to limit the right to that height by implication. This implication is raised by the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alternes. This luis been applied in many cases to limit the effect given by construction to grants and devises, as in the present ease. In Hare v. Horton, 5 Barn. & Ad. 715, the Court of King's Bench so limited the effect of a mortgage. The mortgage conveyed an iron foundry and dwelling-houses, with the appurtenances, and enumerated afterwards the fixtures in the dwelling-houses. Had it not been for this enumeration the mortgage of the iron foundry would have carried with it all the tools and fixtures, including the steam engine, cranes, and presses fixed in the eaz'th and walls, but these were held excluded by reason of the enumeration of the grates, boilers, bells, and other fixtures in the two dwelling-houses, and the brew-house thereto belonging. In The King v. Sedgley, 2 Barn. & Ad. 66, the same doctrine was applied to a statute. In Sprague v. Snow, 4 Pick. 54, the doctrine was applied to a case much like the present. A grant of enough of the water of a stream for the use of a fulling mill was held to limit the grant of the water to that quantity, although the whole of the stream would otherwise have passed by the grant in the same conveyance of the land which included it. In Hiscox v. Sanford, 4 R. I. 58, the same application is made of the doctrine.\\nThe effect of an express covenant in a deed or lease in limiting any implied covenant which might else arise, is well established. Nokes' case, 4 Rep. 80; Merrill v. Frame, 4 Taunt. 329; Rawle on Covenants for Title 356, (ed. 1860, 483.) I think there is no room for doubt on this question. There is no necessity, where the rule of lawis clear, of sending the question to a court of law, or requiring the decision of a court of law in the case.\\nA second question arises as to the mark on' the rock referred to in the will. The complainant asks that a certain mark on the rock be established as the mark referred to in the will, and as the limit of the height of the water. Although the defendant does not deny in his answer that this is the mark, he disputes it in his own testimony, and that of several witnesses. There is no dispute as to the identity of the rock. The defendant contends that the mark referred to-in the will and in the certificate signed by him, was made on top of the rock, on a part that has since scaled off. The complainant contends that it is the mark now on the northwest corner of the rock. This is a mere question of fact. The testimony is contradictory., I think, by the clear weight of evidence, the mark now on the rock is the mark referred to in the will.\\nFirst.. It corresponds with the description of the mark in the certificate. \\u2022 That is signed by the defendant, who made the mark, and he admits the certificate to be genuine and-signed at the time; this describes the mark as on the northwest side and end of the stone, and a mark upward, about three inches from the end of the mark. The stone is nearly in the shape of an oblong parallelogram, one of its longer sides having the direction of a little east of north, so that this side is substantially the northwest side; it is the only one that can be called the northwest side. The mark begins on this side and is cut round the northwest corner and continued upon the end of the stone; the corner is not angular, but .worn round; the mark lias an upward mark, about three inches from its end. This mark answer;-., in every respect, the description in the certificate. On the other hand, the place where the mark is located by the defendant is where there is a scale broken off on the top of the rock near its centre. The top of the rock is not a plane or exactly flat, but it is so nearly flat that this spot could never have been described as the side or end of tlie rock, much less as the northwest side of the rock.\\nSecondly. The two attesting witnesses, Mellon and Sutton, who were especially called there as such, to see the mark made so as to identify it, testify that this is the mark, and give satisfactory reasons for their certainty. They both resided near the rock, and it eoukl hardly have been altered so as to deceive them, without their knowledge. The mark made in their presence was on the corner, several inches below the top of the rock. The rock is a hard boulder, of that species of granite known as syenite, worn into its present condition by the attrition of probably some thousands of years, and, although it might he possible by cutting and grinding and attrition with sand, to wear down the top of this rock so as somewhat to resemble the appearance which the elements had given it, 1 think it would be almost impossible to deceive the experts who have examined it, and quite impossible to do this without attracting the attention of the neighbors. The complainant, Jonas Denton, the husband of Mrs. Denton, the devisee, was present at making the mark, and knew its object. He lived on this farm of his wife from 1818 to 1860, and superintended its cultivation. He drew the certificate, and testifies that it described the rock and mark correctly; he also is confident that the mark now there is the same. Thomas H. Vance was the son of the adjoining owner, and lived with his father, and worked on the farm at the time the mark was made; he examined it the day it was made \\u2022 he was interested for his father's farm, and testifies without doubt that the mark is the one there now. He also measured the distance of the mark below the top of the rock by measuring the distance of both from the surface of the water when both were overflowed; he testifies that the mark was then from eight to ten inches below the top of the rock ; this is as the mark is now.\\nThe evidence of the defendant and several of his witnesses, who think that this is not the mark made in 1850, does not in my mind countervail or shake this testimony. The matter occurred to the defendant after the filing of his answer. His theory is that the mark which he made was on the top of the rock, where a scale of a foot in length by five or six inches wide appears at some time to have broken off the rock. This scale was about five-eighths of an inch thick at one edge, and tapered' to a sharp edge at the other. It is possible that a mark could have been cut in this scale, but it is hardly possible that intelligent men should, in a certificate intended to be evidence, or to refresh their recollection as witnesses, have described this mark as on the side and end of the rock, if made on top of the scale.\\nThis question was,'perhaps, a proper one to be tried on an issue directed, if such issue had been applied for; but both parties having proceeded to take testimony at great length, and- allowed the hearing to be brought on without applying for an issue, it is the province and duty of this court to decide it, if the evidence is such that I can arrive at a conclusion satisfactory to myself. I am entirely satisfied that the mark now on'the rock is that made by the defendant in 1850, and that described in the certificate and referred to in the will.. It must, therefore, upon the principle of law above stated, be the limit of the height to which the defendant is entitled to raise the surface of the water in the pond.\\nThat the dam of the defendant raises the surface of the water in the pond higher than this mark is hardly disputed. It is charged in the bill, and is not denied in the answer. The evidence clearly shows that it has been kept so ever since the death of the testator. Where the fact of a nuisance is clear, especially when it is not disputed, a court of equity will interfere without a trial at law. This has been repeatedly held in this court. In the case of Carlisle v. Cooper, 4 C. E. Green 256, and in the same case, on appeal, 6 C. E. Green 576, this doctrine was acted upon, and the c;ases in which it was adopted are there referred to and commented on.\\nThe right of the complainant is only as to the height of the water on her own land. And the right fixed by the will is only as to the height of the water in the po'nd flowing back over complainant's land; it has no reference to the dam or its height. If the defendant does not raise the water on her land above the lawful height, it is no concern of hers how high his dam is; but on the other hand he cannot keep his dam at any height, in such s'tate that it throws back water higher than that mark. This was so held and decided in Carlisle v. Cooper.\\nThere must, therefore, be a decree for the complainant, that the defendant is not entitled to raise the water in his millpond higher than the mark in the rock referred to in the ninth clause of the will of his lather; and that the mark now existing on said rock is the mark referred to in the will, and is the limit of the height to which the defendant may raise the water at the upper line of the complainant's land; and that the defendant be forever restrained and enjoined from keeping or maintaining his dam at such height as will, in the ordinary state of the water, raise the water in the stream at that line, higher than the mark now existing at that rock.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/531051.json b/nj/531051.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9463029b4f5d54cfd7d1a3d50e19b2dd2d8201c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/531051.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"531051\", \"name\": \"Tindall's Executors, appellants, and Tindall, respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Tindall's Executors v. Tindall\", \"decision_date\": \"1873-06\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"512\", \"last_page\": \"516\", \"citations\": \"24 N.J. Eq. 512\", \"volume\": \"24\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:35:45.786581+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Tindall's Executors, appellants, and Tindall, respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"Tindall's Executors, appellants, and Tindall, respondent.\\n1. The general rule is, that the residuary legatee is entitled as well to a residue caused by a lapsed legacy, as to what remains after payment of debts and legacies. The only exception to the rule is where the words used show an intention, on the part of the testator, to exclude the lapsed legacy from the operation of the residuary clause.\\n2. Where, after a legacy to his wife, and certain general legacies, the testator gives \\u201c whatever of my property shall remain after payment of the above,\\u201d to his residuary legatees, and the legacy to the wife lapses by her death in testator\\u2019s lifetime, such legacy falls into the residue, and does not go to the next of kin.\\nThe opinion of the Chancellor is reported in 8 C. E. Green 244.\\nMr. I. W. Scudder, for appellants.\\nMr. J. E. Emery, for respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"1690\", \"char_count\": \"9423\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nDalrimple, J.\\nThe question in this case is whether a certain lapsed legacy of $5000, given in and by the will of Aaron Tindall, deceased, falls into the residuum of the estate and goes to the residuary legatees, or remains undisposed of and is to be distributed among the next of kin of the testator.\\nThe will, after directing the payment of debts and funeral expenses, and the sale and disposition of all testator's property, real and personal, which he might own at the time of his decease, and the collection of the moneys due him, gives to his wife Ann, in lieu of her right of dower at common law, the said legacy of $5000. After certain general legacies and bequests, the residuum of the estate is disposed of as follows: \\\" I give and bequeath whatever of my property shall remain after payment of the above, and due settlement of all my business, to my two friends, John H. Manning, to him, his heirs and assigns, and to Edward Paxton, to him, liis heirs and assigns.\\\" The residuary legatees are appointed executors. The testator having survived his wife, the legacy of $5000 to her lapsed. This suit is brought by one of the next of kin of the testator, to recover a share of the legacy which has thus lapsed, and his right to recover is put upon the ground that as to the $5000 in question the testator died intestate.\\nThe rule applicable to the question to be solved, as stated iir the text hooks, as well as in many adjudged cases, is that the residuary legatee is entitled as well to a residue caused by a lapsed legacy, or an invalid or illegal disposition, as to what remains after payment of debts and legacies. The only exception to the rule is, that where the words used show an intention on the part of the testator to exclude from, the operation of the residuary clause certain portions of the estate, such intention as gathered from the whole will must not be defeated. Or the rule, embracing the exception, as stated in some of the books, is that the residuary legatee must be a legatee of the residue generally, and not partially so only. The rule is so firmly established, that citation of authority in its support is hardly necessary. I will, however, refer to the .following text hooks and adjudged cases : 2 Roper on Legacies 1672; 2 Williams on Ex'rs 1313; Easum v. Appleford, 5 My. & Cr. 56 ; King v. Woodhull, 3 Edw. Ch. 86 ; James v. James, 4 Paige 117; Banks v. Phelan, 4 Barb. 90 ; Cambridge v. Rous, 8 Ves. 25 ; 2 Redfield on Wills 442.\\nThe learned Chancellor, in the court below, held that the case now before us came within the exception to the general rule, because the estate given was that which should remain after payment of the legacies before given. But I cannot see that this form of expression in any wise limits or restricts the extent of the gift. The clause would have had precisely the same meaning and effect if it had been, in terms, of the residue of the estate. All that the testator could give to his residuary legatees, was what remained of his estate after payment of debts and particular legacies. The legal effect is precisely the same, whether the one form or the other is adopted. The Chancellor bases his opinion upon what he conceives to be the rule as laid down in Williams on Executors, Vol. 2, p. 1315, and in Roper on Legacies, Vol. 2, pp. 1679, 1682. He also cites the case of The Attorney-General v. Johnstone, Ambler 577. Exactly what Mr. Williams states the true rule to be, is as follows : \\\" The testator may, by the terms of the bequest, narrow the title of the residuary legatee, so as to exclude him from lapsed legacies; as when it appears to be the intention of the testator that the residuary legatee should have only what remained after the payment of legacies.\\\" Mr. Roper states the exception to the general rule, in the following language: \\\" When the legatee is not generally, but only partially, residuary legatee, he will not, in that character, be entitled to any benefit from lapses, though very special words are required to take a bequest of the residue out of the general rule; as, first, when it appears the testator intended the residuary legatee should have only what remained after payment of legacies.\\\" If these authors intend to say, (which to my mind is by no means clear) that when the clause of the will giving the residuum of the estate contains, or has annexed to it, the words \\\" after payment of debts and legacies,\\\" the settled rule of construction is that lapsed legacies are not embraced, but that as to them the testator is to be held as having died intestate, I cannot yield my assent to the proposition. ' The cases cited by the authors referred to, do not support such a doctrine, while there are several well considered cases to the contrary.\\nVice-Chancellor Wood, in the case of Bernard v. Minshall, Johns. (Eng. Ch.) 276, 299, says : \\\"All you have to consider is whether the property is excepted, in order to take it away, under all circumstances and for all purposes, from the person to whom the rest of the property is given; or whether it is excepted, merely for the purpose of giving it to some one else. If the latter, and the gift to somebody else fails, the donees of all except this property are entitled to take the whole.\\\"\\nIn Roberts v. Cooke, 16 Ves. 451, it-was held that a general disposition of personal estate not therein before specifically disposed of, comprehended specific legacies lapsed; the word specifically being held to mean particularly.\\nIn lie case of King v. Woodhull, 3 Edw. Ch. 79, 84, the form of the bequest was, \\\"the residue and remainder of my estate, if any there shall be, after the payment of the said \\u00ab51000 to the Missionary Society, I give and bequeath to the children of my niece.\\\" And it was held broad enough to embrace as well the legacy to the Missionary Society, which it was claimed was void, as a bequest to a mission school, which was held to be ineffectual. Vice-Chancellor McCoun, in his opinion in that case, says : \\\" The words 'after payment of debts and legacies,' or after payment of legacies specified or recapitulated in the residuary clause itself, are not restrictive of the bequest to any particular or partial residue; but the bequest after all is general of the remainder, and may be so understood without doing violence to the expressions of the will. Where the residuary clause is thus worded, the legatee is as much a general legatee of the residuum of the estate as if such words were not used.\\\"\\nIn Shanley v. Baker, 4 Ves. 732, the words were, all the rest and residue of my estate and effects \\\" not by me herein before particularly disposed of;\\\" and they were held to embrace a lease-hold property given as a legacy, which, by the statutes of Mortmain, was void. To the same effect is the ease of Brown v. Higgs, 4 Ves. 709.\\nThe case of The Attorney-General v. Johnstone, reported in Ambler 577, was not decided upon the ground that the residuary bequest contained words of import similar to those now under consideration, for it did not, but the conclusion reached in that case was that from the whole context of the will it was evident that the testator did not intend that the void legacy should in any event become a part of the residuum of his estate. The syllabus of the case which very well shows the point decided, is, \\\" Residue under particular circumstances will not take in lapsed legacies ; the residue being given as a small remainder of about \\u00a3100, and the lapsed legacies amounting to \\u00a320,000.\\\"\\nI have not been able to see anything in the residuary clause, when taken by itself, or in the context of this will now before us, which will authorize the result sought by the complainant. It seems to me quite evident that the testator did not intend to die intestate as to any part of his property. He gave the legacy of $5000 to his wife, to be accepted at her option, in lieu of her right of dower in his estate. If she should decline to accept it on these terms, or if by reason of her death in the lifetime of her husband it lapsed, the will of the testator, as ascertained from the well settled meaning of the words he has used, was, that the lapsed or rejected legacy should go into and form part of the residue of his estate.\\nFor the reasons above stated, the decree below must be reversed, and the complainant's bill dismissed, but without costs in this court or the court below.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 The Chancellor, Beasley, C. J., Bedle, Clement, Dalrimple, Depue, Green, Scudder, Van Sycicel, 'Woodhull. 10.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 Hone.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/5758262.json b/nj/5758262.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5f3c405f1b39bc7b503082964e40a9887e4d3a1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/5758262.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5758262\", \"name\": \"IN THE MATTER OF MARIA INES GONZALEZ, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Gonzalez\", \"decision_date\": \"2007-05-25\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"88\", \"last_page\": \"88\", \"citations\": \"191 N.J. 88\", \"volume\": \"191\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:54:16.248941+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"IN THE MATTER OF MARIA INES GONZALEZ, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.\", \"head_matter\": \"922 A.2d 709\\nIN THE MATTER OF MARIA INES GONZALEZ, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.\\nMay 25, 2007.\", \"word_count\": \"130\", \"char_count\": \"725\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThis matter having been duly presented to the Court, it is ORDERED that MARIA INES GONZALEZ of JAMAICA, NEW YORK, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1987, and who was suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months, effective February 24, 2007, by Order of this Court filed on January 25, 2007, be restored to the practice of law, effective immediately; and it is further\\nORDERED that respondent shall practice law under the supervision of Tomas Espinosa, Esquire, or such other practicing attorney approved by the Office of Attorney Ethics for a period of one year and until the further Order of the Court.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/590854.json b/nj/590854.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..818b461236f8bd7e164ab5d8785f2525e299f7e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/590854.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"590854\", \"name\": \"KARANNE WOLPAW, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, v. PARKER, McCAY & CRISCUOLO, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wolpaw v. General Accident Insurance\", \"decision_date\": \"1994-03-25\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"41\", \"last_page\": \"50\", \"citations\": \"272 N.J. Super. 41\", \"volume\": \"272\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:27:34.082447+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"KARANNE WOLPAW, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, v. PARKER, McCAY & CRISCUOLO, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"639 A.2d 338\\nKARANNE WOLPAW, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, v. PARKER, McCAY & CRISCUOLO, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued February 1, 1994\\nDecided March 25, 1994.\\nBefore Judges BRODY, STERN and KEEFE.\\nElliott Abrutyn argued the cause for appellant (Morgan, Mel-huish, Monaghan, Arvidson, Abrutyn & Lisowski, attorneys; Mr. Abrutyn and Joseph G. Dolan, on the brief).\\nHarry V. Osborne, II, argued the cause for respondent Karanne Wolpaw (Evans, Osborne & Kreizman, attorneys; Mr. Osborne, on the brief).\\nRobert W. McAndrew argued the cause for respondent Parker, McCay & Criscuolo (Voorhees & Acciavatti, attorneys; Mr. McAndrew, on the letter brief).\", \"word_count\": \"2652\", \"char_count\": \"16406\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nBRODY, P.J.A.D.\\nDefendant issued a homeowners' policy to Saranne Frew. Other members of Frew's household covered by the policy were plaintiff, who is Frew's sister, and plaintiffs son Heath. All three were sued in a personal-injury action for their allegedly negligent conduct during the term of the policy. Defendant assigned the same firm of attorneys, third-party defendants Parker, McCay and Criscuolo, Esqs., to represent the three insureds even though their interests as defendants in that action were in conflict. Plaintiff brought this action to compel defendant to pay the substantial portion of the negligence-action judgment entered against her that exceeds the policy limit. We agree with the trial judge that defendant breached the policy by assigning a single firm of attorneys to represent insureds having conflicting interests. We disagree, however, with the judge's conclusion that defendant is thereby liable for the entire negligence-action judgment. D\\u00e9fendant's liability is limited to the portion of plaintiffs actual loss attributable to the breach.\\nOn January 9, 1986, plaintiff's eleven-year-old son Heath acci-dently fired a BB from an air rifle that put out an eye of his playmate and neighbor Michael Heim. Plaintiff was divorced from Heath's father Ivan Wolpaw at the time and lived with Heath in the home of her sister Saranne Frew. Plaintiff, her sister and Heath were covered for the accident under a $50,000 homeowners' policy that defendant General Accident Insurance Company had issued to Frew. Michael and his parents brought an action for the ensuing damages against plaintiff, Heath, Frew, Ivan, the rifle's manufacturer, and the store where Ivan had purchased the rifle as a gift for his son. Defendant immediately deposited in court the $50,000 limit of its policy in offer of settlement. The Heims rejected the offer. A jury awarded the Heims damages totalling $502,000 after finding plaintiff 50% negligent, Ivan 30% negligent and Heath 20% negligent. The jury absolved the manufacturer and the store. The claims against Frew had been dismissed before trial on her motion for a partial summary judgment.\\nIn this action, the trial judge held, on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, that defendant had breached its policy by providing a single firm of attorneys to represent insureds having conflicting interests and thereby became liable to pay the full amount of the Heim judgment, including prejudgment and post- judgment interest. The judge accordingly entered partial summary judgment against defendant in the amount of $709,964.20 and certified it as final, thus enabling defendant to take this appeal. R. 4:42-2. Defendant's third-party indemnification claims against the law firm, against whom plaintiff has made no claims, remain to be tried.\\nA liability insurer that insures codefendants whose interests conflict with one another must retain separate and independent counsel for each insured or permit each insured to do so at the insurer's expense. See Yeomans v. Allstate Insurance Company, 130 N.J.Super. 48, 54, 324 A.2d 906 (App.Div.1974). That was the case here. The three insureds had the common interests of minimizing the amount of the Heims's judgment and maximizing the percentage of fault attributable to the other defendants. However, their interests in maximizing the percentage of the other insureds' fault and minimizing their own were clearly in conflict. For instance, it was in plaintiffs interest to argue that she adequately had secured the rifle from Heath's unattended use and had carefully instructed him in its safe use, which he negligently disregarded; on the other hand, it was in Heath's interest to argue that plaintiff negligently failed to secure the rifle, and that he was not negligent in view of his mother's negligence and his youth.\\nWith the general abolition of parental immunity, Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533, 461 A.2d 1145 (1983), and in the absence of sufficient liability insurance coverage, separate attorneys representing plaintiff and Heath might well have asserted cross-claims for contribution against the other's client. That was not done here. It was also in plaintiffs interest to assert a cross-claim against her sister and that she remain a codefendant to share the liability burden. Yet the single firm of attorneys, discharging its duty to her sister, not only did not file a cross-claim for contribution on plaintiffs behalf, but successfully moved to have Frew dismissed from the case. A trial is not necessary to determine the obvious. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954). Defendant violated its contractual duty to provide plaintiff with counsel who were free of conflicting interests.\\nWhere conflicting interests impose on a liability insurer the duty to provide multiple insureds with separate counsel, it may be that in a particular case the separate attorneys would manage the case the same way as one attorney representing all insureds. Even so, where there is the risk of a judgment that will exceed the policy limit, separate independent counsel for each insured must be employed to decide whether and how to act in light of the conflict.\\nA conflict that forms the basis of an insurer's breach, however, does not establish that compensatory damages are to be awarded against the insurer if the breach did not cause the insured an actual loss. The trial judge awarded plaintiff the full amount of the Heim judgment, many times more than the policy limit, after concluding that there is no way to calculate how much of the Heim judgment was caused by defendant's breach. He concluded that because it was impossible to measure plaintiffs loss by retrying the Heim case with separate counsel for each insured, defendant must pay the whole judgment. We disagree.\\nThe object in awarding compensatory damages for a breach of contract is to put the injured party in as good a position as he or she would have been if performance had been rendered as promised. 525 Main Street Corp. v. Eagle Roofing Co., 34 N.J. 251, 254, 168 A.2d 33 (1961). That objective is not achieved by using the same approach in every type of case. \\\"The answer rests in good sense rather than in a mechanical application of a single formula.\\\" Id. at 255, 168 A.2d 33. Nor must the formula yield an exact figure:\\nWhile the damages flowing from defendant's breach of contract are not ascertainable with exactitude, such is not a bar to relief. Where a wrong has been committed, and it is certain that damages have resulted, mere uncertainty as to the amount will not preclude recovery \\u2014 courts will fashion a remedy even though the proof on damages is inexact. [Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 388, 403 A.2d 902 (1979).]\\nAlthough it may not be certain that an injured party sustained damages from a breach, where the breach itself destroys the injured party's ability to prove damages with exactitude, the proof may be inexact. This tolerant approach has been applied to the proof of damages where, as here, a liability insurer breached its policy. Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417 (1980) (more fully discussed below).\\nThe trial judge correctly identified the problem. To take an accurate measure of what plaintiff lost requires the impossible: retrying the Heim ease with each insured having separate counsel. A retrial cannot even be approximated as might be done had the flaw been with a plaintiffs attorney and not a defendant's attorney. In such a case damages in a legal malpractice action can often be approximated by having the successor plaintiffs attorney recreate or create a defective or time-barred tort trial by conducting a \\\"suit within a suit\\\" in which the flawed attorney plays the r\\u00f3le of the tort defendant. See Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J.Super. 388, 397-98, 521 A.2d 1343 (App.Div.1987). However, where the flawed attorney had represented a defendant, as here, there is no one to play the role of the tort plaintiff making claims to which the successor defense attorney may respond.\\nIn Lieberman, supra, the insured was a medical doctor who had been sued for malpractice. His insurer and the attorney furnished by the insurer to represent him settled the malpractice action over the doctor's objection, a breach of the policy and of the attorney's duty to put the insured's interests above those of the insurer. The doctor sued the insurer and the attorney. Damages sought included the amount of a substantial increase in the insurance premium on renewal of the policy because the settlement exceeded $3,500. To recover such damages, plaintiff had to prove that had the case gone to trial, the tort plaintiff would not have recovered more than $3,500.\\nThe Court left it to the parties or, in the absence of agreement, to the trial judge to determine how the insured should be permitted to prove the outcome of a trial that never occurred. Among the Court's comments appropriate to the present case are the following:\\nOn retrial, [the doctor] must show by a preponderance of the evidence what injuries he suffered as a proximate consequence of the respective contractual and professional breaches of [the insurer and the attorney].\\n\\nWe conclude, therefore, that it should be within the discretion of the trial judge as to the manner in which the plaintiff may proceed to prove his claim for damages and that the appropriate procedure should, if not otherwise agreed upon between the parties, be settled through pretrial proceedings. We need not here delineate in final detail what alternatives must be considered except to observe that they include the \\\"suit within a suit\\\" approach or any reasonable modification thereof. Another option, which may be apposite in this case in light of the duality of defendants, the factor of role reversal, and the passage of time, is to proceed through the use of expert testimony as to what as a matter of reasonable probability would have transpired at the original trial. [Citation omitted.] Such experts would testify, in light of their experience and expertise, concerning the outcome of the [malpractice case] if the case had been brought to trial as anticipated by [the attorney] and had been defended in the manner [the attorney] had initially planned. [Id. at 342-44, 521 A.2d 1343]\\nOn remand, the trial judge here should confer with counsel and set a deadline for them to agree upon how to proceed with the proof of damages and when to conduct and complete pretrial discovery. If there is no agreement by the deadline, the judge must determine these matters after considering both sides' arguments.\\nWe add the following observations respecting the damages trial. Although conflicts that formed the basis of the breach may have caused plaintiff's former attorneys to pull their punches against the other insureds whom they also represented, the conflicts did not affect the common purpose of all the insureds to present a united front against the other parties in the case. Thus there is no reason to consider whether if plaintiff had separate counsel at the tort trial, the amount of the Heim judgment would have been less or the dispositions respecting the defendants, other than the insureds, would have been different.\\nIf the parties use experts to express opinions as to whether or as to how having separate counsel probably would have changed the Heim judgment, their opinions must be confined to changes in the allocation of fault among the three insureds. In translating such changes into plaintiffs damages, consideration must be given to the provisions of the comparative negligence statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.4. The statute was amended December 18, 1987. L. 1987, c. 325. The former version applies here because the Heims's claims arose before that date. L. 1987, c. 325, \\u00a7 4. The former version of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3 provided:\\nThe party so recovering [damages in a negligence action] may recover the full amount of the molded verdict from any party against whom such recovering party is not barred from recovery. Any party who is so compelled to pay more than such party's percentage share may seek contribution from the other joint tortfeasors.\\n[L. 1973, c. 146, \\u00a7 3.]\\nThus, regardless of any reduction in the percentage share of plaintiffs fault, she would remain liable to the Heims for the full amount of their judgment unless but for defendant's breach the jury probably would have found that she was not at fault. Had plaintiff, if properly represented, been absolved of all fault then defendant would be liable to pay the whole judgment on her behalf \\u2014 including the substantial excess over the policy limit.\\nAssuming plaintiff would not have been absolved of all fault if she had separate counsel at the tort trial, her damages, had the jury assigned to her a reduced percentage of fault, would be the loss of contribution that she would have recovered from one or both of the other two insureds. To establish this result, plaintiff would have to prove that if she had separate counsel, her sister's share of fault probably would have been more than zero and/or her son's more than 20%.\\nPlaintiff must surmount another hurdle in evaluating her lost opportunity to obtain contribution from her sister and son. To the extent that each of these codefendants is judgment-proof, the right to recover against her or him may be worth little. We have held in a malpractice action against an attorney who missed a limitations deadline that the amount of damages determined in a suit within a suit may be reduced by \\\"evidence of the main [tort] defendant's financial status and solvency .\\\" Hoppe v. Ranzini, 158 N.J.Super. 158, 165-66, 385 A.2d 913 (App.Div.1978).\\nFinally, defendant contends that plaintiff cannot prove that she will suffer any damages from the Heim judgment because she herself is judgment-proof. Assuming she is, we reject the argument. Although plaintiffs damages may be cut back by the fact that her lost opportunities of recovering contribution may be worthless if they are directed against people who are judgment-proof, it does not follow that plaintiff suffered no damages because she herself is judgment-proof.\\nAs we previously noted, in keeping with the general objective in measuring breach-of-contract damages, plaintiff is to be put in as good a position as she would have been had defendant furnished her separate counsel. The portion of any unsatisfied judgment against plaintiff that exceeds what it would have been without that breach is a debt not bargained for when the policy was purchased. Unless discharged in bankruptcy, the judgment will be enforceable for at least twenty years. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-5. Also unbargained for would be the costs of going bankrupt and, more important, the impediments to credit access that result from having gone bankrupt. Plaintiff is not obliged to become a bankrupt to mitigate damages.\\nThe other issues raised have been rendered moot by our opinion or are clearly without merit and require no further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).\\nReversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\nClaims arising on or after December 18, 1987, are governed by the current version of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3, L. 1987, c. 325, \\u00a7 2, which limits the joint and several liability of tort codefendants whose percentage share of fault is less than 60%. Had the present statute applied, plaintiffs liability for noneconomic damages under the Heim judgment would have been limited to 50%, the percentage share of fault attributed to her by the jury.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/594726.json b/nj/594726.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b4e21d29ed0654d3711d490fab90a2943e79bb8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/594726.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"594726\", \"name\": \"IRA BOLYARD, TIMOTHY COLEMAN, WILLIAM FRANK, EDWARD MITCHELL AND JAMES QUARLES AND NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION ON CORRECTION, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS, v. DOUGLAS BERMAN, TREASURER, STATE OF NEW JERSEY; NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD AND JAMES FLORIO, GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS-CROSS-APPELLANTS, AND DEPARTMENT OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE, OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER; GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bolyard v. Berman\", \"decision_date\": \"1994-07-06\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"565\", \"last_page\": \"585\", \"citations\": \"274 N.J. Super. 565\", \"volume\": \"274\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:24:23.280796+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"IRA BOLYARD, TIMOTHY COLEMAN, WILLIAM FRANK, EDWARD MITCHELL AND JAMES QUARLES AND NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION ON CORRECTION, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS, v. DOUGLAS BERMAN, TREASURER, STATE OF NEW JERSEY; NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD AND JAMES FLORIO, GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS-CROSS-APPELLANTS, AND DEPARTMENT OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE, OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER; GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"644 A.2d 1122\\nIRA BOLYARD, TIMOTHY COLEMAN, WILLIAM FRANK, EDWARD MITCHELL AND JAMES QUARLES AND NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION ON CORRECTION, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS, v. DOUGLAS BERMAN, TREASURER, STATE OF NEW JERSEY; NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD AND JAMES FLORIO, GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS-CROSS-APPELLANTS, AND DEPARTMENT OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE, OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER; GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued May 10, 1994\\nDecided July 6, 1994.\\nBefore Judges MICHELS, SKILLMAN and WEFING.\\nPatrick F. McAndrew argued the cause for appellants-cross-respondents (Brandt, Haughey, Penberthy, Lewis & Hyland, attorneys; Eileen K. Fahey and Mr. McAndrew, on the brief).\\nMichael Carlin, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents-cross-appellants Treasurer Berman, New Jersey State Parole Board and Governor Florio (Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General, attorney; Joseph L. Yannotti, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Carlin, on the brief).\\nNo briefs have been filed by respondents Public Defender, General Assembly or Senate.\", \"word_count\": \"6158\", \"char_count\": \"38766\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nSKILLMAN, J.A.D.\\nPlaintiffs seek by this appeal to establish that indigent parolees charged with violations of parole have a right to counsel under either the New Jersey Constitution or state common law which is broader than that guaranteed by the United States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). Plaintiffs also seek to establish that the State cannot satisfy its obligation of providing counsel to indigents in parole revocation proceedings by the assignment of members of the private bar, but must instead appropriate sufficient funds to the Public Defender's Office to perform this responsibility.\\nWhen their complaint was filed, plaintiffs Bolyard, Coleman, Frank, Mitchell and Quarles were indigent parolees who had been charged with violations of parole but who had not been assigned counsel due to the Legislature's failure to fund the Parole Revocation Unit of the Public Defender's Office for the 1991-92 fiscal year. Plaintiff New Jersey Association on Correction, which subsequently joined in this action, describes itself as \\\"an organization of citizens working together for an effective criminal justice system\\\" which provides various services to offenders and victims, including \\\"resource centers for parole and probation purposes.\\\" See New Jersey Ass'n on Correction v. Lan, 80 N.J. 199, 204, 403 A.2d 437 (1979). Defendant New Jersey State Parole Board has the statutory responsibility to administer the State's parole system, see N.J.S.A. 30:4r-123.48, which includes the conduct of parole revocation proceedings. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.62 to -123.63. Defendant Office of the Public Defender (the Public Defender) has the statutory responsibility to provide legal representation to indigents charged with criminal offenses, N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-5, as well as to represent indigent parolees charged with violations of parole. N.J.S.A 2A:158A-5.1. The other defendants are all state officials who are responsible for the formulation and enactment of the Annual Appropriations Act under which appropriations are made to all state agencies, including the Public Defender.\\nIn June 1991, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law the Annual Appropriations Act for 1991, L.1991, c. 185, which contained a provision withholding any appropriation to the Public Defender for the purpose of providing legal representation to indigent persons appearing before the Parole Board:\\nNotwithstanding any provision of section 2 of P.L.1974, c. 33 [N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-5.1], or any other provision of law, or any other provision of this appropriations act, no State funds are appropriated to fund the expenses associated with the legal representation of persons before the State Parole Board or the Parole Bureau.\\n[L.1991, c. 185, 1991 N.J.Laws 1017, 1083.]\\nAround the same time, the then Public Defender announced that his office would no longer be able to provide representation to parolees charged with violations of parole due to the Legislature's withholding of appropriations for this purpose.\\nPlaintiffs then commenced this action, asserting that there is a right guaranteed under both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution, as well as under other provisions of state law, to counsel in parole revocation proceedings, and seeking to compel defendants to continue the funding required to enable the Public Defender to provide such representation. The matter was brought before the trial court on October 16, 1991, pursuant to an order to show cause and defendants' motions to dismiss. The trial court recognized that some indigent parolees charged with violations of parole are entitled to counsel under the United States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Gagnon. However, the court concluded that there is no basis under the New Jersey Constitution or other provision of state law for the recognition of a more expansive right to counsel than is guaranteed by Gagnon. The court also concluded that there is no basis for requiring the Legislature to continue funding the Parole Revocation Unit in the Public Defender's office. The court further recognized that neither the Parole Board nor any other state agency had established a system to provide indigents the representation guaranteed by Gagnon after the Public Defender announced that he would be unable to continue providing legal representation in parole revocation proceedings. Accordingly, the trial court entered an order on October 28, 1991, directing the parties to conduct discovery for the purpose of providing information \\\"to assist the Court in fashioning a ruling in accord with Gagnon v. Scarpelli.\\\"\\nThereafter, the Parole Board, with the assistance of plaintiffs, the Public Defender's Office and the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), undertook to develop a system for providing counsel to indigent parolees entitled to representation under the standards set forth in Gagnon. However, after six months elapsed without the Parole Board adopting such a system, plaintiffs filed a motion in April of 1992 which, among other things, asked the trial court to set a schedule for the Parole Board \\\"to propose a remedy to screen citizens and to provide counsel to citizens who require counsel at parole revocation hearings.\\\" The court granted plaintiffs' motion and entered an order on May 28, 1992, which directed defendants to present a proposal by July 2, 1992 for \\\"a remedy to ensure that counsel is provided for citizens whose parole may be revoked, under the criteria set forth in Gagnon v. Scarpelli.\\\"\\nThe Parole Board submitted a proposal to the trial court in conformity with this order on July 2, 1992. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking modifications of this proposal. In addition, the AOC and the Office of Public Defender submitted comments.\\nAfter the trial court adjourned consideration of plaintiffs' motion on several occasions, apparently for the purpose of obtaining further comments from the AOC regarding its role in the implementation of the Parole Board's proposal, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to enjoin the Parole Board from detaining any person on an alleged parole violation or from revoking any person's parole until it implemented a system for providing counsel for indigent parolees in conformity with Gagnon. The court denied the re quested injunctive relief, but entered an order on December 3, 1992, which approved the Parole Board's proposal for providing counsel to indigent parolees charged with violations of parole, subject to certain modifications agreed to by the Parole Board.\\nThe procedures approved by the trial court require the Parole Board to screen indigent parolees to determine whether they are entitled to counsel under Gagnon. This screening responsibility is performed by \\\"parole counselors,\\\" who the Parole Board is responsible for training. If the Parole Board determines that a parolee is entitled to counsel, it refers his or her name to the AOC to verify indigency, and if the parolee satisfies this condition, the matter is referred to the Assignment Judge of the vicinage in which the parole revocation probable cause hearing is scheduled to be heard for the assignment of counsel pursuant to Rule 3:27-2.\\nThereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion for an award of counsel fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. 42 U.S.C.A. \\u00a7 1988(b). The trial court granted this motion, finding that \\\"plaintiffs were the prevailing party in this litigation, because it was through their efforts that the Parole Board adopted a remedial scheme to guarantee their rights pursuant to Gagnon v. Scarpelli,\\\" and awarded them $20,665 in counsel fees.\\nPlaintiffs have appealed from the court's order of December 3, 1992, approving the Parole Board's procedures for providing assigned counsel under the circumstances required by the Supreme Court in Gagnon, contending that, as a matter of New Jersey law, indigent parolees should be assigned counsel in all parole revocation proceedings and that the Legislature should be required to appropriate funds to provide that representation through the Office of Public Defender. The Parole Board has filed a cross-appeal challenging the trial court's award of counsel fees to plaintiffs.\\nWe reject plaintiffs' argument that New Jersey law entitles indigent parolees charged with violations of parole to legal representation in a broader range of circumstances than is required under the United States Constitution, as interpreted in Gagnon. We also reject plaintiffs' argument that the State is required to provide legal representation to such parolees by funding a Parole Revocation Unit in the Public Defender's Office. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order of December 3, 1992, insofar as it rejects these arguments and requires the assignment of members of the private bar to provide legal representation to indigent parolees under the standards set forth in Gagnon. We also agree with the trial court's determination that plaintiffs are \\\"prevailing parties\\\" within the intent of 42 U.S.C.A. \\u00a7 1988 who are entitled to an award of counsel fees. However, the court failed to set the amount of that award in accordance with the principles set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Therefore, we remand the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of the amount of the award of counsel fees.\\nI\\nIn Gagnon, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the right of indigent parolees to representation by assigned counsel in parole revocation proceedings depends upon the circumstances of each individual case. On the one hand, a parolee \\\"may well have difficulty in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the presentation requires the examining or cross-examining of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex documentary evidence.\\\" 411 U.S. at 787, 93 S.Ct. at 1762, 36 L.Ed.2d at 664. On the other hand, a rigid rule requiring counsel to be provided in all such cases \\\"would impose direct costs and serious collateral disadvantages without regard to the need or the likelihood in a particular case for a constructive contribution by counsel.\\\" Ibid. For example, \\\"[i]n most cases . [the] parolee has been convicted of committing another crime or has admitted the charges against him.\\\" Ibid. Moreover, the introduction of counsel would significantly alter the nature of these proceedings: the decision-making process would be prolonged, the financial cost incurred by the State would be substantial, and there would be a danger that the hearing body would be less attuned to the parolee's rehabilitation needs because it would be distracted by the adversarial nature of such a process. Id. at 787-88, 93 S.Ct. at 1762, 36 L.Ed.2d at 665. Consequently, the Court adopted a case-by-case approach for determining the right of indigent parolees to counsel in parole revocation proceedings:\\nPresumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. In every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record.\\n[Id. at 790-91, 93 S.Ct. at 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d at 666-67.]\\nThe Parole Board, with the assistance of other state agencies, including the Public Defender's Office and the AOC, adopted the previously summarized procedures for providing counsel to indigent parolees in the circumstances required by Gagnon. See Ante at 571, 644 A2d at 1125. Plaintiffs have not challenged the adequacy of these procedures for determining which indigent parolees are entitled to representation by assigned counsel in parole revocation proceedings under Gagnon. Instead, plaintiffs' argument is that, as a matter of state constitutional and common law, any indigent parolee charged with a violation which may result in a revocation of parole should be assigned counsel.\\nThe New Jersey courts have not had occasion in recent years to consider the scope of the right to counsel in parole revocation proceedings because the Public Defender Act, as amended in 1974, L.1974, c. 33, \\u00a7 2, expressly required the Public Defender to provide legal representation to any indigent parolee \\\"who is charged with violation of that parole or who is under consideration for revocation of parole.\\\" N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-5.1. However, in other contexts our courts have recognized a right to assigned counsel which is broader than that guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. Thus, in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295, 277 A.2d 216 (1971), the Court held that even though petty offenders were not then entitled to counsel as a matter of federal constitutional law, \\\"as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a conviction entailing imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.\\\" Similarly, in State v. Sanchez, 129 N.J. 261, 274, 609 A.2d 400 (1992), the Court stated that \\\"[although the language of article 1, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution is virtually identical with that of the Sixth Amendment, we have held in other contexts that the State Constitution affords greater protection of the right to counsel than is provided under the federal constitution.\\\" See also New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.B., 137 N.J. 180, 186-188, 644 A.2d 1093, 1096-1097 (1994); State in Interest of Antini, 53 N.J. 488, 490-91, 251 A.2d 291 (1969); State v. Horton, 34 N.J. 518, 522-24, 170 A.2d 1 (1961).\\nIt would appear that our courts have the authority under the principles set forth in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt and State v. Sanchez to require that counsel be appointed in parole revocation proceedings in a broader range of circumstances than is required by the Supreme Court's opinion in Gagnon. However, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the Gagnon standards provide inadequate procedural protections to indigent parolees charged with violations of parole. As the Court noted in Gagnon, the majority of parole revocations are based upon a parolee's commission of a new offense or his admitted violation of the conditions of parole. 411 U.S. at 787, 93 S.Ct. at 1762, 36 L.Ed.2d at 664. Plaintiffs have not made a persuasive showing that counsel must be automatically assigned under such circumstances in order to safeguard a parolee's right to a fair revocation hearing. Instead, there appears to us to be a reasonable basis for the Court's view in Gagnon that the presentation of \\\"a justifiable excuse for [such a] violation or a convincing reason why revocation is not the appropriate disposition .' is often not susceptible of proof or is so simple as not to require either investigation or exposition by counsel.\\\" Ibid. Moreover, our Supreme Court has characterized Gagnon as requiring \\\"the appointment of counsel when fundamental fairness so requires,\\\" New Jersey State Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192, 209, 460 A.2d 103 (1983), without suggesting that New Jersey law would require a more expansive right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings. Therefore, we conclude that plaintiffs have not shown that the case-by-case approach to the assignment of counsel endorsed by the Supreme Court in Gagnon is inadequate to assure the assignment of counsel in those parole revocation proceedings \\\"in which fundamental fairness \\u2014 the touchstone of due process \\u2014 \\\" requires the State to provide counsel for indigent parolees. 411 II.S. at 790, 93 S.Ct. at 1763, 36 L.Ed.2d at 666.\\nWe emphasize that the Parole Board, as the agency entrusted with the statutory responsibility to conduct parole hearings, also has the responsibility to ensure that parolees charged with parole violations are provided with legal representation in conformity with constitutional requirements. See id. at 790-91, 93 S.Ct. at 1763-64, 36 L.Ed.2d at 666. This means that the Parole Board must process all parolees' requests lor counsel in a timely and fair manner. Moreover, the Parole Board must assure that counsel is assigned sufficiently in advance of any scheduled hearing to provide adequate representation. If the Parole Board fails to properly discharge these responsibilities, plaintiffs may apply for appropriate relief under Rule 1:10-5.\\nII\\nPlaintiffs' contention that the State must provide counsel to indigent parolees by adequately funding a Parole Revocation Unit in the Public Defender's Office rests on two grounds. First, plaintiffs argue that Gagnon requires that indigent parolees who are entitled to counsel be represented by attorneys who are compensated by the State. Second, plaintiffs argue that only experienced, compensated attorneys can provide effective legal representation in parole revocation proceedings.\\nPlaintiffs' first argument relies upon the Court's statement in Gagnon that \\\"there will remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness . will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.\\\" 411 U.S. at 790, 93 S.Ct. at 1763, 36 L.Ed.2d at 666 (emphasis added). However, when this statement is read in context, it becomes clear that the Court's reference to the State providing counsel \\\"at its expense\\\" was simply a shorthand means of distinguishing between retained and appointed counsel. The Court commenced its discussion of the right to counsel in Gagnon by stating that \\\"[t]he second, and more difficult, question posed by this case is whether an indigent probationer or parolee has a due process right to be represented by appointed counsel at these [revocation] hearings,\\\" to which the Court appended a footnote recognizing the distinction between a parolee's right to the assistance of retained and appointed counsel. 411 U.S. at 783, 93 S.Ct. at 1760, 36 L.Ed.2d at 662. Moreover, even in the context of criminal trials, the Court has never held that appointed counsel must be compensated, see Martin County, Fla. v. Makemson, 479 U.S. 1043, 107 S.Ct. 908, 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), and bur Supreme Court has expressly held that a defendant's right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment may be satisfied by the appointment of uncompensated private counsel. Madden v. Township of Delran, 126 N.J. 591, 599-600, 601 A.2d 211 (1992); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 405-07, 217 A.2d 441 (1966); accord Hallford v. State, 629 So.2d 6, 11-12 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, \\u2014 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1870, 128 L.Ed.2d 491 (1994); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 872, 880 (Ky.1992), cert. denied, \\u2014 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1857, 123 L.Ed.2d 479 (1993). Therefore, we are satisfied that Gagnon does not require that counsel assigned to represent indigent parolees be compensated by the State.\\nPlaintiffs' second argument \\u2014 that assigned private counsel who are inexperienced in parole revocation proceedings cannot provide effective legal assistance \\u2014 has been expressly rejected by our Supreme Court in the context of criminal trials.\\nNor is prior experience in criminal matters essential. The law is a vast field and no man is in command of all of it. Lawyers, as do judges, move from scene to scene, absorbing the special features of each. A capacity to that end goes to the essence of the practice of law. A lawyer's training equips him for it, and his every experience sharpens that skill. And although a new scene may demand a greater initial effort, the newcomer may well bring a zeal and a freshness long lost to a tired or comfortable expert.\\n. This is not to say that another approach would not be more desirable. Rather our point is that what we have meets the constitutional demand____\\n[State v. Bush, supra, 46 N.J. at 406-07, 217 A.2d 441.]\\nThe Court has recently expressed a similar view regarding the representation of indigent defendants in municipal court proceedings:\\nWitnesses who indicated their belief that experienced counsel in municipal court provide services superior to assigned counsel fell short of making out a case of constitutional deprivation. Although we do not now subscribe to what we said some years ago in Rush \\u2014 to the effect that there is no difference in the quality of representation \\u2014 the extent of deprivation demonstrated in this case was limited and confined largely to debatable opinions, albeit from experienced practitioners. Certainly there was no showing that the present system came even close to threatening a substantial deprivation of the right to the assistance of competent counsel. Even accepting that in general, a system of paid counsel, either paid by the court on assignment or supplied through a public defender, results in better representation than that provided by pro bono counsel, such a showing does not equate with a constitutional denial of counsel. As has often been noted, the right to counsel is the right only to the effective assistance of counsel, not to the best counsel.\\nWe do not mean to suggest that the differences complained of do not exist or that they are not undesirable____ All we mean is that on the record before us there is no constitutional deprivation.\\n[Madden v. Township of Delran, supra, 126 N.J. at 599-600, 601 A.2d 211 (citation omitted).]\\nWe perceive no basis for reaching a different conclusion regarding the representation of indigents in parole revocation proceedings. These proceedings, conducted before administrative officials, are less formal and less complex than jury trials held in the Superior Court, or even prosecutions heard in the municipal courts. Moreover, if it appears that a particular parole revocation proceeding will be unusually complex, and consequently that experienced counsel should be assigned, the Parole Board will have the responsibility, with the assistance of the AOC, to select counsel who has the special competence required to handle that matter. Cf. id. at 608, 601 A2d 211 (\\\"[I]f the municipal court judge concludes that defendant will not receive effective assistance of counsel, the judge's obligation will be to select other counsel.\\\").\\nWe also reject plaintiffs' argument that the representation of indigent parolees by assigned private counsel will unduly delay their parole revocation proceedings. Although there appears to have been an undue delay in assigning counsel to plaintiff Frank, we cannot conclude that a system of assigned counsel is unworkable on the basis of this single case. However, we remind the Parole Board that it has the responsibility to assure that counsel are assigned to qualifying indigents in a timely manner. If the Parole Board fails to discharge this responsibility, plaintiffs may seek appropriate supplemental relief. R. 1:10-5.\\nIll\\nThe Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides that in any action brought under 42 U.S.C.A. \\u00a7 1983, \\\"the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.\\\" 42 U.S.C.A. \\u00a7 1988(b). Although this legislation confers discretion upon a trial court to determine whether an award of attorney's fees is appropriate, the Supreme Court has indicated that \\\"a prevailing plaintiff 'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.' \\\" Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. at 1937, 76 L.Ed.2d at 48 (quoting S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 5908, 5912) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263, 1266 (1968))). \\\"[Pjlaintiffs may be considered 'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.\\\" Id. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d at 50 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978)); accord Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 789-92, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1492-94, 103 L.Ed.2d 866, 875-77 (1989); Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 494-95, 472 A.2d 138, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832, 105 S.Ct. 121, 83 L.Ed.2 d 64 (1984). Thus, \\\"a plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.\\\" Farrar v. Hobby, \\u2014 U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573, 121 L.Ed.2d 494, 503 (1992).\\nThe trial court correctly concluded that plaintiffs were \\\"prevailing parties\\\" within the meaning of \\u00a7 1988, as interpreted by the Court in Hensley and Farrar: Although plaintiffs' suit primarily sought to establish that indigent parolees facing parole revocation are automatically entitled to the assignment of counsel as a matter of state law, the immediate relief they sought was the assignment of counsel to the individually named plaintiffs. It is clear from the record that at least plaintiff Frank secured that relief. In addition, there is ample support in the record for the trial court's finding that \\\"it was through [plaintiffs'] efforts that the Parole Board adopted a remedial scheme to guarantee their rights pursuant to Gagnon v. Scarpelli.\\\" After the Legislature failed to fund the Parole Revocation Unit in the Public Defender's Office and the then Public Defender announced that, beginning on July 1, 1991, his office would no longer be able to provide representation to indigent parolees charged with violations of parole, the Parole Board failed to take any steps to establish an alternative system of representation in conformity with Gagnon until after this suit was filed in August of 1991. Moreover, following the filing of this suit, the Parole Board did not submit a proposal for providing representation to indigent parolees in conformity with Gagnon until July 2, 1992, approximately one year after the Public Defender terminated his representation of indigents involved in parole revocation proceedings, and it did not actually begin to implement that proposal for at least another six months. Indeed, even after this appeal was filed, the Parole Board filed a motion for a stay which, if granted, would have further delayed the assignment of counsel in conformity with Gagnon. Therefore, we are satisfied that this litigation \\\"modified] the [Parole Board's] behavior in a way that directly benefits [plaintiffs],\\\" and that plaintiffs are thus \\\"prevailing parties\\\" -within the intent of \\u00a7 1988. Farrar v. Hobby, supra, \\u2014 U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 573, 121 L.Ed.2d at 503.\\nWe also reject the Parole Board's argument that even if plaintiffs are viewed as \\\"prevailing parties,\\\" they should nevertheless be denied an award of counsel fees because the absence of counsel in their parole revocation proceedings resulted from the Legislature's defunding of the Public Defender's Parole Revocation Unit rather than the Parole Board's own action or inaction. The system of legal representation ultimately established as a result of this litigation demonstrates that the Parole Board could have immediately taken appropriate steps to conform with the requirements of Gagnon, even without the assistance of the Legislature, when the Public Defender announced that he could no longer provide representation to indigent parolees. In any event, the fact that an executive agency's violation of a litigant's constitutional rights results from legislative action does not qualify as a \\\"special circumstance\\\" which justifies the denial of an award of counsel fees under \\u00a7 1988. \\\"Fee awards against enforcement officials are run-of-the-mill occurrences, even though, on occasion, had a state legislature acted or reacted in a different or more timely manner, there would have been no need for a lawsuit or for an injunction.\\\" Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 739, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1978, 64 L.Ed. 2d 641, 658 (1980); see also Gregg v. Township Comm. of Hazlet, 232 N.J.Super. 34, 39, 556 A.2d 348 (App.Div.1989). Gag-non places the responsibility for the enforcement of the federal constitutional right to counsel in parole revocation proceedings upon \\\"the state authority charged with responsibility for administering the . parole system,\\\" 411 U.S. at 790, 93 S.Ct. at 1763, 36 L.Ed.2d at 666, which in this State is the Parole Board. There fore, the Parole Board may be held liable for counsel fees under \\u00a7 1988 in a successful action brought under \\u00a7 1983 to enforce this constitutional right.\\nAlthough a prevailing party ordinarily is entitled to an award of counsel fees, the trial court has a responsibility to determine what fee is \\\"reasonable\\\" under all the circumstances. \\\"If . a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount.\\\" Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. at 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d at 52. In determining whether to award \\\"a fully compensatory fee\\\" to an attorney for a prevailing party, \\\"the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.\\\" Id. at 435-36, 103 S.Ct. at 1940-41, 76 L.Ed. 2d at 52; accord Farrar v. Hobby, supra, \\u2014 U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 574, 121 L.Ed.2d at 505; Singer v. State, supra, 95 N.J. at 499-500, 472 A.2d 138. If the court concludes that a fee should be adjusted downward because the prevailing party has achieved only a limited degree of success, it \\\"may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.\\\" Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, 461 U.S. at 436-37, 103 S.Ct. at 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d at 52.\\nThe trial court did not undertake the analysis required by Hensley in determining the amount of counsel fees to award plaintiffs. The court only considered the reasonableness of the time spent on the litigation and counsels' hourly rates, stating that \\\"the billings seem proper except for certain double billings [for which the court deducted $1,000 from the total fee sought by plaintiffs],\\\" without considering whether \\\"the degree of success obtained\\\" justified a \\\"fully compensatory fee.\\\" Id. at 435-36, 103 S.Ct. at 1940-41, 76 L.Ed.2d at 52. Therefore, the case must be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of the amount of counsel fees in light of the principles set forth in Hensley.\\nAccordingly, on plaintiffs' appeal we affirm the order of December 3, 1992, insofar as it rejects plaintiffs' claims that indigent parolees have a broader right to counsel in parole revocation proceedings under state law than the federal constitutional right established by Gagnon and that the State is required to appropriate sufficient funds for the Public Defender to provide parolees with such representation in these proceedings. On the Parole Board's cross-appeal we affirm the trial court's determination that plaintiffs are \\\"prevailing parties\\\" entitled to counsel fees under \\u00a7 1988, but we remand for a redetermination of the amount of the award in conformity with the principles set forth in this opinion.\\nThe Legislature has continued to decline to appropriate any funds for this purpose in subsequent years. L.1993, c. 155, 1993 N.J.Laws-, -, 1993 Senate No. 2000 1, 93 (June 29, 1993); L.1992, c. 40, 1992 NJ.Laws 271, 379.\\nDefendants waived any issue of mootness which could arise if the plaintiffs' parole revocation hearings were conducted prior to the conclusion of this litigation, acknowledging that the right to counsel issue was capable of repetition yet evading review and that it was important enough to require resolution on the merits. See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.B., 120 N.J. 112, 118\\u2014 19, 576 A.2d 261 (1990).\\nAccordingly, we do not decide whether these procedures in fact satisfy Gagnon. However, insofar as the questionnaire used for screening requests for counsel suggests that a parolee not only must make \\\"a timely and colorable claim that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty,\\\" 411 U.S. at 790, 93 S.Ct. at 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d at 666, but also must show that the defense of the charges will be \\\"complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present,\\\" ibid., we have serious doubts whether the Parole Board has correctly interpreted Gagnon. Since the two alternative grounds for the assignment of counsel under Gagnon are set forth in the disjunctive, are separated by a semi-colon (rather than a comma), and are separately identified by number, it would appear that the Court intended the precondition \\\"that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present\\\" to be applied only in circumstances where \\\"the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested\\\" and where the parolee believes there are \\\"substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate.\\\" This interpretation is reinforced by the reference in this qualifying clause to \\\"reasons\\\" that are complex or difficult to present, which is the term used in the immediately preceding clause to refer to mitigating circumstances, but which term is conspicuously absent from the clause describing the first ground for the assignment of counsel. The decisions in other jurisdictions provide inferential support for this interpretation of Gagnon. See, e.g., Forbes v. Roebuck, 368 F.Supp. 817, 820 (E.D.Ky.) (parolee's denial of violating parole requires assignment of an attorney), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir.1974); In re Love, 11 Cal.3d 179, 113 Cal.Rptr. 89, 93, 520 P.2d 713, 717 (1974) (a presumptive right to appointed counsel exists \\\"where the parolee denies that he committed the violations and where, even though he does not contest the existence of the violation, he asserts complex matters in mitigation.\\\"); Thompson v. State, 413 So.2d 1301, 1302 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1982) (exception to the Gagnon right to appointed counsel is limited to situations where the probationer has been convicted of a crime or where he has admitted the violation). Therefore, we suggest that the Parole Board, in consultation with the Attorney General, should reconsider whether the standards now being utilized for the assignment of counsel in parole revocation proceedings actually comply with the requirements of Gagnon.\\nBefore the Legislature imposed this responsibility upon the Public Defender, this court refused to recognize an indigent's right to appointed counsel in parole revocation proceedings. State v. Morales, 120 N.J.Super. 197, 202, 293 A.2d 672 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 62 N.J. 77, 299 A.2d 75 (1972).\\nSubsequent to oral argument, the Parole Board submitted monthly statistical tabulations for the period from June 1993 through March 1994 of the number of indigent parolees who have requested counsel and who have actually been assigned counsel in connection with their parole revocation proceedings:\\nDISTRICT OFFICE INTERVIEWED REFERRED PERCENTAGE\\n1 190 3 1.57\\n2 8 0 0\\n3 42 5 11.90\\n4 44 42 95.45\\n5 29 5 17.24\\n6 36 10 27.78\\n7 38 36 94.74\\n8 22 21 95.45\\n9 97 1 1.03\\n10 29 18 62.06\\nDISTRICT OFFICE INTERVIEWED REFERRED PERCENTAGE\\n11 41 23 56.09\\n12 38 13 34.21\\n13 14 1 7.14\\nThese statistics reveal rather startling disparities among the different offices of the Bureau of Parole in granting requests for the assignment of counsel. However, this data is not part of the record on appeal, and in any event would not be sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant the conclusion that the Parole Board's system for the assignment of counsel in parole revocation proceedings is unworkable. Nevertheless, this data indicates a need for the Parole Board and Bureau of Parole to review the operation of the screening system to assure that indigent parolees are being assigned counsel in all districts under the full range of circumstances contemplated by Gagnon.\\nThe Parole Board sent a letter four days before oral argument arguing for the first time that the award of counsel fees was improper because the Parole Board is not a \\\"person\\\" within the intent of \\u00a7 1983. Since this argument was not presented to the trial court, nor briefed by the parties on this appeal, it is not properly before us. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234, 300 A.2d 142 (1973). In any event, the Court has held that counsel fees may be awarded against a state agency pursuant to \\u00a7 1988. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 694-700, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2575-78, 57 L.Ed.2d 522, 536-40 (1978); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2313, 105 L.Ed.2d 45, 58 (1989); Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 672-73 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102, 101 S.Ct. 898, 66 L.Ed.2d 828 (1981).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/739426.json b/nj/739426.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..de405a373f302316bd932503a9140f70cb035c0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/739426.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"739426\", \"name\": \"JOHN RATH, PROSECUTOR, v. CITY OF BAYONNE ET AL., DEFENDANTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Rath v. City of Bayonne\", \"decision_date\": \"1932-08-27\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"997\", \"last_page\": \"998\", \"citations\": \"10 N.J. Misc. 997\", \"volume\": \"10\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Miscellaneous Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:22:56.441638+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JOHN RATH, PROSECUTOR, v. CITY OF BAYONNE ET AL., DEFENDANTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"JOHN RATH, PROSECUTOR, v. CITY OF BAYONNE ET AL., DEFENDANTS.\\nSubmitted May 13, 1932\\nDecided August 27, 1932.\\nBefore Justices Pabkeb, Campbell and Lloyd.\\nPor the prosecutor, John Milton.\\nPor the defendants, Alfred Brenner.\", \"word_count\": \"439\", \"char_count\": \"2511\", \"text\": \"Pee Cukiam.\\nThe writ brings up an ordinance of September loth, 1931, repealing an ordinance of December, 1927, creating the city office of inspector of buildings; and a resolution of October 6th, 1931, assigning the duties of building inspector to the city surveyor. Prosecutor was building inspector at the time of the repealer, and claims to have been illegally deprived of his office.\\nThe first point made is that the repealer ordinance is invalid as undertaking to contravene chapter 50 of Pamph. L. 1914, providing in substance that inspectors of buildings in second class cities (Bayonne is one) shall have indefinite tenure and shall not be removed without charges and a hearing.\\nThe second point is that the repealer also runs counter to the act of 1927 (Pamph. L., p. 422, ch. 223), making similar provision in case of indefinite terms of office in all but first class cities.\\nIf the office itself remained, these statutes would be applicable; but the office was created by ordinance, under authority of Pamph. L. 1886, p. 321; and the power to enact the ordinance implies' a power to repeal. Stemmler v. Madison, 82 N. J. L. 596; 83 Atl. Rep. 85. It is conceded that an office may be abolished bona fide in the interest of economjr, and perhaps for other similar reasons, but it is alleged that the present abolition was for political reasons. We find no fact in the case pointing in that direction, except perhaps that the personnel of the city commission had changed. It seems 'to be recognized in the cases that there must be something indicating a lack of good faith. For example, in Carroll v. Bayonne, 3 N. J. Mis. R. 308; 128 Atl. Rep. 234 (cited in prosecutor's brief), there was a wholesale shedding of policemen and firemen; in McGillvray v. Linden, 5 N. J. Mis. R. 1049; 139 Atl. Rep. 433, the testimony showed political motive; in Womsley v. Jersey City, 61 N. J. L. 499; 39 Atl. Rep. 710, the office was retained or recreated under a transparent change of name.\\nIn the present case the office is definitely abolished at a saving of some $3,500 a year, and the work, under the resolution before us, will be done by the city surveyor without extra pay so far as appears. We are unable to read any bad faith out of this action.\\nThe writ will be dismissed, with costs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/739542.json b/nj/739542.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c1155977f8c4fa6581c49d89d3a5c8d126d8ad7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/739542.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"739542\", \"name\": \"CHARLES STEWART AND VIOLA GREENER, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. WASHINGTON CAMP NO. 7, PATRIOTIC ORDER, SONS OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Stewart v. Washington Camp No. 7\", \"decision_date\": \"1932-04-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"501\", \"last_page\": \"505\", \"citations\": \"10 N.J. Misc. 501\", \"volume\": \"10\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Miscellaneous Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:22:56.441638+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CHARLES STEWART AND VIOLA GREENER, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. WASHINGTON CAMP NO. 7, PATRIOTIC ORDER, SONS OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.\", \"head_matter\": \"CHARLES STEWART AND VIOLA GREENER, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. WASHINGTON CAMP NO. 7, PATRIOTIC ORDER, SONS OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.\\nSubmitted January 26, 1932\\nDecided April 8, 1932.\\nBefore Justice Campbell, Lloyd and Bodine.\\nFor the plaintiffs-appellants, Philip M. Chamberlin.\\nFor the defendant-respondent, Richard C. Chamberlain, Jr.\", \"word_count\": \"1509\", \"char_count\": \"8913\", \"text\": \"Pee Ctjeiam.\\nThe plaintiffs are half-brother and half-sister of one Albert T. Stewart, who in his lifetime was a member of the defendant fraternal society organized under the laws of this state.\\nThe statute, controlling defendant's organization, provides that fraternal beneficiary associations may provide death benefits for \\\"the families, heirs, blood relatives, affianced husband or affianced wife of, or to persons dependent upon, the members.\\\" 1 Comp. 8tat., p. 197.\\nThe statute exempts fraternal beneficiary associations from the provisions of the insurance laws of this state. Such organizations have been given special consideration under our laws for nearly eighty years, because of their benevolent and charitable acts.\\nThe defendant's by-laws provide for payment of death benefits to the widow and next of kin, or legal representative of a deceased member, and if there be none such, provision is made for the expenditure of the benefits, or some part thereof, for the expenses of the last illness, funeral expenses and a grave marker. Stewart left neither a widow or children, but he made a will by which he appointed Edwin Cooke executor. Cooke qualified, and payment of the death benefits, which amounted to $500, was made to him. The plaintiffs sought payment to them. The case was tried before the District Court without a jury, upon an agreed state of facts. The sole question is whether the judgment should have been entered in favor' of the plaintiff.\\nThe statute above adverted to was enacted March 11th, 1893, and went into effect immediately. Prior thereto, fraternal organizations of similar purpose, had been regulated under the Revision of 1875, and the supplements thereto. Pamph. L. 1853, p. 355; Pamph. L. 1855, p. 770; Pamph. L. 1873, p. 31; 1 Gen. Stat., p. 149.\\nBy supplement to the Revision of 1875 {Pamph. L. 1883, p. 57), it was provided that it should be lawful for such association to pay the death benefits to the husband, wife, father, mother, brother, sister or legal representative of such member after his or her death\\nMr. Justice Magie, speaking for the Court of Errors and Appeals, in Golden Star Fraternity v. Martin, 59 N. J. A. 207 (at p. 212); 35 Atl. Rep. 908, respecting this later enactment, said: \\\"It appears that it was designed to empower such associations to contract to pay Meath benefits' according to their rules and by-laws, but the contract is to be limited to-the payment of such death benefits, after the death of the member, to certain specified relatives or connections of the member or to his or her legal representative. It is obvious that such a contract is of the nature of a contract of life insurance. But so far as it provides for the payment of death benefits to the near relatives and connections of the deceased member as a gratuity to them, it is life insurance having a benevolent purpose. Authority to make such contracts of life insurance, in my judgment, could be conferred upon such associations under the title of this act. But the act also authorizes a contract to pay death benefits to the legal representative of a deceased member. When there is no context to indicate that the phrase legal representative' is to be taken as meaning some other relative, it is to be considered as meaning the executor or administrator of a deceased person. Lodge v. Weld, 139 Mass. 499. A contract to pay death benefits to the member's executor or administrator is obviously a contract of ordinary life insurance. Upon the member's death his estate would be increased by the sum thus contracted to be paid, and the transaction would have no benevolent or charitable feature whatever. Authority to make such a contract is not, in my judgment, within the title of this act.\\\"\\nIt is to be noted that our present statute (1 Comp. Stat., p. 197), does not provide for payment to the legal representative of a deceased member. Section 9 of the general act for the incorporation of associations not for pecuniary profit (Pamph. L. 1898, p. 422), provides as follows: \\\"It shall be lawful for associations incorporated under this act, where their certificate of incorporation so specifies, to provide for the relief of disabled or destitute members or their families and to maintain a fund for that purpose, or to contract with their members to pay death benefits according to the rules or by-laws adopted by such associations, and to agree to pay the same to the husband, wife, father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister or legal representative, of such member, after his or her death, which contract the beneficiary therein named shall have full legal power to enforce in proceedings at law or equity.\\\"\\nThe Supreme Court said in Ryan v. Firemen's Benevolent Association, 77 N. J. L. 399, 401, that Pamph. L. 1898, p. 165, did not authorize a charitable institution to assume the functions of a life insurance company and pay benefits in a way different from that provided under the laws in existence at the time of their organization. The defendant was organized October 29th, 1895.\\nBy chapter 76, Pamph. L. 1899, sundry acts relating to corporations not for pecuniary profit and sundry acts relating to fraternal beneficiary societies were repealed, but the pertinent portion of the act of 1893 appears not to have been dis turbed. Further it was in identical form embodied .in an amendment of 1907. Pamph. B., p. 435. The defendant was therefore confined to making of contracts for payments to the families, heirs, blood relatives, &e. Stewart having such a contract, payment should have been to the next of kin since there was no widow. Vice-Chancellor Heed made such distribution in Radient Temple v. William R. Piper, 62 N. J. Eq. 565.\\nAdvisory Master Kocher (In re Beidelman's Estate, 4 N. J. Mis. R. 549; 133 Atl. Rep. 873) so construed the funeral benefit contract before him as entitling the widow to the proceeds thereof rather than the executor. He said: \\\"There appears to be no reported case directly in point. The case of Carpenter v. Alert Council, reported in 26 N. J. L. J. 373, comes the nearest in point. In that case the by-laws provided that the payment shall be made to the widow or near relative of the deceased. There was no widow, and the court construed the 'near relative5 to be the next of kin, and excluded the administrator or executor of the deceased from any claim upon the funeral benefit. It was held, however, that the mere fact that the administrator paid the funeral expenses out of the estate was an irrelevant circumstance; the direction of the constitution and by-laws as to payment, being explicit, must be obeyed.55\\nFurther, \\\"the law is settled, that it is not within the power of either a member of such a corporation, or of the corporation itself, or of the two combined, to divert any pa.rt of the fund raised or accumulated for the benefit of the beneficiaries named in the statute under which the corporation is organized, to any other person, or to apply it to any other purpose than that authorized by such statute authorizing the formation of corporations to accumulate a fund to be paid to the widows -and children of deceased members, the corporation can only pay the fund to the widows and children of deceased members, and if it should make a promise to pay any part of it to any other person, its promise would be void. Its promise would not only be ultra vires, but in direct contravention of the purpose of the statute from which the corpo ration derived both its corporate existence and power. And a member of such a corporation is equally powerless to divert from its appointed channel that part of the fund of the corporation which becomes payable on his death.\\\" American Legion of Honor v. Smith, 45 N. J. Eq. 470.\\nNotwithstanding the provisions of the by-laws, which we cannot and do not regard as conferring a right upon the defendant to choose to make payment either to the executor or to the next of kin, the law is well settled that Pamph. L. 1893, p. 232 (1 Comp. Stat., p. 197), controlled the defendant's incorporation and limited its contracts to such as had a benevolent or charitable feature. The defendant could not, under its charter, make contracts which would increase the estate to be administered in behalf of its members.\\nSince the statute under which the defendant was organized gives it no power to make payment of death benefits to the legal representatives of deceased members, payment to such legal representative is no bar to an action by the beneficiaries who sue in their own right.\\nThe judgment is reversed, with costs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/809891.json b/nj/809891.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b00a153af79b8eac5591b0be7bb52d46cdfc9fd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/809891.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"809891\", \"name\": \"Charles F. Leeds et al. v. Richard A. F. Penrose et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Leeds v. Penrose\", \"decision_date\": \"1888-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"464\", \"last_page\": \"474\", \"citations\": \"44 N.J. Eq. 464\", \"volume\": \"44\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:00:07.545046+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Charles F. Leeds et al. v. Richard A. F. Penrose et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Charles F. Leeds et al. v. Richard A. F. Penrose et al.\\n1. As this case is presented, under the amended answer, it appears that both Leeds and Penrose ax-e guilty of laches, or if the one was too slow in commencing suit, the other was too aggressive in making the improvements for which he claims compensation, after the notice which he had. The complainants are entitled to a conveyance of the lands as prayed for, and Penrose is entitled to\\u2019 be reimbursed to the extent that the expenditures made by him resulted in permanent impx-ovements. The improvements consist in changing very low, wet land into building lots, the value of which has been fixed by the testimony offered by Penrose. The complainants can reimburse by paying him the amount found to be due for such impi'ovements, either in cash or by releasing to him the lots named.\\n2. Query: Can one in such case make very radical changes, and justly claim, compensation for them as against the true owner ?\\nMr. J. J. Crandall, for complainants.\\nMr. IP M. Cooper and Mr. D. J. Pancoast, for defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"4108\", \"char_count\": \"22631\", \"text\": \"Bird, V. C.\\nThis case has once been heard as to the right of the complainants to a deed of conveyance from the defendant, Penrose, for a certain parcel of land named in the bill. The opinion of the-court was that the complainants were entitled to the relief asked for. See 6 Cent. Rep. 545.\\nAfter the views of the court were understood by the defendant, Penrose, he came in and asked leave to amend his answer, so as to show that he had made very valuable permanent improvements on the land in question, amounting to, in all, more than $9,000, and in the full belief that the lands,upon which they were made were his own. It was thought to be more equitable to allow him to make his defence on this point, even though he liad first ventured to wait the action of the court on the question of title. If there was really good faith in his great outlay, it would not be very satisfactory to allow the complainants to have all the benefits thereof. I do not wish to be understood as intimating that it is equitable in every ease where large improvements have been thus made, to allow for them.\\nI think the true inquiry is, Did the defendant make these improvements in that good faith which the law requires, or did he do it after such notice as will impose all the risk on him ? It would be highly inequitable to sustain him in the latter view, should the latter view be supported by the facts.\\nIn a complete and satisfactory sense, the act of the defendant is not bona fide, or, as one text writer expresses it, he was hot wholly innocent; for the defendant knew of this claim to this land by the complainants, as I have stated. See 6 Cent. Rep. 546. One of the complainants absolutely refused to execute a deed for the larger tract to the defendant, Penrose, until the deed to the complainants, for the lot in question, was executed by Pen-rose. It should be remembered that that deed was executed by Penrose, and then the complainants executed the deed according to their parol agreement, for the whole premises, including the parcel now claimed by them, back from Penrose to them. But when the deed to Penrose was delivered, the deed from him to complainants was not delivered, although, as stated, it had been prepared and executed by Penrose. And when one of the complainants demanded it of Guillou, the agent of Penrose, he refused to deliver it, but afterwards, on his own motion and without knowledge of the complainants, handed another deed to the clerk of the county, and ordered him to record it; and when it was recorded, he mailed it to Mrs. Leeds, the mother of two of the complainants and the aunt of tlie other two. She had been actiug for them in all this transaction. She had delivered the deed for the Leeds tract to Guillou, and demanded for them the deed which she knew had been executed for them in return. Hence, it was not improper to send the deed to- her. This deed she retained, taking it to her counsel at once, and advising with him concerning the rights of the defendants in the matter.\\nIn a very few days after the recording of his deed, but whether before it reached Mrs. Leeds or not does not appear, Penrose ordered his men to go to work on the lands now claimed by the complainants. The lands were low and wet, often covered by the tides. The object Penrose had in view was the improvement of the whole tract, so as to be suitable for building lots. The location is so near to the thriving city of Atlantic City that it may be said to be a suburb thereof, if not a part thereof, in case it shall be built upon as contemplated. The parcel which the complainants claim, and which I think the defendants would be least pleased to surrender, lies next to Atlantic City, and, as I understand the evidence, must be crossed in going to that place from the balance of the tract, if the route be made by the most direct way.\\nThe first work done by Penrose was to cut a ditch or canal on the west side of the line of the small narrow strip which he had deeded back to the complainants, eleven feet in width and four feet in depth. It does not appear that this was so dug on purpose to sever the small tract from the other, which was to be improved, but it has that effect. It is expected that this canal will carry water most of the time. The one chief object in cutting it was to get dirt to fill up a small creek which ran through the tract which the complainants claim. This canal opens into Thoroughfare Gap. The act of Penrose made the said parcel so reconveyed inaccessible, except by bridges, and that, too, only over approaches resting on lands of Penrose. Whether, under such a conveyance, the complainants could claim access to that small strip by necessity, over the lands of Penrose, may, under the circumstances of the case, be a question. The act of conveyance and reconveyance being one and the same, and under one agreement, Penrose might well claim that no such right was intended, for if it had been, it would have been reserved. But, however this may be, the first movement by Penrose was, however unintentional it may have been on his part, to make it necessary for the complainants to build bridges in order to get to and from the narrow strip so conveyed back to them as aforesaid.\\nPenrose proceeded with his improvements. He built a wharf on Thoroughfare Gap, three hundred and fifty feet in length, and graded and plotted all of the land in dispute into streets and lots, extending the streets from his own parcel, so conveyed to him by the Leedses, over the whole, to the borders of said canal. Thus he improved about sixty-three acres, while the quantity in dispute is about four. About three years passed before the complainants filed their bill for relief.\\nTwo questions are presented. First, did the defendant proceed in the honest belief that the title to this land was in him ? And, secondly, were the complainants guilty of laches in bringing their suit?\\nIn determining the question of bona fides, we must be governed by the principles of human action, which are supposed to \\u2022control men of prudence and sound understanding. Would a man of prudence have proceeded to expend over $9,000, after the unmistakable notices which were given to Penrose, through his agent Guillou ? I conclude not. It seems to me that Penrose had such notice as any man was bound to respect, in the refusal of one of the complainants to execute a deed to Penrose, until Penrose had actually executed a deed to the complainants for the tract in question. This was plenary evidence of the extent of .their claim. And it is very important to notice that Penrose recognized that claim to the fullest extent by executing that deed, although Guillou, his agent, destroyed it afterwards. This fact is of very great consequence in settling or in balancing the rights .of these parties. This distinct claim, so broadly acknowledged by Penrose, greatly qualifies the claim of Penrose to innocency. Of course, in such cases, the complaining party may so act, or may so omit or neglect to act, as to bar him from setting up such \\u2022qualifying acts. And, it may be within the authorities to say, that, in such case, the negligence should be attended with some .aggravating circumstance before the party is chargeable with such laches as to estop him. I think the manifest aim of the courts is ever to uphold and to give the first place to fundamental property rights. Crest v. Jack, 3 Watts 238 (27 Am. Dec. 353). Also, see some of the limitations to this rule, as stated in the valuable note on page 355 of the last reference.\\n.And this suggestion makes it important to keep in mind the conduct of the other side. For while Penrose commenced work so soon, and made such extensive changes and improvements,, continuing it from day to day, all was done in the presence of the complainants or of Mrs. Leeds, the principal actor in their behalf. So that while in one aspect of the case there is no little evidence to show that Penrose was, in the eye of the law, taking, great risks in expending his money on lands which he knew the complainants claimed, yet it must be admitted, that at this stage,, the complainants knew that Penrose had a deed from themselves for this land, and therefore had the title. And besides this, although it is not as satisfactory as I should like it, yet it is of some force, that Penrose made a deed, transferring the title to-the small parcel alluded to above to the complainants, which he insisted was all that they were entitled to under the agreement; and, as appears, after recording this deed, he sent it to Mrs. Leeds by mail, and it reached her in due course. True, all this was without the shadow of authority from the complainants. And, although I have found that this was not according to the agreement, the fact that this deed was not returned to Penroseimmediately cannot but have some weight in the consideration of the rights of the parties. Yet, in one particular, it was a point of the highest prudence for them to retain this deed, in case of contention, as evidence of an agreement to reconvey some portion of the land.\\nStill it seems to me it was now their plain duty to promptly notify Penrose that they would not accept that deed as performance of the agreement. The fact that they did not had a tendency, and most reasonably, to induce a sense of security on his part beyond what they intended but which they are accountable-for.\\nBut all this is again qualified by the undisputed fact that Mrs. Leeds, in behalf of the complainants, called on one of the workmen employed by Penrose, and while at work on the land in question, and warned him that he was digging on her property, and assured him that she was the owner of it. This was on the third day after' the first work was done. On the next day the workman informed Guillou, the agent of Penrose, and who was superintending all that was done, of what Mrs. Leeds had said, to which he replied: \\\" O, yes, she has. a little three-cornered piece over here.\\\" Hence it will be seen that, immediately after he had mailed to Mrs. Leeds the deed for this little three-cornered piece, he begun his improvements on the other lands claimed by the complainants, and that he was directly warned of that claim. Mrs. Leeds also said to this workman that sho intended to commence a suit against them. This was all communicated to Guillou. It is also in evidence that, sometime after this, Mrs. Leeds called again at the place where the work was going on and said to another laborer that she intended to serve an injunction on them, meaning on Guillou, against going on with the work. But these warnings were unheeded by the defendant. He continued his work until he had, as he claims, expended over $9,000.\\nHow, after these statements, I think it will appear to all that the case is peculiar, in that fault or negligence is justly chargeable to both. For Penrose knew of the Leedses' claim, and yet pressed on to the expenditure of very large sums of money; while, on the other hand, Mrs. Leeds knew that Penrose had executed and mailed to her a deed for the land that he intended to insist on was all the defendants were entitled to, and which, by their own deed to him, left all the balance of the tract in Penrose; and she also knew that Penrose was daily asserting his claim to the balance, by the above-named act of ownership. These things the complainants knew, and yet allowed three years to pass before commencing their suit for the exact specific performance of the agreement. It thus appears, and the case shows, that the complainants received this deed from Penrose, and did not return it, nor did they take any decided steps to assert their rights, beyond the warnings and claims made to the laborers above mentioned. If complainants were slow in bringing their suit, the defendant was too aggressive in making his alleged improvements after notice.\\nI think this makes a fair case for equitable consideration. There is no dispute as to the law. Counsel for complainants insisted that they had a right to rely on the notice of their claim, both as it depended on the original agreement and on the admitted claim made to Guillou by Mrs. Leeds, and on the fact that Pen-rose executed one deed for the tract claimed, and also on the unqualified notice to Mason, the workman, on the third day after the work was begun. And counsel says, these things being so, the complainants are protected from all invasion, by the fundamental property rights which are sacred under every code of laws.\\nWhile these considerations have great force, and are universally adjudged to be of the highest value, they have their bounds in courts of equity. Parties who have undisputed rights may, by their neglect or omission of that which equity considers a duty, forfeit those rights, or impair or qualify their right to assert them.\\nI conclude that negligence may safely be imputed to both. I also conclude that each is entitled to relief \\u2014 the compl\\u00e1inauts to the land they claim, and the defendants to fair compensation for such improvements as I am satisfied are permanent.\\nWhat improvements were made that were really permanent ? This is not so easy for me to determine. Are they permanent in the legal or equitable sense of the term ? Does the law go so far as to permit the possessor of land, in such case, to make whatever changes his fancy may suggest, and at any cost, and then to charge for them as improvements, as against the true owner, whether such changes were in accordance with the views of the true owner or not, or whether he contemplated any changes at all or not ? Is it said that this land can be disposed of by the complainants at advanced prices, aud to that extent it has been improved ? This suggestion brings out the difficulty more distinctly. Can the court say to any suitor in such case, You must accept the work which your adversary has cut out for you, or sell your inheritance, since it can now be sold for enough to reimburse him for his outlay ? Carrying a rule of law, which has been so often applied, to this extent, what advantage will enable the court to compel complainants to accept whatever alterations a bona fide possessor may choose to make, however foreign they may be to the intentions, or contrary to the interests, of the owner? For example, would our law sustain a claim as a permanent improvement, in a case where the owner had always kept land as meadow or pasture, and the possessor should convert it into farm land, and call it an improvement ? Or should the possessor tear down an old and valued homestead and remove all the surrounding shrubbery and other monuments of a past age, and which the true owner was content to preserve, and should construct on the site thereof costly modern buildings, in all worth twenty times the old habitation, would it be equitable for the court to say to the owner that he must pay for the things?\\nIt seems to me that this case and these inquiries suggest the true spirit of the equitable rule, applicable in such cases; and that that rule requires the improvements to have been made in accordance with the design of the owner; and, if not so made, the possessor makes them at his peril, or' at least, he is entirely dependent on such considerations as the court may feel called on to invoke to protect the owner from loss. In other words, his attitude is so doubtful that the court is justified in casting all the risk of possible loss on him. Take the case in hand: the changes may turn out to be improvements, but no one can so affirm with the certainty that he could in case a suitable new barn or dwelling-house had been erected on a farm. I think that, in every such ease, the court must be satisfied that the changes are, indeed, such improvements as can be appreciated by the real owner. They must appear to be substantial benefits to him; something that will be profitable, or will yield an income or interest to him in the ordinary and customary management of the estate. In other words, in such case, the court will cast the risk of loss on the party which ventured to take the greater risk.\\nApplying these views, which seem to me to be so just, to this case, I cannot allow the defendant for all of his expenditures, simply because he has made them, and, in making them, has made very great changes in the face of the property of the complainants. It may well be that it will be quite impossible for the complainants to realize anything like such amounts for their land. This doubt is so serious that it should be borne by the defendant whose conduct created the doubt. 1 can only allow him $6,000, and [ am obliged to say that I cannot give very satisfactory reasons for fixing the sum so high. There is no certain testimony to assure me that the complainants can realize that sum. by the sale of the entire tract, or that the court could, were the court to declare that sum a lien thereon, and attempt to raise money by a judicial sale, accept the testimony of Guillou, who says that these improvements have made the land worth $16,000. I also understood him to say that it would bring $6,000 in the market. But the whole case shows that Guillou is very deeply interested. And it is not too much to say, that so frequently have the lands, or portions of them, on which many of the seaside resorts have been built, or are being built, been before the courts of this State, that they have just reason in every cause, when the question of value is presented, to act on the conviction that all of these lands are held at speculative prices, and also that every such investment is a speculation, as most evidently this, on the part of Penrose, was. What power has the court to compel the complainants to share in this speculation with Penrose? And a most satisfactory explanation of the truth here suggested is in the case which I am now considering. The man offered by the defendants shows that Penrose has graded, laid out in streets and lots sixty-two acres, and that the whole number of lots is two hundred and twenty-eight, of which a large number have been in the market two to three years, and yet not more than one-tenth of them has been sold. Nor is it at all unreasonable to say that there can be no certainty that these alleged improvements are permanent in the just sense of that term. The evidence is that the land is so low that the great tides of the ocean sweep over it, to protect it against which the ditch or canal which has been named, and also one a great deal larger, were dug by Penrose. By a resort to these devices the earth was procured to raise embankments to resist the waters and to raise a foothold .above the low, wet and marshy soil everywhere abounding, and also to open channels to carry off the waters when they should overflow. Now, the suggestion of these facts brings forward the truth that these improvements, so made, on such a foundation, in such a frail manner, with the intention of resisting one of the mightiest forces in nature, and to which they are subject to daily attack, are liable to instant and rapid depreciation. A few years or months may prove th\\u00e1t such generous outlays have been without profit and without wisdom. To these considerations is to be added the great injury done to the lands of the complainants by cutting the canal through it.\\nThe complainants can pay the $6,000 in money or in land at the rates of value given by Guillou. He swears that he sold for Penrose certain lots for $1,250, and that the Leedses' lots are worth that sum. To sustain this view, he said that he was offered $900 apiece fpr Nos. 22 and 23. According to the testimony Penrose has sold lot No. 31, as marked on his map, one-third of which is included in the Leedses' claim. For this he received $1,000. He should be charged with the one-third of this sum. The map also shows that, as the land has been plotted, half of lot No. 161 is made up of the Leedses' land. Penrose should allow $625 for this half. For the two parts of lots so named, the complainants must execute a release to Penrose of all claim or demand, and, in case they elect so to do, pay the balance of the $6,000 in cash. The amount still due to Pen-rose will be $5,041.67. If the complainants do not elect to pay the whole of this in cash, then they must pay $41.67 in cash, and execute a deed of release to the defendant, Penrose, for lots Nos. 29, 162,178 and 179. These are all adjoining the Penrose tract, and lie, in the order named, beginning with No. 29, on Thoroughfare Gap. If my estimate of the fair value of the alleged improvements is correct, then on the basis of the value of the Leedses' lots, as fixed by Guillou, the agent of Penrose, the above assures him full compensation for the improvements that can reasonably be claimed to be permanent.\\nPenrose will be required, by such deed as the Leedses conveyed the whole tract to him, to convey to them the tract which they elaim by their bill, free from all liens or encumbrances which may have been imposed by his instrumentality. He will be required to deliver such deed to the solicitor of the complainants, at his office in Camden', on the thirtieth day after a copy of the decree in this cause shall have been served on him, between the hours of ten and twelve of said day, unless said day falls on Sunday, and in that ease, on the following day. At the time of the delivery of said deed by Penrose, the complainants will be required to pay the said $5,041.67, or to pay the $41.67, and to execute and deliver to Penrose the deed of release for the lots named. Neither party is entitled to costs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/8860483.json b/nj/8860483.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1e149ced9b2cb20a3d62a3897ac915929f4fc6d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/8860483.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8860483\", \"name\": \"ANGELO J. MONACO, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. JAMES CONSTRUCTION CO., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Monaco v. James Construction Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1964-10-13\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"351\", \"last_page\": \"351\", \"citations\": \"43 N.J. 351\", \"volume\": \"43\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:58:38.462963+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"ANGELO J. MONACO, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. JAMES CONSTRUCTION CO., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"ANGELO J. MONACO, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. JAMES CONSTRUCTION CO., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.\\nMr. Charles J. Kahwaty for the petitioner.\\nMr. William V. Breslin for the respondents.\\nOctober 13, 1964.\", \"word_count\": \"37\", \"char_count\": \"273\", \"text\": \"On petition for certification to Superior Court, Appellate Division.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/8861411.json b/nj/8861411.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..773686f9d501c8cfd86644c558a9077e5ff029c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/8861411.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8861411\", \"name\": \"BENEFICIAL LOAN ASSOCIATION, PLAINTIFF, v. ROSE A. HILLERY, EXECUTRIX, ETC., DEFENDANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Beneficial Loan Ass'n v. Hillery\", \"decision_date\": \"1921-04-15\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"271\", \"last_page\": \"276\", \"citations\": \"95 N.J.L. 271\", \"volume\": \"95\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:46:03.615059+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Gummehe, Chief Justioe, and Justices BeegeN and Katzenbach.\", \"parties\": \"BENEFICIAL LOAN ASSOCIATION, PLAINTIFF, v. ROSE A. HILLERY, EXECUTRIX, ETC., DEFENDANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"BENEFICIAL LOAN ASSOCIATION, PLAINTIFF, v. ROSE A. HILLERY, EXECUTRIX, ETC., DEFENDANT.\\nSubmitted December 2, 1920\\nDecided April 15, 1921.\\n1. A subscription contract for the stock of a corporation is supported by a full consideration, that consideration being the delivery to the subscriber of the capital stock subscribed for upon the performance of his agreement to pay the consideration money, and the fact that the stock certificate has not actually been written out in advance of the payments which are required by the subscription to be made is immaterial and does not operate to deprive the company of its right to compel payment of the subscription.\\n2. The holder of a promissory note which comes into his hands after maturity takes it subject to all legal defences which the maker may have against its enforcement, but with that exception his right of recovery is as complete as if he was a holder in due course.\\n3. The assignment of a promissory note as collateral security for the payment of a debt vests in the assignee the legal title, and, having the legal title, he may sue thereon in his own name and recover the amount due thereon, and his right to do this is not at all affected by the fact that he is under a legal obligation to credit the amount collected by him upon the debt for which the note was assigned as collateral security.'\\n4. A corporation is not bound to tender to a defaulting subscriber the certificate of stock called for by the subscription contract without first receiving payment therefor.\\nOn defendant\\u2019s rule to show cause.\\nBefore Gummehe, Chief Justioe, and Justices BeegeN and Katzenbach.\\nFor the rule, Elmer King and Harold A. Price.\\nG-ontra, 0. PranMin Wilson.\", \"word_count\": \"1911\", \"char_count\": \"10953\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nG\\u00fcMMERe, Chief Justioe.\\nThis was an action on a promissory note made by Thomas J. Hillery, the defendant's testator, in his lifetime. The trial resulted in the direction of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount of the note, with interest. The question presented for solution by this rule is the propriety of the trial court's action.\\nThe material and undisputed facts are as follows: On June 4th, 1913, the Continental Banking and Trust Company was organized under the laws of the State of West Virginia. On the 27th of October of that year, Thomas J. Hillery subscribed for ten shares of the capital stock of this corporation, at $120 per share, and at the same time paid $100 on account of his subscription and gave his note for the remaining $1,100. Following is a copy of the note:\\n\\\"115 Broadway, New York.\\n\\\"Oct. 27, 1913.\\n\\\"For value received, I promise to pay to tlie order of the Continental Banking & Trust Company, Eleven Hundred and no Dollars, in three equal installments payable respectively in six, twelve and eighteen months from the date hereof with interest at rate of 5% per annum.\\n\\\"This note when paid, shall be payment of ten shares of the Capital Stock of the Continental Banking & Trust Company, provided the maker hereof shall have made a prior pajrment of $100 which stock shall be held by said Company until this note is so paid in full; at which time said stock is to be delivered to the maker hereof.\\n\\\"Failure to pay any installments as provided herein shall at the option of the holder, mature this entire obligation; at which time the holder thereof shall have the option, privilege and authority to sell the stock issued or to be issued by reason of the execution of this obligation at either public or private sale; the proceeds of said sale to be applied to the payment of this note and the remainder of the proceeds, if any, shall be returned to the maker less the expenses of sale of said stock.\\n\\\"TuoMas J. HilleRy,\\n\\\"Boonton, N. J.\\\"\\nIn December, 1916, the Continental Banking and Trust Company, having become financially embarrassed, sought to obtain a loan from the plaintiff corporation in order to tide it over its difficulties, offering to deposit with that .company as collateral for the intended loan, certain securities which it held, among which was the Hillery note and the certificate of the shares of stock for which the note was given. Favorable action was taken by the directors of the plaintiff corporation upon the application of the Continental company, and moneys were advanced, amounting to over $90,000, within the next two weeks, the Hillery note being endorsed by the Continental company and delivered with the stock, and the other proposed collateral, to the plaintiff. Up to that time no payments had been made upon the note, nor was anything paid subsequently. 'The certificate of stock delivered with the Hillery note bears date January 6th, 1917, and that is presumably the date upon which it was actually made out. A few- weeks after this transaction was completed between the plaintiff and the Continental company, and early in February, 1917, the latter corporation went into the hands of a receiver.\\nThe first ground upon which we are asked to make this rule absolute is that there was, as counsel contend, a total failure of consideration for the note. The argument is that at the time when the certificate was signed, the money for the payment of the stock was not in the hands of the Continental company, and that therefore the legal possession of the stock could not pass, and that this legal situation continued until the company went into the hands of a receiver, so that neither at the time of the institution of the suit nor at the trial was the equivalent for the note in the hands of the -company, or later of its receiver, for' delivery. We are unable to perceive the force of this contention, or its bearing upon the question of defendant's liability. By the terms of the subscription contract, as exhibited in the note, Mr. Hil-lery promised to pay the purchase price of the stock in three equal installments, payable in six, twelve and eighteen months from the date of the subscription. His failure to comply with the terms of his contract entitled the Continental company, when the several breaches occurred, to collect the money due on it by suit. The contract expressly provided that the stock should not be delivered to Hillery until the payments were made, but should remain in the possession of the company with the right to sell it and apply the proceeds of the sale in pajunent of the note in ease of default by Mr. Hillery in meeting the installments thereon as they fell due. The fact that it had not actually written out the stock certificate in advance of the pajnnents which were required to be made is, in our opinion, immaterial, and did not operate to deprive the company of its right to compel pajunent of the subscription. The last payment on the note' was due on the 27th of April, 191-1-, and on that date the Continental company's right of action against the maker for the whole amount of the note became fixed. It seems hardly necessary to add that a subscription contract for the stock of a corporation is supported by a full consideration, that consideration being the delivery to the subscriber of the capital stock subscribed for upon the performance of this agreement to pay the consideration money. Cook Stock & Stockh., \\u00a7 69, and cases cited.\\nNext, it is argued that the rule should be majle absolute because the plaintiff;! was not a holder of the note in due course, not having acquired it before maturity and in good faith. It is true that the plaintiff is not a holder in due course within the meaning of the statutory definition, in that it did not acquire the instrument before maturity; but that fact is entirely immaterial in determining the plaintiff's right. The holder of a promissory note which comes into his hands after maturity takes it subject to all legal defences which the maker may have against its enforcement, but with that exception his right of recovery is as complete as if he was a holder in due course. The theory of counsel upon this point seems to be that, because at the time when this suit was begun neither the Continental company nor the present plaintiff could perform its part of the contract by delivering the certificate of stock to Mr. Hillery's representative, the present defendant, the consideration of the note had failed; but this contention, we think, is sound neither in fact nor in law. The certificate was outstanding and in the hands of the plaintiff at the time the suit was brought. On January 6th, 1917, the date of the actual writing of the certificate, the Continental company had a full right to deliver the stock to Mr. Hillery upon receiving from him the purchase price, and the fact that it was at that time in financial difficulty imposed no limitation upon that right. This being so, the delivery of the stock would have vested Mr. Hillery with the same rights and powers that any other stockholder of the corporation had. By the transfer of the stock and the note to the plaintiff that corporation stood in the shoes of the Continental company and was clothed with full right to deliver:-'the- certificate to Mr. Hillery upon the payment of the note. The assertion that the plaintiff did not acquire the note in good' faith is entirely unsupported by the proofs in the case.- The defendant, therefore, can take nothing by this contention.\\nNext; it is said that the note was never negotiated to the plaintip' so as to enable it to bring suit thereon in its own name--the reason being that it received the instrument merely as .collate^ for -the purpose of collection, and that consequently it was a mere agent of the Continental company in the transaction and never was the owner of the note. This contention \\\"is! without legal support. It is entirely settled that the assignment of a promissory note as collateral security for the payment of a debt vests in the assignee the legal title, and that, having the legal title, he may sue thereon in his own name and recover the amount due thereon; and his right to do this is not at all affected by the fact that he is under a legal obligation to credit the amount collected by him upon the debt for which the note'was assigned as collateral security. This principle is so well settled that the citation of authorities would be superfluous.\\nLastly, it is insisted that the right of the plaintiff to bring suit on this note did not accrue until after it had tendered to Mr. Hillery or his representative the stock for the payment of which this note was given. No authority is cited for this contention, nor is any argument made in support of it. \\\"With-, out the aid of counsel \\u00a1we are unable to perceive on what theory a corporation is bound to tender to a defaulting subscriber the certificate of stock called for by_ the subscription contract without first receiving payment therefor.\\nFor the reasons given, we conclude that the action of the trial court in directing a verdict for the plaintiff was entirely justified, and the rule to show .cause will therefore be disch\\u00e1fged.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/8861909.json b/nj/8861909.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3a5987856d1212864cd88adf57c813e483e7d5e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/8861909.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8861909\", \"name\": \"CHARLES L. ROBERTS, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Roberts v. Civil Service Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1964-12-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"449\", \"last_page\": \"449\", \"citations\": \"43 N.J. 449\", \"volume\": \"43\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:58:38.462963+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CHARLES L. ROBERTS, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"CHARLES L. ROBERTS, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.\\nSee same case below: 85 N. J. Super. 77.\\nMessrs. Gross & Stavis and Mr. William Bossmore for the petitioner.\\nMr. Harold M. Kain, Mr. Arthur J. Sills and Mrs. Marilyn Loftus Schauer for the respondents.\\nDecember 7, 1964.\", \"word_count\": \"58\", \"char_count\": \"393\", \"text\": \"On petition for certification to Superior Court, Appellate Division.'\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/900204.json b/nj/900204.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7aaba5557eb62687a7016f4400ed0b1982746439
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/900204.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"900204\", \"name\": \"TOWNSHIP OF PEMBERTON, ETC., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Township of Pemberton v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1981-02-13\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"346\", \"last_page\": \"359\", \"citations\": \"178 N.J. Super. 346\", \"volume\": \"178\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:48:29.251940+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"TOWNSHIP OF PEMBERTON, ETC., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"TOWNSHIP OF PEMBERTON, ETC., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued January 19, 1981\\nDecided February 13, 1981.\\nBefore Judges ALLCORN, PRESSLER and FURMAN.\\nMichael S. Bokar, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellants (John J. Degnan, Attorney General of New Jer sey, attorney; Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel).\\nJoseph M. Pinto argued the cause for respondent (Polino & Williams attorneys).\", \"word_count\": \"4194\", \"char_count\": \"26497\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nPRESSLER, J. A. D.\\nThe State of New Jersey, Department of Corrections, appeals from a judgment of the Law Division permanently enjoining it from using a residential property purchased by it in Pemberton Township as a home for a small group of pre-adolescent boys between the ages of 8 and 13, who have been committed to the State Training School for Boys at Skillman and who, in the judgment of the Superintendent of Skillman, should and can be successfully diverted from an institutional setting to one approximately as closely as possible a normal family environment. For the reasons herein set forth we reverse and hold that there is no impediment in Pemberton's zoning and other land use ordinances or in a fair consideration of its legitimate local interests inhibiting the Department from proceeding to implement its intended use of the property.\\nThe property in question, referred to throughout the trial as the Goodman house, is located in the New Lisbon section of Pemberton and is one of a group of approximately seven large single-family residences on large lots. The lot size of the property in question is in excess of four acres and includes several outbuildings as well as a large colonial house of distinctive architectural style in an excellent state of repair and containing many bedrooms. The property is located in Pemberton's R-l zone, which is subject to a 40,000 square foot minimum lot requirement and is apparently part of the township's prime single-family residential neighborhood. The immediate vicinity, while retaining some rural characteristics, also includes a variety of state, county, local and private institutional uses, among them Burlington County College, county and municipal buildings, a private facility housing mental and geriatric patients, a drug abuse rehabilitation center, a juvenile detention center housing 50 juveniles of both sexes awaiting hearing, a minimum-security work release facility, a county geriatric facility and a JINS center.\\nThe availability of the Goodman house came to the attention of Thomas Lynch, Assistant Commissioner for Juvenile Services of the Department of Corrections, in September 1978 in connection with his search for premises for use as a group home for teenage girls who had been adjudicated delinquent and sentenced to a custodial disposition. Impressed with the physical suitability of the property for a group home, he made an initial inquiry of the mayor regarding potential local receptivity to the project. Strong opposition was expressed, on the basis of which Lynch concluded that it would be counterproductive for the Department to pursue that plan. He thereupon and upon consultation with the Commissioner of the Department; William Fauver, the Superintendent of Skillman, Dr. Alfred Vuocolo and other Department officials, conceived of the plan of using the property as a group home for a small number of pre-adolescent boys selected from among the general Skillman population. The time for formulation of the plan and making the logistical arrangements necessary to consummate the purchase was exceedingly limited since the property, which had been on the market for some extended period, was to be offered for sale by its owners at a public auction to be held in mid-October. Lynch did, however, arrange for a field inspection to be conducted by Harold Miller, a social work supervisor at Skillman, who has special expertise and experience in group homes for youngsters. He was to investigate and report on the suitability of the premises for group home for young boys, both in terms of the property itself and the surrounding community, and to determine community sentiment, insofar as possible, by discussions with local officials and neighbors. His report as to the property's suitability was generally favorable although not without reservation, and to the extent he was able to determine commu nity sentiment, his impression was that it was neutral or at least not strongly opposed to the project.\\nBased on the Miller report Lynch, with Fauver's complete support and Vuocolo's enthusiastic endorsement, proceeded both with plan formulation and acquisition procedures. The plan was predicated on the theory that among the Skillman population, numbering approximately 155, there was an appreciable number of boys whose adjudications of delinquency were based on minor offenses against property and who were committed to Skillman only because of a lack of a suitable home environment adequate to deal with them and their problems. The purpose of the project was thus to create a normal, healthy, stable and supportive family environment for these young boys whose delinquency problems are primarily attributable to the misfortune of having no such families of their own. The family environment concept was to be implemented by selecting six to eight boys, aged 8 to 13, from Skillman to live in the house as if siblings with substitute parents. The substitute parents, also referred to as therapeutic or treatment parents, would be a married couple, both of whom would be professionally trained in either education, social work or psychology. Consistent with the desire to reproduce a family environment, it was further anticipated that no counselling, vocational or other therapeutic programs would be conducted in the home.\\nIn order to insure the success of the family substitute concept of the program, its standards and guidelines were carefully spelled out in the Department's application for funding therefor to the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency (SLEPA). Selection would be limited to boys deemed able, academically, socially and behaviorally, to successfully attend the local public schools and otherwise to integrate with the community. Excluded from consideration for the program would be emotionally disturbed or retarded children, children who had been adjudicated delinquent on the basis of either serious charges or charges involving violent behavior, and children requiring special services such as psychological counselling, therapy sessions and the like. Any child participating in the program evidencing any inappropriate behavior would be immediately returned to Skill-man. A residence period of approximately six months was contemplated to permit, among other considerations, school term continuity. The boys would be encouraged to participate in such community activities as Scouts and Little League. Within the home they would perform such chores as are customarily performed by boys of similar age living with their own families. In every respect, therefore, their lives, daily routine and interactions with each other and their substitute parents would reproduce the dynamics and functioning of a natural family.\\nIn addition to the spaciousness of the house and grounds of the Goodman property, other aspects of Pemberton recommended it as an appropriate community for the program. The population is multi-racial, socio-economically heterogeneous and, because of the close proximity to Fort Dix and McGuire Air Force Base, transient in nature to an appreciable extent. Thus, it was Lynch's perception that the boys, in significant respects, would not be much different from their peers in the community and would, therefore, find their own adjustments and accommodations to the substitute family easier to make than they would in a racially, socially and economically homogeneous community of stable population. He also regarded as advantageous the proximity of the County College, it having been the experience at Skillman itself that college students take an active and constructive interest in the welfare of these disadvantaged boys on a volunteer basis. Finally, the fact that Pemberton has its own juvenile delinquency problems also appeared to Lynch to be a positive advantage since the necessity to deal successfully with such children in school would give his boys what he and Vuocolo described as a real-life testing situation.\\nWith respect to the community impact of the program, there runs through the testimony of all of the state officials, Fauver, Lynch, Vuocolo and Miller, the leitmotif of a finely tuned sensitivity to local sentiment, at least partially self-protective because of the perception that a community-based program cannot succeed in the face of substantial community hostility. The minor theme is their experience that every such projected program of the Department inevitably evokes initial community opposition to some degree and hence, if the existence of such opposition were uniformly acceded to, there could be no such Department facilities at all. The Department has, consequently, evolved the policy of assessing the broadness of base and the intensity of local opposition and making a determination of whether or not there is a substantial likelihood, based on the nature of the opposition, the nature of the program and the opportunity for explaining the program to the community, that the program, once initiated, will find community tolerance. The Department made such an assessment here in favor of the program for pre-adolescent boys after having abandoned the projected program for teenage girls because of the strength of local opposition. Indeed, neither Miller nor Lynch had initially perceived any substantial community opposition to the boys' home. As Lynch testified, it was his judgment that the community, having accepted all of the aforedescribed institutional uses, including those involving adult drug addicts and adult convicts, it was not likely that \\\"anybody could object to these little kids.\\\" As he further explained\\nI thought that the key to it was the fact that you were dealing with little boys who would fit nicely into that community. I just envisioned that it would not be much different than the Goodman's home, because the Goodmans have five or six. kids themselves and it would be just a large family.\\nIt was also his conviction, after a rather hostile neighborhood meeting which he attended after the purchase, that community understanding of and experience with the program would make it ultimately acceptable. He did in fact persuade one neighbor to support the program by arranging for her to visit Skillman. In summary, then, it was Lynch's reasoning that he was \\\"specially hired by the Department of Corrections to do something for kids and I feel that an alternative to locking them up has to be developed.\\\" Thus he opted to go forward with the program because \\\"[he] felt that the opposition was not that strong, that we morally should proceed with the taking care of the kids first.\\\"\\nIn the light of this factual background we now address the legal issues before us. The first question is whether the use planned by the Department is a permitted use under the Pemberton zoning ordinance. The trial judge concluded that it was not and hence went on to consider the question of whether or not the State in these circumstances was entitled to rely on its qualified immunity from local zoning and land-use ordinances, a question he also decided adversely to the State. We disagree with both of these holdings.\\nWith respect to the permitted use issue, we first note that the Pemberton ordinance includes \\\"detached dwelling units\\\" within the range of principal uses permitted in the R-l district. A detached dwelling is defined as\\nA building physically detached from other buildings or portions of buildings which is occupied or intended to be occupied for residence purposes by one housekeeping unit and which has its own cooking, sleeping, sanitary and general living facilities.\\n\\\"Housekeeping Unit\\\" is defined as one or more persons \\\"living together in one dwelling unit on a non-seasonal basis and sharing living, sleeping, cooking and sanitary facilities on a non-profit basis.\\\" The trial judge agreed that the group home here projected met the literal definition of a permitted dwelling unit but concluded that \\\"[i]n the final analysis, the use is institutional, not intended by the drafters of the ordinance and not within the category of permitted uses.\\\"\\nWe are convinced that this reading of the ordinance is too restrictive and that any housekeeping unit encompassed within its definitional prescription is ipso facto a permitted use in a residential zone. We are further persuaded that the law of this State prohibits a municipality from enacting a zoning ordinance which distinguishes, in the context of permitted uses, between a blood-related family unit and a similarly-sized group of persons who are unrelated but who function together as a family unit. That indeed was the holding of Kirsch Holding Co. v. Manas quan, 59 N.J. 241 (1971), invalidating as unreasonable and excessively sweeping the provision of an ordinance attempting to deal with the social problems of group summer rentals in a resort community by defining \\\"family\\\" so as to exclude groups of unrelated, unmarried persons. See, also, Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. Margate, 112 N.J.Super. 341 (App.Div.1970). And see State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99 (1979), invalidating as not reasonably related to the permissible purposes of zoning, a prohibition against more than four unrelated persons sharing a single housing unit.\\nThis prohibition upon such municipal attempts to engage in social engineering by recourse to the land-use power has been extended to provide similar protection for groups of unrelated persons which have been formed for the purpose of permitting traditionally institutional functions to be performed in the more salutary and constructive context of a \\\"reproduced\\\" single-family setting. Thus, a group home to be operated by the Division of Youth and Family Services for 8 to 12 unrelated multi-handicapped preschool children and two foster parents was held to constitute a single family in the zoning sense despite an ordinance provision attempting to limit \\\"family\\\" to persons related by blood, marriage or adoption. Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206 (1976). A group home operated by a nonprofit association to house ten adolescent girls referred by the Division of Youth and Family Services was held to constitute a family within the local ordinance definition of \\\"a group of persons related by blood or marriage or otherwise lawfully living together in a dwelling unit.\\\" YMCA of Summit v. Summit Bd. of Adj., 134 N.J.Super. 384 (Law Div.1975), aff'd 141 N.J.Super. 315 (App.Div.1976). Similarly, a transitional residence for former mental patients who functioned together as a family was held to come within the zoning ordinance definition of \\\"single housekeeping unit.\\\" Washington Tp. v. Cent. Bergen Comm. Health, 156 N.J.Super. 388 (Law Div.1978). And a residence occupied by nursing and teaching nuns living as a single household was held to be a permitted single-family use despite an ordinance limiting the definition of family to no more than three persons unrelated by blood, marriage or adoption. Holy Name Hospital v. Montroy, 153 N.J.Super. 181 (Law Div.1977). We perceive no material conceptual or functional difference between these family-type substitutes for a traditionally institutional alternative and the group home here in question.\\nNor do we regard the amendment to the zoning ordinance adopted by Pemberton just after the completion of the trial below as in any way affecting the status of this group home as a permitted residential use. Obviously drafted in haste, the evident import of that amendment is to restrict the use here contemplated to the R-3 zone and to permit it therein only as a conditional use. More specifically, the amendment, in attempting to impose these and other restrictions on the group home use, speaks to \\\"Community residences for the treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders of the N.J. Criminal and Penal Code.\\\" For the reasons heretofore stated, we are satisfied that the intended restriction cannot validly apply to those \\\"community residences\\\" which are structured in such a way as to produce a single family unit in the functional sense. Clearly, the group home here proposed constitutes such a unit, and hence it cannot be barred on a use basis from any zoned district to which a biological family would have access. In short, as noted by Justice Mountain in Berger v. State, supra, 71 N.J. at 224, \\\"New Jersey courts have consistently invalidated zoning ordinances that were unreasonably restrictive in delineating permissible occupants.\\\" We are satisfied, in view of the nature of the group-home plan here, that there can be no zoning justification for its exclusion from a residential district.\\nHaving determined that the Department's proposed use of the property must be deemed a permitted use under the zoning ordinance as well as a continuation of the residential use theretofore made of the premises we need not decide the merits of the Department's alternative contention that in any event N.J.S.A. 40:55D-\\u00a36 provides a statutory immunity from local zoning restrictions for such group homes as it here proposes. We deem, however, some comment to be appropriate. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-66(c) provides that\\nNo zoning ordinance shall, by any of its provisions or by any regulation adopted in accordance therewith, discriminate between children who are members of families by reason of their relationship by blood, marriage or adoption, and foster children placed with such families in a dwelling by the Division of Youth and Family Services in the Department of Institutions and Agencies or a duly incorporated child care agency and children placed pursuant to law in single family dwellings known as group homes. As used in this section, the term \\\"group home\\\" means and includes any single family dwelling used in the placement of children pursuant to law recognized as a group home by the Department of Institutions and Agencies in accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the Commissioner of Institutions and Agencies provided, however, that no group home shall contain more than 12 children.\\nThe trial judge was of the view that this provision was not here applicable for the reason that by its terms it is limited to those group homes whose operation is governed by rules and regulations adopted by the Commissioner of Institutions and Agencies and that while there are regulations dealing with group homes operated by the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), N.J.A.C. 10:128-1.1 et seq., there are no such regulations respecting a group home operated directly by the Department of Corrections. We are not persuaded, however, that the group home here is sufficiently different in its material aspects to warrant any less protective status than is statutorily accorded the DYFS facilities. The establishment of the Department of Corrections as a separate entity postdates the adoption of this provision, and the group home here proposed would be, according to the testimony of Department officials, the first of its kind. Its operation is, moreover, subject to the written standards embodied in the SLEPA grant application. We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the Legislature would not have been likely to have denied protected status to a Department of Corrections group home for children under this statute had the prospect of any such facility been before it when the statute was enacted. We would hope that the matter now being brought to the Legislature's attention, it might opt to clarify any ambiguity in the statute in respect of its scope.\\nFinally, while we need not reach the qualified immunity issue, we feel constrained to express our disagreement with the application of that doctrine by the trial court. Insofar as we understand the holding of Rutgers v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 152-153 (1972), the existence of a governmental immunity from local land-use regulation must be determined by attempting to ascertain \\\"the legislative intent in this regard with respect to the particular agency or function involved.\\\" Since, moreover, legislative intent is rarely expressed, it must \\\"be divined from a consideration of many factors, with a value judgment reached on an overall evaluation.\\\" The critical factors, among others, to be considered are the \\\"nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity, the kind of function or land use involved, the extent of the public interest to be served thereby, the effect local land use regulations would have upon the enterprise concerned and the impact upon legitimate local interest.\\\" We further understand Rutgers v. Piluso to say that the last of these factors, the impact upon legitimate local interests, is not actually a consideration in determining if there is an immunity in the first instance but rather that it constitutes that factor which may qualify the immunity if one is otherwise deemed to exist. We so conclude because of the court's further explication that\\nIt is, however, most important to stress that such immunity in any situation is not completely unbridled. Even where it is found to exist, it must not, . be exercised in an unreasonable fashion so as to arbitrarily override all important legitimate local interests, [at 153; citations omitted].\\nIt is beyond dispute that the affirmative criteria respecting the identity of the instrumentality, the function involved, the public interest to be served and the prohibitory effect of local land use regulation are all met here. The question, then, is whether the immunity thereby established was arbitrarily exercised here. We cannot agree with the trial judge's conclusion that it was because we are unable to perceive in the proposed use any appreciable adverse impact on any important legitimate local interest.\\nWe are first satisfied that the record does not support the conclusion that the Department completely disregarded local zoning or community interests. There is the suggestion that it relied on the real estate broker's representation as to the permissibility of the proposed use. More significant, however, is Lynch's undisputed testimony that prior to purchase he discussed the local land use regulation issue with a Deputy Attorney General who advised him that the State did have immunity from local land-use regulation provided the use it proposed was reasonable and the State's action vis-\\u00e1-vis the local community was not arbitrary or capricious, and that despite the immunity, the State could not initiate a use or physical facility \\\"completely inappropriate to a given location.\\\" We are satisfied that this advice was in substantive accord with the Rutgers holding. Lynch further explained the Department's policy to pursue only projects which could potentially win community acceptance and its general practice, intended to be followed here, of informing local authorities of its plans, accommodating specific local problems whenever possible and in general attempting amicably to resolve any conflicts with the community. There is no reason to conclude that as the project proceeds the State will not honor these commitments. Thus, as heretofore indicated, Lynch made a careful and rational judgment, if up until now an erroneous one, regarding the community's willingness to accept the group home.\\nWe are further persuaded that the project, by its nature, does not have the capacity to substantially impact adversely on legitimate local interests. First, for the reasons already stated, we do not regard it as adversely impinging upon the local zoning and land use prerogatives. The use proposed, even if it were not permitted, is nevertheless functionally compatible with the local zoning scheme and pattern. Even the municipality's planner was unable unequivocally to relate the local objection to the project to legitimate land use objectives, it having been his testimony that \\\"to provide a little scenario for these juvenile problems from a land use point of view does not always become apparent.\\\" Nor are we able to perceive any non-land-use related legitimate interest of the community upon which this single home for six to eight pre-adolescent boys will intrude. We point out, moreover, that in respect of the group home for multi-handicapped preschoolers proposed by DYFS and challenged in Berger v. State, supra, the Supreme Court, in dealing with the immunity question there raised, held that \\\"Consideration of these factors [those enumerated by Rutgers v. Piluso, supra] compels the conclusion that the State is immune from the Mantoloking zoning ordinance.\\\"\\nFinally, we note the suggestion by the trial judge of the State's option to seek a variance. In that regard we cannot but conclude that were a variance required, it could not properly be withheld in view of the inherently beneficial nature of the public use here proposed and the patent lack of adverse impact of the community's land use scheme and other legitimate zoning objectives. See, e. g., De Simone v. Greater Englewood Housing Corp. No. 1, 56 N.J. 428 (1970); Black v. Montclair, 34 N.J. 105 (1961); Roselle Pk. v. Union Tp., 113 N.J.Super. 87.\\nThe final point here raised by the State is that the trial court had no jurisdiction over this controversy because what was actually involved was an attack on state action. See R. 2:2-3(a)(2). We regard the issue, however, as moot. Were the action brought directly to this court, we would in any event have been required to remand to the trial court for the making of a record, there appearing to be no administrative hearing mechanism for this kind of matter. We further note that the local zoning conflicts involving state agencies heretofore referred to were all initially tried in the Law Division.\\nThe judgment is reversed, the injunction is dissolved and the matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment dismissing the complaint.\\nThe statute was not amended when the Department of Institutions and Agencies was eliminated and its functions divided between the Department of Human Services and the Department of Corrections.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/906393.json b/nj/906393.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..811c1791ac34d0996f6966aeb048c81f63213d8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/906393.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"906393\", \"name\": \"CAROL ANNE APPLEBY, APPELLANT, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, RESPONDENTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Appleby v. State of New Jersey Civil Service Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-05-16\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"249\", \"last_page\": \"256\", \"citations\": \"190 N.J. Super. 249\", \"volume\": \"190\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:04:15.672591+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CAROL ANNE APPLEBY, APPELLANT, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, RESPONDENTS.\", \"head_matter\": \"CAROL ANNE APPLEBY, APPELLANT, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, RESPONDENTS.\\nSuperior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division\\nArgued April 19, 1983\\nDecided May 16, 1983.\\nBefore Judges MICHELS, PRESSLER and TRAUTWEIN.\\nWilliam H. Covert argued the cause for appellant (Reitman, Parsonnet, Maisel & Duggan, attorneys; William H. Covert, of counsel and on the brief).\\nMark J. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; James J. Ganda, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mark J. Fleming, on the brief).\", \"word_count\": \"2499\", \"char_count\": \"15463\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the Court was delivered by\\nMICHELS, P.J.A.D.\\nCarol Anne Appleby (Appleby) appeals from a final administrative action of the Civil Service Commission (Commission), denying her sick leave injury (SLI) benefits.\\nThe facts giving rise to this appeal are essentially uncontro-verted. On November 17, 1981 at approximately 8:00 p.m., Appleby, a Social Worker II with the Division of Youth and Family Services in the Department of Human Services, was involved in an automobile accident. At the time, she was driving home from work after having completed her last assigned client interview at the client's home. Because home visits were part of Appleby's duties, she was not entitled to overtime wages, but was classified \\\"N.L.\\\" (no limit) as to weekly hours.\\nOn this day, Appleby left her office at 2:45 p.m. to conduct four home interviews, the last at 7:00 p.m. She was scheduled to attend a training program early the next morning at the Middlesex County district office. Therefore, she requested and received authorization from Dorothy Borrelli, an assistant supervisor in her office, to take a state automobile home. She had completed her interviews and was on her way home when she was injured in a one-car accident. She claims that she had planned to telephone a fifth client when she arrived home. In the accident, Appleby suffered a slight laceration of her left instep and bruises on her right hip. X-rays at County Memorial Hospital after the accident showed a \\\"questionable cortical fracture\\\" of the right elbow; but an examination by Dr. Jacob Seltzer the next day showed only a contusion of that elbow. Dr. Seltzer could give no estimate of a return to work date because appellant never returned for further examination. However, he allegedly told appellant to stay home the rest of the week, which she did. She then developed headaches and stayed out a total of nine or ten days. On November 30, she was examined by Dr. David Sobel, who found \\\"no neurological deficit\\\" and \\\"no evidence of trauma.\\\" He recommended no time off.\\nBy letter of December 18, 1981, the appointing authority denied Appleby SLI benefits, citing the Commission's policy that employees on the way home from work are not in the course of employment for purposes of SLI benefits and suggested that she apply for Workers' Compensation. Appleby appealed to the Commission, which denied her appeal.\\nAppleby appeals to this court contending (1) that the Commission's conclusion that she was not acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident is contrary to the facts, and (2) that the Commission's policy of denying SLI benefits to employees injured going and coming from work violates the mandate of N.J.S.A. 11:14-2. We disagree and affirm.\\nBy virtue of N.J.S.A. 11:14-2, each state employee in the classified civil service is to be granted one day of paid sick leave for each month until the December 31 following his appointment and at least 15 days paid sick leave per year thereafter. Determination of the exact number of sick leave days is expressly left to the chief examiner and secretary of the Commission, who is to fix the number by regulation. The statute reads, in part:\\nIn the preparation and administration of regulations regarding sick leaves of absence with pay as provided in section 11:14-1 of this Title, every employee in the classified service shall, in addition to his annual vacation leave with pay, be granted sick leave, as hereinafter defined, with pay of not less than 1 working day for every month of service during the remainder of the first calendar year of service following permanent appointment, and in addition 15 working days in every calendar year thereafter. If any such employee requires none or only a portion of the allowable sick leave for any calendar year, the amount of such leave not taken shall accumulate to his credit from year to year and such employee shall be entitled to such accumulated sick leave of absence with pay if and when needed. In computing the accumulation of sick leave, the years of service of such employee prior and subsequent to the adoption of this act shall be used. [N.J.S.A. 11:14-2.]\\nThis paid sick leave is not limited to illness or injury related to employment. Instead,\\n[s]ick leave is hereby defined to mean absence from post of duty of an employee because of illness, accident, exposure to contagious disease, attendance upon a member of the employee's immediate family seriously ill requiring the care or attendance or [sic: of] such employee, or absence caused by death in the immediate family of said employee. A certificate of a reputable physician in attendance shall be required as sufficient proof of need of leave or leaves of absence of the employee or the need of the employee's attendance upon a member of the employee's immediate family. In the case of an illness of a chronic or recurring nature causing an employee's periodic or repeated absence from duty for 1 day or less, only one medical certificate shall be required for every 6-month period as sufficient proof of need of leave of absence of the employees; provided, however, that certificate must specify that the chronic or recurring nature of the illness is likely to cause subsequent absences from employment. In case of leave of absence due to exposure to contagious disease a certificate from the Department of Health shall be required. In case of death in the family of the employee, any reasonable proof required by the department head shall be sufficient. [N.J.S.A. 11:14-2.]\\nHowever, the Commission is granted the power to promulgate regulations to provide for longer paid sick leaves for work-related injuries and illnesses:\\nThe commission shall establish regulations extending leaves of absence with pay or with part pay for longer periods to employees disabled either through injury or illness as a result of, or arising from, their respective employment. [Ibid.]\\nPursuant to this statutory grant of power, the Commission has promulgated N.J.A.C. 4:1-17.9, which provides in part:\\n(a) In State service, any employee who is disabled through injury or illness as a result of or arising from his/her respective employment may, on the recommendation of the appointing authority and approval by the Civil Service Department, be granted a leave of absence with pay. Any amount of salary or wages paid or payable to an employee for disability leave shall be reduced by the amount of worker's compensation awarded under the New Jersey Worker's Compensation Act for temporary disability:\\n1. Such leave shall not be granted beyond one year from the date of injury or illness;\\n2. The appointing authority shall furnish the Department of Civil Service with such medical or other proof relating to the injury or illness and the continued disability of the employee.\\n3. Such leave shall be with full pay where the employee has demonstrated that she/he is unable to perform his/her job. Where the employee is able to return to work in a part-time capacity, the employee shall be compensated for the hours actually worked, and shall receive sick leave injury benefits for the time absent from work as a result of the disability.\\n4. In order to arrive at a determination of whether sick leave injury benefits should be recommended, the appointing authority may require that the employee be examined by a physician designated by the appointing authority to determine the nature, cause and extent of the injury. The costs of such examination shall be paid by the appointing authority.\\n5. In recommending sick leave injury benefits, the appointing authority shall bo governed by standards adopted by the Civil Service Commission.\\nThe \\\"standards\\\" referred to in N.J.A.C. 4:l-17.9(a)5 are set forth in N.J.A.C. 4:2-17.10, as follows:\\n(a) This section sets forth the standards to be applied in determining whether sick leave injury benefits (SLI) should be granted to an employee. In particular, these standards strictly limit the definition of work relatedness for purposes of determining sick leave injury benefits.\\n(b) Standards:\\n1. Causation: The employee's disability must be an injury or illness resulting from, or arising from, the employment.\\n1. Injuries which would clearly not have occurred but for a specific work-related accident or a condition of employment are compensable.\\nii. Preexisting physical illnesses, diseases or defects aggravated by the employment shall not be compensable where such aggravated injury was a condition of the job that was foreseeable by the employees.\\niii. Psychological or psychiatric illness shall not be compensable except where such illness may be traced to a specific work-related accident or occurrence which traumatized the employee, thereby creating the illness, and the claim is supported by medical documentation.\\niv. Illnesses such as heart disorder, not clearly caused by the employment or the work environment, are not compensable.\\n2. Physical area: Any accident resulting in injury for which the employee seeks compensation must occur on the work premises.\\ni. Work premises shall be defined as the physical area of operation of the employer, e.g. hospital and hospital grounds, building and parking facilities provided by the State for the benefit of its employees, etc.\\nii. The employee shall be compensated for any injury which occurs off the normal work premises while s/he is clearly acting within the scope of the employment.\\n3. Time: For an injury to be compensable, it must occur during the employee's normal working hours or during approved overtime hours.\\n4. Burden of proof: In all cases, the burden of proof is on the employee.\\nApplication of these regulations compels the conclusion that Appleby did not satisfy the standards for entitlement to SLI benefits. Appleby's injury did not occur during her normal working hours or during approved overtime hours as required by N.J.A.C. 4:2-17.10(b)3. It is uncontroverted that the injury occurred when Appleby was driving home after her last client visit. The record shows that Appleby's work day ended with the completion of her last home interview. Nothing in the record suggests that her work day continued until she reached home or that she was on approved overtime at the time of the accident. On the contrary, according to William Readel, the Administrator of the Division of Youth and Family Services's Central Regional office, overtime for social workers ends when the last home visit ends. Thus, Appleby failed to satisfy the time standard of N.J.A.C. 4:2-17.10(b)3 that her injury occur during her normal working hours or during approved overtime hours.\\nFurthermore, the physical area standard of N.J.A.C. 4:2-17.-10(b)2ii, which requires proof that the injury, if off the normal work premises, occurred while she \\\"clearly\\\" was acting within the scope of her employment, was not satisfied merely because Appleby was authorized to drive the state automobile home after her last interview or because she intended to make an employment-related telephone call when she returned home. Thus, we agree with the Commission's decision that Appleby's injury did not result from or arise out of her employment as defined by N.J.A.C. 4:2-17.10. Consequently, she was not entitled to SLI benefits.\\nThis conclusion is consistent with and tracks the construction placed on the regulations by the Commission in other cases. As the administrative agency empowered to promulgate and enforce the Civil Service Act, the Commission's construction of the act and its regulations is entitled to great weight. Malone v. Fender, 80 N.J. 129, 137 (1979); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 69-70 (1978); Infocomp Corp. v. Somerset Trust Co., 165 N.J.Super. 382, 391 (App.Div.1979).\\nFinally, we point out that Appleby's argument that the SLI benefits regulations should be read in pari materia with our Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 et seq., and the judicial decisions construing it has been expressly rejected by this court. In Morreale v. Civil Service Comm'n, 166 N.J.Super. 536, 538-540 (App.Div.1979), certif. den. 81 N.J. 275 (1979), we pointed out the different purposes of the two acts:\\nThe respective statutes sought to be analogized by appellant have wholly different ends and purposes, and the differences warrant different rules of construction in their application. The workers' compensation statute is considered by our courts as \\\"human social legislation designed to place the cost of worker-connected injury on the employer who may readily provide for it as an operating expense.\\\" Hornyak v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 63 N.J. 99, 101 (1973). Consequently, marked liberality in favor of the injured worker is commonly accorded the construction of the workers' compensation act. The Hornyak case was the first decision of the Supreme Court avowedly to place lunch-hour off-premises accidents within the coverage of the workers' compensation act, the court acknowledging that policy rather than logic was the factor determining the point at which the work relation would be held to obtain. 63 N.J. at 104. Title 11 of the Revised Statutes (\\\"Civil Service\\\") has the different objective of achieving an efficient public service system for the welfare of all citizens by establishment of a merit system of appointment with built-in security features. See Mastrobattista v. Essex Cty. Park Comm'n, 46 N.J. 138, 145-147 (1965); Park Ridge v. Salimone, 21 N.J. 28, 44 (1956).\\nIn particular reference to the cost of disability sick-leave benefits of public employees, we must consider that the burden falls on the State Government, to be defrayed by the taxpayers, and that in that area the imposition of costs and expenses upon the public should not be inferred from a statute not expressly or by fair implication mandating the asserted charge against the State.\\nIn the light of the foregoing considerations, the statutory language, \\\"injury or illness as a result of, or arising from, their respective employment\\\" should be given the construction which its language readily implies, not one which strains the sense of the statute as the average reader would glean it. So read, an injury sustained by an employee while on her lunch hour and completely off the employment premises is not to be considered an injury as a result of or arising from the employee's employment; nor as a disability caused by \\\"occupational injury or disease.\\\" N.J.A.C. 4:1-17.9. Off-premises lunch-time injuries were not even regarded as compensable under the liberally construed workers' compensation statutes in this State prior to the recent Hornyak decision, supra.\\nAffirmed.\\nCounsel informed us at oral argument that Appleby was awarded Workers' Compensation benefits for the injury sustained in the November 17, 1981 accident.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/924319.json b/nj/924319.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6650297cada11583d22f53595d1e549af8865a75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/924319.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"924319\", \"name\": \"Stella D. Brown, formerly Stella D. Guter, complainant-respondent, v. Fidelity Union Trust Company, as executor and trustee under the last will and testament of Julius M. Guter, deceased, defendant-appellant, and Irving Hupart, guardian ad litem for defendant John Duff Brown, an infant, defendant-respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Brown v. Fidelity Union Trust Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1940-10-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"197\", \"last_page\": \"205\", \"citations\": \"128 N.J. Eq. 197\", \"volume\": \"128\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:00:50.910149+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Stella D. Brown, formerly Stella D. Guter, complainant-respondent, v. Fidelity Union Trust Company, as executor and trustee under the last will and testament of Julius M. Guter, deceased, defendant-appellant, and Irving Hupart, guardian ad litem for defendant John Duff Brown, an infant, defendant-respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"Stella D. Brown, formerly Stella D. Guter, complainant-respondent, v. Fidelity Union Trust Company, as executor and trustee under the last will and testament of Julius M. Guter, deceased, defendant-appellant, and Irving Hupart, guardian ad litem for defendant John Duff Brown, an infant, defendant-respondent.\\n[Argued May 28th, 1940.\\nDecided October 10th, 1940.]\\nMr. Aquila N. Venino, for the complainant-respondent.\\nMr. Charles Danzig and Messrs. Hood, Lafferty & Campbell, for the defendant-appellant.\\nMr. Irving Hupari, for the defendant-respondent, Irving Hupart, guardian ad litem for John Duff Brown.\", \"word_count\": \"235\", \"char_count\": \"1561\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe facts, which appear in the opinion filed in Chancery, bring the case well within the rule stated by this court in Filley v. Van Dyke, 75 N. J. Eq. 571: \\\"The assumption of jurisdiction by Chancery in cases where the Orphans Court has already entertained an accounting and has not completed it by a final decree thereon, rests in the sound judicial discretion of the former court, in view of such special circumstances as may be presented in the particular case; the question then being whether the circumstances show special cause for the interference of the court.\\\" The circumstances showed special cause which brought the determination within the court's discretion.\\nThe motion to dismiss the appeal, decision heretofore reserved, is denied. The decree below will be affirmed.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 The Chieb-Justice, Parker, Case, Bodine, Dohges, Hehbr, Perskie, Porter, Dear, Wells, WolesKeil, Raeeerty, Hague, JJ. 13.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/927112.json b/nj/927112.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..51cef1e56f3b2321a855be3972a2fe627a6e066c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/927112.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"927112\", \"name\": \"Personal Credit Plan, a New Jersey corporation, complainant, v. Julius Kling and Frieda Kling, his wife, defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Personal Credit Plan v. Kling\", \"decision_date\": \"1941-07-02\", \"docket_number\": \"Docket 139/34\", \"first_page\": \"41\", \"last_page\": \"46\", \"citations\": \"130 N.J. Eq. 41\", \"volume\": \"130\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:11:27.086936+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Personal Credit Plan, a New Jersey corporation, complainant, v. Julius Kling and Frieda Kling, his wife, defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Docket 139/34\\nPersonal Credit Plan, a New Jersey corporation, complainant, v. Julius Kling and Frieda Kling, his wife, defendants.\\n[Decided July 2d, 1941.]\\nMessrs. McCarter, English & Egner, for the complainant.\\nMessrs. Platoff & Platoff, for the defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"1739\", \"char_count\": \"10842\", \"text\": \"Egan, V. C.\\nComplainant seeks specific performance of a contract to purchase property known as 796 Inwood Terrace, Cliffside Park, New Jersey. Defendants have answered and counterclaimed. The counter-claim seeks the return of defendants' deposit of $1,000 and reasonable expenses for examining the title to the premises in issue. The facts in the case are not disputed. The defendants question the complainant's right to hold and convey a marketable title because of a merger under the provisions of section 104 of the General Corporation Act of this state, as amended, P. L. 1929 ch. 261 p. 478 (now R. S. 14:12-1).\\nOn May 25th, 1934, under the provisions of section 104 of the General Corporation Act aforesaid, the following four corporations merged and adopted the name of the complainant herein: Continental Finance Corporation, Consumers Finance Corporation, the Fassau Finance Corporation and the Associated Industrial Bankers Corporation. The first three of them originally were organized under the General Corporation Act of this state, and the latter one was organized under the General Corporation Act of the State of Delaware. By the certificate of merger complainant became possessed of all the powers, privileges and rights expressed in the certificate of incorporation of Continental Finance Corporation, the continuing corporation, which was originally organized on June 3d, 1926. It, in effect, is subject to and governed by that corporation's charter.\\nEach of these four corporations originally had been organized as a finance corporation operating for profit from the loan and use of money by the making of personal loans. They engaged in loaning money under the Small Loan Laws of New Jersey (P. L. 1932 ch. 62 p. 94; R. S. 17:10-1 et seq.), New York and other states. \\\"When the merger was consummated in May, 1934, Continental Finance Corporation, the continuing corporation in the merger, was still actively engaged in this business.\\nSection 104 of the General Corporation Act, aforesaid, provides in part as follows:\\n\\\"Corporations of this State or of this and other States may merge and consolidate.\\n\\\"Any two or more corporations organized under any law or laws of this State or any corporation organized under the laws of this State and any corporation organized under the laws of any other State for the purpose of carrying on any kind of business of the same or a similar nature, may merge or consolidate into a single corporation, which may be either one of said merging or consolidating corporation; but the provisions of this act relative to merger and consolidation shall not apply to any railroad company, insurance company, banking companies, savings banks (or other corporation intended to derive profit from the loan and use of money), turnpike company, canal company.\\\"\\nThe defendants question the validity of the merger and the power of the complainant to hold and convey the premises which it contracted to sell to defendants. They say that under section 104 of the General Corporation Act, aforesaid, the four original corporations having the power, among other things, to lend money and having been engaged in the small loan business from time to time, are \\\"corporations intended to derive profit from the loan or use of money,\\\" and consequently were barred from merging.\\nSection 104 of the Corporation Act was interpreted in Clarke v. Gold Dust Corp., 106 Fed. Rep. (2d) 598. Judge Biggs speaking for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in that case, in part, said (at p. 602):\\n\\\"The appellant lays emphasis upon the fact that by the amendment the American Linseed Company acquired the right to loan to other corporations in which it might become interested and that section 104 forbids a merger where one of the corporations intends to derive profit from the loan or use of money. The power to loan money, however, was clearly incidental to other powers conferred by the amendment. The prohibition of section 104 applies specifically to the merger of insurance corporations, banking companies, and savings banks deriving profits from the loaning of money. Hnder the rule of ejusdem generis the phrase 'or other corporations' employed in section 104 must be restricted to corporations similar to those enumerated in the statute.\\\"\\nThe complainant asserts that under recognized principles of statutory construction, the words \\\"other corporations intended to derive profit from the loan or use of money\\\" refer only to such corporations which were formed under special acts and not corporations with the incidental power to lend money which had been formed under the General Corporation Act. See Group No. 23, &c., v. Association of the Sons of Poland, in which Vice-Chancellor Fielder, whose opinion was sustained by the Court of Errors and Appeals, 121 N. J. Eq. 102; 187 Atl.Rep. 356, determined the right of corporations to merge under the act to incorporate associations not for pecuniary profit in the light of the provisions of the General Corporation Act.\\nIt is my belief that the corporations denied the right to merge under section 104 comprise those corporations which are incorporated under special acts. I believe the merger o\\u00ed these four corporations was authorized by the statute aforesaid.\\nThe premises in question were acquired by the complainant in 1938, which was four years after the merger. The franchise and powers which the complainant possessed and exercised in 1938, and still acts under, as hereinabove observed, are derived from the original certificate of incorporation of Continental Finance Corporation. The merger did not affect the existence or the privileges of this (Continental Finance) corporation; it preserved and continued them. The only noticeable change in its existence was its title from Continental Finance Corporation to Personal Credit Plan. The complainant asserts that the Continental Finance Corporation under its charter is given power to acquire and convey real estate.\\nArticle 6 of the agreement of merger filed May 25th, 1934, in the office of the Secretary of the State of New Jersey, reads as follows:\\n\\\"Except in so far as herein otherwise specifically set forth, or as provided by Statute, the corporate franchise, rights and organization of said Continental Finance Corporation shall remain intact, and said 'PERSONAL CREDIT PLAN' shall possess the powers, privileges and rights granted by and shall be governed by and be subject to the Certificate of Incorporation of Continental Finance Corporation.\\\"\\nThe Consumers Finance Corporation, the Nassau Finance Corporation, and the Associated Industrial Bankers Corporation were by agreement merged with the existing Continental Finance Corporation. The charter of the latter corporation was not amended or changed except in the following respects: changing the location of its statutory office; changing the name of the agent in charge thereof; and amending article 4 thereof with respect to the capital stock of the corporation and providing \\\"that the corporate franchise rights and privileges of the Continental Finance Corporation remain as set forth in the original certificate of incorporation.\\\"\\nIn the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mercantile Home Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 96 Fed. Rep. (2d) 655, the court said:\\n\\\"There is a recognized distinction as applied to corporations between the terms 'merger' and 'consolidation.' In a merger, one corporation absorbs the other but remains in existence, while the other is dissolved. In a consolidation, a new corporation is created, and the consolidating corporations are extinguished. In either event, the new corporation acquires all the assets, property rights, and franchises of the dissolved corporations, and their stockholders become its stockholders. Pinellas Ice and Gold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 57 Fed. Rep. (2d) 188; Royal Palm Soap Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co., 5 Cir., 296 Fed. Rep. 448; Ferguson v. Meredith, 1 Wall 25; 17 L. Ed. 604, 609; Collinsville National Bank v. Esau, 74 Okla. 45; 176 Pac. Rep. 514; Atlantic, &c., Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359; 25 L. Ed. 185; Cortland Specially Co. v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 60 Fed. Rep. (2d) 937, 939; Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. Motter, 10 Cir., 66 Fed. Rep. (2d) 309; Drovers' and Mechanics' National Bank v. First National Bank, 4 Cir., 260 Fed. Rep. 9, 15.\\\"\\nOther authorities expressing the same principles are: Fordyce v. Helvering, 76 Fed. Rep. (2d) 431; Caroline Coach Co. v. Hartness, 152 S. E. Rep. 489; Graeser v. Phoenix Finance Co., 254 N. W. Rep. 859; Union Indemnity Co. v. Railroad Commissioner, 205 N. W. Rep. 492; Collinsville National Bank v. Esau, 176 Pac. Rep. 514; Fletcher Cyc. Corp. \\u00a7 7075.\\nVice-Chancellor Backes in Bingham v. Savings Invest., &c., East Orange, 101 N. J. Eq. 413; 138 Atl. Rep. 659, sustained the validity of a merger, and said:\\n\\\"The East Orange bank and the Central Trust Company, of East Orange, entered into an agreement with the Savings Investment and Trust Company of East Orange, by a two-third vote of all the members of their respective boards of directors, to merge into the Savings Investment and Trust Company the 5,000 shares of capital stock of the former, each having 2,500 shares, to be exchanged for a like number of shares of the savings investment company.\\n# \\u2756 * #\\nThe savings investment company will continue after the merger, as always, with promise of greater power and prestige. The other two merging companies will pass out of the picture. The savings investment company will retain its franchise and absorb theirs.\\\"\\nThis decision was affirmed on appeal, Chief-Justice Gummere saying in 102 N. J. Eq. 302; 140 Atl. Rep. 321:\\n\\\"In other words, the proposed merger, instead of destroying the vested rights of the stockholders or fundamentally changing the corporate contract of the savings investment and trust company, leaves the contract and the vested rights of the stockholders intact, and merely increases the original powers and franchises of the corporation and adds to its property and assets.\\\"\\nI am satisfied that the agreement of the four corporations in the instant case involves no consolidation. It is a merger; and by that merger the Personal Credit Plan, the complainant, has retained, and remains the same corporate entity as the Continental Finance Corporation. Its power to hold, acquire and convey real estate is here recognized and affirmed. Such power did not arise from the merger. It was derived from the charter of the Continental Finance Corporation.\\nThe relief prayed for shall-be granted.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/938650.json b/nj/938650.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bf9904df802056eba052fbf627f47ea7845b0d89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/938650.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"938650\", \"name\": \"Fidelity Union Trust Company, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, as substituted trustee, &c., complainant, v. William G. Caldwell et al., defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Caldwell\", \"decision_date\": \"1945-12-14\", \"docket_number\": \"Docket 148/163\", \"first_page\": \"362\", \"last_page\": \"368\", \"citations\": \"137 N.J. Eq. 362\", \"volume\": \"137\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:56:09.304360+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Fidelity Union Trust Company, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, as substituted trustee, &c., complainant, v. William G. Caldwell et al., defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Docket 148/163\\nFidelity Union Trust Company, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, as substituted trustee, &c., complainant, v. William G. Caldwell et al., defendants.\\n[Decided December 14th, 1945.]\\nMessrs. Ilood, Lafferty & Emerson (Mr. William G. Hart, appearing), ior the complainant.\\nMessrs. Kristeller \\u00a3 Zuclcer (Mr. George II. Rosenstein, appearing), for 'the defendants Armistead D. Mead, Charles P. Mead and Alfred C. Mead.\", \"word_count\": \"2422\", \"char_count\": \"13583\", \"text\": \"Stein, V. C.\\nGeorge B. Wilson died a resident of Monmouth County January 17th, 1909. He left a will duly probated by the surrogate of that county. Complainant, Fidelity Union Trust Company, as substituted trustee under his will, prays construction and instructions with respect to the fourth paragraph thereof which reads:\\n\\\"Fourth: All my residuary estate, both real and personal, wheresoever situate, I give, devise and bequeath to my executor, his heirs, successors, and assigns forever, to have and to hold the same in trust to be disposed of as follows:\\n\\\"(a) One-fifth of the net income from the residuary estate shall be paid to my wife Mary F. Wilson, in quarter-yearly payments during her life. Such payments shall be made to her for her sole and separate use freed from any and all claims by any husband or any creditor. This bequest to my wife is made in lieu of all right of dower and thirds in my estate and her acceptance of this bequest shall debar her from any and all other claims of any description against my estate.\\n\\\"(b) The remaining four-fifths of the net income from the residuary, estate shall be paid during their lives to my three sisters, Jennie B. Wilson, Agnes M. AVilson and Annie B. AVilson, of Wheeling, West Virginia, and to the survivors and survivor of them, in equal portions by quarterly-yearly payments, to wit: one-third of the said four-fifths to each of them as long as three of them survive; one-half of the said four-fifths to each of them as long' as two of them survive, and the entire four-fifths to the last survivor of them. If my wife does not survive me, or if she survives me and dies before any of my said sisters, then the entire net income from the residuary estate shall be paid to my said sisters and the survivors and survivor of them in equal portions as heretofore directed in this clause.\\n\\\"(c) Upon and after the death of all of my said sisters, or, if they all die before me, then upon and after my death one-fifth of the net income from the residuary estate shall be paid to my nephew, Wilson Hoge, during his life, in quarter-yearly payments: one-fifth of the net income from the residuary estate shall be paid to my cousin, George Baird, during his life, in quarter-yearly payments: one-tenth of the net income from the residuary estate shall be paid to my cousin Catherine Caldwell Farrar during her life, in quarter-yearly payments, and the remainder of the net income from the residuary estate' (except the one-fifth thereof payable to my wife during her life) shall be paid to my cousin, Alfred Caldwell, in quarter-yearly payments, until the termination of the trust. If the said Wilson Hoge, or the said George Baird, or the said Catherine Caldwell Farrar, or any of them, shall not survive all of my said three sisters, or, if they, or any of them, shall die after becoming entitled to a share of the net income herein provided for, then the share or shares of net income which would have been payable to them, or any of them, shall be paid to the said Alfred Caldwell, in quarter-yearly payments until the termination of the trust.\\n\\\"(d) If my wife survive me and all my said sisters, then upon and after her death the one-fifth of the net income from the residuary estate which would have been payable to her shall be paid to the said Alfred Caldwell, in quarter-yearly payments, until the termination of the trust.\\n\\\"(e) If neither my wife, nor any of my said sisters survives me, then, upon and after my death the one-fifth of the net income from the residuary estate which would have been payable to my wife shall be paid to the said Alfred Caldwell, in quarter-yearly payments, until the termination of the trust.\\n\\\"(f) Upon and after the death of the last survivor of my wife, my said three sisters, the said Wilson Hoge, the said George Baird, and the said Catherine Caldwell Farrar, or, if they all die before me, then upon and after my death the principal of the entire residuary estate together with any accumulations of net income thereon shall be paid over, transferred and conveyed absolutely to the said Alfred Caldwell, if living, otherwise to such persons as he may by will appoint, or, in default of such appointment, to his next of kin in equal shares per stirpes and not per capita and the trust shall thereby be terminated.\\n\\\"(g) If the said Alfred Caldwell shall die before me, or if he shall die before the termination of the trust, the payments of net income which are herein required to be paid to him shall, until the termination of the trust, be paid to such persons as he. may by Will appoint, or, in default of such appointment, to his next of kin in equal shares, per stirpes and not per capita.\\\"\\nUpon the death of all three sisters of decedent the income of the trust under subdivision \\\"c\\\" of paragraph four thereof is to be distributed among a nephew and three cousins, one of which cousins is Alfred Caldwell. Under subdivision \\\"f\\\" of paragraph four it is provided that upon and after the death of the last survivor of the testator's wife, his three sisters, Wilson Hoge, George Baird and Catherine Caldwell Earrar, the entire residue of the estate, together with any accumulations of net income thereon \\\"shall be paid over to the said Alfred Caldwell, if living, otherwise to such persons as he may by will appoint, or, in default of such appointment, to his next of kin\\nHis widow, Mary E. Wilson, died March 9th, 1915. The last of his sisters, Annie B. Wilson, died July 25th, 1943.' The nephew and all the cousins, including Alfred Caldwell died, thus making effective subdivision \\\"f\\\" of the fourth paragraph of the will. He died March 11th, 1925, a resident of Wheeling, West Virginia, leaving a signed paper-writing which bore his own handwriting dated August 27th, 1921, purporting to be his last will and testament. In proceedings in -the Probate Court of West Virginia this was held to be a valid will and admitted to probate. It was not signed, acknowledged, published or declared in the presence of attesting witnesses as required by the laws of this state and could not here have been admitted to probate as his will.\\nComplainant is in doubt as to whether in his will Alfred Caldwell validly exercised the power of appointment granted to him under the will of George B. Wilson, deceased, and whether the exercise by the power of appointment by him as donee must be determined by the laws of this state, the domicile of the donor of the power, or the laws of West Virginia, the domicile of the donee of the power.\\nIn item second of his will Alfred Caldwell gave to his wife, Laura E. Caldwell, as her absolute property, the full one-third of the rest and residue of his personal estate and property, including as a part of such personal estate all of his right, title and interest in the personal estate of his cousin, George B. Wilson, under the provisions of his will, of every kind, and a dower in his real estate other than his residence property, including as a part of his real estate any real estate to which he has any right, title or interest by virtue of the will of George B. Wilson, deceased. The dower interest referred to in this item is not involved here since Laura E. Caldwell, his wife, died November' 6th, 1927, and prior to the death of Annie B. Wilson, the last life tenant under Wilson's will.\\nIn the fifth item of his will, Alfred Caldwell gave the residue of his estate, including as part thereof the real and personal estate belonging to him under the will of George B. Wilson, of which he had the right to dispose of by will one-sixth thereof to each of five of his children and the remaining one-sixth to his son, William G. Caldwell, in trust for the benefit of his daughter, Laura B. Mead, for life and at her death said share to be paid over and transferred to the then living children of Laura B. Mead and the descendants of any of her children who may then be dead having left descendants, such descendants to take per stirpes. William G. Caldwell qualified as trustee of the trust thus created for the benefit of Laura B. Mead and the others mentioned and is still acting as such.\\nThe children of Alfred Caldwell surviving him are William G. Caldwell, Jane C. Schroll, Helen C. Glass, Martha B. Caldwell, Mary C. Davidson and Laura B. Mead. Laura B. Mead has four children living, namely, Armistead D. Mead, Charles P. Mead, Laura Mead Morris and Alfred C. Mead.\\nThe widow of Alfred Caldwell by item IY of her last will gave all of the property which Alfred C. Caldwell by item second of his will appointed to her to five of her six children, by name, a one-fifth share being given outright to four of said five children and the remaining fifth share be given in trust to pay the income therefrom to the-fifth of said children, Laura B. Mead, for life, and on her death to pay the principal to her children and descendants, if any, otherwise to certain contingent remaindermen. She appointed Martha B. Caldwell and Helen C. Glass executors of her estate. The latter having renounced, Martha B. Caldwell qualified as executrix.\\nIt should be here stated that the power of appointment in the instant case involves personal property only.\\nIt remains to be determined here whether the power of appointment granted to Alfred Caldwell by the will of George B. Wilson has been effectively exercised. If so, the residuary estate now in the possession of the complainant will be distributed five-sixths thereof to five of the children of Alfred Caldwell, deceased, and one-sixth thereof to William G. Caldwell, in trust for Laura B. Mead, who will receive the income thereof for life, with the remainder over to the latter's four children, Laura Mead Morris, Armistead D. Mead, Charles P. Mead and Alfred C. Mead. If the power of appointment has not been effectively exercised, the entire residuary estate vests in the six children of Alfred Caldwell; and, the trust in favor of Laura B. Mead, in so far as Alfred Caldwell's interest in the George B. Wilson's estate is concerned, will fail.\\nCaldwell, the donee, did make a will valid in the state of his residence and probated therein. Whether the power conferred upon him by the will of the donor was exercised is controlled by the law of the domicile of the donor, both as to the execution of the power and the interpretation of it. Rosenbaum v. Garrett, 57 E. J. Eq. 186, 41 Atl. Rep. 252; Farnum v. Pennsylvania Co., &c., 87 N. J. Eq. 108; 99 Atl. Rep. 145; affirmed, 87 E. J. Eq. 652; 101 Atl. Rep. 1053; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 121 N. J. Eq. 497; 191 Atl. Rep. 813. Property passing to an appointee under the provisions of a will executed by the donor of the power does not vest in the appointee through the donee of the power but comes directly to the appointee from the original donor of the power. The donee is but the indicator pointing out to whom the property goes. Leggett v. Doremus, 25 N. J. Eq. 122; McCook v. Mumby, 64 N. J. Eq. 394; 54 Atl. Rep. 406.\\nThe exercise of the power of appointment must be made in the manner directed by the donor. Cameron v. Crowley, 72 N. J. Eq. 681; 65 Atl. Rep. 875. In the instant case the direction of the donor to the donee was that he dispose of the property by his will. That the donee intended to exercise the power by his will is entirely clear from the provisions therein contained. Although it is not necessary that the power should be referred to in the instrument to effect the execution of the power, where the intent is otherwise manifested, it being sufficient if the power exist and is intended to be executed (Den v. Crawford, 8 N. J. Law 90, 103; Cueman v. Broadnax, 37 N. J. Law 508, 513; Wooster v. Cooper, 59 N. J. Eq. 204, 223; 45 Atl. Rep. 381; Ackerman v. Ackerman, 81 N. J. Eq. 437; 86 Atl. Rep. 542; Paul v. Paul, 99 N. J. Eq. 498; 133 Atl. Rep. 868), nevertheless the donee in the instant ease in exercising the power and disposing of the appointed property refers to the will of the donor, the property and the power conferred upon him therein.\\nMr. Justice Story in Harrison v. Nixon, 34 U. S. 483, 504, says:\\n\\\"They [wills] are supposed to speak the sense of the testator, according to the received laws or usages of the country where he is domiciled, by a sort of tacit reference; unless there is something in the language which repels or controls such a conclusion. In regard to personalty in an especial manner, the law of the place of the testator's domicile governs in the distribution thereof, and will govern in the interpretation of wills thereof; unless it is manifest that the testator had the laws of some other country in his own view.\\\"\\nIn 11 Am. Jur. 486 \\u00a7 179, it is said:\\n\\\"The general rule has been stated that the law of the domicil of the donor of' a power of appointment given by will must govern as against the law of the domicil of the donee in determining whether or not the will of the latter has exercised an execution of the power with reference generally to personal property. \\\"\\nI must hold therefore that the power of disposition was not effectively exercised by the donee. Present decree in conformity with the foregoing conclusion.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/944950.json b/nj/944950.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..43ef14228aacf225afde711a0c169d92de07cd41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/944950.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"944950\", \"name\": \"Marjorie Russell, complainant, v. James T. Hanan, defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Russell v. Hanan\", \"decision_date\": \"1935-10-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"99\", \"last_page\": \"100\", \"citations\": \"119 N.J. Eq. 99\", \"volume\": \"119\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:25:22.945038+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Marjorie Russell, complainant, v. James T. Hanan, defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Marjorie Russell, complainant, v. James T. Hanan, defendant.\\n[Decided October 8th, 1935.]\\nMr. Richard J. Fitz Maurice, for the complainant.\\nMr. Joseph C. Paul, for the defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"424\", \"char_count\": \"2450\", \"text\": \"Bigelow, V. C.\\nComplainant prays that defendant be enjoined from relying upon the statute of limitations in a pending law action. Defendant, a surgeon, operated upon complainant in April, 1927. The next morning, complainant heard him ask the nurse what had become of the drain tube or tissue which had been in the wound during the operation. She replied that she had not seen it. They immediately searched for it without success and finally the nurse said it must have gone with the bed linen. Seven years later, another surgeon found the tissue in complainant's neck. She then sued defendant for damages arising from the defendant's negligence in leaving the drainage tissue within the wound. Defendant pleaded the bar of the statute of limitations.\\nA court of equity will enjoin a defendant from relying upon the statute when the defendant's own fraudulent conduct has caused the complainant to delay bringing suit and thus subjecting her claim to the bar of the statute. Howard v. West Jersey and Seashore Railroad Co., 102 N. J. Eq. 517; 104 N. J. Eq. 201; Partrick v. Groves, 115 N. J. Eq. 208; Noel v. Teffeau, 116 N. J. Eq. 446. This equitable jurisdiction rests on the maxim that no man shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. \\\"It is an indispensible requisite, where a plaintiff in a suit at law applies to a court of equity to restrain the defendant from pleading the statute of limitations, that it shall be made clearly to appear that he was prevented, by the act of the defendant, from bringing his action at law until his right of action was barred by the statute.\\\" Lamb v. Martin, 43 N. J. Eq. 34.\\nIn the instant case, defendant, until the tissue was eventually discovered in 1934, was as ignorant as complainant that it had been left in the wound! His colloquy with the nurse emphasized by complainant, does not indicate otherwise. He did nothing whatever to delay complainant from bringing the action against him. That the delay was caused by her ignorance of the existence of the cause of action is not a ground for equitable relief. Hardship caused by the statute may move the legislature to amend, but in the absence of inequitable conduct on the part of defendant, it cannot be the basis for an injunction. The bill will be dismissed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/960431.json b/nj/960431.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4ca7632fdbfd5eac3762c1dc832b67fa8210481e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/960431.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"960431\", \"name\": \"Jacob Williamson, complainant, v. Davis Bender, Harry Bender, Hortense Bender, Mollie Bender, Profit Realty Company, Bender Construction Company, G. L. & S. Holding Company and Isaac Elson, defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Williamson v. Bender\", \"decision_date\": \"1929-12-06\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"363\", \"last_page\": \"367\", \"citations\": \"105 N.J. Eq. 363\", \"volume\": \"105\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Equity Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:50:27.684999+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Jacob Williamson, complainant, v. Davis Bender, Harry Bender, Hortense Bender, Mollie Bender, Profit Realty Company, Bender Construction Company, G. L. & S. Holding Company and Isaac Elson, defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Jacob Williamson, complainant, v. Davis Bender, Harry Bender, Hortense Bender, Mollie Bender, Profit Realty Company, Bender Construction Company, G. L. & S. Holding Company and Isaac Elson, defendants.\\n[Decided December 6th, 1929.]\\nMr. Samuel Daniels and Mr. Albert O. Jordan, for the complainant.\\nMessrs. Corn <& Silverman (Mr. C. Wallace Vail, of counsel), for the defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"1188\", \"char_count\": \"7232\", \"text\": \"Church, V. C.\\nThis is a suit to set aside the following conveyances as fraudulent :\\n\\\"A. Deed to Harry Bender, dated April 22, 1926, to 92 Goldsmith avenue, Newark, N. J., recorded in Book G 74-269.\\nDeed of Harry Bender on same property to Profit Realty Company, on April 11, 1927, recorded in Book G 76-164.\\nTo set aside a mortgage of fifteen thousand ($15,000) dollars by Profit Realty Company to Harry Bender, which is a purchase-money mortgage on same property, and have this mortgage decreed to be the property of Davis Bender and subject to the complainant's judgment. This mortgage is recorded in Book R 60-210.\\\"\\n\\\"B. Deed to Harry Bender dated April 22, 1926, recorded in Book G 74-269, covering:\\n1. Plot on easterly side of South Broad street, Newark.\\n2. Two plots on King street, Newark.\\n3. Plot on South Broad street, adjoining 1.\\n4. Plot on Essex turnpike.\\nAll of these properties were conveyed by Harry Bender to Bender Construction Company by deed dated April 6, 1927, and recorded May 17, 1927, in Book I 76-161.\\\"\\n\\\"C. Mortgage of four thousand ($4,000) dollars of defendant, G. D. & S. Holding Company to Davis Bender, dated January 25, 1926, recorded in Book P 56-400 in Essex county, which was assigned by Davis Bender to Harry Bender on April 22, 1926, by assignment, recorded in Book 179-290. By stipulation the sum of two thousand thirty-five ($2,035) dollars is held by defendants' attorneys, representing the balance due on this mortgage and which shall be subject to the disposition of this court.\\\"\\nThe defendants Harry Bender and Hortense Bender are children of Davis Bender, and Mollie Bender is Davis Bender's wife.\\n. The complainant, Jacob Williamson, recovered a judgment against Davis Bender on February 3d, 1928, for $11,661.52.\\nThe Profit Realty Company is a New Jersey corporation organized by Louis J. Feit, attorney, on March 26th, 1927, and its incorporators were Abraham Kaplan, one share, Samuel Kaplan, eight shares, and Celia Kaplan, his wife, one share. The Kaplans are friends of Davis Bender and Eeit was Bender's personal attorney. None of its stock was ever transferred.\\nThe company was controlled by Samuel Kaplan; it never had a meeting of stockholders or directors, never paid a dividend nor filed a statement of earnings, and never had any business except as a title receptacle of 92 Goldsmith avenue, Newark. It had a bank account, where only money received as rents from 92 Goldsmith avenue were deposited and checks signed by Samuel Kaplan were paid in various and irregular amounts to Harry Bender and Bender Construction Company.\\nBender Construction Company was, likewise, a domestic corporation in which the incorporators were: Harry Bender, twenty-eight shares; Mollie Bender, one share; Hortense Bender, one share. Its principal place of business was 92 Goldsmith avenue. Harry Bender was in control; no meetings of stockholders or directors were ever held, no dividends were paid, no stock transferred. Its sole purpose was to take title to certain of Davis Bender's property through Harry Bender.\\nSivad Realty Company is not a defendant but is mentioned prominently through the testimony; this was composed of Harry Bender, Samuel' Kaplan (of Profit Realty Company) and Harry Hoffman, a quondam partner of Harry Bender and an intimate friend of the Bender group. Harry Bender controlled this corporation which spells the name Davis backward. This company, with a nominal bank account of one hundred and thirty-seven ($137) dollars in 1926, suddenly became enriched with checks of three thousand ($3,000) dollars, ten thousand ($10,000) dollars, &c., loans from Harry Bender, who borrowed the money from his mother, Mollie Bender. Almost from its organization, the company was in the hands of Louis Eeit.\\nIn April, 1925, Davis Bender sold property on Yanderpoel street, Newark, to the Fidelity Title Company. Although the contract of sale was signed by Davis Bender and Harry Bender, the deposit of five thousand ($5,000) dollars was deposited in Davis Bender's account. Title was closed on June 17th, 1925, and a check for thirty-one thousand three hundred and twenty-three and fifty one-hundredths ($31,-323.50) was deposited in Davis Bender's account, which amounted to forty-four thousand four hundred and twenty-six and fifty-three one-hundredths ($44,426.53) dollars on that day. The check was made out to Davis Bender, Harry Bender and Mollie Bender, but the actual money came to Davis Bender.\\nOn June 16th, 1925, Davis Bender executed the note to Williamson.\\nOn April 22d, 1926, Davis Bender, by a bargain and sale deed, conveyed to Harry Bender everything he owned in the way of real estate. No consideration was given by Harry for this deed or the assignment of the four thousand ($4,000) dollar mortgage which was simultaneously executed.\\nOn June 11th, 1926, Davis Bender and his wife executed a chattel mortgage covering his entire household furniture at 92 Goldsmith avenue and his automobile. This was done to secure a loan of two thousand ($2,000) dollars to the Sivad Realty Company, which was entirely controlled by Harry Bender. Harry says he gave the Sivad money to his father. Davis says he does not know who gave it to him. The furniture remained in Davis Bender's home and still is used by him. At the time he executed this mortgage, Davis Bender had on deposit twenty-seven thousand four hundred and forty-seven and ninety-nine one-hundrenths ($27,447.99) dollars.\\nOn March 2d, 1926, Davis Bender contracted to sell his garage property, which he owned, for over $75,000. He was under this contract when he transferred to Harry all his real estate.\\nOn June 16th, 1926, the Williamson note became due and was protested. Erom that time on Davis Bender's bank account shrank to nearly nothing. The bank statement shows checks drawn as follows:\\nNone of these checks was produced. Davis Bender says they were lost. At the same time the Sivad Realty Company's bank account increased very largely, as did that of Harry Bender.\\nThis is a very brief statement of the voluminous testimony taken in this case, but it clearly appears from this and the other testimony which I have read that these conveyances' were made for the express purpose of defrauding creditors, particularly the ten thousand ($10,000) dollar note. A grant by a parent to a child, based on services rendered, has been held invalid as to creditors. See Dodson v. Severs, 54 N. J. Eq. 305. Moreover, a voluntary conveyance by one indebted raises an irrebuttable presumption of fraud. Horton v. Bamford, 79 N. J. Eq. 356. I do not think it necessary to go further into a discussion of the numerous cases that sustain the above statement of law. I think, under the evidence, as a matter of fact, that these conveyances were made to avoid the payment of this judgment, and I will advise a decree that they he set aside.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/983927.json b/nj/983927.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c9685287589eaa074d85974fcb19751243321816
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/983927.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"983927\", \"name\": \"MAUREEN MARTINDALE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. SANDVIK, INC., SANDVIK COROMANT COMPANY, INC., PAUL HODGEN, RICK ASKIN AND JOHN CASCIANO, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, AND JOHN DOES ONE THROUGH SEVENTEEN, DEFENDANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"2002-07-17\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"76\", \"last_page\": \"108\", \"citations\": \"173 N.J. 76\", \"volume\": \"173\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of New Jersey\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:34:23.895746+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"MAUREEN MARTINDALE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. SANDVIK, INC., SANDVIK COROMANT COMPANY, INC., PAUL HODGEN, RICK ASKIN AND JOHN CASCIANO, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, AND JOHN DOES ONE THROUGH SEVENTEEN, DEFENDANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"800 A.2d 872\\nMAUREEN MARTINDALE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. SANDVIK, INC., SANDVIK COROMANT COMPANY, INC., PAUL HODGEN, RICK ASKIN AND JOHN CASCIANO, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, AND JOHN DOES ONE THROUGH SEVENTEEN, DEFENDANT.\\nArgued January 14, 2002\\nDecided July 17, 2002.\\nAnthony N. Iannarelli, Jr. argued the cause for appellant.\\nJill E. Jocher\\u00e1 argued the cause for respondents (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, attorneys; Joseph A. Piesco, Jr., on the brief).\", \"word_count\": \"8726\", \"char_count\": \"56831\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the Court was delivered by\\nLaVECCHIA, J.\\nThis appeal addresses the enforceability of an arbitration agreement contained in an application for employment. The courts below concluded that the agreement to arbitrate executed by the parties was valid and enforceable notwithstanding its inclusion in an application for employment, and therefore held that plaintiff was bound to submit her claims against her former employer to arbitration. All of plaintiff's claims were held to be encompassed by the arbitration agreement, including her statutory claims concerning family leave and those alleging discrimination. We agree and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.\\nI.\\nPlaintiff Maureen Martindale applied and was hired for the position of Benefits Administrator with defendant Sandvik, Inc. in 1994. When she applied, plaintiff had to complete and sign an \\\"Application for Employment\\\" that included an arbitration agreement that appeared on page four of the application. The arbitration agreement stated:\\nAS A CONDITION OF MY EMPLOYMENT, I AGREE TO WAIVE MY RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN ANY ACTION OR PROCEEDING RELATED TO MY EMPLOYMENT WITH SANDVIK.\\nI UNDERSTAND THAT I AM WAIVING MY RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY, AND FREE FROM DURESS OR COERCION.\\nI UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE A RIGHT TO CONSULT WITH A PERSON OF MY CHOOSING, INCLUDING AN ATTORNEY, BEFORE SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT.\\nI AGREE THAT ALL DISPUTES RELATING TO MY EMPLOYMENT WITH SANDVIK OR TERMINATION THEREOF SHALL BE DECIDED BY AN ARBITRATOR THROUGH THE LABOR RELATIONS SECTION OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION.\\nPlaintiff also submitted a resume that set forth her educational background and extensive experience in the field of benefits administration.\\nIt is undisputed that defendant provided her with the opportunity to ask questions about the application and the arbitration agreement and to consult a third party, including an attorney, before signing the documents. Although plaintiff asked questions about the position, she did not ask any questions about the application. According to plaintiff, defendant informed her that she was required to sign page four of the application; nonetheless, there is no claim that plaintiff was coerced into signing the arbitration agreement. Similarly, defendant's Director of Human Resources, John Casciano, testified at a deposition that his practice, followed in respect of plaintiff, was to ask an applicant to read the Application for Employment, review the document with the applicant, and offer to answer any questions. He said that applicants were permitted to take the application home to complete it, and then return it at a later date.\\nIn January 1996, plaintiff informed defendant that she was pregnant. Nearly two weeks before giving birth, plaintiff began to experience medical problems related to her pregnancy. Consequently, plaintiff obtained disability leave. After giving birth, plaintiff requested and defendant granted family and medical leave to commence at the termination of plaintiffs disability leave. However, prior to the termination of plaintiffs disability leave and the commencement of her family and medical leave, defendant notified plaintiff that her position was being eliminated due to a reorganization of defendant's holding company and its financial department. Defendant ceased disability payments to plaintiff in November 1996.\\nPlaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging violation of the New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11B-1 to - 16(FLA). Defendant removed the matter to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey and filed a motion to dismiss, in part. Defendant alleges that while that motion was pending it recalled the agreement to arbitrate contained in the Application for Employment.\\nA remand to the Law Division ensued and thereafter plaintiff amended her complaint to add individual defendants and a claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49(LAD). Defendant then moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiffs complaint without prejudice, but ordered a stay pending appeal.\\nOn appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the orders dismissing plaintiffs complaint and compelling arbitration. The panel held that the arbitration agreement contained in the Application for Employment was valid and enforceable, and rejected the contention that the agreement was a contract of adhesion. We granted plaintiffs petition for certification. 169 N.J. 610, 782 A.2d 427 (2001).\\nII.\\nThe first step in considering plaintiffs challenge to enforcement of an arbitration requirement must be to determine whether a valid agreement exists. Determining whether plaintiff is contractually bound is the predicate to the question whether the specific contractual language requires arbitration of her FLA and LAD claims.\\nA.\\nWe address the question whether plaintiff has entered into a binding agreement to arbitrate disputes with her employer against the backdrop that arbitration agreements may not be subjected to more burdensome contract formation requirements than that required for any other contractual topic. Pursuant to its substantive power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress en acted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), also known as the United States Arbitration Act, in 1925, to abrogate the then-existing common law rule disfavoring arbitration agreements \\\"and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.\\\" Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 1651, 114 L.Ed.2d 26, 36 (1991). Section 2 of the FAA provides that \\\"[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such a contract or transaction . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.\\\" 9 U.S.C. \\u00a7 2 (1994).\\nIn enacting section 2 of the FAA, \\\"Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.\\\" Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858, 79 L.Ed.2d 1, 12 (1984). The substantive protection of the FAA applies irrespective of whether arbitrability is raised in federal or state court. Id. at 16, 104 S.Ct. at 861, 79 L.Ed.2d at 15. Those principles were reaffirmed in Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001), where the Supreme Court held that the FAA's coverage extends to employment contracts. Id. at 112, 121 S.Ct. at 1307, 149 L.Ed.2d at-. Cf. Brown v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 82 Hawai'i 226, 921 P.2d 146, 159 (1996) (holding arbitration agreement contained in employment application satisfied FAA; \\\" 'the creation of an employment relationship which involves commerce is a sufficient 'transaction' to fall within section 2 of the [FAA]' \\\") (quoting White-Weld & Co. v. Mosser, 587 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex.Civ.App.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966, 100 S.Ct. 2943, 64 L.Ed.2d 825 (1980)).\\nThe New Jersey Legislature codified its endorsement of arbitration agreements in N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1 to -11. Moreover, New Jersey courts also have favored arbitration as a means of resolving disputes. See, e.g., Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 168 N.J. 124, 131, 773 A.2d 665 (2001) (noting favored status accorded to arbitration, but stating that favored status is not without limits); Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 281, 633 A.2d 531 (1993) (stating that \\\"arbitration is a favored form of relief' and that \\\"arbitrators function with the support, encouragement, and enforcement power of the State\\\"); Barcon Assocs., Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179, 186, 430 A.2d 214 (1981) (stating that Legislature has encouraged arbitration and courts have favored arbitration because of significant advantages arbitration offers to parties); Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. v. Galarza, 306 N.J.Super. 384, 389, 703 A.2d 961 (App.Div.1997) (recognizing \\\"strong public policy in our state favoring arbitration as a means of dispute resolution and requiring a liberal construction of contracts in favor of arbitration\\\"); Yale Materials Handling Corp. v. White Storage & Retrieval Sys., Inc., 240 N.J.Super. 370, 375, 573 A.2d 484 (App.Div.1990) (reiterating that \\\"New Jersey law [is] consonant with federal law which liberally enforces arbitration agreements\\\"). Thus, in deciding whether to enforce the arbitration provision in this application for employment, we rely on the well-recognized national policy and the established State interest in favoring arbitration.\\nB.\\nAlthough it is firmly established that the FAA preempts state laws that invalidate arbitration agreements, the FAA specifically permits states to regulate contracts, including contracts containing arbitration agreements under general contract principles; therefore, an arbitration clause may be invalidated \\\"upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.\\\" 9 U.S.C. \\u00a7 2. See generally, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1924, 131 L.Ed.2d 985, 993 (1995) (\\\"When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.\\\"); Mastrobuono v. Shear- son Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62-63 & n. 9, 115 S.Ct. 1212, 1218-19 & n. 9, 131 L.Ed.2d 76, 87-88 & n. 9 (1995) (employing common law rule of contract interpretation and citing to precedent of forum state where contract was executed to hold that contract between securities brokerage firm and customers permitted arbitrator to award customers punitive damages); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Board of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 1254, 103 L.Ed.2d 488, 498 (1989) (reiterating application of general state-law principles of contract formation to determine whether arbitration agreement fell within scope of FAA); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 2526 n. 9, 96 L.Ed.2d 426, 437 n. 9 (1987) (\\\"[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.\\\"). However, states may not \\\"decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms . but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause\\\" because \\\"that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal 'footing,' directly contrary to the Act's language and Congress' intent.\\\" Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281, 115 S.Ct. 834, 843, 130 L.Ed.2d 753, 769 (1995).\\nC.\\nThus, the threshold issue is whether under state law the arbitration agreement constitutes a valid contract to arbitrate. Plaintiff contends that because the Application for Employment does not constitute an employment contract the arbitration provision contained therein is unenforceable. We disagree.\\nThe parties do not dispute that they executed a written agreement to arbitrate all claims against defendant. That agreement is complete in and of itself and need not be part of a larger employment contract. Courts in many other jurisdictions have held that an arbitration provision, contained in an application for employment and in the absence of a separate employment agreement, constituted a valid and enforceable contract. See generally, Bradford v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 5 F.Supp.2d 1311, 1315 (M.D.Ala.1998) (holding that plaintiff signed and agreed to arbitration agreement when she applied for employment with defendant); Fuller v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack of Delaware, Inc., 88 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1162 (D.Colo.2000) (compelling arbitration pursuant to arbitration provision contained solely in application for employment); Sheller v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F.Supp. 150, 154 (N.D.Ill.1997) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that because arbitration clause was located in employment application that was not contract of employment, there was no contractual agreement to arbitrate claims against employer and holding that employment application qualified as valid and enforceable contract to arbitrate); DeGroff v. MascoTech Forming Techs.-Fort Wayne, Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 896, 902-04 (N.D.Ind.2001) (compelling arbitration after finding that employee was bound by arbitration provision contained in documents signed during application process). As in those cases, the question of enforceability is determined not on the basis of whether the arbitration agreement is contained in an application for employment or in an employment contract, but rather whether the arbitration provision qualifies as a valid and enforceable contract. Thus, we turn to whether the written arbitration provision constitutes a valid and enforceable contract.\\nBasic contract principles render a promise enforceable against the promisor if the promisee gave some consideration for the promise. We have explained the well-established rule of consideration as follows:\\nThe essential requirement of consideration is a bargained-for exchange of promises or performance that may consist of an act, a forbearance, or the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts \\u00a7 71 (1981). If the consideration requirement is met, there is no additional requirement of gain or benefit to the promisor, loss or detriment to the promisee, equivalence in the values exchanged, or mutuality of obligation. Restatement (Second) of Contracts \\u00a7 79 (1979).\\n[Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys. Corp., 111 N.J. 276, 289, 544 A.2d 377 (1988).]\\nPut another way, \\\"[a] very slight advantage to one party, or a trifling inconvenience to the other, is a sufficient consideration to support a contract when made by a person of good capacity, who is not at the time under the influence of any fraud, imposition or mistake.\\\" Traphagen's Ex'r v. Voorhees, 44 N.J. Eq. 21, 31, 12 A. 895 (Ch. 1888).\\nIn all jurisdictions that have considered the question, courts have held that the creation of an employment relationship, which is achieved when the employer agrees to consider and/or agrees to hire the applicant for employment, is sufficient consideration to uphold an arbitration agreement contained in an employment application. See generally, Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, 148 F.3d 373, 378 (4th Cir.1998) (finding that although employer agreed to be mutually bound to terms of agreement to arbitrate, court would not foreclose that employer's willingness to consider employee's application could qualify as consideration); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 368 (7th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811, 120 S.Ct. 44, 145 L.Ed.2d 40 (1999) (holding that employee's contract with employer was supported by adequate consideration because employee's signing of Form U-4 was supported by employer's promise of employment); Shelter, supra, 957 F.Supp. at 154 (ruling that employer's agreement to consider applicants for employment constituted sufficient consideration for applicants' signing of arbitration provision contained in employment application); Rogers v. Brown, 986 F.Supp. 354, 359 (M.D.La.1997) (upholding arbitration provision in application for employment, reasoning that employee's consideration for contract was employment and compensation from employer).\\nSimilarly, in New Jersey, continued employment has been found to constitute sufficient consideration to support certain employment-related agreements. See, e.g., Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 330 N.J.Super. 252, 265, 749 A.2d 405 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 527, 760 A.2d 781 (2000) (stating that employment can be deemed consideration for employee's submission to employer's demands, including arbitration); Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 153 N.J.Super. 37, 43, 378 A.2d 1164 (App.Div.1977) (holding that continuation of plaintiffs employment for approximately three years after plaintiff signed letter acknowledging restrictive covenant against post-employment competition constituted sufficient consideration to enforce agreement).\\nThe arbitration agreement contained in the Application for Employment signed by plaintiff was supported by consideration in the form of defendant's willingness to consider employment of plaintiff. The agreement provided that plaintiff would agree to waive her right to a jury trial and submit all disputes relating to her employment, including termination, to arbitration \\\"as a condition of employment\\\" with defendant. Although defendant was under no obligation to actually hire plaintiff, defendant's consideration of plaintiff's application, its extension of an offer and the commencement of employment, and thereafter the provision of compensation and on-going employment constituted sufficient consideration to support the parties' agreement to arbitrate their disputes. That agreement is binding, as would be any other contractual term not contrary to public policy contained in a signed employment application that led, as here, to employment.\\nD.\\nPlaintiff contends in the alternative that the agreement to arbitrate her statutory claims against her employer constituted a contract of adhesion and that therefore it is not enforceable. A contract of adhesion, simply put, is a contract \\\"presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, commonly in a standardized printed form, without opportunity of the 'adhering' party to negotiate except perhaps on a few particulars.\\\" Rudbart v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n., 127 N.J. 344, 353, 605 A.2d 681, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 871, 113 S.Ct. 203, 121 L.Ed.2d 145 (1992).\\nEven if the Application for Employment in this case, including the arbitration provision, was found to constitute a contract of adhesion, that does not render the contract automatically void. The observation that a contract falls within the definition of a contract of adhesion is not dispositive of the issue of enforceability. Rudbart, supra, 127 N.J. at 354, 605 A.2d 681. Such a finding \\\"is the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry.\\\" Ibid. In determining whether to enforce the terms of a contract of adhesion, courts must look not only to the standardized nature of the contract, \\\"but also to the subject matter of the contract, the parties' relative bargaining positions, the degree of economic compulsion motivating the 'adhering' party, and the public interests affected by the contract.\\\" Id. at 356, 605 A.2d 681. Similar to a consideration of contract formation, the decision whether an arbitration agreement constitutes an unenforceable contract of adhesion is fact-sensitive, and therefore must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See generally, Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F.Supp. 962, 975 n. 7 (D.N.J.1997) (noting that cases deciding enforcement of arbitration clause in adhesive employment application are \\\"inextricably tied to their facts and not necessarily controlling in later, similar cases\\\").\\nThe United States Supreme Court in Gilmer declared that \\\"[mjere inequality in bargaining power . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.\\\" Gilmer, supra, 500 U.S. at 33, 111 S.Ct. at 1655, 114 L.Ed.2d at 41. As the Appellate Division explained in Young v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, Incorporated, 297 N.J.Super. 605, 688 A.2d 1069 (App.Div. 1997), \\\"the Supreme Court [in Gilmer ] obviously contemplated avoidance of the arbitration clause only upon circumstances more egregious than the ordinary economic pressure faced by every employee who needs the job.\\\" 297 N.J.Super. at 621, 688 A.2d 1069. Virtually every court that has considered the adhesive effect of arbitration provisions in employment applications or employment agreements has upheld the arbitration provision contained therein despite potentially unequal bargaining power between employer and employee. See generally, Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1999) (holding that absent showing of fraud or oppressive conduct, arbitration of plaintiff's age and gender discrimination claims pursuant to arbitration provision contained in Form U-4 was permissible); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1139, 119 S.Ct. 1028, 143 L.Ed.2d 38 (1999) (rejecting argument that disparity in bargaining power resulted in contract of adhesion); Koveleskie, supra, 167 F.3d at 367 (upholding employee's agreement to arbitrate Title VII claim, noting that state law does not void contracts based on unequal bargaining power or contracts made on \\\"take-it-or-leave-it\\\" basis); Nur v. KFC, USA Inc., 142 F.Supp.2d 48, 51-52 (D.D.C.2001) (rejecting argument that arbitration agreement contained in employment application of restaurant's assistant manager was unenforceable contract of adhesion, where agreement was not unduly burdensome, did not favor one party over other, and provided that American Arbitration Association and FAA rules apply to arbitration proceeding).\\nTurning to the arbitration agreement contained in plaintiffs Application for Employment, we do not find determinative the fact that plaintiff was required to sign an employment application containing an arbitration agreement in order to be considered for employment. The employment application was not offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Defendant gave plaintiff an opportunity to ask questions about the application and to take it with her for further quiet review or, perhaps, consultation with family, friends, or a professional such as an attorney. Plaintiff herself was an educated person who was experienced in the field of human resources. Nothing in the record indicates that plaintiff asked to alter any terms of the application or that Sandvik would have refused to consider her for the position if she did not assent to the arbitration provision as presented. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that plaintiff was forced to sign an inflexible contract of adhesion in the circumstances of her completion of the Application for Employment.\\nNonetheless, even if the arbitration agreement could be so characterized, the agreement's subject matter and the public interests affected lead to the conclusion that it should not be invalidated. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how the terms of the arbitration agreement were oppressive or unconscionable. As stated earlier, our courts have held on numerous occasions that agreements to arbitrate are not violative of public policy. Marchak, supra, 134 N.J. at 281-82, 633 A.2d 531. Rather, the affirmative policy of this State, both legislative and judicial, favors arbitration as a mechanism of resolving disputes. Barcon, supra, 86 N.J. at 186, 430 A.2d 214. The insertion of an arbitration agreement in an application for employment simply does not violate public policy.\\nWe perceive no meaningful difference between including a requirement that an employee arbitrate all disputes relating to employment in an application for employment versus an employment contract or an employee handbook. The inclusion of an arbitration provision in an application for employment does not render the agreement any more a contract of adhesion than when it appears in an employment agreement or employee handbook. Indeed, by inserting an arbitration agreement in an application for employment, the prospective employee is put on notice before accepting an offer of employment that his or her claims against that employer will be submitted to an arbitral forum. In conclusion, we hold that the Application for Employment and, specifically, its accompanying arbitration agreement should not be invalidated as a contract of adhesion. The agreement is not rendered unenforceable by the circumstances surrounding the manner in which the contract was formed.\\nIII.\\nHaving found that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, the scope of the agreement must next be determined. In the interpretation of an agreement to arbitrate, the duty to arbitrate rests solely on the parties' intentions as set forth in the writing. Cohen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 231 N.J.Super. 97, 101, 555 A.2d 21 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 87, 563 A.2d 846 (1989).\\nPreliminarily, it is well established that an employee may be bound by an agreement to waive his or her right to pursue a statutory claim in a judicial forum in favor of arbitration. Gilmer, supra, 500 U.S. at 30, 111 S.Ct. at 1654, 114 L.Ed.2d at 39; Garfinkel, supra, 168 N.J. at 131, 773 A.2d 665; Alamo, supra, 306 N.J.Super. at 389, 703 A.2d 961. The essential point is that \\\"[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral rather than a judicial, forum.\\\" Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3354, 87 L.Ed.2d 444, 456 (1985); Barcon, supra, 86 N.J. at 187, 430 A.2d 214 (noting that arbitration merely substitutes arbitral forum for judicial forum with objective of achieving final disposition in speedy, inexpensive, and expeditious manner); Gras v. Associates First Capital Corp., 346 N.J.Super. 42, 52-53, 786 A.2d 886 (App.Div.2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 445, 794 A.2d 184 (2002) (finding no conflict between arbitration and Consumer Fraud Act; reasoning that plaintiffs can vindicate statutory rights in arbitral forum).\\nHere, having agreed to arbitrate, the parties should be bound to that agreement unless either the Legislature has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies, or the statutory claim cannot be vindicated in an arbitral forum. Mitsubishi Motors, supra, 473 U.S. at 628, 105 S.Ct. at 3354-55, 87 L.Ed.2d at 456; Young, supra, 297 N.J.Super. at 616, 688 A.2d 1069. As to the first, there is no indication in the text or legislative histories of either the FLA or the LAD that restrict the use of an arbitral forum to pursue those claims. Indeed, in respect of the LAD, a judicial remedy was never perceived to be essential to vindicate such claims. Garfinkel, supra, 168 N.J. at 131, 773 A.2d 665 (citing Ackerman v. Money Store, 321 N.J.Super. 308, 324, 728 A.2d 873 (Law Div.1998)). The LAD always permitted such claims to be pursued through an administrative hearing proceeding. N.J.S.A 10:5-13. Plainly, a jury trial is not applicable in the administrative setting.\\nSimilarly, the FLA contains no legislative mandate that such claims be pursued solely in a judicial forum. Like the LAD, the FLA allows aggrieved persons to pursue their claims in an admin istrative proceeding. N.J.S.A. 34:11B-11. Concerning whether the statutory claims can be vindicated in an arbitral forum, there is no suggestion in either the FLA or LAD that their respective substantive remedies would be unavailable in an arbitral forum. Thus, in enforcing the agreement to arbitrate there are no identifiable impediments that would preclude vindication of plaintiffs statutory FLA and LAD claims. Cf., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893-94 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \\u2014 U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2329, 153 L.Ed.2d 160 (2002) (determining that arbitration provision contained in employment application constituted contract of adhesion that required voiding because of exacerbating provisions visiting loss of substantial rights pn its signatories, such as, limiting amount of punitive damages that may be awarded and imposing one-year statute of limitations); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060 (11th Cir. 1998) (refusing to compel arbitration of employee's Title VII claim, and finding that arbitration agreement authorizes arbitrator to award damages for breach of contract only and proscribes arbitral award of Title VII damages). Because the parties have agreed to arbitration of their disputes, plaintiff should be bound to that agreement.\\nB.\\nConcerning the scope of the arbitration agreement, the remaining question is whether by signing the application for employment plaintiff agreed to submit her statutory FLA and LAD claims to arbitration. Plaintiff contends that even if the agreement to arbitrate constitutes a valid and legal contract, the language in the agreement was too vague and ambiguous to convey that plaintiff intended to waive her right to a jury trial on statutory claims concerning her employment. She makes the argument notwithstanding that the arbitration agreement stated that she \\\"agree[d] to waive [her] statutory right to a jury trial in any action or proceeding relating to [her] employment with Sandvik.\\\"\\nA similar issue arose in Garfmkel, supra, a case decided after execution of the agreement to arbitrate here. In Garfinkel, we declined to uphold an agreement to arbitrate a statutory LAD claim contained in an employment contract. Supra, 168 N.J. at 127, 773 A.2d 665. There, the agreement contained no reference to waiver of the right to a jury trial. In addition to setting forth the employee's work obligations, the employment agreement in Garfinkel provided that \\\" 'any controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration.' \\\" Id. at 128, 773 A.2d 665. We held that that language was too ambiguous to constitute an enforceable waiver of the employee's statutory causes of action. Id. at 127, 773 A.2d 665. In so holding, we stated: \\\"The Court will not assume that employees intend to waive [their statutory rights] unless their agreements so provide in unambiguous terms.\\\" Id. at 135, 773 A.2d 665. However, we did not require a party to \\\"refer specifically to the LAD or list every imaginable statute by name to effectuate a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights.\\\" Ibid. Instead, we instructed that \\\"a waiver-of-rights provision should at least provide that the employee agrees to arbitrate all statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship or its termination.\\\" Ibid.\\nIn determining whether the arbitration agreement contained in the employment contract was sufficiently clear to constitute a waiver of the plaintiffs statutory causes of action, the Garfinkel Court cited approvingly to Alamo, supra. In Alamo, the Appellate Division considered the enforceability of an arbitration provision contained in an employee handbook that stated that claims that \\\" Alamo has violated this [employee handbook] . shall be submitted to . arbitration.' \\\" 306 N.J.Super. at 387, 703 A.2d 961. The court held that the arbitration clause applied only to disputes arising from the employee handbook, not to controversies arising under the LAD. Id. at 394, 703 A.2d 961. Cf. Singer v. Commodities Corp., 292 N.J.Super. 391, 405-07, 678 A.2d 1165 (App.Div.1996) (finding that arbitration provision stating that employee agreed to arbitrate \\\"any dispute\\\" with employer was sufficiently broad to encompass plaintiffs CEPA claim); Young, supra, 297 N.J.Super. at 613-14, 688 A.2d 1069 (holding that employee's CEPA and LAD claims were subject to arbitration because he agreed to arbitrate \\\"any dispute, claim or controversy\\\" with his employer). In Garfinkel, we concluded that because the arbitration provision stated that claims arising from the \\\"Agreement or the breach thereof' would be subject to arbitration, the parties intended to arbitrate only those disputes arising from the employment agreement itself. Supra, 168 N.J. at 134, 773 A.2d 665.\\nIn the circumstances of this case, the language in the arbitration agreement not only was clear and unambiguous, it was also sufficiently broad to encompass reasonably plaintiffs statutory causes of action. The arbitration agreement provides that plaintiff agreed to waive her right to a jury trial \\\"in any action or proceeding relating to my employment with Sandvik\\\" and that \\\"all disputes relating to my employment with Sandvik or termination thereof' shall be subject to arbitration. Unlike the arbitration provisions contained in Garfinkel and Alamo, the arbitration provision here does not contain any limiting references. Its wording provided plaintiff with sufficient notice at the time she signed the agreement that all claims relating to employment with and termination from Sandvik would be resolved through arbitration. It also addressed specifically a waiver of the right to a jury trial, augmenting the notice to all parties to the agreement that claims involving jury trials would be resolved instead through arbitration. Thus, even though Garfinkel was decided after the parties executed the agreement to arbitrate in this matter and therefore does not control, the wording chosen here satisfied the spirit of that decision. Compelling arbitration under these circumstances is fair and equitable.\\nFinally, plaintiff claims that she did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her right to pursue her statutory claims in a judicial forum. Although plaintiffs level of sophistication is not central to our inquiry, see Garfinkel, supra, 168 N.J. at 136, 773 A.2d 665, we note nonetheless that plaintiff read and understood the Application for Employment before she signed it. She was not rushed in any way. Defendant provided plaintiff with the opportunity to ask questions about the application, to take the application home and thereby take time in considering it, and to consult with another person, including an attorney, before signing the document. As noted, although plaintiff asked questions about the position, she did not ask any questions about the application form either before or after she signed it and she declined the offer to take the application home or to consult with another party. Plaintiff was an educated businesswoman experienced in the field of human resources. She was provided with ample time and opportunity to review the application. We agree with the courts below that concluded that plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily agreed to arbitrate her statutory causes of action against her employer.\\nIV.\\nThe judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed in all respects.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/nj/99113.json b/nj/99113.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e1a328ac5db44a7f4103f41aef0abf17b021d2f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nj/99113.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"99113\", \"name\": \"JOE BRUNO, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, v. TURNER & COMPANY, INCORPORATED, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bruno v. Turner & Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1936-01-31\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"143\", \"last_page\": \"145\", \"citations\": \"116 N.J.L. 143\", \"volume\": \"116\", \"reporter\": \"New Jersey Law Reports\", \"court\": \"New Jersey Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New Jersey\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:25:00.374565+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JOE BRUNO, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, v. TURNER & COMPANY, INCORPORATED, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\", \"head_matter\": \"JOE BRUNO, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, v. TURNER & COMPANY, INCORPORATED, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.\\nSubmitted October 25, 1935 \\u2014\\nDecided January 31, 1936.\\nFor the appellant, Wall, Haight, Carey & Hartpence.\\nFor the respondent, Henry Harris.\", \"word_count\": \"68\", \"char_count\": \"506\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe judgment under review should be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinion of the Supreme Court.\\nFor affirmance \\u2014 -The Chancellor, Chief Justice, Lloyd, Donges, Heher, Perskie, Hetfield, Dear, Wells, WolfsKeil, Rafferty, JJ. 11.\\nFor reversal \\u2014 None.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file