diff --git a/la/10026308.json b/la/10026308.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4724d9acfe7b9b06d70beb6116374ce8cf12d636
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/10026308.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"10026308\", \"name\": \"LEWIS v. LIBERTY INDUSTRIAL LIFE INS. CO.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lewis v. Liberty Industrial Life Ins. Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1936-02-24\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 16216\", \"first_page\": \"143\", \"last_page\": \"146\", \"citations\": \"166 So. 143\", \"volume\": \"166\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:42:23.333188+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"LEWIS v. LIBERTY INDUSTRIAL LIFE INS. CO.\", \"head_matter\": \"LEWIS v. LIBERTY INDUSTRIAL LIFE INS. CO.\\nNo. 16216.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.\\nFeb. 24, 1936.\\nLewis R. Graham and H'arry R. Cabral, both of New Orleans, for appellant.\\nLoys Charbonnet and E. B. Charbonnet, Jr., both of New Orleans, for appellee.\\nRehearing denied March 23, 1936. Writ of error granted April 27, 1936.\", \"word_count\": \"2361\", \"char_count\": \"14077\", \"text\": \"McCALEB, Judge.\\nOn July 3, 1922, the defendant, Liberty Industrial Life Insurance Company, insured one. Lillian Fisher against disability from sickness or accident, subject to certain conditions expressed in the policy contract.\\nDuring the year 1931, while the insurance policy was in force and effect, Lillian Fisher became insane. On May 27, 1931, she was committed to the East Louisiana hospital at Jackson, La., at which institution she has been continuously confined as a patient therein.\\nIn the proceedings entitled. \\\"Interdiction of Lillian Fisher,\\\" No. 206,079 of the civil district court, the insured was interdicted and the plaintiff herein, Alma-Lewis, was appointed and qualified as curatrix.\\nPlaintiff, in her representative capacity, filed this suit against the insurer, claiming health benefits under the policy for the years 1931, 1932, 1933, and 1934, together with double indemnity and attorney's fees.\\nThe insurer, among other things, based its chief defense upon two premises:\\nPrimarily, that insanity is a disability of the mind and not of the body, and therefore such affliction, although causing permanent, total disability, was neither contemplated by the parties nor covered by the terms of the policy.\\nSecondarily, that Lillian Fisher, though insane, was not ill physically, and that the policy only covers illness in case the insured is \\\"necessarily confined to bed.\\\"\\nThe district judge found for the defendant insurer, being of the opinion that the policy \\\"was never intended to cover a permanent disability of the mind, causing insured to become insane, without physical disability.\\\"\\nThe facts are not in dispute. The medical evidence shows that the insured is suffering from dementia prsecox, hyper-phrenic type. This is described to be a mental disturbance subjecting the afflicted person to hallucinations. Because of the malady affecting her mind, the insured is unable to engage in pursuits of any sort and is totally incapacitated. There are no pathological changes in the brain in persons suffering- with this type of insanity.\\nNotwithstanding the insured's mental derangement, she is physically in good health- and has never been confined to bed by reason of her apathy.\\nThe policy in this case insures \\\"against disability from sickness and accident.\\\" Insanity is not excluded.\\nBouvier's law dictionary defines sickness as follows: \\\"By sickness is understood any affection of the body which deprives it temporarily of the power to fulfil its usual functions. It has been held to include insanity. L.R. [1872-3] .8 Q.B. 295.\\\"\\nBallentine's law dictionary says: \\\"Insanity has always been considered a disease and comes strictly.within the meaning of the word sickness\\\" \\u2014 citing Robillard v. Societe St. Jean Baptiste de Centreville, 21 R.I. 348, 43 A. 635, 45 L.R.A. 559, 79 Am.St.Rep. 806.\\nRuling Case Law, vol. 14, p. 1249, reads: \\\"Insanity is 'sickness or other disability' within a health policy, \\\" \\u2014 citing McCullough v. Expressman's Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 133 Pa. 142, 19 A. 355, 7 L.R.A. 210.\\nWe hold that insanity is a \\\"sickness\\\" included in that term as used in the policy contract now before us. See Donlen v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 117 Misc. 414, 192 N.Y.S. 513; American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Denman (Tex.Civ.App.) 260 S.W. 226.\\nHaving found that the disease suffered by the insured is a sickness within the terms of the policy, does the fact that the insured is not confined to bed bar her recovery ?\\nThe policy provides \\\"weekly benefits for sickness will only be paid for each period of 7 consecutive days that the insured is, by reason of illness, necessarily confined to bed and that he shall remain under the professional care of a duly licensed and practicing physician.\\\" (Italics ours.)\\nThe above-quoted provision is clear and unambiguous. It can mean only just what it says. The insured may, under this condition, suffer many known ailments, but liability of the insurer will only attach in the event the insured is necessarily confined to bed.\\nCounsel for plaintiff asserts that our Supreme Court has held, in the case of Newton v. National Life Ins. Co., 161 La. 357, 108 So. 769, 770, that the test of liability in health policies is disability from sickness rather than actual confinement to bed.\\nPrior to a discussion of the Newton Case, supra, it is helpful to briefly review some of the holdings by other courts in respect to the causes and extent of the liability of the insurer in health insurance contracts.\\nCorpus Juris, vol. 29, p. 280, informs: \\\"With reference to sickness indemnity policies, there may be said to be three degrees of sickness, namely: (1) Where the patient is confined to his bed. (2) Where he is not confined to his bed, but is confined to his house. (3) Where he is too sick to work, but is not confined to his house.\\\"\\nHence the parties to the contract may stipulate for protection against any one or all of the three kinds of sickness. It follows that a contract for payment of benefits in case of sickness disability from work would broadly cover all known sicknesses preventing one from engaging in his usual business. Again, the policy may also be narrow in its terms, protecting only for illness which is house-confining. And, again, the contract may be of a more limited scope, as here; where liability ensues only in case the sickness is necessarily bed confining.\\nThese three classes of health policies have been given a liberal, rather than a literal, interpretation by a vast majority of the courts.\\nThe cases are numerous, particularly so with reference to policies which provide for coverage only in the event the sickness is such that it confines the insured continuously within the house. The great weight of authority in actions falling under this class is that the words \\\"continuously confined to the house\\\" mean that the insured must be substantially confined, and the fact that he makes occasional visits to his physician's office, or takes a trip for his health, or is taken out in the air, all on his physician's advice, will not defeat recovery. See Garvin v. Union Mut. Cas. Co., 207 Iowa, 977, 222 N.W. 25, 61 A.L.R. 633; Interstate Business Men's Acc. Ass'n v. Sanderson, 144 Ark. 271, 222 S.W. 51; Great Eastern Cas. Co. v. Robins, 111 Ark. 607, 164 S.W. 750; Jennings v. Brotherhood Accident Co., 44 Colo. 68, 96 P. 982, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 109, 130 Am.St.Rep. 109; Metropolitan Plate Glass & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hawes' Ex'x, 150 Ky. 52, 149 S.W. 1110, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 700; Columbian Relief Fund Ass'n v. Gross, 25 Ind.App. 215, 57 N.E. 145; Van Dusen v. Interstate Business Men's Ass'n, 237 Mich. 294, 211 N.W. 991; Jentz v. National Casualty Co., 52 N.D. 688, 204 N.W. 344; Mutual Benefit Ass'n v. Nancarrow, 18 Colo.App. 274, 71 P. 423; Ramsey v. General Accident, Fire & Life Ins. Co., 160 Mo.App. 236, 142 S.W. 763; American Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Nirdlinger, 113 Miss. 74, 73 So. 875, 4 A.L.R. 871; Breil v. Claus Groth Plattoutschen Vereen, 84 Neb. 155, 120 N.W. 905, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 359, 18 Ann.Cas. 1110; Olinger v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n, 221 Mo.App. 405, 278 S.W. 86; Musser v. Great Northern Life Ins. Co., 218 Mo.App. 640, 266 S.W. 325; \\u00c6tna Life Ins. Co. v. Willetts (C.C.A. 3) 282 F. 26.\\nThe same view of liberal construction holds true in cases where the policy condition, similar to the instant case, is that sickness must necessarily confine the insured to bed.\\nRuling Case Law, vol. 14, p. 1318, reads: \\\"A requirement that the insured be confined to his bed also means that the insured must be substantially bed-ridden.\\\"\\nThus it was held in Nelson v. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 135 Cal.App. 731, 27 P.(2d) 779, that an insured rendered completely helpless by a paralytic stroke was \\\"necessarily, totally, and continuously confined to\\\" bed within health policy, though occasionally lifted out of bed and placed in wheel chair to be taken into the sun, or to his physician's office for treatment. See, also, Home Protective Ass'n v. Williams, 151 Ky. 146, 151 S.W. 361, Ann.Cas.1915A, 260, Bradshaw v. American Benev. Ass'n, 112 Mo.App. 435, 87 S.W. 46, Dodge v. Knapp, 112 Mo.App. 513, 87 S.W. 47, and Hays v. General Assembly American Benev. Ass'n, 127 Mo.App. 195, 104 S.W. 1141, holding that the phrase \\\"necessarily confined to bed\\\" means that the insured must be substantially bedridden.\\nA summary of this jurisprudence reveals that each case, respecting recovery, must be governed by the particular facts involved, giving the conditions of the policy a liberal interpretation with a view of arriving at a fair conclusion disclosing the just intentions of the parties.\\nIn the instant case the insured has at no time been confined to her bed as a result of her affliction. We conceive that allowing her recovery under these circumstances would result in the destruction of the agreement between the parties and substitute therefor a different contract in its place.\\nBut it is insisted that our Supreme Court did just that in the Newton Case, supra.\\nAn examination of the opinion written by Mr. Justice Brunot discloses the following:\\nNewton had a health policy which contained a condition that: \\\"Weekly benefits at the rate specified in the schedule will be paid each seven days (a) for each day that the insured is by reason of illness under the care of a physician and necessarily confined to bed, except that, where the insured is a male whose place of employment is away from his residence, confinement within the house and medical attention therein, if preceded by at least one week's confinement to bed, shall be sufficient.\\\"\\nWhile the policy was in force, he was afflicted with a serious illness. The insurer paid him weekly disability for 7 weeks, and then stopped further payments on the ground that he was not confined in the manner provided for in the policy. The insured then brought suit for 104 weeks' additional benefits.\\nThe court, in affirming the judgment in favor of plaintiff, said:\\n\\\"The district judge found as a fact that plaintiff's illness incapacitated him from work of any kind, and while the plaintiff frequently visited the office of his attending physician for treatment, he construed the word 'confined' as used in the policy to mean inability to do work rather than physical inability to leave the house. We think.this interpretation was correct, especially as plaintiff was totally incapacitated for 7 weeks, and was paid by the defendant $70 or $10 per zueek for those 7 weeks, and because condition No. 2 of the policy reads:\\n\\\" 'That where the insured is a male whose place of employment is away from his residence, confinement within the house and medical attention therein, if preceded by at least one week's confinement to bed, shall be sufficient.' \\\" (Italics ours.)\\nOur reaction to the court's holding is that there was no occasion for an interpretation of the clause \\\"necessarily confined to bed,\\\" inasmuch as the insurer admitted, by paying the insured for 7 weeks, that he was confined to bed for the first week. Insured, having been confined to bed for one week, had the right to claim benefits for all other weeks upon a showing that he was sick and confined to the house. In allowing him recovery the court merely applied the rule of liberal construction most favorable to the insured, holding that the fact that he frequently visited the office of his attending physician did not bar recovery, because there was a substantial confinement within the house.\\nThe decision in that case is clearly distinguishable and not controlling here, as the nature of the illness and the conditions in the policy contract are diverse.\\nCourts can only interpret and construe contracts. Where language is plain and unambiguous, sound interpretation requires that it be given its ordinary meaning, having always in view the intention of the parties.\\nThe defendant insurer has raised other defenses respecting notice and .proof of claiih. In view of our holding, it is unnecessary to pass upon these questions.\\nFor the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.\\nAffirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/10027152.json b/la/10027152.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..379e83963ed1d56c244fbb881e1c1cfe0217dea3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/10027152.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"10027152\", \"name\": \"HARLOW v. OWNERS' AUTOMOBILE INS. CO. OF NEW ORLEANS et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Harlow v. Owners' Automobile Ins.\", \"decision_date\": \"1935-04-01\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 5012\", \"first_page\": \"169\", \"last_page\": \"172\", \"citations\": \"160 So. 169\", \"volume\": \"160\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:29:13.768293+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"HARLOW v. OWNERS\\u2019 AUTOMOBILE INS. CO. OF NEW ORLEANS et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"HARLOW v. OWNERS\\u2019 AUTOMOBILE INS. CO. OF NEW ORLEANS et al.\\nNo. 5012.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.\\nApril 1, 1935.\\nHugh M. Wilkinson' and A. Miles Coe, both, of New Orleans, and Chas. L. Mayer, of Shreveport, for appellants.\\nHarry Y. Booth, of Shreveport, for appel-lee.\\nRehearing denied May 2, 1935.\", \"word_count\": \"2516\", \"char_count\": \"14246\", \"text\": \"TALIAFERRO, Judge.\\nWe find in the record before us written reasons of the trial court for the judgment rendered for plaintiff, wherein the issues, facts, and legal principles involved in the case are clearly stated. After a careful study of the case, we have reached the same conclusions on the issues involved as did the learned trial judge, and have decided to adopt the reasons assigned by him for judgment as our own, adding thereto such further comments as we deem pertinent.\\n\\\"Mrs. Mattie H. Harlow brings this suit against the Service Cab Company and its insurer, the Owners' Automobile Insurance Company of New Orle&js, for damages for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident which occurred on or about December SO, 1933, near the intersection of Petzer avenue and Portland avenue, in the city of Shreveport.\\n\\\"Portions of 'the testimony were conflicting, but the court glean's the following facts from the record:\\n\\\"The . day was a rainy Saturday morning, and the time about 11 o'clock, when Mrs. Harlow, whose.home is on Mabel street, not far from the intersection in question, having purchased a feiv groceries at- th'e Piggly-Wiggly store on Portland avenue, came to the curb in the vicinity of where the 'white lines' now are marking the path for pedestrians across Petzer avenue, and, raising her .parasol, looked up and down the street, and seeing no approaching' car, started across. Upon reaching a point near the opposite side of tbe street, she found mud and water, which she made an effort to avoid by turning east in Petzer avenue and by walking several steps in that, direction, when she was struck from behind and precipitated to the street.\\n\\\"J. H. Maness, the driver of the taxicab for the Service Cab Company, had entered Petzer avenue at- a point west of Portland avenue, and was traveling in an easterly direction. The intersection of Portland with' Petzer at the point where the accident occurred is some distance from the intersection of that portion of Portland avenue which goes from Petzer in a northerly direction; that being an intersection where the street car lines come into Petzer avenue. At this point the cab stopped, awaiting a street car, and then proceeded on its way at a reasonable rate of speed. As it passed the pharmacy a few doors west of the grocery store, whence Mrs. Harlow had just come,' some one hailed the driver of the cab, diverting his attention for a moment, and one of the passengers, seeing Mrs. Harlow in the street, gave warning to the driver, who immediately gave his attention to the space in front of him and applied his brakes. His wheels skidded on the wet pavement, and the cab came to a stop almost the instant it struck Mrs. Harlow. The driver offered to take Mrs. Harlow to the hospital, but she asked to be taken home instead, and this was done.\\n\\\"She later suffered a 'procidentia' as a result of the blow, for which she was operated upon, and has never regained the same hardy strength which she had before, nor her former weight,. though the operation was a success.\\n\\\"There are two points of fact in which there is serious dispute. The first is as to a person on the sidewalk diverting the attention of the driver just before the accident. The driver of the cab testified that he did not remember such diversion of his attention, but, on the, contrary, stated that he kept a lookout and proceeded to stop as soon as h$- saw Mrs. Harlow. Some' of the witnesses for the defendant, however, testified to the fact that some one whistled or called to him from the sidewalk,, and that a passenger, warned him of the danger to Mrs. Harlow, and we find such to be a fact. An objection was made that this testimony came out in- rebuttal and should have been brought out in chief. However that may be, the circumstances of the entire case convinced the court that at least the driver was not maintaining the lookout, which duty the law would impose upon him. . .\\n\\\"The other point of fact that has a bearing on the case, but which is in dispute, is the question of whether or not Mrs. Harlow was proceeding across Petzer avenue in the usual path of .pedestrians, or- whether she was crossing.the street at an angle and at-a distance, from the usual path of pedestrians.\\n\\\"We believe that the preponderance of the testimony shows that at least she com menced her path across the street at approximately th& usual point that pedestrians would cross, though at that time the path was not marked hy white lines. As a matter of law, this imposes upon the driver of the cab the obligation to maintain a very careful lookout, and to .exercise great care with reference to pedestrians.\\n\\\"After Mrs. Harlow turned and proceeded east down the street, it appears to us that, normally, this would change the legal obligation of the parties and place a greater burden on her and a less burden on the driver of the taxicab. However, in this instance, the necessity of making the turn and proceeding down the street arose after she had crossed the greater part of the street, for it was only then that she was confronted with the obstacle of mud and water in her path. The fact that it seems certain that after making this turn she proceeded a number of steps before the accident, convinces the court that the driver of the 'taxicab should have seen her, not only because she had crossed the street, but had gone a number of steps in a perpendicular direction and in a direction the same as that in which the taxicab was traveling. If the driver of the taxicab had been keeping the proper lookout, he had ample opportunity to see her and to avoid the accident.\\n\\\"The only theory of the defendant, upon which this argument is based, is that the accident could have been avoided, and would have been avoided if she had not suddenly stepped from behind parked automobiles. The evidence is also conflicting as to whether ears were parked on the street; but, in view of the other circumstances, we do not find it necessary to determine that fact.\\n\\\"The plaintiff bases her case on a theory of the doctrine of last clear chance, which,, of course, presupposes both the negligence of the defendant and negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The negligence of the defendant was in not keeping a proper lo&k-out, and the negligence of the plaintiff was in her proceeding down the street in front of the approaching taxicab, without looking for the approaching automobile.\\n\\\"It seems undoubtedly true from the tes-, timony that, had she not turned to go east, in the street, but had proceeded across the street, she would not have been struck, be-, cause the several steps that she took east would have taken her to the curb. Therefore her only negligence could have been in turning her back to the approaching car to' proceed in the easterly direction, without looking west when she turned.\\n\\\"The theory of the defendant as to the doctrine of 'last clear chance' is that its applicability is destroyed by the continuing negligence of the plaintiff up to the time of the accident\\n\\\"The cases which defendant has cited undoubtedly establish the legal principle that, if the negligence of the plaintiff continued up to the time of the accident, and that negligence is the proximate cause of the accident, or a proximate cause of the accident, the doctrine does not apply, and plaintiff could not recover.\\n\\\"We. are, however, of the opinion that the theory does not apply to cases of pedestrians in the street being run down by automobiles, even in the instance of a pedestrian placing himself in danger by crossing at an unusual place in the street and when the driver has the last clear chance or the opportunity to avoid the accident.\\n\\\"The case of Bass v. Means, 12 La. App. 260, 124 So. 553, in which a pedestrian was barred from recovery, differs from the case at bar in that the negligent act of stepping in front of the car was almost simultaneous with the negligent act of the defendant, and that under those circumstances the defendant did not have the opportunity of avoiding the accident Therefore the doctrine of last clear chance did not apply.\\n\\\"The case of Robichaux v. Dorion, 17 La. App. 159, 134 So. 784, and the case of Loe-wenberg v. Fidelity Union Casualty Company (La. App.) 147 So. 81, 87, are pedestrian eases where the pedestrian had placed himself in danger, but where the defendant had an opportunity of avoiding the accident, of which he did not avail himself, and we believe these cases are applicable to the case at bar.\\n\\\"In other words, the fact that Mrs. Harlow h\\u00e1d proceeded some distance across the street, and had' then turned and walked down the street a number of steps and then had been struck from behind by the taxicab, the approach of which she was not aware, and her back being to the cab, could not well have been aware, convinces the court that the taxicab driver should have seen her in the street and should have realized her- danger, and he did have the last opportunity to avoid the accident It was his negligence that was the proximate cause of the accident\\n\\\"As to the quantum of damages, we find that Mrs. Harlow is- a woman of 59 years of age, who has had children, which had thereby made her susceptible to the 'proci-dentia' which the accident precipitated. We find that she suffered the usual pain attendant upon a major operation, and that she does not have the same robust strength that she had prior to the occurrence.\\n\\\"Taking into account her age and'the fact that the operation was a success, we feel that an allowance of $1,000 for pain and suffering is proper, and that her hospital and doStors bills should likewise be paid; and we also find that she proved the damage to her earning capacity in the sum alleged in the amended petition, which was $25.\\n\\\"Judgment is therefore rendered in favor of the plaintiff in the total sum of $1278.95.\\n\\\"Cecil Morgan,\\n\\\"District Judge.\\\"\\nPlaintiff was negligent in walking down the street without keeping a lookout for cars behind her which had the right to travel on the same side of the street she was on and in same direction, but her negligence in this respect was in a sense passive, and certainly was not the, or a, proximate cause of her being run down and injured. She was in plain view of all vehicles approaching her from both directions.\\nDefendant's driver states that, when he first saw plaintiff, his ear was 15 feet from her. He was going 15 miles per hour, or 22 feet per second. The brakes were applied, the car skidded on the slippery pavement, and stopped with its impact against plaintiff. It did not. pass over her body to any extent. It therefore follows that, had this driver, discovered plaintiff's presence ahead of him one-half second before he did, the car would have stopped before striking her. The testimony is convincing that he applied the brakes only after his attention was called by one of his passengers to plaintiff's presence ahead of him, and that this passenger saw plaintiff before the driver did and hol-loed at him at the time he was giving attention to the person on the sidewalk who had whistled or-called to him. Undoubtedly an appreciable lapse of time was consumed by the driver while he had his head turned to his rear, or at angles to his left, in the effort to locate and answer the person who had signalled him from the sidewalk. This inattention to duty, the failure for a moment or two to keep a close watch ahead, constituted the proximate cause of the accident, and renders the employer and its insurer responsible for the damages resulting therefrom. It is true plaintiff's negligence continued to the moment of the accident, but it was not a proximate cause of it. The case of Shields v. Succ'n of Hodge, 13 La. App. 546, 128 So. 530, is in point.\\nWe think, as did the lower court, that the doctrine of the last clear chance finds peculiar application to the facts of the case. It is true the driver did not observe plaintiff in the street in time to avert running into her, \\u2022but, had he been the alert driver he should have been, he would have seen' her in time to have avoided the accident. It was his duty to have seen her in time to avoid hitting her. It is no defense to the case that he acted promptly and did everything in his pbwer to prevent hitting her as soon as his attention was directed to her presence before him. The last clear chance doctrine was recognized and applied in the Loewen-berg Case, cited in the lower court's opinion. That ease is decisive of the present case. We there said: \\\"Defendant contends that, in applying the doctrine of last clear chance, we should require plaintiff, in order to recover, to prove that Sanders Fowler, Jr., after seeing the danger, could have avoided the injury. This seems to be the accepted rule in some jurisdictions, but the rule in Louisiana is that, if defendant did not see the danger, but by the exercise of ordinary care could have seen the danger in time to avoid the injury, the doctrine of last clear chance will apply.\\\"\\nThis holding is abundantly supported by the numerous cases therein cited.\\nPlaintiff suffered considerable pain from the accident, and was finally forced to spend several days in a sanitarium, after undergoing operation for the \\\"procidentia.\\\" To accomplish this operation, she was placed under the influence of total anaesthetic. Before the injury she was robust, strong, and vigorous for one of her years. No doctor had attended her for over a quarter of a century. Her weight decreased about twenty pounds, and at time of trial the surgeon who performed the operation on her was of the opinion it would be several months before recovery from the ill effects of the accident and operation. In view of these facts and conditions; we think the award of damages to her inadequate. It should be increased by $500.\\nFor the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is increased to $1,778.95, and, as thus amended, it is affirmed, with costs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/10045736.json b/la/10045736.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b7f7b2f96bdee59a0bde0db5f2aac82bea6ed5a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/10045736.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"10045736\", \"name\": \"HAGAMAN et ux. v. BANKERS INDEMNITY INS. CO.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hagaman v. Bankers Indemnity Ins.\", \"decision_date\": \"1942-04-13\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 17626\", \"first_page\": \"390\", \"last_page\": \"393\", \"citations\": \"7 So. 2d 390\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:45:40.672924+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"HAGAMAN et ux. v. BANKERS INDEMNITY INS. CO.\", \"head_matter\": \"HAGAMAN et ux. v. BANKERS INDEMNITY INS. CO.\\nNo. 17626.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.\\nApril 13, 1942.\\nCurtis, Hall & Foster, of New Orleans, for appellant.\\nLeslie P. Beard, of New Orleans, for appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"1889\", \"char_count\": \"10976\", \"text\": \"SIMON, Judge.\\nThis case arises out of an accident occurring on Pontchartrain Boulevard, between Carrollton Avenue and Metairie Road, at about 10:15 a.m. on July 25, 1940, wherein a truck owned by Gonzales Motor Company and insured by the defendant, Bankers Indemnity Insurance Company, collided with the automobile of the plaintiff, Fred P. Hagaman. The truck of the Gonzales Motor Company was being driven at the time by its employee, Harold Rollins. The automobile of the plaintiff was driven by his wife, Mrs. Fred P. Hagaman, a coplaintiff herein. Fred P. Hagaman sues for property damage in the amount of $411.50 and Mrs. Hagaman seeks recovery for personal injuries in the amount of $1,250, as a consequence of the accident.\\nThere is no real dispute as to the material facts involved.\\nPontchartrain Boulevard is an avenue running from Carrollton Avenue to Lake Pontchartrain along the upper or eastern bank of the New Basin Canal. That section of the boulevard between Carrollton Avenue and Metairie Road consists of two roadways divided by a neutral ground, the lower roadway, that adjacent to the canal, being reserved for traffic proceeding toward the lake and the upper roadway being reserved for traffic proceeding in the opposite direction. The neutral ground is raised above the street surface, bordered by a concrete curb and ornamented with shrubbery and small trees. In this neutral ground are thirty foot-wide openings, at intervals of about 300 feet, or one square apart, so as to permit traffic to cross from one roadway to the other. The boulevard and canal, at a point approximately three blocks from Carrollton Avenue toward the direction of Lake Pontchartrain, are crossed by the overpass of the new Airline Highway.\\nOn the morning of the accident, that portion of the lower or canal side roadway of the boulevard, under and in the immediate vicinity of the overpass, was being resurfaced. As a consequence of this construction, the lower or canal side roadway, at a point some 180 feet from the Carrollton Avenue side of the overpass, was barricaded to detour outbound or lake-bound traffic over to the other, or upper roadway. Barricades had also been placed in the first gap or opening in the neutral ground on the lake side of the overpass, thus preventing motorists from regaining their proper side of the road until they reached the second gap or opening\\u2014 a distance of about 400 feet beyond the lake side of the overpass. These barricades, about 4 feet in height, were in the form of wooden carpenter's horses. It is shown, also, 'that there were no signs of any kind at any point on the lake side of the overpass so placed that they might serve to warn traffic approaching from the direction of the lake that the lower roadway trafile was being detoured to'the upper roadway.\\nMrs. Hagaman entered Pontchartrain Boulevard at Carrollton Avenue, traveling towards the lake, and from this point proceeded out on the lower or canal side roadway. Upon reaching the gap or opening in the neutral ground nearest the Carroll-ton Avenue side of the overpass, the barricades across the canal roadway forced her to detour to the roadway reserved for incoming traffic. Accordingly, she turned to her left, through the neutral ground opening, and proceeded along the upper roadway to the point where the accident occurred, this being shown to be approximately two squares from the point where she had entered the upper roadway. She was traveling at the moderate rate of about 20 to 25 miles per hour, and, while proceeding along the upper roadway, she held to her right, or to the neutral ground side of that roadway, as by law she was required to do. She could not, in fact, have done otherwise, because the remainder of the roadway\\u2014to her left\\u2014was being used by incoming traffic, or that approaching from the direction of the lake.\\nAt the time Mrs. Hagaman detoured from the lower to the upper roadway, the truck of the Gonzales Motor- Company was approaching along said upper roadway from the opposite direction. This truck was also holding to the neutral ground side of said upper roadway, proceeding at a speed of from 30 to 35 miles per hour. From this resulted the head-on collision.\\nThe specific acts of negligence charged to the' truck's operator and alleged to be the sole causes of the collision are that he failed to keep to the right, failed to observe the approach of plaintiff's automobile, and, if he did observe it, he failed to return to his right side of the traffic lane, a course which would have prevented the collision.\\nDefendant denied all allegations of negligence directed against the operator of the truck and affirmatively pleaded the negligence of Mrs. Hagaman as the sole and only cause of the accident. In the alternative, the contributory negligence of Mrs. Hagaman is urged in bar of recovery.\\nAfter a trial of the case on its merits, there was judgment in favor of Fred P. Hagaman in the sum of $249.50, subject to a credit of $25, and in favor of Mrs. Haga-man in the sum of $250. Defendant has appealed.\\nFrom the facts and circumstances disclosed by the record, the palpable gross negligence of the truck driver cannot be seriously disputed. - It is shown that he was driving his truck at a speed of 30 to 35 miles per hour, holding to his left, or the neutral ground side of the roadway, in the face of approaching traffic, without once discovering the impending danger he was creating until it was much too late to avoid the crash. The truck driver testified that he did not see the approaching Hag-aman car, being entirely 'oblivious of the grave realities of the situation until he had reached a distance of about 50 feet away, a distance much too short within which to avert the collision. Under such circumstances he failed to exercise that degree of vigilance and alertness required of operators of motor vehicles. His indifference and apparent lack of attention was most unreasonable considering the time, the place and use then being made of the roadway. By the exercise of ordinary care and observation, the truck driver could immediately have realized that the upper roadway was being used by vehicles proceeding in opposite directions, sanctioned by the necessities of the moment, and could have easily and seasonably regained the lane of traffic proceeding in the direction in which he was moving, thus leaving the other half of the roadway in use at the time for the passage of the oncoming Hagaman car. In this manner the collision could have been avoided.\\nIt is not negligence per se for one to drive in the center, or on the wrong side of the road, but it is negligence for one who is on the wrong side of the road to fail to pull over to the right on meeting another vehicle. Elliott on \\\"Roads & Streets\\\", 3d Ed., Sections 1079-1082.\\nCounsel for defendant, in their brief and argument, very frankly concede the negligence of the truck driver. They contend, however, that Mrs. Hagaman was guilty of negligence contributory to the accident of such a character as to bar her recovery and that of her husband. The trial court answered that contention in the negative, and we think this disposition of the matter manifestly correct.\\nThe record discloses that Mrs. Hagaman was driving at the moderate rate of 20 to 25 miles per hour; that on entering the upper roadway, because of the barricade on the lower side, she proceeded along her right, or the neutral ground side, the place where traffic regulations required her to be; that traffic was approaching and passing her to her left, coming from the direc tion opposite to that in which she was moving, thereby forcing her to drive to her right and as close to. the neutral ground! side as possible. It is further shown that she observed the truck of the Gonzales Motor Company being driven towards her in her lane of the traveled roadway, instead' of in the lane being used by other approaching vehicles. The space in which this observation was made is not shown, though it appears to have been about a distance of three squares. She testified that she proceeded along her right side t>f the roadway, at all times expecting that the driver of the approaching truck would regain the lane or traveled portion of the roadway where he was required to be, thereby yielding to her one-half of the roadway. Acting on this assumption, she stated that the danger which confronted her brought about a feeling of helplessness. She explains this helplessness by stating that she was unable to turn to her right because of the raised neutral ground concrete curb, and could not turn to her left because of the vehicles approaching and passing in the opposite direction.\\nIt is well-recognized that a motorist has the right to assume that the driver of a vehicle coming from the opposite direction will obey the law and to act upon such-assumption in determining his ow*n manner of using the road. As stated in 2 Blash-field's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Perm.Ed., \\u00a7 919: \\\"A driver, therefore, proceeding on the right side of the traveled way, may assume that the driver of a vehicle approaching on the same side, or on his left hand side, will do all that a reasonably prudent person, under all circumstances, would do to avoid a collision, which ordinarily would, be to yield half the way or to turn out in time to avoid a collision, and that such driver will not force him, in violation of the statute or ordinance, or the law of the-road, to turn from the part of the road on which he is lawfully driving.\\\"\\nLearned counsel for defendant contend, however, that Mrs. Hagaman should have, in the face of the approaching truck bearing down upon her, either stopped or sounded her horn. We are not certain, however, that either or both of such acts would have awakened the oblivious truck driver and thus have afforded him an opportunity to extricate himself from the, dangerous position of. his own creation.\\nSuffice it to say that, acting under the assumption which the law affords and recognizes, when she was confronted with this sudden peril she was not called upon to exercise the same degree of care required had she had time for- reflection. When brought face to face with unexpected danger brought about by the gross fault of another, one cannot be held contribut'orily negligent upon the failure to use the best judgment. Willis v. Standard Oil Company, 17 La.App. 217, 135 So. 777; Lacy v. Lucky et al., 19 La.App. 743, 140 So. 857; Jacob v. Edwards et al., La.App., 171 So. 165.\\n. The reasonableness of the amounts awarded the plaintiffs is not questioned and' we conclude that the damages allowed ar.e in accordance with the proof submitted. '\\nFor the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs.\\nAffirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/10047767.json b/la/10047767.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..23e2c5693930a565c5d81279fa08683871a70dbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/10047767.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"10047767\", \"name\": \"DAVIES et ux. v. CONSOLIDATED UNDERWRITERS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Davies v. Consolidated Underwriters\", \"decision_date\": \"1940-11-29\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 6131\", \"first_page\": \"347\", \"last_page\": \"351\", \"citations\": \"6 So. 2d 347\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:53:17.404447+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"DAVIES et ux. v. CONSOLIDATED UNDERWRITERS.\", \"head_matter\": \"DAVIES et ux. v. CONSOLIDATED UNDERWRITERS.\\nNo. 6131.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.\\nNov. 29, 1940.\\nOn Rehearing June 18, 1941.\\nWrit of Review Granted July 18, 1941.\\nSee 6 So.2d 351.\\nHarry V. Booth and L. L. Lockard, both of Shreveport, for appellants.\\nJohn B. Files, of Shreveport, for appel-lee.\", \"word_count\": \"2862\", \"char_count\": \"17000\", \"text\": \"DREW, Judge.\\nThis is a suit by the mother and father of Billie Sue Davies who are seeking damages for the injuries received by her when she was run over by an automobile driven by Welby Stahl and owned by P. J. Mabry. The suit is brought against the insurer of the owner of the car and neither the owner thereof nor the person driving the automobile at the time are made parties defendants.\\nThe lower court determined the case on the ground that the insurer was not liable under the policy provisions, in the following opinion:\\n\\\"Plaintiffs, as the father and mother of Billie Sue Davies, sue the defendant, Consolidated Underwriters, an insurance company, for damages sustained by Billie Sue Davies in being injured by being run over by an automobile belonging to P. J. Mabry and being driven at the time by Welby Stahl, a nephew of P. J. Mabry.\\n\\\"Plaintiffs allege that the automobile was being driven by Welby Stahl with the knowledge and consent of P. J. Mabry; that the Consolidated Underwriters, through its agent, T. H. Mast\\u00edn & Company, had insured P. J. Mabry against loss by reason of the negligent operation of said automobile and, in addition to P. J. Mabry, the owner of said automobile, it is alleged that said contract of insurance also insured 'any member of his family and anyone driving said car with his knowledge and consent.'\\n\\\"By supplemental petition, plaintiffs attached a photostatic copy of the policy of insurance and alleged that P. J. Mabry a few moments after the accident verbally notified the local agent of defendant of the accident and the details of same; that on the same day he notified the defendant in writing of the accident and the connection of the said Welby Stahl therewith. Further, that defendant sent a representative to Shreveport to make an investigation of the accident which representative told P. J. Mabry that the defendant Company would assume all liability as existed against him and Welby Stahl up to the limits of the policy.\\n\\\"The defendant answered by denying, for lack of information, the acts of negligence on the part of Stahl and then denied all other allegations of plaintiff's petition and affirmatively alleged that the policy of insurance did not cover Welby Stahl for the reason that P. J. Mabry, the insured, had not directed in writing that the coverage in the policy be extended to Stahl.\\n\\\"Welby Stahl is a nephew of P. J. Mabry, residing near the said Mabry, hut does not live with him and neither was he a member of the family. Stahl was not an employee of P. J. Mabry but worked for the General Motors Acceptance Corporation. On the day of the accident, Stahl had returned from work to his home and decided to visit his brother in another part of the city and went over and took possession of the automobile belonging to Mabry, covered by the contract of insurance, and proceeded on his way until the accident occurred. Mabry had no knowledge at the time that Stahl was driving the automobile but, according to his testimony, Stahl used the car whenever he desired and had he asked for it on the day of the accident, permission would have been granted by Mabry to so use it. This was implied permission granted by Mabry and, insofar as 'consent' is concerned, we are of the opinion that at the time of the accident, Stahl was driving the automobile with the consent (although only implied) of P. J. Mabry.\\n\\\"Plaintiffs contend that the policy of insurance contains a provision that any person driving the automobile with the consent of the insured is covered by the policy, while defendant contends that the policy does not contain the so-called 'omnibus clause'.\\n\\\"The first page of the contract of insurance insured P. J. Mabry 'against loss by reason of the liability imposed by law upon the subscriber for damages on account of bodily injuries inflicted upon any person, ,' and since it is not contended that P. J. Mabry was in any wise liable, the first page of the contract of insurance has no bearing on the issue here. On the second page of the contract are two provisions, ,A and B, which are made conditions of the policy. Clause B provides for automatic insurance on any other car which is obtained to replace the automobile described in the policy and has no effect in this suit.\\n\\\"Clause A is entitled 'Optional Coverage' and reads as follows:\\n\\\" 'Any person using the automobile described herein with the permission of the named subscriber may, if the subscriber shall in writing so direct within 30 days after the presentation of a claim, be entitled to indemnity in the same manner and under the same conditions as the subscriber, but the underwriter's liability shall not thereby be increased .'\\n\\\"The foregoing provision of the policy is the only one that is applicable to the issue here involved. Counsel for plaintiffs in brief argue that while the clause is carried under the heading of 'optional coverage', it has all of the general characteristics of similar provisions in other policies which have been denominated by the text-writers as 'omnibus clauses'. We do not think so. The writer has before him his own automobile liability policy, issued by the New Amsterdam Casualty Company, in defining the word 'insured' states that whenever that word is unqualifiedly used in the policy\\u2014 'includes not only the named insured but also any person while using the automobiles provided that the actual use is with the permission of the named insured.' The last quoted provision in a policy of insurance is the so-called 'omnibus clause' and covers every person using the automobile described in the policy with the consent of the insured, without further action on the part of the insured. But not so with the provision of the policy sued on in this case. The insured called the 'subscriber' is protected if the subscriber is legally liable for the accident, whether he is the driver of the automobile or whether his employee or another for whom he is responsible, is the driver of the automobile. But does the 'optional coverage' extend to any other person automatically? The provisions say that 'any person' 'may' 'if the subscriber shall direct in writing' be entitled to indemnity, and the subscriber could have secured this omnibus coverage at the time of taking the policy; or if desired, the subscriber could direct that any driver of the automobile with his consent be covered, provided the subscriber so directed in writing within thirty days after the presentation of a claim. If the subscriber did not so direct, then such person would not be entitled to indemnity. This is what makes the quoted clause in the policy under consideration 'optional coverage'. We think that the clause means what it says; that it was optional with the assured whether Welby Stahl, under the circumstances of this case, should be indemnified under the policy. If he so desired, did the assured so direct in writing? We have searched the record in vain for evidence to that effect. The entire testimony on the point is to the effect that Mr. Mabry gave 'notice' to the company of the accident. The evidence is that Mabry notified the Company's local agent who testified that he gave the Company notice of the accident, as that was his business to do so, and on being pressed as to whether Mr. Mabry directed him to give the notice, he would not say, because it was his business to do so. The question of 'notice' is not involved in the optional coverage clause above, but has some significance under another provision of the policy, where the company may otherwise be liable and was not given notice, as provided therein, but the giving of notice of an accident is not, in our opinion, equivalent to a direction in writing to extend the insurance written to some third party.\\n\\\"Counsel cites the case and annotation in 72 A.L.R. 1375 [Stovall v. New York Indemnity Co., 157 Tenn, 301, 8 S.W.2d 473], all of which shows that the policies under consideration contained the so-called omnibus clause, as secondly quoted above, the same as the case of Monroe v. Heard [La.App.], 168 So. [519], 520, where the clause referred to as 'extended insurance' reads as follows: 'The company agrees that in addition to the Assured named in this policy, such insurance shall be available in the same manner and under the same conditions and to the same extent as it is available to the Assured named herein to any person or persons ; but only while it is being used for the purpose [named] and with the consent of the Assured named * ' .'\\n\\\"None of the cited cases show that the policies carried the 'extended insurance' or 'omnibus clauses' with a proviso that in order to be effective, the assured 'must direct it in writing' as is required in the policy under consideration. All of the policies referred to, according to the decisions, extended the insurance to third persons who were driving the automobile 'with the consent of the assured', which policies protected such third persons as effectively as if they had been named in the policy, subject only to the provision that they were driving the automobile with the consent of the assured.\\n\\\"We do not think that notice, as required in Clause C, which the Company received, is equivalent to the requirement in Clause A, which required Mabry to direct in writing' that the Company extend the insurance to cover Stahl. If so, there would have been no necessity for placing such a requirement in Clause A. We have looked in vain for a case wherein the extended coverage was dependent upon a 'direction in writing by the assured within a designated time after the presentation of a claim', and have been unable to find one which authorizes an injured person to sue on the policy of insurance and hold the company liable where no such direction in writing had been made by the assured. In fact, we have found no case where the policy under consideration had a provision therein similar to the one under discussion. We are of the opinion that in order for the defendant Company to he liable for the accidents of Welby Stahl under the policy sued on herein, it was necessary that the assured, Mr. Mabry, should have directed the defendant to indemnify Stahl, within thirty days after the accident. The evidence failing to establish that any such direction was given, the plaintiffs cannot recover on the policy.\\n\\\"The evidence fails to show that any claim has ever been made against either Mabry or Stahl for the accident and injuries by plaintiffs and they have not been made parties to this suit.\\n\\\"Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs cannot recover under the policy of insurance sued on, it is unnecessary to consider any of the other issues involved in this case.\\n\\\"For the reasons assigned, there should be judgment rejecting plaintiffs' demands at their cost.\\\"\\nWe have searched in vain for a case involving a similar policy provision as does the policy involved here and we have failed to find any case which throws any light on the issues involved, and when we give effect to the plain, unambiguous language of the policy, as did the lower court, we are forced to the conclusion that the judgment of the lower court is correct and it is therefore affirmed with costs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/10058141.json b/la/10058141.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2ef1e6b8411e26c60bdf2b13e89a4f3e8b66bd74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/10058141.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"10058141\", \"name\": \"WADDELL v. LANGLOIS et al., and three other cases\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Waddell v. Langlois\", \"decision_date\": \"1935-01-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 1405\", \"first_page\": \"665\", \"last_page\": \"672\", \"citations\": \"158 So. 665\", \"volume\": \"158\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:51:52.523226+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"WADDELL v. LANGLOIS et al., and three other cases.\", \"head_matter\": \"WADDELL v. LANGLOIS et al., and three other cases.\\nNo. 1405.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.\\nJan. 21, 1935.\\nJ. T. Sanders, Jr., and Ben R. Miller, both of Baton Rouge, for appellants.\\nChas. A. Holcombe, of Baton Rouge, for appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"5544\", \"char_count\": \"30863\", \"text\": \"ELLIOTT, Judge.\\nFrederick F. Waddell, plaintiff in suit No. 7169, alleges the death of his daughter Julia Waddell in an automobile collision on May 8, 1931, while riding in a motortruck as the guest of Wilmer Langlois. He alleges that the automobile in which she was riding was being driven by said Langlois, and that the collision was due to the fault and negligence of said Langlois in driving said truck; that said Langlois was a minor at the time, living with Joseph Aubin Langlois, his father. The liability of the son and of the father for the acts of his son is claimed on that account. .He further alleges that his daughter was unmarried; that she was the child of his first wife, who had departed this life years before. Damages are claimed of the father and son in solido in the amount of \\u00a710,000.\\nSuit No. 7170 is by Ernest Davis. He alleges that he was riding as a guest of Wilmer Danglois in the above-referred to.truck at the same time and was greatly injured in the collision ; that the collision was due to the fault and negligence of Wilmer Langlois in driving, and claims damages of father and son in solid\\u00f3 in the sum of \\u00a79,882.90 on said account.\\nSuit No. 7503 is by Frederick F. Waddell against Istrouma Water Company, Inc., and Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation of London, England. He alleges in this suit that the truck which Wilmer Langlois was driving was the property of the Istrouma Water Company, Inc. That Wilmer Langlois was the employee of Istrouma Water Co., Inc., and was driving said 'truck as its employee at the time in the performance of the functions in which he was employed. That Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, of London, England, carried the liability insurance of Istrouma Water Company, Inc., at the time. He therefore claims of the Istrouma Water Company, Inc., and of the Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, in.solido, damages to the extent of' \\u00a710,000 on account of his daughter's death.\\nErnest Davis, plaintiff in suit No. 7518, claims damages of Istrouma Water Company, Inc., and Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, in solido, on the same ground of fault and negligence alleged by Frederick F. Waddell in the sum of \\u00a79,832.90 on account of his injuries.\\nThe defendants, Wilmer Langlois, Joseph Aubin Langlois, Istrouma Water Company, Inc., and Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, filed separate answers setting out their defense in detail and deny liability in each case. They all deny the fault and negligence on which their liability is claimed by the plaintiff, but allege in the alternative contributory negligence on the part of Davis and Julia Waddell leading to the collision and contributing to bring it about. They each pray that plaintiff's demand be rejected.\\nThere was judgment with written reasons rejecting the demand of the plaintiffs in each of the suits.\\nThe plaintiffs Ernest Davis and Frederick F. Waddell each have appealed.\\nThe four suits were consolidated and tried together in the lower court and acted on in one opinion. We will follow the same course in acting on the appeals.\\nPages 70-77 and 78 of the note of testimony are missing, and the transcript is not certified to as being complete. There is no certificate on the part of the clerk of court that it contains all the testimony. The three missing pages and lack of certification have either been overlooked, else are regarded by the parties as not important. There being no complaint, we take it that the record is complete; that all the important testimony adduced on the trial bearing on the issues in the case is before us. We will during the course of the opinion refer to Istrouma Water Company, Incorporated, as the water company, and to the Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, as the assurance corporation.\\nThe petitions aver and the evidence shows that Wilmer Langlois was 20 years of age at the time of the collision, and resided with Joseph Aubin Langlois, his father; that Julia Waddell was unmarried, and that Wilmer Langlois was employed by the water company. His work consisted in going to and from the premises of customers for the purpose of making repairs of equipment, turning on and off water, earing for and removing meters, assisting in making collections, etc., and to facilitate his work, he was furnished with a motortruck. Joseph Aubin Langlois, his father, was also in the employment of the water company and had the right to use the truck in connection with his work. The truck was kept at night on the premises of Joseph Aubin Langlois, and when the day's work was over, and if Wilmer was using the truck, it was his duty to drive it home and put it in the garage. Wilmer's work was from 7 o'clock a. m. to 5 o'clock p. m., but he was also required to do emergency work at night. For instance, if a fire occurred or other emergency happened, his employment required him to go to the place and assist in doing whatever was necessary in behalf of the water company.\\nDuring the evening of May 8, 1931, presumably after his day's work was over, he drove the truck home but did not put it in the garage. He got out of it when he reached home and changed his clothes in order to attend a weinie roast on the Oomite river about 9 miles north of Baton Rouge. To change clothes he no doubt went in the house. Just how long he was thus engaged does not appear, but after doing so he returned to the truck, got in it, and drove to the picnic. It was on his return from the picnic that the collision occurred. The occurrence took place at about 10:30 p. m. while he was driving Miss Waddell from the weinie roast to the place where she worked in the General Hospital at Baton Rouge. The entire trip was made after work hours, and was not connected in the slightest way with emergency or night work in behalf of his employer. Plaintiffs argue in their brief that the truck was being driven home at the time of the occurrence, that is, to the premises of Joseph Aubin Langlois, where it was kept at night, but argument cannot create an issue and situation of that kind when the uneontradieted evidence is, that at the time Miss Waddell was killed and Davis received the injuries on account of which suits are brought, Miss Waddell was being driven to the General Hospital in the city of Baton Rouge. Plaintiffs' argument about the responsibility of the owner of an automobile, as the result of fault and negligence of his employee in driving the truck home, when such is his duty after the work of the day is over, is therefore not entered into. To enter into such a discussion would be taking up a question, not supported by evidence, and contrary to the evidence as to the destination of the truck at the time of the collision. According to the evidence, Wilmer Langlois in returning from the picnic or weinie roast was not driving in the service and employment of the water company, nor with its authority, knowledge, or permission, but, contrary to his duty, because his employer had forbidden him to drive the truck except when in the use and service of the water company. The Civil Code, art. 2320, provides that masters and employers \\\"are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.\\\" As such was not the situation with Wilmer at the time in question, the water company is not answerable for his fault and neglect in driving at the time of the collision.\\nPlaintiffs contend that as the truck was intrusted to the keeping of Wilmer and Joseph Aubin Langlois day and night, that is, all the time, for use in connection with their work, the master and owner is liable in damages, even though it was not being driven, at the time of inflicting an injury, in the specific service and employment of the master and owner.\\nThey take the position that where the employee has possession all the time, the possession of the employee is the possession of the employer, and that although the employer may drive off his road and out of his way on business of his own or for pleasure, his driving is within the scope of his employment, and if injury is sustained while doing so, due to his fault and negligence, the owner and master is liable. It is true Wilmer Langlois had possession of the truck all the time, but his possession was not exclusive; his father had, so far as we can see, a like right and authority to use the truck at any time in .connection with his work. As to who had the superior right, the evidence does not show; so we take it that both had a like right, but neither had the right to drive it except when \\\"in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.\\\" Therefore, the truck, in going to the picnic and in returning therefrom to the General Hospital in Baton Rouge, was not being driven in the exercise of the functions in which the driver was employed. The truck had been driven home at the termination of the day's work. When Wilmer got into it again, after going home, for the purpose of driving to the picnic, it. was not a continuation of the drive home, but the commencement of a new journey; a new drive, which, from its commencement at the home, until its termination at the place of collision, was not in the exercise of the functions in which he was employed, but in pursuit of his own private'business and pleasure. In so far as concerns the water company, it was wrongful, illegal, and unauthorized from start to finish.\\nFrom.Huddy on Automobiles we quote as follows: \\\"It may be stated as a general rule that when the chauffeur or employee of the owner of a motor vehicle, or a third person not in his employ uses the same without the consent of such owner, the owner is not liable for the negligent conduct of the driver, unless such vehicle is being used in his business. Particularly is this so when the use of the> car is contrary to the express instructions of the owner and for the pleasure or business of the chauffeur. And in such a case it is not of controlling importance that the driver was in the general employ of the owner and had the authority to use the car at certain times for certain purposes.\\\" Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, by Huddy, vol. 7 & 8 (9th Ed.) \\u00a7 93, pp. 245, 246, 247, 248. Language in sections 91, 92, 94, 95, could be cited from the same author with numerous authorities under the sections explaining differences and distinctions ; some from this state. But the language of section 93 is appropriate to the situ ation in the present case. The jurisprudence of this state, based on article 2320 of our Civil Code, is substantially as stated by liuddy. The case Valley v. Clay, 151 La. 710, 92 So. 308, is, we think, a sufficient reference as to the law of this state on that subject, but we also have in mind the decision of the Supreme Court in James et al. v. J. S. Williams & Son, Inc., 177 La. 1033, 150 So. 9, and for the reason given by the court in the cases just cited we think the water company not liable in the present case.\\nThe plaintiff contends that Employers' Liability Corporation, Limited, of London, England, is liable, even though the water company is not.\\nThis liability is claimed to result from a clause in the policy of' insurance which the water company carries in the insurance company mentioned, which reads as follows: \\\"This policy shall cover the assured named in the policy and any person while riding in or legally operating any of the automobiles described herein, and the protection granted by this policy is so extended as to be available in the'same manner and under the same condition as it is available to the named assured, to any person, firm or corporation legally responsible for the operation of said automobiles, provided such use or operation is with the permission of the named assured; or if the named assured is an individual, with the permission of an adult member of the assured's household, other than a chauffeur or a domestic servant.\\\"\\nHaving found that driving the truck by Wilmer Langlois from his home to the picnic, and on the return trip, in taking Davis and Miss Waddell to her destination in Baton Rouge, was not driving it with the permission and consent, express or implied, of the named assured, it follows that the demand of the plaintiffs Davis and of Frederick F. Wad-dell, against Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, was properly rejected ' on that account.\\nThe plaintiffs Waddell and Davis claim damages of Wilmer Langlois and Joseph A. Langlois on the ground that the fault and negligent driving of Wilmer Langlois resulted in the injury of Davis and the death of Miss Waddell. It is established that they were riding in the truck as the guests of Wilmer Langlois. The liability of the owner and driver of an automobile for injury to his guests while riding was considered at length by the Supreme Court in Jacobs v. Jacobs, 141 La. 272, 74 So. 992, L. R. A. 1917F, 253. The authority of that case has been generally followed since then, and we have it in mind as our guide at the present time.\\nThe collision took place at about 10 :30 p. m. Miss Waddell's employment required her to be at the hospital at 11 o'clock p. m. that night. The evidence does not indicate unusual darkness or other unusual atmospheric condition at the time, so we take it that the party driving and his guests, all seated on the front seat, could see ahead as far as he could ordinarily see.\\nAs the accident occurred in 1931, the Act No. 296 of 1928 furnishes the legal regulations for driving on highways at that time.\\nThe return trip after leaving the picnic was along the highway from Bayou Sara to Baton Rouge, and took place about a mile and half or two miles from the city limits. This highway crosses the. Hammond & Eastern Railroad at a grade crossing, and is intersected at a, distance which we estimate at between 50 and 100 feet before it reaches the crossing by another road known as the Choctaw road. The Choctaw road, under the definition of highway as contained in section 2, subsec. (n) of the act mentioned, must be deemed a highway. The Baton Rouge and Bayou Sara road is one of the main highways of the state; but the Choctaw road is not. The Bayou Sara road leads north and south; the Choctaw road east and west, and parallels the Baton Rouge, Hammond & Eastern Railroad along the north side of the same. The distance from the place where the Choctaw road intersects the Bayou Sara road, to the place where the Bayou Sara road crosses the Baton Rouge, Hammond & Eastern Railroad is not clear. A picture of the scene brought up in the record indicates that the intersection is within 30 or 40 or perhaps 50 feet of the railway crossing. But one of the witnesses in the case speaking of the distance between the' place where the Choctaw road intersects the Bayou- Sara road, and the place where the Bayou Sara road crosses the railroad, estimates it at about 10 feet; while another estimates it at about 100 feet, so we take it that the distance is likely as already stated, about 50 feet.\\nThe evidence shows that when Wilmer Langlois started from the picnic toward Baton Rouge he had six people in the truck. He stopped at what is known as the Fuller place, about one mile north of the intersection, and there three got out, leaving remaining in the car, Wilmer Langlois, Miss Wad-dell, and Ernest Davis, the plaintiff, all seated on the front seat, with Miss Waddell in between the young men. After starting up from Fuller's place the evidence is to the effect that the truck was being driven at the rate of 40 or 45 miles an hour. From the Fuller place to the intersection, the highway is straight and paved, and there are no obstructions to the view along the Bayou Sara road going south preventing anybody from seeing an automobile in the Choctaw intersection, except that it was at night and about as dark as usual. The evidence does not show, what kind of headlights the truck carried, but we assume that it complied with the requirements of the law. Section 50 of the act just mentioned requires headlights with power to clearly show a person on the road 200 feet ahead.\\nPresuming, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that the truck had headlights of this kind, an automobile stopped at the intersection of the Choctaw road was an object that should have been seen by Wilmer Lang-lois, Ernest Davis, and Miss Waddell far enough ahead to enable Wilmer to slow down or even stop if necessary, and Ernest Davis and Miss Waddell must and should have seen it, had they been looking ahead, in time to have warned Wilmer to slow down or stop before entering it, in ease he did not timely do so without warning.\\nWilmer Langlois testifies that as he came within about 100 feet of the place where the Choctaw road intersects the Bayou Sara road he saw an automobile pull up on the east side of the crossing and stop at the intersection; that when he saw the automobile stop he took it to mean that it yielded him the right of way because he was in the main highway, and that he then came on without checking his speed. The implication from what he says is that, if it had not stopped, he could and would have slowed down so as to let it pass ahead of him; that when he got within 10 or 12 feet of the intersection the stopped automobile suddenly started up and struck him as he went through the intersection, the blow striking his truck toward the rear on the left-hand side as he passed,.causing it to swerve to the right as it crossed the nearby railroad and strike against an iron pillar on the right side of the road. It was this blow against the iron pillar that wrecked his truck and brought about the casualty that occurred.\\nThe evidence shows that the automobile that had stopped at the intersection was in possession of and being driven by an unknown negro who had stolen it from a party who lived in the neighborhood. Act No. 12 of 1924 is not referred to by the parties, and it has no bearing because for a checking of speed or a slowing down to have been effective in preventing a collision, the checking and slowing down must have commenced a proper distance from the intersection and further from the railroad than the act requires.\\nThere is a contention that the negro driving the automobile in the Choctaw road entered the intersection first and pre-empted it, and that Wilmer should have heeded the pre-emption and stopped or slowed down so that the negro could pass ahead of him. Wilmer testifies that the negro stopped at the intersection, and he is corroborated and supported by the witness McQueen, apparently disinterested, who says he was close by looking at the negro and is positive that he stopped at the intersection. There is controversy as to what the witness McQueen says on the subject. We quote a part of his testimony:\\n\\\"Q. Which way did he come from? A. From the east, going toward the west.\\n\\\"Q. He came from a street that comes toward the Bayou Sara Road from the east? A. Tes.\\n\\\"Q. And you say he stopped? A. He drove up there and stopped and then he pulled on ahead. He pulled in the road right ahead of this car coming down the road.\\n\\\"Q. Did he pull out into the Bayou Sara Road? A. Tes. He looked like, the best I can \\u2022remember, he was about half way the road when he stopped.\\n'.'Q. How far back into the intersection was he when he stopped? A. I don't know exactly.\\n\\\"Q. Had he gotton up to the point where the front wheels of his car would touch the pavement on the Bayou Sara Road? A. Not when he stopped the first time.\\n\\\"Q. As I understand it he stopped at a point east of the Bayou Sara Road and at a place where the front wheels of his car did not touch the pavement; is that right? A. No, Sir. He must have been 20 feet or more from the pavement when he suddenly came out of the road.\\n\\\"Q. Tou said a while ago he came out. When he came out of this intersecting street, approximately how far away was the car of Langlois which I understand was travelling in a southernly direction? A. I could not tell just how far, but he was right close to him, he just drove out ahead of him.\\n\\\"Q. Who drove ahead of the other one? A. I took it the negro done it. He drove right out across the highway.\\n\\\"Q. How far into tile highway did he get? A. The other car was about a little past the center of the highway.\\\"\\nIn another place he said that he was standing within 20 feet of the pavement; that the negro drove up opposite him and stopped, then he pulled on across. In another place, speaking of the distance the Langlois car was at the time the negro started up, he says: \\\"He could not have been, according to my judgment, more than 50 or 100 feet when the fellow ran out in-front of him.\\\"\\nThe witness McQueen also says the negro' was halfway across the road when he struck the Langlois car. The fact that the negro did stop his car right at the intersection is testified to by another witness. We therefore feel that there is no doubt that the negro with the stolen car did drive close to the intersection of the Choctaw road with the main highway and stop, within sight of Wilmer Lang-lois and Davis and Miss Waddell then probably about 100 feet distant north, coming toward the intersection at about 40 or 45 miles an hour; therefore, giving credit to what the witness McQueen says, if the negro had not stopped he would have crossed the Bayou Sara road ahead of the Langlois truck and there would have been no collision. We think by stopping at the threshold of the intersection, within sight of Langlois who was coming on fast, the claim of Wilmer, that he was thereby deceived into not .checking his speed, at a time when it could have been done, seems reasonable and we think his claim is supported, to the extent that it should be accepted as true.\\nThe district judge says in his reasons for judgment: \\\"It appears that the accident was due to the action of this negro, and was'not due to any negligence on the part of Lang-lois.\\\" We agree with the lower court that the collision was due solely to the act of the negro in suddenly starting up his ear and entering the intersection after he had stopped as if he were going to wait. If the negro had not acted as he did, there would have been no collision. Plaintiffs strongly contend, however, that Wilmer Langlois was also at fault, and that his contributory fault brought about the collision. It is claimed that he was driving at the time on the east or left side of the road, and that if he had not been violating the law of the road in that respect there would have been , no impact and no injury.\\nDavis testified as a- witness: \\\"Q. Was the truck you were in on the right side or the left side on the middle of the road? A. We were kind of in the middle and on the left side of the highway.\\\"\\nBut in a statement made by Davis on May 19, 1931, which was some 10 days after the occurrence, he said: \\\"I imagine we were on the righthand side of the road, because just before the accident we were on the righthand side of the road.\\\"\\nAlton E. Carpenter appears to be a disinterested and credible witness'. Mr\\u00a1 Carpenter says that there were a series of crashes, and th\\u00e1t he arrived at the scene of the collision very quickly after it occurred; that there were culverts near the place on both sides of the road, and that one of them, on the east side, appeared to have been struck by something; that there appeared marks on the cement where something had skidded. There is no evidence indicating when it was done and it might have been done on some previous occasion. If done at the time of the present collision, for all we know, the automobile driven by the negro might have done it. Mr. Hanks came to the place right after the accident. He testifies that there were a series of crashes and that there was a car track and marks made in the gravel on the right-hand side of the highway going south. We take the witness to say that the marks to .which he referred were off the cement on the right-hand side of the road. Wilmer Lang-lois testified that he was driving on the right-hand side of the road when struck. The weight of the evidence does not support plaintiff's contention on the subject. \\u2022\\nThe rule which gives the right of way to the party who enters first is a recognized rule, but we cannot apply it in favor of plaintiffs in the present case because the driver in the Choctaw road was not the first to enter the intersection. By stopping at the threshold of the intersection as the evidence shows that' the negro did, his act was calculated to lead a party coming and nearby on the main highway, seeing him stop, to suppose that he yielded the right of way and to come ahead. The lower court held that the negro was the sole party at fault, and rejected plaintiffs' demands on the above grounds.\\nWe agree with the lower court, but as Wilmer Langlois was driving, say 40 or 45 miles an hour, without checking his speed to cross the intersection, the provisions of Act No. 296, \\u00a7 5 (a), and paragraph 3 under (b), must be taken into account. We therefore take his speed to be excessive and negligent in driving faster than 15 miles an hour in making this intersection at night. In taking this position we must act on defendants' plea of contributory negligence. Considering the case from that standpoint, we have stated that the road was straight and unobstructed and the view of the intersection ahead good, except that it was night. That Wilmer Lang-lois, Ernest Davis, and Miss Waddell were all seated on the front seat. That the headlights of his truck presumably had power in acc.ordance with the statute to show an automobile ahead stopped in the Choctaw road at its center intersection with the Bayou Sara road as they approached it for a sufficient distance ahead to enable Wilmer, had he been looking ahead, to slow down, check his speed, and even stop if necessary in order to avoid impact with it, and to enable his guests had they been looking ahead to warn him and protest his driving,in case he otherwise did not heed the situation.\\nThe death of Miss Waddell leaves only , Davis as the' other guest. He excuses his failure to see ahead by admitting that he was not looking.\\nIn a statement, obtained by a representative of the Employers' Liability Corporation, Limited, about, 10 days after the collision, while he was in the hospital on account of his injuries, he says: \\\"I must have been talking to Miss Waddell and not paying attention to the driving or other cars that we passed.\\\" His injuries were very severe and opiates had been administered to him, but the effect of these opiates must have passed away by the time he made the statement\\nPlaintiffs criticize defendant's act in obtaining a statement from Davis while he was suffering from his injuries, for the purpose of defending the damage suit which he might bring against it on account of his injuries sustained in the collision. We have considered statements obtained in this way in many instances. Some have received but little effect, others have received more. The situation existing at the time the statement is obtained and the method used in obtaining are taken into account. Eor the purpose of analogy we refer to Revised Statutes of Louisiana of 1870, \\u00a7 615, speaking of the duties of the officer. It is therein provided: \\\"And thereupon said clerk shall proceed to take the testimony of such witnesses in writing, either by himself or some other - disinterested person.\\\"\\nThere is a wide difference between a deposition such as section 615 provides for and the statement obtained from Davis. The party obtaining this statement was not disinterested ; he was in the service of' the Employers' Liability Assurance , Corporation. The language quoted from section 615 was commented on by the Supreme Court in Succession of Segura, 134 La. 84, 63 So. 640. A number of earlier cases are cited and others have been found, in all of which the requirement that the deposition be written by a disinterested person has been enforced. At the time of signing this statement, Davis was on a bed in the hospital and had to be lifted up in order to enable him to sign. Statements of the kind obtained from Davis should be obtained by some officer or other-disinterested person; but the statement made by Davis in this case is corroborated. It is our conclusion that he was not paying attention to the speed of the automobile nor to the intersection ahead, just as he admits, and it is our conclusion that Miss Waddell was also not paying attention, otherwise they would have seen and realized all that they should have seen and understood, had they been looking and taking proper care as they went forward to the intersection. If they had been noting the speed and looking attentively ahead, they could and would have timely seen any danger that Wilmer saw or should have seen, and in time to warn him and protest against whatever he was doing or failing to do, that he should have done. The evidence shows that no protest was made; consequently they shared the responsibility with Wilmer Langlois for .the collision that took place and the result of the same.\\nIn Lorance v. Smith, 173 La. 884, 138 So. 871, 876, the Supreme Court, acting on a case in which they found facts somewhat similar to the present situation, approvingly quoted from 42 C. .7. 1170, \\u00a7 948: \\\"A guest or a gratuitous passenger in a motor vehicle cannot recover for injuries due to the negligence of his host if he is aware of and acquiesces in the negligence. He cannot 'abandon the exercise of his own faculties and intrust his safety absolutely to the driver, regardless of- the imminence of danger, or the visible lack of ordinary care on the part of the driver to avoid all harm. If he fails Louse ordinary care, including the exercise of his own senses of sight, hearing and perception, to protect himself under such circumstances, he is guilty of contributory negligence.' \\\"\\nThe case Provosty v. Christy (La. App.) 152 So. 784, 785, has also received our consideration. In that case the guest did not have opportunity to speak and protest against the act of the driver; therefore, the case is not appropriate to the present situation.\\nIt is our conclusion that if Wilmer ,Lang-lois, defendant, was at fault and negligent the plaintiff Davis and Bliss Waddell shared his fault and negligence, and that their faults and negligence served, with that of Wilmer Langlois, to bring about the collision, the death of Bliss Waddell, and the injury of Davis.\\nFor these reasons, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed.\\nJudgment affirmed;' plaintiff-appellant to pay the cost in both courts.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/10061587.json b/la/10061587.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5ce55b3944ee0cdbd41899c5a4cc5a555ffb8368
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/10061587.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"10061587\", \"name\": \"J. R. QUAID, Inc. v. CYCLONE FENCE COMPANY (United States Steel Corporation)\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"J. R. Quaid, Inc. v. Cyclone Fence Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1954-11-08\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 41885\", \"first_page\": \"409\", \"last_page\": \"412\", \"citations\": \"76 So. 2d 409\", \"volume\": \"76\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:50:26.834119+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"J. R. QUAID, Inc. v. CYCLONE FENCE COMPANY (United States Steel Corporation).\", \"head_matter\": \"226 La. 398\\nJ. R. QUAID, Inc. v. CYCLONE FENCE COMPANY (United States Steel Corporation).\\nNo. 41885.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nNov. 8, 1954.\\nMichel Provosty, Michel O. Provosty, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant in opposition to motion to dismiss appeal.\\nChaffe, McCall, Toler & Phillips and Leon Sarpyj New Orleans, for defendant and appellee (and appellant) in support of its motion to dismiss appeal.\", \"word_count\": \"1088\", \"char_count\": \"6566\", \"text\": \"HAWTHORNE, Justice.\\nPlaintiff instituted this suit for an accounting against the defendant Cyclone Fence Company (now United States Steel Corporation), alleging that under a contract of distributorship which existed between it and the defendant there was due to it, among other things, commissions which had not been paid, and that the defendant had failed to give it proper credit for materials which were defective, inferior, and unsuitable. After answering the defendant reconvened praying for judgment against the plaintiff in the sum of $14,250.66 for goods which it alleged it had sold and delivered to the plaintiff under the contract of distributorship and for which it had not been paid. After trial on the merits the district court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff J. R. Quaid, Inc., for $42,223.85. There was also judgment in favor of the defendant United States Steel Corporation on its reconventional demand for $13,496.06. Both parties appealed suspensively to this court.\\nDefendant has filed in this court a motion to dismiss'the appeal taken by plaintiff, contending that the judgment for $13,496.06 in defendant's favor rendered on its reconven-tional demand has been confessed by plaintiff, and that accordingly the appeal of plaintiff should be dismissed under Article 567 of the Louisiana Code of Practice. That article provides:'\\n\\\"The party against whom judgment has been rendered can not appeal:\\n\\\"1. If such judgment have been confessed by him\\nDuring the trial of the case in the lower court the attorney for plaintiff dictated into the record the following statement:\\n\\\"I would like to dictate an admission by me in the record, or admission on the part of J. R. Quaid, Inc., with the reservation immediately hereinafter stated: J. R. Quaid, Inc. admits that the following amounts which appear on the statement attached to defendant's answer are correct. The amounts are: March 31, 1949, $1,032.- 57, March 31, 1949, $3,257.10\\u2014with regard to the item of April 14, 1949 in the sum. of $127.86 Quaid does not admit the correctness of that item, but finds that the accounting in regard to that item is too complicated and therefore, in 'the interest of saving time, will admit the amount of $127.86; July 19, 1949, $102.03, July 19, 1949, $3,413.-02, July 19, 1949, $3,724.87, July 1-9, 1949, $1,136.52, July 27, 1949, $306.36, September 15,1949, $914.75.\\n\\\"Plaintiff-Quaid also admits that it is entitled to a credit of $519.02 as shown by the credit memorandum of date September 27, 1949.\\n\\\"Quaid does not admit the correctness of the first item on the account, namely the item of February 9, 1948 in the sum of $754.60.\\n\\\"By -this admission plaintiff-Quaid does not want to be construed as admitting that shipments were not delayed; that some of the materials covered by these items were not defective; that some of the material did not fit and therefore could not be made into an entire composite fence; that the material was unsuitable [suitable] for the construction of fences, and other and similar circumstances. In other words, we admit the amount but we think the material was defective and that it is too difficult at this time to allocate this amount to this and we do that for the purpos\\u00e9 of saving time.\\\"\\nThe total of the amounts admitted by plaintiff to be correct corresponds with the amount 'of the judgment rendered in 'the defendant's favor, and it is the contention of the defendant United States Steel Corporation that this admission on the part of plaintiff's counsel amounts to a confession of judgment which precludes appeal under the provisions of Article 567 of the Code of Practice. .\\nUnder the jurisprudence of this court there is no particular form required for the confession mentioned in that article. The admission or confession, how? ever, must be such that it leaves no issue to be tried, and for this court to dismiss the appeal the confession must be actually or substantially ' unconditional. Skinner v. Dameron, 5 Rob. 447; Stewart v. Betzer, 20 La.Ann. 137; Sample v. Whel\\u00e9ss, 159 La. 844, 106 So. 325; State ex rel. Le Conte v. Judge Fourth District Court, 1 McGloin 11.\\nAlthough plaintiff's counsel in the instant case admitted that the amounts which appeared on the statement attached to defendant's answer were correct, this admission was made with the clear reservation that the plaintiff did not concede that the materials covered by these items were not defective or unsuitable. This reservation was in line with the allegation in plaintiff's petition that it was entitled to credits for certain materials which were unsuitable or defective. Even though the amounts shown in the statement were admitted to be correct, plaintiff did not concede or even intimate that it was not entitled to the credits claimed. Because , this admission was made with a reservation and for . the sole purpose of admitting that the amounts shown on the statement were correct, it cannot be said that it leaves no issue to be tried or that it is actually or substantially unconditional.\\nTo us there is no doubt that the statement of plaintiff's counsel is not a confession of judgment which would bar its appeal. But, if there were any doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff-appellant. An appeal is a remedy that is favored in law and is an important right which should never be denied unless its forfeiture or abandonment is conclusively shown. Thus in case of doubt' an appeal should always be allowed rather than denied. Jackson v. Michie, 33 La.Ann. 723; Texas Creosoting Co. v. Midland Const. Co., 177 La. 18, 147 So. 366.\\nIn .support of its, motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal defendant cites and relies on the cases of Succession of Mausberg, 37 La. Ann. 126; Sample v. Wheless, supra, and Hewitt, Heran & Co. v. Stewart's Ex'r, 11 La.Ann. 100. In each of them the alleged confession of judgment left no issue to be tried and was actually or substantially unconditional. They are thus easily differem tiated from the case presently under consideration.\\nFor the reasons assigned the motion to dismiss is denied; costs of this proceeding are to be paid by the defendant.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/10067410.json b/la/10067410.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ea16868b15f8efb96c4917c9df5c2f6454e5e607
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/10067410.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"10067410\", \"name\": \"STATE ex rel. PORTERIE et al. v. H. L. HUNT, Inc.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Porterie v. H. L. Hunt, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1935-07-01\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 33450\", \"first_page\": \"777\", \"last_page\": \"783\", \"citations\": \"162 So. 777\", \"volume\": \"162\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:11:32.813023+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"ODOM, J., dissents.\", \"parties\": \"STATE ex rel. PORTERIE et al. v. H. L. HUNT, Inc.\", \"head_matter\": \"182 La. 1073\\nSTATE ex rel. PORTERIE et al. v. H. L. HUNT, Inc.\\nNo. 33450.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nJuly 1, 1935.\\nGaston L. Porterie, Atty. Gen., and Justiri C. Daspit, Fred. A. Blanche, and E. L. Richardson, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant.\\nP. S. Gaharan, Jr., of Jena, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"4530\", \"char_count\": \"25590\", \"text\": \"ROGERS, Justice.\\nThis suit involves the constitutionality of Act No. 6 of 1932, levying an excise, license, or privilege tax on the business of manufacturing or generating, selling, or using electricity for heat, light, or power. The district court held that the statute was unconstitutional and rejected plaintiff's demand. Plaintiff appealed.\\nThe defendant, H. L. Hunt, Incorporated, an Arkansas corporation, was engaged in business in the parish of La Salle, La., from August 1, 1932, up to and including July 31, 1934. Defendant's business consisted of operating and pumping oil. wells and transporting and handling oil in said parish and state. In the conduct of its business during the fiscal years ending July 1, 1933, and July 31, 1934, the defendant corporation used electrical and mechanical power of more than 10 horsepower, and, in the creation of the power, the defendant corporation operated machines or apparatus known as \\\"prime movers,\\\" of a total capacity of 1,050 horsepower.\\nIgnoring the provisions of Act No. 6 of 1932, the defendant failed to make a return to the supervisor of public accounts showing the total horsepower of the machines or apparatus operated by it during the fiscal year ending July 31, 1933. Defendant filed a return for the fiscal year ending July 31, 1934, and attached to the return a check covering one-half of the amount of the tax due, in the belief, evidently, that the amendment to section 3, Act No. 6 of 1932 (Act No. 32 of 1934, \\u00a7 1), reducing the tax from $1 to 50 cents per horsepower, became effective during the fiscal year for which the return was made. The supervisor of public accounts made a demand on defendant for the balance due on the tax for the year ending July 31, 1934, and also for a report showing the total horsepower of the machinery or apparatus operated by defendant during the fiscal year ending July 31, 1933. Defendant refused to comply with the demands, and the supervisor of public accounts executed under oath a statement of the taxes due by defendant. This statement was filed in the mortgage records of the parish of La Salle to operate as a lien against defendant's property.\\nThe state of Louisiana, through its Attorney General and its supervisor of public accounts, then filed this suit to collect $1,575, as the amount of the tax due, with penalties, interest, and attorney's fees. The suit is predicated on section 3 of Act No. 6 of 1932.\\nSection 1 of Act No. 6 of 1932 levies an annual excise, license, or privilege tax on the business of manufacturing or generating electricity for heat, light, or power. Section 2 levies the tax on the business of selling electricity for the purposes stated. Section 3 levies the tax on any business in which electrical or mechanical power of more than 10 horsepower is used. The taxes levied under sections 1 and 2 are fixed at 2 per cent, per annum of the gross receipts of the sales. Under section 3 the rate of taxation is fixed at $1 per annum for each horsepower of capacity of the machinery or apparatus known as the \\\"prime mover\\\" or \\\"prime movers\\\" operated by the taxpayer. The taxes authorized by the statute are in addition to all other taxes now imposed by law.\\nThe defendant attacks the constitutionality of Act No. 6 of 1932 on five grounds, viz.:\\n(1) That the tax -levied under section 3 is a property tax levied on property which has borne the maximum amount of taxation permitted under article 10, \\u00a7 3, of the State Constitution.\\n(2) That the tax, so far as it applies to defendant, is violative of section 21 of article 10 of the State Constitution, prohibiting the levying of any tax other than a severance tax on oil and gas rights.\\n(3) That the tax is violative of section 8 of article 10 of the State Constitution, in that the tax is arbitrarily fixed and is neither classified, graduated, nor progressive.\\n(4) That the statute is violative of section 1 of article 10 of the State Constitution (as amended, see Act No. 162 of 1926), requiring that taxation shall be uniform, and of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, in that it denies defendant the equal protection of the law.\\n(5) That the statute is violative of section 2 of article 1 of the State Constitution and of. the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, in that it deprives defendant of its property without due process of law.\\nWe shall discuss and dispose of defendant's contentions in the order of their statement.\\n1. Under this ground of attack on the statute, defendant complains that the tax in dispute is a' property tax, not an excise or privilege tax,-and that as a property tax it exceeds the limit of 5\\u00be mills, fixed by section 3 of article 10 of the State Constitution, viz.: \\\"The rate of State taxation on property for all purposes shall not exceed, in any one year, five and one-quarter mills on the dollar of its assessed value.\\\"\\nDefendant argues that, notwithstanding the declaration in the statute that the tax is levied on any business or occupation in which mechanical or electrical machines of more than 10 horsepower are used, the tax in realty is not upon the business or occupation of the user of the machines, but is a direct tax upon the only thing of value in the machines, which is their use; that, if it were not for the use to which they are put, the machines would be without any pecuniary value; that it is the value resulting from such use that determines their assessment value for the purpose of property taxation.\\nThe answer to defendant's complaint and argument is that the constitutional limit of taxation to 5\\u00bc mills on' the dollar applies only to the ad valorem tax that is collected annually on all taxable property according to its assessed value. The tax is levied on the right of ownership. Gulf Refining Co. v. McFarland, 154 La. 251, 97 So. 433; Lionel's Cigar Store v. McFarland, 162 La. 956, 111 So. 341. The tax is levied each year based on the assessed value of the property, irrespective of whether the property is used or not.\\nThe tax levied under Act No. 6 of 1932 is not based on the ownership and the assessed value of the machines or apparatus described in the act. It is based on their use in the user's business, whether he is the owner or riot, and irrespective of their assessed value. Under the statute, no tax is due by the owner of the machines or apparatus described therein unless they are used, in the conduct of his business. But the owner's nonuse of the machines or apparatus does not exempt him from the payment of an ad valorem or property tax thereon.\\nAct No. 6 of 1932 designates the tax levied under its provisions as an excise, license, or privilege tax. What characterizes the tax in dispute as a license or privilege tax is that it is collectible only from those who in the conduct of their businesses or occupations use electrical or mechanical power of more than -10 horsepower. ' The measure of the tax is the horsepower capacity, exceeding 10, of the machines or a.p-paratus used in generating the electrical or mechanical power used in the taxpayer's business. Ownership .is immaterial. The tax is not based on ownership. It-'is not levied or collectible from the owner of the property unless he uses it in the conduct of his business and then only in proportion to the horsepower capacity of the property.\\nThe distinction between a property tax and an excise tax is set forth in Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) vol. 1, p. 131, \\u00a7 45, as follows, viz.:\\n\\\"Generally the answer to the question whether a particular tax is a property tax or an excise tax is so apparent that there is no room for argument; but in many phases the question has been the subject of much litigation, especially in regard to whether a tax on a corporation is an excise tax or a property tax. If the tax is directly on property itself, the tax is a property tax; but a tax is an excise tax rather than a property tax where it is not a tax on property as such, but upon certain kinds of property, having reference to their origin and their intended use. Another thing to be noted, it has been said, is that the obligation to pay an excise tax is based upon the voluntary action of the person taxed in performing the act, enjoying the privilege, or engaging in the occupation which is the subject of the excise, and the element of absolute and unavoidable demand, as in the case of a property tax, is lacking.\\\"\\nIn the same volume and section of his work, the learned author gives as some examples of taxes which have been construed as excise taxes rather than as property taxes, inheritance taxes, taxes upon transfers of stock, taxes on the privilege of recording mortgages, taxes on the sale of gasoline, taxes on the use of vehicles.\\nThe plaintiff cites three cases in our jurisprudence which seem to be particularly appropriate to the issue involved in this case. The cited cases are: Merriam v. City of New Orleans, 14 La. Ann. 318; Hodgson v. City of New Orleans, 21 La. Ann. 301, and State v. Heymann, 178 La. 479, 151 So. 901.\\nIn the Merriam Case the plaintiff attacked as unconstitutional a municipal ordinance levying a license tax on every keeper of a billiard table; the amount of the tax being measured by the number of tables. Plaintiff contended that the tax was a property tax on the tables and not a license or privilege tax for the use of the tables in the taxpayer's business. But the court held the contention was untenable; that the intention of the municipality was to impose a license tax upon the particular calling or business of keeping a billiard table, and riot a property tax upon the -table itself.\\nIn the Hodgson Case, in which the Merriam Case was cited and quoted with approval, the municipal ordinance which was attacked as unconstitutional levied a tax on \\\"every keeper of a warehouse where produce, goods, wares or merchandise are received on storage, one hundred dollars for each and every warehouse.\\\" The court held that the tax was a license tax imposed upon the particular calling or business or keeping a warehouse and not a tax upon the warehouse itself.\\nThe Heymann Case involved section 37 of Act No. 190 of 1932, which levied a license tax on the business of operating an office building. The court held that the tax was not within the limitation of section 3 of article 10 of the State Constitution; that the tax was not a direct tax upon the property but a license tax upon the business in which the property was used or employed.\\nIn the Merriam, Hodgson, and Heymann Cases it was the use of the property in the taxpayer's business that fixed his tax liability for the privilege of so using the property. The case at bar cannot be distinguished in principle from those cases. In this case also it is the use of the property in his business that fixes the user's tax liability for the privilege of conducting the business.\\nThe defendant cites the cases of Dawson, Attorney General, v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 255 U. S. 288, 41 S. Ct. 272, 65 L. Ed. 638, and Thompson, Auditor, v. McLeod, 112 Miss. 383, 73 So. 193, L. R. A. 1918C, 893, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 674. The cases were also cited and distinguished from the case presented in Lionel's Cigar Store v. McFarland, supra.\\nWe think the nature and character of the tax in dispute here easily distinguishes it from the whisky tax which was held to be a property tax in the Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Company Case. Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States declared in that case that the question of whether a tax is an occupation tax or a property tax is one of local law so that a decision of it by the highest court of a state will be .accepted as conclusive. Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 255 U. S. 288, page 291, 41 S. Ct. 272, 65 L. Ed. page 645.\\nIn the Thompson v. McLeod Case the Supreme Court of Mississippi, by a divided court with a strong.dissenting opinion filed by one of the dissenting justices, went rather far in holding that a tax of one-fourth of one cent each year for each cup or box levied on the business of extracting turpentine from standing trees was a property tax and not'an excise tax. But the decision apparently was based on the finding of the court that the alleged tax debtor in taking the crude gum from his trees was not directly engaged in any kind of mercantile business, but was upon his own property pursuing a natural right; that the privilege taxed was not that of selling the gum of the tree, but the privilege or right of the owner or lessee to extract turpentine from standing trees.\\nOn the other hand, it has been held in Texas that the tax on a certain percentage of the market value of the gross products of oil wells was a tax, \\\"not upon the gross products of the oil wells, but upon the occupation of owning, controlling, or managing oil wells producing oil; and the amount of the tax is measured by a percentage of the market value of the gross products.\\\" Producers' Oil Co. v. Stephens, 44 Tex Civ. App. 327, 99 S. W. 157, 158. And in Alabama it has been held that an additional tax of 3 cents per barrel laid upon all oysters canned, packed, shipped, or sold in and from the state, and on all oysters caught and taken from the public reefs and private bedding grounds for packing, canning, shipping, or for sale was not a property tax, but a charge or imposition upon the business or act of marketing oysters. State v. Parker, 5 Ala. App. 231, 59 So. 741.\\nWe think the Thompson v. McLeod Case is distinguishable from the present case. But, if we are wrong in this, we must nevertheless decline to follow it. The decision was by a divided court, and apparently is contrary to the jurisprudence of this state.\\nOur conclusion is that the tax levied under Act No. 6 of 1932 is an excise, license, or privilege tax and not a property tax, and that the tax is not within the limitation placed upon the Legislature-by section 3 of article 10 of the State Constitution.\\n2. Defendant's next complaint is that the tax in dispute is violative of section 21 of article 10 of the State Constitution. The constitutional provision which defendant invokes reads in part as follows, viz.: \\\"Taxes may be levied on natural resources severed from the soil or water, to be paid proportionately by the owners thereof at the time of severance. Such natural resources may be classified for the purpose of taxation and such taxes predicated upon either the quantity or value of the product at the time and place where it is severed. No severance tax shall be levied by any parish or other local subdivision of the state.\\n\\\"No further or additional tax or license shall be levied or imposed upon pil or gas leases or rights, nor shall any additional-value be added to the assessment of land, by reason of the presence of oil or gas therein or their production therefrom.\\\"\\nDefendant argues that under the constitutional provision the tax in dispute cannot be levied on those who, like defendant, are engaged in the business of severing natural resources from the soil. The record shows that defendant is engaged in the business of operating and pumping oil wells and in transporting and 'handling oil in this state.\\nSection 21 of article 10 of the State Constitution authorizes the Legislature to levy a license tax on the privilege of severing natural resources from the soil or water. And the Legislature has levied the tax authorized by the constitutional 'provision. See Act No. 140 of 1922, as amended and superseded by Act No. 24 of the Second Extraordinary Session for the year 1935. This court has held that the tax levied by Act No. 140 of 1922 was a tax levied on the privilege of severing natural resources from the soil, Gulf Refining Co. v. McFarland, 154 La. 251, 97 So. 433.\\nThe constitutional provision authorizing the Legislature to levy a severance tax prohibits the levying of any further license or tax upon oil or gas leases or rights. No attempt is made in Act No. 6 of 1932 to levy an additional license or tax upon oil or gas leases or rights. All that the statute does is to levy a tax on the privilege of doing business in the state and to fix the measure or quantum of the tax according to the horsepower capacity of the machinery or apparatus used in the conduct of the business.\\n3. Defendant also complains that the tax in dispute is violative of section 8 of article 10 of the State Constitution, which provides that \\\"license taxes may be classified, graduated or progressive.\\\"\\nThe defendant's argument is that the tax is neither classified, graduated, nor progressive, because it is based on the original horsepower rating of the machines and apparatus described in the statute, without any allowance for depreciation.\\nAssuming that the constitutional provision means that license taxes must be classified, graduated, or progressive, any reasonable method of graduation will suffice. State v. Heymann, 178 La. 479, 151 So. 901. Section 3 of Act No. 6 of 1932 designates- or classifies those who are amenable to the tax. The statute levies the tax only on those who in the conduct of their business or occupation at any time use electrical or mechanical power of more than ten horsepower. The statute also graduates the amount of the tax levied. The measure or quantum of the tax is determined by the total horsepower capacity of the machinery or apparatus used in the conduct of the business. The greater the horsepower capacity of the property used, the greater the tax. The possible depreciation in the property used cannot in any manner affect the legality of the tax.\\n4. Defendant further complains that section 3 of Act No. 6 of 1932 violates section 1 of article 10 of the State Constitution requiring that taxation shall be uniform on the same class of property throughout the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and that it denies the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, in that it fails to exempt from taxation the \\\"stand-by\\\" engines used by those generating their own power while exempting the \\\"stand-by\\\" engines of those who purchase their power from the persons, firms, corporations, or associations subject to the tax imposed by sections 1 and 2 of the statute.\\nThe pertinent portion of section 3 of Act No. 6 of 1932 reads as follows, viz.: \\\"Provided that any user of power securing all or any part of the power required in the conduct of the business or occupation of such user from a person, firm, corporation or association of persons subject to the tax imposed by Section 1 or Section 2 of this act, shall not be liable for the tax imposed by this Section 3, or for a greater tax under this Section 3, as the case may be, because of the employment of stand-by power facilities by such user during periods of failure of the supply of purchased pow- \\u00bb\\nThe requirement of section 1 of article 10 of the State Constitution that all taxes shall be uniform applies only to property taxes and not to license taxes levied by the Legislature under the authority of section 8 of article .10 of the Constitution. State v. American Ry. Express Co., 159 La. 1001, 106 So. 544.\\nHowever, we fail to see wherein the statutory provision hereinabove quoted violates either section 1 of article 10 of the State Constitution or the .Fourteenth Amend-to the Federal .Constitution. If a machine is not used in the owner's business, vsrhether it be a stand-by machine or not, it is not subject to the tax. Under the provisions of the statute, all taxpayers occupying the-same status or falling into the same class are treated alike. The statute appears to separate the taxpayers into three distinct classes, namely: Those engaged in the business of manufacturing or generating electricity'for heat, light, and power. Section 1. Those who are engaged in the business of selling electricity not manufactured or gefterated by them, for heat, light, or power. Section 2. And those who produce the electrical or mechanical power which they use in the conduct of their own businesses or occupations. Section 3. No tax appears to 1?e directly levied on those who use in their business the electricity manufactured or sold by those subject to the tax levied under sections 1 and 2.\\nThe placing of all those who generate their own power in a separate class is not arbitrary or unreasonable, and we think it was within the sound discretion of the Legislature to make such a classification. The failure to permit the employment of standby facilities free of taxation by such users, while providing that a different class of persons not directly taxed under the statute (section 3) \\\"shall not be liable for the tax imposed by this Section 3, or for a greater tax under this Section 3, as the case may bej\\\" because of the employment of stand-by power facilities by such persons during periods of failure of the supply of purchased power, does not arbitrarily discriminate against or deny the equal protection of the l\\u00e1w to the distinct class of taxpayers created by section 3 of the statute.\\n5. Defendant's remaining complaint is that Act No. 6 of 1932 violates the due process clauses of both Federal and State Constitutions. Defendant contends that all phases of the statute relative to the levy, determin\\u00e1jipn of the amount and collection of the tax considered together constitute a denial of due process of law. We do not think the complaint is well founded.\\nThe tax in dispute is levied in addition to all other taxes. It is levied as an excise, license, or- privilege tax on all businesses where, in the conduct of the business, electrical or mechanical power of more than 10 horsepower is generated. The tax is measured by the horsepower capacity of the machinery or apparatus used in generating the power. The rate is $1 per horsepower.\\nSection 6 of the statute requires those coming under the provisions of the statute to file a return with the supervisor of public accounts at the end of each fiscal year, showing the amount of horsepower capacity of the machinery and apparatus used during the year. Under the statute the fiscal year ends July 31st of each year, and the taxpayer is allowed until September 1st,- or a period of thirty days, within which to file his return. This return must contain. the taxpayer's own calculation as to the horsepower capacity of the machinery or apparatus used by him in the conduct of his business.\\nThe statute specifically designates the date on which the fiscal year ends, prescribes the period within which the taxpayer must file his return, and permits him to fix the measure of the tax by directing him to set forth in his return the horsepower capacity of the machinery or apparatus-used by him during the year. The taxpayer is thus given an opportunity to be heard, and, if he fails to avail 'himself of the opportunity, he is considered as having waived it. Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U. S. 23, 35 S. Ct. 2, 59 L. Ed. 105. If the return is not made, the supervisor of public-accounts is to make a return or cause it to be made, upon such information as the supervisor may be able to obtain, assess the tax due thereon, and add a penalty of 25 per cent, to the amount of the tax for the failure of the taxpayer to make the return. If the taxpayer does as required, there is nothing to be heard about. The tax being based on a fixed rate per horsepower, there is nothing the taxpayer can do which can affect the amount of the tax. He reports .the total capacity of horsepower used in his business, and the statute establishes the amount of the tax to be collected from him. The provision in the statute imposing- a penalty for the failure of a taxpayer to report is for his failure to do his duty. In that event, his-chances to be heard have gone by. Pullman Co. v. Knott, supra.\\nOur conclusion is that Act No. 6 of 1932 provides a well-established and constitutional method of levying the tax, arriving at the amount due and for collecting it from the taxpayer.\\nFor the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is annulled, and it is now ordered that there be judgment in favor of plaintiff the state of Louisiana, and against defendant, H. L. Hunt, Incorporated, in the sum of $1,050, with 25 per cent, thereon as penalty, 10 per cent, on the amount of said principal and penalty as attorney's fees, and 5 per cent, per annum interest on the total amount from judicial demand until paid. It is further ordered that the said plaintiff have judgment against the said defendant in the further sum of IR-OSO, less a credit of $525, with 25 per cent, thereon as penalty, 10 per cent, on the principal amount, plus the penalty as attorney's fees, together with 5 per cent, per annum interest on the total amount from judicial demand until paid. All costs of suit to be paid by the defendant.\\nIt is further ordered that the lien filed in the mortgage records of the parish of La Salle in Book 15, folio 233, to secure plaintiff's claim, be recognized and maintained, and that the sheriff of the parish of La Salle be authorized and directed to sell the property and assets of the defendant situated in the parish of La Salle according to law, and that the proceeds thereof be used to pay the amount of plaintiff's judgment over and above all other creditors of defendant.\\nODOM, J., dissents.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/10067908.json b/la/10067908.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e20091c469652a193a2245581d56a7ee7947f650
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/10067908.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"10067908\", \"name\": \"MAROUN et al. v. MARRS (TOLEDO SCALE CO., et al., Interveners)\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Maroun v. Marrs\", \"decision_date\": \"1938-01-28\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 5575\", \"first_page\": \"723\", \"last_page\": \"726\", \"citations\": \"178 So. 723\", \"volume\": \"178\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:55:09.226095+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"MAROUN et al. v. MARRS (TOLEDO SCALE CO., et al., Interveners).\", \"head_matter\": \"MAROUN et al. v. MARRS (TOLEDO SCALE CO., et al., Interveners).\\nNo. 5575.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.\\nJan. 28, 1938.\\nJ. B. Crow, of Shreveport, for appellants.\\nWilkinson, Lewis & Wilkinson, of Shreveport, for appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"1831\", \"char_count\": \"11442\", \"text\": \"HAMITER, Judge.\\nThe defendant herein, W. G. Marrs, rented from the plaintiffs under a written contract the premises located at the southeast corner of Spring and Texas streets in the city of Shreveport, La., more specifically designated as municipal No. 129 Texas street. When the lessee defaulted in the payment of the agreed rent, the lessors instituted this suit, seeking recovery under the provisions of the lease agreement. In connection therewith, a writ of provisional seizure issued, and thereunder the sheriff seized the furniture, fixtures, merchandise, and other property located in the premises.\\nSubsequently the Allied Store Utilities Company filed a petition of intervention and 'third opposition alleging that it sold to defendant under date of September 29, 1936, certain equipment seized by plaintiffs, and that in payment therefor defendant executed in its favor on said date a promissory note, together with an act of chattel mortgage on the purchased articles. A further allegation is that the mortgage was by notarial act and was duly recorded in the chattel mortgage records of Caddo parish,. La., before the said property was placed in or on the leased premises. Another averment is that it has a prior lien and privilege on said property and is entitled to its release or to be paid out of the proceeds of the sheriff's sale by priority and preference over plaintiffs and all other creditors of defendant. Appropriate judgment is prayed for against plaintiffs and defendant.\\nAlso filing a petition of intervention and third opposition in the proceeding was the Toledo Scale Company, a creditor of defendant. It alleges the ownership of, or, in the alternative, that it has a vendor's lien and privilege on other certain described property seized by plaintiffs, under and by reason of a written contract entered into with defendant. This third opponent avers its right to immediate possession of said property, or, alternatively, that it is entitled to be recognized as having a vendor's lien and privilege thereon superior to all other persons. Judgment in accordance with the named allegations is asked for against plaintiffs and defendant.\\nPlaintiffs' answer to the opposition of the Allied Store Utilities Company asserts that the latter's alleged act of chattel mortgage was not recorded, as required by law, before the property covered thereby was placed in the leased premises. Alternatively, it alleges that the act of chattel mortgage is a nullity.\\n. In answering the opposition of the Toledo Scale Company, plaintiffs allege the superiority of their lessor's lien and privilege, regardless of the consttuction to be placed on the contract executed by and between said third opponent and defendant.\\nNo appearance was made by defendant Marrs, and preliminary defaults were regularly entered against him by plaintiffs and by both third opponents.\\nAfter a trial of the merits, there was judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant* for the amount of the rent claim asserted, and decreeing the maintenance of the provisional seizure, with recognition and enforcement of the lessor's lien and privilege, on all of the property in the leased premises, except one used meat cooler. Third opponents were granted judgments against Marrs for the amounts of their respective claims, but their demands to be paid by preference to plaintiffs' claim were rejected, with the exception that the chattel mortgage of the Allied Store Utilities Company was held superior to plaintiffs' lessor's lien and privilege in so far as the aforementioned used meat cooler is concerned.\\nOrders of suspensive and devolutive appeal were requested by and granted to both of the third opponents. The Allied Store Utilities Company perfected its appeal, but the Toledo Scale Company failed in this regard. The latter filed no bond. Defendant Marrs did not appeal.\\nIn this court plaintiffs have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal sought to be taken by the Toledo Scale Company for the reason that the required appeal bond has not been filed by it. In our opinion the motion must be sustained. An appellate court is not permitted to review the proceedings and judgment of the trial\\\"court when the orders of appeal are not accompanied by an appropriate bond. Durrett Hardware & Furniture Company v. Howze, La.App., 174 So. 205, and cases therein cited.\\nIn answering the perfected appeal, plaintiffs pray for an amendment of the trial court's judgment by ordering recognition of their lessor's lien and privilege on the used meat cooler as being superior to the claim of the Allied Store Utilities Company.\\nIn view of the faot that no valid appeal was pro'se.cuted by either the defendant or the Toledo Scale Company, we are concerned only with the controversy existing between plaintiffs and the Allied Store Utilities Company. For convenience, the latter will hereinafter be designated as appellant.\\nIt is urged by plaintiffs in this court that the chattel mortgage granted-by Marrs to appellant is illegal, null, and void for the reason that (1) the property sought to be mortgaged is not described as required by law, and (2) the act does not specify and set forth the location of the property.\\nThe instrument stipulating the herein-discussed chattel mortgage recites, in part, the following:\\n\\\"Ship to... W. G. Marrs\\n\\\"Street No_ Corner Texas St. & Spring St.,\\n\\\"City... Shreveport... Parish Caddo... State Louisiana\\n\\\"State of Louisiana \\\\\\n\\\"Parish of Caddo /\\n\\\"Be it known, that on this 29th day of September, 1936, before ike, J. B. Crow, a Notary Public, duly commissioned and qualified within and for the Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana, and in the presence of the witnesses hereinafter named and undersigned, personally came and appeared Allied Store Utilities Co., a corporation, vendor, and herein represented by \\u00c1. B. Wynn, whose authority to act herein is acknowledged, which company hereby sells, transfers and conveys to W. G. Marrs, a resident of the Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana, who also appears, is here present, accepting and purchasing for himself, his heirs and assigns, the following described property:\\nQuantity Model No. Fixture Finish Price FOB 1\\\" actor;\\nOne DX610 Hussman-Ligonier Refrigerator counter(s) 10 ft. long Regular Store Serial #36-1003\\nX86 Cooler coil for used cooler t\\nValve for X86 coil s\\n\\\" 100MS Hussman-Ligonier Condensing Unit(s), l'H. P. Current .AC, Electrical Volts, 220, Specification Cycles, 60 Phase 1\\n\\\" Grocer Refrigerator (s)\\n\\\" Used Meat Cooler (s), 8 ft. front, 6 ft. Depth 10.\\\"\\nWith reference to the describing of movable property to be mortgaged, section 2 of Act No. 198 of 1918, as amended by Act No. 178 of 1936 (the Louisiana chattel mortgage statute), provides that,\\n\\\"Every such mortgage of property mentioned in Section 1 shall be in writing, setting out a full description of such property to be mortgaged, so that the same may be identified.\\\"\\nThe chattel mortgage held by appellant\\\" is in writing, and the description of the property therein contained, which is above given, is in our opinion sufficiently definite and complete so as to permit identification thereof. Particularly is this true, when the stated shipping destination of the articles is considered in connection therewith.\\nThe contention is made by plaintiffs' counsel that pursuant to the provisions of section 6 of the chattel mortgage statute, Act No. 198 of 1918, the mortgage act must recite the location of the property affected; otherwise, there is no valid encumbrance as against third persons. The referred to section reads:\\n\\\"Section 6. Be it further enacted, etc., that for the purpose of this Act, it shall be sufficient for the Recorder of each Parish to keep a book to be known as the Chattel Mortgage Book,, which shall' be ruled off into columns, with headings as follows:\\n\\\" 'Time of Filing for Recordation'; 'Name of Mortgagor'; 'Name of Mortgagee'; 'Date of Instrument'; 'Amount Secured'; 'When Due'; 'Property Mortgaged' ; 'Remarks.'\\n\\\"Under the head of 'Property Mortgaged,' it shall be sufficient to enter a general description of the property and the particular place where located.\\\"\\nAssuming, arguendo, and for that purpose only, that the provision just 'quoted sustains counsel's contention, we are of the opinion that the act of chattel mortgage under consideration satisfies the mentioned requirement. As is noted from the hereinabove copied extract, the mortgaged property was shipped to \\\"W. G. Marrs, corner of Texas & Spring streets, Shreveport, Caddo Parish, Louisiana.\\\" Certainly, this sufficiently designates and names the location of the encumbered movables.\\nHaving determined that appellants' chattel mortgage is valid, we now give consideration to the other contention of plaintiffs that the encumbrance sought to be enforced by appellant is inferior in rank to their lessor's lien, and privilege for the reason that the affected articles were placed in the leased premises before the re-cordation of the chattel mortgage act.\\nThe settled jurisprudence of the state relative to this issue is that the privilege resulting from the execution and recordation of a chattel mortgage takes precedence over and primes a lessor's lien and privilege arising subsequently thereto; and, conversely, a prior lessor's lien is superior to a subsequently recorded chattel mortgage. Youree et al. v. Limerick, Papas, Intervenor, 157 La. 39, 101 So. 864, 37 A.L.R. 394; Union Building Corporation v. Burmeister, 186 La. 1027, 173 So. 752.\\nThe only chattel mortgage asserted and alleged on by appellant in this cause is of date September 29, 1936. On direct examination, a district representative and witness of appellant testified that such mortgage was filed for record and recorded before the property covered thereby was placed in the rented premises. However, under cross-examination, he stated that the only article purchased by defendant under the September 29, 1936, transaction was the used meat cooler. There is also evidence in the record that the refrigerator counter, described in the above-mentioned act of mortgage, was affected by another chattel mortgage executed by defendant in appellants' favor under date of June 22, 1936, which is not involved in this suit, and was placed in the rented premises after the recordation of the last-mentioned instrument. From all of this proof, it must be concluded that the mortgaged property, except the used meat cooler, was purchased and placed in the leased premises in connection with the chattel mortgage of date June 22, 1936, and was there located when the act of September 29, 1936, was executed and recorded. Appellant's pleadings contain no allegations regarding the mortgage act of June 22, 1936, and because of this, its introduction in evidence was properly denied after timely objection had been made by plaintiffs' counsel.\\nAccordingly, we hold, as did the trial court, that appellant's chattel mortgage is superior in rank to the lessor's lien and privilege of plaintiffs in so far as the used meat cooler is concerned, but with reference to the remaining seized property it is inferior thereto.\\nThe judgment appealed from is affirmed. Appellant shall pay the cost of the appeal.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/10081936.json b/la/10081936.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..da3077d3822e0e31774def4e420f5d52a19fc8eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/10081936.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"10081936\", \"name\": \"THOMAS v. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Thomas v. Maryland Casualty Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1947-11-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2955\", \"first_page\": \"472\", \"last_page\": \"478\", \"citations\": \"32 So. 2d 472\", \"volume\": \"32\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:03:14.698503+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THOMAS v. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO.\", \"head_matter\": \"THOMAS v. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO.\\nNo. 2955.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.\\nNov. 21, 1947.\\nRehearing Denied Dec. 30,1947.\\nWrit of Certiorari Denied Feb. 16,1948.\\nSamuel M. Robertson, of Baton Rouge, for appellant.\\nTaylor, Porter, Brooks & Fuller, of Baton Rouge, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"4606\", \"char_count\": \"26753\", \"text\": \"DORE, Judge.\\nThis is a compensation suit brought by the plaintiff against the defendant Maryland Casualty Co., the compensation insurer of Armco Drainage and Metal Products Company, plaintiff's employer.\\nPlaintiff alleges that on Saturday, March 16, 1946, while in the employ of Armco Drainage and Metal Products Company, he was engaged with other employees in digging a pit in which to install a concrete slab and, while so doing, he slipped and fell into the pit, fracturing his left hip bone and straining both sacro-iliac joints and causing or aggravating a hypertrophic arthritis in the lumbar spine, all of which injuries are painful and causing stiffness in his back, which disabilities are permanent; that he has not been paid any compensation; that his rate of pay was in excess of $30 a week.\\nHe prays for judgment decreeing him to be totally and permanently disabled and for compensation at the rate of $20 per week for a period not exceeding 400 weeks, beginning March 16, 1946, together with interest on all unpaid past due instalments and for $500 medical expenses.\\nDefendant, for answer, denies all of plaintiff's allegations, save that it admits that it has not paid plaintiff any compensation.\\nThe trial of the case resulted in a judgment in favor of defendant dismissing plaintiff's suit, the trial judge holding, with written reasons, that plaintiff had failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff has appealed.\\nIn this court there are only two questions presented: First, since it is now admitted by the defendant that the plaintiff suffered an accident in the course and scope of his employment, the principal question is whether or not the plaintiff was disabled and has been disabled ever since from performing hard manual labor. It is the contention of the defendant that the accident was slight and did not result in any disabling injury to the plaintiff. Second, if compensation is due, the weekly wage of plaintiff is in contest. These questions will be discussed in their respective order.\\nThe record discloses that plaintiff was engaged in leveling a pit of 12 by 14 feet and four or five inches deep which was to be filled with a concrete slab. A slow drizzle rain was falling and the ground was slick and just soft \\\"enough to mess you up.\\\" The plaintiff's feet slipped from beneath him and plaintiff fell backward in a split to the ground on his bottom and left hip; his body from the waist down came in contact with the ground. The accident happened on Saturday afternoon at about 2:30, March 26, 1946. The plaintiff completed the remainder of the work day, did not work on Sunday, reported to and did work on Monday, Tuesday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday, and was paid therefor. On Monday, April 4, he was referred to Dr. Godfrey, the company and the insurer physician. He reported to Dr. Godfrey on April 5.\\nAccording to plaintiff, he \\\"got up limping in his left side,\\\" and continued to work in pain for the remainder of the day. He attempted to continue working in pain until he could not \\\"make it no further.\\\" He then reported his condition to the superintendent, who sent him to Doctor Godfrey. He went to Doctor Godfrey's office and Doctor Godfrey treated him once. Dr. Godfrey gave him a slip to go to Doctor Williams' office to have his back X-rayed. He did not report to Dr. Williams. He has not worked or attempted to work because he was suffering with so much pain.\\nThe record discloses, according to Dr. Godfrey's report, that plaintiff was examined by Dr. Butler, a colored doctor, on April 4, 1946. We have no report or testimony as to the findings of this doctor. Thereafter, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Godfrey, defendant's doctor, on April 5, 1946. Comment will be made further in this opinion as to Dr. Godfrey's testimony and findings.\\nPlaintiff was next examined by Dr. Kuehnle on April 8, 1946. Dr. Kuehnle testified that \\\"on the first examination the pertinent physical findings were as follows : There was tenderness over both sacroiliacs and a moderate amount of spasm to the paravertebral muscles. While lying on his back he was unable to raise actively the extended left leg higher than about ten inches, and even with this he complained of considerable pain in the left side of the back.\\\" At that time, the doctor made a tentative diagnosis of sacroiliac sprain. He requested X-rays, which were made on April 9, 1946, by the office of Dr. Williams.\\nThe X-ray examination of plaintiff was made by Dr. Arthur S. Alexander, an associate of Dr. Williams, on April 9, 1946. The report of that examination is as follows: \\\"Examination of the entire pelvis including both hip joints and a localized projection of the left hip reveals a questionable cortical fracture 4 mms. in projected length involving the most superior margin of the greater trochanter. If this short area of translucency represents a fracture line, the fragments are in perfect position and alignment.\\\"\\nOn the basis of this X-ray report and his physical examination of plaintiff, on April 9, 1946, Dr. Kuehnle's diagnosis was \\\"Sacroiliac sprain and possible incomplete fracture of the cortex of the greater tro-chanter of the left femur.\\\" Following this, plaintiff was given sixteen diathermy treatments, the first on April 9, 1946, and the last on May 1, 1946.\\nAccording to Dr. Kuehnle's testimony and report, the plaintiff had made good progress towards recovery on May 2, 1946; and was able to resume light work on May 13, 1946, the plaintiff being able to walk with almost normal posture, although he did give the impression of a slight splinting of the lower back. With regard to the fracture of the greater trochanter of the left hip, he stated that the prognosis was good. As of date of May 12, the doctor said that \\\"the injury appears to have recovered.\\\"\\nThe plaintiff was again referred to Dr. ICuehnle on December 5, 1946. The result of that examination, according to the doctor's testimony, \\\"revealed pain in the sacroiliac on extreme flexion of the extended leg. Test for sciatic nerve injury was negative. That was about the extent of the positive findings at that examination.\\\" In a letter to plaintiff's attorney, of date of December 10, 1946, relative to the examination of December 5, 1946, the doctor wrote: \\\"The patient complains of continuous pain in the lower back, radiating down the back of the legs and pain in the left hip. X-ray examination on repeated occasions have revealed no evidence of bone or joint injury. Patient complains of tenderness over the lower back, however, no muscle spasm could be detected. On pinching the skin the patient complained of more severe pain than when pressure was applied to the muscles of the back. Straight leg raising test produced pain only on extreme flexion . It is my opinion that although this man may have pain in the lower back as a result of this accident, the symptoms are far in excess of the amount of pain indicated as a result of these tests. I think that this man is exaggerating his symptoms and that he is actually able to return to work.\\\"\\nI-Ie was shown an X-ray report of May 21, 1946, and was questioned as to any hypertrophic arthritis in the lumbar spine of plaintiff. He read, \\\"except for minimal hypertrophic osteoarthrosis of the lumbar spine, the vertebrae are normal in size, contour and texture.\\\" He would not venture an opinion as to whether the fall caused plaintiff's arthritic condition nor whether it aggravated a previous existing arthritis in the back, merely stating that it was possible and that the present complaints of plaintiff fit in with the picture-of an aggravated arthritis.\\nRegardless of his previous reports and' testimony, the witness, on the date of trial,, expressed the opinion that the plaintiff was-still suffering pain and had not entirely recovered. This opinion is based solely upon a test conducted in open court by the witness and Dr. Cosby, which test is shown as the \\\"Robertson's Sign.\\\" With reference to this test, the witness stated that was the only objective evidence of pain he found on the day of trial. We shall further comment on this test later on in this opinion.\\nUpon being interrogated as to plaintiff's ability to do the work he was accustomed to do prior to the accident, the witness would not commit himself further than that he had recommended to plaintiff that he attempt to work and that it all depends whether plaintiff is willing to try to work. He added that \\\"with the psychological factor he has there, I do not know if he will ever admit that he is not hurting as bad as he says he is.\\\" The witness further expressed the opinion that a compensation settlement would greatly benefit plaintiff's back. However, the doctor would not classify plaintiff as a malingerer.\\nThe plaintiff next offered the testimony of Dr. J. A. Thom, a general practitioner of medicine, of Baton Rouge. He testified as follows: . i\\n\\\"I saw him first on May 3, 1946. At that time there was rigidity of the lower spinal muscles, both on the right side and the left, but more definitely on the left, and he complained of an area of tenderness most noticeable over the left sacroiliac region. It was not well defined, but it extended up the lumbar spine and over into the right side. , . .,\\n\\\"In testing out these leg tests to determine where the trouble was, when you extended the leg on that straight leg test, the leg on the left side, when it was flexed up at right angles, extended slightly beyond, it threw the left lower lumbar muscle into a spasm. The same was not true on the right side, at least was not as noticeable on the right side. I detected no sciatic pain.\\n\\\"On several different occasions I made those tests on him to see how he was progressing. The treatment I used was to immobilize him with Zeo plaster. As we went along, I made several tests on him, and this rigidity of the spinal muscles became less. The last time I checked him over was today. On palpation of the back there was no definite rigidity of those back muscles, although there was more tone to the left dorsal muscle, lower spinal muscle, more tone to it, and it appeared a little larger. On flexing the leg on the leg test, these spinal muscles on the left side were not thrown into a spasm when the leg was over-flexed, not a definite spasm. It caused some rigidity of it, but not a definite spasm.\\\" Further in his testimony, he considers the X-ray findings of arthritis as fitting into the picture of the back pathology he, the witness, developed. He expressed the opinion that the plaintiff's injury had incapacited .him from heavy work, but had urged him to try to do light work. \\\"He (plaintiff) said that he knew he was not able to do a day's work for a man and that nobody would hire him.\\\" He, witness, was not of the opinion that plaintiff was a malingerer, but he considered \\\"like we have to consider all these cases, that they (claimants) make the most they can out of the ailments they have.\\\" He had seen the plaintiff professionally at least 12 or 15 times, maybe more, the first time being on May 3 and the last time in September.\\nOn being questioned by the Court to state in plain English what was his diagnosis, the doctor states: \\\"I think he has a minimum of arthritis. I would have made that diagnosis without the X-ray verifying it. I felt that he had strained his back and had a minimum degree of arthritis, and I also felt that the tendons around there were involved in it, that the tendons were strained.\\\" He was of the opinion that probably the minimum of arthritis was existing prior to the injury, but that the injury aggravated the arthritic condition of his back.\\nIt appears that Dr. Thom had plaintiff X-rayed in May, 1946, and in September, 1946, by the associate of or by Dr. Lester J. Williams.\\nThe report of Dr. Alexander, on May 21, 1946, is as follows:\\n\\\"Examination of the lumbo sacral spine including the entire pelvis and both hip joints reveals no disalignment. Except for minimal hypertrophis osteoarthrosis of the lumbar spine, the vertebrae are normal in size, contour and texture. The inter-vertebral discs are of normal height. The lumbo-sacral and sacro-iliac articulations reveals no changes.\\n\\\"The pelvis is symmetrical. Both hip joints are of equal and normal width and their articular corticies are smooth and regular.\\n\\\"A detail projection on re-examination of the left hip reveals practically complete healing of the suspected fracture at the tip of the greater trochanter. The fragments are in perfect position and alignment.\\\"\\nThe report of Dr. Williams of date of September 30, 1946, is as follows:\\n\\\"X-ray examination of the left pelvis including the hip joint and the proximal half of the left femur is negative for any present evidence of fracture, nor is there any evidence of unabsorbed callus near the superior margin of the greater trochanter.\\\"\\nThe report of Dr. Williams of date of September 30, 1946, is as follows:\\n\\\"X-ray examination of the lumbar spine and pelvis by means of antero-posterior and lateral projections is negative for present fracture or dislocation. There is no evidence of unabsorved callus near the superior margin of the greater trochanter of the left femur. The lumbar spine is normal in size, contour and texture. There is a slight hypertrophic arthritis of the entire lumbar spine. There has been no increase in the amount of hypertrophic arthritis shown since 5/14/46, as shown by a careful comparison of the films at that date and the present. The intervertebral discs are of normal height. The lumbo-sacral and sacro-iliac articulations exhibit no pathology.\\\"\\nThe defendant offered the testimony of Mr. M. E. Hughes, the timekeeper of plaintiff's employer. According to this witness, the witness was about two feet from the plaintiff when plaintiff fell. Plaintiff got up, kind of smiled and looked around to see if anyone was looking at him. Plaintiff did not complain of being hurt. Plaintiff continued to work the rest of the day. The following day, plaintiff did not work. The following morning, plaintiff reported for work and complained of hurting. He, the witness, told him if he, plaintiff, didn't get any. better, he should go to a doctor. Plaintiff kept on working for five days; he kept on complaining, and finally the witness gave him an order to the doctor. After he gave him the order, that was the last he saw of plaintiff. He denies that at any time after the accident plaintiff limped.\\nDr. J. R. Godfrey, called by the defendant, testified that he first saw plaintiff on April 5, 1946,' and that plaintiff at that time gave him a history of having slipped and fallen backwards on March 26, 1946, and that the pain resulting from the fall increased in the days that followed, and on April 4th he consulted a colored physician and received some treatments; that the plaintiff complained of pain over the general area of the lumbo-sacral joint, all the way around the left to the inguinal region. The doctor testified further that he found no objective symptoms as a result of physical examination of the plaintiff, and that he diagnosed his condition as muscle sprain of the lower back, \\\"giving him the benefit of all doubt.\\\" Dr. Godfrey states that the attitude of plaintiff was that of a malingerer in that he grossly exaggerated his symptoms, and even stated that he knew his condition was hopeless and that no amount of treatment would do him any good. He was re-examined by Dr. Godfrey on December 10, 1946, at which time he again exaggerated his symptoms, stating that he had been in extreme pain since the accident and had been unable to work, and on this particular visit the doctor states: \\\"Plaintiff hobbled on a cane carried in his right hand, when, as a matter of fact, his pain was supposed to be on his left side.\\\" The sum and substance of Dr. Godfrey's testimony is to the effect that plaintiff suffered some minor strain on March 26, 1946, but that he was not seriously or permanently injured, and is now capable of returning to his former work of performing manual labor.\\nThe defendant offered the testimony of Dr. Frank Brostrom, an orthopedic specialist, of New Orleans; the doctor examined the plaintiff, on request of defendant, on October 23, 1946. His testimony was taken out of court. After thoroughly going into plaintiff's complaints, and after making a thorough examination of plaintiff, lasting about two hours, to determine his physical condition, the witness, in his report, states r\\n\\\"I do not doubt that the claimant sustained a strain of the lower back from the fall on March 26, 1946, for which he received treatment. The continued complaint of pain over the crest of the left ilium that radiates over the front of the abdomen into the right hip and into the back is too absurd for the examiner to put much faith in the claimant's statements. A minor cortical fracture of the greater trochanter that has healed so perfectly, could not give rise to symptoms seven months after the accident. The range of motion of the lumbar spine, considering the man's age and obesity is in my opinion within normal limits and in view of the negative clinical findings, I see no reason why the claimant should not resume his former occupation.\\\"\\nIn his examination and report on the plaintiff, Dr. Brostrum was questioned about X-rays taken by Dr. Teitelbaum, in charge of the Department of Radiology at Touro Infirmary, and referred to the report of this doctor. Dr. Teitelbaum's report is as follows:\\n\\\"Examination of the lumbar spine reveals no disalignment. The vertebrae are of average size, contour and texture and except for minor osteoarthrosis, exhibit no evidence of injury. The inter-vertebral discs are of normal height. The lumbo-sacral and sacro-iliac articulations shows no changes. An antero-posterior projection of the entire pelvis including both hips and the proximal femurs and a supplementary lateral film of the left hip show the component bones to be normal in contour, texture and density. The hip joint spaces are of equal arid average width and the articular cortex is smooth. - No evidence of disease or injury is demonstrated.\\\"\\nDr. Teitelbaum, in his examination, states that such minor degenerative changes as shown by the X-rays are commensurate with a patient of middle age; but there was no evidence of injury or disease other than these. Plaintiff was 42 years of age when the X-rays were taken by him.\\nAt the beginning of the trial, the plaintiff offered the joint testimony of Dr. Kuehnle and Dr. O. W. Cosby, an eye specialist. Dr. Kuehnle read from a book written by Dr. Otto Steinbrocker the definition' of \\\"Robertson's Sign\\\" as \\\"Dilation of pupils produced by pressure upon any painful area resulting from an organic lesion. In the malingerer or neurasthenic, when an alleged pain is complained of, pressure over the area fails to produce reaction.\\\" Dr. Cosby testified that the \\\"Robertson's Sign\\\" is the same as found in Volume I., Textbook of Ophthalmology, by Duke-Elder, an outstanding book in ophthalmology. He read from this book, under the heading of \\\"The Phycho-Sensory Reflex\\\": \\\"The stimulation of any sensory nerve results in a dilation of the pupils. The dilation does not depend directly upon the physical intensity of the stimulus, but is a function also of the state of receptivity of the higher centers or after ablation of the cerebral entex. The stimulation of any sensory.\\\" The doctor states that, in short, it \\\"simply means that if a painful stimulus occurs there is a resultant dilation of the pupil. Dr. Cosby and Dr. Kuehnle applied the test to plaintiff and to Mr. Middleton, associate counsel for defendant. Dr. Cosby testified that there were dilation of the plaintiff's pupil when Dr. Kuehnle applied pressure upon the left sacro-iliac, the lum-brosacral area of the back, and the right sacral iliac and the anterosuperior area spine of plaintiff and there were no dilation of the pupil when pressure was applied at these areas of Mr. Middleton. There was a dilation of Mr. Middleton's pupil when a painful stimulus was produced by flexion of a finger. He has only applied this test on three occasions, first in the Trimble case, second in this case, and third upon himself. He states that any stimulus to the sensory nervous system will cause dilation of the-pupil, such as fear, excitement, possible extremes of temperature or emotional disturbances.\\nDr. J. S. Anderson, an eye, ear, nose and throat specialist, was offered by the defendant. This doctor testified that he had no information about the \\\"Robertson's Sign\\\"; that prior to three or four days to the trial of the case. As to the Duke-Elder book, he states that any stimulation, either mind or the body, be it psychic or physical stimulation, will cause a dilation of the pupil. He states that the test is not an accurate test of whether a man is suffering pain. In that he is corroborated by Dr. Godfrey.-\\nAnent the \\\"Robertson's Sign\\\" test conducted in open Court and the testimony offered pro and con, relative to proof of pain by the dilation of the pupils of the eye, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the doctors do not think much of this test in that it is-shown that fear or other emotions will cause the pupils to, dilate and that there is no way to tell the degree of pain by the dilation of the pupils. We do not attach any probative value to the test in the determination of this case.\\nA,s to the lay testimony, we have only the testimony of plaintiff's wife, of Mr. J. L. Winfree and of plaintiff.\\nHis wife testified that although plaintiff was a hard working man supporting himself and her, since the accident plaintiff has been unable to work; plaintiff does not rest at night; sometimes she has to get up during the night and rub plaintiff with alcohol; he sleeps on a hard matress, on boards. On account of the plaintiff's condition she had to seek work and that they live on her earnings and help from her employer. Plaintiff never leaves the home and has not earned any money since the accident.\\nMr. Winfree, an employee of the Gulf Refining Co., testified that plaintiff's wife is in his employ as a domestic servant and occasionally keeps the children at night for him and his wife. He knows nothing of plaintiff's ailments; he frequently takes plaintiff's wife home and on these occasions, he, during the afternoon, invariably found plaintiff sitting on the porch complaining .of pain and with apparent difficulty in walking from the porch to the car; plaintiff would walk with a limp and with a cane. At night, plaintiff would be up and would open the door to let his wife in. He would not see plaintiff. Witness' wife would give food and clothes to plaintiff's wife.\\nPlaintiff has testified that ever since he quit his employment with the Armco Drainage and Metal Work, he has not worked and cannot work on account of pain. He is corroborated by the doctors who testified in the case in that his hands are those of one who appears not to have worked. He states that none of the treatment he has received had done any good, save to give him temporary relief.\\nIt is indeed hard to understand this case. All the doctors, save Dr. Godfrey, will not classify the plaintiff as a malingerer. However, Dr. Kuehnle was of the opinion that plaintiff was able to return to work on December 5, 1946. Dr. Thom was of the opinion that in September, 1946, plaintiff should try to work, and Dr. Brostrum was of the opinion that plaintiff could return to work in October, 1946. The only reason we can see for plaintiff not returning to work is his status of mind. He has a slight case of arthritis, and which is common for his age. We believe that he has and is exaggerating his condition. We are therefore of the opinion that the preponderance of the medical testimony shows that plaintiff was fully able to return to work by December 5, 1946, and compensation will be granted unto him beginning from April 4, 1946, to December 5, 1946.\\nDuring the trial of the case, plaintiff sought to introduce reports of Dr. Moss M. Brannerman's, an orthopedic surgeon of Baton Rouge, he having examined plaintiff at plaintiff's own request. The offerings were promptly objected to by defendant unless Dr. Brannerman was ottered as a witness and would identify the reports. Plaintiff refused to call the doctor as a witness. The objection was sustained. In this court, plaintiff complains of the ruling of the lower court. We find no error in the lower court's ruling. These reports are ex-parte reports of Dr. Branner-man and not properly identified. Defendant was entitled to have Dr. Brannerman in court and be cross-examined, if it desired,\\nAfter the case was closed defendant then filed a motion to have the case reopened for the purpose of taking Dr. Bran-nerman's testimony. Plaintiff objected and stated that he would object to having Dr. Brannerman give testimony for the reason that Dr. Brannerman was his own doctor and therefore his findings would be privileged. For that reason, the district judge denied defendant's motion. Dr. Branner-man did not testify. The testimony of Dr. Brannerman must-then be presumed to have .been adverse to plaintiff's case. However, the presumption does not alter our conclusion.\\nAnent plaintiff's wages, we find that the evidence clearly establishes that plaintiff was employed and was receiving at the time of the accident, pay at the rate of 55\\u00a1\\u00e9 per hour, eight-hour day, for five days a week, making his weekly wage $22, 65% of which is $14.30.\\nThe following medical expenses have been proven: Dr. J. A. Thom, $35; Dr. Lester J. Williams, $30; Dr. Moss M. Bran-nerman, $25; totalling $90, and which will be allowed.\\nFor these reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is hereby annulled, reversed and set aside. It is now ordered, adjudged and decreed that there be judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant granting compensation to plaintiff in the full sum of $14.30 per week commencing April 4, 1946, and ending December 5, 1946, with legal interest on the said weekly instalments from the date each was due until paid.\\nIt is further ordered that plaintiff do have and recover judgment against the defendant in the sum of $90, with legal interest from judicial demand until paid.\\nIt is further ordered that the expert medical fees of Doctors O. W. Cosby and J. A. Thom be fixed at $25 each and that of Dr. G. R. Kuehnle be fixed at $50.\\nThe defendant is ordered to pay all costs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/11079133.json b/la/11079133.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..70bd1215e338f84a705c59bb113e5c0d6c04e16f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/11079133.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11079133\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Bobby HOLMES\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Holmes\", \"decision_date\": \"2000-12-08\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2000-KP-1374\", \"first_page\": \"458\", \"last_page\": \"458\", \"citations\": \"776 So. 2d 458\", \"volume\": \"776\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:26:43.663808+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Bobby HOLMES.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Bobby HOLMES.\\nNo. 2000-KP-1374.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nDec. 8, 2000.\", \"word_count\": \"46\", \"char_count\": \"307\", \"text\": \"In re Holmes, Bobby; \\u2014 Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 320-251; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2000-K-0157.\\nDenied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/11111019.json b/la/11111019.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e31d0bf290ebf348ccf9384ad6274a8138653ff8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/11111019.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11111019\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. James WOODS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Woods\", \"decision_date\": \"2001-05-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2000 KA 2147\", \"first_page\": \"1083\", \"last_page\": \"1097\", \"citations\": \"787 So. 2d 1083\", \"volume\": \"787\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:14:29.939395+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before: GONZALES, PETTIGREW, SEXTON, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. James WOODS.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. James WOODS.\\nNo. 2000 KA 2147.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.\\nMay 11, 2001.\\nDoug Moreau, District Attorney, Aaron D. Brooks, Creighton B. Abadie, Assistant District Attorneys, Baton Rouge, for Plaintiff, State of Louisiana.\\nJ. Rodney Messina, Johnny Wellons, Baton Rouge, for Defendant, James Woods.\\nBefore: GONZALES, PETTIGREW, SEXTON, JJ.\\n. The Honorable Fred C. Sexton, Jr., Judge (retired), Second Circuit Court of Appeal, is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.\", \"word_count\": \"6929\", \"char_count\": \"41061\", \"text\": \"JgFRED C. SEXTON, Judge.\\nThe defendant, James Woods, was charged by bill of information with attempted second degree murder, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:27 and 30.1, and possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967(A). The defendant pled not guilty and, after trial by jury, was found guilty as charged. He subsequently was sentenced to twelve years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for his conviction of attempted second degree murder. For his conviction of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, he was sentenced to eight years at hard labor with the first five years to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The defendant has appealed, urging five assignments of error.\\nFACTS\\nOn July 15, 1997, Gregory Labranch, Reginald Williams, and Kenneth Brown traveled to Baton Rouge from LaPlace, Louisiana, to buy drugs. Upon arriving in Baton Rouge, they encountered a man called Slim, who told them that they could buy drugs at the defendant's home. Slim then took the men to the defendant's home. Labranch had approximately $850.00 with which he planned to buy drugs. Slim, Brown, and Williams went into the defendant's home where Brown observed crack cocaine packaged in a sandwich bag. After negotiating over the price of the cocaine, the defendant began to weigh the cocaine. A discussion ensued between the men about the fairness of weighing the cocaine while it was still inside the plastic |3bag. Labranch then entered the house and a fight broke out between the men. Brown hit the defendant on the head with a gun and he, Labranch, and Williams left the house and jumped into their vehicle. Slim, who was armed, stayed inside the house. Shots were fired from the house at the vehicle occupied by Brown, Williams, and La-branch. Bullets entered the vehicle and one of the bullets struck Labranch in the leg. Brown tried to fire his gun but it did not work. Brown, Williams, and Labranch attempted to leave the scene in their vehicle, but the vehicle stalled. The men exited the car and ran to a nearby dry cleaners from which police were called to the scene.\\nPolice later took Brown and Williams to the scene of the shooting where, according to police testimony at trial, they identified the defendant as the shooter. Subsequently, 23.3 grams of cocaine inside a plastic bag were found in the Labranch's vehicle. According to Brown, there was no cocaine in Labranch's car before they went to the defendant's home to buy drugs. However, Brown was not sure how the cocaine ended up in Labranch's car.\\nPROCEDURE\\nWe find reversible error raised by defendant's first and second assignments of error. The defendant also argues in his third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error that the evidence is insufficient. When issues are raised on appeal, both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. The reason for reviewing sufficiency first is that the accused is entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981), if a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in accordance with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not reasonably conclude that all of the essential elements of the offense have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. When the entirety of the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, the accused must be discharged as to that crime, and any discussion by the court of the trial error issues as to that crime would be pure dicta |4since those issues are moot.\\nOn the other hand, when the entirety of the evidence, both admissible and inadmissible, is sufficient to support the conviction, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal, and the reviewing court must then consider the assignments of trial error to determine whether the accused is entitled to a new trial. If the reviewing court determines there has been trial error (which was not harmless) in cases in which the entirety of the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, then the accused must receive a new trial, but is not entitled to an acquittal even though the admissible evidence, considered alone, was insufficient. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988); State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La.1992).\\nAccordingly, we proceed first to determine whether the entirety of the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine and attempted second degree murder.\\nSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE (Assignments of Error Numbers 3, 4, and 5)\\nIn his third assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in sustaining a guilty verdict based upon insufficient evidence. In his fourth assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying the defense's Motion for a Verdict of Acquittal. In his fifth assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying the defense's Motion for a New Trial. Each of these assignments of error questions the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict the defendant.\\nIn his brief to this court, the defendant contends that with regard to his conviction of possession with the intent to distribute, there was no credible evidence presented that the defendant had drugs on his person or in his home. He claims that the only cocaine found was in the victim's car and he was not connected in any manner to that cocaine. The defendant also asserts that no drug paraphernalia was found in his home. With respect to his conviction for attempted second degree | smurder, the defendant contends that none of the witnesses to the crime positively identified him as the shooter.\\nThe standard of review for the sufficiency of evidence to uphold a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the state proved the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity beyond a reasonable doubt. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821; State v. King, 563 So.2d 449, 456 (La.App. 1st Cir.1990), writ denied, 567 So.2d 610 (La.1990); State v. Johnson, 461 So.2d 673, 674 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984). The Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), standard of review incorporated in Article 821 is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, LSA-R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. McLean, 525 So.2d 1251, 1255 (La.App. 1st Cir.1988), writ denied, 532 So.2d 130 (La.1988). Where the key issue raised by the defense is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, the state is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentifieation. State v. Richardson, 459 So.2d 31, 38 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984).\\nThe testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to prove the elements of the offense. The trier of fact may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Johnson, 529 So.2d 466, 473 (La.App. 1st Cir.1988), writ denied, 536 So.2d 1233 (La.1989). This court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. State v. Polkey, 529 So.2d 474, 476 (La.App. 1st Cir.1988), writ denied, 536 So.2d 1233 (La.1989).\\nIn the instant case, Kenneth Brown testified that on July 15, 1997, he was with [ sGreg Labranch and Reginald Williams in Labranch's Cadillac. They decided to drive to Baton Rouge so Labranch could buy drugs. According to Brown, La-branch had $850.00, which he was going to use to buy drugs. While driving around Baton Rouge, the three men encountered a man called Slim that Brown's \\\"podnuh\\\" knew. Slim got into the car with them, they talked, and he took them to the defendant's home. Slim told them that the defendant had drugs at his home. After arriving at the defendant's home, Slim went inside the defendant's house for ten to fifteen minutes. Slim then returned to the car and Brown and \\\"another guy\\\" went inside the house. Brown indicated that the other person was Williams. Brown admitted that he was carrying a .45 gun and Slim was armed with a .38. Labranch kept the money while the others went inside the house. According to Brown, the defendant and the defendant's younger brother were inside the house when he entered. Brown identified the defendant in court as being the person whose house they entered.\\nBrown also saw drugs inside the defendant's home. He described the drugs as being \\\"little rocks\\\" that were packaged in a sandwich bag. Brown stated that no one brought cocaine into the house; the cocaine was already there. According to Brown, there was some negotiation over the price of the drugs and someone told the defendant that they had $850.00. The defendant was measuring out $850.00 worth of cocaine on a digital scale, when there was a discussion about weighing the cocaine while it was still inside the plastic bag. Labranch subsequently entered the defendant's home. The men then argued about the cocaine and Brown hit the defendant on his head with his gun. He thought the clip may have fallen out of his gun. Brown, Labranch, and Williams then ran out of the defendant's home and got into Labranch's car. Slim stayed inside the defendant's house. Someone then fired shots at Labranch's vehicle using an \\\"AK-type . machine gun type weapon.\\\" Brown denied seeing the defendant or Slim fire the weapon. However, Brown later admitted that Slim could have fired the gun. According to Brown, bullets entered the Cadillac and one hit Labranch in the leg. The defendant admitted that after the other men left the house and shots were fired, he tried to shoot his gun, but it did not fire. |7Labranch started the car and moved it,- but the car stalled. La-branch, Williams, and Brown exited the car and ran to a nearby dry cleaners.\\nBrown was aware that cocaine was found inside the Cadillac, but he did not know who put the cocaine there. However, he testified the drugs found in the Cadillac were from the defendant's home. According to Brown, he, Williams, and La-branch went to the defendant's house with the intent to buy drugs but the deal did not take place. Brown admitted to seeing five rocks of cocaine in the house. He was not sure how the drugs got into the car but he conceded that his \\\"podnuh\\\" might have grabbed them from the defendant's house. According to Brown, the defendant's younger brother left from the rear of the house after they arrived. Brown admitted that he had been convicted of illegal use of a weapon stemming from the instant incident. He claimed to have no other convictions except for possibly a drug conviction as a juvenile.\\nGreg Labranch testified that on July 15, 1997, he drove his Cadillac to Baton Rouge with Brown and Williams to buy drugs. He had about $850.00 with him, which he was going to use to buy drugs. While in Baton Rouge, they met a man named Slim who told them that he could help them buy drugs and took them to a house on McKinley Street. At one point in his testimony, Labranch claimed not to know the name of the person they met. Labranch was not sure who lived at the house and he claimed that he did not know the defendant or see him at the house. He claimed that he did not remember much because he was intoxicated. Upon arriving at the house on McKinley Street, Labranch waited in the car while the others went inside the house. According to Labranch, Brown was armed when he went inside the house, Williams was not, and he did not know if Slim was armed. Approximately thirty minutes after the others entered the house, La-branch went inside the house and saw everyone fighting. Labranch saw Slim pull a gun on Brown. After they ran out of the house, someone shot at them. La-branch did not know who was the shooter. Labranch was shot in the leg, but he did not know the caliber of the bullet as it was still in his leg. According to Labranch, he was in the car [\\u00bfwhen he was shot. The bullet went through the driver's side door. He denied previously saying that the gun that shot him was an AK-47. After he was shot and the car stalled, he jumped out of the car and ran to a nearby dry cleaners. Labranch agreed that Slim was armed with a .38.\\nLabranch reiterated that he did not know who shot him. He claimed that Slim told him that he lived at the house on McKinley Street. He claimed that he did not have any money, and that the money belonged to Brown. Labranch denied seeing the defendant before and indicated that the defendant never did anything to him. Labranch denied seeing any cocaine inside the house or picking up any cocaine from the house. He did not know who took the cocaine from the house. According to Labranch, there was not any cocaine inside his car before he went to the house on McKinley Street and he did not know if there was any cocaine inside his car after they left the house. Labranch claimed that Brown had the money to buy the cocaine with him. Labranch pled guilty to illegal use of a weapon in connection with the events of July 15,1997.\\nPete Bahlinger, Jr., testified that on July 15, 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he was driving down McKinley Street when he saw a Cadillac stopped in the middle of the street. As Bahlinger approached the Cadillac, he stopped. He saw a person to his left and heard gunfire and some \\\"shells\\\" hit the street. At that point, three individuals ran out of a house and jumped into the Cadillac and the Cadillac moved. The shooter appeared to go inside the house, but after Bahlinger passed, he looked into his rearview mirror and observed the shooter \\\"in the middle of the street doing this again.\\\" Bahlinger was not sure if he was firing again because he was too far away. Bahlinger decided that he needed to get out of the area because he was in the line of fire. He passed by the Cadillac, which was stopped with the driver's door open. Bahlinger saw three holes in the Cadillac. He then proceeded to the police station. According to Bahlinger, the shooter was firing a weapon that was on an AK-47 frame. In court, Bahlinger identified the person doing the shooting. He stated that he remembered his gait when he saw him walk through the hallway of the | ncourthouse. When asked if he saw the person who fired the AK-47 type weapon in the courtroom, Bahlinger responded, 'Tes, sir. I believe it's that fellow right over there by the defendant.\\\" On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Bahlinger if he saw \\\"this man\\\" fire any gun at anyone. Bahlinger responded that he saw him fire three or four rounds at the Cadillac and he heard the shell casings hit the ground near his track. Bahlinger did not know if the man hit any of the men at whom he was shooting. Bahlinger admitted he had no knowledge about someone named Slim at that house being in possession of a .38. On redirect examination, Bahlinger indicated that the only person he saw shooting was the defendant. He did not hear the shooter say anything.\\nDetective Dave Mays was the first detective to arrive at the crime scene. Mays spoke with the defendant who told him that three black males went to his house and asked for a drink of water. After giving them some water, one of the men produced a weapon and told him to \\\"give it up.\\\" A struggle ensued and the defendant was struck on the head with a gun. The men then fled and he went outside and attempted to fire some shots at them but his weapon jammed. According to Mays, the defendant had a laceration to his head and he was bloody. Mays identified the defendant in court as being the person he spoke to at the crime scene.\\nSergeant Bart Thompson responded to a call from the dry cleaners on the date in question. Upon arriving at the cleaners, he spoke to Labranch, Brown, and Williams. Thompson observed that Brown had a laceration to his head, which was apparently caused by a bullet graze, and Labranch had been shot one time in the leg. Labranch was transported to the hospital and Thompson took Williams and Brown to the crime scene where Brown identified the defendant as being the per son who shot them. According to Brown and Williams, the defendant used some sort of assault rifle. The defendant was taken into custody, the house was secured, and the car was seized.\\nAccording to Thompson, he was approached by witnesses at the scene who Imtold him that just prior to the arrival of the police at the scene, a car left the residence in question. Thompson admitted that he did not see any cocaine at the defendant's residence. Thompson testified that he was made aware that cocaine was found in the victim's car. Statements were taken from Brown and Williams and they both told him that they went to the house in question to buy cocaine. Brown and Williams told him that the cocaine came from the defendant's house. La-branch refused to give a statement regarding the incident.\\nSergeant Richard Cochran of the Baton Rouge Police Department testified that on July 15, 1997, he was working in the crime scene division and was summoned to the instant crime scene. He photographed the house and collected evidence. Cochran collected a live \\\".45 auto cartridge\\\" from the porch near the front door and a spent Winchester 7.62 shell casing from the front yard. According to Cochran, the spent shell casing would have been fired by a rifle. From inside the house, Cochran collected a bloody gun clip that contained three live cartridges. Cochran admitted that he did not find any cocaine or drug paraphernalia inside the defendant's home. He did not find a .38 casing or a .38 bullet.\\nSergeant Ron Cowart of the Baton Rouge Police Department testified that he helped secure the scene until the crime scene unit arrived. Cowart looked in the victim's car and found a bag of suspected cocaine in the driver's seat where the seat and the back of the seat meet. Labranch told Cowart that he went to the defendant's house to get a drink of water and \\\"all hell broke loose.\\\"\\nBaton Rouge Police Lieutenant Edward McCants testified that he was summoned to the crime scene to take care of the victim's car. Upon looking in the car, he found a pistol with no magazine and a \\\"baggy\\\" of drugs. The weapon seized from the vehicle did not have a magazine in it, but it did have one bullet in the chamber. He did not find any spent casings.\\nThe unanimous guilty verdict returned in this case indicates that, after considering the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, the jury accepted the testimony of the state's witnesses. This court will not assess the Incredibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence.\\nAfter reviewing the record, we are convinced that the evidence supports the jury's determination. Brown and La-branch testified that they went to the defendant's home to buy drugs. Brown saw cocaine inside the defendant's home, negotiated a price for the cocaine with the defendant, and observed the defendant measure the cocaine on a scale. After the instant incident, cocaine was found in La-branch's Cadillac and both Brown and La-branch indicated that there was no cocaine in Labranch's car before they went to the defendant's home. Neither Brown nor La-branch were sure how the cocaine ended up in Labranch's car; however, Brown did admit that the drugs found in the car were from the defendant's home and that his \\\"podnuh\\\" might have grabbed the drugs. Although cocaine was not found in the defendant's home, Sergeant Thompson testified that Brown and Williams told him that they went to the house in question to buy cocaine and that the cocaine in question came from the defendant's home. Cocaine was found in Labranch's car.\\nAlthough Labranch and Brown were unable to identify the defendant as the shooter in the instant incident, Brown admitted someone fired at them using an \\\"AK-type\\\" weapon and that Slim had been armed with a .38. According to La-branch, the bullet that hit him in the leg went through his car door. Bahlinger testified that he saw the shooter firing a weapon on an AK-47 type frame. Bah-linger identified the shooter in court, indicated that he remembered his gait when he walked through the courtroom, and indicated that the only person he saw shooting was the defendant. When asked to identify the shooter in court, Bahlinger stated he believed it was \\\"that fellow right over there by the defendant.\\\" It is obvious from the lack of clarification by the prosecutor that Bahlinger indeed was indicating that the defendant was the shooter. In all likelihood, no one but the defendant and defense counsel would have been sitting together at the defense table as the defendant was the only person on trial. Additionally, Sergeant Thompson testified that Williams and Brown were returned to the crime scene where they identified the defendant as being the person |1%who shot at them using some type of assault rifle. The defendant spoke to Detective Mays and placed himself at the scene of the crime.\\nA rational trier of fact, viewing all the evidence, both admissible and inadmissible, as favorable to the prosecution as any rational fact finder can, could have concluded that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine and attempted second degree murder and the defendant's identity as perpetrator of that offense. These assignments of error are without merit.\\nOPENING STATEMENT\\n(Assignment of Error Number 1)\\nIn his first assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering defense counsel to tell the jury during opening arguments about the defendant's prior arrests. In his brief to this court, the defendant argues that the judge, the prosecutor, and the court reporter were wrong about what was originally stated by defense counsel. He contends that forcing defense counsel to introduce evidence of his arrests, particularly without any type of Prieur hearing, was impermissible. The defendant claims forcing defense counsel to report this information to the jury was highly prejudicial as it was highly likely that the jury believed he had gotten away with crimes in the past and that he would not get away this time. He contends that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial, particularly since from the beginning of his trial, the jury was made aware that the instant arrest for possession with intent to distribute was the defendant's third drug related arrest.\\nInitially, we note that the state contends that because defense counsel failed to make a contemporaneous objection to the trial court's decision, he is barred from raising this issue on appeal. It is well settled in our law that an objection need not be raised by incantation. It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action that he desires the court to take, or his objections to the action of the court, and the grounds therefor. | iaThe contemporaneous objection rule has two purposes: 1) to put the trial judge on notice of the alleged irregularity so that he may cure the problem, and 2) to prevent a defendant from gambling for a favorable verdict and then resorting to appeal on errors that might easily have been corrected by objection. City of Baton Rouge v. Schmieder, 582 So.2d 1266, 1270 (La.1991). In the instant case, it is evident that defense counsel preserved this issue for appeal by making arguments to the court and prosecutor regarding the wording used in his opening statement. Thus, this issue is properly before this court.\\nLouisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(B)(1) provides:\\nExcept as provided in Article 412, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.\\nLouisiana Code of Evidence Article 609.1 provides, in pertinent part:\\nA. General criminal rule. In a criminal case, every witness by testifying subjects himself to examination relative to his criminal convictions, subject to limitations set forth below.\\nB. Convictions. Generally, only offenses for which the witness has been convicted are admissible upon the issue of his credibility, and no inquiry is permitted into matters for which there has only been an arrest, the issuance of an arrest warrant, an indictment, a prosecution, or an acquittal.\\nThe general rule of Article 609.1 gives way when a witness has pending charges against him and the cross-examiner seeks to show the fact-finder that these pending charges may bias or influence the testimony of the witness. State v. Johnson, 32,910, p. 8 (La.App. 2d Cir.1/26/00), 750 So.2d 398, 405, writ denied, 2000-0911 (La.11/3/00), 773 So.2d 140.\\nDuring his opening statement, defense counsel stated:\\nMr. Robert Woods \\u2014 I talked to this young man \\u2014 he was 14. He [was] over at his brother's house all the time. He said nobody has ever been over to buy any drugs from them. He [sic] never been arrested for no | Udrugs, Mr. Robert Woods. Mr. Woods has never been convicted of anything. This man here, twenty something years old, he [has] never been convicted of anything.\\nAt the conclusion of defense counsel's opening statement, the prosecutor. asked to approach the bench and a side bar conference was held. The prosecutor complained that defense counsel stated that the defendant had never been arrested for drugs. Defense counsel argued that he said \\\"convicted.\\\" The prosecutor countered that defense counsel used both terms and defense counsel denied doing so. The prosecutor and defense counsel continued to argue until the court stated that it was going to review the transcript. The court then asked the court reporter to review what was said by defense counsel. The court told defense counsel that if he said the defendant had never been arrested, then he would have to correct his statement. At this point, defense counsel stated, \\\"I might have said that.\\\" Subsequently, the court stated that the court reporter checked the transcript and that defense counsel did state that the defendant had never been arrested or convicted. The court told defense .counsel that he needed to correct his statement because he was incorrect for saying that the defendant had never been arrested. Defense counsel then inquired as to what he was to tell the jury and the court indicated that he was to tell the jury that defendant had been arrested on drug charges.\\nDefense counsel then addressed the jury and stated:\\nLadies and Gentlemen of the jury, I want to always stay straight forward, and I talked to Mr. Brooks [the prosecutor] and when we talked \\u2014 I talk fast sometimes and my mind go [sic] forward sometimes. Mr. \\u2014 Mr. Woods has been my client for a while, and I made a statement that Mr. Woods has never been arrested for a drug charge nor convicted. And I want to restate this to the jury. In my opening statement that Mr. Woods has been arrested once. I don't know \\u2014 on a drug charge \\u2014 he has been arrested on a drug charge, but that charge he was never convicted for that charge. Okay? Therefore\\u2014\\nShortly thereafter, the court asked to speak to defense counsel. A bench conference was held wherein the court and the prosecutor pointed out to defense counsel that the defendant had been arrested two times and defense counsel said he was arrested only once. The prosecutor asked defense counsel to correct the mistake. Defense counsel then told the jury:\\n| ^Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm going to come back here and we are going to definitely go forward with the trial now. Mr. Brooks has a record on Mr. Woods. Mr. Woods has been arrested in '92 and '96, but he never [sic] been convicted for anything. He has a right to carry a gun. He has a right to vote, and that is why you come to court to prove or disprove or vindicate \\u2014 -therefore, he's just like us as citizens with all legal rights. Do I make myself clear? So any of us can get arrested, and I think some folks on the jury were arrested but until you are convicted of something\\u2014 okay. Now I am going to sit down before I mess up something.\\nIn the instant case, the trial court erred in ordering defense counsel to inform the jury of the defendant's prior arrests. Defense counsel did not open the door regarding the defendant's arrests as he stated that it was the defendant's brother, Robert Woods, who had never been arrested and the defendant, James Woods, who had not been convicted. The court relied on the court reporter's erroneous review of the transcript. Additionally, the information regarding the defendant's previous arrests was not presented to the jury to show the defendant's motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, nor was it an integral part of the present proceeding. Furthermore, the exception to the rule set forth in LSA-C.E. art. 609.1, which states that only convictions are admissible, did not apply herein as there was no evidence presented that these charges were pending charges against the defendant and the issue of these arrests was not raised on cross-examination of the defendant to show bias or influence. This information was wrongly given to the jury only because of a mistake and not for any specific purpose.\\nMoreover, we are unable to find this error to be harmless. The erroneous admission of other-crimes evidence is a trial error subject to harmless-error analysis on appeal. State v. Johnson, 94-1379, p. 15 (La.11/27/95), 664 So.2d 94, 101. The test for determining whether an error is harmless is whether the verdict actually rendered in this case \\\"was surely unattributable to the error.\\\" Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); State v. Morris, 99-3075, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/3/00), 770 So.2d 908, 915.\\nEvidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible in the guilt phase of a | ^criminal trial unless the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect and unless other safeguards are met. This general rule ensures that a defendant who has committed other crimes will not be convicted of a present offense simply because he is perceived as a \\\"bad person,\\\" irrespective of the evidence of his guilt or innocence. A conviction should be based on guilt and not on character. State v. Johnson, 94-1379 at p. 10, 664 So.2d at 99.\\nIn arguing for a harmless error application in this case, the state points out the strength of its case and that the defendant failed to prove that he suffered any prejudice. While the state may have proved the elements of the charged crimes, we cannot say that the evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming. The state's case depended on credibility determinations. No drugs were found on the defendant or in the defendant's house and only one witness saw drugs inside the defendant's home and saw the defendant weigh the drugs. Additionally, only one witness identified the defendant in court as being the shooter and his identification was confusing. The prejudice to the defendant's credibility created by this erroneous indication of two previous arrests on drug-related crimes cannot be measured. It certainly cannot be ruled out that the jury decided that he was a bad man who had been arrested for other drug offenses. Finally, we note that the defendant did not testify, but had he testified, it is unlikely that the state could have used these arrests to impeach him.\\nConsidering all of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the guilty verdicts actually rendered in this trial were surely unattributable to this error. Accordingly, we find that a harmless error analysis leads us to conclude the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and, therefore, these convictions must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. This assignment of error has merit.\\nJURY INSTRUCTIONS\\n(Assignment of Error Number 2)\\nIn his second assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court |17erred in including the element of specific intent to commit great bodily harm in the definition of attempted second degree murder in its instructions given to the jury. In his brief to this court, the defendant argues that the court's instructions were not harmless error as there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant had a gun or even shot at the victim.\\nWhile a conviction for second degree murder can be obtained by showing that the defendant had either the specific intent to kill or the specific intent to inflict great bodily harm, a conviction for attempted second degree murder can be obtained only by showing that the defendant had the specific intent to kill and committed an act tending to accomplish that purpose. Intent to inflict great bodily harm will not support a conviction of attempted second degree murder. State v. Hongo, 96-2060, p. 2 (La.12/02/97), 706 So.2d 419, 420; State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189, 192-93 (La.1975).\\nIn the instant case, the trial court, when instructing the jury as to the elements of the crime, simply read from the definition of second degree murder, LSA-R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1), followed by a definition of specific intent and attempt. The court then stated that in order to find the defendant guilty of attempted second degree murder, the jury must find that the defendant had the specific intent to commit the crime of second degree murder and did an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the commission of the crime of second degree murder. Consequently, the court included the intent to inflict great bodily harm in the definition of second degree murder. Thus, the court issued erroneous instructions to the jury by including the \\\"intent to inflict great bodily harm\\\" element along with the proper and required \\\"intent to kill\\\" element.\\nPrior to the supreme court's opinion in State v. Hongo, there was a conflict among the courts of appeal, with some circuits holding State v. Butler mandated reversal and remand for retrial where the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that \\\"intent to inflict great bodily harm\\\" was an element of attempted murder. State v. Pyke, 93-1506, p. 8 (La.App. 3rd Cir.5/4/94), 640 So.2d 460, 465; State v.\\nHolmes, 620 So.2d 436, 437 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1993), writ denied, 626 So.2d 1166 (La.1993); State v. Guin, 444 So.2d 625, 635 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983). Other circuits applied a harmless error test, upholding verdicts where there was overwhelming evidence to support the conviction and the erroneous instruction was not found prejudicial. State v. Brunet, 95-0340, p. 7 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/30/96), 674 So.2d 344, 348, writ denied, 96-1406 (La.11/1/96), 681 So.2d 1258; State v. Harris, 26,269, p. 9 (La.App. 2d Cir.9/21/94), 643 So.2d 779, 784, writ denied, 94-2607 (La.2/17/95), 650 So.2d 251; State v. Lyles, 483 So.2d 1174, 1177 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986), writ denied, 488 So.2d 198 (La.1986); State v. Snyder, 97-226, p. 8 (La.App. 5th Cir.9/30/97), 700 So.2d 1082, 1087; State v. Jynes, 94-745, p. 15 (La.App. 5th Cir.3/1/95), 652 So.2d 91, 98; State v. Scott, 490 So.2d 396, 403 (La.App. 5th Cir.1986).\\nThe State v. Hongo decision settled the issue, in holding:\\nBecause the erroneous instruction at issue may be an irrelevancy and because a reviewing court can make this determination, the error is not structural such as that in Sullivan, but rather a trial error which may or may not have prejudiced defendant and thus is subject to harmless error analysis, or in the case of an ineffective assistance claim, an analysis of whether defendant was prejudiced by the error. [Footnote omitted.]\\nState v. Hongo, 96-2060 at p. 5, 706 So.2d at 422. Thus, the erroneous jury instruction does not require an automatic remand, and an appellate court must apply a harmless error analysis.\\nHowever, according to the record before us, the defendant's trial counsel did not object to the erroneous instructions given by the trial court. Thus, the defendant ordinarily is precluded from raising such an alleged error for appellate review. LSA-C.Cr.P. arts. 801 and 841. Nevertheless, exceptions to this rule have been made in individual cases where there have been fundamentally erroneous misstatements of the essential elements of the charged offense. In such cases, the Louisiana |19Supreme Court has adopted the view that such fundamentally incorrect jury instructions so affect the fairness of the proceedings and the accuracy of the fact-finding process that due process of law requires reversal, even in the absence of compliance with legislative procedural mandates. See State v. Williamson, 389 So.2d 1328, 1331 (La.1980); State v. Johnson, 98-1407, p. 10 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/1/99), 734 So.2d 800, 807, writ denied, 99-1386 (La.10/1/99), 748 So.2d 439.\\nWhether an appellate court can continue to make a State v. Williamson analysis and review such a matter on direct appeal is now in doubt, in light of the supreme court's statement in State v. Hongo:\\nAlthough this case is before us via post-conviction proceedings because of trial counsel's failure to object, we note that because we find that the instant error is not structural, it necessarily is not of such significance as to violate fundamental requirements of due process, See State v. Williamson, 389 So.2d 1328 (La.1980), and thus a defendant must make a contemporaneous objection in order to preserve the error for direct review. State v. Thomas, 427 So.2d 428, 435 (La.1982) (on rehearing) (limiting Williamson as it \\\"should not be construed as authorizing appellate review of every alleged constitutional violation and erroneous jury instruction urged first on appeal without timely objection.\\\")\\nState v. Hongo, 706 So.2d at 422, n. 3. Nevertheless, we find it unnecessary to resolve the issue in the case now before the court, having found reversible error on another basis. Consequently, we preter-mit this assignment of error.\\nCONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES REVERSED; REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.\\n. Under the authority of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), this court routinely reviews appellate records for patent error. After reviewing the record, we have discovered a patent sentencing error. For his conviction of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, the defendant was sentenced to eight years at hard labor with the first five years of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. However, at the time the defendant committed the instant crime, LSA-R.S. 40:967(B) (prior to its amendment by 1997 La. Acts No. 1284, \\u00a7 1) did not provide for the first five years of the defendant's sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Thus, the defendant's sentence on that conviction is considered illegal. However, because we have found merit in the defendant's appeal and are reversing his convictions and sentences on those grounds, it is not necessary to vacate the sentence on this particular conviction and remand to the trial court for resentencing on this error.\\n. Although the Third Circuit later adopted the harmless error approach to the issue, in State v. Taylor, 96-320, p. 15 (La.App. 3rd Cir.11/6/96), 683 So.2d 1309, 1318, writ denied, 96-2828 (La.6/20/97), 695 So.2d 1348, the court could not de .ermine that the erroneous instruction had been harmless error, in that case, and remanded the matter for a new trial.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/11171748.json b/la/11171748.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ba15f2a805d356a8961678f018d5e0a1cfea2c37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/11171748.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11171748\", \"name\": \"In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF DISCIPLINARY BOARD, No. 99-PDB-097\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"in Re Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Bd.\", \"decision_date\": \"2000-11-18\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2000-OB-2575\", \"first_page\": \"155\", \"last_page\": \"155\", \"citations\": \"773 So. 2d 155\", \"volume\": \"773\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:35:20.635218+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF DISCIPLINARY BOARD, No. 99-PDB-097.\", \"head_matter\": \"In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF DISCIPLINARY BOARD, No. 99-PDB-097.\\nNo. 2000-OB-2575.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nNov. 18, 2000.\", \"word_count\": \"44\", \"char_count\": \"289\", \"text\": \"In re Moore, Eugene; \\u2014 Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board Office Of The Disciplinary Board No. 99-PDB-097.\\nLeave to appeal is denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/11382412.json b/la/11382412.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3422050865d0a3232f760d43f348b1513f1a7b4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/11382412.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11382412\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas H. PINKERTON\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Pinkerton\", \"decision_date\": \"2002-11-08\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2002-K-0890\", \"first_page\": \"1108\", \"last_page\": \"1108\", \"citations\": \"828 So. 2d 1108\", \"volume\": \"828\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:30:43.980400+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas H. PINKERTON.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas H. PINKERTON.\\nNo. 2002-K-0890.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nNov. 8, 2002.\", \"word_count\": \"51\", \"char_count\": \"328\", \"text\": \"In re Pinkerton, Thomas H.; \\u2014 Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 299124B; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000-KA-2827.\\nDenied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/11520055.json b/la/11520055.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ea20c8c1f8fe629d05aa808c2a0deecd2cc31e96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/11520055.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11520055\", \"name\": \"STATE ex rel. Claude BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Brown v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2000-03-17\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 1999-KH-2593\", \"first_page\": \"320\", \"last_page\": \"320\", \"citations\": \"756 So. 2d 320\", \"volume\": \"756\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:01:59.872156+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"VICTORY, J., not on panel.\", \"parties\": \"STATE ex rel. Claude BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE ex rel. Claude BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.\\nNo. 1999-KH-2593.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nMarch 17, 2000.\", \"word_count\": \"60\", \"char_count\": \"390\", \"text\": \"In re Brown, Claude; \\u2014 Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 28624;\\nDenied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.\\nVICTORY, J., not on panel.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/11545498.json b/la/11545498.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd2046125e7f5a734920fcf9da56635076366177
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/11545498.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11545498\", \"name\": \"In re INTERDICTION OF James \\\"Jackie\\\" J. GALMICHE\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Interdiction of Galmiche\", \"decision_date\": \"2000-02-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 1999-CC-3538\", \"first_page\": \"943\", \"last_page\": \"943\", \"citations\": \"754 So. 2d 943\", \"volume\": \"754\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:46:09.482754+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"CALOGERO, C.J., not on panel.\", \"parties\": \"In re INTERDICTION OF James \\u201cJackie\\u201d J. GALMICHE.\", \"head_matter\": \"In re INTERDICTION OF James \\u201cJackie\\u201d J. GALMICHE.\\nNo. 1999-CC-3538.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nFeb. 11, 2000.\", \"word_count\": \"56\", \"char_count\": \"364\", \"text\": \"In re Hattier, Craig, J.; \\u2014 Third Party; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, Nos. 465-100; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 99-C-1145.\\nDenied.\\nCALOGERO, C.J., not on panel.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/11566480.json b/la/11566480.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0bca0231a4634ac26a28583c3840e459105af684
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/11566480.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11566480\", \"name\": \"Randall S. BASCO v. DOROTHY R. RACINE TRUCKING, INCORPORATED, International Indemnity, David J. Levron and ABC Insurance Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Basco v. Dorothy R. Racine Trucking, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1999-03-19\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 99-OC-0263\", \"first_page\": \"119\", \"last_page\": \"119\", \"citations\": \"740 So. 2d 119\", \"volume\": \"740\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:09:21.987853+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"LEMMON, J. not on panel.\", \"parties\": \"Randall S. BASCO v. DOROTHY R. RACINE TRUCKING, INCORPORATED, International Indemnity, David J. Levron and ABC Insurance Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"Randall S. BASCO v. DOROTHY R. RACINE TRUCKING, INCORPORATED, International Indemnity, David J. Levron and ABC Insurance Company.\\nNo. 99-OC-0263.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nMarch 19, 1999.\", \"word_count\": \"67\", \"char_count\": \"445\", \"text\": \"IN RE: Basco, Randall S.; \\u2014 Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Number CA97 2740; Parish of Terre-bonne 32nd Judicial District Court Div. \\\"E\\\" Number 110776.\\nDenied.\\nLEMMON, J. not on panel.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/11684774.json b/la/11684774.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..21629ebd98f56b56041f1e6dc5b3f8e9517c70a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/11684774.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11684774\", \"name\": \"EXECUTIVE CHIROPRACTIC SERVICES WEST (Re: Wayne Mouchon) v. COASTAL SEAFOOD (Louisiana Workers' Compensation Corporation)\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Executive Chiropractic Services West v. Coastal Seafood\", \"decision_date\": \"1998-06-19\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 98-CD-1553\", \"first_page\": \"471\", \"last_page\": \"471\", \"citations\": \"719 So. 2d 471\", \"volume\": \"719\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:37:00.998561+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"LEMMON, J., not on panel.\", \"parties\": \"EXECUTIVE CHIROPRACTIC SERVICES WEST (Re: Wayne Mouchon) v. COASTAL SEAFOOD (Louisiana Workers\\u2019 Compensation Corporation).\", \"head_matter\": \"EXECUTIVE CHIROPRACTIC SERVICES WEST (Re: Wayne Mouchon) v. COASTAL SEAFOOD (Louisiana Workers\\u2019 Compensation Corporation).\\nNo. 98-CD-1553.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nJune 19, 1998.\", \"word_count\": \"57\", \"char_count\": \"425\", \"text\": \"In re Coastal Seafood; Louisiana Workers' Comp. Corp.; \\u2014 Defendant(s); applying for supervisory and/or remedial writs; Office of Workers' Compensation, District 8, No. 95-07095.\\nContinuance granted. See R.S. 13:4163.\\nLEMMON, J., not on panel.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/11911200.json b/la/11911200.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..02bf908b3d3437b553c50e79cc00423ffccf34fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/11911200.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11911200\", \"name\": \"Tammy SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTIN MILLS, INC., Defendant-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Smith v. Martin Mills, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1997-05-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 97-11\", \"first_page\": \"680\", \"last_page\": \"684\", \"citations\": \"701 So. 2d 680\", \"volume\": \"701\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:36:50.894889+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before THIBODEAUX and DECUIR, JJ\\u201e and BABINEAUX , J. Pro Tem.\", \"parties\": \"Tammy SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTIN MILLS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Tammy SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTIN MILLS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.\\nNo. 97-11.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.\\nMay 21, 1997.\\nWrit Denied Oct. 3, 1997.\\nRussell Karl Zaunbrecher, Crowley, for Tammy Smith.\\nSamuel Robert Aueoin, Lafayette, for Martin Mills, Inc.\\nBefore THIBODEAUX and DECUIR, JJ\\u201e and BABINEAUX , J. Pro Tem.\\nHonorable Allen M. Babineaux, Retired, participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.\", \"word_count\": \"2258\", \"char_count\": \"14110\", \"text\": \"11THIBODEAUX, Judge.\\nTammy Smith filed a claim with the Office of Workers' Compensation after her employer, Martin Mills, Inc., denied her benefits. The hearing officer found that Ms. Smith sustained a work-related carpal tunnel syndrome and, as a result, has been totally and temporarily disabled. The hearing officer further held that Ms. Smith is entitled to all medical treatment prescribed by her physicians, and that Martin Mills, Ri\\u00f1e, acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to accept claimant's claim as compensable. Martin Mills, Inc. appeals the judgment of the Office of Workers' Compensation.\\nWe affirm the claimant's entitlement to medical benefits for the treatment of her carpal tunnel syndrome, and we reverse the judgment granting her disability benefits and penalties and attorney's fees.\\nI.\\nISSUES\\nThe issues presented for review in this appeal are whether the hearing officer was manifestly erroneous in finding (1) that Ms. Smith proved the existence of a work-related carpal tunnel syndrome; (2) that Ms. Smith was totally and temporarily disabled; (3) that Ms. Smith is entitled to medical expenses; and (4) that Martin Mills, Inc. acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to accept the claimant's claim as compensable.\\nII.\\nFACTS\\nOn April 22, 1995, Tammy Smith, an employee of Martin Mills, Inc. (Martin), felt a pull in her neck as she lifted a bundle of material to be sewn. She did not report the incident that day, nor did she mention it to her co-workers. Ms. Smith continued to work until the end of her shift. Later that day, she told her husband and mother that she was experiencing pain in the left side of her chest and pain and numbness in her left arm. Ms. Smith first saw a doctor about the pain the morning of April 24,1995.\\nDr. Ronald Menard was the first of several doctors Ms. Smith consulted after the April 22, 1995 incident. Dr. Menard, a general practitioner and claimant's | \\u00a1family physician, saw Ms. Smith on four separate occasions for her complaints. The date of her first visit was April 24, 1995. After the fourth visit, Dr. Menard determined that Ms. Smith had no objective physical problems and further stated he had no additional treatment to offer her.\\nMs. Smith next saw Dr. John Sabatier, a general internist, on May 2,1995. It was his opinion that Ms. Smith was not suffering from any abnormal objective symptoms. Based on Ms. Smith's subjective complaints, Dr. Sabatier diagnosed her with muscle strain secondary to nerve root irritation.\\nDr. Menard referred Ms. Smith to Dr. John Budden, an orthopedic surgeon, whom she saw on May 10, 1995. At that visit, Ms. Smith complained of pain in the left side of her neck and upper extremity as well as pain and numbness in her left hand. Her CT scan and MRI tests did not show any objective signs of injury. During his deposition, Dr. Budden stated that in spite of the normal test results, it was his opinion that Ms. Smith suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome affecting the left upper extremity; this conclusion was based largely on Ms. Smith's subjective complaints of numbness and upper extremity pain. Moreover, he testified that her work as a seamstress was the underlying cause of the carpal tunnel syndrome, with the lifting incident of April 22, 1995 being the final blow. He did not indicate, however, that Ms. Smith was totally disabled.\\nAt the request of Martin, Ms. Smith saw Dr. Clifton Shepherd, an orthopedist. In his report, he stated that he could not find anything wrong with Ms. Smith after reviewing her X-rays and CT scan. He recommended termination of treatment and a return to unrestricted activities. Furthermore, he indicated that Ms. Smith's complaints were not job-related.\\nOn September 15,1995, Ms. Smith saw Dr. Robert Franklin, a physiatrist, on a referral from Dr. Budden. The diagnostic studies he conducted on Ms. | \\u00bfSmith produced normal results. Nevertheless, it is his opinion that Ms. Smith suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome. Pursuant to his diagnosis of her condition, Dr. Franklin disabled Ms. Smith from her job as a seamstress stating that the repetitive nature of her job could aggravate the symptoms. He found, however, that Ms. Smith was able to perform other job-related duties.\\nOn November 28,1995, Ms. Smith saw Dr. Clark Gunderson, an orthopedic surgeon. After examining the claimant, Dr. Gunderson concluded that she did not suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Gunderson recommended that Dr. James Domingue perform some testing on Ms. Smith. The results of the tests were normal, i.e., no signs of carpal tunnel syndrome.\\nAfter a hearing before the Office of Workers' Compensation, the hearing officer found that Ms. Smith suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome and that she is entitled to temporary total disability benefits of $213.00 per week until she has reached maximum medical improvement as determined by Dr. Bud-den. The hearing officer assessed a 12% penalty on the unpaid indemnity benefits and attorney's fees of $3,500.00. Additionally, defendants were ordered to pay all of Ms. Smith's medical expenses related to the April 22,1995 work accident.\\nIII.\\nLAW AND ARGUMENT\\nAppellant argues that the hearing officer's findings and conclusions are manifestly erroneous and urges this court to accordingly reverse the judgment. We will review this appeal abiding by the routinely applied manifest error standard of review. Addressing this standard of review, our supreme court in Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989), stated,\\na court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's or a jury's finding in the absence of \\\"manifest error\\\" or unless it is \\\"clearly wrong,\\\" |5and where there is conflict in the testimony,.reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. (citations omitted).\\nUnless we find the hearing officer's judgment unsupported by the record, we shall affirm.\\nThe burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a work-related accident occurred rests with the claimant-employee. Frelow v. Mills, 94-799 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/7/94); 647 So.2d 475, writ denied, 95-0065 (La.3/10/95); 650 So.2d 1180. Martin first argues that the hearing officer erred in finding that Ms. Smith met the burden of proving by a preponderance that a work-related incident caused her carpal tunnel syndrome. The primary factor for the hearing officer's finding that Ms. Smith had been injured on the job was the abundance of lay and medical testimony that the claimant was in good health before April 22, 1995. It is well-settled that,\\n[a] claimant's disability is presumed to have resulted from an accident, if before the accident the injured person was in good health, but commencing with the accident the symptoms of the disabling condition appear and continuously manifest themselves afterwards, providing the medical evidence shows there to be a reasonable possibility of causal connection between the accident and the disabling condition.\\nLucas v. Ins. Co. of North America, 342 So.2d 591 (La.1977). (citation omitted). In addition to Ms. Smith's good health prior to April 22, 1995, the hearing officer seemingly relied heavily on the opinions of Ms. Smith's two treating physicians, Drs. Budden and Franklin.\\nBoth Dr. Budden and Dr. Franklin indicated that the carpal tunnel syndrome was work-related. Martin suggests that the hearing officer was erroneous in giving such weight to these doctors' opinions when no other doctors found anything wrong with Ms. Smith. We find that the hearing officer acted well within the bounds of her discretion in deciding this issue. A hearing officer is afforded much discretion | ein evaluating expert testimony and where the testimony of experts differ, it is his or her responsibility to determine which evidence is more credible. Lirette v. State Farm Ins. Co., 563 So.2d 850 (La.1990). Moreover, we note that the opinion/diagnosis of a treating physician is given more weight than that of a physician consulted for the purpose of litigation only. Hall v. McDonald Insulation, 537 So.2d 328 (La. App. 1 Cir.1988). Based on the facts and testimonies in this case, we find that the hearing officer's conclusion that Ms. Smith suffered a work-related injury is supported by the record and not manifestly erroneous.\\nAppellant next argues that claimant did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that she was temporarily and totally disabled as required by La.R.S. 23:1221(l)(c). That statute states in pertinent part,\\n[w]henever the employee is not engaged in any employment or self-employment . compensation for temporary total disability shall be awarded only if the employee proves by clear and convincing evidence unaided by any presumption of disability, that the employee is physically unable to engage in any employment or self-employment. .\\nThe hearing officer based her finding that Ms. Smith reached this burden and is therefore entitled to receive temporary total disability benefits on the deposition testimonies of Drs. Budden and Franklin. Our review of these depositions leads to a different conclusion, however.\\nWhen asked whether he believed Ms. Smith had been totally disabled from performing any type of work since the onset of her problems, Dr. Budden clearly stated that he did not. Although Dr. Franklin disabled Ms. Smith from her seamstress duties, he did not express the opinion that she was unable to perform certain other duties. He replied the following when asked to opine on Ms. Smith's movement capabilities: \\\"[t]his lady is functional. This is not to say this lady could not perform some light to sedentary-type duty position.\\\" In light of the professional medical ^opinions of Drs. Budden and Franklin regarding Ms. Smith's ability to perform certain tasks, as well as the similar opinions of the numerous other doctors Ms. Smith saw, we conclude that the hearing officer was manifestly erroneous in finding that Ms. Smith proved that she was temporarily totally disabled by clear and convincing evidence.\\nAppellant further asserts that the hearing officer erred in finding Ms. Smith entitled to medical benefits. In support of its argument, Martin selectively interprets Lastrapes v. Martin Mills/Farley Industries, 94-1394 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/3/95); 657 So.2d 185 to mean that absent objective evidence of the injury for which compensation is sought, a claim for medical treatment compensation cannot stand. Actually, Lastrapes does not stand for this proposition. Read in its entirety, that case sets forth that the threshold requirement for entitlement to medical benefits is a showing that \\\"they are related to the work accident to a reasonable certainty and by a preponderance of the evidence.\\\" Id. at 186. Martin also refers to Fusilier v. Slick Const. Co., 94-11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/94); 640 So.2d 788. In Fusilier, this court denied medical benefits because the injury suffered by claimant was neither work-related nor disabling. Id. The lack of objective evidence merely strengthened our position; it was not the decisive factor for the denial.\\nIn this case, it was the opinions of Dr. Budden, Dr. Gunderson, and Dr. Sabatier that the source of Ms. Smith's pain was the repetitive movements required by her work. In spite of no objective signs of carpal tunnel syndrome, Dr. Budden and Dr. Franklin specifically stated that Ms. Smith suffers from the condition and prescribed treatment pursuant to their diagnoses. Both doctors testified that tests for carpal tunnel syndrome will not reflect objective signs of carpal tunnel syndrome in four to six percent of the people tested, although those people can in fact suffer from the condition. In light of these testimonies, we find that the hearing officer reasonably concluded that Ms. Smith is owed medical expenses for the treatment of her work-[reIatedg carpal tunnel syndrome. A claim for medical benefits stands independently of a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Young v. Hercules, Inc., 451 So.2d 109 (La.App. 3 Cir.1984). Thus, although Ms. Smith is not entitled to disability benefits, she is entitled to receive medical compensation as she has proven by a preponderance that she suffered a work-related injury.\\nFinally, appellant urges that the hearing officer's finding that it was arbitrary and capricious in handling Ms. Smith's claim is manifestly erroneous. In her written reasons for judgment, the hearing officer stated that Martin was wrong to deny benefits to Ms. Smith when it had been presented with the opinions of Drs. Budden and Franklin. She further referred to Ms. Smith's complaints of pain. As discussed supra, Drs. Budden and Franklin did not definitively and totally disable Ms. Smith. Moreover, Dr. Budden did not reach the conclusion that Ms. Smith suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome until the day of his deposition, February 14, 1996. It is well-settled that when a reasonable basis for denial of benefits exists, the employer cannot be arbitrary and capricious. Terro v. WMCO, Inc., 619 So.2d 639 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993). Martin was not unreasonable in denying benefits to Ms. Smith since, according to the information presented to it, there was no viable workers' compensation claim.\\nIV.\\nCONCLUSION\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Office of Workers' Compensation granting medical benefits for the treatment of carpal tunnel syndrome is affirmed. In all other respects, it is reversed.\\nAll costs shall be shared equally by each party.\\nAFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND RENDERED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/11917397.json b/la/11917397.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fe33ef64eee7886e33267b59073dfb03b66b586b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/11917397.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11917397\", \"name\": \"Nathan Greg LEITL, Plaintiff, v. CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, et al., Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff-Appellee, Yeargin, Inc. (Formerly Known as Project Construction Corporation) and Continental Casualty Company, Third Party Defendants-Appellants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Leitl v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.\", \"decision_date\": \"1997-02-19\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 95-1585\", \"first_page\": \"182\", \"last_page\": \"183\", \"citations\": \"690 So. 2d 182\", \"volume\": \"690\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:50:28.885386+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before WOODARD, PETERS and SULLIVAN, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Nathan Greg LEITL, Plaintiff, v. CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, et al., Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff\\u2014Appellee, Yeargin, Inc. (Formerly Known as Project Construction Corporation) and Continental Casualty Company, Third Party Defendants\\u2014Appellants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Nathan Greg LEITL, Plaintiff, v. CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, et al., Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff\\u2014Appellee, Yeargin, Inc. (Formerly Known as Project Construction Corporation) and Continental Casualty Company, Third Party Defendants\\u2014Appellants.\\nNo. 95-1585.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.\\nFeb. 19, 1997.\\nOrder .Clarifying Decision on Limited Grant of Rehearing April 9,1997.\\nWilliam M. Nolen, William Brock Swift, Robert Joseph Tete, Lake Charles, for Citgo Petroleum Corporation, et al.\\nEdmund M. Kneisel, Atlanta, GA, Keith Michael Borne, Lafayette, John A. Stewart, Jr., New Orleans, for Yeargin, Inc., etc.\\nChristopher M. Trahan, Lake Charles, for St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company.\\nBefore WOODARD, PETERS and SULLIVAN, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"314\", \"char_count\": \"2071\", \"text\": \"SULLIVAN, Judge.\\nFor the reasons assigned in the case of Citgo Petroleum, Corp. v. Yeargin, Inc. and Continental Casualty Company, 95-1574 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/19/97); 690 So.2d 154, which was consolidated with this case, the trial court's judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, amended in part and rendered.\\nCosts of this appeal are assessed to Citgo Petroleum Corporation.\\nAFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AMENDED IN PART; AND RENDERED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/12364328.json b/la/12364328.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ed319096db24886300668c26275243b95bd3c6ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/12364328.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12364328\", \"name\": \"SUCCESSION OF Milton YOUNGER\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Succession of Younger\", \"decision_date\": \"2017-01-25\", \"docket_number\": \"NO. 2016-C-2202\", \"first_page\": \"685\", \"last_page\": \"685\", \"citations\": \"215 So. 3d 685\", \"volume\": \"215\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:20:08.204559+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"SUCCESSION OF Milton YOUNGER\", \"head_matter\": \"SUCCESSION OF Milton YOUNGER\\nNO. 2016-C-2202\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nJanuary 25, 2017\", \"word_count\": \"43\", \"char_count\": \"269\", \"text\": \"Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 12,604; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,-876-CA\\nL Denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/12367047.json b/la/12367047.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e1f342d7bb7e955ed93cbf40ee788b4d3ca43caf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/12367047.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12367047\", \"name\": \"Danielle LARSON v. XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Larson v. XYZ Insurance Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"2017-05-03\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2016-C-0745\", \"first_page\": \"412\", \"last_page\": \"419\", \"citations\": \"226 So. 3d 412\", \"volume\": \"226\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:16:03.455573+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"CRICHTON, J., concurs for thq reasons assigned by Guidry, J.\", \"parties\": \"Danielle LARSON v. XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Danielle LARSON v. XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.\\nNo. 2016-C-0745\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\n05/03/2017\\nRehearing Denied June 29, 2017\\nMUSGRAVE, MCLACHLAN. & PENN, LLC, Richard Todd Musgrave, Theresa S. Anderson; PALOWSKY LAW, LLC, Stacy Renee Palowsky; for Applicant.\\nPRISCHHERTZ, POULLIARD, FRISHHERTZ & IMPASTATO, LL, Dominick P. Impastato, III, Marc Lloyd Frischhertz; for Respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"3657\", \"char_count\": \"21788\", \"text\": \"HUGHES, J.\\n_JjWe granted the writ application in this case to review the applicability \\\"of La. R.S. 9:2795.3, the Equine Immunity Statute. The trial court granted a motion for sura-mary judgment filed by Equest Farm, LLC, finding that the immunity statute applied because plaintiff Danielle Larson was a participant engaged in equine activity at the time the Equest Farm pony bit her. The court of appeal reversed, holding that Larson was not a \\\"participant\\\" under the immunity statute, and that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether another provision in the immunity statute .might apply. We hold that there are genuine issues of material fact on the issue of whether the immunity statute applies. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeal and remand to the trial court.\\nFacts\\nThis suit concerns a horse bite injury sustained in 2013 by Danielle Larson, who visited Equest Farm for the purpose of visiting and feeding horses owned by that facility. Equest Farm is located in City Park in New Orleans, and it boards horses as well as offers camps, lessons, field trips, and birthday parties with horses.\\nLLarson, an Illinois resident, frequently came to the New Orleans area to visit her boyfriend. Larson testified that she has never owned a horse but that she had been riding horses since childhood- and she rode horses at a stable in Illinois. Larson testified that she had previously been shown how to feed a horse: with a flat hand, fingers together so that they are angled down and not sticking up. Larson testified that in the past she had fed horses com mon treats such as carrots, apples, and sugar cubes.\\nLarson testified in her deposition that she had been visiting Equest Farm since 2011 or 2012 to \\\"talk to them\\\" and \\\"give them love and affection.\\\" Larson testified that prior to the incident she had visited Equest Farm at least six times and that she tried to go every time she visited New Orleans. Larson testified that each time she went to Equest Farm for a visit she would first check in with someone from the equestrian center front office before heading into the stables. Larson testified that during a previous visit, a man who appeared to work for Equest Farm gave her mints to feed the horses. Approximately five days before the date of the accident, Larson dropped by Equest Farm to ask if in the coming days she could visit with the school horses, which are horses owned by facility used for lessons. She also wanted to return with treats and was seeking advice on what the horses liked. Larson said she spoke with someone who worked in the office, named Kaley or Kiley, who told her she could return with certain treats, including carrots, and feed and visit with the school horses.\\nWhen Larson returned with carrots on Monday, September 23, 2013, the Equest Farm office was closed in accordance with its regular schedule, and Larson proceeded to the stalls where the school horses were kept. On her way, she encountered two riders who boarded horses at Equest Farm, Joanna Deal and RSusan Gegen-heimer. Larson told them that she was going to feed the school horses carrots. Ms. Deal and Ms. Gegenheimer told Larson to be careful because they heard one of the school ponies had bitten a child.\\nAs Larson was visiting with the school horses, she arrived at a stall where a pony, Wesley, was standing at the gate. Larson placed a carrot in her hand and held it out, but the carrot was knocked from her hand by the horse, causing the carrot to fall to the ground. As Larson squatted down to pick up the carrot, Wesley also reached for the carrot. Instead of biting the carrot, however, Wesley bit off Larson's thumb.\\nLarson required substantial medical care. Doctors attached her injured hand to her groin for four weeks to keep what remained of her hand viable. Larson will have to be fitted for a prosthetic thumb or transfer a toe to her hand.\\nThere is a dispute about the signage that was posted on the day of the incident. Larson testified that she did not see any signs at Equest Farm prohibiting visitors from feeding the horses. Ms. Deal also testified that on the day of the accident she did not recall any such signs, but that she did not go into the school horse barn often. Ms. Gegenheimer also testified that at the time of the accident she was not aware of any rules that would prevent visitors from feeding the horses. Ms. Ge-genheimer further testified that she did not see any signage specifically warning others about a prior nipping incident involving Wesley. Equest Farm LLC, member Leslie Kramer averred by affidavit that there have been signs posted since 2011 that feeding treats or petting horses is not allowed. She averred that the signs stated visitors could \\\"look but not touch\\\" the horses.\\nAs for Wesley, he appears to have a good reputation at Equest Farm, although it is not without blemish. Ms. Deal testified that she saw small children [4ride on Wesley. Ms. Gegenheimer testified he was a \\\"great lesson horse.\\\" Ms. Kramer averred that Wesley \\\"is considered to be one of Equest Farm's best school ponies.\\\" Ms. Kramer also averred that the only other time Wesley has bitten anyone was when a child who had been riding him was holding his ears and muzzle trying to get him to kiss her. Wesley nipped her and bruised her cheek, however, the student continued to take lessons riding Wesley, and no lawsuit was filed.\\nProcedural History\\nLarson filed a Petition for Damages alleging that Equest Farm and its insurer were liable for her injuries under theories of negligence and strict liability. Equest Farm filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which argued that Larson's suit should be dismissed due to the applicability of the Equine Immunity Statute, La. R.\\u00a3j. 9:2795.3. Equest Farm asserted that Larson was a \\\"participant\\\" who was injured as a result of inherent risks of equine activity, and under the Equine Immunity Statute, the facts of her case preclude her from recovery against Equest Farm.\\nThe trial court granted Equest Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing Larson's suit. In reasons given from the bench, the trial court found:\\nI believe that when you went and touched\\u2014when you touched that horse, when you went to feed that horse it was equine activity. You're not a spectator and it could be\\u2014somebody could say that it's inspecting. I don't know. Evaluating, I don't know. But I don't know what that means. I do know horses and I know that you feed a horse, like this (Indicating), and I know if you drop that carrot a horse takes his tongue and he felt the finger and feels like a carrot, and he bites it.\\nNow, again, you're saying maybe that's comparative fault, whatever. That's not a dangerous animal. I mean, that's not\\u2014he didn't do anything negligent. He did what a horse does. That's all you get .\\nAnd just the way he looks, his eyes are way up here, his mouth is way down here. I mean, we own horses. And it's ugly. That picture that was submitted to us is absolutely ugly .\\n|BI think the Fourth Circuit needs to look at it. The [Fjourth Circuit needs to tell me it was equine activity. I do. I think they need to tell me that. Because I do think she took herself out of a spectator position. Had she stayed behind and the horse came over and bit her, I'm with you. But when you go and put yourself in the middle of it, and you knew horses\\u2014what your client says, she loves horses, she knows them, she does that. I just don't know. I think the definition\\u2014you know maybe you're right but somebody might say that's inspecting, that's evaluating. I don't know; But I think you need to let the Fourth Circuit tell you that I'm wrong. So I'm granting your Summary Judgment.\\nLarson appealed. The court of appeal reversed the summary judgment, finding that Larson was not a participant engaged in equine activity, and thus Equest Farm was not afforded immunity under the statute. Larson v. XYZ Ins., 2015-0704 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/23/16), 192 So.3d 181. The appeal court concluded that the definition of \\\"engages in equine activity\\\" found in subsection .(A)(1) of the statute, which must be strictly construed, does not include \\\"a visitor to a stable who feeds treats to a horse.\\\" Id. at p.10, 187. The court noted that the definitions of \\\"equine activity\\\"' listed in subsection (A)(3) are to be considered in determining whether someone is a participant. Id. at p. 12, 189. However, the court of appeal determined that Larson was not \\\"inspecting\\\" or \\\"evaluating\\\" under subsection (A)(3)(d). Id. Larson's visit to see the horses and give them \\\"love and affection\\\" does not meet the dictionary definitions of inspect or evaluate, and dictionary definitions are to be used because the statute does not define these terms. Id. Thus, the court of appeal concluded that-Larson was not a participant under the Equine Immunity Statute.\\nThe majority also opined that even if Larson was a \\\"spectator\\\" pursuant to Subsection (A)(1), the statute could'still provide Equest Farm with immunity -if Larson, as a spectator, placed herself in an unauthorized area. Id. at p. 13, 189. The | f,court of appeal -found that there were genuine issues of material fact on this issue that-bar summary judgment. Specifically, Larson and the two riders testified that they could not recall- seeing signs that prohibited touching or feeding the horses. Id. at pp. 14-15, 190. But according to an affidavit of Ms. Kramer , such signs were posted. Id. at p. 15, 190. The court of appeal stated that whether Equest Farm is entitled to immunity under La. R.S. 9:2795.3 at this juncture should be decided by a trier of fact. Id. The court of appeal thus reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. .\\nEquest Farm filed an application for certiorari, which this court granted. Larson v. XYZ Ins. Co., 2016-0745 (La. 6/28/16), 192 So.3d 782.\\nLav and Analysis\\nAppellate courts review summary\\\" judgments de novo-under the same criteria that govern a distrfct court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Greemon v. City of Bossier City, 2010-2828 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1263, 1267; Samaha v. Rau, 2007-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880, 882; Allen v. State ex rel. Ernest N. Morial-New Orleans Exhibition Hall Authority, 2002-1072 (La. 4/9/03), 842 So.2d 373, 377. In ruling on a motion for summary -judgment, the judge's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. All doubts should be resolved in the non-moving party's favor. Hines v. Garrett, 2004-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765. A fact is material if it potentially ensures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one [ 7conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 765-66.\\nOn motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof remains with the mov-ant. However, if the moving party will not bear the burden of proof on the issue at trial and points out that there is an absence of factual support for one\\\" or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, then the non-moving party must produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If the opponent of the motion fails to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment will be granted. See La. G.C.P. art. 966(D)(1); see also Schultz v. Guoth, 2010-0343 (La. 1/19/11), 57 So.3d 1002, 1006.\\nWhen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in La. C.C.P. art. 967, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in La. C.C.P. art. 967, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him. La. C.C.P. art. 967(B); see also Dejoie v. Medley, 2008-2223 (La. 5/5/09), 9 So.3d 826, 832. Whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Richard v. Hall, 2003-1488 (La. 4/23/04), 874 So.2d 131, 137.\\nWe agree with the court of appeal that there are contested issues of material fact that make summary judgment inappropriate. Issues of the applicability of the immunity statute and potential comparative negligence of the parties remain.\\nDecree\\n|sThe ruling of the court of appeal is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.\\nAFFIRMED and REMANDED\\n. Knoll, J., retired, participated in this decision, which was argued prior to her retirement.\\n. While the concurrence mentions the possible applicability of La. R.S. 9:2795.3(A)(3)(e), it was not addressed by the majority opinion.\\n. Ms. Kramer provided two affidavits in support of Equest Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment. ' Attached to' her second affidavit were photos of the posted signs that instructed visitors not to touch or feed the horses.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/2456863.json b/la/2456863.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..988e0f8ae02ceaeff32756b5ebb134ab9e3bdc9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/2456863.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"2456863\", \"name\": \"The State of Louisiana vs. John Mahner et als.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Mahner\", \"decision_date\": \"1891-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 10,730\", \"first_page\": \"496\", \"last_page\": \"500\", \"citations\": \"43 La. Ann. 496\", \"volume\": \"43\", \"reporter\": \"Louisiana Annual Reports\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:07:15.905110+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The State of Louisiana vs. John Mahner et als.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. 10,730.\\nThe State of Louisiana vs. John Mahner et als.\\nAn ordinance of a municipal corporation which violates any of the recognized principles of legal and equal rights is necessarily void so far as it does so.\\nAn ordinance which prohibits dairies within certain designated limits and gives the City Council the authority to grant permission to carry them on within the prohibited limits is not general in its operations among the class it is intended to affect, and is therefore null and void.\\nAPPEAL from the Third Recorder\\u2019s Court of New Orleans. Landry, J.\\nHenry Renshaw, Assistant Oity Attorney, and Carleton Hunt, City Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellee:\\nUnless ordinance shows no action for penalty was intended without prior demand, unnecessary to aver one. Unnecessary to aver notice of ordinance, this being conclusively presumed as to all on whom it is binding. Dillon Mun. Cor. See. 41G, ICd. of 1S90.\\nAll on whom ordinances are binding are bound to take notice of them. Dillon Mun. Cor. Sec. 306, Ud. of 1890.\\nThe notice referred to in Ordinance 3175 O. S. has no reference to the fine imposed in this ease.\\nThe designation of an official is sufficient, if. by reference to the Oity Charter, the official intended may easily be ascertained.\\nThe enforcement of clause of ordinance under which defendant is prosecuted not subject to the discretion of any official.\\n\\u2022Ordinance 3175 O. S. within the power of Oity to enact under Charter of 1856; Ordinance 3414 C. S. authorized by Act 20 of 1882, Sec. 7.\\nNo unlawful discrimination by Ordinance. State vs. Schlemmer, 42 An. \\u2014; 8 Southern Reporter, 308, 309; 3 An. 689.\\nThe question of the validity of a judgment is distinct from the question of the manner of its enforcement.\\n\\u2022Courts will not interfere with discretion of municipal corporation unless the corporation has manifestly abused its powers. 42 An. 487.\\nA. D. Henriques and Branch K. Miller for Defendants and Appellants :\\nWhere an Ordinance provides a penalty for failure to obey a notice, the notice given must conform strictly to the Ordinance. 36 An. .903.\\nThe operation of an Ordinance can not be left to the discretion of an executive officer. 15 A. and E. Oorp. Cases, 356.\\nThe power to prevent the following of a lawful occupation, save in certain localities, is not inherent in a municipal corporation.\\nAn Ordinance void for want of power in the Council which passed it, can not be valid against an amendment of a subsequent Council having power to pass the original Ordinance. Hun, Pol. Ord. 138, 162.\\nOrdinances must be general in their operation. 1 Dillon Hun. Corp. Sec. 322; 118 IT. S. 551.\\nPower to imprison in default of payment of fine must be expressed. Dillon Hun. Corp. Secs. 336, 353, 3804.\\nAn Ordinance can not make one continuous act a number of offences. 1 Dillon Hun. Corp. 342; 88 111. 274; 12 Johns, (X. Y.)122; 9Wenclell, (X. Y.) 591; 3 An, 688; 36 An. 247\", \"word_count\": \"1606\", \"char_count\": \"9567\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nMcEnery, J.\\nThe defendants were prosecuted for violating or - dinanee No. 3414 of the City of New Orleans, convicted and fined.\\nThis ordinance, and amended ordinance No. 3175, extended the limits within-which the dairies were prohibited.\\nThe defendants ask that the ordinance be declared null and void, because it is not general in its operation, is unconstitutional and oppressive.\\nThe objectionable feature of the ordinance is contained in the first section.\\nThis section prescribes the limits within which dairies may be conducted by permission of the City Oouncil, and it is made unlawful to keep more than two cows without a permit from the City Oouncil. The defendants are within the prohibited limits, and keep more than two cows.\\nThe ordinance is not general in its operation. It does not affect all citizens alike who follow the same occupation which it attempts to regulate. It is only those persons who keep more than two cows within the prohibited limits without the permission of the Oity Council who are subject to the penalties in the ordinance. The discretion vested by the ordinance in the City Oouncil is in no way regulated or controlled. There are no conditions prescribed upon which the permit may be granted. It is within the power of the-City Council to grant the privilege to some, to deny it to others.\\nThe discretion vested in the Council is purely arbitrary. It may be exercised in the interest of a favored few. It may be controlled, by partisan considerations and race prejudices, or by personal-animosities. It lays down no rules by which its impartial execution-can be secured, or partiality and oppression prevented. Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 856; Horr & Bemis, M. P. Ordinances, paragraphs 135, 136.\\nIt was the evident intention of the Council in amending ordinance SITS to prohibit dairies in other places than within the prescribed limits.\\nThe amended ordinance, Section S, grants twelve months' time to the proprietors or owners of all dairies now in existence in violation of the amended ordinance to move their dairies. But as the amendment to the ordinance only extends the limits within which dairies-are prohibited, those who have them in pursuance of the permission from the mayor are exempt from its operations.\\nSection 4 of ordinance 3414 is open to the objections above stated. It is as follows:\\n\\\"That henceforth no new dairies keeping more than two cows shall be established within the limits above named, under the same penalties as are now in force under existing ordinances.\\\"\\nThis section establishes an inequality, granting to some persons, following the same occupation, privileges that are not extended to others.\\nThe ordinances do not regulate dairies in the interest of the public-health. One dairy may be a nuisance because the City Council has refused to give the required permission for its establishment; another may be perfectly harmless and in no -way detrimental to-public health because it exists by permission of the Council. They may exist along side of each other, both unobjectionable in their-police regulations, and one a nuisuance and the other a lawful establishment.\\nBoth the original and amended ordinance violate equal rights, among the class they are designed to affect, and are therefore necessarily void so far as they do so.\\nThis opinion in no way conflicts with the views expressed in the-case of the State vs. Gisch, 31 An. 544. In that ease the ordinance regulated private markets in pursuance of express legislative enactment, by imposing a license upon them when they were conducted in certain localities. The ordinance affected all persons alike who were engaged in the same occupation, and was free from the objections in the ordinance under consideration. Nor does this opinion conflict with the opinion and decree in the case of Bozant vs. Cambell, 9 R. 411, in which the court was called on to deal with a municipal ordinance prohibiting the establishment of private hospitals within certain limits. The court held that, as the Council had a right to repeal the ordinance, it could do so partially and modify it so as to permit in exceptional cases the erection of private hospitals within the prohibited limits.\\nThe instant case does not present the same features. In the exercise of its power in the interest of the public health, the court said the council of the municipality had prudently exercised it.\\nIt is therefore adjudged and decreed that the judgment appealed from be annulled, avoided and reversed, and the suit of the City against the defendants be dismissed with costs of both courts.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/2493439.json b/la/2493439.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0d2bb9cadca5b38fe8e387fd9ee182a9289c0c2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/2493439.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"2493439\", \"name\": \"Railroad Commission of Louisiana vs. The Kansas City Southern Railway Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Railroad Commission v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1901-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 14,189\", \"first_page\": \"450\", \"last_page\": \"451\", \"citations\": \"107 La. 450\", \"volume\": \"107\", \"reporter\": \"Louisiana Reports\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:47:41.611048+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Railroad Commission of Louisiana vs. The Kansas City Southern Railway Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. 14,189.\\nRailroad Commission of Louisiana vs. The Kansas City Southern Railway Company.\\nSyllabus.\\nThe provision of Article 285 of the Constitution, conferring upon this court jurisdiction of suits brought against the Railroad Commission to test the validity of whatever rule, regulation, etc., it may have adopted, cannot be made to apply to suits brought by the Railroad Commission to recover the amount of fines imposed by itself for violations of its ordinances. A suit of the latter hind is an ordinary suit falling within the general rule as to jurisdiction.\\nAPPEAL from the Twelfth Judicial District, Parish of DeSoto.\\u2014 Lee, J.\\nWalter Gui\\u00f3n, Attorney General, (H. T. Liverman .and Lewis Gui\\u00f3n, of Counsel), 'for Plaintiffs, Appellants.\\nAlexander & Wilkinson, for Defendant, Appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"769\", \"char_count\": \"4586\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nProvosty, J.\\nIn this suit the Railroad Commission of Louisiana seeks to enforce payment of a fine of $1000.00 imposed by itself upon the defendant Railway Company, and a motion is made to dismiss the appeal on the ground of want of jurisdiction rations materiae.\\nAs containing a grant of jurisdiction to this court in cases of this character the Attorney General refers to the following Article of the Constitution:\\n\\\"Art. 285. If any railroad, express, telephone, telegraph, steamboat and other water craft, or sleeping car company, or other party in interest, be dissatisfied with the decision or fixing of any rate, classification, rule, charge, order, act or regulation, adopted by the Commission, such party may file a petition setting forth the cause of objection to such decision, act, rule, rate, charge, classification or order, or to either or to all of them, in a court of competent jurisdiction, at the domicil of the Commission, against said Commission as defendant, and either party to said .action may appeal the case to the Supreme Court of the State, without regard to the amount involved, and all such cases, both in the trial and appellate courts, shall be tried sum marily, and by preference .over all other eases. Such cases may be tried in the court of the first instance, either in chambers or at term time; provided, all such appeals, shall be returned to the Supreme Court within ten days after the decision of the lower court; and where the Commission appeals, no bond shall be required. No bond shall be required of said Commission in any case, nor shall advance costs, or security for costs, be required of the Commission.\\\"\\nThat Article, in express terms, has reference exclusively to suits brought against the Commission, for the purpose of testing the validity of some action it -may have taken; but the Attorney General argues that the provision of this Article on the subject of the appeal, must be read into Article 286 under which the present suit has been brought, the two Articles being laws in pari materiae, and having therefore to be construed together.\\nThe canon of construction here invoked is sound; but assuming for argument's sake that Article 285 is in pari materiae, the argument loses sight of the fact that there are other Articles in the Constitution which are also laws in pari materiae, and in connection with which also Article 286 must be construed; these are the Articles inserted in the Constitution for the special purpose of regulating the jurisdiction of this court, which impliedly prohibits this court from entertaining jurisdiction of cases involving a mere monied demand where the amount is less than $2000.00,\\nWe can readily understand why suits brought co test the validity of any rule, regulation, etc., that the Commission may have made, should go to the highest court, which alone is competent to give a decision that shall be authoritative in other cases besides the one in which it is rendered; but after the validity of these rules, regulations, etc., have been established, either by decision or by failure to contest, we can think of no special reason why suits brought to collect fines imposed under these rules and regulations, should come to this court, any more than should any other suits brought by the State, or by any of the State agencies, for the recovery of mere money, and involving no governmental regulation.\\nWe have no jurisdiction of the appeal, and have to sustain the motion to dismiss; but in doing so we will add that the case, being the first of its kind, is one in which we should entertain an application for a writ of review on the petition of either party; so that no permanent injury to either party can result from our present action.\\nAppeal dismissed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/2562942.json b/la/2562942.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2ab4ca34f6fe9efe00a2ad35c222dac1c0607d24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/2562942.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"2562942\", \"name\": \"The State of Louisiana vs. James Green\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Green\", \"decision_date\": \"1896-12-14\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 12,326\", \"first_page\": \"60\", \"last_page\": \"65\", \"citations\": \"49 La. Ann. 60\", \"volume\": \"49\", \"reporter\": \"Louisiana Annual Reports\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:11:29.731210+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The State of Louisiana vs. James Green.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. 12,326.\\nThe State of Louisiana vs. James Green.\\n\\u2018To quash a venire on the ground of irregularity in the proceedings of the jury commissioners, in drawing a jury panel, the defendant must make his point \\u2018dear and certain. It will not do to make it probable merely.\\nThe refusal of a trial judge to grant a new trial on tlie ground of newly discovered testimony will be sustained when it appears that it was only cumulative.\\nAPPEAL from the Twentieth Judicial District-Court for the Parish of Ascension. Gui\\u00f3n, J.\\nM, J. Cunningham, Attorney General, and G. A. Gondran, District Attorney, for Plaintiff, Appellee.\\nE. N. Pugh, for Defendant, Appellant.\\nSubmitted on briefs December 5, 1896.\\nOpinion handed down December 14, 1896.\\nRehearing refused January 4, 1897.\", \"word_count\": \"1790\", \"char_count\": \"10162\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered by\\nWatkins, J.\\nThe defendant is charged with murder, was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor in the penitentiary for a term of six months; and from the verdict and sentence he prosecutes this appeal, relying upon one bill of exceptions, in which his counsel assigns as error of the trial judge, his refusal to quash the general venire on account of alleged irregularities in the manner of drawing the same, and other bills to be found in the transcript.\\nThe motion to quash and set aside the venire of jurors is to the effect \\\" that said venire was not drawn in accordance with law, and that a trial by (jurors drawn from) said venire will be a fraud, and cause your mover herein great and irreparable injury;\\\" and it charges, that the \\\" drawing of said venire was illegal and contrary to law on its face (in) that only four members of the (jury) commission were present, and there is nothing to show that the members of said commission were notified in accordance with Sec. 8 of Act 99 of 1896. That, on its face, the three hundred names required by See. 4 of said act were not drawn as required and laid down in said section of the act, which was violated in every respect.\\\"\\nOn the trial of this motion, counsel for the defendant introduced and filed in evidence the proees verbal of the drawing of the venire and the record of the proceedings of the jury commission, and rested. The District Attorney offered no evidence. The trial judge, in overruling the motion, assigned no reasons, and none are appended to the bill of exceptions reserved to his ruling by defendant's counsel.\\nWe have extracted from the brief of defendant's counsel and reproduce the proees verbal of the jury commission, so as to show clearly the contention upon which defendant's counsel places reliance.\\nIt is as follows, to-wit:\\n\\\"We transcribe in full the entire record connected with the drawing of this jury.\\n\\\"General Venire List.\\n. \\\" August 19, 1896.\\n(Here follow three hundred names.)\\n\\\"State oe Louisiana,)\\n\\\"Parish of Ascension. /\\n\\\"Be it remembered that on ihis 19th day of August, 1896, we the undersigned jury commissioners of the parish of Ascension, duly appointed by the judge of the Twentieth Judicial District Court, evidence of which appointment being duly entered upon the minutes of said court and duly sworn evidence of which being filed and of record, did meet at the office of the clerk of said court; and Christian Kline, one of the commissioners, in the presence of the \\u2022other commissioners and two disinterested witnesses, proceeded to draw from the 'general venire box,' one at a time, the number of names of persons required for service at the ensuing term of the Twentieth Judicial District Court for this parish, to be holden on Monday, October 12, 1896. And therefrom fifty names were drawn to compose the grand and petit jurors for the first week of said term of court, to-wit: (Fifty names.)\\n\\\" And it being the judgment of the jury commissioners that a jury may be required for the second week of said court at said term, thirty additional names, to serve as petit jurors for the second week of said court, were in the same manner and at the same time drawn from said 'general venire box,' and were as follows, to-wit: (Thirty names.)\\n\\\" And it being the judgment of the jury commissioners that a jury may be required for the third week of said court at said term, thirty additional names, to serve as petit jurors for the third week of said court, were in the same manner and at the same time drawn from said 'general venire box,' and were as follows, to-wit: (Thirty names.)\\n\\\" And the said commissioners did thereupon place the ballots which were so drawn for each week in separate envelopes, under seal, and endorsed thereon the week for which they were respectively drawn, and the whole being placed in a box provided for that purpose, said box was sealed and placed in the custody of the clerk -of the court for use at the next term of the District Oourt of this parish.\\n\\\" In faith whereof we have signed the present proees verbal in the presence of one another on the day, month and year first above written.\\n\\\" (Original signed) C. Kline\\nC. A. Bullion.\\nJ. E. Landry.\\nJohn F. Landry.\\nFred. Landry,\\nClerk.\\n\\\"Witnesses: J. F. Fernandez.\\nJ. T. Blouin.\\n\\\" A. true copy:\\n(Seal) Fred. Landry,\\nClerk of Court.\\\"\\nIn order to obtain an accurate idea of the points of objection taken by defendants's council, the statute under which the jury was drawn must be examined and analyzed.\\nThe third section provides, that the District Judge of a country district shall select and appoint five discreet citizens, who, with the clerk of the court, who shall be ex officio a member thereof, shall constitute a jury commission for each parish within his district.\\nIt further provides that the evidence of such appointments shall be the written order of the judge, which shall be entered upon the minutes of the court.\\nIt further provides that \\\"three members of said commission, together with the clerk of the District Court, shall be a sufficient number to perform the duties imposed by this act, provided all the members shall have been duly notified by the clerk of the District Court -of the time and place designated by him for the meeting of said commission, which notification shall appear from the certificate of the clerk in case of the absence of any member thereof.\\\"\\nThe fourth section provides that said commission shall, within thirty days after their appointment, select, according to the provisions thereof, the names of three hundred persons, a list of whom shall be made by the clerk under the supervision of the commission- and supplemented thereafter from time to time as therein directed.\\nThat each of their names shall be written by the clerk on a separate slip of paper, which shall be deposited in a box denominated the general venire box. That within not less than thirty days prior to the meeting of a jury term of court the jury commission shall meet and rectify and revise the aforesaid list and the general venire box. That it shall be the duty of the clerk of court to make a prooes verbal of the acts of the commission and record same in a book to be provided and kept for that purpose, and that it shall be signed by the clerk, the members of the commission and the witnesses.\\nThe fifth section provides that within thirty days of the meeting of a jury term of court the commission shall meet and \\\" draw from the general venire box,\\\" one at a time, the number of persons required for service at the ensuing term of court, and the first fifty names so drawn shall compose the grand and petit jurors for the first week of the court.\\\"\\nThat the \\\" clerk shall keep a record of the drawing with a list of all names in the order they are drawn and showing the weeks for which they have to serve; and, when the drawing and the proees verbal is complete, shall deliver a copy of same to the sheriff,\\\" etc. (Act. 99 of 1896).\\n1. Comparing the prooes verbal which is in evidence with the law it will be seen that there was not only a majority of three of the jury commissioners out of the five appointed, present and participating in the drawing of the jury, but there were four of them present in addition to the clerk of the court.\\nCounsel's insistence is that the proees verbal shows that one of the commissioners was absent, but fails to show that all the members of the commission had been duly notified by the clerk of the time and place at which the commission was to assemble. Counsel has misapprehended the direction of the statute in this particular, which says this \\\" notification shall appear from the certificate of the clerk in case of the absence of any member thereof.\\\"\\nNon constat that, if the proper source of information had been examined and resorted to, the proof could not have been supplied.\\n2. With r\\u00e9gard to the other part of counsel's argument we deem it a sufficient answer to say that it is the fourth section of the act which directs the manner in which the jury commission shall form and prepare the general venire box and the list of three hundred names composing same, and the fifth section indicates the modus operandi of drawing a jury from the general venire box for service at a term of court.\\nThe proceedings of the commission are entirely distinct. Consequently it will not do to argue that no general venire box had been formed at all, because the proees verbal of the acts of the jury commissioners in drawing a jury did not go into the details of its formation. But the prooes verbal does state that the commission \\\" proceeded to draw from the general venire box\\\" certain names, and the list of the names of the three hundred persons composing the general venire box is annexed to and forms a part of the proees verbal itself.\\nHad that question been explored by proof we feel satisfied that this presumption of the existence of a general venire box would have been confirmed. We are of opinion that the motion to quash was properly overruled. State vs. Saintes, 46 An. 547.\\nWith reference to the refusal of the judge to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered witnesses we think he conformed to precedents firmly established, as the testimony proffered was cumulative merely. State vs. Jones, 46 An. 545. We ffnd no reviewable error on the record.\\nJudgment affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/2599213.json b/la/2599213.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7cb490fb7ba6a272e86a1d5312ee96710c661641
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/2599213.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"2599213\", \"name\": \"The State ex rel. Raymond Terence vs. H. L. Lazarus, Judge\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Terence v. Lazarus\", \"decision_date\": \"1885-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 9431\", \"first_page\": \"314\", \"last_page\": \"316\", \"citations\": \"37 La. Ann. 314\", \"volume\": \"37\", \"reporter\": \"Louisiana Annual Reports\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:26:16.670791+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The State ex rel. Raymond Terence vs. H. L. Lazarus, Judge.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. 9431.\\nThe State ex rel. Raymond Terence vs. H. L. Lazarus, Judge.\\nCourts have inherent power to pnnisli for contempt and our Code of Practice has expressly conferred ifc, but a judge cannot assume or decide that a witness has sworn untruthfully and punish him for the perjury as a contempt.\\nRefusing to answer a question that a witness is bound to answer is contumacy and is punishable as a contempt. Answering such question untruthfully is perjury, the punishment of which is remitted to the regular action of the criminal law.\\n^PPLICATION for Certiorari.\\nJoseph 1\\u2018. Jlornor and Brands W. Baker for the Relator.\\nRespondent in propria persona.\", \"word_count\": \"1131\", \"char_count\": \"6534\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the Court was delivered by\\nManning, J.\\nRaymond Terence was a witness in a cause on trial before the respondent Judge, and was committed for contempt in this, \\\" that lie refused to testify truthfully to the questions propounded to him by counsel and by the court and this without leading him to accuse himself of a crime.\\\" He was sentenced to imprisonment for thirty days and to pay a line of twenty-live dollars Ho has obtained from us a writ of certiorari under which the proceedings are now before ns for review.\\nThat this writ may be used for the purpose for which it is now invoked was settled in the De Buys case, 32 Ann. 1256, which has since been adhered to and has now passed beyond dispute.\\nThe judge bases his action on art. 136 of the Code of Practice wherein it is provided, if a witness refuse to answer any question put to him except such as might lead him to accuse himself of a crime, the court may line and imprison him.\\nIt is not charged or pretended that this witness refused to answer any question of any kind. On the contrary it is expressly alleged that he did answer the questions put to him by the counsel and the court, but that ho did not answer them truthfully.\\nRefusing to answer a question that a witness is bound to answer is contumacy and is punishable as a contempt. Answering such question untruthfully is perjury, the punishment of which is remitted to the regular action of the criminal law through the established forms of criminal proceedings, i. e. by indictment or information followed by a trial. An act may be at once a contempt of court and a violation of the criminal law, for example an assault and battery committed in open court would be punishable as a contempt and also by prosecution.. The overt physical visible act distinguishes it from perjury.\\nThe law gives to every judge the power to punish for contempt-. It is necessary for the orderly police of the court, but to decide that the-testimony of a witness is false and to inflict summary punishment upon him without atrial is repugnant to the orderly administration of justice and subversive of our ideas of right.\\nWhere flagrant perjury has been committed, a nisi prius judge has not infrequently directed the attention of the prosecuting officer to the man and his offence and has even ordered his committal until the criminal machinery could be set' in motion for his trial. But the respondent' dispensed with any form of trial, determined the guilt of the offendeiwithout accuser or witness, and summarily punished him without an opportunity of defense.\\nIt is therefore ordered and decreed that the order complained of by tlie relator is annulled and vacated.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/3128984.json b/la/3128984.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..15c70baf5bd700a8b4bcb5772947986fe1afffda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/3128984.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3128984\", \"name\": \"CLARK v. LIFE INS. CO. OF VIRGINIA\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Clark v. Life Ins.\", \"decision_date\": \"1935-11-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 33479\", \"first_page\": \"565\", \"last_page\": \"569\", \"citations\": \"183 La. 566\", \"volume\": \"183\", \"reporter\": \"Louisiana Reports\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:21:11.147691+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CLARK v. LIFE INS. CO. OF VIRGINIA.\", \"head_matter\": \"164 So. 417\\nCLARK v. LIFE INS. CO. OF VIRGINIA.\\nNo. 33479.\\nNov. 4, 1935.\\nRehearing Denied Dec. 2, 1935.\\nCharles J. Mundy, of New Orleans, for relatrix Ellen Harris Clark.\\nEugene J. McGivney and Solomon S. Goldman, both of New Orleans, for respondent Life Ins. Co. of Virginia.\", \"word_count\": \"848\", \"char_count\": \"4884\", \"text\": \"ODOM, Justice.\\nThe defendant Life Insurance Company issued to Chris Harris an industrial life insurance policy for $150 on .October 31, 1898; the premium being 15 cents per week, payable in advance. Harris paid the premiums regularly until March 12, 1923. None were paid thereafter, and admittedly the policy lapsed on March 19, 1923, for nonpayment of premiums. The insured died on August 4, 1933, 10 years, 4 months, and 15 days after the lapse.\\nThe policy contained the following stipulation : \\\"If, after the payment of the weekly premium hereon for five or more years, this Policy shall become void by reason of default in the payment of premiums, the Company agrees to issue a non-participating Paid-up Policy for an amount computed according to the first table below, the said Paid-up Policy to be continued in force for the full expectation of life of the Insured, at the date of issue of the Paid-up Policy, according to the second table below, provided that this policy shall be legally surrendered to the Company and application for said Paid-up Policy made in writing on tlje blank obtainable from the Company for that purpose within eight weeks after said default.\\\"\\nIt is clear that the insured could have surrendered this policy within 8 weeks from the date on which it lapsed, and in lieu thereof received a paid-up policy for an amount computed in a table written into the original policy, which paid-up policy would have continued in force during the life expectancy of the insured. But he failed to surrender the policy within that time or thereafter, and died more than 10 years after the lapse without having taken any steps whatever to secure for himself such benefits as might have inured to him under the terms of the policy.\\nPlaintiff, who is a daughter and heir of the deceased, brought this suit after his death, alleging that even though the policy by its terms lapsed on March 19, 1923, more than 10 years prior to the death of the insured, and was not surrendered within 8 weeks and a paid-up policy issued in lieu thereof, the original policy is still in force because the stipulations providing for its lapse and the loss of all benefits thereunder were against public policy, null, and void. She prayed for judgment against the company for $150, the face of the policy, and in the alternative for an amount for which a paid-up policy would have been issued had the original been surrendered within the time prescribed.\\nThe trial court sustained an exception of no cause of action, and dismissed plaintiff's suit. That judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. 160 So. 461. The case was ordered up on application of plaintiff for writs, and in this court the insurance company has pleaded the prescription of 10 years in bar of plaintiff's action. As this plea is good, we express no opinion as to the merits of the exception which was sustained by both the trial court and the Court of Appeal.\\nArticle 3544 of the Civil Code, which is found under the general heading \\\"of prescription,\\\" reads as follows: \\\"Ten years. In general, all personal actions, except those before enumerated, are prescribed by ten years.\\\"\\nIf, as plaintiff alleged in her petition and now contends, the stipulation in the policy to the effect that under certain conditions the policy would lapse and the insured lose all benefits thereunder, were against public policy and void, the insured himself had an action against the company to have said stipulation decreed void and to obtain for himself such benefits under the policy as the plaintiff now seeks. But that was a personal action, and under article 3544 of the Code prescribed in 10 years. As .the insured lived for more than 10 years after the policy admittedly lapsed under its terms, without bringing any action against the insurer, the plea of prescription tendered by the defendant is good, and must be sustained.\\nIn Watson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 139 La. 737, 72 So. 189, the same plea was presented under facts similar, if not identical, with those here, and this court held that the action was barred by the prescription of 10 years under article 3544 of the Code. In that case the defendant also pleaded the prescription of two years under Act No. 68 of 1906, which the court said was good. But as that prescription is not pleaded in this case, we do not rest our opinion upon it, but upon the 10-year prescription as prescribed by the Code.\\nFor the reasons assigned, the plea of prescription filed by defendant in this court is sustained, and it is ordered that plaintiff's suit be dismissed at her costs in all courts.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/3277490.json b/la/3277490.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e9252cbbdb27c124b84d7806c72a599d33a0aee0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/3277490.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3277490\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Rallie C. EDWINS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Edwins\", \"decision_date\": \"1972-02-29\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 52174\", \"first_page\": \"1065\", \"last_page\": \"1065\", \"citations\": \"260 La. 1065\", \"volume\": \"260\", \"reporter\": \"Louisiana Reports\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:29:26.690023+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Rallie C. EDWINS.\", \"head_matter\": \"258 So.2d 87\\nSTATE of Louisiana v. Rallie C. EDWINS.\\nNo. 52174.\\nFeb. 29, 1972.\", \"word_count\": \"45\", \"char_count\": \"270\", \"text\": \"In re: State of Louisiana applying for writ? of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.\\nWrit refused. Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of discretion.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/331806.json b/la/331806.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ecbb5a0db0b7407b3116dfe0c72a4ec1d67edc58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/331806.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"331806\", \"name\": \"Succession of Benjamin A. Steele\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Succession of Steele\", \"decision_date\": \"1852-03\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"111\", \"last_page\": \"113\", \"citations\": \"7 La. Ann. 111\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Louisiana Annual Reports\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:29:32.272833+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Succession of Benjamin A. Steele.\", \"head_matter\": \"Succession of Benjamin A. Steele.\\nWhere the plea o\\u00ed yes judicata has been made, and the judgment relied upon in support of the plea is obscure, it is competent for either party to explain it by parol or other evidence, to show that it either does, or does not, support the plea.\\nAPPEAL from the District Court of Madison, J. N. T. Richardson, J.\\nStockton and Steele, for appellees.\\nA. Snyder and Bemiss, for appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"885\", \"char_count\": \"5150\", \"text\": \"The judgment of the court was pronounced by\\nPreston, J.\\nGeorge D. Shadburne, curator of the succession of Benjamin A. Steele, has rendered his account; David Stanbrough opposes it, and claims to be a creditor to the amount of one thousand and fifty-three dollars, with interest at the rate of five per cent from the 22d day of April, 1848. Price and Watson, the only heirs of the deceased, resist his claim, on the ground, that it was a matter adjudged in his settlement of his account as tutor of the deceased. Stanbrough, as tutor of the deceased, rendered the final account of his tutorship on the 14th of April, 1849, and the judgment homologating his account, is that which is plead as adjudging this claim against him. He credited himself in the account with a sum of thirteen hundred and thirty-four dollars and seventy cents, as having paid the same to M. Wallace, Esq., the attorney of Pnce and Watson, in two suits prosecuted against him. Price and Watson opposed this credit \\\" as clearly unjust, except for a sum of sixty-four dollars and seventy cents, the remaining sum of twelve hundred and seventy dollars having been paid to satisfy a judgment against D. Stanbrough, as curator of a different succession.\\\" (Suit 1215.)\\nThe decree of homologation in relation to this credit, is as follows: \\\" and it is further ordered, by consent of parties, that the items number IS and 16, amounting to the credit of $1334 70, be withdrawn from said account, and in place thereof, the said tutor be credited with eight hundred and seventy-one dollars, being the price of the slaves, Harriet, Lucy, and their children, purchased by said minor, the 8th of December, 1843, and the,., interest accrued thereon to the death of the minor.\\\"\\nThe money for which Stanbrough was accounting, was twenty-seven hundred dollars, proceeds of a tract of land which he had caused to be sold as tutor, believing it to belong exclusively to the minor. Price and Watson brought suit against him, and established, that one-third of the tract beloifged to them, and recovered judgment for nine hundred dollars, with interest. It appears he paid them the judgment, amounting to one thousand and fifty-three dollars, and he says, with the credit which he consented to withdraw from his account as tutor of the minor. He offered to prove by the attorneys who entered the consent judgment, that in withdrawing the credit, he did not consent to its extinguishment, but reserved it as a claim against the estate of the minor, who was then deceased ; but the evidence was rejected.\\nPrice and Walson contends, that eight hundred and seventy-one dollars, the price paid by Stanbrough for slaves of his ward, was substituted in place of the credit of $1334 70, claimed by the tutor, and that the credit was extinguished by the substitution of the other credit and judgment of homologation.\\nFor two reasons, we think the evidence offered should have been received : First. The judgment is obscure, and we are unable to say which of the parties are right in their views of it. Second. When the plea of rei judicatce is offered, it is legal and proper to establish, by parol evidence or otherwise, the identity of the thing adjudged, and of course, to show in the same manner the contrary, that the thing has not been adjudged, when the obscurity in the judgment itself renders it necessary. But it is not necessary to remand the cause for this evidence. The records and accounts show precisely what Stanbrough received for Price and Watson, as heirs of their father, and also of his ward, their deceased half brother, and what he has paid to them and their creditors. He has .paid three thousand seven hundred and fifty-three dollars, and received twenty-seven hundred dollars, leaving Price and Watson, as the only heirs of his deceased ward, indebted to him one thousand and fifty-three dollars, with interest, as claimed.\\nObjection is made by Price and Watson to several bills for counsel fees, chai'ged by the curator of the succession. We do not see that they have taken an appeal, or brought the curator properly before us, so as to enable us to examine these claims. However, the amounts are not disputed, but it is urged, that the estate of their deceased half brother should not be charged with them. The record shows the services, and we think they were rendered on account of him and his succession, and ate proper charges against it.\\nThe judgment against the opponent, David, Stanbrough, is reversed ; and it is decreed, that he recover from the succession of Benjamin Steele, one thousand and fifty-three dollars, with interest from 22d of April, 1848, and that the succession pay the costs of this appeal. In other respects, the judgment is affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/331962.json b/la/331962.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d454b4dd3a7c79ce2b34e441c003671a2ef904ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/331962.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"331962\", \"name\": \"T. Phelps et al. v. Grorge S. Sawyer, Administrator; George S. Sawyer v. Sureties of Stone\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Phelps v. Sawyer\", \"decision_date\": \"1852-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"551\", \"last_page\": \"552\", \"citations\": \"7 La. Ann. 551\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Louisiana Annual Reports\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:29:32.272833+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"T. Phelps et al. v. Grorge S. Sawyer, Administrator. George S. Sawyer v. Sureties of Stone.\", \"head_matter\": \"T. Phelps et al. v. Grorge S. Sawyer, Administrator. George S. Sawyer v. Sureties of Stone.\\nA judgment rendered against an absent defendant, unrepresented by a curator ad hoc, or by a properly constituted agent, will be annulled and set aside.\\nA suit against the sureties upon an administrator\\u2019s bond will be dismissed unless there be a judgment against the administrator, or he be made a party defendant.\\nAPPEAL from the District Court of the Parish of Catahoula, Barry, J.\\nSawyer, for plaintiff.\\nCurry and Hendry, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"388\", \"char_count\": \"2370\", \"text\": \"By the court:\\nRost, J.\\nSamuel P. Stone, the administrator of the succession of Elias Carter, deceased, having absconded without settling his accounts, the plaintiff was appointed in his place, and brought suit to compel him to account. The petition was answered and an account of Stone's administration, filed by Elias Carter, Jr., who pretended tobe the agent of .Stone. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in that suit, for $1031. Execution having been issued on that judgment, and return, \\\" no property found,\\\" the administrator brought suit against the sureties of Stone on his bond.\\nThe defendants in that suit alleged as one of the grounds of their defence, that the judgment against Stone had been obtained by fraud and collusion, and brought a separate action against the administrator to annul it. There were other grounds of defence, which it is unnecessary to notice.\\nThe suit of the administrator against the sureties, and that brought by the sureties to annul the judgment against Stone, were consolidated and tried together. The district court annulled the judgment and dismissed the action against the sureties as in case of non-suit. The administrator has appealed.\\nThe power of attorney under which Elias Carter, Jr., represented Stone in the first suit, is in evidence. It is essentially a special power, and conferred no authority on Carter to defend that suit. The plaintiff had asked for the appointment of a curator ad hoc, but no appointment was made ; and as the defendant was unrepresented in the proceedings, the judgment rendered against him was properly annulled and set aside.\\nThere being no judgment against the principal debtor, and he not being made a party defendant in the suit against the sureties, that action was also properly dismissed.\\nThe judgments in both cases are therefore af\\u00f1rme\\u00e1.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/334682.json b/la/334682.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..343011ae1654e3e7b4d5777ccbc63a8c6c7a2eba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/334682.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"334682\", \"name\": \"Scott v. Niblett\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Scott v. Niblett\", \"decision_date\": \"1847-03\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"270\", \"last_page\": \"271\", \"citations\": \"2 La. Ann. 270\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"Louisiana Annual Reports\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:56:38.162911+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Scott v. Niblett.\", \"head_matter\": \"Scott v. Niblett.\\nDecision in Spenser v. Knowland, ante p. 222, affirmed.\\nAppeal from the District Court ef Madison, Selby, J.\\nThomas and Snyder, for the plaintiff,\\ncited Spencer V. Knowland, ante p. 222, as decisive of this case.\\nGarland and Pepper, for the appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"307\", \"char_count\": \"1791\", \"text\": \"The judgment of the court was pronounced by\\nSlidell, J.\\nAn order of seizure and sale was obtained upon a judgment in favor of Niblett against Scott in the United States Court, in the State of Mississippi. The judgment did not express on its face that it bore interest, but the plaintiff, in the executory proceeding, exhibited with the record an authenticated copy of a statute of Mississippi, passsed several years before the rendition of the judgment, which allowed interest on judgments at eight per cent. This rate was accordingly allowed by the order of seizure and sale.\\nWe think the order of seizure improperly issued in this respect. See the case of Spencer v. Knowland, ante p. 222. If the creditor had asked us to maintain the order of seizure and sale as to the capital sum, abandoning the interest, it might then have become necessary to examine the points made as to the char acter of the judgment, and the authentication of the transcript. There being no such application, we confirm the judgment of the court below rendering the injunction perpetual.\\nAs some doubt might arise from the phraseology of the injunction thus rendered perpetual and the proceedings in the cause, as to the force and effect of the judgment appealed from, we think proper to say, in affirming it,.that we consider it simply as determining that the order of seizure and sale in question illegally issued, and that it does not form res judicata as to the force and effect of the judgment rendered in Mississippi. Judgment affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/573194.json b/la/573194.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..256d3210030e54642fa0d9356786f19f6a68e772
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/573194.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"573194\", \"name\": \"T. M. Anderson v. R. B. Stille, Tutor\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Anderson v. Stille\", \"decision_date\": \"1856-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"669\", \"last_page\": \"671\", \"citations\": \"12 La. Ann. 669\", \"volume\": \"12\", \"reporter\": \"Louisiana Annual Reports\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:04:27.405442+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"T. M. Anderson v. R. B. Stille, Tutor.\", \"head_matter\": \"T. M. Anderson v. R. B. Stille, Tutor.\\nUle District Judge of the Parish in which the slaves ave situated, lias jurisdiction to try an action for their partition.\\nPlaintiff need not, in order to sustain a sequestration, swear that he fears defendant will conceal, part with, or dispose of, the property sequestered. It will be sufficient if he make oath of his interest in the property sequestered, and that he fears that defendant will send it out of the jurisdiction of the co-irt during the pending of the suit.\\nk \\u00fcPPEAL from the District Court of St. Landry, Dupr\\u00e9, J.\\nJ. L. King, for plaintiff and appellant.\\nSwcmjze & Moore, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"816\", \"char_count\": \"4804\", \"text\": \"Meeeick, C. J.\\nThe plaintiff being the owner of the one undivided sixth part of the slaves in controversy, by the judgment of the District Court of St. Landry, brought the present action to effect a partition.\\nThe slaves were in the possession of the defendant, in the Parish of St. Landry, and about being removed to the Parish of Sabine, where the defendant resides.\\nThe plaintiff also sued out a writ of sequestration, to prevent the slaves from being removed beyond the jurisdiction of the court.\\nThe defendant excepted to the plaintiff's action, which, being dismissed, plaintiff appealed.\\nIt is contended, 1st. That the defendant's domicil being in the Parish of Sabine, this action ought to be instituted there; 2d. That no sufficient ground for the resort to the harsh remedy of a writ of sequestration, has been shown by the plaintiff in his affidavit.\\nOn the first question, it is urged that the term \\\"real property,\\\" used in Art. No. 105, No. 11 Code of Practice, is intended to embrace land; that the suit for a partition of slaves, is governed by the general rule, that one must be sued before the Judge having jurisdiction over the place where the defendant has his domicil. O. P. 162.\\nA judicial construction was put by our predecessor upon the term, real property, as used in the Article 162, O. P., in the case of Scott v. Bowles, 3 Ann. 637, and it was there held, that \\\"slaves being immovable by operation of law, plaintiffs had their election to institute an action for their recovery, either in the parish where the property was situated, or at the domicil of the defendant.\\\"\\nWe see no reason why a different construction should be put upon the same words occurring inthearticle under consideration, which provides, that in matters relative to the partition of real estate between co-proprietors, the suit must be brought before the court of the place whore such property is situated, though the co-proprietors may reside in different parishes.\\nWe have not overlooked the language of the French text, d'un bien-foncls, but wo think the English text, which is in accordance with Article 1304 of the Civil Code, should govern. The article last cited from the Civil Code, is under the head of partition of successions, and is in these words: \\\"All the rules\\nestablished in the present section, with the exception of what relates to collections, are applicable to partitions between co-proprietors of the same thing, where, among the co-proprietors, any are absent, minors, or interdicted, or where the co-proprietors of age, present, cannot agree on the partition and on the manner of making it.\\nBut in these hinds of partitions, the action must be brought before the Judge of the place where the property to be divided, is situated, wherever the parties interested may be domiciliated.\\nThe District Judge for the Fifteenth Judicial District, for Parish of St. Landry, had jurisdiction of the action of partition.\\nIt is further contended, that the affidavit for the sequestration, is insufficient, and that it does assert that plaintiff feared that defendant would conceal, part with, or dispose of the slaves.\\nIt was not necessary in this action, that the affidavit should show such apprehension. It was sufficient, under the 2d paragraph of Article 275, of the Code of Practice, that the plaintiff should make oath of his interest in the property, and that he feared that the defendant would send the slaves out of the jurisdiction of the court, during the pendency of the suit.\\nNo person can be compelled to hold property in common with others. O, O. 1215. The plaintiff had the right to institute his suit at any moment he saw fit, and having brought his action whilst the property of which he was a co-proprietor, was in the Parish of St. Landry, the jurisdiction of the District must be maintained.\\nIt is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the District Court he avoided and reversed; that the defendant's exception be overruled; that the sequestration be maintained, and that this cause be remanded for further proceedings according to law, and that the defendant and appellee pay the 'costs of the appeal.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/609017.json b/la/609017.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4c3bc78f90d254500ca00ffb2d32f7d6fee75483
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/609017.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"609017\", \"name\": \"BROWN et al. v. AMERICAN FIRE INS. CO. OF NEW JERSEY (AMERICAN CENT. FIRE INS. CO. OF NEW JERSEY, Intervener)\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Brown v. American Fire Ins.\", \"decision_date\": \"1918-12-02\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 21614\", \"first_page\": \"519\", \"last_page\": \"519\", \"citations\": \"144 La. 519\", \"volume\": \"144\", \"reporter\": \"Louisiana Reports\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:52:12.029784+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"O\\u2019NIELL, J., being recused, takes no part.\", \"parties\": \"BROWN et al. v. AMERICAN FIRE INS. CO. OF NEW JERSEY (AMERICAN CENT. FIRE INS. CO. OF NEW JERSEY, Intervener).\", \"head_matter\": \"(80 South. 680)\\nNo. 21614.\\nBROWN et al. v. AMERICAN FIRE INS. CO. OF NEW JERSEY (AMERICAN CENT. FIRE INS. CO. OF NEW JERSEY, Intervener).\\n(Dec. 2, 1918.\\nRehearing Denied Feb. 3,1919.)\\nAppeal from Twenty-Third Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary; Thomas M. Milling, Judge.\\nSuit by Robert L. Brown and Oscar Zenor, coreceivers of the Mrs. E. D. Burguieres Planting Co., Limited, against the American Fire Insurance Company of New Jersey, in which the American Central Fire Insurance Company of New Jersey intervened. Judgment for plaintiffs, and intervener and defendant appeal.\\nReversed, and suit dismissed.\\nHowe, Fenner, Spencer & Cocke, of New Orleans, for appellant defendant.\\nJohn W. Lewis, of Opelousas, and Emmett Alpha, of Franklin, for appellant intervener.\\nPaul Kramer, and Foster, Milling, Saal & Milling, all of Franklin, for appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"233\", \"char_count\": \"1489\", \"text\": \".SOMMERVILLE, J-\\nThis case presents similar matters and points of law considered and disposed of this day in case numbered 21613, entitled \\\"Robert L. Brown and Oscar Zenor, Coreceivers of the Mrs. E. D. Burguieres Planting Company, Limited, v. North River Insurance Co. of New York (American Central Fire Insurance Co. of New Jersey, Intervener), 80 South. 674 ; and, for the reasons given therein,\\nIt is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be annulled, avoided, and reversed, and that there be judgment dismissing plaintiffs'' suit, at their costs.\\nO'NIELL, J., being recused, takes no part.\\nAnte, p. 504.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/6683342.json b/la/6683342.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5dfd47eb6dd37bf6052ea00661301785c4555a79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/6683342.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6683342\", \"name\": \"DUBREUIL vs. DUBREUIL\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Dubreuil v. Dubreuil\", \"decision_date\": \"1817-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"81\", \"last_page\": \"82\", \"citations\": \"5 Mart. (o.s.) 81\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Martin (Louisiana Term Reports)\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:27:53.880205+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"DUBREUIL vs. DUBREUIL.\", \"head_matter\": \"DUBREUIL vs. DUBREUIL.\\nAPPEAL from the court of the first district.\\nThe appellant must in all cases give security for costs.\\nA statement of facts must be signed by both. parties, or persons authorized by them.\", \"word_count\": \"325\", \"char_count\": \"1868\", \"text\": \"Derbigny, J.\\ndelivered the opinion of the court. In this case the appellee objects to the appeal as irregularly brought-1. Because no security for the costs was given by the appellant-2. Because the statement of facts, which purports to be agreed upon between the parties, was not assented to by him.\\nIn all cases of appeals, whether execution be stayed or not, the law makes it the duty of the appellant to furnish security to answer the costs. This is a condition without which he has no right to call his adverse party before the appellate court. If he does, the uppeal is irre- gularly brought, and ought not to be heard.\\nEast'n District.\\nJuly 1817.\\nCarleton for the appellant. Seghers for the appellee.\\nBut, independently of that circumstance, there is one feature in this record, which must decide the court to dismiss this appeal. The statement of facts is not signed by the appellee, nor for aught that appears, by any person for him. The conusel appointed ex officio to the absent heirs of John Dubrenil. part of whose estate dis- puted by the appellee as his brother, has signed that statement : but nothing shews that he signed or had any right to sign in air other capacity.\\nof attorney was received, this present attorney in fact signed, himself the petition, which he presented in his name to the court of probates, thereby evincing the intenition of prosecuting his claim in person. It does not appear that he employed any attor ney in the probate court. The statement of facts ought certainly to have been communicated to him, and is a nullity without his assent.\\nIt is, therefore, ordered,adjudged and decreed, that the appeal be dismissed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/6840017.json b/la/6840017.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1559b7db430204101005c980275363bc59ae4721
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/6840017.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6840017\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Glen FORD\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Ford\", \"decision_date\": \"2015-09-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2015-KK-1063\", \"first_page\": \"412\", \"last_page\": \"412\", \"citations\": \"176 So. 3d 412\", \"volume\": \"176\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:08:12.607850+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"WEIMER and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Glen FORD.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Glen FORD.\\nNo. 2015-KK-1063.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nSept. 11, 2015.\", \"word_count\": \"58\", \"char_count\": \"377\", \"text\": \"In re State of Louisiana; \\u2014 Petitioner; Applying for Rehearing of this Court's action dated June 30,2015, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 518-962; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-K-0079.\\nRehearing denied.\\nWEIMER and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/6860204.json b/la/6860204.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1951afaa2ca6875977874b6a2e5ee84999f630c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/6860204.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6860204\", \"name\": \"F.G. SULLIVAN, Jr., Contractor v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE and Parish of East Baton Rouge\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sullivan v. City of Baton Rouge\", \"decision_date\": \"2015-01-27\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2014 CA 0964\", \"first_page\": \"186\", \"last_page\": \"209\", \"citations\": \"170 So. 3d 186\", \"volume\": \"170\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:40:39.025861+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before McDONALD, CRAIN, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"F.G. SULLIVAN, Jr., Contractor v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE and Parish of East Baton Rouge.\", \"head_matter\": \"F.G. SULLIVAN, Jr., Contractor v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE and Parish of East Baton Rouge.\\nNo. 2014 CA 0964.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.\\nJan. 27, 2015.\\nRehearing Denied Feb. 19, 2015.\\n\\u2022 Eric A. Kracht, Scott E. Frazier, John M. Madison, III, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, F.G. Sullivan, Jr., Contractor.\\nMary Roper, Randy B. Ligh, Ashley W. Beck, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees, City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge.\\nMichael D. Fisse, Ryan M. Bourgeois, Covington, LA, for Defendant, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development.\\nBefore McDONALD, CRAIN, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ.\\n. The Honorable Guy Holdridge is serving as Supernumerary Judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.\", \"word_count\": \"10480\", \"char_count\": \"64912\", \"text\": \"CRAIN, J.\\n|2In this suit to enforce a construction contract, the defendant appeals the trial court's denial of a motion to continue the trial, the sustaining of an objection to the use of a deposition at the trial, and the quantum of damages awarded; while the plaintiff appeals the denial of its claim for certain costs incurred by its subcontractor. We affirm the rulings on the motion to continue the trial and the objection to the use of the deposition, amend the award of damages, and affirm the denial of the claim for the subcontractor's costs.\\nFACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\\nAt the conclusion of a public bid process, F.G. Sullivan, Jr., Contractor, and the City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge (City) entered a contract in March of 2001 for a roadway improvement project on Tiger Bend Road in East Baton Rouge Parish for the sum of $3,997,384.20. The project involved the expansion of approximately one mile of the road from two to four lanes and the installation of an underground storm drainage system, a component of the project that Sullivan subcontracted to RCS Contractors, Inc. Sullivan's construction schedule estimated that the project would require a total of 260 work days to complete. The project would begin with the installation of the drainage system by RCS, followed by Sullivan's construction of the two new lanes (Phase 1) and the removal and replacement of the two previously existing lanes (Phase 2).\\nPrior to advertising the project for bids, the City had the right of way cleared and began the process of securing the removal or relocation of utility lines that might interfere with the project, particularly with the installation of the drainage system. It was mutually understood by all parties that the utility lines would be removed or relocated prior to the commencement of work by Sullivan and RCS, and the City's construction plans and specifications indicated no utilities in the construction area. The City advised Sullivan and RCS that the removal and | ^relocation of all utilities would be completed by April 1, 2001, and the City thereafter confirmed that construction on the project could commence on April 2, 2001.\\nRCS began work on the drainage system but soon encountered utility lines that were still located in the right of way. While both parties agree that the removal or relocation of the utilities caused delays in the construction, the date and duration of those delays are the primary points of contention in this litigation. The project was ultimately completed in August of 2003.\\nThe City paid Sullivan the principal contract price, but it refused Sullivan's request for reimbursement of equipment \\\"idle time\\\" for the days when equipment dedicated to the project could not be used because of the delays resulting from the utilities conflicts. For purposes of this appeal, the parties do not dispute that the contract documents provide for reimbursement to Sullivan of a sum, determined by a formula, for such \\\"standby equipment.\\\" After the City refused Sullivan's request for idle-time reimbursement, Sullivan filed this suit seeking recovery of those sums along with additional overhead expense resulting from the utilities delays. Sullivan also sought to recover a \\\"claim\\\" by RCS for the subcontractor's \\\"increased costs and damages\\\" associated with the delays. The City denied any liability and asserted a third-party demand against the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), which was later dismissed on an exception of no cause of action.\\nSullivan's claims against the City proceeded to a three-day bench trial. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court awarded Sullivan $957,736.37 in damages, which was itemized as $889,045.97 in idle equipment costs and $62,690.40 in overhead, and denied Sullivan's claim for RCS's additional costs. A judgment setting forth the trial court's rulings was signed on November 27, 2013. A subsequent motion for new trial was granted only to make |4a minor change of two cents in the judgment amount, amending the award to $957,736.39, as reflected in an amended judgment signed on March 5,-2014. The City appealed the judgment and asserts that the trial court erred (1) in denying its motion to continue the trial, (2) by sustaining Sullivan's objection to the use of a deposition at trial, (3) by finding a construction delay of 303 days due to utilities conflicts, and (4) in computing damages using the calculation prepared by Sullivan's expert. Sullivan also appealed and asserts that the trial court erred in failing to award, as an item of damages to Sullivan, the additional costs incurred by RCS as a result of alleged errors in the City's contract documents.\\nDISCUSSION\\nDenial of Motion to Continue\\nIn its first assignment of error, the City contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to continue the trial. After two prior continuances at the joint request of the parties and a third continuance at the request of Sullivan, the claims were scheduled for trial beginning on September 3, 2013. On August 27, 2013, about one week prior to trial, the City filed a motion to continue asserting that its expert on the calculation of damages, Michael Daigle, was unavailable due to health reasons and that the City needed additional time to hire another expert. The City did not request the issuance of a witness subpoena for Daigle and offered no docu mentation in support of its motion to continue. The trial court denied the motion.\\nAt the beginning of trial, the City renewed its motion to continue, stating on the record that Daigle informed the City's counsel about three weeks prior to trial that he was no longer testifying or handling any litigation on the advice of his | gcardiologist. The City had no documentation from the physician confirming this information. The trial court again denied the motion, explaining:\\nSo the court has nothing in writing from a cardiologist or any medical records of Mr. Daigle. The court does not know who the cardiologist is, and for what purpose the cardiologist has told Mr. Daigle he cannot testify. And Mr. Daigle was able to communicate that to defense counsel effectively. As I stated, there is no\\u2014I find no reason for this court to grant a continuance based off Mr. Daigle's word that his cardiologist, has suggested that he should not do this line of work.\\nThe City argues that the trial court, was obligated to grant a continuance under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1602, which provides:\\nA continuance shall be granted if at the time a case is to be tried, the party applying for the continuance shows that he has been unable, with the exercise of due diligence, to obtain evidence material to his case; or that a material witness has absented himself without the contrivance of the party applying for the continuance.\\nIn order to be entitled to a continuance, the moving party has the burden of showing that he met the requirements set forth in Article 1602. Polkey v. Landworks, Inc., 10-0718 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/29/10), 68 So.3d 540, 551. To meet his burden, the party must establish either (1) that he exercised due diligence, yet was unsuccessful in obtaining material evidence; or (2) that a material witness absented himself contrary to the arrangement made by the party for the witness to appear. McGregor v. Hospice Care of Louisiana in Baton Rouge, Inc., 08-2029 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/27/09), 2009 WL 838621, p. 3, writ denied, 09-1232 (La.9/18/09), 17 So.3d 980. A party applying for a continuance, although entitled to a reasonable delay and opportunity to procure his witnesses, must show due diligence. La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 1602, 1960 Official Revision Comment (b); Spencer v. Benny's Car Wash, LLC, 11-1708 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/4/12), 2012 WL 1580601, p. 6, writ not considered, 12-1279 (La.9/28/12), 98 So.3d 824, reconsideration denied, 12-1279 (La. 11/9/12), 100 So.3d 826.\\n| (\\u00beWhen the conditions of Article 1602 are met, the granting of a continuance is mandatory. Carbo v. City of Slidell, 01-0170 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1/8/03), 844 So.2d 1, 9, writ denied, 03-0392 (La.4/25/03), 842 So.2d 400. The policy behind the mandatory continuance is to insure that a party is not deprived of his day in court or his right to properly present his defense when not due to his own fault or delinquency. See American Motorists Insurance Company v. State, Worker's Compensation Second Injury Board, 544 So.2d 595, 598 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1989).\\nThe record reflects that Daigle told the City's counsel three weeks before trial that he would not appear as a witness on advice of his physician. The City did not request a trial subpoena for Daigle before or after that notification, and it presented no medical documentation or other evidence substantiating Daigle's claim that he was physically Unable to attend trial. Upon the showing made, the City's failure to take reasonable measures to compel, or at least attempt to compel, the witness's appearance at the trial, combined with its failure to present any proof that the witness's health rendered any such measures futile or unnecessary, does not demonstrate sufficient due diligence to invoke the provisions of Article 1602. See Broussard v. Coleman, 479 So.2d 1016, 1018-1019 (La.App. 3 Cir.1985), writ denied, 481 So.2d 1354 (La.1986) (trial court did- not err in refusing to continue the trial or hold the record open based on a witness's illness where the plaintiffs offered no evidence of the illness.and did not subpoena the witness). This assignment of error has no merit.\\nUse of Daigle's Deposition at Trial\\nThe City next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit the introduction of Daigle's discovery deposition, which the City offered during its case-in-chief, on the grounds that Daigle was unavailable for trial because of his health. In support of that tender, the City proffered an exchange of emails dated August 29, 2013, reflecting an attempt by the City's counsel to get an affidavit |7from Daigle confirming his condition. Daigle advised that he was out of state and would not be back in Louisiana until after the trial. When questioned by the trial court, counsel did not know why Daigle, a resident of the Mandeville/Covington area, was out of state and \\\"didn't ask.\\\" Sullivan's counsel objected to the introduction of the deposition, citing a lack of proof of Daigle's unavailability, the City's failure to subpoena Daigle, and the fact that the deposition was taken for discovery purposes. The trial court sustained the objection, finding that the City offered no proof of Daigle's unavailability.\\nOn appeal the City argues that Daigle's health condition rendered him unavailable for the trial or, in the alternative, that exceptional circumstances warranted the admission of the deposition. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1450 provides, in pertinent part, that the deposition of a witness may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds that \\\"the witness is unavailable . or [ujpon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used.\\\" La.Code Civ. Pro. art. 1450A(3)(a) and (c). The trial court has much discretion under Article 1450 in determining whether to allow the use of deposition testimony at trial, and its decision will not be disturbed on review in the absence of an abuse, of that discretion. Dunning v. Dapco Ventures, L.L.C., 01-2366 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/8/02), 834 So.2d.448, 455, writ denied, 03-0215 (La.3/28/03), 840 So.2d 576.\\nAlthough Article 1450 does not specify when a witness is \\\"unavailable,\\\" Louisiana Code of Evidence article 804 provides, in pertinent part, that a declar-ant is \\\"unavailable as a witness\\\" when he \\\"cannot or will not appear in court and testify,\\\" including when he is \\\"unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness, infirmity, or other Insufficient cause.\\\" La.Code Evid. art. 804 A(4). The party asserting the admissibility of a deposition under Article 1450 A(3)(a) must show that the witness is unavailable for trial. See Montgomery v. Breaux, 297 So.2d 185, 189 (La.1974).\\nThe determination of whether a witness is unavailable is a preliminary question for the trial court. See La. Code Evid. art. 104 A; State v. Ball, 00-2277 (La.1/25/02), 824 So.2d 1089, 1112, cert. denied, 587 U.S. 864, 123 S.Ct. 260, 154 L.Ed.2d 107; Folse v. Folse, 98-1976 (La.6/29/99), 738 So.2d 1040, 1048-49. The trial court may consider otherwise inadmissible evidence in determining this preliminary factual question. See La.Code Evid. arts. 104 A and 1101 C(l); Folse, 738 So.2d at 1048-49. Such determinations are reviewed for manifest error and will not be overturned, absent an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Ball, 824 So.2d at 1112; see also Martin v. Francis, 600 So.2d 1382, 1386 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 606 So.2d 541 (La.1992) (recognizing that the trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether a witness is unavailable within the meaning of Article 1450).\\nThe City's assertion that Daigle was unavailable for trial rests entirely on Daigle's statement, reflected in an email proffered by the City, that he was no longer \\\"available for trial testimony on the advice of [his] cardiologist.\\\" The City presented no documentation substantiating Daigle's claim, nor did the City's counsel express any personal knowledge of the physician-imposed restrictions based upon communications with Daigle's physician. While an attorney's representations of his efforts to locate a witness have been held sufficient to ^establish a witness's unavailability, see Ball v. Capital City Cornichon Corp., 11-1862 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/2/12), 2012 WL 1550545, pp. 3-4, writ denied, 12-1448 (La.1/18/13), 107 So.3d 623, counsel's representations in the present case merely conveyed the witness's claim that his physician advised him not to attend the trial.\\nIn reviewing the trial court's determination, this court must be cautious not to re-weigh the evidence or substitute its own factual finding just because it may have decided the matter differently. See Cooper v. Barr 13-1857 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/2/14), 2014 WL 1778281, p. 2, writ denied, 14-1169 (La.9/19/14), 149 So.3d 245. While the City made some showing of Daigle's unavailability, great weight is attached to the exercise of a trial court's discretion, which will not be disturbed on review if reasonable people could differ as to the propriety of the trial court's action. See J. Caldarera and Company, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 03-0759 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/23/04), 873 So.2d 728, 730. Based upon the showing made, the trial court was not sufficiently persuaded that Daigle was unavailable for trial. Under these circumstances, we find no manifest error or abuse of discretion in that determination.\\nOn appeal, the City also argues that exceptional circumstances justified the admission of Daigle's deposition under Article 1450 A(3)(e), because it \\\"was informed only weeks from trial that its damages expert could not attend court on advice from his cardiologist.\\\" The trial court made no determination of whether exceptional circumstances existed in this case because the City did not present this argument when it offered the deposition at the trial. Rule 1-3 of the Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal provides, and our jurisprudence generally establishes, that the courts of appeal will review only issues which were submitted to the trial court and which are contained in specifications or assignments of error, unless the interest of justice clearly requires otherwise. See McLane Southern, Inc. v. Bridges, 13-1819 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/3/14), 2014 WL 5588893, p. 4. Preter-mitting whether the City properly preserved this issue for appeal, we find no exceptional circumstances that warranted the admission of Daigle's discovery deposition. For the reasons already provided, the record supports a finding that the City did not exercise due diligence to secure Daigle's appearance at trial or to substantiate the circumstances preventing his appearance. The \\\"exceptional circumstances\\\" basis for admitting a deposition cannot serve as a substitute for the due diligence required to secure a witness's attendance at trial or the necessity of establishing his unavailability. The City's reliance on Article 1450 A(3)(c) in support of the admissibility of Daigle's deposition is without merit.\\nThe City also argues that Daigle's deposition was admissible at trial because the parties stipulated that the deposition was \\\"taken for all purposes allowed under Article 1421 et seq. of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure in accordance with law.\\\" (Emphasis added.) As indicated, the stipulation that the deposition was taken \\\"for all purposes\\\" is expressly limited to those purposes \\\"allowed under\\\" and \\\"in accordance with\\\" the discovery provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Those provisions include Article 1450, which sets forth the limitations and conditions for using a deposition at trial. The stipulation does not purport to waive Article 1450's requirements and does not reflect an unqualified agreement that the deposition would be admissible at trial.\\nThe two cases cited by the City in support of its argument, Town of Church Point v. Carriere, 463 So.2d 986 (La.App. 3 Cir.1985), and Joseph v. Gibliant, 590 So.2d 841 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991), are distinguishable from the present case. In Town of Church Point, the court found a stipulation ambiguous but upheld the trial court's admission of an expert's deposition into evidence because counsel for |nthe objecting party \\\"surely must have understood\\\" that the deposition was for probable use at trial since it was taken by counsel for the party who hired the expert. Town of Church Point, 463 So.2d at 989. The court reasoned that a deposition of one's own expert \\\"would hardly have been taken for discovery purposes.\\\" Town of Church Point, 463 So.2d at 989. In contrast, Dai-gle's deposition was taken by Sullivan's counsel and the City's attorney did not ask any questions during the deposition. There is no indication that .the parties intended that this discovery deposition would be used by the City at the trial in lieu of Daigle's live testimony.\\nIn Joseph, a physician indicated to both counsel before and during a three-day trial that he would be available to testify at any time. Joseph, 590 So.2d at 843. When defense counsel called him to come to court on the last day of trial, the physician's office indicated that he was not available and would not be for the rest of the day. The trial court then called the physician's office in an unsuccessful effort to secure his attendance. A witness subpoena apparently had been requested but was not personally served. The trial court allowed the introduction of the physician's deposition, and the court of appeal found no abuse of discretion. Joseph, 590 So.2d at 843. Although the court of appeal quoted a stipulation concerning the use of the deposition, the court primarily based its decision on a finding that the witness \\\"chose to make himself unavailable after assuring counsel of his availability.\\\" Joseph, 590 So.2d at 843. The court further found that opposing counsel \\\"knew the deposition was being taken for perpetuation, he was present, and he participated fully.\\\" Joseph, 590 So.2d at 843. Notably, a subpoena for the witness had apparently been requested. See Joseph, 590 So.2d at 843.\\nIn the present case, Daigle did not assure either party at the outset of trial that he would appear when requested, and he was not subpoenaed. Rather, he |12informed the City three weeks earlier that he would not appear at the trial. Further, there is no suggestion that Sullivan's counsel thought the discovery deposition of the witness was a perpetuation deposition for use at trial. Neither Town of Church Point nor Joseph support the City's contention that the parties stipulated to the use of Daigle's deposition at trial in lieu of his live testimony, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Daigle's deposition into evidence. This assignment of error has no merit.\\nCalculation of Damages for Idle Equipment and Additional Overhead\\nThe City's next two assignments of error concern the trial court's reliance on the opinions of Sullivan's expert, Michael Myers, in determining the amount of damages awarded to Sullivan. In rendering its ruling, the trial court stated that Myers, who was accepted by the court as an expert in cost consulting and critical path method scheduling, \\\"gave the court some direction or guidance\\\" as to the length of the delay resulting from the utilities conflicts, but the court agreed with the City that some of the days included in the 303-day delay calculated by Myers \\\"should not be counted.\\\" The court expressed difficulty in determining an exact number of days to \\\"pull out . due to rain, holidays and all of that,\\\" so it used Myers's calculation of 303 days but discounted Myers's net damage figures by 11S15%, resulting in an award for idle equipment costs of $889,045.97. The court also awarded $62,690.40 for Sullivan's separate claim for lost overhead.\\nIn reviewing these assignments of error, we are mindful that when findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error-clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings; for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said. Lirette v. State Farm Ins. Co., 563 So.2d 850, 853 (La.1990); Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989). The rule that questions of credibility are for the trier of fact applies to the evaluation of expert testimony, unless the stated reasons of the expert are patently unsound. Hanks v. Entergy Corporation, 06-477 (La.12/18/06), 944 So.2d 564, 580-81; Lirette, 563 So.2d at 852-53; Hartec Corporation v. GSE Associates, Inc., 10-1332 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/24/12), 91 So.3d 375, 390, writ denied, 12-0972 (La.6/22/12), 91 So.3d 972. The factual basis for an expert opinion determines the credibility of the testimony. Hudspeth v. Allstate Insurance Company, 13-1288 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/3/14), 2014 WL 3559373, writ denied, 14-1651 (La.10/31/14), 152 So.3d 157. Where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's testimony, or the testimony is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable factfinder would not credit the testimony, the court of appeal may find manifest error or clear wrongness even where the finding is purportedly based on a credibility determination. Jackson v. Tulane Medical Center Hospital & Clinic, 05-1594 (La.10/17/06), 942 So.2d 509, 513.\\nWe first address the trial court's award for idle equipment charges. While the City concedes that Sullivan introduced evidence that indicates a delay due to 1 ^utilities conflicts, the City contends that the evidence does not show when the delays occurred. As a consequence, according to the City, Sullivan did not prove what equipment, was at the job site when the actual delays occurred. Having exhaustively reviewed Myers's opinion., and the basis therefore, we find the City's position to be correct.\\nThe parties do not dispute that equipment \\\"standby\\\" or \\\"idle\\\" charges are determined pursuant to a directive in the Engineering Directives and Standards Manual issued by DOTD (DOTD directive), which is part of the contract documents and provides in pertinent part:\\nFor standby equipment, the allowed hourly reimbursement rate shall not exceed one-half of the Blue Book monthly rate, divided by 176, and adjusted for region and age. Standby will not be allowed during periods when the equipment would ordinarily be idle, such as on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, and days when weather conditions prevent the contractor from working, or when breakdowns prevent working, or while being serviced. Standby hours -will not be allowed if the equipment actually worked eight or more hours in the day or forty or more hours for the week.\\nAs indicated, the DOTD directive provides for an hourly reimbursement rate for \\\"standby equipment . [that] shall not exceed one-half of the Blue Book monthly rate, divided by 176, and adjusted for region and age.\\\" This rate is then multiplied by the number of hours the equipment is idle, which in the present case means the amount of time the equipment sat idle on the site because of utilities conflicts.\\nBecause the reimbursement is available only for equipment rendered idle by a delay, and in this ease a delay specifically resulting from utilities conflicts, the specific date of any such delay is necessary to determine what equipment was on the project at the time of the delay. As expressed by Myers, \\\"If a piece of equipment wasn't there during that time period, then it wasn't going to get into any claim.\\\" To establish the dates of the delays, Sullivan did not rely on project documentation identifying when the project was halted because of utilities conflicts. Instead, Sullivan relied on Myers's opinions to show not only the length | l5of the delays, but, more importantly for the idle equipment claim, when those delays occurred. By comparing Sullivan's projected construction schedule with the actual construction schedule, Myers surmised that the delays totaled 303 days, which occurred during two consecutive periods, the first consisting of 122 days from March 25, 2002, through July 25, 2002, and the second consisting of 181 days from July 25, 2002, through May 30, 2003.\\nMyers then used Sullivan's billing record to identify 105 pieces of equipment, ranging from bulldozers to tracks that were on the job site during those delay periods. He calculated the recoverable equipment costs for each piece of equipment by multiplying its idle days by a daily reimbursement rate, which he derived from a monthly rate in the \\\"Blue Book,\\\" a reference book that is mentioned in the applicable DOTD directive. Cumulatively, Myers calculated gross idle equipment costs of $2,557,274.26, which he then reduced by 50% to arrive at net recoverable idle equipment costs of $1,278,637.13.\\nAfter a thorough review of the record and Myers's testimony, we find no reasonable basis supporting his opinion concerning the critical issue of when the delays occurred. Myers opined that the first delay of 122 days occurred from March 25, 2002, through July 25, 2002, whicli correlated with Sullivan's completion of the Phase 1 paving work and the start of the base work for the new road in Phase 2. Because Sullivan originally had not projected any delay between those two phases of the project, Myers attributed the 122 day delay to the utilities conflicts. However, there is no evidence in the record, nor did Myers cite any |,(\\u00a1information upon which he relied, indicating that the project was actually suspended during that period of time.\\nMyers acknowledged that the 122 days of delay \\\"didn't just occur in that period,\\\" meaning March 25, 2002, through July 25, 2002. Rather, the delays \\\"accumulated sporadically over the course of the whole preceding part of the job . incrementally from the beginning of the job through this July 25th point in time,\\\" but the sum result \\\"was realized as March through July of '02.\\\" A summary of the project work prepared by Myers indicates that during that period of time, Sullivan was working on driveways and sidewalks for Phase 1 and excavation and embankment work for Phase 2. That information is supported by the project work diaries which likewise documented Sullivan's work on those parts of the job during that time period.\\nThere was also ample evidence of days when construction was suspended by utilities conflicts before March 25, 2002. Reports generated by the City that documented \\\"work days\\\" were offered into evidence and identified 49 such days lost to utilities conflicts on dates occurring well before the commencement of Myers's first delay period beginning on March 25, 2002. While Sullivan disputes the accuracy of later reports prepared by the City, Sullivan did not dispute that the 49 days identified in the reports were, in fact, lost due to utilities conflicts; however, Myers apparently merged those days into the delay period he identified beginning on March 25, 2002. Similarly, Steve Strickland, Sullivan's project estimator and construction manager, testified that utilities conflicts began within two weeks of commencement of the drainage work in April of 2001 and persisted thereafter. This testimony was corroborated by testimony from Roland Alonso, president and sole owner of RCS, and letters from Alonso and Sullivan to the City advising of repeated conflicts with utilities on numerous occasions before March 25,2002.\\n117Pespite this evidence, Myers utilized a delay period that commenced on March 25, 2002, and ran continuously through My 25, 2002, to identify which equipment was idle and for how long as a result of the utilities conflicts. Myers's calculation, therefore, includes idle equipment charges for any and all equipment that was on the site at any time between March 25, 2002, and July 25, 2002, even though it is undisputed that work was ongoing during that period of time. On the other hand, Myers's calculation does not. include idle equipment charges for equipment that was on the site during any of the uncontested 49 utilities conflict days, all of which occurred before March 25, 2002.\\nAs to the second delay, Myers began with the actual duration of Phase 2 (309 days) and subtracted its duration as projected by Sullivan (128 days) to arrive at a figure of 181 days. He considered these additional 181 days as days when construction on the project was not possible because of utilities conflicts. Without explanation, Myers concluded that the start date and end date of the second delay coincided with the start date and end date for the entire Phase 2 construction: July 25, 2002, through May 30, 2003. Myers made no effort to identify exactly when the 181 delay days occurred during Phase 2. Instead, he generally attributed the 181 days throughout the entire period and utilized a \\\"factor\\\" of .5858 to determine the length of the idle time for each piece of equipment used on the job during Phase 2. That factor appears to be the proportion of delay days, as determined by Myers, compared to the total number of days actually required to complete Phase 2.\\nMyers thus assumed that every piece of equipment used in Phase 2 was idle at some point during that phase, and, moreover, that each such item of equipment was idle for the same percentage of time it was on site: 58.58%. That assumption has no factual basis in the record, and Myers did not identify any information that | ishe relied upon to support the application of such a global assumption to each and every piece of equipment used in Phase 2 of the project.\\nCombining both of his delay periods, Myers assumed that all of the days when construction was suspended due to utilities conflicts occurred during a continuous period of time beginning on March 25, 2002, and ending on May 30, 2003. The record contains no evidence suggesting that construction on the project completely ceased for that period of time due to utilities conflicts or for any other any reason. Myers's opinion concerning when the construction delays occurred is not based in fact, is internally inconsistent, and is contradicted by documents and objective evidence. Therefore, because Myers's reasons are patently unsound, the trial court's reliance on his opinion to determine the amount of the idle equipment charges is owed no deference and was manifestly erroneous. See Hanks, 944 So.2d at 580-81. This warrants a de novo review of the evidence by this court to determine an appropriate amount of damages for the idle equipment charges. See Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571 (La.4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 555; Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 94-1252 (La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 742, 745.\\nThe delays resulting from the utilities conflicts were addressed by several witnesses at trial. Steve Strickland, Sullivan's project estimator and construction manager, testified about his preparation of a construction schedule for the project in connection with the preparation of Sullivan's bid. He testified that RCS began the drainage work, but the planned construction sequence was soon disrupted due to conflicts with utility lines located in the construction area and not shown on the City's construction plans. Strickland also reviewed the City's work day reports that identified working days and nonworking-days. He confirmed that those records identified 49 dates during the first seven months of the construction when work on the project was suspended due to utilities conflicts. The subsequent' work day reports did not identify any more lost days due to utilities conflicts; however, | inStrickland testified that he was familiar with additional'utilities delays, although he did not specify when those delays occurred or their duration. He thought the subsequent work day reports by the City were inaccurate and did not sign them.\\nJesse Spence, Sullivan's junior project manager at the time of the project, confirmed that undisclosed utility lines delayed the construction project. He noted utilities conflicts and delays still occurring as late as 2003; however, like Strickland, Spence did not testify as to any specific dates when construction was suspended or the duration of any such suspension. Spence disagreed with the City's documentation in the work day reports and diaries and believed that Sullivan was charged for work days when utilities conflicts prevented them from working, while on other days the City noted that weather prevented work when, in fact, utilities prevented work. However, Sullivan submitted no documentation of its own to reflect a more accurate number of work days lost due to utilities conflicts.\\nRoland Alonso, president and sole owner of RCS, described problematic delays in completing the installation of the drainage system due to utility lines that had not been removed and were not shown on the plans. As late as February of 2003, almost two years after the commencement of construction, RCS was still hitting utility lines that were not disclosed on the plans. Sullivan offered into evidence numerous letters written by Alonso or Strickland to the City's project engineer regarding the utilities conflicts; however, Alonso also failed to identify any specific dates when his company's work had to stop due to the conflicts and the duration of the delays.\\nThe City offered a discovery deposition of the City, taken pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1442, that consisted of testimony from several City employees involved in the project. The City employees conceded that hnconflicts with unidentified utilities caused delays in the project, but they contended that most of the project delays were due to a lack of cooperation from RCS.\\nThe City also offered excerpts from the discovery deposition of Stephen Spohrer, an engineer retained by the City with experience in construction management and cost scheduling. Spohrer believed that Sullivan's original estimate of the project duration was unrealistic based upon Sullivan's history with similar jobs. According to Spohrer, a job of this nature would normally take Sullivan 22 to 28 months to complete, and the total duration of this project fell within that range. He believed that this project was a normal, typical job for Sullivan and that the surprises they encountered were not unusual for a job of this character in an urban environment.\\nSullivan, as the party seeking to recover damages under the contract, bore the burden of proving its entitlement to idle equipment charges.in accordance with the terms and conditions of the DOTD directive in the contract documents. See La.Civ.Code arts. 1995, 2005; L & A Contracting Company, Inc. v. Ram Industrial Coatings, Inc., 99-0854 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/00), 762 So.2d 1223, 1235, writ denied, 00-2232 (La.11/13/00), 775 So.2d 438. The DOTD directive sets forth a precise formula for determining the idle equipment expenses that requires proof of what equipment was rendered idle by utilities conflicts and the duration of the idle period. Because equipment is periodically delivered to and removed from the project site, the identification of equipment rendered idle by a compensable delay requires proof of the actual dates the project was suspended due to utilities conflicts. Otherwise, it is impossible to determine what equipment was rendered idle by a compensable delay.\\nWhile Sullivan criticizes the City for failing to document the specific days delayed due to utilities conflicts, noting that the City's documentation of the utilities conflicts delays stopped after 49 such days were documented, it is Sullivan l2iwho is claiming damages in this case. Those damages are based upon a specific damage provision of Sullivan's contract with the City. Consequently, it is Sullivan's burden of proof, not the City's, to establish the delays which caused its damage. While claiming about a year of such delays, Sullivan apparently maintained no documentation for the purpose of establishing its claim; thus, the necessity for its expert to construct a formula to reconstruct the delays.\\nAlthough the testimony of the witnesses generally indicates periodic conflicts with utilities throughout the project, the only evidence of actual dates when utilities conflicts suspended the construction is contained in the City's work day reports, which identify 49 such dates from April 16, 2001 through October 26, 2001. No other competent evidence identifies specific dates when work on the projected stopped and equipment was idle due to utilities conflicts. Accordingly, from the evidence presented, we are able to ascertain 49 specific days when the construction was suspended due to utilities conflicts.\\nWe next determine what equipment was on the project site during one or more of these 49 days. The City argues that Sullivan failed to prove when any equipment was on the construction site, because Sullivan did not maintain records confirming the first and last date that each item of equipment was on the site. Sullivan did document when it \\\"charged\\\" each piece of equipment to the project, meaning the days when a piece of equipment was used on the project. Spence reviewed Sullivan's records and determined the first and last day each piece of equipment was charged on the project, and Myers used that information to define the period of time each piece of equipment was on the project site for purposes of his calculations. Although Spence conceded that \\\"theoretically\\\" some of the equipment could have been moved off the job between charge dates, he stated that | a2it would be very uneconomical to do so. At Myers's request, Sullivan personnel also reviewed records for some of the equipment to determine whether it was charged to any other projects during the delay period, and no billings for the equipment were found for other projects.\\nIn an action to recover damages for breach of contract, a plaintiff must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence, either direct or circumstantial. See Guidry v. Statewide Trailer Sales & Lafourche Concrete, Inc., 393 So.2d 144, 145 (La.App. 1 Cir.1980). Proof is sufficient to constitute a preponderance when the entirety of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, shows the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. Hanks, 944 So.2d at 578; Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center, 564 So.2d 654, 664 (La.1989). A fact established by direct evidence is one which has been testified to by witnesses as having come under the cognizance of their senses. Hanks, 944 So.2d at 578; Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 664. Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is evidence of one fact, or of a set of facts, from which the existence of the fact to be determined may reasonably be inferred. Hanks, 944 So.2d at 578-579; Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 664-665.\\nConsidering the entirety of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, we find that Sullivan sufficiently proved the dates that each item of equipment was on the project site. Based upon our de novo review of the evidence, 54 items of equipment were on the project site during one or more of the 49 utilities-conflict days and are eligible for idle time reimbursement, all as more specifically set forth on the Addendum attached hereto.\\nThe remaining information necessary to calculate the idle equipment expense for each of the 54 items of equipment is a reimbursement rate. .We are |^persuaded that Myers determined appropriate monthly reimbursement rates for the equipment by using the Blue Book monthly rate. His testimony and supporting exhibits confirm that for each piece of equipment, he utilized the applicable Blue Book rate, made adjustments for the equipment age and project region, and arrived at a monthly rate. In accordance with the formula set form in the DOTD directive, we reduce that monthly rate by half and divide the figure by 176 hours to arrive at an hourly reimbursement rate, which we then convert to a daily rate based on an 8-hour work-day. For each of 54 items of equipment identified on the Addendum, we have multiplied its daily reimbursement rate by the number of days it was on the site when the construction was suspended. As itemized in the Addendum and in accordance with the formula agreed upon by the parties, we award total idle equipment reimbursement expense in favor of Sullivan and against the City in the amount of $124,741.64.\\nWe next consider Sullivan's claim for additional overhead expenses attributable to delays from utilities conflicts. Overhead or indirect expenses consists generally of the expenses of a business enterprise for salaries of executives, central office staff personnel, rent, communications, vehicles, utilities, interest on borrowed capital and numerous other expenses which are necessary for the operation of the business, but which are not directly attributable to a particular construction job or project. See McCarty Corporation v. Industrial Scaffolding, Inc., 413 So.2d 1322, 1324 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1981). Since it is practically impossible to accurately allocate the exact amount of indirect expense actually incurred on each job or project, the generally accepted practice is to determine what the proportionate amount of all indirect expenses is to the dollar volume of work performed or business done by the company, and then allocate these overhead or indirect expenses to each job or project. McCarty, 413 So.2d at 1324. Overhead or indirect expenses are a true cost of doing business; therefore, it is ^customary to award overhead expenses in both actions of breach of contract and tort actions to cover indirect expenses that are not reflected in a direct expense incurred in remedying the damage sustained, and such expenses need not be proved item by item. See McCarty, 413 So.2d at 1324.\\nMyers calculated a daily amount of overhead expense attributable to the Tiger Bend project based upon the length of the project and the percentage of Sullivan's total revenue derived from the project. That daily amount, according to Myers, was $591.14, which he then multiplied by 303 days to arrive at the sum of $179,115.42. The trial court awarded $62,690.40 for this claim.\\nThe City does not contest Sullivan's right to recover additional overhead expenses caused by any delays from utilities conflicts, but the City does contend that the 303-day figure utilized by Myers to calculate the award was improper because that figure includes weekends, holidays and weather, days. The City essentially argues that the compensable delay for additional overhead expense should be limited to actual work days only.\\nInitially, we note that while the calculation of idle equipment charges requires specific proof of when the delays occurred in order to identify what equipment was on site during the delay, the determination of the additional overhead expenses, as calculated by Myers, does not require such specificity because the overhead expense is distributed pro rata over the entire duration of the project. Myers only needed to determine the total duration of the utilities- conflict delays, which he then multiplied by his daily overhead rate to arrive at the additional overhead expense. As to the duration of the delay, Myers acknowledged that his 303-day figure consisted of calendar days, as opposed to work days, and included weekends, weather days, and holidays. However, his calculation of the additional overhead amount used a daily rate derived from the total overhead expense allocated to the project divided by the total number of calendar days (822) | gfjin the project. Thus in determining the daily rate, Myers spread the overhead expense over calendar days, not just work days, which yielded a lower daily rate than if the overhead had been divided only by work days. His use of calendar days to determine a reduced daily rate appears to warrant the use of calendar days to determine the second factor in the calculation, the duration of the delay.\\nHowever, more importantly, the trial court did not accept Myers's proposed figure of $179,115.42 for the additional overhead expenses. Instead, the court awarded only $62,690.40. Based upon the entirety of the evidence, we cannot say that award is an abuse of discretion. The evidence indicates that the delays from utilities conflicts may have been as long as 303 days (Myers's opinion), as short as 49 days (the City's work day reports), or somewhere in between those two extremes. Myers's opinion was not only contradicted by the City's documentation but was also contradicted by his own construction summary that indicated ongoing work during the period of his delay. On the other hand, the City's documentation of only 49 days of delay caused by utilities conflicts, with the final day occurring in October of 2001, is contradicted by the testimony of multiple witnesses who confirmed continued problems with the conflicts as late as 2003.\\nIn reviewing an award of additional overhead expenses, this court has recognized that \\\"it is practically impossible to accurately allocate the exact amount of' indirect expense or overhead actually incurred on a job and that \\\"such expenses need not be proved item by item.\\\" See McCarty, 413 So.2d at 1324. Likewise, when damages are insusceptible of precise measurement, much discretion shall be left to the court for the reasonable assessment of these damages. La. Civ. Code art. 1999; L & A Contracting Company, Inc. v. Ram Industrial Coatings, Inc., 99-0354 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/00), 762 So.2d 1223, 1235, writ denied, 00-2232 (La.11/13/00), 775 So.2d 438. Absent an abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not disturb a trial court's assessment of damages. L & A Contracting Company, Inc., 762 So.2d at 1235. Considering all of the evidence in the present case, the trial court reasonably could have determined that the recoverable delay was more than 49 days but less than 303 days, and the trial court's award is consistent with a recoverable delay that falls within the range of those two extremes. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion or manifest error in the award of $62,690.40 for Sullivan's additional overhead expenses.\\nSullivan's Appeal: Recovery of RCS's Alleged Damages\\nSullivan also appealed the judgment and contends that the trial court erred in failing to award the alleged additional expenses and damages that its subcontractor, RCS, incurred as a result of the errors in the City's contract documents. RCS's owner, Alonso, testified that the company was owed $209,238.00 for additional work, idle equipment costs, and overhead expenses resulting from the utilities conflicts. Citing Keller Construction Corporation v. George W. McCoy & Co., Inc., 239 La. 522, 557-58, 119 So.2d 450, 463 (1960), Sullivan argues that as the general contractor, it has the right to recover these damages claimed by its subcontractor.\\nIn Keller, a developer contracted with a general contractor (Keller) to complete a project that involved the construction of a sewer system. Keller then entered an agreement with a subcontractor (McCoy) for that work. When the 127system developed leaks, McCoy made several repairs; however, the system continued to develop leaks. The matter proceeded to litigation involving all three parties, with Keller suing McCoy based on allegations of faulty work by the subcontractor, McCoy reconvening against Keller for the costs of McCoy's repair work based on allegations that the leaks were not due to any fault of McCoy, and Keller filing a third-party demand against the developer seeking reimbursement for any liability Keller may have to McCoy if the developer's plans were defective. Keller, 239 La. at 534-535, 119 So.2d at 454-455. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of Keller against McCoy; however, on appeal, the supreme court found that the leaks were due to deficiencies in the developer's plans and specifications. Keller, 239 La. at 536, 556, 119 So.2d at 456, 463. Because the leaks were not due to any fault of McCoy, the supreme court held that McCoy was entitled to recover the cost of the repair work from Keller, who, in turn, was entitled to recover that amount from the developer, the.party ultimately responsible for the defective plans which caused the leaks. Keller, 239 La. at 556-558, 119 So.2d at 463.\\nThe facts of Keller are distinguishable from the present case because RCS is not a party to this suit and has not filed any claim against Sullivan. In contrast to Keller, Sullivan was not cast in judgment to RCS for any expenses or damages incurred by RCS, and Sullivan is not seeking to be reimbursed any liability judicially imposed upon it.\\nSullivan also cites Farrell Construction Company v. Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, 896 F.2d 136, 141 (5th Cir.1990), which addressed whether a subcontractor was an indispensable party in a suit filed against an owner by a general contractor on its own behalf and \\\"for the account of' a subcontractor. Farrell, 896 F.2d at 138-139. The subcontractor, whose presence in the suit would have defeated diversity jurisdiction, entered a \\\"prelitigation agreement\\\" IgjWith the general contractor whereby the parties agreed that the general contractor would file \\\"one consolidated action\\\" against the owner and that the parties would \\\"fully cooperate with each other in the prosecution of the claims.\\\" Farrell, 896 F.2d at 138. The Fifth Circuit held that the subcontractor was not an indispensable party because it did not have any substantive rights, contractual or otherwise, that were enforceable against the owner. Farrell, 896 F.2d at 140-141. In dicta, the court further stated that the general contractor's claim \\\"on behalf of [the subcontractor] is authorized by the civil law\\\" because \\\"[i]n Louisiana . the prime contractor may assert against the owner as an element of its own damages the damages of the subcontractor attributable to the owner's defective plans and specifications.\\\" Farrell, 896 F.2d at 141. The court cited Keller as authority for that statement.\\nWe do not construe Keller as authorizing a general contractor to file suit \\\"on behalf of a subcontractor to recover the subcontractor's damages caused by the owner's fault.\\\" Keller permitted a general contractor, who was judicially declared liable to the subcontractor for expenses it incurred due to faulty plans, to recover those sums from the owner as part of the general contractor's damages. Under those circumstances, the general contractor sustained damages, in the form of judicially-imposed liability to its subcontractor, caused by the owner's breach of warranty for its plans and specifications. To the extent Fair ell construed Keller otherwise, we disagree.\\n| aflRCS is not a party to this litigation and has no claim pending against Sullivan. Sullivan's liability, if any, to RCS for idle equipment charges, overhead, and additional expenses arising out of the undisclosed utility lines has not been judicially imposed and is not otherwise established by the evidence. Spence, Sullivan's representative, testified that Sullivan was only obligated to pay the claim if and when the City paid the amounts to Sullivan. An incomplete copy of the subcontract was introduced into evidence, and the provisions in evidence do not set forth any obligation by Sullivan to pay RCS's idle equipment charges, nor does the subcontract incorporate the City's contract documents, except to provide that the \\\"Subcontractor shall be bound\\\" by the documents insofar as applicable to RCS's work. The subcontract does not vest RCS with the right to enforce any remedies provided in those documents, such as the idle equipment charges, against Sullivan. The trial court did not err in denying Sullivan's claim seeking to recover damages allegedly sustained by RCS. This assignment of error has no merit.\\nCONCLUSION\\nThe November 27, 2013 judgment, as amended on March 5, 2014, is amended, in part, to set forth a total award in favor of Sullivan of $187,432.04, consisting of $124,741.64 in idle equipment expenses and $62,690.40 in additional overhead expenses. As amended the judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal in the amount of $5,252.50 are assessed one-half to F.G. Sullivan, Jr., Contractor, and one-half to the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge.\\nAMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.\\nMcDONALD, J., concurs and assigns reasons.\\n. We note that the sum of the trial court's itemized amounts is $951,736.37, which is $6,000.00 less than its original award of $957,736.37. In opposing the City's motion for new trial, Sullivan suggested that the trial court intended to award $895,045.99 for the idle equipment charges 35% of the gross amount calculated by Sullivan's expert witness, which, when added to the overhead award, would result in a total award of $957,736.39 (two cents higher than the original judgment amount). The trial court signed an amended judgment for the revised total.\\n. This court has previously used Louisiana Code of Evidence article 804's definition of \\\"unavailable\\\" to determine whether a deponent was unavailable for purposes of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1450 A(3)(a). See Walley v. Vargas, 12-0022 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/21/12), 104 So.3d 93, 99-100.\\n. We recognize that any such communications would require Daigle's authorization pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act at 42 U.S.C.A. \\u00a7 I320d et seq. See also 45 C.F.R. \\u00a7 164.508.\\n. See also Trascher v. Territo, 11-2093 (La.5/8/12), 89 So.3d 357, 362 (\\\"A party may not complain on appeal about an evidentiary ruling unless the trial judge was given the opportunity to avoid the perceived error, and the ruling 'affected' a 'substantial right' of the party.\\\")\\n. In two related arguments, the City also, asserted, again for the first time on appeal, that Daigle's deposition was admissible under Article 1450 A(5), which permits the use of a deposition of an expert at trial unless, in pertinent part, the opposing party objects. Because Sullivan objected to the introduction of Daigle's deposition, Article-1450 A(5) is not applicable. The City also cited Estate of Anderson v. Charity Hospital of Louisiana at New Orleans, 537 So.2d 1218 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied, 539 So.2d 633 (La.1989), for the general proposition that \\\"courts in Louisiana have recognized the need to use expert depositions in lieu of live testimony, especially when there is such a vast expanse of time in between when the deposition is taken and the trial occurs, such as the case here.\\\" We find no support for this statement in Estate of Anderson, which upheld the introduction of a perpetuation deposition of an expert who had been available for multiple prior trial settings but was not available for the final trial setting. Estate of Anderson, 537 So.2d at 1218. That holding offers no support for the City's assignment of error.\\n. Pursuant to a provision in the contract documents addressed hereinafter, Myers reduced his gross damage figure for idle equipment charges by 50% to arrive at a net, recoverable amount. The trial court reduced Myers's gross figure by 65%, meaning the court applied an additional 15% discount to Myers's figure to arrive at the amount of the award for idle equipment charges.\\n. Although the DOTD directive provides an hourly reimbursement rate that is determined by dividing the monthly rate by 176, Myers used a daily rate that he calculated by dividing the monthly rate by 30.4 days.\\n. The 50% reduction was applied in accordance with the provision in the DOTD Directive that the reimbursement rate shall not exceed one-half of the Blue Book rate. Rather than use one-half of the Blue Book rate, Myers used the full rate and calculated a gross amount for all \\\"idle\\\" equipment, which he then reduced by 50% to account for the one-half limitation on the Blue Book rate.\\n. Those 49 days, all in 2001, are as follows: April 16, 17, 18, 19, 20; May 14, 15, 16, 17, 23. 31; June 1. 4. 5. 13. 14. 15. 18. 19. 20. 22. 28, 29; July 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 19, 20, 23, 25; August 6, 21, 22; and October 3, 4, 8, 9, 16. 17. 18. 19. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.\\n. The identified equipment includes trucks and a mobile concrete plant moved to the location. We reject the City's arguments that these items of equipment should not be included in the calculation of the idle equipment charges.\\n. Myers offered a similar explanation for his calculation of the idle equipment expenses. According to Myers, his use of calendar-days yielded essentially the same result as a workday delay calculation because he converted the Blue Book monthly rate to a daily rate by dividing the monthly figure by 30.4 days, which is the average number of calendar days in a month. The DOTD directive called for dividing the monthly figure by 176 hours, which if converted to a daily rate, is the equivalent of only 22 days (based on an 8 hour work day). Thus, Myers's higher number of days (calendar versus work day) was offset by a lower daily rate.\\n. We note that de novo review of the award of additional overhead expenses is not warranted by the trial court's error in determining the award for the separate claim for idle equipment expenses. The lower court's error in relying upon Myers's opinion to determine when the delays occurred was not material to the claim for additional overhead expenses, because that claim did not require specific proof of when the delays occurred. Consequently, the trial court's error in determining the award for idle equipment expenses was not material to the overhead expense claim and did not interdict the fact-finding process for that award. Cf. Roberts v. Rudzis, 13-0538 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/28/14), 146 So.3d 602, 608, writ denied, 14-1369 (La.10/3/14), 149 So.3d 797.\\n. In a similar argument, Sullivan also cites jurisprudence from federal courts and other states for the premise that a general contractor should be allowed to recover extra costs and services wrongfully demanded under the contract, regardless of whether the contractor performed the work itself or through a subcontractor. Sometimes referred to as the \\\"pass-through doctrine,\\\" this theory of recovery allows a general contractor to bring an action for the subcontractor's damages; however, as in Keller, the general contractor must be liable to the subcontractor for those damages. See Interstate Contracting Corporation v. City of Dallas, 135 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex.2004). For that reason, the cited jurisprudence is not applicable to the present case.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7001449.json b/la/7001449.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e76ea6dc2208253198d149e92a7bd3eecb16a011
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7001449.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7001449\", \"name\": \"Marti Elizabeth SIMON, et al. v. Ronald THERIOT, Sheriff, et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Simon v. Theriot\", \"decision_date\": \"2013-12-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 13-562\", \"first_page\": \"1057\", \"last_page\": \"1064\", \"citations\": \"127 So. 3d 1057\", \"volume\": \"127\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:09:44.564170+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, SHANNON J. GREMILLION, and PHYLLIS M. KEATY, Judges.\", \"parties\": \"Marti Elizabeth SIMON, et al. v. Ronald THERIOT, Sheriff, et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Marti Elizabeth SIMON, et al. v. Ronald THERIOT, Sheriff, et al.\\nNo. 13-562.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.\\nDec. 11, 2013.\\nCarl J. Rachal, Simon Law Offices, Lafayette, Louisiana, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Marti Elizabeth Simon, on behalf of her minor children, Haley Nel Richard and Haven Gage Richard.\\nPatrick B. Mclntire, Robin J. Magee, Oats & Marino, Lafayette, Louisiana, for Defendants/Appellees, Ronald Theriot, Sheriff St. Martin Parish Sheriffs Office.\\nCourt composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, SHANNON J. GREMILLION, and PHYLLIS M. KEATY, Judges.\", \"word_count\": \"3400\", \"char_count\": \"20660\", \"text\": \"KEATY, Judge.\\n| plaintiff appeals the trial court's judgment granting of a peremptory exception in favor of Defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm.\\nFACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\\nThe action giving rise to this litigation involves the wrongful death causes of action by the survivors, i.e., the minor children of decedent, Christopher Ted Richard (Ted).\\nOn October 8, 2010, Ted dropped off his girlfriend, Danielle Belle (Belle) and/or her mother, at her home. Thereafter, Belle and/or her mother called 9-1-1 to file a complaint against Ted. Members of the St. Martinville City Police and St. Martin Sheriffs units were subsequently dispatched to the scene and arrived, surrounding the vehicle that Ted was occupying. Ted locked and barricaded himself inside his vehicle. Thereafter, Ted called his father, Larry Richard (Larry), his mother, Cheryl Richard (Cheryl), and his ex-wife, Marti Elizabeth Simon (Simon), on his cell phone wherein he indicated he intended to kill himself.\\nOver the next few hours, Ted made several phone calls to Larry, Cheryl, and Simon. During one of these calls to his father, Larry told Ted that he was \\\"on his way\\\" and to \\\"not do anything stupid.\\\" Ted told his father that he would not shoot himself or do \\\"anything stupid\\\" and that he would wait for his father to arrive at the crisis scene.\\nMajor Ginny Higgins (Major Higgins) was the head crisis negotiator with the St. Martin Parish Sheriffs Office and was in charge of the crisis negotiations with Ted. Major Higgins told Larry, Cheryl, and Simon that she did not want them ^having any further communications with Ted as it would interfere with their handling of the crisis negotiations. Major Higgins and her assistant, Deputy Allison Boudreaux (Deputy Boudreaux), also told them that if they spoke by telephone with Ted, they would be criminally charged with obstruction of justice and arrested for interfering with their negotiations. After these conversations with Major Higgins and Deputy Boudreaux, Ted made numerous cell phone calls to Larry, Cheryl, and Simon. Due to the threat of arrest and incarceration, all of these cell phone calls went unanswered. Ted subsequently shot and killed himself while in his own vehicle.\\nSimon, on behalf of her minor children, Haley Nel Richard and Haven Gage Richard, thereafter filed a Petition for Damages against Defendants, Ronald Theriot, in his capacity as St. Martin Parish Sheriff, and the St. Martin Parish Sheriffs Office. Simon's petition alleged that Defendants were negligent and/or at fault in causing Ted's death. Defendants responded by filing an answer with general denials and a peremptory exception for failure to state a cause of action. In its initial judgment in favor of Defendants, the trial court stated that Simon failed to state a cause of action as her petition failed to allege facts which would impose a duty upon Defendants. The trial court granted Defendants' exception but also allowed Simon thirty days to amend her petition to state a cause of action. After Simon filed an amended petition for damages, Defendants re-urged their original exception of no cause of action. The trial court ruled in favor of Defendants, granted the exception, and dismissed Simon's lawsuit with prejudice.\\nIgSimon is now before this court asserting that the trial court committed reversible error and abused its discretion by failing to accept the allegations and facts in her original and supplemental petition for damages as true and correct and in granting Defendants' peremptory exception of no cause of action on the grounds that Simon failed to allege an affirmative duty prohibiting family members from participating in crisis negotiations when a person is threatening suicide.\\nLAW\\n\\\"In reviewing the judgment of the district court relating to an exception of no cause of action, appellate courts should conduct a de novo review because the exception raises a question of law and the lower court's decision is based solely on the sufficiency of the petition.\\\" Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299, pp. 7-8 (La.3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 119.\\nDISCUSSION\\nI. Simon's Mis-Reading of the Trial Court's Judgment\\nIn her assignment of error, Simon asserts two issues: (a) that the trial court failed to accept the allegations of fact in the original and supplemental petitions as true and (b) that the trial court granted the exception of no cause of action because Simon did not allege an affirmative duty \\\"prohibiting family members from participating in crisis negotiations when a person is threatening suicide.\\\" In opposition, Defendants contend that Simon is mistaken on both counts.\\nAs used in the context of the peremptory exception, a cause of action refers to the operative facts which give rise to the plaintiffs right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. Ramey, 869 So.2d 114. The function of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition, which is done by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the [4facts alleged in the pleading. Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru S., Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1235 (La.1993). \\\"On the trial of the peremptory exception pleaded at or prior to the trial of the case, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert any of the objections pleaded, when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition.\\\" La.Code Civ.P. art. 931. Additionally, \\\"[n]o evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.\\\" Id. Consequently, \\\"the court reviews the petition and accepts well pleaded allegations of fact as true, and the issue at trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought.\\\" Jackson v. State ex rel. Dep't of Corr., 00-2882, pp. 3-4 (La.5/15/01), 785 So.2d 803, 806.\\nIn her original petition, Simon alleged the same facts as stated in the factual section above. She further alleged that Defendants were at fault by:\\nA. Negligently failing to utilize properly trained negotiators;\\nB. Negligently failing to properly train the negotiators in question;\\nC. Negligently failing to follow proper accepted police training and procedures for crisis negotiations for dealing with suicidal individuals such as Ted Richard;\\nD. Negligently failing to allow the deceased's father, mother and ex-wife from assisting in the crisis negotiations;\\nE. Other such actions and/or inactions in failing to see and/or do what should have been done under the circumstances in order to avoid and/or prevent the death of Ted Richard; and\\nF.Any and all other acts of negligence and/or fault which may be proven at the trial of this matter.\\nAs mentioned above, the trial court initially ruled in favor of Defendants and allowed Simon thirty days to amend her petition to state a cause of action. In its written reasons for judgment dated June 13, 2012, the trial court stated that \\\"[for] |Bthe purpose of the exception the following facts in the petition are considered true.\\\" The trial court then recited the facts as alleged by Simon in her petition. The trial court further stated:\\nPlaintiff has cited no authority which imposes upon deputies, negotiating with a person threatening suicide, an obligation to allow untrained family members to participate in the negotiations. This court has found no such authority. Plaintiff has failed to allege facts which impose a duty upon the Sheriffs deputies or the Sheriff; therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action.\\nSimon subsequently filed an amended and supplemental petition. She re-alleged the same facts contained in her original petition. She further alleged that Defendants were at fault by:\\na. Failing to recognize and/or not ignore the risks of suicide, which were foreseeable;\\nb. Failing to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent said suicide;\\nc. Once it became clear that there was a high risk of suicide, by failing to adhere to their duty to do everything possible to prevent such suicide, including, but not limited to, allowing Ted Richard's family to speak with him to attempt to circumvent, deter and/or prevent such suicide;\\nd. By failing to act reasonably and prudently under the circumstances;\\ne. By acting carelessly and recklessly under the circumstances; and\\nf. Any and all other acts of negligence which may be proven at the trial of this matter.\\nDespite the supplemental and amended petition, the trial court again granted the Defendants' peremptory exception on December 15, 2012. In its oral reasons for judgment dated November 16, 2012, the trial court stated that it has to \\\"accept the facts as true in deciding.\\\" The trial court further stated that it did not see that a legal duty existed on the part of the Sheriff.\\n| (\\u00a1Contrary to Simon's argument that the trial court was demanding eviden-tiary proof and based upon the above oral and written reasons for judgment, we find that the trial court did accept the allegations of the petition and amending and supplemental petition as true for purposes of the exception. The trial court simply found that under the circumstances alleged, i.e., an armed, barricaded, and suicidal individual, the deputies did not owe any duty to Simon that would make them liable for damages if the suicide took place.\\nAdditionally, the trial court did not grant the exception simply because Simon failed to allege that there was an affirmative duty. Allegation of a duty would not be a fact but would be a legal conclusion that is to be disregarded when analyzing the petition. See Brewer v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 09-1408, 09-1428 (La.3/16/10), 35 So.3d 230 (whether a duty is owed is a question of law); see also Montalvo v. Sondes, 93-2813 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 127 (allegations in counter-claim that original suit was frivolous and in bad faith were mere conclusions when unsupported by facts). What the trial court found was that \\\"[pjlaintiff has failed to allege facts which impose a duty upon the Sheriffs deputies.\\\" Again, the facts alleged in this case establish that the deputies were confronted with an armed, barricaded, and suicidal individual who was never in custody at any time during the encounter. The trial court correctly concluded that, under these circumstances, no duty arose on the part of the Sheriff and the deputies. The exception was granted, not because of a failure to allege a duty, but because under the facts as pled, viewed in the light most favorable to Simon, no duty arose as a matter of law.\\nSimon correctly notes that the trial court found that the Sheriff had no legal duty under the facts of this case to assure the survival of Ted. Simon, however, argues that duty was not the issue. Rather, Simon argues that the issue was 17whether, under La.Civ.Code art. 2315, the deputies \\\"were negligent in the handling of the suicide situation.\\\" We find that Simon is mistaken. The issue raised by the exception was whether a duty existed under the circumstances alleged. It is axiomatic that in all negligence cases, Louisiana courts have adopted a duty-risk analysis to determine if liability exists under the facts of a particular case. Brewer v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 09-1408, 09-1428 (La.3/16/10), 35 So.3d 230. The first element of a duty-risk analysis is whether \\\"the defendant had a duty to conform his or her conduct to a specific standard of care.\\\" Id. at 240. The existence of a legal duty is a question of law, and it is appropriate for resolution by an exception of no cause of action. Id.\\nThus, we find that Simon mis-read the trial court's judgment. Accordingly, we find that Simon's assignment of error is without merit for the reasons stated above and below.\\nII. The Trial Court's Ruling Regarding the Supplemental and Amended Petition\\nDespite Simon's protestations, the issue in this case is whether Louisiana law imposes a duty on the Sheriff to allow family members to participate in crisis negotiations, or more generally, to assure the survival of a suicidal man who has locked himself in a car with a loaded shotgun pointed at his head. We find that it does not.\\nAs mentioned above, the existence of a duty is a question of law. Hardy v. Bowie, 99-2821 (La.9/8/99), 744 So.2d 606. \\\"The inquiry is whether the plaintiff has any law \\u2014 statutory, jurisprudential, or arising from general principles of fault \\u2014 to support his claim.\\\" Id. at 614. In Hardy, police officers were responding to the sound of a gunshot within a crowd. One of the issues was whether they | sowed a duty to bystanders, and particularly the decedent who was shot soon after the police began their search for the gun-wielding assailant. The court noted that \\\"[generally, a 'police officer has a duty to perform his function with due regard for the safety of all citizens who will be affected by his action.'\\\" Id. at 614 (quoting Prattini v. Whorton, 326 So.2d 576 (La.App. 4 Cir.1976)). Citing Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 94-952 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 318, the Hardy court observed that police officers are \\\"held to choosing a course of action which is reasonable under the circumstances.\\\" Hardy, 744 So.2d. at 614.\\nWe note that the above cases have acknowledged tort protection for the benefit of innocent bystanders and for the protection of suspects from battery by the police. Nevertheless, Simon has not provided jurisprudence which stands for the proposition that there exists a duty upon police officers to allow family members to participate in crisis negotiations. Likewise, we have been unable to find jurisprudence to that effect.\\nThe Louisiana Supreme Court has upheld an exception of no cause of action in a slightly different wrongful death by suicide claim. See Ramey, 869 So.2d 114. In Ramey, the decedent physician committed suicide after being told over the phone that he had failed a random drug screen, knowing that the drug test would likely cost him his medical license. The plaintiffs sued the people who had advised the decedent of the test result for negligently failing to take precautions against the risk of suicide when such risk was foreseeable under the circumstances. The supreme court granted the exception of no cause of action, though it remanded the case to allow plaintiffs another opportunity to amend to cure the exception. Justice Knoll, concurring with the holding of the failure to state a cause of action and dissenting from the decision to remand rather than dismiss the suit, noted that the |flpleadings did not articulate any legal duty given \\\"the strong policy considerations against assigning del-ictual responsibility for the suicidal acts of another, and the great reluctance of our courts to extend such liability, especially in non-custodial circumstances.\\\" Id. at 120. Justice Knoll also noted the highly speculative nature of the claim and the general rule that \\\"[p]leadings which establish only possibility, speculation, or unsupported probability do not suffice to establish a cause of action.\\\" Id. at 120-21.\\nOther states have addressed the specific issue of police liability in the context of an armed and suicidal individual. They have found no duty to allow participation by family members in the crisis negotiations and have found no duty to assure survival of the suicidal person at all. In Ferreira v. City of East Providence, 568 F.Supp.2d 197 (D.R.I.2008), Patricia Ferreira shot herself while barricaded in a car. Her suicide came after her brother, against police orders, had draped himself over the windshield of the car, from which he had to be removed and placed in handcuffs in a police cruiser. In Ferreira, as in the present case, the allegation was that if only the police had allowed the brother to continue the dialogue, the suicide could have been prevented. The court noted that the police were justified in removing the brother from the vicinity of the car and that to do otherwise \\\"would have placed Ferreira [the brother], who was in a stressed and upset state, effectively in charge of the situation.\\\" Id. at 207. The court found that the issue was whether the officers owed any duty to protect Patricia from herself. It found that they did not.\\nIn Adams v. City of Fremont, 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 196 (1998), the court found that officers responding to a situation involving a person threatening suicide with a loaded weapon have no legal duty of care that would |inexpose them to liability if their conduct fails to prevent the suicide from being carried out. In Adams, the court noted that police officers in the presence of an armed and suicidal person are concerned with several interests: the physical safety of the community, including themselves, other citizens, and family members; the physical safety of the suicidal person, and; the psychological sanctity of family members. The court held that \\\"imposing liability for the negligent handling of a threatened suicide improperly elevates the interests in preserving the life of the person threatening suicide over the interests of public safety and the physical safety of police officers.\\\" Id. at 272, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 196.\\nIn the present case, Simon contends that the out-of-state cases examined above did not involve exceptions of no cause of action. We note, however, that these cases were decided as a matter of law based on the issue of whether to recognize a legal claim under circumstances virtually identical to the case at hand, i.e., police dealing with an armed and suicidal individual. Both cases held that no such cause of action should be allowed.\\nSimon has likewise cited cases in support of her assignment of error. In Garza v. Delta Tau Delta Fraternity Nat'l, 06-698 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/28/07), an unpublished decision, the allegation was that a police officer refused to take the complaint of a rape victim, told her that no official action would be taken against the alleged rapist, and told her that she would be sued for defamation if she continued to complain. The gist of the case was that the officer encountered a non-suicidal person and helped drive her to suicide. In the present case, however, the petition and supplemental and amended petition makes it clear that the suicidal person in this case was already barricaded in a car with a loaded gun threatening |n suicide when the police encountered him. Thus, the circumstances in this case are easily distinguishable from Garza.\\nSimon also cites the case of White v. Walker, 950 F.2d 972 (5th Cir.1991), a Mississippi federal case. The allegation in White was that the suicidal person was never in contemplation of taking his own life until the encounter with the officer. The court upheld the exclusion of a psychologist's testimony to the effect that the officer's conduct contributed to the suicide. It reversed and remanded solely on the issue of whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation of the suicidal person's rights as a result of the traffic stop that began the encounter. The issue turned on whether there was a violation of Mississippi traffic law. All other claims were dismissed. We find that this case does not stand for the proposition that officers confronted with an armed, barr\\u00ed- caded, and suicidal individual have a duty to save the life of the suicidal individual which trumps their duty to others at risk.\\nFinally, Simon cites Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612 (6th Cir.2005), where the decedent committed suicide while in a police cell at a hospital. Since Gray committed suicide while in police custody, Gray is distinguishable from the facts in the present case as Ted was not in custody at the time of his suicide.\\nThus, Simon's assignment of error is without merit.\\nDECREE\\nThe judgment rendered by the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against Marti Elizabeth Simon, on behalf of her minor children, Haley Nel Richard and Haven Gage Richard.\\nAFFIRMED.\\n. Simon and Ted have two minor children, Haley Nel Richard and Haven Gage Richard.\\n. The facts stated above are the same facts alleged in Simon's petition and supplemental and amended petition.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7001835.json b/la/7001835.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6f77b0b8b978f0bcc2893c67f6515913438e8bf9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7001835.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7001835\", \"name\": \"Connie LOVE v. Jeanne SIREY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Love v. Sirey\", \"decision_date\": \"2013-05-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 12-CA-823\", \"first_page\": \"732\", \"last_page\": \"741\", \"citations\": \"119 So. 3d 732\", \"volume\": \"119\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:35:40.223838+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Panel composed of Judges FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, ROBERT M. MURPHY and STEPHEN J. WINDHORST.\", \"parties\": \"Connie LOVE v. Jeanne SIREY.\", \"head_matter\": \"Connie LOVE v. Jeanne SIREY.\\nNo. 12-CA-823.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.\\nMay 30, 2013.\\nJason P. Foote, Desmonde Bennett, Attorneys at Law, Metairie, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.\\nJohn E. McAuliffe, Jr., Attorney at Law, Metairie, LA, for Intervenor/Appellee.\\nPanel composed of Judges FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, ROBERT M. MURPHY and STEPHEN J. WINDHORST.\", \"word_count\": \"3526\", \"char_count\": \"21927\", \"text\": \"STEPHEN J. WINDHORST, Judge.\\n12Jeanne Sirey appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of her homeowners insurer, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (\\\"State Farm\\\"), finding that State Farm owed no duty to defend or indemnify Ms. Sirey against the claims asserted by Connie Love and denying Ms. Sire/s cross-motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part and remand the matter back to the trial court.\\nPROCEDURAL HISTORY\\nOn February 27, 2007, Ms. Love filed a Complaint for Personal Injuries against Ms. Sirey claiming that Ms. Sirey committed continuous assaults and batteries on Ms. Love through inappropriate comments and inappropriate bodily contact, which occurred at their place of employment, Moti-va. Subsequently, Ms. Sirey contacted State Farm and reported the pending lawsuit. State Farm proceeded to defend Ms. Sirey pursuant to a reservation of rights by appointing separate counsel to represent Ms. Sirey. State Farm filed an Intervention for Declaratory Judgment and then a motion for summary judgment asserting that coverage defenses precluded coverage to Ms. Sirey. Ms. Sirey filed a cross-motion for summary judgment contending she had coverage under the policy. The trial |acourt granted State Farm's summary judgment and denied Ms. Sirey's cross-motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.\\nDISCUSSION\\nWhen reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment, a de novo standard of review is applied. Flowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 12-140 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/31/12), 99 So.3d 696. In summary judgment there is no live testimony or determination of credibility of evidence by the trial court. La. C.C.P. art. 966 B(2); KMJ Services, Inc. v. Hood, 12-757, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/10/13), 115 So.3d 34, 2013 WL 1442631; Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, Council No. 5747, 03-1533 (La.2/20/04), 866 So.2d 228. Therefore, courts of appeal apply the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate, ie., whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. KMJ Services, Inc., 12-757 at 4, 115 So.3d at 36.\\nGenerally, in a motion for summary judgment, the mover retains the burden of proof. After adequate discovery, if the mover sustains this initial burden by showing an absence of factual support for at least one essential element of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, then the burden shifts to the adverse party to present factual support adequate to establish that he will be able to satisfy the evidentia-ry burden at trial. La. C.C.P. art. 966 C(l) & (2). Subsequently, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support to show that he will be able to meet his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the mover is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966 C(2). Robinson v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 08-1224 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/7/09), 9 So.3d 1035, 1043, writ denied, 09-1187 (La.9/18/09), 17 So.3d 975, citing Champagne v. Ward, 03-3211 (La.1/19/05), 893 So.2d 773, 776-77.\\n| insurance policies are contracts between the insured and insurer wherein the agreement governs the nature of their relationship. La. C.C. art.1983. An insurance policy is a contract that must be construed using the general rules of contract interpretation set forth in the Civil Code. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 93-0911 (La.1/4/94), 630 So.2d 759, 763; Peterson v. Schimek, 98-1712 (La.3/2/99), 729 So.2d 1024, 1028. Whether an insurance policy provides or precludes coverage is a dispute that can be properly resolved within the framework of a motion for summary judgment. Brewster v. Hunter, 09-932 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/9/10), 38 So.3d 912, 915, writ denied, 10-773 (La.6/4/10), 38 So.3d 305.\\nThe purpose of liability insurance is to provide the insured protection from claims of damage. Peterson, 729 So.2d at 1028. Courts must determine the intent of the parties when interpreting an insurance policy. La. C.C. art. 2045. Insurance policies should be interpreted to effect coverage, not deny coverage. Yount v. Maisano, 627 So.2d 148, 151 (La.1993). An exclusion from coverage should be narrowly construed. Breland v. Schilling, 550 So.2d 609, 610 (La.1989). An insurance policy should not be interpreted unreasonably or in a strained manner in an attempt to enlarge or restrict its provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplated by its terms or so as to achieve an absurd conclusion. Bernard v. Ellis, 11-2377 (La.7/2/12), 111 So.3d 995; Graphia v. Schmitt, 08-613 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/13/09), 7 So.3d 716, 718. Absent a conflict with public policy or statutory provisions, insurers, like other persons, are entitled to limit their liability and to impose and to enforce reasonable conditions upon the obligations they contractually assume under the policy. Id. When the policy's language is clearly expressed and unambiguous, the insurance policy must be enforced as written and no further interpretation may be made to determine the intent of the ^parties. Id; La. C.C. art.2046. However, when the policy provisions are ambiguous and susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, then those provisions are construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. La. C.C. art.2056; Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 630 So.2d at 764.\\nIn general, an insurer's obligation to defend a lawsuit against its insured is broader than its liability for damage claims. Yount, 627 So.2d at 153. A duty to defend an insured is determined by the allegations of the plaintiffs petition wherein the insurer is obligated to provide a defense unless the petition unambiguously and clearly excludes coverage. Id., citing American Home Assurance Company v. Czarniecki, 255 La. 251, 230 So.2d 253 (1969); Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., 504 So.2d 833 (La.1987). Assuming all the allegations of the plaintiffs petition are true, if there would be coverage under the policy and liability to the plaintiff, the insurer must defend its insured irrespective of the final outcome of the lawsuit. Id.; Graphia, 7 So.3d at 718. The allegations of the petition are liberally construed to determine whether they set forth grounds which bring the claim within the insurer's duty to defend. Id.\\nAssignment of Error One\\nIn her first assignment of error, Ms. Sirey contends that the trial court erred by finding that the acts claimed in Ms. Love's petition do not constitute an insurable \\\"occurrence\\\" under the policy issued to Ms. Sirey by State Farm.\\nState Farm contends that the policy defines an \\\"occurrence\\\" as an \\\"accident.\\\" State Farm argues that the acts of battery and assault are intentional by nature and thus, do not constitute an \\\"occurrence\\\" under the policy. State Farm further claims that when reviewing the acts from the point of view of Ms. Love, the actions by Ms. Sirey do not constitute an \\\"accident.\\\" Ms. Love testified in her deposition that she did not believe that the actions by Ms. Sirey were an accident.\\n1 fiSection II of the policy entitled \\\"Liability Coverage,\\\" provides:\\nCoverage L \\u2014 Personal Liability:\\nIf a claim is made or a suit is brought against an Insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence, we will:\\n1. Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the Insured is legally liable; and\\n2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We may make any investigation and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay for damages, to effect settlement or satisfy a judgment resulting from the occurrence, equals our limit of liability.\\nThus, for the policy to afford coverage to Ms. Sirey there must have been a suit brought against the insured, Ms. Sirey, for \\\"bodily injury\\\" or \\\"property damage\\\" caused by an \\\"occurrence\\\" as defined in the policy.\\nIn Ms. Love's petition and first amended petition, she claimed that Ms. Sirey repeatedly committed several assaults and batteries on Ms. Love over a period of time and the \\\"touchings were offensive\\\" to Ms. Love. Ms. Love additionally claimed that as a result of \\\"continuous unchecked threats\\\" she suffered severe emotional distress that resulted in her transfer to another position wherein she was sent home as disabled.\\nThe trial court found that there was no coverage for the claims in Ms. Love's petitions because they did not constitute an \\\"occurrence\\\" as defined in the policy. The policy definition states that an \\\"occurrence,\\\" when used in Section II of the policy, is \\\"an accident, including exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage during the policy period. Repeated or continuous exposure to the same general conditions is considered to be one occurrence.\\\"\\nThe policy does not define \\\"accident,\\\" \\\"exposure to conditions\\\" and/or \\\"repeated or continuous exposure.\\\" It does not exclude intentional acts from | coverage (discussed infra, assignment of error three), and the definition of occurrence does not specifically exclude assault and battery. Considering the precise language of the policy, and the allegations set forth in the petitions, the policy does not unambiguously or clearly exclude Ms. Love's claims from coverage as an insurable occurrence. We find that the trial court erred in concluding that the petitions fail to state a covered occurrence.\\nAssignment of Error Two\\nIn her second assignment of error, Ms. Sirey contends that the trial court erred by finding that Ms. Love's claims did not result in \\\"bodily injury.\\\"\\nState Farm argues that Ms. Love in her deposition affirmatively testified that she did not sustain any bodily injury or property damage as a result of the actions of Ms. Sirey. State Farm further claims that the policy excludes damages for emotional distress under the definition of \\\"bodily injury.\\\"\\nMs. Sirey contends that Ms. Love's petition and first amended petition claimed bodily injury.. Specifically, Ms. Love claimed that she suffered emotional distress and was \\\"disabled\\\" as result of the acts perpetrated by Ms. Sirey. Additionally, Ms. Sirey argues that Ms. Love testified in her deposition that as a result of the . emotional distress, she suffered from a physical bodily injury, ie., loss of bodily functions. Furthermore, Ms. Sirey claims that Ms. Love's petitions assert various assaults and batteries which include the threat of physical contact and physical contact which could reasonably be interpreted as \\\"bodily injury.\\\"\\nIn the State Farm policy, \\\"bodily injury\\\" is defined as physical injury, sickness, or disease to a person. The policy further provides that:\\nBodily Injury does not include:\\nc. emotional distress, mental anguish, humiliation, mental distress, mental injury, or any similar injury unless it arises out of actual physical injury to some person.\\nlsOn the face of the petition and first amended petition, Ms. Love clearly claimed \\\"bodily injury\\\" sufficient to trigger coverage under the State Farm policy. Ms. Love claimed unwanted bodily contact and \\\"threatened\\\" bodily contact by Ms. Sirey. Ms. Love contended that the acts by Ms. Sirey caused her to be disabled. A review of Ms. Love's deposition testimony provides additional evidence that Ms. Love sustained bodily injury. Ms. Love testified that due to fear and anxiety she developed a physical injury, namely, loss of her bodily functions. Furthermore, Ms. Love claimed bodily injury by contending Ms. Sirey committed several batteries which by its nature encompasses bodily contact. Thus, the policy does not unambiguously exclude coverage for Ms. Love's claimed bodily injury. The trial court erred in finding Ms. Sirey did not have coverage under the policy.\\nAssignment of Error Three\\nIn her third assignment error, Ms. Sirey claims that the trial court erred by finding that this was an intentional act that was excluded by the intentional act provision when in fact the policy contains an intentional injury exclusion.\\nState Farm argues that the acts of assault and battery are intentional torts and are excluded under the policy's intentional act/malicious acts exclusion provision. Ms. Sirey contends that the policy does not contain an intentional act exclusion, rather it contains an intentional injury exclusion which has been held not to exclude all intentional acts.\\nThe State Farm policy \\\"Section II \\u2014 Exclusions\\\" provides:\\n1. Coverage L and Coverage M do not apply to:\\na. bodily injury or property damage:\\n(1) which is either expected or intended by the insured; or\\n(2) which is the result of willful and malicious acts of the insured;\\nlain interpreting insurance policies, policies should be construed to effect coverage, not deny it. Yount, 627 So.2d at 151, citing Breland, 550 So.2d at 610. Thus, any exclusion from coverage should be narrowly construed and where an ambiguity exists, the provision should be construed in favor of coverage and against the insurer. Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd., 634 So.2d 1180, 1188 (La.1994), citing Great American Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So.2d 981, 984 (La.1992); La. C.C. art. 2056.\\nIn Breland, 550 So.2d at 610, the Supreme Court discussed the difference between an intentional act and an intentional injury exclusion. The Court held that\\n[t]he purpose of the intentional injury exclusion is to restrict liability insurance coverage by denying coverage to an insured in circumstances where the insured acts deliberately and intends or expects bodily injury to another. The exclusion is \\\"designed to prevent an insured from acting wrongfully with the security of knowing that his insurance company will 'pay the piper' for the damages.\\\"\\nThe language used in an intentional injury exclusion provision has been held to be ambiguous. Pique v. Saia, 450 So.2d 654, 655 (La.1984). An intentional injury clause, by its language does not exclude coverage for bodily injury caused by an insured's intentional act. Breland, 550 So.2d at 611. The exclusion precludes coverage for bodily injury \\\"expected or intended\\\" by the insured. Id. Thus, the excluded injury would be the injury the insured intended, not the injury which the insured unintentionally caused, however intentional the act which produced the injury. Id. The subjective intention and expectation of the insured will determine which injuries fall within and which fall outside the scope of coverage under an insurance policy with this language. Id.\\n| mThis interpretation is in direct contrast to the traditional intentional tort inquiry into an individual's intent. The intentional tort inquiry focuses on the consequences an objective reasonable person might expect or intend as a result of a deliberate act. Id. Thus, the intentional tort standard exposes an individual to liability for injuries he did not foresee or intend to produce, whereas an intentional injury exclusion excludes coverage only for those injuries which the defendant subjectively intended to inflict. Id. at 612.\\nFor the intentional injury exclusion, whether the act and the resulting injury were intended by the insured is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Id. at 614. The trier of fact must examine \\\"not only the words before, at the time of, and after the pertinent conduct, but from all the facts and circumstances bearing on such intent or expectation.\\\" Yount, 627 So.2d at 152, citing Great American Insurance Co., 608 So.2d at 986, quoting Breland, 550 So.2d at 615 (Lemmon, J. concurring). Because this inquiry is fact intensive, much discretion will be given to the trier of fact. Yount, 627 So.2d at 152.\\nThe State Farm policy does not contain an intentional act exclusion. Instead it contains an intentional injury exclusion. Thus, the court must determine Ms. Sirey's subjective intent to determine whether the she intended the injuries, which is an issue of fact. Accordingly, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Ms. Sirey's subjective intent which precludes summary judgment under the intentional injury exclusion. We find that the trial court erred in finding that the intentional injury exclusion precluded coverage to Ms. Sirey under the policy.\\nState Farm also asserts that the insurance policy contains a separate exclusion for the \\\"willful and malicious | nacts of an insured.\\\" Under the malicious acts section of the exclusion, State Farm contends that coverage to Ms. Sirey is excluded. State Farm argues that assuming the court finds that the exclusion is an intentional injury exclusion, any intended or unintended injury is not relevant in a determination of malicious acts. Rather, the mere act itself fits within the exclusion and thus, the policy does not provide coverage to Ms. Sirey\\nIn Keathley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 594 So.2d 963 (La.App. 3 Cir.1992), the Third Circuit, interpreted an exclusionary clause in a liability policy similar to the clause in the present case. The court held that under the second part of the exclusionary clause (willful and malicious acts), it was immaterial whether the defendant intended the actual resulting injuries. Keathley, 594 So.2d at 966. Although conceding that not many cases have interpreted the \\\"willful and malicious\\\" exclusionary clause, the court noted:\\nThe term willful has been defined, and this term has been held to apply to conduct which is still merely negligent, rather than actually intended to do harm, but which is so far from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if harm was intended.\\nThe usual meaning assigned to this term is that the actor has intentionally done an act of unreasonable character in reckless disregard of the risk known to him, or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow. It is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to consequences, amounting almost to a willingness that harm should follow. See Pros-ser, Law of Torts, Section 34, at pages 187-189 (3d Ed.1964); Cates v. Beauregard Electric Cooperative, Inc., 316 So.2d 907 (La.App. 3d Cir.1975); Prosser v. Crawford, 383 So.2d 1363 (La.App. 3d Cir.1980).\\nThe term malicious, also used in the second part of the exclusionary clause, has not been defined or used in any case like the term \\\"willful.\\\" In order to determine if defendant's conduct fall under this second prong, we must use the common meaning of the word \\\"malicious.\\\" The general meaning of this term as found in Black's Law Dictionary 5th ed. is as follows: \\\"Characterized by, or involving, malice; having, or done with, wicked or mischievous intentions or motives; wrongful and done intentionally without just cause or excuse. See also Malice; Willful.\\\"\\nKeathley, 594 So.2d at 965-966.\\n| ^Despite State Farm's assertion to the contrary, genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the acts claimed by Ms. Love are excluded under this provision.\\nAssignment of Error Four\\nIn her fourth assignment of error, Ms. Sirey contends that trial court erred in granting summary judgment to State Farm because the acts alleged in the plaintiffs petition do not relate to either party's business pursuits exclusion.\\nState Farm argues that the acts claimed by Ms. Love occurred almost entirely at Motiva where Ms. Love and Ms. Sirey are co-workers and are excluded under the business pursuits exclusion. However, we note that the exclusion does not apply \\\"to activities which are ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits. We find that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the business pursuits exclusion unambiguously excludes coverage.\\nAssignment of Error Five\\nIn her final assignment of error, Ms. Sirey contends that the trial court erred by denying her cross-motion for summary judgment since coverage was clearly provided under the State Farm policy.\\nWhile we find that the acts set forth in Ms. Love's petition are not unambiguously excluded from coverage, we likewise find genuine issues of material fact remain which bear on whether or not coverage is excluded under the exclusion provisions of the policy. Considering the reasons above, the trial court was correct in denying Ms. Sire/s cross-motion for summary judgment.\\nWe decline to address Ms. Sirey's request that State Farm should be ordered to reimburse Ms. Sirey for all out of pocket fees and costs for defending herself on this issue. Such a determination would be premature.\\n| ^CONCLUSION\\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's judgment denying Ms. Sir-ey's cross-motion for summary judgment. We vacate the trial court's judgment granting State Farm's motion for summary judgment. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.\\nAFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; AND REMANDED\\n. Ms. Love filed a First Amended Complaint for Personal Injuries on October 25, 2010.\\n. In Breland, the Supreme Court held that \\\"... when a minor bodily injury is intended, and such results, the injury is barred from coverage. When serious bodily injury is intended, and such results, the injury is also barred from coverage. When a severe injury of a given sort is intended, and a severe injury of any sort occurs, then coverage is also barred. But when a minor injury is intended, and a substantially greater or more severe injury results, whether by chance, coincidence, accident, or whatever, coverage for the more severe injury is not barred.\\\" Id. at 614.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7002642.json b/la/7002642.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c65270c517eae9c2f4b05166b345297ff43afa0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7002642.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7002642\", \"name\": \"Melanie GARDNER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Mike CRAFT, et al., & The Stebbins Engineering and Manufacturing Company, Defendants-Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gardner v. Craft\", \"decision_date\": \"2012-09-26\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 47,360-CA\", \"first_page\": \"135\", \"last_page\": \"138\", \"citations\": \"105 So. 3d 135\", \"volume\": \"105\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:38:12.535793+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before CARAWAY, MOORE & SEXTON (Pro Tempore), JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Melanie GARDNER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Mike CRAFT, et al., & The Stebbins Engineering and Manufacturing Company, Defendants-Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Melanie GARDNER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Mike CRAFT, et al., & The Stebbins Engineering and Manufacturing Company, Defendants-Appellees.\\nNo. 47,360-CA.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.\\nSept. 26, 2012.\\nRehearing Denied Nov. 8, 2012.\\nDelphin Law Offices, APLC, by Mark A. Delphin, Lake Charles, LA, Arthur J. O\\u2019Keefe, Law Offices of Reed Morgan, PC, by Stephen Reed Morgan, for Appellant.\\nMayer, Smith & Roberts, L.L.P., Shreveport, LA, by Caldwell Roberts, Jr., The Stebbins Engineering and Manufacturing Co., for Appellee.\\nCook, Yancey, King & Galloway, by Herschel E. Richard, Jr., John C. Nickel-son, Jason Andrew Green, Shreveport, LA, Thomas C. Quinlen, for Int\\u2019l Paper Co. & Mike Craft.\\nBefore CARAWAY, MOORE & SEXTON (Pro Tempore), JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1596\", \"char_count\": \"9814\", \"text\": \"SEXTON, Judge Pro Tem.\\n| ] Plaintiff, Melanie Gardner, appeals a summary judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendant, Stebbins Engineering and Manufacturing Company (\\\"Stebbins\\\"), dismissing with prejudice her claims against Stebbins. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.\\nFACTS\\nMs. Gardner is the widow of Toby Gardner, who worked at the Mansfield location of International Paper Company, Inc. (\\\"IP\\\"). On September 28, 2009, Mr. Gardner was repairing a valve on the platform surrounding the top of the linerboard white water tank/tile chest (\\\"whitewater tank\\\") when he fell through the access opening and into the tank. Tanks such as the one at issue contain pressurized liquid kept at 150 degrees Fahrenheit, pulp fibers and debris. Mr. Gardner died within minutes. The record reflects that the access opening covers are not affixed to the tank and may become dislodged if the tank is overpressurized or overfilled, causing overflow of the liquid and debris onto the top of the tank. Photographs and testimony established that there was pulp debris accumulation around the access opening on the whitewater tank on the day of Mr. Gardner's accident, indicating that the access opening cover may have been dislodged due to overflow at some point prior to his fall.\\nMs. Gardner filed suit against Mike Craft, the manager of the Mansfield paper mill, IP and Stebbins. Stebbins designs and constructs cylindrical concrete tanks or tile chests that can hold cold or hot liquids, and, more than 20 years ago, it designed and manufactured part of the whitewater tank into which Mr. Gardner fell. Stebbins did not design or 12construct the access opening covers on the tanks. Stebbins also has a contractual arrangement with IP to inspect the structural integrity of tile chests at many of its locations worldwide. Ms. Gardner asserted that, through inspections at plants other than the Mansfield paper mill, Stebbins learned that some tile chests were being overpressurized and were overflowing. Ms. Gardner further alleged that this practice caused the access opening covers to become dislodged, presenting a hazard to IP employees working on the tanks, and that the knowledge of this hazardous practice created an obligation on the part of Stebbins to inform IP of the unsafe practice. It should be noted that Stebbins had no such inspection contract for the Mansfield paper mill.\\nMs. Gardner took the corporate deposition of Stebbins and Joe Branch testified on its behalf. Mr. Branch conducted the inspections of the tile chests at various IP locations. The whitewater tank at issue at the Mansfield paper mill was not inspected by Stebbins prior to Mr. Gardner's accident. Mr. Branch testified that, usually, the inspections were requested after a plant had closed and inspections of operating tanks were limited to the structural integrity of the tank. Mr. Branch explained that he \\\"inspect[s] the outside and interior of tile chests and tanks for the outward appearance of the condition of the tile, the cement or the concrete, and the reinforcing steel.\\\" He stated that the inspections have nothing to do with operation of the tank. When he would note overfilling of the tanks, he would be concerned with \\\"cracks or structural flaws that may have occurred from pressure or overpressure,\\\" not with the practice of the plant in [ <\\u00a1overpressurizing the tank. Mr. Branch clearly stated that \\\"[w]e're not trained to operate the plant.\\\"\\nStebbins filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Ms. Gardner's design claim was perempted under La. R.S. 9:2772 and/or La. 9:5607. It further argued that it had not inspected the whitewater tank at the Mansfield paper mill and had no duty to IP or Mr. Gardner. The trial judge granted the motion, finding \\\"no issue of an affirmative obligation on behalf of Stebbins at the Mansfield Plant. And that 9:2772 in addition to that, bars the claim after five years.\\\" This appeal by Ms. Gardner ensued.\\nDISCUSSION\\nThe appellate court's review of a grant or denial of a summary judgment is de novo. Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 99-2181, 99-2257 (La.2/29/00), 755 So.2d 226. A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(B). The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment remains with the movant. Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La.2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880. When the movant, however, will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant is not required to negate all the essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action or defense. Id. Rather, the movant need only point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the ^adverse party's claim. Samaha, supra. Then, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact and movant is entitled to summary judgment. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2).\\nIt is undisputed that Stebbins' design and construction of part of the whitewater tank at issue was completed and accepted by IP more than 20 years prior to Mr. Gardner's accident. Stebbins performed no work on or inspection of the whitewater tank after November 28, 1980. La. R.S. 9:2772 provides a peremptive period of 5 years on design and construction claims. Accordingly, absent a showing of some other duty or obligation on the part of Stebbins in this case, all claims of Ms. Gardner against it are clearly perempted.\\nIn a effort to survive peremption, Ms. Gardner argues that Stebbins' inspections of the tile chests and alleged knowledge of the overfilling and overflowing of tile chests at IP plants, albeit in locations other than Mansfield, created a duty on the part of Stebbins to inform IP of the dangerous operation of the tanks by its employees. In other words, Ms. Gardner asserts that Stebbins assumed a duty to provide safety advice to IP due to its occasional observation and awareness of overpressurizing and overflowing tanks during its inspection of the structural integrity of the walls of the tile chests. We disagree.\\nIn Bujol v. Entergy Services, Inc., 03-0492 (La.5/25/04), 922 So.2d 1113, the supreme court explained:\\nOne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as |5necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect [perform] his undertaking, if\\n(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm, or\\n(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or\\n(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.\\nThis common law doctrine has existed for centuries and has traditionally been used to impose liability upon an actor who has failed to exercise reasonable care when it undertook to perform a duty owed to a third party.\\nThe Bujol court was faced with the question of whether a parent corporation had assumed a duty for the workplace safety of its subsidiary, the plaintiffs employer. The supreme court noted that, under Louisiana jurisprudence, \\\"parties who voluntarily assume certain duties for work place safety must perform those duties in a reasonable and prudent manner.\\\" Bujol, supra. In order to find such an assumed duty, the supreme court required \\\"some proof of positive undertaking\\\" for work place safety, stating that \\\"neither mere concern with nor minimal contact about safety matters creates a duty to ensure a safe working environment for employees of a subsidiary corporation.\\\" Bujol, supra, citing Muniz v. National Can Corp., 737 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.1984).\\nHere, there is no evidence that Stebbins positively undertook any obligation to en sure the safety of IP employees. To the contrary, the evidence conclusively establishes that the only obligation on the part of Stebbins was to inspect for structural integrity certain tanks as requested by RIP. Stebbins exhibited no concern for, or contact with, the operational safety of IP plants or, specifically, the tile chests. Bu-jol, supra; Muniz, supra. There simply is no basis in law for the creation or assumption of any duty on the part of Stebbins to ensure the safe operation of the IP tanks. The trial judge properly granted Stebbins' motion for summary judgment.\\nCONCLUSION\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment in favor of Stebbins Engineering and Manufacturing Company is affirmed. Costs of appeal are assessed to Plaintiff, Melanie Gardner.\\nAFFIRMED.\\nAPPLICATION FOR REHEARING\\nBefore STEWART, CARAWAY, MOORE, LOLLEY & SEXTON (Pro Tempore), JJ.\\nRehearing denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7003864.json b/la/7003864.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..505c9eb2b956f836feffa8af1d0b86d260eaac96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7003864.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7003864\", \"name\": \"STATE ex rel. Carl BARRAS v. STATE of Louisiana\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Barras v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2013-10-25\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2013-KH-1015\", \"first_page\": \"1094\", \"last_page\": \"1094\", \"citations\": \"124 So. 3d 1094\", \"volume\": \"124\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:35:38.430564+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE ex rel. Carl BARRAS v. STATE of Louisiana.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE ex rel. Carl BARRAS v. STATE of Louisiana.\\nNo. 2013-KH-1015.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nOct. 25, 2013.\", \"word_count\": \"67\", \"char_count\": \"417\", \"text\": \"In re Barras, Carl;\\u2014Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 188319; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0275.\\nDenied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/35), 660 So.2d 1189.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7022451.json b/la/7022451.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..95e5f4a0651dcb66e89862c3cdd317c99999bf7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7022451.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7022451\", \"name\": \"STATE ex rel. Daimon WILLIAMS v. STATE OF LOUISIANA\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Williams v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2013-07-31\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2013-KH-0497\", \"first_page\": \"1121\", \"last_page\": \"1121\", \"citations\": \"118 So. 3d 1121\", \"volume\": \"118\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:17:37.217582+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE ex rel. Daimon WILLIAMS v. STATE OF LOUISIANA.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE ex rel. Daimon WILLIAMS v. STATE OF LOUISIANA.\\nNo. 2013-KH-0497.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nJuly 31, 2013.\", \"word_count\": \"78\", \"char_count\": \"515\", \"text\": \"In re Williams, Daimon; \\u2014 Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 01-2427; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-73.\\nDenied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7042300.json b/la/7042300.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a7e00690a3a33245be9c2be737f87a5827311698
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7042300.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7042300\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Jarvis TUCKER a/k/a Joe Tate a/k/a Dwayne Lee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Tucker\", \"decision_date\": \"2010-12-10\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2010-KP-0573\", \"first_page\": \"721\", \"last_page\": \"721\", \"citations\": \"51 So. 3d 721\", \"volume\": \"51\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:12:22.387987+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Jarvis TUCKER a/k/a Joe Tate a/k/a Dwayne Lee.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Jarvis TUCKER a/k/a Joe Tate a/k/a Dwayne Lee.\\nNo. 2010-KP-0573.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nDec. 10, 2010.\", \"word_count\": \"69\", \"char_count\": \"435\", \"text\": \"In re Lee A/K/A, Dwayne; Moses A/K/A, Dwayne; Tate A/K/A, Joe; Tucker A/K/A, Jarvis; \\u2014Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, Nos. 09-97-0406, 04-98-0440; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 2321.\\nDenied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7059584.json b/la/7059584.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d44900c66ee599da3e07cfaca9a0992837a8b907
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7059584.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7059584\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Eric T. MAXWELL\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Maxwell\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-08-19\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2008-KA-1007\", \"first_page\": \"505\", \"last_page\": \"512\", \"citations\": \"17 So. 3d 505\", \"volume\": \"17\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:57:02.725427+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"(Court composed of Judge CHARLES R. JONES, Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, and Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR.).\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Eric T. MAXWELL.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Eric T. MAXWELL.\\nNo. 2008-KA-1007.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.\\nAug. 19, 2009.\\nRehearing Denied Sept. 15, 2009.\\nLeon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, Cate L. Bartholomew, Assistant District Attorney, Matthew Caplan, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, LA, for State of Louisiana.\\nMary Constance Hanes, Louisiana Appellate Project, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.\\n(Court composed of Judge CHARLES R. JONES, Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, and Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR.).\", \"word_count\": \"4012\", \"char_count\": \"24330\", \"text\": \"CHARLES R. JONES, Judge.\\n| jEric Maxwell appeals his conviction and sentence of ten (10) years for the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm. We reverse, vacate Maxwell's conviction and sentence, and remand for a new trial.\\nThe State charged Maxwell with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He pled not guilty at his arraignment. At the conclusion of his jury trial, he was found guilty as charged by a 12 member jury panel. The district court ordered a presentence investigation, and on April 30, 2008, the district court sentenced Maxwell to serve ten (10) years, concurrent with any other sentence, with credit for time served, and recommended him for the Department of Corrections Impact Program, and for any other self-help programs. Maxwell filed an oral motion for appeal that day, and he filed a written motion for appeal on May 5, 2008, on which date it was granted.\\nOn the morning of June 17, 2007, at about 11 a.m., New Orleans Police Department Officer Samuel Dupre was on routine patrol in his marked police vehicle when he was flagged down by a woman who informed him of a parked Lexus on Canal Street in Orleans Parish. The informant stated there were 2 black males \\\"ducked down\\\" in the car and it seemed like they were hiding from |2someone. Based on this information, Officer Dupre proceeded to the location described by the informant and saw the vehicle and the two men she described.\\nWhile parked about 20 feet away from the vehicle described, Officer Dupre witnessed the two men, Maxwell and another male, exit the Lexus and walk up to the Athletes Foot store located on Canal Street, peer through the window and return back to their vehicle. The two men reached under the seats of the vehicle to retrieve something and placed the item in their waste bands or pocket. Officer Dupre testified that because he was parked so far away, he could not confirm as to what the two males were retrieving from under the seat or where on their bodies they hid the item. The two males proceeded to walk back towards the Athletes Foot store. Officer Dupre further testified that the two males' actions made him think that they were going to rob the shoe store because \\\"they looked through the store, walked back to the vehicle to retrieve something that seemed like a gun from under the seat and then proceeded to walk back to the store.\\\"\\nOfficer Dupre testified that at this time, he tried to stop the two males by driving his vehicle up and blocking their way to the store. He asked the two males to place their hands on the car and requested their identification cards. Maxwell did not have an ID, but provided his name and birth date to Officer Dupre. After Officer Dupre ran the two males' names in the system, he found out that Maxwell had numerous warrants against him. The officer exited his vehicle to approach the two males, and he noticed Maxwell cupping a handgun in his hand. Officer Dupre testified that the gun was a blue steel semiautomatic handgun. Maxwell at this time began backing away from the officer, even though the officer had given him a verbal command to drop the weapon. Maxwell turned and ran down University Place. During this foot pursuit, Officer Dupre witnessed Maxwell drop the gun in Ra drain before continuing to run and hide in a parking garage where he was arrested by Officer Dupre.\\nThe security attendant, who was sitting by the parking lot, screamed and pointed to where Maxwell was hiding. Officer Dupre arrested Maxwell, returned him to the drain where Maxwell had dropped the gun, and waited for other members of the police force to arrive and assist him. Officer Dupre testified that at that time, Maxwell stated to Officer Dupre that he merely dropped marijuana in the drain, not a gun. Upon arrival and with Officer Dupre's entire precinct present, the officers pried open the drain where the gun, a fully loaded Bersa Blue Steel semi-automatic .380 caliber handgun, was retrieved. Upon retrieval, the officers returned to the initial location where the Lexus was still located.\\nAt trial, New Orleans Police Department crime lab technical specialist Teddy Fambro testified that he did not take finger prints off the handgun because at the time it was retrieved, it was wet and dirty. At trial, Mr. Fambro identified photographs of the handgun since the gun was not available for review in court.\\nMaxwell was charged with being a felon in possession of a handgun. Thus, his probation officer, Benny Stevens, a probation officer for the State of Louisiana, testified that he supervised Maxwell after he pled guilty to possession of crack cocaine on December 16, 2004, and was placed on probation for 18 months.\\nOn appeal, Maxwell raises four assignments of error:\\n1) the district court erred in the prosecutor's reasons for using peremptory challenges to remove five black prospective jurors, and in failing to require the prosecutor to go back and explain his strikes of five other black prospective jurors which were made before the Bat-son challenge was asserted, i.e., before the pattern became apparent; and in failing to keep official records which permit a review of the jury selection process;\\n|42) the district court erred in granting the State's challenge for cause to remove a black female prospective juror over objection by the defense; the transcript of voir dire is inadequate to review the ruling.\\n3) the district court abused its discretion in overruling defense counsels objection and denying closing arguments, specifically, that the ten (10) year minimum sentence could be \\\"changed\\\", that defense counsel should have questioned the police officer about the contents of the surveillance videotape which he lost before the defense could view it; and that the defense could have called witness to verify whether the police officer was telling the truth; and\\n4) the district court erred in failing to include \\\"illegal carrying of a concealed weapon\\\" as a responsive verdict in Maxwell's prosecution for being a \\\"felon in possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon.\\\"\\nIn his first assignment of error, Maxwell argues the district court erred in not finding a pattern of racially motivated peremptory challenge when the State utilized nine of its twelve peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury and exercised cause challenges only against black venire members. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the United States Supreme Court stated \\\"the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to discriminate on the basis of race.\\\" Bat-son has been codified in Louisiana Law under La. C. Cr. P. art. 795(C), as follows:\\nNo peremptory challenges made by the state or the defendant shall be based solely upon the race of the juror. If an objection is made that the state or defense has excluded a juror, solely on the basis of race, and a prima facie case supporting that objection is made by the objecting party, the court may demand a satisfactory racially neutral reason for the exercise of the challenge, unless the court is satisfied that such reason is apparent from the voir dire examination of the juror. Such demand |sand disclosure, if required by the court, shall be made outside of the hearing of any juror or prospective juror.\\nIn Batson, the United States Supreme Court established a three-step analysis to determine whether a peremptory challenge has been used in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court must first determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1722. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. This second step \\\"does not demand an explanation that is persuasive or even plausible\\\"; as long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curium). Finally, the district court must then determine whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, 106 S. Ct at 1723-1724.\\nIn Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008), the United States Supreme Court reemphasized the district courts' role under the third step of Batson: to carefully scrutinize the plausibility of the prosecutor's explanation for a peremptory strike by evaluating the prosecutor's credibility by assessing \\\"not only whether the prosecutor's demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also whether the juror's demean- or can credibly be said to have exhibited basis for the strike attributed to the juror by the prosecutor.\\\" Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1208.\\nIn the present case, the voir dire record shows that a total of thirty seven (37) people were questioned in the selecting process. The court called two panels. The jury panel was completed and filled during these two panels. The voir dire record shows that when the district court denied the State's challenges for cause on three | fi(3) black jurors, the State used its peremptory challenges to strike these prospective jurors during the first panel, in addition to two (2) others stricken peremptorily. The first three (3) prospective jurors the State requested challenges for cause on were: 1) Cleaster Baham, female; 2) Vanessa Sanders, female; and 3) Dine-trius Dillon, female. In addition to these, the State used its peremptory strikes on Gregory Pound, male, and Glorious Santos, female. All these prospective jurors, according to the panel list attached to the record, were African Americans. When the State's challenges for cause were denied by the district court, the State used its peremptory challenges. The transcript reveals that it was not until the questioning of the second panel of prospective jurors and when the State made its sixth peremptory challenge on another African American person that the defense made a Batson objection. The defense made a Batson objection at this time involving black females that had been struck by the state up to Ms. Annette Hawkins, the sixth African American the State sought to strike.\\nImmediately after the State challenged prospective juror Annette Hawkins, counsel for Maxwell made Batson challenges as to \\\"black females that have been struck by the State up to now.\\\" Upon the defense's Batson objection, the Prosecutor stated his reason as to why he requested for Ms. Hawkins and Ms. Renell Ballard to be struck. The State explained that both black females stated that they would not follow the law and would hold the State to a higher standard to prove its case than what is allowed by the law. The Prosecutor explained that as Ms. Hawkins was providing her statements to the State, Ms. Ballard was shaking |7her head in agreement. The district court accepted the State's reason and did not instruct the State to explain why it struck the first 4 black women as well as Ms. Hawkins. The State further requested Ms. Renell Ballard to be stricken for cause because she stated that she would hold the State to a higher standard of proof and would require the State to produce more than one witness. The district court denied the State's request; however, the State was still allowed to peremptorily strike Ms. Ballard. Upon the defense's Batson objection, the district court refused to instruct the State to provide further reasons for its strike. The record indicates that the State provided reasons for the challenge for cause of each person to be eliminated; however, the State did not provide reasons for the peremptory strikes. The voir dire record shows that after the Prosecutor provided its reasons on the record for requesting Ms. Hawkins to be struck, he inquired from the district court as to whether he should present his reasons for the strikes of the previous prospective jurors to which the defense had made a Batson objection. The district court responded in the negative:\\nState: . those are my reasons. Do you want me to put the reasons on for the others, Your Honor?\\nDistrict Court: No. Well, I'll deny the Batson challenge as to Ms. Hawkins.\\nIn applying the Batson three step test, which has been reaffirmed in recent cases such as Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) and Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2324, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005), we must examine the first element: the district court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a [ \\u00a1peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1722, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In further applying the first test in Batson, in State v. Drake, 2008-1194 (La.1/30/09), 2 So.3d 416, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:\\nThe United States Supreme Court \\\"did not intend, the first step of Batson to be so onerous that a defendant would have to persuade the judge on the basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for the defendant to know with eertainty-that the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.\\\" Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170, 25 S.Ct. 2410, 2417, 162 1. L.Ed.2d 129 (2005). A defendant \\\"satisfies the requirement of Batson first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the district judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.\\\" Id.\\nIn the instant case, the defense did not raise a Batson challenge until the State was on their sixth peremptory strike. The record shows that Ms. Hawkins was the State's sixth strike of an African American. The defense made a Batson objection of all African American females up to Ms. Hawkins. Defense counsel clearly referred to \\\"black females,\\\" when he made the Batson challenge. Though the defense made numerous Batson objections, the district court did not shift the burden onto the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. After the first Batson objection by the defense, prosecutor asked if he should give reasons for striking the previous strikes. The district court clearly stated no, thus ignoring the requirements of the Batson challenge.\\nIn State v. Drake, 2008-1194 (La.1/30/09), 2 So.3d 416 \\u2014 a per curium decision by the Supreme Court \\u2014 during voir dire in Drake, the State peremptorily struck eight African American prospective jurors called for examination after the court excused seven others for cause. However, the State did allow and accept two | ^African American prospective jurors for the panel, of which the defense struck one. The district court found that defendant failed to satisfy the first step of the three step Batson test because he did not make a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent. The appellate court affirmed, finding no error in the district courts conclusion that there was no prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination met by the defense in its Batson objection. State v. Drake, 2008-1194 (La.1/30/09), 2 So.3d 416. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Drake, supra, granted the defendant's writ of certiorari and concluded in Drake that the circumstances set forth above gave rise to a reasonable inference of discriminatory purpose. Id., 2 So.3d at 417. Thus, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's writ of certiorari and remanded the case to the district court \\\"for purposes of providing the State with an opportunity to offer race-neutral reasons\\\" for the exercise of eight of its peremptory challenges to exclude prospective black jurors. Id., 2 So.3d at 417.\\nIn the instant case, the State's use of its peremptory challenges gave rise to a reasonable inference of discriminatory purposes on the part of the State. Though the district court did find initially that Maxwell made a prima facie showing that the State exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race, it is apparent that the court subsequently accepted the Prosecutor's race-neutral explanations for striking the first five named black jurors. However, there is nothing in the record that shows that the district court required the State to go back and provide reasons for the strikes of the first five prospective jurors. When the State inquired as to whether he should go back and give reasons for the first five juror strikes, the district court informed him that it was not necessary. The State argues that its reasons in requesting challenges for cause for three of the first five prospective Jjjjm'ors \\u2014 which were subsequently struck by peremptory strikes \\u2014 provided race neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes. However, this argument is without merit because the State still does not provide race neutral reasons for striking the remaining two prospective jurors, Ms. Santos and Mr. Pounds.\\nThe State further requested Ms. Ballard to be stricken for cause because she stated that she would hold the State to a higher standard of proof and would require the State to produce more than one witness. The district court denied the State's request; however, the State was allowed to still strike Ms. Ballard using a peremptory challenge. Upon defense's Batson objection, the district court refused to instruct the State to provide further reasons for their strike. The State proceeded by striking the eighth prospective juror, another black female, Ms. Monica Sawyer. The State requested Ms. Sawyer to be stricken for cause, but this request was denied by the district court. Instead, the district court allowed for the prospective juror to be removed by the use of peremptory challenge. The district court merely noted the defense's Batson objection to the removal of Ms. Sawyer rather than following the second element of Batson and demanding a satisfactory racially neutral reason for the exercise of the challenge. Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).\\nThe State struck all but two African American prospective jurors. On the jury panel at trial, there were ten whites, two blacks, and a white alternate. This group is not reflective of the population of the Parish of Orleans in which Maxwell resides and is domiciled. By the district court failing to require the State to provide reasoning for the first five strikes which the defense counsel made a Batson objection to, the Batson objection was violated. The defense made a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent on the part of the State; however, the burden to | nprove otherwise was never transferred onto the State. Therefore, the district court did not complete the three part test of Batson.\\nAccordingly, Maxwell's assignment of error has merit. The manner in which the State exercised its peremptory challenges in this case, based on race, resulted in a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights; this error raises serious federal constitutional equal protection issues affecting the rights of both the defendant and the excused venire-member. See State v. Coleman, 2006-0518, p. 9 (La.11/02/07), 970 So.2d 511, 516-517. This error is a structural one, affecting the framework within which the trial proceeded. Id., 2006-0518, p. 9, 970 So.2d at 517. Here, the State used its peremptory strikes to strike all African Americans, the same race as the defendant. When Maxwell made a Batson objection, the district court did not shift the burden of proof onto the State to provide race-neutral reasons for its strikes. Thus, the district court erred in applying the Batson three part test and evaluating the Batson objection by Maxwell. Consequently, we vacate Maxwell's conviction and sentence, and remand this matter to the district court to conduct a new trial. Furthermore, we pretermit the defendant's three remaining assignments of error having found that the district court erred in addressing his Bat-son challenges.\\nA review of the record reveals two errors patent. Both the sentencing transcript and the minute entry from the date of sentencing reflect that the district court sentenced Maxwell to ten (10) years at hard labor.\\nLa. R.S. 14:95.1(B) states that whoever is being found guilty of possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of, inter alia, any violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law, La. R.S. 40:961 et seq., which is a felony, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than [ 12fifteen years \\\"without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence and be fined not less than one thousand dollars or more than five thousand dollars.\\\"\\nIn the instant case, Maxwell's prior conviction was for possession of cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C) and a felony.\\nThe district court failed to stipulate that Maxwell's sentence be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.\\nLa. R.S. 15:301.1(A) provides that the failure of a sentencing court to specifically state that all or a portion of the sentence is to be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence shall not in any way affect the statutory requirement that all or a portion of the sentence be served without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) deems that those required statutory restrictions are contained in the sentence, whether or not imposed by the sentencing court, and the paragraph self-activates the correction and eliminates the need to remand for a ministerial correction of an illegally lenient sentence resulting from the failure of the sentencing court to impose the restrictions. State v. Williams, 2000-1725, p. 10 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 799; State v. Boudreaux, 2007-0089, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/15/07), 966 So.2d 79, 81-82, writ denied, 2007-1936 (La.2/1/08), 976 So.2d 717.\\nTherefore, the district court's failure to stipulate that Maxwell's sentence to be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence pursuant to La. R.S. 14:95.1(B) does not require a remand by this court for a ministerial correction of the illegally lenient sentence.\\nThe second patent error is that the district court failed to impose a mandatory fine on Maxwell of not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars pursuant to La. R.S. 14:95.1(B). The failure to impose a mandatory fine for | ^conviction under La. R.S. 14:95.1(B) requires that the appellate court remand the case for imposition of the fine. State v. Major, 2008-0861, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/10/08), 1 So.3d 715, 719; State v. Brown, 2003-2155, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/14/04), 895 So.2d 542, 545.\\nHowever, having vacated Maxwell's conviction and sentence, and remanding this matter to the district court to conduct a new trial, we find the resolution of this patent error is rendered moot.\\nDECREE\\nFor the forgoing reasons, the conviction and sentence imposed upon Eric Maxwell is reversed and remanded for a new trial.\\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\\n. However, the district court granted the States challenge for cause against Ms. Lan Tran, an Asian female. Ms. Tran had provided similar answers as the jurors previously stricken.\\n. There is no document in the record or the transcript of voir dire that reflects the race of the first five (5) jurors' stricken by the prosecutor. However, there is an attachment in the appellant's brief which shows the figures depicting the sex and race of the jury panel and the panel list with handwritten information by the defense attorney as to the age, sex, occupation and race of each prospective juror. The figures and panel list attached in the brief shows that the first five (5) prospective jurors struck by the State were all black people, 4 females and 1 male.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7062113.json b/la/7062113.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..58ac7cb0a274ae00c509526195b5cafa6edf9187
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7062113.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7062113\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Terrance CARTER\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Carter\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-06-17\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2009-KK-1154\", \"first_page\": \"720\", \"last_page\": \"720\", \"citations\": \"10 So. 3d 720\", \"volume\": \"10\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:29:32.181678+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Terrance CARTER.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Terrance CARTER.\\nNo. 2009-KK-1154.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nJune 17, 2009.\", \"word_count\": \"78\", \"char_count\": \"498\", \"text\": \"In re Carter, Terrance; \\u2014 Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Red River, 39th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 101,993; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 44660-KW.\\nTransferred to Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal retains jurisdiction over capital cases until a sentence of death is imposed. La. Const, art. 5, Sections 5, 10; La.C.Cr.P. art. 912.1.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7064084.json b/la/7064084.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c29e60a6f5ab62abd00551c456f4028476f0fc51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7064084.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7064084\", \"name\": \"Mary Ed McDONALD v. Ronald A. McDONALD\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"McDonald v. McDonald\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-03-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. CA 08-1165\", \"first_page\": \"780\", \"last_page\": \"784\", \"citations\": \"10 So. 3d 780\", \"volume\": \"10\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:29:32.181678+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Court composed of SYLVIA R. COOKS, J. DAVID PAINTER, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.\", \"parties\": \"Mary Ed McDONALD v. Ronald A. McDONALD.\", \"head_matter\": \"Mary Ed McDONALD v. Ronald A. McDONALD.\\nNo. CA 08-1165.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.\\nMarch 4, 2009.\\nKerry Lyndon Spruill, Marksville, LA, for Plaintifi/Appellee Mary Ed McDonald.\\nKeith Wayne Manuel, Attorney At Law, Marksville, LA, for Defendant/Appellant Ronald A. McDonald.\\nDerrick M. Whittington, Whittington Law Firm, Marksville, LA, for Defendant/Appellant Ronald A. McDonald.\\nCourt composed of SYLVIA R. COOKS, J. DAVID PAINTER, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.\", \"word_count\": \"1592\", \"char_count\": \"9741\", \"text\": \"GREMILLION, Judge.\\n| ,The defendant, Ronald McDonald, appeals the judgment of the trial court holding him in contempt and sentencing him to ninety days in jail. For the following reasons, we affirm.\\nFACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\\nRonald McDonald and Mary McDonald, formerly residents of Pearl River, Mississippi, were divorced in February 2005 after eighteen years of marriage. Ronald thereafter moved to Plaueheville, Louisiana. In October 2007, Mary filed a Petition to Make Judgments Executory in Avoyelles Parish concerning judgments for alimony, past due support, and contempt that were rendered by the Chancery Court of Pearl River County, Mississippi. Following a hearing in November 2007, the trial court made executory (1) the Final Judgment of Divorce (which included a property settlement agreement), (2) An April 6, 2006 judgment (reiterating that Ronald pay Mary $475 per month from his retirement plan and that Mary relinquish rights to Ronald's Louisiana Sheriffs Pension Fund) and, (3) the Judgment of Contempt filed on October 18, 2006 (which found Ronald $4,228 in arrearages in alimony owed to Mary).\\nMary then filed a Motion to Examine Judgment Debtor. Ronald filed a Rule for Contempt of Court or Rescind Property Settlement claiming that Mary had failed to execute certain documents which would relinquish her claim over his Louisiana Sheriffs Pension Fund. Mary then filed a Rule for Contempt of Court. Following a hearing in March 2008 on both Mary and Ronald's rules for contempt, the trial court found Ronald in contempt of court for nonpayment of spousal support in the amount of $3,286.50. It further found with regard to Ronald's Louisiana ^Sheriffs Pension Fund:\\nAlthough the evidence presented at hearing failed to reveal to this Court any legal basis for this claim, the record was held open to allow Ronald McDonald the opportunity to submit further information to prove this claim to the Court. The information obtained by Ronald McDonald subsequent to the hearing actually proved that his Rule for Contempt of Court is totally and completely without merit. This Court received correspondence from Andrea Aymond, Attorney for Ronald McDonald, dated May 8, 2008 with attachments from the Louisiana Sheriffs Pension and Relief Fund which confirm that the failure of Ronald McDonald to receive maximum benefits was through no fault whatsoever of Mary McDonald. In fact, if there was any fault to be assessed, that fault would be upon Ronald McDonald.\\nThe trial court further found that Ronald had been fully reimbursed from the Sheriffs pension fund and it further recalled his rule for contempt at his costs. The trial court noted that Ronald had \\\"absolute contempt\\\" for Mary and sentenced him to serve a period of ninety days in the Avo-yelles Parish jail. The trial court held that Ronald could purge himself of the ninety day sentence by paying Mary $3,286.50 plus attorney's fees of $500 and all court costs associated with the rule for contempt. Ronald filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment, for New Trial and Alternatively for Exceptions of No Cause of and No Right of Action, which were denied, with prejudice, by the trial court. Ronald was ordered to begin his ninety day sentence. Ronald filed a supervisory writ to this court, which was denied because an adequate remedy was available through appeal. Ronald now appeals. Maiy answered the appeal and seeks damages for frivolous appeal.\\nISSUES\\nRonald assigns as error:\\n1. The trial court abused its discretion when it held him in contempt of court.\\n2. The trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to the maximum sentence allowed pursuant to La.R.S. 1,13:4611.\\nCONTEMPT OF COURT\\nRonald claims that he should not have been held in contempt because the underlying judgments of divorce, including the property settlement, issued by the Chancery Court in Mississippi were unlawful under Louisiana law and, therefore, could not be made executory by a Louisiana court because they were against the public policy of this state. We disagree. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2541 states:\\nA. A party seeking recognition or execution by a Louisiana court of a judgment or decree of a court of the Untied States or a territory thereof, or of any other state, or of any foreign country may either seek enforcement pursuant to R.S. 13:4241, et. seq., or bring an ordinary proceeding against the judgment debtor in the proper Louisiana court, to have the judgment or decree recognized and made the judgment of the Louisiana court.\\nB. In the latter case, a duly authenticated copy of the judgment or decree must be annexed to the petition.\\nMary complied with the statutory requirements and the Louisiana court ordered Ronald to pay her $475 per month less what she received from his military retirement. Ronald's claim that a Louisiana court must determine whether Mary is in need and free from fault pursuant to La.Civ.Code arts. Ill and 112 is without merit. The determination of whether Mary was entitled to the $475 per month award has already been decided by the Mississippi court. Mary now merely seeks to enforce the money judgment she has against Ronald. Any issues that Ronald has with the original Mississippi judgments should have been raised in the court that issued the judgment.\\nRonald urges that Daigle v. Daigle, 06-346 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/27/06), 940 So.2d 891, writ denied, 06-2914 (La.2/16/07), 949 So.2d 418 supports his position. |4We disagree. Daigle is totally inapplicable to the facts at hand. In Daigle, both parties were Louisiana residents and the property settlement agreement was in contravention of public policy.\\n\\\"A contempt of court is any act or omission tending to obstruct or interfere with the orderly administration of justice, or to impair the dignity of the court or respect for its authority.\\\" La.Code Civ.P. art. 221. Constructive contempt includes \\\"[wjillful disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, mandate, writ, or process of the court[.]\\\" La.Code Civ.P. art. 224. Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4611 addresses punishment for contempt of court and states that district courts may punish a person found in contempt:\\n(d) For any other contempt of court, including disobeying an order for the payment of child support or spousal support . by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not more than three months, or both.\\nThe trial court has vast discretion in determining whether a party is in contempt of court and its decision will not be reversed absent and abuse of discretion. See Martin v. Martin, 37, 958 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So.2d 1081. Having reviewed the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Ronald in contempt of court for failure to pay Mary $475 per month. It is clear that Ronald is intent on refusing to pay or delaying the payment rightfully owed Mary pursuant to the valid Mississippi judgment. It was Ronald's testimony that he feels he owes his former wife nothing and that she does not deserve a cent. Consider this excerpt from the trial transcript:\\nTRIAL COURT: There are two Judgments in Mississippi that say you owe her $475.00 out of the military retirement. Whether she gets it all from you, you know, or gets part from the military retirement and part |5from you $475.00 has to go to her. Do you understand that?\\nRONALD: I understand what you are saying yes, sir.\\nTRIAL COURT: And that is the Judgment of the court that says that. Two Judgments of the court that say that and you understand that but you still don't intend on paying her.\\nRONALD: No, sir.\\nFurthermore, it is clear from reading the letter sent by Ronald's own attorney to the trial court dated May 8, 2008, that Mary is not wrongfully receiving monies from his Louisiana Sheriffs Pension Fund nor did she fail to take any required action. Ronald's actions indicate the willful contempt he has for the court's orders. Accordingly, we find that the ninety day jail sentence was not excessive. These assignments of error are without merit.\\nFRIVOLOUS APPEAL\\nMary urges that we award her damages for frivolous appeal.\\nLa.Code Civ.P. art. 2164 provides that an appellate court may award damages for frivolous appeal. However, damages for frivolous appeal will not be awarded unless it appears that the appeal was taken solely for the purpose of delay, that serious legal questions are not raised, or that the attorney does not seriously believe in the position he advocates. Robinson v. Thornton, 96-1329 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97); 705 So.2d 745, writ denied, 97-2963 (La.2/6/98); 709 So.2d 739.\\nCooks v. Rodenback, 97-1389, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/29/98), 711 So.2d 444, 449. Considering the facts before us, we find that Ronald has pursued this appeal merely for the purposes of delaying payment to Mary. Accordingly, we award her $1425 in attorney's fees for work performed on appeal, an amount equal to three months of the support Ronald has contemptuously refused to pay her.\\nCONCLUSION\\nThe judgment of the trial court finding the defendant-appellant, Ronald [(McDonald in contempt of court and sentencing him to ninety days in jail is affirmed. Ronald is hereby ordered to pay Mary $1425 in attorney's fees for work performed on appeal-\\nAFFIRMED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7430405.json b/la/7430405.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a33d1be8c4a74491d6dd369240ccd193e28f8b05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7430405.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7430405\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. George PAYNE, Jr.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Payne\", \"decision_date\": \"1996-05-22\", \"docket_number\": \"No. CR94-1628\", \"first_page\": \"527\", \"last_page\": \"530\", \"citations\": \"677 So. 2d 527\", \"volume\": \"677\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:48:09.118850+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before WOODARD, PETERS and SULLIVAN, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. George PAYNE, Jr.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. George PAYNE, Jr.\\nNo. CR94-1628.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.\\nMay 22, 1996.\\nJames M. Buck, Alexandria, for State of Louisiana.\\nJoseph Richard Kutch, Pineville, for George Edward Payne Jr.\\nGeorge Edward Payne, Jr., pro se.\\nBefore WOODARD, PETERS and SULLIVAN, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1598\", \"char_count\": \"9513\", \"text\": \"JjSULLIVAN, Judge.\\nOn July 19, 1994, a jury found defendant, George Payne, Jr., guilty of possession of stolen goods in excess of one hundred dollars but less than five hundred dollars, a violation of La.R.S. 14:69(B)(2). On September 23, 1994, the state charged defendant as a multiple offender. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, defendant admitted his status as a multiple felony offender, having pled guilty to a 1988 simple burglary charge. He was sentenced to serve two years with the Louisiana Department of Corrections. Defendant's counsel made an oral motion for appeal and, on September 26,1994, filed a written motion for appeal assigning as error insufficiency of evidence.\\nOn January 31, 1995, instead of briefing the assignment of error, appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, together with a motion to withdraw. This court considered the assignment of error abandoned and did not address it. The court reviewed the record, as mandated by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) and State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990), finding one 12error patent; namely, defendant was not informed of his right to remain silent prior to pleading guilty to his multiple offender status. State v. Payne, 94-1628 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/95); 665 So.2d 158. We denied the motion to withdraw and ordered appellate counsel to brief the issue of whether State v. Harris, 95-0900 (La. 5/19/95); 654 So.2d 680, which involved an application for post-conviction relief, also applied to cases on appeal and, if so, whether defendant's habitual offender hearing was fundamentally fair. After reviewing the record and the relevant law, we find that Hams does apply to eases on appeal, that the habitual offender hearing was fundamentally fair, and affirm defendant's adjudication and sentence.\\nLa.R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides, in part:\\n[T]he court . shall inform [defendant] of the allegation contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law and shall require the offender to say whether the allegations are true.\\nIn State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983), defendant was determined by the trial court to be a habitual offender and sentenced to twenty-four years at hard labor. At the hearing, defendant pled not guilty. No evidence was presented by the state that defendant was the same person who had been previously convicted. The trial court, over the objection of counsel, compelled defendant to testify. The supreme court reversed and vacated the sentence. The court stated:\\nThis section of the statute clearly recognizes that the defendant, if he chooses, has the right to remain silent. Once the defendant chooses to remain silent the state must then by competent evidence prove the elements of R.S. 15:529.1 before the defendant can be sentenced as an habitual offender. Before the defendant chooses to acknowledge or confess in open court that he has been previously convicted of a felony, the statute requires that he first be cautioned by the trial court as to his rights. R.S. 15:529.1(D) specifically provides that defendant be advised by the court of his right to a \\\"formal hearing\\\" and to have the state prove its case. State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1983). Further, this section implicitly provides that the defendant should be advised, by the court, of his statutory right to remain silent.\\n| gM, at 817.\\nMore recently, in State v. Harris, 654 So.2d 680, the supreme court, in an application for post-conviction relief, stated:\\nAdmissions of identity at a multiple offender hearing implicate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983). Nevertheless, multiple offender proceedings \\\"simply should not be equated (at least for purposes of determining the validity of an admission) to trials of guilt or innocence.\\\" State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182, 1185 (La.1983). This Court has therefore declined to adopt as a constitutional prerequisite to a valid admission of identity at a multiple offender proceeding a procedure analogous to the Boykin colloquy which must accompany a valid plea of guilty. Id., 427 So.2d at 1185, n. 7. In the absence of any allegation or showing that the admission was involuntary, compare State v. Johnson, supra, the availability of post-conviction relief turns on whether the proceedings as a whole accorded the petitioner fundamental fairness and due process of law. See, Holloway v. Lynaugh, 838 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 838, 109 S.Ct. 104, 102 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988); State v. Firmin, 522 So.2d 1181 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 532 So.2d 759 (La.1988).\\nIn the case sub judice, unlike in Harris, no independent evidence was introduced by the state to prove defendant was the same person previously convicted of a predicate felony. However, our review of the record convinces us that \\\"the proceedings as a whole accorded the (defendant) fundamental fairness and due process.\\\" At the hearing on September 23, 1994, the following colloquy occurred:\\nBY MS. LAING (assistant district attorney):\\nMr. George Payne?\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes, ma'am.\\nBY MS. LAING:\\nMr. Payne, you're present and represented by your attorney, Mr. Kutch. Is that correct?\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes.\\nUBY THE COURT: .\\nWhat docket?\\nBY MS. LAING:\\nMr. Payne, there's a . Oh, I'm sorry. 236,525.\\nBY THE COURT:\\nMinor little details.\\nBY MS. LAING:\\nThere's a bill of information filed against you, Mr. Payne, alleging that you are a multiple felony offender, second offender, I believe. It's my understanding you intend to admit .\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes ma'am.\\nBY MS. LAING:\\n. that. Is that correct?\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes, ma'am.\\nBY MS. LAING:\\nOkay. It's alleged that you pled guilty to simple burglary in December 14, 1988, and that you were convicted of possession of stolen things in July 19, 1994, and you admit those charges?\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes, ma'am.\\nBY THE COURT:\\nMr. Payne, you understand . We filed the bill?\\nBY MS. LAING:\\nWell, no, I need to file it. I didn't realize that was the original.\\n|5BY THE COURT:\\nMr. Payne, you understand that you have a right to a hearing .\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes, sir.\\nBY THE COURT:\\n. on this particular charge itself on the multiple bill? You have a right to have the state come and prove that you are the same George Payne that had the other convictions.\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes, sir.\\nBY THE COURT:\\nYou have a right to a lawyer at that particular hearing?\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes, sir.\\nBY THE COURT:\\nThen those convictions are valid convictions?\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes, sir.\\nBY THE COURT:\\nIf you plead guilty and accept this at this time, then you're waiving the right to that particular hearing, which would be with all due process and all the rest. You understand that?\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes, sir.\\nBY THE COURT:\\nleAnd you also understand that if you plead guilty on this, you will receive a sentence that will be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence?\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes, sir.\\nBY THE COURT:\\nYou also understand under 15:571.4, I believe, .3, et seq., then you'd also lose your rights to good time? You understand .\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nNo, I . I didn't .\\nBY THE COURT:\\nYou didn't know that?\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nNo. (Inaudible)\\nBY THE COURT:\\nThis would be a sentence without good time. You understand that you have a two-year sentence is the agreement in exchange for this?\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes, sir.\\nBY THE COURT:\\nAnd that that would be without benefit of suspension of sentence or probation but that it would be also without benefit of good time under the statute?\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes, sir.\\nBY THE COURT:\\nAnd you're still prepared to admit?\\nJtBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYes, sir.\\nBY THE COURT:\\nOkay. Court's satisfied in this particular matter. It's going to be the sentence of the Court that Mr. George Payne is to serve two years with the Department of Corrections as an habitual offender, second offender.\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nBut, Your Honor, I've got . I've got almost eleven months turned in now.\\nBY THE COURT:\\nHang on. We've got some other things I've got to say. You will get credit for time served. You've got three years from the date your sentence becomes final to seek post-conviction relief. If you want another court to review this, you've got to ask for it within three years. That needs to show in the sentencing transcript, too, Brenda.\\n* \\u215c \\u215c\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nYour Honor, how much time does that leave me to . due?\\nBY THE COURT:\\nThirteen months.\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nThirteen months?\\nBY THE COURT:\\nIt's straight time.\\nBY MR. PAYNE:\\nOkay.\\nBY THE COURT:\\nIsOkay?\\nThere have been no allegations or showing that the admission was involuntary. Defendant was represented by counsel at the hearing, he was informed of the allegations in the multiple offender bill and he was advised of his right to a hearing wherein the state would have the burden of proving he was the same person previously convicted of the predicate offense. Furthermore, the admission was part of a plea agreement and defendant was fully apprised of the sentence he was to receive.\\nAccordingly, we find there was no error in the habitual offender proceedings and the defendant's adjudication and sentence as a habitual offender are affirmed.\\nAFFIRMED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7450230.json b/la/7450230.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8f26eb0dff2f0f00524dcf633165ad2bad8bc49f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7450230.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7450230\", \"name\": \"BARO CONTROLS, INC. v. Helen PREJEAN\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Baro Controls, Inc. v. Prejean\", \"decision_date\": \"1994-03-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 93 CA 0586\", \"first_page\": \"46\", \"last_page\": \"49\", \"citations\": \"634 So. 2d 46\", \"volume\": \"634\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:59:37.025126+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before FOIL, PITCHER and PARRO, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"BARO CONTROLS, INC. v. Helen PREJEAN.\", \"head_matter\": \"BARO CONTROLS, INC. v. Helen PREJEAN.\\nNo. 93 CA 0586.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.\\nMarch 11, 1994.\\nEugene Groves, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellant Baro Controls, Inc.\\nHobart Pardue, Springfield, for defendant-appellee Helen Prejean.\\nO\\u2019Neal Walsh, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellee American Motorist.\\nBefore FOIL, PITCHER and PARRO, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1520\", \"char_count\": \"8976\", \"text\": \"PITCHER, Judge.\\nThis is an appeal of a trial court's judgment nullifying the right of an option grantor to retain a $10,000.00 option price because of an alleged defect in the property. We reverse.\\nFACTS\\nOn June 6, 1988, Baro Controls, Inc. (Baro), a Texas corporation and owner of Lot 27-A of Joy's Riverway Estates in Livingston Parish, Louisiana, entered into a contract of lease for said property with Helen Prejean (Mrs. Prejean). The term of the lease was from June 1,1988 to September 19, 1988, with monthly rental amounts payable as follow: June, $800.00; July, $400.00; and August through September 19 $300.00. For the additional consideration of $10,000.00, Mrs. Prejean was granted an option to purchase the property for the sum of $130,-000.00. Under the agreement, Mrs. Prejean was to exercise her option on or before September 1, 1988. If she failed to exercise her option within this time frame, the $10,000.00 would be deemed forfeited. Additionally, a forfeiture could result from a default of any term or condition of the lease, or from termination of the lease for any reason, or from a failure to purchase the property as provided for under the agreement.\\nOn July 19, 1988, Baro offered to modify the lease by extending the term of the lease to November 15,1988. Additionally, the rent from the first of August through the end of September would be fixed at $400.00, and then increased to $1,500.00 per month thereafter. The deadline for exercising the option remained at September 1, 1988. The lease agreement specified that any modification to the agreement was to be in writing and signed by the parties.\\nThe September 1, 1988 deadline passed without Mrs. Prejean exercising her option to purchase the property. She stopped paying rent as of October 1, 1988, but continued to occupy the premises. By letter dated October 27, 1988, Baro notified Mrs. Prejean that she was being put in default for failure to pay rent under the terms of the lease agreement.\\nBy letter dated November 5, 1988, Mrs. Prejean's attorney sought to renegotiate the purchase price of the property. In his letter it was claimed that extensive repairs were needed because there was a rotten beam supporting an upstairs deck. Baro responded by offering to reduce the purchase price by $20,000.00. Mrs. Prejean, again through her attorney, wrote Baro and advised that the repair costs might be as much as $25,-000.00, and offered to renegotiate the purchase price. Baro responded by offering to reduce the sales price by 25%, provided that Mrs. Prejean pay all past due rent, pay $20,000 of the purchase price by December 1, 1988, and close the sale by December 15, 1988.\\nBaro and Mrs. Prejean faded to reach a new agreement. Baro filed a rule to evict Mrs. Prejean on December 15, 1988. Mrs. Prejean filed a reconventional demand seeking the return of her $10,000.00 option price because of the alleged defect in the property. Baro then filed pleadings to recover all past due rent under the terms of the lease.\\nAfter trial on the merits, the trial judge held that Mrs. Prejean was entitled to the return of her option deposit, subject to an off-set of $2,000.00 for past due rent. This suspensive appeal followed.\\nTHE OPTION\\nBaro contends that the trial judge erred in rescinding the option and returning the $10,000.00 option price to Mrs. Prejean, notwithstanding the fact that she failed to exercise her option in a timely manner. We agree.\\nAn option is a unilateral contract whereby one party obligates himself to sell to another party a certain thing for a price, under certain terms and conditions, within a stipulated period of time. Ebrecht v. Ponchatoula Farm Bureau Association, Inc., 498 So.2d 55, 57 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986), writ denied, 501 So.2d 233 (La.1987). Additional ly, an option grants to a party an elective right that, when exercised, ripens into a binding contract to buy and sell. Major Commodity Corporation v. Cunningham, 555 So.2d 525, 527 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989). The grantee is free to accept or reject the offer or promise to sell of his own volition within the specified time period.\\nStatutorily, the option is governed by LSA-C.C. art. 2462 and reads in pertinent part:\\nOne may purchase the right, or option to accept or reject, within a stipulated time, an offer or promise to sell, after the purchase of such option, for any consideration therein stipulated, such offer, or promise can not be withdrawn before the time agreed upon; and should it be accepted within the time stipulated, the contract or agreement to sell, evidenced by such promise and acceptance, may be specifically enforced by either party.\\nThe record in the instant case clearly reflects that Baro obligated itself to sell to Mrs. Prejean, Lot 27-A of Joy's Riverway Estates in Livingston Parish, Louisiana, and that it would not withdraw the offer before the expiration of the option. The price was fixed at $130,000.00, and Mrs. Prejean had to accept or reject the offer on or before September 1, 1988. The language of the agreement was clear and unambiguous and was sufficient to put Mrs. Prejean on notice that should she fail to exercise her option on or before the stipulated date, she would forfeit her option to purchase. The September 1, 1988 expiration date passed without Mrs. Prejean notifying Baro that she was accepting the offer in accordance with the terms of the agreement. When this happened, the forfeiture took effect, and Baro was therefore entitled to keep the option money without applying it to any sales price.\\nWe believe that the trial judge erred as a matter of law and was clearly wrong when he ordered the return of the option price. Apparently, the trial judge reasoned that a rotten beam, which Mrs. Prejean cited as being one of the reasons why she decided not to exercise her option, was of such a nature that it would allow her to back out of the option agreement. However, in order for a defect to rise to the level of error necessary to vitiate consent, the error must be as to the principal cause for making the contract, and the cause was known or should have been known to the other party. LSA-C.C. art. 1949. Additionally, one must prove that the obligation would not have been incurred by a reasonable person who knew of the defective condition. See, Sigsworth v. Gernon, 465 So.2d 705, 707 (La.1985). We believe that Mrs. Prejean failed to establish that the defect was of such a nature that she would not have purchased the option had she known of the condition prior to June 6, 1988. The record bears out that Mrs. Prejean continued to live in the residence for some five months past the expiration of the date to exercise the option, and continued in her efforts to purchase the property, through her attorney, at a renegotiated price. Throughout the attempted renegotiations, Mrs. Prejean contended that the repairs to the rotten beam were going to cost anywhere from a low of $25,000.00 to a high of $40,000.00. However, the record reflects that the ultimate purchaser of the property repaired the defective condition for $4,300.00.\\nWe believe that Mrs. Prejean gambled and lost. She gambled that a renegotiated sales price for the property would be confected, and that she would be able to apply the $10,000.00 option price to the new deal, even though the option had expired. Because Mrs. Prejean failed to exercise her option in a timely fashion, she is not entitled to a return of her option price.\\nPAST DUE RENT\\nBaro further contends that it is entitled to collect past due rent based upon the terms of a written modification to the original agreement that was tendered to Mrs. Prejean. We disagree.\\nAlthough Mrs. Prejean testified that she verbally agreed with the modification agreement which was tendered to her, Baro is precluded from collecting the amounts set forth therein, because Article XII of the original lease agreement specified that any modifications to the lease agreement must be in writing and signed by the parties. Mrs. Prejean never signed the modification, and the new rental amounts never went into effect. Therefore, the trial judge was correct in granting judgment in favor of Baro for the sum of $2,000.00, based on five (5) months of past due rent at the rate of $400.00 per month, which was a reasonable rental in accordance with the terms of the original lease agreement.\\nFor the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed as to the return of the option price, and affirmed as to the award for past due rents. All costs of this appeal are assessed against Helen Prejean.\\nAFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7450354.json b/la/7450354.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a19ddd8d111c3e318ced3a31288fa8f5a6c39dd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7450354.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7450354\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana, v. Vincent SMITH\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Smith\", \"decision_date\": \"1996-01-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 95-KA-734\", \"first_page\": \"1260\", \"last_page\": \"1269\", \"citations\": \"668 So. 2d 1260\", \"volume\": \"668\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:20:45.742921+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before GOTHARD and CANNELLA, JJ., and REMY CHIASSON, J. Pro Tem.\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana, v. Vincent SMITH.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana, v. Vincent SMITH.\\nNo. 95-KA-734.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.\\nJan. 30, 1996.\\nJohn M. Mamoulides, District Attorney, Terry M. Boudreaux, Assistant District Attorney, Gretna, for Plaintiff/Appellee.\\nLinda Davis-Short, 24th Judicial District, Indigent Defender Board, Gretna, for Defendant/Appellant.\\nBefore GOTHARD and CANNELLA, JJ., and REMY CHIASSON, J. Pro Tem.\", \"word_count\": \"5088\", \"char_count\": \"31212\", \"text\": \"UGOTHARD, Judge.\\nDefendant, Vincent Smith, appeals his conviction and sentence for second degree murder. We affirm.\\nSmith was indicted by a Jefferson Parish Grand Jury on December 8, 1994 for second degree murder in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30.1. He pled not guilty at his arraignment, and was subsequently tried by a jury on May 23, 24 and 25, 1995. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged. On June 25, 1995, the court sentenced Smith to life imprisonment at hard labor -without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, giving credit for time served. Defendant filed this appeal.\\nIsOn November 27, 1994, at about 4:30 a.m., the victim, Johnnie Mae Payne, and a friend, Mattie Lang, were returning home from an evening out. As they arrived at the apartment complex at 7525 Airline Highway, defendant, the victim's live-in boyfriend, was sitting outside. An argument began between defendant and the victim which continued after the two went inside the victim's apartment. The argument became loud enough to awakened Ms. Payne's children. During the course of the argument, Smith shot Payne.\\nOne of the victim's children, Quinton Payne, testified that he heard his mother telling defendant to get out of the house, to which defendant replied \\\"I'll kill you.\\\" Quinton further testified that after his mother replied \\\"shoot me then,\\\" he heard gunshots. Quinton looked out of his bedroom and saw his mother laying motionless on the floor. He then observed defendant bend over the victim and shoot her in the head.\\nAfter shooting the victim, the defendant went from the back part of the house to the front room. He pointed a gun at Shadrika Payne, the victim's daughter, and demanded the keys to the victim's pick-up truck. Smith threatened to shoot Shadrika also if she did not comply. Believing that her life was in danger, Shadrika gave defendant the keys. Defendant then opened the door and left the scene in the victim's white Ford pick-up truck.\\nAfter defendant left, the police were called to the scene. A broadcast giving a description of the suspect vehicle and naming the perpetrator as Vincent Smith went out over police radio. Deputy Henry Bonds, who was working a paid detail in the area at the time, observed the suspect vehicle on Airline Highway. After verifying the race of the subject, Officer Bonds stopped the vehicle at the intersection of pHolIygrove and Airline Highway. Deputy Edward Ducos of the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office, who was also working a paid detail, arrived on the scene.\\nWhen the driver identified himself as Vincent Smith, Officer Ducos advised him of his constitutional rights and inquired as to what happened. Defendant advised the officer that his girlfriend pulled a gun on him, that she fired a shot at him, that he got in a struggle with her to gain control of the gun, during which she was shot. The officer then inquired as to the whereabouts of the weapon, to which defendant replied that he threw it behind the seat. Officer Ducos checked behind the seat to verify the location of the gun, but did not remove it until the crime lab arrived to process the scene.\\nDefendant was thereafter transported to the detective bureau. After being fully advised of his rights and executing a waiver of rights form, defendant gave a taped statement to Detective Dennis Thornton. In defendant's statement, he claimed that he and the victim were arguing and that she told him to leave the apartment. As Smith was packing his clothes, Payne fired a shot. A struggle over the gun ensued during which it fired accidentally. Defendant then tripped over the victim, causing the gun to go off again.\\nIn addition to taking a statement from defendant, Detective Thornton spoke to other witnesses and gathered evidence about what had occurred. Based on the information received, Detective Thornton arrested defendant for the murder of Johnnie Mae Payne.\\nIn his first assignment of error defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him of second degree murder, contending that the evidence warranted a verdict of manslaughter.\\n|5In State v. Burrow, 565 So.2d 972, 976 (La.App. 5 Cir.1990), writ denied, 572 So.2d 60 (La.1991), the court set forth the standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence as follows:\\nThe constitutional standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence, enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), requires that a conviction be based on proof sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965 (La.1986); State v. Davis, 540 So.2d 600 ([La.App.] 5th Cir.1989). When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of the offense, LSA-R.S. 15:438 mandates that, \\\"assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.\\\" The requirement of LSA-R.S. 15:438 does not establish a standard separate from the Jackson standard, but rather provides a helpful methodology for determining the existence of reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676 (La.1984); State v. DiLosa, 529 So.2d 14 ([La.App.] 5th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 538 So.2d 1010 (La. 1989). Ultimately, all evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Porretto, 468 So.2d 1142 (La.1985), dissenting opinion, 475 So.2d 314 (La.1985).\\nThe defendant was charged with and convicted of one count of second degree murder in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30.1, which reads in pertinent part as follows:\\nA. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:\\n(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]\\nAccordingly, the state must show that the defendant killed the victim; and that the defendant had the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. State v. Gibson, 529 So.2d 1347 (La.App. 5 Cir.1988), writ denied, 536 So.2d 1212 (La.1989).\\nIn the present ease, there was testimony that defendant shot the victim. Specifically, Quinton Payne testified that as the victim lay motionless on the floor, defendant approached with the gun, bent over her, and shot her in the head. In | (\\u00a1addition, there was expert testimony by Dr. Fraser Mac-Kenzie of the Jefferson Parish Coroner's Office that the victim died of gunshot wounds, and that the hypothetical scenario that this incident resulted in an accidental fashion because of two people struggling over the gun, would be inconsistent with his findings. Ms. Louise Walzer, an expert in firearms examination who tested the weapon, testified that the gun discharged only when the trigger was pulled and did not go off accidentally.\\nWe find the state presented sufficient evidence to show that defendant killed the victim and that defendant had the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.\\nHowever, a homicide committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of self-control and cool reflection is manslaughter. LSA-R.S. 14:31. The presence of \\\"sudden passion\\\" or \\\"heat of blood\\\" distinguishes manslaughter from murder. State v. Thome, 93-859 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/23/94), 633 So.2d 773; State v. Robinson, 598 So.2d 407 (La.App. 5 Cir.1992). \\\"Sudden passion\\\" and \\\"heat of blood\\\" are not elements of the offense of manslaughter; rather, they are mitigatory factors in the nature of a defense which exhibit a degree of culpability less than that present when the homicide is committed without them. State v. Thome, supra. When the preponderance of the evidence shows that a homicide was committed in \\\"sudden passion\\\" or \\\"heat of blood\\\" which would have deprived an average person of his self control and cool reflections, a jury errs in rendering a verdict of second degree murder. State ex rel. Lawrence v. Smith, 571 So.2d 133, 136 (La.1990), appeal after remand, 584 So.2d 334 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1991), writ denied, 586 So.2d 566 (La.1991); State v. Robinson, supra.\\n|7In reviewing a claim that defendant proved the presence of the mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence, the appellate court must determine whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found that the mitigatory factors were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Thome, supra; State v. Robinson, supra.\\nDefendant argues that the evidence showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the mitigating factors of heat of blood and sudden passion were present. Defendant points to the facts that he and the victim were involved in a heated argument, the victim arrived sitting next to another man in the back seat, and that there was a knife found in the bedroom where the shooting occurred.\\nHowever, the evidence presented does not support defendant's argument that heat of blood and sudden passion were present. While the testimony clearly established that defendant and the victim were in a heated argument, defendant himself indicated that he and the victim argued often, and routinely separated only to reconcile shortly afterward. Moreover, while a knife was found in the bedroom, there was no testimony indicating that the victim threatened defendant with the knife. Further, the testimony suggests that at one point the argument calmed down but then escalated again. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it appears that the jury could have reasonably found that the mitigatory factors were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Copeland, 93-544 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/25/94), 631 So.2d 1223, writ denied, 94-0417 (La. 5/20/94), 637 So.2d 477. We find this assignment to be without merit.\\nIn his second assignment of error, defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying a defense motion for mistrial. At trial, defendant testified in his own behalf Rand on direct examination admitted to several prior convictions: simple robbery, aggravated battery, possession of cocaine, car burglary, and assault and battery. During the cross-examination of defendant by one of the prosecuting attorneys, the following exchange took place:\\nQ. And you said, as you were waiting for her to come home, you felt hurt and used, right?\\nA. Um-hum (affirmative response).\\nQ. All right. Let me ask you, Mr. Smith, on April 22nd, 1985, do you think that\\nByron Alexander felt hurt and used when you robbed him and pistol\\u2014\\nMS. SCHLOSSER:\\nUh, objection\\u2014\\nMR. OLINDE: whipped him\\u2014\\nMS. SCHLOSSER:\\nYour Honor.\\nMR. OLINDE: for forty dollars?\\nMS. SCHLOSSER:\\nObjection.\\nTHE COURT:\\nSustained.\\nMR. OLINDE:\\nThat's part of a conviction, Judge\\nMS. SCHLOSSER:\\nObjection!\\nIsTHE COURT:\\nSustained.\\nMR. OLINDE:\\nWere you not convicted\\u2014\\nTHE COURT:\\nIt is\\u2014\\nMS. SCHLOSSER:\\nMistrial!\\nTHE COURT: sustained!\\nTHE COURT:\\nIt is sustained, Mr. Olinde.\\nMR. OLINDE:\\nI can't ask him about the conviction, Judge?\\nMS. SCHLOSSER:\\nMistrial!\\nTHE COURT:\\nCome on up, counsel.\\n(The following conversation occurred at the Bench, out of earshot of the jury.) THE COURT:\\nNo, you cannot. He admitted it. You cannot go into the facts, once they admit it. MS. SCHLOSSER:\\nMistrial.\\nJioMR. OLINDE:\\nI'm not asking\\u2014\\nTHE COURT:\\nI'm denying\\u2014\\nMR. WILSON:\\nIt's not a mistrial.\\nTHE COURT:\\na mistrial.\\nMR. WILSON:\\nIt's the Bill of Information.\\nTHE COURT:\\nI'm not \\u2014 just lay off of it. He's admitted it. You can't go any further into it, and I'm not granting a mistrial.\\nMS. SCHLOSSER:\\nOkay. Let me make this request, then. THE COURT:\\nWait, counsel.\\nMS. SCHLOSSER:\\nI just want the record to reflect that I requested a mistrial over this.\\nTHE COURT:\\nOkay.\\nMS. SCHLOSSER:\\nOkay\\u2014\\nTHE COURT:\\nAnd I denied it.\\n| nAfter the trial judge denied the motion for mistrial, defense counsel requested the judge to instruct the jury that convictions are to be used for credibility only. When the judge thereafter charged the jury, she told them that: \\\"Prior convictions may be used only to consider the credibility of a witness, and for no other purpose.\\\"\\nDefendant now complains that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for mistrial. Defendant specifically contends that inasmuch as defendant admitted his conviction, the reference to the facts of that conviction was inadmissible and highly prejudicial. On the other hand, the state contends that defendant's argument is without merit as the trial judge maintained the objection and prevented the prosecution from delving further into the simple robbery by pistol whipping.\\nDefendant relies on LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 770 to support his argument that a mistrial is warranted. That article provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\\nUpon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or comment, made within the hearing of the jury by the judge, district attorney, or a court official, during the trial or in argument, refers directly or indirectly to:\\n(2) Another crime committed or alleged to have been committed by the defendant as to which evidence is not admissible;\\n#\\nAn admonition to the jury to disregard the remark or comment shall not be sufficient to prevent a mistrial. If the defendant, however, requests that only an admonition be given, the court shall admonish the jury to disregard the remark or comment but shall not declare a mistrial.\\nPursuant to LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 770(2), the state is prohibited from referring to other crimes committed by defendant as to which evidence is not admissible. We do not find that article applicable to the instant situation because evidence of defendant's prior convictions is admissible pursuant to LSA-C.E. art. 609.1, which reads in part as follows:\\n11\\u00beA. General criminal rule. In a criminal case, every witness by testifying subjects himself to examination relative to his criminal convictions, subject to limitations set forth below.\\nB. Convictions. Generally, only offenses for which the witness has been convicted are admissible upon the issue of his credibility, and no inquiry is permitted into matters for which there has only been an arrest, the issuance of an arrest warrant, an indictment, a prosecution, or an acquittal.\\nAlthough actual convictions are admissible, the details of such convictions are generally not admissible as shown by LSA-C.E. art. 609.1 C which reads as follows:\\nC. Details of convictions. Ordinarily, only the fact of a conviction, the name of the offense, the date thereof, and the sentence imposed is admissible. However, details of the offense may become admissible to show the true nature of the offense:\\n(1) When the witness has denied the conviction or denied recollection thereof;\\n(2) When the witness has testified to exculpatory facts or circumstances surrounding the conviction; or\\n(8) When the probative value thereof outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.\\nIn the present ease, defendant admitted the conviction on direct examination and therefore, the details of the offense were not admissible. When the prosecutor tried to delve into the details of one of defendant's convictions, the trial judge sustained the defense objection and did not allow the prosecutor to pursue that line of questioning. Further, we note that it was defense counsel during direct examination, who brought up the fact of defendant's conviction, which defendant admitted. Thus, we find defendant's complaint in this regard without merit.\\nIn the third assignment defendant argues the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress his statements.\\nOn December 19, 1994, defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Confession alleging that the statements made to the police officers were not freely and | ^voluntarily given but were made under the influence of fear, intim-idations, threats or other duress, or because of promises or other inducements. In his motion, defendant also alleged that he \\\"had not been advised of his rights under Miranda, or had invoked his right to remain silent or to have an attorney and this right had not been honored.\\\"\\nAt the April 7, 1995 suppression hearing, Deputy Edward Ducos of the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office testified that on November 27, 1994, in the early morning hours, he was working a paid security detail at the Metairie Country Club. At approximately 4:30 a.m., he heard a police broadcast about a 1980 white Ford pickup, driven by Vincent Smith, who was wanted for a shooting that occurred at 7525 Airline Highway. Henry Bonds, who was working the detail with Officer Ducos, checked the south side of the golf course. Bonds advised headquarters that he sighted such a truck and asked for the race of the person involved in the shooting. When headquarters advised that it was a black male, Bonds notified them that he had the possible vehicle. At that point, Officer Ducos proceeded towards Officer Bonds who had stopped the vehicle at Hollygrove and Airline Highway. After the driver identified himself as Vincent Smith, Deputy Ducos advised defendant of his constitutional rights and asked him what happened. In response to the officer's inquiry, defendant stated that he went to a barroom to meet his live-in girlfriend; however, when she was not there, he returned to his apartment. The girlfriend arrived later with two other men and asked him to leave. At that time, the girlfriend pulled a gun out and shot at him. They struggled over the weapon, and he shot her. In response to the officer's question, the defendant advised him that he threw the gun behind the seat. After the officers handcuffed defendant, they moved the seat forward and observed a black steel nine millimeter pistol. The officers left the gun |i4in that location until the crime lab arrived. Defendant was placed in the police unit and brought to the detective bureau.\\nRegarding the issue of whether the defendant was properly informed of his constitutional rights, Deputy Ducos testified that he read defendant his Miranda rights using the card that he carries with him. According to the officer, defendant indicated that he was a career criminal and that he understood those rights. The officer also testified that defendant waived his rights prior to making his oral statement. Deputy Ducos further testified that he did not force, threaten, coerce or intimidate defendant into making a statement, nor did the officer promise or offer defendant any inducement or reward for making the statement. According to the officer, defendant made the statement freely and voluntarily and did not appear to be intoxicated.\\nDetective Dennis Thornton of the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office testified as to his participation in the investigation. On November 27, 1994, he executed a waiver of rights form with defendant. Thornton testified that he explained the rights that were listed on the form, that defendant placed his initials next to each stated right, and that defendant indicated he understood the rights that were read to him. Subsequent to the execution of this form, defendant gave a taped statement to the officer. According to Detective Thornton, no one forced, threatened or coerced defendant into making this statement, nor did anyone offer him any promises or inducements. The detective further testified that defendant gave the state ment freely and voluntarily and did not appear to be under the influence of any sort of intoxicant at the time. In addition, the officer testified that at no time did defendant state that he was hard of hearing or that he could not understand what was being explained to him.\\nhgAfter listening to the testimony presented, the trial judge denied the motion to suppress both statements, expressing her belief that they were freely and voluntarily given.\\nDefendant now contends that the statements were not freely and voluntarily given because the officers played \\\"mind games\\\" with him and made him feel pressured into giving a statement.\\nIn State v. Leeming, 612 So.2d 308, 311\\u2014 312 (La.App. 5 Cir.1992), writ denied, 616 So.2d 681 (La.1993), this court set forth the law regarding the admissibility of a confession as follows:\\nBefore a confession can be introduced into evidence, the State has the burden of proving that it was free and voluntary and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises, [footnote omitted] LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 703(D); LSA-R.S. 15:451; State v. Vaccaro, 411 So.2d 415 (La.1982). It must also be established that an accused who makes a confession during a custodial interrogation was first advised of his constitutional rights as per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and voluntarily and intelligently waived those rights. State v. Castillo, 389 So.2d 1307 (La.1980), cert, denied, 453 U.S. 922, 101 S.Ct. 3159, 69 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1981); State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La.App. 5th Cir.1990).\\n\\u215c \\u215c \\u215c # \\u215c \\u215c\\nThe issue of whether a showing of volun-tariness has been made is analyzed on a case by ease basis with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The trial judge must consider the \\\"totality of the circumstances\\\" in deciding whether the confession is admissible. State v. Shepherd, 449 So.2d 1120, 1123 (La.App. 5th Cir.1984). The admissibility of a confession is in the first instance a question for the trial judge. His conclusions on the credibility and weight of testimony relating to the voluntariness of a confession are entitled to great weight and will not be overturned on appeal unless they are not supported by the evidence. State v. Be-noit, 440 So.2d 129 (La.1983); State v. Weiland, supra; State v. Delaune, 572 So.2d 652 (La.App. 5th Cir.1990).\\nIn the present case it appears that the state, through the testimony of the police officers, proved that defendant's statement was freely and voluntarily given |if,and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises. The testimony at the suppression hearing that the officer read and explained to defendant his constitutional rights, and that defendant decided to waive those rights and give a statement, was undisputed. In addition, the testimony adduced at trial showed that defendant indicated he understood those rights and wished to waive them. It is also noted that defendant did not object at trial to the introduction of the waiver of rights form or the transcribed copy of the statement.\\nWe conclude that defendant was properly advised of his rights and waived them before giving a free and voluntary statement. Accordingly, the trial judge properly denied defendant's motion to suppress. This assignment is without merit.\\nIn his next assignment defendant argues the trial court erred in applying R.S. 15:283 . In the present case, the prosecutor, during the course of the trial, made a motion that Quinton Payne, a twelve-year-old witness, be allowed to testify unseen by defendant. In arguing the merits of the motion, the prosecutor asked the court to consider that the witness is a twelve-year-old child who witnessed his mother being shot in the head by the defendant. The prosecutor also informed the court that the witness entered the courtroom earlier and was so traumatized by the sight of the defendant he was unable to talk for a while. It also appears from the prosecutor's statement, that Quinton witnessed the murder of his cousin, James Darby, six months earlier. Defense counsel objected to the state's motion on the basis of the confrontation clause, arguing that the accused has a right to face his accusers.\\nAfter arguments by counsel, the judge, using LSA-R.S. 15:283 for guidance, granted the state's motion and allowed that the chair for this witness be placed next Irrto the bench. Defendant now contends that the trial judge's ruling violated his right to confront his accusers as guaranteed under the provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Louisiana Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 16. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in applying LSA-R.S. 15:283 in a situation where the child witness was not the victim of the crime and there was no proof of the necessity for the child to testify from a position other than the witness chair.\\nThe Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that \\\"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.\\\" In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), the federal right to confrontation was made binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, Article I, \\u00a7 16 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 guarantees an accused in a criminal prosecution the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. See also LSA-R.S. 15:273 which provides, in part, that \\\"[t]he accused shall have the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him....\\\"\\nIn State v. Racca, 525 So.2d 1229, 1231 (LaApp. 1 Cir.1988), the court discussed the purpose behind the confrontation clause, stating as follows:\\nThe Court set forth the purposes underlying the constitutional right of confrontation in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1935, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). Therein, the Court noted the purposes protected by that right are as follows: (1) to insure that the witness will give his statements under oath, thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) to force the witness to submit to cross-examination, the \\\"greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth\\\"; (3) to permit the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate [the opportunity] to observe the demeanor of the witness making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility. See also State v. Kaufman, 304 So.2d 300 (La.1974), U.S. cert, denied, 429 U.S. 981, 97 S.Ct. 495, 50 L.Ed.2d 591 (1976).\\nIisln State v. Roberts, 541 So.2d 961 (La. App. 2 Cir.1989), the court stated that confrontation means a face-to-face meeting between witness and defendant. However, the court noted that this right is not absolute, but is subject to the inherent power of courts to conduct criminal proceedings in a dignified, orderly and expeditious manner.\\nIn State v. Daniels, 484 So.2d 941, 944 (LaApp. 1 Cir.1986), which the state cites in its brief, the court stated the following:\\nLa.R.S. 15:283 preserves the essential elements of confrontation \\u2014 the oath, the opportunity to observe the witness' demean- or, and the right to cross-examine. These elements provide \\\"all that the Sixth Amendment demands: 'substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement.'\\\" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 69, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)). The defendant's right to confront the child face to face during the child's testimony is not critical to the purposes of cross-examination. As long as the defendant can hear the child's testimony and can confer with her attorney, the essential safeguards of cross-examination are preserved. Admittedly, the United States Supreme Court has used the words \\\"face to face\\\" to describe the guarantee of the confrontation clause. Snyder v. Massachu setts, 291 U.S. 97,106, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). However, this language supports the right of cross-examination rather than of physical confrontation per se and the court's choice of words may have resulted from its inability to foresee technological developments permitting cross-examination without physical presence. See Note, 98 Harv.L.Rev. 806, 823 (1985). The Constitution mandates confrontation, not intimidation. In the child-victim case where all elements of confrontation are preserved except the ability of the witness to see the defendant and the jury, the constitutional mandate is satisfied.\\nIn the present case, there is nothing to indicate that defendant was deprived, in any way, of his right to confront his accusers. The witness was in the courtroom, but was located in such a position that he could not directly see defendant. It appears, however, that defendant had a view of the witness, heard all of his | ^testimony and was given a right to full cross-examination. Moreover, the trial judge's comments on the record support the position that defendant was not denied his right to confrontation in any way. Particularly, on June 30,1995, the trial judge had defendant brought to court solely to make the following comments on the record:\\nAll right, Mr. Smith, I meant, when I sentenced you, to make a comment for the record, because I know it's going up on appeal, and I want this part to go up, too, Patty; when Quentin Payne testified, we moved him from the normal witness area in my courtroom to an area directly beside my desk and below. I want the record to reflect that, while he was not directly in front of Mr. Smith, he was able to see him \\u2014 Mr. Smith was able to see Quentin Payne, so I don't think the right to confrontation was abridged in any way. I don't know whether that will appear in the record Quentin Payne, when asked to identify, was able to directly look to his side and see the defendant, Vincent Smith, and point at him and identify him. But I wanted to be very clear, for the record, that there was viewing between the two. Okay, that's the only reason I brought him over today. Thank you.\\nGiven the facts of this case, we do not find merit in the defendant's argument that his constitutional rights to confrontation were violated by the actions of the trial court.\\nIn his final assignment of error, defendant requests a review of the record for errors patent in accordance with LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 920 and State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La.1975). We have conducted such a review and find no errors patent.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.\\nAFFIRMED.\\n. It is noted that defendant's appeal motion was filed prior to the time he was sentenced. However, the prematurity of the motion was cured by defendant's subsequent sentencing. See State v. Waldron, 482 So.2d 163 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986).\\n. LSA-R.S. 15:283 concerns testimony by victims of child abuse and allows such testimony to be taken in a room other than the courtroom.\\n. Although the court, in Daniels, was discussing LSA-R.S. 15:283, the language employed by the court is helpful in understanding an accused's right to confrontation.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7469792.json b/la/7469792.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d315218507ec92e6762946f55a9ae7424073160f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7469792.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7469792\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Richard Allen COLE, Sr., Defendant-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Cole\", \"decision_date\": \"1995-02-01\", \"docket_number\": \"No. CR 94-1070\", \"first_page\": \"1214\", \"last_page\": \"1220\", \"citations\": \"649 So. 2d 1214\", \"volume\": \"649\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:30:25.017254+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before DOUCET, C.J., and THIBODEAUX and SULLIVAN, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Richard Allen COLE, Sr., Defendant-Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Richard Allen COLE, Sr., Defendant-Appellant.\\nNo. CR 94-1070.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.\\nFeb. 1, 1995.\\nRehearing Denied March 17, 1994.\\nMonique Yvette Metoyer, Alexandria, for State.\\nJoseph Richard Kuteh, Pineville, for Richard Allen Cole Sr.\\nBefore DOUCET, C.J., and THIBODEAUX and SULLIVAN, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"3372\", \"char_count\": \"19948\", \"text\": \"JiDOUCET, Chief Judge.\\nPROCEDURAL HISTORY\\nOn September 14, 1993, defendant was charged by bill of information with one count of theft over five hundred dollars and one count of possession of stolen goods over five hundred dollars. On September 24, 1993, defendant entered a plea of not guilty to all charges. The theft charge was dropped by the state on January 11,1994. The first trial on the possession of stolen goods charge began on February 22, 1994, with a mistrial based on a hung jury being declared the next day. A new trial was held and on May 18, 1994; the jury found the defendant guilty. Finally, on June 17, 1994, defendant was tried and adjudged a second habitual offender. Defendant was then sentenced to seventy-two months at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Defendant now appeals alleging three assignments of error.\\nFACTS:\\nDefendant Richard Cole and victim Louise Landry met in mid-September of 1992. Subsequent to that meeting, an intimate relationship developed between the two. According to Louise, the relationship became a friendship two weeks after the initial meeting. Richard went to Louise's home on various occasions following the initial meeting. Richard's brother, Clifford, ^accompanied Richard to Louise's on two or three occasions. Within days or hours following some of the visits, Louise found various items missing from her home, including two rings, some silverware, a handgun, tools and a toolbox. The items became missing at different times over a period of several months. Louise wrote Richard a letter asking him to return the rings and the pistol; one of the rings was then mailed to her. The pistol was returned to her by being placed under a bush outside her house.' The silverware and the tools were' never retrieved.\\nERRORS PATENT:\\nLa.C.Cr.P. art. 920 provides as follows:\\nThe following matters and no others shall be considered on appeal:\\n(1) An error designated in the assignment of errors; and\\n(2) An error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.\\nA review of the record reveals one error patent. It concerns defendant's habitual offender hearing. Defendant admitted his guilt as a habitual offender. Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1) and State v. Walker, 432 So.2d 1057 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983), he should have been informed of his right to remain silent and have the state prove its ease. In Walker, supra, the trial court's failure to comply with La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1) resulted in this court's remand of the case for another multiple offender hearing. The trial judge failed to do so in this case.\\nHowever, the transcript of the hearing reveals that when the court began the habitual offender hearing, the defendant's own attorney inquired of the defendant if he had any objection to admitting that he was the same Richard Cole, Sr. in the prior proceedings which formed the basis of his \\\"habitual offender\\\" status. The defendant stated that he had no objection to such admission.\\nMoreover, if evidence is introduced to establish the prior convictions, the error is not reversible. State v. Mallett, 552 So.2d 28 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989), writs denied 556 So.2d 1258 and 558 So.2d 567 (La.1990). In the case sub judice, evidence was introduced of Cole's prior convictions. The state introduced certified copies of various convictions, and the court accepted one from Catahoula Parish. Defense did not object to the validity of the conviction. Because evidence was introduced to establish the prior conviction, the trial court's failure to comply with La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1) does not require remand of the case. Defendant was properly sen- teneed after being correctly adjudged a multiple offender.\\n| ^ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1:\\nBy defendant's first assignment of error, he claims insufficiency of the evidence. As to appellant's argument that the verdict is not supported by the evidence adduced, it is well settled that when the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the trier of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, supra, citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983).\\nIn order for the state to obtain a conviction, it must prove all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was charged with possession of stolen goods over five hundred dollars, a violation of La.R.S. 14:69(A) and (B)(1), which read:\\nA. Illegal possession of stolen things is the intentional possessing, procuring, receiving, or concealing of anything of value which has been the subject of any robbery or theft, under circumstances which indicate that the offender knew or had good reason to believe that the thing was the subject of one of these offenses, [and]\\nB. (1) Whoever commits the crime of illegal possession of stolen things, when the value of the things is five hundred dollars or more, shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten years, or may be fined not more than three thousand dollars, or both.\\nThe elements of the crime are: 1) intentional possessing, procuring, receiving or concealing, of 2) anything of value,; 3) which has been the subject of any robbery or theft, 4) where circumstances indicate that the offender knew or had good reason to believe that the thing was the subject of one of these offenses and 5) the value of the items stolen exceeds five hundred dollars. Defendant claims the evidence was lacking to satisfy most of the elements. Our review of the trial transcript, including the various witnesses' testimonies indicates otherwise.\\nDetective Keith Perkins of the Rap-ides Parish Sheriffs Office testified he interviewed the victim Louise Landry and Clifford Cole, brother of the defendant Richard Cole. Perkins said that both of them were sober and were able to readily answer questions posed to them.\\nUClifford Cole, who was called by the state, identified the defendant as his brother, Richard Cole. Clifford stated that he went to Louise Landry's home on only two or three occasions, and that he was with his brother Richard on all of the visits. Clifford testified that while he had access to all the rooms in her house during visits, he only went into the den, the bathroom and the spa. He stated that on the third visit to the house he stayed outside because he was helping his brother Richard clean out Louise Landry's tool shed. He said Landry told them they could take the tool box and she watched them put it in the truck. Concerning the silverware Landry found missing, Clifford testified he was not aware Landry owned silverware until he was told by Detective Perkins she was missing it. The prosecutor then impeached Clifford by reading from a previous statement he had made to Detective Perkins on August 6, 1993. When asked by Perkins if he ever saw the silverware, Clifford replied that Richard had told him he sold the silverware at a flea market. Clifford said on the stand he lied during the interview with Perkins, and the contents of the statement were untrue. Clifford stated on the stand he had addressed an envelope for Richard to Louise Landry but he did not know Richard sent a ring back to her. The prosecutor once again referred to Clifford's previous statement to Perkins. In the statement Clifford said he was told by Richard that he wanted to get the ring back to Landry but he did not want to give it to her so he mailed it back to her. Once again, when confronted by the prosecution about the inconsistency of the two statements, Clifford said the previous statement to Perkins was a he because he did not have any knowledge of Richard mailing the ring back to Louise Landry. Clifford also told the prosecutor he never saw the ring and he never told Perkins the ring was yellow gold. The prosecutor read the section of the statement in which Clifford described the ring as yellow gold. Clifford then claimed he was inebriated when he gave the statement to Detective Perkins.\\nOn cross-examination, Clifford stated that on one of the instances of visiting Landry's house he had entered Landry's bedroom and awakened Richard. He also stated that his testimony for the state was part of his plea bargain agreement with the state, and he told Detective Perkins what he wanted to hear during the statement so he could get bond.\\nLouise Landry identified the defendant Richard Cole. Landry testified that the pistol that was found missing had been kept on a shelf of a nightstand that had a skirt over it. Landry testified that, besides herself, Richard was the only person who knew where the pistol was kept. She testified Richard came to her home on a Thursday night and wanted to visit. Landry refused him and then he Rasked if he could borrow a shotgun to take his son squirrel hunting. Landry said she let him in and then he went and got his brother Robert who was waiting in the car. Landry and Richard went to the storage room where the shotgun was and then Richard said he had to use the bathroom. Landry and Robert sat and talked during this time. Richard returned and said, \\\"I have to go, I have to go.\\\" Landry says she noticed he was fidgety and antsy. After they left, Landry went to bed, but the next morning she thought something was not right. She went to cheek the pistol and it was gone. Then she checked her jewelry box and found the two rings were missing. Landry said after she noticed the two rings missing she wrote Richard Cole a letter explaining what the rings meant to her and that she would be grateful if he returned them and the pistol to her. She says she slipped the note under his door and then ran errands. When she returned home the phone was ringing; it was Richard. Landry said Richard told her the pistol was on the side of the garage. She then asked him about the jewelry and he said he knew nothing about it. Landry said the yellow gold wedding band was sent anonymously to her in the mail. She said Richard returned the pistol by placing it under a bush near her house.\\nLandry testified the silverware, the tools and toolbox turned up missing after Clifford and Richard had been at the house helping her clean the utility shed. They both had unaccompanied access to the house. Landry said she was in the utility shed talking with each of them one at a time. She said they always made sure one of them was in the utility shed with her. Landry said she could not see the back door of her house nor the gate to the driveway from the utility shed. She testified Richard was the only one who knew she kept her silver in that drawer. Landry also testified as to the value of the silverware, the rings, the tools and the tool box. She said the silverware was appraised at about ninety-two hundred to ten thousand dollars, and she paid one hundred twenty-five dollars for the wedding band and three hundred eighty-nine dollars for the turquoise ring. She testified the tool box cost seventy-nine dollars and the tools cost forty-five dollars. Landry did not testify to the value of the gun. The stolen items exceeded the five hundred dollar requirement of the statute.\\nWe find that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury could have found sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Clifford's testimony was impeached, and the jury may have found Landry and Officer Perkins more credible. Accordingly this assignment of error lacks merit.\\nASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2:\\nIsBy this assignment of error defendant contends Landry's testimony as to the value of the tool set and the silverware were hearsay under La.Code Evid. art. 801. De fendant contends Landry rightfully testified about the value of the rings because she paid for them. The value of the gun is not in issue because Landry testified that she had no idea about the value of the gun.\\nLa.Code Evid. art. 801(C) states:\\nC. Hearsay. \\\"Hearsay\\\" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\\nAlthough defendant does not refer to any other evidence articles in his brief, staff assumes he makes his argument in conjunction with La.Code Evid. art. 802 which makes hearsay inadmissible. In State v. Lambert, 475 So.2d 791 (La.App. 3 Cir.1985), writ denied, 481 So.2d 1345 (La.1986), this court was faced with a similar claim by a defendant. In Lambert, the victims testified as to the value of stolen items including a gun and replacement of and responsibility for a stolen credit card. The defendant claimed these testimonies were hearsay. The court held the victims' testimony constituted their personal knowledge and was thus admissible. Lambert, 475 So.2d at 794. Landry had the silver appraised so she could have personal knowledge of the amount of the silver. Thus, her testimony stemmed from personal knowledge and was not inadmissible hearsay.\\nIn State v. Hoskin, 605 So.2d 650 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992), a possession of stolen goods case, the court held the owner's testimony as to the value of the stolen goods was sufficient if it was clear and uncontradicted. Landry had the silverware appraised and testified based upon that appraisal. The defense could have brought up the value of the silver on cross-examination if he wanted to impeach or contradict Landry's testimony. Additionally, he could have subpoenaed the appraiser from the store where Landry had the jewelry appraised. The defense chose to do neither and so Landry's testimony was clear and uncontradicted as required by Hoskins. Staff submits Landry's testimony as to the value of the silverware was sufficient and correctly admitted.\\nAs to the tool box and the sprocket set, nothing in the transcript indicates Landry did not pay for these items. Landry was asked what she paid for the items and she responded with what she thought the prices for the items were. The defense did not cross her on the topic of her knowledge of the tools and tool box or whether she had purchased them. The defendant claims that Landry's answer was hearsay, yet he presented no contradictory evidence to show Landry did not testify from personal knowledge. Based on Hoskins, supra, Landry's testimony was sufficient because it was clear |7and uncontradicted. Staff submits Landry's values for the tools and tool box were properly admitted as they were not hearsay.\\nBecause Landry's testimony as to the value of the silver, the tools and the tool box resulted from her personal knowledge, it did not constitute hearsay. Hence it was properly admitted into evidence. Thus this assignment of error also lacks merit.\\nASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3:\\nDefendant contends in his third assignment of error the testimonies of Louise Landry and Clifford Cole made references to other crimes and a mistrial should have been declared based on these references. Defendant refers to a bench conference held during trial at which time defense counsel objected to Landry's testimony regarding the tool box and some tools. Landry stated the Coles were at her house, helping her clean out a utility shed. They asked if they could have the tools and toolbox and she told them no. Landry then testified, without further prompting from the prosecution, that the Coles \\\"took all of that regardless.\\\" Defendant's objection was based on his belief that Landry's answer was evidence of another crime, either theft or unauthorized use of a moveable. The judge did not grant a mistrial saying the testimony did not make a strong reference or point to Richard Cole being guilty of theft. The judge did caution Landry to be careful not to give the impression Richard Cole stole anything. La.Code Evid. art. 404(B)(1) states:\\nB. Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. (1) Except as provided in Article 412, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.\\nAlthough Landry's comment that the Coles took the tool box and tools was evidence of another crime, it was properly admitted because it related to conduct that constituted an integral part of the act or transaction that was the subject of the proceeding. That the goods in issue were stolen is an element of the crime of possession of stolen goods. If the Coles were authorized to take the tool box and tools, then the goods were not stolen. If the goods were not stolen then one of the elements of the crime is lacking. The reference to the Coles taking the tools and tool box was not offered to depict the defendant as a bad man but was admissible because it helped to prove that the goods were stolen, and this fact was an integral part of the crime for which the defendant was being prosecuted. Thus, the trial judge's decision to forego granting a mistrial was proper.\\nIgDuring Clifford's testimony he was asked by the prosecution whether he recalled testifying previously that he had gone to Landry's home with Richard Cole. Defense objected to the prosecutor's question arguing it made reference to a prior trial. The judge overruled the objection saying it did not make reference to another trial. La.Code Crim.P. art. 770(2) states:\\nUpon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or comment, made within the hearing of the jury by the judge, district attorney, or a court official, during the trial or in argument, refers directly or indirectly to:\\n\\u215c *\\n(2) Another crime committed or alleged to have been committed by the defendant as to which evidence is not admissible;\\n\\u215d # \\u215c * \\u215c \\u215c\\nThe prosecutor's question was whether Clifford had previously testified that he had gone to Landry's home with Richard. This question does not refer to another crime alleged to have been committed by the defendant, rather he question concerns Clifford testifying previously about something he did, that is, going to Landry's home. There is no indication that Clifford previously testified in a trial for a crime which Richard committed. The trial judge's denial of a mistrial based on this objection was proper.\\nCONCLUSION:\\nIt is clear that sufficient evidence existed for a reasonable jury to have found defendant guilty of possession of stolen goods. The value of the stolen items was properly proven through the testimony of the owner. Although Clifford Cole and Louise Landry's testimony established that the missing property had been stolen, it did not contain evidence of other crimes warranting a mistrial. Accordingly, defendant's assignments of error are without merit and the trial judge's decision is affirmed.\\nAFFIRMED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7488461.json b/la/7488461.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bcef0e989638b17ff6e528260ad4d27d7a7c084d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7488461.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7488461\", \"name\": \"Harold BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Brown v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1992-12-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 91-KH-2859\", \"first_page\": \"252\", \"last_page\": \"252\", \"citations\": \"609 So. 2d 252\", \"volume\": \"609\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:06:11.503551+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Harold BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.\", \"head_matter\": \"Harold BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.\\nNo. 91-KH-2859.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nDec. 21, 1992.\", \"word_count\": \"80\", \"char_count\": \"516\", \"text\": \"In re Brown, Harold; \\u2014 Plaintiff(s); applying for supervisory and/or remedial writs; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 91KW-2071; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. \\\"F\\\", No. 303-482.\\nDenied. Relator has failed to carry his burden of proving that the five-year cleansing period of La.R.S. 15:529.1(C) prohibited the lower court's finding that he is a fourth felony offender. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7488979.json b/la/7488979.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..77c47375204da292d4f6bb684fdfc56bc2bd4aac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7488979.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7488979\", \"name\": \"Barbara Wilkinson SPILLMAN, William P. Raborn, Trustee and the Barbara Wilkinson Spillman Trust v. Earl Wayne SPILLMAN\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Spillman v. Spillman\", \"decision_date\": \"1993-05-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 93-C-0931\", \"first_page\": \"1182\", \"last_page\": \"1182\", \"citations\": \"617 So. 2d 1182\", \"volume\": \"617\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:56:58.966548+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"CALOGERO, C.J., and DENNIS and ORTIQUE, JJ., would grant the writ.\", \"parties\": \"Barbara Wilkinson SPILLMAN, William P. Raborn, Trustee and the Barbara Wilkinson Spillman Trust v. Earl Wayne SPILLMAN.\", \"head_matter\": \"Barbara Wilkinson SPILLMAN, William P. Raborn, Trustee and the Barbara Wilkinson Spillman Trust v. Earl Wayne SPILLMAN.\\nNo. 93-C-0931.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nMay 21, 1993.\", \"word_count\": \"79\", \"char_count\": \"497\", \"text\": \"In re Raborn, William P.; \\u2014 Plaintiff(s); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. CA92 0138; Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court, Div. \\\"B\\\", No. 10,465.\\nDenied.\\nCALOGERO, C.J., and DENNIS and ORTIQUE, JJ., would grant the writ.\\nHALL, J., not on panel.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7497323.json b/la/7497323.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0bf5da1941ce3a55f701443f5ace319317694ec2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7497323.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7497323\", \"name\": \"STATE ex rel. Wilbert TURNER v. STATE of Louisiana\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Turner v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1992-03-16\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 92-KH-0653\", \"first_page\": \"881\", \"last_page\": \"881\", \"citations\": \"594 So. 2d 881\", \"volume\": \"594\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:25:00.785642+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE ex rel. Wilbert TURNER v. STATE of Louisiana.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE ex rel. Wilbert TURNER v. STATE of Louisiana.\\nNo. 92-KH-0653.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nMarch 16, 1992.\", \"word_count\": \"112\", \"char_count\": \"699\", \"text\": \"In re Turner, Wilbert; \\u2014 Plaintiff(s); applying for supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. \\\"L\\\", No. 78-456.\\nThe relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a motion for production of documents he has filed on or about October 15, 1991. If relator's representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the motion. If relator's representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7504958.json b/la/7504958.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d5545bac4585ef92272c435509cedca7bd85ca4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7504958.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7504958\", \"name\": \"Margaret Susan ROMERO v. Luddy Paul HERPIN, et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Romero v. Herpin\", \"decision_date\": \"1991-10-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 91-C-1526\", \"first_page\": \"525\", \"last_page\": \"525\", \"citations\": \"586 So. 2d 525\", \"volume\": \"586\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:51:42.790937+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Margaret Susan ROMERO v. Luddy Paul HERPIN, et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Margaret Susan ROMERO v. Luddy Paul HERPIN, et al.\\nNo. 91-C-1526.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nOct. 4, 1991.\", \"word_count\": \"62\", \"char_count\": \"404\", \"text\": \"In re Romero, Margaret Susan; \\u2014 Plaintiffs); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA89-1292; Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. \\\"B\\\", No. 88-54837-B.\\nPrior report: La.App., 579 So.2d 1218.\\nNot considered. Not timely filed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7506909.json b/la/7506909.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b237d2c56de8674c31176a752b57d9ecb3bef479
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7506909.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7506909\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Dale MAXIE\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Maxie\", \"decision_date\": \"1992-02-12\", \"docket_number\": \"No. Cr91-487\", \"first_page\": \"1072\", \"last_page\": \"1075\", \"citations\": \"594 So. 2d 1072\", \"volume\": \"594\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:25:00.785642+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before DOMENGEAUX, C.J., STOKER, J., and MARCANTEL , J. Pro Tern.\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Dale MAXIE.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Dale MAXIE.\\nNo. Cr91-487.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.\\nFeb. 12, 1992.\\nWrit Denied May 15, 1992.\\nW. Charles Brown, Mansfield, for defendant-appellant.\\nDon Burkett, Dist. Atty., Many, for plaintiff-appellee.\\nBefore DOMENGEAUX, C.J., STOKER, J., and MARCANTEL , J. Pro Tern.\\nHonorable Bernard N. Marcantel participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.\", \"word_count\": \"1609\", \"char_count\": \"10048\", \"text\": \"DOMENGEAUX, Chief Judge.\\nThe defendant, Robert Dale Maxie, was charged with the second degree murder of Bryan Keith Jones. Defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial when the jurors could not reach a verdict. His second trial resulted in a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. After ordering a presentence investigation, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to the statutory maximum, 21 years at hard labor.\\nAlthough the defendant raises four assignments of error on appeal, he has briefed only two. Those assignments of error not briefed are deemed abandoned and shall not be considered. Uniform Rules of Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4.\\nFACTS\\nThe defendant, Robert Dale Maxie, and the victim, Keith Jones, were acquaintances who lived in the same apartment complex in Zwolle, Louisiana. The two men had had a series of confrontations concerning a trip to Dallas in December of 1989, during which the defendant alleged Jones had stolen $600 of stereo equipment from the defendant's car.\\nOn February 4, 1990, Jones died from four gun shot wounds inflicted by the defendant. On that day, the defendant and Jones had argued on two separate occasions before the fatal shooting.\\nDuring the first argument, Jones threatened the defendant with a knife; however, this encounter was broken up by the victim's girlfriend, Denean Simms. The defendant and Jones then headed toward their apartments, the defendant in his car and the victim on foot.\\nThe final confrontation occurred shortly thereafter in the parking area in front of the Lakeway Apartments. The defendant was driving out of the complex when he saw Keith Jones walking home. When Jones saw the defendant, Jones threw down his jacket, left the sidewalk and began walking toward the defendant's car. The defendant parked his car and got out, armed with a .22 caliber semi-automatic rifle.\\nNumerous witnesses presented different versions of the next events, but all testified that after an exchange of words, the defendant shot Jones four times. The first bullet shattered a bone in Jones' right leg, the three others entered his chest cavity. The first policeman on the scene testified he found the victim's opened knife about nine feet from his body.\\nThe disputed testimony concerns whether the victim was armed with a knife during the confrontation and whether the victim continued to advance toward the defendant after the shooting started.\\nLauren Rivers, 19, Bobby Rivers, Jr., 17, and Christi Corbin witnessed the shooting from the Rivers' home approximately 206 feet from the scene. Christi Corbin, who did not know either the victim or the defendant, testified the victim raised his hands and said, \\\"What are you going to do, kill me?\\\"' Christi, Lauren and Bobby testified they all saw Jones' hands and he was unarmed. They also stated Jones did not continue advancing toward the defendant after the shooting started, but rather Jones attempted to dodge the defendant's bullets. Bobby Rivers, Sr., who did not witness the shooting, but offered assistance to the victim, testified he saw a closed knife near the victim's body.\\nAretha Maxie Kennedy, who witnessed the shooting from a different vantage point, also testified that the victim was unarmed. Denean Simms did not witness the second confrontation but she testified she saw a closed knife near the victim's body.\\nThe defendant testified that Jones threatened him with a knife and that Jones continued to approach him even after he fired the first shot. His testimony was corroborated by his girlfriend, Tetra Thomas, and her brothers, Cory Thomas and Marcus Station.\\nSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE\\nThe defendant contends the evidence presented is insufficient to convict him of manslaughter.\\nWhen the issue of sufficiency of the evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibilities of the witnesses and, therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the trier of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983).\\nAlthough the defendant was originally charged with second degree murder, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter. La.R.S. 14:31 defines manslaughter as:\\n(1) A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed....\\nSince the defendant raised the defense of justification, the State must prove that the killing was not a justifiable act of self-defense. State v. Sylvester, 438 So.2d 1277 (La.App. 3d Cir.1983), writ denied, 444 So.2d 606 (La.1984), citing State v. Brown, 414 So.2d 726 (La.1982).\\nLa.R.S. 14:20 provides that a homicide is justifiable:\\n(1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger....\\nDefendant contends he justifiably killed Keith Jones because Jones advanced toward him with a knife, undeterred by the defendant's first shots. Although the defendant's testimony was corroborated by his girlfriend and her brothers, three disinterested witnesses testified otherwise. The witnesses who viewed the shooting from the Rivers' home stated that the victim was unarmed and that he had stopped his advance before the defendant began shoot ing. This version of the disputed events was supported in part by forensic evidence: A ballistic expert testified that the absence of powder burns on the victim's shirt established the victim was at least three feet from the end of the rifle barrel when it was discharged.\\nEven if the disputed facts were resolved in defendant's favor, other evidence discredits the defendant's claim of self-defense. The defendant could have easily driven away when Keith Jones approached him on foot. Instead, the defendant got out of his vehicle armed with a .22 caliber weapon. Although the defendant knew he hit Jones in the leg with his first shot, he admitted he continued to pull the trigger at least three more times.\\nViewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find any rational trier of fact could conclude the defendant did not have a reasonable belief that he was in danger of losing his life' or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing was necessary to save himself from danger.\\nThis assignment of error lacks merit.\\nSENTENCE REVIEW\\nThe defendant contends his sentence of 21 years at hard labor, the statutory maximum, is excessive.\\nA sentence which falls within the statutory limits may, nevertheless, violate the defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). Generally, a sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, or is nothing more than needless imposition of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Reed, 409 So.2d 266 (La.1982). The trial judge is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Cann, 471 So.2d 701 (La.1985).\\nIn written reasons for sentencing, the trial judge noted the defendant's youth, 22 years, his steady employment history, and that the defendant had never been convicted of another crime. Nonetheless, the trial court believed that a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the killing of another human being. The court believed the defendant acted without provocation or justification, knowing that his actions would cause serious harm to the victim. Finally, the trial judge concluded that a term of imprisonment would not cause hardship to the defendant's dependents because, although the defendant had a steady work history, he never provided support for his two illegitimate children who are receiving aid from the the State.\\nThe defendant shot the victim four times over an alleged theft of goods worth $600 which defendant never reported as stolen. The defendant could have easily avoided the final confrontation with Jones, but he overresponded to the victim's actions by arming himself with a .22 caliber semiautomatic rifle. Although the defendant knew his first bullet struck the victim, he continued to pull the trigger at least three more times. Considering the above, we find a sentence of 21 years at hard labor is not excessive. Had the defendant been convicted of second degree murder, he would have received a mandatory life sentence.\\nThis assignment of error is without merit.\\nFor the above reasons, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.\\nAFFIRMED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7519353.json b/la/7519353.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7e0b30ed0f96eb60d8483589d8322e960ed2a005
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7519353.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7519353\", \"name\": \"Ricardo Augusto PUTZEYS v. Linda Marks SCHREIBER, et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Putzeys v. Schreiber\", \"decision_date\": \"1991-02-28\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 90-CA-0876\", \"first_page\": \"563\", \"last_page\": \"566\", \"citations\": \"576 So. 2d 563\", \"volume\": \"576\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:31:14.604319+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before BARRY, CIACCIO and ARMSTRONG, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Ricardo Augusto PUTZEYS v. Linda Marks SCHREIBER, et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Ricardo Augusto PUTZEYS v. Linda Marks SCHREIBER, et al.\\nNo. 90-CA-0876.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.\\nFeb. 28, 1991.\\nWrit Denied May 2, 1991.\\nBrian J. Waid, Bubrig and Waid, Buras, for plaintiff/appellant.\\nQuentin F. Urquhart, Jr., Montgomery, Barnett, Brown, Read, Hammond & Mintz, New Orleans, for defendants/appellees.\\nBefore BARRY, CIACCIO and ARMSTRONG, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1304\", \"char_count\": \"8475\", \"text\": \"BARRY, Judge.\\nRicardo and Helga Putzeys appeal a summary judgment which dismissed their suit against Mr. Putzey's employer, Rollins, Inc., for alleged injuries from an automobile accident. All material facts were stipulated. At issue is whether the Put-zeys can recover underinsured motorist benefits from Rollins as self-insurer of the vehicle Mr. Putzeys was driving and whether the exclusive remedy provisions of the workman's compensation law are applicable.\\nWe affirm.\\nFACTS\\nMr. Putzeys, a pest control technician for Rollins, was injured when Rollins' truck was hit by a car owned by Linda Schreiber and driven by Kevin Schreiber. Mr. Put-zeys was in the course and scope of his employment when the accident occurred. The accident was Mr. Schreiber's fault and the Schreiber vehicle was underinsured.\\nRollins leased the truck from B & M Equipment, Inc. pursuant to a Standard Leasing Agreement which provides in pertinent part:\\nINSURANCE: During the lease term, each vehicle shall be covered with the following insurance:\\n# Sic\\n(ii) Liability insurance naming Lessor as the insured party with limits of no less than $500,000 for any one person for injury or death, $1,000,000 for any one accident for personal injury or death and $100,000 for property damage.\\n\\u215d5\\nPERSONS PROTECTED, INSURERS: All insurance referred to above shall protect, as their interests may appear, the Lessor, the Lessee, ., and any person responsible for the use or operation of the vehicle. All such insurance shall be provided through insurance companies approved by Lessor.\\nRollins obtained a liability policy from National Union Fire Insurance Company which provided coverage in favor of Rollins and B & M Equipment in the amount of one million dollars per occurrence with a $250,000 self-insured retention. Rollins qualified as self-insured under La.R.S. 32:1042 and obtained a certificate of self-insurance for the first $250,000 in liability. Rollins rejected U/M coverage under the National Union policy.\\nMr. Putzeys sued the Schreibers and their insurer, Champion Insurance Company. Rollins filed a subrogation claim as Putzeys' worker's compensation self-insurer. Mr. Putzeys amended his petition to add Rollins as the U/M insurer of the truck, alleging in the alternative a third party breach of contract claim against Rollins. Mrs. Putzeys joined the suit as a plaintiff. Rollins and the Putzeys filed motions for summary judgment on the Put-zeys' demand against Rollins. The court granted Rollins' motion and dismissed the Putzeys' claims.\\nASSIGNMENT NO. 1\\nThe Putzeys claim that Rollins breached its leasing contract with B & M by acting as self-insurer for the first $250,-000 of liability coverage and that Rollins should not be allowed to profit by the breach. They contend that Mr. Putzeys is an innocent third party who would have been protected if Rollins had strictly complied with the lease agreement.\\nWe disagree. The lease only required Rollins to purchase liability insurance coverage. Rollins had no obligation to carry U/M coverage and it expressly rejected U/M coverage on the one million dollar excess liability policy. Whether Rollins, as self-insured, technically violated the lease requirement that \\\"insurance shall be provided through insurance companies\\\" is irrelevant because Rollins had no contractual obligation to provide U/M coverage.\\nASSIGNMENT NO. 2\\nThe Putzeys argue that a self-insurer which is contractually bound to provide insurance coverage assumes the responsibilities of an insurer under Louisiana law.\\nThe B & M lease required that Rollins \\\"cover\\\" its leased vehicles with liability insurance. Self-insurance is one method of complying with the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law (LMVSR), R.S. 32:851-1043.\\nPlaintiffs cite cases where self-insureds have been required to provide U/M coverage. See Jones v. King, 549 So.2d 350 (La.App. 5th Cir.1989), writ denied552 So.2d 401 (La.1989); Pollard v. Champion Ins. Co., 532 So.2d 838 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988), writ denied 533 So.2d 374 (La.1988). Those cases involve auto rental companies which offered liability coverage without giving the lessees the opportunity to accept or reject U/M coverage as required by R.S. 22:1406(D). The rental agencies were found to have voluntarily placed themselves in the position of vehicle liability insurers by offering liability insurance as part of their rental contracts.\\nU/M coverage is not mandatory under Louisiana law. R.S. 22:1406 provides that U/M coverage is not applicable \\\"where any insured named in the policies shall reject . the coverage or selects lower limits.\\\" A certificate of self-insurance is not a \\\"policy\\\" for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage under 22:1406(D). Hearty v. Harris, 574 So.2d 1234, 1238 no. 11 (La.1991). A self-insurance certificate only indicates that the self-insurer possesses sufficient assets to meet the state's criteria to respond in damages. Those who choose to comply with the LMVSR by obtaining a self-insurance certificate do not have to provide U/M coverage. Jones v. Henry, 542 So.2d 507 (La.1989).\\nSince we find that plaintiffs' recovery is barred on other grounds it is not necessary to address the policy issues left unresolved in Jones.\\nASSIGNMENTS NO. 3 AND 4\\nThe Putzeys claim that the trial court erred by finding Rollins immune from suit both as a UM insurer and for breach of a stipulation pour autrui in Mr. Putzeys' favor.\\nR.S. 23:1032 provides in pertinent part: \\u00a7 1032. Exclusiveness of rights and remedies; employer's liability to prosecution under other laws A. (l)(a) The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on account of an injury, or compensa-ble sickness or disease for which he is entitled to compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or relations, against his employer, or any principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal, for said injury, or compensable sickness or disease.\\n(b) This exclusive remedy is exclusive of all claims, including any claims that might arise against his employer, or any principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal under any dual capacity theory or doctrine.\\n(2) For purposes of this Section, the word 'principal' shall be defined as any person who undertakes to execute any work which is a part of his trade, business, or occupation in which he was engaged at the time of the injury, or which he had contracted to perform and contracts with any person for the execution thereof.\\nUnder this statute an employee's sole remedy against his employer for non-intentional acts is worker's compensation. The legislature amended R.S. 23:1032 in 1989 to overrule Ducote v. Albert, 521 So.2d 399 (La.1988). That decision created a judicial exception to R.S. 23:1032 to allow recovery against employers acting in a dual capacity. The amendment makes it clear that an employee's cause of action against his employer is under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act except for an intentional tort. Williams v. Gervais F. Favrot Co., 499 So.2d 623 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986), wnt denied 503 So.2d 19 (La.1987). An employer may not be held liable for damages under any contractual or \\\"dual capacity\\\" theory.\\nAs a general rule legislative acts apply prospectively. La. C.C. Art. 8. However, legislation which is interpretive of existing laws is applied retroactively. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., Inc., 360 So.2d 1331 (La.1978). The amended version of R.S. 23:1032 clarifies the term \\\"exclusive remedy\\\" as used in that statute to include all claims for damages including those arising under a \\\"dual capacity\\\" theory. Since the amendment does not establish new rights or obligations but merely clarifies existing law, it is retroactive.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nAFFIRMED\\n. The Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA), Champion's statutory successor, was substituted for Champion as defendant.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7527824.json b/la/7527824.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..00b90e4dfd13e06fd7732669740fb0baad1a31b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7527824.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7527824\", \"name\": \"DASH BUILDING MATERIALS CENTER, INC., et al. v. T.R. HENNING, a/k/a Timothy R. Henning, et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Dash Building Materials Center, Inc. v. Henning\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-04-12\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 89-CA-1362\", \"first_page\": \"653\", \"last_page\": \"654\", \"citations\": \"560 So. 2d 653\", \"volume\": \"560\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:22:26.386803+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before LOBRANO, ARMSTRONG and PRESTON H. HUFFT, J. Pro Tem.\", \"parties\": \"DASH BUILDING MATERIALS CENTER, INC., et al. v. T.R. HENNING, a/k/a Timothy R. Henning, et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"DASH BUILDING MATERIALS CENTER, INC., et al. v. T.R. HENNING, a/k/a Timothy R. Henning, et al.\\nNo. 89-CA-1362.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.\\nApril 12, 1990.\\nJules J. Mumme, III, New Orleans, for plaintiffs/appellees.\\nJack A. Ricci, Baldwin & Haspel, New Orleans, for defendants/appellants.\\nBefore LOBRANO, ARMSTRONG and PRESTON H. HUFFT, J. Pro Tem.\", \"word_count\": \"742\", \"char_count\": \"4588\", \"text\": \"PRESTON H. HUFFT, Judge Pro Tem.\\nDash Building Materials Center, Inc., (Dash), instituted suit against Timothy R. Henning to collect the balance due on purchases made in the sum of $12,578.46. The petition alleges that the defendant/appellant, Timothy Henning, signed a guaranty agreement in February of 1980 when he completed an application for credit with the plaintiff. The credit application was made in the name of the corporate account T.R. Henning, Inc. and was guaranteed personally by Timothy Henning. It is the plaintiff/appellee's position that this guaranty agreement renders the defendant liable for the sum in question.\\nThe appellant contends that the guaranty was applicable only to the account of T.R. Henning, Inc. and the disputed purchases were made by Henning Construction, Inc., Henning Construction, Inc. was an entity owned and operated by Timothy Henning, his father and brother. It is now in bankruptcy proceedings. T.R. Henning, Inc. has allegedly been dormant since 1983. The appellant testified that he notified Dash of this change in corporate status and that Dash was aware it was selling and extending credit to Henning Construction, Inc.\\nThe invoices for the purchased goods were made in the name of T.R. Henning, Inc. The appellee asserts that it was unaware of any change in the defendant's corporate status. Dash officer Michael Diecidue testified that had. the company been aware of such a change, it would have required the appellant to sign another guaranty covering the new corporation before any credit would have been extended in accordance with company policy.\\nThe trial court found that the materials were purchased by T.R. Henning, Inc. as shown on the invoices and guaranteed by Timothy Henning. The trial judge in oral reasons for judgment stated that he did not believe that notice was given to Dash and, that the defendant was aware he was being billed as T.R. Henning, Inc.\\nThe appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to find that the defendant gave sufficient notice regarding the change of companies and that, based upon a preponderance of evidence, the plaintiff knew or should have known it was selling to Henning Construction, Inc., a company for which T.R. Henning did not guarantee the debt. We do not agree with the appellant's argument.\\nIn order to avoid personal liability to a third person, it is the agent's burden to prove that he contracted as an agent, rather than as an individual, by notifying the third party of his agency relationship, including the principal's identity. Meisel v. Natal Homes, Inc., 447 So.2d 511 (La.App. 4th Cir.1984). Duckworth-Woods Tire Service, Inc. v. Smith & Johnson (Shipping), Inc. 430 So.2d 207 (La.App. 4th Cir.1983). In the case at hand, the only evidence presented by the appellant was the testimony of his brother, Mark Henning, and himself. The appellant testified that no written notice was ever sent. As previously stated, the trial judge specifically discounted this testimony and stated that it was his view that notice was not given. It is our view that the trial court is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses. Furthermore, this court may not set aside this finding of fact unless it can be seen as manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989).\\nDefendant argues that because Dash accepted checks drawn on the account of Henning Construction, Inc. it should have been aware of the corporate change. This factual circumstance will not serve to classify the trial court's judgement as manifestly erroneous. See the analogous case of Pesson v. Kleckley, 526 So.2d 1220 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1988), where the acceptance of checks written on a corporation's account was not sufficient to prove constructive notice of an individual's agency status. There was testimony presented by an officer of Dash to the effect that no attention was given to the payee of an account. Rather, it was the name on the invoice that determined who was responsible for the purchase. The appellant presented no evidence to contradict this stated company policy.\\nWe find no manifest error in the judgment rendered by the trial court and the judgment is affirmed.\\nAFFIRMED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7539140.json b/la/7539140.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..525a9c03cc9d2078a58ee196315361d5e578a789
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7539140.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7539140\", \"name\": \"Harold MILLER v. John KNORR, Jr.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Miller v. Knorr\", \"decision_date\": \"1989-11-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 89-CA-0486\", \"first_page\": \"1043\", \"last_page\": \"1046\", \"citations\": \"553 So. 2d 1043\", \"volume\": \"553\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:13:17.857093+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before GARRISON, KLEES and BECKER, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Harold MILLER v. John KNORR, Jr.\", \"head_matter\": \"Harold MILLER v. John KNORR, Jr.\\nNo. 89-CA-0486.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.\\nNov. 30, 1989.\\nCharles P. Ciaccio, Wessel, Bartels & Ciaccio, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee Harold Miller.\\nEleanor K. Roemer, Asst. City Atty., New Orleans, for intervenor-appellee City of New Orleans.\\nMadeleine M. Slaughter, Covington, for defendant-appellant John Knorr, Jr.\\nBefore GARRISON, KLEES and BECKER, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1168\", \"char_count\": \"7327\", \"text\": \"KLEES, Judge.\\nDefendant, John Knorr, Jr., appeals a preliminary injunction based on the violation of a zoning ordinance of the City of New Orleans. We amend and affirm.\\nThe property in question is a building located at 4220-22-24 Dumaine Street. On March 10,1980, defendant filed an affidavit with the Building Inspection Section of the City of New Orleans stating that the building had been used as a three-family dwelling continuously since 1970. The area in which the property is located is zoned for two-family residences (RD-2). Defendant alleges that in 1980 he began using the building as a five-family residence. On March 16, 1983, a Field Inspection Report by the Building Inspection Section shows the building as being used as a three-family residence. An affidavit signed by defendant on August 4, 1987, attests that the building has been used as a three-family residence continuously since 1970. On August 12, 1987, plaintiff Harold Miller, who resides at 4226 Dumaine Street, sent a written complaint to the City of New Orleans alleging that the defendant was in the process of converting the building into a five-family dwelling. A Field Inspection Report dated March 9, 1988, shows the building in question to be a legally non-conforming \\\"tri-plex\\\" but containing five units. A letter was sent by the City on March 10, 1988, demanding that Knorr either reconvert the building at 4220-22-24 Dumaine Street into a tri-plex or prove a legal non-conforming five-plex.\\nPlaintiff filed an action on July 25, 1988, requesting injunctive and declaratory relief. The City of New Orleans intervened on December 5, 1988. A hearing on a preliminary injunction was submitted on affidavits \\u00e1s per court order, and on January 9, 1989, a preliminary injunction was issued against defendant. No further action has been taken in the trial court. Defendant appeals that injunction.\\nDefendant makes the following contentions in this appeal: (1) the preliminary injunction should not have issued since the action has prescribed; (2) the preliminary injunction is invalid for failure to prove irreparable harm, failure to post a bond, and failure to describe in reasonable detail the act or acts to be enjoined; and (3) costs should not have been assessed against him.\\nDefendant first argues that this action has prescribed. He claims to have used his building at 4220-22-24 Dumaine Street as a five unit dwelling by open and apparent non-conforming usage since 1980. La. R.S. 9:5625 provides that an action for violation of use regulations must be brought within two years of the date the municipality \\\"first had been actually notified in writing of such violation\\\" (italics ours). In the instant case, the City was not actually notified in writing until plaintiffs complaint letter was received on August 14, 1987. This action was brought on July 25, 1988, well within the prescriptive period. See also City of New Orleans v. Elms, 498 So.2d 773 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986); Dudenheffer v. City of New Orleans, 482 So.2d 175 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986); and State v. Baudier, 334 So.2d 197 (La.1976).\\nDefendant next contends that the preliminary injunction was improper because plaintiff Miller failed to show irreparable injury. However, a showing of irreparable injury is a prerequisite to injunctive relief only where the actions to be enjoined are lawful. City of New Orleans v. National Polyfab Corp., 420 So.2d 727 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982); Bossier v. Lovell, 410 So.2d 821 (La.App. 3d Cir.1982). The violation of a zoning ordinance is unlawful. Thus, irreparable injury need not be proven.\\nDefendant also contends that the preliminary injunction is invalid because plaintiff Miller failed to post a bond. The City of New Orleans intervened in this case and La. R.S. 13:4581 provides that municipalities are exempt from bond requirements. Therefore, no bond must be filed in this proceeding. Dept. of Conservation v. Reardon, 8 So.2d 353 (La.1942).\\nDefendant additionally asserts that the preliminary injunction is void for lack of specificity. La. C.C.P. art. 3605 provides:\\n\\\"An order granting either a preliminary injunction or a final injunction or a temporary restraining order shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by mere reference to the petition or other documents, the act or acts sought to be restrained.\\\"\\nFollowing the preliminary injunction hearing, this judgment was rendered:\\n\\\"IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a preliminary injunction issue herein and accordingly let there be judgment herein in favor of Harold Miller and the City of New Orleans, and against John Knorr, Jr., declaring the premises situated at 4220-22-24 Du-maine Street to be in contravention of the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the City of New Orleans, in that the structure is currently being used as a 5-family dwelling when it possesses only a legally non-conforming 3-family dwelling status.\\\"\\nThis judgment lacks the detailed description of the act or acts sought to be restrained. Indeed there is no language in the judgment which purports to describe any act to be enjoined. Rather, the judgment merely \\\"declares\\\" the property to be in contravention of the zoning ordinance. Although declaratory relief was prayed for in the original petition, the hearing which gave rise to this order was only to \\\"show cause . why a preliminary injunction should not issue.\\\" See \\\"Order\\\" to set hearing issued by Judge Connolly. Thus, declaratory relief was not at issue in the hearing and could not be properly granted without stipulation by the parties to the contrary. The preliminary injunction is therefore invalid for lack of specificity.\\nHowever, we find that it is proper for a preliminary injunction to issue in this case. Consequently, we amend the judgment below to provide that the defendant, John Knorr, Jr., is enjoined from use of the premises as a five-family dwelling, a four-family dwelling, or any use other than a legally non-conforming three-family dwelling or as otherwise permitted in an RD-2 zone by the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the City of New Orleans.\\nFinally, defendant submits that it was improper for the trial court to assess costs against him. However, La. C.C.P. art. 1920 provides that the trial court may render judgment for costs against any party as it may consider equitable. The trial court was within its discretion to assess costs against defendant.\\nAccordingly, for the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is amended to provide that defendant, John Knorr, Jr., is enjoined from use of the premises located at 4220-22-24 Dumaine Street as a five-family dwelling, or a four-family dwelling, or any use other than a legally non-conforming three-family dwelling or as otherwise permitted in an RD-2 zone by the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the City of New Orleans and as amended is affirmed. Costs of this appeal to be borne by appellants.\\nAFFIRMED AND AMENDED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7545358.json b/la/7545358.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9d3c808394d2a4798c10830bdef30428bdacb604
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7545358.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7545358\", \"name\": \"Bessie BETHUNE v. DEPARTMENT OF WELFARE\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bethune v. Department of Welfare\", \"decision_date\": \"1989-03-14\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 88 CA 1760\", \"first_page\": \"215\", \"last_page\": \"217\", \"citations\": \"541 So. 2d 215\", \"volume\": \"541\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:50:39.610412+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SCHOTT, C.J., and KLEES and WILLIAMS, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Bessie BETHUNE v. DEPARTMENT OF WELFARE.\", \"head_matter\": \"Bessie BETHUNE v. DEPARTMENT OF WELFARE.\\nNo. 88 CA 1760.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.\\nMarch 14, 1989.\\nJuan A. Velasco, New Orleans, for plaintiff/appellant.\\nMichael A. Starks, Asst. City Atty., Val K. Scheurich, III, Deputy City Atty., Don J. Hernandez, Chief Deputy City Atty., Okla Jones, II, City Atty., New Orleans, for defendant-appellee.\\nBefore SCHOTT, C.J., and KLEES and WILLIAMS, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"747\", \"char_count\": \"4647\", \"text\": \"SCHOTT, Chief Judge.\\nAppellant was suspended five days and fined five days pay for dereliction of duty as a civil servant. The Civil Service Commission dismissed her appeal as untimely. She has appealed the dismissal to this court.\\nAppellant was employed by the City of New Orleans to supervise children residing at Milne Boys Home. On July 11, 1987, during appellant's shift, four of the residents absented themselves from the institution for two hours. Nonetheless, appellant reported them as present. Following an investigation, appellant's immediate supervisor recommended the five day suspension and fine. On July 22, 1987 appellant's appointing authority notified her that he was imposing the five day suspension and fine. On July 23, 1987 appellant's assistant superintendent, Muburak Kareem, notified her of the suspension and fine.\\nOn July 28, 1987 appellant filed an employee grievance form with Kareem asking for a reversal of the disciplinary action. On September 16 appellant's appointing authority notified her that \\\"the committee has decided to substantiate\\\" the suspension and fine. On October 15 appellant took her appeal to the Civil Service Commission.\\nThe Civil Service Commission; has exclusive power to hear and decide disciplinary cases for civil servants. Const. Art. 10 \\u00a7 12. Rules adopted by the commission have the effect of law. Const. Art. 10 \\u00a7 10(4). Commission rules in effect at the time of appellant's suspension provided the right to a regular employee in the classified service to appeal to the Commission from a suspension and fine. Rule II Section 4.1. Such an appeal had to be received by the Department of Civil Service no later than the thirtieth calendar day after the action taken by the appointing authority. Section 4.3.\\nWhen appellant's case came before the commission it was dismissed as prescribed. The commission held that the July 22 notice by the appointing authority triggered the delay for the appeal to the commission. In this court appellant contends that the second notice she received in September triggered the appeal delay time. According to appellant she filed her grievance on a form supplied by the City of New Orleans. On the form she asked for a rescission of the suspension and fine. She was afforded a hearing before several supervisory personnel at which she presented her version of the facts and was told that the matter was being considered and that she would hear from the City in due course. Because of this advice and since the hearing took place after the July 22 letter she felt no need to appeal, but she did take a timely appeal after receiving the second letter from her appointing authority in September. From these facts appellant argues that the City was estopped from pleading prescription.\\nThe city contends that the constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases to the commission and the commission's rule providing appellant with a thirty day period in which to appeal required her to turn to the commission for relief after she received the July 22 letter; that her notice of grievance was tantamount to an appeal but was directed to the wrong entity, one which was without jurisdiction over the matter; and that this notice, the subsequent hearing, and the second notice had no meaning or effect on her appellate rights.\\nWhile we consider the commission's position and the city's argument to have great merit we have concluded that the peculiar facts of this case do not support the conclusion reached by the commission. Although the appointing authority notified appellant that disciplinary action was being taken, his subsequent actions toward appellant clearly indicated that his action was not final and was subject to reversal. By receiving and entertaining appellant's grievance notice of July 28 he rescinded his own disciplinary notice issued six days previously. Not until September did he issue an effective disciplinary notice from which appellant's only remedy was an appeal to the commission.\\nAccordingly, the order of the Civil Service Commission dismissing appellant's appeal is reversed and the case is remanded to the Civil Service Commission for a hearing on the merits of the appeal.\\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7559775.json b/la/7559775.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ff66b639f73dca479cfbd16d1a47009ff2e5656c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7559775.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7559775\", \"name\": \"HASPEL & DAVIS MILLING & PLANTING CO. LTD., et al. v. BOARD OF LEVEE COMMISSIONERS OF the ORLEANS LEVEE DISTRICT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Haspel & Davis Milling & Planting Co. v. Board of Levee Commissioners\", \"decision_date\": \"1993-11-19\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 93-CC-2207\", \"first_page\": \"391\", \"last_page\": \"391\", \"citations\": \"629 So. 2d 391\", \"volume\": \"629\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:36:24.262082+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.\", \"parties\": \"HASPEL & DAVIS MILLING & PLANTING CO. LTD., et al. v. BOARD OF LEVEE COMMISSIONERS OF the ORLEANS LEVEE DISTRICT.\", \"head_matter\": \"HASPEL & DAVIS MILLING & PLANTING CO. LTD., et al. v. BOARD OF LEVEE COMMISSIONERS OF the ORLEANS LEVEE DISTRICT.\\nNo. 93-CC-2207.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nNov. 19, 1993.\", \"word_count\": \"78\", \"char_count\": \"514\", \"text\": \"In re Orleans Levee, Bd./Comm.; \\u2014 Defendants); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court, Div. \\\"A\\\", No. 31-357; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 93CW-2026.\\nDenied.\\nCALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.\\nLEMMON, J., not on panel.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7566224.json b/la/7566224.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e24bae910af1700e818e4dea995f45aa0a87fd88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7566224.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7566224\", \"name\": \"STATE ex rel. Clauzel B. CHENIER v. STATE of Louisiana\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Chenier v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1989-06-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 89-KH-0048\", \"first_page\": \"1208\", \"last_page\": \"1209\", \"citations\": \"546 So. 2d 1208\", \"volume\": \"546\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:23:10.746756+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE ex rel. Clauzel B. CHENIER v. STATE of Louisiana.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE ex rel. Clauzel B. CHENIER v. STATE of Louisiana.\\nNo. 89-KH-0048.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nJune 30, 1989.\", \"word_count\": \"55\", \"char_count\": \"344\", \"text\": \"In re Chenier, Clauzel B.; \\u2014 Plaintiff(s); applying for supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court, Div. \\\"F\\\", No. 16164084; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW88-1176.\\nj)enje(j\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7579566.json b/la/7579566.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..08d8c94519f9818c248cff4bfcbfcf646577e2b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7579566.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7579566\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Roy CHAMBERS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Chambers\", \"decision_date\": \"1987-11-17\", \"docket_number\": \"No. KA-6909\", \"first_page\": \"1089\", \"last_page\": \"1091\", \"citations\": \"518 So. 2d 1089\", \"volume\": \"518\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:54:28.003482+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before KLEES, CIACCIO and WILLIAMS, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Roy CHAMBERS.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Roy CHAMBERS.\\nNo. KA-6909.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, . Fourth Circuit.\\nNov. 17, 1987.\\nRehearing Denied Feb. 11, 1988.\\nHarry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Richard Olsen, Jacob Frenkel, Asst. Dist. Attys., Kathyra Wallace, Law Clerk, for plaintiff-appellant State of La.\\nJames C. Lawrence, Lawrence & Lawrence, New Orleans, for defendant-appellee Roy Chambers.\\nBefore KLEES, CIACCIO and WILLIAMS, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1094\", \"char_count\": \"6635\", \"text\": \"KLEES, Judge.\\nThe defendant was charged with the violation of R.S. 14:95.1, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and pled not guilty. He then filed a motion to quash, arguing that this prosecution was barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because of his earlier acquittal on a narcotics charge arising out of the same facts. The trial court granted the motion to quash, and the State appeals. We affirm.\\nThe facts are as follows. Police Officers Wethern, McNeil, and Farve were conducting a long term investigation into heroin distribution from a residence in the 2900 block of Bruxelles Street. By July 5, 1985, one person, Paul Peddington, had already been convicted, and the officers began focusing on Tommy Battenburg, whom they believed to have taken over Peddington's position as retail seller. They also were watching Roy Chambers, whom they believed was supplying Battenburg. On July 5, they followed Battenburg from his residence to Bud's Broiler on Banks Street. In the parking lot, they observed Battenburg and the defendant, Roy Chambers, standing next to a silver Chrysler which the officers knew belonged to Peddington. They noticed Battenburg walking away from Chambers and placing something in his pocket. The officers then followed Bat-tenburg back to Bruxelles Street, where they arrested him and confiscated heroin found on his person. Battenburg told them that Chambers had sold him the heroin at Bud's Broiler, that Chambers was driving Peddington's car, and that Chambers had quantities of heroin and two firearms in the car. The officers returned to Bud's Broiler and saw the defendant walking out of Bud's with keys in his hand. They arrested the defendant, took the keys, and determined that the keys fit the silver Chrysler. The defendant then began protesting that the car did not belong to him, but to Ped-dington.\\nThe officers proceeded to search the car, where they discovered a .38 caliber revolver on the floor, a cigarette pack containing 168 doses of heroin underneath the dashboard near the steering column, and a shotgun in the trunk. No drugs were found on the defendant's person, but approximately one thousand dollars was found in a purse he was carrying. The officers later searched defendant's apartment, but discovered nothing.\\nThe record reveals no errors patent.\\nThe defendant was charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute and with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The charges were severed, and the defendant was first tried on the narcotics charge and acquitted. The defense then filed a motion to quash the prosecution on the firearms charge, arguing that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, this prosecution could not continue because a jury had already determined in the first trial that the defendant did not have possession or control of the car where both the heroin and the revolver had been found. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that \\\"this issue has been tried on similar facts.\\\" The State has appealed, contending that collateral estoppel does not apply in this case.\\nIn State v. Blache, 480 So.2d 804 (La. 1985), the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that the principle of collateral estop-pel, which is anchored in the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, may bar a prosecution in which an issue of ultimate fact has already been determined by a valid and final judgment. The Court adopted the definition of collateral estoppel set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), to wit:\\n\\\"Collateral estoppel\\\" is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principal in our adversary system of justice. It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.\\nState v. Blache, 480 So.2d at 306, quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 443, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. The Court in Blache went on to state that in Louisiana, \\\"the application of the doctrine has been limited 'to those cases where it is required by Ashe v. Swenson....'\\\" Id. Therefore, we must apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel according to the following guidelines, set out by the Court in Ashe:\\nWhere a previous judgment of acquittal was based on a general verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires the court to \\\"examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.\\\"\\nId. 480 So.2d at 306, quoting Ashe v. Swen-son, 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194.\\nIn the instant case, both the heroin and the gun were found in the silver Chrysler, the gun on the floor and the drugs under the dashboard. The defendant was never seen in actual possession of either the drugs or the gun, nor was he seen driving the car, although he had keys to it. The defense in the narcotics trial presented strong evidence tending to establish that the car belonged to someone other than the defendant and that other people drove it. The prosecution presented no additional evidence linking the defendant to either the car or the heroin. Under the circumstances, we find that the trial court was correct in concluding that the jury's verdict of \\\"not guilty\\\" of possession with intent to distribute (which necessarily incorporated a finding of not guilty on the lesser included offense of possession) could not rationally have been based on any issue other than non-possession of the car and thus of the drugs as well. Since a jury has determined that the defendant did not have possession or control of the heroin found in the car, he cannot legally be held to have had possession or control of the revolver found in the same car at the same time. Therefore, defendant's prior acquittal on the narcotics charge bars this prosecution under the doctrine collateral estoppel.\\nAccordingly, for the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's granting of the motion to quash.\\nAFFIRMED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7603581.json b/la/7603581.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eea3e8f1501f3aa88e45bbcb94852b55b787448b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7603581.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7603581\", \"name\": \"Betty Vidrine VITA, born Mathieu v. UNITED GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Vita v. United General Insurance Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1985-11-22\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 85-C-1203\", \"first_page\": \"900\", \"last_page\": \"900\", \"citations\": \"478 So. 2d 900\", \"volume\": \"478\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:21:29.411031+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"CALOGERO and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.\", \"parties\": \"Betty Vidrine VITA, born Mathieu v. UNITED GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY.\", \"head_matter\": \"Betty Vidrine VITA, born Mathieu v. UNITED GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY.\\nNo. 85-C-1203.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nNov. 22, 1985.\", \"word_count\": \"67\", \"char_count\": \"429\", \"text\": \"In re Vita, Betty Mathieu Vidrine; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 84-393; Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court, Div. \\\"A\\\", No. 81-6894.\\nPrior report: La.App., 469 So.2d 433.\\nDenied.\\nCALOGERO and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7624947.json b/la/7624947.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5c8bee6fd39d78b302a59dc57445288d7096f350
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7624947.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7624947\", \"name\": \"Lynn Richard BRAY, et al., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. T.H. ISBELL, et al., Defendant-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bray v. Isbell\", \"decision_date\": \"1984-10-10\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 83-943\", \"first_page\": \"594\", \"last_page\": \"597\", \"citations\": \"458 So. 2d 594\", \"volume\": \"458\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:43:52.232955+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before FORET, STOKER and KNOLL, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Lynn Richard BRAY, et al., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. T.H. ISBELL, et al., Defendant-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Lynn Richard BRAY, et al., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. T.H. ISBELL, et al., Defendant-Appellee.\\nNo. 83-943.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.\\nOct. 10, 1984.\\nRehearing Denied Nov. 26, 1984.\\nWrit Denied Jan. 7,1985.\\nSandoz, Sandoz & Schiff, Lawrence B. Sandoz, III, Opelousas, for plaintiff-appellant.\\nWilliam Tracy Barstow, Opelousas, for defendant-appellee.\\nBefore FORET, STOKER and KNOLL, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"971\", \"char_count\": \"5872\", \"text\": \"KNOLL, Judge.\\nPlaintiffs, Lynn Richard Bray, his mother, Nina Sue Landry, and his stepfather, Robert R. Landry, appeal from a judgment dismissing their claim for damages against T.H. Isbell, owner of the Sunset Motor Inn, and John Dan Wells, the inn's general maintenance man. Plaintiffs seek damages for injuries Bray suffered when Wells shot him after Bray broke into a vending machine on the premises of the Sunset Inn. The trial court concluded that Bray was 100% at fault and his injuries were dam-num absque injuria.\\nOn appeal Bray urges two errors. Since we are affirming, and find that the record supports that Wells used reasonable force under the circumstances, we will address only that assignment of error.\\nOn March 25, 1981, Bray and two companions, Roland Morvant and Terry Fonte-not, drove to the Sunset Inn at approximately 11:30 p.m. They parked their car on the service road in front of the inn and, while Fontenot slept in the car, Bray walked to the vending machines at the inn as Morvant waited nearby. Bray broke into a vending machine and stole the coin box. Mrs. Gastineau, the inn's manager, saw Bray and immediately alerted her son, Wells, who was asleep on the couch in her apartment. Wells went to the back door of the apartment and saw Bray breaking into the machine with a tire tool which prompted Wells to obtain his mother's .22 pistol. When he shouted at the intruders, Bray and Morvant ran toward their parked car carrying the money box, a tire tool, and a lug wrench. As Bray and Morvant reached the car, Wells, who was about 20 feet away, asked them to drop their weapons, put their hands up, and go inside the inn so he could call the police. Instead, Bray and Morvant ran past their car, away from Wells. When they were approximately 70-75 yards away, Wells fired three warning shots, one of which struck Bray in the lower back and exited through his stomach. Bray has undergone four surgeries.\\nPlaintiffs contend that Wells's use of force against Bray was unreasonable under the circumstances. The law is well settled that a plaintiff cannot recover damages for a battery if he is at fault in provoking the difficulty in which he is injured. Neville v. Johnson, 398 So.2d 111 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1981); Levesque v. Saba, 402 So.2d 266 (La.App. 4th Cir.1981); Tripoli v. Gurry, 253 La. 473, 218 So.2d 563 (1969). However even where a person is the aggressor, the person retaliating may use only so much force as is reasonably necessary to repel the attack, and if he goes beyond this, he is liable for damages. Neville, supra. Where a person reasonably believes he is threatened with bodily harm, he may use whatever force appears reasonably necessary to protect against the threatened injury. Byrd v. Isgitt, 338 So.2d 374 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1976); Hesse v. Busby, 379 So.2d 25 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1979), writ denied, 381 So.2d 1234 (1980). Each case is dependent on its own facts. Roberts v. American Employers Ins. Co., Boston, Mass., 221 So.2d 550 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1969).\\nResort to dangerous weapons to repel an attack may be justifiable in cases when the fear of personal danger is genuine and'founded on facts likely to produce similar emotions in reasonable men. Ne-ville, supra; Levesque, supra; McCullough v. McAnelly, 248 So.2d 7 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1971). It is only necessary that a person have grounds which lead a reasonable man to believe force is necessary, and that he actually so believes. Although all facts and circumstances must be taken into account to determine the reasonableness of his belief, detached reflection or a pause for consideration cannot be demanded under circumstances which require split second decisions. Levesque, supra.\\nA reviewing court must give substantial weight to the trier of fact's conclusions, and is obliged to accept reasonable evaluations of credibility and inferences of fact, even if other evaluations and inferences are also reasonable. Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978); Canter v. Koehring Company, 283 So.2d 716 (La. 1973).\\nIn its reasons for judgment, the trial court stated in part:\\n\\\"... this Court believes the use offorce in this matter was reasonable. If the Defendant shot to run these people off so they wouldn't come back, and steal, and/or harm him or his mother; or, if he shot, as the Court believes he did, thinking he was threatened (see evidence about the lugwrench [sic] one was still carrying) by the object in the perpetrator's hand, the Defendant used what the Court believes was reasonable force. This Court still believes and finds that taking all the facts and circumstances together, as they exist in this case, the 'reasonable' man would have done what Defendant did in the situation. It is difficult [not] to believe that in hot pursuit of a criminal in near proximity to the crime scene; with a parked car; with one armed with an object in his hand which could be a weapon; and with a pause for consultation, as the perpetrators acted; . this Defendant was justified in . shooting.\\\"\\nWe find that the record supports the trial judge's determination that Wells used reasonable force under the circumstances. Bond v. Toriello, 260 So.2d 727 (La.App. 4th Cir.1972), writ denied, 262 So.2d 788; Edwards v. Great American Insurance Company, 146 So.2d 260 (La. App. 2nd Cir.1962).\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiffs-appellants.\\nAFFIRMED.\\nSTOKER, J., dissents.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7642299.json b/la/7642299.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b4062542b75a28a1b9c9383d183a623ece72e034
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7642299.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7642299\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Jesse PENDERGIST, III\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Pendergist\", \"decision_date\": \"1984-03-23\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 84-K-0349\", \"first_page\": \"1068\", \"last_page\": \"1068\", \"citations\": \"447 So. 2d 1068\", \"volume\": \"447\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:07:12.853656+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"CALOGERO and MARCUS, JJ., would grant the writ.\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Jesse PENDERGIST, III.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Jesse PENDERGIST, III.\\nNo. 84-K-0349.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nMarch 23, 1984.\", \"word_count\": \"66\", \"char_count\": \"400\", \"text\": \"In re Jesse Pendergist, III., applying for writ of certiorari, to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83 KA 0712, Parish of East Baton Rouge, to the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, No. 181169, Section \\\"I\\\".\\nCase below: 444 So.2d 306.\\nDenied.\\nCALOGERO and MARCUS, JJ., would grant the writ.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/7645154.json b/la/7645154.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b38a239fad9bb21369d0112f6f92e8a84d063ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/7645154.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7645154\", \"name\": \"Joseph SCIORTINO, Jr. v. Thomas L. ALFANO, Jr., Individually and as Deputy Sheriff of the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana, et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sciortino v. Alfano\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-09-16\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 83-C-1299\", \"first_page\": \"1149\", \"last_page\": \"1149\", \"citations\": \"437 So. 2d 1149\", \"volume\": \"437\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:25:11.282204+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.\", \"parties\": \"Joseph SCIORTINO, Jr. v. Thomas L. ALFANO, Jr., Individually and as Deputy Sheriff of the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana, et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Joseph SCIORTINO, Jr. v. Thomas L. ALFANO, Jr., Individually and as Deputy Sheriff of the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana, et al.\\nNo. 83-C-1299.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nSept. 16, 1983.\", \"word_count\": \"84\", \"char_count\": \"548\", \"text\": \"In re Alwynn J. Cronvich, Sheriff of the Parish of Jefferson, North River Insurance Company, and International Surplus Lines Insurance Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson. No. 216-937. 435 So.2d 1010.\\nDenied.\\nLEMMON, J., would grant the writ.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/8200371.json b/la/8200371.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f70ae6091bacc256d4731b14cd6ce9b725143cda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/8200371.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8200371\", \"name\": \"STATE ex rel. Edwin CODRINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Codrington v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2008-10-10\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2008-KH-1849\", \"first_page\": \"43\", \"last_page\": \"43\", \"citations\": \"994 So. 2d 43\", \"volume\": \"994\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:12:17.580803+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE ex rel. Edwin CODRINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE ex rel. Edwin CODRINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.\\nNo. 2008-KH-1849.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nOct. 10, 2008.\", \"word_count\": \"108\", \"char_count\": \"700\", \"text\": \"In re Codrington, Edwin; \\u2014 Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 95-6759; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KH-1326.\\nThis application is transferred to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal for consideration pursuant to the procedures outlined in that court's en banc resolution of September 9, 2008. See State v. Cordero, 08-1717 (La.10-03-08), 993 So.2d 203.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/8314127.json b/la/8314127.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8d92e32d82eb983d8a8701a1cc0f27eb78f797a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/8314127.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8314127\", \"name\": \"D. Brennan HOLLOWAY v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Madison Parish Police Jury, State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation and Development; David Holloway and Susan Holloway v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company, Madison Parish Police Jury, State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation and Development and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Holloway v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"2007-05-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2007-CC-0568\", \"first_page\": \"618\", \"last_page\": \"618\", \"citations\": \"956 So. 2d 618\", \"volume\": \"956\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:59:58.685075+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"D. Brennan HOLLOWAY v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Madison Parish Police Jury, State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation and Development David Holloway and Susan Holloway v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company, Madison Parish Police Jury, State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation and Development and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"D. Brennan HOLLOWAY v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Madison Parish Police Jury, State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation and Development David Holloway and Susan Holloway v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company, Madison Parish Police Jury, State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation and Development and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.\\nNo. 2007-CC-0568.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nMay 4, 2007.\", \"word_count\": \"104\", \"char_count\": \"720\", \"text\": \"In re Kansas City Southern Railway Company et al.; \\u2014 Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 03-114, 03-116; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 42229-CW, 42228-CW.\\nDenied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/8329543.json b/la/8329543.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..11cd27fa2925636938fb2009713f0f280fde1c0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/8329543.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8329543\", \"name\": \"STATE ex rel. Robert NORWOOD v. STATE of Louisiana\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Norwood v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2007-03-23\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2005-KH-0582\", \"first_page\": \"1101\", \"last_page\": \"1101\", \"citations\": \"951 So. 2d 1101\", \"volume\": \"951\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:19:35.929838+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE ex rel. Robert NORWOOD v. STATE of Louisiana.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE ex rel. Robert NORWOOD v. STATE of Louisiana.\\nNo. 2005-KH-0582.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nMarch 23, 2007.\", \"word_count\": \"53\", \"char_count\": \"332\", \"text\": \"In re Norwood, Robert; \\u2014 Plaintiff; Applying for Motion to Enforce this Court's action dated June 17, 2005, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 279 \\u2014 452.\\nDenied. Moot. The district court has acted.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/8393576.json b/la/8393576.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd3b1ffae4955f961538997b4fb68986826367d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/8393576.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8393576\", \"name\": \"John R. SISK v. Heather Grable SISK\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sisk v. Sisk\", \"decision_date\": \"2008-03-07\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2008-C-0073\", \"first_page\": \"914\", \"last_page\": \"914\", \"citations\": \"977 So. 2d 914\", \"volume\": \"977\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:04:17.591575+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"John R. SISK v. Heather Grable SISK.\", \"head_matter\": \"John R. SISK v. Heather Grable SISK.\\nNo. 2008-C-0073.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nMarch 7, 2008.\", \"word_count\": \"54\", \"char_count\": \"335\", \"text\": \"In re Sisk, John R.; \\u2014 Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 034117; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,619-CA.\\nNot considered. Not timely filed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/8425367.json b/la/8425367.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..47e5b5f1bc6ccddba0909f5bc2f83b73140cdfc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/8425367.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8425367\", \"name\": \"Eugene RALPH, Gregory Pembo, Helen E. Robinson, Phyllis Everage, Lionel Brackitt and Elle Bennett v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS and the New Orleans City Council\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Ralph v. City of New Orleans\", \"decision_date\": \"2006-05-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2006-C-0153\", \"first_page\": \"537\", \"last_page\": \"539\", \"citations\": \"928 So. 2d 537\", \"volume\": \"928\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:34:14.985817+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Eugene RALPH, Gregory Pembo, Helen E. Robinson, Phyllis Everage, Lionel Brackitt and Elle Bennett v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS and the New Orleans City Council.\", \"head_matter\": \"Eugene RALPH, Gregory Pembo, Helen E. Robinson, Phyllis Everage, Lionel Brackitt and Elle Bennett v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS and the New Orleans City Council.\\nNo. 2006-C-0153.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nMay 5, 2006.\", \"word_count\": \"1007\", \"char_count\": \"6319\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM.\\nh Finding that the court of appeal erred in affirming the trial court's judgment granting the defendants' peremptory exception of no right of action, we grant this writ and reverse that portion of the court of appeal's decree.\\nThe City of New Orleans (\\\"City\\\") enacted local ordinances that acknowledge domestic partnerships and establish a Domestic Partnership Registry. Under the City's health care program, the City implemented a new policy to provide domestic partner coverage to same-gender partners of City employees who were registered with the Domestic Partnership Registry. The City's health care program provides benefits funded by both City and individual employee contributions. The City's contribution is generated from the General Fund Operating Budget, which includes non-dedicated taxes (including, inter alia, sales, use and property taxes), fees, fines and service charges. Plaintiffs filed a petition seeking a declaratory judgment that the City Council acted ultra vires and without statutory authority in enacting the Domestic Partnership Registry and related ordinances, and the City acted ultra vires in extending health care insurance and/or other benefits to registered domestic partners of city employees. Plaintiffs also filed a petition for injunction against the City to enjoin the enforcement of Domestic Partnership policy and its related ordinances. | ^Defendants filed Peremptory Exceptions of No Cause of Action, No Right of Action and No Interest in Plaintiffs to Institute this Suit. The trial court granted all Peremptory Exceptions.\\nOn appeal, the court found the trial court erred in granting the exception of no cause of action. We agree with that portion of the court of appeal's opinion. In a split decision, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court's granting defendants' exception of no right of action. The majority found that, absent a showing by plaintiffs that they possess a real and actual interest vested in their assertions that the public fisc is affected by the actions of the City and the Council, the plaintiffs did not establish the minimal requisite interest sufficient to afford them a right of action. Ralph v. City of New Orleans, 04-1270, p. 17 (La. Ct.App. 4 Cir. 12/14/05), 921 So.2d 988.\\nIn Alliance for Affordable Energy v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 96-0700 (La.7/2/96), 677 So.2d 424, we explained what constitutes \\\"standing\\\" in an action brought by a taxpayer seeking to challenge a-local ordinance:\\nLouisiana jurisprudence recognizes the right of a taxpayer to enjoin unlawful action by a public body. Id. [citing Louisiana Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Calcasieu Parish School Bd., 586 So.2d 1354, 1357 (La.1991).] Under our law, a taxpayer may resort to judicial authority to restrain public servants from' transcending their lawful powers or violating their legal duties in any unauthorized mode which would increase the burden of taxation or otherwise unjustly affect the taxpayer or his property. Stewart v. Stanley, 199 La. 146, 5 So.2d 531 (1941). \\\"The fact that the taxpayer's interest may be small and insusceptible of accurate determination is not sufficient to deprive him of the right.\\\" Id.\\nThis Court in League of Women Voters of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 381 So.2d 441 (La.1980), further refined this standard and held that \\\"a taxpayer will not be allowed to compel the performance of a public duty by mandamus absent a showing of some special interest which is separate and distinct from the interest of the public at large.\\\" Id. at 447. |aOn the other hand, a citizen seeking to restrain unlawful action by a public entity, Stewart, 5 So.2d at 531, is not required to demonstrate a special or particular interest distinct from the public at large. Id. Consequently, taxpayer plaintiffs seeking to restrain action by a public body are afforded a right of action upon a mere showing of an interest, however small and indeterminable. See Woodard v. Reily, 244 La. 337, 152 So.2d 41 (1963); Stewart, 5 So.2d at 531.\\nAlliance, 96-0700 at p. 6, 677 So.2d at 428.\\nIn the case sub judice, the plaintiffs have alleged the City is spending tax money to pay for health insurance and other benefits for at least one person who has qualified as a \\\"domestic partner\\\" under the ordinance. The spending of tax money, no matter how minuscule the effect on the City budget, clearly affects the public fisc. When a plaintiff is attempting to restrain action by a public body that affects the public fisc, the plaintiff has an interest, however small and indeterminable, which is sufficient to afford him a right of action. McCall v. McCall, 96-0394, p. 4 (La. Ct.App. 4 Cir. 1/29/97), 688 So.2d 193, 196, writ denied, 97-0534, 693 So.2d 745, 97-0539 (La.5/1/97), 693 So.2d 745, (citing Davis v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., 412 So.2d 1131, 1133 (La.App. 2 Cir.1982), writ denied, 415 So.2d 942 (La.1982)). The taxpayers/plaintiffs in this matter have demonstrated an interest, no matter how small and indeterminable. The plaintiffs have standing to challenge the City's act of extending benefits.\\nThe plaintiffs also have standing to challenge the ordinance instituting the Domestic Partner Registry. The City's policy of extending benefits to domestic partners of its employees is premised upon those employees registering with the Domestic Partner Registry. Thus, the ordinance is intertwined with the policy of extending benefits, which has an affect on the public fisc.\\nAccordingly, the court of appeal decision sustaining defendants' exceptions of |4no cause of action and interest of plaintiffs to institute the suit is reversed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.\\n. Fundamentally there is no distinction between the exception of no right of action and that of no interest in plaintiff to institute the suit. Wischerv. Madison Realty Co., Inc., 231 La. 704, 709, 92 So.2d 589 (1956). We will treat these as a single exception.\\n. The City admits that approximately ten employees are currently receiving health insurance benefits for registered domestic partners.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/8508493.json b/la/8508493.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bdc12002fb33bb0b2ff24f1cae29fb16207b8b68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/8508493.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8508493\", \"name\": \"New Orleans National Bank vs. John S. Wells et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"New Orleans National Bank v. Wells\", \"decision_date\": \"1876-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 4898\", \"first_page\": \"736\", \"last_page\": \"738\", \"citations\": \"28 La. Ann. 736\", \"volume\": \"28\", \"reporter\": \"Louisiana Annual Reports\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:13:49.330558+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"New Orleans National Bank vs. John S. Wells et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. 4898.\\nNew Orleans National Bank vs. John S. Wells et al.\\nThe position ol the defendants is that the bond which they signed ns principal and sureties was not given to the bank, because by its terms it is in favor of the president and directors to protect them, and not the bank, against the misconduct and unfaithfulness of the paying-teller. This is erroneous.\\nThe language of the bond makes it very clear that the paying teller was employed for and in behalf of the corporation, and not of the president and directors as individuals distinct from the corporation, and the bond was taken as a guarantee of his fidelity to the institution. These officers, in taking the bond, were acting for the hank and as the bank, and were exercising the poivers conferred by the act of Congress.\\nThe expressions therefore in the bond, \\u201c shall savo the said president and directors of the New Orleans National Bank harmless from or oii account of any negligence or misconduct of him, the said John S. wells,\\u201d could apply only to their official capacity, acting for and representing the bank, and wore necessarily intended to be and was in law a bond or obligation in favor of the bank. To have taken it in favor of themselves individually would have been bad faith and without legal effect under the circumstances.\\nAPPEAL from the Fourth District Court, parish of Orleans. Lynch, J.\\nMerrick, Race & Foster, for plaintiff and appellant.\\nBreaux, Fenner & Hall and Cotton & Levy, for defendants and appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"1157\", \"char_count\": \"6702\", \"text\": \"Howell, J.\\nThe New Orleans National Bank,- organized under the laws of the United States, and acting, as alleged, through its president and directors, sues the defendants, in solido, as principal and sureties, for twenty thousand dollars, and the principal for $6007 70 additional, as the .defalcation of said principal on the following bond:\\n\\\" Know all men by these presents that we, John S. Wells, Thomas Henderson, and James H. Mehaffey, all residing in New Orleans, in this State of Louisiana, are jointly and severally bound to the president and directors of the New Orleans National Bank in the sum of twenty thousand dollars, to be paid to the said president and directors, for which payment well and truly to be made we and each of us. hereby bind ourselves, our executors, and administrators firmly by these presents; dated in New Orleans on the twentieth day of February, in the year 1871. Whereas the above-bounden John S. Wells has been appointed paying teller, to continue in office during the will of the present or any future board of directors of said bank, now the condition of the above obligation is such that if the said JohnS. Wells shall well, truly, and faithfully do and perform all and singular the duties of said office of paying teller, and shall well and truly perform any and all other duties which may bo assigned him as one of the clerks of said bank, and shall render a faithful account of the moneys and effects committed to his charge or under his control, and generally shall save the said president and directors of the New Orleans National Bank harmless from or on account of any negligence or misconduct of him, the said John S. Wells, then this obligation to be void, or else to remain in full force and virtue.\\n\\\"(Signed) JOHN S. WELLS,\\nTHOMAS HENDERSON,\\nJ. H. MEHAFFEY,\\\"\\n\\\"Witness \\u2014 (Signed)\\n\\\"A. Wheles,\\n\\\"We L.' Bbowx, Jr.\\\"\\nTo this action the defendants filed the following exception:\\n\\\" Now into court come the defendants, and for peremptory exception founded in law, plead that the petition discloses no cause of action against the exceptors; that the bond sued on is not given in favor of the party plaintiff in this cause, and therefore she can not stand in judgment, as will be more fully shown by authority on the trial of this exception. Wherefore your exceptors pray this their exception in law be sustained and the suit be dismissed with costs, and for general relief, etc.\\\"\\nThe exception was maintained and plaintiff appealed.\\nAs wo understand the position of the defendants, they insist that the bond was not given to the bank, because by its terms it is in favor of-the president and' directors, to protect' tl\\u00ed\\u00e9m, and not'the'bank, against the misconduct and unfaithfulness of the paying teller. This we think erroneous. The language of the bond makes it very clear to us that the paying teller was employed for and in behalf of the corporation, and not the president and directors as individuals distinct from the corporation, and the bond was taken as a guarantee of his fidelity to the institution. He was to have charge of and account for the money and effects of the bank, as paying teller, and perform such other duties as might be assigned to him as one of the clerks of the bank, not the money and effects of the then or any future president and directors, or discharge duties personal to them. These officers in taking the bond were acting for the bank and as the bank, and were exercising the powers conferred by the act of Congress.\\n\\\" From the circumstance that a corporation is an intellectual being it follows that they can not personally transact all they have a right legally to do, as has been above observed ; wherefore it becomes necessary for every corporation to appoint some of their members to whom they may intrust the direction and care of their affairs, under the name of mayors, presidents, syndics, directors, or others, according to the statutes and qualities of such corporation.\\\" R. C. C., art. 438.\\n\\\" These attorneys or officers, by contracting, bind the corporations to-which they belong in such things as do not exceed the limits of the administration which is intrusted to them; their act is supposed to be the act of the corporation.\\\" Art. 439, second clause. \\u2022\\nThe expression, therefore, in the' bond, \\\" shall save the said president and directors of the New Orleans National Bank harmless from or on account of any negligence or misconduct of him the said John S. Wells,\\\" could apply only to their official capacity, acting for and representing the bank,.and was necessarily intended to be and was in law a bond or obligation in favor of the bank. To have taken it in favor of themselves individually would have been bad faith and without legal effect under the circumstances. The matter is so plain to us that we can not see how it can be considered that the contracting parties intended to make an obligation in favor of any other than the bank, a corporation acting through, its proper officers, and for its interest.\\nIt is therefore ordered that the judgment appealed from bo reversed, the exceptions overruled, and the cause remanded to be proceeded in according to law. Costs of appeal to be paid by appellees.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/8964497.json b/la/8964497.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..542c4b47cd64c8de6e51721aea1cec6ba1834bcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/8964497.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8964497\", \"name\": \"George HALLARON v. JACOB'S ENGINEERING GROUP, INC.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hallaron v. Jacob's Engineering Group, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-05-13\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2005-C-0858\", \"first_page\": \"1002\", \"last_page\": \"1002\", \"citations\": \"902 So. 2d 1002\", \"volume\": \"902\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:04:55.013644+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"George HALLARON v. JACOB\\u2019S ENGINEERING GROUP, INC.\", \"head_matter\": \"George HALLARON v. JACOB\\u2019S ENGINEERING GROUP, INC.\\nNo. 2005-C-0858.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nMay 13, 2005.\", \"word_count\": \"53\", \"char_count\": \"356\", \"text\": \"In re Jacob's Engineering Group Inc.;\\u2014 Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review Office of Workers' Compensation Dist. #7, No. 01-03985; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 04-CA-876.\\nWrit not considered; not timely filed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9093741.json b/la/9093741.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..76ddb1220d81ae5e4865c3b15683ba48477703cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9093741.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9093741\", \"name\": \"STATE ex rel. Lloyd J. WESTON v. STATE of Louisiana\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Weston v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-10-17\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2002-KH-3014\", \"first_page\": \"753\", \"last_page\": \"754\", \"citations\": \"855 So. 2d 753\", \"volume\": \"855\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:57:22.527090+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE ex rel. Lloyd J. WESTON v. STATE of Louisiana.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE ex rel. Lloyd J. WESTON v. STATE of Louisiana.\\nNo. 2002-KH-3014.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nOct. 17, 2003.\", \"word_count\": \"53\", \"char_count\": \"330\", \"text\": \"In re Weston, Lloyd J.; \\u2014 Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-638; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-755.\\nDenied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9142455.json b/la/9142455.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1fc6d1274d7e7480b879acd15f5c0f951c9ddd0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9142455.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9142455\", \"name\": \"VINTAGE CONTRACTING, L.L.C. and Joseph C. Canizaro v. DIXIE BUILDING MATERIAL COMPANY, INC., Maryland Casualty Company and Stiel Insurance Services of New Orleans, Inc.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Vintage Contracting, L.L.C. v. Dixie Building Material Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-05-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2003-CC-0995\", \"first_page\": \"1052\", \"last_page\": \"1052\", \"citations\": \"845 So. 2d 1052\", \"volume\": \"845\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:17:05.741091+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"VINTAGE CONTRACTING, L.L.C. and Joseph C. Canizaro v. DIXIE BUILDING MATERIAL COMPANY, INC., Maryland Casualty Company and Stiel Insurance Services of New Orleans, Inc..\", \"head_matter\": \"VINTAGE CONTRACTING, L.L.C. and Joseph C. Canizaro v. DIXIE BUILDING MATERIAL COMPANY, INC., Maryland Casualty Company and Stiel Insurance Services of New Orleans, Inc..\\nNo. 2003-CC-0995.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nMay 30, 2003.\", \"word_count\": \"70\", \"char_count\": \"475\", \"text\": \"In re Stiel Insurance Services of New Orleans Inc..; \\u2014 Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 571-387; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-58.\\nDenied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9424062.json b/la/9424062.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..70247f03c5b1608c1e1553d517670454673a7634
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9424062.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9424062\", \"name\": \"William G. CORBELLO, et al. v. IOWA PRODUCTION, Shell Oil Company, Shell Western E. & P, Inc., et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Corbello v. Iowa Production\", \"decision_date\": \"2002-06-14\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2002-C-0826\", \"first_page\": \"779\", \"last_page\": \"779\", \"citations\": \"818 So. 2d 779\", \"volume\": \"818\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:14:29.340281+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"William G. CORBELLO, et al. v. IOWA PRODUCTION, Shell Oil Company, Shell Western E. & P, Inc., et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"William G. CORBELLO, et al. v. IOWA PRODUCTION, Shell Oil Company, Shell Western E. & P, Inc., et al.\\nNo. 2002-C-0826.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nJune 14, 2002.\", \"word_count\": \"66\", \"char_count\": \"402\", \"text\": \"In re Shell Oil Co.; Shell Western E & P Inc.; \\u2014 Defendants; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calca-sieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 92-2568; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 01-567.\\nGranted.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9446762.json b/la/9446762.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..60a727d2e8029556bd9b1d04ca44175e27f77d63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9446762.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9446762\", \"name\": \"In re Alton B. LEWIS, Jr.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Lewis\", \"decision_date\": \"2002-04-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2002-OB-0774\", \"first_page\": \"1264\", \"last_page\": \"1264\", \"citations\": \"814 So. 2d 1264\", \"volume\": \"814\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:42:22.946030+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In re Alton B. LEWIS, Jr.\", \"head_matter\": \"In re Alton B. LEWIS, Jr.\\nNo. 2002-OB-0774.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nApril 5, 2002.\", \"word_count\": \"193\", \"char_count\": \"1261\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nConsidering the Joint Petition for Transfer to Active Status filed by respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,\\nIT IS ORDERED that Alton B. Lewis, Jr. be reinstated to the practice of law, subject to the following conditions:\\n1. Respondent must fully and completely adhere to all terms of his recovery agreement entered into with the Lawyer's Assistance Program;\\n2. Respondent must fully and completely adhere to those conditions set forth by Douglas Cook, M.D. in his correspondence with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel; and\\n3. Respondent must accept monitoring by the Executive Director of the Lawyer's Assistance Program on a quarterly basis. The director, together with a member of respondent's firm, shall monitor respondent's caseload and work hours and oversee respondent's return to practice in an effort to optimize his recovery process.\\nThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel shall monitor respondent's compliance with these conditions and notify this court of any violation. Any violation of the conditions may be grounds for immediately returning respondent to disability inactive status.\\n/s/ Pascal F. Calogero\\nJustice, Supreme Court of Louisiana\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9534296.json b/la/9534296.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ed003b5ba3766c949cba3139c44063862028dd10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9534296.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9534296\", \"name\": \"LAFAYETTE ENTERTAINMENT CENTER, INC. v. LOUISIANA STATE ATHLETIC COMMISSION\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lafayette Entertainment Center, Inc. v. Louisiana State Athletic Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1981-12-16\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 12726\", \"first_page\": \"56\", \"last_page\": \"57\", \"citations\": \"408 So. 2d 56\", \"volume\": \"408\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:13:59.440021+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before REDMANN, SCHOTT and KLEES, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"LAFAYETTE ENTERTAINMENT CENTER, INC. v. LOUISIANA STATE ATHLETIC COMMISSION.\", \"head_matter\": \"LAFAYETTE ENTERTAINMENT CENTER, INC. v. LOUISIANA STATE ATHLETIC COMMISSION.\\nNo. 12726.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.\\nDec. 16, 1981.\\nJohn J. Messina, Metairie, for plaintiff-appellant.\\nWilliam J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Warren E. Mouledoux, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Louis M. Jones, Joe Giarrusso, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Louisiana Dept, of Justice, New Orleans, for defendant-appellee.\\nBefore REDMANN, SCHOTT and KLEES, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"382\", \"char_count\": \"2369\", \"text\": \"REDMANN, Judge.\\nPlaintiff appeals from the dismissal as moot of its action for 1980 boxing licenses and for a declaratory judgment invalidating defendant commission's rule that only one promoter's license can be issued in each city. Plaintiff concedes the mootness of the 1980 licenses issue, but argues that the issue of the validity of the commission's rule is not moot notwithstanding that plaintiff did not apply for 1981 licenses.\\nWe agree. A rule that only one license can be issued obliges an applicant to compete with and defeat the existing license-holder and all other would-be licensees. A plaintiff might have no hope of defeating a more experienced licensee, and thus deem it futile to apply for a license while the one-license rule remains in force. Moreover, the one-year period for a license of any year might expire while judicial review is pending. Were it not for this appeal's having been selected for the accelerated disposition docket, it would not have been heard until 1982, by which time any question of a 1981 application could also be argued to be moot. Thus we conclude that plaintiff's declaratory judgment action on the one-license rule is not moot notwithstanding that plaintiff's application for a 1980 license has become moot and plaintiff has not applied for a 1981 license.\\nNevertheless, La.R.S. 49:963 provides the validity of a rule can be determined by action for declaratory judgment \\\"only after the plaintiff has requested the agency to pass upon the validity . of the rule . . . \\\" Plaintiff's petitions do not show that it did request the commission to pass upon the validity of the one-license rule. The petitions therefore fail to state a cause of action and must be dismissed on that ground, with leave, however, to amend to allege, if it can, the facts necessary to authorize this action within R.S. 49:963.\\nAmended to allow amendment within a delay to be fixed by the trial court.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9552534.json b/la/9552534.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0c0642ce8bac1bc47e8a31f1e3a63c56cd271b38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9552534.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9552534\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Roland J. BROTHERS, Jr.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Brothers\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-10-28\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 82-K-2163\", \"first_page\": \"903\", \"last_page\": \"903\", \"citations\": \"421 So. 2d 903\", \"volume\": \"421\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:00:43.820651+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"WATSON and LEMMON, JJ., dissent from the order.\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Roland J. BROTHERS, Jr.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Roland J. BROTHERS, Jr.\\nNo. 82-K-2163.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nOct. 28, 1982.\", \"word_count\": \"48\", \"char_count\": \"300\", \"text\": \"In re Roland J. Brothers, Jr., applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Lafayette. No. 88530.\\nBail reduced to $75,000.\\nWATSON and LEMMON, JJ., dissent from the order.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9570776.json b/la/9570776.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..13d1a19e42f9d398f85dfb27a9ba6f898ffb2077
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9570776.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9570776\", \"name\": \"James E. MOUTON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARMCO, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mouton v. Armco, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-07-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 8840\", \"first_page\": \"889\", \"last_page\": \"890\", \"citations\": \"417 So. 2d 889\", \"volume\": \"417\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:45:01.271970+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before DOMENGEAUX, GUIDRY and CUTRER, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"James E. MOUTON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARMCO, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"James E. MOUTON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARMCO, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\\nNo. 8840.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.\\nJuly 21, 1982.\\nLeGardeur & Fitzsimmons, Ltd., J. F. Le-Gardeur, Jr., for intervenor-appellant.\\nAndrus & Preis, Edwin G. Preis, Jr., Jeansonne, Gibbens, Blackwell & Briney, John A. Jeansonne, Jr., Lafayette, Gugliel-mo & Lopez, James T. Guglielmo, Opelou-sas, John K. Hill, Jr., Lafayette, for defendants-appellees.\\nBefore DOMENGEAUX, GUIDRY and CUTRER, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"791\", \"char_count\": \"4985\", \"text\": \"CUTRER, Judge.\\nThis appeal presents the issue of whether a wife has a cause of action to recover damages for mental anguish, loss of consortium and embarrassment allegedly caused by injuries suffered by her husband.\\nJames Mouton filed suit for damages resulting from injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of several defendants. Mouton's wife intervened seeking damages for mental anguish, loss of consortium and embarrassment resulting from the husband's injuries. The intervention named Armco, Inc., Ball Marketing, Inc., and Bituminous Insurance Company as defendants.\\nThe trial court dismissed the wife's inter-v\\u00e9ntion by granting a motion for summary judgment, filed by Armco, Inc., and sustaining exceptions of no cause of action filed by Ball Marketing and Bituminous. The trial court rendered separate judgments in its rulings on the motion and exception. The wife appeals. We affirm.\\nThe issue presented herein was put to rest in the recent case of Lanham v. Woodward, Wight & Co., Ltd., 386 So.2d 131, 134 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1980), writ den., 392 So.2d 668 (La.1980), where this court held as follows:\\n\\\"We recently addressed this issue in McFarland v. Cathy, 349 So.2d 486 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1977). In that case we faced a fact situation similar to the one presently before us. The children and wife of Booker T. McFarland asserted a claim for their damages resulting from an accident which left Mr. McFarland a quadriplegic. Citing a long line of jurisprudence, we made the following observation:\\n'The established rule in this State is that, except in death cases, one person may not recover damages for mental pain and anguish suffered by him merely as a result of physical injuries sustained by another person. '\\n\\\"In Bourque v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 345 So.2d 237 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1977), we also faced the issue of whether or not one spouse could claim damages for mental anguish and loss of consortium because of physical injuries sustained by her husband. In denying recovery we approvingly quoted from our brothers of the First Circuit who in McKey v. Dow Chemical Co., Inc., 295 So.2d 516 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1974) said:\\n'Traditionally and historically our jurisprudence has consistently declined to allow recovery to one party for mental pain and anguish resulting from mere personal injury to another.\\n%\\n'The rationale of this premise is the avoidance of opening a field of litigation which will flood the courts with actions in which practical justice cannot be meted out to both plaintiff and defendant alike. Another basic premise of the rule is that, under such circumstances, there is no breach of a legal duty toward the party claiming damages.'\\nft\\nIntervenor contends that Louisiana's position should be changed as it is in a minority in its view. This argument was also answered in Lanham as follows:\\n\\\"We recognize that a growing number of jurisdictions allow a recovery for loss of consortium. According to Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 12 Cal.3d 382, 115 Cal.Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669 (1974), the California decision which held that such a claim would be recognized in that state, thirty-one jurisdictions do recognize such a remedy. See also F. F. Stone, Louisiana Tort Doctrine: Emotional Distress Occasioned by Another's Peril, 48 Tulane L.Rev. 782 (1974), for an excellent discussion of this area and a criticism of Louisiana's no recovery position.\\n\\\"Despite the fact that our position appears to be a minority view and open to criticism, we believe it is the preferable position based on the public policy consideration discussed in McKey v. Dow Chemical Co., Inc., supra. It is a determination that the claimant is not within the ambit of the risk invaded by the tort-feasor's conduct and hence the defendant owed no duty to him. Further, considering the body of jurisprudence beginning with our Supreme Court's decision in Black v. Car-rollton Railroad Company, 10 La.Ann. 33 (La.1855), to date, wherein the established rule is to deny such recovery as the plaintiffs seek in the instant suit, we are of the opinion that any change in this established rule, if there is to be a change, should be instituted by our legislature.\\\"\\nUnder these well established principles, the trial court, in the case at hand, correctly dismissed the wife's intervention.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. All costs of this appeal shall be paid by intervenor-ap-pellant.\\nAFFIRMED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9571834.json b/la/9571834.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d53bb8c1a1bc34568ab738873962c12c047ffa48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9571834.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9571834\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Perry T. CURRY, Sr.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Curry\", \"decision_date\": \"1980-11-10\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 67429\", \"first_page\": \"506\", \"last_page\": \"509\", \"citations\": \"390 So. 2d 506\", \"volume\": \"390\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:34:19.146831+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"DENNIS, J., concurs with reasons.\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Perry T. CURRY, Sr.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Perry T. CURRY, Sr.\\nNo. 67429.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nNov. 10, 1980.\\nWilliam J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.\\nWalter J. Rothschild, Oestreicher, Whalen & Rothschild, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"1544\", \"char_count\": \"9384\", \"text\": \"DIXON, Chief Justice.\\nAt approximately midnight on March 27, 1979, Albert Johnson was driving down Bienville Street when he noticed two men struggling on the sidewalk. One man was straddled over the other, slashing the victim's face with a butcher knife. Johnson drove past as slow as he could, then stopped at the corner and watched for about five minutes. He immediately notified the police, who arrived moments later. The victim was dead and there were bloody tennis shoe prints leading away from the body. Perry Curry, who lived in an apartment adjacent to where the murder occurred, soon emerged from the alley leading to his apartment. He asked what was going on. One of the policemen noticed that Curry was wearing tennis shoes, and asked Curry to lift his feet. On the bottom of Curry's left shoe was blood. When Johnson saw Curry, he rapped on the window of the police car in which he was sitting and shouted that this was the man he had seen.\\nCurry has been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He has appealed, relying on two assignments of error. We affirm his conviction and sentence.\\nAssignment of Error No. 1\\nThe defendant contends that the trial judge erred in overruling his motion to suppress the tennis shoes. The thrust of his argument is that Curry's initial detention was unlawful because not supported by reasonable suspicion as required by C.Cr.P. 215.1. Under the facts of this case, article 215.1 is inapplicable. The officers arrived at the scene of a brutal murder only moments after it had occurred. The defendant suddenly emerged from a dark alley adjacent to where the murder happened. According to the defendant's own testimony, he approached the scene and inquired what was going on. He voluntarily stood by the other observers when told to do so by the police. He voluntarily responded to the officer's inquiries. As this court recently stated in State v. Neyrey, 383 So.2d 1222, 1224 (La.1979):\\n\\\"However, the articulable suspicion requirement of C.Cr.P. art 215.1(A), Article 1, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is necessary only where the stop is forcible. See Terry v. Ohio [392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)]; State v. Saia, 302 So.2d 869, (La.1974). Police officers do not need probable cause to arrest, or reasonable cause to detain, in order to converse with citizens. State v. Shy [373 So.2d 145, 147 (La.1979)]. The fact that police approach a citizen and address him does not compel the citizen to respond to the officer. The citizen has the legal right to walk away from the encounter, or simply not to respond. State v. Shy, supra; State v. Brown, 370 So.2d 547 (La.1979)....\\\"\\nThis assignment of error lacks merit.\\nAssignment of Error No. 2\\nIn this assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for mistrial. The defendant's theory is that the prosecutor violated C.Cr.P. 770(2) by making references to another crime committed by the defendant. We find that the unfortunate incident that occurred during Curry's trial does not constitute a violation of C.Cr.P. 770(2).\\nThe state's case hinged on Johnson's identification of Curry. Johnson testified that at the time of the murder Curry was wearing a white, short-sleeved T-shirt, but that at the time of his arrest he was wearing a flowered shirt. The clothing that Curry was wearing at the time of his arrest was taken from him by Richard Stricks, an attorney who visited Curry eighteen hours after the arrest.\\nThe prosecutor in this case had a booking photograph of Curry which he erroneously believed to have been taken in connection with the instant arrest. During cross-examination of Stricks, the picture was shown to the witness. Through questioning of the witness, it was brought out that this was a booking photograph and that Curry was wearing a light colored sleeveless tank top. During redirect examination, Stricks was asked by defense counsel whether the photograph indicated when it was taken. The witness responded, \\\"It looks like March 31, 1978.\\\" The defendant was arrested for the instant murder on March 27, 1979. At this point, defense counsel unsuccessfully sought a mistrial, urging that the above incident constituted a violation of article 770(2), which provides:\\n\\\"Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or comment, made within the hearing of the jury by the judge, district attorney, or a court official, during the trial or in argument, refers directly or indirectly to:\\n(2) Another crime committed or alleged to have been committed by the defendant as to which evidence is not admissible; An admonition to the jury to disregard the remark or comment shall not be sufficient to prevent a mistrial. . . \\\"\\nWe note at the outset that article 770's mandatory mistrial remedy is available for both direct and indirect comments. Inasmuch as the prosecutor in this case never directly referred to any other crimes committed by Curry, any violation would have had to have been by an indirect reference. It is ofttimes difficult to distinguish between such indirect references, and other innominate types of prosecutorial blunders. This court, in a recent interpretation of article 770(3), dealing with comments on the defendant's failure to take the stand, discussed the test to be applied in determining whether an indirect reference was made:\\n\\\"The purpose behind the rule embodied in article 770(3) is to prevent attention from being drawn to the fact that the defendant has not testified in his own behalf. When the remark directly points out that the defendant has not testified, it is irrelevant whether the prosecutor intended the jury to draw unfavorable inferences from defendant's silence. See State v. Johnson, 345 So.2d 14 (La.1977). Nor is this court allowed to speculate on the effect that the remark had on the jury. State v. Hall, 297 So.2d 413 (La.1974). When a remark directly refers to the defendant's failure to take the stand, the statute mandates that the defendant be granted a mistrial if he requests one. State v. Marcello, 375 So.2d 94 (La.1979). This court will inquire into the intended effect on the jury only to distinguish between indirect references to the defendant's failure to testify and statements that the prosecution's case is unre-butted. State ex rel. Clark v. Marullo, 352 So.2d 223 (La.1977); State v. Frank, 344 So.2d 1039 (La.1977); State v. Reed, 284 So.2d 574 (La.1973); State v. Bentley, 219 La. 893, 54 So.2d 137 (1951); State v. Antoine, 189 La. 619, 180 So. 465 (1938). The latter reference is generally permissible. If, however, the defendant is the only one who can dispute the testimony, then 'a reference to the testimony as uncontroverted focuses the jury's attention on the defendant's failure to testify....' State v. Perkins, 374 So.2d 1234, 1237 (La.1979).\\\" State v. Fullilove, 389 So.2d 1282 (La.1980).\\nIn the instant case, the jury was never shown the photograph. Stricks' testimony was equivocal in that he merely stated that the photo looks like a booking photograph. Furthermore, the prosecutor's error in this case was an innocent one and not one done purposefully to draw attention to prior crimes committed by the defendant. The only way that the jury could have realized that this photograph was from a prior arrest was if they remembered the exact date of this crime, then noted that the date on the photograph was different. The connection was never spelled out for them. It is plausible that the jury still believed this photograph to be the one from the instant case. Had this photograph been from the instant case, such a fact would have been favorable to the defendant. The suggestion had already been made at trial that the defendant could have been wearing the T-shirt underneath his flowered shirt. Such a theory would have been weakened.if, instead of a T-shirt, he was wearing a tank top.\\nOf course, we can only speculate what inferences the jurors drew from the incident. Unless the inference is plain that the prosecutor commented on other crimes committed by the defendant, article 770 is inapplicable. We hold, therefore, that the action of the prosecutor in this case, albeit a blunder, did not constitute an indirect reference to other crimes committed by the defendant.\\nThis assignment of error lacks merit.\\nThe conviction and sentence are affirmed.\\nDENNIS, J., concurs with reasons.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9588250.json b/la/9588250.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8139a3f91e49304e3ab57eda980568ff43e6a416
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9588250.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9588250\", \"name\": \"Joseph CARMOUCHE and Enola Bruno v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, and Viola Angelle, Willie Angelle, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Morris Bruno, Jr.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Carmouche v. State ex rel. Department of Highways\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-10-10\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 63043\", \"first_page\": \"536\", \"last_page\": \"536\", \"citations\": \"363 So. 2d 536\", \"volume\": \"363\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:16:13.088525+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.\", \"parties\": \"Joseph CARMOUCHE and Enola Bruno v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, and Viola Angelle, Willie Angelle, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Morris Bruno, Jr.\", \"head_matter\": \"Joseph CARMOUCHE and Enola Bruno v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, and Viola Angelle, Willie Angelle, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Morris Bruno, Jr.\\nNo. 63043.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nOct. 10, 1978.\", \"word_count\": \"72\", \"char_count\": \"457\", \"text\": \"In re: Joseph Carmouche and Enola Bruno, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Lafayette. 360 So.2d 1374.\\nWrit denied.\\nCALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9613020.json b/la/9613020.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..19a7dc061ce581662df2070ce6255e27ed3eef29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9613020.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9613020\", \"name\": \"Mrs. Margaret HOLLOWAY, wife of and Robert E. Holloway v. SOUTHERN BAPTIST HOSPITAL, Commercial Union Insurance Company of New York, the Continental Insurance Company and James M. Freeman\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Holloway v. Southern Baptist Hospital\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-10-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 8797\", \"first_page\": \"871\", \"last_page\": \"875\", \"citations\": \"367 So. 2d 871\", \"volume\": \"367\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:11:49.528789+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before REDMANN, STOULIG and SCHOTT, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Mrs. Margaret HOLLOWAY, wife of and Robert E. Holloway v. SOUTHERN BAPTIST HOSPITAL, Commercial Union Insurance Company of New York, the Continental Insurance Company and James M. Freeman.\", \"head_matter\": \"Mrs. Margaret HOLLOWAY, wife of and Robert E. Holloway v. SOUTHERN BAPTIST HOSPITAL, Commercial Union Insurance Company of New York, the Continental Insurance Company and James M. Freeman.\\nNo. 8797.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.\\nOct. 30, 1978.\\nPer Curiam On Denial of Rehearing Jan. 16, 1979.\\nLawrence J. Smith, Michael A. Villa, Levy & Smith, New Orleans, for plaintiffs.\\nMonte J. Ducote, New Orleans, for defendant Southern Baptist Hospital.\\nCharles A. Boggs, Montgomery, Barnett, Brown & Read, New Orleans, for defendant Commercial Union Ins. Co.\\nLawrence D. Wiedemann, New Orleans, for defendants Dr. James M. Freeman and Dr. Leslie Guidry.\\nLilian M. Cohen, Charles R. Maloney, New Orleans, for defendant Mrs. Earline Karl.\\nConrad Meyer, IV, Baldwin & Haspel, New Orleans, for defendant Mrs. Lola Breedlove Moore.\\nH. Martin Hunley, Jr., Lemle, Kelleher, Kohlmeyer & Matthews, New Orleans, for defendants Dr. James A. Rogers, Dr. Der-mit L. Roux, New Orleans Anesthesia Associates and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.\\nBefore REDMANN, STOULIG and SCHOTT, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"2092\", \"char_count\": \"13118\", \"text\": \"REDMANN, Judge.\\nPlaintiff wife had healthy arms when she entered an operating room for heart surgery. By the time she returned to her room after a week's stay in recovery room and surgical intensive care unit, she was experiencing left arm pain which heralded a left ulnar neuropathy with causalgia. Despite major surgical efforts at ulnar nerve relocation and autonomic nerve system excisions (including removal of her uppermost rib), she remains afflicted today with the neuro-pathy and causalgia which have caused atrophy and disability of the left arm.\\nPlaintiff husband and wife now appeal from the rejection on the merits of their action for damages against hospital, surgeons, anesthesiologists and nurses.\\nThe ultimate question is whether plaintiffs have borne their burden of proving that some fault within La.C.C. 2815 by some defendant caused the injury. Because no direct evidence established causative fault (as plaintiffs concede), the question becomes whether circumstantial evidence establishes causative fault as, more probably than not, the source of the injury. As plaintiffs phrase it, the question is whether res ipsa loquitur applies.\\nMcCann v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., La.1973, 276 So.2d 259, 262, establishes that a cause of action is stated by a petition alleging that \\\"the body of the injured [plaintiff] was in the exclusive custody of the several defendants . . . [and] while under anesthesia [or heavy sedation] received injuries to a part . . . not involved in the surgery [in the nature of] untoward or unusual occurrences during the time of medical supervision.\\\" At trial, unless other evidence exculpates them, proof of the cited circumstances will support the res ipsa loquitur inference that the medical custodians were somehow at fault; see Larkin v. State Farm M. A. Ins. Co., 1957, 233 La. 544, 97 So.2d 389.\\nThe trial judge's reasons for judgment expressly found \\\"that all of the parties [defendant] involved used the highest degree of care and standard necessary for the protection of the patient.\\\" The reasons lamented, however, Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 1954, 225 La. 618, 73 So.2d 781, \\\"and its doctrine as to the inapplicability of res ipsa loquitur to most malpractice cases\\\". We reverse because the trial judge erred in founding his judgment on the belief that the circumstantial evidence rule of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable. The rule applies here.\\nMeyer's \\\"interpretation of the law as to a physician's duty to his patient\\\", already weakened by McCann, was overruled subsequent to the judgment appealed from, in Ardoin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., La. 1978, 360 So.2d 1331. Ardoin expressly condemned the \\\"locality rule\\\" which prevented liability in Meyer. The present case is unconcerned with the locality rule (save as to nurses, a question we pretermit). There is no dispute over the duty owed by hospital and other medical personnel not to so pull the arm of an anesthetized or sedated patient as to damage the ulnar nerve by stretching, or not to allow the sedated patient to remain for several hours in one position, as to damage the ulnar nerve by prolonged compression. Disputed is whether plaintiffs proved that duty was breached, and by whom. We conclude that the evidence legally establishes that some breach of that duty was the mechanism of plaintiff wife's injury.\\nThe test of proof is stated by Boudreaux v. American Ins. Co., 1972, 262 La. 721, 264 So.2d 621, 636:\\nIt suffices if the circumstantial proof excludes other reasonable hypotheses only with a fair amount of certainty, so that it be more probable than not that the harm was caused by the tortious conduct of the defendant. . . . [By] the principle of \\\"res ipsa loquitur\\\" (the thing speaks for itself) . . . where properly applied, the circumstantial evidence indicates that the injury was caused by some negligence on the part of the defendant, without necessarily proving just what negligent act caused the injury.\\nThat test is met by this record. Perhaps the strongest evidence for plaintiff is that from Dr. Richard W. Levy, a neurosurgeon, while that for defendants is from Dr. Robert J. Schramel, a thoracic and cardiovascular surgeon. Even Dr. Schramel agrees that the most probable explanation of plaintiff wife's problem is a stretching or compression of the ulnar nerve. Although 15% of all similar cases are from other, undetected causes, cases arising during hospitalization are not often from undetected cause. Dr. Schramel, however, would not rule out as a cause a stretching or compression of the brachial plexus (which includes the ulnar nerve) at the thoracic outlet \\u2014 an uncommon but not necessarily fault-implying result of spreading the ribs apart after cutting through the sternum vertically to allow access for heart surgery. Dr. Schramel, who never examined the patient, discounts her causalgia as causalgia-like symptoms, while Dr. Levy relies on his clinical diagnosis of causalgia from its objective signs, and especially upon the limitation of problems to the area served by the ulnar nerve branch (distal to the thoracic outlet) rather than all areas served by the brachial plexus, (a) to practically eliminate as a cause thoracic outlet syndrome, (b) to define a stretching injury as statistically much more probable than a compression injury, and (c) to place the situs of the ulnar nerve injury along the nerve between elbow and armpit (rather than at the elbow, making improbable as a cause some prolonged compression at the elbow groove, as during the six-hour surgery).\\nThe 3000-page transcript and the depositions contain many medical opinions, usually questioned and explained in depth. We eliminate discussion of other possible causes such as a severe blow, which would have caused bruising not present, and declare that the great bulk if not the unanimity of the medical evidence supports the conclusion that, more probably than not, plaintiff wife's injury was caused by a severe stretching or prolonged compression of the ulnar nerve.\\nWe may here note the distinction between ulnar neuritis and ulnar neuropathy with causalgia. The neuritis is a transitory, inflammatory condition which occurs with some frequency as a result of even moderately prolonged compression of the nerve. The neuropathy is a permanent degenerative condition, far more seldom seen. Much testimony (including some by Dr. Schramel) spoke of a neuritis, and assigned innocent causes, such as lying in bed with one's arms folded over the abdomen. We find the clear preponderance of the evidence is that these innocent possibilities would not explain plaintiff wife's condition of neuropa-thy with causalgia.\\nSurgeons and anesthesiologists are eliminated as possible causes because their work and positioning of plaintiff wife on the operating table with arms at her sides did not affect the left ulnar nerve. (Even blood pressure cuff and intravenous injection were on the right arm.) Although an anesthesiologist probably assisted in lifting the patient post-operatively from the table to the roller-bed for the trip to the recovery room, he would have lifted the patient's head, and not her side. It is thus not established as more probable than not that surgeons or anesthesiologists severely stretched or compressed plaintiff wife's ulnar nerve.\\nDamage-causing stretching or compression of the nerve can most easily occur while one is anesthetized (or sedated) and the body's muscles are relaxed and protective reactions to pain are eliminated (or reduced). The unsedated person whose arm is pulled pulls back, preventing stretching; one whose arm is compressed (to the point that fingers tingle) moves his arm, relieving the compression. Plaintiff wife was anesthetized when moved from operating room to recovery room, and then heavily sedated by 36 (sic) doses of morphine during the next 44 hours before her removal to the intensive care unit, where morphine usage was tapered off but she was markedly disoriented much of the time during her five-day stay. After that time, within an hour of her return to her room, her complaint of arm pain is first recorded in the nurses' notes. (Relatives' testimony of earlier complaints, and of rubbing left arm and little finger, may not have been noted by the nurses or may have been deemed referred pain from the incision; there is, however, one earlier note of arm and chest pain.) During that eight-day aftercare period, doctors did visit and prescribe medications, but the physical custody of plaintiff wife was in the nurses and orderlies employed by defendant hospital.\\nEven if we do not accept Dr. Levy's testimony (relying on the causalgia) that stretching is far more probable than compression as the cause of the injury, we cannot escape concluding that, more probably than not, one or the other occurred while plaintiff was unconscious or sedated, in the custody of the employees of defendant hospital. The more probable (according to Dr. Levy), a stretching, could have occurred only if, e. g., the patient were lifted by the arm when unable or virtually unable to sense and react to pain, and it would have breached the hospital's duty of reasonable nursing care to so pull on a patient's arm to lift her or for any other reason. The other possibility, a prolonged compression, could only have occurred if the hospital had similarly breached its duty of reasonable nursing care by placing the patient in a position in which compression could occur and leaving her in that position for several hours, rather than turning with a reasonable frequency (such as that reflected by the intensive care unit nurses' notes).\\nBecause certain family members did visit plaintiff wife in recovery and intensive care, the possibility exists that one of them could have pulled her arm while she was heavily sedated. However, the testimony is that they were only allowed to visit a few minutes at a time and that they were not permitted to be close to the patient. This testimony makes this possibility so remote that we conclude that, more probably than not, no family member caused plaintiffs nerve injury.\\nUnder all of the evidence including the circumstantial evidence in this record, the res ipsa loquitur inference is available against the hospital that one (or more) of its employees caused the injury to plaintiff wife. The evidence withstands the test of Boudreaux, supra.\\nQuantum of damages includes past medical expenses of $12,654.62, future medical expenses we estimate at $10,000, and general damages for all phases of disability and pain and suffering we fix at $50,000.\\nReversed as to Southern Baptist Hospital against whom there is judgment for the plaintiff husband for $12,654.62 with interest from judicial demand and all costs (save those expended against or by other defendants) and for the plaintiff wife for $60,000, with interest from judicial demand; otherwise affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9631306.json b/la/9631306.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..57241ed91f60e8ae2ed6ed202ade89587c9d0fae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9631306.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9631306\", \"name\": \"George A. HEFT v. William R. BURK, Jr. and Burk and Associates, Inc.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Heft v. Burk\", \"decision_date\": \"1974-12-13\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 55583\", \"first_page\": \"670\", \"last_page\": \"670\", \"citations\": \"304 So. 2d 670\", \"volume\": \"304\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:32:52.258359+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"George A. HEFT v. William R. BURK, Jr. and Burk and Associates, Inc.\", \"head_matter\": \"George A. HEFT v. William R. BURK, Jr. and Burk and Associates, Inc.\\nNo. 55583.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nDec. 13, 1974.\", \"word_count\": \"113\", \"char_count\": \"614\", \"text\": \"In re: George A. Heft, applying for Certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 302 So.2d 59.\\nWrit denied. No error of law.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9637291.json b/la/9637291.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7788e2073875f9b86946b2de3fd482bb4d729789
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9637291.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9637291\", \"name\": \"Willie Lee JOHNSON et al. v. BANNER CORPORATION\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Johnson v. Banner Corp.\", \"decision_date\": \"1975-02-13\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 6470\", \"first_page\": \"534\", \"last_page\": \"536\", \"citations\": \"308 So. 2d 534\", \"volume\": \"308\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:52:16.365546+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SAMUEL, STOULIG, and BEER, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Willie Lee JOHNSON et al. v. BANNER CORPORATION.\", \"head_matter\": \"Willie Lee JOHNSON et al. v. BANNER CORPORATION.\\nNo. 6470.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.\\nFeb. 13, 1975.\\nRaymond D. Levith, New Orleans, for plaintiff s-appellants.\\nDeutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, Charles K. Reasonover, New Orleans, for defendant-appellee.\\nBefore SAMUEL, STOULIG, and BEER, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"872\", \"char_count\": \"5380\", \"text\": \"BEER, Judge.\\nThis is a suit by four workers for wages allegedly owed them by Banner Construction Corporation for work performed in January and February 1972. Banner subcontracted with Andrews Construction Corporation under an unrecorded, unbond-ed, piecework type contract to construct homes in its Glendella Subdivision. Banner paid Andrews in full, but Andrews never paid its men. Andrews is now insolvent. Nine similar claims had been previously submitted to Banner and were paid. On April 12, 1972, counsel for plaintiffs submitted these claims, which' were not paid and now are the subject of this suit.\\nThe trial court denied the claims. We affirm.\\nAppellants allege four reasons for reversal of the trial court:\\n1) The doctrine of equitable estoppel should apply to their claims because the first nine were paid on the basis of affidavits similar to those filed on behalf of the unpaid four (one claim was dropped by stipulation).\\n2) LSA-R.S. 23:631 and 632 should apply to an owner-general contractor as an \\\"employer of laborers\\\" and therefore plaintiffs are entitled to penalties as a result of Banner's willful failure to pay;\\n3) LSA-R.S. 9:4812 provides that an owner is liable for the wages of laborers who are working for a subcontractor under an unrecorded contract between the subcontractor and the principal; and\\n4) The definition of \\\"statutory employer\\\" under LSA-R.S. 23:1061 et seq. should be extended to include employees who find themselves in the present situation.\\nBanner received the original request for payment to the nine other Andrews' employees on February 28, 1972. Banner, apparently realizing that those Andrews employees would file liens against the property, paid them. The subsequent request for payment to the plaintiffs was not made until April 12, 1972, apparently after the expiration of the lien period. Banner's earlier action was doubtlessly based upon their correct belief that they had a potential legal obligation to the first group. We do not agree that because of this Banner should be equitably estopped from refusing to pay the second group if, indeed, the legal situation vis-a-vis the second group, had changed. The doctrine of equitable estoppel must be employed very cautiously and only when it is clearly applicable. See: American Bank & T. Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 251 La. 445, 205 So.2d 35 (1967).\\nLSA-R.S. 23:631 requires an employer to pay his employees within 24 hours after termination of employment. R.S. 23:632 provides that any employer who fails to comply with the provisions of R.S. 23:631 shall be liable to the employee for penalties. The jurisprudence has interpreted these statutes as being penal in nature and therefore they must be strictly construed, Mitchell v. Fein, 281 So.2d 463 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973), Collins v. Joseph, 250 So.2d 796 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1971). Because these statutes are strictly construed, the definition \\\"anyone employing laborers\\\" in the first sentence of 23:631 cannot be interpreted to apply to Banner. The plaintiffs themselves testified that they were working for Andrews.\\nLSA-R.S. 9:4812 grants an in rem right of action which authorizes the filing of a lien against an owner's property by laborers where work has been done without a contract or the contract is unrecorded. Within 60 days after the last furnishing of labor, the lien may be filed. A laborer must, thereafter, bring suit within one year of such filing to protect his lien right. It is clear from the cases interpre-tating 9:4812 that a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the lien was filed within 60 days of completion, Hicks v. Tate, 7 So.2d 737 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1942), Weaks Supply Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 180 So. 883 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1938). Unless the lien is filed there is no means by which the laborer can avail himself of the provisions of R.S. 9:4812. The record does not show that any liens were ever filed in connection with these claims nor is there any evidence to show that the time for such filing had not expired. Plaintiffs failed to even introduce evidence on this issue much less carry the burden of proof.\\nPlaintiffs contend that the definition of \\\"statutory employer\\\" in LSA-R.S. 23:1061 et seq. (Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Statute) applies by analogy in a suit for wages. This statute designates the general contractor as the \\\"statutory employer\\\" of the subcontractor's employees to prevent an employer from avoiding his workmen's compensation responsibilities. No Louisiana court has ever sanctioned an analogy of these statutes to claims for wages and we find absolutely no basis upon which we should take this drastic step.\\nAfter trial on the merits the district court stated, \\\"Plaintiffs were not certain as to either the job location or the period of employment, and there were no records submitted in support of their claim, plaintiffs did not prove their contentions by a preponderance of the evidence.\\\" We agree.\\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is correct and is affirmed. Costs to be paid by appellant.\\nAffirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9648282.json b/la/9648282.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6907e383638bc418be70722657363ae7ecabf623
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9648282.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9648282\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Richard LENSEY v. Gayle K. HAMILTON, Judge, 1st Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Lensey v. Hamilton\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-04-23\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 64035\", \"first_page\": \"1360\", \"last_page\": \"1360\", \"citations\": \"369 So. 2d 1360\", \"volume\": \"369\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:03:54.172314+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Richard LENSEY v. Gayle K. HAMILTON, Judge, 1st Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Richard LENSEY v. Gayle K. HAMILTON, Judge, 1st Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana.\\nNo. 64035.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nApril 23, 1979.\", \"word_count\": \"57\", \"char_count\": \"354\", \"text\": \"In re Richard Lensey, applying for writ of mandamus. Caddo Parish. No. 99,639.\\nWrit granted. Trial court ordered to furnish the transcript of the Boykin hearing.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9653562.json b/la/9653562.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..39439329078f2f9f2eb9ba8e40c490991edcc00d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9653562.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9653562\", \"name\": \"William M. SHAW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. J. Clifton GARRETT et al., Defendants-Appellants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Shaw v. Garrett\", \"decision_date\": \"1974-05-28\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 12329\", \"first_page\": \"897\", \"last_page\": \"899\", \"citations\": \"295 So. 2d 897\", \"volume\": \"295\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:26:30.102588+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before PRICE, HALL and WILLIAMS, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"William M. SHAW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. J. Clifton GARRETT et al., Defendants-Appellants.\", \"head_matter\": \"William M. SHAW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. J. Clifton GARRETT et al., Defendants-Appellants.\\nNo. 12329.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.\\nMay 28, 1974.\\nCampbell, Campbell, Marvin & Johnson, by John T. Campbell, Minden, Stephen M. Waller, Homer, for defendants-appellants.\\nJohn T. Keys, Jr., Metairie, for Carolyn Marie Scruggs Franklin, defendant and third party plaintiff.\\nKitchens, Benton & Kitchens, by John B. Benton, Jr., Minden, Shaw & Shaw, by Jean C. Shaw, Homer, for plaintiff-appel-lee.\\nBefore PRICE, HALL and WILLIAMS, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"519\", \"char_count\": \"3247\", \"text\": \"PRICE, Judge.\\nPlaintiff and defendants are owners of contiguous estates in Claiborne Parish and this action was initiated by plaintiff to settle the common boundaries between these properties. Defendants filed an exception of acquisitive prescription of ten, twenty and thirty years without particularizing the factual basis for their claims. At the time of the hearing on the exception the trial judge refused to hear evidence in support of the exception and referred the trial of the exception to the merits. Defendants have appealed this action of the trial court.\\nPlaintiff opposes defendants' right to appeal for the following reasons:\\n(1) The action of the trial court is not a \\\"judgment\\\" as defined by LSA-C.C.P. art. 1841 as it made no determination of any rights between the parties (as to the prescription claimed by defendants) but merely postponed making any such determination until trial of the merits.\\n(2) Even conceding the action constituted a \\\"judgment of the court\\\", it is interlocutory in nature and no irreparable injury would result to defendants entitling them to an appeal from such a judgment under the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. art. 2083.\\n(3) The plea of acquisitive prescription is an affirmative defense to an action of boundary and may not be asserted by peremptory exception.\\nWe find the second argument of plaintiff relating to the lack of showing of irreparable injury is dispositive of this matter, and although there may be merit to the other reasons advanced in his opposition, we do not find it necessary or appropriate to give them consideration in this opinion.\\nDefendants concede the trial court's ruling appealed from is interlocutory in nature, but contend they have a right to have the exceptions tried in advance of the merits under LSA-C.C.P. art. 929 as they were pled prior to answer and should their exceptions be maintained they would be relieved of spending a considerable sum for surveys in preparation for a trial of the merits.\\nThe prevailing jurisprudence is against both of these arguments projected by de fendants in support of their right to appeal this interlocutory order.\\nThe inconvenience and expense in having to answer and defend a lawsuit as a result of the trial court's refusal to sustain exceptions has been held not to constitute irreparable injury sufficient to justify an appeal from an interlocutory judgment. See Waters v. Waters, 264 So.2d 275 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972), and Stull v. Rosenfield's House of Fashion, Inc., 220 So.2d 160 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1969).\\nFor the foregoing reasons this appeal is dismissed and this cause is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.\\nCosts of this appeal are to be paid by appellant.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9701285.json b/la/9701285.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..765bfe56833d53c0c9688714f28853296cb1629d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9701285.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9701285\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Jacob BAKER\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Baker\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-05-22\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 61120\", \"first_page\": \"110\", \"last_page\": \"115\", \"citations\": \"359 So. 2d 110\", \"volume\": \"359\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:36:35.823985+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"SANDERS, C. J., and SUMMERS and MARCUS, JJ., dissent.\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Jacob BAKER.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Jacob BAKER.\\nNo. 61120.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nMay 22, 1978.\\nRehearing Denied June 15, 1978.\\nBilly H. Ezell, Levingston, Tynes, Liles & Ezell, Lake Charles, for defendant-appellant.\\nWilliam J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frank T. Salter, Jr., Dist. Atty., Adam L. Ortego, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.\\n. We find it unnecessary to consider the second and third assignments because of our resolution of assignment number one.\", \"word_count\": \"2996\", \"char_count\": \"17901\", \"text\": \"CALOGERO, Justice.\\nDefendant Jacob Baker was convicted of violating Revised Statute 14:71 by issuing eleven worthless checks in the aggregate amount of $627.38. He was sentenced to ten years at hard labor in the custody of the Department of Corrections. On appeal he urges three assignments of error for reversal of his conviction.\\nASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1\\nDefendant urges that the trial judge wrongly refused to grant his motion to quash based on the allegation that the section of R.S. 14:71 under which he was prosecuted was unconstitutionally vague.\\nRevised Statute 14:71 provides in full that:\\nIssuing worthless checks is the issuing, in exchange for anything of value, with intent to defraud, of any check, draft, or order for the payment of money upon any bank or other depository, knowing at the time of the issuing that the offender has not sufficient credit with the bank, or other depository for the payment of such check, draft, or order in full upon its presentation.\\nThe offender's failure to pay such check, draft, or order within ten days after the receipt by him of written notice of its nonpayment upon presentation shall be presumptive evidence of his intent to defraud.\\nWhoever commits the crime of issuing worthless checks, when the amount of the check or checks is five hundred dollars or more, shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten years, or may be fined not more than three thousand dollars, or both.\\nWhen the amount of the check or checks is one hundred dollars or more, but less than five hundred dollars, the offender shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than two years, or may be fined not more than two thousand Hollars, or both.\\nWhen the amount of the check or checks is less than one hundred dollars, the offender shall be imprisoned for not more than six months, or may be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or both. If the offender in such cases has been. convicted of issuing worthless checks two or more times previously, upon any subsequent conviction he shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than two years, or may be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or both.\\nWhen the offender has issued two or more worthless checks, the aggregate of the amount of the worthless checks shall determine the grade of the offense, [emphasis added]\\nDefendant argues that the part of the act which allows the state to aggregate amounts of checks in order to determine the grade of the offense is unconstitutionally vague because it is uncertain in meaning and allows for arbitrary enforcement and unreasonable application, all in violation of his state and federal guarantee of due process of law. Defendant forcefully argues that the aggregation provision puts too much discretion in the hands of the state which can change the grade of the offense by the manner in which it aggregates the worthless checks. The state's arbitrary decisions as to aggregation can transform a series of misdemeanors into a single felony, or multiple felonies, affecting the mode of trial, range of punishments and applicable prescription periods.\\nThe state counters defendant's arguments by relying on the language of the aggregation provision which is that \\\"When the offender has issued two or more worthless checks, the aggregate amount of the worthless checks shall determine the grade of the offense.\\\" The fact that the legislature used the word \\\"shall\\\" in the provision, the state urges, means that the state is required to aggregate the check amounts when an offender has written more than one worthless check. The state's position is that it has no discretion as to aggregation. That position is severely undercut by the state's actions in this very case. Asserting in brief that defendant was originally charged with issuing over fifty worthless checks, the state takes the position that it elected to consolidate those fifty charges into four bills of information.\\nThe bill of information for which defendant has been tried and is now an appeal charges eleven worthless checks in an aggregate amount of $627.38 written between December 31, 1975 and January 15, 1976. The checks were issued in varying amounts ranging from $50.00 to $97.38 to three different business establishments. Another information, referred to here as the \\\"second\\\" information although it was filed the same day, charges eleven worthless checks in an aggregate amount of $502.45 written between December 31, 1975 and March 27, 1976. The checks were issued in amounts varying from $19.95 to $96.33 to five different business establishments. The \\\"third\\\" information, filed the same day as the others, charges twelve worthless checks amounting to $651.49 during the same time period, December 23, 1975 to January 15, 1976. The amounts vary from $9.68 to $75.60 and the payees are ten different business establishments. The \\\"fourth\\\" information charges thirteen bad checks amounting to $562.50 during the same time period December 23,1975 to January 15,1976. The checks range in amount from $14.17 to $91.76 and were written to six business establishments. Four months later the state filed a fifth information against defendant Baker for issuing $343.05 worth of checks to seven businesses between January 10, 1976 and April 3, 1976.\\nWe make this rather detailed digression to illustrate several points which we deem important to resolution of the issue in the case. First we note the state divided forty-seven checks which were all written between December 23, 1975 and March 27, 1976 into four separate bills of information. The bills were not divided into rational time segments (such as by months) because all four bills include the period December 31, 1975 to January 15, 1976. Nor were the bills divided by payee: for example, bills one, two and four contain checks written to George Theriot's; bills one and four reflect checks written to Kroger's; bills three and five contain checks written to Wizard Enterprises, etc. And, of course the state did not aggregate all the bad checks that it might have charged against defendant into one prosecution, but rather opted to charge the crimes in four groups each totalling over $500.00 (and a fifth group totalling over $100.00) thereby exposing defendant to four ten year sentences and one two year sentence. In short, the state divided fifty-nine checks into five groups in an arbitrary manner and aggregated the sums of those checks into five different felony charges. Clearly the state's action was not based on the language of the statute which it now claims is mandatory because if that were so all fifty-nine checks would have been aggregated into one crime, causing defendant to be exposed to only one ten year prison term.\\nHaving noted that the state did not act in this case as if it were bound by the \\\"clear mandatory provisions\\\" of the statute, we turn to an examination of the statute itself in light of defendant Baker's claim that it is unconstitutional.\\nThe eleven checks in the first information which alone is here on appeal are seven checks for $50.00, three checks for $60.00, and one check for $97.38. If the checks could not be aggregated, the crimes would have been separate misdemeanors since no single check was for $100.00 or more. Had the checks not been totalled, one year prescription on commencement of trial would have applied and the offense grade of each charge would have been a misdemeanor, carrying a maximum punishment of six months in parish prison and a fine of $500.00. See C.Cr.P. art. 578. It was on the strength of the aggregation provision that the state chose to charge him with five felonies. Defendant Baker argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.\\nThe rule that a criminal statute must fall if it is vague requires that the statutory language convey a sufficiently definite warning of the proscribed conduct that the public and law enforcement officials will be put on notice as to its meaning. A statute may not be so vague and indefinite as to be impossible of reasonable, fair and uniform operation. See Schwegmann Brothers Giant Supermarkets v. McCrory, 237 La. 768, 112 So.2d 606 (1959). If the language is so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, then the statute violates due process. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); Connick v. Lucky Pierre's, 331 So.2d 431 (La.1976); State v. Dardar, 257 La. 191, 241 So.2d 905 (1970). That portion of a statute which pertains to the grade of an offense and defines the crime may be so vague that it offends due process. See United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 68 S.Ct. 634, 92 L.Ed. 823 (1948); State v. Billiot, 254 La. 988, 229 So.2d 72 (1969).\\nThe provision in question was added to the worthless check statute in 1972. Before that time Louisiana, like most other states, did not allow the totalling or aggregating of the amounts of multiple worthless checks. Acts 1914, No. 209, \\u00a7 1, 2; Acts 1952, No. 433, \\u00a7 1; Acts 1954, No. 442, \\u00a7 1; Acts 1956, No. 156, \\u00a7 1. After Louisiana added the aggregation provision it was apparently one of only a few states which allowed a totalling of amounts to determine the grade of the offense. See 38 Missouri L.R. 432, 445-46 (1973). Of those states, Alabama has since amended its statute to excise the aggregation provision, see Ala.Stat. Tit. 13A, \\u00a7 13 A-9-13 (1975); Oklahoma allows aggregation of only those checks which were written \\\"in pursuance of a common scheme or plan to cheat and defraud,\\\" Okla.Stat.Ann. Tit. 21, \\u00a7 1541.3; Minnesota allows aggregation only when the transactions occurred within a six-month period, Minn.St. 609.52, subd. 2(3)(a); Utah repealed its aggregation provision in 1973, see Laws 1973, Ch. 196, \\u00a7 76-10-1401; and the New Mexico totalling provision was struck down as unconstitutionally vague, see State v. Ferris, 80 N.M. 663, 459 P.2d 462 (Ct.App.1969).\\nIn the Ferris case the court struck a totalling provision similar to ours as unconstitutionally vague after making the following analysis:\\nUnder \\u00a7 40-49-5(A), supra, a worthless check for more than $1.00 but less than $25.00 subjects the offender to a county jail term. So does the total amount of checks between those amounts. If the issuance of one check within this range is punishable, is the offender to be punished for each check issued within this range? Or, under the statutory language, may an offender issue any number of worthless checks and receive only one punishment so long as the amount is less than $25.00?\\nUnder \\u00a7 40-49-5(B), supra, a worthless check for $25.00 or more subjects the offender to a penitentiary term. Suppose the offender issues four worthless checks, each for $25.00. Under the statutory language is he to receive one or four punishments? What if he issues one worthless check for $25.00, one for $10.00 and one for $5.00? Under \\u00a7 40-49-5, supra, is he subject to one penitentiary term, or a penitentiary term plus one or two county jail terms? If he issues an additional worthless check for $11.00, is he then subject to two penitentiary terms? Compare In re Dick, supra [64 Cal.2d 272, 49 Cal.Rptr. 673, 411 P.2d 561].\\nJust how are the penalty provisions to be applied in a \\\"totaling\\\" situation? The statute is uncertain. This uncertainty is compounded when \\u00a7 40-49-4, supra, is considered because that section makes each worthless check a separate offense. Does the statute provide for only one punishment for multiple offenses? Compare Scott v. District of Columbia, 122 A.2d 579 (Mun.Ct.App.D.C.1956). Men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the meaning of the statutory language. We agree with the trial court. The provisions of \\u00a7 40-49-5, supra, concerning the \\\"totaling\\\" of checks, are so vague that they offend due process and are void. See N.M. Att'y Gen. Opinion 66-80 (June 22, 1966). 459 P.2d at 464-65.\\nWe believe that a similar analysis can be made regarding uncertainty and arbitrariness under the Louisiana statute. First, the Louisiana statute, unlike some other states' aggregation provisions, sets no time period within which the crimes must have been committed to be available for aggregation. If two bad checks are written eleven months apart, can or must they be coupled? What is the cutoff period? Is it to be one month, three months, six months, a year? What about a defendant who writes additional bad checks after arrest but before trial? Does arrest separate offenses so that the new offense remains a separate offense or must the state amend its charge to include the new offense? Second, under R.S. 14:71 a single worthless check represents a crime for which a person may be prosecuted. When a person has written three checks in the amounts of $110, $95, and $10 can he be charged only with the felony of writing three checks totaling $215, or can he be charged with two felonies, one for the $110 check- and one for the two others? The mandatory \\\"shall\\\" would indicate that the state could not so charge, and yet it has done so in this case. Third, we are concerned with single and multiple punishments under the statute. If trial is had on all three checks, can the convicted defendant receive a punishment for each check according to its value or only one punishment for the total?\\nThis worthless check statute is not saved from uncertainty as is the theft provision which allows the grade of the offense to be determined by the aggregate taken, because the theft provision punishes \\\"a misappropriation or taking by a number of distinct acts.\\\" R.S. 14:67. The crime of theft is one crime (\\\"a misappropriation or taking\\\") against a single victim through a series of separate actions. The legislature has made it one offense to pursue a certain course of conduct, viz., misappropriation of the property of another, even when that misappropriation takes place through a number of distinct acts. The legislature, however, has not by R.S. 14:71 made it one offense to issue worthless checks within a particular time frame, or against a single establishment, or with a common plan or scheme. Instead, the legislature has allowed aggregation of worthless checks by means of a statute which is so uncertain of application as to allow for arbitrary, nonuniform and unfair enforcement of the law and to require persons of common intelligence to guess at its meaning. Thus, the provision of R.S. 14:71 which states that \\\"When the offender has issued two or more worthless checks, the aggregate of the amount of the worthless checks shall determine the grade of the offense\\\" is so vague that it offends due process as a matter of state law and is consequently declared void.\\nWe find that this sentence is severa-ble from the remainder of the statute. The aggregation clause was added to the worthless check law by Acts 1972, No. 655. Before that amendment the act had operated simply to proscribe the issuance of worthless checks. There was no reference to aggregation of worthless checks. When the legislature added the aggregation section, it specifically declared the provisions severa-ble. Because the act had existed so many years without an aggregation provision and because the act was specifically declared severable by the legislature, we have no difficulty in holding the aggregation provision severable from the rest of the statute.\\nThus, we hold that the portion of Revised Statute 14:71 which provides for aggregation of amounts of worthless checks is unconstitutionally vague. The remainder of the statute is unaffected by our decision herein. The effect of our declaration herein is to excise from the statute the sentence which provides for the aggregation of amounts and the references in the three penalty paragraphs to more than one check. Our decision does not affect the legality of the remainder of the statute and does not bar reprosecution of this defendant in accordance with law for issuance of the worthless checks at issue in this appeal.\\nDecree\\nAccordingly, we grant defendant's motion to quash made on the basis that the aggregation provision of Revised Statute 14:71 is unconstitutionally vague. We reverse defendant's conviction and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\\nSANDERS, C. J., and SUMMERS and MARCUS, JJ., dissent.\\n. No check charged in any of the other four informations was greater than the check for $97.38 charged in the first information.\\n. The New Mexico statute declared unconstitutional in Ferns provided as follows:\\n\\\"A. When the amount of the check, draft or order, or the total amount of the checks, drafts or orders, are for more than one dollar ($1.00) but less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00), imprisonment in the county jail for a term of not more than thirty [30] days or a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100), or both such imprisonment and fine.\\n\\\"B. When the amount of the check, draft or order, or the total amount of the checks, drafts or orders, are for twenty-five dollars ($25.00) or more, imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than one [1] year nor more than three [3] years or the payment of a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or both such imprisonment and fine.\\\" N.M.Stat.Ann. \\u00a7 40-49-1 to -9.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9705227.json b/la/9705227.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e6368f0f5c0d55b15b67a69d550937d3402c32bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9705227.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9705227\", \"name\": \"Paul JONES et ux., v. Leon LUNGARO et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Jones v. Lungaro\", \"decision_date\": \"1970-02-02\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 7869\", \"first_page\": \"60\", \"last_page\": \"65\", \"citations\": \"231 So. 2d 60\", \"volume\": \"231\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:49:29.654553+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before LOTTINGER, REID and BLANCHE, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Paul JONES et ux., v. Leon LUNGARO et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Paul JONES et ux., v. Leon LUNGARO et al.\\nNo. 7869.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.\\nFeb. 2, 1970.\\nJames E. Moore, Ben W. Lightfoot, Baton Rouge, for appellants.\\nJames B. Thompson, III, Baton Rouge, \\\"for appellees.\\nBefore LOTTINGER, REID and BLANCHE, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"3100\", \"char_count\": \"18009\", \"text\": \"LOTTINGER, Judge.\\nThese four consolidated suits result from a rear end collision or collisions involving three automobiles.\\nSuit No. 7869 entitled Paul Jones, et ux. v. Leon Lungaro, et al., La.App., 231 So.2d 60, was filed by Paul Jones, individually and on behalf of his minor child, Pamela, and his wife, Mrs. Ruby Jones, as petitioners against Leon Lungaro and his liability insurer, Hanover Insurance Company, as well as Frank Hardesty, his employer, Shelly Brawley and Brawley's Parts, Bumper and Plating Works, Inc.\\nSuit No. 7870, entitled Roy F. Vick, et al., Versus Leon Lungaro, et al., La.App., 231 So.2d 65, was filed by Mr. Roy F. Vick, individually and for and on behalf of his minor children, Frank Vick, Mark Vick, and Diane Vick and his wife Gloria C. Vick, as petitioners against Leon Lungaro and Hanover Insurance Company, his liability insurer, as well as Frank Hardesty and his employer, Shelly Brawley doing business as Brawley's Parts, as defendants.\\nSuit No. 7871,' entitled Hanover Insurance Company Versus Frank Hardesty, et al., La.App;, 231 So.2d 66, was filed by the Hanover Insurance Company, as petitioner, against Frank Hardesty, his employer, Shelly Brawley, Brawley's Parts, Bumper and Plating Works, Inc. to assert its sub-rogation claim for damages paid under its collision insurance policy to Leon Lungaro resulting from the collision of the Hardesty vehicle with the Lungaro vehicle. Joined as a defendant was Safeco Insurance Company of America, the liability insurer of defendants, Hardesty, Brawley and Bumper.\\nSuit.No. 7872, entitled Leon A. Lungaro Versus Frank Hardesty, et al., La.App., 231 So.2d 66, was filed by Leon A. Lungaro against Frank Hardesty, Shelly Brawley, and Brawley's Parts, Bumper and Plating Works, Inc., as defendants, for personal injuries sustained in the accident.\\nPrior to trial herein the claims by the Vicks and the Jones against Hardesty, his employer and insurer were compromised, however, all rights were reserved as against the other defendants, namely Lungaro and Hanover. Also prior to trial, Mr. Lungaro died and his heirs were substituted as parties defendant.\\nJudgment below in suit No. 7869, entitled Paul Jones, et ux. Versus Leon Lun-garo, et al., was rendered in favor of petitioner, Paul Jones, for the sum of $125.00 for medical expenses incurred by him for his wife and minor child, in favor of Paul Jones for and on behalf of his child, Pamela Jones, in the sum of $150.00 and in favor of Mrs. Ruby Jones in the sum of $750.00, said judgments being against Leon Lungaro and his insurer, Hanover Insurance Company.\\nIn suit No. 7870, entitled Roy F. Vick, et al. Versus Leon Lungaro, et al., judgment was rendered in favor of Mr. Vick for special damages in the sum of $348.80, in favor of Mr. Vick on behalf of his three minor children, Frank, Mark and Diane, in the sum of $150.00 each, and in favor of Mrs. Vick in the sum of $1,000.00, said judgment being against the heirs of Leon Lungaro and Hanover Insurance Company.\\nIn suit No. 7871, judgment was rendered in favor of Hanover Insurance Company in the sum of $933.66 on its subrogation claim, and against Hardesty, his employer and insurer. Furthermore, in suit No. 7872, judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner, the Lungaros, and against Hardesty, his employer, and insurer in the sum of $2,-389.85 for personal and property damages resulting from the second collision.\\nFrom the above judgments, appeals were taken by the heirs of Leon Lungaro and his insurer, Hanover Insurance Company, as well as> Hardesty, his employer and insurer. Answers to appeals were filed by the plaintiffs in suit No. 7869 entitled Paul Jones, et ux. Versus Leon Lungaro and in suit No. 7870 entitled Roy F. Vick, et al. Versus Leon Lungaro, et al.\\nDuring the course of these proceedings, settlements were made of the suits by the Vicks and Jones against Hardesty, his employer and insurer, and therefore same were dismissed. Because of the dismis- sab of said defendants, the Lower Court reduced by one-half the judgment in their favor.\\nThe above mentioned suits were tried at the same time by the Lower Court and one set of written reasons was given, however, individual judgments were rendered in each case. We will do likewise, that is we will render one set of reasons for judgment, and will grant separate judgments in each of the four cases which are now before us.\\nThe facts disclose that on February 3, 1967, all three vehicles involved in the collision were traveling in a southerly direction on Scenic Highway in the city of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The first of the vehicles were driven by Mrs. Vick and Mrs. Jones and several of the Vick and Jones children were riding as passengers. The vehicle owned and operated by Leon Lun-garo, now deceased, and which was insured by Hanover Insurance Company was following the Vick vehicle, and following the Lungaro vehicle was a pick up truck owned by Shelly Brawley but operated by his employee, Frank Hardesty, which latter vehicle was insured by Safeco Insurance Company.\\nThe facts as found by the Lower Court are as follows:\\n\\\"The facts of this case, as supported by the evidence, appear to be as follows : On the morning of February 3, 1967, Mrs. Vick, her three children, and Mrs. Jones and her child, Pamela Jones, as guest passengers were riding in the Vick vehicle. Mrs. Vick was driving and was .proceeding in a southerly direction along Scenic Highway in the inside lane of southbound traffic. In the 3100 block of Scenic Highway Mrs. Vick sig-nalled to make a lefthand turn and slowed to a stop to allow oncoming traffic to clear so that she could make her turn. While stopped and waiting to complete her turn, Mrs. Vick's vehicle was hit from the rear by a 1966 Comet Station Wagon, owned and driven by Mr. Leon Lungaro. Very shortly after this collision, the Lungaro vehicle was hit from the rear by a 1959 Ford pickup truck being driven by Mr. Frank Hardesty. The force of this collision caused the Lungaro station wagon to impact the second time with the Vick car.\\n\\\"As the result of these two collisions, injuries were sustained by all three drivers, Mrs. Vick, Mr. Lungaro, and Mr. Hardesty, and also by the occupants of the Vick vehicle, Frank, Mark, and Diane Vick, and by Mrs. Ruby Jones and her minor child, Pamela Jones.\\n\\\"La.R.S. 32:81A imposes a statutory duty upon the driver of a following vehicle.\\nThe driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.\\nThe jurisprudence supporting this is legion. This statute imposes upon a following motorist a duty to exercise great care, sometimes referred to as extraordinary care. Evans v. Thorpe, La.App., 2 Cir., 175 So.2d 418. As a general rule, when a following vehicle collides with the rear of the lead car, the following driver is considered to be at fault. Zeno v. Breaux, La.App. 3 Cir., 164 So.2d 666. So it can be seen, that the duty imposed upon Lungaro and Hardesty as following drivers was a very high one.\\n\\\"The evidence shows that Mrs. Vick had properly signalled, slowed, and stopped to make her left turn before she sustained the first impact. She cannot be found contributorily negligent. Lun-garo breached his duty to Mrs. Vick by following too closely and too fast. This breach was the cause of his collision with Mrs. Vick and of the damages and injuries resulting therefrom. Lungaro was clearly negligent toward Mrs. Vick and the occupants of her car.\\n\\\"Hardesty owed the same duty to Lun-garo as Lungaro owed to Mrs. Vick. In addition, he owed to Mrs. Vick and the occupants of her car, the duty of reasonable care for any foreseeable damages that might result from his own negligence toward Lungaro. The evidence shows that Hardesty breached his duty and that this breach was the cause of damages and injuries to the Lungaro car and partly at least to the Vick car and to the occupants of both vehicles. Hardesty was clearly negligent toward Lungaro and Mrs. Vick and the occupants of the Vick car.\\n\\\"Both Mrs. Jones and Mrs. Vick testified that their car was struck twice. They testified after the first blow that the children started screaming and almost instantly they were hit the second time. Hardesty testified to the same effect that he saw the Lungaro car strike the Vick car and that then Har-desty's car hit Lungaro and knocked him into the Vick car the second time. A Mr. Cotton who had a place of business immediately across the street from where the accident happened said that he distinctly heard the squealing of car tires twice. He said his back was to the accident but when he heard the wheel squealing he immediately looked around and Lungaro's head and body were bobbing back and forth like a head and body would bob as the result of a collision either in front of him or from the rear. Cotton testified he saw Lungaro's head bob back and forth immediately before Hardesty's car struck the Lun-garo car. Lungaro was not present to speak for himself at the trial, but all of the above facts add up and convinced the court beyond any shadow of a doubt that the Lungaro car struck the Vick car first and almost immediately was himself struck by the Hardesty car, knocking the Lungaro car into the Vick car the second time. No other solution is possible from the above statement of facts.\\n\\\"After the accident and before the trial Mr. Lungaro died and by stipulation of counsel his heirs were made parties-litigant. By stipulation the American Bank and Trust Company, executor of Mr. Lungaro's estate, is made party-plaintiff to assert whatever interest they may have. The court is convinced from the medical evidence that Mr. Lungaro's death was not due in any respect as a result of this accident.\\\"\\nWith regard to the evidence which is in the record, both Mrs. Vick and Mrs. Jones testified that after Mrs. Vick had brought her vehicle to a complete stop preparatory to making a left-hand turn, they felt the force of the first impact. This impact caused the children who were riding in the rear seat to fall to the floor and commence screaming. Both ladies testified that they had turned around to pick up the children from the floor and to console them before they felt the blow of the second impact.\\nMr. Cotton, the bystander, who the record discloses was a friend of Mr. Lun-garo, testified that he was standing in the front of his welding shop when he heard the screeching of brakes. He immediately turned around and, according to his testimony, saw the Lungaro vehicle stopped less than a car's length to the rear of the Vick vehicle and Mr. Lungaro's head was bobbing back and forth. Although Mr. Cotton did not see the Lungaro vehicle strike the Vick car, his testimony indicates that at the time he first noticed the Lun-garo car it had either struck and bounced back from the Vick vehicle and Mr. Lun-garo's head was still bobbing back and forth from the force of the impact, or Mr. Lungaro had succeeded in bringing his vehicle to a stop a distance of less than the length of a car to the rear of the Vick vehicle and that his head was bobbing back and forth because of the sudden stop. In any event, Mr. Cotton was still observing this scene when he again heard the screeching of brakes and he saw the Har- desty truck tear into the rear of the Lun-garo automobile, shoving it into the Vick vehicle.\\nWe feel that the findings of fact by the Lower Court are correct and that same are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, under the well established principal of our jurisprudence to the effect that the findings of fact by a Trial Court are entitled to grant weight and should not be set aside lightly, such findings are sustained by this Court. LaFiette v. Travelers Insurance Company, 191 So.2d 790.\\nAs stated by the Lower Court the claim by the various petitioners for damages against Frank Hardesty, his employer and insurer, was compromised prior to the trial of this matter and the rights of plaintiff were reserved insofar as the other defendants were concerned. Therefore, the Lower Court gave a credit equal to one-half of the damages sustained by petitioners, in rendering judgments in favor of the Jones and the Vicks.\\nCounsel for the Lungaros, complains that this was error on the part of the Lower Court as, if the Court were to determine that there were two separate collisions and that Hardesty and Lungaro were both negligent, but are not joint tort-feasors, then it would be necessary to determine what damages, if any, were sustained in each collision. In support of his contention, counsel cites Jarreau v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., La.App., 24 So.2d 700, and Henderson v. Falgout, La.App., 183 So.2d 675.\\nThe Jarreau case concerned rear end collisions involving four vehicles. The second vehicle, driven by petitioner, first ran into and damaged the first vehicle and, shortly thereafter, the fourth vehicle ran into the third vehicle shoving it into the second vehicle, and, in turn, shoving the second vehicle into the first vehicle, which had been stopped. The driver of the second vehicle sued the driver of the fourth vehicle for damages. In that case the Court dismissed the suit holding that a substantial part of the damages to petitioner's car was caused when he struck the first vehicle, and that, as petitioner was unable to show how much of the damages was caused by that collision and how much additional damage was caused from the chain reaction when the fourth vehicle struck the first vehicle, the petitioner had failed to sustain his burden of proving the damages sustained in the two collisions.\\nIn the Henderson case, the Lower Court awarded a summary judgment against one defendant motorist and his insurer and dismissed suit as to the other defendants. The plaintiff appealed and then moved to remand the matter to the Lower Court in order to take additional testimony. In that case we held that petitioner was not entitled to a remand for the purpose of taking testimony of purported eye witnesses when he had made no effort to introduce affidavits or depositions in opposition to defendant's motion for a summary judgment and had ample time to secure said affidavits and depositions before petitioner's attorney had left on a trip to Europe. The question there was a procedural one and is not similar to the question now before us.\\nArticle 2324 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides:\\n\\\"He who causes another person to do an unlawful act, or assists or encourages in the commission of it, is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act.\\\"\\nIn Fouquier v. Travelers Ins. Co., La.App., 204 So.2d 400, this Court was faced with a three car collision, the facts of which are strikingly similar to the facts now before us. In that case petitioner brought her car to a near stop because of traffic conditions, when the following vehicle driven by Martin was unable to stop and struck the rear of plaintiff's car. Thereafter, a third vehicle, operated by Wilson, struck the Martin vehicle and drove it again into the rear of petitioner's vehicle. Suit was filed by the driver of the plaintiff's vehicle and her passengers against the drivers and insurers of the Martin and Wilson vehicles. In that case we said:\\n\\\"There is no question as to the liability of the defendants herein. Neither Miss Martin nor Wilson were able to advance any reason as to their failure to observe the vehicle ahead of them and stop before striking it. Their failure to keep a proper lookout and maintain their vehicles under control is clear and makes them guilty of negligence, proximately causing the accident, and soli-darily liable for the damage caused thereby.\\\"\\nAlthough the Lower Court did not cite the decision in the Fouquier case in support of its decision, we feel that the Lower Court was correct in holding that Lungaro and Hardesty were joint tort feasors and were thus liable in solido. A similar result was reached by us in Ford v. Williams, La.App., 62 So.2d 838. See also Abrego v. Tri-State Transit Co., La.App., 22 So.2d 681. Therefore, the allowance of a credit of one-half of the damages sustained by all petitioners except the Lungaro interest in the judgment rendered below was correct under the theory advanced in Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., La.App., 163 So.2d 915.\\nThere is no real dispute before this Court as to the quantum of damages allowed the remaining petitioners, and under the prevailing jurisprudence to the effect that the allowance of damages by the Lower Court is not to be disturbed unless there is an abuse of the discretion of the Lower Court. Gaspard v. LaMaire, 245 La. 239, 158 So.2d 149.\\nIn Suit No. 7872 filed by the Lungaros, the defendants in the alternative plead contributory negligence on the part of Mr. Lungaro. A similar plea is made in Suit No. 7871 filed by Hanover on its claim for subrogation to damages paid on the Lungaro vehicle. As we have held Mr. Lungaro to have been guilty of concurring or contributory negligence, the judgments of the Lower Court in these suits should be reversed.. Furthermore, the plaintiffs in these two suits have failed to prove the amount of damages resulting solely from the fault of the defendants. The judgments of the Lower Court in Suits Nos. 7869 and 7870 should be affirmed.\\nFor the reasons hereinabove assigned, the judgments of the Lower Court in Suits No. 7871 and 7872 will be reversed and there will be judgment therein in favor of defendants and dismissing petitioners' demands. The judgments of the Lower Court in Suits No. 7869 and 7870 will be affirmed. All costs of this appeal to be paid by defendants.\\nJudgment affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9706148.json b/la/9706148.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8d4127623e7e9bbf06f6ea9d5d864fb6f8b61a39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9706148.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9706148\", \"name\": \"Mrs. Martha Bailey CRICHTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUCCESSION of Powell CRICHTON (Miss Margaret S. Hemingway, Ancillary Testamentary Executrix), Defendants-Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Crichton v. Succession of Crichton\", \"decision_date\": \"1970-01-06\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 11316\", \"first_page\": \"109\", \"last_page\": \"117\", \"citations\": \"232 So. 2d 109\", \"volume\": \"232\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:01:55.259027+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before AYERS, DIXON and WILLIAMS, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Mrs. Martha Bailey CRICHTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUCCESSION of Powell CRICHTON (Miss Margaret S. Hemingway, Ancillary Testamentary Executrix), Defendants-Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Mrs. Martha Bailey CRICHTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUCCESSION of Powell CRICHTON (Miss Margaret S. Hemingway, Ancillary Testamentary Executrix), Defendants-Appellees.\\nNo. 11316.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.\\nJan. 6, 1970.\\nRehearing Denied March 3, 1970.\\nTheus, Grisham, Davis, Leigh & Brown, by John C. Theus and Robert L. Curry, Monroe, for Mrs. Martha Bailey Crichton.\\nHayes, Harkey & Smith, by Thos. M. Hayes, Jr., Monroe, for Miss Margaret S. Hemingway.\\nBlanchard, Walker, O\\u2019Quin & Roberts, by Robert Roberts, III and Joseph W. Mil-ner, Shreveport, for Gloria Crichton Mc-Gehee.\\nLunn, Irion, Switzer, Johnson & Salley, by Harry A. Johnson, Shreveport, for Powell Crichton, Jr.\\nHenry G. Hobbs, Minden, for Kate Crichton and Edward Bailey Crichton.\\nBefore AYERS, DIXON and WILLIAMS, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"4710\", \"char_count\": \"28246\", \"text\": \"WILLIAMS, Judge.\\nPowell Crichton died in New York on November IS, 1962 at the age of 78. He was born in Louisiana but left the state when he was very young. He practiced law in New York for many years and resided in Westchester County. In 1916 Powell Crichton married for the first time of which marriage two children, Powell Crichton, Jr. and Mrs. Gloria Crichton McGehee were born. The first Mrs. Crichton died in Westchester County, New York in 1923. In 1925 Mr. Crichton married a second time to Martha Bailey Crichton, the plaintiff-appellant. Two children were born of this marriage. In 1935 the couple separated, Mrs. Crichton thereafter living in the British Colony, Bermuda, although the couple was never divorced. At his death Mr. Crichton was survived by his four children and his widow. According to the terms of his will, dated November 13, 1953, the entire estate passed in trust to his surviving children. No provision was made for his surviving wife. The bulk of his estate consisted of bank accounts, stocks, bonds and an interest in a partnership, all in Louisiana. He also left some real property located in Louisiana. The intangible movable property is the subject of this litigation.\\nMiss Margaret S. Hemingway, Mr. Crichton's secretary, was named Executrix in his will. Succession proceedings were opened in the state of New York where the will was admitted to probate on January 30, 1963, and Miss Hemingway qualified as Testamentary Executrix. On August 20, 1963 ancillary succession proceedings were opened in Louisiana and Miss Hemingway qualified as Ancillary Executrix. She filed an inventory purporting to describe and value the Louisiana properties and sought approval of the inventory. The personal property involved here was listed in the inventory as belonging to the second community and was valued at a total of $306,-281.50. The widow asserted a claim to an undivided one-half interest in the personal property left by decedent and sought an order to show cause why her community interest should not be recognized. She further sought to enjoin the Executrix from removing any of the property from Louisiana during the pendency of the proceedings. The son and daughter of the first marriage excepted to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana court to determine the ownership of the personal property. On January 4, 1966 the District Court overruled the exceptions. The Executrix was permanently enjoined from transferring the assets out of Louisiana.\\nOn September 20, 1965 the Executrix filed an account in New York in which the widow's share of community property was listed as unpaid. Mrs. McGehee, the daughter of the first marriage, objected to the account primarily on the ground of inapplicability of Louisiana community property law. Mrs. Crichton objected to the account on the basis that the properties were held by Miss Hemingway solely as Ancillary Testamentary Executrix in Louisiana and could not be removed or disposed of because of the Louisiana injunction. Mrs. Crichton made no effort to assert any rights in Mr. Crichton's estate under New York law. The entire basis of her claim is based on LSA-C.C. Art. 2400. Mrs. McGehee filed a motion for summary judgment. In a contradictory proceeding the Surrogate Court of Westchester County held that Louisiana's community property laws were not applicable and sustained the objection to the widow's claim. The court recognized that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the person of all parties. In re Crichton's Will, 49 Misc.2d 405, 267 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1966).\\nThe children of the first marriage sought recognition in the Louisiana Court of the judgment of the Surrogate Court under the Full Faith and Credit clause by means of a motion for partial summary judgment. This motion was denied by the district court. From this ruling application for supervisory writs were made to this court and the Louisiana Supreme Court. The applications were denied on the ground that an adequate remedy could later be had on appeal.\\nThe Executrix and widow appealed the Surrogate's decision to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division (Second Department) of the State of New York which unanimously affirmed the Surrogate decision rejecting the widow's claim. In the Matter of the Will of Powell Crichton, Deceased, 26 A.D.2d 639, 272 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1966). Before the case was decided the widow's appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Executrix appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court of that state, which in an opinion by the Honorable Keating, J., unanimously affirmed the decision of the Surrogate Court. In re Estate of Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811, 228 N.E.2d 799 (1967). That court held that New York law should be applied, relying primarily on the legal fiction that movables follow the person \\\"mobilia sequuntur personam\\\".\\nThe instant case was thereafter tried in Louisiana. The trial court held that the final judgment of the New York Court of Appeals was entitled to full faith and credit. The previous ruling overruling an exception of res judicata was recalled and the exception was then sustained. In his oral opinion the judge below went on to say that if he were considering the matter on its merits he would have likewise chosen to apply the law of New York. The court further ordered the dissolution of the injunction previously issued. The widow has appealed suspensively from this judgment.\\nArticle IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides:\\n\\\"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. \\\"\\nThis mandate was supplemented by the Act of Congress, 28 U.S.C.A. \\u00a7 1738.\\nThe federal jurisprudence has uniformly placed a judgment on a different level than a statute of another state. The United States Supreme Court reviewed the subject in Magnolia Petroleum Company v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 64 S.Ct. 208, 88 L.Ed. 149 (1944). The Court therein reversed the Court of Appeal, State of Louisiana, 1st Circuit, which affirmed the judgment of the District Court of Calcasieu Parish, granting supplemental relief under Louisiana Workmen's Compensation law to an injured workman who had already received disability payments under Texas Workmen's Compensation law. The Court made the following observations:\\n\\\" in thus refusing, on the basis of state law and policy, to give effect to the Texas award as a final adjudication of respondent's claim for compensation for his injury suffered in Texas, the Louisiana court ignored the distinction, long recognized and applied by this Court, and recently emphasized in Williams v. North Carolina, supra (317 U.S. 287, 294, 296, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279, 283, 284, 143 A.L.R. 1273), between the faith and credit required to be given to judgments and that to which the local common and statutory law is entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States.\\\"\\n\\n\\\"The full faith and credit clause and the Act of Congress implementing it have, for most purposes, placed a judgment on a different footing from a statute of one state, judicial recognition of which is sought in another. \\\"\\n\\\"From the beginning this Court has held that these provisions have made that which has been adjudicated in one state res judicata to the same extent in every other.\\n\\\" Even though we assume for present purposes that the command of the Constitution and the statute is not all-embracing, and that there may be exceptional cases in which the judgment of one state may not override the laws and policy of another, this Court is the final arbiter of the extent of the exceptions. And we pointed out in Williams v. North Carolina, supra (317 U.S. 294, 295, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 283, 284, 143 A.L.R. 1273), that 'the actual exceptions have been few and far between *\\n\\\"These consequences flow from the clear purpose of the full faith and credit clause to establish throughout the federal system the salutary principle of the common law that a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as in that where the judgment was rendered, so that a cause of action merged in a judgment in one state is likewise merged in every other. The full faith and credit clause like the commerce clause thus became a nationally unifying force. It altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part are given nationwide application. Because there is a full faith and credit clause a defendant may not a second time challenge the validity of the plaintiff's right which has ripened into a judgment and a plaintiff may not for his single cause of action secure a second or a greater recovery.\\\" [320 U.S. 436-440, 64 S.Ct. 212-213, 88 L.Ed. 153-156]\\nThe Supreme Court has further elucidated the rule that full faith and credit must be given to a foreign judgment even as to findings of jurisdiction when that question has been litigated in the court rendering the original judgment.\\nThe Court succinctly stated the rule of res judicata as follows:\\n\\\"One trial of an issue is enough. 'The principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues,' as well to jurisdiction of the subject matter as of the parties.\\\" [Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78, 60 S.Ct. 44, 51, 84 L.Ed. 85, 93 (1939)].\\nError in the proceeding of the other court is not a defense to enforcement of a judgment.\\nThe Louisiana Courts have recognized the requirement of full faith and credit. Biri v. Biri, 192 So.2d 862 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1966) the court gave full faith and credit to a Texas divorce decree where both parties were domiciled in Texas when the divorce proceedings were in stituted as found by the Texas court. The court recognized that Louisiana could concern itself only with the question of domicile and jurisdiction over the parties and the issues in a suit for recognition of a foreign judgment. In Mente & Company v. Anciens Etablissements Verdier-Dufour & Cie., 177 La. 829, 149 So. 492 (1933), the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded a case to the trial court for the purpose of receiving proper evidence of the New York proceedings. The Court stated further:\\n\\\"For, when two suits involving the same issues between the same parties are brought before two separate courts each clothed with jurisdiction thereof, and both suits are allowed to proceed pari passu, the first judgment rendered in either of said courts is the judgment between the parties, and the suit in the other court immediately abates and must be dismissed. Code Prac. art. 94, as amended by Act No. 62 of 1918.\\\"\\nThe requirements for sustaining a plea of res judicata are set forth as follows in Article 2286 of the Louisiana Civil Code:\\n\\\"The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with respect to what was the object of the judgment. The thing demanded must be the same; the demand must be founded on the same cause of action; the demand must be between the same parties, and formed by them against each other in the same quality.\\\"\\nThe record unquestionably demonstrates that these requirements have been fully met. The issue of the widow's rights has been fully litigated in the New York proceedings. On the basis of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the interpretation of that clause by the Supreme Court of the United States, we hold that we are bound to accord full faith and credit to the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York as a final decision between the parties regardless of whether or not the courts of Louisiana would have reached the same result.\\nThe Full Faith and Credit Clause, however, does not require that we agree with another court's interpretation of one of our statutes. The interpretation placed upon Article 2400 is incorrect and the conclusion reached is repugnant to our law.\\nArticle 2400 of the Louisiana Civil Code reads as follows:\\n\\\"All property acquired in this State by non-resident married persons, whether the title thereto be in the name of either the husband or wife, or in their joint names, shall be subject to the same provisions of law which regulate the community of acquets and gains between citizens of this State.\\\" [LSA-C.C. Art. 2400]\\nThe New York Court of Appeals resolved the choice of law problem by examining the respective contacts which Louisiana and New York have to the controversy. The court posed the issue as follows:\\n\\\"The issue in this case is whether the community property laws of Louisiana should be applied to govern the property rights of New York domiciliaries in intangible personal property acquired during coverture. From the previous discussion, it is clear that the community property system is designed to regulate the property rights of married persons and, in particular, to protect the interest of each spouse in the property accumulated during marriage. For reasons which become obvious merely in stating the purpose of the rule, Louisiana has no such interest in protecting and regulating the rights of married persons residing and domiciled in New York.\\\" [20 N.Y.2d 124, 134, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811, 820, 228 N.E.2d 799, 808]\\nThe court then made the following statements :\\n\\\"It is urged by the appellant that the Louisiana contacts with this case give it the paramount interest in the application of its law. Among the contacts which are urged as being significant are the facts the deceased was born in Louisiana, that, although he was domiciled in New York, the bulk of his fortune was made in Louisiana, and that the documentary evidences of his intangible property are located in that jurisdiction. Exactly how these contacts are related to the policies sought to be vindicated by Louisiana's community property laws is not made clear. The reason, no doubt, is that they have no relation whatever.\\\" [Ibid, p. 134-135, 281 N.Y.S.2d p. 820, 228 N.E.2d p. 808]\\nThe court concluded that New York law must be applied. The court then discussed whether Louisiana Courts would apply Louisiana or New York law. The reasons and conclusions are lengthy but deserve repeating here:\\n\\\"An examination of the context in which article 2400 was enacted would appear to indicate that it was intended to apply to property purchased by nonresidents who, subsequent to the acquisition of the property, become residents of Louisiana. In two cases decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court shortly before the enactment of article 2400, it was held that the real property of such persons located in Louisiana was not subject to the community property laws of Louisiana but rather to the laws of the State where the owners were domiciled at the time the property was acquired. (Huff v. Borland, 6 La.Ann. 436; Wolfe v. Gilmer, 7 La.Ann. 583). Louisiana does, of course, have a substantial interest in regulating the property rights of married persons domiciled in Louisiana, regardless of when the property was acquired, and it is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the effectuation of this governmental interest motivated the enactment of article 2400. It might be noted that, although the Louisiana statutes subject to the community of 'acquets and gains' all property held by persons married in Louisiana and all property acquired by persons married in other jurisdictions (art. 2399, supra) after they become residents of Louisiana (La.Code of 1870, art. 2401), no provision other than article 2400 is applicable to property acquired in Louisiana by nonresidents who later move to Louisiana.\\\" [20 N.Y.2d 124, 131, 132, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811, 817-818, 228 N.E.2d 799, 805-806]\\nThe court then concluded:\\n\\\"Up to this point we have not considered whether the Louisiana courts would, in fact, apply their own law to determine the widow's rights in the property in question. Although it would appear from the unequivocal wording of the statute that this would be the case, the previous discussion of the context in which article 2400 was enacted, as well as the pertinent Louisiana decisions in this area, leads to the conclusion that the Louisiana courts might well apply New York law. Perhaps the leading Louisiana case in this area is Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 52 La.Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851, 50 L.R.A. 816 [1900]. There the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that a cause of action for personal injuries suffered in Louisiana was an intangible property right which had its legal situs at the domicile of the married woman and could not be said to have been property acquired in Louisiana. Therefore, the plaintiff wife, a nonresident of Louisiana, was permitted to sue instead of her husband.\\n\\\"This case was distinguished in a later decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The court appeared to indicate that the basis of the decision was not that article 2400 was inapplicable but rather that it would not be applied where the domiciliary law was not inimical to the policy of the State of Louisiana. (Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc., 202 La. 505, 12 So.2d 253 [1942].)\\n\\\"The application of New York law to the facts in this case could hardly be said to be inimical to the policy of Louisiana. The protection afforded the wife under our law certainly makes adequate provision for her financial security. Therefore, whether Williams or Matney are regarded as controlling, a rather strong argument can be made that the Louisiana courts, under these circumstances, would not apply article 2400.\\\" [20 N.Y.2d 135, 136, 281 N.Y.S.2d 821, 228 N.E.2d 809]\\nWe cannot agree with the conclusion reached by the New York court. In the first place the court has refused to properly recognize Louisiana's right to establish its own conflict of laws rule. In clear unambiguous terms Article 2400 of the Louisiana Civil Code states the question of ownership of property located within this state is to be determined according to our laws. The right of the situs state to assert such a rule has been approved by commentators in the field of conflict of laws.\\nThe New York court also erroneously relied heavily on cases decided before the passage of Article 2400 which first became part of our law as a result of the passage of Act 292 of 1852. Huff v. Borland, supra; Wolfe v. Gilmer, supra.\\nThe New York court also appears to have completely ignored the most complete interpretation of Article 2400 by the Louisiana courts to date. In Succession of Dill, 155 La. 47, 98 So. 752 (1924), the Louisiana Supreme Court sets forth the far reaching effects of LSA-C.C. art. 2400. In that decision the court stated:\\n\\\"Now it is clear that a community exists in the following cases:\\n(1) Where the parties marry, and continue to live here.\\n(2) Where the parties marry here, and remove out of the state.\\n(3) Where the parties marry outside the spate, and continue to reside outside thereof.\\n(4) Where the parties marry outside the state, and then remove here together.\\n\\\"And all these communities have, as their basis, equality between the spouses; that is to say, property acquired in this state by either of them falls into the community.\\\" (Emphasis supplied).\\n%\\n\\\"We therefore conclude that the accepted interpretation of the act of 1852 (R.C.C. art. 2400) is the correct interpretation thereof, and that all property acquired in this state by married persons becomes community property regardless of where both or either of them reside (unless they have contracted otherwise). R.C.C. art. 2329; Act 236 of 1910, p. 400.\\\" (Emphasis supplied). [98 So. 752, 755]\\nIn view of the clear language of Article 2400 and the preceding authorities we are convinced that Mrs. Crichton was entitled as a substantive right to a one-half interest in the movable property left by the deceased under Louisiana law. However, as a consequence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution we are bound to hold that the judgment of the State of New York is entitled to res judicata effect in Louisiana.\\nFor the reasons so stated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant.\\n. \\\"Art 2400. All property acquired in this state by non-resident married persons, whether the title thereto be in the name of either the husband or wife, or in their joint names, shall be subject to the same provisions of law which regulate the community of acquets and gains between citizens of this State.\\\"\\n. \\\"The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto.\\n\\\"The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.\\n\\\"Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 947.\\\" [28 U.S.C.A. \\u00a7 1738]\\n. It was later recognized that the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit did not bar an additional award in the second state unless the award in the first state was actually exclusive in nature. Industrial Commission of Wis. v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 67 S.Ct. 886, 91 L.Ed. 1140 (1947). However, the fundamental precepts of Magnolia v. Hunt, supra, remain unchanged.\\n. In Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963) the following language is pertinent:\\n\\\"However, while it is established that a court in one State, when asked to give effect to the judgment of a court in another State, may constitutionally inquire into the foreign court's jurisdiction to render that judgment, the modern decisions of this Court have carefully delineated the permissible scope of such an inquiry. From these decisions there emerges the general rule that a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit\\u2014 even as to questions of jurisdiction \\u2014 when the second court's inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.\\n\\\"With respect to questions of jurisdic-dietion over the person, this principle was unambiguously established in Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244. There it was held that a federal court in Iowa must give binding effect to the judgment of a federal court in Missouri despite the claim that the original court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant's person, once it was shown to the court in Iowa that that question had been fully litigated in the Missouri forum. 'Public policy,' said the Court, 'dictates that there be an end of litigation ; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest; and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties. We see no reason why this doctrine should not apply in every ease where one voluntarily appears, presents his ease and is fully heard, and why he should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded by the judgment of the tribunal to which he has submitted his cause.' 283 U.S. 525-526, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. at 1247.\\\" (Emphasis supplied). [Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186, 191, 192]\\n. See Milliken v. Myer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1941) where the Court made the following statements: \\\"Where a judgment rendered in one state is challenged in another, a want of jurisdiction over either the person or the subject matter is of course open to inquiry. But if the judgment on its face appears to be a 'record of a court of general jurisdiction, such jurisdiction over the cause and the parties is to be presumed unless disproved by extrinsic evidence, or by the record itself.' Adam v. Saenger, supra (303 U.S. 59, at p. 62, 58 S.Ct. 454, 82 L.Ed. 649, 651). In such case the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles on which the judgment is based. Whatever mistakes of law may underlie the judgment it is 'conclusive as to all media concludendi.' Fauntleroy v. Lum, supra (210 U.S. 230 at p. 237, 28 S.Ct. 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039, 1042).\\\" [311 U.S. 457, 462, 61 S.Ct. 339, 342, 85 L.Ed. 278, 282, 283]\\n. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 532.\\n. Professor Leflar has made the following observation:\\n\\\"It must be remembered, whichever law be chosen, that the situs has a sort of primary control over property within its borders. The situs may refer the determination of marital interests in the movable to the law of the domicile, or it may determine the matter by its own law, as it pleases. For example, the Louisiana community property statutes are expressly applicable to all property, movable or immovable, acquired in Louisiana by non-residents. The great body of American authority, however, is to the effect that the law of the domicile, rather than that of the situs, at the time of acquisition controls \\\" [Robert A. Lef-lar, The Law of Conflict of Laws, sec. 176 (1959)]\\n. Worthy of note are the comments of the author in 42 Tulane Law Review 662 (1968).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9718948.json b/la/9718948.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..03031eeda6ba6379fb8739495d64e544b19a5339
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9718948.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9718948\", \"name\": \"FIDELITY AND CASUALTY COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1971-02-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 3305\", \"first_page\": \"255\", \"last_page\": \"259\", \"citations\": \"244 So. 2d 255\", \"volume\": \"244\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:25:17.223659+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before FRUG\\u00c9, SAVOY and DOMEN-GEAUX, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"FIDELITY AND CASUALTY COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants.\", \"head_matter\": \"FIDELITY AND CASUALTY COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants.\\nNo. 3305.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.\\nFeb. 4, 1971.\\nRehearing Denied March 4, 1971.\\nGold, Hall & Skye, by Jimmy M. Stoker, Alexandria, for defendant-appellant, Aetna Life and Casualty Co.\\nNeblett, F\\u00fchrer & Hunter, by Robert B. Neblett, Jr., Alexandria, for plaintiff-ap-pellee, Neil Maurer. \\u2022'$\\nStafford, Pitts & Bolen, by Richard Storms, Alexandria, for plaintiff-appellee, Fidelity & Casualty Co.\\nEdward B. Cloutman, III, Alexandria, Edward Roberts, Alexandria, Zeldon & Zeldon, by Max Zeldon, New Orleans, for defendant-appellee.\\nBefore FRUG\\u00c9, SAVOY and DOMEN-GEAUX, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"2427\", \"char_count\": \"14019\", \"text\": \"SAVOY, Judge.\\nThis case and the companion case of Maurer v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, 244 So.2d 260 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1971), arose out of a multiple vehicle accident which occurred October 21, 1968, on U. S. Highway 165 at its intersection with Louisiana Highway 1203 in Kings-ville, near Pineville, in Rapides Parish, Louisiana. A truck and trailer owned by A. A. Rabalais, Inc., being driven by its employee, James H. Tate, was proceeding in a southerly direction along U.S. Highway 165 and collided with a car crossing the highway owned and being driven by Joseph C. Daniels. After this collision, the truck proceeded a distance, struck an automobile owned and occupied by Neil A. Maurer which was parked at a service station. At the time, Maurer was working in the course and scope of his employment with Reproduction Supply Agency of Alexandria. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York insured the Maurer car against loss by collision, and was also the workmen's compensation insurer of Maurer's employer.\\nIn the instant case, Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York sued under its rights by subrogation for the amounts it paid on the collision loss to Neil A. Maurer, and for the medical and compensation benefits paid out under the workmen's compensation policy resulting from the personal injuries received by Maurer. Named as defendants in this case are Joseph C. Daniels, A. A. Rabalais, Inc., and its liability insurer, Aetna Life and Casualty Company.\\nIn the companion case, Neil A. Maurer sued for personal injuries and damages; and named as defendants are Joseph C. Daniels, A. A. Rabalais, Inc., Aetna Life and Casualty Company, and his own insurer, Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, under the provisions of the uninsured motorist clause.\\nThis case, the companion case cited above, and another lawsuit for damages by James H. Tate against Joseph C. Daniels, were consolidated for trial. After trial on the merits, the district court found that Joseph C. Daniels and James H. Tate were guilty of joint and concurrent negligence which caused the accident. In the instant case, judgment was rendered for plaintiff, Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, and against defendants, Aetna Life and Casualty Company and Joseph ' C. Daniels, in solido, for $3,341.52, representing $1,296.24 for automobile damages, $1,-615.00 for workmen's compensation payments, and $430.28 for medical payments, plus legal interest and costs. From this judgment Aetna Life and Casualty Company and A. A. Rabalais, Inc.' filed an appeal to this Court.\\nIn the companion case, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff, Neil A. Maurer, and against defendants, A. A. Ra-balais, Inc., Aetna Life and Casualty Company, and Joseph C. Daniels, in solido, in the amount of $7,100.00, plus legal interest and costs. Judgment was further rendered in favor of Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York denying plaintiff's claim, but reserving to plaintiff all rights against said company under the uninsured motorists clause should judgment be unenforceable against Aetna Life and Casualty Company, but subject to a credit for the subrogation claim, and subject to the limits of coverage. From this judgment, the plaintiff, Neil A. Maurer, and the defendants, Aetna Life and Casualty Company and A. A. Ra-balais, Inc. filed appeals to this Court.\\nThe record shows the accident occurred at about 6:30 A. M. on October 21, 1968, on U. S. Highway 165 at its intersection with Louisiana Highway 1203, which is also known as Maryhill Road. Highway 165 runs generally north and south, and Mary-hill Road runs generally east and west at this intersection. Just north of this intersection Highway 165 forms a \\\"Y\\\" junction with Military Highway. In traveling south on Highway 165, one would take the left or east fork of the highway to enter Military Highway or the right or west fork to continue on Highway 165. Mary-hill Road ends where it joins the right or west fork of the \\\"Y\\\" intersection. There is a neutral area within the \\\"V\\\" area formed by the joining of Military Highway and Highway 165. This neutral area aligns with Maryhill Road, and would be used in proceeding to Maryhill Road from Military Highway. It is separated by two islands within the \\\"V\\\" area.\\nDefendant, Daniels, drove his car into the neutral area from Military Highway, stopped at the stop sign giving Highway 165 the right-of-way, and then proceeded across Highway 165 with the intention of proceeding westerly on Maryhill Road. At this time, the Rabalais truck was proceeding southerly along Highway 165, and the two vehicles collided.\\nThe Rabalais truck continued after the impact in a southwesterly direction onto the concrete apron of Dupree's Esso Service Station located in the southwest corner of Maryhill Road and U. S. Highway 165, running over a small traffic island or neutral ground, and then into the station pumps and the automobile in which Neil A. Maurer was seated, pushing the Maurer car over 50 feet to the point where the vehicles came to rest.\\nThe investigating state trooper located the point of impact on Highway 165 at a point 1 foot 4 inches from the west edge of the highway at its intersection with I^aryhill Road. There were gouge marks and debris in the highway at this point. Highway 165 was 22 feet 1 inch wide at this point. The trooper found skid marks left from the truck 33 feet in length beginning north of the point of impact. He did not recall whether or not these skid marks proceeded beyond the point of impact.\\nThe truck motor was still running when he arrived. On questioning the service station operator, he was told that Tate ran from the cab of the truck after it had stopped. Upon questioning Tate about this, Tate said he could not remember exactly at the time as to whether he was thrown out of the truck or whether he got out by himself. At the time the trooper arrived, Tate was lying next to the small island within the apron of the service station lot, at about the point where the truck had crossed the island.\\nThe record shows the accident occurred at night, the area of the intersection was lighted by lights from two service stations, and the weather was clear and dry.\\nJames H. Tate testified he had worked for A. A. Rabalais, Inc. for six years, and his route carried him through the same area every other day for the past three years. His tractor was pulling an empty 40 foot van which was 13]\\u00a14 feet high. He stated he stopped about a quarter of a mile from the \\\"Y\\\" intersection to check his tires, that he had only gained a speed of about 35 miles per hour and was in fourth gear of ten gears at the time of the acci- \\u2022 dent. He first saw the Daniels car when it had \\\"jumped\\\" three or four feet across the line and was about 30 feet in front of him. He reached for the horn, but did not know whether he blew it, slammed on his brakes and attempted to swerve to the right to miss the car. The front of the car struck the left front of the truck. He testified he lost control of the truck, the door came open and he fell out; and the next thing he remembered was that someone put a covering over him, and he was lying against the curb next to the island. He noticed the car had its headlights burning. He estimated the car was five feet over the center line of the road, and his truck was partly off on the shoulder at the time of the collision. He was alone in the cab of the truck.\\nJoseph C. Daniels testified he left Military Highway, pulled into the neutral ground and stopped for the stop sign; he stated he looked right, then left, then straight ahead, and started into the intersection with the intention of going straight across Highway 165 into Maryhill Road. He stated that as he pulled out his boy hollered there was a truck, he slammed on his brakes and saw the truck about a foot from him; and the collision occurred. The right front fender of his car struck the truck, and his car spun around and was struck again in the rear. He testified he pulled out from the stop sign at a normal speed, and that he had only traveled eight to ten feet from the stop sign to the point of impact.\\nThere was a depression in the highway which affected visibility to the north of the intersection in question. However, from the evidence, and the personal observations of the district court who looked at the area, the driver of a vehicle traveling in a southerly direction as.Tate was driving could see the stop sign and a vehicle at the neutral ground in the intersection a distance of at least 300 feet from the intersection. There was nothing to obstruct a view of the intersection from this distance.\\nThe judgments of the district court against Joseph C. Daniels have become final, as Daniels did not file an appeal in either case. The evidence establishes clearly that he was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the accident.\\nThe issues raised in these appeals are whether or not James H. Tate was guilty of negligence which was a concurring and proximate cause of the accident; and whether or not the quantum awarded Neil A. Maurer was inadequate or excessive.\\nAfter reviewing the evidence in this case, we are of the opinion that Tate was guilty of speeding which was a proximate cause of the accident. Since we have reached this conclusion, it is not necessary to discuss the other ground upon which the trial court found liability, namely, the failure to keep a proper lookout.\\nAppellants maintain that the district court erred in finding that Tate was driving the truck in excess of the speed limit of 45 miles per hour. In this connection, it is argued that Tate testified he was driving 35 miles per hour; that no other witness observed the speed of the truck until after the first collision; that neither Hat-taway nor Dupree had a sufficient opportunity to judge the speed of the truck; that no foundation was laid for their testimony in that regard; and that evidence as to the distance the truck traveled after the first collision, and the damages caused was not sufficient to establish excessive speed.\\nMary Hattaway, who lived across the street from the Esso Service Station, stated she heard a crash, she did not see the Daniels car, but saw the truck as it proceeded off the highway, over the curbs and across the island, hit the pumps, strike the parked car and continue until it stopped. She had been driving twelve years and stated, over objection, that she thought the truck was going faster than it ought to have been. She characterized the speed as very fast. She estimated the speed over 40 miles per hour although she could not state how much faster.\\nMason Dupree, the owner of the Esso Service Station, testified he was at his desk, heard the crash, saw the Daniels car skidding sideways, and the Rabalais truck swerving. He stated he saw the vehicles impact a second time, then as he walked through the door of his station, he saw the truck hit the steep curb of the island, and come on across, striking the pumps, lights, and the Maurer car; and then travel another 50 or 60 feet to where the two vehicles stopped together. He stated the truck appeared to be going wide open. Over objection, he estimated the speed of the truck at 60 miles per hour. He stated the front bumper of the truck hit the pumps and struck the car broadside. He saw the driver in the truck as it came through the area of the station, and then noticed someone move from the cab of the truck toward the highway after the truck stopped. He thought this must have been the truck driver as there was no one else in the area. The motor of the truck was still running after the accident.\\nThe testimony of Hattaway and Dupree was admissible upon showing that they drove vehicles and observed the speeds of vehicles. See Jones v. Southern General Insurance Company, La.App.; 157 So.2d 335. The evidence shows these witnesses were in a position to observe the truck, and any objection to their testimony would go to the weight rather than the admissibility of their testimony. Inasmuch as the truck had braked and left skid marks of 33 feet at the first'collision, it is reasonable to assume the truck was thereafter going slower than it was prior to the first collision. The distance the truck traveled, and the extent of the subsequent damages it caused substantiated the testimony of Hat-taway and Dupree of excessive speed. The district court rejected the testimony of Tate that he was driving 35 miles per hour. This Court will not disturb the district court's finding that Tate was driving at an excessive rate of speed prior to the collision with the Daniels car. Each case must stand on its own facts, and this Court finds the evidence supports the holding that the excessive speed of the truck was a proximate cause of the second collision with the Maurer car, and the damages resulting therefrom.\\nThe issue as to quantum pertains to and will be discussed in the companion case of Maurer v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, supra. The damages sustained by plaintiff in the instant case were stipulated to by the parties in the amount as awarded by the district court.\\nFor the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court in the instant case on appeal is affirrped. All costs of the appeal are assessed to appellants.\\nAffirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9725150.json b/la/9725150.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2bf86ea28b8c6beb7b9f03b920f47bc0161cb018
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9725150.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9725150\", \"name\": \"Mrs. Gertie HALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hall v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1971-07-13\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 3506\", \"first_page\": \"435\", \"last_page\": \"438\", \"citations\": \"250 So. 2d 435\", \"volume\": \"250\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:26:48.431638+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before FRUG\\u00c9, SAVOY and HOOD, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Mrs. Gertie HALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Mrs. Gertie HALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\\nNo. 3506.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.\\nJuly 13, 1971.\\nNathan A. Cormie and Robert E. Morgan, Lake Charles, for plaintiff-appellant.\\nHall, Raggio, Farrar & Barnett by Thomas L. Raggio, Lake Charles, for defendant-appellee.\\nBefore FRUG\\u00c9, SAVOY and HOOD, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1655\", \"char_count\": \"9654\", \"text\": \"HOOD, Judge.\\nMrs. Gertie Hall instituted this suit to recover benefits alleged to be due her under a life insurance policy issued by defendant, Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company. A summary judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the suit, and plaintiff has appealed.\\nThere is no dispute as to the facts. The issue presented involves an interpretation of the provisions of the policy.\\nPlaintiff's husband, Richard Dale Hall, was killed in a helicopter crash in the Gulf of Mexico on October 8, 1966. There was in effect at that time a group life insurance policy issued by defendant, insuring the lives of the employees of Tidex, Inc., and/or Tidewater Marine Service, Inc. Richard Dale Hall was included as an insured under that contract, and plaintiff was named as his beneficiary in the policy.\\nThe policy issued by defendant provides a life insurance benefit of $5,000.00, and an additional benefit of $5,000.00 in event of loss of life as the result of nonoccupational bodily injuries due to external, violent and accidental means. After the death of Mr. Hall, defendant paid the sum of $5,000.00 to plaintiff, representing the benefit due as life insurance, but it refused to pay the additional sum of $5,000.00 claimed by plaintiff as the accidental death benefit. Plaintiff instituted this suit for the additional sum of $5,000.00, alleging that that amount is due her under the policy, since her husband's death was caused by violent and accidental means.\\nUnder the heading of \\\"General Provisions,\\\" the policy provides:\\n\\\"Legal Actions \\u2014 No action at law or in equity shall be brought to recover on the group policy prior to the expiration of sixty days after written proof of loss has been furnished in accordance with the requirements of the group policy. No such action shall be brought after the expiration of three years after the time written proof of loss is required to be furnished,\\\" (italics added).\\nThe policy also provides under the same general heading that:\\n\\\"Proofs of Loss \\u2014 Written proof of loss must be furnished to the Insurance Company at its said office in case of claim for loss for which the group policy provides any periodic payment contingent upon continuing loss within ninety days after the termination of the period for which the Insurance Company is liable and in case of claim for any other loss within ninety days after the date of such loss. Failure to furnish such proof within the time required shall not invalidate nor reduce any claim if it was not reasonably possible to give proof within such time, provided such proof is furnished as soon as reasonably possible and in no event, except in the absence of legal capacity, later than one year from the time proof is otherwise required.\\\" (italics added).\\nThis suit was instituted on January 29, 1970, or three years and 113 days after the death of the insured. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that plaintiff's suit was filed too late, since it was instituted more than three years and 90 days after the loss was sustained. The trial judge concluded that plaintiff is barred from maintaining the action by the prescription provided in the policy, and judgment was rendered dismissing the suit. It is from that judgment that plaintiff has appealed.\\nPlaintiff takes the position that she had three years and ISO days after the death of the insured, or until March 6, 1970, within which to institute suit, and she contends that the suit thus was timely filed. She argues that under the provisions of the policy the three year prescriptive period therein provided does not commence to run until after her right to sue accrued, that is, until after the expiration of the 90 day period allowed for filing a proof of loss and the 60 day period during which no suit can be filed.\\nDefendant contends that the three year prescriptive period commenced to run 90 days after the death of the insured or on January 6, 1967, and that this suit was not timely filed since it was not instituted until after January 6, 1970.\\nSubject to statutory limitations, a policy of insurance is a contract between the parties, and as between them it constitutes the law of the case. The rules of its interpretation are the same as for agreements generally, and where the language is clear and expresses the intention of the parties, the contract will be enforced as written. Pappas v, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 191 So.2d 658 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1966); Labbe v. Mt. Beacon Insurance Company, 221 So.2d 354 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1969).\\nThe general rule is that where the provisions of a contract are ambiguous, the contract will be construed against the party who framed it. Where there is room for doubt as to the meaning of an insurance policy, the courts generally have held, consistent with the above mentioned general rule, that the policy will be construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured, especially where a forfeiture is involved, so that indemnity will be granted rather than denied. Muse v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 193 La. 605, 192 So. 72 (1939).\\nA provision in an insurance policy fixing a definite delay within which suit thereon must be filed is binding on the parties, unless the provision is contrary to express law. Muse v. Heine, 189 So.2d 40 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1966); and Green v. Peoples Benev. Industrial Life Insurance Company of Louisiana, 5 So.2d 916 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1941). In the instant suit, the provisions of the policy limiting the time within which suit may be instituted are not contrary to any express law of this state. That provision of the policy is binding on the parties, therefore, and will be enforced as written.\\nWe have considered the policy involved in the instant suit with the above rules in mind. The three year prescriptive period provided in that policy begins to run \\\"after the time written proof of loss is required to be furnished.\\\" The written proof of loss is required to be furnished \\\"within ninety days after the date of such loss.\\\" We interpret the policy to mean that the three year period within which a suit may be brought to recover on that policy commences to run 90 days after the death of the insured. In this case the death of the insured occurred on October 8, 1966. The written proof of loss was required to be filed within 90 days thereafter, or by January 6, 1967. And, under the provisions of the policy suit could be filed within three years after the last mentioned date, or by January 6, 1970. This suit was not filed until January 29, 1970, which was too late.\\nWe find no merit to the claim that the three year prescriptive period does not begin to run until 60 days after the 90 day period allowed for filing a proof of loss. Plaintiff argues that she was precluded from filing suit \\\"prior to the expiration of sixty days after written proof of loss has been furnished,\\\" that her \\\"right to sue\\\" thus did not accrue until the expiration of that sixty day period which occurred on March 6, 1967, and that the three year prescriptive period thus did not commence to run until March 6, 1967. According to plaintiff's computations, she had until March 6, 1970, within which to sue, and she contends that her suit thus was timely filed.\\nTo support that argument plaintiff relies on the cases of Finkelstein v. American Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 222 La. 516, 62 So.2d 820 (1952); and Steel, Administrator, v. Phoenix Insurance Company of Brooklyn, 154 U.S. 518, 14 S.Ct. 1153, 38 L.Ed. 1064 (1894).\\nThe Finkelstein case was specifically overruled by our Supreme Court in Gremillion v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 256 La. 974, 240 So.2d 727 (1970). In Gremillion a fire policy provided that no suit on the policy shall be sustainable \\\"unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been complied with, and unless commenced within twelve months next after inception of the loss.\\\" Among the \\\"requirements\\\" of the policy prior to suit were the filing of a proof of loss within 60 days after the loss, the selection of appraisers within 20 days after the parties fail to agree on the amount of the loss; and the appointment of an umpire within 15 days after the appraisers fail to agree on one. Although the policy provided that no suit could be filed until after these requirements were met, our Supreme Court held that the prescriptive period of one year nevertheless commenced to run on the day of the fire loss, and not on the day the other \\\"requirements\\\" relating to proof of loss were completed. In our opinion that holding is applicable here. We do not consider the Steel case to be applicable, but if it should be considered as being in conflict with Gremillion, then we feel bound to follow the holding of our Supreme Court in the latter case.\\nWe find no ambiguity in the provisions of the policy involved here relating to the time within which suit on the policy may be filed. Our conclusion is that this suit was not timely filed, since it was instituted more than three years and 90 days after the death of the insured. We, therefore, find no error in the judgment of the trial court dismissing the suit.\\nFor the reasons herein set out, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. The costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff-appellant.\\nAffirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9745765.json b/la/9745765.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..604003bab3f2a943e96cd3bf242222fd879efdab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9745765.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9745765\", \"name\": \"Mrs. Leona HOWARD et al. v. HARDWARE MUTUAL COMPANY et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Howard v. Hardware Mutual Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1973-12-03\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 51653\", \"first_page\": \"334\", \"last_page\": \"337\", \"citations\": \"286 So. 2d 334\", \"volume\": \"286\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:06:37.423986+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Mrs. Leona HOWARD et al. v. HARDWARE MUTUAL COMPANY et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Mrs. Leona HOWARD et al. v. HARDWARE MUTUAL COMPANY et al.\\nNo. 51653.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nDec. 3, 1973.\\nVelma P. O\\u2019Neal, Robert J. Mack, Joseph A. Sims, Jr., Sims, Mack & Sims, Hammond, for plaintiffs-applicants.\\nDaniel R. Atkinson, Dale, Owen, Richardson, Taylor & Mathews, Baton Rouge, for defendants-respondents.\", \"word_count\": \"1245\", \"char_count\": \"7335\", \"text\": \"SANDERS, Chief Justice.\\nThis matter is before us, for the second time, to review a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeal, wherein the plaintiff's appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the $25.00 filing fee. 251 So.2d 642. See also 277 So.2d 192.\\nWe remanded this matter to the trial court for the taking of testimony to determine whether the failure to pay the filing fee in this case was imputable to the appellant, Leona Howard, 262 La. 216, 263 So.2d 13 (1972).\\nThe suit arose when the plaintiff, Leona Howard, sued to recover damages, for herself and her minor child, Sharon Faye Howard, because of the death of her husband, Hardy Howard, Jr., from a gunshot wound inflicted by the defendant, Marvin L. Mobley. Mobley's general liability insurer, Central Mutual Insurance Company; his employer, Southern Truck Service, Inc; and its insurer, Hardware Mutual Casualty Company were named as defendants in this suit.\\nAfter trial on the merits, judgment was rendered in favor of Mrs. Howard, individually, for $5,339.50, against Hardware Mutual, Southern Truck Service and Mob-ley. The suit was dismissed as to Central Mutual. No damages were awarded to plaintiff on behalf of the minor child, Sharon Faye Howard, born two and one-half months after her father's death, the court finding that the father would not have supported the child if he had lived.\\nHardware Mutual and Southern Truck Service moved for and received an order of suspensive appeal to- the First Circuit Court of Appeal, returnable on March 10, 1971. The necessary appeal bond was filed.\\nLeona Howard was granted an order for a devolutive appeal, with a return date of March 10, 1971. A bond for this appeal was timely filed.\\nMobley filed an answer to these appeals wherein he sought a reversal of the find ing that he was negligent; and alternatively, he asserted coverage under Hardware Mutual's policy.\\nThe record was completed and lodged with the Court of Appeal on April 23, 1971. On May 12, 1971, prior to the hearing date, Hardware Mutual and Southern Truck Service moved to dismiss Leona Howard's appeal on the grounds that she had failed to timely pay the $25.00 filing fee fixed by LSA-R.S. 13:352(1), as required by Article 2126 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and Rule I, Section 10, Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.\\nLeona Howard filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, consisting of an affidavit by her attorney. The affidavit contained a statement to the effect that the attorney had inquired as to the sufficiency of funds on hand in the office of the Clerk of Court in East Baton Rouge Parish with regard to coverage for the plaintiff's appeal. The response, as set forth in the affidavit, explained that enough money had been previously deposited and that no additional costs were necessary.\\nOn June 30, 1971, the Court of Appeal dismissed Leona Howard's appeal, for failure to pay the $25.00 filing fee. 251 So.2d 642. In the Hardware Mutual and Southern Truck Service appeal, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed on September 3, 1971, and the contentions in Mobley's answer to the appeal were rejected. Since Leona Howard's appeal had been dismissed, the court was unable to consider the claim for damages on behalf of the minor child. 253 So.2d 555.\\nWrits were granted by this Court on Leona Howard's application, individually and on behalf of the minor, to review the judgment dismissing her appeal. 259 La. 769, 252 So.2d 667.\\nOn October 5, 1972, after remand, the district court heard testimony from Leona Howard's attorney and employees of the clerk's office for the district court in East Baton Rouge Parish, regarding the filing fee. Based upon this testimony and the documentary evidence, the district court found that there were insufficient funds, at the time of the appeal, to cover the filing fee of Leona Howard. The district court further found that appellant's attorney had inquired regarding the sufficiency of money on hand and was assured that there were sufficient funds to cover his appeal.\\nBased- upon these findings, the court concluded:\\n\\\"I feel that, to answer the question of the Supreme Court, that the failure to pay the filing fee was not imputable to the fault of Mr. Mack and, thus, imputable to his client, the appellant, Leona Howard.\\\"\\nThe finding of the trial judge on this factual issue is entitled to great weight. We adopt it.\\nThe law favors appeals. Thus, they are to be maintained unless legal grounds for dismissal are clearly shown. La. Power and Light Co. v. Lasseigne, 255 La. 579, 232 So.2d 278 (1970); Portier v. Marquette Casualty Co., 245 La. 702, 160 So.2d 585 (1964); Wischer v. Madison Realty Company, 242 La. 334, 136 So.2d 62 (1961); Richardson v. Richardson, La.App., 264 So.2d 699 (1972); In re Roberts, La.App., 257 So.2d 473 (1972).\\nArticle 2161 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides:\\n\\\"An appeal shall not be dismissed because the trial record is missing, incomplete or in error no matter who is responsible, and the court may remand the case either for retrial or for correction of the record. An appeal shall not be dismissed because of any other irregularity, error or defect unless it is imputable to the appellant. Except as provided in Article 2162, a motion to dismiss an appeal because of any irregularity, error, or defect which is imputable to the appellant must be filed within three days, exclusive of holidays, of the return day or the date on which the record on appeal is lodged in the appellate court, whichever is later.\\\" (Italics ours).\\nIn the present case, no \\\"irregularity, error or defect\\\" appears in the record. The Howard appeal, with the completed record, was timely lodged in the Court of Appeal. The sole dispute centers around the failure to pay the necessary filing fees.\\nWe have found that the failure to timely pay the filing fee was due to no fault of the appellant. She has been ready and willing to pay an accurately determined cost deficit at any time. Moreover, once the appeal has been timely lodged in the appellate court, the non-payment of the filing fee within the three-day period fixed by Article 2126 LSA-C.C.P., is no longer fatal to the appeal. See Suire v. Patin's Tire Service, La.App., 251 So.2d 182, writ ref., 259 La. 811, 253 So.2d 68 (1971); Delaware Imp. Corp. v. Shall, La.App., 243 So.2d 75 (1971). See also Vogt v. Wheat, La.App., 222 So.2d 579 (1969).\\nThe respondents rely upon our decision in La. Power and Light Co. v. Lasseigne, 255 La. 579, 232 So.2d 278 (1970). In that case, however, the appeal was not timely lodged in the Court of Appeal. Hence, the case is distinguishable.\\nWe hold that the appeal was improperly dismissed.\\nFor the reasons assigned, the judgment of the First Circuit Court of Appeal, dismissing the appeal, is reversed. The case is remanded to that court for a consideration of the merits. The costs in this Court are taxed against the respondents. The assessment of all other costs relating to the appeal will await the outcome of the case.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9747650.json b/la/9747650.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3319b81defc142f8cf0c7c54dec44f692a52abdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9747650.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9747650\", \"name\": \"ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY v. DAIGLE PONTIAC-BUICK, INC., et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Zurich Insurance Co. v. Daigle Pontiac-Buick, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1974-02-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 9712\", \"first_page\": \"282\", \"last_page\": \"284\", \"citations\": \"292 So. 2d 282\", \"volume\": \"292\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:47:07.719394+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SARTAIN, TUCKER and WATSON, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY v. DAIGLE PONTIAC-BUICK, INC., et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY v. DAIGLE PONTIAC-BUICK, INC., et al.\\nNo. 9712.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.\\nFeb. 11, 1974.\\nCharles W. Wilson, III, Baton Rouge, for appellant.\\nA. J. Kling, Jr., Gonzales, for appellees.\\nBefore SARTAIN, TUCKER and WATSON, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"934\", \"char_count\": \"5501\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nThis is a subrogation suit by plaintiff Zurich Insurance Company to recover Five Hundred Fifty-one and no/100 ($551.00) Dollars paid under an insurance policy issued to Earl Trabeaux for loss occurring when he took his 1971 Pontiac GTO automobile to defendant Daigle Pontiac-Buick Company for minor repairs, and was forced to leave it there overnight, during the course of which some one stole four wheels from Mr. Trabeaux's car and committed other damage upon it. Judgment was granted in the defendant's favor in the trial court, and plaintiff has appealed.\\nPlaintiff cites as error the following:\\nI. That the trial judge erred in holding that a compensated depositary is not required to provide a fenced area or a night watchman.\\nII. That the trial judge erred in unequivocally holding that the compensated depositary is required only to exercise the same degree of care as to vehicles left with him as he would with his own property.\\nThe lot on which Mr. Trabeaux's car was parked fronts on Burnside Street which is the main thoroughfare of Gonzales, Louisiana. Along the front of this lot two rows of new cars were parked which were for sale. The Trabeaux vehicle was parked behind them, locked. The lot was well lighted, to the extent that a person could be seen on the lot and the colors of the automobiles could be distinguished. The lot was unfenced, however, and no night watchman was provided. Since Burnside Street is the main thoroughfare, it is regularly patrolled by the city police, and in fact, on the night of the theft extra patrolmen were on duty because of a football game being played in Gonzales. Furthermore these patrolmen did indeed see the thieves leaving the parking lot. They gave chase to them, but they managed to escape.\\nCivil Code Article 2937 provides that \\\"The depositary is bound to use the same diligence in preserving the deposit that he uses in preserving his own property.\\\" Counsel for plaintiff, relying upon Verdin v. Quality Chevrolet Co., 255 So.2d 458 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1971), argues strenuously that, in the case of a compensated depositary, Article 2937 requires him to provide a fenced area for the vehicle and a nightwatchman. In distinguishing the Verdin case from the instant case, the trial judge made the following statement in his written reasons for judgment:\\n\\\"We believe that the Court therein made it clear that each case of this type would depend upon the facts of the particular case. Therein the evidence clearly indicated that the defendant had failed in his duty to remove the keys from the ignition and to have locked the doors of plaintiff's vehicle prior to the theft. The evidence herein shows that the automobile of the plaintiff was properly locked and that there was no theft of the automobile. We believe the distinguishing feature of the two cases are the fact that in the cited case the vehicle was left unlocked with the key in the ignition while in the instant case the automobile of plaintiff was locked and protected to the same extent as the defendant's new automobiles.\\n\\\"We have carefully considered the jurisprudence cited by the plaintiff and fail to find that it establishes a new or different standard of care from that of the Civil Code. We believe that the codal (sic) article is based on the premise that every man will use reasonable care to safeguard his own property. If reasonable care is exercised, it establishes the standard of care to be used with a depositor's property. Thus, we cannot say that a parking lot should be fenced or that a night watchman must be provided, or that extra precautions should be undertaken to protect the depositor's property under all circumstances. The question is whether or not the care exercised by the depositary is commensurate with the care which he should have exercised over his own property. We agree with the holding of the cited decision that each case of this nature must be decided on its own facts.\\\"\\nWe think that the trial judge correctly distinguished the Verdin case from this one. Defendant exercised the same degree of care which it exercised over its own property which consisted primarily of new automobiles. The area in which the Trabeaux vehicle was parked was well-lighted to the extent that one could see a person standing in the lot and could distinguish the colors of the various automobiles parked there. The Trabeaux vehicle was locked and the keys placed in a safe place. Defendant's premises were regularly patrolled by the police, with increased patrolling on the particular night of the theft. All reasonable precautions were taken. We agree with the finding of the trial judge that the evidence preponderates to indicate that defendant acted within the intendment of C.C. Art. 2937 to preserve the deposit as a prudent administrator, using the same diligence and standard of care he used for his own automobiles. Civil Code Article 2937 does not require him to be an insurer of vehicles left with him.\\nThe judgment of the trial court is affirmed for the reasons set forth above at the appellant's costs.\\nAffirmed.\\nThis opinion was authored by TUCKER, J. prior to his death on the 25th day of January, 1974, and is concurred in by the remaining members of the panel.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9758076.json b/la/9758076.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..85ab802a26f0b9d7f2ff8d226f6b91d2736340d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9758076.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9758076\", \"name\": \"In re ADOPTION OF Brenda Faye and Gwendolyn MOODY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Adoption of Moody\", \"decision_date\": \"1967-06-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 10818\", \"first_page\": \"222\", \"last_page\": \"223\", \"citations\": \"201 So. 2d 222\", \"volume\": \"201\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:38:54.431544+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before GLADNEY, AYRES and BO-LIN, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"In re ADOPTION OF Brenda Faye and Gwendolyn MOODY.\", \"head_matter\": \"In re ADOPTION OF Brenda Faye and Gwendolyn MOODY.\\nNo. 10818.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.\\nJune 30, 1967.\\nRehearing Denied July 27, 1967.\\nFord E. Stinson, Benton, for appellant.\\nWallace, Wyche & Bigby, Benton, for appellee.\\nBefore GLADNEY, AYRES and BO-LIN, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"977\", \"char_count\": \"5651\", \"text\": \"GLADNEY, Judge.\\nForest T. Moody, the father of Brenda Faye and Gwendolyn, ages 13 and 11 years at the time of trial, born of his marriage with Dorothy Faye Marsh, has appealed from a judgment of adoption of the children in favor of Charles Wayne Rose.\\nAppellant's marriage to Dorothy Faye Moody was dissolved by divorce on September 26, 1961, which decree awarded the custody of the two children to the mother and ordered monthly child support payments to be made by the father into the custody of the Clerk of Court at Collins-worth County, Texas. Dorothy Faye Moody, on January 13, 1962, married Charles Wayne Rose, a member of the United States Air Force, and within a short time after their marriage he was transferred to Spain where he was joined by his wife and the children. Moody made monthly payments of support as required by the decree of divorce until May of 1962 and thereafter made no further payments in compliance with the judgment. On May 25, 1962 he filed in the Collinsworth Court an application for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain custody of the two children, but this suit was not served due to the alleged inability of the petitioner to locate his former wife. Rose, his wife, and the children, after living in Spain until October of 1965, returned to the United States and established a residence in Bossier City.\\nThis proceeding was filed on behalf of Charles Wayne Rose on February 28, 1966 and objection to the adoption was entered by appellant on the ground his consent was not forfeited because of his failure to pay child support. Thus the contention of appellant before this court is that the judgment of the trial court is in error forasmuch as the mother of the children, by moving them out of the jurisdiction of the Collins-worth County Court, and failing to disclose her whereabouts, deprived him of his rights with respect to the children and therefore, his noncompliance with monthly payments of support for the children was not without justification.\\nThe judgment of the trial court granting the adoption was predicated on the provisions of LSA-R.S. 9:422.1 which provide that where the spouse of the petitioner for the adoption has been granted custody of the child by a court of competent jurisdiction and the other legitimate parent has failed to comply with the court order for support for a period of one year, the latter's consent is not necessary.\\nIn reaching its conclusion the trial court correctly ruled that the recent decisions of the Supreme Court In Re LaFitte, 247 La. 856, 174 So.2d 804 (1965) and In Re Ackenhausen, 244 La. 730, 154 So.2d 380 (1963) are controlling as to the issues presented in the instant case. In LaFitte the natural father of the children admittedly failed to make support payments for over a year and asserted that he was justified in doing so because his former wife had taken the children to the Phillippines where her husband was employed in the military service. The Supreme Court held the parental rights of the natural father had been forfeited, since it was not shown that his failure to make payments for support of the children was due to circumstances over which he had no control. The court quoted the following from the prior case of Ackenhausen, supra, in determining the effect and application of LSA-R.S. 9:422.1:\\n\\\" 'We think the legislature was attempting to define the conduct which would be a failure of the parent to fulfill his responsibility of support of his child, whereby the parent would forfeit his parental rights,' and the only time consent of both parents is not needed is 'when the failure to comply with the order of the court is without just cause.' 'The legislature never intended by this provision to dispense with consent where the legitimate parent shows that his failure to comply with the court order for support was for reasons beyond his control.' However, in this same decision we emphasized that 'we do not propose to give the statute such a strict interpretation as to make it ineffective and inoperative,' and that 'To hold that under the statute there must be a complete refusal or failure to pay any sum whatever for one year before consent would be dispensed with would be to disregard completely the obligation which a parent has to provide support and maintenance for his child.' (The emphasis has been supplied.)\\\" [174 So.2d 804, 806]\\nThe effect of the statute is to cause a forfeiture of the right of the parent to give consent where, by reason of his conduct, he has evidenced a failure to fulfill his responsibility of supporting his children during the period provided by the statute, and it is only when failure to comply with the order of the court is with just cause that the consent of both parents is essential to the adoption.\\nIn the present case appellant is shown to have had ample means and income from which to make payments and knew that such were to be made to the Clerk of the Collins-worth Court and when made would be forwarded for the support of Gwendolyn and Dorothy Faye. Under the established facts Moody refused to make support payments to the Clerk of Court for no other reason than he thought he was being denied visitation rights. This was not an adequate excuse and in our opinion he has failed to show he was without fault in refusing to make judgment payments.\\nThe judgment is affirmed at appellant's cost.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9763585.json b/la/9763585.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5ea2ef63da9a470fb09895a3370ca97066a1adaf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9763585.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9763585\", \"name\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Willie SMITH, Jr.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Smith\", \"decision_date\": \"1977-10-10\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 59595\", \"first_page\": \"1178\", \"last_page\": \"1180\", \"citations\": \"350 So. 2d 1178\", \"volume\": \"350\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:27:37.029001+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Willie SMITH, Jr.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Louisiana v. Willie SMITH, Jr.\\nNo. 59595.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nOct. 10, 1977.\\nRichard V. Burnes, Gravel, Roy & Burnes, Alexandria, for defendant-appellant.\\nWilliam J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., William C. Pe-gues, Dist. Atty., William E. Tilley, First Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1190\", \"char_count\": \"7522\", \"text\": \"SANDERS, Chief Justice.\\nThe State indicted Willie Smith, Jr., for the possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:966. After trial, the jury returned a responsive verdict of guilty of possession of heroin. The court sentenced defendant to nine years imprisonment. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, relying upon nine assignments of error. However, finding reversible error in his first assignment, we pretermit the remaining eight.\\nThe context facts are that:\\nOn November 16, 1974, a search warrant was issued, authorizing the search of Willie Smith's person, car, and motel room. In executing the warrant, police stopped defendant in his car and informed him of the search warrant. The police then searched defendant's clothing and found a matchbox containing eight packets of heroin. Within one or two minutes, Officer Parker arrived on the scene with the warrant and presented it to the defendant. After being given the matchbox containing the heroin found by his fellow officers, Parker arrested defendant and searched his person a second time. This second search produced a ninth packet of heroin. Subsequent searches of the car and the motel room yielded no additional contraband.\\nIn his motion to suppress, defendant contends that the search warrant is invalid because the affidavit on which it issued did not contain sufficient facts warranting probable cause. The affidavit reads as follows:\\n\\\"T/C Vernon Parker of the La. State Police narcotic section has on several occasions received information that Willie Smith was selling heroin in the Leesville area.\\n\\\"On November 15th T/C Parker received information from a confidential reliable informant that Willie Smith departed Leesville in route to Beaumont, Texas for the purpose of obtaining a quantity of heroin and returning to Lees-ville and selling it.\\n\\\"On this date T/C Parker was again contacted by this reliable informant who, stated that, Willie Smith returned to Leesville at 8:00 A.M. this date and to his knowledge had sold three hits of heroin within an hour. The reliable informant states that Smith will be holding additional heroin at this time.\\n\\\"The confidential reliable informant has been reliable to T/C Parker for approximately six years and has led to the arrest and conviction of several narcotics users and sellers. The informant is also paid by T/C Parker to obtain this type of information.\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nProbable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he has reasonable trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed. State v. Sierra, La., 338 So.2d 609 (1976); State v. Hightower, La., 272 So.2d 363 (1973). The magistrate must be supplied with enough information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); State v. Sierra, supra; State v. Holmes, 254 La. 501, 225 So.2d 1 (1969).\\nIn Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), the United States Supreme Court held that when a search warrant is based solely on hearsay, the affidavit must indicate some of the underlying circumstances on which the informant bases his conclusions and some of the circumstances supporting the informant's credibility. Then, in State v. Paciera, La., 290 So.2d 681 (1974), we outlined the requisites in an affidavit, as follows:\\n\\\"If we can deduce a rule from these cases, it is this: The affidavit submitted to the magistrate may be based entirely upon hearsay, but, if so, it must set forth underlying circumstances and details suf ficient to provide a substantial factual basis by which the magistrate might find reliable both the informant and the information given by him. Factors which support the credibility of an unidentified informant include prior accurate reports or any specific independent corroboration of the accuracy of the instant report. Factors which support the creditability of the information reported include (a) direct personal observation by the informant, or (b) if the information came indirectly to the informant, the reasons in sufficient factual detail for the magistrate to evaluate and credit the reliability both of the indirect source and of the indirectly-obtained information. See State v. Linkletter, 286 So.2d 321 (La.Sup.Ct.1978).\\\"\\nThe affidavit in the present case sets forth that the informant had given prior accurate reports which led to several arrests and convictions. These facts are sufficient to establish the reliability of the unidentified informant. State v. Sierra, supra; State v. Roach, La., 322 So.2d 222 (1975); State v. Humble, La., 309 So.2d 138 (1975); State v. Paciera, supra.\\nIn addition, the affidavit must demonstrate the reliability of the information provided by the informant. The information's reliability may be established by (1) the informant's personal observation, State v. Harris, La., 343 So.2d 145 (1977); State v. Culotta, La., 343 So.2d 977 (1976); State v. Paciera, supra, or (2) the recitation of the facts upon which the informant based his conclusion, State v. Sierra, supra; State v. Vince, La., 305 So.2d 916 (1974).\\nThe supporting affidavit recites that the confidential informant told Officer Parker that Smith went to Beaumont, Texas, to purchase heroin in order to return to Leesville and sell it, and that Smith returned at 8:00 that morning and \\\"to his knowledge\\\" had made three heroin sales within an hour.\\nThe affidavit does not set forth that the informant personally observed the various events reported or had direct personal knowledge of the factual allegations recited. The informant could well have been relying upon hearsay information or could have reached his own conclusion from circumstantial evidence. The affidavit does not disclose how the information was acquired. Hence, the affidavit failed to demonstrate the reliability of the information.\\nIn State v. Humble, supra, we held that when the affidavit merely contained unsubstantiated rumors and conclusory statements, it provided no adequate basis for a magistrate's finding of probable cause.\\nWhen questioned regarding the information given by his paid informant, the affi-ant officer was asked whether he asked the informant how he obtained the information. He replied that he did not.\\n\\\"Q. Do you know, Trooper Parker, how this informant knew that Willie Smith had gone to Beaumont?\\n\\\"A. No \\u2014 I don't. (Record p. 80.)\\nti\\n\\\"Q. Did you ask this informant how he got that information (that Smith had sold the heroin after returning from Beaumont)?\\n\\\"A. No \\u2014 I didn't.\\\" (Record p. 82.)\\nThe search warrant is fatally defective. Consequently, all evidence obtained as a result of the execution of the warrant, the nine packets of heroin found on defendant's person, must be suppressed. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).\\nFor the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are reversed. The case is remanded for a new trial consistent with law and the views herein expressed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9815237.json b/la/9815237.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c8c84ba3147e5612c6baea5bdface8d942765a9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9815237.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9815237\", \"name\": \"Jerry GARDEN and Lillie M. Walker, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert L. PHILLIPS et al., Defendants-Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Garden v. Phillips\", \"decision_date\": \"1968-06-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 11022\", \"first_page\": \"741\", \"last_page\": \"742\", \"citations\": \"211 So. 2d 741\", \"volume\": \"211\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:45:03.144807+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before AYRES, BOLIN and WILLIAMS, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Jerry GARDEN and Lillie M. Walker, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert L. PHILLIPS et al., Defendants-Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Jerry GARDEN and Lillie M. Walker, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert L. PHILLIPS et al., Defendants-Appellees.\\nNo. 11022.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.\\nJune 4, 1968.\\nLeonard, Wootan & Lemoine, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellants.\\nTheus, Grisham, Davis, Leigh & Brown, Monroe, for defendants-appellees.\\nBefore AYRES, BOLIN and WILLIAMS, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"87\", \"char_count\": \"620\", \"text\": \"BOLIN, Judge.\\nFor the reasons assigned in consolidated case of Robert L. Phillips, Sr. and Mrs. Dewanna Ann Whittington Phillips v. Jerry Garden and Stonewall Insurance Company, La.App., 211 So.2d 735, the judgment appealed from is affirmed at appellants' cost.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9835140.json b/la/9835140.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1f8e13cb1b0cbe6b3b7a22fe6a1f75ba2771beee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9835140.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9835140\", \"name\": \"H. M. GILBERT v. H. N. HANNER et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gilbert v. Hanner\", \"decision_date\": \"1966-06-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 48235\", \"first_page\": \"442\", \"last_page\": \"442\", \"citations\": \"187 So. 2d 442\", \"volume\": \"187\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:24:53.991258+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"H. M. GILBERT v. H. N. HANNER et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"249 La. 461\\nH. M. GILBERT v. H. N. HANNER et al.\\nNo. 48235.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nJune 21, 1966.\", \"word_count\": \"61\", \"char_count\": \"320\", \"text\": \"In re: H. M. Gilbert applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Caddo. 187 So.2d 133.\\nWrit refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, the result is correct.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9857640.json b/la/9857640.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5e49e5a13611bc7f0e5c62fc716a97889dced676
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9857640.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9857640\", \"name\": \"Lucius MAYFIELD, Administrator Pro Tempore of the Succession of Van Mayfield, et al. v. George J. NUNN et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mayfield v. Nunn\", \"decision_date\": \"1960-05-31\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 44132\", \"first_page\": \"65\", \"last_page\": \"70\", \"citations\": \"121 So. 2d 65\", \"volume\": \"121\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:42:57.515040+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Lucius MAYFIELD, Administrator Pro Tempore of the Succession of Van Mayfield, et al. v. George J. NUNN et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"239 La. 1021\\nLucius MAYFIELD, Administrator Pro Tempore of the Succession of Van Mayfield, et al. v. George J. NUNN et al.\\nNo. 44132.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nMay 31, 1960.\\nJerome T. Powell, Robert G. Chandler, Shreveport, for plaintiffs-appellants.\\nMorgan, Baker, Skeels, Middleton & Coleman, Shreveport, for defendants-appel-lees.\", \"word_count\": \"3250\", \"char_count\": \"19062\", \"text\": \"GARDINER, Justice ad hoc.\\nThis suit was instituted on January 29, 1958 by Lucius Mayfield in his capacity as Administrator pro tempore of the Succession of Van Mayfield, and by Jessie Holmes Mayfield, having for its immediate purpose to enjoin further prosecution of a suit via executiva instituted by defendants George Nunn and Jack A. Martin to foreclose a mortgage on certain real estate for the alleged reason that the mortgage note, signed by Van Mayfield and Jessie Holmes Mayfield, on which some payments had been made, was tainted with usury. Exceptions of no cause or right of action having been maintained by the lower Court, and writs having been refused by this Court, the foreclosure proceedings were terminated and admittedly are no longer open to attack. A devolutive appeal was perfected from the lower Court's maintaining of the exceptions as to other relief sought, and the matter is now before us for consideration.\\nThe petition's well pleaded factual allegations, which must be accepted as true in disposing of the exceptions, are that on May 29, 1956 the defendants George J. Nunn and Jack A. Martin, at the request of and for the account of Van and Jessie Holmes Mayfield and in order to liquidate the Mayfields' indebtedness of $9,933.70 to the National Bank of Bossier City, secured by three mortgage notes the payments on which were then in default, paid to the bank the said sum; that contemporaneously with that payment, and as a condition for making it, the defendants required the May-fields to execute a promissory note in the principal sum of $15,000, bearing eight per cent per annum interest from date until paid, payable in $400 monthly installments, secured by an act of mortgage affecting certain real property owned by the May-fields (the same property which had secured the notes to the bank \\u2014 the prior mortgages being then cancelled); that the note \\\"included a bonus\\\" (over and above the indebtedness) of $5,166.30 and, in addition, stipulated eight per cent per annum interest, \\\"not only upon the debt but also on the said bonus.\\\" It was further alleged that after execution of the mortgage note, Van Mayfield made monthly payments to defendants from July, 1956 through October, 1957, totaling $5,700; that in the foreclosure proceedings (sought to be enjoined) the defendants were claiming the sum of $11,839.-13 as still due on the mortgage note, with 8% interest from October, 1957 until paid, plus 10% of principal and interest as attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs, asserting that because of the usurious character of the interest charged, no portion of the installments paid can be applied to interest but that those sums must be credited in entirety against the original indebtedness of $9,-933.70, leaving a balance due of $4,233.70 \\u2014 rejected when offered to plaintiffs \\u2014 prayed' (aside from the prayer for temporary injunction) that the defendants be duly cited' to appear and answer the petition and that after legal delays, etc., there be judgment against them decreeing the \\\"bonus\\\" and the interest \\\"from date\\\" to be usurious interest not collectible; prayed also that the payments of $5,700 \\\"be recognized,\\\" that the original amount due of $9,933.70 be reduced by $5,700 and that there be judgment against plaintiffs and in favor of defendants for the remainder, i. e. $4,233.70, with 5% interest from date of judgment until paid; and for general and equitable relief.\\nThe Trial Judge, having given oral reasons for maintaining the defendants' exceptions of no cause or right of action, on motion for rehearing re-stated, in a memorandum opinion, his appreciation of the case, noting that the sole issue was whether or not the note in question bore an usurious \\u2022rate of interest and stating that while in the Court's opinion the rate of interest was unconscionable and was certainly usury in disguise, nevertheless \\\"in as much as the courts have permitted any amount as a bonus or commission or excess charge to be incorporated in the body, or the principal amount stated on the face of the note, we see no reason for restricting the note to no interest from date and we have been unable to find any case in which this factual situation was presented to the courts.\\\"\\nCounsel for plaintiff-appellants, contending that their petition factually sets forth a case of usury under the laws of this State, submit that Article 2924 of the Revised Civil Code-LSA, comprising our law on usury, treats discount as prepaid interest; that also falling within the category of prepaid interest are sums deducted from the amount of a note before the proceeds are delivered to the maker; and that in adopting Article 2924 of the Code the lawmakers intended to legalize the discounting of notes and the sale of discounted notes on the theory that the amount of the discount constituted prepaid interest up to the date of maturity; but that if Article 2924 be construed to allow the collection of interest from date of note upon prepaid interest, the result would be in conflict with Article 1939 of the Civil Code-LSA prohibiting interest upon interest \\u2014 unless capitalized within the meaning of the law.\\nCounsel for defendant-appellees, in defense of the ruling on their exceptions, contend as their major premise that \\\"discount\\\" is distinct from \\\"interest,\\\" since discount is said to entail the gauging by the creditor of the element of risk, the gamble of capital, the chances of gain or the probabilities of loss; from which it follows that Article 1939 of the Civil Code-LSA prohibiting the recovery of interest upon interest is totally inapplicable; and particular emphasis is placed on a paragraph of Article 2924, which is said to be more appropriate to the instant case and to be devoid of restriction as to when the interest begins to run.\\nA study and analysis of the various paragraphs of Article 2924 reveal that the law declares interest to be either legal or conventional; legal (or judicial) interest is fixed at 5%; as to sums discounted at banks, the interest is at the rate established by their charters; conventional interest cannot exceed 8%, and if a higher rate is paid, as discount or otherwise, the same may be sued for and recovered within two years from the time of such payment \\u2014 except in two instances, the one set out first being devoid of restriction as to when interest begins to run (this being the provision on which defendants rely), the other, in almost identical terms, with a proviso that interest be not more than 8% per an-num after maturity until paid; and the question presented in the case before us is whether or not the obligation signed by the Mayfields for $15,000, which included a \\\"bonus\\\" of somewhat more than $5,000, with interest stipulated at 8% from date, falls within either exception, or whether it has characteristics which are prohibited under the laws relating to interest. The two paragraphs, having originated in substantially their present wording as Act 161 of 1856 (appearing as the first exception) and Act 62 of 1860 (appearing as the second \\u2014 see footnote 3), were incorporated in the Revised Civil Code upon its adoption in 1870. Legislative history for the decade following 1850 is almost non-existent; assuming that enlightenment might be had from the House and Senate Journals for the years 1856 and 1860 (we are informed that the whereabouts of only one copy of each of these publications is known), they could not be obtained. We therefore turned to the jurisprudence of the period for assistance in an interpretation of the meaning of the provisions.\\nOne of the earliest cases dealing with the subject, decided in the year 1860, stated that \\\"The Act of March 20, 1856 [Act 161 of 1856] had in view the sale of notes and other written obligations, their discount or sale, for the purpose of raising money, and nothing more.\\\" Crane v. Beatty, 15 La.Ann. 329. Twice during the course of succeeding months the above construction of the 1856 statute was repeated and approved: Weaver v. Maillot, 15 La.Ann. 395, and Campbell & Strong v. Hilliard, 15 La.Ann. 537. In a subsequent case involving a promissory note carrying interest \\\"from date\\\" at the rate of 10%, the provisions of the 1856 Act were applied to reduce the interest to 8%; Williams v. Halsmith, 1865, 17 La.Ann. 200. Several cases considered both the 1856 and 1860 Acts; for example, in Weaver v. Kearny & Blois, 1865, 17 La.Ann. 326, 327 the Court said: \\\"The evident object of the Legislature in passing these acts was that there should be no stipulation for interest exceeding the rate of 8% unless the parties contracting for a greater rate of interest on a valid claim should add the interest to the claim in making the amount of the written obligation.\\\" In Tarver v. Winn, 1866, 18 La.Ann. 557, 558, where the Court had for consideration a suit on a note providing a large sum would be paid in the future as damages or interest in case of failure to make payment at maturity, the observation was made: \\\"The law has declared such a stipulation causes the forfeiture of the entire interest contracted for, unless it be capitalized and placed in the amount for which the note was given. See Acts relative to interest passed in the years 1855 and 1860.\\\" To the same effect is Walker v. Villavaso, 1866, 18 La.Ann. 712. The Act of 1860 was invoked in Mutual National Bank of New Orleans v. Regan, 1888, 40 La.Ann. 17, 3 So. 407, to oppose a claim of usury as to certain mortgage notes based on the fact that a discount of 9% had been deducted from the face value of the notes and retained by the \\\"owner\\\" or lender; but the transaction was held to be within the exception of the 1860 Act (by that time incorporated in the Revised Civil Code of 1870 as the second exception under Article 2924) and not usurious, since the notes bore interest only after maturity and at the rate of 8%. Chadwick v. Menard, 1900, 104 La. 38, 28 So. 933, 934 reviewed the laws of usury as well as the jurisprudence interpreting the Acts of 1856 and 1860, and the statement was again made that the early decisions recognized that the Act passed in 1856 \\\"had in view the sale of notes for the purpose of raising money.\\\" See, also, Huntington v. Westerfield, 1907, 119 La. 615, 44 So. 317.\\nThere are two recent cases dealing with the subject: General Securities Co., Inc. v. Jumonville, 1950, 216 La. 681, 686, 44 So.2d 702, 703, concerned a note acquired by a finance company at a discount of 11% of its face value, but conditioned to bear interest at 8% from maturity; the first exception under Article 2924 was not alluded to by the Court, but the note was held to come under the second exception, with the observation that \\\"since it does not bear more than 8% interest after maturity it cannot be said to carry usurious interest;\\\" and Vosvein v. Leopold, 1956, 230 La. 21, 87 So.2d 715, where the plaintiff-sued on two separate notes executed by defendant, one in the principal sum of $4,-200 and stipulating interest at 6% per an-num from date, made up of the remainder due ($3,800) on a previous note and a $400 cash loan made to defendant \\u2014 as to which the Court held that while undoubtedly a portion of the $3,800 forming part of the $4,200 note included usurious interest imposed on the prior obligation, since the usurious interest was capitalized with a portion of the principal obligation, no relief could be granted the defendant; as to the other note, in principal sum of $1,943, representing $1,368 interest on the $3,800 included in the first note and attorney's fees in another transaction, the Court, omitting any reference to the first exception under Article 2924 and quoting only the second, refused to afford its protection, noting that \\\"otherwise parties would be permitted to recover usurious interest by merely capitalizing it with transactions foreign to the principal obligation and by this means circumvent the law.\\\" 230 La. at page 28, 87 So.2d at page 717.\\nApplying the above principles to the instant case, and at the same time having in mind the pertinent rule of statutory construction that, provided the interpretation is reasonable and not in conflict with the legislative intent, effect and meaning must if possible be given to every part of the statute, we think that the first exception set out in Article 2924 and having its origin in the 1856 Act has no application here; its purpose has been repeatedly stated as intended to facilitate the sale of notes to raise money and nothing more, whereas the second exception set out in the Article has been employed through the years as authorizing the capitalizing of interest. The \\\"bonus\\\" added to the Mayfields' obligation of $9,933.70 then overdue at the Bank was nothing more than a form of discount, capitalized, and it necessarily follows that the said note for the whole amount of $15,000 was, to the extent of the principal recited therein, an obligation recognized by law.\\nHowever, we are unable to agree with counsel for defendants in their attempt to establish the legality of interest on the whole amount from date of note. The distinction sought to be made between \\\"discount\\\" and \\\"interest\\\" has no place in this case; the words, in the sense in which they are used in Article 2924 of the Code, are synonymous, are used in the alternative and interchangeably throughout the various paragraphs. The LSA-Civil Code, Article 1939 (see footnote 2) expressly forbids recovery of interest upon interest except in the sole case of a holder or owner of a note not paid at maturity, who may then add to the principal the interest due thereon, and thus \\\"by another contract made a new debt.\\\" (Emphasis ours) Since the \\\"bonus\\\" was discount or interest, it necessarily follows because of the prohibition contained in Article 1939 of the LSA-Civil Code that the interest on the note in this suit from date was illegal and cannot be allowed. The payments totaling $5,700 must therefore be applied against the principal of $15,000, leaving a remainder due of $9,300. The case will therefore be remanded, with leave given plaintiffs to amend the allegations of their petition, with a prayer consistent therewith.\\nFor the reasons assigned the judgment of the District Court is reversed and set aside, the exceptions of no right and no cause of action are overruled, and the case is remanded to the District Court to be proceeded with according to law and consistent with the views herein expressed. Appellee shall pay the costs of this appeal\\u00bb; all other costs shall await the final determination of the case.\\n. The plaintiffs, in applying for writs of certiorari and mandamus, sought to restrain absolutely and in its entirety the sale under executory process, though admitting an indebtedness in a lessor amount than the remainder said to be due on the mortgage note; and writs were denied since the law allows the sale to be made to satisfy the undisputed debt; Crowley Bank & Trust Co. v. Hurd, 137 La. 787, 69 So. 175; Sample v. Elliott, 155 La. 941, 99 So. 705.\\n. That Article declares: \\\"Interest upon interest cannot be recovered unless it be added to the principal, and by another contract made a new debt. No stipulation to that effect in the original contract is valid. The provisions of this Article shall he held to apply to all persons, partnerships and corporations irrespective of custom or of the character of business in which they are engaged.\\\"\\n. \\\"Interest is either legal or conventional. Legal interest is fixed at the following rates, to wit:\\n\\\"At five per cent on all sums which are the object of a judicial demand. Whence this is called judicial interest;\\n\\\"And on sums discounted at banks at the rate established by their charters.\\n\\\"The amount of the conventional interest cannot exceed eight per cent. The same must be fixed in writing; testimonial proof of it is not admitted in any case.\\n\\\"Except in the cases herein provided, if any persons shall pay on any contract a higher rate of interest than the above, as discount or otherwise, the same may be sued for and recovered within two years from the time of such payment.\\n\\\"The owner or discounter of any note or bond or other written evidence of debt for the payment of money, payable to order or bearer or by assignment, shall have the right to claim and recover the full amount of such note, bond or other written evidence of debt and all interest not beyond eight per cent per annum interest that may accrue thereon, notwithstanding that the rate of interest or discount at which the same may be or may have been discounted has been beyond the rate of eight per cent per annum interest or discount; but this provision shall not apply to the banking institutions of this State in operation under existing laws.\\n\\\"The owner of any promissory note, bond or other written evidence of debt for the payment of money to order or bearer or transferable by assignment shall have the right to collect the whole amount of such promissory note, bond or other written evidence of debt for the payment of money, notwithstanding such promissory note, bond or other written evidence of \\u2022debt for the payment of money may include a greater rate of interest or dis-\\ncount than eight per cent per annum; provided such obligation shall not bear more than eight per cent per annum after maturity until paid.\\n\\\"Provided however where usury is a defense to a suit on a promissory note or other contract of similar character, that it is permissible for the defendant to show said usury whether same was given by way of discount or otherwise, by any competent evidence.\\\" (As amended by Acts 1908, No. 08)\\n. In those cases the Court rejected an attempt to extend the provisions of the 1856 Act so as to authorize and legalize transactions between debtors and creditors wherein usurious interest was added to the sum really due, as a consideration for an extension of time, or for the indulgence of the creditor.\\n. By the terms of Act 291 of 1835, if a contract was usurious, the penalty was forfeiture of the entire interest.\\n. It would appear, although the point was not raised, that the note on which recovery was permitted in the Vosbein case (230 La. 21, 87 So.2d 715), and which bore interest from date \\u2014 the said note including $3,800 due on a prior obligation on which usurious interest had been collected \\u2014 might in some respects come under the exception of Article 1939 permitting interest on interest.\\n. As stated in the opinion, counsel on oral argument in this Court admitted that the foreclosure proceedings were terminated and no longer open to attack; but we do not know the amount for which the property was sold nor other circumstances connected with the foreclosure and are therefore unable to make a more definitive ruling.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9889186.json b/la/9889186.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..99dcce304aea8704f031905932bc40c15816bfe8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9889186.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9889186\", \"name\": \"CAPPEL LUMBER COMPANY, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. A. C. BENEDICT, Defendant-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cappel Lumber Co. v. Benedict\", \"decision_date\": \"1958-12-19\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 8945\", \"first_page\": \"270\", \"last_page\": \"271\", \"citations\": \"108 So. 2d 270\", \"volume\": \"108\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:49:41.287250+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CAPPEL LUMBER COMPANY, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. A. C. BENEDICT, Defendant-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"CAPPEL LUMBER COMPANY, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. A. C. BENEDICT, Defendant-Appellee.\\nNo. 8945.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.\\nDec. 19, 1958.\\nRehearing Denied Feb. 2, 1959.\\nWilliam Ray Bradford, Alexandria, for .appellant.\\nBernard Kramer, Alexandria, for appel-lee.\", \"word_count\": \"203\", \"char_count\": \"1265\", \"text\": \"HARDY, Judge.\\nThis is a suit for the recovery of a balance due on open account, or on a contract of purchase, and plaintiff has appealed from a judgment sustaining defendant's plea of prescription and dismissing plaintiff's suit.\\nReference to plaintiff's petition discloses that, despite an allegation of the sale of materials of a value of $101.14, plaintiff prayed for judgment in the sum of $100 with legal interest and costs, which amount does not confer jurisdiction of this appeal upon this court.\\nThis question has been very recently considered by this court, in Barber v. Hardwick, 107 So.2d 725, in which the law governing appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal was set forth in minute detail, as reflected by the opinion of Judge Gladney.\\nIt is clear that this court has no jurisdiction of the appeal, which fact must be noticed, ex proprio motu. Accordingly, It Is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the appeal be and it is hereby dismissed at appellant's cost.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9892702.json b/la/9892702.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3e1bc9e220a40d97ef6c9bd06f2c30033f45e12e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9892702.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9892702\", \"name\": \"Robert J. ZIBILICH v. ORLEANS PARISH DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Zibilich v. Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee\", \"decision_date\": \"1961-05-09\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 365\", \"first_page\": \"860\", \"last_page\": \"863\", \"citations\": \"129 So. 2d 860\", \"volume\": \"129\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Court of Appeal\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:34:21.032307+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before McBRIDE, REGAN, YARRUT, SAMUEL and HALL, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Robert J. ZIBILICH v. ORLEANS PARISH DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Robert J. ZIBILICH v. ORLEANS PARISH DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE et al.\\nNo. 365.\\nCourt of Appeal of Louisiana. Fourth Circuit.\\nMay 9, 1961.\\nReasons May 10, 1961.\\nCertiorari Denied May 10, 1961.\\nG. Harrison Scott, Robert Weinstein and James A. Comiskey, New Orleans, for plaintiff and appellant.\\nAlvin W. Lacoste, in pro. per.\\nGerald P. Federoff, Michael H. O\\u2019Keefe and George J. Haylon, New Orleans, for John J. Petre, defendant and appellee.\\nHarry Fuller, Baton Rouge, for Wade O. Martin, Jr., defendant and appellee.\\nThomas Barr, III, New Orleans, for Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee, appearing herein through John J. Caswell, Chairman, defendant and appel-lee.\\nBefore McBRIDE, REGAN, YARRUT, SAMUEL and HALL, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1460\", \"char_count\": \"8926\", \"text\": \"REGAN, Judge.\\nFor the reasons which will be hereinafter handed down:\\nIt is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the motion to dismiss the appeal herein be sustained and the appeal is dismissed.\\nMotion sustained; appeal dismissed.\\nReasons\\nPlaintiff, Robert J. Zibilich, an unsuccessful candidate for the Democratic nomination as councilman for the City of New' Orleans, representing District C, instituted this suit against the defendant, the Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee et al., endeavoring to be recognized as the Democratic nominee, a position which he insists that he was deprived of through irregularities which occurred in the conduct of the primary election. Alternatively, he asserted that he is entitled to compete for the nomination in a second primary against John J. Petre, who the committee certified as the party nominee after the official tabulation revealed he had obtained a majority of 97 votes.\\nDefendants pleaded the exception of no cause of action, asserting that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient irregularities, even if proven, to afford plaintiff the benefit of a majority of the votes cast.\\nThey then answered and generally denied the allegations of plaintiff's petition.\\nFrom a judgment dismissing plaintiff's suit, he has prosecuted this appeal.\\nCounsel for defendants have filed in this court a motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that by virtue of the rationale of LSA-R.S. 18:362, and the jurisprudence interpretative thereof, the election contest has become moot. The pertinent portion of the statute reads:\\n\\\" Plowever, if for any reason any contest filed in court is not finally decided in the district court in time to print the name of the nominee of the party upon the ballot before the election, the political party committee shall certify the name of the contestee in the suit filed, which name shall be printed upon the ballot as the nominee of the party. No court has jurisdiction to enjoin such action.\\nPlaintiff's suit, contesting the result of the April 15th primary, was dismissed by a judgment of the district court rendered on May 2, 1961. The general election is scheduled for May 27th, and in the course of oral argument before us on May 9th, a printed ballot, furnished by the Secretary of State to the Civil Sheriff in Orleans Parish, for the purpose of conducting absentee voting, was shown to this court; it included the name of Petre as the Democratic nominee for the disputed coun-cilmanic ' seat and it is conceded that absentee balloting is now in progress,\\nIn asserting that the contest is moot, counsel for the defendants rely upon the rationale of a decision emanating from the Supreme Court entitled Downs v. Pharis, wherein the organ thereof expressed the opinion that an election contest is moot when it is not decided more than thirty days before the general election, since the court is powerless to enjoin the Secretary of State from performing a ministerial duty, as outlined in the statute. In the above case the court reasoned thus:\\n\\\"In the case at bar, it appears that Downs secured a temporary order from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge restraining the Secretary of State from printing the official ballots for the general election to be held in Rapides Parish on November 8th. This order was properly issued originally, at a time more than 30 days before the general election, if the contestant had cause to believe that the ballots would be printed and sent to the clerk of court. But obviously, in view of R.S. 18:362, R.S. 18:1072 and the jurisprudence to which we have referred, the judge who issued the restraining order was without power or authority to extend that injunction against the Secretary of State to any date beyond the time (30 days) when the Secretary of State was required by law to furnish the clerk of the district court with the printed ballots, save possibly in an exceptional matter showing fraud, or gross wrongdoing, which does not appear in this case.\\\"\\nCounsel for the plaintiff initially assert that the motion should be denied because special elections are governed by the provisions of LSA-R.S. 18:305, rather than LSA-R.S. 18:362. LSA-R.S. 18:305 provides :\\n\\\"A. Whenever a special election is held to fill a vacancy for an unexpired term caused by death, resignation, or otherwise of an officer, the respective committees having authority to call primary elections to nominate candidates for the office may fix the date at which a primary shall be held to nominate candidates in the special election, which date shall not be less than ten days after the issuance of the order for the special election.\\n\\\"B. This committee may do the things above set forth without reference to provisions in this Part referring to other primary elections. However, in fixing the dates and hours the committee shall grant as much time for the performance of the acts required as is reasonably practicable.\\\"\\nPlaintiff insists that since this is a special election, the court could either order a new election or a second primary and thereby cause the Secretary of State to remove the name of Petre as the Democratic nominee because LSA-R.S. 18:362 is not a legal mandate to the Secretary of State in cases of special elections.\\nThis contention, we believe, possesses no merit in view of the provisions of LSA-R.S. 18:1072, which reads:\\n\\\"The Secretary of State shall furnish to the clerk of the district court for each respective parish and to the civil sheriff for the parish of Orleans, at least thirty days prior to any primary, special or general election, printed ballots stamped 'Absentee Ballot' . As amended Acts 1960, No. 254, \\u00a7 2.\\\" (Emphasis added).\\nTherefore, it is clear from this recently amended statute that the provisions of LSA-R.S. 18:305 are not intended to exempt the Secretary of State from performing the legislative mandate of fur nishing absentee ballots to the necessary-parish officials thirty days before the election, despite the fact that it is characterized as a special election.\\nIn the final analysis, counsel for the plaintiff argue that LSA-R.S. 18:362, as interpreted by the Downs case, in effect deprives the aggrieved candidate of his right to question the result of an election. Counsel emphatically point to the fact that there was insufficient time for the complaining candidate to have the merits of his case disposed of in the district court and, additionally, to have the lower court decree, if unfavorable, reviewed by an appellate tribunal.\\nWe have not drawn the judicial veil so tightly around us so as to cause us to fail to recognize the real, practical and equitable characteristics of the foregoing contention; however, it is one which more properly addresses itself to the wisdom of the legislature rather than the judiciary, the very nature of which is its civil function as an interpreter, rather than a creator, of the law. Hence, it is clear that one contesting an election possesses only such rights as are afforded him by the election laws of this State.\\nThe jurisprudence is well-settled to the effect that election matters are beyond the control of the judiciary in the absence of special authority granted to it either by statutory or constitutional authorization.\\nFor the sake of coherence, we reiterate herein the decree which was rendered by us in this matter on May 9, 1961.\\nFor the reasons assigned, the motion to dismiss is sustained and this appeal dismissed at plaintiff's cost.\\nMotion sustained; appeal dismissed.\\n. The other defendants cited are Alvin W. Lacoste, another unsuccessful candidate for the disputed councilmanic seat; John J. Petre, the certified Democratic irominee; and Wade O. Martin, Jr., Secretary of State of the State of Louisiana.\\n. This cause was tried on the merits below, and the trial judge concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove allegations of fraud and irregularities sufficient to change the result of the primary election.\\n. 240 La. 580, 124 So.2d 553, 557.\\n. LSA-R.S. 18:362.\\n. This statute is in pari materia with LSA-R.S. 18:362.\\n. Downs v. Pharis, 240 La. 580, 124 So.2d 553; Reid v. Brunot, 153 La. 490, 96 So. 43.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/la/9904299.json b/la/9904299.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fd05356c3174e49d9e94edb334dc6bddfb1dabd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/la/9904299.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9904299\", \"name\": \"Succession of Laurence J. HOLLAND\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Succession of Holland\", \"decision_date\": \"1958-11-10\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 44069\", \"first_page\": \"697\", \"last_page\": \"703\", \"citations\": \"106 So. 2d 697\", \"volume\": \"106\", \"reporter\": \"Southern Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:54:06.219554+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"PONDER, J., absent.\", \"parties\": \"Succession of Laurence J. HOLLAND.\", \"head_matter\": \"236 La. 8\\nSuccession of Laurence J. HOLLAND.\\nNo. 44069.\\nSupreme Court of Louisiana.\\nNov. 10, 1958.\\nRehearing Denied Dec. 15, 1958.\\nJesse S. Guillot, Melvin J. Duran, New Orleans, for opponents-appellants.\\nJames T. Flanagan, New Orleans, for executor-appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"3036\", \"char_count\": \"18003\", \"text\": \"SIMON, Justice.\\nThis is an appeal from a judgment decreeing valid the last will and testament of Laurence J. Holland, dated July 16, 1957, which was executed during decedent's last illness while a patient in St. Joseph's Hospital in Joliet, Illinois.\\nIn the district court, Malvern F. Dris-coll, as executor named in the will dated July 16, 1957, instituted proceedings to have this will probated. Suit was filed by Melvin J. Duran and Mayer U. Newfield to have the will of July 16, 1957, declared null and void, on the ground of testamentary incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will, and to have probated a prior will, dated August 8, 1956, with a codicil thereto, in which Duran and Newfield were named co-executors. After trial the district court decreed the will of July 16, 1957, to be valid on the ground that the testimony preponderates in favor of testamentary capacity at the time of the confection of the will. From this judgment opponents, Duran and Newfield, have appealed.\\nAs error, appellants contend that the trial judge did not give sufficient weight to the medical testimony adduced in this case.\\nThe will in question, three typewritten pages in length, was made by decedent dur ing his last illness while a patient in St. Joseph's Hospital in Joliet, Illinois. The will was executed on July 16, 1957, and the testator died as a result of hepatic failure on July 17, 1957. On this appeal there is no question as to the form of the will under the laws of Illinois, the only \\u2022dispute being as to the testamentary capacity of the testator at the time of the \\u2022execution of the will. It is admitted by the parties to this suit, executors under the two wills, that the testator, an alcoholic, died at age thirty-five due to hepatic failure.\\nIt is the contention of the appellants that at the time of the execution of the will, July 16, 1957, the testator was in a .\\u2022state of progressive hepatic failure in St. Joseph's Hospital and that as a result of this serious illness, alcoholism, and the administration of hypnotic drugs, he was incapable of executing a valid will and testament. In addition to the medical testimony \\u2022of two attending physicians, Drs. Theodore Z. Polley and Thomas Morrison, appellants rely upon the testimony of Dr. Joseph E. 'Schenthal, a specialist in internal medicine, who testified solely from medical charts \\u2022of St. Joseph's Hospital that were introduced in evidence.\\nThe executor, under the will of July 16, 1957, relies upon the testimony of Judge Stewart Hutchison, who prepared the will and was present at its signing by the decedent, the two witnesses to the will, Mr. Robert Hamlin and Mrs. Mildred Krusemark, and the testimony of the testator's mother, who was present during the night of July 16, 1957.\\nHence the question propounded is one of fact, videlicet: whether the testator possessed testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will.\\nAccording to the record the testator, a resident of Louisiana, went to visit in Joliet, Illinois and while there, on July 7, 1957, took ill with a mouth infection. Dr. Theodore Z. Polley was called to treat testator and after examination on this date, diagnosed testator's condition as trench mouth with a possible upper gastrointestinal hemorrhage and enlargement of the liver, prescribing penicillin for the treatment of the mouth infection. Upon the advice of Dr. Polley, on July 12, 1957, testator was admitted as a patient to St. Joseph's Hospital in Joliet, Illinois, for treatment of a liver ailment. On the day of his admittance, testator telephoned Malvern Dris-coll, his attorney in New Orleans, and informed him that he wished to make a new will. Mr. Driscoll advised testator to contact an attorney in Illinois. Testator requested Mr. Robert Hamlin, a close friend, to secure an attorney for him and on July 15, 1957, Stewart J. Hutchison, Judge of a probate court in Illinois, visited testator in the hospital, with the consent of Dr. Morrison, one of the attending physicians, and received instructions from testator as to the provisions of the will to be made. O'n July 16, 1957, Judge Hutchi-son returned to the hospital with the will in question, which was executed on that date in his presence and in the presence of two witnesses, Mr. Hamlin and Mrs. Mildred Krusemark, a nurse in attendance at the hospital.\\nBefore going into a discussion of the testimony presented in the case, we may mention at the outset that both wills made by decedent, one dated August 8, 1956, with a codicil thereto and the other dated July 16, 1957, set up trusts giving monthly payments to testator's aunt and mother and naming a beneficiary for the remainder. In the latter will the testator's mother and aunt are given a slightly larger portion than in the previous will, the name of the beneficiary is changed (both beneficiaries under the respective wills are not relatives of the decedent but merely friends) and the executors named therein are different.\\nAppellants rely chiefly upon the testimony of Dr. Polley who stated that two days after testator's admittance to the hospital he was incoherent and was having hallucinations. Dr. Polley testified on interrogatories that on July 16, 1957, tes tator was lethargic, poorly responsive, and in his opinion was in such a condition, mentally and physically, that he could not have understood a three-page typewritten will dealing with trusts and various legacies. His opinion is based on the following facts: testator on July 16th was incontinent of his urine while lying in bed; was running a continued fever of 102.4; was having coffee-ground emesis; was expectorating large amounts of bloody phlegm and was totally incoherent and not responding to stimulae. According to his testimony, Dr. Polley saw the patient during his hospital rounds on the morning of July 16, 1957, between 7:30 and 8:30 A.M. and did not see testator again that day. It appears that the will was executed during the day of July 16, 1957, no exact hour being given but referred to as around the noon hour. Dr. Polley testified that on July 17th the testator was' in a critical terminal status, exhibiting gross muscular twitching,' was confused and not in contact with his environment.\\nDr. Thpmas Morrison, who also attended the testator, testified that on July 15, 1957, the testator was mentally clear and alert, and according to the progress notes there is no- record of the patient's mental condition to indicate mental confusion on July 15th. Dr. Morrison did not give an opinion as to the testator's mental capacity \\u00f3n July 16th, not having seen testator on that date. He testified further that he was aware of testator's desire to make a will, having been contacted by Judge Hutchison -for permission to see the patient, which consent he did so give.\\nDr. Joseph Schenthal, who never' saw or examined the testator, testified that the testator was mentally incapable of making a will at any time during his stay in the hospital, his testimony being based exclusively on the medical charts of the hospital introduced in evidence.\\nMalvern J. Driscoll, attorney and executor named in the will of July 16, 1957, testified that the decedent telephoned him from Illinois on Friday, July 12, 1957, and told him (Driscoll) that he wished to make a new will and eliminate Lee Holland, a beneficiary named in the will of August 8, 1956. Driscoll testified that he advised decedent to contact an attorney in Illinois,, which of his knowledge testator did, because Judge Hutchison telephoned Driscoll, and discussed the matter with him. Dris-coll testified that from the tenor of their conversation there was no indication of any mental incapacity of any kind, the testator's thoughts and desires being clearly and lucidly expressed.\\nRobert Hamlin, a close friend of testator, testified that several days before-July 16th, testator requested him to secure-an attorney for the purpose of making a new will. Hamlin testified that he contacted and arranged for Judge Hutchison* to visit with the testator on July 15th.. Hamlin further testified that he was present as a witness at the execution of the will. The tenor of his testimony is that though the testator evidenced physical weakness-as a result of the ailment and his attentiveness and alertness were slightly impaired' from the effects of alcoholism extending-over a period of several years, nevertheless the testator's mental capacity to appreciate his surroundings and to fully realize the import of his actions was evident.\\nStewart Hutchison, an attorney of long standing at the bar and probate Judge of a court in Illinois, testified that upon Hamlin's request he visited with testator on> July 15th for about an hour, with the-consent of Dr. Morrison. According to. his testimony, when asked concerning the-condition of decedent-from a layman's point of view, he answered:\\n\\\"He was a patient in bed and undoubtedly ill. When I was first asked to go see him and informed he was a patient, I contacted his attending physician and supervisory nurse of' the floor of the hospital. I informed' them of my requested presence and the purpose therefor. The Doctor; and Nun both informed me that he was physically and mentally able to execute a Will.\\\"\\nOn July 15th testator instructed Judge Hutchison as to the provisions he wished contained in the will. On July 16th, Judge Hutchison testified he returned with the will in question which was read to testator and signed by him in the presence of two witnesses, he again remaining with the testator for a period of about one hour. Judge Hutchison testified emphatically that the testator was mentally capable on both of these occasions, was lucid in his expressions, and alert of mind. He testified that the testator was conscious and perfectly aware of the import of the document and its provisions.\\nA witness to the will, Mrs. Mildred Krusemark, who was a nurse in attendance, testified that she knew decedent from the time of his admittance until his death in the hospital and that decedent told her several times that he wished to make a will. She knew of her own knowledge that decedent requested to see an attorney for the purpose of making a will on about the third day after his admittance. She was asked in interrogatories: \\\"Isn't it true Mr. Holland was attempting and arranging vo make this will for several days?\\\" to which she answered: \\\"I'm sure he dwelt on that, in fact seemed quite anxious at times.\\\" She testified that she saw the testator sign the will and that he was mentally capable at that time.\\nThe mother of the testator, who resided in New York, testified that testator spoke to her on the telephone at one o'clock in the day on July 16, 1957, and she arrived from New York in Joliet about seven o'clock that night. She testified that she spent most of the night with her son engaging in conversation with him, he being at all times rational and lucid.\\nAccording to the medical chart in evidence, the only mention of incoherence on July 16th is an entry at 8:00 P.M. namely: \\\"Patient talking incoherently @ times. Responds to oral stimuli.\\\" The testator died on July 17th at 8:40 A.M. and the final diagnosis according to the record is: \\\"Gastro-intestinal hemorrhage, esophageal varices, Cirrhosis, portal.\\\" The record does not show that the testator was ever comatose or ever actually lapsed into a coma. The drugs administered on July 16th are as follows: Pancebrin, lcc. intro-muscular; Vitamin C, 500 mgm.; Penicillin, 300,000 units; Dramamine, 50 mgm.; 1000 cc's of 5% Glucose; Vitamin K, Tablets I; Miltown, 400 mgm.; Dilantin, gr. lt/2) Ascorbic Acid, 500 mgm.; and Lipo-adrenal Cortex. Medical science defines Pancebrin as a vitamin preparation, Dramamine is usually prescribed for nausea, Miltown is a tranquilizer, Dilantin is an anti-convulsant, and Lipoadrenal Cortex is a preparation used for the treatment of shock, as was the case herein due to a drop in blood pressure. The testator's chart shows that no morphine or any of its derivatives were administered on July 16th. A study of the drugs aforementioned indicates that they may tend to make the patient drowsy but do not produce hypnosis such as is contended herein.\\nRecapitulating the testimony, Dr. Morrison did not venture an opinion as to the mental capacity of testator on July 16, 1957; Dr. Polley's testimony is not conclusive because he saw the patient only on the morning of July 16th between 7:30 and 8:30 A.M. and did not see testator at all the rest of the day; Dr. Schenthal's testimony is unrealistic since he testified flatly that testator could not have been mentally capable at any time from his admission on July 12th until his death on July 17th, and this testimony is based solely on his hypothesis gathered from medical charts without a personal examination or observation of the testator. It is significant that Dr. Schenthal's testimony in regard to the total mental incapacity of the testator between the dates aforestated is in all respects contradicted by the testimony of Dr. Morrison, wherein the latter testified that on July 15, 1957, he personally examined and observed the testator and concluded that the testator was mentally alert and lucid.\\nThe testimony of Judge Hutchison that the testator was mentally capable of executing a valid last will and testament is corroborated by the two witnesses to the will and the testimony of the testator's mother.\\nAppellants rely on Succession of Lafferanderie, 228 La. 871, 84 So.2d 442; Succession of Pizzati, 218 La. 549, 50 So.2d 189; and Artigue v. Artigue, 210 La. 208, 26 So.2d 699.\\nThe Succession of Lafferanderie, supra, relied upon by appellants, is not contrary to the conclusion we have reached as to the testamentary capacity of the testator at the time of the confection of the will. Appellants point out that in the Lafferan-derie case this Court gave more weight to the medical testimony of attending physicians than to the testimony of the attorney and witnesses to the will. A reading of that case reveals that the reason for such a conclusion was that the attending physician had treated the testatrix for a number of years for senile dementia, the claim for incapacity therein, and had known her condition. Whereas the attorney had seen the testatrix on only the occasion of the making of the will, and the witnesses thereto were parties in interest whose testimony was not conclusive.\\nSuccession of Pizzati, supra, involved the issue of mental capacity as a result of insanity. The facts disclose that five months after the execution of the will, interdiction proceedings were instituted. In that case testatrix was a victim of senile dementia caused by arteriosclerosis and the medical experts who examined the testatrix five or six months after the will was written were unable to positively state that she lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of her will.\\nIn Artigue v. Artigue, supra, it was there claimed that testatrix was insane and from the evidence presented the court found that the decedent was suffering from a condition that brought about softening of the brain and deterioration of the brain cells and that as a result of that condition the testatrix had evidenced signs of mental incompetence as insanity as early as 1941, or about a year previous to the execution of her will. It is significant that in that case the notary testified that he knew the testatrix and that from his observation on the date the will was made, she was sane on the date of the confection of the will. But an examination of the opinion conclusively reveals that the witnesses to the will knew that the testatrix was of unsound mind and that this fact was deliberately withheld from the notary. We found, and correctly so, that the testatrix was of unsound mind and not capable of testamentary capacity.\\nManifestly, we know of no rule of law which makes it imperative upon the courts to resolve the issue of testamentary capacity solely upon the testimony of medical experts. Of necessity, the testimony of medical experts should not be ignored but should be considered and weighed along with all of the facts and circumstances presented in the record. It is equally true that lay testimony must be taken in connection with expert testimony, attaching to it such weight as would guide us in resolving the issue of mental capacity.\\nIn the instant case we cannot say that the trial judge committed manifest error. From a reading of the evidence as a whole, we are justified in concluding that the testator herein possessed legal mental capacity as would authorize the execution of the will in question. We reiterate the oft-stated principle, so firmly embedded in our law and jurisprudence, that there is a legal presumption of sanity at the time of the will's confection and that the person attacking the will has the burden of proving lack of testamentary capacity when the will was executed. Chandler v. Barrett, 21 La.Ann. 58; Kings- bury v. Whitaker, 32 La.Ann. 1055; Succession of Mithoff, 168 La. 624, 122 So. 886; Rostrup v. Succession of Spicer, 183 La. 1087, 165 So. 307; Succession of Edgar, 184 La. 775, 167 So. 438; Succession of Lambert, 185 La. 416, 169 So. 453; Succession of Stafford, 191 La. 855, 186 So. 360; Landry v. Landry, 196 La. 490, 199 So. 401; Artigue v. Artigue, 210 La. 208, 26 So.2d 699; Clanton v. Shattuck, 211 La. 750, 30 So.2d 823; McCarty v. Trichel, 217 La. 444, 46 So.2d 621; Succession of Pizzati, 218 La. 549, 50 So.2d 189; Succession of Lafferanderie, 228 La. 871, 84 So.2d 442. We conclude that this burden has not been adequately met.\\nFor the reasons assigned, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed at appellants' cost.\\nPONDER, J., absent.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file