Arcane Backend: Missing admin authorization on git repository endpoints allows non-admin users to exfiltrate stored Git credentials and tamper with GitOps configs
Date: 2026-05
Affected: go/github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend
Attack vector: info-disclosure
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: Critical
CVE: CVE-2026-45625
CWE: CWE-862
CVSS: 9.9 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)

## Summary Arcane's huma-based REST API exposes nine endpoints under `/api/customize/git-repositories` and `/api/git-repositories/sync` for managing GitOps source repositories and their stored credentials. Eight of those endpoints (`list`, `create`, `get`, `update`, `delete`, `test`, `listBranches`, `browseFiles`) never call the `checkAdmin(ctx)` helper that every other admin-managed resource (container registries, environments, users, API keys, swarm, settings, system, notifications, events) uses, and the huma authentication middleware deliberately enforces only authentication, not the `admin` role. As a result, any logged-in user with the default `user` role can list, create, modify, delete, and test git repository configurations. By repointing an existing repository's URL to an attacker-controlled host while omitting the `token`/`sshKey` fields (which `UpdateRepository` only rewrites when explicitly supplied), the attacker causes Arcane to decrypt the legitimate PAT/SSH key on its next `/test`, `/branches`, or `/files` call and present it as HTTP Basic auth (or SSH key auth) to the attacker's host — producing a one-step exfiltration of plaintext Git credentials. ## Details ### Auth bridge does not enforce role `backend/internal/huma/middleware/auth.go:192-254` (`NewAuthBridge`) validates Bearer JWTs / API keys / agent tokens and stores the user (and an `userIsAdmin` flag) in the request context, but it never rejects non-admin callers — admin enforcement is intentionall


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Architectural layers (MAESTRO):