AVideo: Full-Read SSRF Through Unvalidated statsURL Parameter in plugin/Live/test.php
Date: 2026-03
Affected: composer/wwbn/avideo
Attack vector: ssrf
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: Medium
CWE: CWE-918
CVSS: 4.9 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N)

## Summary The `plugin/Live/test.php` endpoint accepts a URL via the `statsURL` parameter and fetches it server-side using `file_get_contents()`, `curl_exec()`, or `wget`, returning the full response content in the HTML output. The only validation is a trivial regex (`/^http/`) that does not block requests to internal/private IP ranges or cloud metadata endpoints. The codebase provides `isSSRFSafeURL()` which blocks private IPs and resolves DNS to prevent rebinding, but this endpoint does not call it. An authenticated admin can read responses from cloud metadata services, internal network services, and localhost endpoints. ## Details The vulnerable code path is in `plugin/Live/test.php`: **User input (line 11):** ```php $statsURL = $_REQUEST['statsURL']; if (empty($statsURL) || $statsURL == "php://input" || !preg_match("/^http/", $statsURL)) { _log('this is not a URL '); exit; } ``` The regex `/^http/` only verifies the URL starts with "http" — it does not validate the host, resolve DNS, or check against private/reserved IP ranges. **Sink — file_get_contents (line 58-68):** ```php if (ini_get('allow_url_fopen')) { try { $tmp = file_get_contents($url, false, $context); _log('file_get_contents:: '.htmlentities($tmp)); ``` **Sink — curl_exec (line 73-94):** ```php } elseif (function_exists('curl_init')) { $ch = curl_init(); // ... curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, 0); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, 0); // ..


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):