AVideo: stored XSS via unescaped stream key in modeYoutubeLive.php class attribute
Date: 2026-05
Affected: composer/WWBN/AVideo
Attack vector: xss
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: Medium
CVE: CVE-2026-45580
CWE: CWE-79
CVSS: 5.4 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N)

## Summary **Type:** Stored cross-site scripting. The Live plugin's "YouTube-style" view renders the live transmission's stream key into an HTML class attribute by raw `echo`, without `htmlspecialchars()`. A `canStream` user can persist a key containing `"` plus an event handler via `plugin/Live/saveLive.php`, and any visitor (logged in or anonymous) opening the stream's live page executes attacker JavaScript in the platform origin. **File:** `plugin/Live/view/modeYoutubeLive.php`, line 203. **Root cause:** the template builds a live-status hook by concatenating the database key into a class name: `class="title_liveKey_<?php echo $livet['key'] ?>"`. There is no escaping. The persistence path `plugin/Live/saveLive.php:30` accepts `$_REQUEST['key']` verbatim into `live_transmitions.key` (the auto-generation path uses `uniqid()`, but the manual save path lets the caller override it with anything). The `on_publish.php:117` sanitiser strips only `&` and `=`, not `"`, `<`, or `>`, so the poisoned value also passes through every internal data flow. The admin-side rendering of the same field is similarly unescaped, so an admin opening the stream details page gets the same XSS in admin context. ## Affected Code **File:** `plugin/Live/view/modeYoutubeLive.php`, lines 195-209. ```php <i class="fas fa-lock"></i> <?php } else { ?> <i class="fas fa-video"></i>


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):