PraisonAI vulnerable to sandbox escape via `print.__self__` builtins module leak in `execute_code` (subprocess mode)
Date: 2026-05
Affected: pip/PraisonAI, pip/praisonaiagents
Attack vector: prompt-injection
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: Critical
CVE: CVE-2026-47392
CWE: CWE-184
CWE-693
CVSS: 9.9 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)

## Summary `execute_code()` in `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using `print.__self__` to retrieve the real Python `builtins` module, from which `__import__` can be extracted via `vars()` and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox. This is a **novel bypass** that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (`type.__getattribute__` trampoline). --- ## Severity **CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — 9.9 Critical** --- ## Root Cause Three independent gaps in the AST-based security validation: ### Gap 1: `__self__` missing from `_blocked_attrs` In CPython, all built-in functions (C-level functions) have a `__self__` attribute that returns the module they belong to. The built-in functions in `safe_builtins` (`print`, `len`, `range`, etc.) are the *real* CPython built-in functions, so `print.__self__` returns `<module 'builtins' (built-in)>`. The `_blocked_attrs` frozenset (line 52) does NOT include `__self__`. The AST check at line 74 only blocks attributes that are IN this set, so `print.__self__` passes. ### Gap 2: `vars` not blocked as callable or attribute `builtins.vars(obj)` returns `obj.__dict__`. The function name `vars` is not in the AST `Call` blocklist (line 83: only blocks `exec`, `eval`, `compile`, `__import__`, `open`, `input`, `breakpoin


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):