Uni-CLI: Legacy HTTP MCP transport accepted browser-originated localhost requests
Date: 2026-06
Affected: npm/@zenalexa/unicli
Attack vector: other
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: High
CWE: CWE-346
CWE-352

## Impact Uni-CLI versions before 0.225.2 exposed the legacy JSON-RPC-over-HTTP MCP transport on loopback without validating browser Origin headers before routing requests. A malicious web page could send a CORS simple POST request, such as text/plain, to the local /mcp endpoint and deliver a JSON-RPC body to the dispatcher. If the user had started the local MCP HTTP transport, that page could drive tools/call requests against the user's local Uni-CLI server. The Streamable HTTP transport already enforced this browser-to-localhost boundary. The legacy stateless HTTP path did not, so the two HTTP transports had drifted. This issue is about the browser-to-localhost boundary; it does not change Uni-CLI's local-code-execution trust model. ## Patches Version 0.225.2 fixes the issue by moving the Origin policy into a shared guard and applying it before routing in both HTTP transports. Non-loopback browser Origins are rejected with HTTP 403 before health, OAuth, or /mcp dispatch runs. Non-browser clients that omit Origin remain supported. ## Workarounds Upgrade to 0.225.2 or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, do not expose the legacy HTTP MCP transport to browser-originated traffic; use the default stdio transport or the Streamable HTTP transport instead. ## Credits Reported privately by Ryan Vonbrubeck ([@dodge1218](https://github.com/dodge1218)).


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