praisonai-platform: Project endpoints accept any project_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR
Date: 2026-06
Affected: pip/praisonai-platform
Attack vector: auth-bypass
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: High
CVE: CVE-2026-47418
CWE: CWE-639
CVSS: 8.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)

## Summary **Type:** Insecure Direct Object Reference. The project CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` and `GET .../{project_id}/stats`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `project_id` through `ProjectService.get(project_id)` / `update(project_id, ...)` / `delete(project_id)` / `get_stats(project_id)`. None of these calls thread `workspace_id` through to constrain the lookup. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, delete, or read stats for projects that belong to a different workspace `W2`. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py`, lines 47-108; route handlers at `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py`, lines 51-108. **Root cause:** identical to the agent and issue IDORs in this codebase. The route accepts `workspace_id` from URL, uses it solely for the membership gate, then calls `ProjectService.get(project_id)` which is `session.get(Project, project_id)` — a primary-key-only lookup with no `workspace_id` predicate. `update` and `delete` call `self.get(project_id)` first, inheriting the gap. `get_stats` likewise has no workspace check. ## Affected Code **File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py`, lines 47-108. ```python class ProjectService: ... async def get(self, project_id: str) -> Optional[Project]: """Get project by ID."""


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):