Dgraph: Pre-Auth Full Database Exfiltration via DQL Injection in Upsert Condition Field
Date: 2026-04
Affected: go/github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph, go/github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v24, go/github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25
Attack vector: auth-bypass
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: Critical
CVE: CVE-2026-41327
CWE: CWE-943
CVSS: 9.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)

## 1. Executive Summary A vulnerability has been found in Dgraph that gives an unauthenticated attacker full read access to every piece of data in the database. This affects Dgraph's default configuration where ACL is not enabled. The attack is a single HTTP POST to `/mutate?commitNow=true` containing a crafted `cond` field in an upsert mutation. The `cond` value is concatenated directly into a DQL query string via `strings.Builder.WriteString` after only a cosmetic `strings.Replace` transformation. No escaping, parameterization, or structural validation is applied. An attacker injects an additional DQL query block into the `cond` string, which the DQL parser accepts as a syntactically valid named query block. The injected query executes server-side and its results are returned in the HTTP response. There are no credentials involved. When ACL is disabled (the default), the `/mutate` endpoint requires no authentication. The `authorizeQuery` and `authorizeMutation` functions both return `nil` immediately when `AclSecretKey` is not configured. Even when ACL is enabled, a user with mutation-only permission can inject read queries that bypass per-predicate ACL authorization, because the injected query block is not subject to the normal authorization flow. POC clip: https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/edf43615-b0d5-46cd-abd9-2cb9423790d2 ## 2. CVSS Score **CVSS 3.1: 9.1 (Critical)** ``` CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N ``` | Metric | Valu


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