PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Event Injection via SSE `/publish` Endpoint
Date: 2026-06
Affected: pip/praisonaiagents
Attack vector: auth-bypass
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: Medium
CWE: CWE-306
CVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N)

## Summary The SSE (Server-Sent Events) server in `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/server/server.py` exposes a `/publish` endpoint that broadcasts arbitrary messages to all connected clients without any authentication. The `ServerConfig` dataclass (line 24) defines an `auth_token` field, but this token is never validated in the `/publish` or `/events` request handlers. Any attacker with access to the SSE server port can inject arbitrary events into the SSE stream visible to all connected clients, or use `/info` to leak server configuration including connected client count. ## Details **Vulnerable code (lines 164–180):** ```python async def publish(request): try: data = await request.json() event_type = data.get("type", "message") event_data = data.get("data", {}) self.broadcast(event_type, event_data) return JSONResponse({ "success": True, "clients": len(self._clients), }) ``` The `auth_token` field in `ServerConfig` (line 31): ```python @dataclass class ServerConfig: ... auth_token: Optional[str] = None ``` This `auth_token` is **never referenced** in any request handler. The `/publish` endpoint processes any POST request regardless of authentication headers. The `/info` endpoint (line 182) also has no auth and returns server configuration including `self.config.to_dict()`. **Routes registration (lines 190–194):** ```python routes = [ Route("/health", health, methods=["GET"])


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