Vitess allows HTML injection in /debug/querylogz & /debug/env
Date: 2024-12
Affected: go/vitess.io/vitess, go/vitess.io/vitess, go/vitess.io/vitess
Attack vector: xss
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: Medium
CVE: CVE-2024-53257
CWE: CWE-79
CVSS: 4.9 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N)

### Summary The `/debug/querylogz` and `/debug/env` pages for `vtgate` and `vttablet` do not properly escape user input. The result is that queries executed by Vitess can write HTML into the monitoring page at will. ### Details These pages are rendered using `text/template` instead of rendering with a proper HTML templating engine. ### PoC Execute any query where part of it is HTML markup, for example as part of a string. To make it easier to observe you might want to make sure the query takes a few seconds to complete, giving you time to refresh the status page. Example query that can trigger the issue: ```sql UPDATE users SET email = CONCAT("<img src=https://cataas.com/cat/says/oops>", users.idUser, "@xxx") WHERE email NOT LIKE '%xxx%' AND email != "demo@xxx.com" ``` Result: ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c583816b-157c-474e-bbed-152b3dc0372f) ### Impact Anyone looking at the Vitess status page is affected. This would normally be owners / administrators of the Vitess cluster. Anyone that can influence what text show up in queries can trigger it. This would normally be pretty much everybody interacting with a system that uses Vitess as a backend.


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):