Open Redirect Vulnerability in Taguette
Date: 2025-12
Affected: pip/taguette
Attack vector: phishing
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: Medium
CVE: CVE-2025-67502
CWE: CWE-601
CVSS: 5.4 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N)

## Summary An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in Taguette that allows attackers to craft malicious URLs that redirect users to arbitrary external websites after authentication. This can be exploited for phishing attacks where victims believe they are interacting with a trusted Taguette instance but are redirected to a malicious site designed to steal credentials or deliver malware. **Severity:** Medium to High --- ## Details The application accepts a user-controlled `next` parameter and uses it directly in HTTP redirects without any validation. The vulnerable code is located in two places: ### Location 1: Login Handler (`taguette/web/views.py`, lines 140-144) ```python def _go_to_next(self): next_ = self.get_argument('next', '') if not next_: next_ = self.reverse_url('index') return self.redirect(next_) # ← No validation of next_ parameter ``` This method is called after successful login (line 132) and when an already-logged-in user visits the login page (line 109). ### Location 2: Cookies Prompt Handler (`taguette/web/views.py`, lines 79-85) ```python def post(self): self.set_cookie('cookies_accepted', 'yes', dont_check=True) next_ = self.get_argument('next', '') if not next_: next_ = self.reverse_url('index') return self.redirect(next_) # ← No validation of next_ parameter ``` In both cases, if `next_` is provided by the user, it is passed directly to `self.redirect()` without checking whether it points to the sa


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):