PraisonAI's symlink-extraction bypass of `_safe_extractall` writes outside `dest_dir`
Date: 2026-05
Affected: pip/PraisonAI
Attack vector: path-traversal
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: High
CVE: CVE-2026-44340
CWE: CWE-22
CWE-59
CVSS: 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N)

### Summary The `_safe_extractall` helper that all `recipe pull`, `recipe publish`, and `recipe unpack` flows route through validates each archive member's `name` for absolute paths, `..` segments, and resolved-path escape — but does **not** validate `member.linkname`, does not reject symlink/hardlink members, and calls `tar.extractall(dest_dir)` without `filter="data"`. A bundle that contains a symlink with a name inside `dest_dir` but a `linkname` pointing outside it, followed by a regular file whose path traverses *through* the just-created symlink, escapes `dest_dir` and lets the attacker write arbitrary content to an attacker-chosen location on the victim's filesystem. ## Affected paths Every code path that calls `_safe_extractall` is exposed: | Caller | File:line | |---|---| | `praisonai recipe unpack` | `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py:1175` (introduced as the fix for GHSA-99g3-w8gr-x37c) | | `LocalRegistry.unpack` (recipe pull) | `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:413` | | Registry archive validation (publish) | `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:808` | ## Root cause `recipe/registry.py:131-178`: ```python def _safe_extractall(tar: tarfile.TarFile, dest_dir: Path) -> None: ... for member in tar.getmembers(): ... member_path = Path(member.name) if member_path.is_absolute(): raise RegistryError(...) if '..' in member_path.parts: raise RegistryError(...) resolved = (dest_resolved / mem


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):