AVideo: CSRF on Player Skin Configuration via admin/playerUpdate.json.php
Date: 2026-04
Affected: composer/wwbn/avideo
Attack vector: other
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: Medium
CVE: CVE-2026-35181
CWE: CWE-352
CVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N)

**Severity:** Medium **CWE:** CWE-352 (Cross-Site Request Forgery) ## Summary The player skin configuration endpoint at `admin/playerUpdate.json.php` does not validate CSRF tokens. The `plugins` table is explicitly excluded from the ORM's domain-based security check via `ignoreTableSecurityCheck()`, removing the only other layer of defense. Combined with `SameSite=None` cookies, a cross-origin POST can modify the video player appearance on the entire platform. ## Details In `admin/playerUpdate.json.php` at line 17, the player skin is set directly from POST data: ```php $pluginDO->skin = $_POST['skin']; ``` No CSRF token is validated anywhere in the endpoint. Normally, the ORM layer performs a Referer/Origin domain check as a secondary defense against cross-origin writes. However, the `plugins` table is registered in `ignoreTableSecurityCheck()`, which explicitly bypasses this ORM-level protection for plugin configuration. AVideo's session cookies are configured with `SameSite=None`, meaning the admin's authenticated session cookie is automatically included in cross-origin POST requests from any website. An attacker can craft a page that, when visited by an authenticated admin, silently changes the player skin to any value, including potentially invalid or disruptive configurations. ## Proof of Concept Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled domain: ```html <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head><title>CSRF Player Skin</title></head> <body> <h1>Loading video...</h1>


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