praisonai-platform: Agent endpoints accept any agent_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR
Date: 2026-06
Affected: pip/praisonai-platform
Attack vector: prompt-injection
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: High
CVE: CVE-2026-47419
CWE: CWE-639
CVSS: 8.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L)

## Summary **Type:** Insecure Direct Object Reference. The agent CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id}`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `agent_id` through `AgentService.get(agent_id)` which is a primary-key lookup with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, or delete agents that belong to a different workspace `W2` by guessing or harvesting an agent UUID and calling `…/workspaces/W1/agents/<W2-agent-id>`. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/agent_service.py`, lines 53-112; route handlers at `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/agents.py`, lines 53-100. **Root cause:** the route extracts `workspace_id` from the URL path and passes it to `require_workspace_member` for the membership check, but never threads it through to the service layer. `AgentService.get` calls `session.get(Agent, agent_id)`, which is `SELECT * FROM agents WHERE id = :agent_id` with no `AND workspace_id = :workspace_id`. `update` and `delete` call `self.get(agent_id)` first and then mutate the returned row, inheriting the same gap. The `MemberService` is the one place in this codebase that does this correctly: it uses `(workspace_id, user_id)` as a composite key. The agent service simply forgot the second predicate, which is the textbook GHSA pattern for FastAPI services that treat routing parameters as decorative rather than aut


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):