Paperclip: Malicious skills able to exfiltrate and destroy all user data
Date: 2026-04
Affected: npm/@paperclipai/server
Attack vector: rce
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: High
CWE: CWE-77
CVSS: 7.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)

### Summary An arbitrary code execution vulnerability in the workspace runtime service allows any agent to execute shell commands on the server, exposing all environment variables including API keys, JWT secrets, and database credentials. ### Details A malicious skill can instruct the agent to exploit the **workspace runtime service** feature, which allows arbitrary shell command execution on the server. ### Vulnerable Code Path 1. Agent calls `PATCH /api/projects/{projectId}/workspaces/{workspaceId}` to set a malicious `runtimeConfig` 2. Agent calls `POST /api/projects/{projectId}/workspaces/{workspaceId}/runtime-services/start` 3. Server executes the command via `spawn()` in `server/src/services/workspace-runtime.ts`: ```typescript const shell = process.env.SHELL?.trim() || "/bin/sh"; const child = spawn(shell, ["-lc", command], { cwd: serviceCwd, env, ... }); ``` The `command` parameter comes directly from workspace config with no sanitization, allowing arbitrary code execution in the server's process context. ### Attack Flow The attached skill (disguised as a "system health diagnostic") instructs the agent to: 1. Create a workspace with a malicious runtime command 2. Start the runtime service to execute the command 3. The command reads `/proc/1/environ` and exfiltrates via `curl` This successfully exfiltrated the server (not the agent workspace) environment variables. | Variable | Value | Risk


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):