The vllm-metal inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS unconditionally sets trust_remote_code=True when loading model tokenizers, and runs without sandboxing.
Date: 2026-05
Affected: docker/docker_desktop, apple/macos
Attack vector: rce
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: High
CVE: CVE-2026-5817
CWE: CWE-829
CVSS: 8.2 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)

The vllm-metal inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS unconditionally sets trust_remote_code=True when loading model tokenizers, and runs without sandboxing. This causes transformers.AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained() to import and execute arbitrary Python files included in any model pulled from an OCI registry, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user when inference is triggered. Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model and request inference.


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):