PraisonAI: PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled environment variable unconditionally disables authentication
Date: 2026-06
Affected: pip/praisonai
Attack vector: auth-bypass
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: High
CWE: CWE-287
CVSS: 8.2 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N)

### Summary Setting `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled` completely disables all authentication on the `/api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke` endpoint. This bypass is advertised in the application's own error messages, making it likely to appear in production Docker and Compose configurations. ### Details ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py:32 _CALL_AUTH_DISABLED = os.getenv('PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH', '').lower() == 'disabled' async def verify_token(...) -> None: if _CALL_AUTH_DISABLED: return # all authentication skipped unconditionally ``` The application's own error message advertises the bypass: > "Set CALL_SERVER_TOKEN or PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled to run without authentication." This causes the setting to appear in Docker/Compose configurations as a convenience option. ### Proof of Concept ```python import os os.environ["PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH"] = "disabled" # verify_token() now returns immediately for any request # POST /api/v1/agents/any-agent/invoke → 200 OK (no token needed) ``` Common vulnerable deployment: ```yaml # docker-compose.yml environment: - PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled # auth completely disabled ``` ### Impact Full unauthenticated access to the agent invocation API. Any agent registered on the server can be triggered without credentials, potentially executing arbitrary actions depending on the agent's configured tools.


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):