WWBN AVideo: Missing CSRF Protection on State-Changing JSON Endpoints Enables Forced Comment Creation, Vote Manipulation, and Category Asset Deletion
Date: 2026-04
Affected: composer/wwbn/avideo
Attack vector: other
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: Medium
CVE: CVE-2026-40928
CWE: CWE-352
CVSS: 5.4 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L)

## Summary Multiple AVideo JSON endpoints under `objects/` accept state-changing requests via `$_REQUEST`/`$_GET` and persist changes tied to the caller's session user, without any anti-CSRF token, origin check, or referer check. A malicious page visited by a logged-in victim can silently: 1. Cast/flip the victim's like/dislike on any comment (`objects/comments_like.json.php`). 2. Post a comment authored by the victim on any video, with attacker-chosen text (`objects/commentAddNew.json.php`). 3. Delete assets from any category (`objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php`) when the victim has category management rights. Each endpoint is reachable from a browser via a simple `<img src="…">` tag or form submission, so exploitation only requires the victim to load an attacker-controlled HTML resource. ## Details AVideo exposes a helper, `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` (`objects/functionsSecurity.php:138`), that rejects cross-origin requests when the `Referer`/`Origin` does not match `webSiteRootURL`. It is only invoked in one file in the tree — `objects/userUpdate.json.php:18` — and is *not* applied to the endpoints below. There is also an `isGlobalTokenValid()` helper (`objects/functions.php:2313`) intended for CSRF-style token checks; none of the affected endpoints call it. `allowOrigin()` only sets CORS response headers and does not prevent cookie-bearing top-level or image requests from reaching the server. ### 1. `objects/comments_like.json.php` — CSRF → forced like/dislike


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):