AVideo: DOM XSS via Unsanitized Display Name in WebSocket Call Notification
Date: 2026-04
Affected: composer/wwbn/avideo
Attack vector: xss
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: Medium
CVE: CVE-2026-34716
CWE: CWE-79
CVSS: 6.4 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N)

## Summary The AVideo YPTSocket plugin's caller feature renders incoming call notifications using the jQuery Toast Plugin, passing the caller's display name directly as the `heading` parameter. The toast plugin constructs the heading as raw HTML (`'<h2>' + heading + '</h2>'`) and inserts it into the DOM via jQuery's `.html()` method, which parses and executes any embedded HTML or script content. An attacker can set their display name to an XSS payload and trigger code execution on any online user's browser simply by initiating a call - no victim interaction is required beyond being connected to the WebSocket. ## Details When a call notification arrives via WebSocket, the caller's identity is extracted from the JSON message: ```javascript // plugin/YPTSocket/caller.js:73 userIdentification = json.from_identification; ``` This value is passed directly to the jQuery Toast Plugin as the heading: ```javascript // plugin/YPTSocket/caller.js:89 heading: userIdentification, ``` Inside the jQuery Toast Plugin, the heading is rendered as raw HTML: ```javascript // node_modules/jquery-toast-plugin/src/jquery.toast.js:60 // Constructs: '<h2>' + heading + '</h2>' // Then inserts via .html() ``` jQuery's `.html()` method parses the string as HTML and executes any script-bearing elements (such as `<img onerror>`, `<svg onload>`, etc.). There is a secondary injection vector in the same file where the full JSON message is placed inside a single-quoted `onclick` attribute: ```javasc


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