Budibase: SSRF in AI Extract File Automation Step via Missing IP Blacklist Validation
Date: 2026-05
Affected: npm/@budibase/server
Attack vector: ssrf
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: High
CVE: CVE-2026-45548
CWE: CWE-918
CVSS: 7.7 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N)

## Vulnerability Details **CWE-918**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) The `processUrlFile` function in `packages/server/src/automations/steps/ai/extract.ts` uses `fetch(fileUrl)` directly **without the IP blacklist validation** that is consistently applied to all other automation steps. This allows an authenticated user to trigger server-side requests to internal network addresses. ### Vulnerable Code **`packages/server/src/automations/steps/ai/extract.ts` (lines 116, 139)**: ```typescript async function processUrlFile(fileUrl: string, ...): Promise<ExtractInput> { const response = await fetch(fileUrl) // NO blacklist check! // ... const fallbackResponse = await fetch(fileUrl) // Also NO blacklist check! } ``` ### Contrast with All Other Automation Steps (Same Codebase) Every other automation step that makes outbound HTTP requests properly uses `fetchWithBlacklist`: - `steps/slack.ts:19`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})` - `steps/discord.ts:28`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})` - `steps/zapier.ts:33`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})` - `steps/n8n.ts:53`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, request)` - `steps/outgoingWebhook.ts`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})` - `steps/make.ts`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})` The `fetchWithBlacklist` function (`steps/utils.ts:100`) validates URLs against the IP blacklist which blocks: - `127.0.0.0/8` (loopback) - `10.0.0.0/8`, `17


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):