Nginx-UI: Disabled users retain full API access through previously issued bearer tokens
Date: 2026-04
Affected: go/github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
Attack vector: other
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: Critical
CVE: CVE-2026-33026
CVE-2026-33030
CVE-2026-33031
CWE: CWE-284
CWE-312
CWE-347
CWE-354
CWE-639
CWE-78
CWE-863
CVSS: 8.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)

### Summary A user who was disabled by an administrator can use previously issued API tokens for up to the token lifetime. In practice, disabling a compromised account does not actually terminate that user’s access, so an attacker who already stole a JWT can continue reading and modifying protected resources after the account is marked disabled. Since tokens can be used to create new accounts, it is possible the disabled user to maintain the privilege. ### Details The application exposes an account-level disable control through the users management API. Login process correctly enforces that control: https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/6ec542fd97abf2c5950f374f78a32938ad0030e6/internal/user/login.go#L29-L31 However, token-based authentication does not enforce the same check (This code validates token structure and expiry, but returns that user object without checking `user.Status`.): https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/6ec542fd97abf2c5950f374f78a32938ad0030e6/internal/user/user.go#L44-L139 There’s also no token revocation feature, unlike when a password is changed: https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/6ec542fd97abf2c5950f374f78a32938ad0030e6/api/user/user.go#L38-L51 As a result, a disabled user can continue to have full API access. In particular, since that includes account creation, they can create a new account and keep operating even after the JWT expires. ### PoC The issue was validated with version 2.3.3 using the `uozi/nginx-ui:sha-c92ec0a` docker i


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