Directus: Sensitive fields exposed in revision history
Date: 2026-04
Affected: npm/directus
Attack vector: info-disclosure
Category: vulnerability-disclosure
Severity: Medium
CVE: CVE-2026-39943
CWE: CWE-200
CWE-312
CVSS: 6.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N)

### Summary Directus stores revision records (in `directus_revisions`) whenever items are created or updated. Due to the revision snapshot code not consistently calling the `prepareDelta` sanitization pipeline, sensitive fields (including user tokens, two-factor authentication secrets, external auth identifiers, auth data, stored credentials, and AI provider API keys) could be stored in plaintext within revision records. ### Impact Any user or service account with read access to `directus_revisions` (or flow logs) could retrieve values for fields that are supposed to be concealed or encrypted at rest, including: - `token`, `tfa_secret`, `external_identifier`, `auth_data`, `credentials` - `ai_openai_api_key`, `ai_anthropic_api_key`, `ai_google_api_key`, `ai_openai_compatible_api_key` This could lead to account takeover (via stolen tokens or 2FA secrets) or unauthorized use of third-party API keys stored against users. ### Affected code paths 1. **Item create/update revisions** The data (snapshot) field written to directus_revisions was not processed through prepareDelta, so concealed/encrypted fields were stored without redaction. Relational fields were also included, which should have been excluded. 2. **Authentication service** When a user was auto-suspended after repeated failed login attempts, the revision record was created with the raw user object (including all sensitive fields) rather than the sanitized delta.


Mitigations:

Architectural layers (MAESTRO):