Hodgson Pete: Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill — First Reading 
Hodgson Pete: Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill — First Reading 
[Volume:628;Page:559] 
Hon PETE HODGSON (Minister of Health) 
 on behalf of the  
Deputy Prime Minister 
: I move  
That the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill be now read a first time. 
 I intend to move that the bill be referred to the Justice and Electoral Committee for consideration. 
The bill has a history in this House and many members will be familiar with its provisions. It is directed against party hopping or waka jumping—the situation where an MP ceases to be a member of the political party for which he or she was elected to Parliament at the last general election either to become an Independent MP or to defect to another political party. The legislation has its roots in a member’s bill that Dr Cullen moved in 1999. It was reintroduced in 2000 by the Government and passed as the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001 because circumstances showed there was a real need to bring stability to parliamentary arrangements. In the two Parliaments before the last Act was introduced a total of 22 MPs defected from the parties for which they were elected. This was unacceptable to the general public particularly because the MPs concerned often used their votes quite irresponsibly to tip the balance of power. In short the amount of party hopping that occurred prior to 2001 brought Parliament into disrepute. 
Under the MMP electoral system that New Zealand has adopted voters have a right to expect that the parties they elect to Parliament will remain in the same proportion for the next 3 years. The previous Act had a sunset clause and it lapsed at the last general election. The Government has agreed to support reintroduction of the legislation in order to allow the current Parliament to decide whether it is an arrangement that should be reinstated permanently. 
The legislation sets up a very simple mechanism: where a parliamentarian ceases to be a member of the political party that he or she stood for at the last election the bill provides a procedure that allows the seat to be declared vacant by the Speaker. A member can notify the Speaker that he or she has left the political party; alternatively the leader of that member’s parliamentary party can notify the Speaker that he or she believes that the member has distorted the proportionality of Parliament and is likely to continue to do so. The leader needs the support of two-thirds of the caucus to give such a notice so there is a built-in safeguard that ensures the leader is acting with the support of a significant majority. 
Experience has shown that the measures have been very effective in halting the avalanche of defections. The number of defections and resignations from parties has been very small over the past 4 years and we have seen considerably greater stability in Parliament. Equally important public confidence in the institution has improved. The public can now trust the electoral process to deliver enduring stable arrangements that reflect their decisions at the ballot box. 
A lot of criticism was levelled at the legislation when it was introduced in 2000. Since that time however the legislation has been road-tested. Four years of practical experience have shown that many of the criticisms were misplaced and the legislation has a really positive impact on the stability of Parliament. 
With this background it may be worthwhile to respond to some of the early criticisms. One criticism of the legislation when it was introduced last time was that New Zealand was embarking on a different path from that of most other countries. At that time the countries that had anti-defection legislation were dismissed as a handful of banana republics but the reality is that more than 30 jurisdictions have introduced legislative restrictions on MPs who defect from or otherwise part ways with the party they were voted in on. This is across a range of electoral systems including a plural majority system MMP and proportional representation. The truth is that such legislation has been used internationally as countries find it necessary to ensure stability in their electoral arrangements. 
There was also a criticism that the arrangements would give too much power to political parties. The fear was that there would be a chilling effect on freedom of expression and that this would undermine democracy. In truth this criticism was made without a proper understanding of modern government and the nature of MMP. The reality is that MMP Parliaments quite unlike those under the first-past-the-post system are made up of a number of parties with a plurality of views. Minority Governments are the norm and this means that debate on legislation occurs much more intensively on the floor of the House than it ever did before. Select committees are made up of a much broader range of parties and those committees have become a very active forum in which views are expressed on legislation. There is also regular consultation with other parties on policy so a range of viewpoints are built in before bills even reach the House. In contrast to the criticism that was made of the electoral integrity amendments then debate on legislation has been alive and well over the past 4 years. This is because freedom of expression is built into the MMP environment. 
There was also uncertainty about how the legislation would be interpreted by the courts. Since the Act was passed the electoral integrity provisions have been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of  
Prebble and Ors  
v  
Huata 
. I am sure the select committee will want to look at the bill and see whether that decision justifies any modifications to it. Justice Keith in particular gave a very considered judgment and it may be worthwhile recording some of the points he made. He documented the history of political parties in New Zealand and indicated that under MMP the party is more important than it ever was before. However he did not consider that the electoral integrity amendments would place too much power in the hands of political parties and lead to a chilling of freedom of expression. Members may be interested in what he said in this respect: “Because of the dominant role of party their freedom of expression is for the most part to be exercised within caucus and other party processes. The central role of party already well established by 1993 has been enhanced by the introduction of a proportional electoral system.” 
Another point that is worth emphasising is the way the bill deals with constituency members and list members. One criticism made about the electoral integrity amendments the last time they were in the House was that they should distinguish between constituency MPs and list MPs. It is true that the bill itself makes no distinction between the two types of parliamentarian but there are real differences in the way each is treated upon defecting from their party. Where a constituency MP’s seat becomes vacant under the bill there is a by-election. The MP is entitled to stand again and test the will of the voters about his or her decision to defect from the party he or she was originally voted in on. In contrast where a list MP’s seat becomes vacant under the bill the next person on the party list is promoted to Parliament. There is no by-election and the MP must wait until the next general election to test his or her mandate. This is a neat solution because it reflects the electoral mandate that attaches to each type of MP. Constituency MPs are voted in on a combination of party and electorate support. It seems fair that they should be entitled to test their mandate with the constituency immediately if they defect. List MPs in contrast are voted in purely on party grounds. Where they defect they arguably have very little mandate to remain in Parliament as Independent MPs or as part of any other political party. They should wait until the next general election before receiving the opportunity to start again. 
Finally we should not let ourselves be confused by arguments about the application of Edmund Burke’s philosophy in this debate. The last time that electoral integrity amendments were in the House some members suggested that the bill cut across his ideas about representative democracy. Those contributions simply showed that members had not gone away and read Burke’s essays. Burke was a political philosopher who wrote in the 18th century. The environment was completely different with the Westminster political system only just beginning to take on its modern form. At that time English members of the House of Commons were often nominees of landed gentry and were expected to vote in the House according to the view of their sponsor. Burke’s theory of representative democracy was a reaction against this. He argued that members of Parliament should not simply be proxies for their constituents. It was a discussion about the relationship between MPs and their constituents not MPs and their parties. On the relationship between a member of Parliament and his or her party—and that is the debate that is before us now—Burke was much more ready to concede that parliamentarians should be ready to submit to the collective will. 
In conclusion the practical experience of the last 4 years shows that the legislation works well and that there has been a real improvement in the stability of Parliament which is why the Government has agreed to support the introduction of this bill into the House to allow Parliament to decide whether it is an arrangement that should be reinstated permanently. I commend the bill to the House.