Bakshi Kanwaljit Singh: Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment Bill — Second Reading In Committee Third Reading 
Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume 
Bakshi Kanwaljit Singh: Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment Bill — Second Reading In Committee Third Reading 
[Sitting date: 24 November 2009. Volume:659;Page:8252. Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume.] 
KANWALJIT SINGH BAKSHI (National) 
: 
 I stand to support the Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment Bill. The purpose of the bill is to repeal the partial defence of provocation. At a time when the Government is sending a strong message that people must find a way other than violence to manage their anger it is inappropriate that anger be singled out as an overriding factor justifying conviction for manslaughter rather than murder. 
Historically the sole reason for the provocation defence was to avoid the mandatory murder penalty effectively rewarding the person for his or her lack of self-control. Section 102 of the Sentencing Act 2002 now allows the presumption of life imprisonment to not be adopted on the grounds of manifest injustice. The historical rationale of section 169 of the Crimes Act 1961 has therefore been abolished. Juries have encountered difficulties in determining how an ordinary person would have acted when confronted with provocation at that level of gravity. The defence assumes that ordinary reasonable people who are confronted with severe provocation will react with a homicidal loss of self-control when in fact ordinary people do not. 
The Government considers that the partial defence of provocation is fundamentally flawed. It effectively provides a defence for lashing out in anger—not just any anger but violent homicidal rage. It rewards a lack of self-control by enabling an intentional killing to be categorised as something other than murder. The trial process including the sentence is often deeply traumatic for the families and friends of the victim. The distress caused to those close to the victim will generally reduce any defence argument as the provocation issue is confined to sentencing. We believe that the risk that a jury will acquit altogether when confronted with an intentional but provoked killing is very low. Juries will still sometimes convict for manslaughter if an alternative defence such as lack of intent has been run but they are not likely to let an offender walk free on the ground of sympathy alone. 
The repeal of the partial defence of provocation for murder from the statute book is the preferred option. It is not proposed that provocation be considered as an express mitigating factor at sentencing. Rather the sentencing judge will be able to use his or her discretion under the Sentencing Act 2002 to consider whether life imprisonment would be manifestly unjust given the particular circumstances of the case. If the sentencing judge determines that the life sentence is justified he or she can take into account the existence and degree of provocation together with all other relevant aggravating and mitigating factors in fixing the length of the minimum non-parole period. The repeal of partial defence would make factors such as the alleged sexual behaviour of the victim and the nature of the relationship with the defendant less relevant in the crime. The emphasis upon such factors in evidence results in significant amounts of distress for the families and friends of the victim. 
In conclusion I make the point that this is not a knee-jerk reaction to the recent Weatherston case. The matter has been on the Minster of Justice’s work programme for some time. 
Sitting suspended from 6 p.m. to 7 p.m. 
KANWALJIT SINGH BAKSHI 
: Although recent cases have certainly drawn the partial defence of provocation into the public eye the Law Commission first recommended its repeal in 2001 and the defence was the subject of a stand-alone report in 2007. I commend this bill to the House.