Penk ChrisCHRIS PENK (National—Helensville): Thank you very much Madam Chair. It's a pleasure to contribute to the Part 4 debate on the End of Life Choice Bill. I've got some very specific remarks of course to make in relation to certain provisions and Supplementary Order Papers (SOPs) but I thought it was worth starting by placing tonight's debate in the context of the bill as a whole. Part 4—CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): No we won't. No we won't because the member is dicing with not having any more speeches. So I suggest that he gets on and talks to his SOPs. CHRIS PENK: I understand Madam Chair. I am however—you will be aware—able to speak to matters within Part 4 that are not SOPs as well. CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): You are. CHRIS PENK: Thank you and that is exactly what I'm about to do. So Part 4 is Related matters". It is the last chance saloon for Mr Seymour to express to the committee and particularly those members that are comfortable with the idea of euthanasia or assisted suicide in general but are not comfortable with the lack of protection in his bill—it's the last chance that he has to demonstrate that he's thought of all the things that are necessary if one is establishing a regime for assisted dying as it is euphemistically referred to. So in that context I will be speaking about what's in Part 4 but it's also worth noting in passing—and in passing only—that which is not referred in Part 4. The—CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): Well no. Let's not go there. Let's not even try going there. CHRIS PENK: OK. Looking at for a start SOP 381 in my name you'll see that that refers to the Schedule which is within of course Part 4 and it's the Schedule—Part 2 thereof—that establishes some amendments or proposed amendments to the Health and Disability Commissioner's code of consumer rights as it's referred to. So in this contribution I'd like to speak to that and more particularly five different aspects of that SOP and what it is hoping to achieve. The first thing is the overriding nature of it and that's deliberate by design in terms of the wording. I'll come back to that—the fact that it relates to requesting and receiving services. Third just a quick note on the terminology within that: consumer and provider. Fourth relating to a petition that was received today and I'd like the opportunity to highlight that. Then finally just establishing to whose benefit exactly the SOP is envisaged to be for. So looking at the first of those aspects I've started with the words "Despite anything else contained in this Code". The reason for that—and of course remembering that this is in relation to the code of patients' rights as we might say—is this is designed and specifically set up to be an overriding provision whereby everything else in the code is subject to this. Everything else takes a backseat to this overriding provision—this suggestion that I'm about to make. The reason for that is because the right not to be deprived arbitrarily of life is an overriding consideration in itself. The right to life is a fundamental right in the sense that other rights depend upon it—almost all other rights I suppose we could say. So for that reason I want to make it clear that this proposal is such that we would have a person be able to rely on this right notwithstanding anything else that is said in the code of patient rights. So that's the first thing. The second thing is the right itself that I would be establishing. That's for a consumer—I'll come back to that word in a moment—to have the right to request and receive services only from particular providers. The significance of those two different verbs in relation to services is of course that the person has the right to request them and the right to receive them as well. Therefore there's a corresponding responsibility on the so-called provider to provide such services and so it is we sort of have a right-handed duty engaged within that one phrase. Just noting quickly as to terminology that it is a provider and a consumer as defined within the code of rights that I am referring to in case that terminology should seem strange for what would otherwise traditionally be for example a doctor-patient relationship. Now passing to the fourth point that I had highlighted I would be bringing to attention of the House: a petition was received today by the Parliament in the name of Renée Joubert and it pointed to a petition that had been signed by some 2600 or so other New Zealanders. That referred to essentially the same sort of idea as captured in the SOP. I'd like to talk a bit more about it after the break. It is specifically in relation to those who have advocated for such an idea: those who provide care for vulnerable Kiwis towards the end of their life those who receive such care already—maybe in a palliative situation maybe in a situation of terminal illness of an uncertain prognosis certainly many disabled and elderly New Zealanders—those who are very much at the crossroads the cross-section and indeed the crosshairs of Mr Seymour's proposal. So it is that I think it appropriate as we debate Part 4 of the End of Life Choice Bill that we give some recognition to this petition this proposal from outside the House and that we inside the Chamber debating and considering ways that we can improve the bill give some expression and voice to that. I want to give fellow members an opportunity to—CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): Well as it relates to Part 4. It would be good if the member would get on with relating the petition to Part 4. CHRIS PENK: Yes indeed Madam Chair. The petition is exactly the same subject matter of SOP 381. CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): Good. CHRIS PENK: Thank you. Happy to clarify. So it is that as reflected in the petition and indeed similar wording but not identical within the explanatory note and I'll take the liberty of quoting from my own explanatory notes: "This choice will be meaningful for Kiwis who might otherwise fear diagnosis and prognosis from 'providers' (to use the language of the Code of Patient Rights) whose practice includes ending the lives of patients." So just to spell out very clearly that the SOP is concerned—both in the sense of having as its subject matter but also concerned as in anxious—for those who are feeling in a particularly vulnerable situation and who could be more vulnerable than those with a terminal illness and all that that implies including often times at least a temporary situation of depression as the science indicates is entirely common—certainly not uncommon. It's for their benefit that we would provide a choice for them to receive services from someone who isn't actively engaged in providing euthanasia and assisted suicide. The reason is probably obvious at least to 119 members of the House but I'll spell it out for the benefit of the 120th which is around basically the chilling effect—the fear that a person might have in terms of disclosing the extent of their situation or even going along to receive health services in the first place and hearing the implications for them that might be put on offer. At least nominally of course there is a choice under the bill and I acknowledge that that at least in philosophical terms is the starting point of the sponsor of the bill and some others who have supported it thus far. But of course without rehashing previous discussions in previous parts of course the notion of choice in that sense can be rather fluid and flexible. I just want to focus on that word "choice" as I've used it in that SOP's explanatory note and also in terms of the right because by implication a right can be exercised or not exercised. There's an implicit choice even there. That is of course if the raison d'être if the rationale for the bill is of course around choice then it should not only be that a person has the choice to die in a certain way and at a certain time and by requiring the State to participate in that but they should also have the right actively to opt out of that. This is not dissimilar in a way to the choice that might have been expressed previously in relation to conscientious objection and so on but they were covered elsewhere so again I hasten to get in ahead of you there Madam Chair. We won't go there again but just to point out this is a different thing. This is a thing that's quite specific to this SOP in this part because it has not been covered elsewhere and it's because this is a suggestion that will amend that which is elsewhere on our statute book—I use the term "statute" rather loosely there. It's a legislative instrument. It's if not primary legislation then regulations—in effect a code which is very important to the lives and health rights of Kiwis. As such it is hugely important that colleagues who are minded to support the bill in all other respects do need to—I would urge them—understand and to engage with the fact that this choice has got to be both ways. Patients and New Zealanders have to have the choice not to engage in this way."