Hipkins Chris: Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill — In CommitteeText is incorporated into the Bound VolumeHipkins Chris: Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill — In Committee[Sitting date: 16 October 2013. Volume:694;Page:13953. Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume.]CHRIS HIPKINS (Labour—Rimutaka): I am very happy to follow on from my colleague Trevor Mallard who amongst other things in his very useful contribution established for the Committee that he is very very old. I want to thank him for that. Of course as we debate Part 1 which includes the interpretation clause of the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill—and I have got a number of points that I want to raise on the definitions—it is of course useful to remember why we are here and how this whole debate came about. It came about because the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) one of the agencies whose powers are significantly increased under this bill was unable to read its own Act and to interpret the law as it stood. It was unable to do that and this bill expands its powers. It was not able to stick within the law as it was so the Government’s solution to the GCSB being unable to follow the law as it was is to increase the scope of theGCSB’s powers under the law. There are a number of reasons why the interpretation clause in this bill creates some huge concerns in that regard.Of course there is a little irony in all of this in that the catalyst for this the best example of the GCSB being unable to follow its own law was the Kim Dotcom case. Of course who was Kim Dotcom? He was John Banks’ big donor—Hon Clayton Cosgrove: Brown bag.CHRIS HIPKINS: —and of course John Banks lost his job today because of those brown bag anonymous donations.The CHAIRPERSON (Lindsay Tisch): Order! Order!CHRIS HIPKINS: Well it is absolutely relevant Mr Chair—The CHAIRPERSON (Lindsay Tisch): Come back come back. That has got nothing to do with it.CHRIS HIPKINS: —and I am intending to come back to it because I am going to come to the definition of “national security” because it is directly relevant to the Kim Dotcom case. It is absolutely relevant to the Kim Dotcom case. “National security”—according to this legislation—“in relation to New Zealand includes its economic well-being”. How much broader could a definition of “national security” get than simply being economic well-being? This bill gives the Minister enormous powers simply on the basis of the country’s economic well-being. It does not necessarily need to suggest that anyone has broken a law or that any operator has broken a law but simply that a Minister deems it to be in the interests of national security.So in the Kim Dotcom case Kim Dotcom andMegaupload may not have even been deemed to have broken any laws. It simply could have been the case that the Minister decided that it was not in the country’s economic well-being for theMegaupload operation to continue to operate. This is my understanding of how this bill operates and I am sure my colleague Clare Curran will correct me if I am wrong. My understanding of it is that under this definition of “national security” which is purely economic well-being the Minister could effectively shut downMegaupload if she deemed it to be not to do with the country’s economic well-being. It is nothing to do with whether any laws have been broken but it simply applies an economic well-being test. That is so so utterly broad.Amy Adams the Minister in the chair is shaking her head so I am hoping that she will address this issue when she makes her contribution in this part of the debate because I have never seen anything that defines national security and extends national security powers so broadly yet has such a broad definition of what national security actually is. I think that that is incredibly concerning and I am looking forward to the Minister’s contribution on that.Coming back to network operators and the definition of “network operator” another question that I have for the Minister is whether the Government’s Network for Learning which is being extended to all schools in the country and being made available to all schools would come under the definition of a “network operator”. Clare Curran has just passed me some further information about the Network for Learning although I am relatively familiar with it. We have got 21 schools according to Nikki Kaye being connected to the Network for Learning by the end of this year. I would actually quite like to hear from the Associate Minister of Education Nikki Kaye who is overseeing the implementation of the Network for Learning. She is on the phone so I am assuming that means that she is getting some advice on this matter so that she can participate fully in this debate.I would like to know what the implications of this bill are for the Network for Learning. It is going to be rolled out from what we understand to all schools in the country over time. It is a significant network so let us look at what the network operatordefinition in the bill states. It states that a “network operator means a person who owns controls or operates a public telecommunications network;”. The Network for Learning surely must come under the definition of that so what are the implications? This is a managed network for schools that is going to connect schools together via a secure data network offering high levels of service quality and support so the Government therefore becomes a network operator under the definitions in this bill. So what are the implications for the Network for Learning and for interactions with kids who might be using the Network for Learning as a result of this? Is the GCSB now going to be snooping on kids and teachers throughout the country as a result of this legislation? Because under the definition of a “network operator” the Network for Learning could well come within that definition.Let us look at a “network security risk”. A “network security risk means any actual or potential security risk arising from the design build or operation of a public telecommunications network; or any interconnection to or between public telecommunications networks in New Zealand or with telecommunications networks overseas”. Again it is a very very broad definition—any actual or potential security risk arising from those things. So could kids working in schools be deemed to be a potential security risk and on the basis of that could we have the GCSB snooping in on the activities of schools and kids as a result of this legislation? I think we do want to have some clarity.One of the problems with this bill is that the definitions are simply so broad. I am completely willing to admit that I was not part of the select committee process for this bill. I picked up this bill for the first time this afternoon and tried to make head or tail of it. I have to say that it is incredibly complex and incredibly difficult but I have been alarmed in reading the definitions at just how broad they are and when we get into Part 2 in particular at just how sweeping are the powers under Part 2. The reason that of course the Part 2 powers are relevant to the debate on Part 1 is that the Part 2 powers all rely on the definitions that are established here in Part 1—those very very broad definitions.Let us look at the “other lawful interception authority”. That “means an authority to access an information infrastructure (within the meaning of the Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003)” and “includes an authority to intercept a private communication (whether in an emergency situation or otherwise) that is granted to any member of a surveillance agency under any other enactment”. Authority to access an information infrastructure—so what is an information infrastructure? Let us go back and see what the definition of an information infrastructure is under this piece of legislation here. An information—oh it is not defined. An information infrastructure is not defined. So basically we have got here unless I might have missed it but no I did not. No I cannot see it here. So we have got it here that—Dr David Clark: The Minister will correct you if you’re wrong.CHRIS HIPKINS: —I am sure she will—it “means an authority to access an information infrastructure”. Well what is an information infrastructure? How can we be having a definition with another definition contained within in it that is not then defined? It actually just makes a mockery of the whole thing. This bill is so poorly worded and gives such broad powers that it is almost certainly going to result in significant legal challenges to the Government and the reason all of the New Zealand public should be concerned about that is that it deals with such a sensitive delicate issue. It deals with the privacy of New Zealanders’ information and their interactions online and use of other forms of telecommunications.I said in earlier debates on this matter that I think the issues around privacy and around what New Zealanders can expect when they are using information andcommunications technology is one of the biggest and most challenging issues that this Parliament is going to deal with over the next few years. What we have seen from this Government is that it deals with this debate in an ad hoc piecemeal fashion without a real proper thorough examination of the principles that should guide it and that is why we end up with bad legislation like this.For example if we turn to the principles clauses in Part 1 here—I will get to the principles clauses as I was reading them a moment ago. In clause 5 here as part of “Purposes and principles” we have got principles relating to an interception capability and we have got principles relating to network security but there are no principles relating to privacy and no principles relating to the actual New Zealand citizen’s rights under this legislation. So surely in a principles clause—and Part 1 sets out the principles behind the bill—we should set out the principles under which the powers being granted by this bill should be allowed to be used. One of those principles has to be a balancing principle that protects the privacy of New Zealanders and yet that is not in here. Fundamentally when we debate this legislation—Clare Curran has mentioned this and the Committee will find references to it in the Labour Party’s minority report—we have to get the balance between privacy and security right because a democratic system relies on both of those things.This bill basically says that the Government can ride roughshod over individual rights and freedoms in the name of security adopting an incredibly broad definition of security. It is massively expanding powers and it is not democratic it is not fair and it is not right.