Tanczos Nandor: Supreme Court Bill — Instruction to CommitteeCWH In Committee Speaker Recalled In Committee Speaker Recalled In Committee 
Tanczos Nandor: Supreme Court Bill — Instruction to CommitteeCWH In Committee Speaker Recalled In Committee Speaker Recalled In Committee 
[Volume:612;Page:9012] 
NANDOR TANCZOS (Green) 
: 
 For the clarification of everybody in the Chamber it is pronounced “Narn-dor Tarnt-zosh”. 
I would like to begin my speech this evening by offering and putting on record an expression of sympathy from the Green MPs to Green staff member Roland Sapsford for the loss of his father whose funeral was held earlier this evening. Members may have noticed that a number of Green MPs have been away from the Chamber this evening to attend that funeral but we are now back in full strength. 
I would like to address the questions raised by the amendment of Stephen Franks regarding the referendum. This is an issue of some interest to members of Parliament and to a few people outside of Parliament. I think that first of all we need to address whether the bill is a major constitutional issue and I think that that is debatable. I say that because if we look back to 1996 the New Zealand Courts Structure Bill which was introduced by the National Party sought to remove—not to replace as this bill does—the right of appeal to the Privy Council. That bill was therefore a significantly more important constitutional move than this one and it did not contain provision for a referendum. The Supreme Court Bill in contrast replaces the Privy Council with a Supreme Court that will fulfil the same function in a different forum and arguably more effectively. 
We have to ask what kinds of things are appropriate to have referenda on because contrary to some members’ opinions we do not have a convention in this country that major constitutional changes should be done by referenda. The history of the use of referenda in this country is extremely patchy. They were first used in 1919 and there have been only 10 Government-initiated referenda in all the time since then. Three of them were on alcohol one on gambling one on the military draft two on the length of the term of Parliament two on MMP and one on superannuation. In contrast the most significant constitutional issues this Parliament has faced such as the adoption of the Statute of Westminster the abolition of the Legislative Council the adoption of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act the establishment of the Court of Appeal and the privatisation programmes rammed through this House were not done by referenda. 
Let us bear in mind that no country in the world including Canada Australia Singapore India Hong Kong and a whole host of others has used a referendum to end appeals to the Privy Council. In practice we do not have in this country a convention that means significant constitutional issues should be decided by referenda. 
If anything we tend to use referenda for minor issues in this country and if our country is to adopt a principle that says major constitutional issues should be so decided—and that is something I would be supportive of—we need to establish some guidelines about how we determine what is a major constitutional issue of the kind that should be addressed by referenda. We have to have some criteria. Accusations that this bill is a major issue needing a referendum needs to be backed up by some criteria and evidence. 
It seems to me that if we are to look at the question of what issues should be decided by referenda we should look at things like whether the issue relates to the composition of Parliament because referenda would then provide a safeguard against the ability of Parliament to act in order to change its own composition—that safeguard being the people’s will. Issues that are subject to the self-interest of parliamentarians such as Parliament’s re-elections would be suitable for referenda. If there were evidence of widespread and general demand for referenda such as we would have indicated to us through a citizens initiated referenda process that would be a suitable indication. We might need to look at amending the process to be less onerous but there is no such indication in this case. 
Lastly if the balance of power between the executive the legislature and the judiciary is to be changed a referendum would be indicated. I would argue that the Supreme Court Bill invokes none of those criteria. It may invoke others that have not been mentioned but this Parliament would need to identify what those were if we were to make a credible argument. Let us bear in mind that the 1996 Royal Commission on the Electoral System was very cautious about the use of referenda. It said that they should in general be avoided provided there is continued development of restraints on the power of Governments such as through parliamentary select committees the Ombudsman the Official Information Act and administrative review through the courts. Those comments were made before the advent of MMP which provides further restraints upon the executive because of the need for minority Governments to fashion working majorities. 
Some say that the bill will pass with too slim a majority. I reject that view. The bill has the support of three parties in this Parliament.