Goff Phil: Questions for Oral Answer — Questions to Ministers 
Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume 
Goff Phil: Questions for Oral Answer — Questions to Ministers 
[Sitting date: 21 March 2013. Volume:688;Page:8840. Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume.] 
11. 
Hon PHIL GOFF (Labour—Mt Roskill) 
 to the  
Minister of Defence 
: Will he rule out “systemic health and safety issues throughout the Defence Force” being a cause of Defence Force fatalities in light of revelations surrounding the non-combat deaths of Defence personnel over the last three years; if not why not? 
Hon Dr JONATHAN COLEMAN (Minister of Defence) 
: 
 I am not ruling such issues in and I am not ruling them out. What I can say is that there is an extensive programme of health and safety work that has been under way for some time. I also note that the final court of inquiry report and recommendations relating to the Private Ross tragedy are yet to be released. 
Hon Phil Goff 
: Do the interim findings of the court of inquiry into the tragic death of Private Michael Ross which the Minister has been briefed on suggest that there was not just one error but a whole catalogue of errors and mistakes that contributed to Michael Ross’ death and that the loss of life of Michael Ross was entirely avoidable? 
Hon Dr JONATHAN COLEMAN 
: I want to acknowledge first that this was a very real tragedy and there will be very hard lessons to be learnt from this. The gist of the report in the  
Sunday Star-Times  
is indeed correct and it looks like there were multiple safety failings in what is a very tragic case. My condolences go to the family. I think we will find that there have been major errors that need to be corrected so that this can never happen again. 
Hon Phil Goff 
: How does he explain the catalogue of errors that he has been advised on that led to Private Michael Ross’ death which included first of all the boat he was travelling in not being inflated so that he was thrown out of it; secondly its engine breaking down so they could not turn round to pick him up; thirdly the fact that the gas canister that would have inflated his life jacket was empty and had not been checked; fourthly the fact that the life jacket was in fact a navy jacket and not suitable for the equipment that army personnel hold; fifthly the fact that the safety boat was not accompanying the boat that Private Ross was travelling in; and sixthly when it finally turned up it did not have the complement of crew necessary to actually provide any assistance? 
Hon Dr JONATHAN COLEMAN 
: I am not going to deny any of those facts but what I am going to say is that I am awaiting the final court of inquiry recommendations which will be acted on. I also want to say that the police have investigated this. There is a separate Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment investigation which has the power to lay charges and a military police investigation. This is a very serious matter which has to be taken seriously. 
Hon Phil Goff 
: Does the Minister recall the findings of the court of inquiry into the Iroquois crash on Anzac Day which pointed out that the crew was neither adequately prepared nor trained; that there were deficiencies in the orders management and operational environment within which the air force was operating in at the time; and that these were key contributing factors in that tragedy? And what lessons have been learnt and what changes have been made in the 3 years that have elapsed since then? 
Hon Dr JONATHAN COLEMAN 
: All I can say about the Iroquois crash is that there were six key causes—basically relating to culture to oversight of orders and to adherence to orders. One of the key things that was said in the report findings was that the genesis of that accident goes back 10 years to 2001 when changes were made in an attempt to make our operations more efficient and cost-effective. At the time two layers of flying command and supervision along with staff support were removed from the organisation. That was in 2001. You wanted to know what has been done in the period since. This will take some time but I am quite happy to relay the answer for the House if the member so wishes. 
Mr SPEAKER 
: If the member wants— 
Hon Phil Goff 
: Supplementary question. 
Hon Dr JONATHAN COLEMAN 
: I am asking— 
Mr SPEAKER 
: Order! No. You are required only to answer one part of a supplementary question. 
Hon Phil Goff 
: Has it occurred to him that a culture where operational orders were not being followed and basic mistakes were being made might have been in part at least an outcome of the fact that at the time of Private Michael Ross’ death the morale in the Defence Force was the lowest ever on record according to the Minister’s own surveys; that there had been a massive loss of skilled and experienced people of over 1000 Defence Force personnel that year; and that there was a situation where a very high level of attrition—in fact the highest in recent history—meant that people were in a mind-set and lacked the training that then allowed that catalogue of errors to occur? 
Hon Dr JONATHAN COLEMAN 
: I completely reject those assertions and think it is pretty low that an absolute tragedy would be utilised by that member to try to make a political point. 
Hon Phil Goff 
: I raise a point of order Mr Speaker. That is a comment that is bound to cause disorder in the House. Michael Ross happened to have been a family friend and I despise the Minister for making that sort of accusation. 
Mr SPEAKER 
: Order! It would be helpful if the Minister could address the question. 
Hon Dr JONATHAN COLEMAN 
: Well I have made my point that this tragedy has nothing to do with attrition and morale and I will reassert my point that this member should not be attempting— 
Mr SPEAKER 
: Order! That is a sufficient answer. 
Hon Phil Goff 
: Is it satisfactory that Crib 19 on which Corporal Doug Hughes took his own life was deployed when the warrant officer responsible for pre-deployment training said that they had not been adequately trained that they had received 60 percent of the training that they had needed and that actually one of the components that were missing from the training was identification of stress and management of stress? Why did the Minister allow that to happen and what inquiry has he done into that fact? 
Hon Dr JONATHAN COLEMAN 
: The member knows that what he is asserting there is actually incorrect. The warrant officer’s report that he refers to— 
Hon Trevor Mallard 
: I raise a point of order Mr Speaker. I want to replay a point of order from yesterday. You know that there is only one way of suggesting that members have breached privilege. To suggest that a member has said something in the House that they know is incorrect is a breach of privilege. It has long been ruled by Speakers that you cannot make an accusation that a member is doing that as that member just did and actually as members did yesterday. 
Mr SPEAKER 
: Can I just say that we are dealing with what is a very sensitive issue. I am going to invite the member to ask his question again because it has now passed by quite some time. 
Hon Phil Goff 
: Is it satisfactory that Crib 19 on which Corporal Doug Hughes lost his life was deployed when the warrant officer responsible for the pre-deployment training of that crib is on record as saying that the group was not adequately trained—they had done 60 percent of the training—but he had no option but to deploy them? Is it true that one of the components on which they had not received training in pre-deployment was the identification of stress and management of stress which were obviously relevant to Corporal Hughes taking his own life? 
Hon Dr JONATHAN COLEMAN 
: No.