Wilkinson Kate: Succession (Homicide) Bill — In Committee 
Wilkinson Kate: Succession (Homicide) Bill — In Committee 
[Volume:639;Page:9786] 
KATE WILKINSON (National) 
: 
 Thank you Mr Chairperson for allowing me to take a call on Part 1. The Succession (Homicide) Bill itself is reasonably straightforward. It is as the commentary on the bill states a bill to codify the law that precludes a person who unlawfully kills another person from benefiting from the death of that person which does seem to make some sense. 
However the law must strike a balance between flexibility and certainty and I have to say that in this case I have a question for the Minister which I would like him to take a call on. My question is whether this bill is a wee bit inflexible. In this regard I refer to the interpretation clause which of course has the definitions of “assisted suicide” “homicide” “killer” etc. My concern is probably in response to reading the submission of the New Zealand Law Society which was concerned that this proposed codification of the law did not take sufficient account of the differing degrees of moral culpability. I would have thought that that issue would be easy enough to resolve by merely providing that the judge had a discretion in exceptional circumstances when the interests of justice and fairness so required. 
In that regard I draw the Committee’s attention to some of the examples given by the New Zealand Law Society and other submitters in relation to areas where this bill might actually have some harsh and perhaps unintended consequences. There may be for example a number of domestic killings that have a varying degree of culpability and where the moral abhorrence if you like felt towards the perpetrators of those crimes may be somewhat less than that which is felt towards a cold-blooded murderer. Those domestic killings are still subject to this inflexible code and that may lead to harsh results. For example a battered woman or a child who has been abused over a prolonged time might suddenly snap and kill the abuser. Those people would or could upon conviction come within the scope of the bill and lose any entitlement to any inheritance—say half the house that they had lived in with their abuser. That may be a situation whereby it is fair and equitable and not unreasonable that a judge has the discretion to say: “These people have been abused. Although we don’t condone their actions we can understand whey they snapped and finally put their abusers to rest but should they also be deprived of their assets and their home?”. 
Another example is that of a mercy killer. Not all mercy killers may come within the assisted suicide exception. An example is a person convicted of failing to provide the necessities of life. In those cases it could be argued that the degree of moral culpability is at the lower end of the scale. We can indeed say that that can be reflected in the sentencing for that crime but in addition to the sentencing this bill automatically deprives the killer of any succession entitlements as well as the ownership of some assets. 
I have mentioned in previous speeches during the second reading debate on this bill the reckless driver. A reckless driver might have a car accident and kill his wife in that accident. He might not necessarily be a negligent killer; he might just be a reckless driver. Perhaps he still loved his wife and his wife would have wanted him to inherit. But under the provisions of this bill the reckless driver—the poor husband who already has to confront his own guilt over having killed his wife through his own recklessness—has to face the fact that he is then deprived of any of their joint assets. That may not necessarily have been what the wife would have wanted or intended and in such a case the bill could lead to some unintended and perhaps harsh consequences. 
Those consequences could easily be remedied by a simple proviso for the judge to have discretion in very exceptional circumstances. That is not to say that such a situation is to be regarded as the norm because no killing is to be condoned. But such a proviso would mean that in exceptional circumstances where the judge has had due regard to all the evidence surrounding the accident and the reckless driver—or the abused wife—he or she may decide on balance that that person should inherit. 
I would like the Minister to take a call on that question. I do not think it is a partisan suggestion and I do think it would put some common sense into the bill.