Franks Stephen: Criminal Records (Clean Slate) Bill — Instruction to Committee In Committee Procedure 
Franks Stephen: Criminal Records (Clean Slate) Bill — Instruction to Committee In Committee Procedure 
[Volume:617;Page:12569] 
STEPHEN FRANKS (ACT) 
: 
 Part 1 of the Criminal Records (Clean Slate) Bill has preliminary provisions the general overview that Mr Worth has just been discussing and the definitions. In the general overview we see a complicated decision diagram that shows the essence of this bill. If one has convictions has not been convicted for the specified period—which the bill reduced from 10 years to 7 years—and has not been to prison then one’s convictions will be concealed. The net effect we were told at the Justice and Electoral Committee was that up to 700000 people though probably more likely 500000 people would become eligible for the benefit of having a concealed record. That concealment according to the statement about this bill—the select committee’s pious intent—is supposed to help people to rehabilitate. The committee had no evidence that the net effect of a concealment arrangement like that would be more rehabilitation or less. There is evidence that people with a criminal record find it harder than others to get jobs and there is evidence that criminal records do influence the way people react to those with such records. But we had no evidence that a scheme like that described in clause 3 “Overview” will actually change anything in New Zealand advantageously and there is every likelihood that it will change things disadvantageously. 
I say that because a criminal record is objective evidence of a propensity to commit further offences. It is true that if a person has not committed a further offence for a long time after he or she was first convicted the likelihood of reoffending is low. But that likelihood is not negligible and we had no evidence that it was lower than if one had no record. In other words it is rational for people to ask about convictions if they want to get an idea of someone’s character. In the absence of objective information the people trying to make a decision about a person—whether they are employers community groups wanting to leave someone in charge of the accounts or maybe even people in a social setting or officers during an election who simply want to know that the reputation of the person they are dealing with is beyond reproach—will not just say they will make a guess. People make other assumptions. They use stereotypes. They try to make assumptions about a propensity for criminality on the basis of things like the way people dress or their accents or in this country and more seriously their colour. When over 50 percent of the people in New Zealand prisons and a huge proportion of those who come before the courts are Maori or Polynesian if people cannot get accurate information about criminal records they will make assumptions that will be adverse to those who are likely to be in the groups with a higher rate of offending. 
The Maori MPs should think about that when they look at these clauses. They should think about the effect when objective information is not available of stereotyping. Stereotyping is simply a prudent reaction; it is what one does in the absence of better information. We all do it even if we do not want to do it. What this legislation will do—and we can be certain of it because it is the way that people react—is given that it will be illegal to be given information about a criminal record and given that the law will tell people to lie about their record make the community become more cautious and more risk adverse. The community will not take chances on people who it feels may be dishonest or who might have committed offences. It will not give them the benefit of the doubt. Instead the community will try to find a way to make sure that it does not have to run that risk. One way that people will not run the risk is by assuming that if they are dealing with a young Maori they should assume criminality.