Huo Raymond: Limitation Bill — Second Reading In Committee Third Reading 
Huo Raymond: Limitation Bill — Second Reading In Committee Third Reading 
[Volume:666;Page:13559] 
RAYMOND HUO (Labour) 
: 
 For those people who are watching the live coverage of this high-rating not too terribly late-night show via television or the Parliament website I say that there is no need for them to thoroughly understand a recent Supreme Court ruling in order to truly appreciate the importance of this Limitation Bill. The Supreme Court’s ruling is the latest development in long-running litigation by the Commerce Commission against Carter Holt Harvey Ltd relating to the misgrading of timber prior to November 2003. 
The Supreme Court has confirmed that the Commerce Commission is subject to the 3-year limitation period in section 43 of the Fair Trading Act 1986 when it brings proceedings for compensation on behalf of consumers. That issue may sound a bit dry or remote but it is relevant to the Limitation Bill. What does not sound dry or remote is the nature of the case. I guess the mentioning of words such as “misgrading of timber” or “building material” will hit a nerve or push a button. I will come back to that case  
Commerce Commission v Carter Holt Harvey Limited 
 either during the Committee of the whole House or at the bill’s third reading 
Limitation law seeks to balance two interests. The first is that people have the right to bring claims to court when they have suffered an injury or some loss as the result of wrongdoing by another party. The second and equally important interest is that we ought not to let the period in which claims can be brought run indefinitely. We should not let plaintiffs sleep on their rights. The longer a plaintiff waits to bring his or her claim the harder it is for the defendant to defend it him or herself and the harder it is for courts to reach a good decision. Limitation periods allow potential defendants to get on with their lives without the threat of litigation forever lurking. 
The bill implements the Law Commission’s recommendation to replace the existing Limitation Act 1950 with a new and modern regime. The new regime will encourage claimants to make their claims without undue delay and will protect defendants from the unjust pursuit of stale claims. The Limitation Act 1950 is old legislation and it needs to be upgraded. The Labour Party supports the proposed changes in this bill. However although Labour agrees with most of the bill we disagree with the provisions on longstop periods. The bill provides for a longstop period of 15 years for most cases but only 10 years for Building Act cases. The reasons given for the shorter longstop period in the case of the Building Act—the complexity caused by multiparty building claims and failing memories—can also rise in other claims so a shorter period is warranted. It should be 15 years for all claims. Owners of houses with latent defects should have just as long as others to bring forward their claims. 
The bill simplifies the limitation regime by providing a general civil limitation defence to most claims. The new concept of money claims is introduced and it is defined to include any claim for monetary relief. That replaces the haphazard approach taken by the 1950 Act which sets out different limitation periods for different causes of action. The limitation period for most or all claims will be 6 years after the act or omission on which the claim is based. There are exceptions or modifications to this period in cases of minority or incapacity or if there has been an acknowledgment of liability part payment or fraud. A 3-year late knowledge period is being introduced because there might be circumstances where people do not realise they have a cause of action. Currently the limitation period for most claims runs from the date the cause of action accrued; namely the date on which all the elements necessary to establish the claim first came together. That has been very contentious and ambiguous. Under this bill the start date for most claims will be the date when the act or omission on which the claim is based occurred. 
The bill provides that a limitation defence cannot be used in cases of child sex abuse no matter how much time has elapsed since that abuse took place. There is currently no statutory limitation period for claims under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act; this bill rectifies that situation by bringing that Act under the definition of money claims and the 6-year limit. 
The Limitation Act 1950 contains the general rules for determining the cut-off dates after which it is too late for a plaintiff to bring a civil claim. The most common period is 6 years and applies to claims founded on contract or tort claims for an account or claims in respect of a breach of trust. The current periods are subject to extension in a range of circumstances—for example if the claimant is under 20 years of age or is of unsound mind or because of fraud or mistake the claimant is unable to discover that a claim exists. There are difficulties with both the substance and the drafting of the 1950 Act. The 1950 Act which followed closely the terms of the 1939 Act is incomplete misleading and inaccessible. Judges have suggested that it is flawed and requires a complete legislative overhaul. The courts have made piecemeal attempts to cure the difficulties but the overall result has been a lack of harmony. One major issue with the current legislation is that in some cases claimants can be barred from gaining relief by the limitation period before they even know they have a claim. 
I look forward to more debate at the Committee stage and at the bill’s third reading. Thank you.