Tanczos Nandor: Succession (Homicide) Bill — Second Reading 
Tanczos Nandor: Succession (Homicide) Bill — Second Reading 
[Volume:639;Page:8994] 
NANDOR TANCZOS (Green) 
: 
 I rise to give a reasonably brief contribution on behalf of the Green Party to the Succession (Homicide) Bill because much has been said already about the bill and colleagues have made very useful contributions. The bill is more or less a codification of the law as it stands; it is primarily that. 
I want to take a moment to acknowledge as previous speakers have done the excellent work of the Law Commission in one of its reports. I have to say that one of the criticisms of successive Governments is that the enormous amount of very valuable work done by the Law Commission often on fairly technical areas of law reform is often shelved and ignored by Governments. I think the current Labour-led coalition Government is to be commended for having found the time in its extremely busy and tight legislative schedule to progress these important pieces of work by the Law Commission. I commend the Associate Minister of Justice and the Leader of the House for having made the space to do this very important work. 
I want to touch on a couple of areas in the bill. One area mentioned by previous speakers concerns the definition of homicide. Clause 4 defines “homicide” as “the killing of a person or a child who has not become a person by another person intentionally or recklessly by any means that would be an offence under New Zealand law whether done in New Zealand or elsewhere; but does not include— (a) a killing caused by negligent act or omission;”—which Mr Harawira referred to—“or (b) infanticide under section 178 of the Crimes Act 1961; or (c) a killing of a person by another in pursuance of a suicide pact; or (d) an assisted suicide.” It is important to dwell on these exemptions for a second. An earlier speaker Lynne Pillay referred to the principle behind the bill and I think she is right but moral culpability is what we are trying to get at. So I think it is right that those issues are exempt from the definition of homicide. 
Another area that caused me a little bit of concern and that the previous speaker Mr Chauvel talked about was around clause 15 “Evidence if no criminal prosecution or unsuccessful prosecution in New Zealand”. Subclause (2)(a) states: “the court hearing the proceedings may decide for the purposes of this Act whether the killing of a person or a child that has not become a person has taken place …”. Basically it is saying the court would decide on the balance of probabilities whether the person was guilty and that the conviction of a person elsewhere than in New Zealand is admissible evidence and is to be given any weight that the court determines. I have to say that it causes me concern that a person who has not been prosecuted or who has been acquitted other than on the grounds of insanity or where the prosecution has been stayed or withdrawn can undergo a second process for the purposes of this bill to decide whether he or she has committed homicide. So in that respect a bit of disquiet remains with me. 
I also want to touch on the issue of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act because Mr Finlayson is right about the need for some clarification. My understanding was the same as Mr Harawira’s understanding and that was that the select committee was reassured that the interests of children would not be affected by the passage of this provision and that in addition—and this was something that needed to be checked—when the bill came into effect the killer could still have any interest in that land returned to him or her as well. We do need to be reassured that those provisions in Te Ture Whenua Maori Act are not affected not unduly affected. Because the meaning is quite different. When we say “not unduly affected” we have to ask what the residual effect is. What does it actually mean? My understanding is as I have stated. 
The final area I will just touch on is where someone has a valid claim against the State with regard to a testamentary promise. As previous speakers have said there was a little bit of twisting our heads around the idea that someone who has been assured of some kind of benefit would continue to receive that benefit—despite having killed that person—because that benefit was not dependent on the killing but was a pre-existing matter. In working through the principle of what we are trying to get at here—that a killer should not benefit from his or her deed—we could see that in that case that principle did not apply. So that is as stated. 
Once again I thank the Government for progressing important pieces of Law Commission work because the commission does important work. It is often not highly exciting inflammatory kind of law reform but it is important work. Given that the Government has such a tight schedule and the Order Paper is so full it is gratifying to see that the Government has made a special place to ensure that this important work is progressed.