Borrows Chester; Finlayson ChristopherThe CHAIRPERSON (Hon Chester Borrows): Kia ora mai tātou. Tēnā tātou katoa. Members the Committee is resumed. Before the dinner break we were debating Part 2 of the Intelligence and Security Bill. Kris Faafoi has the call and has 3 minutes remaining. I call the Hon Chris Finlayson. Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON (Attorney-General): Come out come out wherever you are Mr Faafoi. But what I will do—Iain Lees-Galloway: I will listen on his behalf. Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: Thank you very much. Look there are a number of points that were raised just before the dinner break. Mr Faafoi was emphasising a very important point in clause 20 Specific duties of Director-General of an intelligence and security agency" and in particular the importance of maintaining political neutrality. I know that has been the subject of quite a lot of debate in recent years and all the points with respect are fairly made. We just need to make sure at all times that these agencies that have huge intrusive powers do their job properly and are scrupulous about maintaining political neutrality. In so far as he was emphasising that point I do not think anyone would take issue with that. Mr Parker raised a number of helpful points and I will just quickly run through what he said. In respect of clause 14 he had a very helpful summary of exactly what that clause is actually aimed at: the provision of security services advice and assistance by the two intelligence agencies. But I would simply say that clause 14 has to be read in conjunction with clause 15(4) because there will be circumstances that require a warrant even when safeguarding services are being provided. Can I come to Mr Cunliffe's questions. The member for New Lynn raised a couple of issues about clause 9 and focused on the word "specialises" and then similarly on clause 10 and the word "specialises". Look the point that I need to emphasise is that the SIS was carved out of the Police in 1946 and became the human intelligence agency. For many years no one was prepared to acknowledge the existence of the signals intelligence agency—the GCSB. Then in 1977 it was Robert Muldoon who said: "Well yes the signals intelligence agency exists." and then it was under Helen Clark's Government that it received its first piece of legislation in 2003. I guess the word "specialises" in both clauses 9 and 10 recognises existing capability and throughout the Government has been adamant that there is no intention to merge the agencies although there may be circumstances for example in relation to financial management or human resources or matters such as that where they may share some services. But there is no intention to merge. In other words the SIS focuses on human intelligence and the GCSB focuses on signals intelligence. But sometimes it could be said that the boundary is becoming blurred. A lot of human intelligence work can happen online—reference to Facebook for example and that sort of stuff. That said the powers in the warranting regime—and we will come to that in due course—are designed to reflect these specialist capabilities with the SIS having if you like real-world powers and the GCSB powers being framed in terms of information infrastructure and cyber-activities. Mr Cunliffe also had a question on clause 13. The constraints in the bill for clause 13(1)(b)(iii) exist in the purpose provision of the bill. It is very important to bear in mind at all times the purpose provision of the bill in Part 1 which deals with preliminary provisions but the purpose comes back to protecting New Zealand as a free open and democratic society. I will not go through the clause now but it ties it back to New Zealand's interests. So the purpose is New Zealand - centric. It is focused on the protection of New Zealand interests and it is also subject to clause 13(3) which requires the Minister to be satisfied that provision of intelligence is subject to New Zealand law and human rights recognised under New Zealand law. He also raised a question about limits on clause 14. I think I have probably covered the point but I just emphasise that ultimately anything done under clauses 14 and 15 must be either lawful or—as I said in response to what Mr Parker said—done under a warrant. Then he raised a question about clause 15(1)(b) and focused on those words "everything that is necessary or desirable" and thought that was rather loose. Clause 15 makes it very clear that anything unlawful has to be warranted and I refer the honourable member to subclause (4). It is a point I have raised on a number of occasions now but it is good that I am able to emphasise that point. Mr Davis raised a question about clause 16 and particularly he asked for the circumstances where assistance could be provided in terms of subclause (4) and the kind of assistance I am talking about is the provision of assistance to the New Zealand Police or the New Zealand Defence Force. The answer to that is that this is where both the GCSB and the SIS have powers that other agencies do not have and in a way it is to stop the necessity for the Police or the Defence Force having to replicate at a very high cost the specialist capabilities of the intelligence and security agencies. Finally I refer to what the Leader of the Opposition was saying in relation to clause 23. I agree with him that it is incredibly important in our kind of system not only for political neutrality reasons but also for the good governance of the country that the Leader of the Opposition be consulted on a regular basis by the intelligence and security agencies. I hear what he says about other parties in the Parliament. I am simply going to say that when we get to Part 6 and we have a discussion about the Cabinet committee on intelligence and security I can deal with some of the points that Mr Little raised at that stage. So I think that picks up all the various points that were raised by members before the dinner break."