Worth Richard: Government Communications Security Bureau Bill — In Committee 
Worth Richard: Government Communications Security Bureau Bill — In Committee 
[Volume:607;Page:4397] 
RICHARD WORTH (NZ National—Epsom) 
: 
 The Committee stage of this bill is now in its third hour. We have called valiantly and repeatedly for members of the Government to take a call and they have remained mute. Requests have been made to the Minister but he has declined them. Those who have sat in the chair in that 3-hour period have similarly declined to take the opportunity of participating in this debate and Mr Prebble in the comments he has made in the last few moments has raised the issue as to why that is. With real sadness I suggest that that is happening in the context of the significant issues that are occurring in Iraq where the need for intelligence in the military context is ever-pressing. Yet Government members are simply not prepared to take part in this debate. I would suggest that that is sad. Instead we have seen three members on the Government side of the Chamber limit their contributions to this debate to the moving of closure motions. That is disgraceful. Members on the Government side of the Chamber could if they wished make a contribution yet they choose not to do so. 
Two parts of this bill are significant: Part 2 which has already been debated and passed and Part 3 which we are currently debating. I urge Government members in the context of what is happening in the world community to be prepared to stand and comment on the merits or otherwise of this bill. This bill is being passed on the basis of a coalition of the willing to use a well-worn phrase—in this case it is the Government and National who are fielding the numbers for this legislation to get through. It is shameful—and Government members must acknowledge this—when that is the case that Government members are not participating in this very significant debate. 
Part 3 has a number of provisions in it obviously but one of the central parts is the distinction drawn between on the one hand interception warrants and on the other hand computer access authorisation. The Greens made strong submissions for changes to be made to Part 3 that in the result were ultimately unsuccessful. Some of the issues on which the Greens unsuccessfully argued for change touched on the decision of the Intelligence and Security Committee to decline to give all people in New Zealand protection from having their communications intercepted. A second illustration was the decision of the committee to decline to reduce the period for which a warrant is in force from 12 to 6 months. 
I want to look very briefly at what Part 3 is all about in the context of the reality of the day-to-day operations of the Government Communications Security Bureau. The starting point is that there is to be no interception of domestic communications and that is because the bill forbids the bureau to authorise or take any action to intercept the communications of a person who is not a foreign organisation but who is a New Zealand citizen or a permanent resident. In my view Mr Prebble has accurately explained the implications of that provision. 
We then move to the case of permissible interceptions with warrants or authorisations because the bill forbids certain types of interception taking place without a warrant or authorisation. There seem generally to be four classes of case. The first involves interceptions where there is physical connection of the interception device to any part of a network—and that is straightforward enough. The second relates to installation of an interception device in a place without the permission of the occupier. The third relates to the installation of an interception device in a place where the purpose of the installation is to intercept communications made to or received in that place. Then finally there is the situation of interceptions that involve accessing computer systems. In all those cases an interception warrant or a computer access authorisation is required.