Finlayson Christopher: New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill — Second Reading 
Finlayson Christopher: New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill — Second Reading 
[Volume:673;Page:19352] 
Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON (Attorney-General)  
on behalf of the  
Minister in charge of the NZ Security Intelligence Service 
: I move  
That the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill be now read a second time 
. This bill updates the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 to reflect new technologies. The Act’s warrant framework was designed in 1977 before technologies such as mobile phones and the internet became common. Technological changes have now overtaken the warrant framework so the bill addresses first the prevalent use of computer mobile phone and internet technologies and second new surveillance technologies available to the SIS. The bill also clarifies protections from liability for persons acting under warrants and provides for delegation powers. 
During the first reading the House referred the bill to the Intelligence and Security Committee for its consideration. That committee comprising the leaders of the National Maori ACT Labour and Green parties received and considered 23 written submissions on the bill. The committee heard from those submitters who wanted to be heard in person. I am advised the committee appreciates the efforts of all the submitters. Those submitters raised matters covering three general themes within the scope of the amendments: the surveillance powers of the SIS the framework protecting employees and persons assisting the SIS when exercising intelligence warrants and delegation powers. Submitters had concerns about extensions to the surveillance powers in respect of new technologies. There were also calls for any modernisation of surveillance powers to be accompanied by additional legislative safeguards. A number of submitters were concerned that the proposed delegation framework in the bill could undermine the existing accountability framework in the substantive Act. The Act currently requires each interception warrant to specify in advance the persons who may assist in the execution of the warrant. 
The committee has recommended four changes to the bill all of which either improve or add to the existing safeguards in the legislation. First the committee recommends including a specific reference to human rights in the Act requiring the intelligence service to perform its functions in accordance with a comprehensive set of principles which include human rights. Secondly the committee recommends applying an additional safeguard by requiring the warrant issuers to consider specifically whether mistaken identities or other third parties could be affected and if so what conditions should be imposed on the exercise of the warrant. Thirdly the committee recommends requiring any irrelevant electronic tracking records to be destroyed as soon as practicable after the warrant expires. Finally the committee recommends requiring the director to maintain a register of delegations relating to the execution of warrants. The warrant issuers and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security will be able to inspect this register at any time which will enable effective oversight of the delegations. 
I now turn to the need for this legislation and the balance that has to be struck between preserving the privacy of New Zealanders and maintaining the security of New Zealand. Inevitably there are costs associated with conferring surveillance powers on any State agency. Surveillance activities by their very nature intrude into personal privacy. However these costs must also be weighed against the benefits of maintaining the security of New Zealand. Personal privacy is a basic human right and a central value of our democracy. All New Zealanders have reasonable expectations of privacy including being protected from any unreasonable or disproportionate use of surveillance. As such it is significant that the SIS will be able to use electronic tracking or undertake computer-based surveillance activities only under a warrant. Additional safeguards introduced by the bill including a requirement that the SIS perform its functions in accordance with a set of principles which include human rights will complement existing protections in the Act. Providing for specific protection against the surveillance of mistaken identities is new. It will apply across the board not just to the limited circumstance of an alias as requested by submitters. 
More generally it is commendable that this bill seeks to clarify the law in respect of modern electronic surveillance techniques. The Act’s current warrant framework was designed to cover only those surveillance activities that were unlawful in 1977. The drafters could not have contemplated new electronic tracking or computer surveillance technologies nor could they have anticipated the prevalent use of mobile phones and the internet and the ability to hide behind cyber-identities. The proposed amendments will ensure that the law clearly identifies the types of surveillance practices that may be used by the SIS and the authorisations that are required. 
National security privacy and other fundamental civil liberties are complementary rather than conflicting values. Sir Geoffrey Palmer the recently retired president of the Law Commission and also a former Minister in charge of the SIS has said “To a very significant extent ‘national security’ means just this—freedom from interference; freedom from terrorist attack freedom from deliberately incited racial violence freedom from espionage which itself threatens basic freedoms such as privacy freedom from the kind of genuinely subversive activity that is aimed—not just in theory but in fact—at destabilising or overthrowing the very democratic system upon which the exercise of civil liberties depends.” With those thoughts in mind Parliament must strike a balance allowing for effective national security measures on the one hand and protecting reasonable expectations of privacy on the other. Surveillance powers do have an impact on privacy; that must be acknowledged. But those same measures help the Government to uphold the security values that support all New Zealanders’ privacy and other basic human rights. 
The bill includes measures to maintain an appropriate balance between these privacy and security values. It places clear limits on the issue of warrants which must be approved before exercising intrusive surveillance powers. In the case of New Zealanders this approval must be given both by the Prime Minister and by the Commissioner of Security Warrants. They must both be satisfied that any interception seizure or electronic tracking is necessary that the value of the information justifies the surveillance and that the information is unlikely to be obtained by any other means. 
To summarise the bill does contain measures that impact on aspects of personal privacy but as I have said these intrusions are balanced against clear benefits to New Zealand’s security. The measure will mean that the SIS can continue to use effective methods to investigate threats to New Zealand security. The existing warrant scheme already includes important tests that have to be met before any intelligence warrant is issued. The exercise of these powers is also subject to effective independent oversight. The existing protections contained in the warrants framework the additional protections recommended by the committee and the effective existing oversight will continue to ensure that impacts on privacy are indeed minimised. I commend the bill to the House.