Finlayson Christopher: New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill Crimes Amendment Bill (No 3) — Third Readings 
Finlayson Christopher: New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill Crimes Amendment Bill (No 3) — Third Readings 
[Volume:673;Page:19738] 
Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON (Attorney-General) 
 on behalf of the Minister in charge of the NZ Security Intelligence Service: I move  
That the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill and the Crimes Amendment Bill (No 3) be now read a third time 
. This legislation makes select changes to the powers of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. In particular it modernises those parts of the warrant framework that have not kept pace with technology as the principal Act’s warrant framework is now over 30 years old. That framework was designed at a time when the principal methods of communication were by mail landline telephone or facsimile. Although the core surveillance powers contained in the warrant framework have remained relevant new ways of communicating mean that those powers do not in all respects marry up with modern communication methods. Changes must therefore be made to enable the Security Intelligence Service to regain its full functionality before New Zealand hosts an important event like the Rugby World Cup. Changes to the warrant powers will ensure that the Security Intelligence Service is equipped to deal with the now widespread use of computer mobile phone and internet technologies and to take advantage of new surveillance technologies available to it. The legislation also clarifies the protections from liability for persons acting under warrants and provides for delegation powers. 
In the Committee of the whole House the original bill was divided into two bills by Supplementary Order Paper 248 to reflect the need to amend the Crimes Act in respect of computer offences. The two bills are therefore the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill and the Crimes Amendment Bill (No 3). The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill achieves five changes: it adds a specific reference to electronic tracking in the warrant framework it amends the subject of warrants to include cyber-identities it removes the requirement to amend a warrant every time a new person is requested to assist under a warrant it provides a proper suite of delegation powers and finally it ensures that sufficient protections are in place for those who execute warrants. The Crimes Amendment Bill (No 3) removes an existing barrier to the use of modern surveillance methods as they relate to or affect computers. 
These are important changes to the Security Intelligence Service’s powers. They are necessary to enable the Security Intelligence Service to keep up with new ways of communicating. They will improve its functionality in the modern age and make sure that it is ready for the Rugby World Cup. 
Whenever surveillance powers are updated care must be taken to retain the very delicate balance between the right to privacy and the need to use surveillance in maintaining the security of the State. That balance is achieved by ensuring that powers extend only as far as can be justified and by maintaining a strong system of checks and balances on the exercise of those powers. First intrusive surveillance powers can be exercised by the Security Intelligence Service only under warrant and warrants must be approved by the Prime Minister in every case together with the approval of the Commissioner of Security Warrants who must be a retired High Court judge in the case of domestic warrants. Perhaps it is appropriate here to place on record the excellent service of retired High Court Judge Sir John Jeffries in the work that he does. The other pillar to the system of checks and balances is the independent oversight achieved through the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. In particular he or she has a statutory duty to review the execution of warrants. In this role he or she has access to all information held by the Security Intelligence Service. 
The Security Intelligence Service is also subject to oversight bodies in respect of its general functions. The Intelligence and Security Committee oversees policy expenditure and administration. The Privacy Commissioner and the Chief Ombudsman retain important oversight roles in respect of information requests and the Controller and Auditor-General reviews all expenditure. 
I commend the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee on this bill. The committee is comprised of the leaders of the National Party the Maori Party the ACT Party the Labour Party and the Green Party. It worked in a constructive and considered way to improve the bill and I thank the members of the committee for their contribution. The committee added additional safeguards to the legislation following the hearing of submitters’ concerns. The principal addition was the reference to human rights in the principal Act requiring the Security Intelligence Service to perform its functions in accordance with a comprehensive set of principles. The committee also added other safeguards including ensuring that mistaken identities are not tracked requiring any irrelevant tracking records to be destroyed and maintaining a register of delegations in respect of those persons who execute warrants. They sufficiently bolster existing protections in the principal Act. 
The process of amending the principal Act has led to additional safeguards being introduced. The select committee recommended adding a set of principles to guide the operation of the Security Intelligence Service. Other safeguards recommended by the select committee included ensuring that mistaken identities are not tracked and together with the package of what has been proposed they provide what I believe are adequate protections in the principal Act. 
These bills achieve the necessary and as I said delicate balance between the two principles of national security and privacy. I commend both bills to the House.