Huo Raymond: Limitation Bill — Third Reading 
Huo Raymond: Limitation Bill — Third Reading 
[Volume:666;Page:13589] 
RAYMOND HUO (Labour) 
: 
 The Limitation Bill simplifies the limitation regime by providing a general civil limitation defence to most claims. A new concept—“money claim”—is introduced. It is a new and unifying concept which means a claim for monetary relief whether at common law in equity or under any enactment. This replaces the haphazard approach taken by the 1950 Act which sets out different limitation periods for different causes of action. The limitation period of almost all claims will be 6 years after the act or omission on which the claim is based. There are exceptions or modifications to this period in cases of minority or incapacity or if there has been an acknowledgment of liability part-payments or fraud. A 3-year late knowledge period is introduced because there might be circumstances where people do not realise they have a cause of action. 
Currently the limitation period for most claims runs from the date the cause of action accrued—namely the date on which all the elements necessary to establish the claim first came together. This has been very contentious and ambiguous. Under this bill for most claims the start date will be the date when the act or omission on which the claim is based occurred. The bill provides that the limitation defence cannot be used in cases of child sexual abuse no matter how much time has elapsed since the abuse took place. There is currently a new statutory limitation period for claims under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. This bill rectifies that situation bringing the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act under the definition of “money claim” and the 6-year limit. 
There are two other issues I wish to revisit in the third reading. Although Labour agrees with most of the bill we disagree with the longstop period provisions. The bill provides for a longstop period of 15 years for most cases but only 10 years for Building Act cases. I acknowledge the contributions made by the Hon David Parker last night on that particular issue. I believe that it should be 15 years for all claims. Owners of houses with latent defects should have just as long to bring the claim as those with other claims. 
The second matter is related to a Supreme Court case that I cited earlier in the first reading of the bill. The case is  
Commerce Commission v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd 
. The brief background of that case is as follows: in October 2002 the Commerce Commission started an investigation relating to the misgrading of timber prior to November 2003. In August 2005 the commission brought proceedings under the Fair Trading Act in the District Court. Carter Holt Harvey pleaded guilty and was fined $900000. In October 2006 the Commerce Commission brought civil proceedings in the High Court under the Fair Trading Act seeking compensation for end-users of the timber and competitors of the company. Carter Holt Harvey applied to have the High Court proceedings struck out on the grounds that it was statute barred under section 43(5) of the Fair Trading Act having been brought more than 3 years after the date on which the loss or damage was discovered or ought reasonably to have been discovered by the commission. 
The struck-out application was unsuccessful in the High Court but it succeeded in the Court of Appeal. In the Supreme Court the decision of the Court of Appeal was reversed. What is relevant to this particular bill according to Bell Gully is in respect of “reasonable discoverability”. As drafted the bill does not define “knowledge” nor does it specify the degree of knowledge required before a claimant is taken to know or ought reasonably to know the specified facts. I quote: “It is therefore likely that in the absence of amendments to the Bill the Supreme Court’s decision in the  
Carter Holt Harvey  
case will influence the application of the Limitation Bill once enacted.” I asked the Attorney-General to take a call during the Committee of the whole House last night to shed some light on that point; it is a bit disappointing that the Attorney-General appears not to have taken a call on that point. 
Turning back to the Limitation Act nevertheless the bill appears to succeed in its goals of enhancing clarity as to the applicable limitation period. In relation to equitable claims such clarity has arguably come at the expense of equities history freedom from limitation periods. I agree with what Russell McVeagh stated in its opinion that although the concept of the “late knowledge period” may prevent injustices to claimants the bill cannot of course prescribe a code for assessing whether in a particular case a plaintiff knew or ought to have known the necessary facts. That will always be a task for the courts and one of increased significance under the new regime. I guess that would have answered to some extent the question I posed last night to the Attorney-General. Having said that I hope that with the bill being passed into the law the surgery required is no longer beyond the proper province of the courts. Thank you.