Worth Richard: Judicial Matters Bill — In Committee Procedure 
Worth Richard: Judicial Matters Bill — In Committee Procedure 
[Volume:617;Page:12874] 
RICHARD WORTH (National—Epsom) 
: 
 National has already indicated its concern about the Judicial Matters Bill and that concern is deep-seated for a number of reasons. In connection with this particular call I would like to start on Part 1 which deals with the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and the Judicial Conduct Panel. There are three subparts one concerned with preliminary provisions one concerned with the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and one concerned with the Judicial Conduct Panel. 
Just from those headings one might think that what we are looking at in Part 1 is judicial conduct that had varying degrees of lapse seriousness. But we are not. We are talking about only the circumstances in which it is appropriate to remove a judge and that is a judge of the District Court a judge of the High Court a judge of the Court of Appeal and a judge of the Supreme Court. It is obviously intended that this power be rarely used. The reality is that it has never been used in New Zealand at all. So the first question is why are we debating a proposal that it would seem on past history there is no need to advance at all? I said yesterday that legislation should be remedial in nature. That means that it should have a positive purpose and it should be designed to remedy an ill or an evil. Here we have the Government spending a considerable amount of time and energy in advancing a cause that is meritless in that there is no mischief. 
I am not saying on any basis that the public is wholly satisfied with the judges. Quite clearly the level of complaint indicates there is room for improved performance a greater understanding by the judiciary of its role and a greater understanding by the public of the judges’ role. But that is not what we are about in looking at Part 1. Part 1 is all about removing a judge from office—a very significant constitutional step. If there is concern about judicial conduct it is here in Part 1 that it should be addressed. The Government did not have the fortitude to do that. It did not have the fortitude to look at conduct that falls below the standard of proven misconduct. 
I think that is a pity because the Justice and Electoral Committee heard evidence and submissions from a number of people who wished to see a tighter code of conduct. They wished the circumstance of the intemperate judge dealing perhaps unfairly in their perspective with counsel or a witness to be dealt with. They wished something to be done—as it has been done for example in Australia—with the judge who fails to get on with his judgments. It is fair to say and it is an old saying that “Justice delayed is justice denied”. There have been instances in Australia where judges have been brought to account for their failure to get on and deal with cases on a timely basis and to get on and write judgments that represent the closing part of the judicial process. 
I also resent the fact that a right I have as a member of Parliament to move an address seeking the removal of a judge is to be taken away from me and other members of the House. Instead this whole process is to be entrusted to a complex bureaucracy that is explained by a line diagram which is included in the bill so that we can follow through the various process pathways. Why should not we all as members of Parliament continue to have the right we have had for many years to move an address for the removal of a judge if the circumstances are so serious? But no a bureaucracy is to be set up. 
A significant element of costs is to be associated with both the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and his panel. I think it is wrong that heads of bench who are given specific statutory status are not being given associated power and responsibility.