Reti ShaneDr SHANE RETI (National—Whangarei): It's a pleasure to offer a few reflections on this the third reading of the Food Safety Law Reform Bill. I'd like to start by acknowledging previous Ministers who have done a lot of work on this: the Hon Jo Goodhew the Hon Nathan Guy and the Hon David Bennett who put a lot of effort to get this bill through to its third reading today.I want to particularly reflect on the first part of the bill which deals with modifications to the Food Act and reflect this as a legislative process that brings into account the findings of the whey protein concentrate contamination inquiry. We've heard parts of that. We're aware that in 2012 at the Hautapu factory at the back of Cambridge there they had an issue where a broken torch lens entered into the product stream. Unfortunately it was reworked against standing policies and pipes and hoses that were unclean were used. The product also wasn't dispersed through other products; it should've been a 10 percent dispersal—that wasn't followed. And subsequently the product entered the product line.About a year later the product goes offshore to an Australian facility that tests for SRCs—sulphite reducing clostridia. Fundamentally that picks up two of the clostridia which is the gram positive rod clostridium sporogenes; and clostridium botulinum. It's the second one that's important to us here because that produces a neurotoxin that's actually quite dangerous. So they test for that; it's positive. Then discussions go back and forth between Fonterra and AgResearch. They decide to test it for toxins here in New Zealand—again against protocol in an unaccredited laboratory. It turns out when two Government laboratories in the USA actually test it that it's clostridium sporogenes so we have this sort of false laboratory test.If we look at that and look at the key findings—and I tried to pull the one sentence out of the recommendations from the inquiry that this legislation brings forward—we notice how much it's about communication and information. So if we look at the contributing factors from the report we see organisational pressures and a silo mentality. We see that communication was unclear. We see there was a lack of adequate escalation procedures; testing communication and readiness; and that it lacked an updated well-rehearsed crisis plan. Also the response was slow. All parties could also have coordinated better during the crisis. There was inadequate tracing—undeniably a complex task—in a food safety culture.There was a sentence here that I particularly liked. It said A food safety programme and a food safety culture are entirely different. One is concerned with documentation and processes the other with employee behaviour and a top-to-bottom commitment to putting food safety first." I think it's a nice way to frame it: a food safety programme and a food safety culture. So Part 1 of this bill amending the Food Act deals to these recommendations. It spends a lot of time talking about food control plans: what their form might be what their content might be and how they're regulated. Clause 23 of this bill spends a lot of time looking at food tracing and how we might follow that pathway—again coming from these recommendations.So again I want to acknowledge the hard work that has gone into this. I didn't mention the Primary Production Committee; I'd like to do that now. It's my pleasure to commend this bill to the House."