Penk ChrisCHRIS PENK (National—Helensville): Thank you Madam Chair. The fourth exception to the regime in clause 9A I can touch on pretty quickly you may be relieved to know. This is where the bill states that the main provision prohibiting essentially brokering activity does not apply in relation to anything done by or on behalf of a department." Now the term "department" is of course defined within the bill essentially by pointing to that equivalent definition within the Public Finance Act. That is pretty helpful but we're still left with the implication that the bill or the activity prohibited under the bill does not apply effectively to the Government. So a department of the State of New Zealand can't be prosecuted under this bill because an exception is provided by the operation of clause 9A(4). So this gives rise to a couple of questions in my mind on which I would appreciate some clarification on behalf of the many New Zealanders who are no doubt following along with great interest. The first is whether such activity undertaken by a New Zealand department or an employee or an individual acting on its behalf is covered elsewhere on our statute book. In other words is there somewhere else in our legislative framework that says that such brokering activity can't be carried out by a Government department or that perhaps the Government department could be made vicariously liable for the actions of a civil servant doing the things that are prohibited by this bill? Perhaps more of interest more on the basis of interest than practical effects I wonder what the justification for separating out the actions of a department are in this way. Perhaps it relates to the historical notion of sovereign immunity such that a nation State will not be held accountable for actions that are traditionally an exercise of prerogative but that may or may not be the case. That's simply my speculation and I'd certainly be interested to know if there is some answer that can be provided through the Minister but perhaps by the officials on that one as well.In relation to the following clause clause 10 "Offence to carry out brokering activity without registration or permit" it's stated at new subclause (1A) that "It may be presumed in the absence of any evidence to the contrary that an exception described in section 9A does not apply." So this seems on principle a valid thing for the law to set out—that an exception won't apply on a presumed basis—but the evidence to the contrary that's referred to in that provision isn't defined any further. So we don't know if the evidence to the contrary need only be prima facie evidence or perhaps merely on the balance of probability which would be a civil standard or would it be expected that if a matter were prosecuted in the courts the traditional criminal standard of "beyond reasonable doubt" would apply? That much is not clear from the wording of new subclause (1A)—Kieran McAnulty: Oh we've been over this. Say something new.CHRIS PENK: —and it seems to me that for the sake of clarifying the record and for the edification of Mr McAnulty and any others who perhaps may be struggling with that particular section that would be a useful matter on which to have some guidance.Then my next question or discussion on which some guidance might be helpful is to do with the maximum amount of the fine in that same clause. There is an additional fine calculation to be made where the offence in the opinion of the court occurs in the course of producing a commercial gain. So my question then is: if a commercial gain is not in fact "produced" but is merely sought then will the additional penalty of "3 times the value of that [commercial] gain" apply? In other words will we be rewarding an individual or a person for committing an offence that does not satisfactorily or successfully result—[Time expired]"