Ardern Jacinda: Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill — Instruction to Committee In Committee Speaker Recalled In CommitteeText is incorporated into the Bound VolumeArdern Jacinda: Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill — Instruction to Committee In Committee Speaker Recalled In Committee[Sitting date: 20 August 2013. Volume:692;Page:12603. Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume.]JACINDA ARDERN (Labour):Thank you Mr Chair. That became quite the bidding war in the end. I just want to clarify that as we are debating Part 3 of the Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill there seems to be a fundamental lack of understanding on the Government benches that this overall bill extends the power of the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) to essentially spy on New Zealanders and of course that then extends to the oversight provisions that sit in Part 3. But overall that is a fundamental change to the way that the GCSB operates in New Zealand and to have members on that side of the Chamber try to claim that that is not case seems absolutely absurd. This is an incredibly short part of this bill but it is an incredibly important part because New Zealanders are seeking reassurances around the oversight of the GCSB which will hold this grand extension of powers. Unfortunately these oversight provisions are grossly inadequate and if anything would add to the nervousness of New Zealanders. That was certainly the case I think at the public meeting last night where these provisions were discussed at some length.I think it is helpful if we perhaps delve into the differences that you might see in the way that the Intelligence and Security Committee operates versus the way that any other committee that exists within a parliamentary context operates and the transparency—or the lack of it—that applies across these committees because that is essentially what Part 3 deals to. Well firstly this provision sets out that the Prime Minister is able to relinquish the chairmanship of the committee when it discusses the performance of the agency. This is meant to be the first element that is meant to give us great comfort.When we are looking at the performance of the GCSB do not worry because the Prime Minister who is involved in the appointment process of the head of the GCSB and who is the Minister responsible for the GCSB will relinquish the seat. Let us be clear. It would be the same if for instance we were to have Paula Bennett sitting as the chair of the Social Services Committee when it was about to review the Ministry of Social Development. It is an absolutely shameful suggestion to imply that that somehow gives us any sense of comfort that it will be a transparent examination because it essentially examines the Minister’s own performance by the performance of their department.But do not worry the Prime Minister will relinquish the chairmanship and will hand the chair over to—whom? Well potentially the Attorney-General or the Deputy Prime Minister. To again extend the example to another committee it is the equivalent of having Paula Bennett say: “Don’t worry I won’t review my own department. I’ll get my associate to come in and review the department.” What comfort can we as New Zealanders take from that level of transparency? Absolutely none. That is why again I do not think that New Zealanders can take from that any sense of security that this grand sweeping broadening of provisions will have at the very least the oversight that they deserve. However it is our contention that they should not exist at all.But then what is the second provision that is meant to give us comfort? Well the committee will be required to table its reports in the House and make them publicly available. The problem is that you know only what you know when you are a member of a select committee. I am able to scrutinise the Ministry of Social Development only to the degree that I understand what is happening within the Ministry of Social Development. That requires me to be able to extract information primarily through written questions for example or perhaps through the financial review process or by asking the Minister questions directly. What we have seen through the example laid out by my colleague Russel Norman is that we have got a case of the Prime Minister simply refusing to answer those questions. He is simply refusing to say for instance a pretty key piece of information around the revenue source of and potential payments received from external sources by the GCSB. I would consider that to be much more fundamental than an operational issue. I would consider that to be fundamentally an issue of our national security and yet that is something that we will not get any transparency around. So how can we have any degree of confidence that an annual report would require that kind of information?A second point—and I would love to hear from the Minister in the chair the Attorney-General on this issue—is that as a member of Parliament I can ask a chief executive directly through an Official Information Act request for operational questions to be answered if the Minister refuses to answer them. As it is our expectation that we can seek that operational information—