Little Andrew: Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill — Referral to Government Administration Committee In CommitteeText is incorporated into the Bound VolumeLittle Andrew: Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill — Referral to Government Administration Committee In Committee[Sitting date: 06 August 2013. Volume:692;Page:12376. Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume.]ANDREW LITTLE (Labour):Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak on this very important bill the Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill. What is very clear is that Government members have spent the night trying to convince the Committee and all New Zealanders that this bill makes no significant difference to the existing Government Communications Security Bureau Act and of course nothing could be further from the truth.My learned colleague the Hon David Parker has adumbrated the changes to new section 8 set out in clause 6 which demonstrate that under this bill the powers for the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) have been significantly expanded including through the definition of the target for surveillance which is now described as “information infrastructure”. It is not just computer systems; it is now a very broad definition. Of course what new section 8 also does in describing the functions of the bureau is no longer limit it to foreign intelligence.Even with that the next best thing we might do is look at the safeguards that are provided for in the bill. The point I want to make and I will myself adumbrate these a little as I tread wearily on in my speech is to show that the safeguards are virtually non-existent. I turn first to section 8C inserted by clause 6 which sets out the other departments and agencies that the GCSB will be allowed to assist which is all very well. Peter Dunne has very nobly said that his Supplementary Order Paper 308 if it is passed will mean that the Government cannot simply add departments but will have to amend the legislation if it wants to add any more departments. That is good as far as it goes but actually it is not good enough because of subsection (2) of new section 8C which says: “To avoid doubt the Bureau may perform its function …”—and I cut to the chase through to paragraph (c) of that subsection—“even though the advice and assistance might involve the exercise of powers by or the sharing of the capabilities of the Bureau that the Bureau is not or could not be authorised to exercise or share in the performance of its other functions.”So here we have a safeguard that is not a safeguard. It gives the appearance of constricting restraining and limiting theGCSB’s powers but then gives it an out. The GCSB can do whatever it likes because it will be able to rely on section 8C(2)(c). That is no safeguard at all and that confirms the anxiety that many New Zealanders have that this legislation in addition to expanding to an extraordinary degree the powers that the GCSB currently has now provides no real safeguard. Even if my other learned colleague the Hon Trevor Mallard is correct in his concerns about section 4 which is amended by clause 5 and the new definition of “incidentally obtained intelligence” and that paragraph (a) does not mean paragraph (a) it does not matter because section 8C(2)(c) will protect the GCSB from exercising its powers in any context and in any way at all.Let us move to section 8CA “Principles underpinning performance of Bureau’s functions” inserted by clause 6. There is a very noble and honourable setting out of the principles in subsection (1) of that new section. It will be “in accordance with New Zealand law” and “all human rights standards” will be observed and exercised. It will “discharge … its operational functions independently and impartially:”—fantastic grand to be commended. But it is all ruined by subsection (2). Subsection (2) comes in and completely destroys any benefit there might be. In fact it is not just subsection (2) but subsection (3) as well. Subsection (2) says: “Subsection (1) does not impose particular duties on … the Director …”. So even though there are these principles the director will have no duty to abide by them at all. Then subsection (3) gives the appearance of some sort of protection. It says: “The Director must take all reasonable steps to ensure that—(a) the activities of the Bureau are limited to those that are relevant …” and so on. Basically they are a set of factors that look like a codification of the principles of intra vires.Here is the thing. The first argument might be to say well why have “all reasonable steps”? There is other language that the Government could use in a bill like this. What about “all practicable steps” which is much firmer much tighter? But the real question is why have this provision at all if you do not want to—