Parker DavidHon DAVID PARKER (Attorney-General): Thank you Madam Speaker. It's a pleasure to take a call on the bill to establish the office of the Inspector-General of Defence. The first reading is a significant milestone towards the implementation of one of the key recommendations of the inquiry into Operation Burnham and the Government remains committed to that course.At the heart of this bill lies probably one of the most important democratic tenets of civilian control of the military and ministerial accountability to Parliament. It's Government's view that independent oversight as recommended by the Burnham Inquiry will support the Minister's ability to assert elected authority over the Defence Force and mean that they can stand in this House and account for that authority. That's how the military is meant to operate in democracies—they're meant to be under the democratic control of the elected representatives. What the inquiry into Operation Burnham found was while the activities of Operation Burnham were lawful as has been quoted by the prior speaker there were some very significant shortcomings over a period of years—they weren't just isolated—in the way in which the Defence Force subsequently dealt with allegations of civilian casualties.While there was no institutional strategy to cover up civilian casualties there was a series of incorrect and misleading statements and they came to be known to be incorrect and misleading to the military and they didn't correct them. As a consequence the briefings—not only of Ministers but also in public statements—were incorrect. Those inaccuracies which were deliberate jeopardised the democratic control of the military which of course is vital in a democracy. So establishing an independent Inspector-General of Defence as set out in the bill will contribute to restoring public trust and confidence following the allegations of wrongdoing during Operation Burnham and the subsequent shortcomings that were clearly identified by the inquiry. The public in my view should feel reassured that this bill is a product of a robust development process that only occurs in transparent and responsible democracies willing to front up and objectively learn and improve when things go wrong.This process started with allegations that were made by investigative journalists Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson in their book Hit & Run. The Government decided it was in the public interest to have an inquiry and it was the right thing to do. It was opposed at the time the inquiry by the military. The inquiry was undertaken by the Hon Sir Terence Arnold KC and the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer KC—two people of the highest repute. They found that the lack of openness with Ministers and the public once information had become known about the possibility of civilian casualties was wrong and one of their four main recommendations was the establishment of an Inspector-General of Defence. The Government accepted the recommendation and undertook work to progress it. There's been guidance from a group of senior officials from across the Public Service. Our officials have also consulted with the journalists concerned and we should remind ourselves that this would never have come to light were it not for those journalists. The officials have consulted with Sir Terence Arnold and Sir Geoffrey Palmer relevant academics around the country stakeholders Government agencies and of course the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) themselves. So this legislation has been through a robust design and development process.The independence of the inspector-general's office is important and it will assure the people of New Zealand that the NZDF's activities are subject to a level of oversight that's appropriate for our values and our governance arrangements. The bill establishes the Inspector-General of Defence as an independent statutory authority. They have to be associated with a ministerial portfolio—in this case it will be the Ministry of Justice—and this is similar to the model used for the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. That's actually a similar institution and actually that institution—reformed in recent years—has restored public confidence in those agencies. There was some very good work done on that by the prior Minister in the prior Government; the Hon Chris Finlayson led that work on behalf of the Prime Minister of the time John Key. This independence means the office is not part of the Public Service and it isn't subject to ministerial direction or Government policy. Importantly it also means that it's external to the Defence Force. The bill requires the office to act independently impartially and in the public interest. Public interests of course include security interests; it won't act imprudently in that regard.Another visible layer of the office's independence is the appointment process for the inspector-general which requires a recommendation of this House to the Governor-General and this should assure the public that anyone in the role has the support of the majority of our elected members. In fact these things are generally done unanimously in this House in my experience. I think the public will be confident they will act impartially and have appropriate experience and qualifications. The office once appointed employs their own staff appoints an advisory panel and can procure specialist advice as needed. The Inspector-General established by the bill will determine when and in what circumstances it undertakes its investigative functions. The bill sets out that they can start an investigation or assessment on their own initiative. They can also decline to investigate and refer something to a more suitable oversight body or defer to a request from the Defence Force or the Minister or the Secretary of Defence. This level of self-determination is in line with the inquiry's recommendation that the office has control over its work programme.The scope of the inspector-general's own-initiative function is focused on operational activities which have the most potential to cause harm undermine public confidence in the Defence Force and carry reputational risks for New Zealand. The public should have confidence that this is the kind of activity that the inspector-general is lawfully required to focus on. It doesn't mean to say that they're going to be getting involved in day to day operational stuff from the proper provenance of the power structures or the command structures within the Defence Force. But the Defence Force the Minister or the Secretary of Defence may by request expand the scope of the inspector-general's work to include other things if they think it is wise. This will in some ways enable the office to keep up to date with future roles in the New Zealand Defence Force and it also provides a useful tool to acquire an independent view which can be currently difficult to arrange given the nature of the Defence Force's work. Some of that stuff can of course be done privately by the inspector-general if appropriate.To ensure the inspector-general is able to undertake its work effectively and independently the bill provides significant information-gathering powers that can be exercised on the initiative of the inspector-general. These would be similar to what the inquiry into Operation Burnham had but go a bit further. For example the office would have direct access to all Defence Force - held information and would be able to examine witnesses and compel the provision of information. One of the difficulties that Operation Burnham had was that there was a real reluctance to provide some information that was clearly within the purview of that inquiry and it was only when they got into that inquiry and forced access to some of that information that new information came to light that should have previously been given to the inquiry anyway—found in safes that no one knows how it got into or how long it had been there but it hadn't been publicly reported on or provided to Ministers.The Defence Force is also required to reasonably assist the inspector-general in carrying out its work. This could mean providing information supporting a visit to a base an operational theatre or making a ship or an aircraft viewable. To facilitate the flow of information there are safeguards for people who raise concerns and cooperate with the office. The bill extends these safeguards to New Zealand Defence Force personnel. It's important that these people can engage with the inspector-general independent of their other responsibilities when they're doing so in good faith. The bill has independent oversights built in. I believe it will support its purpose which is to support civilian control of the military which in turn supports ministerial accountability to this House and I commend the bill to the House.