Graham Kennedy: Tariff (New Zealand-Hong Kong China Closer Economic Partnership Agreement) Amendment Bill — First Reading 
Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume 
Graham Kennedy: Tariff (New Zealand-Hong Kong China Closer Economic Partnership Agreement) Amendment Bill — First Reading 
[Sitting date: 22 June 2010. Volume:664;Page:12097. Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume.] 
Dr KENNEDY GRAHAM (Green) 
: 
 With respect to the previous speaker Stuart Nash—and I do have respect—I say that he is incorrect. This party will not be supporting the proposed Tariff (New Zealand-Hong Kong China Closer Economic Partnership Agreement) Amendment Bill. On 30 March the Minister of Trade Tim Groser signed the New Zealand - Hong Kong China Closer Economic Partnership Agreement. He said at the time that it was “a significant achievement that further strengthens the economic links between New Zealand and the Asia-Pacific region.” He said that it complements the existing free-trade agreement with China. Given Hong Kong’s position as a regional trading and investment hub he said that it would support business engagement with Asia and the Pacific. He recalled the 43 percent increase in exports to China in the last 12 months which brought in an extra $1 billion worth of export income and he said that the agreement would add “to a growing collection of high quality and comprehensive FTAs in the region.” 
We know all about high-quality comprehensive free-trade agreements. A veritable raft of free-trade agreements have come down the track over the last 2 or 3 years as a syndrome of a failed global World Trade Organization agreement that is better known as the “spaghetti bowl” or to give it an Asian flavour “noodle soup”. We have free-trade agreements with Thailand Singapore ASEAN China Malaysia and now Hong Kong. We shall have the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership—the TPP—and we will have Korea India and the Gulf States. 
I have scrutinised the national interest analysis of each one of these six Asian free-trade agreements. Essentially they amount to a template. The wording is essentially the same. The reasoning is the same. The underlying beliefs are the same. All that has been changed by officials is simply the names of the countries pretty much and little more. That is not I think a genuine analysis. Analysis requires objectivity; it requires intellectual rigour. There is none of that in these documents. These documents are more of a credo—let us call it the “Free Traders’ Creed”. 
Let us look at the template. There are essentially 10 sections or so. Let us look at the first two sections. The first is the reasons for becoming a party; the second is the advantages and disadvantages of free-trade agreements. 
Let us explore the advantages. Almost without exception there are generally about 10 bullet points lined up and usually nine or 10 out of the 10 pertain to export interests. Let us look at the disadvantages. The disadvantage will even take the form of a lament that the other side was too timid with our exports. I quote the ASEAN agreement national interest analysis: “A more ambitious outcome on the elimination of tariffs was preferred but was simply was not possible.” 
Occasionally—just occasionally—there is an opaque reference to imports and to the effect of imports on New Zealand. The phraseology used is “negative adjustment effects” which basically is a euphemism for company collapse and job loss. I will quote from a few. 
This is from the ASEAN analysis: “The removal of tariffs on products imported into New Zealand can result in negative adjustment effects for import-competing sectors. AANZFTA does however attempt to mitigate these impacts by delaying tariff elimination on imports of acute sensitivity to particular New Zealand industries.” 
This is from the analysis of the agreement with China: “The removal of New Zealand’s tariffs on imported Chinese products can create adjustment effects for import competing sectors. The FTA attempts to mitigate these effects with various protections”. 
The analysis of the agreement with Malaysia states: “Any trade agreement involving reciprocal tariff removal may have implications for domestic producers as a result of increased exposure to foreign suppliers. In order to mitigate the potential for any negative adjustment effects in New Zealand the [agreement] includes longer phase-out periods for imports in sensitive sectors in New Zealand relative to other sectors of the economy.” 
The analysis in the Hong Kong agreement states: “Any trade agreement involving reciprocal tariff removal while providing better access for exporters can create adjustment costs for domestic producers.” These are euphemisms used in the national interest analysis for company failure and job losses. 
Let me give this challenge to this Government as we prepare for an analysis of the Hong Kong agreement and further readings of the bill in this House. I challenge the Government in the Hong Kong agreement if not the previous agreements and if not the Malaysian agreement all future free-trade agreements to name the New Zealand companies that will face negative adjustment effects to estimate the loss of income they will suffer to estimate the loss of jobs that this will incur for New Zealanders to be a little more intellectually honest in the national interest analysis to show a little more moral integrity and to show a little more political courage.