Government Communications Security Bureau Bill — In Committee 
Government Communications Security Bureau Bill — In Committee 
[Volume:607;Page:4368] 
Government Communications Security Bureau Bill 
In Committee 
Clause 1 Title 
KEITH LOCKE (Green) 
: 
 In speaking to the title I point out that the word “Government” is appropriate because this organisation is a Government institution and this bill rectifies an error a very bad practice in Government operations and accountability to this Parliament because for 25 years this organisation has existed without a statutory foundation. So it is good that this matter is being rectified but we have to look at the rest of the title—for instance the words “Communications Security”—to see whether this organisation is justified; whether we really need it. The bill does provide one purpose that is quite positive and that is acting as an agency to make sure Government communications are secure. However in my opinion that could best be carried out by a subdivision of the New Zealand Police. The main functions of the Government Communications Security Bureau are purposes—and these are the most expensive ones—that we should not identify with. When we talk about communications security the main facility of the Government Communications Security Bureau is the Waihopai satellite communications interception station near Blenheim. That has two dishes directed towards two satellites over the equator in the Pacific which draws down all of the telephones faxes and emails that go through those two communications satellites. There is a network of such satellites around the equator. We are concerned through Waihopai with just these two over the Pacific. All those communications are drawn down into those two dishes and run through a huge bank of computers in Waihopai and in Wellington. 
The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Clem Simich) 
: Would the member please return to the title at this stage? 
KEITH LOCKE 
: Yes I am just explaining that the term “Communications Security” does not really apply. This information is then primarily conveyed overseas first and foremost to a foreign organisation the United States National Security Agency. It is not really communication security because communications of only five nations remain secure in this system—that is the five Anglo nations: New Zealand Australia Great Britain the United States and Canada. All the other countries in the world are being spied upon through this system by what is called the Echelon system. 
We see a problem of communications security for other countries. We saw a memo from a section head of the United States National Security Agency recently. A chap called Frank Coza talked about their agency the National Security Agency “mounting a search”—those were his words—on the members of the Security Council to try to get their votes. The Waihopai station which is part of this system is not protecting communications as the title would imply; it is not protecting the security of communications for those Security Council members. 
In fact this agency may be used for purposes that we do not agree with. In question time today I raised the question of whether the communications security element of this agency is actually being turned on its head and being used against this country—because we do not support the war in Iraq. It is clear from US congressional documents that Waihopai has been used in what is called Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. If it can be used there by communications through Waihopai going off to the National Security Agency then what is to stop them using it similarly in terms of getting electronic intelligence for their activities in Iraq? The question of sovereignty is very much relevant to that. 
RICHARD WORTH (NZ National—Epsom) 
: 
 It is a privilege to speak on this bill in the Committee stage and to follow the previous speaker who decided that he would not confine himself to what is a very narrow debate on the title. He instead offered his wide-ranging perspectives on issues of Government security. In the short time that I have available in this debate I intend to focus on exactly the title. It seems to me that in any discussion about a title one must be satisfied on two points. The first point is that the title is legally accurate and the second point is that the title factually captures the content of the bill. I do not have an alternative title to suggest to the Committee. However it is fair to say that some criticism could be directed at this title. If one looks at the contents of the bill it can be seen that there are really two fundamental thrusts to it. There are of course four parts but if one looks at the content of the legislation one sees that essentially it is concerned with the organisation the objectives and the functions of the bureau and that it sets up in that context a department of State. So it could be argued that the bill could be called the “Government Communications Security Bureau Establishment Bill”—that being a core part of this legislation. But that of course is only a part of it. That is really what Part 2 is concerned about. 
Part 3 contains provisions that I guess the previous speaker would describe as draconian. Certainly he would find them in his world ideologically offensive. Part 3 is concerned with the interception of communications and provides for warrants and computer access authorisation. There might be a case for the bill being called the “Government Communications Security Bureau Interception of Communications Bill”. 
For those students who look at these issues and seek to access material on a quick and ready basis such a title would certainly provide a key for that approach to the legislation. If one looks at the first test I suggested which is concerned with the lawfulness of the title—the extent to which it is legally accurate—one cannot really quibble with this title. However in a factual setting as to whether the title is all-encompassing some criticism can be levelled. I hope the Minister will take a call and perhaps suggest what for him would be a more harmonious alternative. My sense of it is that he has not considered this issue at all. He has not even considered it. That is a pity when time has been set aside by Parliament for a focus to be offered on this particular issue—that is the title of the bill. That is all I wish to say in these opening comments on what will clearly be an extended Committee stage. 
ROD DONALD (Co-Leader—Green) 
: 
 As my colleague Keith Locke said the only good thing about this bill is that it confirms the existence of the Government Communications Security Bureau but that is where its virtue ends. The first problem with this bill is that this has been the first opportunity for the New Zealand Parliament to debate it clause by clause. This is an extraordinary bill because unlike most other legislation that comes before this Parliament it was not referred to a parliamentary select committee. In fact it would have been impossible for this bill to be referred to a parliamentary select committee because of the existence of the Intelligence and Security Committee Act and the Intelligence and Security Committee. That is a creature of statute. In our view that should be abolished because the existence of that committee stopped this bill— 
The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Clem Simich) 
: We are discussing the title. 
ROD DONALD 
: That is what I thought I was talking about—that is the Government Communications Security Bureau Bill—that stopped this bill going to a parliamentary select committee. In fact this bill should have a title along the lines of the “Government Communications Security Bureau (Mandated by the Statutory Select Committee and not by a Parliamentary Select Committee) Bill”. It has not had the scrutiny it deserves. I look forward to a decent debate on this bill. I hope the chairperson will allow a wide-ranging debate given that this bill has not had the parliamentary scrutiny that legislation of this significance deserves. So I call upon his good offices to do that because it is of real concern that a bill with this title should be dealt with by the Parliament without thorough scrutiny particularly at this time of international crisis. There are very serious questions revolving round the mandate this bill gives to the Government and I am worried that it allows the Government to proceed without being fulsome in its explanation of what the bill involves. Again perhaps the title should more appropriately be along the lines of the “Government Communications Security Bureau (Secret Spying on Pacific Island Neighbours and Trading Partners) Bill”. That is one of the issues we should be able to address in considering this legislation because we do not know the extent to which that sort of activity is taking place. 
We were told in the briefing that the bureau is a member of a long-standing collaborative international partnership for the exchange of foreign intelligence and the sharing of information systems security technology but we do not know the extent to which our friends and neighbours are being spied upon. The advantage of the bill as described by the Government Communications Security Bureau is that it is a further step towards greater openness on the part of the Government in relation to intelligence and security matters. The bill’s title does not meet our expectations in that regard and it should therefore be entitled the “Government Communications Security Bureau (Extension of the Surveillance State) Bill” because that is exactly what it does. Another suitable title would be the “Government Communications Security Bureau (Insult to the Privacy of New Zealand Citizens) Bill” because again we have no confidence that this legislation will give New Zealanders the security they deserve or that it will not undermine their privacy as a result of legalising what are in our view the illegal activities carried out at the Waihopai spy base and the Tangimoana surveillance station. We look forward to a decent debate on this bill given the fact that it is among the most unusual legislation to come before this Parliament and that it has not been referred to a select committee where parties like the Greens and ACT—was Mr Prebble on the Intelligence and Security Committee? 
Hon Richard Prebble 
: I was on it when this bill was going through. 
ROD DONALD 
: Is the member not on the committee any more? 
Hon Richard Prebble 
: No. Winston Peters wanted to have a go. 
ROD DONALD 
: The Government has consistently denied the Greens representation on the committee. 
Hon RICHARD PREBBLE (Leader—ACT NZ) 
: 
 I rise to speak in favour of the proposal and of the title of the bill. It is a sensible measure to put these proposals into legislation partly because it makes it harder for those paranoid members of the community to continue in their fantasies. I object very strongly to suggestions that this bill has not had parliamentary scrutiny. The Intelligence and Security Committee is a parliamentary committee. 
Rod Donald 
: It is not a parliamentary select committee. 
Hon RICHARD PREBBLE 
: It may not be an ordinary select committee but every single member of that committee is a member by statute and the committee was voted for by the Parliament. I assure the Committee that we did meet all the people whom we said we met—it is mentioned on the front page of the bill that we had 16 submissions and that we heard them in public. I can remember doing that. It is not very easy to get the Prime Minister the Leader of the Opposition the Minister of Finance the then Deputy Prime Minister Mr Anderton and myself together for a meeting but we did manage to do that. 
Richard Worth 
: Not a happy company. 
Hon RICHARD PREBBLE 
: We were a happy company on this particular matter. That is why this bill is appropriately named because everyone except the Greens accepts that it is a function of the State to provide security to its citizens. I say to Mr Donald that in an age of international terrorism we need to know what those who think evil thoughts about this country and our security systems and trade are doing. One way of doing that is to electronically monitor them. If that comes as a source of shock and horror to the member I tell him that it does occur and that it is a function of the State. As a Parliament we want to be sure that those powers are being exercised in a lawful way and in a way that will protect New Zealand. The member has said that this bill is incorrectly named to which I reply that it is most certainly correctly named. 
In looking at clause 7 “Objective of Bureau” I see that the security or defence of New Zealand is the No. 1 task. That is something every MP ought to be willing to support. The protection and advancement of the international relations of the Government of New Zealand is another objective as is the protection of New Zealand’s international well-being or economic well-being. Clause 7(1)(ab) was added by members of the committee and states that the Government is required to provide “foreign intelligence to meet international obligations and commitments of the Government of New Zealand; and (b) advice assistance and protection to departments of State and other instruments of the Executive Government of New Zealand in order to—(i) protect and enhance the security of their communications information systems and computer systems; or (ii) protect their environments from electronic or other forms of technical surveillance by foreign organisations or foreign persons.” 
I tell Mr Donald that one of the things this bill does is to stop foreign Governments from being able to tap into communications information that we have here. I make no apology for saying that the ACT party is in favour of this bill—and that includes ACT’s Solomon Islands representative. I do not know why we should make an exemption for the Solomon Islands because if the Solomon Islands Government is able to tap into what is happening with New Zealand’s communications information I will be very surprised. It would also come as something of a surprise to the Solomon Islands. However we certainly have a great interest in the Pacific and in the Solomon Islands. I suspect that this bureau will do the opposite of what the member expects because it is far more likely that we will find information that may be of great interest and importance to the Solomon Islands Government. 
That is one of the core functions of the State. It is the Government’s function to provide security and it is for that reason that the ACT party is in favour of this bill. Right now when we know there is international terrorism and when threats are being made even in this country I would have thought that even the Green Party would be very pleased that we have a Government Communications Security Bureau. I would have thought the Greens would be in favour of there being a general agreement in this House that this should be legislated. We ought to be prepared to tell the public about it. Am I pleased about and proud of this organisation and the staff who work for it? Yes I am. I think the staff are patriotic New Zealanders who are carrying out a very important job. I am pleased to support the bill. 
SIMON POWER (NZ National—Rangitikei) 
: 
 I will make a quick contribution to this debate on the title of the bill. Since I came to the Committee at the start of the debate I have been listening to the opposing views as to the process this bill has gone through. I have listened carefully to the Greens’ views about the bill not having gone to a select committee. Mr Prebble then put the view that a parliamentary committee set up by statute has enabled parliamentary scrutiny to occur on this bill. 
If we go back to first principles we should ask whether the title of the bill reflects its background and key features which are set out on the commentary. It states that the key features of the bill include: “The establishment of the Government Communications Security Bureau as a department of State”. We heard my colleague Richard Worth moot that the title might be made more descriptive in nature by an amendment reflecting that that department of State is to be established. We will have to wait until the part-by-part voting to see whether Mr Worth puts forward an amendment to that effect. 
Another key feature of this bill is to make sure that the title accurately reflects the objectives and functions of the Government Communications Security Bureau. I am not exactly sure how a title could do that in itself but interestingly the next key feature is the regulation of the bureau’s functions with respect to the interception of communications. I jotted down some of Rod Donald’s alternative bill titles. He argued that it should be amended to read the “Mandated by Statutory Select Committee Not Parliamentary Select Committee Bill”. 
Rod Donald 
: Did I? 
SIMON POWER 
: I think the member may have suggested that. The point is that the bill has been subject to the scrutiny of a parliamentary committee—and that is an important point to make. Mr Donald also offered the “Secret Spying on Pacific Island and Trading Partners Bill”—or words to that effect—as an alternative title. 
Mr Prebble has quite rightly made the point that it cuts both ways with legislation like this; that yes some interference in privacy issues relating to domestic communications does occur—I will come back to that—but more important there is some regulation around the ability of sovereign foreign bodies to draw information out of the domestic communications market as it were. I worry that Mr Donald views another proposed amendment to the title to be the “Extension of Surveillance Bill” or the “Insult to the Privacy of New Zealand Citizens Bill”. 
Interestingly that does raise an interesting point. In effect the bill tries to draw out the argument that in this instance issues relating to the public good and in particular those matters that Mr Prebble raised—essentially the security of the New Zealand people—actually outweigh the rights of those individuals in our society to privacy in certain matters. There is no doubt that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act confers privacy on individuals and their communications and that is a view that should be respected across the board in New Zealand society. But every now and again issues of greater good that are bigger than any privacy issues surrounding any one individual will occur and this is one of those issues. That is why the Government Communications Security Bureau Bill is essential why its title reflects the establishment of the bureau as a department of State and why in this case that balance tips firmly in the favour of the public good and in fact of the security interests of New Zealanders given these uncertain times that we live in. While we are dealing with the title I also think it is worth drawing the Committee’s attention to the commentary on the bill. 
Clause 1 agreed to. 
Part 1 Preliminary provisions 
RICHARD WORTH (NZ National—Epsom) 
: 
 I would like to start by talking briefly about the commencement provision as there was an alteration to it as the bill went through the Intelligence and Security Committee. The plan now is that the Act other than section 32 comes into force on the day after the date on which the bill receives the royal assent. The drafters considered three possibilities when they looked at the commencement date. The first possibility was a date nominated by Order in Council.That was not chosen. The second possibility was a fixed date—some date in futurity which could have been the commencement date. The third possibility which has been seized on by the draftsman relates to the date on which the bill receives the royal assent. On that date we are to see a very significant change in the context of structural issues relating to a core element in the security services. 
The Government Communications Security Bureau has been with us for a number of years and the contribution that the bureau and the Security Intelligence Service make to this nation is absolutely undoubted. Since 1977 the bureau has provided the New Zealand Government with intelligence information from foreign signals derived from the interception of the communications of foreign Governments and other foreign entities. It strikes me as somewhat ironic that in these days of sophisticated electronic transmission of data and electronic transmission of documents the safest way for materials to be handled is probably by personal courier. That is why all around the world personal couriers carrying top-secret materials are travelling long distances in aircraft rather than those materials being entrusted to the electronic networks that exist throughout the world. 
The bureau was set up without specific statutory authority. As I understand it the director’s authority as chief executive of the bureau derives but for this legislation from an instruction that was issued by the Prime Minister. It was also the case that the bureau’s signals intelligence function and its role of ensuring the security of New Zealand Government communications and information systems were not formally defined. That adds substance to the point Mr Prebble offered—that for those who are deeply suspicious of Government activity often in a quite irrational way there is security in knowing that these activities are now to be statute-based and subject to a degree of statutory oversight that would not otherwise have been the case. 
So before 1996 Parliament’s oversight of security intelligence—and I am speaking now of the three core elements in our security intelligence system: the External Assessments Bureau the Security Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau—was basically left to the Prime Minister. Sure there was some faint involvement by the Government Administration Committee but it did not have any real control or power over the security intelligence agencies. So we had the situation that by convention secret briefings were given to the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition and together the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition would certify each year that the agencies had met accountability rules and complied with the law. National introduced some key changes in 1996 after extensive public consultation. So it was that the Intelligence and Security Committee Act set up the Intelligence and Security Committee—a statutory committee with specific functions. 
KEITH LOCKE (Green) 
: 
 I am moving an amendment under this part so that we are not intercepting the communications of foreign diplomatic missions because they get very upset if that is the case. The Green Party wrote to the missions and one of them the South African consulate did reply saying that it would take a very grim view of anyone violating its privacy by hacking into its computers. So I think we should support this amendment. Also the definition of a foreign organisation is so broad that it could include all kinds of organisations such as Greenpeace voluntary organisations and subsidiaries of overseas corporations. With the takeover of a lot our economy by Australian British and American firms or whatever a lot of our economic organisations would be foreign under this definition. New Zealanders working for them or representing them would be subject to spying as would New Zealanders communicating with them. Also it is as my colleague Rod Donald said an intrusion on the privacy of New Zealanders. 
Sitting suspended from 6 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. 
Hon TONY RYALL (NZ National—Bay of Plenty) 
: 
 I am very pleased to take a call in the debate on Part 1 of the Government Communications Security Bureau Bill a bill that the National Party in Opposition is supporting. I think this might also be an opportune time to reflect on my experience as a member of my first dealings with the Government Communications Security Bureau. 
Hon Richard Prebble 
: You don’t look like a subversive. What happened? 
Hon TONY RYALL 
: It was in those heady days of the early 1990s when I was a member of the Government Administration Committee—which Mr Prebble as he will recall later joined. 
A series of security and intelligence-related organisations appeared before that select committee which was made up of a number of new members: Christine Fletcher myself and a few other people. Some of those groups that came before the committee had a most intriguing presence. What was interesting was that they could appear before us we could ask them questions but they would never tell us anything—very much like Government departments under this Labour Government. I recall for example that a Mr Parker from the Government Communications Security Bureau came before us. But from the Security Intelligence Service a person incredulously named Mr McIvor appeared before us. Later on another officer of the Security Intelligence Service appeared before us—a Mr Smith—and we had our doubts about these individuals. But the point I raise is I think quite valid because it reflects how the whole of Parliament has developed its scrutiny function of all these security and intelligence-related organisations. 
In the early 1990s those bodies would come before the Government Administration Committee. There would be minimal financial data; it was a very simple input-output mode. 
Richard Worth 
: I raise a point of order Mr Chairperson. Where is the Minister? 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: The Minister is here. She has apologised. I call the Hon Tony Ryall. 
Richard Worth 
: I really think that the Hon Tony Ryall should start again because the proceedings to this point have been wholly irregular. It is just our good fortune that a Minister with significant knowledge of this bill has now joined us. What a tragedy it would be if someone who did not have that knowledge had joined us. 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: I thank the honourable member for drawing that to my attention. The situation as I understand it is that as long as there is a quorum in the Chamber and a Minister is in the Chamber that is fine. The Minister has now taken her seat and there the matter ends. 
Hon TONY RYALL 
: Parliament has taken greater powers to itself in the ability to scrutinise those organisations. In the early 1990s there was minimal scrutiny of either their operation or their spending of public moneys. I can recall one situation where I think the Chairperson at the time Christine Fletcher sought to get an indication from one of the intelligence agencies as to some of its activities to which the presenting officer merely smiled and gave those inimitable words: “You might very well think that but I couldn’t possibly comment.” or whatever the phrase of the television programme of the day was. 
We have subsequently seen over the years Parliament form a special committee of its elders chaired by the Prime Minister which has provided much greater scrutiny than a parliamentary forum. Similarly we have seen more information provided under the normal processes of financial review and the estimates process of these agencies. This bill is a further step in that in providing departmental status for the Government Communications Security Bureau and allowing Parliament to undertake its functions to assure the people of New Zealand that the various fundings provided to this agency are well spent. 
What is most interesting to read in the commentary of the select committee is that it is quite clear that any bill of an intelligence nature attracts quite interesting submissioners—people who have quite a bent on conspiracy theories and seem to think that all the Government Communications Security Bureau ever does is listen in on New Zealanders’ telephone calls which is of course expressly prohibited. The bureau is not allowed to listen in on New Zealanders. I think that what is important is that this bill proceed and that we have greater scrutiny of this agency. As members of Parliament we rely on the Intelligence and Security Committee to examine these agencies to ensure that they are complying both legislatively and financially. 
Hon PETER DUNNE (Leader—United Future) 
: 
 I will take a brief call on Part 1. As the member who preceded me said this bill which I think has significant support in the Chamber—certainly it has support from United Future—changes the status of the Government Communications Security Bureau. It formalises it into a Government department for the purposes of enhancing its accountability. 
I often think that when members of this House and members of the public become interested in matters of security and seek greater accountability for the security agencies and that is subsequently achieved either through reports to the Intelligence and Security Committee or other discussions that take place what becomes clear is how little we have to be secret about. We do not have an agency here of the capacity of the CIA or some of the great intelligence agencies of the world—that is not the size and scale of operation in New Zealand—but it is none the less a significant agency and it is important to see its operations its objectives and its functions coded in a particular statute. 
But I make the point that there will be those—I suspect it may be those whom the member who preceded me was referring to when he talked about the nature of the submissions that legislation of this type attracts—who will not be satisfied even with a legislative framework for the Government Communications Security Bureau who will still feel that something sinister is going on and who will still believe that various secrets are being purveyed to other nations at the expense of New Zealanders and that somehow we have a right to know. I say to those people that they will never be satisfied by whatever legislative environment is put in place. 
I guess that there is a sense of concern amongst a number of people about what is being collected about people and about why people are being spied upon or snooped upon or whatever language one might want to use. There is a natural reaction in such circumstance to say: “We are a small country with very few secrets therefore we do not need the services of an intelligence agency.” I would have thought that international events at this time and the climate that we have been living in over the last 2 or 3 years would indicate that one of the great protections we have in a free society is the fact that information that is relevant to the protection of freedom is gathered and passed on to the relevant authorities. 
I am fascinated as at the moment I happen to be reading Bob Woodward’s book about the Bush White House’s reaction to September 11 and the tragedy that befell the United States at that point. What becomes clear throughout that is the value of intelligence in determining a nation’s response. Members may well say that that is utterly irrelevant to the New Zealand context. It may well be in terms of its scale but the point remains the same. We do need to have information gathered about potentially damaging and subversive activities we do need to have an ability to have that recorded in a way that is proper and we need to have it dealt with accordingly by the relevant agencies. 
I think there would be legitimate public outcry if our intelligence agencies were utterly unaccountable were not treated the way that this bill seeks to treat the Government Communications Security Bureau and were basically allowed to run their own show. But that should not lead people to assume that because we are going to have a more rigid and accountable regime all the information that is gathered somehow now comes into the public domain. The very nature of intelligence services means that will never be the case and there will need to be some protection some security and some secrecy. That is ultimately the protection for all of us. So this bill is a positive step forward. It will enhance accountability. 
The member who preceded me spoke of an exchange that took place at the Government Administration Committee some time in the early 1990s and the mystery that seemed to be attached to that. My only direct dealing with the intelligence services was as a Minister of the Crown involved in a citizenship case. I was contacted by the Security Intelligence Service and asked to hold my decision relating to Mr X because further inquiries were still proceeding. Some months later I was advised by the director that I could now make my decision because those inquiries had been completed. When I asked him the nature of the inquiries he told me that it was not my business but I was free to proceed which I thought was a rather bizarre state of affairs given that I had to decide on this particular person’s eligibility for New Zealand citizenship knowing that he had been investigated by the Security Intelligence Service and that the service had found it unnecessary to proceed any further. I was none the less completely in the dark as to what the event was about. 
Those stories may often occur but the point I am making through that illustration is that the climate we are now moving into where there is potentially greater accountability will I think enhance the understanding of members of this House of the way in which our intelligence services operate albeit that it may not satisfy them. It will also put the intelligence services on more notice about their accountability. 
ROD DONALD (Co-Leader—Green) 
: 
 This part is significant. It contains the commencement purpose and interpretation clauses and of course the standard clause “This Act binds the Crown”. I want to dwell on the commencement for a minute. Commencement is of course all about the timing of this legislation and it is worth reminding the Committee that this bill was introduced under urgency on 8 May 2001. The Government was in a big hurry at that time and required a report back by 7 November 2001. The bill has of course languished on the Order Paper ever since. Now more than 16 months later we are finally holding the Committee stage of the debate. 
I refer to the purpose of the bill. It is all about legitimising a Cabinet minute because up until now the Government Communications Security Bureau has existed only because of a Cabinet minute. In fact until a few years ago the Government was very keen to deny that such an organisation even existed. The purpose clause fails to acknowledge that the organisation was established under the five-nation agreement a highly secret document that makes the Government Communications Security Bureau an outpost for American signals intelligence along with Britain Canada and Australia. So it is remiss of the Government not to make clear in this purpose clause that the purpose of this legislation is to give some legislative backing to an organisation that is part of an international agreement that neither this House nor any of the other Houses involved have ever seen. 
I move to the interpretation clause. We have a number of concerns here. One particular concern was highlighted by my colleague Keith Locke just before the dinner break and I would like to reinforce the point he made because he has put up a very serious amendment. He is seeking to ensure that the Government Communications Security Bureau does not spy on the New Zealand diplomatic missions of other Governments. Right at this time that is a particularly apposite request given the revelations that Waihopai has been used to spy on UN diplomatic missions in the lead-up to the non-decision by the Security Council to endorse an invasion of Iraq. 
New Zealand needs to know absolutely clearly that the Government Communications Security Bureau does not have authorisation to spy on those other missions not only for reasons of good international relations but also because at the moment this Government Communications Security Bill is in our view contrary to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Options Protocol of 1963 of which New Zealand is a member. That convention states clearly that the official correspondence of a consular post shall be inviolable. In our view “correspondence” clearly means all communications and this bill covers those communications. 
We would seek a very straightforward and modest amendment which we would like other parties to consider. It is simply to add to the definition of “foreign organisation” the words “but not the New Zealand diplomatic mission of any country”. Whether or not members support our stand on other issues I hope they see the good sense in supporting that particular amendment. 
I move to some of the other features of foreign organisations. One has to bear in mind that the definition includes any overseas company or subsidiary of an overseas company and it also means any individual who is neither a New Zealand citizen nor a permanent resident. So when we are talking about individuals we are talking about roughly 50000 Australians who are living in New Zealand and the 60000 overseas visitors who are here at any one time. They can be spied on by the Government Communications Security Bureau quite legitimately if this legislation passes and that is of real concern to us. 
I think about some of the company examples. When this bill was first introduced we raised the issue of the Singapore-owned Dominion Breweries’ intentions of closing down the Monteith’s brewery on the West Coast. We did not think that fitted the bill’s requirement to look after our economic well-being. Perhaps a more current example of what this legislation enables—and perhaps in this case we would support it—is that our economic well-being has been undermined by Frank Russell Co. That is the organisation that advised the Government Superannuation Fund to invest on the international sharemarket leading to losses of over $324 million in the last 14 months. 
Hon RICHARD PREBBLE (Leader—ACT NZ) 
: 
 I rise specifically to refute the remarks we have just heard from Mr Rod Donald the co-leader of the Greens. 
Rod Donald 
: The Government should do that. 
Hon RICHARD PREBBLE 
: No no. This is Parliament and I think it is perhaps more powerful when someone who is not a member of the Government is prepared to point out that the member is talking rubbish. In fact I thought I was going to be replying to Mr Locke who prior to the tea break made a very similar speech and spoke for 70 seconds in support of his amendment but has chosen not to speak after the tea break. But I do not want to be too critical of Mr Locke. It is clear to me that he is probably on his way to Baghdad to be a human shield and I am a bit surprised that Mr Donald who was also telling us he was going to be a human shield apparently has not got around to going. 
Richard Worth 
: He hasn’t made the bookings yet. 
Hon RICHARD PREBBLE 
: Yes. Well I think it goes somewhere towards showing the strength of their convictions even though— 
Ian Ewen-Street 
: They can’t afford it. 
Hon RICHARD PREBBLE 
: No no. There is no question of a lack of money. Mr Locke told me and he was somewhat bemused that many people whom one would not normally associate with the Greens had offered to help pay his fare—but not a return fare. 
However let me make this point. The Greens would have us say that the Government Communications Security Bureau should not ever in any way eavesdrop on diplomatic missions. One has to ask what planet they live on. Are they not aware that for example even Jordan normally known as a friend of Iraq has just expelled yesterday a number of Iraqi diplomats? How did it know to do that? It said they had been engaged in activities they should not have been engaged in. The idea that no diplomatic mission in New Zealand has ever engaged in spying—I thought Mr Donald would have done a little bit of homework! We know there have been cases of diplomats who have been expelled from New Zealand because they were engaged in subversion against this country. I saw that the Iraqi diplomat in Sydney wanted to come to this country. Would the Greens have said “Welcome to New Zealand and under our bill you can engage in any subversion you like and we will never never listen.”? That is nonsense. 
Mr Donald also does not realise that the convention he is referring to is the reason that consular and diplomatic missions are able to carry messages through couriers as they do. That does not mean we cannot listen in to their telephone conversations when they are engaged in spying. The fact that Mr Donald and Mr Locke are prepared to believe that no diplomat would ever do that says something about those members. Of course I do not think that Mr Locke and Mr Donald actually believe that. I say to them that they have a duty to this Parliament and to the country to put security interests ahead of the petty partisan policies they are quite prepared to put forward. I do not think Mr Donald for one minute believes there has never been any spying by any diplomat. He is very careful not to make a response to me now. 
Rod Donald 
: Of course there has been spying. 
Hon RICHARD PREBBLE 
: Oh now he says there has been. But he wants us to have an amendment to say: “Come to New Zealand. We are complete mugs; you can spy on us.” I say to the Greens and to the Government which relies on the Greens that they are not fit to be in Government if they are not prepared to put our country’s security first and that is why we are in the unusual situation that National the ACT party and I think a few United Future members are promoting this measure of security. The Government is sitting back and letting us do it and the Greens are promoting a motion that I would say is not in the security interests of this country. I think it is high time they put their bodies where their principles are and that having gone around the country and earned huge cheers from various audiences by saying they were prepared to be human shields it is about time they were. Or have they not watched television? I tell Mr Donald that if he does not hurry up he will miss the opportunity. 
ROD DONALD (Co-Leader—Green) 
: 
 I will not take my full time but I was part way through a discussion on the definitions when I lost the call. The point I was making was that the definition of “foreign organisation” when linked with the objective of the bureau—which we will come on to in the next part—enables the Government Communications Security Bureau effectively to spy on any foreign company operating in New Zealand. Although I sometimes doubt the benefit of some of those foreign companies to our country I think when one links the definition of “foreign organisation” with the objectives statement it really does raise a question about whether it is acceptable for a State agency to be spying on foreign businesses operating in this country. I do not think it puts us in a very good light. 
It reminds me of issues that were raised several years ago about the Government Communications Security Bureau and in particular its parent the National Security Agency in the United States when suggestions were made that in some countries the Americans used their eavesdropping capability to give advantages to American companies. In Indonesia for example the Americans used eavesdropping to give an American company an advantage over a Japanese company tendering for Indonesian Government business in the telecommunications sector. That is the sort of thing that we really ought to be safeguarding against in this legislation and the Government does not do that. 
When one turns to the next page in the bill one can see that “foreign organisation” also includes any international organisation. One that immediately springs to mind is the Greenpeace organisation. I think there is an extraordinary irony in this bill that it legitimises the Government Communications Security Bureau’s spying on Greenpeace which is the very organisation that has been the— 
Hon Richard Prebble 
: It puts out false propaganda. It frequently breaks the law. 
ROD DONALD 
: That is the sort of thing that some Governments do. In fact Greenpeace suffered at the hands of French terrorists when the  
Rainbow Warrior 
 was bombed and there were very real questions about the role of New Zealand security agencies at that time. 
Hon Richard Prebble 
: Name one. 
ROD DONALD 
: Well despite the existence of the Government Communications Security Bureau and the Tangimoana signals intelligence station somehow security agencies did not seem to know that the  
Ouvea 
 was coming to New Zealand and what it was going to be getting up to. And the Security Intelligence Service did not seem to do a very good job tracking the terrorists when they were in this country. So I think it is extraordinary that this legislation will enable the Government Communications Security Bureau to spy on the likes of Greenpeace when Greenpeace is the one organisation that has suffered at the hands of a terrorist Government which sank the  
Rainbow Warrior 
 in Auckland Harbour. 
I believe that the Intelligence and Security Committee has not done a good job. It is a statutory committee not a select committee and those members who doubt my word should have a look at what David McGee has written on that particular subject. There is a very real distinction between a statutory committee—fortunately it is Parliament’s only one—and a select committee. If this bill had gone to a select committee and if all parties had been on that select committee I believe that some important changes would have been made to those definitions to tighten them up. 
I seek the Committee’s support for our amendment to clause 4 which is to add the words “but not the New Zealand diplomatic mission of any country” because in our view that phrase gives effect to the Vienna convention of which New Zealand is a signatory and keeps good relations between our country and those missions based here. It avoids the problem the current definition has which is the one that has clearly upset the South African consul for example who said that he would take much more than just a very grim view of anybody violating their privacy by hacking into their computers tapping into their telephones and bugging their homes and offices. 
Richard Worth 
: Which consul? Was that Mr Fortuin? 
ROD DONALD 
: Indeed it was Mr Fortuin—a former employee of this Government I hasten to add. Mr Fortuin was expressing very real concern about the role that the Government Communications Security Bureau would have as a result of this legislation. 
RON MARK (NZ First) 
: 
 New Zealand First will be supporting the passage of this bill but without the amendments I have heard of late for they do not make sense to us. I must also put on the record my expressions of concern that the Government does not seem to want to contribute in any way shape or form to this debate. That tends to indicate to me that this Government true to form does not want to talk about some of the very conservative and conventional things it is required to do as a Government because at the very core and heart of its Labour being it does not like them. 
When Labour members get into debates on the hustings in future I will hear all their rhetoric again about protecting human rights privacy and all of that. They will be big on the jaw out on the hustings but not on this issue we are debating tonight—in fact they have not debated it. They know it is a reality of life that such bills need to go through the House and become law but they do not want to have to admit they did it. If that were not so they would be on their feet seeking a call in this debate and making a contribution so that their words were on the record. However it will be on the record that they have been silent. My interpretation is that their heart lies very much in what they are hearing from the Greens; they just do not have the bottle to stand up and say so. 
I draw attention to a particular part of the bill—[ 
Interruption 
] If Jill Pettis has something to say she should take a call. She should not parrot over there like the old fishmonger’s wife. She should stand up and take a call. 
Jill Pettis 
: Get the bill passed. You won’t get on the front page of the  
New Zealand Herald 
 with this speech. 
RON MARK 
: I raise a point of order Mr Chairperson. You know what I am going to comment on. I really do think that in terms of the Standing Orders if the junior whip for the Government wishes to interject rarely and reasonably and with a little bit of humour that is one thing but if she wants to keep up a running commentary during my speech she should do the proper thing—that is take a call and make a 5-minute speech. 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: I thank the honourable member for that but it was not a running commentary. It was getting close but it was not quite there. 
RON MARK 
: I also signal to the Government that I find it a little strange that we are approving the functions of the bureau in clause 8 and I will touch on gathering foreign intelligence intercepting communications and all of that— 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: We are doing Part 1 clauses 2 to 5. 
RON MARK 
: I am sorry but I will get to that. I signal now that there are areas of the bill such as Part 1 where I have failed to find any determination by the Government to deal with acts of organised foreign crime that are now being seen in our streets in terms of the distribution of methamphetamine. Those are international issues of security for our nation. I have yet to hear any Government member say how he or she intends using the Government Communications Security Bureau Bill to shore up some of our weak laws and weak policing in respect of international crime and foreign interventions into our society because that is proving to be detrimental to the health and well-being of our nation today and indeed is undermining law and order in our streets. 
 I argue—and I am waiting to hear from a Government member—that the issues of security and the well-being of our young people and of our nation are surely deserving of the attention of such an organisation. Therefore I expect to hear some mention of those issues and the authorisation given to the Government Communications Security Bureau to act on them in conjunction with New Zealand Police. There is plenty of time still and maybe the Minister or the very loud and vocal junior whip over there might care to stand and enlighten us all as to how this bill will aid the police in protecting our interests from improper undue and illegal foreign interference in New Zealand. 
The question was put that the amendment set out on Supplementary Order Paper 61 in the name of Keith Locke to clause 4 be agreed to. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That the amendment be agreed to. 
Ayes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Noes 107 
Labour 52; New Zealand National 26; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8. 
Amendment not agreed to. 
The question was put that the amendment set out on Supplementary Order Paper 36 in the name of the Rt Hon Helen Clark to clause 4 be agreed to. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That Part 1 as amended be agreed to. 
Ayes 107 
Labour 52; New Zealand National 26; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8. 
Noes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Part 1 as amended agreed to. 
Part 2 Organisations objectives and functions of Bureau 
SIMON POWER (NZ National—Rangitikei) 
: 
 We now arrive at Part 2 of this bill and in particular the clauses that relate to the organisation objectives and functions of the bureau. They are the clauses that provide for the statutory establishment of the bureau as a department of State. In Rod Donald’s contribution during Part 1 he outlined his concerns over the definition of “economic well-being” and its inclusion as one of the bureau’s objectives in terms of gathering information. I was interested to note that clause 7(2) of this reasonably well-drafted legislation sets out that the objective of economic well-being is relevant only to the extent that that is affected by the actions or intentions of foreign organisations or foreign persons. In fact this bill does not allow for wide-ranging powers to swarm and swoop over a whole lot of economic activity or company business as it were. 
This is probably one of the better pieces of drafting we have seen from this Government—we could have done with some of it in the occupational safety and health legislation. If we check carefully as we walk through the amendment that has been made by the Intelligence and Security Committee to clause 7 we see that the reference to foreign intelligence in clause 7(1)(a) reads: “The objective of the Bureau is to contribute to the national security of New Zealand by providing—(a) foreign intelligence that the Government of New Zealand requires to protect and advance ... (ii) the international relations of the Government”. I was not on that statutory committee but there was obviously a bit of concern about how that objective would play out and the committee saw fit to insert a new paragraph (ab) which states that the bureau will provide “foreign intelligence to meet international obligations and commitments of the Government of New Zealand;” as opposed to simply providing foreign intelligence for the purposes of the international relations of the Government. So the statutory committee has seen fit to narrow that part of the objective to simply meet international obligations. 
I wonder whether the Minister is able to take a call on that matter. I appreciate that she probably was not on the committee but I am interested to know whether the international obligations refer just to those obligations that we see in an environment such as the United Nations or whether they extend to the bilateral relationships one would expect a Government to carry out on a day-to-day basis. For the sake of clarity I wonder whether somebody from the Government preferably the Minister would be able to give us a bit of guidance on that. We are asking a reasonably important question here—does the Government see the provision of foreign intelligence as being limited only to the purposes of international obligations relating to such bodies as the UN or does it have a more bilateral context in mind in the sense of relationships that we have in an everyday environment with other countries around the world? I would be quite interested in any response that the Government is able to give me on that point. 
Clause 8 “Functions of Bureau” set outs how that foreign intelligence is to be gathered. That is really the guts of the bill and I suspect we will be hearing from the Greens about it. It is quite a narrow clause because it talks about the intercepting of communications under the authority of this Act or by cooperating with public authorities or by collecting information in any other lawful manner and then limits that function to deciphering decoding and translating communications. In that sense it is an uncontrolled or untapped authority. It is quite a specific and narrow authority. Interestingly at clause 8(1)(d) the bureau has a function “to provide reports on foreign intelligence to the Minister and any person or office holder”—and here is the amendment made by the statutory committee—“whether in New Zealand or abroad authorised by the Minister:”. One would imagine that there is some significance attached to that new amendment and perhaps if a member who was on the committee is present he or she could help us to understand what if any significance that addition has and how the committee sees that function of the bureau operating on a day-to-day basis. 
ROD DONALD (Co-Leader—Green) 
: 
 To pick up on one of the last points that Simon Power made it would be extremely helpful if there was a member of the committee in the Chamber who could give some clarification as to why the committee added the words “whether in New Zealand or abroad” to clause 8(1)(d). Our difficulty here is that most of us were not on the Intelligence and Security Committee. Indeed unlike any normal select committee if we had wanted to attend a meeting of that committee when it was considering this bill we would not have been allowed to because it is not a select committee it is a statutory committee. It would be good if a Government member or even one of the Opposition members who is on the committee could take a call on that. 
Simon Power made another point that I would like to respond to. He is right to say that clause 7(2) limits international well-being and economic well-being as being relevant only to the extent that they are affected by the actions or intentions of foreign organisations or foreign persons. But that does not stop the Government Communications Security Bureau from spying on New Zealand citizens. We are told that the Government Communications Security Bureau will not spy on New Zealand citizens or permanent residents for the purpose of intercepting their communications but clearly if the bureau is eavesdropping on communications between foreign individuals and organisations and New Zealanders then it must be gathering information on those New Zealanders as part of that purpose. One cannot tell me that the Waihopai spy station turns on the tape when a foreign voice is talking and then immediately turns it off when a New Zealand voice is talking. In fact the Inspector-General has clarified in one of his numerous reports that the Waihopai spy station does collect information or intelligence on what New Zealanders are saying insofar as it is needed to make sense of the foreign information it is collecting. So we know that it is collecting information about New Zealanders even though clause 7 is meant to qualify the scope relating to the interception of communications involving foreign organisations and foreign persons. 
We now come to what we see as the most ridiculous aspect of clause 7(2) and that is the inclusion of New Zealand’s international or economic well-being which mirrors what was in the Security Intelligence Service legislation. As we see it that clause is really part of the Government’s attempt to keep both those intelligence agencies relevant in the modern era. It was desperate to move beyond security or defence because the cold war was over and of course it can now thank George Bush for opening up a new front in terms of persecuting people of other religions. However at the time that provision was added to the bill it was very difficult to see any justification for it. Indeed we cannot see any justification for it now. It goes beyond the core purposes of the agency which are about the security and defence of New Zealand. If there is to be an organisation doing that work—and we believe there should be such a unit within the police force—then its role is about security and defence and terrorism and espionage. Its role is not about international or economic well-being. The bill we were debating before tea which was the Industry New Zealand and Trade New Zealand Integration Bill is about one organisation among others that should be looking after our economic well-being and we have the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to look after our international well-being. We do not need a body called the Government Communications Security Bureau being able to trawl across our communications—whether they are made by phone fax or email—looking for anything that might be an issue in relation to our international or economic well-being. 
The bureau has been given a brief that is far too wide and justification for it that is far too broad especially in the context of there not being any proper parliamentary scrutiny of what the agency does. I know there is an Intelligence and Security Committee but it does not provide parliamentary scrutiny. We do not know the extent to which the Government Communications Security Bureau is using its Echelon dictionary systems supplied by the National Security Agency in the United States to spy on political parties from overseas that happen to have a relationship with parties in New Zealand or internationally. 
Hon PETER DUNNE (Leader—United Future) 
: 
 I want to make some comments about clause 8 with particular reference to those of the member who has just sat down. He said that the functions set out for the bureau in clause 8 were too broad and that New Zealand should have the agency as part of the police force— 
Rod Donald 
: Clause 7. 
Hon PETER DUNNE 
: OK clauses 7 and 8. He said that the agency should be part of the police force designed to gather intelligence that was relevant to the interest of New Zealanders. I am paraphrasing a little bit but that was the gist of what he said. 
Rod Donald 
: Security in defence only. 
Hon PETER DUNNE 
: Security in defence only. Then he talked a bit about terrorism and the international situation. The point he misses is that in today’s environment those old definitions of what were security and defence matters are far more blurred than ever before. The whole march of international terrorism shows us that we cannot put things into the neat little boxes that once used to be the case. Consequently if a Government is looking at an effective way to measure the potential impact on its own country of the sorts of activities it regards as unacceptable it needs to have more breadth and strength in the way it approaches it. 
When we talk about the objective of the bureau being to provide intelligence on matters relating to security and defence inevitably a Government has to look at things like international and economic well-being because so much of the struggle today is about those matters. It is not simply a case of a full frontal attack on a country in a military sense. That certainly happens and we have a graphic example of that at present. However we also see economic warfare and the application of other forms of warfare and pressure that are equally detrimental to a nation’s well-being. That is why a country needs to have objectives for its Government Communications Security Bureau that reflect the fact that the very nature of the international terrorist campaign the international struggle—call it what one likes—and intelligence-gathering have changed. It is not simply a case of putting a little box around it and saying “This is a defence or security issue.” It has a much wider set of implications. 
From examples that have been quoted from time to time we know about the use of economic and industrial sabotage to strike at the heart of a nation’s well-being. We know that biosecurity sabotage has been threatened in this country before. I think it would be folly not to have the capacity through our intelligence services to monitor activities that might well be leading to the enhancement of those activities within New Zealand. That would be the case if we stuck to the very narrow definition the member who preceded me seemed to be applying. The powers and functions set out in clause 8 make it clear that this legislation is very much about protecting New Zealand’s broad interests. As I said before in relation to Part 1 it is arguable sometimes how much of a threat and a risk we are suffering from but the reality is that we need those sorts of organisations in place providing those sorts of functions to ensure that we have a measure of protection. 
I know that some members will say that the references to international and economic well-being are really code for being able to monitor and potentially suppress domestic dissent. I do not accept that reality. The bill sets out sufficient protections and mechanisms to ensure that that will not be the case. However what it does do—and this is the very point surely—is recognise that in today’s environment those sorts of issues are part and parcel of the threat we face. Terrorists do not see things neatly in terms of defence or security relationships only. Terrorists view issues from the totality of the damage they can do to a particular State or society in advancing their own objectives. They will not sit there and say that that affects just the defence or security interests of New Zealand. They will use whatever methods available to them to advance their cause. I think that everyone in this House recognises that—even the member who preceded me. 
The point therefore is that in arming ourselves to the extent that it is possible to arm ourselves to protect our nation against those sorts of incursions powers need to be crafted in this legislation of the nature of those set out in clauses 7 and 8. This is about protecting New Zealand’s interests. It is not about some sort of vast spying network that either contributes to international security or spies on New Zealanders. 
RON MARK (NZ First) 
: 
 I raise a point of order Mr Chairperson. I did seek the call before and you saw fit for whatever reason—and I do not question that—to allocate the call to a party of a lesser size than New Zealand First. You have already taken a call from a National member. You have not taken a call from New Zealand First and before you make a decision I would like you to consider that. 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: I thank the honourable member for his submission. I always take into consideration the situation of parties in the Chamber. At this particular time I have taken the decision to call Richard Worth. 
RICHARD WORTH (NZ National—Epsom) 
: 
 I am certainly looking forward to hearing the contribution— 
Hon Richard Prebble 
: I raise a point of order Mr Chairperson. I would be interested to know how the chair is deciding to take calls. You are clearly not following party size. You are not following seniority because you have called a member who has not been in the House as long as I have and who represents a smaller party. You are clearly not looking at all parties because New Zealand First wants to contribute. It is your gift and if you want to be unfair you can. I would like to know on what basis we are doing the calls. It is not one that I am aware of. 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: I thank the honourable member for his contribution. I did look to the honourable member for the next call but he did not rise. 
Hon Richard Prebble 
: When you called Mr Dunne ahead of me I did not rise. 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: The reality is that I have called Richard Worth and I cannot take the call from him but I will take into consideration what the honourable member has said. I thank him for drawing the matter to my attention. 
Ron Mark 
: I raise a point of order Mr Chairperson. 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: I have made a ruling and already called someone. Under the Standing Orders I cannot take the call away. 
Ron Mark 
: I know that but my point of order is this: the Hon Richard Prebble has asked for an explanation as to why you saw fit to make the decision you did. The reason I took my point of order before you made your ruling was so that you had a chance to consider what I had to say. But you have now accorded two calls to the National Party before you have heard from any other Opposition parties on this part so it is difficult for those of us sitting here to understand your logic. You were simply asked for an explanation and all you have said is that you have since made your call so that is it. That is not particularly fair. 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: Can I thank the honourable member. I also take into account proportionality and I will now call Richard Worth. 
RICHARD WORTH 
: After that exchange I thank you for giving me the call. I certainly look forward to the contribution that Mr Mark might make later in this debate and I should not overlook Mr Prebble. I should also not overlook the large number of members of the Government who are in the debating Chamber. I do not doubt their willingness to take calls in the course of this debate. Before I move to the substantive part Part 2 I would also like to observe that to date in this debate not one member of the Government has taken a call—not the Minister in the chair Lianne Dalziel; not all the members in this packed Chamber opposite. Why have they not done that? 
John Carter 
: Arrogance! 
RICHARD WORTH 
: Arrogance is one of the reasons offered. I think there is a natural timidity to speak out about the merit or otherwise of this legislation. The Minister sits silently scribbling with her green pen. 
Hon Richard Prebble 
: I raise a point of order Mr Chairperson. The honourable member is suggesting that Government members are too timid to speak. That of course is out of order. It is suggesting that they lack courage. For whatever reasons Government members are not speaking I am sure that lack of courage is not one of them. The member cannot pursue an argument of that sort. 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: There is a clear Speaker’s ruling that one cannot indicate in the House that members lack courage. The member will withdraw and apologise. 
RICHARD WORTH 
: I withdraw. I would just like to say—not with reference to that point of order—that there is a difference between timidity and lack of courage. I of course apologise and withdraw and I am standing on— 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: The member will now withdraw and apologise. 
RICHARD WORTH 
: I withdraw and apologise. 
In connection with Part 2 I would like to say first that all of this part and Part 3 are in substantive terms probably the crunch parts of the bill. That is for a raft of reasons. The first issue is Part 2 which establishes as a department of State the Government Communications Security Bureau. When I was talking about Part 1 I offered an insight into the history of the events that had seen this entity operate for a number of years without the status that it is now to be given by this legislation. 
The second issue that relates to Part 2 concerns the substantive provisions that deal with the objective of the bureau. Those provisions raise the very important philosophical issue that what we are about in this debate is striking a balance. It is a balance between on the one hand an active intelligence service necessary for national security and on the other hand a reluctance—a concern perhaps—that there will be aspects of invasion of privacy or a threat in some way to the fabric of the nation. It is a balance that the Green Party struggles to find and we certainly heard from them in that regard. It was Jenny Shipley I think who on 21 March 2000 made a comment about striking that balance. She spoke about the balance between keeping matters secret that clearly deserve to be kept secret in the public and national interest and on the other hand allowing public discussion and debate on those issues that deserve wider consideration. 
The Intelligence and Security Committee was quite robust I would suggest in the way it dealt with a number of submissions in respect of Part 2. That was all to the good because in this type of legislation there is always the runaway possibility that it will be distorted by the strong views of small elements of the community about the security intelligence function. So I simply note that the committee declined to make a number of major changes that were sought. It declined for example to narrow the objectives of the Government Communications Security Bureau. It declined to expand the role of the Inspector-General. It declined to include details of operations in the bureau’s published annual report on the basis that that might prejudice security. In the context of the balance that the committee had to bring to bear to the argument those were important considerations and the committee did consider them. That is all to the good. 
In the short time remaining I would like to focus on the functions of the bureau. I do not seek to read out the functions set out in clause 8. Members have had the benefit of hearing earlier speeches on what those functions are. 
RON MARK (NZ First) 
: 
 I really want to point out a couple of things but firstly I need to bring to the attention of the Committee just how long this part has been waiting to be debated. It is quite interesting to go back through some of the Order Papers is it not? On 10 September 2002 this bill was sitting at No. 41 on the Order Paper. 
Rod Donald 
: It came in under urgency. 
RON MARK 
: It did too. On 27 February this year it had finally worked its way to No. 12 on the Order Paper. Here we are on 25 March and the bill has finally got to the stage where we are now debating it as item No. 5—it is actually listed as item No. 7—on the Order Paper. We have witnessed up to this point an absolute silence on the Government benches and a Minister who simply is not interested in the bill. She is sitting there not answering any questions and not countering any points that are made by members—points that the Government clearly disagrees with because it has voted against the amendments that those members have put up—with an absolute confidence that this bill in its current form is ready for passing. I draw clause 9(2) to the attention of the Minister in the chair the Hon Lianne Dalziel. I ask her to please take an interest in the security issues that face our country. I ask her to read clause 9 and specifically subclause (2) and ask herself whether that clause is correct. If the Minister is happy for clause 9(2) to go through then that is fine—that probably justifies why she can sit there and not make one sentence one word or one utterance in support defence or explanation of the bill. But when I look at that clause I see a problem. I am not being paid the sort of money that Minister is getting paid. I do not have a ministerial gold card a ministerial gold car with leather seats and all the trappings of office around me but someone certainly does. I see that there is a problem. There is a basic error—a simple fundamental flaw—that this Government has not picked up on. 
Why? Because Government members are not even participating in the debate. They have not even read the bill. It is not my job to sit here and tell the Government how to do its job particularly when it has the biggest Cabinet that the country has ever seen since—well since whenever. This Government has more people on ministerial salaries than anyone can recall in their time in this House. There is a fault an error in this bill and the Government had better sort its act out or we will be back here in the Chamber again correcting it. That is all I am saying to the Minister. I can see the error; I am not responsible for the bill; someone sitting in this Chamber is responsible for it right now; and I suggest that that someone do some work right now to correct that fault. If we find that we are back in the Chamber again in order to resolve stupid administrative errors then that simply reflects poorly on the calibre and quality of Cabinet staff and the administration—the executive—of this Government. I am talking about a simple basic stupid little flaw that should not be in the bill given that this bill has been hanging around on the Government Order Paper for years. I will leave it at that. 
Hon RICHARD PREBBLE (Leader—ACT NZ) 
: 
 I hope the Minister has listened to what Mr Ron Mark said because I think he is right. It does appear to me that this bill has been overtaken by another bill which we have just passed. The Minister may not be interested but I see that the director is here. If he wants to be paid it would be a really good idea to make an amendment to this clause. Otherwise the director who does deserve to get paid will not be paid. So I compliment Mr Ron Mark on discovering that matter and I am sure the Minister would be rather pleased if we carried on discussing it for a while but I turn to another point. 
Some members were asking whether any members of the committee could explain why there was an amendment to clause 8(1)(d). I have had a look at that and I think the reason is apparent on the face of it. This is the clause that states: “to provide reports on foreign intelligence to the Minister and any person or office holder” and the addition states: “whether in New Zealand or abroad”. If it were not for that amendment one could say that the provision related only to foreign intelligence from overseas but of course there can in fact be foreign intelligence—as within our definition; to do with foreigners—within New Zealand and indeed quite often it may be. That is my memory of why that amendment is there but if the Minister—who is now I hope taking an interest—would also like to look at clause 9(2) she could confirm whether the answer I am giving is correct. 
I say again when I look at this bill that the Green Party in my view has a duty when looking at legislation to move beyond just making meaningless slogans and look at the reality. We are passing laws; those members sought to be members of Parliament. If they sought to be MPs then they have a duty to this House to debate in an intelligent and rational way. The sorts of things that we have been hearing from the Green Party are complete nonsense. The first example of that is the suggestion this bill has been put together in order to find work for the Government Communications Security Bureau. Where have the Greens been? The idea that there are now no threats to New Zealand is as silly as the proposal which I heard from a very senior member of this House that we live in a benign environment. We actually face more security threats today than we have faced for many years and they come from terrorists. If the Green Party is not prepared to use this type of intelligence to combat terrorists how does it propose we do it? Are they just proposing that somehow or other we can just say that we are so supportive? I listened to a suggestion made by Mr Donald—which I thought was greatly offensive—that terrorism against the West was the result of George Bush. He suggested Mr Bush was somehow responsible for the events of 11 September. That type of conspiracy nonsense does no credit to the Green Party whatsoever. Does Mr Donald think we are supposed to take seriously his suggestion that it is George Bush who is somehow responsible for those actions of terrorism? Are we supposed to believe that the Green Party actually believes that? The alternative is that the Greens do not believe it. Well if they are members of this Parliament they ought to be telling us what they really believe rather than things they think will make good rhetoric and will persuade some flaky members of the community to give them their vote. 
The reality is we all know we need the Government Communications Security Bureau. We also know there are people engaged in such things as economic espionage. We do hold commercial secrets in this country. There was a well-known example of a particular individual from China who had in his possession a number of cuttings—I think it happened in the apple industry—that had cost New Zealand millions of dollars to collect. The Green Party would have us believe we should rely purely on the police to protect us from that type of economic sabotage. That is nonsense. This legislation is the only way that we will have protection but I say to Government members that they ought to be debating the matter. The reason Government members are not debating this legislation is I think that there is a contrast between the reality of this bill—an alliance between the United States Britain and New Zealand; that is what the Government is creating under this bill—and the Government’s public rhetoric to the opposite. 
JOHN CARTER (Senior Whip—NZ National) 
: 
 I raise a point of order Mr Chairperson. I did not want to interrupt the member’s speech but I noticed something that is rather extraordinary. I hope that what I saw was not what I think I saw as I would hate to feel that the senior Government whip was putting some pressure on the Chair to conclude the debate. It seemed odd that the senior Government whip was tapping his watch and pointing at you as though to say: “We have had enough time on this bill.” If the senior Government whip wishes to indicate to the Chair there are other ways in which it can be done but if he needs to do so he should not do it quite so obviously. 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: The member will also notice that the Chair took no notice. 
ROD DONALD (Musterer—Green) 
: 
 I raise a point of order Mr Chairperson. I would like to draw your attention to an issue of equity. My colleague Mr Prebble has had two calls on this part and I— 
Hon Richard Prebble 
: I most certainly have not. 
ROD DONALD 
: Has he not? I thought he had had a second. My apologies. 
GEORGINA BEYER (NZ Labour—Wairarapa) 
: 
 I move  
That the question be now put 
. 
Hon TONY RYALL (NZ National—Bay of Plenty) 
: 
 I want to pick up on the point that the Hon Richard Prebble made about the vital need for Parliament to have a debate on this bill. Debate requires that there is a contribution from Government members of the Committee. We have not heard one Government member take a call to— 
Hon Member 
: Why do you think that is? 
Hon TONY RYALL 
: Well we have not heard one Government member seek a call to justify this bill which is in the name of their Prime Minister. Not one Labour member has sought to take a call to explain what is going on. I think I know why. This Government has been seeking to perpetrate a misconception on the people of New Zealand. This Government has been trying to convince the people of New Zealand that they have no involvement in what is going on in Iraq no involvement with the Americans and no involvement with the British or Australians. The simple fact of the matter is that I am sure there is a level of information sharing going on. Whether it is at a low level I do not know but this organisation is one of the apparatus by which our left-wing Government is able to spy on the activities of other entities in this country. We have a Prime Minister who is trying not to be involved in any of this international conflict but the fact is the Prime Minister is promoting legislation that enshrines in the statute of this country an organisation whose raison d’être is spying on other entities and this Prime Minister and her party do not want to be seen to be debating that matter at a time when they are trying to distance themselves from involvement. 
What I have to say to this Government is: “Accept your responsibilities and take a call in this debate.” because we need to know what the Government thinks. I have to say that right now this is a country where we should be fearful for our security because there is no doubt that the Islamic fundamentalists and ideologues who are perpetuating great violence in many parts of the world are anti-Western. This Government would like to think they are just anti-American. Well they are actually anti-Western. The fact that so many of our cousins across the Tasman lost their lives in Bali would surely be enough of a message to the “lefties” in this Parliament that this country is involved as a potential target for those organisations. That is why we need the sorts of legislation that support the intelligence-gathering structures. 
I am concerned that we have a party in Parliament—the Greens who one day aspire to be part of a Government—who at every opportunity rail against the apparatus of the State being applied for the security of the State and the security of New Zealanders. Because time and time again when we come to passing legislation to support the security infrastructure of New Zealand there is always one party against it—namely the Greens. But is it not interesting that the very freedoms that Mr Locke and Mr Donald have to protest against the Government and the Parliament of New Zealand are denied to millions of people in Iraq. Millions of people in Iraq do not have the opportunity to stand up and protest against their Government. No members of Parliament in Iraq have an opportunity to stand up and protest against their Government but we have that right in New Zealand because we use every means we have to enforce our freedoms and our right to be free. Part of that freedom means actually taking the unpleasant decisions of having to support a security infrastructure and the apparatus necessary to find out who is plotting against us. 
ROD DONALD (Musterer—Green) 
: 
 I raise a point of order Mr Chairperson. When you consider the inevitable closure motion I would like you to take into account the alternation in the Chamber between those who support the bill and those who oppose—and we are the only ones who oppose. I further ask you to consider that since I last spoke the Greens have been challenged by Richard Worth Richard Prebble and Tony Ryall and I believe that natural justice suggests we should have the opportunity to rebut those challenges. 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: I thank the member but I do not need his assistance on this. 
DARREN HUGHES (NZ Labour—Otaki) 
: 
 I move  
That the question be now put 
. 
KEITH LOCKE (Green) 
: 
 I think it is right to have this debate as it is a very important one. The comments that Tony Ryall made were in the spirit of the seriousness of this issue so it is good to be able to address some of them. 
I want to speak to clause 12 “Annual report” which I think is a weak provision. The way I read it in terms of the reporting on interceptions that the Government Communications Security Bureau does it appears weaker than what is actually the practice in the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service which not only reports on but reports the number of interceptions. Under the Security Intelligence Service legislation the organisation has to report the number of interceptions and the duration of those interceptions. Even that is not really sufficient accountability but it is much more than is set out under the reporting procedures in clause 12. 
I think that is one of the problems when one is dealing with electronic interception. Even though the targets of that interception might be legitimate intelligence services can do the wrong thing and by the very nature of electronic interceptions the targets of those interceptions do not even know it is happening. So it is important to have a proper reporting procedure because that is an element of the accountability. If there are a lot of interceptions and if they are going on for a long time then hopefully the Parliament and the people will put pressure on the Government and ask what is going on what the threat is and what all the interceptions are about. Of course with secret organisations one is not asking for every last detail but one does want some accountability. 
The other problem with clause 12 is seen in subclause (4)(a) and (b) which states that the reporting should not prejudice relations with other agencies. Of course there is a reason for that. If one is getting intelligence from overseas one does not necessarily want to disclose it all but I am a bit worried that subclause (4)(a) and (b) will allow information to be kept confidential purely on the basis that it is being provided by an overseas agency—the CIA or MI5 or whatever. In a sense that means that these agencies are dictating what is secret and what is not because they say: “Well we’re not going to give you any more information unless you keep all this secret.” 
One of the problems with that is that one cannot necessarily trust those agencies. We have seen Colin Powell get up at the United Nations recently and say: “On the basis of this intelligence information we have there are links between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.” which proved to be completely false. There was all the other contrary information such as: “There are all these intercepts we have with Saddam Hussein’s generals that show they are going around hiding weapons of mass destruction.” The inspectors have pooh-poohed all of that in terms of mobile laboratories and the sorts of things that Powell came out with. One of the problems is that he could say: “This is secret intelligence information.” and nobody could countermand what he was saying although in this case the CIA people were so outraged they selectively leaked to the press saying that Powell was talking a lot of rubbish. 
One of the problems is that when countries have agendas—as the United States under the Bush administration have at the moment—they often use secret information through their intelligence organisations to justify what they are doing not only in an unaccountable way but in a lying way. That was the case with Colin Powell at the United Nations. So we have to be cautious about putting provisions in here that would allow overseas organisations to dictate what we should or should not disclose. 
The other material under Part 2 involves the whole question—and I think my colleague has already spoken about it—of whether what the Government Communications Security Bureau correctly interprets to be New Zealand’s international well-being or economic well-being is completely subject to a partisan interpretation. 
If one is from Monsanto one might say that what we are doing in this country with GE products is completely in the interests of New Zealand. Any politician in New Zealand who supports Monsanto and GE would say: “Oh that’s completely in our interests.”; whereas people on the other side of the political fence would say that it is not and that companies like Monsanto are undermining our economic well-being. 
MARTIN GALLAGHER (NZ Labour—Hamilton West) 
: 
 I move  
That the question be now put 
. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That the motion be agreed to. 
Ayes 60 
Labour 52; United Future 8. 
Noes 55 
New Zealand National 26; New Zealand First 12; ACT New Zealand 8; Green Party 9. 
Motion agreed to. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That Part 2 be agreed to. 
Ayes 106 
Labour 52; New Zealand National 26; New Zealand First 12;  ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8. 
Noes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Part 2 agreed to. 
RICHARD WORTH (NZ National—Epsom) 
: 
 I raise a point of order Mr Chairperson. My point of order is in connection with the concluded Part 2 and relates to clause 9(2). We know and we think that the Government should know that there is an error that we have sought unsuccessfully to have the Government take notice of. The error is that the remuneration of the director is determined by an entity and under a statute that no longer exists. Mr Mark started this issue off and other members on this side of Parliament sought to draw the issue to the attention of the Minister in the chair who would not listen to that point. National supports this bill. If we did not support it I suppose we would be happy to leave a hopeless mess behind us. But now we have a situation where the director of the bureau will not get paid. I suggest that this is an issue that needs to be revisited on the basis of the point of order I now raise. 
Hon RICHARD PREBBLE (Leader—ACT NZ) 
: 
 While I am sympathetic to the point that the member has raised it is not actually a point of order. The Government can pass and often does bills that are nonsense. Mr Mark drew the matter to the Minister’s attention and so did others. If the Government wants to pass a bill whereby the director’s pay is to be determined by an organisation that has been abolished that is not a question of order; it is just a question of good sense. 
Rod Donald 
: The director won’t be happy. 
Hon RICHARD PREBBLE 
: I know the director will not be happy. For all I know the Government does not like the director. However the matter is not a point of order and no doubt at some point when Helen Clark comes back we will have this provision recommitted and we will all draw it to your attention. 
The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Clem Simich) 
: I thank Mr Prebble for pointing out that the matter was not a point of order. I agree with him. It is a drafting issue and it is something the Government will have to address. 
RON MARK (NZ First) 
: 
 I raise a point of order Mr Chairperson. Can I suggest a way forward so that the time of the Committee is not wasted and so that the Government is not made to look any more stupid than it currently looks. I brought this point clearly to the attention of the Minister and the Government whips. They consulted with officials and they proceeded to sit here and do nothing while the provision passed through. I suggest that the Government whips might like to consult quickly and approach other whips with a view to us going out of Committee moving on to the next order of business and taking some corrective action before the Government looks even more stupid than it currently does. 
Hon RICK BARKER (Minister of Customs) 
: 
 I have taken some advice on the matter. I am advised that the remuneration Act is not superseded until 1 April and until that time the bill as it stands has to reflect what is currently the law. It cannot do otherwise. We know it will change but we are dealing with it at this time. At some later stage when the law takes effect the wording will simply be changed as a consequence. 
Part 3 Interception of communications 
KEITH LOCKE (Green) 
: 
 The Green Party has several amendments under this part three of which are along the lines suggested by the Privacy Commissioner who made a very intelligent submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I will move these motions which are amendments he suggested. The Committee and Parliament as a whole should take them on board. For a start clause 15(1) would add paragraph (c) “otherwise intercept any private communication.” The aim of this is to guard against the situation where the permission of a person alone is sufficient for an interception. The commissioner wants warrants to be obtained. If one gets a householder’s permission to intercept a communication and from that household one looks at the communications of someone in the next-door property the fact that permission has been given to the Government Communications Security Bureau should not avoid the need for a warrant. That is a very good suggestion made by the Privacy Commissioner and it is now put down in an amendment. 
The idea in clause 16(1) is to omit the words “or by any other enactment” which is a very general term. In this part we are talking about warrantless communications and there is a particular problem with warrantless communications. If we just have any other enactment to allow this without specifying those particular Acts we could get into a lot of trouble. On behalf of the Green Party I suggest that in clause 23(1) we change the period of the warrants from 12 months to 6 months. The Privacy Commissioner argued that 6 months is quite a long time and there should be some sort of review. It does not mean to say the interception could not continue beyond that time but there would have to be a review process and an additional application in order to achieve that extension of the warrant. That would be more in line with warrants in other agencies that do not go for 12 months. My amendment to clause 24A adds after the words “whose communications are to be intercepted” the words “and also to take reasonable steps to avoid damage to computer and communications equipment accessed in the interception process.” This last amendment is not a suggestion of the Privacy Commissioner but it would be a useful addition to the bill. 
Part 3 “Interception of communications” is very important. It is a considerable invasion of our privacy when an agency like the Government Communications Security Bureau is given the right to intercept electronic communications which we use so much these days and in tandem with the Crimes Amendment Bill (No 6) and the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill the powers to intercept electronic communications of all types plus the right to hack into people’s computers—that is to access people’s computers remotely without them even knowing that that is happening. Under clause 16 which refers to unwarranted interceptions it will be done only to foreign communications. As I said earlier the term “foreign” is so wide that it can include a lot of foreign non-governmental organisations such as Greenpeace Amnesty International etc. or subsidiaries of foreign corporations. Also any New Zealander in communication with a foreigner could be intercepted. Most electronic communications do not carry passport details with them so none of the intercepting agencies really knows whether they are intercepting a New Zealander or a foreigner. New Zealanders can be caught up in this system which is why it is very important to have all the proper qualifications here in terms of warrants and proper authorisation. There should not be any looseness in the system. 
Clause 20 “Authorisation to access computer system” contains a very broad power. I am sure that most people like myself keep a lot of back-files on their computers for years. A lot of our personal lives—all our thoughts and everything—are on our computers. 
SIMON POWER (NZ National—Rangitikei) 
: 
 I listened with some interest to the contribution that was made by Keith Locke and I think we might be reading different parts of the bill. When I read the purpose of Part 3 and more particularly the restrictions imposed on interceptions contained in clause 14 I was struck by how limited the powers of the Government Communications Security Bureau were. Frankly I was quite surprised at the processes by which that information has to be obtained. I was interested to see that clause 14 states that interceptions are not to target domestic communications at all. 
Ron Mark 
: It’s to look after the unions. 
SIMON POWER 
: Maybe Mr Mark is right; perhaps we should not go too far down that track. However it is worth just spending a bit of time on that. For those members opposite who have not read the bill I say that clause 17 which relates to the issuing of the interception warrant is completely subject to the restrictions imposed by clause 14. In legal terms the bar is actually set quite high for those who are seeking to obtain or intercept information by one means or another. 
It is worth spending a bit of time on clauses 14 and 15 because I imagine that they will become the focus of the debate on this part. Clause 14 states: “Neither the Director nor an employee of the Bureau nor a person acting on behalf of the Bureau may authorise or take any action for the purpose of intercepting the communications of a person ... who is a New Zealand citizen or a permanent resident.” I would have thought that that was pretty limited in that case. 
Clause 15 goes on to say: “(1) Unless authorised by an interception warrant to do so neither the Director nor an employee of the Bureau nor a person acting on behalf of the Bureau may—(a) physically connect an interception device ... or (b)”—and this is where the bill gains in strength and gets a bit of grunt—“install an interception device in a place for the purpose of intercepting communications that occur in the place.” That emphasis is a change from the original clause 15(b) which read: “install an interception device in a place—(i) without the permission of the occupier of the place”; that has now been removed. That provision has been strengthened in the sense that the need for the interception to occur is no longer subject to the permission of the occupier. That is a change that the select committee has made and in my view it is a significant change. 
Perhaps it is just a bit of a quirk of mine but the other thing I thought was quite interesting was that the old clause 15(b) phrase “for the purpose of intercepting communications made or received in the place” has been replaced by the phrase “that occur in the place”. That widens the scope. The interception may occur as long as the intercepting communication occurs in that place. In other words the interception does not have to be made or received; it just has to occur. That is a widening and a strengthening of the earlier provision. 
I will turn now to clause 17 which deals with interception warrants. I will just reiterate what I said earlier which is that the issuing of an interception warrant is subject to clause 14 the whole way through. That means interceptions are not to target domestic communications. The Minister in the chair might be able to help me out here but my reading of it is that with the issuing of an interception warrant being subject to clause 14 the warrant cannot relate to the communications of a New Zealand citizen or a permanent resident. Is that right? I think it is pretty limited. 
Ron Mark 
: It’s a bit soft. 
SIMON POWER 
: My colleague Ron Mark says it is a bit soft. I am surprised by the narrow scope of that clause and by the way in which the see-saw has come down on the side of the public good as opposed to the privacy of an individual. Actually the see-saw has not moved very much at all. I would be very interested in any other comments other members may care to make. 
RON MARK (NZ First) 
: 
 I will pick up on the points that have been raised by the honourable member Simon Power. I ask the Government to reflect on this. I know what this bill is all about; it is about enhancing our security and protecting ourselves. In the light of September 11 and the things we have seen since then it is a very sensible bill. We might argue that it has taken too long to get here but when we look at some of the issues that face us as a nation and we reflect on a lot of the debate we have had in this House in respect of border control and immigration I have to ask what clause 14 “Interceptions not to target domestic communications” means in stating: “Neither the Director nor an employee of the Bureau ... of a person ... who is a New Zealand citizen or a permanent resident.” 
Let me use an example so that I am not accused of being xenophobic or whatever. In the Middle East I was known by a couple of names. I had the names Hernam Singh and Abdul Aziz. Let us just imagine that Abdul Aziz came to New Zealand on a tourist visa to travel around and look at our wonderful scenery then sought to change his status from that of a tourist to that of a resident or a student so as to attend university. We all know that that is possible here because the Minister has answered countless questions about that very issue and has confirmed that that indeed happens. After 2 years in New Zealand Abdul Aziz then applies to be a permanent resident. At that point none of his internal communications within New Zealand can be monitored by this bill. Is that sensible? It is not sensible. 
The one thing we have all learnt from modern terrorist operations is that to those people time is no boundary or limitation. The prospect idea or method of installing people in a country where they are sleepers and go about establishing their reputations their careers their CVs and their history alongside ordinary New Zealanders is a time-proven method of operating. It is standard operating procedure for many terrorist organisations. It is an operating procedure that has been used very effectively because they know that after a certain time an individual’s slate is cleaned and sanctified and that person can then move out on to the greater international market with a clean New Zealand passport and operate with freedom inside another country or can commence operating inside the host country. This clause prevents the Government Communications Security Bureau from monitoring the communications of such an individual. 
I ask the Government whether that is what it intended. Is that sensible? That is where the Security Intelligence Service comes in. Maybe the Minister in the chair being as learned and well-paid as he is could take a call and satisfy my concerns by explaining how our other internal security mechanisms pick up and kick back on this particular worrying anomaly just to reassure me and the Committee that such a scenario could not be played out and that such a scenario if not covered in this bill is covered in other legislation that the Security Intelligence Service acts under or that the New Zealand Police may have at its disposal. Far from having the concerns that Mr Locke has I do not see anything in clause 14 that worries me about the freedoms and rights of people who are not even citizens of this nation but are simply permanent residents. I see a threat to the New Zealand security system a failing in our internal security and a gap in that clause that would give comfort to people who might have in their intent the notion or the deliberate plan of acting against New Zealand’s interests or long term against the interests of New Zealand’s allies. I really would appreciate the Minister satisfying my concerns by taking a call and commenting on that right now. 
ROD DONALD (Co-Leader—Green) 
: 
 The previous speaker Ron Mark said earlier in his speech that we all know what this bill is about. I am beginning to wonder whether some Government members do actually know what this bill is about because they have not risen to their feet to comment on it in any way whatsoever which suggests to me they do not have a clue about what is going on here. 
I would therefore like to point out briefly that what we are talking about in all these polite words is the Tangimoana radio signal station—that is the station that failed to pre-empt the  
Rainbow Warrior 
 bombing by not picking up that the French yacht the  
Ouvea 
 was on its way to New Zealand—and the Waihopai satellite communications station which we all know failed to predict the Fiji coup because it clearly was not listening to communications coming out of or going into Fiji. That is what the Government Communications Security Bureau is and does and it has all the international connections that we have referred to previously. 
I digress by saying that I have visited the Waihopai base in Blenheim a couple of times. My first visit was made without advance warning. It was fascinating to look at the foyer because up on the wall were photographs of all the other bases—the Australian British and American ones. When I came back a couple of months later on an official visit I think with Labour MP Tim Barnett those photographs had been taken down. On that second visit the most fascinating thing about the foyer was the empty picture hooks on the walls and the fascinating thing about the base commander’s office was that all the mugs bar half a dozen of them were missing from the shelves on the back wall because they had engraved on them all the different conferences he had been to overseas. The second time round he had been to many fewer conferences! 
I return to the part. Mr Worth said earlier that there needed to be a balance and we entirely agree. We are simply saying that the balance is wrong and in this particular part I appeal to all other parties in the Committee to support the amendments Keith Locke has put up. He is trying to give effect to the very real concerns raised by the Privacy Commissioner and those concerns are real. So in the same way that in the previous part we would prefer not to have “economic well-being” and “international well-being”—instead accepting that there does need to be a concern for security but constraining that to acts of espionage sabotage and terrorism—in this part we are saying that there does need to be a limit placed on the extent to which the interceptions authorised by warrant can be applied. That is why we want to add the words “otherwise intercept any private communications”. Equally with clause 16 we want to delete the words “or by another enactment”. 
From our point of view what we are dealing with here is a bill that gives the Government Communications Security Bureau extraordinary powers to hack into people’s computers and to tap their phones and bug their homes. We at least want those aspects of the bill that are subject to ministerial warrant or authorisation to be as tight as possible because the organisation the Waihopai spy base can do extraordinary invasions of people’s privacy through its electronic-trawling exercise known as Echelon. We know that that interception system monitors every phone call every fax and every email transmitted via international telecommunication satellites which in our view infringes the privacy of law-abiding individuals and organisations. There is nothing we can do to stop that but the very least this Committee could do is support the amendments in Keith Locke’s name to ensure that where a warrant is issued it is issued for the very narrowest of purposes. 
On that point I would like to finish on clause 14 “Interceptions not to target domestic communications”. The issue is “target”. The purpose cannot be to intercept domestic communications. As I said on an earlier part the tape will not be turned off when people here taking part in a foreign conversation respond because then the conversation would not make any sense. So although people’s communications might not be targeted certainly they are being monitored recorded and analysed. According to the best sources we have those communications are going straight back to the National Security Agency in the United States of America which supplied the Echelon system the ‘dictionary” system and which in effect runs the Waihopai spy base even though it is our taxes that pay for it. 
RON MARK (NZ First) 
: 
 I want to make just a short call. I refer to the Government’s Supplementary Order Paper 36 in the name of the Rt Hon Helen Clark which amends clause 14. Simon Power might be interested in having a look at this as well. 
Further to the concerns we have just expressed there is one other amendment that the Government is making and that is to insert after the words “a foreign organisation” the words “or a foreign person”. Clause 14 would then read: “for the purpose of intercepting the communications of a person (not being a foreign organisation or a foreign person) who is a New Zealand citizen or a permanent resident.” 
I am a little confused now because that raises a question. I will ask the Minister in the chair one more time—and I hope he is awake because I would seriously like an explanation. He has a whole bank of officials he can consult. He can get an answer and advise the Committee. I ask him whether that surely does not raise the question of how one justifies saying that a permanent resident is not a threat but a foreign person is. How can this Government—and this Government of all Governments which criticises my party up hill and down dale for targeting foreigners—right here differentiate between foreign persons and accord greater privilege to permanent residents who we know are foreign persons yet to gain New Zealand citizenship? That is how I see it. Am I wrong? 
All I am saying is that the concern from the Opposition side of the Committee is that clause 14 appears very loose. Clause 14 makes it impossible for the Government Communications Security Bureau to monitor or intercept the communications of persons who are New Zealand citizens or permanent residents. We are questioning why permanent residents should be included. Now as I look at the Supplementary Order Paper in the Rt Hon Helen Clark’s name I question it even more given that the Government is differentiating foreign persons. There is a question there and the question is this: what makes a foreigner who has gained permanent residence any less of a threat than a foreign person who has been in the country for precisely the same period of time but who has not yet been approved or given permanent residence? Surely the difference lies in a piece of paper and a tick as far as the interpretation of this bill is concerned but in terms of the individual standing before us there could be no difference. 
Am I clear or am I confusing the Minister? Would he like to ask me a couple of questions and ask me to explain myself? I would certainly like to know from the Minister why a foreign person living in New Zealand who may well have applied for permanent residence but has not yet received it is considered to be different from a person who has gained permanent residence. My argument is that there should be no reference to “permanent resident” in that clause. If the Government is going to exempt New Zealand citizens that is fine—please explain to me how we pick that up in other legislation—but I suggest to the Minister that there is a serious anomaly in the legislation and it is deserving of an explanation to the Committee. Or are we going to see more of the same bland know-nothing quiet arrogance from the working class party? Please can the Minister explain? 
Hon RICHARD PREBBLE (Leader—ACT NZ) 
: 
 I rise to reply to the points made by Mr Rod Donald and Mr Ron Mark. Clause 14 is not as either of them has described it. I say to Mr Donald that he has been in Parliament long enough to know that the title of a clause is not part of the law. He has to read the clause and the clause is quite clear. It states that the Government Communications Security Bureau cannot intercept communications of a person who is a New Zealand citizen or a permanent resident. I would have thought that the Greens would be in favour of that instead of suggesting otherwise. I most certainly did support it because the purpose of the Government Communications Security Bureau is to guard us from foreign threats. We have the Security Intelligence Service to guard us from local threats and that is a split that is made worldwide. 
Mr Ron Mark if I understand him correctly wants to know why we do not authorise the Government to spy on all permanent residents. I can tell Mr Mark that there is a very good reason for that which is that people who have permanent residence have already gone through a process and they been approved as such. Mr Mark should understand what he is suggesting. The biggest group of permanent residents in this country are people from the UK. We have over 350000 permanent residents from the United Kingdom and if I understand the New Zealand First Party correctly it is suggesting that that group of people is somehow some sort of security threat to this nation. Well I would like to see New Zealand First put that speech around the country and suggest that that is what a New Zealand First Government would suggest. We have permanent residents from the UK who have been living in this country for 30 to 40 years and if we are suddenly going to suggest that because of events in the Middle East we now have to include them among those subject to security warrants from the Government Communications Security Bureau then I really think those members need to get a grip. 
But I do say that it is legitimate for Mr Ron Mark to raise these questions and they ought to be answered by the Government. This is a serious bill. It is a bill that has been called for for a long time and it needs to be debated. I suggest that the reason the Government is not prepared to debate it has been actually touched on by the Greens. This is a bill that puts in legislative form the fact that there is a longstanding intelligence agreement between the United States the UK Canada Australia and New Zealand—[ 
Interruption 
] And in my case I am in favour it. Sorry; what was the member saying? 
Hon Brian Donnelly 
: Long may it continue. 
Hon RICHARD PREBBLE 
: Thank you. It is not often that we agree. The member said: “Long may it continue.” and I see absolutely no reason that we should not say that. But I do find it very interesting that here we are this week putting in legislative form statutory recognition of the fact that our security lies with our traditional allies yet we are following a foreign policy where the Prime Minister is saying—for I think domestic political purposes—that our security does not lie with the United States. 
The Committee ought to realise that some of the intelligence we are providing may be of assistance to the UK Australia and America in Baghdad today. That may very well be the case. That does not worry me and I am quite prepared to be upfront about it. But I suspect that it worries the members opposite because they are not prepared to discuss what they are doing. I also suspect that some Government back-benchers do not actually realise that some of the things Mr Locke is saying—although he might put it in a somewhat exaggerated form—are in fact correct. I am not concerned about it but some of the things he is saying most certainly are correct. I think that those Government back-benchers who think they are following an anti-American line because that is what they want do not actually realise that our Prime Minister runs at least three different foreign policies at exactly the same time. There is the one she gives us on television then of course there is this one. I find it very interesting that she is the Minister in charge of this bill yet she has not said a word about it. Why is that? She does not want to explain it. 
MARTIN GALLAGHER (NZ Labour—Hamilton West) 
: 
 I move  
That the question be now put 
. 
RICHARD WORTH (NZ National—Epsom) 
: 
 The Committee stage of this bill is now in its third hour. We have called valiantly and repeatedly for members of the Government to take a call and they have remained mute. Requests have been made to the Minister but he has declined them. Those who have sat in the chair in that 3-hour period have similarly declined to take the opportunity of participating in this debate and Mr Prebble in the comments he has made in the last few moments has raised the issue as to why that is. With real sadness I suggest that that is happening in the context of the significant issues that are occurring in Iraq where the need for intelligence in the military context is ever-pressing. Yet Government members are simply not prepared to take part in this debate. I would suggest that that is sad. Instead we have seen three members on the Government side of the Chamber limit their contributions to this debate to the moving of closure motions. That is disgraceful. Members on the Government side of the Chamber could if they wished make a contribution yet they choose not to do so. 
Two parts of this bill are significant: Part 2 which has already been debated and passed and Part 3 which we are currently debating. I urge Government members in the context of what is happening in the world community to be prepared to stand and comment on the merits or otherwise of this bill. This bill is being passed on the basis of a coalition of the willing to use a well-worn phrase—in this case it is the Government and National who are fielding the numbers for this legislation to get through. It is shameful—and Government members must acknowledge this—when that is the case that Government members are not participating in this very significant debate. 
Part 3 has a number of provisions in it obviously but one of the central parts is the distinction drawn between on the one hand interception warrants and on the other hand computer access authorisation. The Greens made strong submissions for changes to be made to Part 3 that in the result were ultimately unsuccessful. Some of the issues on which the Greens unsuccessfully argued for change touched on the decision of the Intelligence and Security Committee to decline to give all people in New Zealand protection from having their communications intercepted. A second illustration was the decision of the committee to decline to reduce the period for which a warrant is in force from 12 to 6 months. 
I want to look very briefly at what Part 3 is all about in the context of the reality of the day-to-day operations of the Government Communications Security Bureau. The starting point is that there is to be no interception of domestic communications and that is because the bill forbids the bureau to authorise or take any action to intercept the communications of a person who is not a foreign organisation but who is a New Zealand citizen or a permanent resident. In my view Mr Prebble has accurately explained the implications of that provision. 
We then move to the case of permissible interceptions with warrants or authorisations because the bill forbids certain types of interception taking place without a warrant or authorisation. There seem generally to be four classes of case. The first involves interceptions where there is physical connection of the interception device to any part of a network—and that is straightforward enough. The second relates to installation of an interception device in a place without the permission of the occupier. The third relates to the installation of an interception device in a place where the purpose of the installation is to intercept communications made to or received in that place. Then finally there is the situation of interceptions that involve accessing computer systems. In all those cases an interception warrant or a computer access authorisation is required. 
DARREN HUGHES (NZ Labour—Otaki) 
: 
 I move  
That the question be now put 
. 
KEITH LOCKE (Green) 
: 
 I think the problem here is that people do not quite understand the technology of interception. This part has a provision on interceptions without warrants and the reason there is such a clause is that when we are talking about something like the Waihopai satellite communications interception system it is a vacuum cleaner - type system. It draws down millions of communications passing through two communications satellites and it then filters those communications by using key words key telephone numbers fax numbers destination phone numbers and origin phone numbers etc. 
But the key word system in particular is very hard for New Zealand to control when we are part of—and Richard Prebble referred to this—a five-nation network with Britain the United States Canada Australia and ourselves. One can put a key word in. I think Ron Mark mentioned a name that he used to get called by although I have forgotten what it was now. But that name could be put in the system—the National Security Agency puts a whole lot of those key words into the Echelon system that the five nations are part of—and how will the Government Communications Security Bureau here figure out what that name means or why it is spying on Ron Mark under that particular name? 
There is no way practically that New Zealand can exercise its sovereignty when for example the Waihopai system was used for the war in Afghanistan—and we have a report for the US Congress put out on 11 July last year that talks about Waihopai being used for that. It states that. It refers to the SAS stating “Helen Clark recently acknowledged the presence of SAS forces on the ground in Afghanistan.” The report goes on to state: “Intelligence support was offered as well. New Zealand’s Waihopai monitoring station is part of the five-nation Echelon network.” That report admits that communications concerning Afghanistan were being intercepted at Waihopai. That was part of our contribution to that war. 
Now how can we guarantee that that same five-nation system is not intercepting communications and using them for the Americans’ effort against Iraq? That is the problem. It is part of the technology of interception. It is not just that one interception device is being put on one wire between two people. People say that the interception will not target domestic communications. Well of course that is a great principle but how will it be carried out in practice when we have something like Waihopai? If we intercept a communication of my colleague Ron Mark there under his pseudonym how would we know whether he was a New Zealander? That would not be in the communication. 
R Doug Woolerton 
: We checked. He’s all right. 
KEITH LOCKE 
: The member checked? So the problem is that the key word system sweeps up a whole lot of innocent people. 
When the Law and Order Committee was hearing submissions on the Crimes Amendment Bill (No 6) which gave the Government Communications Security Bureau authorisation to intercept communications including at Waihopai a Wellington woman by the name of Anna Willing gave evidence to the committee. She said she had sent an email to a friend in America on the eve of the presidential elections. Her friend had been visited by the FBI which had intercepted the email she had received from that New Zealand woman because it had three words in it: “presidential” “election” and “funeral”. Anna Willing had said in that communication that she could not watch the presidential elections on TV because she was going to a funeral but that combination of words was intercepted either at this end or at the FBI end—who knows? That communication did lead to an FBI investigation of her friend. That is what such mass interception can lead to. 
The Privacy Commissioner had laid out certain proposals which I have put into Supplementary Order Paper 61. The report back on the bill is very short and to the point. It does not deal with the Privacy Commissioner’s questions at all. I say that the Government should answer them. 
STEVE CHADWICK (NZ Labour—Rotorua) 
: 
 I move  
That the question be now put 
. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That the question be now put. 
Ayes 60 
Labour 52; United Future 8. 
Noes 56 
New Zealand National 27; New Zealand First 12; ACT New Zealand 8; Green Party 9. 
Motion agreed to. 
The question was put that the amendment set out on Supplementary Order Paper 36 in the name of the Rt Hon Helen Clark to clause 14 be agreed to. 
Amendment agreed to. 
The question was put that the amendment set out on Supplementary Order Paper 61 in the name of Keith Locke to clause 15(1) be agreed to. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That the amendment be agreed to. 
Ayes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Noes 108 
Labour 52; New Zealand National 27; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8. 
Amendment not agreed to. 
The question was put that the amendment set out on Supplementary Order Paper 61 in the name of Keith Locke to clause 16(1) be agreed to. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That the amendment be agreed to. 
Ayes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Noes 108 
Labour 52; New Zealand National 27; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8. 
Amendment not agreed to. 
The question was put that the amendment set out on Supplementary Order Paper 61 in the name of Keith Locke to clause 24A be agreed to. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That the amendment be agreed to. 
Ayes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Noes 108 
Labour 52; New Zealand National 27; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8. 
Amendment not agreed to. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That Part 3 as amended be agreed to. 
Ayes 108 
Labour 52; New Zealand National 27; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8. 
Noes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Part 3 as amended agreed to. 
Part 4 Provisions relating to other enactments 
KEITH LOCKE (Green) 
: 
 The Green Party has an amendment to clause 30 in this part. We want to add a new clause 30A “Amendment to Privacy Act 1993”. We want to add the following subsection to section 57 of the Privacy Act: “(2) Despite subsection (1) principle 9 applies to the Government Communications Security Bureau.” I should explain here that principle 9 is a principle in section 6 of the Privacy Act and all Government departments are supposed to abide by it—that is the agency is not to keep personal information longer than necessary. Principle 9 states: “An agency that holds personal information shall not keep that information for longer than is required for the purposes for which the information may be lawfully used.” This again comes from the Privacy Commissioner. That was one of his suggestions. He thinks that the general principle should apply to all Government agencies including the Government Communications Security Bureau. He says in his submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee that he talked to the Government Communications Security Bureau about the issue and it did not object to that change so I cannot quite understand why the report back from the committee did not include it. The Government should address the matter. The Government has set up a Privacy Commissioner but it not only ignores his substantial submission in the report back—as the committee has done—but when the bill comes before the House and an MP puts forward amendments based on the concerns of the Privacy Commissioner the Government does not even bother engaging with that debate. That is being very disrespectful to the Privacy Commissioner. 
This part has amendments to a lot of different sections. One of the amendments under clause 28 is the amendment to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act. I think the role of the Inspector-General is quite controversial. The Inspector-General has quite a few powers to investigate complaints to review the Government Communications Security Bureau and report annually to Parliament. In the past his reports to Parliament have not been of much use. He says that he has not had many complaints. He does not get many complaints with electronic interception because people do not know that they are being intercepted—that is the nature of the interception. I think he has to go further than that. Today when I asked a question in Parliament about the powers of the Inspector-General of Intelligence with regard to the use of Waihopai for the war in Iraq Dr Cullen on behalf of the Prime Minister replied that the Inspector-General had said that our sovereignty was being upheld by Waihopai. I raise the same point that I raised before: given the nature of the technology of stations like Waihopai it is very hard to guarantee that our sovereignty is being upheld when there are interceptions using key words. 
Under this section we should consider the role of the Inspector-General. I do not think that his role has been very successful. He has tended to side with the intelligence agencies in the two cases that have arisen—not specifically in respect of the Government Communications Security Bureau but on the other side of his reporting in respect of the SIS. He did say that there was nothing wrong with the intrusion into Aziz Choudry’s place. I see that Aziz Choudry later won a court case against the SIS but his position had to be taken in the face of opposition from the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. There is a problem here of accountability that applies to the whole bill and it would be better in my opinion—and this is the position of the Green Party—if we did not have the Government Communications Security Bureau. It has some positive functions in this bill. 
RICHARD WORTH (NZ National—Epsom) 
: 
 We come to the final part of the Government Communications Security Bureau Bill Part 4. It is headed “Provisions relating to other enactments”. It proposes a host of changes to other legislation. There are amendments to the Crimes Act and the Higher Salaries Commission Act. There are certain changes that Mr Locke has been talking about that refer to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act; there are amendments to the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act to the Official Information Act to the Public Finance Act to the Radiocommunications Act and to the State Sector Act. Then there is the revocation of secondary legislation—the Crimes (Exemption of Listening Device) Order. 
I shall deal with two pieces of legislation that are subject to amendment by Part 4. The first relates to the Crimes Act amendment that is set out in clause 26 and a significant change to section 216B(2)(b) of the Crimes Act. Members opposite are nodding quite clearly because they have a close and sufficient familiarity with that particular and very tricky provision. Section 216B is headed “Prohibition on the use of listening devices” and subsection (1) was itself amended in 1999. Basically the provision creates a term of imprisonment not exceeding 2 years for everyone who intentionally intercepts any private communication by means of a listening device. The particular change in clause 26 proposes to amend section 216B(2)(b) by inserting after subparagraph (iii) a further subparagraph that the draughtsman has identified as subparagraph (iiia). It contains the words: “the Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2001;”. Members opposite will immediately be aware of the huge significance of that change. That change is not necessarily the most significant one but it is certainly one worth commenting on. 
The other issue relates to a change to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act. That legislation came into force on 1 July 1996 and basically set up the office of Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security with provisions that dealt with the functions of the Inspector-General complaints and associated amendments to the Ombudsmen Act and to the Privacy Act. Again I can see members opposite nodding because of their familiarity with those particular provisions. What is occurring here though is an amendment to section 11(1) of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act. After paragraph (d) in that section a new paragraph that the draughtsman has decided to title (da) has been inserted. The actual wording of that paragraph is: “without limiting the generality of paragraph (a) to review the effectiveness and appropriateness of the procedures adopted by the Government Communications Security Bureau to ensure compliance with the provisions of Part 3 of the Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2001 in relation to the issue and execution of interception warrants and computer access authorisations;”. 
Those were the two primary provisions in Part 4 that I sought to deal with in the limited time available. However I do not doubt that members who follow me will want to draw the attention of the Committee to other significant changes in that part. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That the amendment set out on Supplementary Order Paper 61 in the name of Keith Locke to insert new clause 30A in Part 4 be agreed to. 
Ayes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Noes 108 
Labour 52; New Zealand National 27; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8. 
Amendment not agreed to. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That Part 4 be agreed to. 
Ayes 108 
Labour 52; New Zealand National 27; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8. 
Noes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Part 4 agreed to.