Worth Richard: Government Communications Security Bureau Bill — Third Reading 
Worth Richard: Government Communications Security Bureau Bill — Third Reading 
[Volume:607;Page:4516] 
RICHARD WORTH (NZ National—Epsom) 
: 
 National supports this bill which has a number of objectives. The key objectives are firstly to set up as a department of State the Government Communications Security Bureau secondly to define the objectives and functions of that new department of State thirdly to regulate the bureau’s functions in respect of the interception of communications including computer traffic and finally to create a regime of interception warrants and computer access authorisations in relation to the activities of the bureau. 
We have a reasonably sophisticated set of security intelligence entities in New Zealand. We have the Security Intelligence Service which is the equivalent of the CIA or MI6 mostly concerned with spying on New Zealand and visitors to New Zealand. We have the Government Communications Security Bureau which runs the spy stations at Waihopai near Blenheim and Tangimoana near Palmerston North—a critical linkage that monitors satellite and radio communications worldwide. We have the External Assessments Bureau which is a research organisation that produces reports on overseas threats to New Zealand. We have the Domestic and External Security Secretariat which is part of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and which reports on domestic and external security issues. Finally we have the defence intelligence unit within the New Zealand Defence Force which is concerned with military intelligence relating to New Zealand deployments overseas. 
Quite clearly with legislation of this type it is necessary to strike a balance between on the one hand the need for the intelligence services to undertake an effective role and on the other hand the need for appropriate oversight of such intelligence services. As Mr Shirley said in his contribution in this third reading debate the world is not a safe place. The Prime Minister I suggest is foolish and naive to suggest otherwise. Mr Shirley picked up a phrase—incorrectly as it turns out—that the Prime Minister has repeatedly uttered. The accurate phrase is that she has described us as living in an exceptionally benign strategic environment. This is a quibble really but Mr Shirley said “extraordinarily benign”. What the Prime Minister has said is that we live in an exceptionally benign strategic environment. Informed commentators have dismissed those comments and our Australian counterparts have certainly dismissed them because the reality is that we simply do not live in an exceptionally benign strategic environment. 
One need only look at events that are occurring on the world plane at the moment to see that. But even if we look closer to where our clear strategic interests lie we see that the arc of instability that tracks through Indonesia and some of the islands in the Pacific holds real threats and concerns for all New Zealanders. The Prime Minister has sought to distance herself from those comments which formed core assumptions in the current defence policy by saying that when she said that she was talking about relationships between States. But no one accepts that. Even if that were so her comment that we live in an exceptionally benign strategic environment is simply not correct. Not only do we face turbulence touching events within States but we face the new threat described in broad terms as asymmetric warfare. It is the issue of the rise of terrorism with all that that entails. 
In the period that most of us have been in Parliament issues of biological and chemical warfare have not loomed large. They now represent real threats—threats that are capable of causing immense damage that cannot be dismissed as fanciful and that we must constantly be on guard against. It is against that background that I would like to speak very briefly about the history of the Government Communications Security Bureau and why it has become appropriate for this legislation to be passed. 
There were a number of possibilities in respect of setting up the bureau and its structure. The bureau has been with us for a number of years and the contribution that it and the Security Intelligence Service have made is undoubted. The bureau started in 1977 and since that date it has provided the New Zealand Government with intelligence information from foreign signals derived from the interception of the communications of foreign Governments and other foreign entities. It is a curious circumstance that in these days of sophisticated electronic transfer of data the most secure way of handling information is by personal courier. In the days before this current legislation came before Parliament the bureau operated without specific statutory authority. The director’s authority as chief executive of the bureau derived from an instruction issued by the Prime Minister. It was also the case that the role of the bureau was in no sense formally defined. 
Before 1996 when a number of changes were made that saw parliamentary oversight of security intelligence the activities of the bureau were basically left to the Prime Minister. There was some faint involvement from the Government Administration Committee but it did not really have any control or power over the security intelligence agencies. That is why I say that this bill that establishes the Government Communications Security Bureau as a department of State is appropriate and timely. 
In the short time that I have left I will talk about some aspects of the Government Communications Security Bureau with particular reference to Part 3 of the bill. Part 3 is concerned with the interception of communications and the setting of bounds for the day-to-day operations of the bureau. It sets up a system of permissible interceptions with warrants or authorisations. The bill forbids certain types of interception from taking place without a warrant or an authorisation and divides them into four classes. The first involves interceptions where there is physical connection of the interception device to any part of a network—that is straightforward enough. The second relates to the installation of an interception device in a place without the permission of the occupier. The third relates to the installation of an interception device in a place where the purpose of the installation is to intercept communications made to or received in that place. The final situation relates to interceptions that involve accessing computer systems. National supports the bill. 
Bill read a third time.