Robertson Grant: Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill — Referral to Government Administration Committee In CommitteeText is incorporated into the Bound VolumeRobertson Grant: Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill — Referral to Government Administration Committee In Committee[Sitting date: 08 August 2013. Volume:692;Page:12562. Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume.]GRANT ROBERTSON (Deputy Leader—Labour):I rise to speak on Part 3 of the Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill but as the Minister in the chair the Attorney-General has introduced the question of electoral defeat I thought we could perhaps traverse the Minister’s career which hasbeen an illustrious one of defeat beginning I think with losing the Mana seat to Graham Kelly—would that be right or was it Winnie Laban? It was Winnie Laban.Hon Christopher Finlayson: Dear old Winnie.GRANT ROBERTSON: Well it was Winnie Laban. I had been kind of hoping it was Graham Kelly because I do see a future for the Minister in the chair as the High Commissioner to Ottawa which is where Graham Kelly ended up.Hon Phil Goff: I would have thought Siberia.Chris Hipkins: Mongolia.GRANT ROBERTSON: That is right there are a number of places that he could be sent and that would be possible. But I can tell you that out in Rongotai they are looking for the Attorney-General because they cannot find him. Here in the Labour caucus we all just wish and hope that Mr Finlayson will run against us in the next election. That is what we all wish. If he stumped up in Wellington Central—he has lived in the seat for years and years but is too scared to run in Wellington Central.The CHAIRPERSON (Eric Roy): Order!GRANT ROBERTSON: I am merely responding to the Minister’s comments.The CHAIRPERSON (Eric Roy): I understand that. It is time for the member to debate Part 3.GRANT ROBERTSON: Very good. In Part 3—and it would have been nice if the Minister had stuck to it as well—we are debating the question of the amendments to the Intelligence and Security Committee Act 1996. On this part of the bill it would be fair to say—unlike Part 2 because the Opposition could see in Part 2 the improvements that the Government had attempted to make; they did not go far enough but we could see them—the effort does not even get there. It is a token effort to do something about an Intelligence and Security Committee that has not under the leadership of John Key provided the kind of oversight that we believe should be in place.We also believe that by legislation this is exactly the kind of legislation that should be part of an overall review of our intelligence agencies. In 1996 when this legislation was brought in this was deemed to be the appropriate structure for the committee. Some minor tinkering takes place in Part 3 but the basic structure of the committee remains and the basic problems with the committee remain.That was never better exemplified than when the committee was hearing this bill. The leader of the Labour Party David Shearer made the not-unreasonable suggestion that some of the agencies for which now under this bill it will be possible and legal for the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) to assist might like to come to the committee and describe to the committee the kinds of actions and activities that the GCSB would be working with them on how it worked with them and what the relationships would be. That is at the heart of Part 1 which has already been passed by the Committee today. That is what David Shearer sought for the committee to do. John Key ruled that out. He ruled that out straight away as the chair of the committee. Dr Norman and David Shearer as the two Opposition members on the committee were trying to have the committee undertake a proper analysis of this bill. They were not able to do that because the Prime Minister in the chair assisted by Mr Ryall and John Banks were able to stop that from happening. That to us highlights the shortcomings of the Intelligence and Security Committee that are not corrected by the amendments that stand in Part 3.We can look around the world and find other examples of the way intelligence and security committees are composed and the way that they go about their business which we believe should be seriously considered in terms of the New Zealand model and should be part of Part 3 today. We need only look across the Ditch where in Australia they had two large-scale reviews of their intelligence agencies. They did that becausethe Australian agencies were struggling in a number of areas. What that led to was a parliamentary oversight that was significantly enhanced.I want to pick up one particular aspect of the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and that is that Ministers the Speaker and the President of the Senate are not able to be members of that committee. That is a very significant difference from the Intelligence and Security Committee which we are looking at today. It makes it Parliament’s committee. It is quite clear that this is a statutory committee that we are amending here in Part 3 of the legislation. It is a statutory committee. It is separate from the select committee process. But making those changes that the Australians did to not have the Ministers in place in those roles is a very significant change. I am not yet ready to say that that is absolutely what I think should happen in New Zealand but I do believe that it should be on the table in any review. As I said in my call on Part 2 earlier I personally believe that we do need the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security to be an Officer of Parliament and we certainly need to enhance the Intelligence and Security Committee in terms of its role as representative of this Parliament. So the Australians have that matter.I will return shortly to the question of the functions of the committee which are being amended in clause 38. I want to reference one other country’s intelligence and security committee arrangements and that is Norway’s because that is another step again from where the Australians are. The Australians are saying no Ministers and excluding the President of the Senate as well. What the Norwegians have done is create a Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee that actually includes non-politicians. It is actually a committee that—and this is exactly what the Act says—“should represent a wide range of experience both political and from other walks of life.” It actually says that sitting members of the Parliament cannot sit on the committee. That is another step again from the question of whether or not you would have non-Ministers on it.These are exactly the options that should be on the table in a review which is contained in Supplementary Order Paper 305 from David Shearer on this part as well. We need to look at a wider range of options. It may be possible to put the two together to have a parliamentary oversight committee but also have one that has the general public having some oversight. The Norwegian example is one where they can investigate a number of matters. They are restricted—of course they are restricted—in terms of the information that they can look at but when you look at the purposes of the Norwegian committee the very first one of those is to discover and prevent unjust treatment of any person. Surely that is the kind of oversight we would want. We would want to know that there were people looking over the actions of our intelligence agencies with a mind to avoiding unjust treatment. Imagine if we had had that before the Kim Dotcom saga or before we found out about the 88 illegal spying cases. The Norwegians have a very open model. Again I am not saying that that is necessarily the exact answer but when we look at what the Government is putting on the table in Part 3 it is woefully weak in improving the way in which the Intelligence and Security Committee works.When we return to the functions of the committee which are contained under clause 38 here—look yes it is an excellent idea to have the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security discuss his or her report but when the committee is fundamentally set up the way it is it is not going to be able to inquire into all of the matters that it should. Even the Australians have understood that. They slightly expanded the functions of their committee to make sure that they could review any matter in relation to the agencies that was referred to it. That is a wider brief than what we have in New Zealand and obviously when the Ministers are not in charge of the committee that could lead to some quite substantive investigations.We do believe that the Intelligence and Security Committee has an important part in establishing that framework of trust that New Zealanders need to rebuild in our intelligence agencies. Where we are today is that our trust and faith in our intelligence agencies are at their lowest possible level. That falls at the feet of John Key and the National Government but it is also contributed to by the structures that are around our intelligence agencies.We have not had a review of our intelligence agencies since 1976. That is far too long and too much has changed in the world for us to complacently sit here and in Part 3 tinker about with the Intelligence and Security Committee structure and say that that is enough. The world has changed. The digital era has fundamentally changed the way we communicate with one another and in turn has fundamentally changed the way that security and intelligence agencies work. The Government must recognise that have a review and look at the widest possible range of options for oversight. That includes a more independent inspector-general and it includes relooking at the way in which Parliament does its job on behalf of New Zealanders to look out for these intelligence and security agencies.The amendments in Part 3 are not even window dressing. They are just the most minor of tinkering to try to make the Government look like it is doing something to make the Intelligence and Security Committee a stronger body. The bill does not do that. My colleague Mr Goff I am sure will take a call shortly—and I will leave him to talk about this in detail—and I am sure that one of the things that he will raise is the question of who should chair the Intelligence and Security Committee because there are some ideas out there that having a Government member as the chair of that committee effectively leads us to where we have ended up. New Zealanders need to re-establish trust.