Wilkinson Kate: Succession (Homicide) Bill — Second Reading 
Wilkinson Kate: Succession (Homicide) Bill — Second Reading 
[Volume:639;Page:8989] 
KATE WILKINSON (National) 
: 
 I take a brief call in support of the Succession (Homicide) Bill. I would however like to raise a couple of issues that I think perhaps need some clarification. I can certainly go into further detail on them in the Committee stage—assuming of course I am permitted to take a call in that stage. 
Mention has been made a couple of times in relation to clause 10 of attempts to provide that killers should not be deprived of pre-existing rights. That has been expanded to include claims under the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act. I would like to run a scenario past the House because if the intention of the House here is indeed uncertain—as I believe it perhaps is—then an amendment may be necessary. 
Let us imagine a case where a housekeeper has killed a flatmate. The flatmate has provided in a will—obviously before being killed—that in recognition of such a great job in housekeeping and looking after the flatmate he or she bequeaths the housekeeper $1000. Under this legislation the killer would not be allowed to receive the $1000. But if for example the flatmate had forgotten to put the bequest in the will but had promised that in recognition of such a great job of housekeeping he or she would leave the housekeeper $1000 then under this legislation and under the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act the killer would be allowed to keep the $1000. We have to question how it can be lawful to get to keep $1000 for housekeeping only if it is not provided for in the will and to lose it if it is provided for in the will. The amount of the promise is still the same. The service rendered is still the same. The only difference is whether the promise is included in the will. Unlikely though that scenario may be I wonder whether that provision may lead to some uncertainty. 
One of the other issues that I raise in relation to the bill—and it was actually raised by the New Zealand Law Society in one of its submissions—is in relation to flexibility and in particular flexibility in relation to culpability. If a battered wife for example finally snaps and kills her abuser should there be under this legislation an exception whereby she can in fact inherit her share of the estate? Or in the case of a mercy killing that does not amount to assisted suicide which is provided for in the bill should the killer be treated in the same way as he or she would be in the case of a cold-hearted premeditated killing? In another scenario if someone is a killer by virtue of failing to provide the necessities of life should he or she be treated in the same way as a cold-hearted premeditating killer? The scenario I raised at the first reading was that of someone who was a killer by virtue of the fact that he or she was a reckless driver who had killed his or her spouse in a car accident. Should such a driver be treated in the same way as a cold-hearted murderer? 
I do note that other jurisdictions have given the courts some discretion to modify the rules in exceptional circumstances. Those jurisdictions provide that forfeiture of an inheritance applies unless there are special circumstances—for example if the moral culpability of the killer at the time supports such an exception. I certainly would like that point to be debated a little more in the Committee stage. If it is the intention of the House to treat all killers whatever their circumstances as being the same and therefore to deprive them of any benefit under a will then so be it but I do think that issue can be raised. 
The third and final point that I raise is in relation to timing. I have mentioned the issue in other speeches of the delays in our courts. We could have a scenario whereby a killer inherits from his or her victim’s estate and it is not until some years later that the death is attributed to the killer. In other words perhaps at the time it was regarded as an accidental death and subsequently it was in fact found to be a murder but because of the time lapse between the act of killing and the charging of the killer the estate may have already been distributed. If it has been distributed so be it but is this legislation intended to apply retrospectively? Will the estate that has already been inherited then be forfeited years later and if there is anything left of it be redistributed? 
In speaking to the first reading I also drew the attention of the House to two instances referred to in the Law Commission report where there was a delay of some 4 years between a killing and the court actually giving a judgment. During those 4 years the estate of course remains dormant. The executors have a duty to properly and expeditiously administer the estate but under this proposed legislation they cannot. The estate in effect is in limbo. 
I think this bill is certainly well intentioned. It is timely; it has taken some 10 years since the Law Commission report. Like many laws though I do not believe it is perfect and I would like some of those imperfections to perhaps be addressed in the Committee stage. Having said that we do support this reading of the bill.