Dalziel Lianne: Criminal Procedure (Reform and Modernisation) Bill — First Reading 
Dalziel Lianne: Criminal Procedure (Reform and Modernisation) Bill — First Reading 
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Hon LIANNE DALZIEL (Labour—Christchurch East) 
: 
 I wish to speak on the first reading of the Criminal Procedure (Reform and Modernisation) Bill. I will comment on a couple of points that have been made. One is that the size of a bill is not the measure of the depth of its application or of whether it will in fact make a significant difference to the way things are done. I could point to legislation that is large in size but not great in impact; there have been many examples of bills like that. So I do not think that we should be taken with the fact that this bill has some 500 pages. I am very pleased the previous speaker Simon Bridges has read every page of it. I am not on the Justice and Electoral Committee so I did not have the pleasure of going through it with a fine-tooth comb. 
Hon Simon Power 
: Oh that member would’ve been good. 
Hon LIANNE DALZIEL 
: Well I have far too many botch-ups to fix in the bills that get referred to the Commerce Committee so there you go. 
Hon Simon Power 
: The Financial Advisers Bill—are you still fixing that one up? You’ll get there. 
Hon LIANNE DALZIEL 
: Well we might find some difficulty. But I am sure that Mr Assistant Speaker Roy does not want us discussing another bill during debate on the Criminal Procedure (Reform and Modernisation) Bill. 
I will particularly focus on the question of name suppression. This bill proposes some changes. They are probably not changes of substance because of course the precedent has already been established through the court system to allow for a threshold to apply against the presumption that suppression will not be granted. That threshold seems to operate quite universally within the higher jurisdictions but it appears that there is some discussion as to whether suppression is being appropriately applied at the lower level. 
I think this is an incredibly important issue. It was interesting going back to the Law Commission’s report  
Suppressing Names and Evidence 
 because everybody who submitted on that report actually agreed with the starting point which was that we start with the presumption against the suppression of evidence. Essentially they were arguing that the principle of open justice and the right to freedom of expression are rights that go to the very existence and health of our political and legal institutions. Everyone accepted that—every single one of the people who submitted on the report agreed with the starting point that suppression should not be granted. 
But somewhere deep down inside of me I do not know whether that still should be the case in a society where we have instantaneous communication. That rule was not developed in this environment at all. That rule was about having courts open and about people being able to freely come and go and observe the processes of justice. Nowadays people are convicted before they have even had a trial: they are convicted in the court of public opinion before the case even starts. That bothers me—it really bothers me. I wonder whether this is not a good time to reflect on the history of why we have ended up with this presumption operating the other way. 
If we are operating from another fundamental principle—that people are innocent until proven guilty—then surely that presumption should exist as a primary protection. Maybe the question around suppression is actually more about consistency than it is about openness. Maybe the consistency should be the other way around: the presumption is that suppression is always granted unless there is a very good reason not to grant it. 
I will just explore this. I know of a case in Christchurch where I think there was a travesty of justice in terms of what actually occurred. It was a case in which name suppression had been granted against a male in I think his 40s. The charge that he was facing related to an entrapment case. A police officer had brought a 14-year-old posing as a daughter to make her available for a sexual transaction which of course would be illegal on every level. In fact nothing happened but a transaction was to be entered into. He was charged with the offence. Name suppression was granted. There were all sorts of murkiness around the entrapment issue so it was going to be a very difficult case. 
There followed a series of appearances on the  
Holmes 
 show essentially of males in their 40s holding high-profile positions—which actually looked like free advertising to me; they were probably advised by a certain consultant who seemed to be the same consultant advising all of them—who all came out and said it was not them. Every single one of them appeared on the television saying it was not them. 
When the case went back to the court for a review of the suppression order I felt that the judge was put under enormous public pressure to lift the suppression order because suspicion was being cast upon so many. I think that was because there is an essential presumption that names will be put out in the media and that somehow we have the right to know who is being charged when in actual fact we have the right to know who has been convicted. There are only very exceptional cases where name suppression would apply in a case after a conviction and those cases really relate to the rights of victims. 
I know that view has not been adopted but I would really like us to take the opportunity to reflect on whose rights and what rights we are really protecting with this debate on name suppression. Sometimes I think we forget that our technology has moved on beyond what was available to those who wrote the original rules under which we operate today. 
I know that the Minister of Justice has taken some considerable effort on this issue. There is the wider issue of what cannot be suppressed in an environment that has changed as well. Maybe my plea is too late because there is no mechanism for protecting that information in the Internet age. I will not describe what Whale Oil calls the Minister because I know what the acronym stands for and it would be totally unparliamentary to mention it. 
Charles Chauvel 
: Who cares what he says anyway? 
Hon LIANNE DALZIEL 
: Well I do not normally read Whale Oil. I make a point not to but it does tie up with all of this. I think the issue around suppression cannot be separated from the fact that access to information is now so open. 
The Minister has conducted alongside these changes in our law a Law Commission review about the adequacy of regulations around how the Internet interacts with the justice system. I support the concept of having that review but at the same time I acknowledge how hard it will be. There are two media jurisdictions at the moment the Broadcasting Standards Authority and the Press Council for those of us who read or view the news. They exist because we have the right to have matters presented with fairness accuracy and balance. We will not get that from Whale Oil. We would not expect it from Whale Oil. In fact he would not be Whale Oil if there was any fairness accuracy or balance in anything he said. Actually when we think about what a blogger does— 
Hon Member 
: For somebody who doesn’t read his blog—you’re the second speaker today. 
Hon LIANNE DALZIEL 
: I am being serious. When we think about what a blogger does we would not expect fairness or balance but I do not think it is unreasonable to expect accuracy when someone knows they are deliberately misrepresenting the situation in order to make a particular point. 
I look forward to this bill’s referral to the Justice and Electoral Committee which I am not on and I look forward to hearing about the debate from my colleagues who are on the committee. I encourage people to make submissions on all of the detailed issues contained in this bill.