Worth Richard: Electoral Finance Bill — In Committee 
Worth Richard: Electoral Finance Bill — In Committee 
[Volume:644;Page:13619] 
Dr RICHARD WORTH (National) 
: 
 Is it not an amazing outcome that the parliamentary process has been so degraded that we are reduced to having a discussion about whether the governing law is the law of common sense when our role is to frame language that is precise in its terms and will regulate and control rights processes? 
Common sense is what every individual thinks he or she has. It is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down. One person’s view of common sense is sometimes seen by another person as utter foolishness. We are talking about an idea—a concept if you like—that in respect of every issue the argument must be that there can be only one truth. Clearly that is patently foolish. Common sense can characterise opposing arguments. If there is one huge disservice that the Minister sitting in the chair has done in the context of this much extended debate on this particular legislation it has been to offer a view that common sense will triumph and that common sense somehow underlies all that is in this legislation. 
I will confine my comments though to clause 122(1) which sets some time limits for prosecutions. It sets them in respect of a number of sections which are listed in the body of the subclause. I will not read out the sections but the areas of activity are the return of candidates’ donations the return of party donations the return of third-party donations the return of candidates’ election expenses the return of party election expenses and the return of third-party election expenses. To add to the complexity of it all differing time frames are set for when these returns are to be filed. One needs to dig into the legislation to find out what those time periods are. In the case of candidates under clause 72 there are 70 working days after polling day. In the case of party donations under clause 91 there is a different time limit of 50 working days after the date the relevant declaration is filed under the Electoral Act. 
My complaint—National’s complaint—is that a time limit set by this legislation of 6 months for the laying of charges is clearly insufficient. In order to deal with that issue we have put up a Supplementary Order Paper. Criminal law has a number of time limits set for different processes. Six months is a time limit traditionally set for laying charges in respect of minor offences. So if one is speeding in a motor car 6 months is a period fixed for laying the charge. If one is involved in an assault case 6 months is a period for laying the charge. As one sees instantly those offences are instantly recognisable involve objective assessments—was he or she speeding; did he or she hit the other—and instantly measurable. 
But this is not of that world at all. This involves specific judgments in respect of a number of offence-creating provisions that require assessment balancing of interests and a look—some would say—at common sense. More accurately they require a look at what the statutory framework is in respect of the particular offence-creating provision. If we are seeking workable legislation it is foolish to set time frames of the period of 6 months. 
In the context of looking at clause 122 I urge the Government to look at these matters in a more careful and cautious way. If charges are to be brought then that needs to be done on the basis of a hugely careful scrutiny of the particular activities that have occurred. The consequences of conviction on any of these provisions and on charges under sections 32 40 50 75 94 and 114 are extraordinarily grave for the person who is embroiled in the process and later convicted. It is not too late in the piece for the Minister to reflect on what National proposes.