Moroney Sue: Human Tissue Bill — Third Reading 
Moroney Sue: Human Tissue Bill — Third Reading 
[Volume:646;Page:15440] 
SUE MORONEY (Labour) 
: 
 I welcome the opportunity to speak on the third reading of the Human Tissue Bill as I was on the Health Committee at the time when submissions were heard on this bill. I know that members opposite are interested to hear from members of the select committee about how those submissions proceeded. This was a difficult bill for the select committee members to hear. I thank the members of the select committee and the chair Sue Kedgley who spoke before because we were dealing with issues about untimely deaths deaths that families were not prepared for and there were some quite difficult discussions that went on around that issue. 
I take the opportunity while I am on my feet to pay my respects to our Waikato firefighter Derek Lovell in the event of his untimely death. I also pay my respects to his family his wife Milli and his daughter Tiffany who I have visited. Our thoughts go out to those people in the event of that untimely death. 
In the select committee we heard many such tragic tales of personal circumstances that people had found themselves in. We thought about the trauma they had gone through and considered the issue of organ donation and what that meant for them. We also had some submissions from families who had found themselves in that position and did not contemplate the issue of organ donation as it had never been raised with them. They were there to say to the select committee that as difficult as it would have been for them at the time they wished there had been quite a standard process whereby they had been asked to consider the issue. So we did hear submissions from all aspects. 
There were quite a number of aspects to this bill. People have spoken about the organ donation issue substantially in the course of this third reading debate probably because that was the one that really touched our hearts the most I suspect and because it was very controversial. However there are many controversial aspects to this bill. It covers how to deal with human tissue with regard to research and education and it also deals with a range of other very sensitive issues. I want to speak to a couple of those issues today. 
We heard from previous speakers that the bill as first introduced to the House had a number of significant amendments recommended to it by the select committee. Two of the more technical amendments concerned foetal tissue and the collection and use of gametes and embryos. I alert the House to the fact that although organ donation is controversial and emotive we had several other equally controversial and emotive issues to deal with. I want to briefly outline those two important amendments today. 
With regard to foetal tissue the amendment recommended by the select committee clarified the consent process for use of human tissue from dead foetuses. Although the Human Tissue Act 1964 specifically excludes stillborn children from the definition of “body” the Human Tissue Bill includes dead foetuses and stillborn children as a specific type of foetus thereby ensuring that situations not covered by the Code of Health and Disability Consumers’ Rights are in fact covered by the consent framework in this bill. 
Foetal tissue that is removed or obtained in the course of a health care procedure is covered by the code and not by the Human Tissue Bill. This includes foetal tissue removed as a result of termination or stillborn children delivered with the assistance of a health practitioner. In these situations the foetal tissue is treated as a body part of the mother and the mother would have the right to make an informed choice about the use of that tissue. 
Having described that I imagine that listeners to this debate can well understand the range of emotive issues and very tricky situations that the select committee considered. We were helped in the course of our deliberations by the officials who were able to talk to us about the technical realities of the decisions we were making as a select committee. 
The Human Tissue Bill covers foetal tissue that is not removed or obtained in the course of a health care procedure. So the consent framework applies to foetal tissue that is inside the body of a dead mother; to foetal tissue that has issued from the mother but not in the course of a health care procedure for example through a miscarriage or birth of a stillborn child without assistance from a health practitioner; and to foetal tissue where the mother gave consent to collection and use of tissue under the code and where the mother has since died and someone wants to use the tissue for a purpose not covered by the original consent. Although there will be few situations where the bill rather than the code will apply it is important that the bill makes clear who can consent in these situations. The new clause does just that. 
The second important amendment that I want to outline to the House today is with regard to the collection and use of gametes and embryos. This second amendment ensures that the collection and use of gametes and embryos from dead people is covered by the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act—known as the HART Act—which was passed in 2004. This bill amends that Act to provide for regulations requiring informed consent for the collection of gametes and embryos from dead people for reproductive procedures reproductive research or other lawful purposes. The specific form or content of the regulations will reflect the outcome of the consultation process currently being led by the Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology. This is a sensible approach. The consent framework in the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act which requires consent of the individual is more appropriate than the consent framework in this bill which allows consent to be given by various people other than the individual concerned. 
I return briefly to the issue of organ donation which has been well canvassed in the course of this debate. There has been some discussion about drivers’ licences and whether they are the appropriate place for an individual to indicate willingness to donate. I would argue outside the scope of this bill that as an educative process it is actually very useful for people when being issued their drivers’ licences to think carefully about the issue of organ donation. I think the choice whether to indicate willingness to donate causes people to think seriously about the responsibility that comes with having a driver’s licence issued to them. It raises that prospect of the thing that we never like to think about—that is an unexpected or untimely death. I think it is quite appropriate in the issuing of drivers’ licences that people do stop and reflect on the responsibility that has been handed to them when they take up a driver’s licence and get out on our roads. 
Of course we know that road accidents are a major cause of unexpected and untimely deaths so I think it is appropriate that people are called to think about that with regard to that process. However members have quite rightly put before this House today in this debate that the option of indicating willingness to donate on drivers’ licences has not resolved the issues about the consenting that goes with that. It is not a legally binding document and it does not give effect as people had perhaps in a misguided way thought it would when they made that decision and stated a willingness to donate on their drivers’ licences. I think it is entirely appropriate that in addition to that process the consent processes are spelt out now in this bill. I commend this bill to the House.