Tanczos Nandor: Land Transport (Unauthorised Street and Drag Racing) Amendment Bill — In Committee Third Reading 
Tanczos Nandor: Land Transport (Unauthorised Street and Drag Racing) Amendment Bill — In Committee Third Reading 
[Volume:607;Page:4585] 
NANDOR TANCZOS (Green) 
: 
 I would like to pick up on some of the points raised by Deborah Coddington because I think that she has identified a very serious point in the bill that the select committee seems to have failed to pick up. She talked about the clause that allows a vehicle to be seized and impounded for 28 days in certain circumstances. Clause 8(2)(1A) states that an enforcement officer may seize and impound a vehicle if the officer believes on reasonable grounds that a person operated the vehicle in a race or in an unnecessary exhibition of speed or acceleration on a road in contravention of section 22A(1). It does not just state a race but also an unnecessary exhibition of speed or acceleration and that is a very broad understanding of what we are talking about here. 
Section 22A(1) which clause 8 refers to simply states that a person must not operate a motor vehicle in a race or in an unnecessary exhibition of speed or acceleration on a road unless the operation of the vehicle in that manner is authorised by law. If a person is speeding clearly that is not authorised by law. If a person takes off from a traffic light a bit quickly and breaks the speed limit then he or she has broken that clause. According to the bill that person’s vehicle can then be impounded for 28 days. 
There is a limitation on this in section 96(9) of the principal Act inserted by clause 8 which states: “Nothing in subsection 1A applies to a person operating a motor vehicle in a manner that is authorised by law within the meaning of section 22A(4).” I know that the select committee was concerned to make sure that people engaged in legitimate motor races were not picked up by this bill and I think that is very good. However all it does is say that if a person is involved in a race or exhibition of speed authorised by law then that subsection does not apply. It still does not pick up on the point identified by Deborah Coddington which the select committee with all its consideration obviously did not pick up at all—that is that a person taking off from a traffic light a bit quickly and who breaks the speed limit can have his or her vehicle impounded by the police for 28 days. 
Members are saying: “Don’t be pathetic; the police will not do that.” Of course they will not do that to a member of Parliament or a lawyer in a BMW but when we listen to the rhetoric of members in this House talking about hoons and thugs and we think about the way in which this bill is deliberately designed to scapegoat a certain section of the population then undoubtedly those powers may well be used against certain sections of the population—not the ones who are the friends of members of Parliament in general but some sections of the population; the same ones who are targeted by the police in many of their operations. 
Once again let us remind the Committee that this is what was identified in terms of advice to the select committee. The advice to the select committee was that this bill breaches the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. Some members in this House seem to think that the Greens are very quaint. We think that if we have a New Zealand Bill of Rights Act we should adhere to it. There is a quaint notion in relation to human rights—that we can take or leave some people when we choose to. 
The reality is that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is legislation based on international human rights conventions designed to protect the human rights and civil rights of people on this planet. This Parliament should think very very carefully before making an exception in this case when there is not a proven case that warrants that kind of activity. If we make an exception in this case what are we prepared to make an exception for the next time? That is what this Parliament has to come to grips with. 
We pass legislation knowing that we are contravening the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act at our peril. [ 
Interruption 
] I tell Lianne Dalziel that the difference with the breath-testing laws is that they relate to an offence for which there is no subjective test. If a person’s breath-alcohol reading is over the limit that is clear and if a person is driving while disqualified or suspended that is clear also. There is no question of subjectivity. If a person is guilty of one of the offences under this bill it is a subjective test and it should not be for a police officer to decide whether someone is breaking the law and then punish that person before his or her guilt has been established. 
The other point which I raised in the second reading debate is about who does a person who feels that he or she has been unfairly targeted by the police appeal to. 
Clayton Cosgrove 
: The courts. 
NANDOR TANCZOS 
: To the police. I ask Clayton Cosgrove whether he has read the bill. That person would apply to the police. The bill states that that person should apply to the police.