Wall LouisaLOUISA WALL (Labour—Manurewa): Tēnā koe Mr Chair. I do acknowledge that I've had two calls but just to let the committee know that if Part 1 of my Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) is out of order because David Seymour's Supplementary Order Paper is voted on in the affirmative then I won't participate in the rest of the debate to push what we've been trying to do through our SOP which essentially is to create another lawful process and in fact I want to focus on that.But before I do so I just want to make a mention about the use of the word suicide" in the Chamber tonight. A lot of people have talked about this being suicide. In fact that was one of the rationales for the legislative reform in Canada because people actually were suiciding because they didn't have a choice and they were taking their lives months before it was necessary because there were no other options. So what I want to highlight about this bill is that the qualification is that you have a terminal illness and then obviously we're trying to create a lawful process a lawful mechanism that then gives effect to a medical procedure. That medical procedure as outlined in David Seymour's SOP is the administration by a medical practitioner of medication to relieve a person's suffering; or the self-administration by the person. So to categorise that as suicide I actually am incredibly offended.Suicide by our experience of it here in New Zealand are people who are traumatised who have hurts and who actually choose to die. As I've said earlier tonight if you're faced with a terminal illness this isn't a life and death decision; it's a death decision and it is about how and when as a person who has a terminal illness you will die and trying to give that person a sense of control over a situation that actually is incredibly uncontrollable. So the proposition I think we all need to consider tonight is: should someone with a terminal illness have that right to choose how and when they die?That gave effect to the SOP that Lawrence Yule and I created because essentially we suggest it does; but obviously it does have to have a context around it. And so for us it was about the patient and a medical practitioner involved in their care—whether that be their GP or an oncologist or a palliative care specialist whoever—with their whānau being able to apply to the Family Court jointly meeting certain criteria: that is they have a terminal illness exhausted all possible treatment options—there aren't any more options left that the public good provides—and that they were receiving palliative care. So we thought as a context that would be permissive right?So then I guess the issue is what is the best mechanism? We thought it was the Family Court. I want to acknowledge my colleague Kiri Allan for talking about the Family Court and what Family Court judges have done within the context of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 because in fact within the context of legislation to get a compulsory treatment order applied for by a relative of a person essentially it's a 14-day process where the judge talks to the person talks to their doctor and can seek other medical professional advice. But essentially that medical procedure means somebody can go into a facility to receive mental health treatment for up to six months. So it's a familiar process which is exactly why we thought it would be the best process from an objective position to determine whether or not the person who had the terminal illness then could give consent.I guess the extra criterion that we've included in ours is the involvement of either a psychiatrist or a psychologist that firstly can attest to the fact that the person has the capacity to give informed consent and then obviously whether or not that person thinks the person has given informed consent by applying to the court with their medical profession for the court then to give consent for that person to die which is—Mr Chair I'd like to continue just to explain—[Time expired]"