O'Connor Greg; Sepuloni CarmelPart 2 Oversight of Oranga Tamariki systemCHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): Members we now come to Part 2. The question is that Part 2 stand part.Hon CARMEL SEPULONI (Minister for Social Development and Employment): The consultation with care-experienced children and young people that has led to this bill started in 2018 during the development of the Beattie report. The Beattie report drew on the voices of children and young people including from the Modernising Child Youth and Family Expert Panel report and 22 hui held with Māori including those with care experience. These voices and those of the tamariki and rangatahi advocates and others who have participated in the development process or submitted on the bill have been clear in their call for comprehensive independent monitoring and a solution to the current confusing and cumbersome complaints process. We have listened to those voices. Part 2 of this bill establishes the independent monitor to monitor outcomes for children and young people receiving services through the Oranga Tamariki system and ensures that they have strengthened complaints and investigations processes through the Ombudsman. As with Part 1 I want to take the time to talk to why the clauses in Part 2 of the bill are drafted the way they are and respond to the particular issues that have been raised.Establishing the monitor and its objectives in clauses 12 and 13—clause 12 establishes the independent monitor. It also explicitly provides that it will be independent of Oranga Tamariki. I want to take a moment to discuss that independence here. The monitoring function in respect of the Oranga Tamariki system is not new to the bill. A version of the proposed monitor currently sits in the Ministry of Social Development with a significantly reduced function. We have heard voices calling for greater independence of the monitor proposed in this bill. I can understand why this is a real concern for the tamariki and rangatahi in the system and their advocates who may lack trust in Government systems that have not operated as well as they should have for them. That is why we have actually made the monitor more independent through the changes in the bill. The monitor will be a statutory officer with a legal duty to act independently housed in a departmental agency that shares its back-office functions with the Education Review Office so it can focus resources on monitoring the Oranga Tamariki system.This explicit independence requirement which is set out in clause 13 of the bill is strengthened at numerous places throughout Part 2. This is particularly the case in clause 16 which specifies that the monitor must act independently when developing the tools for and carrying out its monitoring function and stops Government from directing the monitor to stop doing or preventing the monitor from doing anything it considers necessary to perform its functions. The legal duties this places on the monitor and the Government don't just make the monitor more independent; they make it clear the monitor would be acting unlawfully if it does not act independently and the Government would be breaking the law if it interfered in the monitor's affairs. An example of how this might work in practice is with regards to the reviews that the monitor undertakes under clauses 24 and 25. These provisions are clear that the monitor is able to inquire into anything it chooses in the Oranga Tamariki system. Although Ministers may ask them to look into additional matters they cannot ask them to stop any work they are doing even if it impacts on the delivery of the reviews that the Ministers have requested. The objectives of the monitor are set out in clause 13—to carry out objective impartial and evidence-based monitoring and provide advice about the Oranga Tamariki system and its interface with other systems. I know that there have been questions raised with regards to why one of the monitor's key functions is to support public trust and confidence in the system. This is not about the Government trying to get the monitor to make the Government look good. The monitor's advice will support the Government to make better decisions with regards to policy and practice in the Oranga Tamariki system. But it will also provide the advocate the Children and Young People's Commission with the information that it needs to hold the Government to account.We want more transparency and accountability in the system—not less transparency and accountability in the system—so that our tamariki and rangatahi and their families and whānau have confidence to engage with and get the support they need.I also want to note the change proposed by Jan Logie in her Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) on this clause which would add a requirement that the monitor acts independently when fulfilling its objectives under clause 13. While I don't disagree with the intent of the suggestion it's not necessary. The role of the monitor means it will fulfil its objectives by engaging in monitoring and developing the tools and approaches to do this. Because it is required to do these things independently it will always be acting independently when it is working to fulfil its obligations.I want to move on now to clauses 17 18 and 19 which provide more detail as to how the monitor will work with Māori. We know—all of us know—that Māori are disproportionately represented in the Oranga Tamariki system. That is why aspects of the bill including the Treaty provisions were co-designed with Te Kāhui and the proposals now reflected in the bill were tested in 22 hui across the country.Clauses 17 and 18 ensure that this engagement will be continued by the monitor once it is up and running by requiring it to appoint a Māori Advisory Group to support meaningful and effective engagement with Māori and work with them in the development of its priorities work programmes and monitoring approaches.The monitor's relationship with Māori won't be limited to one group. Clause 19 requires it to build relationships with hapū iwi and Māori organisations and engage in shared mahi regarding how to improve oversight of the Oranga Tamariki system.I know that Jan Logie has submitted a Supplementary Order Paper seeking a range of changes to the bill with regards to our Treaty obligations and the relationships of the entities with Māori. I want to be clear that although the Public Service Act doesn't allow shared decision-making arrangements for departmental agencies these provisions provide a strong framework for a close relationship between Māori and the monitor. They are also sufficiently flexible to allow for situations where some distance is necessary and appropriate such as where a Māori organisation is potentially subject to monitoring.Clause 19 holds the monitor accountable to working in this way by requiring it to demonstrate publicly on an internet site how it has given regard to the views of the Māori Advisory Group.Reports and reviews" clauses 21 to 31—the monitor is currently required to do at least one report every three years to the responsible Ministers on the national care standards. It has already completed four since we established it in 2019 but it is clear that there is more work to do.Clauses 21 to 23 of the bill expand the monitor's role to require additional reports at least once every three years on the state of the Oranga Tamariki system; each year on compliance with the national care standards regulations; and each year on the performance of the Oranga Tamariki system in respect of outcomes being achieved for Māori children and young people and their whānau. This increased scrutiny of the system will create greater accountability and transparency but we have heard concerns from tamariki rangatahi and their advocates that the reporting and review requirements in the bill do not create enough accountability for the agencies that work in the system. I want to give them comfort that this is not the case. I've already discussed the monitor's independent reviews and the fact that although Ministers can ask to look into a matter they cannot interfere in the monitor's work.When the monitor completes its reviews: I know the select committee recommended that the agencies that are subject to reports have up to 60 working days to respond. However we are reducing the response time frames to 20 working days for clause 22 and 23 reports; and 35 working days for cause 21 24 and 25 reports.Children and young people need to see that agencies are responding quickly to issues raised by the monitor and identifying how and when they will be addressed. As well as providing the reports to the relevant chief executives and requiring them to provide a quick response we have ensured that the findings in the reports and these responses are as public and transparent as possible. Not only must the monitor publish all its reports Mr Chair—CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): Carry on Minister Sepuloni.Hon CARMEL SEPULONI: Thank you very much Mr Chair. As well as providing the reports to the relevant chief executives and requiring them to provide a quick response we have ensured that the findings in the reports and these responses are as public and transparent as possible. Not only must the monitor publish all its reports and agencies' responses to them online under clause 30 the bill also requires the Minister responsible for the Oranga Tamariki Act to present a copy of the reports to the House as soon as practicable after receiving it. I also want to address the concerns Karen Chhour has raised in her Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) regarding these clauses. The member wants to add reports that the monitor has initiated into clause 27 which requires the monitor to share its report with a list of people including the responsible Ministers chief executives and the Ombudsman and commission. This makes sense. It is important that the monitor's findings are seen and responded to by all the relevant parties. That is why this change has already been implemented through the Government SOP. So I just acknowledge that there was alignment there. The member also wants to add the chief executive of Oranga Tamariki into this list. Again we agree with the intent but this requirement is already in the bill because clause 27(c) requires the monitor to share the report with the chief executive of any agency that is the subject of the report and in practice this will always include Oranga Tamariki. Powers of entry—I'm now going to move on to clauses 30 to 35 which govern the monitor's ability to enter premises to undertake its monitoring functions. The monitor's role is to support agencies in the system to work towards continuous service improvement by identifying areas of high performance and areas for improvement through impartial and evidence-based monitoring. In doing this it will be necessary for the monitor to take the information provided to it by agencies and validate it by visiting communities connecting and listening to those that have a role to play in the Oranga Tamariki system including whānau hapū iwi caregivers providers and professionals. Most importantly the monitor will engage directly with children and young people. The bill strengthens the current powers of entry for monitoring and ensures that the monitor has the ability to visit residences and other locations of interest to do this work. But as the monitor is not investigating specific breaches of any legislation does not monitor individual children and does not carry out an enforcement function it is not appropriate for the monitor to have a without notice power of entry to carry out monitoring. To require otherwise would represent a significant intrusion on the public's right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure enshrined in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. An unlimited power of entry would likely exacerbate tension or emotional harm to children and young people. It is unsettling for children and young people to have strangers entering their places of residence unannounced especially when they are expected to interact with those strangers and answer their questions. To the extent the Ombudsman and Children's Commissioner are discharging Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) functions under the Crimes of Torture Act 1989 as designated national prevention mechanisms they have a without notice power of entry to do so. OPCAT monitoring is focused on human rights breaches and takes place in places of detention to check on the treatment and conditions of detainees. This differs from monitoring under the bill as OPCAT is focused on individual residences rather than at a system level. Where there is a serious and imminent risk to children and young people's safety the police have the necessary powers to act and take the appropriate action. It would not be appropriate for the monitor to take action in these circumstances especially if there is distress amongst residents. This clause sets out new duties that apply to an Ombudsman where they are dealing with complaints and investigations including a duty to ensure they operate in a culturally competent way that their processes are visible and accessible to children and that investigations processes incorporate a tikanga Māori approach. There has been some concern that the Ombudsman is not the appropriate organisation to resolve complaints. However the Ombudsman already has oversight of complaints about the Oranga Tamariki system. What we are doing is expanding the scope to care and custody providers for which the Ombudsman can resolve complaints requiring complaints processes to be visible and accessible and ensuring the Ombudsman has the necessary powers to resolve complaints in a timely manner. The bill places a strong onus on the Ombudsman to ensure children's participation is considered. This is done through the principles in clause 5 of the bill."