Genter Julie Anne: Register of Pecuniary Interests of Judges Bill — First Reading 
Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume 
Genter Julie Anne: Register of Pecuniary Interests of Judges Bill — First Reading 
[Sitting date: 27 June 2012. Volume:681;Page:3449. Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume.] 
JULIE ANNE GENTER (Green) 
 on behalf of  
Dr Kennedy Graham 
: I move  
That the Register of Pecuniary Interests of Judges Bill be now read a first time. 
 I nominate the Justice and Electoral Committee to consider the bill. Before I speak to the substance of this bill I would like to just quickly pay homage to the hard work put in by my colleague Dr Kennedy Graham on this bill. It is a fine piece of draft legislation and deserves careful consideration. Unfortunately his global affairs portfolio responsibilities meant that he could not be here this week to speak on this bill. 
The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Lindsay Tisch) 
: Just a point for the future. You cannot refer to the absence of a member. In the context of this we understand but just think about it in the future. You cannot talk about the absence of a member. 
JULIE ANNE GENTER 
: Thank you Mr Speaker. Given that the bill was introduced in November 2010 one would have hoped it could reach this stage before now but we are glad that it is finally here and we acknowledge and appreciate that the Government has agreed to work with us on this bill. 
We in the Green Party and I believe pretty much the whole of the country were saddened by the set of circumstances that led ultimately to the resignation of one of our most talented judges not very long ago. It is always a personal tragedy when unexpected events put to an abrupt end the work of talented individuals who have contributed much to the future of New Zealand. The circumstances surrounding that episode do not warrant detailed investigation here in this debate. Suffice it to say that it exposes a number of characteristics of the judiciary of a small country such as New Zealand—and perhaps even of countries that are not so small—and of the limited and to some extent intimate circle of acquaintances that goes to make up the higher echelons of the judiciary. 
In such circumstances there exists an even greater than usual responsibility on the part of all individuals involved to ensure that the integrity of the system is not in any way compromised through a strict respect for the principles of openness and transparency. It is a time-honoured principle of Western democracy that public servants of every kind must be beyond reproach. Public confidence in the standard of behaviour and conduct observed by leading servants of the people is a cornerstone of social harmony and political stability. A threshold of confidence should ideally be enshrined in constitutional and legislative form. Little scope should be available for individual discretion or subjective perception. 
The principles of transparency in this respect pertain in particular to issues of financial interest. Nothing undermines public confidence in a nation’s institutions and procedures more than a suspicion that a public servant may have suffered a conflict of interest arising from a financial engagement in a particular dealing in which one was professionally involved. 
In New Zealand members of the executive have been required under statute since 1990 to provide statements of pecuniary interests pertaining to their personal financial affairs. Such statements are submitted to the Speaker and these are made available for public consumption. In 2006 this practice was extended to all members of Parliament. Since then MPs have been required to submit annual statements of pecuniary interests to a registrar who makes the information publicly available. 
The legislature’s version of pecuniary interest statements was modelled along the lines of that of the executive. In both cases a careful balance has been struck between transparent public knowledge of an individual’s financial affairs and the preservation of personal privacy. The correct balance in this respect appears to have been achieved over the years. The public interest in such annual statements is significant without appearing inappropriate and few complaints have been voiced by those on whom the obligations are placed. There seems to be general acceptance that such exercises are in the public interest and are neither unduly onerous nor revealing. 
No such practice however has been observed in the case of the judiciary. Recent developments within New Zealand’s judicial conduct processes suggest that application of the same practice observed by the other two branches of government might assist in the protection of the judiciary in the future. Being obliged under law to declare pecuniary interests that might be relevant to the conduct of a future case in which one is involved would relieve a judge from a repetitive weight of responsibility to make discretionary judgments about his or her personal affairs as each case arises. 
Having declared one’s pecuniary interests once in a generic manner independent of any particular trial a judge may freely proceed in the knowledge that if one is appointed to adjudicate public confidence for participation has already been met. Yet care is to be exercised to ensure that the final decision as to whether to accept a case is left to the individual judge. 
There should be no intention of external interference in the self-regulation of the judiciary by the judiciary. This is the reasoning behind the draft legislation before us. It takes as its purpose the promotion of due administration of justice by requiring judges to make returns of pecuniary interests in order to provide greater transparency within the judicial system and to avoid any conflict of interest in the judicial role. 
Let me review the main provisions of the bill. Clause 4 provides that “Nothing in this Act is to be interpreted as compromising the constitutional principle of judicial independence guaranteed by the Constitution Act 1986 and respected by constitutional convention.” Clause 6 describes the two key components of the bill which are to require returns of pecuniary interests from judges and to establish a register of such returns. 
Clauses 5 7 and 8 impose a duty on judges to make an initial return of pecuniary interests following appointment as a judge. Clause 9 lists the contents of returns of pecuniary interests. Clause 14 provides that disclosure of the actual value amount or extent is not required in relation to any matter that is required to be disclosed. Clause 19 provides that the registrar must publish the information contained in both initial and annual returns of pecuniary interests. 
Clause 20 provides that the registrar must publish the name of any judge who fails to submit any return. Clause 21 provides that it is the responsibility of each judge to ensure that his or her obligations under the Act are fulfilled and places limits on the responsibilities of the registrar. Clause 22 provides that a complaint that a judge has failed to make a return of pecuniary interests is a matter that has bearing on the judicial functions or judicial duties of the purpose of section 16(1)(b) of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004. 
This bill is not designed to imply any right of the legislature to intervene in the affairs of the judiciary. As I said before nothing in the draft will be interpreted as compromising the constitutional principle of judicial independence guaranteed in our constitution. The intention of this bill is simply to facilitate the promotion of due administration of justice by requiring a similar financial return by judges to what is already required by both the legislature and executive of this country. We submit that our constitutional integrity as a nation will be enhanced with the passage and adoption of this bill. Thank you.