Webb DuncanDr DUNCAN WEBB (Labour—Christchurch Central): Kia ora e te Mana Whakawā. Along with Melissa Lee I too congratulate Deborah Russell for the hard work she's done on this bill. It's interesting isn't it—when we talk about limitation we are arguing strenuously that we should push out the ability to make a claim for sexual harassment to a year. If you flip the question on its head you can actually ask an interesting question: why do we have a limitation period at all? Because 90 days—in any employment situation—is a relatively short period of time. And I can't imagine that there are many employment situations where after three months after the termination of employment the employee in particular is in a great space to embark upon some kind of complaint or litigation. So it is just worth asking that question which is Why do we have limitation?" and against that question to measure whether it should be the very short period of three months or perhaps the period of one year which is the amendment set out in this legislation or the three-year period which is the longstop period under the Employment Relations Act or a longer period such as the six-year period in the more general Limitation Act or longer again.Now I can absolutely understand the need for both employers and employees to have finality—that they don't want to part ways perhaps in somewhat fractious terms and be wondering about whether some claim is going to be hanging over them. But against that it's got to be recognised that limitation by definition is an absolute defence to any claim—even the most deserving claim. And at the moment we've got a framework which at least on its face says that the most egregious sexual harassment would have an absolute defence if the matter was raised 91 days after the employment relationship was terminated and that can't be right. Now there is a saving provision in section 115 of exceptional circumstances and it in fact recognises that in cases where there has been trauma—and this might be one of them—the court can give special leave for a matter to be raised. But that is yet another hurdle for the raising of a grievance a complaint because you have to apply to the court for leave. And so it's a barrier in the face of a legitimate claim. So we need to think very carefully about this and this is absolutely a good bill that does the right thing in this case which is where there is a claim for sexual harassment—which almost by definition is traumatic—then it should be pushed out that additional period. Because we do know that in situations like that—and the Act itself it is worth noting that "sexual harassment" is not some vague term; sexual harassment is actually defined at length in the Employment Relations Act. I think that's an important point to make that it's not just some offhand comment or something like that; it's a course of conduct that is clearly inappropriate and might be verbal can be physical and I think you can probably understand what that definition clause in the Act does. So this is a very good piece of legislation. It again shifts the needle to say to disgruntled and disaffected employees who have been wronged that the door won't be shut on you to make your claim to be heard and your wrong to be properly redressed simply because the clock has been ticking. But I do think it's important to note that this one year is not actually the final length of time. It is in fact possible to raise a claim up to three years later where you can show that there were exceptional circumstances. And I do want to put it on record that in many cases situations of sexual harassment will fall into that category notwithstanding this amendment. That category still exists and parties should be aware of it because limitation raises odd issues of being shut out of a deserving claim simply because the clock has ticked past a particular time. A good bill—well done Deborah Russell—I commend it to the House."