Little AndrewCRIMES AMENDMENT BILLFirst ReadingHon ANDREW LITTLE (Minister of Justice): I move That the Crimes Amendment Bill be now read a first time. I nominate the Justice Committee to consider this bill. I see it as an important function of Government to keep the statute book up to date. Archaic laws that serve no useful purpose or—worse—frustrate legitimate prosecution should be removed from the laws of New Zealand. To maintain public confidence in the law the criminal code should be relevant to modern society. It should not allow criminals to go unpunished only because of historical anomalies and for that matter we should not seek to retain laws that have no useful application in our country today. It's on that basis that I'm pleased to bring to this House the Crimes Amendment Bill today. This bill repeals three provisions from the Crimes Act 1961. In my view all have passed their use-by date. I believe New Zealand law and society will benefit from their removal from the statute book. Let me start with discussing the year and a day rule that is now encapsulated in section 162 of the Crimes Act. That section provides that no one is criminally responsible for the killing of another unless the death takes place within a year and a day of the cause of the death. This rule has been described as an anachronism and I agree. The rule has its genesis in medieval times. Its origins lie in a distrust of science. Whatever its relevance centuries ago it has no place in modern New Zealand. As long ago as 1991 the Crimes Consultative Committee in considering the Crimes Bill of 1989 concluded that advances in medical science had greatly reduced the difficulties in linking injury to a death that occurs a considerable time later. The authors of the great criminal law text Adams on Criminal Law agree and note that—to quote them—In relation to proof of causal connection the development of medical science has no doubt rendered the law under section 162 unnecessary." Most like-minded countries to New Zealand have abolished the rule. It's been abolished in the United Kingdom in most Australian states and in Canada. The rule was abolished in those jurisdictions due to factors such as public concern about the rule precluding legitimate prosecution in the case of medical intervention keeping victims alive for longer than one year and one day.This issue has been highlighted in New Zealand following the 2017 death of a victim 15 months after he was assaulted and the alleged offender in that case could not be prosecuted for murder or manslaughter notwithstanding the clear connection between his act—a violent assault on the deceased—and the death of the victim.The CTV Building collapse following the 2011 Christchurch earthquake highlighted another problem with the retention of the law in New Zealand. Arguably a critical omission in that case related to the shortcomings in the design of the building dating back to 1986—significantly longer than a year and a day before its collapse—and it's important to recognise that this wasn't the sole factor that led to this case not being prosecuted. The Crown solicitor had a view and the Deputy Solicitor-General had a view that the failures of the engineers and designers of the building that meant that 26 years later the building collapsed meant that the deaths that happened at a result of that collapse had their causal origins in the actions of the engineers 26 years before. It therefore put the engineers' actions outside the one year and one day rule and therefore it could not be prosecuted. Possible concerns about the repeal of the rule resulting in a person remaining liable to prosecution for murder or manslaughter for lengthy periods of time are unjustified. There's currently no limitation period under the Criminal Procedure Act for filing charges for other serious offences and there should not be for murder or manslaughter. Also there are existing checks and balances in the operation of the criminal justice system to prevent prosecution where that would be an abuse of process. Repeal of the year and a day rule will ensure that prosecution is not precluded solely by an ancient rule setting an arbitrary length of time between the cause of death and death itself. I think what it would come down to is that in the circumstances where a Crown solicitor or the police or the Solicitor-General or the Crown Law Office are considering a prosecution where there is a considerable length of time between the death and the action alleged to have caused the death they will exercise their judgment about whether they have a reasonable chance of establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the death was a result of those actions. Where they don't think they can meet that threshold then they will make their judgment about prosecution accordingly. The next issue that I'd like to speak to is the current protection against prosecution contained in section 71 of the Crimes Act. I should start by pointing out that section 71 of the Crimes Act doesn't create the offence of accessory after the fact. Section 71 is definitional in that it sets out the essential elements of being an accessory after the fact. The accessory after the fact definition in section 71(1) applies to anybody who knowing any person was a party to the offence helps the person escape after arrest or to avoid arrest or conviction. However section 71(2) of the Crimes Act 1961 provides that no person whose spouse or civil union partner has been a party to an offence can become an accessory after the fact to that offence even where they do the act prohibited by section 71(1). This kind of protection generally no longer applies. So for example section 67 of the Crimes Act recognises that a person may conspire with his or her civil union partner to commit an offence. Why then should they be given an exception to being an accessory after the offence? The judiciary have noted that section 71(2) creates an immunity for spouses or civil union partners but the same thing does not apply to non - civil union or de facto partners—clearly discriminatory clearly inconsistent and clearly a complete shambles. There've also been judicial observations that the retention of spousal immunity for accessory after the fact is anomalous. It represents an outdated view of the nature of marriage which is no longer recognised by the law in other contexts. The risk that some defendants may experience threats or intimidation by their spouse or partner to assist them evading justice doesn't justify a retention of this law. Section 24 of the Crimes Act which is the defence of compulsion protects a person from criminal liability who commits an offence under the threat of death or serious physical harm. So repeal of section 71(2) of the Crimes Act will ensure that all people who help someone with whom they are in a close relationship to evade justice may be prosecuted as an accessory after the fact.Finally I'd like to refer to section 123 of the Crimes Act which relates to blasphemous libel. At the outset I acknowledge that the honourable member Angie Warren-Clark has a member's bill repealing the same section but she has agreed to withdraw her bill because that is now covered by this Government bill. Section 123 of the Act criminalises the publication of blasphemous libel. Leave of the Attorney-General is required in order to mount a prosecution. There is a statutory defence if what is published expresses in good faith and decent language an opinion on any religious subject. No prosecutions for blasphemy have occurred in New Zealand since 1922 and even in that case nearly 100 years ago the jury returned a not guilty verdict. This is a law that simply does not apply in the modern context. In 1998 when Te Papa exhibited the Virgin in a Condom statue the Solicitor-General rejected a call to commence a criminal prosecution under the blasphemous libel law. The view was expressed that it would be inconsistent with the freedom of expression as protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.Offences dealing with blasphemy have been repealed in numerous other countries in recent years: England and Wales did so in 2008 followed by Norway the Netherlands and Denmark. There is currently a bill in the Canadian Parliament doing the same thing. I am satisfied that good reason exists to repeal this offence and that we should now do so. It hasn't been applied for a considerable period of time and it stands with a very distinct tension with our New Zealand Bill of Rights Act protection of freedom of expression. There will be a range of views on this matter; that could be a matter that can be debated in the select committee.The criminal law in New Zealand would be modernised and improved by this bill. I commend it to the House as a simple but important piece of law reform."