Shearer David: New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill — In Committee 
Shearer David: New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill — In Committee 
[Volume:673;Page:19629] 
DAVID SHEARER (Labour—Mt Albert) 
: 
 I am pleased to take a call on this important bill the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill. As two of the earlier speakers were arrested and put under surveillance by the SIS I feel somewhat left out. I do not think I have such a colourful past as they do—[ 
Interruption 
]—that is true. Maybe I need to get my file. I know that Keith Locke got his file and it was about a foot thick I remember him once saying. 
Hon Trevor Mallard 
: It was nearly as thick as Gavin Briggs. 
DAVID SHEARER 
: That is right. But seriously this is important legislation. There were as I understand it 23 different written submissions that covered mainly Part 1 of the bill. As others before me have said the fact that the submissions had to be heard in secret was regrettable. Although there is some interest in this bill and we could have looked at some of the submissions independently in secret I think for the most part the submitters did not feel that their submissions needed to be heard in secret nor did they want them to be. They wanted their submissions to be heard in the public arena. With that prelude I will move into some of the issues.  
I will start by quoting Sir Geoffrey Palmer whom the Attorney General quoted earlier in either the first or second reading. I think his words summarise the essence and the purpose of Part 1. He was also a Minister in charge of the NZ Security Intelligence Service. He said: “To a very significant extent ‘national security’ means just this—freedom from interference; freedom from terrorist attack freedom from deliberately incited racial violence freedom from espionage which itself threatens basic freedom such as privacy freedom from the kind of genuinely subversive activity which is aimed—not just in theory but in fact—at destabilising or overthrowing the very democratic system upon which the exercise of civil liberties depends.” I thought that was a particularly relevant quote that needs to be looked at in balance with the protection of the right to privacy the powers that might impinge on people’s privacy and certainly the powers that might impinge on the basic human rights that govern our country.  
Trevor Mallard mentioned at the very end of his contribution that this bill basically brings the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act up to date so that it has the same sort of ability to look at powers of surveillance in the 21st century. It has been 42 years since that Act was properly updated. The Government although I am not sure whether this is particularly relevant would like to get this bill through before the Rugby World Cup. I do not quite understand the reason for the urgency. The Security Intelligence Service is well and truly in place and is working well so I do not know whether this legislation will make much difference to it. Nevertheless given the fact that the bill is to go through the House by then perhaps the Minister might want to comment on any difference that it would make if this legislation did not come up before the Rugby World Cup.  
The submissions on this part focused on four general areas. The first was the surveillance powers of the SIS and that includes the electronic surveillance and tracking capabilities which I just mentioned. The second was the protection from liability of employees and others who assist in the exercise of warrants. Clearly that is necessary as the SIS relies on a number of other people and individuals in the exercise of its work. The third area was the delegation of powers including the power to exercise warrants and the absence of a requirement to name all of the people who assist. Again I think it is pretty self-evident why that is the case: obviously people assisting the SIS could be compromised in the actions that they assist with. The last general area was that of oversight and accountability including issues of human rights and the role of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.  
I was pleased that the Intelligence and Security Committee made a number of amendments to the bill somewhat in response to the four areas that submitters brought up. First of all there was an amendment regarding the principles. David Parker spoke to this amendment. Section 4AAA inserted by clause 5A has been brought into the bill to in a sense highlight the work of the Security Intelligence Service. It runs through what the Security Intelligence Service is trying to do when performing its functions. It lists that in the three paragraphs of section 4AAA(1) which state that the SIS: “(a) contributes to keeping New Zealand society secure independent and free and democratic: (b) contributes to the participation of New Zealand in the maintenance of international security:” as part of our obligations and “(c) acts—(i) in accordance with New Zealand law and all human rights standards”—and this is one of the things that the Human Rights Commission insisted went in as part of its contribution to the select committee—“except to the extent that they are in relation to national security modified by an enactment: (ii) in the discharge of its operational functions independently and impartially: (iii) with integrity and professionalism: (iv) in a manner that facilitates effective democratic oversight.”  
Although one would hope that those principles were inherent within the legislation or the actions of the SIS generally I think it adds to the bill to have them explicitly stated. It will give more confidence perhaps to those people who have some nervousness about this legislation in terms of the way the SIS will carry out its work in future.  
The other aspect I will touch on is the destruction of irrelevant records. This is covered in clause 8A which was also brought into the legislation at the select committee. Once again the idea is that information that is collected but that is not particularly relevant to a case would be destroyed once it was seen to be not relevant. New subsection (2A) of section 4G which is amended by clause 8A states: “As soon as practicable after the expiry of an intelligence warrant that authorises electronic tracking the Director must ensure that any records resulting from the electronic tracking undertaken under that warrant are destroyed except to the extent that those records are relevant—”. In other words a lot of information is likely to be gathered in an inquiry and all of it that is not relevant should be destroyed. The question I have—again for the Minister—concerns how we are to ensure that the information has been destroyed. How will we know that it has been destroyed? What sorts of safeguards could we ask for as a Parliament to make sure that it happens? A provision on that might be in the legislation; it might already be well covered. But I would welcome the Minister’s intervention on that question.  
My last point is about mistaken identity—another area where the bill was modified at the select committee. This is in clause 7 which amends section 4B by adding a number of subsections including: “(4) The Minister or as the case requires the Minister and the Commissioner must consider whether to include conditions in an intelligence warrant to minimise any risk …”.