Dunne Peter: Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill (No 2) — Second Reading Instruction to Committee In Committee 
Dunne Peter: Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill (No 2) — Second Reading Instruction to Committee In Committee 
[Volume:626;Page:21620] 
Hon PETER DUNNE (Leader—United Future) 
: 
 At the outset as the chair of the Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee I express to the officials who advised us and served us so faithfully our appreciation for their professionalism their advice and their assistance as we dealt with these issues. 
I come back to section 8(2A) inserted by clause 4 because that is really the most important part of the bill. I want to pick up a couple of the arguments that have been raised so far. It is certainly true that during the select committee’s examination of the bill we received a large number of submissions from people concerned about the possible criminalising of their generous donation to some charitable concern for humanitarian reasons. I want to take that analogy and then test it alongside what the provision actually states. Let us imagine someone in the wake of the tsunami disaster deciding to support Tamil relief or other relief causes collecting on the streets of Wellington. The fear expressed to us was that unwittingly those people might be exposing themselves to prosecution if it was discovered subsequently that the organisations to which they were donating were in fact terrorist organisations. The provision actually states that that person would commit an offence if he or she “directly or indirectly wilfully and without lawful justification or reasonable excuse provides or collects … knowing that they will benefit”. So short of someone actually carrying a placard or a banner indicating where the funding will go a person making that donation can hardly be said to be doing it wilfully without lawful justification or reasonable excuse or providing funding knowing that terrorist organisations will benefit. 
The test is a very high one. The select committee was certainly concerned to ensure that no innocent parties were adversely affected by this provision. We looked very closely at the wording and the intent. I pick up the point that Mr Prebble raised. There are so many qualifications in here in terms of hurdles to be crossed that one could say that the section has been dressed up rather grandly. Far more likely what the clause does is put in place so many hurdles a prospective offender has to cross to make it almost impossible that the innocent would be trapped by it. The test is a remarkably high one. 
After a lot of consideration the select committee came to the conclusion that that was a fair and reasonable amendment to make. It would not capture the innocent and it would not give rise to the concern expressed in some of the submissions. In response to a point made earlier by Mr Jones I say that that was why the committee inserted in its report the comment: “We seek the Government’s confirmation that this is indeed its intent.” It was certainly the conclusion of the select committee that the intent of the provision was as described to us and as reported in our report. We are seeking an explicit statement from the Government made in the course of this debate that that is exactly what it had in mind because that is what we believe the Government had in mind all along. 
This is not a question of second-guessing or saying that the law is not clear enough. It is saying that the only way in which we as a group of reasonable people were able to interpret the provision was in that way. We expect that was the Government’s intention as well. We therefore think that that should now be stated explicitly in the light of this consideration and in the light of the concern that was expressed to us. This is not a way of trying to second-guess or rewrite the law. It is simply a way of reinforcing what we thought and took to be the obvious. It does come down to being a very high threshold for any prospective offender to cross. 
Reference has already been made to the fact that we should not be making these amendments at this time in view of the fact that we are undertaking as provided for under section 70 of the principal Act a wider review of that legislation. That is a very erroneous conclusion to draw. Firstly we have the practical problems of the designations that have been referred to. When members in this House rightly express concern about the speed of court processes and the fact that justice is often being delayed I invite them to consider the consequence of not passing the particular provision relating to designations. Our courts would become in effect nothing more than outlets to process terrorism designations. Vicious murderers killers thugs and other violent offenders—property thieves drug dealers and the lot—would have to take their place in an ever-lengthening queue because the court system would be clogged. I would then invite those members who have expressed concern about justice being delayed to come back to this House and say that that is an acceptable position because clearly it is not. 
There was no alternative but to act. It may well have been in retrospect an unwise provision to have included in the first place in terms of the duration of the time. But the reality is that we have to act now and we are through this bill. It does not cut across the provisions of the wider review. I say to the House that in fact that review is well advanced. As of today I think we have heard from all of those who wished to make submissions to us on that review. An interesting commentary both on this bill and on the wider review which is at variance with some of the arguments we hear about the level of wider concern is the number of submissions we have received. This bill received 13 submissions. An earlier speaker referred to the principal Act receiving 130 submissions. The substantive review has received a similar small number of submissions. That is indicative of a general acceptance in the population that there are now matters that require us to act in the way we are acting that some of the assumptions we might have had in our naivety 3 or 4 years ago no longer apply because of an international situation we could not have imagined those few short years ago and that therefore some compromises—unfortunately perhaps—have to be made to some of our accepted norms of freedom and the way in which we move around. 
 I do not get a sense—and it did not come through at the Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee hearing either—that there is great unease. I was struck by the similarity of origin of many of the submissions. Many people who have a certain predictability about them were the ones who chose to appear before us on this matter. I do not diminish the points they made but I simply make the observation that there was a sameness about the submitters and about what they had to say. 
We are dealing here with a bill that is essentially procedural. The issue of the designations has to be resolved. The question of the refinement of section 8 of the principal Act by the insertion of this new clause will not compromise good citizens’ rights at all. The innocent genuine well-intentioned person who supports international humanitarian relief organisations will not be adversely affected by these provisions simply because of the way in which they are designed. The test is a deliberately high one. Short of the public advertisement of terrorist intent or public knowledge that an organisation is a well-known front for terrorist activities the individual donor or supporter has nothing to fear from these provisions. The sooner we can proceed to pass them and then later in the year deal with the outcome of the substantive review and if necessary make changes to the principal Act in the light of that review the better for all concerned.