edithatogo/nz-hansard-corpus huggingface dataset:
Faafoi KrisHARETE HIPANGO (National): Minister just to labour the point in relation to the appropriate it appears to be the qualities of the lawyer as opposed to the competencies—could the Minister please explain when appointing a lawyer to represent a child that the Family Court has complex issues and a variety of proceedings within the Family Court? Accordingly would the Minister not consider it appropriate that there is a match of the lawyer's skills and competence to the specific case requirements in addition to those factors of personality cultural background training and experience to suitably qualify to represent the child?I put it to the Minister to consider that further to what is outlined in clause 7 subclause (2) proposed that in the appointment of a lawyer the court must also consider the match of the lawyer's skills and/or competence to the specific case requirements bearing in mind that the Family Court not only deals with domestic violence it also deals with custody guardianship separation access contact care and protection and welfare—a number of issues—which adds to the complexity and therefore ought to reflect upon the skillset and competence of the lawyer being matched to the specific proceedings to represent the child. What is the Minister's view on that please?Hon KRIS FAAFOI (Minister of Justice): It is pretty clear because at the end of the clause they're suitably qualified to represent the child" and if that person isn't qualified to represent the child in that specific instance then I'm pretty sure that the court will adjudicate that that person isn't the right person to represent the child. I would also reflect that the independent panel recommended the framing of the clause and I'm also told that the clause reflects the practice note and also aligns with—and I haven't seen this section—section 159 of the Oranga Tamariki Act in order to make sure there is consistency across pieces of legislation. So to answer the member's question I don't think the clause and the point that she is making are mutually exclusive. I think if the person is suitably qualified to represent the child within that scope of practice then the court will make a decision that they are the suitable person in that instance."
McKee Nicole; Faafoi KrisNICOLE McKEE (ACT): Thank you Madam Chair and thank you Minister for answering the question that I put up earlier.I go back to clause 7 Minister around the personality and cultural background. You gave a very good explanation there and I thank you for that. I would've thought though Minister that those qualities would already be looked upon by the judge in appointing a counsel for the child. My question to you is: should a person who is not deemed to be culturally appropriate for that child is appointed and there are concerns later raised about that person not having the personality or the cultural background could this—or had you thought about whether or not it could incur further delays as a new counsel for the child is appointed if that indeed ends up being the case because the appropriate person was deemed not to have been found in that first instance?Hon KRIS FAAFOI (Minister of Justice): Thank you Madam Chair. I think again a valid question. I think the heart of that lies in some of the earlier language which is as so far as reasonably practicable. I think most courts would make an effort to make sure that the best fit would be there for a lawyer of the child. As you said in your submission you would have expected or assumed for that to be happening already. I believe there is no harm in making sure that is explicit and again in an effort to make sure that there is care and effectiveness for the child to take into consideration what is best in terms of personality cultural background training and experience.I do envisage there will be some situations where that may not be possible—where especially in smaller rural areas or provincial towns where the pool of lawyers that may be available to do the work in a timely manner may not necessarily be available. That again the court might see that best fit is made. But I'm confident that making it explicit within the bill that these factors where it is practicable are taken into account and where best efforts are made to make sure that we do have someone appropriate for the child will be more effective than this situation that we have at the moment.
Faafoi KrisHARETE HIPANGO (National): Kia ora Madam Chair and Minister. Look in taking this call this evening I'm cognisant of the fact that the Minister does not have experience of practising in the Family Court and therefore the answers are in that context. So I'm going to refer to clause 4 of the bill Minister where it talks about inserting section 5(g) which says that a child must be given reasonable opportunities to participate in any decision affecting them." Minister I put it to you—mindful that I wasn't on the Justice Committee and I didn't hear submissions mindful that I have been counsel for children mindful that children being burdened with the responsibility of making decisions as affect them subject to their age is detrimental to their welfare and best interests. So Minister could you please answer: why is it that it's considered that a child should be making decisions as affect them when there is proven psychological evidence that that is detrimental to a child for them to be burdened with that responsibility when it is actually the lawyer's duty of care and role to be the voice and it is the judge who makes the decision not a child participating in that decision making? Hon KRIS FAAFOI (Minister of Justice): I thank the learned colleague for making that submission. I would again ask her to look at the clause. It is not asking or enforcing a decision from a child. It is in essence allowing an opportunity for the child to participate in that decision process. Again as her colleague pointed out I think most people would want to ensure that there is an opportunity to understand what is in the best interests of the child in a care of children application and the purpose of this bill is to give the effective and efficient ability for that to happen. We believe it is important to make sure we can do that quickly. I've mentioned the delays in the Family Court process because of the without notice applications. Making sure that we're giving that opportunity is we think pretty fundamental to making sure that it can happen. It is not the child who makes the decision but we think it's important that the child does have a voice in that process. HARETE HIPANGO (National): Accordingly then Minister would it not be better to have included in section 5(g) in clause 4—rather than "a child must be given reasonable opportunities"—that the onus is on the voice or the representative of that child to do so and not the child presumably? Hon KRIS FAAFOI (Minister of Justice): I think that goes to the wider context of the changes within the bill. As one of her colleagues mentioned—Mr Brown—the change is where we are looking at a best fit for the appointment of a lawyer to understand the situation of a child to ensure that we can understand and express what the child would like to be taken into consideration during the process and what the child's best interests and perspective are and making sure that we have the person to best represent that as the member may have just outlined."
McKee NicoleNICOLE McKEE (ACT): Madam Chair thank you and thank you Minister. The ACT Party does support this bill but I have one question and that is also on clause 7. It's in regard to looking at the appointment of a lawyer whereby the statement reads in clause 7(2): When appointing a lawyer to represent a child the court or Registrar must so far as is reasonably practicable appoint a lawyer who is by reason of their personality cultural background training and experience suitably qualified to represent the child." When I gave my second reading speech I made the point that I think it's important that we get the right person representing the child. But I have concerns when we start legislating about personality and cultural background. I've tabled an amendment whereby I request your thoughts upon removing the words "by reason of their personality cultural background training and experience". So it would actually read: "appoint a lawyer who was suitably qualified to represent the child". Then that way we ensure that it is the best person for the child and any judge or appointee would be able to actually make sure that things like personality and cultural background are automatically taken without it having to be legislated. So I'd just like to leave that in your court there Minister because I would like to fully support this but do have concerns that we do not have the expertise within our courts and therefore may not be getting the right person to represent the child. Thank you."
Faafoi KrisHon KRIS FAAFOI (Minister of Justice): Thank you. Can I thank Mr Penk for the issues that he raised. Very simply in terms of the amendments to clause 4 that he mentioned yes it does reflect the policy intent.He does raise a good point in terms of the subsequent issue that he raised and we have seen fit to amend the commencement date in order to make sure that there is a process to ensure that there is a framework in order to ensure the kinds of questions that he is talking about—about how we engage with young people etc.—is done in a safe manner.I acknowledge that while I think the close-to-70 submissions that the Justice Committee heard were pretty well balanced towards support or neutral on the bill there were some issues raised about the safety of children within that process. And in order to do that there is a stocktake being done of how we do have frameworks in order to make sure that children can participate in that and that that is done in a safe way to make sure that when children's needs are taken into account especially when family violence is involved we have the right expertise and frameworks in order to deal with that. Again I want to reflect some of the concerns raised especially when there was trauma or family violence involved. Some submitters said that involving children in that process can be re-traumatising but that it could be managed. I think that is why undertaking the stocktake and audit to ensure that there is a safe framework for that to happen will ensure that children will still be able to have their views expressed as to what they want to see as a decision not to make the decision in order for the process—and hopefully not a court process—to determine what is in their best interests.
Rurawhe AdrianFAMILY COURT (SUPPORTING CHILDREN IN COURT) LEGISLATION BILLIn CommitteePart 1 Amendments to Care of Children Act 2004CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Members we now come to the Family Court (Supporting Children in Court) Legislation Bill. We come first to Part 1. This is the debate on clauses 3 to 9 Amendments to Care of Children Act 2004. The question is that Part 1 stand part.
Rurawhe AdrianClauses 1 and 2CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Members we now come to our final debate clauses 1 and 2. This is the debate on title and commencement.
Bayly AndrewANDREW BAYLY (National—Port Waikato): I just want to acknowledge what the Minister has said. I think it's an important element of what is in this part of the bill. It's an important function that we make sure that we do get proper regulation across the financial sector involving all the key organisations. So in terms of this being a part of this bill it's a good thing.
Robertson GrantHon GRANT ROBERTSON (Minister of Finance): This is the miscellaneous section of the bill which tidies up a number of matters. The only one which I want to draw the House's attention to is Subpart 4 on the Council of Financial Regulators. This is something that I do believe is important. It is the statutory recognition of effectively the importance of coordination amongst those whose job it is to regulate our financial system in New Zealand. We saw in the wake of the royal commission of inquiry into the Australian banking system the importance of the way in which for example the Reserve Bank and the Financial Markets Authority (FMA) work together. I believe that there is considerable scope to improve the way in which regulation works in our financial sector to make it clearly understandable to the public to ensure that the interests of consumers are held in the highest regard that we can do better in those areas in a more coordinated way. So I am particularly pleased that the council is recognised here its membership with the bank the FMA the Treasury and what is effectively the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment but also includes the Commerce Commission. It is important to I think all New Zealanders to know that those agencies are working together and by giving that body statutory recognition I believe we are enhancing that work. Otherwise the part represents a number of tidy-up - related matters.
Rurawhe AdrianPart 6 Miscellaneous provisionsCHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Members we now come to Part 6. This is the debate on clauses 258 to 297 and Schedule 4 miscellaneous provisions. The question is that Part 6 stand part.
Smith Damien; Robertson GrantDAMIEN SMITH (ACT): I think it is time from the ACT Party's point of view that we should also be looking at the disadvantaged members of society the Pasifika community the Māori community and actually include now in the framework the Reserve Bank the credit unions and building societies mutual model. We should give them the same liquidity buffers that the rest of the banks get because there is a wellbeing issue there and sort of they are discriminated against in terms of an equal playing field. So I'd like the Minister's point of view on that and giving them equal access to any liquidity support that they require.Hon GRANT ROBERTSON (Minister of Finance): I thank the member for the question. I don't think that in terms of the way we write legislation we would be going into that level of detail. That is not how we write legislation. But I do want to acknowledge the issue that he is raising and the fragility from time to time of some of the financial institutions in New Zealand. The member raises the question for example of credit unions and the importance of making sure that those whose funding is within those bodies who as the member points out can often come from lower-income groups are protected. I acknowledge that point. Whether the exact answer to that question has the same size liquidity buffers as other institutions is a matter I believe that falls within the operational purview of the bank. But I think the member is raising an important issue for New Zealand and one that can be taken up. But it would not in my opinion be appropriate for us to be dealing with that within the legislation. But I do think he is raising an issue of some importance.
Rurawhe AdrianPart 5 Financial and accountability mattersCHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Members we now come to Part 5. This is the debate on clauses 200 to 257 financial and accountability matters. The question is that Part 5 stand part.
Bayly AndrewANDREW BAYLY (National—Port Waikato): I want to continue that vein of thoughts from the Hon Michael Woodhouse because we've been talking tonight and the first thing we do agree on is the independence and the importance of the independence of the Reserve Bank. I think there's a difference around making sure we've got the right framework for that and then differentiating that in terms of the independence of the bank to perform its functions. I think it's that crucial part of independence that it should be free to go out and execute and perform the functions that are set out clearly under the various remits that are provided and we've just been talking about how the Minister can change that quite easily without much transparency or oversight by Parliament. But with regard to the much wider issue of independence there are some fundamental changes to this bill that give us a great deal of discomfort and one is around the appointment process. So essentially what we've ended up with is moving from a single governor with wide-ranging powers to one where we've now got a board that is essentially appointed by the Minister of Finance without any real criteria as to how those people should be appointed and what skill sets. All we know is what they shouldn't be able to do like be an undischarged bankrupt. But that's one level of oversight now by the Minister and of course the board that is appointed by the Minister now has the role of making a recommendation around the governor which of course is subject to oversight by the Minister and of course we've got the all-important monetary policy committee again with ministerial oversight. So this whole issue of independence has been cut through and degraded because now there's a significant amount of oversight with the Reserve Bank particularly where appointees to the bank board could now be very much ex-politicians and all those unfavourable things that we wouldn't want to see creeping into the appointment process around the board. So that's one issue around the lack of independence. If we're talking about trying to achieve clause 168 I think that's the first strike of a bow that says that well actually this piece of legislation doesn't help that. We've talked about the remit process and I think that is a very significant thing in terms of the way the Minister has oversight in terms of the remit. In the context of the Minister's opening statement about protecting independence we agree with that but I'm not sure that we agree with the approach of it and that's why most of the five Supplementary Order Papers that have been put up are dealing with the issue of independence and making sure we are protecting it. What we're seeing with this second of three—we haven't yet seen the third piece of legislation coming through—is what other changes will be made that will undermine the independence of the Reserve Bank.
Woodhouse MichaelHon MICHAEL WOODHOUSE (National): I couldn't resist a chuckle when the Minister Grant Robertson was describing what Part 4 did in the context of clause 168 where he quoted the section safeguarding the independence of the bank. Because actually subclause 168(1) refers to the operational independence as it relates to a particular person or persons—that is the Minister can't direct the bank to go after individuals or groups of individuals which is absolutely right; that's not the Minister's role. But it is ironic in the extreme that he tends to reinforce the operational independence of the bank when the bill as a whole actually undermines that in my view. The simple question that National members have asked themselves in their consideration of their support for this bill was this: does the bill make stronger or weaker the operational independence of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand? And the answer is inevitably weaker". In fact Part 4 then goes on to list a number of ways in which the Minister of State Services and the Minister of Finance may give plenty of directions instructions remits and so on—that is a greater power than in the 1989 Act. So I point that out at Part 4 my mirth at the irony of the introductory remarks the Minister made which were in fact directed at protecting individuals and groups not his overall influence."
Robertson GrantHon GRANT ROBERTSON (Minister of Finance): Thank you very much Mr Chair. So Part 4 of the bill is around the operations of the bank. Again much of this is carried over from previous incarnations of the Reserve Bank Act. A very important clause for me is clause 168—the safeguarding of the independence of the bank—that has been consistent throughout the operation of the bank. And I do on a serious note want to underscore the fact that I do believe it is a genuinely held view of all members of this House that we do need to protect the independence of the bank. And to take up the offer made to me earlier on by Nicola Willis in terms of the Hansard that is an important thing for us to reiterate at this time.Over the years of the bank's operation it has evolved. Monetary policy has evolved. The responsibilities of the bank have evolved and increased. But that question of independence is important. The creation of the Reserve Bank Act in 1989 came from things that occurred in New Zealand in the first part of that decade. I think it is important for all members of the committee—and I'm not making a political point there I'm making an overall point that actually it is important for the committee to reiterate the importance of that.Otherwise the part looks at the role of the bank as an employer and indeed being a good employer. Questions around liability liability for the bank itself for those within the bank's operating models—so members of the board the monetary policy committee the governor and so on—how that liability is exercised how the bank deals with third parties in terms of its contracting process. We then have the process for the review of the bank and its operations and reasons why it can release information and then a set of miscellaneous conditions to allow the board the governor and other office holders to go about their work.
Sage Eugenie; Rurawhe AdrianHon EUGENIE SAGE (Green): Point of order Mr Chair. I seek your leave to correct the vote. It should be two votes against from the Māori Party.CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Leave is sought for that purpose. Is there any objection? There is none. The record will be adjusted. So the Ayes are 75 the Noes are 45 and Part 3 still stands part.
Rurawhe AdrianPart 4 Operation of Reserve BankCHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Members we now come to—Hon Eugenie Sage: Mr Chair. I seek—CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): —taihoa—the debate on Part 4. This debate is on clauses 168 to 199 which relate to the operation of the Reserve Bank. The question is that Part 4 stand part.
Rurawhe AdrianCHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): If no one wants a call I'm going to put the question. The question is that Andrew Bayly's amendment to Part 3 inserting new clause 118(4) set out on Supplementary Order Paper 48 be agreed to.Amendment not agreed to.
Henderson EmilyDr EMILY HENDERSON (Labour—Whangārei): I move That the question be now put.
Willis Nicola; Rurawhe AdrianNICOLA WILLIS (National): I want to change tack a little and talk about clause 151 which is about defacing bank notes. This is an interesting part of the Act which the Minister has chosen not to change in this modernisation. I just want to ask him a little more about that because I do remember being informed as a young person that it was in fact an offence for me to intentionally deface a bank note: to write on it to rip it any of that sort of thing. That is in fact the case in the bill we are debating here. I note—and for the purposes of all those who may be concerned that they have in the past written on a bank note and may now have broken the law and not been aware of that—that that offence does not apply if you have first sought permission from the Reserve Bank. But if you have committed the offence of defacing a bank note you are liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $2000. So you could be fined for drawing on a bank note.Now the interesting case in which this could occur of course is the artist who uses the $5 note in all its glory to create a mural or to do some such. The charity auction where someone signs a bank note and uses it for it. The interesting question I have for the Minister is why he thinks that should remain an offence. Because I think we can all understand that offence in the context of subclause (3) which says that if you are defacing or disfiguring the bank note and then intentionally using it to put in circulation or using it to demand payment or using it as a deposit then that's not quite right and I think that's fine. But did the Minister give any thought to the idea that defacing a bank note—if actually it's only for your own personal use or it's actually just for the purposes of raising money for a charity—and not intending for the bank note to be used legal tender in future should continue to be the case—should New Zealanders be very aware that if they write on a bank note tomorrow they are liable to a fine of $2000?CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Does someone want a call?
Bayly Andrew; Robertson GrantANDREW BAYLY (National—Port Waikato): Yeah I want to return to my Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 48. I just wanted to say that not one member from the Government side has actually stood up and addressed or debated any of the issues of the five SOPs that have been put up. I make that point quite deliberately because in returning to this SOP which would require the Minister if he or she put in place a new remit and it is at their discretion whether they did so they would be empowered to do so but it would only be subject to confirmable secondary legislation which effectively means it would have to be debated on the floor of the House.The Minister made the assertion before—look in his case he would negotiate with the Reserve Bank board because it is no longer probably with the Government there it's probably the board and then make a determination without any outside consultation. That goes through the House and if I understand what he was saying before that would then have the opportunity to be debated at the Finance and Expenditure Committee.What assurance can he give—because I'm not sure he can because there is nothing specified in the legislation or the proposed bill—that actually this would be properly debated first of all in the Finance and Expenditure Committee whether that involved any third parties particularly if the remit change affected a number of the banking sector as an example or perhaps some other organisations? And what is the opportunity in this House other than to ask questions of the Minister? Because otherwise we have a substantial change to the direction of the Reserve Bank premier financial institution and basically under this current arrangement it all happens and gets done and dusted without any form of debate.Hon GRANT ROBERTSON (Minister of Finance): I am literally repeating myself but the monetary policy remit is akin to the policy targets agreement that has been and was in operation in the earlier life of this piece of legislation. That is an agreement between the Government of the day and the Reserve Bank Governor. The opportunity for scrutiny does come through the parliamentary process. The Reserve Bank Governor and the monetary policy committee's decisions are debated at each and every term by the Finance and Expenditure Committee. The process of putting a remit together is clarified in this legislation. And this is I think the third or fourth time I've explained that to Mr Bayly that I don't believe the Order in Council process is commensurate and appropriate with the remit; it is commensurate and appropriate with the objectives therefore that is why that process is in there but is not when it comes to the remit. I don't think the change here is the characterisation that Mr Bayly has given it—it is simply just not correct.
Brownlee GerryHon GERRY BROWNLEE (National): Simple question that arises out of that explanation is: why is it then that clause 205A empowers the Minister to do that and not the board itself?Hon Grant Robertson: What clause sorry Mr Brownlee?Hon GERRY BROWNLEE: Well here's our problem you see. We're debating Part 2—Hon Grant Robertson: No we're not.Hon GERRY BROWNLEE: Part 3. We have a very important clause that I can see. And it might be technical it might be belts and braces but none the less it's there and it should be considered. But the effect of the bank's duty to comply with a direction given under 205A—so what the Minister has just outlined is that the board of the bank might determine that the monetary policy committee's approach to things is not 100 percent and therefore there needs to be a turning away from that. But the turning away from it is power of the Minister to direct the bank.Hon Grant Robertson: No.Hon GERRY BROWNLEE: Well how's that work? Why is it saying then that the direction is given under 205A if the board is unable under clause 45 to exercise its duties?Hon GRANT ROBERTSON (Minister of Finance): No so—thank you. So I simply didn't hear the number of the clause; that was the reason I asked the member for clarification. So again what clause 205A does is allow the Minister power to direct the bank relating to the minimum level of capital and financial risk management. The matter we were debating earlier on with Mr Bayly that would be a material matter in terms of whether or not the bank was able to meet all of its duties and it would be theoretically possible that the monetary policy committee could take a decision that would impact upon an already agreed minimum level of capital for example.
Smith Damien; Robertson GrantDAMIEN SMITH (ACT): With regards to efficiency ACT believes we should be reinserting this concept. Fundamentally it was based on making the Reserve Bank better. It would be a measure of how well the financial system performs its functions thereby contributing to what we hope is a sustainable and productive economy. So it doesn't make sense to me that there isn't some sort of formulation reflecting efficiency in that sense. ACT believes that it should be an objective in itself not merely an analytical consideration and we'd just like to get your thoughts on that please.Hon GRANT ROBERTSON (Minister of Finance): This is in Part 2 of the bill. The objectives were covered in clause 9. Part 3 of the bill does not cover those matters. I've also explained that to the member in the debate we had not today but the previous time we were debating Part 2.
Robertson GrantHon GRANT ROBERTSON (Minister of Finance): The member has hit on the very point that I made in my first intervention here and we discussed this with Mr Brownlee earlier on for the reason why clause 121 is how it is. And as I said to Mr Brownlee earlier in one form or another clause 121 has existed in the Reserve Bank Act since it began although not utilised. The point being that the appropriateness of the Order in Council process for this is because that is about the amendment of the objectives of the Act. So for a period of time not exceeding 12 months you can actually and have always been able to amend the objectives of the Act. The difference for clause 118 is that is about the remit which is the operationalisation of the way in which the Government of the day and the Reserve Bank give effect to the monetary policy aspects of the bank's work.As I said in one of my earlier interventions a way of helping explain to members of the committee is that the monetary policy remit is effectively the new generation of the policy targets agreement. Bill English or Michael Cullen or Ministers before then all went about their business of negotiating a policy targets agreement with the bank and publishing it—that's what they did. That is essentially the same process that happens with the remit. As I have already said in my earlier calls what you end up then with having the Order in Council process in addition to the normal remit process is effectively two remits issued by two different people: the Governor-General or the Minister of Finance. Actually the best place for the Order in Council process as is appropriate is at the objectives level of legislation not at the monetary policy remit which is the operationalisation element of it.In terms of the other interventions that have been made I'll simply be repeating myself that there is ample opportunity for oversight of the work of the monetary policy committee through the Finance and Expenditure Committee who do it every single time.Andrew Bayly: That's all.Hon GRANT ROBERTSON: And Mr Bayly I again take you back to the fact that this is not what Bill English did with the policy targets agreement; there wasn't a parliamentary moment for that. This is an arrangement between the Government of the day and the Reserve Bank Governor for how they are going to express the ability for the bank to go about its monetary policy work. That is how it has been; that is how it now is. There is opportunity for oversight. There is also the advice that the bank must provide on a five-yearly basis and if the Minister is going to alter the remit they have to consult with the monetary policy committee before doing so. This is the similar process we've had for a very long time. The anomaly was the introduction of the Order in Council process which we now don't deem to be necessary.
Willis NicolaNICOLA WILLIS (National): I want to draw the committee's attention to clause 118 of Part 3 the remit for the monetary policy committee because it's important I think that the committee understands that this part of the bill changed during the select committee process. As introduced to the House by the Minister the bill required the Reserve Bank to provide advice to the Minister of Finance before the Minister could issue a remit to the monetary policy committee. As originally presented to the House the bill required that we deduce—because it was believed that that would allow for a comprehensive consultation process that would ensure a well-informed monetary policy remit. The bill now as the committee examines it as reported back by the Finance and Expenditure Committee—on which of course there are a majority of Government members—provides for the Minister to issue a remit without first receiving that advice.So this is a significant change. My colleagues have referred to the implications of this have constructively provided an alternative mechanism which could be used to fill the gap. But my question for the Minister is: what is the reason for the change from the way he introduced the bill to the way it is now? Why did he see fit to remove that consultation requirement? If he could elucidate on that reasoning I think it would be very helpful because this is a significant matter. The monetary policy remit in many ways is at the heart of what the Reserve Bank does. It has incredibly far reaching implications for the economy; for example as amended by that Minister it currently requires the support of the maximum sustainable employment level. There has been much debate about what that means and whether that has encouraged a more expansionary policy from the Reserve Bank whether it has potentially allowed it to have lower interest rates for longer and the ramifications of that. So it is a very significant remit. It has significant implications in terms of price stability and inflation levels. The change from requiring consultation to not requiring consultation is significant in that broader context.I also want to highlight an apparent contradiction I think which is that clause 121 of Part 3 is quite specific in that it allows the Governor-General on advice of the Minister to direct the monetary policy committee to formulate monetary policy for one or more economic objectives for a particular period of time. So for 12 months to say Well here's a particular thing you're required to achieve over the next 12 months." and it gives the Minister that power. But tellingly in subclause (4) when the Minister exercises that power he is required to make an Order in Council—the Order in Council is viewed as secondary legislation that is set out explicitly. I think it's interesting that the Minister thinks that constraint is appropriate for that section for clause 121 where he's setting out a short term objective but is not necessary for clause 118 in departure from how this bill was originally drafted and I would invite his comments."
Bayly AndrewANDREW BAYLY (National—Port Waikato): Oh I was waiting for the Minister to stand up and answer that question but—Hon Grant Robertson: I've already answered it.ANDREW BAYLY: Hmm. Well interesting.So I think my colleague just made a very good point—this was a late addition by the officials to grant the Minister the power to issue a remit without benefit of a consultation process. So therefore we don't really know how people in the banking sector particularly view this—other than what we've heard subsequently and in an anecdotal sense. But I think the Minister's response before is conflating two things: one is there is a normal remit process driven by the Reserve Bank to change if they so wish on a five-yearly basis. If it wants to change a remit it goes through a proper process that involves extensive consultation before it comes to the Minister. Now that is set down laid out understood and subject to wide consultation. The process for that is fine and we do not have an issue with that process because it is one that follows a prescribed arrangement or framework.This Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 48 in my name is dealing with the occasional use—and the Minister's used it once equivalently under section 68B where the Minister chooses to make a change to the policy remit of the Reserve Bank. It is not subject to any outside consultation. It may be negotiated between the Reserve Bank and the Minister but it's not subject to any other outside consultation and I'm not sure that it actually be subject to any select committee processes either. So what this SOP is saying is if that is the situation—and hopefully it's used very sparingly—the Minister should still be entitled and able to do that if he or she so wishes. But if they use it in that extreme circumstance then that change should be debated on the floor of this House. Because it's extraordinary it's unused and it's not subject to any other oversight.Now the Minister says it will be subject to discussion with the next select committee. It may be but as the Minister well knows the select committees are controlled by the party in power and the opportunity to debate this may be actually quite limited. So what this bill has been very clear about is: if you want to do it that's fine—as the Minister that's fine. But make sure it goes through a parliamentary process. And what we are talking about is confirmable secondary legislation which means it can be implemented quickly but it just must be subject to debate on the floor of the House so it's very transparent and everyone can see that the Minister made the change—because not everyone follows regulations and all that sort of stuff and knows exactly what goes on in Government. It's explicit. It's debated here. It's confirmed and obviously the Minister from the party that controls Parliament and it will be passed. But at least people have the opportunity to debate it publicly on the floor of Parliament which I think is the proper way to do this type of change to our most esteemed and significant financial institution in this land.
Woodhouse MichaelHon MICHAEL WOODHOUSE (National): Thank you Mr Chair. I thank the Minister for that response. I should make it very clear: my concern is not that this House has oversight over the Reserve Bank my concern is that this House has oversight of the executive and the Minister of Finance. That creeping influence that we are seeing by some of the changes in this bill does give me cause for concern. Not of the individual who holds that warrant right now—mostly at the moment—but of future Labour Ministers of Finance who may not act in a way that's consistent with the arm's length. I want to know actually what changed between this bill being introduced—and actually I don't think the recommended changes—if memory serves me we weren't able to have submissions on this point because the amendment that we are talking about only came through officials to the committee after the select committee submissions process had been concluded. So my question is: what changed? What was the problem the executive is trying to solve with the amendments that were confirmed in the second reading but through which we seek to improve through Mr Bayly's Supplementary Order Paper? Because it's still not clear to me what problem we are trying to solve and why we are so concerned at the degree of oversight of the executive.
Doocey MattMATT DOOCEY (Senior Whip—National): Point of order. Mr Chair we're in a bit of position here where the question was put before all the Supplementary Order Papers (SOPs) were discussed and debated. So we have SOP 48 in the name of my colleague Andrew Bayly which is for Part 2. We've now voted on Part 2 and we won't be able to debate SOP 48. My understanding is that—CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Yeah I'm on my feet. OK I accepted the closure motion based on my watching the entire debate—[Interruption] Excuse me? Have you got something to say?—and as far as I'm concerned all members of the committee had ample opportunity to debate every single SOP as well the entirety of Part 2. We are now on Part 3. That part is over.MATT DOOCEY (Senior Whip—National): Speaking to that point of order Mr Chair.CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Are you taking a point of order? A new one?MATT DOOCEY: Yeah just speaking to that point of order—CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): No no. I made a ruling.MATT DOOCEY: Is the ruling now that we won't speak to SOPs?CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Are you taking a new point of order?MATT DOOCEY: Well I was speaking to that point of order.CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): No you made a point of order I have made a ruling that's the end of it.
Rurawhe AdrianPart 3 Central bank functionsCHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Members we now come to Part 3. This is the debate on clauses 112 to 167 and Part 1 of Schedule 3 which relate to central bank functions. The question is that Part 3 stand part.
Bayly AndrewANDREW BAYLY (National—Port Waikato): Thank you. See this is what I find fascinating because the Minister says Oh that one little statement—that covers it all." but we can have in clause 30 all the reasons why you can't be on the board: a person who is a member of the monetary policy committee an employee or a subsidiary of the bank someone who's an undischarged bankrupt someone who is prohibited from being a director or promoter someone subject to a property order someone who's incapacitated someone who's involved in a crime of dishonesty someone who's been convicted within the past five years. So it just goes on relentlessly on why you can't. The one thing that's missing is it should be saying that you can't be a politician but that's not even on it. So that would be the first part if you wanted to go down to clause 30 Minister. But the view that you might take as the Minister of Finance may be different from the next Minister of Finance and why not be absolutely explicitly clear about the minimum requirements of what should be the requirements for someone sitting on that board? If the current Minister's interpretation is one that he wishes to place weight on certain aspects which may be wider diversity or whatever it may be as opposed to making sure we've got a majority of core skills—because this is now an executive board. This is no longer just a governance board. This is an executive board that has to actually deal with really meaty problems and actually think about and understand macro-prudential policy and monetary policy very well and all the interlocking things that go—maybe the insurance industry. We haven't even put that in the list here. Key parts of the functions—how do we know even the weighting that the Minister might even put on these? All we've got is one statement which says "The Minister may only recommend a person who in the Minister's opinion"—gee depending on who that is—"has the appropriate knowledge skills and experience to assist the Bank to achieve its objectives". That is such a floater of a statement. What Supplementary Order Paper 47 suggests and what I suggest is that you should at least set a minimum requirement of the expertise and at least some of the skills that you want on that board because potentially if you lost the plot Minister we could end up with a range of people on this board—an executive board of the Reserve Bank—that actually may not be appropriate at all."
Rurawhe AdrianCHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Ka te rā tēnā rā tātou katoa. Members the committee is resumed. Before the dinner break we were debating the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bill and we are on Part 2.
Bayly AndrewANDREW BAYLY (National—Port Waikato): Look I won't perpetuate this argument because we've got another four Supplementary Order Papers to work our way through but it's interesting that the Minister didn't answer the question. I think if you go back to the original proposition Minister Robertson you said that you wanted to create a lasting piece of legislation that would extend over 30 years. I think the very extent of what we've just talked about—COVID actually may occur again in the next foreseeable future or a different version of it. We've had the Asian crisis we've had so many crises over the last 30 years that this is actually something to be expected and should be anticipated in the bill and if you hadn't had that agreement why wouldn't we put that into a bill knowing what you've just been through? That's the key crucial point.The second point and I will just say there is a difference between controlling what the bank does—and no one even from our side believes that we should be getting into how the bank performs its role. This is about putting in a financial framework which as the Minister of Finance you have overall responsibility for the Government's balance sheet and it can have—CHAIRPERSON (Hon Jacqui Dean): Order! Order! No—don't bring the—ANDREW BAYLY: The Minister has overall responsibility for the Government's balance sheet and some of these matters particularly as we've seen with large-scale asset purchase is a considerable impost on that and it can lead to a huge increase. Yet the Minister seems intent on allowing the bank to just be able to do that under any circumstances.
Brooking RachelRACHEL BROOKING (Labour): Thank you Madam Chair. I move That the question be now put.
Robertson GrantHon GRANT ROBERTSON (Minister of Finance): Thank you Madam Chair. Just to respond briefly to Damien Smith's points and then the specific question that Mr Bayly asked.In terms of the broad sweep of Damien Smith's comments: firstly we covered this somewhat exhaustively in Part 1 of the bill which is that this is the product of a long period of consultation—the bill that is—and that it has been through several rounds of that as well as the select committee process. I agree it would have been preferable to have had consensus on it but the Government continues to believe that the changes we're making are important and have had a significant amount of and opportunity for public input. In terms of the very specific point the member made about not mentioning inflation just to be aware that section 8 of the Act has never done that. It's always talked about price stability and so it's never used the word particularly. It's important that that is understood by everybody involved in the way in which the Act works to mean inflation but we haven't changed that element of the language in the previous Act or indeed in this bill here.In terms of Mr Bayly's question in terms of the clarification I sought for clause 205A—in particular subclause (2)(c)—the ability to set out the Minister's expectations as to the bank's financial risk management would cover the material in the issues that the member is concerned about. So that would be in the hands of the Minister of the day to make that decision and also we can define capital via subclause (2)(a). So my view is it strikes the right balance. I respect the fact that's not the member's view but we do think it's got the right balance of us being able to set parameters as a Government and have the bank operate independently.
Dean JacquiRESERVE BANK OF NEW ZEALAND BILLIn CommitteeDebate resumed from 29 June.Part 2 Reserve Bank of New Zealand (continued)CHAIRPERSON (Hon Jacqui Dean): Members we come now to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bill. When we were last in committee on this bill we were considering Part 2 the debate on clauses 8 to 111 and Schedule 2 and Part 2 of Schedule 3 which provide for the continuation of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The question is that Part 2 stand part.
Edmonds BarbaraBARBARA EDMONDS (Associate Whip—Labour): I move That the committee report progress presently and move to consider the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bill.Motion agreed to.Progress to be reported.