English Bill: Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill — First Reading 
English Bill: Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill — First Reading 
[Volume:628;Page:564] 
Hon BILL ENGLISH (National—Clutha-Southland) 
: 
 It is so disappointing that the Parliament finds itself again debating the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill. When Parliament passed the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act back in the first term of the current Government I was relieved it had an expiry clause so this abomination on the Parliament would come to an end. It did but we did not realise just how self-serving the new Government arrangements would be that have given rise to the agreement between Labour and New Zealand First to bring this Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill to the House.  
I contend that this bill is a cynical use of power by the executive. In Parliament now we have this strange situation where the executive accords itself a wide-ranging flexibility for the arrangements that it makes in order to keep itself in power. So we have this innovative and entrepreneurial arrangement between Labour and Mr Peters—and Mr Dunne to be fair—whereby they can function in quite an unprecedented way. They can be Ministers in the Government and Opposition in the Parliament. They have to follow collective responsibility in their portfolio areas but they are not bound by collective responsibility in any other area.  
So the executive has kept to itself all the advantages of the flexibility of the New Zealand constitution. It is exploiting that flexibility and it has some grand talk about what it is doing. It says that MMP is developing; that we are coming up with new conventions; let us just say that everyone agrees with the Government arrangement that has been put together. I certainly do not and the National Party does not agree with that arrangement because fundamentally it lacks integrity. But we accept that it will be put to the test by the pressures of government and then it will be put to the test by the next election. However that flexibility is something that Helen Clark and Winston Peters want to make very sure is not available to any member of this Parliament. So they want a set of rules for the executive that are endlessly flexible and totally open-ended so they can make whatever arrangement they like to suit themselves but they want to make absolutely sure that the representatives in the House—elected by the people—do not have it.  
The executive is not elected by the people; it is elected either by the Labour Party caucus in the case of the Labour Party or selected by the leader in the case of the National Party. I am not quite sure how the Greens would do it; and I hesitate to even imagine it! The executive is not elected by the people but the MPs are. That is what is so wrong with this legislation. The executive unelected has decided to make whatever rules it likes to suit itself but those who were elected by the people—the MPs right through this Parliament—are going to be prevented from making what would be an extreme decision and that is to leave their party and thereby disturb the proportionality of Parliament.  
Let us just think about the consequences in this Parliament of different people making the sorts of decisions that this legislation is aimed at. If an MP leaves a party within the Opposition and stays in the Opposition sure it does disturb the proportionality of Parliament but it does not make any difference to the Government; it does not change any of the decisions that it is making. In this Parliament with the arrangements that are in place an MP can leave one of the governing parties—the New Zealand First Party or United Future or Labour—and cross to the Opposition and it does not make any difference to what is going to happen in the Parliament under the current arrangements. So this bill will stop that from happening whereas it does not make any difference.  
Let us see what would make a difference. Say for example Mr Winston Peters decides to leave the Government. Well that might bring it down it might cause an election. Certainly he will leave the Government; it is just a matter of time. That could bring the Government down and cause a change of Government or cause an election—the two things can happen separately. But both are from the point of view of voters fairly drastic results. There are pretty important consequences from that.  
Is Parliament going to pass any legislation that says: “Once you’ve signed a confidence agreement you must keep it for the term of office.”? No we are not even though that is the measure that would make the biggest difference to the stability of government. Why do we not do it? We do not because we believe that it is better that those arrangements are tested by the pressures of government by the flow of public opinion and by the scrutiny of Parliament and the media. We know that under those pressures those arrangements generally fail. They did between 1996 and 1999 a couple of times and in fact they did before 1996. They failed between 1999 and 2002 and I will come back to that. They did not fail in the last term of office and Peter Dunne paid the price and he feels very sorry for himself because of it. And they will fail this time because it is Winston Peters.  
Those arrangements do stand the test of political reality and that is what should happen for MPs who leave their party. They should stand the test of the political reality of an election. What we do know is that any New Zealand MP who becomes an Independent loses. Those people are never seen again. That is pretty harsh punishment. They get dealt to.  
The other point about this legislation is that if members want to get around it they can. I can recall the absurdity of Jim Anderton sitting in the House saying: “I am leader of the Alliance in the House and leader of the Progressives outside the House.” Do members know what is so cunning about this legislation? It is that only the leader of a party can get away with it because he or she cannot put in the letter. The leader of a party can get away with it and Jim Anderton did. So leaders of parties can get around this legislation. Is not that ironic? Helen Clark and Winston Peters two party leaders who want to take every political advantage of flexibility of our constitution that they can in order to form a Government and maintain executive power then present the Parliament with legislation that only party leaders can avoid the consequences of because they do not put in the letter. We know this from the historical record because Jim Anderton did it. He was the leader of one party in the House and the leader of another party outside the House.  
I notice Government members quoting the Supreme Court in support of this legislation. The Supreme Court made a decision in the context of the legislation that was on the books. It would be quite wrong to read Sir Kenneth Keith’s opinion as being supportive of the legislation. That is our job to decide. He had no choice but to render a judgment on it and in the terms of the legislation he rendered a wise judgment. But it is not to support the legislation.  
So that is what is wrong with this legislation. It gives privilege to the executive. It takes from MPs privileges the executive have kept which is the ability to make their own decisions about their own destiny—as Winston Peters will and we know that. Doug Woolerton knows that too. The day will come. But Doug Woolerton cannot leave his party. Winston Peters can leave the Government for political reasons but Doug Woolerton cannot leave his party. Is not that just ridiculous? This is stealing from the representatives of the people the fundamental longstanding and deeply held privileges of representation. That is what it did in the Government’s last term in office and it is to my great regret that this Government the Government of New Zealand has decided now to remove those privileges forever because there is no wind-out clause in this legislation.