Clendon DavidDAVID CLENDON (Green): I would just like to speak to one specific point which is new clause 36A in particular subclause (4). The majority report from the Social Services Committee indicated that there should be a new clause 36A which we hope will ease the Attorney-General's concerns." We all want our Attorney-General to sleep well at night. The specific concerns expressed by the Attorney-General were in respect of the lifelong reporting obligations that can be imposed on people who are captured under this legislation. The Attorney-General deemed that this was inconsistent with section 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act which is the right not to be subjected to disproportionately severe treatment or punishment. The Attorney-General said that he considered that registration and reporting obligations constitute a punishment—so after a person has been tried convicted sentenced and completed a sentence nevertheless we are going to impose further punishment on them. He suggested that placing registrable offenders on a register was not in itself disproportionate but the fact that in the original drafting of the bill there was no mechanism ever for a person to have their name removed from that register was disproportionate. So new clause 36A does address that. I should say that similar concerns were expressed by the Human Rights Commission which said that "lifelong [Child Sex Offender Register] registration which may be invoked retrospectively and without the possibility of independent review constitutes disproportionately severe treatment." So there are two fairly high-powered comments that we really ought to have some means for people to extract themselves from this register. Clause 36A was inserted for that reason but what it unfortunately does under subclause (4) is: "The court may make an order indefinitely suspending the reporting obligations of the offender only if the offender satisfies the court that he or she does not pose a risk to the lives or sexual safety of 1 or more children or of children generally." In other words it is a reverse onus of proof. It is incumbent on an individual to prove their innocence rather than for corrections or police or anybody else to demonstrate that there is an ongoing serious risk. That is unfortunate wording. It is an unfortunate reversal of the usual expectation that the prosecuting body if you like—in this case it is the police corrections whoever—would not be obliged to prove that a particular individual continues to represent significant risk for children but rather the onus is on the individual to prove their innocence. I think that is back to front. I do not think that is appropriate at all. It does say that the police and corrections may make submission. If a person applies—I should make the point they may not make such an application until at least 15 years have gone by at which point if they are unsuccessful in their application in the normal course of events they must wait at least another 5 years before they can make a similar application. It just seems to be wrong that a person who has not reoffended for a period of 15 years after release from prison is nevertheless obliged to demonstrate innocence. I really wonder how you can do that. How can any of us prove to the satisfaction of a court that tomorrow we are not going to go out and offend in some way large or small? I find it difficult to think of how one would construct such an argument. An argument of innocence against a charge that you are guilty is one thing but proof of innocence I think sets too high a bar and to me it is most unlikely in fact to satisfy the concerns expressed by the Attorney-General or indeed by the Human Rights Commission. Thank you I will leave it there."