Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill — Second Reading Instruction to Committee In Committee Third Reading 
Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill — Second Reading Instruction to Committee In Committee Third Reading 
[Volume:616;Page:12273] 
Tuesday 30 March 2004 
( 
continued on Thursday 1 April 2004 
) 
Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill 
Second Reading 
Debate resumed. 
LINDSAY TISCH (National—Piako) 
: 
 Last night I mentioned that National supports this bill. It is a very important piece of legislation. But what I was concerned about was that this bill had its genesis 2 years ago when it had its first reading and then went to the Law and Order Committee and yet it has only now surfaced again in the House 2 years later in 2004. That is in my view an absolute insult given the importance of this legislation. This is an important bill and we support it. 
Hon Dr Michael Cullen 
: Good. 
LINDSAY TISCH 
: But I make the point to the member that although we support the bill it should have come back to us at least 2 years ago instead of sitting around. We know of the problems in the world today with regard to terrorism. In fact if we were to look in today’s  
Dominion Post 
 in the world section we would see the headline “Foiled—the terror bombers of suburbia”. So what we see around the world whether it be in Madrid in Bali or in other areas like the Philippines is that terrorism is at its height—and it is growing. 
While we may think that here in New Zealand we are geographically isolated and that nothing will ever happen to us a Government that has its mind on the issue of terrorism should be protecting its citizens. The primary role of any Government is to protect its citizens and what this bill does is to allow the surveillance organisations to be able to intercept telecommunications legally. I note the commentary on the bill and I will quote from it because there are some misconceptions about what the bill does. The commentary on the bill under the heading “Background” states: “The bill does not change or extend in any way the existing powers of surveillance agencies to intercept communications.” It also states: “This legislation is necessary to prevent law enforcement and national security capability being seriously eroded because of technical issues related to telecommunications networks.” So the bill will plug the loopholes in order to make sure that we do have effective intelligence systems and that our surveillance capabilities are the best in the world and will be kept up to date with the changes in technology. 
September 11 the Bali bombing the recent Madrid bombings the bomb materials found just recently in London by the anti-terrorist squad and the point I made about the headline in the  
Dominion Post 
 today all show that terrorism threats around the world are growing and they could come very close to home. I am sure that all New Zealanders will support this bill. The Government’s primary role as I mentioned before is to make sure we are vigilant and do have in place the methodologies needed to be able to legally intercept any communications that may be to the detriment of our country and people. The bill will allow the law enforcement agencies—that is the surveillance agencies—to have that capability and we need to support that. One of the problems we currently face is that some digital and Internet technologies do not permit the monitoring of communications and information where necessary with the interception technology that we have. Many New Zealanders have digital phones; probably every member in this House has a digital phone. They are very common and we want to make sure they do not become a serious threat to society. 
Our telecommunications industry must be able to legally intercept illegal communications. That in essence is what this bill provides for. The police the Security Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau must have at their disposal the valuable tools provided for in this legislation to legally intercept communications. National is happy to support this bill. 
DAVID PARKER (Labour—Otago) 
: 
 I rise in support of this bill. This bill does not make it any easier for the police or the Security Intelligence Service etc. to get interception warrants. But it does mean that when those authorities get their warrants telecommunication providers will have a duty to assist them and will have the technical capability to intercept calls that are passing over their networks. I commend this bill to the House. 
KEITH LOCKE (Green) 
: 
 The Green Party will be opposing this bill as it has done previously. We do not see the need to grant these powers to the police and the intelligence agencies at this time. No objective case has been made either in terms of this bill or of the other bill that authorises such interceptions—the Crimes Amendment Bill (No 6) which passed through the House a year or so ago—that we would catch many more criminals be they terrorists or anyone else through the exercise of these powers. In our opinion the downside is much greater than the upside. No one doubts that by having greater surveillance be it electronic interception cameras in the streets or whatever else it is we could catch more criminals. But we have to make an objective analysis of the situation. With any advance in surveillance or security powers we have to analyse whether the downside with regard to issues of privacy and civil liberties is greater than the upside. We believe the downside is greater than the upside. 
The argument being advanced so far in the debate by several speakers including the last is that we live in a new era of terrorism. Unfortunately Ron Mark basically said that if the Greens were affected by terrorism they would think differently from how they do. I thought I would start at that point. Just over 20 years ago on 27 March 1984 I was living in Wellington and was on my way down the Petone motorway to go to a meeting of the Wellington Trades Council where I was a delegate from the railway workers union. On my car radio I heard about a bombing at the Wellington Trades Hall. One of the people I expected to see at that meeting was the caretaker of the hall Ernie Abbott whom I knew well and talked to a lot. When I arrived at the meeting I heard that he had been blown up by a terrorist bomb. 
The second incident—there have been only two terrorist incidents in New Zealand over the last few decades—occurred on 10 July 1985. Friends of mine had come in on the  
Rainbow Warrior 
. They were active in the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement and I knew that other friends of mine were visiting the  
Rainbow Warrior 
. I was living in Auckland at that time and when I heard that there had been a bomb on the  
Rainbow Warrior 
 I was very fearful for their safety. So the idea that people in this House and myself in particular are not aware of the problems of terrorism and of its effects on those closest to us is quite wrong. I think what needs to be borne in mind is that those two incidents of terrorism were terrorist acts against left-wing and progressive people. The idea that people of my political persuasion are not on the receiving end of those things and do not understand them is completely wrong. 
We hear talk that we are not in a benign strategic environment and that there is a whole new era of terrorism but we need to look objectively at the situation. We need to look at Australia where there has not been recent terrorism but there is a history of terrorism. Terrorism was much more prevalent in Australia in an earlier period—particularly that committed by some Croatian neo-fascists who set off a whole lot of bombs. If we look at the other countries that have been mentioned we see that there have been some very dramatic terrorist acts over the last year or two particularly those in Spain in Bali and on September 11. In the cases of Madrid and Bali because of the placement of the bombs there was horrific loss of life which we have all been very sad about. We have been pleased that the Bali bombers have been brought to justice and we hope that the Madrid bombers will be as well. 
 If we look historically at the incidence of terrorism in Spain we see that in earlier periods it has been much higher than it is currently particularly with regard to the ETA bombings and historically in Indonesia the incidence of bombing was much greater before September 11 2001. In Britain the incidence of terrorist bombings was historically much greater throughout the Irish Republican Army period. Looking at Europe as a whole we see that with the Red Army faction of the Baader-Meinhof gang the Red Brigades and all the rest of it there was a much greater incidence of bombings in an earlier period. Leaving September 11 aside the interesting thing about the United States is that the period from 1998 until now has been a historic low point in terms of terrorism compared with earlier periods when there were the Symbionese Liberation Army people bombing Oklahoma and the Weather Underground Organization people etc. So the idea that we are in a new age of terrorism is statistically false. That is not to say that there is not a problem particularly one generated by concerns in the Islamic world and in extremist sections of the Islamic community but the idea that one has to have these powers now is incorrect. 
When talking about a benign strategic environment one must first examine where the problem is of countries going around and invading and occupying other countries. The prime problem with the world today is that there is only one country the United States together with its allies doing that. Unfortunately New Zealand is being dragged along with the United States in one instance. The United States had invaded and occupied Afghanistan and Iraq. That is the cause of a lot of the upset that exists throughout the Islamic world which unfortunately gives some of the Islamic extremists a degree of support for the horrific actions they carry out. One has to remove the cause of terrorism and particularly to address the cause that has been highlighted over the last week: the continuing occupation of Palestinian lands by Israel. That has been a running sore and has caused a lot of the terrorism we have seen over the last decades. In fact Palestinian terrorism in earlier times was internationalised. That occurred at the Munich Olympics and in a lot of aircraft hijackings. In order to really root out the international forms of terrorism by small groups and non-State actors one has to deal with the underlying problem in the Middle East region rather than be part of the problem by for instance sending the New Zealand SAS back to Afghanistan. 
New Zealand is involved in electronic surveillance already particularly through the Waihopai Valley tracking station near Blenheim which is part of the US-led Echelon five-nation network. What has that involved us in? It has involved us in very nefarious activities. It was exposed recently that the network had spied on Kofi Annan and other UN officials and there were reports in the Australian media that New Zealand had received a transcript of one of those interceptions of Kofi Annan. Unfortunately the Government has pleaded the need for secrecy on security matters as a reason for not reporting to the House whether that is true. I think what that issue and the whole issue of Waihopai which now links up with Echelon shows is that the use of electronic interception is part of New Zealand being an intelligence dependency of particularly the United States and alongside it of Britain Australia and Canada. 
The explanatory note on Supplementary Order Paper 197 with regard to this bill which has just been put forward and which members will talk about later shows again that there is unwarranted interception through Waihopai—that is interception without a warrant. That is explicitly allowed in this bill and it is very dangerous because it means that we can be involved in such things as spying on Kofi Annan or—this also became public about a year ago—the National Security Agency issuing instructions to its overseas partners such as those in Britain and presumably in New Zealand to launch spying on UN delegates—particularly on those from countries that were believed to be wavering on a United Nations resolution prior to the American invasion of Iraq. For us to be involved in that sort of thing by using the electronic intelligence this bill authorises and puts into practical effect would be quite wrong. We know that electronic intelligence is used for nefarious purposes and that the intelligence agencies themselves are very untrustworthy. 
There is huge debate going on in Britain in Australia and in the United States in particular about the way in which intelligence is being altered and manufactured. That can be done very easily with regard to electronic intelligence. The material coming through into computers can be altered manufactured and reinterpreted very easily. So that is a very dangerous road to go down when the New Zealand intelligence agencies and to an extent the police are in a dependent relationship with such overseas agencies. 
Hon KEN SHIRLEY (Deputy Leader—ACT) 
: 
 The ACT party will be supporting the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill but it is a qualified support. There are many aspects of this bill that are not desirable and in an ideal world they certainly would not be our preference because they do impinge on civil liberties and freedoms. But we have come to the conclusion that in the troubled world we are now in with the international terrorism we face these measures are on balance necessary and therefore we support them. However in supporting them we always want to be assured—and we seek assurance—that adequate checks and balances are in place so that our freedoms and individual liberty can be upheld to the greatest extent possible. 
Mr Locke from the Green Party who has just resumed his seat made some very interesting points. He raised the issue of the bombing at Wellington Trades Hall that killed Ernie Abbott many years ago. It was a tragedy and a murderous act but it was probably undertaken by a deranged individual or by someone who was acting individually with malice. What we have in the world today is warfare. It is no longer conducted by State nation against State nation but rather by determined terrorists who are highly organised and well funded and who are deliberately attacking what they perceive as Western values and the concepts of international free trade. 
The interception of telecommunications in our modern high-tech world is important. All nations of the Western World do such interceptions and it is important that we have cooperation and the exchange of information. If anything I regret that this country is out of the intelligence loop and is on the fringe of it. We are out of the main intelligence loop because of this Government’s position on foreign affairs matters and security issues. That is regrettable because it does expose us to threats that we may not otherwise be exposed to. While our Prime Minister may think we live in a strategically benign region that is not the case. There has been the Bali bombing and there is an unstable situation throughout Melanesia and now in Polynesia. 
I believe the measure of screening phone calls the work that is done at Waihopai with the Echelon programme and other actions that cause so much angst to Mr Locke are on balance required and there are appropriate and proper checks and balances in place for that. We know that Osama bin Laden does not carry a cellphone any more. He is probably holed up somewhere on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and time is running out for him. But if it were not for the level of monitoring of cellphone information and traffic he would still be running his operation freely and using his cellphone to talk to his operatives around the world. So that is just one rather graphic example of the need for these forms of monitoring. 
Again Mr Locke raised the issue of the 10 July 1985 tragedy of the  
Rainbow Warrior 
. Yes that was an act of terrorism. It was an act of terrorism committed against the sovereign State of New Zealand by another Government in fact. But we should bear in mind that we caught the two General Directorate for External Security operatives—from memory I think that Prieur and Mafart were their names. Four people got away. If we had had proper cellphone monitoring—if cellphones had been used to the same extent in those days as they are now—would we possibly have caught the other four? That is the mirror image of the argument that Mr Locke put to us. Yes the bombing of the  
Rainbow Warrior 
 was a tragedy and yes it was an unlawful act. I think that France deeply regrets that act; it was caught and exposed for doing it. That was a criminal act by France back in 1985. 
Since that time the stakes have grown. We have had the Manhattan bombings of the World Trade Center and bombings in Bali Madrid and Baghdad. Just this week in the UK seven people I think were arrested with—I forget how many—tonnes of ammonia nitrate obviously for a very major bombing operation in the UK. My understanding is that they were caught substantially through the monitoring of cellphone traffic. In our modern high-tech world we have to weigh up on the one hand the question of an impingement on civil liberties against the fact on the other hand that without security we cannot have freedom. We have the incredible irony that we cannot have security without freedom and we cannot have freedom without security. That is the exact situation we are facing. It is really on considering that balance that the ACT party lends its support to this bill. 
MARC ALEXANDER (United Future) 
: 
 I rise on behalf of United Future to talk about the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill. But before I go to some of the substance of it I would like to address some of the concerns raised yesterday by the honourable Simon Power who questioned the duplicity of this Government for arguing about the requirement for such a bill given Labour’s insistence on New Zealand’s benign strategic environment. 
Simon Power 
: That’s right. Good point. 
MARC ALEXANDER 
: It is a very good point. To partly address it I would like to say that although we were given advice that yes New Zealand is still in a benign strategic environment underlying that is a sense of unease about the way the world is progressing. Whether we like it or not we will be dragged into the net of worldwide terrorism. If we look at it it is no coincidence that it came up recently in the news media that the second most powerful member of al-Qaeda might have slipped into New Zealand on two occasions. So for whatever reason we are caught up in the net of international terrorism. We have not yet been attacked but I do not share the optimism of the Green spokesperson Keith Locke that we are living in a benign strategic environment. All I say to him is simply that we have a troubled world and Keith Locke is probably the most appropriate person to talk about that point. In my opinion and given his views he is a troubled man speaking out in a troubled world. 
Speaking to the substance of the bill the bill is necessary—in fact it is essential if we are to ensure that law enforcement and our national security capability will not be compromised due to changes in technology. The bill places a legislative obligation on all telecommunications network operators to intercept communications when authorised to do so by a warrant from a lawful authority. The bill also imposes—in concert with the technological regime of interception—reasonable assistance to police the Government Communications Security Bureau and the SIS. It should be noted that although the bill gives those operators the capacity to intercept communications it does not expand the powers of the respective agencies that can make use of it. I think that is a vital point. It should also be pointed out that this legislation is not unique but puts us on a par with other nations such as the UK Germany our cousins the Australians across the ditch and the US. 
A question debated at some length during the Law and Order Committee process—a high-powered select committee process I might add under the sterling leadership of Martin Gallagher who with his razor mind corralled us into really understanding this bill—was who will pay? Although there was some debate regarding the amount and about how the apportionment was to be considered it will be the Government—or should I say the taxpayer—who will pay for the technological requirements imposed by the bill for existing fixed and mobile phone networks. There will be a phased implementation process to provide the industry with the opportunity to put in place the necessary changes. 
I suppose the real conundrum of the bill is the inevitable clash between the issues of law enforcement and the right to individual privacy. Somewhere somehow a balance must be struck and I believe that the bill in light of the very real threat to our security since 9/11 achieves that. The simple truth is that the right to individual privacy can only be guaranteed by having the ability to enforce our security and this bill is the means to do it. The rights to privacy that we in New Zealand value so highly should not be unduly threatened or compromised by this bill. At the same time we must not romanticise our privacy to the detriment of legitimate security concerns. 
I make mention of the other point not yet raised and it is that putting aside the international threats to our security one of the prime reasons that this bill is being put before us is to also combat the internal threat—the threat to security and safety posed by criminal organisations. A fundamental part of this bill now gives the technological advantage to police and security agencies so that they can access information against for example gangs and drug barons who use New Zealand as a way to profit from the P epidemic at the expense of the public and against the relationship those criminals have overseas in bringing these drugs into the country and organising criminal activities. United Future supports this bill as it properly balances the needs of internal security with our right to privacy. 
My last comment at this point is simply to suggest to those people who do not see a need for such a bill that they reflect on the fact that they now have the freedom to voice their concerns about so-called intrusions into their rights to privacy because we have put in place security measures to ensure that freedom in the first place. I find it very odd that individuals are against legislation of this sort. What would they replace it with? I am left only with the conclusion that they would replace the ability to guarantee our safety with such technological innovation with measures such as throwing psychiatrists at the terrorists and criminal organisers and looking upon them as simply misguided individuals. 
That is not the way forward. This bill addresses some of the legitimate concerns we have in this country about threats of both an external and internal nature. It would be good to see all parties of this House send the very same message. Sadly that does not seem to be the case because the Greens have romanticised their freedom and clearly do not see that freedom as having been hard won by innovations such as the ones that this legislation proposes. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That this bill be now read a second time. 
Ayes 110 
New Zealand Labour 52; New Zealand National 26; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8; Progressive 2; Independent: Awatere Huata. 
Noes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Bill read a second time. 
Instruction to Committee 
Hon RICK BARKER (Associate Minister of Justice) 
: 
 I move  
That it be an instruction to the Committee of the whole House on the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill that it take the bill part by part. 
Motion agreed to. 
In Committee 
Part 1 Preliminary provisions 
SIMON POWER (National—Rangitikei) 
: 
 In the debate on the second reading we have now had the opportunity to listen to the extensive contributions of members regarding the overall theme of the bill. It seems to me that except for Mr Keith Locke and the Green Party the House is more or less in agreement on the provisions of the bill. I particularly enjoyed the contribution of Marc Alexander who gave us a bit of an insight into what went on in the minds of the members of the Law and Order Committee during the deliberations on the bill. 
However we now turn to the more in-depth and detailed analysis of the bill which we will examine part by part. I am disappointed that the Minister in the chair Rick Barker was not prepared to go clause by clause but nevertheless we will proceed to work our way through it part by part. [ 
Interruption 
] That is right. We will work our way part by part. 
We begin as it were at the beginning with some definitions. It is interesting that in this modern age the definition of “number” which we would have assumed would relate primarily to either a phone number or a letterbox number now includes an Internet address and an email address. Telecommunications companies are being required by the bill to meet certain technological standards to ensure that the interception of messages by various surveillance agencies is forthcoming. 
I am not sure whether it is easier or more difficult to intercept an email message or a telephone message and I will certainly be interested in the Minister’s view on that. I am not sure whether Ron Mark or perhaps the Hon Ken Shirley could assist on that point but I am sure the Minister will have the information at his fingertips. I do not have a clue. I am technologically inept when it comes to these things and I would appreciate the Minister giving the Committee a guide as to whether the same technologies can be used for both those mediums. [ 
Interruption 
] Mr Chairman I can usually stick up for myself but if this banter is going to occur across the Chamber are we to get some order around here? 
The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson) 
: Order! 
SIMON POWER 
: Thank you. I appreciate your intervention. That was very helpful. I would like to see a very quick explanation from the Minister as to whether one technology takes care of all those matters defined as a “number” in clause 3 “Interpretation” or whether there are a variety of technologies. I simply do not know the answer to that question. I am sure that it would take the Minister only 2 minutes to advise me of that. 
However as is the custom to point out in this part of the debate the purpose and principles of the bill in clauses 5 and 6 go to the heart of the legislation. Members either hold or do not hold the view—and it really is a fundamental one—that the strategic and intelligence environment we live in has altered. On one side of that argument we have every party in the House except the Greens saying it has changed. In that camp we also have the Australians and the British who passed legislation long before this House got to the issue at hand. We have the Australians and the British both saying that we need new technologies to deal with surveillance requirements in this ever-changing world. 
It seems to me—not unsurprisingly—that the Greens are on somewhat of a limb here. I look forward to the further contribution in the Committee stage of my friend Keith Locke who will at least give the Committee an opportunity to hear the alternative view to that of Australia the UK and nine-tenths of this House. 
Actually this bill gives no further powers to surveillance agencies— 
KEITH LOCKE (Green) 
: 
 I am glad that the previous speaker mentioned the question of whether we have a benign strategic environment or are living in a new era of terrorism because in my second reading speech I went through it objectively country by country and although I did not give the exact statistics the pattern is quite clear. It behoves members like Simon Power to come out with counter-statistics. There was greater prevalence of terrorism in the world in the 1970s and 1980s. That is clearly demonstrable. Particularly in the more advanced countries the prevalence was much greater. 
To deal with the other question which was about which countries are invading other countries today and occupying them there is one country that is leading the charge: the United States. That is the reality. In so far as there is a change in the environment it is the danger from the United States invading other countries and occupying them and leading to huge upset throughout the Islamic world. 
To get on to the technological question the technology is different in terms of intercepting emails. One of the problems is that one can intercept millions and millions of emails very easily whereas in previous times the intrusion on privacy was limited by the technology—listening to phone calls transcribing them etc. was very time-consuming. In the Law and Order Committee mobile probes were described which can be put over a particular line to draw down particular emails from a particular person’s email address. One can of course go more broadly than that in terms of interception technology. Emails can be intercepted according to keyword systems or combinations of systems which makes it even more dangerous. 
I will deal briefly with the amendment proposed by Rick Barker set out on Supplementary Order Paper 197 to the definition of “other lawful interception authority” in which he goes over the authorisation for the different agencies. At least the police have a reporting procedure and one can get the number of interceptions. There are various controls in relation to the police and that at least is a step forward. The reporting procedure of the Security Intelligence Service is much more sketchy. It just has to report the number and average duration of interceptions. The Government Communications Security Bureau really has no reporting procedures and that is particularly dangerous because as the explanatory note of the amendment states it covers the authority of the Government Communications Security Bureau “for foreign communications to be intercepted without an interception warrant or a computer access authorisation:”. 
That question of computer access—hacking remote access or whatever one wants to call it—was condemned by the Privacy Commissioner in the Crimes Amendment Bill (No 6) which gave authorisations for that sort of thing to groups such as the Government Communications Security Bureau. There is no reason to grant that power. If there is reason to think someone has something dodgy on his or her computer—and it is happening a lot in terms of people involved in child sex pornography—we can go to that person’s residence seize the computer and look at it. One does not need that power of remote access. It is very spooky to a lot of people including the Privacy Commissioner that someone’s computer can be accessed remotely and files can even be altered deleted or changed. That is specific in the Australian legislation. It is not specific in this legislation but it is implied. So one does not even know that the police or the security services have been into one’s computer. 
The complaints procedure becomes very difficult too. The complaints procedure in relation to electronic interception is quite difficult because how does one ever know one has been intercepted to start with even if the results of that interception if they are wrongly used or mistakes are made could very much affect one’s future life if one ends up on some database as being in email communication with some terrorist group or whatever. It can be very damaging if that happens. That is one of the reasons why the Green Party thinks the downsides for civil liberties are actually greater than the upsides. Earlier speakers have said that any sophisticated terrorist or criminal can get round any electronic interception very easily. One uses throwaway cellphones and so on. 
RON MARK (NZ First) 
: 
 First I want to make it very very clear in what will quite clearly be a broad-ranging debate and contribution on the various parts that I understand and accept the Green perspective and that of Mr Locke. I have admiration for Mr Locke in one respect: he is always consistent in his view and he is brave enough to express that view no matter the criticism that may be levelled at him by myself my party and other parties. There are many people in this country who have put on uniforms—and I have been one—to defend Mr Locke’s and the Green Party’s right to say the sorts of things they say. I do not think he would put on a uniform to defend my right to say what I say but I have done it for him. 
But I have to say that in all the concerns he and the Green Party have expressed about this bill I have not heard what the alternative is. I ask Mr Locke to table in this Committee now a Supplementary Order Paper; to put up amendments that would deal with the issues that he sees are of concern. If this man and his party believe there is an alternative to this measure for stopping international terrorism they should table it. They should talk about it. They should tell us what it is. 
The sad fact of life is that terrorism is now with us. Regardless of what we may think of this legislation and the ability of the telecommunications companies to comply with it—that is interpreting and intercepting our phone calls—that is the price we pay in a free society if we are to guarantee that freedom. The legislation is there in terms of the orders and warrants required and the compliance that is placed upon the Security Intelligence Service the police or anyone wanting access to this information and the protections are there within the High Court. 
I would say to Mr Locke that he should read today’s paper. He should have a look at page B1 of the  
Dominion Post 
. The Green Party should read what has just happened in Britain with the discovery of 500 kilograms of nitrous oxide. They should read about the 700 police the 24 raids and the intention of people to hit soft targets. I know that the ability to intercept my phone calls has an impact on my life but dare I suggest that having my head blown off and spread across three city blocks would likewise have an impact on my life. If I am to provide the people of this country with the ability to go to a McDonald’s restaurant to go to a KFC restaurant to go to a place that is considered a soft target but an American asset and be safe I have to accept that some constraints will come upon us and there will be some encroachment into the privacy of our lives. 
This is not wanted. This is not ideal. This is not what the men who are represented in the plaques around us commemorating the various battles they fought saw for this country. But sadly this is the reality of life. When there are people who are prepared to make their point by blowing up trains full of commuters killing and maiming thousands of people one must accept there have to be adjustments to our way of life and to some of the issues of privacy that we might have previously thought sacrosanct. 
In answer to Mr Power yes already there is the ability to intercept and interpret emails and faxes and that happens now. But this issue has been with our security people for some time. Every politician in this House wants a secure cellphone so that the other parties do not pick up him or her everyone wants a secure walkie phone in the home but someone has to provide the means to allow our security agencies to intercept calls on the occasions when they suspect that the individual using that device is planning or involved in terrorist activities. 
This is not the ideal. This is not what we foresaw 5 or even 2 years ago as being what our country would have to do. But this is now the reality of life and if we are to be responsible about protecting our citizens protecting our families and protecting this nation and the people who come here—be they tourists businessmen or immigrants—this is necessary. 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: Just before I call the next member it has been brought to my attention that we may have heard a cellphone ringing in the Chamber. Can I just say to members that they should give their full attention to the proceedings of the Committee. We should eliminate all unnecessary distractions from our duty. Cellphones should be switched off within hearing of the debating chamber. All members can be alerted to urgent messages by messengers or via the party whips. Any cellphone emitting sounds from the public gallery will be confiscated and the owner ejected from Parliament. I also refer members to Speaker’s ruling 16/2: cellphones are not permitted in this Chamber when switched on. 
KEITH LOCKE (Green) 
: 
 I would just like to follow up the exchange I have been having with Simon Power. He said that the Greens and I are out on a limb because our analysis of the situation differs from that of Australia Britain and the United States. To argue just on that basis—that because other bigger countries that we have had a longstanding— 
Simon Power 
: I raise a point of order Mr Chairperson. I apologise to the member. I realise this is probably technically not a point of order but as a point of clarification I never mentioned the United States. I said Australia the UK and nine-tenths of the people in this Chamber. 
The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson) 
: Can I just say to the member that that is out of order. There is a Speaker’s ruling about misrepresentation. If members feel they have been misrepresented in what is being said they can take a point of order at the end of the speech and clarify it. 
KEITH LOCKE 
: I take Mr Power’s clarification. If he did not refer to the United States I take that point but I think he has done so on other occasions and in general the people who run his line of argument pay great attention to what the United States Government says about these matters. One of the problems of this bill is that it is a bit of a reflex reaction to what other Governments are saying. We can even see it in the commentary: “The bill is similar to recent overseas legislation”—in Australia and the United Kingdom in particular. I think it is being driven by that rather than by any real domestic need. I explained the two terrorist incidents that have taken place in New Zealand one of them 20 years ago and one of them 19 years ago. There is no indication that we are under any particular threat at the present time and there is no objective reason from the point of view of dealing with terrorism for introducing this legislation at the present time. 
I think the downsides are much greater than the upsides. Even Mr Mark said that we wished to have privacy with our own cellphones and electronic communications. That is very important but if we want to have that privacy we should not give the power to intercept to secret organisations that are largely unaccountable in the way that the Security Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau are. We might say that they would not affect us and that we can trust them but if we look around the world we see what has happened with intelligence agencies—their spying on dissidents of one type or another on a whole range of issues. Material has come out for instance on the way that the FBI and J Edgar Hoover spied on all kinds of people from different cultures: black activists Martin Luther King Charlie Chaplin Paul Robeson and all sorts of people. 
Hon Member 
: Commies. 
KEITH LOCKE 
: Well that was the problem. Everyone who was a dissenter was defined as a Commie and had to come before a committee and confess he or she was communist name friends and all the rest of it. People were naming other people who had no political background just to get off the hook. It was a very dangerous situation. We can say that that situation does not exist now and that Helen Clark or Don Brash would never do that sort of thing to us but we have to establish our legislation and the powers we give to intelligence agencies in particular such that they cannot be abused by a Government that has a rather vindictive approach to political dissenters. So we do not want to go down— 
Ron Mark 
: Don’t say that about Helen. It’s not nice. 
KEITH LOCKE 
: Mr Mark is casting aspersions against our Prime Minister there I think. But we do not want to go down that track of giving the agencies of Government those powers unnecessarily. 
The technology matter that Simon Power referred to is very important because it means two things. The first is that many people can be intercepted much more easily than in the past with letter opening and telephone tapping. It is actually the volume of those interceptions that creates a problem too. There might be one or two other people in New Zealand called Simon Power and one of them might have nefarious associations that show up in a big surveillance sweep—particularly when keywords come into it. Poor old Simon Power might be on some database because somebody up in Whakatane who has the same name has received an email from an Islamic person in Yemen—or possibly even two emails. That is double trouble—that Simon Power’s name would be put on a list and all sorts of things would flow from that. All that information is exchanged internationally so the wrong Simon Power could be put on a database in America. 
DARREN HUGHES (Junior Whip—Labour) 
: 
 I move  
That the question be now put 
. 
MARC ALEXANDER (United Future) 
: 
 I have just a couple of quick points really in response to some of the comments from the Green spokesperson. There is confusion over a couple of things. First of all the Greens seem to suggest we are living in some sort of benign world where there is no real threat to New Zealand’s security. That is clearly not the case. We are not isolated from the international community and there has to be a means by which we allow our security services to be able to protect us and give them the technological ability to do so. The delusion that the Greens seem to be under is that we are not important enough in the world to constitute any kind of threat at all. If that is an inhibition on our future involvement in the world then that is a price I do not think anyone is willing to pay—including the people who actually died for the establishment of the freedoms we currently have. 
Meanwhile back in this universe let us talk about the threat from the internal side of things. There are criminal organisations out there accessing technology that we ought to be able to intercept when we need to. We do not want to allow ourselves to be so overly focused on the external threats—as real as they are—that we dismiss the internal threats that exist. There are gangs in this country and criminal organisations in this country that use technology so if we have the legislative means to access their communication and to disrupt their criminal activity then I say that that is the kind of legislation we need to support. 
There are a couple of things also that have been missed in Part 1 and I want to pick them up. The first is that there are safeguards. The Green spokesperson seems to be of the opinion that once this legislation is passed everybody’s communication will somehow be listened into by everybody else. That is not so. This bill is all about lawful interception and about giving the capacity for lawful interception. Before that even occurs there must be an interception warrant. In other words there is a lawful process by which interception is made possible and it can be possible only if we have the technological means to carry it out. Providing that process is what this bill does. 
It also does another very important thing. With the pace of technological improvements it future-proofs the process. It does that in a couple of important ways not least of which is that it allows network operators to choose the mechanisms by which interceptions will be practicable. So we will not have to revisit this legislation every couple of years in order to give it teeth again. We will be able to pass this legislation in the assurance that it will have ongoing ability to access the technologies required in order for those interceptions to occur. 
Hon MARK BURTON (Deputy Leader of the House) 
: 
 I move  
That the question be now put 
. 
Hon KEN SHIRLEY (Deputy Leader—ACT) 
: 
 There have been a number of contributions in this debate and in many senses it seems as if it is the whole of the Committee versus the Green Party and in particular Mr Locke. But in many respects I would like to support Mr Locke and express gratitude that he is making the points he is. They are very important points and although the ACT party supports this legislation let us not fool ourselves—these are draconian measures that impinge on civil liberties and freedoms. That is the view that Mr Locke is putting to the Committee and to that extent he is right. Where I believe he is wrong is in this issue—that in the current world in which we live and given the security risks we face there is a price regrettable as it may be that we have to pay as a society to ensure our freedom and security. It would seem and the evidence is abundant that without these measures we would have our freedoms and securities stripped from us. 
There is an incredibly bitter irony in that situation. It is not a comfortable situation; it is one that as a Parliament we should monitor closely to make sure that safety measures and backups are in place to ensure that those measures at all times are exercised and used only in an extremely appropriate manner. Where they are not we should be doubly vigilant to make sure that the authorities if they do abuse the measures are brought to account. There is in principle real concern with the measures but undoubtedly they are necessary and required. 
In talking of security and freedoms the irony is that the very nations Mr Locke seems to be defending are those that reject the Western values and ideals we enjoy and cherish. We only have to look at the Taliban in Afghanistan at Mugabe in Zimbabwe at any of the corrupt tribal dictatorships of Africa or at the fundamentalist Muslim States to ask what freedoms and securities they enjoy and compare the overarching freedoms and securities we enjoy in Western-type societies relative to other societies that generate such a threat. 
Yes under this bill any telecommunications network has to enable its systems to be monitored. It has to provide encryption codes and the like and it is common knowledge that most telecommunications traffic is monitored. Things like key words Echelon programs and other such things are realities in the modern world but on the other side what are the examples of the abuse of those things? I would put it to members that there are very few indeed. 
 We actually enjoy incredible freedoms that the technology gives us but the price we must pay in the world we live in with the terrorist threats we face is that the very tools that we use in our daily lives and which contribute to our freedom and enjoyment of life can be used against us by terrorists and the like. These measures are necessary to curb curtail and eliminate those illegal activities and threats. It is that balance that the ACT party has wrestled with and on balance we come down in support of this legislation. 
The question was put that the amendments set out on Supplementary Order Paper 197 in the name of the Hon Rick Barker to Part 1 be agreed to. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That the amendments be agreed to. 
Ayes 110 
New Zealand Labour 52; New Zealand National 26; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8; Progressive 2; Independent: Awatere Huata. 
Noes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Amendments agreed to. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That Part 1 as amended be agreed to. 
Ayes 110 
New Zealand Labour 52; New Zealand National 26; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8; Progressive 2; Independent: Awatere Huata. 
Noes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Part 1 as amended agreed to. 
Part 2 Interception duties 
SIMON POWER (National—Rangitikei) 
: 
 Somewhat deceptively the Committee could be misled to believe that the guts of this bill was in Part 1 but there are some interesting and potentially troubling issues lying deep within the wording of Part 2 and it is worth stepping the Committee through this. We will ask the honourable Minister David Cunliffe to answer this question as he might have a better idea of how its interpretation is to proceed. I would be interested in his views on this issue. 
Part 2 outlines the issues relating to interception duties but more particularly and potentially worrying is the issue around ministerial exemptions in clause 11. As I said earlier in this debate I was not lucky enough to be part of the select committee that considered this bill but it seems to me that the Minister may exempt any network operator from the requirements of section 7—to recap section 7 relates to network operators and the requirement that they have to have the interception capability; essentially the guts of the bill—if the Minister considers there are special circumstances that justify granting an exemption. Somewhat unusually when that type of provision is put in legislation the bill gives an example of where a Minister might consider an exemption. It states: “for example”—not surprisingly given that it is an example—“a pilot trial of a new network or telecommunications service”. 
Members should act with caution anywhere that a ministerial exemption exists. The reason for that is disturbingly contained in clause 11(2) which states that “The Minister may grant the exemption—(a) unconditionally;”. The Minister can unconditionally grant the exemption so that those telecommunications companies do not have to meet the interception capability required or the Minister can impose any conditions he or she thinks fit. “The exemption—(a) must be granted for a period of time that the Minister specifies; and (b) may at any time be varied or revoked by the Minister.” 
In those circumstances we are entrusting one individual with an extraordinary power to exempt telecommunications companies from holding the required capability for those interceptions to occur. At first glance I admit that may not seem significant. But upon closer inspection what is clear from that particular exemption is that we are creating a whole other regime for that Minister to operate within quite independently of the legislation that this Committee is currently debating and will more than likely approve. 
Our obligation as members of Parliament is to create an environment of certain and clear law not least because then the affected telecommunications companies know the boundaries that they are operating within. This legislation states that putting all of that aside it will allow the Minister to do whatever he or she likes. It will allow that Minister to grant exemptions at any point on any conditions and for any length of time that the individual thinks fit. This is no reflection on any one Minister—that would be too easy a target. But what I ask is how appropriate it is as a drafting exercise—and the Minister in the chair the Hon David Cunliffe might have a view on this—to create a legislative framework for telecommunications companies to work within to create certainty at some cost to those companies and then say that putting all of that aside we will let the Minister do what he or she likes; we will create an exemption so wide that the Minister can act outside of the provisions of this legislation should the Minister think that is the right course of action to take. 
On that point I would like to say that this is an opportunity for the Minister in the chair to stand and explain to the Committee why that is. If this legislation is necessary—and apart from the Greens nobody denies that this legislation is necessary—it seems pretty straightforward that if we are to create this interception capability then the very least we can do is give the telecommunications industry a degree of certainty. Effectively this legislation enforces that interception capability on the telecommunications industry. We can say to the telecommunications companies that this is the way in which this regime will operate these are the costs—which we will come to in Part 3 a fascinating part of this bill—that these companies will incur and this is how those costs are recouped. 
But in amongst all of this certainty and the framework that members have worked through by way of select committee and under urgency last night and this morning we give it all away. We give it all away by saying that the Minister can do as he or she pleases with regard to enforcing that interception capability. As a lawyer I ask only one thing from legislation. Actually I ask two things— 
Darren Hughes 
: What’s in it for me? 
SIMON POWER 
: No not at all. I ask only two things. Iwant clarity. I do not want judicial activism. We have seen what that can do and we do not want any more of it. We want clarity and we want certainty. I think members of the New Zealand public are quite entitled to form the view that if Parliament does nothing else—and let us face it; many members of the public question what Parliament does—it must provide clear and certain law. If we are prepared to pass through this Parliament legislation that gives the Minister such a gaping prerogative outside of the provisions of this bill are we serving the telecommunications companies are we serving the war against terrorism are we serving the New Zealand public appropriately? 
I see the Minister nodding. I do not think it is rough to ask him to stand and answer this simple question: “In what circumstances would the Crown envisage exercising or granting that exemption?”. There is a balance between the privacy issues that Mr Locke has raised and the security issues that I Ron Mark and Ken Shirley have raised so I think the Committee is entitled to know in what circumstances the Minister envisages that the Crown would exercise the gaping exemption referred to. I do not think it is an unreasonable request of the Minister to add a small amount of clarity and certainty to the debate around the interpretation of clause 11 in Part 2. 
KEITH LOCKE (Green) 
: 
 I was very interested in Simon Power’s comments because he was concerned about such extensive powers being granted to one person to grant exemptions under this legislation. It just reverberated in my mind that in another very current case that ofthe Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security one person is given extensive powers operating with secret powers that generally we do not know about and also getting it wrong. It was only after that person had expressed some apparent bias—on three counts in the court decision—that he could be taken off that case. Now he has resigned as inspector-general. But it just shows the danger of relying on individuals to get it right particularly in the areas we are talking about of interceptions and intelligence. So I share some common ground with my colleague Simon Power on that question. I hope he will support the moves of the Green Party to have a greater level of accountability surveillance and parliamentary accountability of our intelligence services the inspector-general interceptions warrant exemptions and all the rest of it. 
I hope we can work together on that to move beyond the present situation where we have only this Intelligence and Security Committee which is made up of the Prime Minister the Leader of the Opposition and their appointees. So it is not an MMP committee. It does not have any real powers. It has not had any demonstrable successes. We have the particularly bad situation in respect of the appointment of a new Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security because it is a matter of the Prime Minister getting her head together with Don Brash to make the decision. Other parties such as New Zealand First ACT United Future and the Greens are left out in the cold on this.So I do agree with Simon Power on that matter. 
Referring back to the requirements put on network operators in this bill any operators—be they Internet service providers be they telecommunications companies—there is a concern amongst some of them particularly Internet service providers that they will be required to cooperate with this and that not only will it cost them time and money to cooperate with the agencies in this interception but they will be in some way compromised by this particularly with their clients. That is a bad situation to put operators in. There are some operators—in relation to the previous debate around the Crimes Amendment Bill (No 6) as well—such as PlaNet Internet in Auckland or Plain Communications in Christchurch—that were worried about being drawn into this surveillance net. 
In fact one of the things that has come out of the discussion with Internet service providers is that there is some advantage in New Zealand electronic communications as being seen as surveillance-free—that is police and intelligence agencies do not get into them. It could be an international business advantage for New Zealand communications to be seen in that light. Of course it would not stop them from being intercepted when they depart our shores by the CIA FBI National Security Agency of America or whoever. But it would be a business advantage for the Internet service providers and telecommunications people for New Zealand to be surveillance-free and not have this sort of legislation going through. 
The bill actually goes beyond the Internet service providers and telecommunications companies and does cover for instance hotels with their communications networks. Hotels are for example required to cooperate in the interception of particular customers going through their PABX phone system etc. So it is drawing a lot of people into the net and I image that a lot of hotel owners do not understand they will be drawn into this. 
There is some advantage in the way the encryption provision is written—that is there is no obligation on the Internet server provider or the telecommunications provider to decrypt messages unless they have provided the encryption devices specifically to their customers. It is good that that exists but we have to realise that this bill is not just giving powers to the intelligence services and the police but also incorporating a lot of other people in the net and unnecessarily intruding on the privacy of the customers of Internet service providers and it could lead to a lot of problems. 
GERRARD ECKHOFF (ACT) 
: 
 I want to take a relatively short call on what I deem to be an extremely important bill. As I am sure the Committee is well aware nobody values the freedoms of New Zealanders or indeed speaks more about the freedoms of New Zealanders than the ACT party. We are after all a classical liberal party. We do not like the intrusion of the State into our daily lives. Yet when we live in a society we must also reflect and understand the times that we live in. From time to time in order to ensure the freedoms the democracies and the lifestyle that we most certainly enjoy in this country we might have to accept that the power of the State to intercept and to act on our behalf against those who would do us real harm is extremely important. Somebody once said that the price of democracy is eternal vigilance. I have possibly got that wrong but I am sure that members understand the sentiment. For that very reason we have to ensure that Big Brother if that is the right expression is eternally vigilant and does have the capacity to act on behalf of our free society. It is indeed a free society despite what some in the Green Party would say about the influence of this bill and the powers it gives the State to intercept communications etc. 
I very much doubt whether New Zealanders who read  
Hansard  
or are listening to this debate would be the slightest bit concerned if the Security Intelligence Service listened into my conversation with my wife this morning about the euthanasia debate. I have not the slightest problem with the State intercepting my emails my communications with my family or my friends. I am unsure as to why Mr Locke feels that if I get a call from overseas I should be concerned if it comes from Yemen—highly unlikely! But if it did happen that I knew somebody in Yemen I really would not be concerned about the Security Intelligence Service or anybody else intercepting that call and checking me out thoroughly— 
Ron Mark 
: One wouldn’t know about a member of the Greens. 
GERRARD ECKHOFF 
: Yes that is right. Those are attitudes that I believe reasonable New Zealanders—indeed 99.9 percent of New Zealanders—hold. They understand the difficulties that we in the Western World face and the need to utilise technology. It is pointless having technology if we cannot utilise it and if we cannot give the intelligence services the opportunity to intercept on our behalf. It is worth reflecting that many many years ago we used to erect barriers to protect our society; Hadrian’s Wall the Great Wall of China and the Maginot line were built. We had physical barriers in those days. But today with technology advancement and threats physical barriers no longer protect anybody. In fact we need the cyberspace technologies and so on to ensure that we pick up the transmissions of terrorists one to the other who would seek to do us harm. 
I also emphasis the point that it is not just a matter of external threats from terrorist organisations emanating from the Middle East and other areas; I personally find that there are huge threats in our society from the pervasive influence of gangs in this country. The police need interception powers to understand whatever it is that the gangs are planning to do. With the huge sophistication of the means that those people employ these days the police must have powers to equal that sophistication and must have the opportunity to act and reflect the concerns of our society about those internally who would do us harm. I suspect that most New Zealanders do not have a problem with that. 
KEITH LOCKE (Green) 
: 
 I would like to take a short call to respond to a point made by Gerry Eckhoff. He said he would not have the slightest problem with his emails being intercepted. Sometimes people use the argument that if they have nothing to hide why bother? There is a number of dimensions to the Green critique of this legislation. One of them is this straight question of personal privacy. Everyone has affairs he or she wants to remain private. We use computers and emails very extensively. Our whole life is often on our computers including very personal stuff—love life and all kinds of things that we do not want people intruding into. It is all very well to say: “Well if I’m squeaky clean and nothing I’m doing in private is going to get me into trouble with the law then I don’t need to worry about whether my emails are intercepted.” but one thing that is true in our society is that all these agencies are operated by real people with the full range of human emotions and foibles and everything else. 
One thing struck me when a former employee of the Communications Security Establishment in Canada which is the equivalent of the Government Communications Security Bureau here came to New Zealand a couple of years ago. He said that a lot of this interception stuff is rather boring so when he and his colleagues came across personal titbits sex stuff and what not they would watch or listen in. It is just human reality that there is interest in personal things. We have experiences going right back to the British royal family with the “Squidgy” tapes and everything else of people taking an interest wrong though it might be in the personal affairs sex life etc. of others. 
The problem is that the technology being authorised here involves such a large scale of interception and fine-tuning who is being intercepted through various filters—email origin destination numbers keyword combinations etc.—that the surveillance can be used in non-political areas. Up to this present time I have been dealing more with the political area of interception but even in the non-political area of personal privacy people can pry into our lives unnecessarily. There is provision in this bill for hacking by the Government Communications Security Bureau or the Security Intelligence Service—that is remote access to one’s computer and one does not even know. That could result in people searching around in other people’s files and taking an interest not just in political things but in very personal things. We do not need to go down that track if it is not warranted and the Green Party does not think it is warranted in the present circumstances in New Zealand. 
RON MARK (NZ First) 
: 
 Although I disagree with those arguments if I was to take them and accept them the very first question I would ask that member is what the alternative is. What does that member offer me as an alternative that would give me cause not to vote in favour of this bill but to support the approach that he might consider best suits our needs? The bottom line is whether we agree or disagree with the invasion of Iraq. New Zealand First made its position very clear on that issue and I know that it surprised the Green Party. We were opposed to intervention without United Nations approval. So we have agreed on that. But the point I make is those issues are irrelevant to our dealing with the problem we have here. We have the possibility of terrorist individuals and organisations and people involved in organised crime using telecommunications to do their business. What is the alternative to interdiction if we do not pass this legislation and grant these powers? I might well agree with many of the things Mr Locke said but I am waiting for the alternative. I have a horrible feeling that when we finish up today at 6 o’clock I will still be waiting for an alternative solution. 
I also want to address the points made by Mr Power not so much to criticise him but more to prod the two Ministers who have sat in the chair and said nothing. We have had two highly paid Ministers in the chair. Mr Barker sits there doing what I do not know. He has not offered one explanation to Mr Power. We had the other Minister who also offered no explanation. If I might help the Minister who is more highly paid than me who enjoys the pleasures and luxuries of ministerial facilities a big car and a flash leather chair I draw his attention to page 21 of the interdepartmental report. He might like to stand and answer Mr Power because the answers are all there if the Minister cares to do his job. Hello? I am still waiting. If I might prepare myself for future appointment to a ministerial position because quite clearly some people do not seem very intent on doing their job I draw Mr Power’s attention to the telecommunications interception capability departmental report dated 11 August 2003. He should go to page 21. The issue of the Minister granting exemptions is very well covered there in clauses 11 and 12. It states clearly that the Minister may exempt any network operator from the requirements of section 7. It goes on to talk about the Minister granting exemptions unconditionally or subject to conditions and the period that they may be granted for which the Minister must specify. But it goes on to further state that before granting verifying or revoking an exemption the Minister must consult with responsible Ministers. 
Simon Power 
: No one in that Cabinet! 
RON MARK 
: I say to Mr Power that if he had a bank of Cabinet Ministers headed by Don Brash would he be confident that in consultation with those Ministers his Minister could capably give an exemption? We are saying that the Minister will not have that power on his own; he will be required to consult. 
The National Council of Women—surprise surprise—supports the exemption clause. It said that the clause appeared to be fair to all parties. The Telecommunications Carriers Forum supports the exemption clause and said that it thought the bill should provide some guiding principles around special circumstances rather than provide an example. It went on about some examples in particular and said that further exemptions should be included in that provision. It submitted that exemptions should be provided where it is not cost-effective or practical to provide an interception or where it would damage the reputation or purpose of the product or service and that another exemption should be where a trial or limited network or service was being provided. The comment was made that it is appropriate to keep wide the grounds for granting an exemption to allow the legislation to be future-proof and that providing guidelines as to special circumstances might inadvertently limit those circumstances. The recommendation that was accepted by the committee was that there be no change to the clause. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That Part 2 be agreed to. 
Ayes 110 
New Zealand Labour 52; New Zealand National 26; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8; Progressive 2; Independent: Awatere Huata. 
Noes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Part 2 agreed to. 
Part 3 Miscellaneous provisions 
The question was put that the amendment set out on Supplementary Order Paper 197 in the name of the Hon Rick Barker to clause 19 be agreed to. 
Amendment agreed to. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That Part 3 as amended be agreed to. 
Ayes 110 
New Zealand Labour 52; New Zealand National 26; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8; Progressive 2; Independent: Awatere Huata. 
Noes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Part 3 as amended agreed to. 
Clause 1 agreed to. 
Bill reported with amendment. 
Third Reading 
Hon RICK BARKER (Associate Minister of Justice) 
: 
 With pleasure I move  
That the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill be now read a third time 
. We have had a useful discussion in the House and it is pleasing to see that in the Committee of the whole House members agreed 110 to 9 which means there is general agreement in this House on this piece of legislation. It is eminently sensible legislation. It does not as some people have tried to characterise it extend the powers of the police the Security Intelligence Service or other Government agencies to intercept material. What it does do is put obligations on the telecommunications providers to facilitate interception and to be technically capable to intercept communications going through their networks. 
The bill is not prescriptive in the way in which interception is to be undertaken. There was nervousness and some apprehension on the part of the telecommunications providers that they would need to have technologies embedded in their systems. The bill is clear that that is not the case. Telecommunication providers will have the opportunity to determine what technologies they deploy how and when and will be able to reduce their costs accordingly. What we are interested in is an outcome not necessarily a technological solution. This bill does that. 
I want to praise the good work of the Law and Order Committee. It has managed to bring together a number of amendments give assurance to the industry and resolve a number of issues. I am very pleased about that; it was excellent work. I think the House has had a very good debate on this legislation and we are well and truly agreed on the merits of this bill. 
SIMON POWER (National—Rangitikei) 
: 
 On behalf of the National Party I would like to commence the third reading of this bill by saying—as we have through all stages of the bill—that we support the Minister’s legislation. I am pleased to hear the Minister say that we had a robust and reasonably good debate on the issues contained in the bill. I think that is true. I am a bit disappointed that the Minister did not take a call during the Committee stage when members raised two or three issues of a technical nature in particular around the ministerial exemption. But putting that aside I think it has been a debate that has at the very least put on the record a range of concerns and views that various parties have had over the passage and the content of this bill. 
Just by way of recapping some of those issues in the third reading style I think it is worth saying that legislation like this is finely balanced. It is a fine balance for members to pass legislation that on the face of it appears to interfere with the privacy rights of individuals and their ability to communicate directly with each other via telecommunication devices such as landlines telephones email and the Internet. But that is not what this bill does because as the Minister rightly pointed out—and those are not words that fall easily from my mouth—this bill does not increase the powers of various surveillance agencies. It requires telecommunication providers to meet certain standards in respect of interception capability. 
A number of issues have been raised in the bill about the costs of those interception capabilities. Issues have been raised about whether the Minister should have powers to grant exemptions at various stages throughout that process. I refer to the comments made by my colleague and friend Mr Ron Mark who said: “Well Mr Power don’t worry there’s a panel of Ministers who have to be consulted.”—a panel of what the legislation describes as responsible Ministers who have to be chatted to when these decisions are made. 
 I say to Mr Mark that that does not satisfy me. If members look at who the responsible Ministers will be in light of the current Government they will see that the Minister in Charge of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service is one and the Minister Responsible for the Government Communications Security Bureau is another. Presumably that is just the Prime Minister. Lastly and this is the really concerning bit I see that one of the responsible Ministers includes the Minister of Police. It gives me no confidence that the Minister in charge of this bill acting alone will be curtailed by that “panel of Ministers” as Mr Mark described it. 
There are some other matters contained in Part 3 that members did not debate at any length but are interesting issues that relate to the matter of costs and where those costs are picked up for those particular surveillance agencies and telecommunications companies. Clause 18(2) specifies that a surveillance agency must pay the costs referred to—that is the costs incurred by the network operator in conducting a surveillance—on “a date no less than 1 month” and I see that the select committee changed the period from 2 months to 1 month “after the date of the invoice or other appropriate document”. 
I am pleased to see the razor sharp minds of members on the Law and Order Committee picking up on that. Had that point slipped by the chairman and his diligent team network communication providers might have been out of pocket for 2 months. Lord knows it is unlikely that those companies would have been able to sustain that in their cash flows but I see that the costs are now required to be paid within 1 month. Well done to the select committee and its chairman for picking up on that point! It will be helpful to the telecommunications industry. 
More important though—and I think this is quite interesting because it is a Government-driven requirement that the standards of surveillance must be met—the select committee has deemed it appropriate to retain a clause in the bill that deals with the resolution of disputes over costs. I would have thought that that was slightly unusual. I would have thought that legislation that included such a clause was slightly unusual. Presumably the usual common-law remedies would be available to a telecommunications network company in the event that a surveillance agency did not meet its debts on time. However in this case we see that the select committee has deemed it appropriate to place in the legislation a particular provision relating to the resolution of disputes over costs. 
I guess the overall theme of the bill and what the House and the Committee of the whole House spent most of their energy on was whether the Government’s implementation of a bill such as the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill and the framework contained within it being that of national security was consistent with the assertions of the Prime Minister the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Minister of Defence pre- and post-September 11 that New Zealand continues to live and operate an incredibly benign strategic environment. I know that many members in this House from the United Party New Zealand First the ACT party— and to be fair the Green Party—addressed this issue during their second-reading contributions. 
But the Government cannot at a policy level have it both ways. It cannot assert in face of the evidence of Baghdad Spain Jakarta Bali and New York that we live in an incredibly benign strategic environment. It cannot deploy troops to Afghanistan and Iraq and still tell New Zealanders that we live in an incredibly benign strategic environment and then tell them that it needs legislation to help it collect information for national security. It cannot cut both ways. If we do not live in a benign strategic environment—which is what the National Party has asserted from a position long before September 11—then legislation like this would have been necessary back then as well. 
When it is clear that we do not live in a benign strategic environment any longer it seems to me that the Government needs to take stock of the way it produces its foreign policy statements. The best manifestation of that assertion is the bill before the House itself. If we did live in an environment where terrorism was not a reality then presumably the fears that Mr Locke brought out about the provisions of this bill and its workings would not be valid and this bill would not be necessary. In fact this bill is very necessary. National has supported it from start to finish and will continue to do so through the third reading. 
MARTIN GALLAGHER (Labour—Hamilton West) 
: 
 As chairman of the Law and Order Committee I rise to take a very brief call—obviously to acknowledge the necessity of this bill but also to be mindful of the appropriate checks and balances. Although the bill is essentially very technical in my view it is a profoundly significant and important one. 
I take the opportunity to acknowledge the good work of the committee—in particular the deputy chairperson Marc Alexander. I know that the previous speaker would join me in acknowledging the good work of the Hon Tony Ryall Brian Connell and of the Government members on the committee. I also thank Edwin Perry for his contribution and acknowledge his good work on the committee. He has now been replaced by Ron Mark. 
Finally this was in many ways—and I say it with sadness—an absolutely necessary bill. This is the reality of the times in which we live. We hope we have it right. We believe we have it right and I commend this bill accordingly. 
RON MARK (NZ First) 
: 
 I rise on behalf of New Zealand First to support this bill in its third reading. I have to say that the debate and discussion we have had has been somewhat passionate. In general the views of members in the House are not shared by the Green Party and I want to put that on record. The one thing I love about this country of ours is that we are a democratic nation. We are free to express our views and to have our say. We are free to stand up for those views in the highest court in the land and to express them without any fear whatsoever that our ability to do so will be interdicted our lives threatened or that we will be trampled on by the boot of the State in order to silence us because what we are saying is not popular well-received or liked. 
In that respect I have to say that it is a good thing that we have parties in the House like the Greens. I probably will not be thanked for saying that by some of my political colleagues but it is. Because at least there is that voice out there warning and cautioning people as to the loss of privacy and rights. However I have to say that my views are somewhat different from theirs. This legislation has come about because of a need. What is that need? The need is based on the fact that we have organised crime in this country simple burglars who have the technology to defeat our law enforcement agencies and people who can roam around in cars at night. Take boy racers. The technology that boy racers have courtesy of the telecommunications industry is such that they give the police a very difficult time tracking their movements and curbing their unlawful activities. That is at the low end of the scale. 
At the higher end of the scale we have burglars who would break into one’s home and steal one’s possessions. They are able to carry out their unlawful business because they can monitor the police airwaves. Why? Because our police force does not even have secure communications. How ridiculous is that? I will not use the word that comes to mind. I would say that it is extremely ridiculous. It is exceedingly ridiculous that the criminal fraternity can intercept the police’s communications but the police are not in a position to intercept theirs. What does that do? It hamstrings law enforcement agencies and does not assist law-abiding citizens who have had crimes committed against them. 
 Then there is the gang situation. Gangs are dealing in an organised manner and on an international basis in the trafficking of drugs. They pose a greater threat to our community particularly to our children and as we are hearing more and more frequently to young vulnerable women whom young male predators would exploit through the use of drugs—drug rape. The case involving Mr Isherwood is an example. 
But at the top end of the scale terrorism threatens our very existence let alone our lifestyle. Sometimes we have to swallow a dead rat and accept that legislation such as the Crimes Amendment Act (No 6) the Terrorism Suppression Act and now the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill need to exist if we are to guarantee safety and security to our people our children and our country. Everyone knows that this will not solve all the problems. Terrorists by their very nature are extremely adept at subverting systems and at ensuring they remain undetected. But when we have reports that a person who is No. 2 in al-Qaeda may well have visited this country at least twice one has to consider that he might have brought a cellphone with him that it might have been a secure cellphone and that even if the police or the telecommunications companies had known he was here and had moved to intercept him they might not have been able to do so. That is a silly situation to allow to continue. 
Mr Power’s concern and lack of confidence in a future National Government Cabinet really gives me great concern. The fact that he does not believe he has confidence in future National Ministers led by Don Brash to review an exemption proposal being proposed by a Minister gives me great cause for concern. I would simply say to him that under a New Zealand First - led coalition Government he would not have those same concerns. I am pretty sure the clauses dealing with exemptions that the Government is passing could well be handled inside a Government that we are part of or leading. I understand his concerns about lack of confidence in Mr Don Brash— 
Hon Annette King 
: Where is the National Party? 
RON MARK 
: Yes where is the National Party? It is a shame that Mr Power is not able to listen to me here in the House but hopefully he is by other means. But I would tell him to take heart. He may not have confidence in his colleagues in a future National Government to exercise with confidence the duties and responsibilities under clause 11 and he may not have confidence in Don Brash in Tony Ryall or Nick Smith. But help is on its way: his party could always form a coalition with Labour. I am sure there is enough skill on that side of the House to overcome those deficiencies. 
I am somewhat distracted Mr Speaker because I have never in my entire time in this House been here when one party chooses not to be represented. I do not know whether that is outside the Standing Orders but it certainly has to be outside the Standing Orders in the eyes of the public for there not to be one National Party member in this Chamber—not one. So when the press is looking for an Opposition I tell them that they can come to New Zealand First. We are standing here representing the Opposition. We will handle the workload on our own. We do not need to hide under the skirts of the National Party. We are quite capable of representing the opposing views of New Zealanders. If Don Brash does not want to do the job then I am ready to step in with my leader Winston Peters to do it for him. It seems that he does not just run from debate— 
Mr SPEAKER 
: The member will come back to the bill. 
RON MARK 
: He does not just run from this Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill. Not only have I not seen him representing his views but his entire caucus seems to be absent without leave. 
I finish by saying that we should focus seriously on the need for this bill. If members of the House have any concerns may I mention a few names: Riyadh Istanbul Manila Bali Baghdad Australia—the various plots there—and Great Britain. If people are still in any doubt having listened to those names they should consider the tens of thousands of victims and then read section B1 of today’s  
Dominion Post 
.  
I said a long time ago after the attacks of September 11 that one needs to be very very careful of the people we are dealing with internationally when there are people who openly state: “Why kill a tiger if you can kill a lamb?”. That gives one an indication of the mentality and the drive behind the things they do. New Zealand is not a benign country. For anyone who wants to make an impact on the United States or Britain there is no softer target than New Zealand. I sincerely hope and pray that we never see the day when we have people come into this country determined to make an impact a political point by killing Americans Australians or Britains on sovereign New Zealand soil. I simply say to people who would oppose such legislation that they should think about those things because not only will Americans Australians and Britains be killed there will be collateral damage that will involve innocent New Zealanders.  
Members may think that my thoughts are a little far-fetched but I know these people. I lived and worked in the Middle East for 6 years. My job was in the Defence Force. My speciality was inside a special force and I worked with some very very good people who dealt with these issues on a day-to-day basis. We are not a benign little country. We are part of the global community and we are as vulnerable as anyone else to a terrorist organisation that may seek to make a point regardless of the consequences involving innocent bystanders and people who played no part in the situation that they the terrorist organisations find themselves in. 
KEITH LOCKE (Green) 
: 
 The Green Party will be opposing the third reading of the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill. We have said all along that the capacity to intercept emails will catch a few more criminals but the serious criminals will all be able to get round the interception systems by using anonymisers encryption code words Internet cafes hotmail addresses throwaway cellphones or whatever it might be; it is very easy. All the big fish whether or not they are terrorists will get round the systems. However millions of people will be affected because of the scale of the interception—even Waihopai intercepts millions of communications—and it will affect the privacy of many. As I said earlier everyone has some very private aspects to their lives—be they personal family friends sexual or whatever—that they do not want intruded upon. We have so much on our computers and in our emails that is very private to us. 
Also large-scale electronic interception leads to a lot of mistakes. There have been plenty of examples of identity confusion in the big security scares in Europe involving bombs on planes. Recently a plane was stopped because of a 9-year-old kid on it who clearly was not a terrorist. He just had a similar name to somebody on a huge database that presumably got out of control. Another way mistakes are made is when people use email. They do it very quickly using irony saying the opposite of what they mean and using extreme language. Things can easily get out of context. We can see that with intelligence agencies even in the case of Ahmed Zaoui. 
The tape the Security Intelligence Service produced in evidence in that case is clearly just the tape of a tourist. He has himself on it. He did not mail it off to al-Qaeda. He brought it with him in luggage to New Zealand when he applied to the Immigration Service under his own name knowing he would be interrogated. I will lend it to any member who wants to look at it. Obviously the Security Intelligence Service has got it completely wrong in describing that as a “casing” video. That indicates that people can get the context completely wrong and that applies in the area of emails likewise. 
There are examples from around the world. There is one from the Communications Security Establishment in Canada in terms of interception. One Canadian was put on a database because of two emails that were intercepted. In one she referred to her son’s play “bombing”. The word “bombing” was picked up in a keyword search. She used a similar word in another email then she was put on a high-security database. The way that this sort of mass interception operates and the way the results are recorded are very dangerous. We all receive hundreds and thousands of emails from people and if we receive two emails from those who are believed to be suspicious people on a database rightly or wrongly then we could be put on a particular list. There is no real control over what use is made of those lists and who might have access to them or over where they go around the world and over who uses them in the wrong context—using those errors effectively against us perhaps when we travel. 
 The consequences of these mistakes can be hugely inconvenient. I mentioned the case of the airline. A lot of inconvenience was caused to passengers when the airline got a person’s identity wrong. We can look at the example in Afghanistan last year when the Americans claimed that a particular alleged terrorist or Taliban member was deemed to be in possession of a certain cellphone. So the Americans fixed the location of that cellphone when it was turned on bombed the place and killed nine kids. That was a very bad incident and even the idea of bombing someone on suspicion of beingthe person with that cellphone or email address or whatever is very dangerous and it shows how out of control some of those agencies are in reality. 
The other point is in relation to crime fighting. It is actually quite inefficient and a wrong use of resources and a wrong set of priorities to concentrate on electronic intelligence to the extent that is happening in America Australia and now it seems New Zealand. The budget of the Government Communications Security Bureau the electronic interception agency in New Zealand is much greater than that of the Security Intelligence Service and that is a waste because the idea that we can really get to the bad people just through this huge expenditure on electronic interception of cellphones emails or whatever is wrong. 
We see examples of that day to day with the Americans themselves who presumably in Iraq have electronic surveillance across the whole country. But can they actually track down the people who are letting off these bombs across the country? I have not seen much evidence that they have been able to. A reliance on electronic interception for crime fighting rather than on people on the ground doing the hard yards in the traditional way leads to a false sense of complacency particularly when the agencies doing this are largely unaccountable and have political biases. 
That is the problem. Behind these walls of secrecy there are political biases which have been disclosed in some of the debate that has taken place in America Britain and Australia today. There have been cases recently such as when Colin Powell went to the United Nations before the Iraq war and had all those pictures of mobile biological warfare labs and everything else. Even though Hans Blix and others were saying at the time that it was all wrong they went ahead with it. Now it has been proved that it was all fictional and that there was no proper checking. It was creative intelligence for a political purpose and that is what is happening today. 
Unfortunately New Zealand by following along with this legislation under the impetus of pressure from the United States Australia and Britain is part of our being an intelligence dependency and getting it wrong. I think this has come out in the Ahmed Zaoui case. It came out in the court judgment yesterday too in a quote from the director of the Security Intelligence Service where clearly the Security Intelligence Service was most worried about getting offside with these overseas intelligence agencies. Accuracy or the rights of Ahmed Zaoui come second to that. 
The quote from the Security Intelligence Service director in the court decision yesterday was: “If Mr Zaoui with his public record were allowed to settle here that would indicate that New Zealand has a lower level of concern about security than other like-minded countries. That would impact adversely on New Zealand’s reputation with such countries and thus on New Zealand’s international wellbeing.” The fact that Ahmed Zaoui has been framed in overseas countries and those lies have been circulated by overseas intelligence agencies is secondary to the consideration whereas the Refugee Status Appeals Authority actually analysed all that evidence provided now by the Security Intelligence Service and showed those cases to be frame-ups. So that is the problem we can get into when we get into this area of dependency on overseas intelligence agencies. 
The material is all classified and it is a circle of secrecy. Every country says: “We won’t give you information unless you keep it absolutely secret.’’ so the public of those countries including New Zealand cannot even find out what is going on. We saw a case of that recently when I asked the Prime Minister whether media reports were true that New Zealand had received transcripts of interceptions of conversations of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan we were told that it is all secret and we could not be told. 
There is a problem too of this interception authorisation being extended in two bad ways. At the present time it is just origin and destination numbers of one particular person that interception is to be focused on but we could quite easily get into a system like the American Carnivore system or extend what happens at Waihopai where a combination of key words is put into the system and a lot of people get caught in that net. 
The other dangerous proposal that is coming up—and it has come up in Europe; there were references in the  
Guardian 
 last October—is the demand that records of all the emails and phone calls be stored by the telecommunications agencies and Internet service providers for a year so that the agencies can look back over a whole year of people’s private lives as reflected in those records. 
So I think we must vote against this bill. It is an intrusion on our privacy. It is giving extra and unwarranted powers to intelligence agencies that have been found wanting and we do not need it in our situation. We are not seriously subject to terrorist threats. We have not seen terrorist incidents other than that carried out by the French intelligence agency in 1985 and the bombing of Trades Hall in 1984 and I do not think it is envisaged that these powers would result in the interception of French intelligence communications. 
MARC ALEXANDER (United Future) 
: 
 I rise on behalf of United Future in support of the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill at its third reading. This bill ensures that technology is not a barrier to effective national and international security standards. Amongst other things it essentially fixes a loophole in the Act passed in 1987 that allows for only voice messages to be intercepted by the authorities. This predated the widespread use of the Internet and email and so was grossly out of date. The bill places a legal obligation on network operators to have the technical capacity to intercept and monitor communications when an interception warrant is issued by the High Court and authorised by police the Government Communications Security Bureau or the Security Intelligence Service and has the agreement of the communications company. There is a process in place. 
Network operators will be required to have the capability to isolate and intercept communications authorised obtain relevant information about the cause intercept unobtrusively while protecting the privacy of other communications and obtain the information in a usable format. 
There will also be a legislative duty to assist all service providers to provide reasonable assistance to the surveillance agencies in executing an interception warrant within their technical capability and on a cost-recovery basis. Network providers have indicated some concerns over not being able to fully recover costs or compensation incurred with an interception warrant as their own staff may be required to provide technical assistance and that would take them away from their normal duties not to mention the use of premises and systems. The Government has indicated that it will pay for interception capabilities of existing fixed or mobile voice networks implemented within 18 months of the legislation being enacted not for Internet and email services at a cost of up to $3 million. This applies only to those networks in operation as at 12 November 2002 the day the bill was introduced. 
A 5-year phase-in period for other networks is aimed at helping to reduce the impact on the industry. If undertaken with general upgrades the transition time will allow network operators to continue to choose systems designs and specifications for their own purposes. Compliance costs have been estimated at $12 million over the next 5 years and a submission to the select committee from telecommunications companies although disputing the estimated cost of compliance upon further consultation with a number of other providers found that the original figure was confirmed as being reasonably accurate. 
The theory is that whenever a periodic upgrade occurs in the future the requirements established by this bill will be considered by providers as a matter of course. However if such requirements prove difficult to achieve then they might serve to inhibit the introduction of new technologies. The committee amended the bill to make it clear that network operators and service providers have the freedom to choose where and how they provide interception capability. 
 There are concerns that by creating higher barriers to entry to the industry this bill will impinge on product design development and innovation. Although this is addressed in clause 5 “Purpose” in the context of the New Zealand telecommunications environment competitors already find it difficult to compete with the monopolistic advantages held by Telecom New Zealand. In this respect the good news is that the US European countries and Australia are seeking international user requirements that would require interception capability to be a standard design feature of new technology and it is difficult for manufacturers to ignore the consumer muscle those markets can flex. 
It is worth remembering that the surveillance agency is liable to pay for the costs in each instance of assistance provided by a service provider. The select committee amended the bill to require surveillance agencies to pay the bill within 1 month rather than 2 months to lessen the financial burden on operators. The Law Commission initially suggested that those costs be recoverable through the District Courts but I am pleased to see that the onus to recover costs is clearly spelt out without the need for this kind of action. 
It is also relevant to point out that similar legislation in Australia under the Commonwealth Telecommunications Communications Act 1997 and in the United Kingdom under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 require network operators to cover the costs of ensuring ongoing interception capability. 
The select committee heard submissions in support of the bill from the Police Association and even representatives from the telecommunications companies that supported the intent of the bill recognising the need for interception capability to keep pace with technical advancements. United Future gave conditional support to this bill on first reading subject to scrutiny by select committee. It was our concern that this bill must not alter or increase powers of surveillance agencies at the expense of protecting individual human rights. In this legislation the High Court warrant is intended to allay concerns about protection of privacy. Because of the need for police to seek a warrant to gain access to a network each time the bill is not likely to encroach on existing privacy laws. We would be more concerned if surveillance agencies were continuously listening to communications traffic without needing warrants to do so. The interception capability requirements also specifically refer to privacy including the ability to exclude communications that are not authorised to be intercepted. 
Having said this the bill is clearly a response to the increasing threat of terrorism in the wake of September 11. In the case of the Bali bombing we have already witnessed the use of modern telecommunications by conspirators in the form of text messaging. This bill would bring us into line with the legal requirements for interception capability already in place in a number of countries including Australia the United Kingdom Germany and the Netherlands. But this bill avoids some of the draconian measures in some of those other laws such as the British Act for example which forces the surrender of encryption fees on threat of a 2-year jail sentence. Nevertheless passing the legislation adds further weight to our claims that we are contributing to the war on terror. 
Information is one our most powerful weapons in the fight against terrorism as we saw earlier this week in the pre-emptive raid carried out by authorities in the United Kingdom. There will be many conspiracy theorists and the Greens are amongst them I suspect who will see this bill as increasing the powers of police and other law enforcement and security agencies to undertake surveillance and this was reflected in some of the submissions to the committee as well. However the bill does not extend in any way their existing powers; it merely enables them to keep pace with future technological changes. 
I think members also need to keep the implications of this bill for domestic crime uppermost in their minds. This is something that I reiterated during the Committee stage. A member of the police electronic crimes unit described the current ability to access only some channels of communications used by criminals as being like police being allowed to breath-test only people driving white cars while people in coloured cars can simply get away. They are unable to capture evidence and bring it to the courts simply because they cannot get their hands on such evidence. 
Non-voice communications were not the only problems for police. In 2001 the Government signalled that it would require public telecommunications networks to be interception-capable but it emerged that Vodafone New Zealand did not have this capability and police said that their ability to combat crime was being seriously eroded because of that. The value of interception capability to police cannot be underestimated. Even without the ability to intercept Internet email and some voice traffic in the year to June 2000 police obtained 32 interception warrants and 132 people were prosecuted for crimes where evidence of intercepted communications was used. Most electronic crimes investigated are of the old-fashioned kind such as drugs fraud sexual offending and indecent publications but which have an electronic component. 
United Future welcomes the bill and supports it wholeheartedly and unreservedly in the fight against both the external threat to our security and the internal threat to our security from crime organisations. 
Hon KEN SHIRLEY (Deputy Leader—ACT) 
: 
 Very briefly I say the ACT party will be supporting this legislation—certainly not unreservedly though and I do not believe any member of Parliament who has studied this bill should accept it unreservedly. In an ideal world we would not favour these measures because they are an intrusion by the State into what we regard as basic freedoms civil liberties and privacy. But on balance we have come to a firm view that we do not live in an ideal world—certainly not in these times—and it is for those reasons that this bill is necessary. The bill is certainly not accepted without reservation; it is accepted with considerable reservation. But we will be voting for it. 
Mr SPEAKER 
: The question is  
That the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill be now read a third time 
. Those in favour will say “Aye” of the contrary opinion will say “No”. The Ayes have it. 
METIRIA TUREI (Green) 
: 
 I raise a point of order Mr Speaker. Please excuse my failure to realise what was going on. The Greens are voting against this bill. Is there a second vote to be had? 
Mr SPEAKER 
: We have actually passed the bill but I can take the leave of the House that we have a vote. Is there any objection to my restating the question? There is. 
DARREN HUGHES (Labour—Otaki) 
: 
 I seek leave for the vote to be taken again on the third reading of the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill. 
Mr SPEAKER 
: Leave is sought to take it again. Is there any objection? There is not. I will return then to the situation where I state the question. I ask members to please pay attention. The question is  
That the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill be now read a third time 
. 
A party vote was called for on the question  
That the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill be now read a third time. 
Ayes 110 
New Zealand Labour 52; New Zealand National 26; New Zealand First 13; ACT New Zealand 8; United Future 8; Progressive 2; Independent: Awatere Huata. 
Noes 9 
Green Party 9. 
Bill read a third time.