Cunliffe DavidHon DAVID CUNLIFFE (Labour—New Lynn): I appreciate the opportunity to join my colleagues in working through some of the questions clause by clause in Part 2 of this very important intelligence and security legislation. Mr Chairman if you will permit me I have a series of reasonably specific questions that I seek the feedback on of the Minister in the chair the Hon Christopher Finlayson in due course as suits the Minister.First is the language that is common to clauses 9 and 10 of the bill setting up the functions of the SIS and the GCSB which uses the phrase specialises in"—in the former case "human intelligence" and in the latter case "signals intelligence" both of which relate to their former quite distinct roles. The phrase "specialises in" is however non-exclusive—that is it does not forswear the possibility that the agency may be involved in activities other than in the case of the SIS human intelligence and in the case of the GCSB signals intelligence.I seek the Minister's comment on whether any limitation is intended or whether the word "specialises" merely conveys a weighting of activities and if that is the case how the purview of the agencies is in fact bounded. When that is combined with clause 11 which follows the objectives are set fairly widely: "(a) the protection of New Zealand's national security; and (b) the international relations and well-being of New Zealand;"—which are very broad and include—"(c) the economic well-being of New Zealand." It has been common ground across the House that several of the functions particularly warranting provisions exempt economic well-being in the definition of national security but here the definition in clause 11 is broad which helps me with the inference that I laid out around clauses 9 and 10 that the word "specialise" is probably deliberately non-limiting in terms of those functions. So that is the first area of inquiry.The second area of inquiry is clause 13 in relation to "Intelligence collection and analysis". In clause 13(1)(b) the intelligence collected may be provided to one or more of the following: "(i) the Minister: (ii) the Chief Executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet:"—and here is the kicker—"(iii) any person or class of persons (whether in New Zealand or overseas) authorised by the Minister …" who is separately determined as the Minister responsible for the GCSB or the Minister in charge of the NZ Security Intelligence Services. So the Minister may authorise the provision of that information to any overseas person. Presumably that would be contingent upon established security relationships.But wearing the hat that I sometimes have the privilege to wear in the Regulations Review Committee I say that as the Minister knows there is pushback from the legislature against Orders in Council using regulatory powers and only principles-based legislation. Here of course the Minister has an even wider ambit than an Order in Council because it is a simple ministerial decision. So if the Minister could perhaps comment on what boundaries he sees around that action—whether there are other parts of the Act that limits the Minister's discretion because at first plain reading to myself who spent only a short period of time on the committee that ministerial power of passing on information is very broad.This leads me to another matter which I may not have time to deal with fully but a matter of public concern in the past has been whether it has been possible for New Zealand intelligence agencies to collect intelligence on New Zealanders via an overseas partner agency that they may not have got a warrant for—I am not saying they could not get one but they get information that has not been warranted domestically perhaps by a partner country intelligence service. I understand that that has been proscribed in this Act at least as far as New Zealand agencies seeking such information. I would ask the Minister to help us with two things: firstly to confirm that that is proscribed and to direct us to the provision of the Act that so proscribes that; and secondly how that bears upon this clause in clause 13(1)(b)(iii) where it appears to be an unfettered discretion by the Minister to provide New Zealand - collected information to any relevant person or persons whether in New Zealand or overseas provided it is in accordance with subclause (3) which itself—[Bell rung] Mr Chairman?The CHAIRPERSON (Lindsay Tisch): The Hon David Cunliffe.Hon DAVID CUNLIFFE: I do appreciate it Mr Chairman. Thank you. Subclause (3) of course is still relatively broad. It requires the Minister first to be satisfied that the agency will be acting in accordance with New Zealand law and all human rights obligations which is some relief I admit but the discretion as to the destination of that intelligence information is still very wide.Since you permitted me the time I might come to my fourth point which is in clause 14 "Protective security services advice and assistance". It is a function in subclause (1) of an intelligence agency which is either the SIS or the GCSB "to provide protective security services advice and assistance to—(a) any public authority (whether in New Zealand or overseas); and (b) any person or class of persons … authorised by the Minister responsible …".Again at first reading that seems very broad. The Minister can authorise the New Zealand intelligence agencies either of them to provide protective security services to any person or persons or authorities either in New Zealand or overseas—potentially anyone in the world really. That is a ministerial discretion. I would invite the Minister to comment on what he feels not personally of course binds or bounds a Minister in the exercise of that discretion because—not that one has any reason to doubt the integrity of our agencies—it is the job of the legislature to understand the boundaries that the law provides.If I flick the page over then to clause 15 my fifth question since you have kindly allowed me the time is around clause 15(1)(b). The language there is extremely broad: "doing everything that is necessary or desirable to protect the security and integrity". That sounds like "by all means necessary". Admittedly this is to protect the integrity of the infrastructure and that reminds me of the Act that this replaces where that power was broad enough to include the warrantless intercept of New Zealand citizens but the Prime Minister of the day gave an assurance which was not incorporated in the law that that interpretation would not be exercised. I find no legislated assurance in clause 15(1)(b) that ministerial oversight proscribes—or that the law proscribes—any form of action in this clause at least against New Zealand citizens. I would like the Minister's assurance that at least elsewhere in this Act the apparently limitless power conferred by this subsection is bounded by other protections of New Zealanders' privacy and legal rights. As that is six questions notwithstanding the fact that there are a few minutes still on the clock I think that is more than enough even for a Minister of his overwhelming intelligence to retain in his head. So I look forward to a couple of other calls later. Thank you."