SpeechHon NANAIA MAHUTA (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Thank you Mr Chair. No particular order but thank you for the questions that have come through. Firstly in relation to the scope of the bill and the way in which other countries may well be considered I would point the member to both clause 3 and clause 8(2)(a) and (b). Effectively when we drafted the bill it was intended to be quite wide in its intent so Belarus was factored in when we drafted the bill because there was evidence of their support for the activities that were undertaken by the Putin regime. In terms of the broadness of the scope there was also consideration that were the military incursion or invasion to extend to bordering countries of the Ukraine perhaps we needed to provide scope for the inclusion of sanctions for those particular instances as well. All the points that Minister Shaw raises in relation to the regulations coming back to the House: I think in the fullness of a broader autonomous sanctions regime that is the basis upon which I think that type of an approach would be very useful. Because this is very limited and targeted having the regulations go through the Regulations Review Committee will I think be satisfactory but that is also why I've pointed to the public register because that is a way of showing transparency around what ultimately gets considered and approved and then enforced. On the issue of family members I am advised that that is covered off in clause 10(2) of the legislation. There was always the thought that if evidenced the ability to target Russian oligarchs is well placed but in the event that perhaps family members and their activities by association needed to be considered again that was a matter that was factored into the drafting of the bill. I take the point again around the post-enactment review after a two-year period. Look I live with optimism but to the extent that these sanctions will still need to be around in two years' time I suspect that the process that I'm undertaking in regards to a broader autonomous sanctions regime may well eclipse this particular legislation. So let me come back to the last question that Mr Simon O'Connor raised which is what is the approach in terms of the Magnitsky type of model. It's my intention to steward through in the coming weeks—and it has always been a process for me—an approach to looking at our human rights tool kit and within that context where an autonomous sanctions regime would best fit. We would firmly locate human rights at the core of that approach alongside the rest of the tool kit that New Zealand has available to it but we would also modernise the way in which these sanctions can apply. The other key aspect to that approach is it would enable a fuller round of consultation and engagement both with those who may be impacted but also from civil society the legal fraternity and the banking fraternity in a more fulsome way. That will help develop that legislation. I'm trying to recall the other aspects of the questions. They—Simon O'Connor: Cyber-security.Hon NANAIA MAHUTA: Cyber-security is covered off both in terms of clause 5 and if we go to clause 5—actually read clause 3 and clause 5 in tandem—you will see that a service has been defined and to the extent that we have electronic service" and "communications service" there and I guess threaded through the range of other services there is the aspect of cyber that is taken account of. Now these are very complex issues but I am assured that the breadth of the scope of those areas will enable us to deal with the issue of cyber. Now I'm hopeful I covered off most of those questions.On the issue of sanctions regarding oil I'm not sure if I understood the question properly and I apologise to the member if I have to ask you to repeat it. But as we have already explained we don't source our oil from Russia. However it is inevitable that there will be significant downstream impacts. The conversation—and I'll relay it I guess in the spirit that I had heard some of the discussions around these types of sanctions applying and how it might recalibrate what is happening in Europe—is that it may well lead to a swifter recalibration of energy source use and actually moving towards a low-carbon type of opportunity and that was very much within the European framing of conversations about the impact of sanctions regarding oil. I would hope again that these are all the things we have to have a serious conversation about. The scale of this war is so significant and with the impact of the key resources that are exported out of Russia and now sanctions being placed on them I would hope that several countries will use that as a significant motivation to accelerate towards a low-carbon economy so that we can see the shift very quickly. My worry often in this particular situation is that a lot of the investment will go towards military strengthening and then we will see a backsliding on some of the undertakings that we just recently gave at COP26. These are the things that every country is balancing up as they one respond to the war but also try and think about how we as a community of countries still remain resilient in these very difficult times.The last thing that I would like to just add by way of clarification of this approach to developing sanctions is it's not intended to be one go at it. We will evolve our sanctions as events happen as we're gathering more intelligence and as we're observing what's happening with our international partners. So while I take the point for example that our lists right now aren't comprehensive Australia has updated their sanctions list over this brief period of time and they will continue to do so as will we once this legislation passes through. The point of all of that is we have a more agile approach to developing sanctions. We have not within primary legislation defined the sanction; we've utilised the ability to determine our sanctions by regulation and in a way where with every regulation or every range of regulation we can have thresholds that apply to that consideration as it gets passed to me for consent and to the Ministers for power to act. What that affords us as a country is for us to be in step and you will have heard many of the presentations on this side of the House say that the whole approach that we're taking to our sanctions framework is to be in step with events as they occur but also in step with responses of other international partners as they are making their determinations.I'll offer one insight. While I was up in Europe the big conversation—and the invasion had not happened yet—was around what was the most swiftest way to send a message to Russia from the European Union and without a doubt it was economic sanctions. Not all of the States across the European Union were of one mind about what they could do bilaterally in terms of Russia but they were all of one mind that if they took a progressive approach to economic sanctions over a fairly successive and quick period of time that in itself would start to bite down on Russia. I do think that we need to consider that our approach sits alongside other countries and their effort to send Russia a message."