Hipkins Chris: Crown Entities Reform Bill — In Committee 
Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume 
Hipkins Chris: Crown Entities Reform Bill — In Committee 
[Sitting date: 23 May 2012. Volume:680;Page:2385. Text is incorporated into the Bound Volume.] 
CHRIS HIPKINS (Labour—Rimutaka) 
: 
 I am very happy to take another call on the title and commencement of the Crown Entities Reform Bill. I have to say I am somewhat surprised to be taking another call but I am very happy to help the Committee out at this particular time. I did not get the opportunity to complete all of what I was intending to say earlier on which will come to me in a minute. I tell you what I will talk a little bit more about commencement. This was something that I began to talk on. I just sort of glossed over the issue of the Royal assent earlier on and of what the Royal assent might actually mean.  
I am referring particularly to my colleague Trevor Mallard’s Supplementary Order Paper 32 to amend clause 2 “Commencement”. In the first part he talks about “Part 3 comes into force on the day 3 years after the date on which this Act receives the Royal assent.” There are many many things that can complicate when that might actually be. As I have described before in New Zealand’s constitution there is no absolute requirement for the Governor-General to sign a piece of legislation that this Parliament has passed. It is convention that the Governor-General will sign legislation on the recommendation of—Trevor Mallard will help me here—normally the Prime Minister who would be the chair of the Executive Council. 
Hon Trevor Mallard 
: No no.  
CHRIS HIPKINS 
: No? 
Hon Trevor Mallard 
: The Governor-General chairs it. 
CHRIS HIPKINS 
: Oh the Governor-General chairs the Executive Council. 
Hon Trevor Mallard 
: But a Minister—any Minister; normally the Prime Minister or sometimes the Attorney-General—signs off the recommendation. 
CHRIS HIPKINS 
: That is right. But the convention is that the Governor-General takes his or her advice from the Prime Minister and if the Prime Minister was not there then it could be any Minister could it not? Any member of the Executive Council— 
Hon Trevor Mallard 
: Any Minister can act for any other Minister. 
CHRIS HIPKINS 
: And any Minister can act for any other Minister. 
Hon Trevor Mallard 
: I made the recommendation on the prostitution legislation. 
CHRIS HIPKINS 
: Well there is an interesting piece of history. Trevor Mallard made the recommendation to the Governor-General to sign the prostitution law reform piece of legislation. Basically the Governor-General receives the recommendation and the convention within our constitutional arrangements is that once Parliament through the Ministers has recommended that a piece of legislation be signed the Governor-General will sign it but he or she does not have to do that. The Governor-General has a reserve power to refuse to sign legislation that has been passed by the democratically elected Parliament.  
That could be seen as a strength or a weakness in our constitutional arrangements. Some constitutionalists would argue that because we have a unicameral Parliament and we do not have an Upper House we have a very simple legislative process but actually having some check within our constitutional arrangements—i.e. the Governor-General having the power to refuse to sign legislation—is a useful thing. On the other hand people could argue that the Governor-General has no mandate whatsoever. The Governor-General is not elected. The Governor-General is appointed by the Queen the head of State normally on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. People could argue that the Governor-General does not have a mandate to be determining which legislation should or should not be signed and come into law and that that in fact is the prerogative of the elected Parliament.  
But our constitutional arrangements as they stand at the moment do give the Governor-General the unelected effective de facto head of State—or the person acting on behalf of the head of State who is also unelected—the prerogative to not sign laws. Therefore the issue around the date on which a bill may receive the Royal assent can be a little ambiguous. If the Governor-General in New Zealand for example were to refuse to sign legislation the Government could simply wait until the Governor-General is out of the country and could then go to the Chief Justice who if I am correct is the Administrator of the Government in the absence of the Governor-General. The Government could get the Chief Justice to sign the legislation and that would therefore trigger the legislation and bring the legislation into force.  
So I think it would actually be cleaner for the legislation and for Trevor Mallard’s Supplementary Order Paper if in fact Part 3 were to come into force on a specified date. I think 1 July 2015 might in fact be a more appropriate date than 3 days after the date on which this Act receives the Royal assent which at this point we do not know when that is going to be. If the debate on the Committee stage for example continues beyond more than another 7 or 8 minutes the Committee stage will not be finished tonight. The House will then have to go back into Committee on a future date to reconsider this bill and therefore again we are not entirely sure when the Government may finally move this up the priority list in order for it to be passed.