Worth Richard: Care of Children Bill — In Committee Procedure 
Worth Richard: Care of Children Bill — In Committee Procedure 
[Volume:621;Page:16682] 
RICHARD WORTH (National—Epsom) 
: 
 Mr Chairperson may I start by reciprocating the greeting you gave to members when the Committee resumed this morning—morena to your whanau. I want to talk about Part 3. This part which is headed “Jurisdictional procedural miscellaneous and saving and transitional provisions” is more significant than at first blush might appear. There are two particular issues that I would like to deal with in this call which I hope is the first of many calls on a complex and tricky part of the bill. 
The first clause I would like to deal with is clause 120 which states in summary that “the Court may receive any evidence that it thinks fit whether or not it is otherwise admissible in a Court of law.” Some would say that those sorts of provisions which are becoming increasingly common in legislation are well and good that they are in some way a reflection of a people’s court approach. But in a court like the Family Court particular care needs to be taken in respect of the material that the court receives because the judgments that are being made on the welfare of the child are just so critical. 
It is right to say that this is a court where there is a lot of unreliable evidence. There is a lot of double-type hearsay evidence for example. One of the things that I would have liked to see in this bill if this were a caring Government—and we know it is not—would be a provision that where allegations of sexual abuse for example are made by a mother against a father in respect of a child who is the subject of the proceedings and those allegations on their face do not seem to be well supported there should be a clear obligation before that sort of evidence is relied upon that there be proof that a complaint has been made to the police in respect of the particular incident or incidents referred to in the affidavit material. 
Those who have experience of the Family Court would know that allegations of this type are quite commonly made are difficult to refute and are often not true. Sometimes they are true but often they are not. That is the danger of the wording of a clause like this that it permits a mass of evidence—so-called evidence in any event—to flow into the record without a proper opportunity to assess the probative value of that sort of material. Therefore I note clause 120 and it is an issue that I plan to come back to in later calls probably this afternoon. 
Dr Paul Hutchison 
: Or tomorrow morning? 
RICHARD WORTH 
: My friend says “Or tomorrow morning” but regretfully I think we can only sit as late as 10 p.m. without— 
Simon Power 
: Start again Saturday. 
RICHARD WORTH 
: Yes perhaps we can do that. Perhaps we can start again tomorrow. 
The second matter that I wish to deal with is clause 129 which is about attendance at hearings generally. Dr Muriel Newman has made some comment about this but not in the context that I will seek to advance. I would say though in respect of the issues that she raises that she has exemplified a really good comment that Justice Brandeis once made which is that sunlight is the best disinfectant—the concept that if the Family Court is open its transparency can be better assessed and the consequence of course is a greater degree of confidence in the administration of justice. 
It is not that point that I want to take up. It is the point that is referred to in clause 129(1)(g). Clause 129 lists the people who may attend a hearing of proceedings under this Act other than criminal proceedings. There are some obviously identified categories of person. But paragraph (g) states: “any other person(s) whom the Judge permits to be present.” I just caution members in looking at paragraph (g) to reflect on what its consequences might be. It will be possible for a determined litigant in the Family Court to seek an outcome where a significant number of supporters are sitting in the back of the court—