Penk ChrisCHRIS PENK (National—Helensville): Thank you Madam Chair. I'm grateful to the Minister of Justice for his opening remarks in relation to my conscientious objection Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 469. Regrettably however the key feature that the Minister missed in relation to the SOP is about the unreasonable disruption aspect of what is currently in the bill and I'll return to that in some detail shortly.But first let me say that the concept of conscientious objection as contained and upheld in my Supplementary Order Paper is one that's long been recognised in New Zealand law and society. The word conscience" comes from a root word meaning knowledge—indeed the word "science" is within the word "conscience". So it is appropriate that those medical professionals who wish to exercise their conscience in this regard are indeed relying on science in upholding the fact that the separate life that is the unborn child is scientifically upheld by such features as unique DNA the capacity for self-movement and so forth.The key aspect of this as I say is around the unreasonable disruption that currently would be able to be used as a basis for precluding the exercise of conscience. I would like it to be noted for the record that the SOP that I have prepared on this matter is very much based upon that that a majority of this House passed in the End of Life Choice Bill—almost to the word in fact in a lot of different parts of it. So it is my hope that with a relatively modest proposal in relation to protecting conscience the House and its committee that's now considering this provision of the bill will look favourably upon it.I would like to speak briefly to the mechanics of what it is that I'm proposing and then go into some of the situations in which an exercise of conscience should be upheld in a way that is not currently the case. I'm proposing in what will be new section 19 of the relevant Act in clause 7 "(2) A is not under any obligation to provide … [a] service requested if [that person] A objects on the grounds of conscience". I've omitted some words but I don't believe I misrepresented the context. That person A is someone who's carrying out a wide range of activities which could include contraception services sterilisation abortion or information or advisory services in relation to the continuation or not of a pregnancy.The effect of the conscientious objection would not be to unduly delay the performance of the services being sought by the woman in question because I've specifically said that the referral effectively would need to take place at the earliest opportunity and the nature of the referral that would be required would be that person A must tell B—essentially the woman seeking the abortion—that they can attain the services from another health practitioner. So I believe that's pretty reasonable in balancing the different rights and responsibilities involved.The unreasonable disruption provision within the bill as it currently stands is such that a person who is working in a medical field—and I use that term deliberately broadly—including a nurse at a public hospital might be considered to be unreasonably disrupting the activities in a way that the employer considers unreasonable but which they—the person concerned herself or himself—does not consider unreasonable. It is a very vague definition and as such is not suited to the irreducibility of freedom of conscience in such a controversial area as this.I'd like to address the argument that I anticipate would be made against the existence of a right of conscientious objection in relation to abortion and it goes something along the following lines. They will say that a person should not seek employment where things will be done of which they disapprove. So we might give the example of a vegan who applies for a job at a butcher's shop. Well with all due respect the hospital is not the same as a butchery—or at least should not be—and that's because other activities that I would class as genuine healthcare also happen in hospitals. So it's entirely reasonable for a person to seek employment in a hospital a public hospital that performs health activities that a person has trained for and is happily carrying out without needing to be forced into a regime with which they are not comfortable and indeed which they are against—which they are deeply opposed to.I use the case of the public hospital deliberately. My chief correspondent in relation to this who's inspired me to put forward this proposed SOP amendment is a female nurse. I shouldn't need to point out that she's a female but it somehow seems relevant in the context of the Minister's opening statement. She too has rights and these rights too should be protected. In her case these are to go about the work that she's trained for that she performs very happily to the benefit of New Zealand society in the particular area that she serves without being discriminated against in this way. For the purpose of the debate I'll call her nurse Marcella—not her real name but she did not want me to use that and for that I can hardly blame her.So I think there's probably little more that I need to say in relation to the conscientious objection SOP. Obviously I'd be happy with any interaction that other members of the committee of the whole House or the Minister himself would provide in relation to that but I'd urge very serious consideration of that. It is a fundamental right I believe of New Zealanders that should not be undermined—that they have the right of conscientious objection at least to the point of being required to refer on for other services. In my remaining time on this call I'd like to touch on a couple of other SOPs not to steal the thunder of colleagues but suffice to say that a number of them I'll be watching closely because I think they make very sensible suggestions to improve the bill as it currently stands.I did want to comment though on the SOP in the name of Jan Logie. I refer to SOP 326 which is one of the three that she's put forward. This is the one—for those not having to hand immediately SOP 326—and I'll quote from the end part of the explanatory note because I think it actually summarises the issues involved very clearly indeed: "This amendment would also clarify that the offence of killing an unborn child applies only to death to an unborn child caused by an assault on the pregnant person differentiating this from assault from an abortion sought by a pregnant person." So that's as stated in the SOP itself.I think this is what the Americans call saying the quiet part out loud. Here we have in black and white an acknowledgment that the type of assault—bearing in mind that as acknowledged by the SOP writer herself we're talking about a particular form of assault being allowed and another form of assault not being allowed. It seems to me extraordinary that the rights of the entity variously referred to as the unborn child—as it is currently in the Crimes Act—or a fetus if one prefers can be dependent on the intent of the violence that's perpetrated.It's vaguely reminiscent of the classic line from President Richard Nixon along the lines that if the president does it it means it's not illegal which is to say that the person carrying out an act against another is somehow significant to the commission of the offence. While there might be legal situations in which it's possible that that's the case in the case of an unborn child it seems to me extraordinary that we could be even contemplating as a Parliament saying that if there is a deliberate act sanctioned by the law—by which I mean sanctioned in the sense of permitted—it would be OK to cause the death of an unborn child but in other situations that will not remain so.That brings to the end my remarks on that particular SOP. Again just to reiterate I'd be grateful for colleagues to very seriously consider my points in relation to conscientious objection. Others have made other points in relation to conscientious objection. I note that Dr Deborah Russell is proposing a regime whereby some health providers would need to state their position in relation to abortion but others would not. That seems to me unbalanced and therefore unfair. I think that all health providers should be treated in the same way—namely that as the law would currently allow by default an organisation would have to merely provide services in accordance with the law accepting that conscientious objection should apply to individuals who want to exercise that within those organisations."