철학에서, '''사차원주의''' (''시간적 부분의 교리''와 ''"접속"'' 개체 이론으로도 알려져 있다)는 시간을 통한 객체의 지속성은 공간과 차지하는 시간의 전체 영역의 다양한 하위 영역 시간적 부분을 가진 시간 속에 존재하는 객체를 통한 그것의 확장과 같다는 존재론적 위치이다. == 같이 보기 == 위치를 옹호하는 논쟁인 리트델릭–퍼트넘 논쟁. 세계선 ==출처== Armstrong, David M. (1980). "Identity Through Time". In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, 67-68 Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Hughes, C. (1986). "Is Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts?" ''Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society'' 85: 213-33. Heller, Mark (1984). "Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects". ''Philo- sophical Studies'' 46: 323-34. Reprinted in Rea 1997: 12.-330. Heller, Mark (1990). ''The Ontology of Physical Objects'': Hunks of Matter''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heller, Mark (1992). "Things Change". ''Philosophy and Research'' 52: 695-304 Heller, Mark (1993). "Varieties of Four ''Australasian Journal of Philosophy'' 71: 47-59. Lewis, David (1983). "Survival and Identity". In ''Philosophical Papers, Volume 1'', 55-7. Oxford: Oxford University Press. With postscripts. Originally published in Amelie O. Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 17-40. Lewis, David (1986a). ''On the Plurality of Worlds''. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Lewis, David (1986b). ''Philosophical Papers, Volume 2''. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McTaggart John Ellis (1908). "The Unreality of time" in Mind: Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 17 (1908): 456-473. 1976: Survival and identity. Pp. 17-40 ''in'' (ed.) ''The identities of persons''. Berkeley: University of California Press. Google books 2004: defense of presentism. Pp. 47-82 ''in'' (ed.) ''Oxford Studies in Metaphysics'', Volume '''1'''. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google books 2005: Review of an ontology of persistence and time. By Theodore Sider. ''Ars Disputandi'', '''5''' PDF 1985: Can amoebae divide without multiplying? ''Australasian journal of philosophy'', '''63'''(3): 299–319. == 외부 링크 == *Rea, M. C., Four Dimensionalism" in ''The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics''. Oxford Univ. Press. Describes presentism and *" Time" in the ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' Sider 2003 An ontology of persistence and time, Cited by 744 ''In analytical metaphysics, there are three, closely related, debates about time and the nature of change and persistence. The first is about what there is. Presentists believe that only present things exist, whereas eternalists think that also past and future things exist, even though ...'' MICHAEL C. REA- The Oxford handbook of metaphysics, 2003 CHAPTER i. INTRODUCTION. Cited by 48 as it will be understood in this chapter, is view about the ontological status of non-present objects. Presentists say that only present objects exist. There are no ...'' Koslicki Philosophical Studies, 2003 Springer, The crooked path from vagueness to Cited by 37 ''How do the familiar concrete objects of common-sense houses, trees, people, cars and the like persist through time? According to the position known as or 'the doctrine of temporal parts', ordinary concrete objects persist through time by perduring, i.e., by ...'' Markosian Philosophy and Research, 2004 Wiley Online Library 2, Two Arguments from Sider's Cited by 19 ''The Argument from Vagueness Sider's argument from vagueness for is adapted from his reconstruction of David Lewis's argument for the following conclusion about fusions.2 ... The Principle of Universal Fusions (PUF): Every class of objects has fusion.'' Miller Erkenntnis, 2005 Springer, The metaphysical equivalence of three and four dimensionalism. Cited by 15 ''ABSTRACT. argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then show that the two theories are inter- translatable and equally ...'' 분류:시간의 철학 분류:물리철학 분류:시공간