dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
LT. BRYSON: I refer the Tribunal to Document Number EC-611, in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-622, consisting of Schacht's speech in Berlin on 29 November 1938. I wish to read into the Record a excerpt from the top of Page 10: "If there is anything remarkable about the New Plan, it is . again only the fact that German organization under National Socialist leadership succeeded in conjuring up in a very short time the whole apparatus of supervision of imports, direction of exports, and promotion of exports. The success of the New Plan can be proved by means of a few figures. Calculated according to quantity, the import of finished products was cut down by 63 percent between 1934 and 1937. On the other hand, the import of ores was increased by 132 percent, of petroleum by 116, of grain by 102, and of rubber by 71 percent." While President of the Reichsbank and Minister of Economics, Schacht acquired still another key position, that of Plenipotentiary General for War Economy. He received this appointment from Hitler pursuant to the unpublished Reich Defense Law secretly enacted on 21 May 1935. This law is in evidence as Document Number 2261-PS, Exhibit Number USA-24, consisting of a letter from Von Blomberg dated 24 June 1935 to the chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Forces, together with copies of the Reich Defense Law and the Cabinet's memorandum relating thereto. Pertinent comments on and excerpts from this document appear in the transcript for 23 November, at Pages 278 and 292 (Volume II, Pages 220-229). I will simply state therefore that by virtue of this appointment Schacht was put in complete charge of economic planning and preparation for war in peacetime, except for certain direct armament production under control of the War Ministry. Upon the outbreak of war he was to be the economic czar of Germany with complete control over the activities of a number of key Reich ministries. Schacht appointed Wohlthat as his deputy and organized a staff to carry out his directives.
LT. BRYSON: In this connection I offer in evidence excerpts from a pre- trial interrogation of Schacht under date 17 October 1945. This document is Exhibit Number USA-616 (Document 3729-PS). I wish to read into the Record a question and answer found at the bottom of Page 40 of the document book: "Q: 'Let me ask you a general question then: Do you take the responsibility as Plenipotentiary General for War Economy for the writings that were made and the actions that were done by Wohlthat and his assistants?' "A: 'I have to."' I also offer in evidence Document Number EC-258, Exhibit Number USA-625, consisting of a status report issued in December 1937 under the signature of Schacht's deputy, Wohlthat. The report is entitled, "The Preparation of the Economic Mobilization by the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy." Schacht had withdrawn from office immediately prior to the preparation of this report, and it plainly is a recapitulation of his accomplishments while in office. Since the entire text is relevant, we ask permission to submit the document without reading therefrom on condition that translations into French and Russian be later filed with the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think this is consistent with the rule laid down by the Tribunal, which was that the translations in the French and Russian languages should be submitted at the same time. You are now suggesting that you can submit translations at a later stage.
LT. BRYSON: Well, if Your Honor pleases, in any event I did not plan to read from the document at this time and Defense Counsel do have the German original.
THE PRESIDENT: I was not speaking of the Defense Counsel so much as of the members of the Tribunal.
LT. BRYSON: We have the Russian translation in process now and it was delayed and we were unable to get it here at this time, but the delay will be very short and the document is of critical importance to our case.
THE PRESIDENT: How long will it be before it is ready?
LT. BRYSON: I wouldn't like to say precisely, Sir, but perhaps within 4 or 5 days.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you propose to do now, because it is a very complicated and long document, is it not?
LT. BRYSON: It is and it shows . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Were you proposing to summarize it?
LT. BRYSON: was proposing to summarize it, Sir, now.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you would summarize it now and only be permitted to put it in at the stage when you have the translation ready, you may summarize it now.
LT. BRYSON: I will summarize it now, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Will it take long to summarize?
LT. BRYSON: Not very long, Sir; no.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, it is 5 o'clock.
LT. BRYSON: I think there will be time to summarize it, and then we will stop. This document discloses that before his resignation Schacht had worked out in amazing detail his plans and preparations for the management of the economy in the forthcoming war. For example, 180,000 industrial plants in 300 industries had been surveyed with respect to usefulness for war purposes; economic plans for the production of 200 basic materials had been worked out; a system for the letting of war contracts had been devised; allocations of coal, motor fuel, and power had been determined; 248 million Reichsmark had been spent on storage facilities alone; evacuation plans for war materials and skilled workers from military zones had been worked out; 80 million wartime ration cards had already been printed and distributed to local areas; and a card index on the skills of some 22 million workers had been prepared. That concludes the summary, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. [The Tribunal adjourned until 11 January 1946 at 1000 hours.]
LT. BRYSON: If the Tribunal please, before picking up our line of proof against the Defendant Schacht, I would like to supply a point of information. Yesterday the President of the Tribunal inquired with respect to Document Number EC-457, Exhibit Number USA- 619. The question raised by the Tribunal was with respect to the words "in retirement" in the letterhead used by Schacht in writing to Hitler in 1932. This is the letter in which Schacht expressed his belief in the truth of the Nazi movement and in which he said that Hitler could always count upon him as a reliable assistant. The letterhead has printed upon it "The President of the Reichsbank" and after that phrase there is typed the letters "a. D.", and I understand that those letters are an abbreviation for a German phrase meaning "in retirement" and that it is customary, or it was customary, in Germany for retired officials to continue to use their titles with the letters "a. D."
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
LT. BRYSON: Yesterday we had just about completed our proof with respect to the contribution of the Defendant Schacht to the preparation for war, and I wish to submit one more document on this point. This is Document Number EC-451, Exhibit Number USA-626. It consists of a statement by George S. Messersmith, United States Consul General in Berlin, 1930 to 1934. I will quote therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the fourth paragraph: "It was his" - Schacht's - "financial ability that enabled the Nazi regime in the early days to find the financial basis for the tremendous armament program and which made it possible to carry it through. If it had not been for his efforts, and this is not a personal observation of mine only but I believe was shared and is shared by every observer at the time, the Nazi regime would have been unable to maintain itself in power and to establish its control over Germany, much less to create the enormous war machine which was necessary for its objectives in Europe and later throughout the world. "The increased industrial activity in Germany incident to rearmament made great imports of raw materials necessary, while at the same time exports were decreasing. Yet by Schacht's resourcefulness, his complete financial ruthlessness, and his absolute cynicism, Schacht was able to maintain and to establish the situation for the Nazis. Unquestionably, without this complete lending of his capacities to the Nazi Government and all of its ambitions, it would have been impossible for Hitler and the Nazis to develop an armed force sufficient to permit Germany to launch an aggressive war." We turn now...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Lieutenant Bryson, I am not sure that that gives a full or quite fair interpretation of the document. Don't you think perhaps you ought to read the paragraph before?
LT. BRYSON: The preceding paragraph, Sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. BRYSON: "Dr. Schacht always attempted to play both sides of the fence. He told me, and I know he told both other American representatives in Berlin and various British representatives, that he disapproved of practically everything that the Nazis were doing. I recall on several occasions his saying, after the Nazi Party came into power, that if the Nazis were not stopped, they were going to ruin Germany and the rest of the world with it. I recall distinctly that he emphasized to me that the Nazis were inevitably going to plunge Europe into war." If the Court please, I would like to read also from the last paragraph: "In my opinion Schacht was in no sense a captive of the Nazis. He was not compelled to devote his time and his capacities to their interest. His situation was such that he would most likely have been able either to work on much less restrained scale or to abstain from activity entirely. He continued to lend his services to the Nazi Government out of opportunism." We turn now to the third part of our case against Schacht. The evidence is clear that he willingly contributed his efforts to the Nazi conspiracy, knowing full well its aggressive designs. The Tribunal will recall our proof that Schacht was converted to the Nazi philosophy in 1931 and helped Hitler come to power in 1933. We will now prove, first, that Schacht personally favored aggression and, second, that in any event he knew Hitler's aggressive intentions. There is ample evidence to justify the conclusion that Schacht rearmed Germany in order to see fulfilled his strong belief in aggressive expansion as an instrument of German national policy. Schacht had long been a German nationalist and expansionist. He spoke against the Treaty of Versailles at Stuttgart as early as 1927. I offer in evidence Document EC-415, Exhibit Number USA-627, consisting of a collection of excerpts from speeches by Schacht.
LT. BRYSON: I quote from the top of Page 2: "The Versailles Dictate cannot be an eternal document, because not only its economic but also its spiritual and moral premises are wrong." It is common knowledge that he strongly favored acquisition of colonial territory by Germany. However, he also favored acquisition of contiguous territory in Europe. On 16 April 1929 at the Paris conference in connection with reparations, he said...
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to read the passage that follows that at a later stage?
LT. BRYSON: At a later stage, if you please, Sir, in connection. with another point.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go on.
LT. BRYSON: On 16 April 1929, at the Paris conference in connection with reparations, he said: "Germany can as a whole pay only if the Corridor and Upper Silesia will be handed back to Germany from Polish possession and if, besides, somewhere on the earth, colonial territory will be made available to Germany."
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What are you quoting from?
LT. BRYSON: I offer in evidence Exhibit Number USA-628 (Document 3726-PS), consisting of excerpts from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht on 24 August 1945. You will find it in the document book at the back, labelled "Interrogation of 24 August". At the top of the first page of the interrogation this statement was quoted to Schacht, and his reply contains an admission of having made the statement. In his reply he said: "That Germany could not pay at the time after I made the statement has been proved, and that Germany will not be able to pay after this war will be proved in the future." I wish to point out that this is the very territory which was the subject of the armed aggression in September 1939. In 1935 Schacht stated flatly that Germany would, if necessary, acquire colonies by force. I offer in evidence Document EC-450, designated as Exhibit Number USA-629. This document consists of an affidavit of S. R. Fuller, Jr., together with a transcript of his conversation with Schacht at the American Embassy in Berlin on 23 September 1935. I wish to read from Page 6 of the document where there appears a statement by Schacht in the lower half of the page.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the conversation?
LT. BRYSON: The conversation occurred on 23 September 1935. The page number of this document is at the bottom, and I quote from Page 6: "Schacht: 'Colonies are necessary to Germany. We shall get them through negotiation, if possible; but if not, we shall take them."' In July 1936, when the rearmament program was well under way, Schacht again publicly spoke of the Versailles Treaty . This time his language contained an explicit threat of war. I refer the Tribunal again to Document EC-415, which I have previously introduced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-627, consisting of a collection of speeches by Schacht. I wish to read from the paragraph beginning in the middle of the first page: "But the memory of war weighs undiminished upon the peoples' mind. That is because, deeper than material wounds, moral wounds are smarting, inflicted by the so-called peace treaties. Material loss can be made up through labor, but the moral wrong which has been inflicted upon the conquered peoples in the peace dictates, leaves a burning scar on the peoples' conscience. The spirit of Versailles has perpetuated the fury of war; and there will not be a true peace, progress, or reconstruction until the world desists from this spirit. The German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning." Later in the same year Schacht publicly advocated the doctrine of Lebensraum for the German people. I quote again from Document EC-415, Exhibit Number USA-627, being an excerpt from Schacht's speech at Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, on the second page, the last paragraph: "Germany has too little living space for her population. She has made every effort, and certainly greater efforts than any other nation, to extract from her own existing small space whatever is necessary for the securing of her livelihood. However, in spite of all these efforts, the space does not suffice." In January 1937 Schacht, in a conversation with Ambassador Davies, at least by inference threatened a breach of the peace in demanding a colonial cession.
LT. BRYSON: I offer in evidence Document L-111, being Exhibit Number USA-630, and consisting of excerpts from a report under date of 20 January 1937, by Ambassador Davies to the Secretary of State. I wish to read therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the second paragraph: "He" meaning Schacht - "stated the following: "That the present condition of the German people was intolerable, desperate, and unendurable; that he had been authorized by his Government to submit proposals to France and England which would: (1) Guarantee European peace, (2) secure present European international boundaries, (3) reduce armaments, (4) establish a new form of a workable league of nations, and (5) abolish sanctions with new machinery for joint administration; all based upon a colonial cession that would provide for Germany an outlet for population, a source for food stuffs, fats, and raw materials." In December 1937 Ambassador Dodd noted in his diary that Schacht would be willing to risk war for the sake of new territory in Europe. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador Dodd's diary.
THE PRESIDENT: The proposal contained in Document L-111 was for cession of colonies, was it not?
LT. BRYSON: It was, Sir. I turn now to Document EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador Dodd's diary. The entire diary has previously been received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-58. I quote some notes on a conversation with Schacht on 21 December 1937, beginning near the bottom of the second page of Document EC-461, in the last paragraph: "Schacht meant what the army chiefs of 1914 meant when they invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in 6 weeks; that is, domination and annexation of neighboring little countries, especially north and east. Much as he dislikes Hitler's dictatorship, he, like most other eminent Germans, wishes annexation without war if possible; with war if the United States will keep hands off."
THE PRESIDENT: There is another passage in that book, that diary. I am not sure; it probably is not the same date, but it is on the first page of the exhibit, I think - the third paragraph.
LT. BRYSON: The third paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it at a different time?
LT. BRYSON: It is a different time, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: September the 19th of what year?
LT. BRYSON: We will check that in the complete volume here, and I think in a minute I will be able to supply the date. In the meantime would you like me to read it, Sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think you had better read it.
LT. BRYSON: "He then acknowledged that the Hitler Party is absolutely committed to war; and the people, too, are ready and willing. Only a few government officials are aware of the dangers and are opposed. He concluded, 'But we shall postpone it 10 years. Then it may be we can avoid war"'.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think you should read the next paragraph, too.
LT. BRYSON: "I reminded him of his Bad Eilsen speech some 2 weeks ago and said, 'I agree with you about commercial and financial matters in the main. But why do you not, when you speak before the public, tell the German people they must abandon a war attitude?' He replied, 'I dare not say that. I can speak only on my special subjects."'
THE PRESIDENT: And the next one.
LT. BRYSON: And the next one: "How, then, can German people ever learn the real dangers of war, if nobody ever presents that side of the question? He once more emphasized his opposition to war and added that he had used his influence with Hitler - 'a very great man', he interjected - to prevent war. I said, 'The German papers printed what I said at Bremen about commercial relations between our countries, but not a word about the terrible effects and barbarism of war.' He acknowledged that and talked very disapprovingly of the Propaganda Ministry which suppresses everything it dislikes. He added, as I was leaving 'You know a party comes into office by propaganda and then cannot disavow it or stop it."' The date of his conversation was in September 1934.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a pity that those years are not stated in the document. It is rather misleading as it is.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, the exhibit which is in evidence will show the dates.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am not blaming you; but it is misleading, because it looks like September the 19th and December the 21st, and as there were 3 years' interval between, it makes a difference. That is right, isn't it?
LT. BRYSON: Yes, that is right. I am sorry the excerpt simply shows the page numbers from the exhibit, and not the dates. Schacht admittedly strained all the resources of Germany to build up a Wehrmacht which would provide Hitler with an instrument of realization of his desire for Lebensraum. In this connection I offer in evidence Document Number EC-369, Exhibit Number USA-631, consisting of a memorandum from the Reichsbank Directorate, signed by Schacht, to Hitler, dated 7 January 1939. I wish to read the last paragraph of the first page: "From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the reconstruction of the German Armed Forces. It - the Reichsbank - therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility of financing the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was the necessity, which pushed all other considerations into the background, to carry through the armament at once, out of nothing and furthermore under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy possible." It is clear that the "successful foreign policy" which Schacht thus attributed to rearmament included the Austrian and Czechoslovakian acquisitions. I offer in evidence Document EC-297(a), Exhibit Number USA-632, being a speech of Schacht's in Vienna after the Anschluss in March 1938. I quote from the third page and the second full paragraph: "Thank God, these things could not after all hinder the great German people on their way, for Adolf Hitler has created a communion of German will and German thought. He bolstered it with the newly strengthened Wehrmacht and finally gave the external form to the internal union between Germany and Austria." With respect to the Sudetenland I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-611, already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-622, being a speech by Schacht; EC-611 but I will not read it, Sir - being a speech by Schacht on 29 November 1938, shortly after the Munich settlement.
LT. BRYSON: I have earlier read the pertinent remark attributing Hitler's success at that conference to the rearmament made possible by Schacht's financial and economic measures. This line of proof shows that Schacht entertained an aggressive philosophy with respect to territorial expansion and justifies the conclusion that he allied himself with Hitler because of their common viewpoint. We turn now to prove that, whether or not Schacht wanted war, he at least knew Hitler planned military aggression for which he was creating the means. He had numerous discussions with Hitler from 1933 to 1937. He knew that Hitler was intent upon expansion to the east, which would mean war, and that Hitler felt 11 Jan. 46 he must present the German people with a military victory. I offer in evidence Exhibit Number USA-633 (Document 3727-PS), consisting of an excerpt from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht on 13 October 1945, and I read from the second page at the end of the second question: "Q: 'What was there in what he"' meaning Hitler "'said that led you to believe he was intending to move towards the east?' "A: 'That is in Mein Kampf. He never spoke to me about that, but it was in Mein Kampf.' "Q: 'In other words, as a man who read it, you understood that Hitler's expansion policy was directed to the east?' "A: 'To the east.' "Q: 'And you thought that it would be better to try to divert Hitler from any such intention and to urge upon him a colonial policy instead?' "A: 'Quite."' I also offer in evidence Document EC-458, Exhibit Number USA-634, consisting of an affidavit of Major Edmund Tilley under date of 21 November 1945, with respect to an interview of Schacht on 9 July 1945. I read the second paragraph: "During the course of the discussion Schacht stated to me that he had had numerous talks with Hitler from 1933 to 1937.
LT. BRYSON: Schacht stated that from these talks he had formed the impression that in order to make his hold and government secure, the Fuehrer felt that he must present the German people with a military victory." As early as 1934, Schacht stated his belief that the Nazis would bring war to Europe. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC- 451, which I have already submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-626, consisting of an affidavit under date of 15 November 1945 by Messersmith, American Consul General in Berlin, 1930 to 1934. I wish to read from the first page, third paragraph, last sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: You have read it already.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, there is a little more there which we have not read, which I should like to read.
THE PRESIDENT: You read the whole paragraph. At our invitation you read from the third paragraph down to the bottom of the page.
LT. BRYSON: I should like to read the first sentence of the fourth paragraph on Page 1.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
LT. BRYSON: "While making these protestations he nevertheless showed by his acts that he was thoroughly an instrument of the whole Nazi program and ambitions and that he was lending all his extraordinary knowledge and resourcefulness toward the accomplishment of that program."