dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. SERVATIUS: The Prosecution has stated repeatedly that the aim of the Indictment was to punish only the guilty ones and not to set a trap for the innocent, or catch them all in one net. These words are in accordance with the principle of justice, but the motion to characterize the group as criminal in itself rests on considerations of expediency. This apparent contradiction can be resolved only by requesting the Court's decision on a matter of procedure in order to meet an emergency. Accordingly, it is true that a number of innocent persons were included in the preliminary proceedings here before the Tribunal, but in subsequent proceedings they ate to "have the right to raise any objections," as Justice Jackson has stated. In its decision of 13 March 1946 regarding the regulation of the procedure for taking evidence, the Tribunal expressed itself in a sense which makes a majority ruling appear possible; a clear basis for the decision itself, or its ultimate influence on the subsequent individual trials, was not created. The decision of the Tribunal in this regard must depend essentially on the results which its Verdi can be expected to have. Therefore, Law Number 10 of the Control Council, of 20 December 1945, is of the utmost importance. From the text of this law it appears as if mere membership in an organization or a group which has been declared criminal will be punishable. If that were the case, the inclusion of innocent persons in the present proceedings would seriously impair the principle of guilt which forms the basis of modern criminal law. Such an interpretation would not be compatible with the text of the Charter. There, indeed, Article 10 declares the objection that an organization was not criminal to be inadmissible, but one may still raise the objection that one did not know about its criminal character. It follows also from Article 11 of the Charter that a conviction is contemplated only because of participation in the criminal activity. The informed press and the radio have also expressed themselves in the same vein.
DR. SERVATIUS: The question arises as to how the criminal character of the group is to be established, which is decisive for its conviction. The attitude of the Tribunal can be learned from its ruling of 13 March 1946. The essential factor is participation in the conspiracy. This presupposes the formation of the group for the commitment of a specific act which has been declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter. Such a formation, however, in the case of every conspirator is based, among other things, on concrete knowledge of the crime contemplated. As proof of this knowledge the Prosecution alleges the notoriety of the crimes or the comprehensive information available to the Political Leaders. The persecution of the Jews and the conflict with the Church were publicly known as general tendencies. The criminal excesses proceeding from them were not known. In this connection the following is also important: The thing that matters is not the general knowledge of the facts, but the general knowledge of the motives behind them. Unless We are concerned with, genuine war crimes, the motive for aggressive war must be known; the actions must have been recognizable as the first stage of a war of aggression. Only in this way could participation in the criminal conspiracy result. The Prosecution concludes that these motives must have been self-evident to the persons affected from the doctrine of National Socialism. There, it is claimed, aims were stated Which of necessity had to lead to a war of aggression. In this way even building up the Party and recruiting members, as well as the seizure of power, become criminal, proceeding from the motive of a war of aggression. It is claimed that an alliance existed for waging an aggressive war or for the commission of war crimes. Is this conclusion correct? As manuals, the Political Leaders had the Party Program and the book Mein Kampf. The Party Program had been attacked vigorously by domestic opponents, but no official foreign agencies had objected to it.
DR. SERVATIUS: In 1925 the Interallied Rhineland Commission in Coblenz had approved the Party Program for the Rhineland, and later the League of Nations had done likewise for Danzig. The Party was permitted, including its philosophy as expressed in the book Mein Kampf. Besides, it was known that Hitler had declared that his book was out of date in many points. It is true that the goals to which the Party aspired could lead to a war, and it is also true that a war which aims at something which infringes on the property of someone else, must include an attack on such property. But the slogans "Lebensraum" (Living Space) and "Los von Versailles" (Away with Versailles) just as little as the slogan "Workers of the world unite" is bound to result in aggressive war. A door always remains open to negotiation through an appeal to reason. Just as strikes, uprisings, and revolutions within a state can be justified for workers in their struggle for existence, so wars may come about in the life of nations. But the normal way is that of negotiation. Otherwise, any member of an opposition party could be prosecuted for high treason. That an aggressive war was actually waged, which would obviously go beyond the technical concept of the opening of hostilities, has been contested with cogent arguments in the proceedings before the Tribunal by many of the major defendants. If Hitler demanded living space, the result of the war forces one to believe that other nations are taking it without condemning the principle which as a "law of life" is supposed to have been the cause of this war. The archives of the world remain closed. For the Defense it is not so important to determine whether an aggressive war was waged, but rather to determine whether the Political Leaders knew about it and whether it became generally obvious to them. The facts themselves speak eloquently against the general knowledge of aggressive intentions.
DR. SERVATIUS: To every Political Leader Hitler's offer to disarm down to the last machine gun must have been impressive, and also his repeated declaration that the misfortune of other peoples could not bring any advantages to his own people, but rather that the welfare of all should be the basis of international life. Equally impressive must have been the naval agreement with Great Britain, his declaration to France that he did not intend to make further territorial claims, the Munich Pact, and finally the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. The latter in particular caused a wave of rejoicing because it seemed to bring about peace with the, very adversary who had hitherto been designated as our worst enemy. Precisely this treaty proves at the same time how impossible it is to derive any directives for practical use from the book Mein Kampf. Of primary importance for judging the rearmament of Germany as far as the Political Leaders are concerned is Hitler's repeated declaration that "Bundnisfuhigkeit" (the ability to conclude alliances) must be established by an equality of armaments. The extent of rearmament was not perceptible in relation to the strength of our opponents, and Hitler himself had declared it to be folly for a small nation to challenge the whole world. However, the cornerstone of the conviction of all the Political Leaders that no war was being planned was the fact, emphasized again and again, that Hitler himself had served as a frontline soldier in the first World War; one could not, therefore, expect him to bring on the miseries of a new war. I Thus at the 1936 Party Rally in Nuremberg, on the occasion of an appeal directed exclusively to the Political Leaders, Hitler literally stated: "During these long years we had no other prayer than 'Lord, give our people domestic peace and grant and preserve for them peace with other nations'. In our generation we experienced so much of fighting that it is understandable if we long for peace....
DR. SERVATIUS: "We wish to care for the future of our nation's children, and to work for the future, not only in order to safeguard their lives but also to make them easier. So much misfortune lies behind us that we have only one request to address to a merciful and benevolent Providence: 'Spare our children that which we had to suffer!' We desire nothing but peace and tranquillity for our work." (Document PL-41a.) These words were directed to the very same men who as Political Leaders are today affected by the Indictment. In contrast to thought of war there were strong foundations for a positive policy of peace. For all those who fought for Socialism and who believed in the realization of peace plans, the fact that Hitler himself had been a worker was of primary importance. The elimination of unemployment appeared as the greatest possible accomplishment of peace; a success which was convincing for everyone who regained employment. It was not Hitler's demoniacal magic which brought 7 million unemployed and the same number of partially employed people with their families to his ranks; what moved the masses was the fact that he gave them work and bread again. It cannot be denied that the position of the worker was improved to something beyond a bare existence, and that his social standing was raised. At the beginning of the war a great social work was in the process of construction, namely, the universal old-age insurance system. To the Political Leaders this did not look like aggressive war. There is still one more important reason why the occurrences and their motives were not generally known: it is the system of secrecy. The means of preserving secrecy are known to the Tribunal from the evidence they have heard. I would like to emphasize another point which helped in a particular way to preserve secrecy; it is the confidence which Hitler enjoyed. This confidence was nourished from the huge reservoir of social success which he had gained by eliminating unemployment, which had brought human beings to the edge of despair.
DR. SERVATIUS: To this were added his successes in foreign policy, which had been recognized abroad. Everything was supported by the traditional authority of the State and by emphasizing that tradition; both are things which have much influence on the people. To that was added a hitherto unknown frankness of speech in matters of foreign policy which the French Prosecutor has called naiveté Within Germany this frankness brought about the conviction that Hitler would not instigate anything secretly. That picture was completed for the millions of followers by the facade of respectability and dignity which was kept up by that very circle around Hitler from whom criticism and warnings were first to be expected. From all this one has to conclude that the Political Leaders could not have gained knowledge of any aggressive intentions. The assumption by the Prosecution that special information had been given about these plans also seems untenable in the light of the evidence submitted during the Trial. The Prosecution's allegation presumably rests on their original assumption that it was a part of the normal business routine to inform all Hoheitstr5ger, whereas it has now been established that only a very small circle was initiated. The situation is different with regard to the war crimes: here the deciding factor is not proof of the motives for known occurrences, but the knowledge of the facts themselves. It is certain that war crimes, because of their despicable motives, are kept secret as a matter of course. In the course. of testimony the Tribunal has learned of the ring of silence which was drawn around the worst atrocities. Other war crimes with which the defendants are charged are individual cases which did not become publicly known. We shall comment on these in connection with the individual points of the accusations. A number of happenings have been adduced by the Prosecution which according to the Charter itself do not constitute crimes. Evidence has been given concerning the development of the Party, the seizure of power, and the maintenance of power.
DR. SERVATIUS: These are occurrences the general nature of which has not been denied. The creation of a dictatorial state and the prohibition of other parties is a measure of home policy which every state may take according to its judgment. To allege that these methods were created for a war of aggression and that they are therefore criminal is an unnatural construction of the facts. Proof for any such assumption is lacking. The organization of the State along dictatorial lines may be necessary for the establishment of Socialism as well as for a war of aggression. Thus, the direction of the economy can serve good as well as evil. The British Prosecutor has shown us another point of view. He has stated that intervention is possible in order to protect citizens against their own government; from this he concludes that even war can be waged out of humanitarian reasons. The Charter does not confer such a right of intervention, as has already been stated in the beginning. But even international law has hitherto never recognized any right of intervention upon moral grounds. Crusades are not permitted. If the so-called methods of the Party are commented upon here, it is because its abuses are connected with the crimes in the Charter. Four documents have been submitted which are connected with Political Leaders and concern the influencing of elections. The most important one is Document D-43 from the year 1936. It concerns an inquiry by the Reich Minister of the Interior as to which civil servants did not fulfil their obligations to vote. The Ortsgruppenleiter are asked to comment upon this. This is a letter from the Kreisleiter's office in Bremen. Another Kreisleiter, the witness KUM, declared before the Commission that he did not receive any such inquiry. The general character of this inquiry is thus put in doubt. One document, R-142, dating from the year 1938, is of purely local importance. It originates from the Coblenz SD Sector and mentions the statement of the Kreis Manager (Kreisgeschuftsfuehrer) about the reasons for the bad election results because of personal quarrels.
DR. SERVATIUS: Both documents deal with the results of the election after the vote. Two further documents-D-897 and D-902-dating from the year 1938, are letters exchanged between the lowest offices of the SD in Erfurt about supervision of the election. Concerning this, the closest possible co-operation with the Ortsgruppenleiter is ordered. As far as the proceedings against the Political Leaders are concerned it is shown that the order-issuing apparatus of the Party in no way intervened here. These are merely independent and isolated measures by other offices. No general practice or knowledge, therefore, can be deduced from that. Another charge is that of police spying. The pretext for this is in a passage of the Organizations Book, Page 101 of the 1940 edition, according to which Blockleiters are to report persons spreading dangerous rumors. In connection with this the keeping of household card index files is mentioned, as practiced in the Cologne Gau and including detailed supervisory questions. The question now is whether this was generally handled by the Political Leaders in this way, and whether-it was done in conformity with Party directives. The Party directives to the Political Leaders specify the exact opposite. See Decree Number 127 of 5 October 1936 in the orders of the Fuehrer's Deputy (Document Number PL-34). The witnesses examined in connection with this question have testified that these instructions were followed and that the card indexes known to them contained nothing resembling police spying. This confirms the fact that there existed no general order resembling the system in the Cologne Gau which was binding on all Gaue. In this connection we refer particularly to the testimony of the witness Dr. Kuhn who, as Counsellor of the District Court of Appeal was the qualified adviser for the Subversive Activities Law (Heimtilekegesetz) in the Ministry of Justice.
DR. SERVATIUS: The witness declared in his interrogation on 10 July 1946 that the proceedings instituted could mostly be traced back to statements by hostile neighbors or other informers and only very rarely originated with Political Leaders. The only concrete testimony about cases of police spying which the Prosecution has submitted is Document L-901, in which a Block Leader and janitor of a Parish Hall reports a secret meeting of the members of the Confessional Church in his building. The charge of police spying is also coupled with that of causing persons to be placed in protective custody and sent to concentration camps. That political adversaries in a State should be declared enemies of the State and arrested seems to be a prescriptive right which politicians arrogate to themselves. It is based upon reciprocity and represents in this case a retaliation for the losses in the political struggle. A connection with a war of aggression is not established. The charges of the Prosecution will, therefore, be directed against misuse of office through excesses and atrocities. It was not the 'Party which was competent in this sphere, but the State agencies. In accordance with orders by the Chief of the Security Police and SD of 10 March 1940, Document Number PL-100, arrests were solely the function of the Gestapo. Any interference on the part of Political Leaders was strictly forbidden (Number PL-29). In this manner secrecy was assured from the very beginning. The real conditions in the concentration camps were concealed from the Political Leaders through the fact that orders were issued and carried out that even after their release political prisoners and their families should remain under thorough supervision. This is Document Number PL-100, which creates such astonishment when read today.
DR. SERVATIUS: When the witness Count von Roedern was interrogated before the Commission concerning knowledge about conditions in the concentration camps he said that in the beginning of 1943 the Landesgruppenleiter of the Auslandsorganisation of the Party had visited the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen, and had gained the impression on that occasion that the rumors about 460. concentration camps which were circulated abroad at that time were without foundation. The witness Sieckmeier states in Affidavit PL-57 that in the spring of 1939 he visited the concentration camp at Buchenwald with 150 American guests, and the witness Wunsche states in Affidavit PL-57b that in June 1938 he visited the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen with a class of the Berlin Zollschule (School for Customs Officials). Both state that the quarters and the food of the prisoners were in conformity with the regulations. Thirty-five more statements by Political Leaders who had visited such camps are contained in the collective affidavits. They are all to the same effect. 14,000 statements summarized in Affidavit PL-57 show that these Political Leaders knew nothing about the conditions in the concentration camps, that in seven cases they received no answer to their inquiries, but that satisfactory answers were received in 102 cases. Then incriminating documents about euthanasia were submitted. It has been shown that the Political Leaders had no part in carrying out these measures, and that they had no general knowledge of them. Document 630-PS, a letter of Hitler's of I September 1939, shows that this was a so-called "special secret order," which was given directly to Reichsleiter without portfolio Bouhler and Dr. Brandt. Neither the Reichsleiter nor Gauleiter were informed about any such special secret order (Proof: Document 59a, Hederich Affidavit). According to Document D-906, Numbers 3 and 6, the medical commission concerned seems to have established contact with the Gauleiter or Kreisleiter in individual cases.
DR. SERVATIUS: It is 'noteworthy, however, that precisely this last document mentions that the Hoheitstrager are not included, since the regulations do not contemplate this. Confirmation of these facts is given by the collective affidavits PL-59 of Karl Richard Adam, who states that 7,642 Political Leaders executed affidavits to the effect- that they had not received any orders, and had not been involved in carrying out such measures. All other measures were also taken to preserve secrecy about this matter, which had already become known here and there and had given rise to many rumors. This is shown by the special notes recommending secrecy in the incriminating documents. The witness Meyer-Wendeborn stated before the Tribunal that upon his inquiry he was told that these were only rumors; and a physician, Dr. Engel (PL-59b), and Kreisleiter Dr. Dietrich (PL-59c) confirm this official denial of the, mercy killing. Were these measures in any way connected with the conduct -of the war? It is certain that euthanasia was already being discussed in 1934, as shown by Document M-152. Carefully worded articles were published in the press, which encouraged this idea from the viewpoint of eugenics (Zuchtwahl), and which referred to the custom in ancient Greece of exposing and abandoning the unfit. Any connection with warlike intentions, however, is difficult to establish, even though the member of a Gau staff defines mercy killing in case of war as a war measure in Document D-906. I now come to the events which became public knowledge: smashing 6f the labor unions, conflict with the Churches, and persecution of the Jews. The "smashing" of the free trade unions was well known. It was a revolutionary act. It was either permissible or not permissible, as in any revolution. It was an event which happened only once and for which the responsibility is clear. The Political Leaders did not have a direct part in its execution, but they knew of the event and approved it. The question must be examined whether it was a measure anticipating war, or whether other reasons were decisive.
DR. SERVATIUS: The 150 large and small labor unions, which included 30 percent of the workers, were already at the end of their tether before they were dissolved. Economically, the majority of them were facing collapse; the many years of unemployment had depleted their treasuries, while increasing the demands upon them. The political parties which dominated the unions had been helpless in the face of the economic crisis; they had been powerless against Hitler, and so they resigned. Mass withdrawals, which began at the end of 1932 and the beginning of 1933, had thus made the unions mere shadows. On the other hand, the-workers transferred to the NSBO, and thereby aligned themselves with the idea of peace within the ranks of labor, which was clearly preparing the way for the solution of the economic crisis. In the same way the employers' organizations were compelled to maintain peace within labor, and were dissolved. The purpose of the elimination of all organizations was to effect a settlement between labor and capital; the class struggle was replaced by the duty to care for the workers on the one hand, and the duty of loyalty on the other as a key to the elimination of economic distress. That the proceeding was so understood and approved -by the workers is shown by their willing cooperation; thus the economic-political proceeding was justified after the event. Then the Church question is also an incriminating point. It is well known that the Churches lived in constant strife with National Socialism. It is not known that the cause of this strife lay in the opposition of the Churches to an int6nded war of aggression. After initial differences about power politics, it was only later that reasons of Christian morality impelled the Church in an ever increasing degree to fight against National Socialism. In general, the Churches were indifferent to the foreign policy of nations, in accordance with the principle, "Give unto Caesar that which is Caesar's".