dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing.] I think the Tribunal could read this themselves if the defendant says that it is true that he wrote it. Probably Dr. Siemers could check it over and see that there are no inaccuracies.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, My Lord. Then I shall have the opportunity to put a very brief question. [Turning to the defendant.] I will ask you to take a look at a place on Page 29, which is marked with pencil, where the paragraph deals with Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl. Will you confirm that?
RAEDER: What am I supposed to do? Yes, well...
COL. POKROVSKY: I am asking you with regard to everything that I read into the record and what you say just now in this paragraph. I would like to have an answer from you. Do you confirm all that?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I quite agree with the suggestion by the Tribunal. However, I should like to ask that the entire document be submitted. I have only short excerpts before me, and I would be grateful if I could see the entire document. I assume that Colonel Pokrovsky agrees to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Siemers, one part of the document having been put in evidence, you can refer to the remainder of the document. You can put the remainder of the document in, if you want to.
RAEDER: I said that at the time I tried to find an explanation for the cause of our collapse.
COL. POKROVSKY: First, I ask you to give the answer, yes or no.
RAEDER: Yes. On the whole, I agree entirely with this judgment. But I should like to add that I wrote those things under entirely different conditions. I do not wish to go into details, and I never expected that that would ever become public. These were notes for myself to help me form my judgment later on. I also want to ask especially that what I said about Generaloberst Jodl should also be read into the record, or where it belongs, that is, right after the statement about Field Marshal Keitel. With regard to Field Marshal Keitel, I should like to emphasize that I intended to convey that it was his manner towards the Fuehrer which made it possible for him to get along with him for a long time, because if anybody else had been in that position, who had a quarrel with the Fuehrer every day or every other day, then the work of the whole of the Armed Forces would have been impossible. That is the reason and the explanation of what I wanted to express by that statement.
COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution has no further questions to ask the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, have you got the whole document before you? Was that the original document you had before you?
RAEDER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: In your writing?
RAEDER: No, it is typewritten. But it is signed by me.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the document can be handed to Dr. Siemers. Dr. Siemers, do you want to re-examine beyond putting in that document? Have you any questions you want to ask in addition to putting in that document?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, on account of the cross-examination made by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, I should like to re-examine, and I should like to ask for permission to do that after I have read this document, so that I can also cover the document tomorrow in this connection.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, the thought occurs to me with respect to this document-do I understand that the Tribunal will order copies to be distributed to all of the Defense Counsel? There are matters with respect to the defendants on which the Counsel might want to examine. They might be surprised.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought it was fair that Dr. Siemers should see the document.
MR. DODD: Yes. I have no objection to that. But my point is, that in the document there is reference to defendants other than the defendant represented by Dr. Siemers. And at a later date, if this document is not made known to the others by the reading of it or by the turning over to them in translated form, they may claim surprise, and lack of opportunity to examine on it.
THE PRESIDENT: I think some photostatic copies of the document should be made so that all the defendants referred to therein may be acquainted with the terms of the document. -
MR. DODD: I just thought I would make that suggestion.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. [The Tribunal adjourned until 21 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with reference to your examination yesterday, I have to put the following questions to you in re-examination. Sir David was talking about the fact that before 1933 you had carried out rearmament behind the backs of the lawmaking bodies. I think that question as such, has been clarified; but there is one supplementary question. On whom did it depend just what was submitted to the Reichstag?
RAEDER: On the Reichswehrminister.
DR. SIEMERS: And who was the Reichswehrminister at that time?
RAEDER: He was a member of the government and my direct superior. I had to submit everything to him which I wished to get.
DR. SIEMERS: And his name was Groener, wasn't it?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: May I draw the Tribunal's attention to the extract from the Constitution which I have recently submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-3, according to which Article 50 lays down that the Reich President gives all orders and decrees even where the Armed Forces are concerned. For their validity decrees require to be countersigned by the Chancellor or the Minister concerned. By the act of countersigning responsibility is accepted. In this, our case, the Reichswehrminister was the competent Reich Minister; and anything that was done afterwards with reference to the law-making bodies was a matter for the government to decide. [Turning to the defendant.] Sir David has submitted to you Document C-17. It is the index of a book written by Colonel Scherff, called The History of the German Navy from 1919 to 1939 . Was this book ever written?
RAEDER: As far as I know, only the index was compiled. I assume that if anything had been written, then it would have been submitted to me a long time ago, but I never heard of that at all.
DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that the American Prosecution, at the time when they submitted the document, pointed out that as far as they knew the book was not written. [Turning to the defendant.] I believe that it is very difficult to base accusations on an index, but I want you to tell me, Defendant, when did you learn of this index?
RAEDER: It became known to me during my first interrogation by an American prosecutor.
DR. SIEMERS: Furthermore, Document D-854, which is GB-460, was put to you yesterday. May I come back to one question put by Sir David. On Page 1 Sir David had been reading as follows: "But if-as was stated-in nearly all spheres of armament where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit-or at least its violation was prepared-a long time before the 16th of March 1935...." Then Sir David asked you: "Do you want to say that this is untrue?" You answered but you did not quite finish your reply, at least it never became quite clear what you said in the German or the English record. I want you to tell me why you are of the opinion that Assmann was not quite right in this respect?
RAEDER: It is an utter exaggeration. First of all, violations-as have been proved here in detail-were mostly of a very minor nature; and only the number of deviations may have given the impression that there were many violations. Secondly, in its essential points, we never actually filled the quotas allowed by the Versailles Treaty; in fact, we remained below the figures granted. Besides, only defense measures are involved, very primitive defense measures-Assmann's representations are just a great exaggeration.
DR. SIEMERS: What you are trying to say, therefore, is that Assmann's way of putting it "in practically every sphere of rearmament" is wrong?
RAEDER: Yes, probably Document C-32 will have led him to that conclusion because there were so many points. However, on closer examination they turn out to be very minor points.
DR. SIEMERS: With regard to the important points of rearmament, that is to say construction of large ships, the Navy did not violate the Treaty, did it?
RAEDER: No, no.
DR. SIEMERS: By repeating it three times, Sir David emphasized the fact that you had a great deal of confidence in Assmann. I have nothing to say against it, but beyond that I would like to put a supplementary question to you: Did you have that much confidence in him, that in your opinion Assmann could pass a proper legal judgment? Was he a lawyer?
RAEDER: No. Assmann was a naval officer who was not used at the front any more. He was a very clever writer who had written a few volumes about the first World War. He wrote very well, but even the volumes on the naval warfare during the first World War were corrected a great deal by the persons concerned; but against him and his ability to write history nothing can be said.
DR. SIEMERS: I think you remember this document from yesterday. Is It a final historical work? Is it a final and corrected edition?
RAEDER: No. So far as I know, he had not got that far. He was making summaries and extracts from war diaries and records.
DR. SIEMERS: Assmann has written (Document D-854, GB-460): "If, in this light, there were plans for 'preparing the construction' in 1935 of twelve 275-ton submarines, six 550-ton submarines, and four 900-ton submarines, then one will have to consider the strategic points of view valid at that time." Added together 22 were planned, and for the following year 14 submarines-by no means built, just planned. Are these figures correct in your opinion?
RAEDER: They are correct in my opinion. The only thing I am not sure about is the 900-ton type; I cannot quite explain that. I cannot remember that at that time we were building 900-ton boats. Apart from the 250-ton type, our first types were 550-tons, and only then did the 740-ton boats come. Perhaps he is thinking of those when he says 900-tons. We did not actually build 900-ton boats.
DR. SIEMERS: On Page 158, Sir David has read to you the following sentence, which I want to repeat because it needs clarification. "It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty. Considering the size of U-boats which had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to 1938. In reality, 118 were completed and constructed." I want to remind you that in the original there is the Note Number 6 referring to a letter of the Chief of the Naval Budget Department . . .
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: . . . from the year 1942, presumably containing statistics on the construction of submarines as the years went by. I believe that these figures need to be clarified. According to material at my disposal, it appears that these 55 U-boats were in accordance with the London Agreement; that is to say, in accordance with the 45 percent agreed on in 1935. You probably have not got the exact figure in mind, but is that roughly correct?
RAEDER: Yes, that is probably right.
DR. SIEMERS: And now, the Figure 118. That, according to material at my disposal, is also well-founded. That is the figure which corresponds to the 100 percent equality in regard to the tonnage of submarines. If we had 118 submarines, then our submarine equipment corresponded to that of Britain at that time. Is that so?
RAEDER: Yes, it is correct; and it is also correct that we included these later boats in the budget and had ordered them after we had seen Admiral Cunningham and his staff in Berlin on 30 December and had reached a friendly understanding in accordance with the agreement, allowing us to build 100 percent. The remark read at the beginning, saying that we had committed most violations in this sphere, is a complete untruth. Until the beginning of the war we only built such U-boats as we were allowed to build; that is to say, first 45 percent and later 100 percent. It was a great mistake, of course, that we did it.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have just said that it was a complete untruth. I think that, even if Sir David used that word against you, one ought not to pass such sharp judgment against Assmann. Do you not think, Admiral, that there was possibly h legal error on his part when...
RAEDER: Yes, that may be.
DR. SIEMERS: ...he wrote these details and that he was not really thinking of what you have just told us had happened; namely, that in 1938 there had been an agreement between England and Germany, according to which Germany could now build 100 percent?
RAEDER: That is quite probable. When I said "untruth," I meant incorrectness.
DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that in the Naval Agreement of 1935, 100 percent was planned from the beginning and that Germany at first renounced that but had the right at any time to increase to 100 percent, provided that Great Britain was notified. The notification is presumably what you described, Witness; that is the negotiation with Admiral Cunningham?
RAEDER: Yes, that was on 30 December 1938, or it may have been 31 December.
THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant saying that there was a notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938? Is that what you said; that there was notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938?
RAEDER: Admiral Cunningham came to Berlin, to this friendly negotiation which had been provided for in the agreement. On that 30 December we arranged with him that from now on, instead of 45 percent, 100 percent would be built.
THE PRESIDENT: Was that an oral arrangement or a written one?
RAEDER: It was a conference between the Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff and Admiral Cunningham, and certain other individuals, but I cannot remember the details. However, I am pretty certain that minutes were taken.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, unfortunately, I have not been able to trace any written evidence. I only know from Exhibit Number Raeder-11, that is the agreement of 1935, that Germany could increase the tonnage, and the agreement of '37, that Germany had the duty to give notification. Generally, notification is only in writing in diplomatic relations, although, in my opinion, it was not necessarily a duty in this case. Negotiations, as the witness said, did take place.
RAEDER: May I, perhaps, add that apart from the submarine problem, the question of two heavy cruisers, which we had originally dropped, was also settled. We only wanted to build three for the time being; and now we were asking for assent to build the other two, to which, we were entitled. That was also agreed upon in accordance with the agreement.
DR. SIEMERS: Document C-140 was put before you yesterday; it is USA-51. You will find it in the British Document Book 10a on Page 104. I want to put one sentence from that document to you again, which has not been quoted by the Prosecution, neither in November nor yesterday. It appears under Figure 2-c. There is the following statement-I want to add that this is the question of sanctions and the possible preparation of a defense against sanctions in 1935. I quote from 2-c: "For the time being I prohibit any practical preparations." Witness, I want to ask you...
THE PRESIDENT: That is not 10a, 104.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. Elwyn Jones has just been kind enough to point out to me the English translation. It appears from it that-as I have also the English translation before me-that there are two documents C-140; one has one page and the other has two. One has not got a heading and is dated, Berlin, 25 October 1933. In my opinion it is the document...
THE PRESIDENT: That is the one on Page 104?
DR. SIEMERS: No, on Page 104 there is, as I just heard from Major Elwyn Jones, the other document, C-140, which has the heading, "Directive for the Armed Forces in Case of Sanctions."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and the date of it is 25 January 1933?
DR. SIEMERS: 25 October 1935, but that is a clerical error. It is 1933.
MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): There appears to be another document which is not in the document book.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, perhaps I may point out that the Document C-140, USA-51, presented by the Prosecution, must be the one I have referred to, because it tallies with the record; I mean the record of the session of 27 November. That is the document to which I have just now referred.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it C-140 or C-141?
DR. SIEMERS: C-140, the same number, and that is the same as USA-51. Mr. President, perhaps to simplify matters, I may later, after today's session or tomorrow submit the Document C-140 in the, here presented, English and German text.
THE PRESIDENT: Read the document now and you can settle with Mr. Elwyn Jones about the proper notation of the document, whether it should be C-140 or whatever the exhibit number ought to be.
DR. SIEMERS: [Turning to the defendant.] In the version submitted by the Prosecution, preparation for the defense against sanctions is mentioned. I shall now read a further sentence to you, and I quote, "For the time being, I prohibit all practical preparations." Would it be right, therefore, that in 1933 nothing whatever was prepared by you in the Navy?
RAEDER: No. Apart from the ordinary state of preparedness, nothing was allowed to be done, in accordance with this order. This was merely a precaution on the Fuehrer's part in order to take preparative measures in case the opponent might do something.
DR. SIEMERS: You see, the reason why I am asking you this is that yesterday in the cross-examination the preparations that you were supposed to have made in this connection were held against you. I now come to Document C-189, which is USA-44. I beg to apologize for troubling the Tribunal in that I am asking them, if possible, to look at the document again. It is contained in Document Book Raeder 10, Page 14; and, incidentally, Sir David re-submitted it yesterday. Sir David attached great importance to the two words "against England." There under Figure 2 it says: "The Ob.d.M. expresses the opinion that later on the fleet must anyhow be developed against England and that, therefore, from 1936 onward, the large ships must be armed with 35 centimeter guns like those of the King George class." Would this mean that you were using the plans of the English for building ships of the King George class? The only reason, therefore, why you were pointing this out was that you were considering the 35 centimeter guns used in the King George class by the British Admiralty?
RAEDER: Yes, it was the aim of every navy at that time to know as early as possible which was the largest caliber of guns being used by other navies. I said yesterday that, to start with, we had chosen as a model the French Dunkerque type, but later on we discovered that the British used up to 35.6 centimeters. Ships have to be used, if war breaks out, in their actual state; their gun caliber cannot be changed any more. Therefore we always went as high as possible.
DR. SIEMERS: Would I be right, therefore-please excuse me- if I said that the expression "against Britain" in this connection is not correct grammatically, that according to German language usage it should have said "with reference to England"?
RAEDER: Yes, it should have said "developing with regard to England." I said yesterday that it would have been quite senseless if I were to do something against Great Britain before the conclusion of the pact.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that was fully gone into in cross-examination, and the defendant stated his explanation of the words used.
DR. SIEMERS: From Document C-190, which is the conversation on 2 November 1934 aboard the Emden between you and Hitler, Sir David has held up to you that Hitler, in a discussion with you and Goering, said that he considered the expansion of the Navy in the planned manner an absolutely vital necessity, since war could not be conducted unless the Navy safeguarded the ore imports from Scandinavia. It was said that this would have to be understood to mean that the Navy was planned in view of a war and in view of safeguarding the ore imports, which really meant aggressive intentions. Are you of the opinion that the British Navy was not planned to safeguard imports to England or for the event of war and was not equipped accordingly?
RAEDER: No, there is not the slightest doubt about that.
DR. SIEMERS: Six submarines are mentioned in this document. Considering that figure, may I ask you to tell me the number of submarines that Germany would have needed in order to conduct an aggressive war?
RAEDER: Well, at any rate, many more than we had in October 1939, a multiple of that.
DR. SIEMERS: From a document, Mr. President, which was submitted yesterday, D-806, I want to quote, in addition to the second paragraph which has been quoted, the first paragraph and put it to the witness. It is D-806, GB-462, submitted yesterday at noon. [Turning to the defendant.] There it says: "1.) Reference: Submarine Construction Program. On 27 October 1936 I made decision regarding the full utilization of the still available U-boat tonnage according to the Naval Agreement of 1935 and regarding the immediate ordering of the construction of U-41 to U-51 ." Were these the rest of the submarines within the 45 percent limit to which we were entitled according to the Naval Agreement of 1935?
RAEDER: Yes, that is right, judging from the figures.
DR. SIEMERS: And then, Admiral, you have been very thoroughly questioned about Austria and Czechoslovakia. Since that subject has been gone into in detail, I shall confine myself to just one question: Did you, at any time, receive any tasks or orders of a foreign political nature from Hitler? And did he ask you for your advice especially in foreign political matters?
RAEDER: I was never asked for advice, and I had no foreign political tasks, unless you consider the duties which I had to fulfill in Bulgaria and Hungary after my resignation of a foreign political nature.
DR. SIEMERS: Regarding Czechoslovakia, that is, concerning the document about the "Rest Tschechei," you were asked whether Hitler had aggressive intentions against Prague at that time. I think the question ought to have been whether his intentions were for an aggressive war. In connection with that, you have been asked about Goering's threat to bombard Prague, and you quite rightly admitted to Sir David that such a bombing would be a threat. Sir David commented on it as being near to aggressive war; but in order to be quite clear, I want you to tell the Tribunal when you learned of this planned bombing.
RAEDER: Only after the whole matter had been settled, and only by way of conversation. I heard no announcement and I knew nothing else of it beforehand.
DR. SIEMERS: So you knew nothing of it before the occupation of Prague?
RAEDER: No, because military undertakings against Prague were altogether unknown to me.
DR. SIEMERS: Then there is the Document C-100. Mr. President, it was presented yesterday under the Number GB-464.
THE PRESIDENT: 463, I've got it.