dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MAJOR JONES: This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain." The second part of Paragraph 1 reads: "In view of our military and political power in comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the Weser Exercise will be kept as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary,demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force will provide the necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance should be met with, all military means will be used to crush it." There follows, in Paragraph 2 on the next page: "I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the operation against Denmark and Norway the commanding general of the 21st Army Corps, General Von Falkenhorst." Paragraph 3: "The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously. I emphasize that the operations must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy seizes the initiative against Norway we must be able to apply immediately our own counter measures. "It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures.All preparations, particularly those of transport and of readiness, drafting, and embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor in mind.
MAJOR JONES: "In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with fictitious objectives." Then Paragraph 4 on the next page, "The Occupation of Denmark," which is given the code name of "Weserubung Sud": "The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of Funen immediately after occupation of Zealand. "Added to this, having secured the most important places, the group will break through as quickly as possible from Funen to Skagen and to the east coast." Then there follow other instructions with regard to the operation.Paragraph 5: "Occupation of Norway, Weserubung Nord' ": "The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations. "The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the transport by sea of the landing troops." And there follows a reference to the part of the Air Force, and I would like particularly to draw the Court's attention to that reference.This is Paragraph 5 on Page 3 of Hitler's directive: "The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will ensure air defense and will make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain." I am underlining that entry at this stage because I shall be referring to it in connection with a later document. Whilst these preparations were being made and just prior to the final decision of Hitler. . . The PRESIDENT: Did you draw our attention to the defendant by whom it was initialed, Frick, on the first page of that document.
MAJOR JONES: That is an initial by Fricke. That is a different person altogether. That is a high functionary in the German Admiralty and has no connection with the defendant who is before the Tribunal. As I was saying, My Lord, while these decisions were being made reports were coming in through Rosenberg's organization from Quisling; and if the Court will again turn for the last time to Document 007-PS , which is Rosenberg's report, the Tribunal will observe the kind of information which Rosenberg's organization was supplying at this time. The third paragraph, "Quisling's reports" --that is in Annex I in Rosenberg's report, the section dealing with Norway, Page 6 on my copy--referring to the second page of the annex, the paragraph beginning with: "Quisling's reports transmitted to his representative in Germany,Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of intervention by the western Powers in Norway, with tacit consent of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent by January.These increasingly better substantiated communications were in sharpest contrast to the view of the German Legation in Oslo which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian Nygardsvold Cabinet and was convinced of that government's intention and readiness to defend Norway's neutrality. No one in Norway knew that Quisling's representative for Germany maintained closest relations with him; he therefore succeeded ingraining a foothold within governmental circles of the Nygardsvold Cabinet and in listening to the Cabinet members' true views. Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the bureau"--Rosenberg's bureau--"which conveyed the news to the Fuehrer through Reichsleiter Rosenberg. During the night of the 16th to 17th February English destroyers attacked the German steamer Altmark in Jossingfjord." The Tribunal will remember that that is a reference to the action by the British destroyer Cossack against the German naval auxiliary vessel Altmark which was carrying 300 British prisoners captured on the high seas to Germany through Norwegian territorial waters.
MAJOR JONES: The position of the British Delegation with regard to that episode is that the use that was being made by the Altmark of Norwegian territorial waters was in fact a flagrant abuse in itself of Norwegian neutrality and the action taken by H. M. S. Cossack which was restricted to rescuing the 300 British prisoners on board--no attempt being made to destroy the Altmark or to capture the armed guards on board of her--was fully justified under international law. Now the Rosenberg report which I interrupted to give that statement of the British view on the Altmark episode--the Rosenberg report continues: "The Norwegian Government's reaction to this question permitted the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived at between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. Such assumption was confirmed by reports of Chief of Section Scheidt, who in turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling. But even after this incident the German Legation in Oslo championed the opposite view and went on record as believing in the good intentions of the Norwegians." And so the Tribunal will see that the Nazi Government preferred the reports of the traitor Quisling to the considered judgment of German diplomatic representatives in Norway. The result of the receipt of reports of that kind was the Hitler decision to invade Norway and Denmark. The culminating details in the preparations for the invasion are again found in Jodl's diary, which is the last document in the document book. I will refer the Court to the entry of the 3rd of March. "The Fuehrer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of a swift entry into N"--which is Norway--"with strong forces. "No delay by any branch of the Armed Forces.
MAJOR JONES: Very rapid acceleration of the attack necessary." Then the last entry on March the 3rd: "Fuehrer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before Case Yellow with a few days interval." So that the important issue of strategy which had been concerning the German High Command for some time had been decided by this date, and the fate of Scandinavia was to be sealed before the fate of the Low Countries; and the Court will observe from those entries of March 3 that by that date Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea of a Norwegian aggression. The next entry in Jodl's diary of the 5th of March: "Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about Weser Exercise; Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till now. Won't listen to anyone and wants to show that all preparations so far made are worthless. "Result: "(a) Stronger forces to Narvik; (b) Navy to leave ships in the ports (Hipper or Lutzow in Trondheim); (c) Christiansand can be left out at first; (d) six divisions envisaged for Norway; (e) a foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen also." Then the next entry to which I desire to draw the Court's attention is the entry of the 13th of March,which the Court may think is one of the most remarkable in the whole documentation of this case: "Fuehrer does not give order yet for 'W."'--Weser Exercise-- "He is still looking for justification." The entry of the next day, the 14th of March, shows a similar pre-occupation on the part of Hitler with seeking justification for this flagrant aggression. It reads: "English keep vigil in the North Sea with 15 to 16 submarines;doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent operations by Germans. Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give for Weser Exercise." And then I would like the Court to look at the entry for the 21st of March, which by inadvertence has been included in the next page at the bottom of Page 6: "Misgivings of Task Force 21 . .
MAJOR JONES: ." The Court has seen from documents that I have put in already that Task Force 21 was Falkenhorst's force, which was detailed to conduct this invasion. "Misgivings of Task Force 21 about the long interval between taking up readiness positions at 0530 hours and closing of diplomatic negotiations. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken and even exaggerate them." Comment upon that entry is, I think, unnecessary. The nest entry, if the Court will turn to Page 5, of the 28th of March, the third sentence: "Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the other three commanders are worrying about matters which are none of their business. Krancke sees more disadvantages than advantages. "In the evening the Fuehrer visits the map room and roundly declares that he won't stand for the Navy clearing out of the Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo will have to remain occupied by naval forces." There the Court will observe that Jodl, as ever, is the faithful collaborator of Hitler Then April the 2d: "1530 hours. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General Von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer All confirm preparations completed. Fuehrer orders carrying out of the Weser Exercise for April the 9th." Then the last entry in the next page, the 4th of April: "Fuehrer drafts the proclamations. Pieckenbrock, Chief of Military Intelligence I, returns with good result from the talks with Quisling in Copenhagen." Until the very last the treachery of Quisling continued most active.
MAJOR JONES: The Prosecution has in its possession a large number of operation orders that were issued in connection with the aggression against Norway and Denmark, but I propose only to draw the Court's attention to two of them to illustrate the extent of the secrecy and the deception that was used by the defendants and their confederates in the course of that aggression. I would now draw the Court's attention to Document C-115, which for the purpose of the record will be Exhibit GB-90. First of all I will draw the Court's attention to the second paragraph, "General Orders," with a date, "4th of April 1940": "The barrage-breaking vessels"-Sperrbrecher-"will penetrate inconspicuously and with lights on into Oslo Fjord disguised as merchant steamers. "Challenge from coastal signal stations and look-outs are to be answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers. I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the operation before zero hour." Then the next entry is an order for reconnaissance forces dated the 24th of March 1940, "Behavior during entrance into the harbor." The third paragraph is the part to which I wish to draw the Court's attention: "The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as possible. All challenges in Morse by Norwegian ships will be answered in-English. In answer to questions a text with something like the following content will be chosen: " 'Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent.' "Challenges to be answered with names of British warships: "Koln-H.M.S. Cairo; Konigsberg-E.M.S. Calcutta; Bremse- . H.M.S. Faulkner; Karl Peters-E.M.S. Halcyon; Leopard- British destroyer; Wolf -British destroyer; S-boats-British motor torpedo boats. "Arrangements are to be made enabling British war Rags to be illuminated.
MAJOR JONES: Continual readiness for making smoke screen." And then finally the next order dated the 24th of March 1940, Annex 3, "From Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces; most secret." Next page, page two: "Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of passing craft. To challenge in case of the Koln-'E.M.S. Cairo'; then to order to stop--'(1) Please repeat last signal, (2) Impossible to understand your signal'; in case of a warning shot-'Stop firing, British ship, good friend'; in case of an inquiry as to destination and purpose-'Going Bergen, chasing German steamers."' Then I would draw the Court's attention to Document C-151, which for the purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-91, which is a Doenitz order in connection with this operation. If the Court will observe, it is headed: - "Top secret, Operation Order-'Hartmut.' Occupation of Denmark and Norway. "This order comes into force on the code word Hartmut. With its coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking part lose their validity. "The day and hour are designated as Weser-Day and Weser-Hour, and the whole operation is known as Weser Exercise. "The operation ordered by the code word has as its objective the rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land side." And there is at the end of that paragraph another contribution by Doenitz to this process of deception: "The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fly the British flag until the troops have landed except, presumably, at Narvik." The Tribunal now knows as a matter of history that on the 9th of April 1940 the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and almost unarmed people of Norway and Denmark was launched. When the invasions had already begun a German memorandum was handed to the Governments of Norway and Denmark attempting to justify the German action; and I would like to draw the Court's attention to Document TC-55, Exhibit GB-92.
MAJOR JONES: That is at the beginning of the book of documents-the sixth document of the book. I am not proposing to read the whole of that memorandum; I have no doubt the defending counsel will deal with any parts which they consider relevant to the defense. The Court will observe that it is alleged that England and France were guilty in their maritime warfare of breaches of international law and that Britain and France were making plans themselves to invade and occupy Norway and that the Government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such a situation. · The memorandum states-and I would now draw the Court's attention to Page 3 of the memorandum to the paragraph just below the middle of the page beginning "The German Troops": "The German troops, therefore, do not set foot on Norwegian soil as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations against England as long as it is not forced to do so by measures taken by England and France; German military operations aim much more exclusively at protecting the north against proposed occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French forces." In connection with that statement I would remind the Court that in his operation order of the 1st of March Hitler had then given orders to the Air Force to make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain. That is the 1st of March. And this is the memorandum which was produced as an excuse on the 9th of April The last two paragraphs of the German memorandum to Norway and Denmark, the Court may think, are a classic Nazi combination of diplomatic hypocrisy and military threat. They read: "The Reich Government thus expect that the Royal Norwegian Government and the Norwegian people will respond with understanding to the German measures and over no resistance to them. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all possible means by the German forces employed, and would therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed.
MAJOR JONES: The Royal Norwegian Government are therefore requested to take all measures with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of the German troops can take place without friction and difficulty. In the spirit of the good German-Norwegian relations that have always existed, the Reich Government declare to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany has no intention of infringing by her measures the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Norway now or in the future." What the Nazis meant by the protection of the Kingdom of Norway was shown by their conduct on the 9th of April. I now refer the Court to Document TC-56, which will be Exhibit GB-93, which is a report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Norwegian Forces. It is at the beginning of the document book, the last of the TC documents. I will not trouble the Court with the first page of the report. If the Tribunal will turn to the second page: "The Germans, considering the long lines of communications and the threat of the British Navy, clearly understood the necessity of complete surprise and speed in the attach In. Order to paralyze the will of the Norwegian people to defend their country and at the same time to prevent Allied intervention, it was planned to capture all the more important towns along the coast simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament and other military and civilian people occupying important positions were to be arrested before organized resistance could be put into effect and the King was to be forced to form a new government with Quisling as its head." The next paragraph was read by the learned British Attorney General in his speech and I will only refer to the last paragraph but one: "The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded towns along the coast were captured according to plan with only slight losses. In the Oslo Fjord, however, the cruiser Blucher, carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division, technical staffs, and specialists who were to take over the control of Oslo, was sunk.
MAJOR JONES: The plan to capture the King and members of the Government and Parliament failed. In spite of the surprise of the attack resistance was organized throughout the country." That is a brief picture of what occurred in Norway. What happened in Denmark is described in a memorandum prepared by the Royal Danish Government, a copy of which I hand in as Exhibit GB-94 and an extract from which is in Document D-628, which follows the C documents. "Extracts from the memorandum concerning Germany's attitude towards Denmark"-before and during the occupation-"prepared by the Royal Danish Government. "On the 9th of April 1940 at 0420 hours"-in the morning that is-"the German Minister appeared at the private residence of the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Air Attache of the Legation. The appointment had been made by a telephone call from the German Legation to the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 4 o'clock the same morning. The Minister said at once that Germany had positive proof that Great Britain intended to occupy bases in Denmark and Norway. Germany had to safeguard Denmark against this. For this reason German soldiers were now crossing the frontier and landing at various points in Zealand, including the port of Copenhagen; in a short time German bombers would be over Copenhagen; their orders were not to bomb until further notice. It was now up to the Danes to prevent resistance, as any resistance would have the most terrible consequences. Germany would guarantee Denmark territorial integrity and political independence. Germany would not interfere with the internal government of Denmark but wanted only to make sure of the neutrality of the country. For this purpose the presence of the German Wehrmacht in Denmark was required during the war.... "The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was completely without foundation; there floras no possibility of anything like that.
MAJOR JONES: The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested against the violation of Denmark's neutrality which, according to the German Minister's statement, was in progress. The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared further that he could not give a reply to the demands, which had to be submitted to the King and the Prime Minister, and further observed that the German Minister knew as everybody else that the Danish Armed Forces had orders to oppose violations of Denmark's neutrality so that fighting presumably had already taken place. In reply the German Minister expressed that the matter was very urgent, not least to avoid air bombardment." What happened thereafter is described in a dispatch from the British Minister in Copenhagen to the British Foreign Secretary, which the Tribunal will find in D-627, the document preceding the one which I have just read. That document, for the purposes of the record, will be GB-95. That dispatch reads: "The actual events of the 9th April have been pieced together by members of my staff from actual eye-witnesses or from reliable information subsequently received and are given below. Early in the morning towards 5 o'clock three small German transports steamed into the approach to Copenhagen harbor while a number of airplanes circled overhead. The northern battery guarding the harbor approach fired a warning shot at these planes when it was seen that they carried German markings. Apart from this the Danes offered no further resistance, and the German vessels fastened alongside the quays in the Free Harbor. Some of these airplanes proceeded to drop leaflets over the town urging the population to keep calm and co-operate with the Germans. I enclose a specimen of this leaflet, which is written in a bastard Norwegian-Danish, a curiously unGerman disregard of detail, together with a translation. Approximately 800 soldiers landed with full equipment and marched to Kastellet, the old fortress of Copenhagen and now barracks.