dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ALDERMAN: I shall read a few brief extracts from these notes, starting with the third paragraph on Page 1 of the English translation: "In answer to a remark by Matsuoka that Japan was now awakened and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to accept a risk in this connection just as the Fuehrer had done successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament and with the resignation from the League of Nations." I now skip several pages of the German text and continue on with the English translation. "The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, which in its time was the only dominant power on the European continent. "In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trips: "1) Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year, the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede it, if she had not collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign herself to this fact. "2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa. "3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity, which would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan-a chance which would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in East Asia." Here again, in the portion just quoted, we see Ribbentrop pursuing the same track I have previously noted.
MR. ALDERMAN: Germany has already won the war for all practical purposes. Japan's entry will hasten the inevitable end. But Japan had better get the positions she wants during the war. I also invite the Tribunal's attention to Ribbentrop's assurances, expressed in the quotation I read from 1877-PS previously, that Japan likewise had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union if Japan entered the conflict. The references to the weaknesses of the United States, scattered throughout the quotations I have read, were also an ingredient in this brew which was being so carefully prepared and brought to a boil. I should like to introduce one more document on the part of the case dealing particularly with exhortation of the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. This is our Document 1538-PS, which I now over as Exhibit USA-154. This document is a top-secret report, dated 24 May 1941, from the German Military Attaché in Tokyo to the Intelligence Division of the Now. I wish merely to call attention, at this point, to the last sentence in the paragraph numbered 1, wherein it is stated-I quote: "The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand." I shall return to this document later. I point out here, however, the fact which appears from the sentence I have just read, that the German military were keeping in close touch with the Japanese operational plans against Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators had fostered. Next, exhortations by the Nazis to Japanese aggression against the U.S.S.R. I invite the Tribunal's attention, at this point, to the language of the Indictment on Page 10 of the English edition. I quote, beginning with the eighth line from the top of the page: "The Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would weaken and handicap those nations with whom they were at war and those with whom they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators exhorted Japan to seek a 'new order of things'." The evidence I have just adduced showed the Nazi exhortations with particular reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations.
MR. ALDERMAN: We now turn to their efforts to induce the Japanese to commit a "stab in the back" on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here again the Defendant Ribbentrop appears as the central figure. For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order Number 24 regarding collaboration with Japan, the conspirators had been preparing Fall Barbarossa, the plan for the attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic Order Number 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese "must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation." In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, on 29 March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order Number 2d, Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. The report of this conference, contained in 1877-PS, has already been introduced as Exhibit USA-152 and read into the record. I wish to invite the Tribunal's attention again to the first two paragraphs of the English translation of 1877-PS, where Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the largest part of the German Army was on the eastern frontiers of the Reich fully prepared to open the attack at any time. Ribbentrop then added that although he believed that the U.S.S.R. would try to avoid developments leading to war, nevertheless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not probable, would have to be considered possible. Whatever conclusion the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in April of 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed their aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of Ribbentrop's remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July 1941 Ribbentrop dispatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo. The telegram is our Document 2896-PS, which I now introduce as Exhibit USA-155. I quote from numbered Paragraph 4 of that telegram, which is the first paragraph of the English translation: "Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Foreign Minister for conveying the cable report of the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. It would be convenient if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way.
MR. ALDERMAN: In summing up, I should like to say I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the Japanese policy and in the Japanese Foreign Minister; first of all because the present Japanese Government would really act inexcusably toward the future of their nation if they would not take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure for all time its expansion to the south and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse-a report which coincides with our own observations as far as we are able to judge the present war situation-it is simply impossible that Japan should not settle the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military preparations are completed." Skipping now to the middle of the second paragraph on Page 1 of the English translation-the sentence beginning "However . . .": "However, I ask you to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan's entry into the war against Russia at the earliest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better. The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on the trans-Siberian railroad before winter starts. After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three-Power-Pact States in the world be so gigantic that the question of England's collapse or the total destruction of the British Isles will be only a matter of time. An America totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the British Empire which are important for the Three Power-Pact countries. I have the unshakeable conviction that a carrying through of the New Order as desired by us will be a matter of course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons.
MR. ALDERMAN: I ask you to report in the near future, as often as possible and in detail, on the political situation there." We have Ott's reply to this telegram, dated 13 July 1941. This is our Document Number 2897-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-156. After reading the heading, I shall skip to the last paragraph on Page 3 of the German text, which is the paragraph appearing in the English translation: "Telegram; secret cipher system"-Sent 14 July from Tokyo; arrived 14 July 1941-"As fast as possible. "I am trying with all means to work toward Japan's entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible, especially using arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram cited above to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the Foreign Office, military elements, nationalists, and friendly businessmen. I believe that according to military preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest obstacle to this against which one has to fight is the disunity within the activist group which, without unified command, follows venous aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the changed situation." On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations to induce the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. I shall present three documents covering July of l942 and March and April of 1943. The first is our Document 2911-Ps which contains notes of a discussion between Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. As a matter of background I note that at this time German armies were sweeping forward in the U.S.S.R and the fall of Sevastopol had just been announced. I now offer our Document 2911-PS as Exhibit USA-157, and I quote the relevant extracts appearing in the English translation thereof: "He, the German Minister, had asked to see the Ambassador at this time, when the situation was as described, because now a question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint conduct of the war.
MR. ALDERMAN: If Japan felt herself sufficiently strong militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably now. He thought it possible that if Japan attacked Russia at this time, it would lead to her (Russia) final moral collapse; at least it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In any case, never again would Japan have such an opportunity as existed at present to eliminate once and for all the Russian colossus in eastern Asia. "He had discussed this question with the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer was of the same opinion; but he wanted to emphasize one point right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at the half-way mark, and we do not want to urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profitable."
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now, for 10 minutes.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I now offer in evidence our Document Number 2954-PS as Exhibit USA-158. This is a record of a conference between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 199;3. I note again for background that the strategic military situation in the broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat. In the previous month, February 1943, the Soviet armies had completely defeated the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted very severe losses. Further north and west their winter offensive had removed large areas from the hands of the invader. Combined United States and British forces had already landed in North Africa. You will remark as I read that the tone of Ribbentrop's argument at this time reflects the changed military situation. The familiar Japanese refrain of "So sorry, please," likewise appears to have crept in. I note in this record that the month of February 1943 had also seen the end of the organized Japanese resistance on the Island of Guadalcanal . I now quote the relevant extracts from the minutes of the discussion between Ribbentrop and Oshima on 6 March 1943, which appear in the English translation in the document book: "Ambassador Oshima declared that he received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his Government to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely recognize the danger which threatens from Russia and completely understand the desire of their German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the war. They are rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start the war against Russia now.
MR. ALDERMAN: On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question. "The Japanese Government have the intention to become aggressive again in the future on other fronts. "The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in Tokyo. At present Germany wages the war against the common enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that ad powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their forces not only to defeat England and America, but also Russia. It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot overstrain the German national strength. He was inwardly concerned about certain forces at work in Tokyo, who were of the opinion, and propagated the same, that doubtless, Germany could emerge from the battle victoriously and that Japan should proceed to consolidate her forces before she should further exert herself to the fullest extent." I now skip several pages in the German text and resume the quotation: "Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on Russia by Japan and he declared that, after all, the fight on the Burma front as wed as in the south is actuary more of a maritime problem; and on all fronts except those in China at best very few ground forces are stationed. Therefore the attack on Russia is primarily an Army affair, and he asked himself if the necessary forces for that would be available." Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about 3 weeks later on 18 April 1943. The top-secret notes of this conference are contained in our Document 2929-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-159.
MR. ALDERMAN: I shall quote only one sentence: "The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that, without any doubt, this year presented the most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak as she was at the moment." I now wish to come to that aspect of this conspiracy which is in a large measure responsible for the appearance of millions of Americans in uniform all over the world. The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the Japanese against the United States, as noted by the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening statement, present a two-fold aspect; one of preparations by the Nazis themselves for an attack from across the Atlantic, and the other of fomenting war in the Pacific. In the course of my presentation of the Nazi exhortations to the Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., I have referred to some documents and quoted some sentences relating to the United States. I shall take those documents up again in their relevant passages to show their particular application. I have also, in the treatment of Ribbentrop's urging the Japanese to war against the U.S.S.R., gone beyond the dates of 7 December and 11 December 1941, when the Japanese and German Governments respectively initiated and declared aggressive war against the United States. Apart from the advantage and convenience of presentation, these documents have indicated the Nazi awareness and acceptance of the direction in which their actions were leading, as well as the universal aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with the Japanese. Their intentions against the United States must be viewed in the focus of both their over-all plan and their immediate commitments elsewhere.
MR. ALDERMAN: That their over-all plan involved ultimate aggressive war against the United States was intimated by the Defendant Goering in a speech on 8 July 1938, when these conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria and were perfecting their plans against Czechoslovakia. This speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft industry, and the copy that we have was transmitted as the enclosure to a secret memorandum from Goering's adjutant to General Udet, who was then in charge of experimental research for the Luftwaffe. It is contained in our Document R-140, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-160. I invite the Tribunal's attention to the statement in the covering memorandum that the enclosure is a copy of the shorthand minutes of the conference. I shall not go through the long speech in which Goering caned for increased aircraft production and pointed to the necessity for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. I wish to quote just two sentences, which appear on Page 33 of the German text and Page 11 of the English translation. Quoting from the second full paragraph on Page 11 of the English translation, starting with the third sentence from the end of the paragraph: "I still lack these rocket-motors which could make such flights . possible. I completely lack the bombers capable of round-trip Bights to New York with a 5-ton bomb load. I would be extremely happy to possess such a bomber which would at last stuff the mouth of arrogance across the sea." Goering's fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization at that time, either technically or in the fact of the Nazi conspirators' schedule of aggression that has been outlined here in the past several days. During the period of their preparation for and the waging of aggressive war in Europe, up to the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R., it is only reasonable to believe that these conspirators were not disposed to involve the United States in war at that time.
MR. ALDERMAN: Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940 the prosecution of war against the United States of America at a later date was on the military agenda. This is clearly shown in a document which we have found in the files of the OWL, the German Air Force files. It is Document 376-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit Number USA-161. This document is a memorandum marked "Chefsache," the German designation for top. secret, from a Major Von Falkenstein to an unspecified general, presumably a Luftwaffe general. Falkenstein, who was a major of the General Staff, was at that time the Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations Stab of the OKW, which was the staff headed by the Defendant Jodl. His memorandum, which he characterizes as a "brief resume on the military questions current here," is dated the 29th of October 1940. It covers several questions. I shall quote to you numbered Paragraph 5, which appears at the bottom of the first page of the English translation and carries over to the reverse side of the one-sheet document: "5) The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic islands with a view to the prosecution of a war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present: "(a) No other operational commitment; (b) Portuguese neutrality; (c) support of France and Spain. "A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF."-or the German Air Force. The Nazis' military interest in the United States is further indicated by Paragraph 7 which I read: "General Botticher has made repeated reference, especially in his telegram 2314, dated 26th of October, to the fact that in his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supine Command.
MR. ALDERMAN: I pointed out that the matter was specifically a GAF one but have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own merits." Again, in July 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting from early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the Fuehrer signed an order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the United States. This top secret order, found in the files of the German Navy, is our Document C-74, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-162. I read from the first paragraph of that text just preceding the paragraph numbered (1): "By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive Number 32, for the further conduct of the war, I lay down the following principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material supplies: "(1) In general: "The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia will enable the strength of the Army to be considerably reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of the Army will allow, the armored units will be greatly increased. "Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which have a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England and, should the case arise, against America. "The main effort in armament will be shifted to the Air Force, which must be greatly increased in strength." From these documents it appears that the Nazi conspirators were making at least preliminary plans of their own against the United States. The Nazis' over-all plan with regard to the United States was, however, a complex one involving, in addition, collaboration with the Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations to the Japanese to undertake an assault against British possessions in the Pacific Far mast, they again considered war against the United States. I now refer again to Basic Order Number 24, regarding collaboration with Japan. This is our Document - 75, which I have put in as Exhibit USA--151. I have read it in its entirety into the record.