dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any of the other Defendants' Counsel who wish to ask questions of this witness? BY DR. SEIDL (Counsel for the Defendants Hess and Frank): Q Can you recollect what Hitler said at the Cabinet meeting regarding his political aims and the program of the new Government? A Hitler delivered a very long speech, and the Ministers individually took his words.  One of the details I remember at this meeting is that the Fuehrer talked first of all about the stopping of unemployment, something which would have to be achieved.  Secondly, he spoke about the fact that an economic recovery of Germany would have to be arranged.  And thirdly, he talked in detail about what he thought would be achieved if a revision of the Versailles Treaty were to be accomplished, and that it would be necessary to put an end to the defamation which was contained against Germany in the Versailles Treaty, and that it would be necessary for Germany to bring her on an equal footing with the ether nations. All these matters Hitler talked about were then contained in a formal Government declaration.  I also recollect that in that declaration there was mentioned the protection of Christendom. I can't remember any more details. But that, I an convinced, are the main points which we were concerned with. Nothing was discussed which would have made it particularly necessary to keep the matters secret.  And what was discussed was in the main contained in the Government declaration which was published in the press. Q Did Hitler say anything during that meeting that he was going to alter the system of government and that he was going to establish a dictatorship? A He did say that the present parliamentary system in Germany had been a failure - BY THE PRESIDENT: Q You arc speaking about a meeting.  What was the date of the meeting you are referring to?
DR. SEIDL: That is the first Cabinet meeting - A It is the first Cabinet meeting which the Defense Counsel inquired about. I think the first Cabinet meeting was on the 30th of January, 1933. That is the day of the seizure of power. The Fuehrer furthermore stated that the present governmental system had been a failure. Furthermore, he said that the result of that failure had been that the President of the Reich had been obliged to declare a state of emergency, according to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution and that he had created an emergency Government, and that it would now be necessary to create a stable Reich Government, a Government which would be in power for many years, and that how one could create such a Government would be something which he would have to discuss with the President and the Reichstag, the German Parliament. Q Did Hitler say during that meeting, that Cabinet meeting, that he was arranging for a preferential position of power for the N.S.D.A.P.? A He said that the N.S.D.A.P., the Nazi Party, was of course the strongest party and would as such have to be given due influence in the German Government. But he said nothing regarding the other parties that still existed and were represented, such as the German Nationalist, such as that he would remove them or want he was going to do. Hitler did not say that. Q Did Hitler state his foreign political aims during that meeting, and did he say in particular that Germany would finally have to be freed of the shackles of the Versailles Treaty and would have to have an equal footing in the community of peoples? A Yes. I answered that question in the affirmative before. Those were the foreign political aims -- complete revision of the Versailles Treaty. Q Did Hitler mention at the time that for the achievement of these foreign political aims one would consider another war as a possibility, if necessary -- a preventive war? A    As far as I know and as far as I remember, a war was not men- tioned. At any rate, not a preventative war or an aggressive war.
DR. SEIDL: Did Hitler in the time that followed, in cabinet sessions or during any other meeting, when all ministers or members were present state his plan for the achievement of his foreign political aims? A A general, main, plan, no. Nothering over and above the general points I have mentioned. Neither during that meeting nor during any other meeting did he develop his plans, just as in my opinion he never did discuss in detail his general plans, his long-term plans. What caused Hitler to appoint Hess as the Deputy Fuehrer of the Party and to make him a minister? A He appointed Hess as Deputy Fuehrer because he, as Chancellor of the Reich, could no longer take care of the business of the Party, in other words, for the technical command of the Party, he had to have another man, and he appointed him a minister because he wanted a man in the cabinet who was in a position to communicate the wishes and conceptions of the Party to the cabinet. Maybe he was visualizing in that connection something which became a law later on, a unity between the Party and the State. Here the leading generals before and after seizure of power-what was their attitude towards the leaders of the Party? A Before the seizure of power, contact between the party and the generals did not exist as such. That could only have been in certain individual cases between certain members of the Party and some -- very few-generals. After the seizure of power, I had the opportunity to be present when the Fuehrer --that was, I think at the beginning of February 1933 -met the supreme commanders of the armed forces and had them introduced to him, and I had the impression that the Fuehrer had met only a few of these men previously. They were all introduced to him, and I stood by his side. It was my Impression that he knew some -- very few -- of these men and had met them previously.
DR. SEIDL: After the seizure of power  of course, the connections between the leaders of the Party and the generals became closer, since the Party was included into the State to a considerable extent, but what I would like 
     to say is that relations, general relations between the Party--that is to say, theReich leaders of the Party and the political leaders of the staff of the Party on one side, and the leading generals on the other, and even the generals of a slightly junior rank were at no time going beyond the purely formal or so-called social relations. I would almost like to say that they were duty social contacts when one met at celebrations or demonstrations and very occasionally. I feel that the overall relations between the leadership staff of the Party on one side and the generals on the other did at no tine become any closer than that. Q Witness, as far as these contacts were concerned, did they ever change after Hitler became the leader, the head of the State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces? A As far as the generals are concerned, I am of the opinion that nothing in principle changed, since the generals regarded the Fuehrer as not being the leader of the Party but as the head of the state, and they considered him as the supreme commander of all the armed forces. Consequently, they did not believe that any particularly close relations to the generals ought to be established. Did meetings take place for the discussion of political aims between the Reich government, the Reich leaders of the Party, and the high generals? A Such joint meetings are out of the question. They never took place. That would have been impossible because of the large number of people involved. Were members of the Reich government and the Reich leadership staff of the government and the leading generals in a position, as far as important questions referring to the nation were concerned, and particularly referring to war or peace, to define their attitude when they talked to Hitler?
DR. SEIDL: A Jointly, these three groups -- If I can call them that --jointly, they could not voice their opinions. They were not interrelated. Every individual one of these leader staff of the Party, the government and the generals, could, as such, not define their views either, particularly since 
     they knew little about the Fuehrer's political and economic aim. They knew nothing about them, so how could they define their attitude? They knew because they were executing these matters and because they saw the facts, but they were surprised by them quite frequently, and any lter reaction would have meant a stab in the back against the Fuehrer's policy. So that a political main plan of Hitler's in which these 
     chief groups were included, did not exist at all, and, therefore, on could not talk about a conspiracy? A I know of no such general plan, but I can assure you of one thing, and that is the loading majority of ministers knew nothing of any such general plan. They never had any knowledge of it. Just how far the Fuehrer informed individual persons of such a general plan, I do not know. I was not present, but probably--or possibly--the Fuehrer may have told one or the other person, perhaps the Party or the government or the generals, perhaps he did tell them of some plans, but just what they said, what was mentioned, that of course I do not know, and whether they agreed with the Fuehrer in such case or whether they disagreed, that I cannot say either, just as I do not know whether shortly before the execution of any large scale political plans, such as for instance the march into Czechoslovakia or any such matter, whether shortly previously they did consult with the Fuehrer and advise him, whether they agreed, whether they contradicted him, or whether they merely took their orders from him which they had to execute. Q If I understand you right, then you want to say that all political decisions of any magnitude were taken by Hitler alone?
DR. SEIDL: A The large scale political decisions were certainly arrived at by him alone, possibly after consultation and participation of a few persons, but never with the participation of the Reich government, because, if I should mention it  then I should say that when we left the League of Nations, that was the last time that Hitler informed the Reich government of an action. Then came the important action of the march into the Rhineland. Q Forgive me if I interrupt you, but I was told that you ought to speak a little more slowly. A More slowly? Certainly, 
     A  More slowly? Particularly during the first years, and of course all during the later years, the law of usage and habit developed, which meant that the Fuehrer acted more independently than should have been the case according to the Weimar Constitution. Largely, political questions were all removed from the jurisdiction of the Cabinet by the Fuehrer. That was in 1933 and 1934, when Hindenburg was still alive, and during that time the Fuehrer did not wish that general political questions be raised in the Cabinet by any minister. I have repeatedly had to inform ministers that they were to refrain from bringing up questions which did not belong in their immediate sphere of influence and discuss them in the cabinet. For instance, on one occasion I had to pass on such information to those men who wanted to discuss church policy. I had been forbidden to put any general political questions on the agenda of such a Cabinet meeting. If, in spite of that, a minister raised a political question during a meeting of the Cabinet, then the Fuehrer used to speak himself and deal with that individual person, or order him to report personally. Then the period developed when, after Hindenburg's death, the Fuehrer became both the head of the State and the leader, and then such debates in the Cabinet, as long as there were Cabinet meetings, were stopped altogether. Nothing could be debated. The ministers were not allowed to feel that they were political ministers.
DR. SEIDL: I had to communicate these facts to them repeatedly, by order of the Fuehrer, and tell them to refrain from raising any particular questions during Cabinet meetings. Then came the time, which I have already described, during which these large-scale political actions took place, and no Cabinet meetings took place at all. The Fuehrer acted independently and alone, and all statements were made on behalf of the Reich Government. He himself made these declarations, alone and without consulting anybody first. I must admit that the Cabinet quite often complained about that, but nevertheless failed to perpetually resist that custom. So gradually, the governmental powers -- if I now consider the "government" such as is laid down in Anglo-Saxon law under "Government", then there was no longer any Reich Government after 1936 in its proper entirety, consisting of minister. That form of government ceased to exist in 1936. The Fuehrer was the Reich Government, and those powers had slipped into his hands. All I can say is that it may have been wrong, it may have been stupid, but it wasn't a crime. It was a political development such as has happened repeatedly in history. I only want to remind you that in ancient Rome, where the Senate had the powers and had all powers, in that connection there was a gradual -
THE PRESIDENT: When you see two lights in front of you, you are either speaking too fast or else the system has broken down, and you must stop altogether.
THE WITNESS: Very well. BY DR. SEIDL: Q Go on, but you must speak more slowly. A   These developments in ancient Rome were just exactly the same. The Senate had all powers, and extraordinary laws, leading to -
THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly keep silent when the Tribunal wishes to speak?
THE WITNESS: Yes, but, of course, I don't know when they do.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal really doesn't want to hear a history of ancient Rome.
THE WITNESS: Very well. BY DR. SEIDL: Q Witness, you have described the development when the governmental powers slipped into Hitler's hands. A Yes, but not completely. Q Well,in that case, please continue.
THE PRESIDENT: We have had quite enough.  We quite understand that he is saying that Hitler took over all powers and would not listen to any debate at all. It is perfectly clear that he said so.
DR. SEIDL: Yes. BY DR. SEIDL: Q Witness, will you please tell me one more thing?   And this is my last question in this connection.  Please tell me whether you, as Minister of the Reich and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, considered the development you have just described as legal. A I have considered that development, in the first place, from the point of view of the legalist, and I have discussed these questions repeatedly with Hitler, and I consider it perfectly legal and, if it is necessary, I can quote you my reasons in detail.  Particularly, I consider that development legal because of the well-known Enabling Act and later laws which gave plenipotentiary powers to the Government.  Therefore, the Government, in turn, was in a position to detach some of those powers to the Fuehrer and to pass some of them on.  In that manner the Reich Government, as such -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal isn't really interested in whether or not it was legal. What the Tribunal is interested in is whether crimes against other nations were committed. We certainly don't want to hear this in such great detail.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, but the main point in the indictment is Point I, and that is concerned with the conspiracy.
THE PRESIDENT: The main point in the  indictment is not whether it was in accordance with German law that Hitler should take over the powers of his government. There was no such point made in the indictment. BY DR. SEIDL: Q Witness, I now turn to some questions which only concern the defendant Dr. Frank. Since when do you know Dr. Frank and what were his activities up to the outbreak of the war? A I met Frank during the year 1932.  If I understand you rightly, you want to know his activities from the outbreak of the war? Q Yes. A Well, first of all, he was the Chief of the Legal Division of the Party.  Then, for the Party point of view, he became Chief of the National Socialist Union of Lawyers, which, later on, he came the Union of Legalism. Then he became a member of the Government, and upon seizure of power in 1933 he became Minister of Justice in Bavaria.  At the same time he became Commissar for Legal Reforms. Later on--and I can't tell you the exact year--he became Minister Without Portfolio, and he was the President of the Academy of Law.  He finally became Governor General.
THE PRESIDENT: We have had the defendant Frank's posts proved to us already. I should think, probably more than once.  We don't require them from Dr. Lammers.
DR. SEIDL: In that case, I want to put another question to the witness. BY DR. SEIDL: Q Witness, what was the relationship between Frank and Hitler? A The relationship between the two was, at the beginning, I should like to say, good, but not particularly close. At any rate, during the whole time he did not belong to those who could to called the closest consultants of the Fuehrer. Q    What was Frank's attitude towards the police state and the question of concentration camps? A Frank has repeatedly made speeches in public when he was working for or talking in favor of a legal state, though probably not very strongly. He confined his views to being opposed to internment in concentration camps, since such detention was without a legal basis. These speeches made by Frank were frequently the cause of a severe blame from Hitler, so that in the end the Fuehrer instructed me to order him to remain silent, even in the publishing of these speeches. Finally, the result of these activities of Frank's, when he was working for the legal state, wasthat he was removed from his office as the Reich chief of the legal section of the NSDAP--the Party. Q Wasn't he made to resign as president of the academy of law? A Yes, that happened at the same time; and, at the same time, the union of lawyers. Q Another questions: Did Frank as Governor General have considerable powers, or was it not ratherthe case that his position was very unstable? You can certainly say that in many ways his powers had been damaged. A There are a number of arguments:  One was caused by the armed forces. That didn't affect him so much, because commissars in occupied territories were never army chiefs. But then Reichsmarshal Goering, as plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, had considerable powers to issue orders to both the Party and the state in all occupied territories, therefore including the Government General, so that he therefore could give orders to the Governor General, and he could in fact work against the orders of the Governor General and cancel them.
DR. SEIDL: Certainly, Frank's powers as Governor General were considerably limited through the police, since Himmler as chief of the German police had legal powers as police chief which he was to coordinate, nevertheless, with the Governor General, which wasn't always done. Furthermore, the Governor General suffered a further loss of power through the fact that Himmler became Reich Commissioner for the consolidation of German national qualities, and as such had to reorganize resettlement, and in fact did do so without asking the Governor General first. These were further limitations in favor of Minister Speer in favor of rearmament, and there were further limitations on behalf of the postal services, railroad services, and so on; but these are the chief infringements or losses of power in the case Frank. Q What, according to your observations, was Frank's principal attitude towards the Polish and Ukrainian peoples, and what was the policy he tried to achieve? A In my opinion he always tried to have a moderate policy and to create an atmosphere in favor of Germany inside Poland, but he didn't alwaysachieve that, and particularly were his failures due to the fact that the powers of the police and Himmler's powers were so predominant in the sphere ofresettlement that his measures and his intentions were disturbed and suffered setbacks. He found it difficult to assert himself. Q Did he have any intentions of Germanizing people, or is it true that he opposed Himmler's policy as commissioner for the saving of German national characteristics and that he opposed them wherever possible? A I wouldn't have thought that Frank would be silly enough to have Germanizing intentions or intend to make the Poles into Germans, but maybe he tried to win the people of German origin in Poland for the German case. But he had difficulties regarding this resettlement scheme, since he hadn't been asked previously, and since by means of resettlement people had been pushed into the Government General. In that respect he and I agreed perfectly.
DR. SEIDL: I have repeatedly told the Fuehrer about this and reported to him that these mass resettlements couldn't be done all at once and without the agreement of the Governor General and that he couldn't govern if these resettlement measures weren't communicated to him first -- if he had no influence upon these measures. Q Witness, you stated earlier that the entire security police and the SD in the Government General were under the immediate jurisdiction of Himmler and the chief of the German police. Did Governor General Frank not try to work against the policy of force of these two men? Did he not try to object and to rectify the matter? A    On this point he has raised repeated complaints addressed to me. They had the aim that I should take them to the Fuehrer, which, however, I only succeeded in doing in part. In one point, however, we did want to help. In the Government General there was established a secretariat of state for the security system. This was under the Higher SS police leader Krueger. This, however, only functioned for, four to six weeks and then the differences of opinion borke out once more. The secretary of state Krueger stated, "I am receiving my orders from Himmler."  If the Governor General would complain, then Himmler would say, "These are all unimportant matters. I have to be able to rule on them directly." And the Governor General said, "But to me they aren't unimportant. To me these things are important indeed." The channels of command and the cooperation with the Governor General were not being observed, and it is therefore perfectly obvious that he had a very difficult position because of this police system. Q Is it correct that the Governor General repeatedly, both verbally and in writing, stated what he objected to, and what were the reasons? A     He repeatedly offered his resignation because of these con- flicts which he had, in particular with Himmler, and because in the case of these conflicts he was never told that he was right.