dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. STEINBAUER: The protest against the plebiscite made to the Chancellor by Seyss-Inquart in the name of the Nationals was entirely justified legally. Apart from the fact that there could be no guarantee for a proper vote at such short notice, the vote itself was not constitutionally legitimate. Article 65 of the Austrian Constitution of 1 May 1934 specifies exactly under what circumstances the nation can be called upon to vote. Dr. Schuschnigg, therefore, bases his proclamation of the election on Article 93 of the Constitution which article merely says generally: "The Federal Chancellor determines policy." The Austrian Patriotic Front (Vaterlandische Front), that is, the political organization, had the task of carrying out the election. The subsequent developments are well known, particularly the events of 11 March 1938. The main charge in respect to the conspiracy is, I take it, that Seyss-Inquart caused the entry of the German troops by his telegram about alleged unrest. We find this historical lie, which has given the defendant the name of "Judas of Austria" in the story of the Anschluss. We find this historical lie for instance, in Raphael Lemkin's Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Page 109). We find it again in the opening speech of the American Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Justice Jackson, although it is incontestably proved by the submission of Goering's telephone conversations (Document Number 2449-PS) in connection with Goering's testimony, that this telegram was never sent and, what is more, was dictated and addressed to a third party at a time when the German troops had already received the order to cross the frontier. Consequently, these telephone conversations of Goering represent a historical document of the greatest importance. Rainer's speech in Carinthia and his testimony as a witness before the Tribunal also give the lie to the charge that Seyss-Inquart participated in the seizure of power.
DR. STEINBAUER: According to this document (Document Number 4005-PS) it was Globocznik who wrongfully used the telephone in the Federal Chancellery to give the alarm to the federal states. Appointed Federal Chancellor by virtue of Schuschnigg's withdrawal under duress, the defendant discusses the constitution of the Cabinet, invites the ministers to enter it, and takes the retiring head of the Government home in his own car. When it is further learned from the testimony of the witness Stuckart and from Glaise-Horstenau under what circumstances the law of annexation came into being, then it can indeed be said that Zernatto was right when he wrote that Austria was conquered, in his opinion, even against the wishes of Seyss-Inquart and his Government. I refer to Exhibit Number 63. Whoever, therefore, dispassionately surveys the whole set of events of March 1938 relative to the Anschluss, and examines particularly the part played by the defendant, can only come to the conclusion that. one cannot really speak of a carefully thought out "conspiracy," of the perpetration of a crime by co-ordinated stages. Where Austria is concerned, however, the Englishman Geyde is right when he says the curtain fell on the "Tragedy of Austria" when the troops marched in. It was to rise again soon on a new play: "The Martyrdom of Austria." On 15 March 1938 Adolf Hitler came to Vienna. We have seen in this courtroom the film record of his reception. Deeply moved, the defendant addressed him as follows: "What centuries of German history have striven for, what untold millions of the best Germans have bled and died for, the final goal in fierce combat, the only solace in hours of bitterness has today been achieved. The Ostmark has come back to the homeland. The Reich is restored, the empire of racial Germans is established." With these words Seyss-Inquart defined his political aim, which was and remained the guiding star of his actions. With the Fuehrer came Josef Goebbels, who turned on his gigantic propaganda machine at high pressure. There was rally after rally. Festivals were held.
DR. STEINBAUER: There was not a house in the land which was not beflagged. The leader of the Socialist workers said: "I vote yes" and the bishops exhorted the people to fulfill a national duty: "Render unto God the things that are God's and unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's." Both were to be disappointed. For with Goebbels came Himmler and his Gestapo and SS. Already during the night of 13 March there was a wholesale arrest operation in Vienna. It included the members of the former military associations, as well as prominent leaders of the Socialist paramilitary organizations, Jews who were active in political and public life, Communists and Monarchists, priests and Freemasons, and even the leaders of the Boy Scouts and of the Austrian youth organizations. In Vienna alone 76,000 arrests were made. Already on the 2d of April 1938 the first Dachau convoy left the West Station with 165 leading officials, including the present Federal Chancellor Figl, Education Minister Hurdes, and Minister of Justice Dr. Gero. The second convoy followed on 21 May, the third at the end of May, and so it went on. Punctually, every 8 days, convoys left for Dachau, Buchenwald, and Sachsenhausen. On 10 May 1946, the People's Court in Vienna sentenced to death Anton Brunner, who had had 49,000 people, mostly Jews, sent to the extermination camps in Theresienstadt, Auschwitz, Minsk, and Riga. And what of the defendant? He was given the cold shoulder and pushed to the wall. The victor of the Saar electoral contest, Josef Burckel, was set up as Reich Commissioner for the reunion of Austria with the Reich and armed with dictatorial powers. The powers of the defendant scarcely exceeded those of an Oberprasident in the Reich, that is, those of a second level administrative authority. Still less, because immediately above him was Burckel who under the pretext of the annexation interfered with everything and laid claim to everything, particularly in matters concerning the churches and the Jews. This is evidenced by Documents 67, 70, and 91. The defendant opposed Burckel's methods.
DR. STEINBAUER: He even raised objections to Hitler himself against Burckel's action in Graz on 8 April 1938. This we know from the testimony of Neubacher, Schirach, and Stricker, and from the documents submitted by the Defense. But Burckel, whom Churchill described as the Governor of Vienna in his book Step by Step, remained the stronger man and the importunate admonisher, Seyss-Inquart, was transferred to southern Poland as a provincial commissioner. This treatment alone at the hand of his alleged fellow conspirators shows only too clearly that Seyss-Inquart was actuated by his enthusiasm for the Anschluss and cannot have been a conspirator. He was not a leader, he was led or, what in my opinion is more accurate, he was misled, perhaps also a docile tool in the hands of the big two, Hitler and Goering. But it was solely for his political ideals, the Anschluss, without any intention of a war of aggression. Of course, there was something of an economic boom in Austria after the Anschluss. It was partly a fictitious boom due to rearmament. But what took place was not the Anschluss that the Anschluss enthusiasts in Austria had visualized, especially when the war provided a motive and a pretext for ruthlessly controlling and repressing every dissenting or critical opinion. Austria never ceased hoping for her liberation and fighting for it. There was much suffering and many died; 6,000 were executed in Austria. In the Landesgericht of Vienna alone 1,200 men died by the guillotine, 800 of them merely because of their anti-Nazi conviction. In the last days of the war Vienna's most beautiful buildings came down in ruins, and St. Stephan's Cathedral, one of the noblest monuments of German Gothic, went up in flames. Thus was fulfilled the promise that Hitler had made on 15 March 1938: "The pearl has the setting which its beauty deserves." Not the idea of the Anschluss, that is to say, the wish to bring about the national unification of a people, was a crime; it was the introduction of a system that has probably prevented it from ever coming true; that was criminal.
DR. STEINBAUER: The defendant certainly did not wish that. To conclude my statements on the Austrian question I shall now proceed briefly to examine the legal aspect of the charge against my client. To elucidate his legal responsibility, I will review his behavior in the following short survey: First his political activity: 1) After the Agreement of 11 July 1936, the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, took the Defendant Seyss-Inquart to work with him as a representative of the National Opposition, therefore, not as a political follower of his, as for instance the witness Guido Schmidt. 2) Seyss-Inquart always declared-for the first time to Dr. Dollfuss in July 1934-that the National Opposition consisted only of National Socialists who obey only Hitler's will, who, in any case, would never act against Hitler's will. 3) Seyss-Inquart declared he was a National Socialist; thus he always stood for the interests of the Austrian National Socialists. This is not only confirmed by the witness Skubl but borne out by the authorities previously quoted by me. 4) To avoid any military or international conflict, Seyss-Inquart pursued the following aim: To allow the Austrian National Socialists to participate independently of the Reich National Socialist Party, should Austria and Germany form a close union. 5) Seyss-Inquart declared that this aim could only be attained if Hitler agreed to it and directed the Austrian National Socialists expressly toward this policy. This he wanted to attain. 6) The culminating point of Seyss-Inquart's efforts was his interview with Hitler on 7 February 1938; although he was so to speak, minister by the grace of Hitler, he stood for his Austrian program. Herein lies Seyss-Inquart's mistake. He thought Hitler and Berlin would pursue a joint policy, that is, as Bismarck said, use the "art of the possible." Berlin, however, did not wish to pursue a joint policy. In the face of this fact Seyss-Inquart's policy broke down on 11 March.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is this mistake punishable, especially as the Austrian State leaders desired to reach an agreement along the same lines, and Dr. Schuschnigg, knowing his program, allowed him to continue his activity? In view of the defendant's basic attitude until March 1938, details of his political tactical attitude are of secondary importance. And now the activity of the defendant as Minister of the Interior and Security. 7) There is no trace of any National Socialist influence on the Austrian executive. The witness Skubl has confirmed this with exceptional clarity. Seyss-Inquart forbade the Police to take up any political attitude (Document 51); he forbade National Socialist demonstrations (Document 59); he avoided such occasions (Document 59); he demanded that the Austrian Nazis stand for legality (Document 52). 8) On 11 March 1938 Seyss-Inquart fulfilled his duties as mediator, in accordance with the Berchtesgaden agreement. Together with Glaise-Horstenau he gave Dr. Schuschnigg, in the forenoon of 11 March, a perfectly candid statement of the facts. He particularly pointed out the threatening National Socialist demonstrations and the possibility of a German invasion. In the afternoon he delivered Goering's demands to Schuschnigg and the latter's answers to Goering. 9) After Dr. Schuschnigg's offer to resign, Seyss-Inquart retired. He did nothing to comply with Goering's demand to obtain the transfer of the Federal Chancellorship or to seize power. The ultimatums, with the threats of invasion by the Reich, were, as is known, transmitted by Embassy Counsellor Von Stein and General Von Muff, to whose pressure President Miklas finally yielded. This appears from President Miklas' statements (Document Number 3697-PS) and the statements of the witnesses Rainer and Schmidt. 10) Only after Dr. Schuschnigg's farewell speech did Seyss-Inquart publicly demand the maintenance of order. He did not designate himself as a provisional government but, in good faith, as Minister of the Interior and of Security, as was confirmed by the witness Schmidt.
DR. STEINBAUER: He took the order not to put up any resistance to the German troops from Dr. Schuschnigg's farewell speech. 11) Seyss-Inquart tried as long as possible to preserve Austria's independence, as instanced by his telephone conversations with Goering (Document 58), also by his request to Guido Schmidt to join his Ministry as Foreign Minister, as confirmed by the witness Schmidt, and according to the statements of witness Skubl; by refusing the demanded telegram (Document 58); by the request to Hitler not to march in, as confirmed by Goering; by the request to Hitler also to let Austrian troops march into the Reich. 12) On 13 March 1938 the Anschluss Law was issued in conformity with Article III of the Austrian Constitution of 1 May 1931. The psychological situation for Seyss-Inquart was the same as for all Austrians, who on 10 April had by secret ballot voted for the Anschluss by 4,381,070 votes to some 15,000. Some of the accusations made against Seyss-Inquart are: 1) That he used his various positions and his personal influence to promote the seizure, incorporation, and control of Austria by the Nazi conspirators. 2) That, as an integral part of his evil intentions in the sense of the Indictment, he participated in the political planning and preparations of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances. Concerning the first accusation, I refer to the above survey and limit myself to the following short statements: As a political aim, the annexation of Austria to the German Reich is nowhere indicted, and the defendant pursued no other aim. Here-as also on other points-the Prosecution go beyond the limits of the Charter. Concerning the second accusation-that Codefendant Seyss-Inquart had participated in a conspiracy against peace must be judged by Article 6 (a), Part II (a) of the Charter.
DR. STEINBAUER: There it is stated, among other things, that collective planning, preparation, or execution of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, is punishable as a breach of the peace. . I leave it to the Tribunal to examine if this ruling can really be applied to the case of the entry into Austria in spite of the fact that there was no war. It is a significant point that, according to the meaning of the said ruling, the outbreak of a war is the condition for rendering an act punishable for breach of the peace within the meaning of the said provision. In any case I cannot reconcile myself to an interpretation of this ruling which goes so far as to consider even an abandoned plan for war, or the possible planning for a war which turns out to be bloodless as punishable as the accomplished crime. It must be pointed out most emphatically that no proof has been furnished that my client ever imagined that events would even lead to a war between Austria and any other power because of the Anschluss or pursuant to it. On the contrary, his decision to take an active part in politics after the drama of 25 July 1934 was dictated by the resolve not to let the Anschluss question become the cause of military or international complications. Furthermore, it must have been far from his mind to imagine that Hitler or his entourage had seriously considered the possibility of such a consequence. The outcome of the Austrian enterprise proved him to be right. The German troops were greeted on their march into Austria with flowers and cheers. As for the great powers, France and England protested on 12 March 1938 against the Anschluss. But this was only a very mild and ineffectual protest. Military support for Schuschnigg was not forthcoming; above all, the League of Nations, the guarantor of Austria's independence, was not appealed to.
DR. STEINBAUER: On 14 March 1938 the British Government declared in the House of Commons that they had discussed the new situation with their friends of the Geneva Entente and that the unanimous opinion had been that a debate in Geneva would lead to no satisfactory result. When the League of Nations was informed of the Anschluss by the German Foreign Office it took note of it without protest, and the Austrian representative at the League of Nations, Pflugl, was given his papers. The Hague Court of Arbitration struck its Austrian member, Professor Verdross of Vienna, from the register of judges. The diplomatic agencies were withdrawn or transformed into consulates in the German Reich. Only a very short time elapsed, in fact it was only a few months after the occupation and annexation of this small country that a treaty concerning another small state was concluded in Munich on 29 September 1938 with the alleged aggressor. The French Prosecutor, M. de Menthon, in his opening speech mentioned that great politican and statesman Politis. I also would like to call him to mind. Shortly before his untimely death he wrote in his book, La Morale Internationale: "Qui menace les petites nations menace l'humanite toute entiere." The League of Nations powers did not feel called upon to pay any heed to this sentence. But there is another principle of international order which they did not see fit to apply when confronted with the Austrian Anschluss. I mean that principle which, under the name of the Stimson Doctrine, has found entry into the science of international law and diplomatic language. It is the principle according to which the nations of the world refuse to recognize territorial acquisitions obtained by force. This principle has at least penetrated into the legal consciousness of present times as deeply as the prohibition of wars of aggression, which is one of the main pillars upon which the Nuremberg Trial rests.
DR. STEINBAUER: As evidence of this fact I will recall here the proposition of the Brazilian Delegate Braga to the second session of the League of Nations, in which he proposed a blocus juridique universal (universal juridic blockade) against aggressor states and at the same time submitted as one of the measures to be adopted, the denial of the right of annexation by aggressor nations. You will find this explanation printed in the document book submitted by Professor Jahrreiss to the Court as complement to his legal arguments, and which is reproduced there as Document Number 10 on Page 35. I will further recall the so-called Saavedra-Lamas Pact signed by several South American states on 10 October 1933 in Rio de Janeiro and which the Little Entente and Italy also joined. Here the signatory states bound themselves not to recognize the validity of a forcible occupation or annexation of national territories. The Seventh Pan-American Conference accepted this principle on 26 December 1933 with the participation of the United States of America. It agrees as to contents with a proposition already submitted previously by the Peruvian Delegate Cornejo on 14 January 1930 to the Council of the League of Nations.
DR. STEINBAUER: It is above all contained in the famous notes of the American Secretary of State Stimson to China and Japan of 27 January 1932, which contains the following sentence: "The American Government does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement brought about by means that are contrary to the statutes and obligations of August 27, 1928 in Paris." And finally I remind the Tribunal of the declarations of the Council of the League of Nations on 16 February 1932, in which the Stimson Doctrine, raised to a principle, was expressed as follows: "No encroachment on the territorial integrity and no infringement of the political independence of a member of the League of Nations in violation of Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations could be recognized as legally valid by the member nations." Nevertheless all the nations of the world recognized the incorporation of Austria into the German Reich without feeling compelled to concern themselves with the Stimson Doctrine. This likewise substantially answers the accusation of the crime against peace by violation of treaties. Germany is supposed to have violated three treaties. First the German-Austrian Agreement of 11 July 1936; second, Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain; lastly, Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles. Here also, it must be pointed out that all the nations concerned have not only tolerated the violations of the treaties but, moreover, tacitly sanctioned them by their attitude. This implies at least a renunciation of international law, and the powers concerned have thereby forfeited the right to take any action because of treaty violations, as this would be contrary to all sense of fairness. With particular regard to Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, the German Government, and therefore Seyss-Inquart as alleged coconspirator, cannot be charged with violation of this provision because Germany was not bound by this treaty, which she had not signed, and which for her represented a res inter alia acta.
DR. STEINBAUER: On the other hand, the German-Austrian Treaty of 11 July 1936 was a res inter alia acta for powers other than Germany and Austria; here Austria alone could have raised the objection of a breach of treaty. In this connection attention is called to the fact that the reconstituted Austria is not among the signatories of the London Agreement of 8 August 1945. Therefore the four states of the International Military Tribunal are not entitled to vindicate the interests of Austria at this Trial. With regard to Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, I resist the temptations to discuss the question of the legal validity of this provision; I will dwell on the legal significance of the contradiction of this article with the so-called Fourteen Points of President Wilson. But in concluding my legal exposition of the Austrian affair, I cannot altogether refrain from expressing a general idea: One of the great principles of international order which in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has established itself after much suffering, much confusion, and many makeshifts and become more and more a reality is the right of self-determination of nations. This basic principle of the right of self-determination of the nations has become so firmly rooted in the legal conceptions of international relations in our century that one is forced to the idea that it belongs to the general principles of international law, an idea that particularly appeals to the democratic way of thinking. But as a general principle of international law it would, together with the Charter, the prescriptive international law and, thirdly, the law of treaty, then become the standard criterion of judgment for the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, which at all events must find a similar basis for other questions. And further it would acquire, like all other generally accepted principles of law, a constraining force and above all have precedence over international treaty law.