dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
RAEDER: It would lead us too far if I were to start quoting several entries here. But the document, I would like to emphasize, is entirely convincing.
DR. SIEMERS: You had nothing to do with the Directive 21, which is signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl?
RAEDER: Absolutely nothing.
DR. SIEMERS: But following that, you made some preparations in accordance with the directive? As they concerned the Navy they were in any case not so important here.
RAEDER: Yes. We had the first conference in January, as can be seen from one of these entries in C-170. I had reported to the Fuehrer on 4 February about our intentions and in March the Navy began with certain preparations. I have said already that the Navy throughout the first period was hardly concerned with major operations, but only with the cutting off of the Gulf of Finland by mines and light naval forces. I do not know whether that is in Directive 21 or somewhere else but the Fuehrer, at my urgent request, had ordered that the center of gravity of the naval warfare should still be in the direction of England. Consequently, we could use only relatively small forces for the war against Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we had better break off now. The Tribunal rather understood that you hoped to finish by midday today. We realize that you had 2 hours of today taken up with your documents, but when do you think you will be able to finish now?
DR. SIEMERS: I believe I will need only about three-quarters of an hour, between half an hour and an hour.
THE PRESIDENT: Tomorrow at 10 o'clock we shall deal with the documents of Seyss-Inquart, and we are told that will only last 30 minutes. [The Tribunal adjourned until 18 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]
MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the application for documents of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, 87 documents altogether have been submitted to the Prosecution, and we have gone over them in the German. After numerous conferences with counsel for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, we find we are unable to agree now on 17 of these documents. As of yesterday the number was 20, as I so stated, but we have now reduced it to 17. Document Number 5 in the defendant's list is a copy of a resolution of the German National Assembly on the 21st of February 1919, advocating Anschluss between Austria and Germany. We have told counsel we object to it as being really irrelevant here and immaterial. It is a resolution of a German parliamentary body, and it doesn't seem to us to make any difference what they were thinking of Anschluss in 1919. Document Number 10 is an extract from a newspaper article published in October 1945 and written by a man named Walford Selby. It is a critical article criticizing the Treaty of St. Germain for not avoiding the obliteration of the Austro-Hungarian economic entity, and it discusses what it describes as the mistakes of 1919, and so on. We understand that it is intended to explain, with other documents, the economic background of the Anschluss movement. Whatever may be said for that type of proof, there are at least five other documents on the same basis and we made no objection to them. But we did feel that somewhere this sort of thing, even if relevant, certainly became cumulative. Documents 7, 12, 26, and 33 are all on the same subject, the economic background of Anschluss, and this is a long one. Therefore, we feel that it certainly is not necessary, doesn't add very much, merely creates a lot of paper work, and is cumulative. Document Number 11 is a speech delivered by a Dr. Schober, giving the area and population of the Republic of Austria. We haven't any very serious objection to this type of thing excepting that there probably are better sources if the defendant wishes to establish the area and population of Austria in 1921.
MR. DODD: Further, it seems to us that the Tribunal could very well take judicial knowledge of the area and population of Austria as of that date from reliable publications. Document Number 14 is a statement by the former Chancellor of Austria in 1922 to the effect that Austria belongs to Germany. Our objection is again based on the cumulative feature of this document, because there are at least three other documents with almost identical statements by Dr. Renner to which we have made no objection. Document 19 is an extract from a book written by a man called Kleinschmied, and the extract purports to show that a number of politicians lived or prospered on the Anschluss movement in Austria. That doesn't seem to us to be very important here or likely to help the Tribunal very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, what exactly does "lived from the propaganda" mean? That they made their living by reason of propaganda, or what?
MR. DODD: Yes. It purports to show that they made it a vehicle for carrying on political activities, and made an issue of it and sustained themselves politically. Number 21 is an extract from Kunschak's book Austria 1918-1934 , and it gives the increase in the National Socialist votes in Austria between 1930 and 1932. That didn't seem to us to be very material or very helpful or likely to be helpful to the Tribunal. We objected to it on the grounds that it was irrelevant and immaterial. Document Number 22 is an extract from an article in the New Free Press of August 1932, opposing the League of Nations loan. This again is submitted to prove the flow or the continuity of the Anschluss movement. There is at least one other document, Number 23, which purports to establish the same principle on the same kind of proof. Number 27 is an extract from an article written by Martin Fuchs, "Un Pacte avec Hitler," and it discusses the Yugoslav policy with respect to Anschluss between Germany and Austria. Again that doesn't seem to the Prosecution to have any direct bearing or any helpful bearing upon the issues here, whatever the Yugoslavs thought about it. Number 31 is an extract from the Neue Zeitung of the 11th of January of this year wherein Gordon Walker states that the celebration in Austria after the Anschluss was genuine. -Well, that is Mr. Walker's opinion, and there is some other substantial opinion on the other side. We doubt very much that his opinion is material here or competent.
THE PRESIDENT: Who is he?
MR. DODD: I understand he is a member of the Labor Party in Great Britain, and a writer. Number 39 is an extract from the Archiv of 1938. This sets forth a statement made by Senator Borah, of the United States, that the Anschluss was a natural and inevitable affair and had nothing to do with the United States. This was not a speech made by the late Senator Borah in the Senate; it was his own opinion, and it does not seem to us that it would be very helpful. Some later opinions of Senator Borah were not so helpful, and this doesn't seem to be very likely to be helpful to the Tribunal with respect to this issue. Number 47 is an extract from Zernatto's book The Truth about Austria . Zernatto was one of the State Under Secretaries of Austria, as the Tribunal knows. He left the country after the Anschluss and went to the United States and wrote this book. He makes a number of statements, I might say, about the Defendant Seyss-Inquart. The Tribunal would be interested in knowing that this Document 47, and Documents 48, 50, 54, 55, 60, and 61 are all extracts from the same book. Now, we felt that wherever he reports a conversation with Seyss-Inquart, that would have bearing and relevancy before the Court; but where he expresses his opinion, we have more doubt about its relevancy. This one statement, Number 47, seems to be his opinion. He doesn't cite any conversation or anything other than what appears to be his impression that Seyss-Inquart disassociated himself from Leopold's efforts. Now, we do not object to 48, and to 50, or to 54, because although we originally thought we would object, on reviewing them they appeared to set out actual conversations between Zernatto and SeyssInquart, and it might be helpful to the Tribunal. Therefore, we do not object to the next three. But 55, again, is a statement in Zernatto's book that, in Zernatto's opinion, Seyss-Inquart was a figure on the chess board and was double-crossed by the Nazi or new Party leadership. We object to that for the reason that I have stated; it is the author's opinion.
MR. DODD: He is deceased, by the way, and is certainly not available. In any event, we do not think his opinion can be very helpful. Number 60 is also a statement from Zernatto's book and it sets out a conversation with an unnamed Austrian Nazi. We felt that was altogether too vague and would not be of value or helpful. In Number 61, again, the author Zernatto expresses his opinion that Seyss-Inquart was afraid of shouldering responsibility. I don't want to stress our objections too heavily to these extracts. I don't think they are very harmful, certainly, but I rather object because we would like to cut down some of this printing, and I do not think they will be very helpful to Seyss-Inquart. Number 68 is the first document on anti-Semitism, and it is an excerpt from the publication entitled The Elements of National Socialism by Bishop Alois Hudal. It explains anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria; and it goes on to discuss matters that the Tribunal has heard very much about through other defendants, the disproportionate position of the Jewish population in Germany, and so on. We object to it as not being helpful and not material. Again 69 is another extract from Zernatto's book on the causes, as some of these people see it, of anti-Semitism. It is his opinion and does not to us seem to be helpful or material here. Number 71 is on the Slovak question. I doubt that there has been any serious claim made anywhere in this case that at various times the Slovaks have not claimed autonomy. This extract from the Archiv of 1938, insofar as we can discover, seeks to establish that they did want autonomy. Well, we don't think that is very important here, and it will not be helpful to the Tribunal or to Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a document of state?
MR. DODD: Well, it is a document from the Archiv , and in that sense it is a public document.
THE PRESIDENT: After Slovakia had been taken over by the Reich?
MR. DODD: No, not afterwards, it's in 1938, and it preceded the taking over.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.
MR. DODD: These are our objections, Mr. President. I do think we have tried to be rather...
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, Mr. Dodd, we are only considering now the question of objections to translation. We are not considering the question of admissibility, nor are we binding you not to object to them after they have been translated.
MR. DODD: Yes, I am aware of that, Mr. President. We. tried to be, I think, fairly generous about this list. The excerpts, or most of them, are not too long. We did think we would have to call a halt somewhere, and I do not think our 17 objections out of the 87 listed are very strict or are pinching, really, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart.
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Your Lordship, High Tribunal, I know that you value my small country, Austria, not only because of its ancient culture and its scenic beauty, but also because it was the first country which lost its freedom through Hitler. However, with all respect which you have for this country, I cannot expect of you that, as representative of great powers, you know the history of my country to the last detail. I do believe that it is of the utmost importance for the defense of Seyss-Inquart that you understand fully on the basis of what background and what motives this man acted the way he did. I myself can see three reasons which led to the Anschluss. First of all, the desperate economic situation which runs like a red thread from 1918 right up to-I am sorry to say-and through the year 1946. The second reason, and I shall be very brief with regard to the documents . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, will you come to the actual documents as soon as possible, because you will remember we are only discussing the question of whether they should be translated or not.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. The second reason was the disunity of the democratic parties. The third reason was the attitude of the surrounding powers. From these points of view I have assembled my documents. The first document is a resolution of the Weimar National Assembly, and I am of the point of view that it is important in respect to a final judgment that the Anschluss was not only a wish of the Austrian population, but an all-German postulate. It is very short and I request that it be admitted. The second document is by Selby, who for many years was the British Ambassador in Vienna, a genuine friend of our country. In this article he refers to the economic background and conditions in Austria, which led to the Anschluss. That was the reason for my including this document. The next document is a speech delivered by Federal Chancellor Schober who was held in great esteem by the world. In this speech he refers to the fact that the burdens imposed on Austria are too great for her to carry. He described the situation as a whole as a case of bankruptcy. The next document is a statement by the present Federal Minister, Dr. Karl Renner, in 1922. At that time Dr. Seipel went to Geneva and with great difficulty put through a loan at the League of Nations which was of great importance to us because at the same time it was demanded of Austria that we should forego independence for 10 years' duration. That meant that we were not to take any steps to change the conditions for an Anschluss. Renner opposed Seipel in Parliament at that time. This document is in no way cumulative to Document 33, since in Document 33 I want merely to describe the economic situation as it obtained in the year 1938. The next document is Point 2 of my evidence, namely, the strong political propaganda for the Anschluss. In any event, I must dispute most strongly the assertion that Document Number 21, which is very short, is irrelevant.
DR. STEINBAUER: I consider it extremely important to prove that this new, very young party, which grew in the fertile soil of a desperate economic situation, increased tenfold, as far as the number of votes was concerned, in the years 1930 to 1932; thus all the time there existed a recognized political opposition to the government. The next Document, Number 22, is an article which again illustrates the economic situation in Austria at a very essential period of history, namely, the moment when Federal Chancellor Dollfuss went to Lausanne in order to negotiate another loan from the League of Nations, and we again were forced to suppress thoughts of an Anschluss for another 10 years. This Document, Number 22, as well as the next one, Number 23, is not cumulative, since the one shows the political and the other the economic position of the members of Parliament with respect to the League of Nations' loan of the year 1932. The next document is only an extract from the views taken by the various surrounding states to the Anschluss question. I selected only Yugoslavia, for Yugoslavia was the country which most strongly supported the idea of Anschluss in her foreign policy. As far as Document 31 is concerned, I should like to remark, supplementing the remarks made by the Prosecution, that Gordon Walker is not only a member of the Labor Party, but-and this point is much more important-during the entire war years he was head of the British Radio Division Austria, and he was himself in Austria in the year 1938 and he witnessed the Anschluss. His judgment therefore is of extraordinary importance since it is the judgment of a prominent foreigner. The same remark also applies to the following document, the statement by Senator Borah who for 25 years was the Chairman of the American Committee on Foreign Affairs. His opinion is surely deserving of notice. The next documents concern statements made by Dr. Zernatto. I should like to add that Dr.
DR. STEINBAUER: Zernatto was Federal Minister, General Secretary of the Fatherland Front and Schuschnigg's right-hand man during the period of the Anschluss. He was one of the spiritual fathers of the Schuschnigg plebiscite. I am sorry to say that the died an emigrant in 1940, and I cannot produce him as a witness here; but his book is a document and actually tells what this man experienced in those critical days. I urgently request that the remaining three documents, which are very brief, be left in the book. The next two documents, which concern anti-Semitism, I included very unwillingly in order to avoid any accusation of anti-Semitic propaganda. I included them because in the trial brief my client is accused of being a member of an anti-Semitic organization. This accusation is unjustifiable insofar as more importance is attached to this organization than it actually deserves. If this matter is not further emphasized by the Prosecution, I shall not attach any particular importance to these two documents myself. The last document which is being objected to, Number 71, contains the Agreement of Pittsburgh which was concluded between Masaryk and Hlinka, the Slovak leader, at which occasion Masaryk solemnly promised autonomy to the Slovaks, a promise which was not kept according to the letter of the agreement and which gave rise to a strong demand for autonomy in Slovakia, which was supported by Hitler. For these reasons I ask that this document also be approved.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal will consider the question of these documents. Now, Dr. Siemers. [The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.]
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday in connection with Norway I submitted on one occasion Documents 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, and 86. I beg the Tribunal's pardon, but I forgot to submit one document pertinent to this matter, and I should like to remedy this omission. The document, which has already been granted me, is Exhibit Number Raeder-88, which likewise is an extract from the White Book and is printed in my Document Book Number 5, on Pages 392 and following. This document shows the British order of 6 April 1940, regarding the plans for the occupation of northern Swedish ore fields, proceeding from Narvik. Since the Tribunal is familiar with this document, it will not be necessary for me to read from it. [Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, yesterday we had arrived at the topic of Russia. You had answered my question regarding Directive Number 21, Document 446-PS, of 18 December 1940, to the effect that the Navy had not worked on this directive. You further stated that the Navy undertook preparations in January in accordance with the command.
RAEDER: May I make a brief remark on this directive to the effect that yesterday I believe you made a mistake when you said that this directive was signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl. This was the copy of the operational staff which Hitler had signed; but Keitel and Jodl only countersigned. Thus there is no question of a signature of these two; when such directives were issued they were signed only by Hitler, and the others could merely countersign.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, and I thank you for the correction. In this connection, I should like to ask the Tribunal to consider Document C-35, USA-132. This document is found in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10a, on Page 16. It is an extract from the War Diary with the date of 30 January 1941. It describes the preparations by the Navy, in accordance with Hitler's command of 18 December, where Hitler under Number IV of the directive commanded that precautionary measures be taken in case Russia should alter her previous attitude toward Germany, that is, only in case of this possibility. [Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, in connection with your representation of the Russian situation, the Prosecution has submitted Document C-66, which corresponds to GB-81. This is your report of 10 January 1944 to Admiral Assmann for the historical archives of the Navy. The document will be found in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10, Page 13. There you will find the basic position taken by Raeder with respect to "Fall Barbarossa." This is set forth under "a" of the document under Number 1... I have just heard that this document is also to be found in the Document Book 10a, on Page 35. There you wrote: "At this time the Fuehrer had made known his 'unalterable decision' to conduct the eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. Accordingly, further warnings, as long as completely new situations had not arisen, were completely without purpose, as one knew from experience. As Chief of the Naval Operations Staff I was never convinced of the 'compelling necessity' for Barbarossa." Do you have anything to add to these statements which you made at that time?
RAEDER: I should like to say in this connection that despite the fact that the directive had been issued on 18 December, I made a comprehensive report at the end of December, as can be seen from Document C-170, which I mentioned yesterday on several occasions, in order to convince the Fuehrer of the wrongness of this decision. This shows that I have gone very far, for when the Fuehrer had issued a directive, even if it applied only to a hypothetical case, it was generally impossible to approach him with basic considerations against this directive. Everything else I mentioned already yesterday.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, yesterday, in connection with your counterproposals made to Hitler with respect to Russia, you mentioned that in the autumn the plan was still to carry through the action "Seeloewe," that is, to land in England.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: When, according to your strategic opinion, or the opinion of the Navy, did this possibility cease to exist? When did you have to dispense with this plan?
RAEDER: In the course of the month of September we still believed that the landing could be carried through. As a necessary condition the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and I, too, always insisted-and he realized this fully-that for a landing air superiority would have to be on our side; and therefore we were waiting to see whether we could actually produce this air superiority in time for the landing, which due to weather conditions could not be carried out later than the beginning of October. If it were not possible by then, it would have to be postponed until May of the following year. It developed that air superiority could not be produced to the necessary extent; consequently it was said that the landing was to be postponed until the spring of the following year. Further preparations were to be taken and they actually were taken. But in the course of the winter the idea of a landing was completely abandoned, and Hitler decreed that preparations in the harbors along the Channel should be carried on only to such an extent as would give the British the impression that this landing actually was to take place. In September I had the impression that Hitler no longer had any great interest in this landing and that in his own mind he was completely committed to the Russian campaign in conjunction with which he, of course, could not carry out the landing in England.