dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. STAHMER: Would you please state your views? Goering: After the Reich Defense Council had begun to exist, a Reich Defense Law was provided in 1935 for the event of a mobilization. The agreement or, better said, decision, was made by the Reich Cabinet and this law was to be applied and became effective in the case of a mobilization. Actually it was replaced when mobilization did come about, by the law I have mentioned regarding the Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense. In this law, before the time of the Four Year Plan, that is 1935, a Plenipotentiary for Economy was created, at first for the event of a mobilization, and a Plenipotentiary for Administration; so that if war occurred, then all the departments of the entire administration would be concentrated under one minister and all the departments concerned with economy and armament were likewise to be concentrated under one minister. The Plenipotentiary for Administration did not function before mobilization. The Plenipotentiary for Economy, on the other hand -- this title was not to be made known to the public -- was to begin his tasks immediately. That was indeed necessary. This is perhaps the clearest explanation of the fact that the creation of the Four Year Plan necessarily led to clashes between the Plenipotentiary for Economy and the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, since both of them were more or less working on the same or similar tasks. When, therefore, in 1936, I was made Delegate for the Four Year Plan, the activities of the Plenipotentiary for Economy practically ceased.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, ought I to stop now with the questioning?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think that would be a good time. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
DR. STAHMER: A word has been repeatedly used here: Reich Research Council (Reichsforschungsrat). What kind of institution was that? Goering: I believe it was in the year 1943 that I received the order to concentrate the entire field of German research, particularly insofar as it was of urgent importance to the conduct of war. Unfortunately, that was done much too late. The purpose was to avoid parallel research and useless research, to concentrate an research on problems important for the war. I myself became President of the Reich Research Council and established directives for research according to the purpose mentioned.
DR. STAHMER: Did this have any connection with the Research Office of the Air Force? Goering: No, the Research Office of the Air Force was entirely different, and it had nothing to do with either research on the one hand or the Air Force on the other hand. The expression was a sort of camouflage, for, when we came to power, there was considerable confusion on the technical side of control of important information. Therefore, I established for the time being the Research Office, that was an office where all technical devices for the control of radio, telegraph, telephone, and all other technical communications could be provided. Since I was then only Reich Minister for Air I could do this within only my own ministry and therefore used this camouflaged designation. This machinery served to exert control above all over foreign missions, and important persons, who had telephone, telegraph, and radio connections with foreign countries, as is customary everywhere in all countries, and then to decipher the information thus extracted and put it at the disposal of other departments. The office had no agents, no intelligence service, but was a purely technical office intercepting wireless messages, telephone conversations, and telegrams, wherever it was ordered, and passing on the information to the offices concerned. In this connection I may say that I have also read much about those communications made by Mr. Messersmith, which figured here. He was at times the main source for such information.,
DR. STAHMER: What was the purpose and importance of the Secret Cabinet Council which was created a short time after the seizure of power? Goering: In February 1938 there came about the retirement of the War Minister, Field Marshal Von Blomberg. Simultaneously, because of particular circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel General Von Fritsch, retired, that is to say, the Fuehrer dismissed him. The coincidence of these retirements or dismissals was, in the eyes of the Fuehrer, disadvantageous to the prestige of the Wehrmacht. He wanted to divert attention from this change in the Wehrmacht by means of a general reshuffling. He said he wanted above all to change the Foreign Office because only such a change would make a strong impression abroad and would be likely to divert attention from the military affairs. At the time I opposed the Fuehrer very strongly about this. In lengthy, wearisome personal conversations I begged him to refrain from a change in the Foreign Office. He thought, however, that he would have to insist upon it. The question arose as to what should be done after Herr Von Neurath 's retirement or after the change. The Fuehrer intended to keep Herr Von Neurath in the Cabinet by all means for he had the greatest personal esteem for him. I myself have always expressed my respect for Herr Von Neurath. In order to avoid a lowering of Herr Von Neurath's prestige abroad, I myself was the one to make a proposal to the Fuehrer. I told him that in order to make it appear abroad that Von Neurath had not been entirely removed from foreign policy, I would propose to appoint him chairman of the Secret Cabinet Council. There was, to be sure, no such cabinet in existence, but the expression would sound quite nice, and everyone would imagine that it meant something. The Fuehrer said we could not make him chairman if we had no council. Thereupon I said, "Then we shall make one," and offhand I marked down names of several persons. How little importance I attached to this council can be seen in the fact that I myself was, I think, one of the last on that list.
DR. STAHMER: Then, for the public at large the council was given out to be an advisory council for foreign policy. When I returned I said to my friends, "The affair has gone off all right, but if the Fuehrer does not ask the Foreign Minister for advice, he certainly will not ask a cabinet council for advice on foreign policy; we will not have anything to do with it!" I declare under oath that this Cabinet Council never met at all, not even for a minute; there was not even an initial meeting for laying down the rules by which it should function. Some members may not even have been informed that they were members.
DR. STAHMER: When was the Reich Cabinet in session last? Goering: As far as I remember, the last meeting of the Reich Cabinet was in 1937, and, as far as I can remember, I presided over the last meeting, the Fuehrer having left shortly after the beginning. The Fuehrer did not think much of Cabinet meetings; it was too large a circle for him, and perhaps there was too much discussion of his plans, and he wanted that changed. From that time on, there were only individual conferences -- conferences with single ministers or with groups of ministers from the ministries concerned. But since the ministers found, very rightly, that this made their work difficult, a solution was adopted whereby I, under the title of the Four Year Plan, called the ministers together more frequently, in order to discuss general matters with them. But at no time in the Cabinet or the Ministerial Council was any political decision of importance mentioned or discussed, as, for instance, those decisions -- the annexation of Austria, the Sudetenland, and Czechoslovakia -- which finally led to war. I know how much importance the Fuehrer attached to the fact that in all these matters only those ministers should be informed who absolutely had to be informed, because of the nature of their work, and that only at the very last minute. Here too, I can say under oath that quite a number of ministers were not informed about the beginning of the war or the march into Czechoslovakia, the Sudetenland, or Austria until the next morning, when they learned about it by radio or through the press, just as any other German citizen.
DR. STAHMER: What part did you have in making the Munich Pact of September 1938? Goering: The incorporation of the Sudeten Germans or, better said, the solution of the Sudeten German problem I had always emphasized as being something that was necessary. I also told the Fuehrer after the Anschluss of Austria that I should regret it if his statements were misunderstood to mean that with the Anschluss of Austria this question had been settled. In November 1937, 1 stated to Lord Halifax that the Anschluss of Austria, the solution of the Sudeten German question in the sense of a return of the Sudeten Germans, and the solution of the problem of Danzig and the Corridor were integral parts of German policy. Whether they were tackled by Hitler one day, or by me or somebody else the next day, they would still remain political aims which under all circumstances would have to be attained sometime. However, both of us agreed that all efforts should be made to achieve that without resorting to war. Furthermore, in my conversations with Mr. Bullitt I had always taken up the very same position. And I told every other person, publicly and personally, that these three points had to be settled and that the settlement of the one would not make the others unimportant. I also want to stress that, if in connection with this, and also in connection with other things, the Prosecution accuses us of not having kept this or that particular promise that Germany had made in the past, including the Germany that existed just before the seizure of power, I should like to refer to the many speeches in which both the Fuehrer -- this I no longer remember so well -- and I, as I know very well, stated that we warned foreign countries not to make any plans for the future on the basis of any promises made by the present government, that we would not recognize these promises when we acquired power. Thus there was absolute clarity in respect to this.
DR. STAHMER: When the Sudeten question approached a crisis and a solution was intended by the Fuehrer, I, as a soldier and Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, as was my duty, took the preparatory measures, ordered for any eventuality. As a politician I was extremely happy at the attempts which were made to find a peaceful solution. I acknowledge that at that time I was very glad when I saw that the British Prime Minister was making every possible effort. Nevertheless, the situation on the day before the Munich agreement had again become very critical. It was about 6:30 or 7 o'clock in the morning when the Italian Ambassador, Attolico, rang me up and said that he had to see me immediately on orders from Mussolini, that it was about the solution of the Sudeten problem. I told him he should go and see the Foreign Minister. He said he had a special order from Mussolini to see me alone first. I met him, as far as I remember, at 9 o'clock in the morning, and there he suggested that Mussolini was prepared to mediate; that a meeting should be called as soon as possible between Germany (Adolf Hitler), England (Prime Minister Chamberlain), France (Premier Daladier), and Italy (Mussolini), in order to settle the question peacefully. He, Mussolini, saw a possibility of that and was prepared to take all necessary steps and asked me personally to use all my influence in that direction. I took the Ambassador, and also Herr Von Neurath although he was not Foreign Minister at that time, at once to the Reich Chancellery and reported everything to the Fuehrer, tried to persuade him, explained to him the advantages of such a step and said that this could be the basis for a general easing of tension. Whether the other current political and diplomatic endeavors would be successful one could not yet say, but if four leading statesmen of the four large western European powers were to meet, then much would be gained by that. Herr Von Neurath supported my argument, and the Fuehrer agreed and said we should call the Duce by telephone.
DR. STAHMER: Attolico, who waited outside, did that immediately, whereupon Mussolini called the Fuehrer officially and matters were agreed and Munich decided upon as the place. Late in the afternoon I was informed by the Italian Embassy that both the British Prime Minister and the French Prime Minister had agreed to arrive at Munich the next day. I asked the Fuehrer, or rather, I told him, that under all circumstances I would go along. He agreed. Then I suggested that I could also take Herr Von Neurath with me in my train. He agreed to that also. I took part in some of the discussions and, when necessary, contributed to the settlement of many arguments and, above all, did my best to create a friendly atmosphere on all sides. I had personal conversations with M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain, and I was sincerely happy afterwards that everything had gone well.
DR. STAHMER: Before that, the Anschluss of Austria with Germany had taken place. What reasons did Hitler have for that decision, and to what extent did you play a part in those measures? Goering: I told the Tribunal yesterday, when I gave a brief outline of my life, that I personally felt a great affinity for Austria; that I had spent the greater part of my youth in an Austrian castle; that my father, even at the time of the old empire, often spoke of a close bond between the future of the German motherland of Austria and the Reich, for he was convinced that the Austrian Empire would not hold together much longer. In 1918 while in Austria for 2 days, having come by plane, I saw the revolution and the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire take place. Those countries, with a predominantly German population, including Sudeten Germany, convened at that time in Vienna in the Parliament. They declared themselves free of the dissolved Hapsburg State and declared, including the representatives of Sudeten Germany, Austria to be a part of the German Reich. This happened, as far as I know, under the Social Democratic Chancellor, Renner. This statement by the representatives of the Austrian-German people that they wanted to be a part of Germany in the future was changed by the peace treaty of St. Germain and prohibited by the dictate of the victorious nations. Neither for myself nor for any other German was that of importance. The moment and the basic conditions had of course to be created for a union of the two brother nations of purely German blood and origin to take place. When we came to power, as I have said before, this was naturally an integral part of German policy. The assurances which Hitler gave at that time regarding the sovereignty of Austria were no deception; they were meant seriously. At first he probably did not see any possibility. I myself was much more radical in this direction and I asked him repeatedly not to make any definite commitments regarding the Austrian question. He believed, however, that he had first of all to take Italy into consideration.
DR. STAHMER: It was evident, especially after the National Socialist Party in Germany had come to power, that the National Socialist Party in Austria was also growing more and more. This party, however, had existed in Austria even before the seizure of power in Germany, just as the origin of the National Socialist Workers Party goes back to Sudeten Germany. The Party in Austria was therefore not a Fifth Column for the Anschluss, because the Austrian people themselves originally wanted and always wanted the Anschluss. If the idea of the Anschluss did not figure so clearly and strongly in the Austrian Government of that time, it was not because it did not want to be joined to Germany, but because the National Socialist form of government was not compatible in any way with the form of government in Austria at that time. Thus there resulted that tension, first in Austria itself, which has repeatedly been mentioned by the Prosecution in its charges. This tension was bound to come because the National Socialists took the idea of the Anschluss with Germany more seriously than the Govermnent did. This resulted in political strife between the two. That we were on the side of the National Socialists as far as our sympathies were concerned is obvious, particularly as the Party in Austria was severely persecuted. Many were put into camps, which were just like concentration camps but had different names. At a certain time the leader of the Austrian Party was a man by the name of Habicht from Wiesbaden. I did not know him before; I saw him only once there. He falsely led the Fuehrer to believe, before the so-called Dollfuss case, that the Austrian armed forces were prepared to undertake something independently in order to force the government to accept the Anschluss, or else they would overthrow it. If this were the case, that the Party in Austria was to support whatever the armed forces undertook along those lines, then, so the Fuehrer thought, it should have the political support of the Party in Germany in this matter.
DR. STAHMER: But the whole thing was actually a deception, as it was not the Austrian Army which intended to proceed against the Austrian Government but rather a so-called "Wehrmacht Standarte," a unit which consisted of former members, and released or discharged members, of the Austrian Army who had gone over to the Party or joined it. With this deceptive maneuver Habicht then undertook this action in Vienna. I was in Bayreuth with the Fuehrer at the time. The Fuehrer called Habicht at once and reproached him most severely and said that he had falsely informed him, tricked him and deceived him. He regretted the death of Dollfuss: very much because politically that meant a very serious situation as far as the National Socialists were concerned, and particularly with regard to Italy. Italy mobilized five divisions at that time and sent them to the Brenner Pass. The Fuehrer desired an appeasement which would be quick and as sweeping in its effect as possible. That was the reason why he asked Herr Von Papen to go as an extraordinary ambassador to Vienna and to work for an easing of the atmosphere as quickly as possible. One must not forget the somewhat absurd situation which had developed in the course of years, namely, that a purely German country such as Austria was not most strongly influenced in governmental matters by the German Reich but by the Italian Government. I remember that statement of Mr. Churchill's, that Austria was practically an affiliate of Italy. After the action against Dollfuss, Italy assumed a very standoffish attitude toward Germany and made it clear that Italy would be the country which would do everything to prevent the Anschluss. Therefore, besides the internal clearing up of Germany's relations with Austria by Herr Von Papen, the Fuehrer also tried to bring about a change in Mussolini's attitude to this question. For this reason he went to Venice shortly afterwards -- maybe it was before -- at any rate he tried to bring about a different attitude.
DR. STAHMER: But I was of the opinion that in spite of everything we may have had in common, let us say in a philosophic sense -- fascism and National Socialism -- the Anschluss of our brother people was much more important to me than this coming to an agreement. And if it were not possible to do it with Mussolini, we should have to do it against him. Then came the Italian-Abyssinian war. With regard to the sanctions against Italy, Germany was given to understand, not openly but quite clearly, that it would be to her advantage, as far as the Austrian question was concerned, to take part in these sanctions. That was a difficult decision for the Fuehrer to make, to declare himself out and out against Italy and to achieve the Anschluss by these means or to bind himself by obligation to Italy by means of a pro-Italian or correct attitude and thus to exclude Italy's opposition to the Anschluss. I suggested to him at that time, in view of the somewhat vague offer regarding Austria made by English-French circles, to try and find out who was behind this offer and whether both governments were willing to come to an agreementin regard to this point and to give assurances to the effect that this would be considered an internal German affair, and not some vague assurances of general co-operation, et cetera . My suspicions proved right; we could not get any definite assurances. Under those circumstances, it was more expedient for us to prevent Italy being the main opponent to the Anschluss by not joining in any sanctions against her. I was still of the opinion that the great national interest of the union of these German peoples stood above all considerations regarding the differences between the two present governments. For this to happen it could not be expected that the government of the great German Reich should resign and that Germany should perhaps be annexed to Austria; rather the Anschluss would have to be carried through sooner or later. Then came the Berchtesgaden agreement. I was not present at this.
DR. STAHMER: I did not even consent to this agreement, because I opposed any definite statement which lengthened this period of indecision; for me the complete union of all Germans was the only conceivable solution. Shortly after Berchtesgaden there was the plebiscite which the then Chancellor Schuschnigg had called. This plebiscite was of itself an impossibility, a breach of the Berchtesgaden agreement. This I shall pass over, but the way in which this plebiscite was supposed to take place was unique in history. One could vote only by "yes," every person could vote as often as he wanted, five times, six times, seven times. If he tore up the slip of paper, that was counted as "yes," and so on. It has no further interest. In this way it could be seen from the very beginning that if only a few followers of the Schuschnigg system utilized these opportunities sufficiently the result could be only a positive majority for Herr Schuschnigg. That whole thing was a farce. We opposed that. First of all a member of the Austrian Government who was at that moment in Germany, General Von Glaise-Horstenau, was flown to Vienna in order to make clear to Schuschnigg or Seyss-Inquart -- who, since Berchtesgaden, was in Schuschnigg's Cabinet -- that Germany would never tolerate this provocation. At the same time troops which were stationed near the Austrian border were on the alert. That was on Friday, I believe, the 11th. On that day I was in the Reich Chancellery, alone with the Fuehrer in his room. I heard by telephone the news that Glaise-Horstenau had arrived and made our demands known clearly and unmistakably, and that these things were now being discussed. Then, as far as I remember, the answer came that the plebiscite had been called off and that Schuschnigg had agreed to it. At this moment I had the instinctive feeling that the situation was now mobile and that now, finally, that possibility which we had long and ardently awaited was there -- the possibility of bringing about a complete solution.