dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
six times, among other things with loss of civic rights. It is especially significant that Streicher had the Jew Wolk paid by the Fraenkische Tageszeitung from 1934 to 1937. The Fraenkische Tageszeitung paid Wolk the sum of Reichmark 9,623.65. [P. 160] According to the statement of the district treasurer [Gauschatzmeister], his financial adviser, and several other persons, Streicher is regarded as extremely brutal. The statements made by Verlagsdirektor Fink are especially significant. He declared that he was convinced that the Gauleiter would have him bumped off one of these days, as soon as he found out that Fink had told the truth to the investigating commission. [P. 161] According to reports of reliable witnesses, Gauleiter Streicher is in the habit of pointing out on the most varied occasions that he alone gives orders in the district of Franconia. For instance, at a meeting in the Collosseum in Nurnberg in 1935 he said that nobody could remove him from office. In a meeting at Herkules Hall, where he described how he had beaten Prof. Steinruck, he emphasized that he would not let himself be beaten by anybody, not even by an Adolf Hitler. [P. 166] For, this also must be stated here, in Franconia the Gau acts first and then orders the absolutely powerless authorities to approve. [P. 172] In general it is to be said that Koenig was regarded as the evil spirit in Franconia. In an unheard-of-manner he tyrannized the Gau leader, the authorities and the population, and he knew how to make the influence of his power felt everywhere. Koenig's word carried the weight of that of the Gauleiter. [P. 174] In favor of Strobl [pencil note: Director of the AEG, Gaue economic adviser, and president of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce] it must be said that he, in contrast to almost all other defendants, immediately told the truth on all points in his interrogations. It is primarily thanks to him that clearness was quickly reached in many cases which could be verified. As an excuse for his incorrect acts Strobl states that he like all other persons in the Gau of Franconia was to such an extent under the pressure of Gauleiter Streicher and his adjutant Koenig that he would never have dared to do anything against the
was quickly reached in many cases which could be verified. As an excuse for his incorrect acts Strobl states that he like all other persons in the Gau of Franconia was to such an extent under the pressure of Gauleiter Streicher and his adjutant Koenig that he would never have dared to do anything against the orders of the two men mentioned. [P. 179] By the law of April 1938 it is decreed that all applications for Aryanization shall be submitted to the competent Gauleiter. From that time on Strobl submitted the applications, which he had up to that time handled by himself, to the adjutant of the Gauleiter, SA Brigadier General Koenig for approval. He makes the excuse that it had been the practice in Franconia for the adjutant to take care of almost all matters as agent for and deputy of the Gauleiter. Every order of Brigadier General Koenig was equivalent to an order of the Gauleiter. Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946 Previous Document Volume IV Menu
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Document No. 1759-PS Previous Document Volume IV Menu Next Document COPY OF DOCUMENT 1759-PS United Mexican States Mexico, Federal District Embassy of the United States of America Mexico City, D. F. Mexico Raymond H. Geist, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: I came to Berlin in December, 1929, as Consul and continued in that capacity, exercising my official functions until the end of 1939. In 1938 I was appointed First Secretary of the Embassy and continued in that office discharging at the same time my duties as consul. During the entire period of ten years my work was of such character that I frequently came into contact with many officials of the German Government. After the Nazis came to power in 1933, these contacts increased owing to the much more frequent occasions on which it was necessary to intervene with German officials in order to protect the rights of American citizens and their properties. During this period I not only had many official contacts but also friends and acquaintances, both in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. My work permitted and occasionally required travel in Germany. It was my custom to make bicycle trips, as well as excursions by automobile to various points particularly in the environs of Berlin, often to the extent of fifty miles. Although I do not have the first-hand information with regard to developments under the National Socialists for all of Germany that I have regarding the neighborhood of Berlin, I saw enough during my excursions, and was told enough by friends and acquaintances to know that the activities hereafter described in and around Berlin were being substantially duplicated all over Germany. There were indeed few military establishments in the neighborhood of Berlin in 1929 and until 1933 there were the Casernas at Potsdam and the military establishment at Doeberitz. After the Nazis came to power, military establishments of all sorts grew up with enormous rapidity. Before the end of 1933, during my frequent excursions, I discovered outside of Berlin on nearly every road leaving from the city new large military establishments, including training fields, airports, barracks, proving grounds, anti-aircraft stations and the like. For these establishments most of the ground was broken during the year 1933; there were probably
frequent excursions, I discovered outside of Berlin on nearly every road leaving from the city new large military establishments, including training fields, airports, barracks, proving grounds, anti-aircraft stations and the like. For these establishments most of the ground was broken during the year 1933; there were probably fifty within the immediate vicinity of Berlin. Most of these establishments were being openly prepared, nevertheless they were under guard. It was apparent with respect to others that an attempt was made to preserve secrecy. I recall in particular that the large anti-aircraft station near my house in the Gruenwald was built under secrecy, likewise a munitions dump burrowed in the hills of Wildpark near Potsdam was also built under secrecy. Being disguised as a German and speaking the language, I was able on my bicycle trips to penetrate certain of these establishments where at various times I saw military exercises, including the use of tanks, in various maneuvers. I recall from my travels beyond Berlin and the information and reports which I had from friends and acquaintances that the same feverish preparations were in progress throughout the length and breadth of Germany, in fact, all establishments which could serve a military purpose were converted to military uses. I also saw the preparations being made for building up the new army. I visited the camps of the compulsory labor service, the Arbeitsdienst, which was well under way by the end of 1933, with camps established all over Germany. Though this was ostensibly a labor service, it was essentially military in character, as is well known. I saw the men working on reclamation projects and was informed that they worked two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon, the balance of the time being spent in military tactics and in instruction in Nazi ideology. So that when conscription went into effect in 1935 through the medium of these camps, it was possible for the Germans to put a trained army of at least 3,500,000 men, which formed the nucleus of the future army of aggression. Particularly through the years 1933 and 1934 the hordes of storm troopers SA were much in evidence practicing military exercises. They were being converted into
these camps, it was possible for the Germans to put a trained army of at least 3,500,000 men, which formed the nucleus of the future army of aggression. Particularly through the years 1933 and 1934 the hordes of storm troopers SA were much in evidence practicing military exercises. They were being converted into a military organization. I frequently encountered the storm troopers deployed in fields and in forests engaged in military technical exercises. This was all the part of a general plan to prepare Germany's manpower for war. I witnessed, too, scores of times, the training of the Hitler Youth, which included boys from 14 to 17, who dressed in their uniforms, were likewise generally in evidence wherever I chose to travel. I frequently saw them in the woods near Berlin, deployed in ravines, in fields, woods and hillsides staging mock attacks, employing the technique of actual maneuvers. Frequently they were under the direction of uniformed leaders and at times under officers of the Reichswehr. This type of training of the youth extended everywhere in Germany. Frequently my route of travel had to be changed in order not to find myself in the midst of some maneuvers which required the use of roads or paths along which I was riding. It was not considered wise to get too close to these operations, particularly if they were on an extensive scale. The Deutsche Jungvolk (boys from the ages of 6 to 14) was also the vehicle for military training. They were also in evidence throughout the country. I frequently met them marching. I saw them engaged in military exercises in the school yards during the school recesses, particularly throwing hand grenades usually under expert adult leadership. Often I have seen these children in large numbers engaged in what were obviously military maneuvers, and under the direction of adult uniformed officers. I had occasion, at times, to witness the organizations which were created for the girls that were part of the Hitler Youth and were also incorporated in the so-called Arbeitsdienst, usually located somewhere near the camps for men. The resultant illegitimate children were a definite planned result of the program; they were part of the manpower and the army for the next generation. The shame and
were part of the Hitler Youth and were also incorporated in the so-called Arbeitsdienst, usually located somewhere near the camps for men. The resultant illegitimate children were a definite planned result of the program; they were part of the manpower and the army for the next generation. The shame and the grief of parents over this program fostered and urged by the Nazis although it existed, was seldom openly expressed on account of dangers to which the parents might expose themselves. So far as the youth were concerned, the entire program was carried on with lavish propaganda and enough benefits to the participants to make it extremely popular. The Nazis provided the youth with special trains, special trucks, special bathing beaches, food and other privileges. At the same time, the semi-hysteria which was maintained about the whole National Socialist program made it impossible for parents or anyone else to speak against it even if they had wished to do so. The German people were well acquainted with the goings on in concentration camps and it was well known that the fate of anyone too actively opposed to any part of the Nazi program was liable to be one of great suffering. Indeed, before the Hitler regime was many months old almost every family in Germany had had first-hand accounts of the brutalities inflicated in the concentration camps from someone either in the relationship or in the circle of friends who had served a sentence there; consequently the fear of such camps was a very effective brake on any possible opposition. In addition to what I saw during these many years with my own eyes regarding the preparation and the building of a huge armed force, I received reliable information from trustworthy sources as to its scope and strength. One of my close friends in Berlin was one George Graffenstein, who lived at 34 Altenauerstrasse, just across the street from me. He was a German, formerly a member of Meile Printing Company of Chicago and a man strongly opposed to the Nazis. he had been an officer in the German army in the First World War; therefore he knew a large number of the officers of Reichswehr. Occasionally he gave in his house beer-evenings which a number of Reichswehr officers attended, including
Company of Chicago and a man strongly opposed to the Nazis. he had been an officer in the German army in the First World War; therefore he knew a large number of the officers of Reichswehr. Occasionally he gave in his house beer-evenings which a number of Reichswehr officers attended, including certain generals. To these parties I was occasionally invited. One of these generals was General Goettke, who was the head of the artillery on the General Staff and a Very close friend of Graffenstein. In addition, Graffenstein's nephew was on the General Staff and was at the same time the liaison between the Reichswehr and the S.A. Late in 1934, George Graffenstein told me that from the information which he had received from his friends, the armament program was already so complete, so far advanced, so gigantic and all-inclusive, that there was no doubt of Germany's winning the war on sheer weight of arms alone. That same information was given to me directly by certain of the high officers of the Reichswehr, whom I met at Graffenstein's house. By the middle of 1934 it had become obvious that the rearmament program, though in its beginning, was being planned on a vast scale so that it could not possibly be considered as defensive armament but only as a weapon for offensive war. This was, however, not a conclusion of my own; but it was openly stated as such to me. Graffenstein told me in 1934, during the conversations to which I have already referred, that the purpose of the program was an aggressive war. He told me that he had been so informed by General Goettke in particular. This statement was borne out by other persons who were in the know in Germany at that time. I confirmed his statements by my own conversations with the generals who gathered in his house. They intimated to me, not only that Germany was embarked upon an inevitable program toward war but even gave me indications of the general plan, namely, the drive to the East and the attack upon Russia, after Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria had been eliminated. This was as early as 1934, and I had many similar conversations along the same line at Graffenstein's house during the following years. Similar information was constantly
gave me indications of the general plan, namely, the drive to the East and the attack upon Russia, after Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria had been eliminated. This was as early as 1934, and I had many similar conversations along the same line at Graffenstein's house during the following years. Similar information was constantly being confirmed from other sources at later dates. For instance, in December 1938, I had a conversation with General Franz Halder, who was then Chief of Staff, at the house of Dr. Etscheit, a prominent Berlin lawyer. Halder stated to me: "You must take into account the National Socialist program in the East. If you, the Western powers, oppose our program in the East, we shall have to go to war with you." During this conversation he made it clear to me that the program of the Nazis for expansion in the East was unalterably fixed and decided upon. It included the attack on Poland, the annexation of Austria, territorial expansion in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Russia, particularly in the Ukraine. The latter provinces would have to be German. When I replied to Halder that I was positive the Western powers would never tolerate any such aggressive program and that inevitably it would not only mean war with England and France but with the United States as well Halder replied: "That is a pity." The same information as to the aggressive intention of the Nazis was given to me by a friend, Count von Bismarck, formerly Counselor of the German Embassy in London. He was violently anti-Nazi. In Germany, where I knew him, he held no official position, deriving his income from his estates in East Prussia; but he was a man with wide contacts in officialdom, particularly in the Foreign Office. He said that the Nazis were headed for war, for huge aggressive adventures, that conquest of the East was a major part of the vast plan and that conquest of the West would only follow, when complete victory in the East solidified Germany's strength and resources in those quarters. He made this statement to me in 1936 and we discussed it often in 1937 and 1938. He was extremely disturbed, not over the aggressive plans of the Nazis, but over their manner of converting Germany into a slave State,
victory in the East solidified Germany's strength and resources in those quarters. He made this statement to me in 1936 and we discussed it often in 1937 and 1938. He was extremely disturbed, not over the aggressive plans of the Nazis, but over their manner of converting Germany into a slave State, which he repudiated entirely. He considered that the course of the Nazis militarily could not be hindered and furthermore, no country was preparing to stop them. I also had the same information from another reliable source. After Hitler came to power in 1933, General von Hammerstein withdrew from public life. He had been head of the Reichswehr under Chancellor Bruening. Although he was then retired, he knew and associated intimately with the Generals of the German Army, as he was among them primus inter pares. He told me of the German program for aggressive war during a long conversation which we had during a musical recital in 1938 at Dr. Paul Kempner's home. The army, he said, was at a highly mechanized strength, extremely mobile and ready for anything. He was sure, in view of the preparations and the excellent character of the German equipment that the German Army was then an instrument of invincible striking power. He stated categorically that it was a superb instrument which had been formed to wage war and that it would not be much longer delayed. He did not know the plans and details but he confirmed the information that I had from all sources, that Germany intended to strike in the East and that the war in the West depended on whether or not the Western powers would endeavor to intervene when the German war machine started moving. Of these aggressive designs I learned also from other sources. A personal friend, Dr. hans Henniger, a veterinarian in Berlin, was an intimate friend of an officer by the name of Schlessicher (I believe that is the correct spelling), who was the responsible purveyor to the German Army, therefore a high member of the Quartermaster Corps. I do not remember his exact title. Dr. Henniger received from this man information constantly with regard to the preparations being made by the Germans in 1939. A month before March 15, 1939, I was informed of the plans for marching into Prague on that date and that
member of the Quartermaster Corps. I do not remember his exact title. Dr. Henniger received from this man information constantly with regard to the preparations being made by the Germans in 1939. A month before March 15, 1939, I was informed of the plans for marching into Prague on that date and that large stocks of food and other equipment were being accumulated near the border of Czechoslovakia. On March 15, 1939, the German Army rolled into Prague. I also had a good deal of personal experience with and first-hand knowledge of the internal policies from 1935 to 1939. Indeed, from the very outset of the regime, I had intimate and continuous contact with various officers of the German Government in the course of my duties as an American official protecting American citizens or protesting against their mistreatment. The acts of violence against American citizens were numerous, particularly during the early years of 1933 and 1934. In addition, I was constantly receiving information as regards other Nazi tactics and the nature and number of victims from a variety of sources; the victims themselves on many occasions, both American and German, told me their experiences and appealed for help; relatives and friends of victims, both those who came back and those who did not; the foreign newspaper correspondents and, to a very considerable degree, I received information from the Gestapo itself. For a period I dealt directly with Herr Heinrich Himmler, then subsequently with Herr Reinhard Heydrich and often with Dr. Werner Best. My vigorous relations with the Gestapo began in March, 1933. In fact I knew the organization of the secret police and dealt with that organization before the Nazis came to power. It was then the Politische Abtailung des Politzeipraesident, i.e., the political division of the Politizeipraesidium, which was charged with supervisory and preventive functions with regard to political matters, then chiefly investigating the terror of Communists. It was located in Berlin at the Politozeipraesidium. On March 6, 1933, it was moved from the Politizeipraesidium to No. 8 Prinzalbrechtstrasse and became the famous Gestapo [Geheimstaatpolizei], its first chief was Rudolf Diels, who was succeeded by Heinrich Himmler, in May, 1934.
of Communists. It was located in Berlin at the Politozeipraesidium. On March 6, 1933, it was moved from the Politizeipraesidium to No. 8 Prinzalbrechtstrasse and became the famous Gestapo [Geheimstaatpolizei], its first chief was Rudolf Diels, who was succeeded by Heinrich Himmler, in May, 1934. I knew well not only Diels but also Himmler, his second in command, Reinhard Heydrich and his administrative officer, Dr. Werner best. The organization at No. 8 was huge with over 1,000 persons employed there. Besides, as rapidly as administrative measures permitted, Gestapo headquarters were established throughout Germany, not only in the cities but in provincial places to such an extent that the smallest hamlet and village fell under direct Gestapo supervision. At the beginning of the Hitler regime, the only organization which had meeting places throughout the country was the S.A. (storm troopers). Until the Gestapo could be organized on a national scale the thousands of local S.A. meeting places became the "arrest points." There were at least fifty of these in Berlin. Communists, Jews, and other known enemies of the Nazi party were taken to these points and, if they were enemies of sufficient importance, they were immediately transferred to the Gestapo headquarters. During 1933 and 1934, when the Gestapo became universally organized, the S.A. were gradually eliminated as arresting agents and the S.S. [Schutzstaffe] were incorporated as administrative and executive officials into the Gestapo. By the end of 1934, the S.A. had been fairly well eliminated and the S.S., the members of which wore elegant black suits and were therefore called Elite Guards, became almost identical as functionaries with the Gestapo. Immediately in 1933, the concentration camps, as soon as they were established, were put under the immediate charge of the Gestapo and they remained exclusively a Gestapo institution. Only "political" prisoners were held in the concentration camps. Ordinary criminals remained the responsibility of the regular police authorities and the established courts. On being sentenced, they were confined in the regular prisons. These confinements were always the result of duly carried out legal procedure. Incarceration in concentration camps was carried out without any legal procedure,