dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR.SIEMERS: And the Navy, of course, always made efforts to maintain the friendly relations laid down in the Pact?
WAGNER: Yes, that was the Admiral's opinion.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral Wagnerl Admiral Raeder has been accused by the Prosecution that he had never bothered about international law and that he broke international law conventions as a matter of principle if it suited him. Can you express a general opinion about Raeder7s attitude in that respect?
WAGNER: Yes; that is completely wrong. Admiral Raeder considered it most important that every measure for naval warfare should be examined from the point of view of international law. For that purpose we had a special expert on international law in the Naval Operations Staff with whom we in the Operations Department had almost daily contact.
DR.SIEMERS: Furthermore, Raeder has been accused by the Prosecution of advising a war against the United States and trying to get Japan to go to war with the United States. May I ask for your opinion on that?
WAGNER: I consider this charge completely unjustified. I know that Admiral Raeder attached particular importance to the fact that all naval war measures-especially in the critical year of 1941- were to be examined very closely as to the effects they might have on the United States of America. In fact he refrained from taking quite a number of militarily perfectly justified measures in order to prevent incidents with the U.S.A. For instance, in the summer of 1941 he withdrew the submarines from a large area off the coast of the U.S.A. although that area could certainly be regarded as the open sea. He forbade mine-laying action which had already begun against the British port of Halifax, Canada, to prevent, at all costs, the possibility of a United States ship striking a mine. And finally, he also forbade attacks on British destroyers in the North Atlantic because the fifty destroyers which had been turned over to England by the United States created the dangerous possibility of confusing the British and American destroyers. All this was done at a time when the United States, while still at peace, occupied Iceland, when British warships were being repaired in American shipyards, when American naval forces had orders that all German units should be reported to the British fleet, and when finally President Roosevelt in July 1941 gave his forces the order to attack any German submarines they sighted.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Admiral Raeder ever make a statement in the Naval Operations Staff that there was no risk in a war against America and that the fleet or the American submarines were not much good?
WAGNER: No, Admiral Raeder as an expert would never have made such a statement.
DR. SIEMERS: On the contrary, did not Raeder expressly speak of the strength of the American fleet and that one could not fight simultaneously two such great sea-powers as America and Great Britain?
WAGNER: Yes, it was perfectly clear to him and to us that America's entry into the war would mean a very substantial strengthening of the enemy forces.
DR. SIEMERS: Now on one occasion Admiral Raeder suggested in his war diary that Japan should attack Singapore. Was there any discussion about Pearl Harbor in connection with that in the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: No, not at all. The attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was a complete surprise, both to the Admiral and to the Naval Operations Staff and, in my opinion, to every other German department.
DR. SIEMERS: Were there no continuous naval-military discussions and conferences between Japan and Germany?
WAGNER: No, before Japan's entry into the war there were no military discussions according to my conviction.
DR. SIEMERS: I should now like to show you Document C-41, Mr. President, this is Exhibit GB-69. Later on, the British Delegation will submit it in Document Book 10a for Raeder. I do not know whether the Tribunal already has it. It is as yet not contained in the trial brief against Raeder. In the newly compiled Document Book 10a, it is on Page 18.
THE PRESIDENT: You can offer it in evidence now, if you want to, so you can put it to the witness.
DR.SIEMERS: The Prosecution has submitted it; yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very welt
DR. SIEMERS: This concerns a document signed by Admiral Fricke, and it is dated 3 June 1940. It is headed "Questions of Expansion of Areas and Bases." That document contains detailed statements on future plans. [Turning to the witness.] I should like to ask you if Raeder gave the order to prepare this memorandum or how did this memorandum come to be written?
WAGNER: Admiral Raeder did not give the order to draft this memorandum. This constitutes the personal, theoretical ideas of Admiral Fricke regarding the possible developments in the future. They are quite fantastic, and they had no practical significance.
DR. SIEMERS: Was this study or this note tallied about or discussed in any large group in the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: No, in my opinion only the Operations officers had knowledge of this document, which by its very form shows that it is not a well-thought-out study made by order of Grossadmiral Raeder but an ad hoc jotting-down of thoughts which occurred to Admiral Fricke at the moment.
DR.SIEMERS: Was this study or this document passed on to any outsiders at ail?
WAGNER: I think I can remember that this document was not sent to any outside office but remained in the Operations Department. The Grossadmiral, too, in my opinion did not have knowledge of it, particularly since this document shows that he did not initial it.
DR.SIEMERS: You have a photostat copy of that document?
WAGNER: Yes' . DR.SIEMERS: Are there any other initials on it which might show that it was put before Admiral Raeder? How was this sort of thing generally handled in the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: Every document that was to be put before the Admiral had on its first page in the left margin a note: "v.A.v.," which means "to be submitted before dispatch," or "n.E.v.," "to be submitted after receipt," or else "to be reported during situation reports." And then at that place the Admiral would initial it with a green pencil, or the officers of his personal staff would make a note indicating that it had been submitted to him.
DR. SIEMERS: And there are no such marks on this document?
WAGNER: No.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to show you Document C-38, which is a document of the Prosecution bearing the number Exhibit GB-223. It is contained in the Prosecution's document book on Raeder, Page 11. The war between Germany and Russia began on 22 June 1941. According to the last page but one of the document which you have before you, the OKW as early as 15 June-a week before the outbreak of the war-ordered the use of arms against enemy submarines south of the Memel line, the southern tip of Oeland, at the request of the Naval Operations Staff. The Prosecution is basing the accusation on this document and once more referring to an aggressive war. Unfortunately, the Prosecution has only submitted the last page of this document. It did not produce the first and second page of the document. If felt had done so, then this accusation would probably have been dropped. May I read to you, Witness, what is contained there; and I quote: "On 12 June at 2000 hours one of the submarines placed as outposts on both sides of Bornholrn, as precautionary measure, reported at 2000 hours an unknown submarine in the vicinity R Adlergrund (20 miles southwest of Bornholm) which had surfaced and was proceeding on a westerly course and which answered a recognition signal call with a letter signal which had no particular significance." That ends the quotation. May I ask you to explain what it means that this submarine did not reply to the recognition signal call?
WAGNER: In time of war the warships of one's own fleet have an arrangement of recognition signals; that is to say, the recognition signal has a call and a reply which immediately identifies the ship as belonging to one's own fleet. If a recognition signal is wrongly answered, it proves that it is a foreign vessel.
DR. SIEMERS: As far as you can remember, were there any other clues showing that ships appeared in the Baltic sea which were recognized as enemy ships?
WAGNER: Yes. I remember that there were individual cases where unknown submarines were observed off the German Baltic ports. Subsequently it was found, by comparing the stations of our own submarines, that these were indeed enemy vessels.
DR.SIEMERS: Were these facts the reason which caused the Naval Operations Staff to ask for the use of weapons?
WAGNER: Yes, these very facts.
DR. SIEMERS: A similar case has been made the subject of an accusation in connection with Greece. It has been ascertained here in Court from the War Diary that on 30 December 1939 the Naval Operations Staff asked that Greek ships in the American blockade zone around Great Britain should be treated as hostile. Since Greece was neutral at the time, there has been an accusation against Raeder of a breach of neutrality. May I ask you to tell us the reasons which caused the Naval Operations Staff and the Chief, Raeder, to make such a request to the OKW?
WAGNER: We had had news that Greece had placed the bulk of its merchant fleet at the disposal of England and mat these Greek vessels were sailing under British command.
DR. SIEMERS: And it is correct that Greek vessels in general were not treated as hostile, but only vessels in the American blockade zone around England?
WAGNER: Yes. DR. SIEMERS The next case, which is somewhat similar, is that which occurred in June 1942, when the Naval Operations Staff made an application to the OKW to be allowed to attack Brazilian ships, although Brazil at that time was still a neutral. The war with Brazil started some two months later on 22 August. What reasons were there for such a step?
WAGNER: We were receiving reports from submarines from the waters around South America, according to which they were being attacked by ships which could only have started from Brazilian bases. The first thing we did was to refer back and get these questions clarified and confirmed. Moreover, I think I can remember personally that at that time it was already generally known that Brazil was giving the use of sea and air bases to the United States with whom we were at war.
DR. SIEMERS: So that this was due to a breach of neutrality on the part of Brazil?
WAGNER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to submit to you Documents C-176 and D-658. Document C-176 has the number Exhibit GB-228. These two documents are based on the Commando Order, that is, the order to destroy sabotage troops. The Prosecution has charged Raeder with an incident which occurred in December 1942 in the Gironde estuary at Bordeaux. In Document C-176, on the last page, you will find something which I would like to quote. "Shooting of the two captured Englishmen took place by a firing-squad, numbering one officer and 16 men, detailed by the port commander at Bordeaux, in the presence of an officer of the SD and by order of the Fuehrer." Previous entries, which I do not want to quote separately and which portray the same things, show that the SD had intervened directly and had got into direct touch with the fuehrer's headquarters. I now ask you whether the Naval Operations Staff had heard anything at all about this matter before these two prisoners were shot, or whether they knew anything about this direct order from Hitler which is mentioned in this connection?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff had nothing to do with a direct order for the shooting of people in Bordeaux. The Naval Operations Staff knew the tactical course of events of this sabotage undertaking in Bordeaux and nothing at the time beyond that.
DR.SIEMERS: Therefore, this case was not put to the Naval Operations Staff or to Admiral Raeder, and it was not discussed by them?
WAGNER: Yes. I am certain that that was not the case.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I ask the Tribunal to take notice of the fact that this war diary is by no means the war diary which has been frequently mentioned, the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff, but the war diary of the Naval Commander west, and was therefore unknown to the Naval Operations Staff. That is why the Naval Operations Staff did not know of this case.
THE PRESIDENT: You are referring now to Document C-176?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, and also to D-658, which is the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the reference to it?
DR. SIEMERS: This is D-658, which shows the following: According to the OKW communique, these two soldiers had in the meantime been shot. The measure would be in keeping with the special order by the Fuehrer. That has been submitted by the Prosecution, and it shows-and I shall refer to this later-that the Naval Operations Staff knew nothing about the entire episode because this shows an entry dated 9 December, whereas the whole affair happened on the 11th. It; PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a good time to break off. [A recess was taken.]
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I am now submitting to you Document UK C-124. Mr. President, C-124 corresponds to USSR-130. This document deals with a communication from the Naval Operations Staff, dated 29 September 1941, addressed to Group North, and it deals with the future of the city of Petersburg. This report to Group North says that the Fuehrer had decided to wipe the city of Petersburg from the face of the earth. The Navy itself had nothing to do with that report. Despite that, this report was sent to Group North. Witness, I will return to this point, but I would like to ask you first-you have a photostatic copy of the original-to tell me whether Raeder could have seen this document before it was dispatched?
WAGNER: According to my previous statements Admiral Raeder did not see this document since there are no marks or initials to that effect.
DR.SIEMERS: And now the more important question on this point. In view of the terrible communication which is mentioned by Himmler in Point 2, why did the Naval Operations Staff transmit it even though the Navy itself had nothing to do with it?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff had asked that in bombarding, occupying or attacking Leningrad the dockyards, wharf installations, and all other special naval installations be spared so that they might be used as bases later on. That request was turned down by Hitler's statement as contained in this document, as can be seen from Point 3. We had to communicate this fact to Admiral Carls so that he could act accordingly and because in the case of a later occupation of Leningrad he could not count on this port as a base.
DR.SIEMERS: Because of the significance of this testimony, I would like to quote to the Tribunal the decisive point to which the witness just referred, and that is III of USSR-130. I quote: "The original requests of the Navy to spare the dock, harbor, and other installations important from the Navy viewpoint are known to the High Command of the WehrTnacht. Compliance with these requests is not possible, because of the fundamental aim of the action against Petersburg." That was the decisive point which the SKL told Admiral Carls as commander of Group North.
WAGNER: That was the sole reason for this communication.
DR.SIEMERS: Do you know whether Admiral Carls did anything with this document? Did he transmit it to any one, or do you not know anything about that?
WAGNER: As far as I am informed, this communication was not passed on; and it was not the intention that it should be passed on for it was meant solely for Group North. On the strength of this document, Admiral Carls stopped the preparations which had already been made for using the Leningrad naval installations later on and made the personnel available for other purposes. That is the only measure which the Navy took on the basis of this communication and the only measure which could have been taken.
DR. SIEMERS: I should tell the Tribunal that accordingly I will submit, under Number Ill in my Document Book Raeder, an affidavit which contains this fact, which the witness also points out, that nothing was passed on by Group North so that the commanding naval officers never learned of this document. This concerns an affidavit by Admiral Butow who at that time was Commander-in-Chief in Finland, and I shall come back to this point when I present the case on behalf of Admiral Raeder. I have no more questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions? [There was no response.] The Prosecution may cross-examine.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, with regard to the questions asked by Dr. Siemers, I was going to leave the cross-examination on those points to the cross-examination of the Defendant Raeder so as to avoid any duplication. [Turning to the witness.] As I understand the evidence which the Defendant Doenitz has given and your evidence, you are telling the Tribunal that with respect to the treatment of neutral merchant ships, the German Navy has nothing to reproach itself with. Is that right?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And the Defendant has said that the German Navy was scrupulous in adhering to orders about the attitude towards neutral shipping, and the neutrals were fully warned of what they should and should not do. Is that right?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Admiral Doenitz has also said that there was no question of deceiving neutral governments; they were given fair warning of what their ships should not do. Do you agree?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL.PHILLIMORE: Now, I want just to remind you of what steps were taken as regards neutrals, as they appear from the defense documents. First of all, on 3 September orders were issued that strict respect for all rules of neutrality and compliance with all agreements of international law which were generally recognized were to be observed. My Lord, that is D-55, Page 139.
THE PRESIDENT: In the British document book?
COL. PHILLIMORE: In the Defense document book-Doenitz-55. And then, on 28 September, a warning was sent to neutrals to avoid suspicious conduct, changing course, zig-zagging, and so on. That is Doenitz-61, at Page 150. On 19 October that 'warning was repeated and neutrals were advised to refuse convoy escort. That is Doenitz-62, at Page 153. On 22 October there was a repetition of the warning, that is Doenitz-62, Page 162; and on 24 November the neutrals were told that the safety of their ships in waters around the British Isles and in the vicinity of the French coast could no longer be taken for granted. That is Doenitz-73, at Page 206; and then from 6 January onwards, certain zones were declared dangerous zones. That is right, is it not?
WAGNER: No. On 24 November a general warning was issued that the entire United States fighting zone was to be considered dangerous. The specific zones which since January were used as operational zones were not made public, since they came within the scope of the first warning and served only for internal use within the Navy.
COL. PHILLIMORE: That is the point I want to be clear about. The zones that you declared from 6 January onwards were not announced. Is that the point?
WAGNER: Yes, the neutrals were warned on 24 November that all of those zones which had been specifically declared as operational zones since January would be dangerous for shipping.
COL. PHILLIMORE: But when you fixed the specific zones from 6 January onwards, no further specific warning was given. Is that the case?
WAGNER: That is correct. After the general warning, we issued no further specific warnings about parts of this zone.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, you are not suggesting, are you, that by these warnings and by this declaration of an enormous danger zone, you were entitled to sink neutral shipping without warning?
WAGNER: Yes. I am of the opinion that in this zone which we, as well as the United States of America before us, regarded as dangerous for shipping it was no longer necessary to show consideration to neutrals.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you mean to say that from 24 November onwards every neutral government was given fair warning that its ships would be sunk without warning if they were anywhere in that zone?
WAGNER: What I want to say is that on 24 November all the neutral countries were notified officially that the entire United States of America zone was to be considered as dangerous and that the German Reich could assume no responsibility for losses in combat in this zone.
COL.PHILLIMORE: That is quite a different case. Do not let us have any mistake about this. Are you saying that by that warning you were entitled to sink neutral ships anywhere in that zone without warning, sink on sight?
WAGNER: I did not quite catch the last few words.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you suggesting that you were entitled to sink at sight neutral shipping anywhere in that zone, as from 24 November?
WAGNER: I am of the opinion that we were justified from that period of time onwards in having no special consideration for neutral shipping. If we had made exceptions in our orders to our U-boats, it would have meant in every case that they could not have sunk enemy ships without warning.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not a question of any special consideration. Do you say that you became entitled to sink at sight any neutral ship, or sink it deliberately, whether you recognized it as neutral or not?
THE PRESIDENT: Surely you can answer that question "yes" or "no."
WAGNER: Yes, I am of that opinion.
COL.PHILLIMORE: Will you tell me how that squares with the submarine rules?
WAGNER: I do not feel competent to give a legal explanation of these questions because that is a matter of international law.
COL. PHILLIMORE: At any rate, that is what you proceeded to do, is it not? You proceeded to sink neutral ships at sight and without warning anywhere in that zone?
WAGNER: Yes; not just anywhere in this zone, but in the operational zones stipulated by us neutral ships were...
COL. PHILLIMORE: But wherever you could-wherever you could?
WAGNER: In the operational zones stipulated by us we sank neutral ships without warning, for we were of the opinion that in this case we were concerned with secured zones near the enemy coast which could no longer be considered the open sea.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And that is what you desired to do at the very start of the war, was it not? That is what you decided to do?
WAGNER: From the beginning of the war we decided to adhere strictly to the London Agreement.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you look at the document which was put in yesterday? My Lord, it is D-851. It is put in as GB-451. It is a memorandum of 3 September.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
COL.PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it was the only new document that Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe put in in cross-examination. [Turning to the witness.] Would you look at the third paragraph: "The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage to England can be achieved with the forces available only if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping in the prohibited area indicated on the enclosed map." - Do you still say that you did not intend from the start of the war to sink neutral shipping without warning as soon as you could get Hitler to agree to let you do so? Do you still say that?
WAGNER: Yes, absolutely. In this document, in the first paragraph, it says: "In the attached documents sent to the Navy by the OKW the question of unrestricted U-boat warfare against England is discussed." I cannot judge these documents if they are not submitted to me.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were in the general staff at that time. You were in charge of the Department IA. This point of view must have been put forward by your department?