dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ALDERMAN: The Hungarians, with the exception of Horthy, who wished to put the Hungarian intention to participate on record, proved reluctant to commit themselves. Thereupon Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop's statement and said that whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well. I now quote from this document the first two paragraphs: "While in the forenoon of the 23rd of August the Fuehrer and the Regent of Hungary were engaged in a political discussion, the Hungarian Ministers Imredy and Kanya were in conference with Von Ribbentrop. Von Weizsacker also attended the conference. "Von Kanya introduced two subjects for discussion: Point 1, the negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente; and 2, the Czechoslovakian problem." Then I skip two paragraphs and read the fifth paragraph: " Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary's attitude would be if the Fuehrer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech provocation by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured if Hungary marches towards the north and perhaps the east; moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and one to two more years time for its development should be allowed. " Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were between the pincers of the Axis Powers. Romania alone would therefore not move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England would not recklessly risk her empire. She knew our newly acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted since it would depend on Czech provocation. Von Ribbentrop repeated that, ' Whoever desires revision must exploit the good opportunity and participate.' "The Hungarian reply thus remained a conditional one.
MR. ALDERMAN: Upon the question of Von Ribbentrop as to what purpose the desired General Staff conferences were to have, not much more was brought forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory of military material and preparedness for the Czech conflict. The clear political basis for such a conflict-the time of a Hungarian intervention-was not obtained. "In the meantime, more positive language was used by Von Horthy in his talk with the Fuehrer. He wished not to hide his doubts with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put on record Hungary's intention to participate. The Hungarian Ministers were, and remained even later, more skeptical since they feel more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary with its unprotected flanks. "When Von Imredy had a discussion with the Fuehrer in the afternoon he was very relieved when the Fuehrer explained to him that in regard to the situation in question he demanded nothing of Hungary. He himself would not know the time. Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs he would have no objections." I think perhaps that sentence, "Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well," is perhaps as cynical a statement as any statesman has ever been guilty of. By the third day of the conference the Germans were able to note that, in the event of a German-Czech conflict, Hungary would be sufficiently armed for participation on 1 October. I now offer in evidence Document Number 2797-PS as Exhibit USA-89, another captured German Foreign Office memorandum of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 August 1938. You will note that the English mimeographed translation bears the date 29 August. That is incorrect; it should read 25 August.
MR. ALDERMAN: I read the last paragraph from that document, or the last two: "Concerning Hungary's military preparedness in case of a German-Czech conflict Von Kanya mentioned several days ago that his country would need a period of one to two years in order to develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary. "During today's conversation Von Kanya corrected this remark and said that Hungary's military situation was much better. His country would be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to take part in the conflict by October 1 of this year." -Signed with an illegible signature which probably is that of Weizsacker. The account of the German-Hungarian conference again finds its corroboration in General Jodl's diary, Document Number 1780-PS, from which I have already several times read. The entry in that diary for 21 to 26 August on Page 4 of the English version of the document reads as follows: "Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent. Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the War Minister Von Raatz. "They arrived with the idea that in the course of a great war after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old State of Hungary can be re-established. They leave with the understanding that we have neither demands from them nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them. "Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that when the issue arises a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude." The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a staff conference on 6 September. I quote again from Jodl's diary, the entry for 6 September, beginning at the end of that same page: "Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.
MR. ALDERMAN: Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Fuehrer, especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with OAI, General Von Stulpnagel." It is somewhat interesting to find a high-ranking general giving a briefing on such political matters. Then we come to final actual preparations for the attack. With a 1 October target date set for Case Green, there was a noticeable increase in the tempo of the military preparations in late August and September. Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators was devoted to technical details, the timing of "X-days," questions of mobilization, questions of transport and supplies. On 26 August the Defendant Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled, "Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures." This is Item 17 at Pages 37 and 38 of the English translation of the Schmundt file on Case Green, our Number 388-PS. I should like to invite the special attention of the Tribunal to this memorandum. It demonstrates beyond the slightest doubt the complicity of the OKW and of Defendant Keitel and Jodl in the shameful fabrication of an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals in bare outline the deceit, the barbarity, the completely criminal character of the attack that Germany was preparing to launch. I ask leave to read this document in full: "Chief Section L; for chiefs only; written by General Staff officer; top secret; note on progress of report; Berlin, 24 August 1938; access only through officer; 1 copy. "Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures. "The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peacetime airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-Order and to demand that the X-Order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day. "The Army's efforts are tending in the opposite direction.
MR. ALDERMAN: It intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1 which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKH also demands that the X-Order be given to the Army not later than 1400 on X minus 1. "To this the following must be said: " 'Operation Green" '-or Aktion Grun-" will be set in motion by means of an 'incident' in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance." -I call special attention to that sentence- "The fixing of the exact time for this incident ;s of the utmost importance. "It must come at a time when the over-all meteorological conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it "-news of this prepared incident-" to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1. "It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X-Order at 1400 on X minus 1. "On X minus 2 the Navy, Army, and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning. "If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous. "For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of numerous maneuvers and exercises. "Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident. "Even a warning of diplomatic representatives in Prague is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (that is the death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers).
MR. ALDERMAN: "If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X-Day, but it must be the day after that. "In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident (X-Fall). "It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in good time-insofar as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident. "I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on these points." -Signed- "J" -(Jodl). In handwriting, at the bottom of the page of that document, are the notes of the indefatigable Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant. These reveal that the memorandum was submitted to Hitler on August 30; that Hitler agreed to act along these lines, and that Jodl was so notified on 31 August. There follows Jodl's initials once more. On 3 September Keitel and Von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at the Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference. These will be found as Item 18 at Pages 39 and 40 of the Document Number 388-PS. I shall read the first three short paragraphs of these minutes: "Colonel General Von Brauchitsch reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to 'exercise areas' for 'Grun'. Field units to be transferred on 28 September. From here will then be ready for action. When X-Day becomes known field units carry out exercises in opposite directions. "Fuehrer has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day march away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere." -Then there is a question mark.- "OKH must know when X-Day is by 1200 noon, 27 September." You will note that Von Brauchitsch reported that field troops would be transferred to the proper areas for Case Green on 28 September and would then be ready for action. You will also note that the OKH must know when X-Day is by 12 noon on 27 September.
MR. ALDERMAN: During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views on the strategy the German armies should employ and the strength of the Czech defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the possibility, and I quote, "of drawing in the Henlein people." The situation in the West still troubled him. Schmundt further noted, and here I read the final sentence from Page 40 of the English transcript: "The Fuehrer gives orders for the development of the Western fortifications: Improvement of advance positions around Aachen and Saarbrucken; construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action." Five days later General Stulpnagel asked Defendant Jodl for written assurance that the OKH would be informed 5 days in advance about the impending action. In the evening Jodl conferred with Luftwaffe generals about the co-ordination of ground and air operations at the start of the attack. I now read the 8 September entry in General Jodl's diary, Page 5 of the English translation of Document 1780-PS. "General Stulpnagel, OAI, asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed 5 days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the over-all meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for 2 days in advance and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this moment (X-Day minus 2) "-or as the German puts it- "X-2 Tag." "General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision, even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that... Italy is reserved." Now, this is Jodl talking: "I must admit that I am worrying, too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June '37, 5 November '37, 7 December '37, 30 May 1938, with the last statements.
MR. ALDERMAN: In spite of that, one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure on us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore. "1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of High Command of Armed Forces and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force. (Present were General Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg, and myself) We agree about the promulgation of the X-Day order "-X-Befehl-" (X-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (X-Day minus 1"-X minus 1 day-" 7 o'clock). The 'Y' time has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour." Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September, Hitter met with Defendant Keitel and Generals Von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nuremberg. Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later joined this conference, which lasted from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning. Schmundt's minutes on this conference are Item 19 in the large Schmundt file, on Pages 41 to 43 of Document 388-PS. In this meeting General Halder reviewed the missions assigned to four of the German armies being committed to the attack, the 2d, the 10th, the 12th and the 14th German Armies. With his characteristic enthusiasm for military planning, Hitler then delivered a soliloquy on strategic considerations, which should be taken into account as the attack developed. I shall quote only four paragraphs, beginning with the summary of General Von Brauchitsch's remarks, on the bottom of Page 42: "General Oberst Von Brauchitsch: 'Employment of motorized divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other divs' "-that is for divisions" 'ready to march into the area at the right time.
MR. ALDERMAN: In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of September, if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23d, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command II.' "The Fuehrer: 'Does not see why workers have to return home as early as X-ll. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day. Also the railroad cars will stand around unnecessarily later on.' "General Keitel: 'Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands in the West. Trains must be assembled.' "Von Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD (Labor Service) will be drafted, 96 construction battalions will be distributed (also in the East). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.' " From this day forward the Nazi conspirators were occupied with the intricate planning which is required before such an attack. On 11 September Defendant Jodl conferred with a representative of the Propaganda Ministry about methods of refuting German violations of international law and of exploiting those of the Czechs. I read the 11 September entry in the Jodl diary at Page 5 of the English translation of 1780-PS: "In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Hahnke, for the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks. These joint preparations for refutation"-Widerlegung-"of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important." This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by Section L, that is, Jodl's section of the OKW. I now offer in evidence Document C-2 as Exhibit USA-90, which is a carbon copy of the original, signed in pencil. Seven copies of this captured document, as it shows on its face, were prepared and distributed on 1 October 1938 to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftwaffe, and the Foreign Office. In this study anticipated violations by Germany of international law in connection with the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed and counterpropaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda agencies.
MR. ALDERMAN: It is a highly interesting top-secret document and with a glance at the original you can see the careful form in which the study of anticipated violations of international law and propagandistic refutations thereof were set out. The document is prepared in tabular form, in which the anticipated instances of violation of international law are listed in the left hand column. In the second column are given specific examples of the incidents. In the third and fourth column the position to be taken toward these incidents, in violation of international law and in violation of the laws of warfare, is set forth. The fifth column, which in this document unfortunately is blank, was reserved for the explanations to be offered by the Propaganda Minister. I first quote from the covering letter: "Enclosed is a list drawn up by Section L of the OKW, of the violations of international law which may be expected on the part of fighting troops. "Owing to the short time allowed for the compilation, Columns c-1 and c-2 had to be filled in directly therefore, for the time being. "The branches of the Armed Forces are requested to send in an opinion so that a final version may be drawn up. "The same is requested of the Foreign Office. "The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. "By order" -signed- "Burckner." I am sorry that I perhaps cannot take the time to read extensively from this document. I shall confine myself to reading the first 10 hypothetical incidents for which justification must be found from the second column, Column b of the table: "First: In an air raid on Prague the British Embassy is destroyed." "Second: Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed. "Third: The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague. "Fourth: On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered. "Fifth: Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of an important bridge, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.
MR. ALDERMAN: "Sixth: Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to do road work or to load munitions, and so forth. "Seventh: For military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets, foodstuffs, and fodder from the Czech population. As a result, the latter suffer from want. "Eighth: Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily evacuated to the rear area. "Ninth: Churches are used for military accommodations. "Tenth: In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft." From Nuremberg on the 10th of September, Hitler issued an order bringing the Reichsarbeitsdienst (the German Labor Service) under the OKW. This top-secret order...
THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that document now?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the classification with reference to gas?
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps I should, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: It is number 4.
MR. ALDERMAN: Incident number 4?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: Well, number 4 was the supposed incident. `'On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered." Under the column, "Attitude of International Law Group": "According to the declaration agreed to in June 1925 by 40 states, including Czechoslovakia, the employment of poison gases, chemical warfare agents, and bacteriological substances is expressly forbidden. Quite a number of states made the reservation to this declaration on the prohibition of gas warfare." Then, under the column headed "Justification by the Laws of War": "If the assertion, that the opponent-in this case the Czechs used a prohibited gas in warfare, is to be believed by the world, it must be possible to prove it. If that is possible, the firing of gas projectiles is justified, and it must be given out in public that it can be proved that the enemy was the first to violate the prohibition. It is therefore particularly important to furnish this proof. If the assertion is unfounded or only partially founded, the gas attack is to be represented only as the need for carrying out a justified reprisal, in the same way as the Italians did in the Abyssinian war. In this case, however, the justification for such harsh reprisals must also be proved." From Nuremberg on the 10th of September, Hitler issued an order bringing the Reichsarbeitsdienst (the German Labor Service) under the OKW . . .
THE PRESIDENT: There is another short passage which seems to be material.
MR. ALDERMAN: I was very much tempted to read the whole document.
THE PRESIDENT: The justification of number 10.