dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
The aim must also be to secure all territories, which are of special interest to us for the war economy, by conquering them. "At the time the 4-year-plan was established, I issued the statement where I made it clear that a completely autarchical economy is impossible for us, because the need of men will be too great. Nevertheless, my solution was always to provide the necessary reserves for missing stocks respectively to secure the delivery in wartime through economic alliances." (1456-PS) On this macabre note the story of this aggression comes to an end. In view of the solemn pledge of non-aggression; the base and sinister motives involved; the months of secret planning and preparation; and the suffering intentionally and deliberately wrought; it may perhaps not be too much to say that in the history of relations between sovereign nations, a blacker chapter has never been written than the one which tells of the Nazi conspirators' unprovoked invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union. LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST THE USSR Document Description Vol. Page Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6 (a)...I 5 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 6; V.....I 27,29 Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court. *444-PS Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer's Headquarters signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl, 12 November 1940, concerning plans for prosecution of war in Mediterranean Area and occupation of Greece. (GB 116)....III 403 *446-PS Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl, Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, concerning the Invasion of Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31)...III 407 *447-PS Top Secret Operational Order to Order No. 21 signed by Keitel, 13
Area and occupation of Greece. (GB 116)....III 403 *446-PS Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl, Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, concerning the Invasion of Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31)...III 407 *447-PS Top Secret Operational Order to Order No. 21 signed by Keitel, 13 March 1941, concerning Directives for special areas. (USA 135)...III 409 *864-PS Top Secret Note, 20 October 1939, on conference between Hitler and Chief OKW concerning future relations of Poland to Germany, 17 October 1939. (USA 609)....III 619 *865-PS Correspondence between Keitel, Rosenberg and Lammers, April 1941, concerning appointment of Jodl and Warlimont as OKW representatives with Rosenberg. (USA 143)....III 621 *872-PS Memorandum of Discussion between the Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case "Barbarossa" and "Sonnenblume" (African operation). (USA 134)...III 626 *873-PS Top secret memorandum of discussion with the Chief "L", 30 April 1941, about the invasion of Russia. (USA 137)....III 633 874-PS Draft letter to Todt, initialed K, J, and W, 9 March 1941, concerning Deception measures....III 634 876-PS Letter from Keitel, 12 May 1941, concerning Deception of the enemy......III 635 886-PS Fuehrer decree, 13 May 1941, on courts martial and treatment of enemy civilians in the district "Barbarossa", signed by Keitel for Hitler, and initialed by Jodl....III 637 *1017-PS Memorandum entitled "Memorial No. 1 regarding USSR", 2 April 1941, found in Rosenberg's "Russia File". (USA 142)...III 674 *1019-PS Appendix to Memorandum No. 2. Recommendation as to the personnel for the Reich Commissariats in the East and for the Political Central Office in Berlin, 7 April 1941. (USA 823)...III 681 *1029-PS Paper entitled "Instructions for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic States", 8 May 1941, found in Rosenberg's "Russia File". (USA 145)...III 690 *1030-PS General instructions for all Reich Commissars in the Occupied Eastern Territories, 8 May 1941, found in Rosenberg file. (USA 144)...III 692 1034-PS Minutes of discussion concerning Construction and Administration, 29 June 1941....III 693 *1039-PS Report concerning preparatory work regarding problems in Eastern Territories, 28 June 1941, found in Rosenberg's "Russia File". (USA 146)...III 695 *1058-PS Excerpt
8 May 1941, found in Rosenberg file. (USA 144)...III 692 1034-PS Minutes of discussion concerning Construction and Administration, 29 June 1941....III 693 *1039-PS Report concerning preparatory work regarding problems in Eastern Territories, 28 June 1941, found in Rosenberg's "Russia File". (USA 146)...III 695 *1058-PS Excerpt from a speech, 20 June 1941, by Rosenberg before people most intimately concerned with Eastern Problem, found in his "Russia File". (USA 147)...III 716 1156-PS Report to Goering from Chief of Office for War Mobilization of Economy, 19 March 1941....III 808 *1157-PS Report on conference, 29 April 1941, concerning top secret plan for Economic exploitation of Soviet Areas (Oldenburg Plan). (USA 141)...III 811 *1229-PS OKW Directive to the German Intelligence Service in the East, signed by Jodl, 6 September 1940. (USA 130)....III 849 1316-PS Top secret note for files on conference of 21 March 1941 concerning employment of Quartermaster General...III 908 *1317-PS Top secret notes taken by Hamann of a discussion of the economic exploitation of Russia, presided over by General Thomas, 28 February 1941. (USA 140)...III 911 *1456-PS Thomas memorandum 20 June 1941; Keitel consulted about resources of USSR. (USA 148)....IV 21 *1517-PS Memorandum from Rosenberg concerning discussion with the Fuehrer, 14 December 1941. (USA 824)....IV 55 *1799-PS Annex 1 to report of Chief of General Staff of the Army, 5 December 1940, concerning planned operation in the East. (USA 131)...IV 374 *1834-PS Report on conference between Ribbentrop and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129)....IV 469 *2353-PS Extracts from General Thomas' Basic Facts for History of German War and Armament Economy. (USA 35)...IV 1071 *2718-PS Memorandum "About the result of today's discussion with State Secretaries about Barbarossa", 2 May 1941. (USA 32)....V 378 3014-PS Affidavit of General Ernst Koestring, former German military attaché in Moscow, concerning planning for the attack on the USSR in early August 1940...V 734 3031-PS Affidavit of General Warlimont, 21 November 1945, stating that first directive for campaign against USSR was issued in August 1940....V 740 3032-PS Affidavit of General Walter Warlimont, 21 November 1945, stating that the projected campaign against USSR was first made known to him at conference
in early August 1940...V 734 3031-PS Affidavit of General Warlimont, 21 November 1945, stating that first directive for campaign against USSR was issued in August 1940....V 740 3032-PS Affidavit of General Walter Warlimont, 21 November 1945, stating that the projected campaign against USSR was first made known to him at conference with Jodl, 29 July 1940....V 741 *3054-PS "The Nazi Plan", script of a motion picture composed of captured German film. (USA 167)....V 801 3579-PS Memorandum, signed Schnurre, on the status of deliveries under German-Russian economic agreement, 28 September 1940....VI 276 *C-33 Entries in Naval War Diary, concerning operation "Barbarossa" and "Marita". (USA 133)...VI 846 *C-35 Entry in Naval War Diary, January 1941, p. 401. (USA 132)...VI 852 C-37 References to operation "Barbarossa" in the German Naval War Diary, June 1941....IV 854 *C-38 Letter, 13 June 1941, requesting decision on action against enemy submarines and Order to attack Soviet submarines, 15 June 1941. (GB 223)....VI 855 *C-39 Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138).....VI 857 *C-50 Covering letters and Order of 13 May 1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless treatment of civilians in the USSR for offenses committed by them. (USA 554; GB 162)...VI 871 C-51 Order signed by Keitel, 27 July 1941, for destruction of all copies of Order of 13 May 1941 (document C-50) without affecting its validity....VI 875 C-53 Order signed by Keitel, 20 September 1940, concerning Military Missions to Rumania...VI 877 C-54 Fuehrer Order, 23 May 1941, concerning military activities in Rumania....VI 877 *C-77 Memorandum from Chief of High Command to Navy High Command, 18 May 1941. (GB 146)....VI 908 *C-78 Schmundt's Order of 9 June 1941, convening conference on Barbarossa on 14 June. (USA 139)....VI 909 C-150 Letter from Hitler to General Antonescu, 18 June 1941....VI 963 *C-170 File of Russo-German relations found in OKM files covering period 25 August 1939 to 22 June 1941. (USA 136)...VI 977 *L-172 "The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the 5th Year of War", a lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)...VII 920 *TC-25 Non-aggression Treaty between Germany and USSR and announcement of 25 September 1939 relating to it. (GB 145)...VIII 375
*L-172 "The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the 5th Year of War", a lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)...VII 920 *TC-25 Non-aggression Treaty between Germany and USSR and announcement of 25 September 1939 relating to it. (GB 145)...VIII 375 Statement XIV Hungarian Relations with Germany Before and During the War by Nicholas Horthy, Jr., Nurnberg, 22 February 1946...VIII 756 Statement XV Why Hungary Went to War Against the Soviet Union by Nicholas Horthy, Jr., Nurnberg, 3 May 1946...VIII 767 13. COLLABORATION WITH ITALY AND JAPAN AND AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES: NOVEMBER 1936 TO DECEMBER 1941 In the course of two years, the swastika had been carried forward by force of arms from a tightly controlled and remilitarized Germany to the four corners of Europe. The conspirators then projected the Nazi plan upon a universal screen, involving the old World of Asia and the New World of the United States of America. As a result, the wars of aggression that were planned in Berlin and launched across the frontiers of Poland ended some six years later, almost to the day, in surrender ceremonies aboard a United States battleship riding at anchor in the Bay of Tokyo. A. Formal German-Japanese-Italian Alliances. The first formal alliance between Hitler's Germany and the Japanese Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin on 25 November 1936 (2508-PS). This agreement, on its face, was directed against the activities of the Communist International. It was subsequently adhered to by Italy on 6 November 1937 (2506-PS). It is an interesting fact-especially in light of the evidence to be presented regarding Ribbentrop's active participation in collaboration with the Japanese-that Ribbentrop signed the Anti-Comintern Pact for Germany, at Berlin, even though at that time, November 1936, Ribbentrop was not the German Foreign Minister, but simply Hitler's Special Ambassador Plenipotentiary. On 27 September 1940, some four years after the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed and one year after the initiation of war in Europe, the German, Italian, and Japanese Governments signed another pact at Berlin-a ten-year military-economic alliance (2643-PS). Again Ribbentrop signed for Germany, this time in
On 27 September 1940, some four years after the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed and one year after the initiation of war in Europe, the German, Italian, and Japanese Governments signed another pact at Berlin-a ten-year military-economic alliance (2643-PS). Again Ribbentrop signed for Germany, this time in his capacity as Foreign Minister: This tripartite Pact pledged Germany, Italy, and Japan to support of, and collaboration with each other in the establishment of a "new order" in Europe and East Asia. The agreement stated, in part: "The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it as a condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the world be given its own proper place. They have therefore decided to stand together and to cooperate with one another in their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to extend this cooperation to such nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to give to their endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that their aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan have agreed as follows: "Article 1: Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe. "Article 2: Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia. "Article 3: Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means, if one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." "Article 6: The present Pact shall come into force immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force." (2643-PS) The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold announcement to the world that
war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." "Article 6: The present Pact shall come into force immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force." (2643-PS) The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold announcement to the world that the leaders of Germany, Japan, and Italy had cemented a full military alliance to achieve world domination and to establish the "new order" presaged by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi overflow into Austria early in 1938. A statement by Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, is relevant in this connection. Mr. Hull declared: "The reported agreement of alliance does not, in the view of the Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation which has existed for several years. Announcement of the alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long existed in effect and to which this Government has repeatedly called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has been fully taken into account by the Government of United States in the determining of this country's policies." (2944-PS) No attempt is made here to trace the relationships and negotiations leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27 November 1940. Nevertheless, one example of the type of German-Japanese relationship existing before the formalization of the Tripartite Pact is noteworthy-the record of a conversation of 31 January 1939 between Himmler and General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. This record, which is signed by Himmler in crayon, reads: "File Memorandum "Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over the following subjects: "1. The Fuehrer speech, which pleased him very much, especially because it had been spiritually warranted in all its features. "2. We discussed conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the triangle Germany/Italy/Japan into an even firmer mold. He also told me that, together with German counter-espionage (Abwehr), he was undertaking long-range projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and
warranted in all its features. "2. We discussed conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the triangle Germany/Italy/Japan into an even firmer mold. He also told me that, together with German counter-espionage (Abwehr), he was undertaking long-range projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organization was to become effective only in case of war. "3. Furthermore he had succeeded up to now to send 10 Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional Russians, whom he had also sent across, had been shot at the frontier." (2195-PS) B. Nazi Encouragement of Aggression by Japan The Nazi conspirators, once their military and economic alliance with Japan had been formalized, exhorted the Japanese to aggression against those nations with whom they were at war and against those with whom they contemplated war. In this the Nazi conspirators pursued a course strikingly parallel to that followed in their relationship with the other member of the European Axis. On 10 Jun 1940, in fulfillment of her alliance with Germany, Italy had carried out her "stab in the back" by declaring war against France and Great Britain. The Nazi conspirators set about to induce similar action by Japan on the other side of the world. The nations against whom the German-Japanese collaboration was aimed, at various times, were the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America. (1) Exhortations to Attack the British Commonwealth. At least as early as 23 February 1941 the Nazi conspirators undertook to exploit their alliance with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the British Commonwealth. Again the figure of Ribbentrop appears. On that date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese open hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as possible. (1834-PS) As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation of the report of that conference, Ribbentrop on 2 March sent copies of an extract of the record of this conference to his various
which he urged that the Japanese open hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as possible. (1834-PS) As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation of the report of that conference, Ribbentrop on 2 March sent copies of an extract of the record of this conference to his various ambassadors and ministers for their "strictly confidential and purely personal information," with the further note that "these statements are of fundamental significance for orientation in the general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941." The report stated, in part: "Strictly secret "Extract "from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941." "After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM [Reich Foreign Minister] declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany's victory in the west these policies had been fully vindicated. He [the RAM] regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are together now. "* * * Now the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect? (1834-PS) Ribbentrop subsequently proceeded to shape the argument for Japanese intervention against the British. First outlining the intended air and U-boat warfare against England, he said: "* * * Thereby England's situation would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all on weather conditions." "The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English-American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production
above all on weather conditions." "The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English-American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to the English (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead. On order of the Fuehrer the antiaircraft defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on submarines, airplanes and antiaircraft guns. "Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won to-day militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the war quickly and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the cooperation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan in its own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England's key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick action: "1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.) The effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war. "2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America