dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. NELTE: Gisevius, after leaving, the Gestapo, claims to have received important information continuously-it should be pointed out that from 1933 to 1944 Nebe served in the RSHA, evidently to the satisfaction of his superiors Himmler, Heydrich, and Kaltenbrunner-otherwise he would not have stayed in office so long and would not have been promoted to the rank of Police General and SS Gruppenfuehrer. So while on the one hand for 11 years he carried out the duties of his office with the well-known methods of the Gestapo-which was under Himmler-and later the Kripo, Dr. Gisevius refers to him as his friend and staunch political associate. Now it might be assumed, perhaps, that in the position he held he was able to prevent disaster, possibly even to hold up execution of orders. Document USSR-413, just referred to, shows that Nebe did not do this. In the deposition by Wielen, forming part of the document, the horrible case of the 50 escaped R. A. F. fliers, in which General Nebe, the friend of Dr. Gisevius, was involved, is dealt with. Wielen states as follows in this connection: "One day during that time I received, about noon, an order by telegraph from General Nebe to proceed to Berlin immediately, to be entrusted with a confidential order. Arriving in Berlin on the evening of that day, I reported to General Nebe at his office, Wendischer Markt 5-7. I gave him a condensed report on the position of the matter at that time. He then showed me a teletype order signed by Kaltenbrunner, to the effect that, in conformity with the Fuehrer's explicit and personal order, more than half of the officers who escaped from Sagan were to be shot when recaptured. General Nebe himself seemed shocked at this order. He was deeply worried. I heard later that he did not go to bed that night, but spent the night on his sofa in his office. I myself was likewise shocked at this frightful step which was to be taken, and refused to carry it out.
DR. NELTE: I said it violated rules of war and undoubtedly was bound to result in reprisal measures against those of our own officers who were in English camps as prisoners of war, and that I flatly refused to take any responsibility in the matter. General Nebe declared that in this instance I would not be in any way responsible as the State Police was to act entirely independently, and that, after all, orders given by the Fuehrer had to be executed without protest. "Nebe furthermore added that naturally it was my duty to keep the matter in deepest secrecy, and that the reason for his showing me the original order was so that I would make no trouble for the State Police." Any comment seems superfluous. This is significant of Nebe's personality. The trustworthiness of a person is an inseparable part of his entire personality. Information obtained from a person who for more than a decade was able to play such an abominable double role can lay no claim to credibility. I believe that this analysis of the statements of the witness Dr. Gisevius and of the men belonging to the Gisevius group gives me the right to say that the charges made against the Defendant Keitel by the witness can be no suitable foundation for the argument of the Prosecution, namely, that the Defendant Keitel (1) formed a circle around Hitler; (2) had tremendous influence on the OKW and the Armed Forces; (3) did not submit reports on atrocities and crimes to Hitler; and (4) did not protect his subordinates, but even threatened them with the Gestapo. Rather is it true that the real position of Keitel, however important it may have seemed to outsiders, was neither decisive nor of importance either for the total sum of events or for the basic and important decisions of Hitler.
DR. NELTE: Justice can be done to the actual importance of this activity if one says that it was tremendous, because physically and spiritually it went beyond human strength; because it placed the defendant perpetually in a dilemma between his military point of view and the unbending will of Hitler to whom he was faithfully, far too faithfully, devoted. Physically it presented an almost insoluble problem, for it had no sharply defined, clear outline but called for the perpetual balancing of essential differences; the adjustment of personal sensitiveness; the "self-protection" against encroachments of the individual of flees among themselves or against the OKW; clever maneuvering when Hitler, in explosive reaction to disagreeable news, wished to issue extravagant orders; the settlement of all disagreeable matters which Hitler did not wish to attend to himself. It was a tremendously thankless task, which found only very slight compensation in the brilliant position in the immediate proximity to the head of the State, in the decorative participation in all events of what is called world history, in the representative discharge of the duties of a field marshal. Was Keitel a political general? The Defendant Keitel is accused of having taken part in, helped, and promoted the planning of, preparing of, and inciting to aggressive wars, and in so doing of violating international treaties and assurances. The defendant has testified in the witness box in this connection. Insofar as knowledge or having cognizance of the intention to attack is concerned, I shall come back to the subject in connection with another point. The facts as such have been set forth by the Defendant Keitel. As far as initiating and carrying out of strategic measures is concerned, defense counsel for General Jodl will deal with these questions. I would like to mention a single event which assumed historical importance, and a personal importance for the Defendant Keitel, during this Trial: the conversation between Hitler and Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938.
DR. NELTE: This was the sheet-lightning that might have revealed the coming of the storm to clearsighted people. Keitel, Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces for only a week, so far without any contact with big political events, did not perceive these signs of approaching stormy weather. Hitler, who after the sudden change of 4 February 38 had immediately gone to the Obersalzberg, called Keitel for the first time, without giving any explanation. Keitel came without knowing what Hitler wanted or what was to happen at the Obersalzberg. Only in the course of the day did he realize that his presence could have any connection with the presence of Schuschnigg and the discussion of the Austrian question. He did not participate in any of the conversations, especially with Schuschnigg or Dr. Schmidt, as is shown by the evidence. He realized, however, that his presence, together with that of Generals Von Reichenau and Sperrle, was to have some significance for the conversations with Schuschnigg; for as Hitler did not speak to him at all about military matters he was forced to the conclusion that the representatives of the High Command of the Armed Forces, the Army and the Air Force had been invited in order that their presence should indicate the power of the Armed Forces to Schuschnigg. The situation therefore was that Hitler intended to use the representatives of the Armed Forces as a means of pressure for the realization of his political plans, while the latter had no knowledge of this beforehand, but realized this intention only later on. This meeting at the Obersalzberg is now being used by the Prosecution as a basis for the accusation that Keitel was a political general. The Prosecution introduced the conversations of Hitler with Hacha and Tiso, at which the Defendant Keitel also was present, as a further symptomatic event to bear out this charge. 8 July 4B This evidence does not appear convincing if it is intended to prove that Keitel also actively participated in the political conversations.
DR. NELTE: When the Defendant Keitel took part in State visits and conversations with foreign statesmen, he did not participate in the conversations, although present. Hitler liked to have Keitel in his entourage as the representative of the Armed Forces. Thus, Keitel was present at Godesberg when Prime Minister Chamberlain went there, also at Munich on 30 September 1938, and at the visit of Molotov in November 1940. He was also present at the meetings of Hitler with Marshal Petain, General Franco, King Boris, Regent Von Horthy, and Mussolini. This function of Keitel is, however, insufficient to make the defendant a general who must have taken a decisive part in the shaping of political events. How little this assertion is justified is seen from the fact testified to by Admiral Burckner that Keitel was extremely careful not to encroach on the affairs of the Foreign Office and gave his officers orders not to engage in matters referring to foreign policy. In domestic politics the exclusion of the Chief of the OKW resulted from the removal of-the Reich War Minister, already dealt with, and the thereby intended and achieved elimination of political representation of the Armed Forces in the Cabinet. It is obvious, and has also already been pointed out, that the position of the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW involved, and in time of war to an increased extent, his coming into some kind of contact with all the ministries and highest offices, and dealing with them as the representative of the OKW, that is to say, of Hitler. That did not make Keitel a politician, that is to say, a man who took part in an advisory capacity in the determination of the Government's aims, and had an influence on them. In his high office he naturally worked to carry out these aims and bears a responsibility to that extent, but not as a political general. Mr. President, I am now beginning a long chapter. Do you want me to start with it?
THE PRESIDENT: Go on reading then until 5 o'clock.
DR. NELTE: The idea of war against Russia was rejected by Keitel. This found visible expression in the memorandum which Field Marshal Keitel drew up, discussed with Von Ribbentrop, and handed over to Hitler. According to his sworn statements the reasons were: (a) military considerations; (b) the Nonaggression Pact with the Soviet Union dated 23 August 1939. In spite of being personally presented, the memorandum had no success. Hitler, as usual in questions of strategic nature, rejected Keitel's point of view as unconvincing. In this connection, and owing to Hitler's curt rejection, Keitel asked for release and transfer to the front. This is the case which Reich Marshal Goering confirmed in his interrogation. Hitler refused, sharply criticizing the habit of generals asking to be released or tendering their resignation whenever he did not approve their opinions or suggestions. That was decisive for Keitel: he remained at his post, did his duty, and fulfilled his obligations in carrying out the tasks incumbent upon him within the framework of further preparations. Here, too, in keeping with his conception of duty, Keitel did not make known to the outside world his basically negative attitude toward the war with Russia, after Hitler had made his decision. This case is in several respects typical of Keitel and of the way he is judged by others. We know-and it has been proved by the evidence-that other generals were also opposed to war with the Soviet Union. Their objections, too, were waived or rejected by Hitler. They, too, accepted the decision of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, continued to do their duty and carried out the orders given to them. But there was one basic difference: these other generals went back to their headquarters after the discussion. There, in their own circle of officers they spoke about the decision made by Hitler. Of course it was disputed, yet they acted in accordance with it.
DR. NELTE: Since Field Marshal Keitel, due to his military conception, as already depicted, did not make known to the generals, when they appeared in the Fuehrer's headquarters for discussions, what his own attitude was, which was also at variance, the impression was bound to arise that Field Marshal Keitel completely agreed with Hitler and did not support the scruples of the Armed Forces' branches.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I think you might stop there. [The Tribunal adjourned until 9 July 1946 at 1000  hours.]
MARSHAL (Lieutenant Colonel James R. Clifford): May it please the Tribunal, the Defendants Hess and Fritzsche are absent.
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): I have an order to read. The Tribunal orders: 1. Applications for witnesses for organizations to be heard by the Tribunal in open court in accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Tribunal's order of 13 March 1946 should be made to the General Secretary as soon as possible, and in any case not later than 20 July. 2. The Tribunal believes that so much evidence has already been taken, and so wide a field has been covered, that only a very few witnesses need be called for each organization. That is all. DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel3: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, yesterday I dealt with the problem of Keitel and the Russian campaign. Now I recall to you what Keitel said in the witness box concerning the so-called ideological orders: "I knew their content. In spite of my personal misgivings I passed them on without letting myself be deterred by the possibility of serious consequences." I wanted to point that out in order to make what I have to say now comprehensible, above all, in its extent. In the course of time the opinion arose and was disseminated throughout the Army, that Field Marshal Keitel was a "yes man," a tool of Hitler's and that he was betraying the interests of the Armed Forces. These generals did not see, nor were they interested in the fact that this man was fighting a constant battle, day after day, in every possible field, with Hitler and the forces which were influencing him on all sides. The effects of this distorted picture shown here in detail, which definitely did not apply to Keitel, especially not in the sphere of strategic operations, planning, and execution, made themselves still felt even in this Trial; perhaps not without the fault of the Defendant Keitel himself. As to the justification of his conception of duty there can in principle be no argument. It has also been confirmed here by the witness Admiral Schulte-Mönting for the Defendant Grossadmiral Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): There can be no doubt that the rest of the admirals and generals were in principle of the same point of view, that it is impossible in military spheres to criticize before subordinates the decision of a superior as expressed in an order, even if one has misgivings about the order. One may say that every principle, every basic rule must be interpreted and applied in a reasonable way, that every exaggeration of a good principle detracts from it. In the case of Keitel this objection affects the problem of his responsibility and guilt. Does nonrecognition of the point where a principle, correct in itself, is being carried to excess and thus endangers the object for the protection of which it has been established, constitute guilt? In the case of Keitel we must consider this crucial question from the point of view of a soldier. The thoughts and ideas which the Defendant Keitel had in this connection were the following: It is incontestable that the principle of obedience is necessary for every army; one might say that obedience-in civilian life a virtue and therefore more or less unstable in its application- must be the essential element of a soldier's character, because without this principle of obedience the aim which is to be accomplished by the army could not be achieved. This aim-the security of the country, the protection of the people, the maintenance of the most precious national possessions-is so sacred that the importance of the principle of obedience cannot be valued highly enough. Hence, the duty of those called upon to preserve that national institution, the Armed Forces, in the sense of its higher task, is to emphasize the importance of obedience. But what the general demands of the soldier, because it is indispensable, must hold good for himself too. This also applies to the principle of obedience. It would be dangerous to weaken an order, still less an essential principle, by mentioning exaggerations and taking them into consideration at the outset.
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): That would leave the principle of decision to the individual, that is, to his judgment. There may be cases where the decision depends, or must be made dependent, on actual circumstances. In theory, that would lead to a devaluation or even to an abrogation of the principle. In order to forestall this danger and to eliminate any doubt as to its absolute importance, the principle of obedience has been changed in military life into one of "absolute obedience," and embodied in the oath of allegiance. This is equally valid for the general as for the common soldier. The Defendant Keitel not only grew up in this school of thought, but during the 37 years of his military service, up to 1938, including the first World War, he had become convinced that this principle of obedience is the strongest pillar upon which the Armed Forces, and thereby the security of the country, rests. Deeply imbued with the importance of his profession, he had served the Kaiser, Ebert, and Von Hindenburg in accordance with this principle. As representatives of the State, they had to a certain extent an impersonal and symbolic effect on Keitel; Hitler, from 1934, at first appeared in the same light to him, that is, merely as representing the State, without any personal connection, in spite of the fact that his name was mentioned in the oath of allegiance. In 1938 Keitel as Chief of the OKW came into the immediate circle and the personal sphere of Hitler. It appears important for further explanation and in assessing the personality of Keitel to bear in mind that Keitel, as the result of his highly-developed soldierly conception of duty described above, and the pronounced feeling of soldierly obedience, was now exposed to the direct effects of Hitler's personality.
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): I am inclined to assume that, Hitler had clearly realized, in the preliminary discussions with Keitel which led to the Fuehrer Order of 4 February 1938, that Keitel was the type of person he was including in his calculations: A man upon whom he could rely as a soldier at any time; who was devoted to him with sincere soldierly loyalty; whose bearing fitted him to be a worthy representative for the Armed Forces in his sphere; and who in the opinion of his superiors was an extraordinarily able organizer as shown by the report of Field Marshal Von Blomberg. Keitel himself has admitted that he sincerely admired Hitler, and that the latter subsequently attained a strong influence over him and brought him completely under his spell. This must be borne in mind if we wish to understand how Keitel could have made out and transmitted orders from Hitler which were irreconcilable with the traditional conceptions of a German officer, such as, for instance, orders C-50, 447-PS, et cetera, submitted by the Soviet Russian Prosecution. By exploiting the willingness to fight for Germany, which might be taken for granted in the case of every German general, Hitler was able to camouflage his party political aims with the pretext of defending the national interests and to present the impending struggle with the Soviet Union as a dispute which must inevitably be settled-even as a war of defense, the necessity for which was made clear by definite information which had been received and on which depended the existence of Germany. In this way Hitler broached the fateful question. General Jodl has testified here to the fact that, as an officer of long standing, Keitel's conscience pricked him nevertheless; and that he repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, raised objections and suggested alternatives to the orders drafted.
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): During his cross-examination by the representative of the American Prosecution, the Defendant Keitel has openly declared that he was aware of the illegal nature of these orders, but that he believed that he could not refuse to obey the orders of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and head of the State, whose final pronouncement in the case of all objections was: "I do not know why you are worrying; after all, it is not your responsibility. I myself am solely responsible to the German people." This is a reasoned analysis of Keitel's attitude toward the so-called ideologically-based orders of Hitler. Keitel's last hope, which in many cases proved to be justified, was that the commanders-in-chief and subordinate commanders of the Armed Forces would at their discretion and within the scope of their responsibility either fail altogether to apply these harsh, inhuman orders, or would apply them only to a limited degree. In view of his position, Keitel had only the choice between military disobedience by refusing to transmit the orders, or complying with the instructions to forward them. I shall investigate in another connection the question of what alternative cases of action might have been open to him. The problem here is to show how Keitel came to forward orders which indisputably violated the laws of warfare and humanity and why, by reason of his duty to obey, his sworn loyalty to the Supreme Commander, and the fact that he saw in the order of the head of the State the absolution of his own responsibility, he failed to recognize the point at which even the soldier's strict duty of obedience must end. Every soldier who has appeared here as a defendant or as a witness has mentioned the duty of allegiance.
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): All of them, when they sooner or later realized that Hitler had drawn them and the Armed Forces into his egocentric gamble for the highest stakes, have considered their oath of allegiance as rendered to their country and have believed that they must continue to do their duty in circumstances which to us and even to themselves, when they realized the extent of resulting disaster, appear inconceivable. Not only soldiers such as Raeder, Dönitz, and Jodl, but Paulus as well, kept their positions and remained at their posts, and we have heard the same from other defendants. The statements of the Defendants Speer and Jodl in this connection were deeply moving. The question of whether these facts relieve the Defendant Keitel of guilty responsibility requires investigation. Keitel does not deny that he bears a heavy moral responsibility. He realizes that no one who played even the smallest part in this terrible drama can feel himself devoid of the moral guilt in which he was entangled. If I nevertheless emphasize the legal point of view, I am doing so because Justice Jackson, in his speech on behalf of the Prosecution, expressly referred to the law as being the basis of your verdict-to international law, the law of individual states, and the law which the victorious powers have embodied in the Charter. I assume that the Defendant Keitel has recognized that some of Hitler's orders violated international law. The Charter says that a soldier cannot clear himself by referring to orders given by his superiors or by his government. At the beginning of my argument I asked you to determine whether, independently of the terms of the Charter, the principle is unimpeachable that the standard determining right or wrong cannot but depend on a national concept.