dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, take the next, Number III: "Planned armament works tolerated by the Reichskabinet, but behind the back of the legislative bodies." The legislative bodies would be the Reichstag and the Reichsrat, would they not?
RAEDER: Yes. But I already said recently that it was not the military commander-in-chief's business to negotiate these matters with the Reichstag This was a matter for the Government. Herr Severing will also testify to that. SIR DAVIE) MAXWELL-FYFE: We will hear Herr Severing when he comes. At the moment I want you to tell the Tribunal this . . .
RAEDER: [Interposing.] I say the same...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just wait a minute; you have not heard my question yet. What did you say to Captain Schuessler? Did you tell him you are giving an entirely false picture in suggesting that the Navy had anything to do with going behind the back of the Reichstag? Did you make any effort to correct what Captain Schuessler was saying?
RAEDER: No, I did not correct his book. I had no time for that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just before we come to Number IV, if you just look, it's page- My Lord, it is Page 32 of the English book, and Page 186 of your book. This is part of Captain Schuessler's description of Section II dealing with economic rearmament; it comes under the heading, "Difficult Working Conditions." [Turning to the defendant.] Do you see that? It begins: "There were often difficult working conditions." Do you see that? The heading is "Difficult Working Conditions."
RAEDER: Yes I see, "Difficult Working Conditions."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to look at the last part of it. Now, I want it quite clear, Defendant. This is dealing with the period from 1923 to 1927, before you were head of the Navy; so I want to ask you about it. "There were often many external difficulties besides these for the Tebeg-the camouflaging of the task and the work, the distance separating them, the impossibility of settling any questions even of minor importance by telephone, and the necessity of avoiding if possible any written correspondence, and of carrying it out in any case as private correspondence with false names and disguised expressions." Did you not know that that was the method by which it was being carried on?
RAEDER: No; I really knew very little about the Tebeg-the Tebeg, the Davis-any of these things. But I think it was quite right for these people to work like that, because at that time the attitude of a large percentage of the German people was unreliable, and there was great danger if these things leaked out. In any case, the Tebeg had been dissolved when I arrived. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Now, would you kindly turn back to Page 126, in Book 4, Page 28 of the English book, and just look at Captain Schuessler's description of the fourth period: "Armament under the direction of the Reich Government in camouflaged form (from 1933 to 1935 when we were free to recruit on an unrestricted basis.)" Do you agree that Captain Schuessler was giving an accurate description of your methods from 1933 to 1935?
RAEDER: How does he describe it? Where is that passage?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Number 4.
RAEDER: "Armament under the leadership of the Reich Government in camouflaged form"?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that it is a correct description of your activities from 1933 to 1935?
RAEDER: Of course. I did that on orders from the head of the State; and before all the head of the State was very anxious to see that no exaggerated measures should be taken, so that it would not interfere in any way with his plans for making an agreement with Great Britain. He allowed very little to be done with regard to the Navy. He could at once have built eight armored ships, so many destroyers, and so many torpedo boats, none of which had yet been built, but he did none of these things because he said, "We do not want to create the impression that we are arming on a large scale." He approved only two...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have explained that; so note, Defendant, the point is this-the "camouflaged form" when you were negotiating the naval agreement. You did not want anyone to know what steps you had taken contrary to the treaty and how far you had gone. That is the plain fact of it-you wanted to get the naval agreement without disclosing what you had done isn't that so?
RAEDER: No, that distorts the sense of what I said. We did not want the announcement of these measures to cause strained relations between Germany and Britain. The measures as such were completely justifiable and were extremely minor.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will come to that in a moment. I only do want, before we leave these naval works, to ask you one question about another book. You know that Oberst Scherff projected a history of the German Navy. I don't want any misunderstanding about it. As I understand the position, you permitted Oberst Scherff to have recourse to the archives of the Navy but beyond that you hadn't seen anything of his work, isn't that right?
RAEDER: I did not see his book at all. I saw the table of contents here the first time I was interrogated. I did not give him the order, either; he received it from the Fuehrer; and for that reason I allowed the Chief of the Navy Archives to assist him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is exactly what I put to you. I want you to turn to Book 10a. It starts at Page 1 in the English version and also Page 1 in the German. And if you would look at Page 3 you will find the proposed table of contents of Oberst Scherff's book, Page 3 in the English version. I think it must be about Page 3 in the German version, too. Now would you look at the heading of Section 2. It is: "Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State." And then he describes, "(a) National Socialism in the Navy before 1933"...
RAEDER: Where is that? I have not found it yet.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Section 2 of the table of contents.
RAEDER: No, that must be something quite different. I have not got it here... I have got it now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Section 2, which is: "Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State." And you can see the proposed headings which were to cover some 30 pages: "National Socialism in the Navy before 1933." Then: "The oath of the Navy to the Fuehrer; the taking over of the National Insignia; the first alteration of the flag and the New War flag." Do you agree with Oberst Scherff's description? You agree that this is a correct description, that the proceedings could be described as the incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State?
RAEDER: Of course-I explained that here recently-the Navy- the Armed Forces-had to have some connection with the National Socialist State. A democratic Navy in a monarchy is impossible. The basic principles must agree. But I myself decided the extent to which these principles were adopted-that is to the degree where the Navy maintained its internal independence and yet occupied its appropriate position with regard to the National Socialist State. Apart from that, I do not see any text here; I can only see the headings.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that doesn't offend you as a description. That is all I wanted to get clear. I do not want to spend a great deal of time.
RAEDER: But the headings mean nothing. For instance, it might say in the actual text that the Navy did not fit into the National Socialist State properly. I do not know. The same holds good of the fleet. Of course...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to waste time on it. There were three matters which you dealt with in your examination-in-chief, and I am not going to deal with them in detail; but I just want to remind you of them and put one general question. You can put that document away; I am not going to pursue it further. Would you mind putting that document away and giving me your attention for the next question? You were asked about the E-boats, your survey list, that long document, in September 1933, and the question of disguised auxiliary cruisers as transport ships O. Is this a fair summary of your answer: That you admitted that these breaches of the Treaty took place, but said in each case that the breach was only a little one. Is that a fair summary of your answer? Is it?
RAEDER: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let's take it in bits, then. Are you disputing that any of these matters with regard to the E-boats, the matters on the survey lists or the transport ships O-are you disputing that any of these matters took place? I understood, you admitted they all did take place...
RAEDER: No, they took place in the way I described. For instance, these auxiliary cruisers were not built. We were not allowed to do that. But we were allowed to make plans and we were allowed to select those ships which, in the event of war-if a war had broken out in which Germany was attacked by another state-could have been used as auxiliary cruisers. That was not a violation. If it were I would admit it. The U-boat designing office in Holland was not a violation of the Versailles Treaty either. The wording was quite different; I do not remember the third case which you mentioned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember there was a long list in a document, from yourself.
RAEDER: Yes, of course.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I understood, maybe wrongly, that you admitted these things took place, but you said "it is only a little one."
RAEDER: Yes, of course. Those were small things, but they were urgently necessary in Germany's defense interests. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Now, I want to ask you about an officer of yours, Vice Admiral Assmann. Was he an officer in whom you had confidence?
RAEDER: He was a very able historian.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you answer my question? Was he an officer in whom you had confidence?
RAEDER: I had confidence that he would write history correctly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all I wanted. Now, would you have a look at a new document, which is Document Number D-854, which, My Lord, will be Exhibit Number GB-460. Now, that is an extract from one of a series of essays on the operational and tactical considerations of the German Navy and consequent measures taken for its expansion between 1919 and 1939, contained among the files of Vice Admirals Assmann and Gladisch, who were in the historical section of the German Admiralty. Now, would you mind not looking at it for a moment, Defendant? I want to ask you some questions and then you can look at it with pleasure afterwards. Do you agree that in nearly all spheres of armament where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit? Do you agree with that?
RAEDER: No, by no means in every sphere. In the most important sphere we were far behind the Versailles Treaty, as I explained to you very clearly. Possibly we infringed on it the other way round, by not doing as much as we could have done.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you just look at this document. At the beginning of the first quotation your officers say: "But if-as was stated-in nearly all spheres of armament where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit-or at least its violation was prepared-a long time before the 16th of March 1935..." Are your admirals wrong in stating that? Is that what you are telling the Tribunal?
RAEDER: May I please see which page this is on? I have not seen it yet. Yes, he says, "in nearly all spheres of naval armament . . ." That is not the case, for in the sphere of...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That's what I put to you; is that right?
RAEDER: No, it is not right. We had not even built as many ships as we could have built, but-as I have explained repeatedly, the violations were concerned with...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You've explained that.
RAEDER: ... violations were...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, we do know the position of your shipbuilding yards. You've given that explanation and it's a matter of discussion whether it's of any value. I am not going to argue with you. I am asking you this question: Are you saying that the admirals of your historical section are wrong in that sentence that I read out to you?
RAEDER: Yes, I am stating that. It is wrong as it stands. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE I see. Well, now let's pass on- the Tribunal will judge that-to the statement of Admiral Assmann. It goes on: "This probably took place in no other sphere, on the one hand so early, and on the other hand under such difficult circumstances, as in the construction of a new submarine arm. The Treaty of Versailles had only been in force a few months (since 10 January 1920) when it was already violated in this point." Do you agree with Admiral Assmann on that?
RAEDER: No, he is wrong. It was not violated at all in this point, and the reason it started so early was because all the ex-U-boat commanders and U-boat officers and technicians were out of a job and offered their services to maintain technical developments in U-boats abroad; that is why it was so early. But that has nothing to do with me because I had no say in these matters then. At that time I was working on the Navy Archives.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, how are you able to be so confident today that Admiral Assmann is wrong? I thought you said that he was a good historian. He had not to go back very far. He only goes back 20 years.
RAEDER: A good historian can make mistakes too if his information is wrong. I merely said I had confidence in him...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say quite in detail-the first paragraph is about Japan.
RAEDER: Yes; what he says about the building of U-boats is wrong.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let's just see how far he was wrong. We needn't go into the first paragraph which deals with shipbuilding for Japan, but take the second one: "In 1922..." Do you see the paragraph which begins: "As early as 1922, three German shipbuilding yards established a German U-boat designing office in Holland under a Dutch cover name with about 30 engineers and designers. In 1925 a Dutch shipbuilding yard built two 500-ton U-boats for Turkey according to the plans of this bureau, which enjoyed the financial and personal support of the Naval Command. In the solution of this question, too, Kapitaen zur See Lohmann was concerned decisively." Is that right?
RAEDER: We have admitted that. That was in no way a violation of the Versailles Treaty.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We'll not argue that, but it's right anyway. Admiral Assmann's right about that. Then he deals with Finland and with Spain. And, if you look at the end of the paragraph after dealing with Spain, he says: "Already in the autumn of 1927 the Naval Designing Department was commissioned to carry out construction in Spain by the Chief of the Naval Command Staff, Admiral Zenker, who accepted the responsibility despite all the difficulties in the field of home politics. The working out of the project and the drawing up of the construction plans took place in the Dutch Bureau. After completion in 1931, the ship carried out trial runs and diving exercises from Cadiz to Cartagena, under German direction and with German personnel, consisting of officers, engineers, naval construction students and foremen." That's all. That's quite right, isn't it?
RAEDER: Yes, but the shipbuilding designer from our designing office, in particular, as well as the above-named other persons employed on U-boat construction, were discharged from the Navy
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And just look at the last sentence: "This boat which is now the Turkish submarine Guer became the prototype for the U-25 and U-26."
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the 250-ton submarines which were made in Finland. And, if you look at the last sentence of the next paragraph: "The Finnish U-boat was the first U-boat plan to be worked out in Germany and successfully carried out; the Dutch bureau was called upon only to work out the details. "The Finnish 250-ton vessel became the prototype for U-1 to U-24."
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And now the next paragraph: "The building and the thorough trial of the prototype vessel made if; possible to obtain the parts for U-1 to U-24 in 1933 to 1935, long before the order for the assembly of the vessels; and the latter was prepared beforehand as far as was possible without endangering secrecy."
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you turn on to Page 156. You see where the next quotation is from: "At the beginning of 1935"-that is 6 months before the Anglo-German Treaty-"there were probably six 250-ton boats ready for assembly, six 275-ton and two 750-ton boats on which preparatory work was being done. About 4 months were needed for assembling the small ships and about 10 months for the big ones, dating from 1 February 1935, but everything else was still quite uncertain." Now, look at the next words: "It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty. "Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to 1938. In reality 118 were completed and under construction. "The preparations for the new U-boat arm were made so early, so thoroughly and so carefully, that already 11 days after the conclusion of the German-British Naval Treaty, which permitted the construction of U-boats, the first German U-boat could be put into commission on 29 June 1935." Now, take that sentence, which is written by Admiral Assmann, and we've seen what your connections with Assmann were through about 100 documents. He said: "It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty." Now, you've told this Tribunal for about several hours of your evidence that that was a freely negotiated treaty of which you were very proud and which you were ready to support. Are you telling the Tribunal, that your admirals are wrong in saying that in submarine construction Germany adhered the least to the restrictions of that freely negotiated treaty?
RAEDER: That is a completely false judgment. I have stated here that, as long as no negotiations with Great Britain had taken place with regard to the pending agreement, all the preparations which we did make were exclusively attended to abroad-that in the proportion which probably...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you can make your explanation . . .
RAEDER: Will you please stop interrupting me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We'll take it in this order, and don't get cross about it. You answer my question, and then you make your explanation. Now answer my question first. Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong in saying in that first sentence that it was just in the "sphere of submarine construction that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty." Is Admiral Assmann wrong when he says that, is that what you're telling the Tribunal? Well, that is my question.
RAEDER: He is wrong. I said so; I have already said so.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe these are not questions relating to facts. They are questions for legal decisions. It is a legal argument as to just how Article 191 of the Versailles Treaty is to be interpreted.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the question is quite proper. In his explanation, of course, he can explain that in his view it was not a breach of the Treaty and he has already explained that. He can give us his opinion about it. He was the head of the German Navy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, will you take the second sentence...
RAEDER: But I should like to finish if I may. I can give an explanation of that. All these things were only preparations made outside Germany. The point under discussion is whether the Finnish U-boats were constructed with the help of German designers. That is true. German designers were not forbidden to help Finnish designers to draft designs for U-boats. It is also true that this U-boat later...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I'm awfully sorry to interrupt you, but you know this isn't dealing-this sentence isn't dealing with this early period. This is dealing with the period after the Anglo-German Treaty in 1935 and that's what I want you to answer me about. This Finnish matter was long before that.
RAEDER: I am still speaking of the period preceding the agreement, for I was accused of manufacturing U-boat parts abroad. And the fact is that...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I know, but don't you see that...
RAEDER: I have not given my answer yet. No...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you about that. I like you to answer the right question. I'm not asking you about the question of Versailles any longer. I'm asking you about Admiral Assmann's assertion that you did not adhere to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty in 1935, and what you did in Finland in the 20's has nothing to do with that. Now, that's all. You can give your explanation.
RAEDER: That is entirely wrong We particularly restricted ourselves with regard to the construction of U-boats; and in 1938 we had still not built the 45 percent which we were entitled to build, so we made an application for permission to build up to 100 percent; and this was agreed on, and came into effect, as appears from the text of the English treaty, after a friendly discussion with the British Admiralty at the end of 1938. At the beginning of the war we still did not have 100 percent. We were always behind with the construction of submarines. Admiral Assmann, who probably had no up-to-date knowledge of these matters, is quite wrong. I can swear to that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the next sentences. This is dealing...
RAEDER: What page are you speaking of?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 156. I will read it very slowly again: "Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to 1938. In reality 118 were completed and under construction." Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong when he states that?
RAEDER: I am awfully sorry; I still have not got the passage from which you are reading, that is quite-which line...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got the sentence, Defendant?
RAEDER: Yes, I have found it now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you see what Admiral Assmann says, that: "Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to 1938." That is before there was any mention of going from 45 to 100. "In reality 118 were completed and under construction." Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong in giving these figures?
RAEDER: Certainly. In 1939 we entered the war with 40 submarines-I do not know the exact number. This is either a misprint or quite an incredible figure. As you know, we started the war with-I think-26 U-boats capable of sailing the Atlantic, and in addition a number of smaller boats. I cannot tell you for certain now what was under construction at the beginning of the war but there was no intention of this kind. That was precisely the accusation made against me-that I did not have   sufficient U-boats built in good time. I dispute the whole of that sentence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree then, Defendant, that Admiral Assmann's figures are quite incompatible with what you have told the Tribunal about the number of U-boats with which you started the war?
RAEDER: Yes.