dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. EXNER: Then comes Document AJ-16, which I submit herewith. "Special directives for the administration and pacification of the occupied areas of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg." This is Page 161, Volume II of my document book. I will quote only from Page 162 in order to save time. I will read perhaps the last sentence: "International law must be strictly observed in every case." But I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the other regulations. In this connection I should like to mention Document 440-PS, Exhibit GB-107, in my Document Book 2, Page 164-Directive Number 8 regarding the conduct of war, dated 20 November 1439. It says in respect to the tasks of the Air Force-I will read the last paragraph: "Localities, especially large open cities, and industries are not to be attacked without a compelling military reason, neither in the Dutch nor in the Belgian-Luxembourg areas.-Signed Keitel." Did you also draft that?
JODL: I drafted that order.
DR. EXNER: Then we might refer to the regulations for fighting partisans, a matter which has been discussed here also.
JODL: And I should like to refer to something I believe I have stated already, that I ordered an immediate investigation of the Malmedy incident.
DR. EXNER: Did you constantly bear in mind the aspects of international law where your orders were concerned?
JODL: I believe I have already stated that. I studied international law very carefully in its bearing on my orders. I do not wish to detain the Court with the knowledge I gathered from these regulations, for it is only incomplete, but I should like to conclude by saying that owing to the fact that there were no regulations governing air warfare, deplorable confusion in definition arose for instance between rebellion and legal war force; between franc tireur , bandit, and scout; between spy and scout; demolition crews and saboteurs. Any time with the help of aircraft a rebellion might be converted into a legal war; and a legal war, on the other hand, might become a state of rebellion. That is the effect that parachute troops and the furnishing of supplies by air have had on international law.
DR. EXNER: In this connection, I should like to submit the affidavit of Lehmann, Exhibit AJ-10 (Document Number Jodl-63). This document has not been submitted to the Court because it was only yesterday that the Prosecution declared itself in agreement with the use of this affidavit. I believe it is the affidavit of the Judge Advocate General, Dr. Lehmann. If the Tribunal will declare this affidavit admissible, I can perhaps merely refer to it...
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
DR. EXNER: I submit it herewith but it has not been translated yet, as we received permission for it only yesterday in Court.
MR. ROBERTS: As Sir David said yesterday there is no objection to the affidavit, although there was no actual order granting the affidavit of Lehmann. My Lord, it is very short, especially the copy I had, and I think there is no reason to object to it.
DR. EXNER: Then, in order to save time, I shall just refer to it; and I beg the Tribunal to read these statements of Dr; Lehmann. They seem to me to be significant, as after all it is the highest jurist in the German Wehrmacht, Judge Advocate General Lehmann, who is giving information here.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better give it an exhibit number.
DR. EXNER: Yes, AJ-10 was the exhibit number I gave it, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. EXNER: This gentleman mentions legal discussions, which he had occasion to carry on with Jodl, and he gives us Jodl's attitude toward legal questions. And now, General, in connection with crimes against the laws of war there is one last question which comes to our attention. Numerous entries in the war diary, orders, et cetera, are the subject of serious charges against you. Did you have the possibility, before you were captured, of destroying all this material?
JODL: Yes, between 3 May and 23 May I had time and leisure to burn every piece of paper, but I gave instructions to my staff not to destroy a single file, for I felt I had nothing to conceal. I handed the complete files, and above all the especially important ones, all the original Fuehrer directives since 1940, to the American officer when I was captured.
DR. EXNER: And now I shall turn to the alleged Crimes against Peace. First of all we have to make it clear what posts you held during this critical period. Tell us, please, what posts you held from 1933.
JODL: From 1932 to 1935 I was in the division which was later called the Operations Division of the Army. From the middle of 1935 until October 1938 I was Chief of the Department for National Defense in the Wehrmachtsamt, which was later called the OKW.
DR. EXNER: That means the Wehrmachtsamt was actually the OKW?
JODL: Yes, later on. From October 1938 until shortly before the Polish campaign I was artillery commander at Vienna and at Brunn, in Moravia; and from 27 October 1939...
DR. EXNER: Just a moment please. 27 September?
JODL: No-August, rather. On 27 August 1939 I took over the office and the tasks of Chief of the General Staff.
DR. EXNER: Now, let us take that period. Did you concern yourself with war plans in the years 1932-35 when you were in the so-called Truppenamt?
JODL: At that time there were no preparations in the Operations Division, except for combat directives for the improvised Grenzschutz 0st (frontier guard East). This was a militia-like organization, and preparations were made to evacuate the whole German border in case of enemy occupation. That was all.
DR. EXNER: Had you anything to do with the proclamation of general conscription?
JODL: No, I had nothing to do with that. I believe I heard about it the day before.
DR. EXNER: What were your duties as chief of the Department for National Defense from June 1935 to October 1938?
JODL: In this position I had to work out the operational strategic directives according to the instructions of my chiefs, Keitel and Blomberg. I had to study and to clarify the problem of the leadership of the Wehrmacht; to prepare studies and exercises for the big Wehrmacht maneuvers in 1937. I had to supervise the Wehrmacht Academy; I had to work out drafts for laws in connection with the general conscription order and with the unified preparation for mobilization in the civilian sector, that is, of state and people. The so-called Secretariat of the Reich Defense Committee came under me.
DR. EXNER: Tell us, please, what were you at that time? What was your military rank?
JODL: I acquired that position while I was lieutenant colonel; and in 1936-I believe-I became a colonel.
DR. EXNER: Did you take any part in the Reich Defense Law?
JODL: No, that law originated before I entered my office in the Wehrmachtsamt.
DR. EXNER: But the Prosecution is accusing you of participation in it on the grounds of a supplement which you made to the Document 2261-PS, Exhibit USA-24, which is to be found in Volume I, Page 9. In this document it says, "Attached a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935. . ." The signature is Blomberg's and it is dated 24 June. Then comes a supplementary paragraph: "Berlin, 3 September 1935. To the Defense Economic Group la, copy transmitted, Signed Jodl" What can you tell us about that?
JODL: Indisputably that is a valid Reich law of which I had to transmit a copy to one of the other offices. I need not say more than that.
DR. EXNER: You yourself did not participate in the drawing up of the law itself?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Council?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Committee?
JODL: I was that automatically from the moment I took over the direction of the National Defense Department. At the tenth session of this meeting of experts, on 26 June 1935, General Von Reichenau designated me as his deputy.
DR. EXNER: What was the purpose of this committee? This has already been discussed, I believe, so please be as brief as possible.
JODL: In a few words: With this committee a unified mobilization, not of the Army, but the mobilization of the State and people, corresponding to military mobilization, was prepared. These plans were laid down in the mobilization books giving final figures and various stages of tension.
DR. EXNER: What were these various stages of tension?
JODL: We had learned about this from France and had adopted it. The French had a system by which mobilization was carried out in five stages according to the degree of tension existing.
THE PRESIDENT: Do we need the detail about this? Is it not sufficient to say it was copied from France?
DR. EXNER: Very welt [Turning to the defendant.! Perhaps you can tell us what this meant; why we adopted this system of stages of tension? What was the reason?
JODL: The purpose was to have some means at our disposal-as was customary all over Europe at that time-that would achieve an intensified readiness for war before the public order for mobilization was issued.
DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with armament?
JODL: No. It did not concern itself with armament at all.
DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with political plans or intentions?
JODL: It had nothing to do in any way with political problems.
DR. EXNER: But how about war?
JODL: It was concerned only with mobilization.
DR. EXNER: That means, a certain particular war . . .
JODL: Mobilization is a necessity for every possible war.
DR. EXNER: In this committee you concerned yourself with mobilization books. Is that correct?
JODL: Yes. I believe I have already explained that. In these books the details of all the chief Reich authorities were set down and indexed according to degrees of tension.
DR. EXNER: What do you mean by chief Reich authorities?
JODL: I mean all the ministries.
DR. EXNER: You mean the civil authorities?
JODL: Yes, the civil authorities. And the preparations made by them had to be brought into line with the preparations by the military.
DR. EXNER: What were the preparations in the demilitarized zone?
JODL: The preparations in the demilitarized zones were connected solely with evacuation, that is the surrendering of the areas west of the Rhine in case of a French occupation.
DR. EXNER: I believe we have discussed that at length already, and in this connection I should like to refer to Document EC-405, Exhibit GB-160, Page 11 of my document book, the first volume, where the tenth session is mentioned. You are accused of having decreed the utmost secrecy concerning all these preparations, which, according to your description, were of a purely defensive nature. Why all this secrecy?
JODL: Keeping measures of this kind secret is taken for granted all over the world. For us in Germany it was especially important, as for years the civil authorities had no longer been accustomed to concern themselves with military matters, and it seemed to me of particular importance that in foreign countries no misunderstanding should arise by, let us say, the capture of an order of this nature-a very characteristic misunderstanding such as occurred in these proceedings in connection with the "Freimachung" of the Rhine.
DR. EXNER: And why did you decree secrecy? So that foreign countries would not be disquieted?
JODL: At that time we were even weaker than during the period when we had an army of only 100,000 men. This army of 100,000 men had been broken up into hundreds of small groups. It was the time of our very greatest impotence, and at that period we had to be extremely careful to avoid any and all tension with foreign countries.
DR. EXNER: What were the military plans of those days?
JODL: I have already said that there were the combat directives for the Grenzschutz fist. I had also worked out instructions for the commander in East Prussia in case he were cut off from the Reich through a sudden attack by Poland.
DR. EXNER: Did you know of any German intentions of attack at that time?
JODL: There was no thought or talk of that whatsoever.
DR. EXNER: Well, I should like to quote one sentence from the twelfth session of the Reich Defense Council. It is on Page 14 of Volume I of my document book, Document EC-407, Exhibit GB-247. At that meeting Lieutenant Colonel Wagner of the OKH said-who was he, by the way?
JODL: He later became Quartermaster General.
DR. EXNER: Lieutenant Colonel Wagner said: "The outcome of the war"-that is, the last war-"has resulted in a completely changed military and political situation in the case of a future war, namely the necessity for waging it in one's own country." He said that on 14 May 1936. What would you gather from this sentence?
JODL: Of course, one can perhaps say...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, surely it is a statement by somebody else, and this statement speaks for itself. It is not a matter that this witness can interpret to us.
DR. EXNER: Very well. [Turning to the defendant.] Now, were you concerned with armament in the Truppenamt, and later in the Department for National Defense?
JODL: I personally had nothing at all to do with armament in the real sense. That was a matter for the various branches of the Wehrmacht-the Army, the Navy, the Air Force-and it was dealt with and handled by their organizational staffs. The Commanders-in-Chief discussed these matters with the Fuehrer direct. But I hope, and I will not deny, that my work in the General Staff contributed to the reconstruction of the German Wehrmacht.
DR. EXNER: Your diary, 1780-PS, does not contain a word about armament, and it seems obvious that at that time you did not concern yourself with this problem. What were your thoughts and ideas on the question of armament? Were you in favor of it?
JODL: At that time I was of the same opinion as my superiors; and it was characteristic that on the day before the statement was made that 36 divisions were to be formed, Blomberg as well as Fritsch suggested to the Fuehrer that only 24 divisions should be formed. They feared a thinning down of the entire army. Perhaps they also feared too stormy a foreign policy, based on forces existing only on paper.
DR. EXNER: Please answer a question which appears to be important to me: What were the deadlines in connection with the armament in 1935?
JODL: Various stages were provided for. The first deadline set was 1942-43. Most of the West Wall was to be completed by 1945. The Navy's plan of construction ran on to 1944-45.
DR. EXNER: At that time what did you consider the objective of the armament?
JODL: Since it was not possible to achieve general disarmament, the objective was to establish military parity between Germany and the neighboring countries.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I should like to refer to a document which has already been submitted-the 2-year report of General George Marshall. This has already been submitted as Raeder-19. I have a part of it here before me, a part which I submitted under Exhibit AJ-3, (Document Jodl-56) Page 168. Regarding the problem of rearmament, some sentences seem to hit the nail right on the head. In the second paragraph on Page 6, or rather the last sentence there, we see: "The world does not seriously consider the wishes of the weak. Weakness is too great a temptation to the strong, particularly to the brutal who scheme for wealth and power." Then on the next page there is another sentence: "Above all we must, I think, correct the tragic misunderstanding that a security policy is a war policy..." Can you tell us, please, what the ratio of our military strength to that of foreign countries was at that time?
JODL: In 1935, when we set up 36 divisions, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia possessed 90 divisions for times of peace, and 190 divisions for war. We had hardly any heavy artillery, and tank construction was in its earliest stages. The conception of defensive and offensive armament has been discussed here on various occasions. It would lead us too far afield to go into that in detail. But I should like to say only that as far as Germany was concerned, with her geographical position this conception did not apply. The disarmament conference too, after months of discussion, failed because a proper definition for this conception could not be formed.
DR. EXNER: I should like to quote from an expert, George Marshall again, on Page 168 of my document book, from which I have just quoted; and again just one sentence. It is in the first paragraph: "The only effective defense a nation can now maintain is the power of attack..." Now, however, the Prosecution asserts that you should have known that such a tremendous rearmament as the German rearmament could serve only for an aggressive war. Will you comment on this, please?
JODL: I believe this can only be explained as an expression of military ignorance. Up to the year 1939 we were, of Course, in a position to destroy Poland alone. But we were never, either in 1938 or 1939, actually in a position to withstand a concentrated attack by these states together. And if we did not collapse already in the year 1939 that was due only to the fact that during the Polish campaign, the approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held completely inactive against the 23 German divisions.
DR. EXNER: But tell us, when did intensive rearmament actually begin?
JODL: Real rearmament was only begun after the war had already started. We entered into this world war with some 75 divisions. Sixty percent of our total able-bodied population had not been trained. The peacetime army amounted to perhaps 400,000 men, as against 800,000 men in 1914. Our supplies of ammunition and bombs, as the witness Milch has already testified, were ridiculously low.
DR. EXNER: In that connection I should like to read a diary entry of yours, Page 16 of Volume I of my document book, which is 1780-PS, USA-72. On 13 December you said: "After completion of project for L"-that is the Landesverteidigung, National Defense-"Field Marshal reports on state of war potential of Wehrmacht, indicating chief bottleneck is inadequate stocks of ammunition for Army-10 to 15 days of combat equals 6 weeks' supply."
JODL: That is right, we had ammunition for 10 to 15 days of combat.
DR. EXNER: Now I shall turn to the question of the occupation of the Rhineland.
THE PRESIDENT: Let us break off now. [A recess was taken.]
DR. EXNER: General, when did you first hear of the plans to occupy the Rhineland?
JODL: On 1 or 2 March 1936; that is to say about 6 days before the actual occupation. I could not have heard of them any earlier because before that the Fuehrer had not yet made the decision himself.
DR. EXNER: Did you and the generals have military objections to that occupation?
JODL: I must confess that we had the uneasy feeling of a gambler whose entire fortune is at stake.
DR. EXNER: Did you have legal objections?
JODL: No; I was neither an expert on international law nor a politician. Politically speaking it had been stated that the agreement between Czechoslovakia, Russia, and France had made the Locarno Pact void, which I accepted as a fact at the time.
DR. EXNER: How strong were our forces in the Rhineland after the occupation?
JODL: We occupied the Rhineland with approximately one division, but only three battalions of that went into the territory west of the Rhine; one battalion went to Aachen, one to Trier, and one to Saarbrucken.
DR. EXNER: Three battalions. That is really only a symbolic occupation, is it not?
JODL: Yes, and they acted only symbolically.
DR. EXNER: Did you do anything to avoid a military conflict because of that occupation?
JODL: There were serious reports which came from our military attaches in Paris and London at the time. I could not fail to be impressed by them. We suggested to Field Marshal Von Blomberg then that perhaps he ought to discuss withdrawing these three battalions west of the Rhine on condition that the French would withdraw four to five times as many men from their borders.
DR. EXNER: Was that suggestion ever made?
JODL: Yes, it was made to the Fuehrer, but he turned it down. He rejected very bluntly General Beck's suggestion that we should declare that we would not fortify the area west of the Rhine. That was a suggestion of General Beck's, which the Fuehrer turned down very bluntly.
DR. EXNER: Did you think at the time that that action was connected with any aggressive intention?
JODL: No, there could not be any question of aggressive intentions.
DR. EXNER: Why not?
JODL: I can only say that, considering the situation we were in, the French covering army alone could have blown us to pieces.
DR. EXNER: Do you think that the leading men had aggressive intentions then?
JODL: No, nobody had aggressive intentions; but it is of course possible that in the brain of the Fuehrer there was already an idea that the occupation was a prerequisite for actions to be taken later in the East. That is possible; but I do not know, because I could not see into the Fuehrer's brain.
DR. EXNER: But you did not see any outward signs of it?
JODL: No, none whatsoever.
DR. EXNER: Did you know of the so-called testament of Hitler dated 5 November 1937 which has been presented here?
JODL: The first time I heard it read was here in Court.
DR. EXNER: What did you learn about it at the time?
JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg informed Keitel and Keitel informed me that there had been a discussion with the Fuehrer. When I asked for the minutes I was told that no minutes had been taken. I refer to my diary, Document 1780-PS, as proof of this. What I was told was not at all sensational and hardly different in any way from anything contained in general directives for the preparation of a war. I can only assume that Field Marshal Von Blomberg at that time kept these things to himself because he may not have believed that they would ever be carried out.
DR. EXNER: Was there an operational plan against Austria?
JODL: There was no operational plan against Austria. I state that most emphatically.
DR. EXNER: Now we come to Document C-175, a directive which has the Exhibit Number USA-69. It is in Volume I; Page 18 and the following pages. It is a directive for the unified preparation of the armed forces for war of the year 1937. The Prosecution quoted Case Otto only from this directive, so that the impression was bound to be created that the whole was a plan for a campaign against Austria. Please explain what this directive means.
JODL: It was one of those typical standard preparations for war, for every conceivable eventuality. Such directives had come out every year in Germany ever since there was a General Staff and general conscription. These theoretical military studies made a distinction between two cases, namely cases of war which because of their nature were politically probable or might be probable, and cases which were improbable. As far as the former were concerned, a. plan of operations was to be drafted by the Army and the Air Force. For the latter appropriate suggestions only were to be brought forward. If the Tribunal would turn to Page 21 of the document, there appears at the end of the page, Part 3, a sentence as follows: "The following 'special cases' are to be considered by the High Command in general without participation by regional authorities..." and among such cases, on Page 22, is the special "Case Otto."
DR. EXNER: On Page 18 of this document is a directive valid from 1 July 1937 until, probably, 30 September 1938, that is a little more than a year. That, in turn, replaces another similar directive which is referred to in the first paragraph, which had been drawn up for the same problems previously. Did you participate in discussions on the Austrian case?
JODL: No, I did not participate in any discussions.
DR. EXNER: It is said in the trial brief that on 12 February 1938 you had been at Obersalzberg. Keitel has already rectified that. Your entry in the diary under 12 March 1938 is, therefore, based only on an account which you received through Keitel; is that right?