dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
and the methods of anti-partisan warfare in operational areas presented the highest political and military leaders with a welcomed opportunity of carrying out their plans, namely the systematic extermination of Slavism and Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I always regarded these cruel methods as military insanity, because they only helped to make combat against the enemy unnecessarily more difficult. "(Signed) Heusinger "Generalleutnant." (3717-PS) (At this point, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was called upon for oral testimony. His testimony on direct examination was substantially to the same effect as his affidavit 3712-PS.) (c) Responsibility of the Group for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment. The foregoing evidence against the General Staff and High Command Group is such that no German soldier can view it with anything but shame. The German High Command developed and applied a policy of terror against commandos and paratroopers, in violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, on the Western Front. On the Eastern Front it descended to savagery. In advance of the attack against the Soviet Union, the High Command ordered the troops to take "ruthless action", left it to the discretion of any officer to decide whether suspected civilians should be immediately shot, and empowered any officer with the powers of a Battalion Commander to take "collective despotic measures" against localities. Offenses committed against civilians by German soldiers, however, were not required to be prosecuted, and prosecution was suggested only where desirable in order to maintain discipline and security from a military standpoint. Soon after the invasion of the Soviet Union, German troops were told by the OKW that "a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing" and were encouraged to observe a punitive ratio of 50 to 100 Communists for one German soldier. German troops were told that they were to take "revenge on subhuman Jewry" and that they were not merely soldiers but "bearers of ruthless national ideology and avengers of bestialities". The High Command and the chief lieutenants of Himmler jointly planned the establishment of the Einsatzgruppen, the behavior of which has been shown in detail. These groups
"revenge on subhuman Jewry" and that they were not merely soldiers but "bearers of ruthless national ideology and avengers of bestialities". The High Command and the chief lieutenants of Himmler jointly planned the establishment of the Einsatzgruppen, the behavior of which has been shown in detail. These groups when in operational areas were under the command of the German Army, and German soldiers joined in their savagery. The Einsatzgruppen were completely dependent upon the Armed Forces for supplies with which to carry out their atrocities. The practices employed against the civilian population and against partisans were well known to all high ranking German officers on the Eastern Front. No doubt some of them disapproved of what was going on. Nonetheless, the full support of the military leaders continued to be given to these activities. The record is clear that the General Staff and High Command Group, including the defendants, who were members of the Group and numerous other members ordered, directed, and participated in war crimes and crimes against humanity as specified in counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment. C. Conclusion. The world must bear in mind that the German High Command is not an evanescent thing, the creature of a decade of unrest, or a school of thought or tradition which is shattered or utterly discredited. The German High Command and military tradition have in the past achieved victory and survived defeat. They have met with triumph and disaster, and have survived through a singular durability not unmixed with stupidity. An eminent American statesman and diplomat, Mr. Sumner Welles, has written ("The Time for Decision", 1944, pp. 261-262) that: "* * * The authority to which the German people have so often and so disastrously responded was not in reality the German Emperor of yesterday, or the Hitler of to-day, but the German General Staff. "It will be said that this insistence that the German General Staff has been the driving force in German policy is a dangerous oversimplification. I am not disposed to minimize the importance of other factors in German history. They all have their place. But I am convinced that each of them has played its part only in so far as it was permitted to do so by
been the driving force in German policy is a dangerous oversimplification. I am not disposed to minimize the importance of other factors in German history. They all have their place. But I am convinced that each of them has played its part only in so far as it was permitted to do so by the real master of the German race, namely, German militarism, personified in, and channelled through, the German General Staff." "Whether their ostensible ruler is the Kaiser, or Hindenburg, or Adolf Hitler, the continuing loyalty of the bulk of the population is given to that military force controlled and guided by the German General Staff. To the German people, the army to-day, as in the past, is the instrument by which German domination will be brought about. Generations of Germans may pass. The nation may undergo defeat after defeat. But if the rest of the world permits it, the German General Staff will continue making its plans for the future." The German General Staff and High Command is indicted not now at the bar of history, but on specific charges of crimes against International Law and the dictates of the conscience of mankind as embodied in the Charter. The picture that emerges from the evidence is that of a group of men with great powers for good or ill who chose the latter; who deliberately set out to arm Germany to the point where the German will could be imposed on the rest of the world; and who gladly joined with the most evil forces at work in Germany. "Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired", Blomberg and Blaskowitz say, and that is obviously the truth. The converse is no less clear; the military leaders furnished Hitler with the means and might which were necessary to his mere survival, to say nothing of the accomplishment of those purposes which seem to the world so ludicrously impossible in 1932 and so fearfully imminent in 1942. It was said above that the German militarists were inept as well as persistent. Helpless as Hitler would have been without them, he succeeded in mastering them. The generals and the Nazis were allies in 1933. But it was not enough for the Nazis that the generals should be voluntary allies; Hitler wanted them permanently and completely under his control. Devoid of political skill or principle, the
Helpless as Hitler would have been without them, he succeeded in mastering them. The generals and the Nazis were allies in 1933. But it was not enough for the Nazis that the generals should be voluntary allies; Hitler wanted them permanently and completely under his control. Devoid of political skill or principle, the generals lacked the mentality or morality to resist. On the day of the death of President Hindenburg in August 1934, the German officers swore a new oath. Their previous oath had been to the Fatherland; now it was to a man, Adolf Hitler. It was not until 18 days later that the law requiring this change was passed. A year later the Nazi emblem became part of their uniform and the Nazi flag their standard. By a clever process of infiltration into key positions, Hitler seized control of the entire military machine. No doubt these generals will ask what they could have done about it. It will be said that they were helpless; and that to protect their jobs and families and their own lives they had to follow Hitler's decisions. No doubt this became true. But the generals were a key factor in Hitler's rise to complete power and a partner in his criminal aggressive designs. It is always difficult and dangerous to withdraw from a criminal conspiracy. Never has it been suggested that a conspirator may claim mercy on the ground that his fellow-conspirators threatened him with harm should he withdraw from the plot. In many respects the spectacle which the German General Staff and High Command group presents today is the most degrading of all the groups and organizations charged in the Indictment. The bearers of a tradition not devoid of valour and honour, they emerge from this war stained both by criminality and ineptitude. Attracted by the militaristic and aggressive Nazi policies, the German generals found themselves drawn into adventures of a scope they had not foreseen. From crimes in which almost all of them participated willingly and approvingly were born others in which they participated because they were too ineffective to alter the governing Nazi policies, and because they had to continue collaboration to save their own skins. Having joined the partnership, the General Staff and High Command group planned and carried through manifold acts
willingly and approvingly were born others in which they participated because they were too ineffective to alter the governing Nazi policies, and because they had to continue collaboration to save their own skins. Having joined the partnership, the General Staff and High Command group planned and carried through manifold acts of aggression which turned Europe into a charnel-house, and caused the Armed Forces to be used for foul practices foully executed of terror, pillage, murder and wholesale slaughter. Let no one be heard to say that the military uniform shall be their cloak, or that they may find sanctuary by pleading membership in the profession to which they are an eternal disgrace. LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES Document Description Vol. Page Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 9 ......................... I 6 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H); Appendix B ......................... I 29,27 3737-PS Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Articles 4, 23 ......................... VI 590, 594 3738-PS Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to treatment of Prisoners of War, Articles 2, 3 ......................... VI 600 Note: A single Asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court. *375-PS Case Green with wider implications, report of Intelligence Division, Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August 1938. (USA 84) ......................... III 280 *386-PS Notes on a conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November 1937, signed by Hitler's adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. (USA 25) ......................... III 295 *388-PS File of papers on Case Green (the plan for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept by Schmundt, Hitler's
on a conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November 1937, signed by Hitler's adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. (USA 25) ......................... III 295 *388-PS File of papers on Case Green (the plan for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept by Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant, April-October 1938. (USA 26) ......................... III 305 *444-PS Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer's Headquarters signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl, 12 November 1940, concerning plans for prosecution of war in Mediterranean Area and occupation of Greece. (GB 116) ......................... III 403 *446-PS Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl, Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, concerning the Invasion of Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31) ......................... III 407 *447-PS Top Secret Operational Order to Order No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March 1941, concerning Directives for special areas. (USA 135) ......................... III 409 *498-PS Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA 501) ......................... III 416 *503-PS Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October 1942, concerning Hitler's explanation of his commando order of the day before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) ......................... III 426 *506-PS Draft of top secret letter, 22 June 1944, initialed by Warlimont, concerning enemy agents. (USA 549) ......................... III 430 *508-PS OKW correspondence, November 1942, about shooting of British glider troops in Norway. (USA 545) ......................... III 430 *509-PS Telegram to OKW, 7 November 1943, reporting "special treatment" for three British commandos. (USA 547) ......................... III 433 *512-PS Teletype from Army Commander in Norway, 13 December 1942, concerning interrogation of saboteurs before shooting; and memorandum in reply from OKW, 14 December 1942. (USA 546) ......................... III 433 *526-PS Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, concerning saboteurs captured and shot in Norway. (USA 502) ......................... III 434 *531-PS OKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing inquiry from Supreme Command West about treatment of paratroopers. (USA 550) ......................... III 435 *537-PS Order signed by Keitel, 30 July
*526-PS Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, concerning saboteurs captured and shot in Norway. (USA 502) ......................... III 434 *531-PS OKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing inquiry from Supreme Command West about treatment of paratroopers. (USA 550) ......................... III 435 *537-PS Order signed by Keitel, 30 July 1944, concerning treatment of members of foreign "Military Missions", captured together with partisans. (USA 553) ......................... III 439 *551-PS Order signed by Keitel, 26 June 1944, concerning treatment of Commando participants. (USA 551) ......................... III 440 *728-PS Letter of Foreign Office to Chief of Supreme Command of Armed Forces, 20 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators. (GB 152) ......................... III 526 729-PS Handwritten note initialed Keitel, 14 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators ......................... III 529 730-PS Draft of letter to Foreign Office, attention Ambassador Ritter, 15 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy aviators ......................... III 530 731-PS Memorandum initialed by Jodl, 22 May, concerning measures to be taken against Anglo-American air crews in special instances ......................... III 531 732-PS Letter from Feske to Keitel, 19 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators ......................... III 532 733-PS Telephone memorandum, 26 June 1944, concerning treatment of terror aviators ......................... III 533 *735-PS Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to fix the cases in which the application of Lynch Law against Allied airmen would be justified. (GB 151) ......................... III 533 737-PS Conference Notes, 4 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators ......................... III 536 *740-PS Letter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators. (GB 153) ......................... III 537 741-PS Secret memorandum, 5 July 1944, concerning terror aviators ......................... III 538 *789-PS Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, 23 November 1939, to which all Supreme Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) ......................... III 572 *798-PS Hitler's speech to Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 29) ......................... III
III 538 *789-PS Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, 23 November 1939, to which all Supreme Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) ......................... III 572 *798-PS Hitler's speech to Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 29) ......................... III 581 *872-PS Memorandum of Discussion between the Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case "Barbarossa" and "Sonnenblume" (African operation). (USA 134) ......................... III 626 *1061-PS Official report of Stroop, SS and Police Leader of Warsaw, on destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. (USA 275) ......................... III 718 *1279-PS Minutes of meeting concerning treatment of members of foreign "Military Missions" captured with partisan groups and draft of order, 7 July 1944 pertaining thereto. (USA 552) ......................... III 857 *1541-PS Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13 December 1940. (GB 117) ......................... IV 101 *1746-PS Conference between German and Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; speech by Hitler to German High Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27 March 1941; plan for invasion of Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) ......................... IV 272 *1775-PS Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 February 1938. (USA 73) ......................... IV 357 *1780-PS Excerpts from diary kept by General Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA 72) ......................... IV 360 *1786-PS Excerpt of 14 March 1943 of War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. (USA 561) ......................... IV 369 *1809-PS Entries from Jodl's diary, February 1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) ......................... IV 377 *1816-PS Stenographic report of the meeting on The Jewish Question, under the Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, 12 November 1938. (USA 261) ......................... IV 425 *1919-PS Himmler's speech to SS Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA 170) ......................... IV 558 *2261-PS Directive from Blomberg to Supreme Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) ......................... IV 934
IV 558 *2261-PS Directive from Blomberg to Supreme Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) ......................... IV 934 *2327-PS Two top secret memoranda, 14 June 1939, concerning operation "Fall Weiss". (USA 539) ......................... IV 1035 *2385-PS Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30 August 1945. (USA 68) ......................... V 23 *2610-PS Affidavit of Frederick W. Roche, Major, U. S. Army, 7 November 1945. (USA 548) ......................... V 330 *2802-PS German Foreign Office notes of conference on 13 March 1939 between Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117) ......................... V 443 *3012-PS Order signed Christiansen, 19 March 1943, to all group leaders of Security Service, and record of telephone conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March 1943. (USA 190) ......................... V 731 *3040-PS Secret order of Reichsfuehrer SS, 20 February 1942, concerning commitment of manpower from the East. (USA 207) ......................... V 744 *3702-PS Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz Halder, 7 November 1945. (USA 531) ......................... VI 411 *3703-PS Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA 532) ......................... VI 413 *3704-PS Affidavit of Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, 7 November 1945. (USA 536) ......................... VI 414 *3705-PS Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA 535) ......................... VI 415 *3706-PS Affidavit of Colonel-General Johannes Blaskowitz, 10 November 1945. (USA 537) ......................... VI 417 *3707-PS Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz Halder, 13 November 1945. (USA 533) ......................... VI 419 *3708-PS Affidavit of Colonel Bernd von Brauchitsch, 20 November 1945. (USA 534) ......................... VI 419 *3710-PS Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 26 November 1945. (USA 557) ......................... VI 420 *3711-PS Affidavit of Captain Wilhelm Scheidt, 26 November 1945. (USA 558) ......................... VI 424 3712-PS Affidavit of General von dem Bach, 27 November
VI 419 *3710-PS Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 26 November 1945. (USA 557) ......................... VI 420 *3711-PS Affidavit of Captain Wilhelm Scheidt, 26 November 1945. (USA 558) ......................... VI 424 3712-PS Affidavit of General von dem Bach, 27 November 1945 ......................... VI 425 *3713-PS Affidavit of General Roettiger, 8 December 1945. (USA 559) ......................... VI 429 *3714-PS Affidavit of General Roettiger, 28 November 1945. (USA 560) ......................... VI 430 *3715-PS Affidavit of Major General Rode, 30 November 1945. (USA 562) ......................... VI 431 *3716-PS Affidavit of Major General Rode, 30 NOVEMBER 1945. (USA 563) ......................... VI 433 *3717-PS Affidavit of General Heusinger, 1 December 1945. (USA 564) ......................... VI 434 *3718-PS Affidavit of Colonel v. Bonin, 1 December 1945. (USA 565) ......................... VI 435 *3739-PS Memo on General Staff and High Command and affidavit thereto. (USA 778) ......................... VI 624 *3868-PS Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning execution of 3,000,000 people at Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA 819) ......................... VI 787 *C-5 Memorandum to Supreme Command of the Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, concerning base in Norway. (GB 83) ......................... VI 815 *C-23 Unsigned documents found in official Navy files containing notes year by year from 1927 to 1940 on reconstruction of the German Navy, and dated 18 February 1938, 8 March 1938, September 1938. (USA 49) ......................... VI 827 *C-35 Entry in Naval War Diary, January 1941, p. 401. (USA 132) ......................... VI 852 *C-50 Covering letters and order of 13 May 1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless treatment of civilians in the USSR for offenses committed by them. (USA 554; GB 162) ......................... VI 871 *C-63 Keitel order on preparation for "Weseruebung", 27 January 1940. (GB 87) ......................... VI 883 *C-64 Raeder's report, 12 December 1939, on meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. (GB 86) ......................... VI 884 *C-65 Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder concerning visit of Quisling. (GB 85) ......................... VI 885 *C-66 Memorandum from Raeder to