dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO (Alternate member of the Tribunal for the French Republic): The directive of Hitler issued on 1 March 1940 for the attack on Denmark and Norway stated that the operation "should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic." It is, however, to be remembered that the Defendant Raeder's memorandum of 3 October 1939 makes no reference to forestalling the Allies, but is based upon the aim of "improving our strategical and operational position." The memorandum itself is headed "Gaining of bases in Norway." The same observation applies mutatis mutandis to the memorandum of the Defendant Doenitz of 9 October 1939. Furthermore, on 13 March the Defendant Jodl recorded in hi diary:. "Fuehrer does not give order yet for 'W' (Weser Exercise) He is still looking for an excuse." On 14 March 1940 he again wrote: "Fuehrer has not yet decide what reasons to give for 'Weser Exercise'." On 21 March 1940 he recorded the misgivings of Task Force XXI about the long interval between taking up readiness positions and the close of the diplomatic negotiations, and added: "Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken." On 2 April he records that all the preparations are completed; on 4 April the naval operational order was issued; and on 9 April, the invasion was begun. From all this it is clear that when the plans for an attack on Norway were being made, they were not made for the purpose of forestalling an imminent Allied landing, but, at the most, that they might prevent an Allied occupation at some future date. When the final orders for the German invasion of Norway were given, the diary of the Naval Operations Staff for 23 March 1940 records: "A mass encroachment by the English into Norwegian territorial waters ...
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO (Alternate member of the Tribunal for the French Republic): is not to be expected at the present time." And Admiral Assmann's entry for 26 March says: "British landing in Norway not considered serious."Documents which were subsequently captured by the Germans are relied on to show that the Allied plan to occupy harbors and airports in Western Norway was a definite plan, although in all points considerably behind the German plans under which the invasion was actually carried out. These documents indicate that an altered plan had been finally agreed upon on 20 March 1940, that a convoy should leave England on 5 April, and that mining in Norwegian waters would begin the same day; And that on 5 April the sailing time had been postponed until 8 April. But these plans were not the cause of the German invasion of Norway. Norway was occupied by Germany to afford her bases from which a more effective attack on England and France might be made, pursuant to plans prepared long in advance of the Allied plans which are now relied on to support the argument of self-defense. It was further argued that Germany alone could decide, in accordance with the reservations made by many of the signatory powers at the time of the conclusion of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, whether preventive action was a necessity, and that in making her decision her judgment was conclusive. But whether action taken under the claim of self-defense was in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation and adjudication if international law is ever to be enforced. No suggestion is made by the defendants that there was any plan by any belligerent other than Germany to occupy Denmark. No excuse for that aggression has ever been offered.
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO (Alternate member of the Tribunal for the French Republic): As the German armies entered Norway and Denmark, German memoranda were handed to the Norwegian and Danish Governments which gave the assurance that the German troops did not come as enemies, that they did not intend to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations against England as long as they were not forced to do so by measures taken by England and France, and that they had come to protect the North against the proposed occupation of Norwegian strong-points by English-French forces. The memoranda added that Germany had no intention of infringing the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Norway then or in the future. Nevertheless, on 3 June 1940, a German naval memorandum discussed the use to be made of Norway and Denmark, and put forward one solution for consideration, that the territories of Denmark and Norway acquired during the course of the war should continue to be occupied and organized so that they could in the future be considered as German possessions. In the light of all the available evidence it is impossible to accept the contention that the invasions of Denmark and Norway were defensive, and in the opinion of the Tribunal they were acts of aggressive war. The Invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg The plan to seize Belgium and the Netherlands was considered in August 1938, when the attack on Czechoslovakia was being formulated, and the possibility of war with France and England was contemplated. The advantage to Germany of being able to use these countries for her own purposes, particularly as air bases in the war against England and France, was emphasized. In May of 1939, when Hitler made his irrevocable decision to attack Poland, and foresaw the possibility at least of a war with England and France in consequence, he told his military commanders: "Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied....
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO (Alternate member of the Tribunal for the French Republic): Declarations of neutrality must be ignored." On 22 August in the same year, he told his military commanders that England and France, in his opinion, would not "violate the neutrality of these countries." At the same time he assured Belgium and Holland and Luxembourg that he would respect their neutrality; and on 6 October 1939, after the Polish campaign, he repeated this assurance. On 7 October General Von Brauchitsch directed Army Group B to prepare "for the immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if the political situation so demands." In a series of orders, which were signed by the Defendants Keitel and Jodl, the attack was fixed for 10 November 1939, but it was postponed from time to, time until May of 1940 on account of weather conditions and transport problems. At the conference on 23 November 1939 Hitler said: "We have an Achilles heel: the Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger.... Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed. England and, France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England.... If the French Army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us. We must anticipate them... We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coast will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland.... My decision is unchangeable; I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914.
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO (Alternate member of the Tribunal for the French Republic): If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack[3]) the war is not to be ended victoriously." On 10 May 1940 the German forces invaded the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. On the same day the German Ambassadors handed to the Netherlands and Belgian Governments a memorandum alleging that the British and French armies, with the consent of Belgium and Holland, were planning to march through those countries to attack the Ruhr, and justifying the invasion on these grounds. Germany, however, assured the Netherlands and Belgium that their integrity and their possessions would be respected. A similar memorandum was delivered to Luxembourg on the same date. There is no evidence before the Tribunal to justify the contention that the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg were invaded by Germany because their occupation had been planned by England and France. British and French staffs had been co-operating in making certain plans for military operations in the Low Countries, but the purpose of this planning was to defend these countries in the event of a German attack. The invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg was entirely without justification. It was carried out in pursuance of policies long considered and prepared, and was plainly an act of aggressive war. The resolve to invade was made without any other consideration than the advancement of the aggressive policies of Germany. The Aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece On 12 August 1939 Hitler had a conversation with Ciano, and the Defendant Ribbentrop at Obersalzberg. He then said: "Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with the uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind." This observation was made only 2 months after Hitler had given assurances to Yugoslavia that he would regard her frontier as final and inviolable.
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO (Alternate member of the Tribunal for the French Republic): On the occasion of the visit to Germany of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia on I June 1939, Hitler had said in a public speech: "The firmly established reliable relationship, of Germany to Yugoslavia, now that owing to historical events we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and countries, but can also represent an element of calm to our nerve-racked continent. This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to perform really constructive work." On 6 October 1939 Germany repeated those assurances to Yugoslavia, after Hitler and Ribbentrop had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Italy to enter the war on the side of Germany by attacking Yugoslavia. On 28 October 1940 Italy invaded Greece, but the military operations met with no success. In November Hitler wrote to Mussolini with regard to the invasion of Greece, and the extension of the war in the Balkans, and pointed out that no military operations could take place in the Balkans before the following March, and therefore Yugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by other means and in other ways. But on 12 November 1940 Hitler issued a directive for the prosecution of the war, and it included the words: "The Balkans: The Commander-in-Chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea, in case of need entering through Bulgaria." On 13 December he issued a directive concerning the operation "Marita," the code name for the invasion of Greece, in which he stated: "1. The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania, it is doubly necessary that the British endeavor be foiled to create air bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as to the Romanian oilfields. "2.
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO (Alternate member of the Tribunal for the French Republic): My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Romania within the next months (b) after the setting-in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send a task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland." On 20 January 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, at which Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel, Jodl, and others were present, Hitler stated: "The massing of troops in Romania serves a threefold purpose: (a) an operation against Greece; (b) protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey; (c) safeguarding the guarantee to Romania.... It is desirable that this employment be completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore, disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment, and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment." On 19 February 1941 an OKW directive for the operation "Marita" stated: "On 18 February the Fuehrer made the following decision regarding the carrying-out of Operation Marita: The following dates are envisaged: Commencement of building bridge, 28 February; crossing of the Danube, 2 March." On 3 March 1941, British troops landed in Greece to assist the Greeks to resist the Italians; and on 18 March, at a meeting between Hitler and the Defendant Raeder, at which the Defendants Keitel and Jodl were also present, the Defendant Raeder asked, for confirmation that "all of Greece will have to be occupied, even in the event of a peaceful settlement," to which Hitler replied, "The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement." On 25 March, on the occasion of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact at a meeting in Vienna, the Defendant Ribbentrop, on behalf of the German Government, confirmed the determination of Germany to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO (Alternate member of the Tribunal for the French Republic): On 26 March the Yugoslav ministers, who had adhered to the Tripartite Pact, were removed from office by a coup d'etat in Belgrade on their return from Vienna, and the new Government repudiated the pact. Thereupon on 27 March, at a conference in Berlin with the High Command at which the Defendants Goering, Keitel and Jodl were present, and the Defendant Ribbentrop part of the time, Hitler stated that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the contemplated attack on Greece, and even more so with regard to the attack upon Russia which was to be conducted later on. Hitler announced that he was determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new Government, to make ail preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. He stated that he would act with "unmerciful harshness." On 6 April German forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia without warning, and Belgrade was bombed by the Luftwaffe. So, swift was this particular invasion that there had not been time to establish any "incidents" as a usual preliminary, or to find and publish any adequate "political" explanations. As the attack was starting on 6 April, Hitler proclaimed to the German people that this attack was necessary because the British forces in Greece (who were helping the Greeks to defend themselves against the Italians) represented a British attempt to extend the war to the Balkans. It is clear from this narrative that aggressive war against Greece and Yugoslavia had long been in contemplation, certainly as early as August of 1939. The fact that Great Britain had come to the assistance of-the Greeks, and might thereafter be in a position to inflict great damage upon German interests, was made the occasion for the occupation of both countries. The Aggressive War against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On 23 August 1939 Germany signed the non-aggression pact with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO (Alternate member of the Tribunal for the French Republic): The evidence has shown unmistakably that the Soviet Union on their part conformed to the terms of this pact; indeed the German Government itself had been assured of this by the highest German sources. Thus, the German Ambassador in Moscow informed his Government that the Soviet Union would go to war only if attacked by Germany, and this statement is recorded in the German War Diary under the date of 6 June 1941. Nevertheless, as early as the late summer of 1940, Germany began to make preparations for an attack on the U.S.S.R. in spite of the non-aggression pact. This operation was secretly planned under the code name "Case Barbarossa," and the former Field Marshal Paulus testified that on 3 September 1940, when he joined the German General Staff, he continued developing "Case Barbarossa," which was finally completed at the beginning of November 1940; and that even then, the German General Staff had no information that the Soviet Union was preparing for war. On 18 December 1940 Hitler issued Directive Number 21, initialled by Keitel and Jodl, which called for the completion of all preparations connected with the realization of "Case Barbarossa" by 15 May 1941. This directive stated: "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England.... Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized." Before the directive of 18 December had been made, the Defendant Goering had informed General Thomas, Chief of the Office of War Economy of the OKW, of the plan, and General Thomas made surveys of the economic possibilities of the U.S.S.R. including its raw materials, its power and transport system, and its capacity to produce arms. In accordance with these surveys, an economic staff for the Eastern territories with many military-economic units (inspectorates, commandos, groups) was created under the supervision of the Defendant Goering.
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO (Alternate member of the Tribunal for the French Republic): In conjunction with the military command, these units were to achieve the most complete and efficient economic exploitation of the occupied territories in the interest of Germany. The framework of the future political and economic organization of the occupied territories was designed by the Defendant Rosenberg over a period of 3 months, after conferences with and assistance by the Defendants Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Goering, Ribbentrop, and Frick or their representatives. It was made the subject of a most detailed report immediately after the invasion. These plans outlined the destruction of the Soviet Union as an independent State, and its partition, the creation of so-called Reich Commissariats, and the conversion of Estonia, Latvia, Bielorussia and other territories into German colonies. At the same time Germany drew Hungary, Romania, and Finland into the war against the U.S.S.R. In December 1940 Hungary agreed to participate on the promise of Germany that she should have certain territories at the expense of Yugoslavia. In May 1941 a final agreement was concluded with Antonescu, the Prime Minister of Romania, regarding the attack on the U.S.S.R., in which Germany promised to Romania Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the right to occupy Soviet territory up to the Dnieper. On 22 June 1941, without any declaration of war, Germany invaded Soviet territory in accordance with the plans so long made. The evidence which has been given before this Tribunal proves that Germany had the design carefully thought out, to crush the U.S.S.R. as a political and military power, so that Germany might expand to the east according to her own desire.
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO (Alternate member of the Tribunal for the French Republic): In Mein Kampf Hitler has written: "If new territory were to be acquired in Europe, it must have been mainly at Russia's cost, and once again the new German Empire should have set out on its march along the same road as was formerly trodden by the Teutonic knights, this time to acquire soil for the German plough by means of the German sword and thus provide the nation with its daily bread." But there was a more immediate purpose, and in one of the memoranda of the OKW that immediate purpose was stated to be to feed the German armies from Soviet territory in the third year of the war, even if "as a result many millions of people will be starved to death if we take out of the country the things necessary for us." The final aims of the attack on the Soviet Union were formulated at a conference with Hitler on 16 July 1941, in which the Defendants Goering, Keitel, Rosenberg, and Bormann participated: "There can be no talk of the creation of a military power west of the Urals, even if we should have to fight 100 years to achieve this.... All the Baltic regions must become part of the Reich. The Crimea and adjoining regions (north of the Crimea) must likewise be incorporated into the Reich.... The region of the Volga as well as the Baku district must likewise be incorporated into the Reich.... The Finns want Eastern Karelia. However, in view of the large deposits of nickel, the Kola peninsula must be ceded to Germany." It was contended for the defendants that the attack upon the U.S.S.R. was justified because the Soviet Union was contemplating an attack upon Germany, and making preparations to that end. It is impossible to believe that this view was ever honestly entertained. The plans for the economic exploitation of the U.S.S.R., for the removal of masses of the population, for the murder of commissars and political leaders, were all part of the carefully prepared scheme launched on 22 June without warning of any kind, and without the shadow of legal excuse. It was plain aggression.
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO (Alternate member of the Tribunal for the French Republic): War against the United States Four days after the attack launched by the Japanese on the United States fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Germany declared war on the United States. The Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan had been signed on 27 September 1940, and from that date until the attack upon the U.S.S.R. the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, with other defendants, was endeavoring to induce Japan to attack British possessions in the Far East. This, it was thought, would hasten England's defeat, and also keep the United States out of the war. The possibility of a direct attack on the United States was considered and discussed as a matter for the future. Major Von Falkenstein, the Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, summarizing military problems which needed discussion in Berlin in October of 1940, spoke of the possibility "of the prosecution of the war against America at a later date " It is clear, too, that the German policy of keeping America out of the war, if possible, did not prevent Germany promising support to Japan even against the United States. On 4 April 1941, Hitler told Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister, in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop, that Germany would "strike without delay" if a Japanese attack on Singapore should lead to war between Japan and the United States. The next day Ribbentrop himself urged Matsuoka to bring Japan into the war. On 28 November 1941, 10 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Ribbentrop encouraged Japan, through her Ambassador in Berlin, to attack Great Britain and the United States, and stated that should Japan become engaged in a war with the United States, Germany would join the war immediately. A few days later, Japanese representatives told Germany and Italy that Japan was preparing to attack the United States, and asked for their support. Germany and Italy agreed to do this, although in the Tripartite Pact, Italy and Germany had undertaken to assist Japan only if she were attacked.