dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
RAEDER: Yes, I have the directive here. It is of 20 May 1938 and says with regard to the Navy: "The Navy participates in the operations of the Army by employing the Danube flotilla. That flotilla is put under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In regard to the conduct of naval warfare, at first only those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other states. Those measures must be confined to what is absolutely necessary, and must be carried out inconspicuously." The entire course of action at the end of September and beginning of October made the special measures unnecessary, so the Danube flotilla which we had taken over from Austria was put under the command of the Army.
DR. SIEMERS: What was the size of the Danube flotilla?
RAEDER: It consisted of some small river craft, one small gunboat and minesweepers.
DR. SIEMERS: That is the total extent to which the Navy participated?
RAEDER: Yes, in which the Navy participated.
DR. SIEMERS: In what way did you and the Navy participate in the preparations for the occupation of what the document calls the "remainder of Czechoslovakia"? This concerns Document C-136, USA-104 in the Document Book of the British Delegation, 10 a, Page 101. It is of 21 October 1938. The Prosecution points out that according to that you had already been informed in October that Czechoslovakia was to be occupied after some time, that is in March, as actually happened. Will you please tell us something about that?
RAEDER: That directive looks suspicious at first but the way in which it is drafted shows that this again refers to possible cases. Point 1 deals with the securing of the borders of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks. Points 2 and 3 are "Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia," "Occupation of the Memel Country." Number 2, "Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia": The first sentence. reads, "It must be possible to shatter the remainder of Czechoslovakia at any time if her policy should become hostile toward Germany." That is the prerequisite in case of any action against Czechoslovakia; that did not mean that it was certain that any action would be taken. In the same manner, under Number 3, mention is made of the occupation of the Memel country, where it says: "The political situation, particularly warlike complications between Poland and Lithuania, may make it necessary for the German Armed Forces to occupy the Memel country."
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. May I point out that, according to my document, the part which the witness has just read is missing in the English translation-so that you will not look for it unnecessarily. [Turning to the defendant.] So here again this is a possible eventuality?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: On 3 September 1939, at the beginning of the war, the Athenia was sunk. From the military point of view that case has already been clarified by Herr Kranzbuehler, but I should like you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to state your position and give an explanation of the incident with special consideration of the fact that the Prosecution, especially in this case, has raised a very severe and insulting accusation. They have made the accusation that you, purposely and in violation of the truth, held England and Churchill responsible for the sinking of the Athenia , although you knew perfectly well that the Athenia had been sunk by a German U-boat. As proof, the Prosecution has submitted the article of 23 October 1939 from the Voelkischer Beobachter . Mr. President, that is Document Number 3260-PS, GB-218. Document Book 10 of the British Delegation on Page 97. [Turning to the defendant.] I would like you to explain that point.
RAEDER: The fact is that on 3 September at dusk the young submarine commander of the submarine U-30 met an English passenger ship which had its lights dimmed and torpedoed it because he assumed, by mistake, that it was an auxiliary cruiser. In order to avoid misunderstanding I should like to state here that the deliberations of Kapitaenleutnant Fresdorf, which have been mentioned here concerning the torpedoing of dimmed ships in the Channel, did not yet play any part in the Naval Operations Staff at that time and that this commanding officer could not have known anything about these deliberations. He knew only that auxiliary criusers had their lights blacked out, and he assumed that this was an auxiliary cruiser at the entrance of the northwest channel, England-Scotland. He did not make a report since it was not necessary. The information that a German U-boat had torpedoed the Athenia was broadcast by the British radio, and we probably received the news during the night of the ad to the 4th, and transmitted it to the various news services. In the morning of 4 September we received that news at the offices of the Naval Operations Staff, and I requested information as to how far our nearest submarine was from the place of the torpedoing. I was told, 75 nautical miles. At about the same time, State Secretary Von Weizsaecker in the Foreign Office, who had been a naval officer in the first World War, learned of this situation and made a telephone call to the Naval Operations Staff, asking whether it was true. He did not call me personally. He received the answer that, according to our information, it could not be right. Thereupon he sent for the American Charge d'Affaires -I believe Mr. Kirk-in order to speak to him about the matter because the radio broadcast had also mentioned that several Americans had been killed in that accident. From his experiences in the first World War it was clear to him how important it was that there should be no incident involving America. Therefore, he told him what he had heard from the Naval Operations Staff.
RAEDER: I personally told the same thing to the American Naval Attache, Mr. Schrader, and that certainly in good faith. I believed that I could tell him that in good faith because we had no other information. State Secretary Von Weizsaecker then came to see me personally, if I remember correctly. We were very close friends, and he told me what he had told the American Charge d'Affaires. He apologized, I believe, for not having spoken to me personally and that concluded the case for the time being. The matter was such that, if it had been reported in a normal way, we would not have hesitated to admit and to explain the reason. We would not have hesitated to apologize to the nations concerned. Disciplinary measures would have been taken against the officer. I also reported the incident to the Fuehrer himself in his headquarters and told him that we were convinced such was not the case, and the Fuehrer ordered that it should be denied. This was done by the Propaganda Ministry, which had been informed of the order by my press department. The submarine returned on 27 September...
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me if I interrupt. That date, Mr. President, is identified by Document D-659, which was submitted by the Prosecution, it is Exhibit GB-221 in Document Book 10 on Page 110.
RAEDER: The submarine commander returned on 27 September to Wilhelmshaven. Admiral Doenitz has already described how he received him and how he immediately sent him to me to Berlin by air. The U-boat commander reported the entire incident to me and confirmed that it was a sheer mistake, that it was only through all these messages he had heard that he himself discovered that it was not an auxiliary cruiser that was concerned but a passenger steamer. I reported the facts to the Fuehrer because they could have had severe political consequences. He decided that, as it had been denied once, we had to keep it utterly secret, not only abroad but also within official circles and government circles. Consequently, I was not in a position to tell State Secretary Von Weizsaecker or the Propaganda Ministry that the facts were different. My order to the Commander of the U-boat fleet reads: "1. The affair is to be kept strictly secret upon orders of the Fuehrer. "2. On my part, no court-martial will be ordered because the commanding officer acted in good faith and it was a mistake. "3. The further political handling of the matter is to be attended to by the High Command of the Navy, as far as anything has to be done." With that the commander returned to Wilhelmshaven and Admiral Doenitz has already reported that he was punished by disciplinary procedure. To our great surprise, about one month later that article appeared in the Voelkischer Beobachter in which Churchill was accused of being the author of that incident. I knew absolutely nothing about that article beforehand. I would certainly have prevented its appearance because, knowing that our submarine had torpedoed that ship, it was out of the question to lay the blame on the enemy, on the First Lord of the Admiralty of all people. I found out later that the order to publish such an article was issued by Hitler and reached the Propaganda Ministry through the Reich Press Chief. As far as I remember I was told that the Propaganda Minister had himself drafted that article. Later I could not prevent it.
RAEDER: I did not see the article nor did any of my officers of the High Command of the Navy see it. They would certainly have come to me at once so that I could have prevented its publication. We had no reason to expect such an article 4 weeks after the torpedoing of the Athenia . That is the case of the Athenia .
DR. SIEMERS: You just said that you had discovered that Hitler knew about the article. When did you discover this?
RAEDER: Here, from my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche.
DR. SIEMERS: Not at that time then?
RAEDER: No, by no means.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit again at a quarter past two. [The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.]
DR. SIEMERS: In the meantime I have perused my documents and I am therefore in a position to carry out the original plan, that is, of submitting the documents during the examination. In connection with the documents which we dealt with last, Document C-126, "Strategic Preparations," I should like to submit the following documents which are contained in the White Book s, documents which have been granted me for my use and which also concern strategic preparations on the part of the Allies. We are dealing with Exhibit Number Raeder-33. It is the document dated 9 November 1939; and also Exhibit Number Raeder-34, General Gamelin to General Lelong, 13 November 1939; and also Exhibit Number Raeder-35, two extracts from the Diary of Jodl, 1809-PS, which concern the measures taken by the Luftwaffe regarding the Caucasus. It is not necessary for me to comment on this. I would just like to call your attention to the questions which I put to the witness Reich Marshal Goering on 18 March; he has already testified regarding the plans of the Allies for the destruction of the Caucasian oil fields. And finally in this connection, Exhibit Number Raeder-41, to be found in the Document Book 3, Page 205, and the following pages, a report of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin, dated 16 March 1940, it deals with the war plans for the year 1940 concerning the tightening of the blockade, the plans regarding the Scandinavian countries and, in addition, the plans for the destruction of the Russian oil wells in the Caucasus. [Turning to the defendant] Admiral, before I deal with the separate campaigns of Greece, Norway, and so forth, I would like to ask you to answer a question which relates to you personally. What decorations did you receive from Hitler?
RAEDER: I received from Hitler in the autumn of 1939 in addition to the Golden Emblem, which I have already mentioned, the Knight's Order to the Iron Cross. Furthermore, in the year 1941 on the occasion of my 65th birthday I received a donation of 250,000 marks. This donation was given to me by Hitler through an adjutant and in connection with that he sent a document. When I thanked him on the very first occasion, he told me that he was giving me this donation as a means of decoration in the same manner as the former rulers of Prussia had given their generals similar donations, whether as sums of money or as a country estate; then he emphasized that Field Marshals Von Hindenburg and Von Mackensen had received donations from him as well.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the passage "Greece." With regard to Greece, the Prosecution has quoted Document C-12, which is GB-226. This is to be found in Document Book Number 10, Page 1. This document deals with the decision on the part of Hitler which was transmitted through the OKW, dated 30 December 1939, signed by Jodl, and we read under Number 1.): "Greek merchant ships in the area around England, declared by the United States to be a barred zone, are to be treated  as enemy vessels." This decision on the part of Hitler was made on the basis of a report by the SKL. What caused you to make this report even though Greece was neutral at the time?
RAEDER: At that time we had received a large number of intelligence reports from our intelligence service that Greek shipping companies apparently with the knowledge of the Greek Government were allowing Greek ships to be chartered by England under favorable conditions. Therefore, these Greek ships were in the service of England and thus were to be treated in the same way as we were treating the English merchantmen. These intelligence reports were confirmed later on to an even greater degree than had been the case in the beginning.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I would like to submit to the High Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-53, to be found in my Document Book 3, Page 258. This document deals with the War Diary kept by the SKL in the month of December 1939. On Page 259, under the date of 19 December, the following entry is made: "Greece has hired out about 20 vessels to ply between the United States, Le Havre and Liverpool." This is confirmed by the reports just mentioned by the defendant. The next entry, on the same page under the date 30 December: "Justified by the sales and chartering of numerous Greek ships to England it has been decreed, with the agreement of the Fuehrer, that Greek ships in the zone from 20 degrees West to 2 degrees East and from 44 degrees North to 62 degrees North shall be considered as hostile craft by U-boats. Attacks to be made invisibly as far as possible." I also submit the following document, Number Raeder-54. This document is taken from the White Book s. It is dated 23 January 1940, and it is a report from the German Embassy at the Hague to the Foreign Office. The heading is: "The Contemplated Chartering of 50 to 60 Greek Ships to the British Government." It is not necessary for me to read it. I should like merely to quote the beginning of the first sentence: "After the British press brought reports at the end of November last year"-that is, 1939-"about the alleged charterings of Greek vessels to British companies"-and so forth-then follows the statement that these 50 to 60 ships are now chartered by British companies. Even though it is not quite accurate historically, I would now like first of all to conclude the question of Greece. In historical sequence Norway should follow now first, but for the sake of coherence I should like to deal with Greece and the occupation of Greece first. In the Document C-152, identical with C-167 or Exhibit GB-122, in the Document Book of the British Delegation Number 10, Page 23, the Prosecution has charged you with the Figure 9 of this lengthy document, specifically Figure 9.)B.)f.).
DR. SIEMERS: It says there: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy requests confirmation of the fact that the whole of Greece is to be occupied even in the case of a peaceful solution. The Fuehrer: Complete occupation is a stipulation for any settlement." This document concerns your report to Hitler of 18 March 1941. What were the reasons for your making this proposal?
RAEDER: In the beginning I had but little knowledge of the political intentions of the Fuehrer as far as Greece was concerned, but I did know of his Directive Number 20, dated 13 December 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, I would like to mention for the assistance of the Court that we are dealing with Document 1541-PS, that is GB-117, Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 270. This directive is dated 13 December 1940.
RAEDER: In this directive the Fuehrer, for the reasons given in Paragraph 1, said that his intention was, as set forth in Paragraph 2: "b.) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to employ this group of forces to occupy the north coast of the Aegean by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland ('Operation Marita'). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected." The next time I heard about these things again was when I heard that the British had landed in southern Greece on 3 March. We learned that on about 5 or 6 March. For this reason I asked the Fuehrer that he occupy all of Greece in order to prevent the British from attacking us from the rear, by air, and from erecting air bases, all of which would hamper the conduct of our war not only in Greece but also in the eastern Mediterranean. The fact was that when a political decision had been made by Hitler of his own accord and without having consulted anyone, I, as Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, always had to draw my strategic conclusions from this political decision and then had to make to him my proposals on naval and on other warfare as far as they concerned me. Since in December he had already considered the possibility that all of Greece would have to be occupied, the case had now actually arisen for me to make this proposal to him for the reason I have already mentioned. When I said "all of Greece," that implied to me and the Naval Command the entire Greek coast, where the British forces might land.
DR. SIEMERS: Your proposal was made about 2 weeks after British troops had landed in Greece?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection I would like to submit Exhibit Raeder-58, in my Document Book 3, Page 271. This is a document contained in the White Book , according to which on 4 January-I beg the Tribunal's pardon. Sir David is right. Document 58 has been rejected and I withdraw it. In this connection I would like to submit Exhibit Number Raeder-59. It is to be found in Document Book 3, Page 273 and is an extract from the White Book . It is the minutes of the French War Committee of 26 April 1940. This document deals with the decision of the War Committee regarding Norway, the Caucasus, Romania, and Greece. I also submit Exhibit Number Raeder-63, in Document Book 3, Page 285, which is an address by the British Secretary of State for India, Amery, dated 1 December 1940. This document also shows plans regarding Greece, a year and a quarter before the time just mentioned by the witness. Now I shall turn to the topic of Norway. [Turning to the defendant.] The British prosecutor, Major Elwyn Jones, considers the attack against Norway a special case in the series of aggressive wars waged by the Nazi conspirators. In this connection he pointed out that, in this case, Hitler did not think of this himself but rather was persuaded by you. Since his point is very important, I should like to ask you to describe this event exactly, and therefore I ask you first of all: When was the first conversation about this matter between you and Hitler?
RAEDER: The first conversation between Hitler and myself concerning the question of Norway was on 10 October 1939, and that was at my request. The reason for this was that we had received reports at various times during the last week of September through our intelligence service of the offices of Admiral Canaris that the British intended to occupy bases in Norway. I recall that after reports to this effect had reached me several times Admiral Canaris visited me himself on one occasion-something he did in very important cases only. And, in the presence of my chief of staff, he gave me a coherent explanation concerning the intelligence reports which had been received. In this connection air bases were constantly mentioned, as well as bases in the south of Norway. Stavanger was mentioned constantly with the airport Sola, and Trondheim was usually mentioned and occasionally Christiansand. During the last days of September I had a telephone conversation with Admiral Carls who was the commander of Navy Group North and was therefore in charge of operations in the Skagerrak, the Kattegat and in the North Sea. This man had obviously received similar reports. He informed me that he had composed a private letter addressed to me, in which he dealt with the question of the danger of Norway's being occupied by British forces and in which he was in a general way dealing with the question as to what disadvantages such a step would have for us, and whether we should have to forestall such an attempt, and also what advantages or disadvantages the occupation of Norway-that is, of the Norwegian coast and the Norwegian bases-by our forces would have. Up until that point I had not concerned myself with the Norwegian question at all, except for the fact I had received these reports.
RAEDER: The arrival of this letter at the end of September or the beginning of October, it must have been about then, impelled me to show it to the Chief of Staff of the SKL and to instruct him to deal with all dispatch with the question of the occupation of Norwegian bases by England, and the other questions which Admiral Carls had dealt with, and to have the questions discussed in the SKL. The advantages and disadvantages of an expansion of the war towards the North had to be considered, not only of an expansion on our part but, above all, an expansion on the part of England; what value, what advantage would accrue to us if we acted first; what disadvantages would result if we had to defend the Norwegian coast? The result of this was the questionnaire mentioned in C-122, GB-82, where the questions were asked: What places were to be used as bases; what the possibility of defense by us would be; whether these ports would have to be developed further; and also, what advantages would result so far as our U-boats were concerned? These questions, as I have already stated, were put to Admiral Doenitz as well, but his answers arrived only after I had made the report on 10 October. I would like to say, by way of introduction, that it was entirely clear to me that if we undertook to occupy these bases we would violate neutrality. But I also knew of the agreement which existed between the German and Norwegian Governments of 2 September regarding neutrality, and I knew the concluding sentence, in this aide memoirs , which is Document TC-31, GB-79, dated 2 September 1939.
DR SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, but I should like to point out, Mr. President, that this document is found in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, at Page 330. [Turning to the defendant.] You have that document before you?
RAEDER: Yes, I have it before me, and I would like to quote the concluding sentence.
DR. SIEMERS: It is the last document in the book, Your Honor, at Page 329.
RAEDER: [Continuing.] The last sentence: "Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government change so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as would be forced upon the Reich Cabinet by the resulting situation." Then, within the next few days, I asked the Chief of Staff of the SKL to submit to me the data which the SKL had prepared during the preceding days and I reported to Hitler on 10 October, because I considered this problem particularly important. It was entirely clear to me that the best possible solution for us would be that Norway should maintain a steadfast neutrality, and I expressed my opinion, as may be seen in Document C-21, GB-194. This is an extract from the War Diary of the SKL.
DR. SIEMERS: It is in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 6.
RAEDER: It says here, on Page 3 of the German version, the next but last paragraph, under the date of 13 January: "Situation discussion with the Chief of the SKL."