dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SCHMIDT: Yes, I should like to add, if I am to pass over the historical events-that is how I understood the question-that the Federal Chancellor accepted the invitation in order to prevent Austria's being reproached for having refused a peaceful attempt to clear up existing differences between Austria and the German Reich. The Chancellor was by no means optimistic, the more so because the existing differences of opinion were very great and also because of the personality of his partner in the talks. I recall that Schuschnigg, before leaving for this meeting, told me that he was of the opinion that instead of him it might have been better to send Professor Wagner-Jauregg, the greatest psychiatrist of Vienna; but he believed, in view of the exposed position of Austria, that he had to accept in order to forestall a coup and to gain time until the international situation should improve in Austria's favor. Unfortunately, we were right. Our fear of a coming attack or of coming difficulties was justified. The fear that Austria would be left entirely alone was also justified. The realization of the fact that we were completely deserted was perhaps one of the primary reasons which carried greatest weight with Schuschnigg together with the need of bridging over this difficult period and gaining time. Austria had to tread this path in the dark winter days from the end of 1937 until March 1938 without the hope of any immediate or prospective assistance. And then we came to Berchtesgaden.
DR. STEINBAUER: As Foreign Minister, did you inform the big powers of the events of Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: Yes. Contrary to frequent press reports, the interested big powers were informed in detail both before and after Berchtesgaden. I gave all the material to the head of the political section to whom the diplomatic corps applied first. The Federal Chancellor himself and I gave detailed reports to the accredited foreign representatives in Vienna and drew their attention to the dangerous situation of the country.
THE PRESIDENT: Forgive my interrupting you. We don't want the details. You said you informed the foreign powers beforehand and after. That is sufficient.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we return to the defendant. Did Dr. SeyssInquart take part in these talks?
SCHMIDT: What talks?
DR. STEINBAUER: The talks in Berchtesgaden.
SCHMIDT: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: He became Minister of the Interior and Police Minister, and went to see Hitler in Berlin. Did he report to Schuschnigg the substance of his first talk with Adolf Hitler?
SCHMIDT: I do not know, but I do know of individual statements by State Secretary Zernatto, the head of the Fatherland Front, from which I can conclude that a conversation between Minister Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart, at which this talk was mentioned, must have taken place.
DR. STEINBAUER: It can therefore be assumed that, through Zernatto, Schuschnigg also learned of it?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I assume so.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we will pass over events until we come to March. Schuschnigg planned a plebiscite. Do you know whether Schuschnigg informed Seyss-Inquart of this and discussed it with him?
SCHMIDT: Yes, Seyss-Inquart was informed of it. I learned that an agreement between Seyss-Inquart and the Federal Chancellor was reached on or about 10 March. The Chancellor told me that Seyss-Inquart had declared himself willing to speak on the radio in favor of the election.
DR. STEINBAUER: When Glaise-Horstenau reported that there was a threat of invasion, did you, in your capacity as Foreign Minister, inform the foreign powers of this?
SCHMIDT: Yes. I did not receive a 'direct report from Glaise-Horstenau. I learned of the critical situation only from the ultimatum which demanded the cancellation of the plebiscite planned by the Federal Chancellor on 13 March. From then on there was constant contact during 11 March with the diplomatic corps in Vienna and later, during the hours which followed, with our foreign representatives also.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then the demands of the German Reich followed closely upon one another. Especially, the demand was made that Schuschnigg should resign. The ministers were assembled, and a member of the Government is said to have told SeyssInquart the following: "We now see clearly that the Reich is putting an end to Austria. It would be best for Seyss-Inquart to take over the office of Chancellor so that the transition may at least be bearable." Do you remember such a statement?
SCHMIDT: No. Only later did I hear of a statement by Minister Glaise-Horstenau which contained this request to Seyss Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have the impression that with the farewell speech of Schuschnigg, the Fatherland Front which was directed by him had also collapsed?
SCHMIDT: I believe the question does not quite fit the situation. The resignation of the Chancellor was demanded by ultimatum; and finally the State itself was taken over, so that the Fatherland Front no longer existed. With the entry of the German troops, National Socialism had become a reality and developments showed that it did not permit the Fatherland Front to live any longer.
DR. STEINBAUER: Seyss-Inquart was then appointed Chancellor. Me set up his Cabinet; and you, Witness, were proposed as Foreign Minister, is that correct?
SCHMIDT: That is correct. I refused. I was approached again, and I refused again, and I was asked to give my reasons. SeyssInquart told me that he intended to keep Austria independent as long as possible; but he was afraid that with his Government, which had a National Socialist majority, he would encounter difficulties in the West. Therefore, he wanted to retain my diplomatic experience and connections for the Government. He added that he intended to create a broader platform for this Government by calling in positive Austrian representatives.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you find the names of such positive Austrians on the list of ministers?
SCHMIDT: There were names of such men. I have been puzzled about it myself, but I cannot recall any individual names with any certainty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know why another list of ministers was drawn up which was the final list?
SCHMIDT: In the evening State Secretary Keppler arrived from Berlin; and as I learned later, he rejected me, and others too, I believe. I think I can remember one name. I believe that he suggested at the request of Berlin that Weber should take over the Foreign Ministry. Thus this list was discarded and Seyss-Inquart no longer tried to persuade me to go back on my decision.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you believe that Seyss-Inquart had the intention of keeping Austria independent, even under National Socialist leadership?
SCHMIDT: As a witness, I can only say what I know. Opinions are very difficult to express. I have stated what he told me.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions to put to this witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: According to a statement by the American Ambassador in Vienna at that time, Mr. Messersmith, Herr Von Papen, at the beginning of his activity in Vienna, is said to have stated that his real task in Vienna was the economic and political incorporation of southeast Europe into Germany, and that south. east Europe was the natural hinterland of Germany. Did you, Witness, ever hear of such a statement?
SCHMIDT: No. In view of the close contact which I had already with Mr. Messersmith before my appointment as a member of the Government, and especially later, I would probably have heard of it. I assume, however, that no special significance was attached to this question at the time, because in first visits between diplomats, as a rule, a tour d'horizon is usually made and questions are discussed which interest both countries, that is, general political questions. Nor did I observe later that a southeast Europe policy was being carried on from the German Legation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: According to Mr. Messersmith, Herr Von Papen is supposed to have said at that time that he was working to weaken and undermine the Austrian Government. Did the witness Messersmith report such a statement by Herr Von Papen to you?
SCHMIDT: No.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the Austrian Government consider it advisable and necessary to normalize relations with the Reich by an agreement in July 1936?
SCHMIDT: Yes. I have already explained the reasons for conducting a realistic policy which were of an economic nature and based on foreign policy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In these and in later negotiations, did the international political situation, particularly the settlement of the Party question, also have a part in deciding this?
SCHMIDT: Of course, it was the task of the Government to ease inner political tension. The Federal Chancellor had to try to find a way out of the difficult situation which he had inherited from Dollfuss by liquidating the inner political fronts.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you believe that Herr Von Papen concluded the July 1936 Agreement with treacherous intent?
SCHMIDT: No, I have no reason to disbelieve that he considered this agreement a serious endeavor to create a modus vivendi between Austria and the Reich. The fact that it resulted in a modus male vivendi does not alter this.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the Germans complain that after the Agreement of 11 July 1936 there was no essential change in the inner political course of the Austrian Government?
SCHMIDT: Yes, many reproaches were made; and thus we come to the last and the real cause of the conflict with the Reich. The struggle against National Socialism within the country in the interests of maintaining the independence of the country and, on the basis of the Agreement of 11 July, insuring co-operation with the German Reich, whose leaders were-National Socialists-these were the two imperative demands which, after a time, the Austrian Government found to be irreconcilable. This also explains the difficulties encountered by all persons entrusted with carrying out this agreement in Vienna, including the German Minister.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As a result of these conditions, particularly those arising out of the July Agreement, were questions of internal policy, such as questions of policy and personnel of the so-called National Opposition, the subject of discussions between the Federal Chancellor and Herr Von Papen?
SCHMIDT: The situation as just described shows that such discussions were unavoidable; and tallies on the inner political situation also took place between the Chancellor and the German Minister, as well as with the Italian Minister, in a general way that is not unusual. I know of no diplomatic memoirs which do not contain such entries. The Chancellor would never have tolerated interference of any kind. In questions of personnel Schuschnigg was especially reticent, because, if I may say so, he was afraid of "Trojan Horses." That, more or less, represents the situation which was discussed in talks between the Chancellor and the German Minister.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen make it clear that he was opposed to the methods of the illegal Party?
SCHMIDT: Yes. According to the information received by the Government, Papen opposed the leaders of the illegal Party, that is, Leopold in particular. This was doubtless due to fundamental differences, differing political ideas and differing political methods, which Von Papen on the one hand and the leaders of the illegal Party on the other were determined to pursue.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen, on the basis of the July Agreement, ever adopt an aggressive attitude in Austrian foreign policy?
SCHMIDT: There existed between Austria and the Reich, not only in cultural and inner political relations, but also in the field of foreign policy, irreconcilable differences of opinion. I will only mention the demand of the Reich that Austria should leave the League of Nations, which we rejected by pointing to the fact that Austria, by reason of her geographical position and her history, had a continental mission, and also to the loans received from the League of Nations. A second point was Austria's attitude. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is this at all answering the questions that you have put to him?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He is introducing the answer to the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Try and get on with the answer to it, will you? Get the witness on to the answer rather than the introduction.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to know whether Herr Von Papen took advantage of the opportunities for an aggressive intervention in Austrian foreign policy in the individual cases mentioned by you.
SCHMIDT: I wanted to say that in spite of the deeply rooted differences this did not occur and that an ambassador with a more radical point of view would certainly have had the opportunity and the occasion to adopt a more severe attitude towards Austria. There was not a single case where we reached an agreement with the German Reich on a joint foreign policy. Von Papen did remind us of that, but that was all. As for aggression, or aggressive activities, I cannot say anything about this.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On the contrary, did Herr Von Papen act on occasion as mediator? I would like to recall the Pinkafeld case.
SCHMIDT: The Pinkafeld flag incident is an example of Von Papen's activity as mediator. In itself it was a minor incident, but it led to threats of invasion by Hitler. Von Papen was called to Berlin and had a great deal of difficulty in calming down Hitler's fury, who, as I said, threatened to invade Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, if it is convenient to you, it would be more convenient to the Tribunal if you spoke a little faster.
SCHMIDT: He succeeded in settling the matter and there were no consequences.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He settled the matter. Did Herr Von Papen speak to you about the reasons for his being recalled on 4 February 1938?
SCHMIDT: On the occasion of a visit on the 5th he expressed his astonishment-and I might say his anger-at his being recalled, which in his opinion and also in our opinion was due to the events of 4 February 1938, the dismissal of General Von Fritsch and of 30 other generals, and the dismissal of Von Neurath. He thought that Austria would not be unaffected either, especially in view of the man who had been proposed to succeed him. At that time, Burckel or Consul General Kriebel was proposed. That was approximately what Von Papen said to me and I believe also to the Federal Chancellor.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then he believed and feared that his successor would adopt a more severe policy against Austria?
SCHMIDT: That conclusion was inevitable in view of the two persons just mentioned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Von Papen take part in the pressure exerted on you and Schuschnigg in the Berchtesgaden talks?
SCHMIDT: No, he did not.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On the contrary, did he not, insofar as he had any opportunity of taking part in the negotiations, attempt to tone down Hitler's demands?
SCHMIDT: In view of the atmosphere of violence which prevailed and the program of demands which was presented, this was not difficult. I believe that he, like many others who were present, endeavored to restore calm and thus enable the negotiations to proceed in an atmosphere of reason.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the course of the negotiations, a number of concessions were made. Do you believe that Von Papen's attitude and his part in these negotiations had a restraining effect, and led to your obtaining these practical results?
SCHMIDT: His attitude on the whole was no doubt mediatory. One cannot speak of success at Berchtesgaden as far as the result is concerned; but that is not Von Papen's fault.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, do you think you will be able to finish in a few moments?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. [Turning to the witness.] In order to answer my question I believe it would be better if you would not consider the final result of Berchtesgaden but rather the fact that Hitler had presented to you a very large program of demands going far beyond the final results, and if you would consider that actually some points which were of great importance to you were changed in the course of the negotiations.
SCHMIDT: As far as there was any help coming from the other side it came from Von Papen.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you perhaps recall that the Hitler-Schuschnigg negotiations were especially violent because Hitler was trying to win Schuschnigg over to his German attitude and Von Papen came to Schuschnigg's aid and thereby put Schuschnigg in a better position to negotiate than at the beginning?
SCHMIDT: I was not present for the first hour or two of the talk. I cannot answer the question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: My last question is this: Did Herr Von Papen, after 26 February, the day on which he took leave of the Austrian President, still carry on any official activity in Vienna?
SCHMIDT: No; the Vienna Embassy was administered by the Charge d'Affaires, Embassy Counsellor Von Stein, who made the two official demarches of the Reich, on the afternoon of the 9th or the morning of the 10th, against the plebiscite planned by Schuschnigg. Von Stein, together with General Muff and State Secretary Keppler, also handed to the Austrian President the ultimatum demanding the resignation of Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg. This shows that Ambassador Von Papen was no longer active.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess until a quarter past two. [The Tribunal recessed until 1415  hours.] Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Saturday.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I ask the indulgence of the Court and have permission to put one more question to witness Schmidt, a question which I had overlooked putting before the recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, in November 1937, in the course of measures introduced against the illegal movements, certain materials were confiscated which were given the name "Tafs papers." Is Herr Von Papen referred to personally in these "Tafs papers"?
SCHMIDT: As far as I can recollect, a number of documents were discovered one after the other along with this material which we called the "Tafs plan." I think I can remember that in one of these documents Papen was mentioned. An attempt on the life of the German Ambassador to Vienna was to be the cause for internal disturbances in Austria, which were to be followed by repressive measures by the Government; and then later this was to lead to measures on the part of the German Reich. I cannot remember the details of that plan any more.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: With the permission of the Tribunal, I should now like to put a few questions to this witness. Dr. Schmidt, when and on what occasion did you meet Herr Von Neurath?
SCHMIDT: I met Von Neurath in November 1937 in Berlin, where I paid him a visit in response to his invitation.
DR. VON  LUDINGHAUSEN: Can you tell us what attitude Von Neurath, as German Foreign Minister, had with regard to the relations of the German Reich with Austria? In particular, can you tell us his views regarding the Agreement of 11 July 1936? In this connection I should like to draw your attention to the fact that the Prosecution has alleged that, as it is expressed, Von Neurath concluded this agreement in a deceptive way.
SCHMIDT: During the few times I met Von Neurath he always expressed the view that he was in favor of an independent Austria, and together with this he wanted the closest possible co-operation in the foreign political, economic, and military spheres. Our negotiations always proceeded on the basis of the 11th of July Agreement, and differences of opinion arose only about the interpretation of the agreement. Neurath, on behalf of the German Government, held that the agreement should, if possible, work actively in his interest, while we, for defensive reasons, preferred a different interpretation. At any rate, Neurath rejected means of violence and followed approximately the line of an Austria which was independent, but as close as possible to Germany.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was Neurath's attitude toward the extreme factions of the Party in the Reich which, in practice, followed a policy of intervention in the internal affairs of Austria?
SCHMIDT: As I already mentioned, Neurath rejected methods of violence, and with them the methods of intervention, and also the methods of the illegal party in Austria. From conversations which I had with him I believe that I can state this unequivocally. This is also attested by his complete rejection of the activity of State Secretary Keppler and Veesenmeyer, who were certainly among the pioneers of the new development in the Southeast and primarily in Austria. The expressions which he used in that connection allow no doubt regarding his attitude.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for the Defendants Frank and Hess): Mr. President, may I have permission to represent my colleague Dr. Stahmer, who is absent, and put a few questions on behalf of Defendant Goering to the witness?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have just stated that in November 1937 you paid an official visit to Berlin?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: On that occasion, did you also talk to the then Field Marshal Goering?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that even at that time Field Marshal Goering already told you that the Austrian problem could only be solved by the complete union of the two sister nations, that is to say, by the annexation of Austria to the Reich, and that he for his part would do everything to achieve that end?
SCHMIDT: It was not told me in those words. The former Reich Marshal probably did refer in an insistent way to close co-operation with Austria, but a demand for an Anschluss was not mentioned, as far as I can remember. As an illustration of that, I might say that at that time the events of 25 July 1934 were discussed. I expressed the view that the Agreement of July 1936 ought to put a final touch to that development, and Reich Marshal Goering stated that he had called the wire-puller of this affair to account-I believe he mentioned Habicht-and had banished him to some obscure part of Germany. From this remark alone it appears, therefore, that there can have been no talk of an Anschluss. The former Reich Marshal welcomed the development caused by the 11th of July 1936, that is, that a full stop had been put to the then existing development, which one had to describe as a state of war, as it had been up to the 11th of July 1936.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on the morning of the Anschluss, that is to say, the morning of 12 March 1938, Goering had you come to Berlin by airplane?
SCHMIDT: No. That was either Monday or Tuesday; it must have been the 15th or 16th.
DR. SEIDL: When you were in Berlin, did he put the question to you whether you yourself or Schuschnigg had asked for help from foreign powers, military help, on the day before the Anschluss?
SCHMIDT: I cannot remember having heard that question.
DR. SEIDL: You stated this morning that with the Anschluss National Socialism in Austria became a reality. I now ask you, was not National Socialism also a political reality in Austria even before the Anschluss?
SCHMIDT: Yes, certainly a political reality, but I am talking of a political reality in the sense of an organized power in the State.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid you are going a little too fast- well, I do not know what it was. Anyhow, you had better repeat it, because the interpreters do not seem to have it.
DR. SEIDL: The question was whether or not National Socialism in Austria had been a political reality even before the Anschluss, and I put this question with reference to the fact that the witness had said this morning that National Socialism did not become a reality in Austria until the German troops marched in.
SCHMIDT: By the term "political reality" I meant that National Socialism had then got the State power into its hands, because until then it represented a prohibited party, which of course after the agreement of February 12 was supposed to be drawn within the framework of the Fatherland Front for responsible co-operation in political affairs. In other words, I wanted to show the basic change which came about for National Socialism with the arrival of the German troops.
DR. SEIDL: Now, one last question: After the Anschluss, did you not repeatedly tell the Reich Marshal that the Fatherland Front, on the occasion of the Anschluss, collapsed like a house of cards?