dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SCHACHT: I knew perfectly well that bare economic and general political statements would of course accomplish nothing with Von Brauchitsch because he would then certainly have referred to Hitler's leadership. Therefore I wanted to say to him something of quite a different nature and, in my opinion, that is of the most decisive significance. I was going to remind him that he had sworn an oath of allegiance to the Weimar Constitution. I wanted to remind him that the Enabling Act did not delegate power to Hitler but to the Reich Cabinet and I wanted to remind him that in the Weimar Constitution there was and still is a clause, which has never been annulled and according to which, war cannot be declared without previous approval by the Reichstag. I was convinced that Brauchitsch would have referred me to his oath sworn to Hitler and I would have told him: '`I also have sworn this oath. You have sworn no oath other than your military one, perhaps, but this oath does not in any way invalidate the oath sworn to the Weimar Constitution; on the contrary, the oath to the Weimar Constitution is the one that is valid. It is your duty, therefore, to see to it that this entire question of war or no war be brought before the Cabinet and discussed there, and when the Reich Cabinet has made a decision, the matter will go before the Reichstag." If these two steps had been taken, then I am firmly convinced that there would have been no war. DR. DIX: You never reached Brauchitsch. We do not want to repeat the description of that whole affair or of your attempts at the Bendlerstrasse and so on. Have you anything to add to Gisevius' testimony or do you wish to change anything in it? SCHACHT: I can only confirm that Gisevius' statement is correct in every single point and I myself merely want to add that Canaris mentioned among many reasons which then kept us from making the visit, that Brauchitsch would probably have us arrested immediately if we said anything to him against the war or if we wanted to prevent him from fulfilling his oath of allegiance to Hitler.
SCHACHT: But the main reason why the visit did not come about was quite correctly stated by Gisevius. Moreover it is also mentioned by General Thomas in his affidavit which we shall later submit. The main reason was: the war was canceled. And so I went to Munich on a business matter and to my surprise while in Munich, war was declared on Poland; the country was invaded. DR. DIX: You mentioned the Reichstag a short time ago. A meeting of the Reichstag did in fact take place, though not before 546 2 May 46 the war or before the declaration of war, but immediately thereafter. At the time you were still a Minister without Portfolio. Normally you would have had to sit on the minister's bench during that meeting. Did you take part in that meeting? SCHACHT: I did not participate in that meeting at all and I would like to add at once that during the entire war, I was present at only one meeting of the Reichstag. I could not avoid it, considering the matters which I already mentioned here yesterday. It was after Hitler's return from Paris. I had to participate in this meeting of the Reichstag, which followed the reception at the station because, as I said, it would otherwise have been too obvious an affront. It was the meeting during which political matters were not dealt with at all, but at which the field marshal's rank was granted by the dozen. DR. DIX: Now, this last effort which has just been mentioned to stop the outbreak of war through Canaris brings us to the particular chapter of your attempts at a coup to overthrow Hitler and his government. We want to make it a rule, if possible, not to repeat what the witness Gisevius has already stated but only to supplement or correct or state what you know from your own memory. Before I touch upon that chapter, however, may I ask you whether you know from information you received or from other indications, that your oppositional attitude and that of your similarly minded friends, and your oppositional aims, were known in authoritative circles abroad?
SCHACHT: SCHACHT: I do not wish to repeat anything; I merely want to point out that I have already stated repeatedly here that I continually discussed the situation in Germany-thus also my own position-with my friends abroad-not only with Americans, Englishmen, and Frenchmen but also with neutrals-and I would like to add one more thing; foreign broadcasting stations did not tire at all of speaking constantly about Schacht's opposition to Hitler. My friends and family received a shock whenever information on this subject transpired in Germany. DR. DIX: When did your attempts to overthrow the Hitler government begin? SCHACHT: As early as 1937 I tried to determine which groups in Germany one might rely upon in an attempt to remove the Hitler regime. Unfortunately in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937, I got to know that all those circles in which I had placed my hope were failing, namely the scientists, the educated middle class, and the leaders of economy. 547 2 May 46 I need only mention that the scientists permitted themselves to listen to the most nonsensical National Socialist lectures without opposing them in the least. I call attention to the fact that when the economic leaders saw that I was no longer a figure in economy, they disappeared from my anteroom and thronged into that of Goering. In a word, one could not rely upon these circles. Consequently, one could depend only on the generals, on the military, because according to my conception at the time, one could certainly count on an armed resistance even by the SS bodyguard. Therefore, as has been stated here-and I do not want to pursue it further-I tried at first to contact such generals as Kluge, for instance, merely in order to ascertain whether among the military there were people with whom one could speak openly. And this first occasion led me to a great many generals whom I contacted in the course of time. DR. DIX: That was then in the year 1937; now we come to 1938, still limiting ourselves by what Gisevius has already said, merely touching on it briefly and confirming it.
SCHACHT: By the way, were you in any way directly or indirectly involved in the negotiations at Godesberg or Munich? SCHACHT: In no way. DR. DIX: Now we continue with your political work, aiming at a revolt. Is Gisevius' account of the year 1938 correct or is there something to be added to it? SCHACHT: Gisevius' statement is complete and reliable. DR. DIX: That also applies to the attempt at a coup d'etat in the late summer of 1938? SCHACHT: Yes. DR. DIX: Then came the war. Did you fold your arms after war broke out? SCHACHT: No; throughout the entire war I pleaded with every general whom I could contact. I used the same arguments which I have just mentioned in connection with the prospective interview with Brauchitsch; therefore, it was not merely theory, but I actually spoke to all these generals. DR. DIX: Was not a visit to General Hoeppner significant in this connection? SCHACHT: In 1941 I tried not only to get in touch with General Hoeppner but in a whole series of conversations I attempted to make him take action. Hoeppner was perfectly willing and prepared and later he too, unfortunately, lost his life as a consequence of 20 July 1944. 548 2 May 46 In the year 1942-and this has not been mentioned here up to now, because Gisevius did not participate-I tried again to mobilize General Von Witzleben to renewed activity. I went on a special journey to Frankfurt-on-the-Main, where he had his headquarters at that time, and Von Witzleben proved as ever to be completely resolved to act, but he told me that, of course, he could only do so if he again received a command at the front. Then I... DR. DIX: At that time Frau Strunck, who knew of these matters, was in Frankfurt? SCHACHT: She knew of these things and can confirm them. DR. DIX: Perhaps I may tell the Tribunal at this point that Frau Strunck was granted me as a witness and she was here. In order to save time, however, I have decided to dispense with this witness since she could make only cumulative statements on what Gisevius has already said and I do not think it is necessary.
SCHACHT: Schacht himself has just stated the only piece of information which she could have added, namely this trip, this special journey to Frankfurt to Von Witzleben. On the strength of experience the Tribunal will itself know that in the course of a revolutionary movement, stretching over years such as this, many journeys are made and in respect to this particular journey it is not important to submit special evidence. In order to save time, therefore, I have decided to dispense with the testimony of Frau Strunck. Excuse me, I merely wanted to say this now. Then there is the next... SCHACHT: May I perhaps say one more thing? I of course always participated in the conversations-mentioned by Gisevius here-with the other generals, that is the group of Beck, Fromm, Olbricht, et cetera. These things did not come about for some time an account of the negotiations abroad for which the generals were always waiting. I think that enough has been said here about this topic and I need not make further report on it. I come then to one last point, which does not become apparent from Gisevius' statement but about which an affidavit from Colonel Gronau will be submitted here. I can mention it quite briefly in order to save time. Naturally, together with the group of Beck, Goerdeler, my friend Strunck, Gisevius, and others I was completely informed of, and initiated into, the affair of 20 July. However, and I think it was mutual, we told each other whenever possible only those things which the other absolutely had to know, in order not to embarrass the other man, should he at any time be submitted to the tortures of the Gestapo. For that reason, apart from being in touch with Beck, Goerdeler, Gisevius, and Strunck, et cetera, I had another connection with the generals who were at the head of this revolt and that was the General of Artillery Lindemann, one of the main participants in the coup, who unfortunately also lost his life later. 549 2 May 46 DR.
SCHACHT: DIX: Perhaps it would be proper-and also more intelligible in connection with your participation in 20 July-if I read a brief part of Colonel Gronau's affidavit which refers to Lindemann. [Turning to the Tribunal.] It is Exhibit Number 39 of our document book, Page 168 of the German text and Page 176 of the English text. Is shall omit the first part of the affidavit, but I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it; essentially it contains only matters on which evidence has already been given. I shall read only the part that deals with 20 July. It begins on Page 178 of the English text and on Page 170 of the German text, and I start with Question 5: "Question 5) You brought Schacht and General Lindemann together. When was that? '`Answer 5) In the fall of 1943, for the first time in years, I again saw General Lindemann, my former school and regiment comrade. While discussing politics I told him that I knew Schacht well, and General Lindemann asked to be introduced to him, whereupon I established the connection. "Question 6) What did Lindemann expect from Schacht, and what was Schacht's attitude toward him? "Answer 6) The taking up of political relations with foreign countries following a successful attempt at revolt. He promised his future co-operation. At the beginning of 1944 Lindemann made severe reproaches that the generals"- that should read "he severely reproached Lindemann"; it is incorrectly copied here-"because the generals were hesitating so long. The attempt at revolt would have to be made prior to the landing of the Allies. "Question 7) Was Lindemann involved in the attempted assassination of 20 July 1944? "Answer 7) Yes, he was one of the main figures "Question 8) Did he inform Schacht of the details of this plan? "Answer 8) Nothing about the manner in which the attempt was to be carried out; he did inform him, however, of what was to happen thereafter. "Question 9) Did Schacht approve the plan? "Answer 9) Yes. "Question 10) Did Schacht put himself at the disposal of the military in the event of a successful attempt? "Answer 10) Yes.
SCHACHT: "Question 11) Were you arrested after 20 July 1944? "Answer 11) Yes. 550 2 May 46 "Question 12) How were you able to survive your imprisonment? "Answer 12) By stoically denying complicity." Now, we have left the years 1941 and 1942 and to explain the Putsch in logical sequence we reached the year 1944, something that could not be avoided, but we must now go back again to the year 1941. You have already mentioned, in passing, the efforts made abroad. In 1941 you were in Switzerland. Did you make any efforts in that direction there? SCHACHT: Every time I went abroad I talked at length to my foreign friends and again and again looked for some way by which one might shorten the war and begin negotiations. DR. DIX: In this connection, the Fraser letter is of importance. I think the Fraser letter and the way it was smuggled into Switzerland has been sufficiently discussed by the witness Gisevius. I have on two occasions stated the contents briefly, once when the translation was discussed and again during the discussion on the admissibility of the letter as evidence before the Court. I do not think I need do it here nor that I need read it. I should merely like to submit it. It is Exhibit 31, on Page 84 of the German and Page 91 of the English text. And-I say this now, we shall discuss it later- the same applies to the article which appeared this year in the Baster Nachrichten and which deals with a conversation which an American had with Schacht recently. I shall not read that either since I have already stated the main points of its contents. I submit it as Exhibit Number 32, Page 90 of the German text and Page 99 of the English text. I might point out that this article has already been the subject of certain accusations made during the crossexamination of Gisevius by the representative of the Soviet Prosecution. GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to raise one objection in regard to Document 32; this is an article about Dr. Schacht and his ideas by an unknown writer describing his conversations with an unknown economist.
SCHACHT: The article in question was published in the Baster Nachrichten on 14 January 1946, that is, when the present Trial was already well under way, and I cannot consider that this article can be presented in evidence with regard to Schacht's case. DR. DIX: I might-may I, before the Tribunal decides, say some thing very briefly? THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. DR. DIX: The article has already been admitted as evidence. We have discussed it, and the Tribunal approved the article as evidence The Tribunal can, of course, revoke that decision. I think, for me it would... 551 2 May 96 THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal has always made it clear that the allowance of these documents is a provisional allowance and that when the document is actually offered in evidence, they will then decide the relevancy or its admissibility, rather, and its relevancy. DR. DIX: That is quite beyond doubt. I merely wanted to point out that we have already discussed the question once before. Of course, the Tribunal can today reject the document. I shall... THE PRESIDENT: The allowance is provisional It is not a question of the Tribunal's reversing its previous decision. The previous decision was merely provisional, and the question of admissibility now comes up for decision. DR. DIX: It is quite clear to me, Your Lordship. I am merely surprised at the objection raised by the Soviet Prosecution, inasmuch as the representative of the Soviet Delegation himself referred to that article in his observations during the cross-examination of the witness Gisevius. It is true, he did not submit it to the Tribunal but he referred to it in his observations to the witness Gisevius. However, if the Tribunal has the slightest objections to allowing the article as documentary evidence, then I shall ask permission to leave it. I will then-and I think I may-ask the witness Schacht whether it is true that in 1941 he had a conversation with an American who was a professor of national economy, a conversation which dealt with the possibility of peace.
SCHACHT: I leave it to the Tribunal For me, it is no-I thought it would be simpler, if I submitted the article. THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, as you have raised the objection to this document, what have you to say about the point that Dr. Dix makes that you used the document yourself in crossexamination? GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, we did not use this document in the cross-examination of the witness Gisevius. An explanatory question was asked in order to reach a decision on this point and I particularly emphasize... THE PRESIDENT: Will you say that again? I did not understand you. GEN. RUDENKO: I say that we did not use this document during the cross-examination of the witness Gisevius, but we did ask an explanatory question in order that when the document was presented by Dr. Dix, we could object to it as being of no probative value. I especially... THE PRESIDENT: But did you not put the contents of the document to Gisevius? I do not remember. What I want to know is did you not put the contents of the document? 552 2 May 46 GEN. RUDENKO: No, no, we did not submit the contents, and we did not discuss the substance of the document. We merely asked a question-did the witness Gisevius know about the article in the Baster Nachrichten of 14 January 1946? That was the question, and the witness answered that it was known to him. DR. DIX: May I say one more thing? It appears to me that the Soviet Delegation does not desire to have the article submitted as evidence. I therefore withdraw it as evidence. And since I have no due reasons to the contrary, no factual reason to the contrary, I can certainly fulfill this wish of the Soviet Delegation. I would like the Tribunal to consider the matter as settled. May I now put my question? [Turning to the defendant.] Well, you had conversations in Switzerland? SCHACHT: Yes. DR. DIX: What was the subject of these conversations, in broad outlines, and with whom did you have them? SCHACHT: This article, which has just been discussed... MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First, Your Honor, may I interpose an objection?
SCHACHT: The reason I did not join in the Soviet objection to this document was that I want to know who this economist is. I vacant to check this thing. There are very peculiar circumstances about this document and I object to his retelling a conversation with an unknown economist. All I ask is that he identify time and place and person with whom he had his conversation, so that we can do a little verifying of this effort to get something before the Tribunal that did not appear until 1946. DR. DIX: The question is now being given a significance which its comparative triviality really does not merit. I shall, therefore, dispense with this question too. Please do not now refer to the conversation with the professor, and I shall leave it to the Prosecution to put the question which Mr. Justice Jackson has just mentioned during cross-examination. Well, your conversations in Switzerland, then, excepting that with the unknown professor. SCHACHT: Yes, I tried again and again to shorten the war and to bring about some form of mediation which I always sought for particularly through the good offices of the American President. That is all that I can say here. I do not think I need go into details. DR. DIX: Very well. Did you in your letters to Ribbentrop and Goering-you have already mentioned Hitler-or besides, did you, 553 2 May 46 during the war, state your views about the policy of the war in writing at any time? First of all, as far as Hitler was concerned. SCHACHT: I mentioned my discussion with Hitler in February 1940. In the summer of 1941 I wrote a detailed letter to Hitler, and the witness Lammers has admitted its existence. I do not think he was asked about the contents of this letter here, or he was not allowed to talk about it. If I may come back to it; in that letter, I pointed out somewhat as follows-I shall use direct language- "You are at present at the height of your success."-This was after the first Russian victories.-"The enemy believes that you are stronger than you really are.
SCHACHT: The alliance with Italy is rather a doubtful one, since Mussolini will one day fall and then Italy will drop out. Whether Japan can still come to your aid at all is questionable in view of Japan's weakness in the face of America. I assume that the Japanese will not be so foolish as to wage war against America. The output of steel, for instance, in spite of approximately similar population figures, amounts to one-tenth of the American production. I do not think, therefore, that Japan will enter into the war. I now recommend you at all events to reverse foreign policy completely and to attempt with every means to conclude a peace." DR. DIX: Did you state your views to Ribbentrop during the war? SCHACHT: I do not know when it was. On one occasion Herr Von Ribbentrop conveyed to me through his State Secretary, Herr Von Weizsacker, the reproachful message that I should not indulge in defeatist remarks. That may have been in 1940 or in 1941, during one of those 2 years. I asked where I had made defeatist remarks and it appeared that I had talked to my colleague Funk and had given him extensive reasons why Germany could never win this war. I held this conviction unchangeable at all times before and during the war, even after the fall of France. I answered Ribbentrop through his State Secretary that I, as Minister without Portfolio, considered it my duty to state my opinion to a ministerial colleague in its true conception, and in this written reply I maintained the view that Germany's economic power was not sufficient to wage this war. This letter, that is, a copy of this letter was sent both to Minister Funk and to Minister Ribbentrop through his State Secretary. DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, this would be a suitable moment . . . The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours. 554 2 May 46 Afternoon Session DR. DIX: I spoke before of 20 July. Do you recall a statement made by Hitler about you in connection with 20 July? SCHACHT: Codefendant Minister Speer was present and told me about it. It was on 22 July 1944 when Hitler issued the order to his circle for my arrest.