dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON PAPEN: I should like to make the following remarks about your explanation, Sir David. Here in this report we are concerned with a change in the Austrian Government, with Prince Starhemherg and the Heimwehr involved. You know that Starhemberg and the Heimwehr had allied themselves with Mussolini against the German Reich. A loosening-up of this inner-political front which was working against the interests of a union could be only advantageous, in the light of my policy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But what I do not understand is this. You see, you have said, "In spite of the Vice Chancellor's clear victory and of the diligent efforts of the Austrian press.. ." and you go on to say, ". . .every new weakening of the system is of advantage." You see, Prince Starhemberg and the Italian party, according to you, had won, because you say, "In spite of..." this ". . . clear victory." Then you say, "every new weakening of the system." That could not be Starhemberg's alliance, because that had been successful. By "the system" you mean the Government of Austria, do you not? You cannot mean anything else. My Lord, perhaps I should not continue the argument. But it is a somewhat complicated subject.
VON PAPEN: Yes, it is.
THE PRESIDENT: I was thinking that you should perhaps draw attention to the few remaining sentences.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, certainly I will read on: "The continuation of negotiations for a settlement which I had recommended since the Geneva declaration, seems to be entirely superfluous for the time being. It will be a good thing to continue the increasingly excited public feeling against the Italian trend by clever and tactful handling via the press without, however, giving the Government justifiable cause for having recourse to the desperate measure of starting a new propaganda campaign against us. I would be very grateful if the Reich Minister for Propaganda were to put a few experienced journalists to work in this connection. "For the rest, we can confidently leave further developments to the near future. I am convinced that the shifting of powers on the European chess board will permit us in the not too distant future to take up actively the question of influencing the southeastern area." Extraordinary-if I may so-extraordinary how Mr. Messersmith had got your ideas if you had never had this conversation with him, was it not? My Lord, perhaps this will be a convenient time to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time.
VON PAPEN: But may I come back to that question tomorrow?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. [The Tribunal adjourned until 19 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant Von Neurath is absent. [The Defendant Von Papen resumed the stand.]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just before we leave Mr. Messersmith, Defendant, I want to ask you three questions about the other countries in southeastern Europe that Mr. Messersmith mentioned. Did you know that the German Foreign Office financed and directed the Henlein movement among the Sudetendeutschen?
VON PAPEN: I do not believe that I learned of that at that time. In 1935, when this report was written, the Sudeten German question was not acute.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When did you learn about it?
VON PAPEN: Mainly here in this room.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Did you know that the Reich was supporting Mr. Codreanu and the Iron Guard in Romania?
VON PAPEN: I believe that that was also much later.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You learned that sometime later than 1935, did you? When did you learn that?
VON PAPEN: I cannot say; but I believe that events in connection with the Iron Guard in Romania took place about 1937. I may be wrong; but I do not think so.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think perhaps you have the microphone a little too near you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, I am sorry. [Turning to the defendant.] Did you know that in 1944 you were discussed in a Reich state paper edited by the Defendant Kaltenbrunner as being a possible person to do the same thing in Hungary, to arrange for Hungary's acquisition by the Reich, doing the internal work inside Hungary in order that Hungary should be acquired? Did you know that?
VON PAPEN: No. In the first place, I did not know that; and in the second place I may say that the idea is impossible, because I was a close friend of the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy. In my interrogatory to Admiral Horthy I asked him a question which he unfortunately failed to answer because he did not remember. It says that in the autumn of 1943 the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Keresctes-Fischer, handed me a document showing that German or German and Hungarian forces wanted to bring about the incorporation of Hungary into the Reich through a revolt. At Regent Horthy's desire, I at once handed this document over to Herr Von Ribbentrop and asked him to take the appropriate measures to prevent it. That is all set down in the files, and the Hungarian Minister of the Interior will be able to confirm it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see my point. I do not mind whether you would have taken it or not. The point that I am putting is that you were the choice. Don't you know that? You know the document I am referring to, D-679, with many comments by Kaltenbrunner, in which you were discussed as being the possible person to do the internal work in Hungary. My Lord, it is Page 78 of Document Book 11, and Page 46 of the German Document Book 11.
VON PAPEN: Sir David, I went over this note the day before yesterday after you submitted it here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will not trouble you with it if you only learned it here. The only point I want to know is this. Did you know in 1944 that you were being suggested in a German state document as being the person who might do the internal work in Hungary in order that Hungary might be acquired by the Reich? If you say you do not know, I shall not trouble you with it any further. You say you only knew that since the day before yesterday?
VON PAPEN: Yes, and in the second place, it is a historical fact that I repeatedly opposed these efforts in Hungary which aimed in one way or another, ultimately by occupation, at making Hungary a part of the German Reich. I considered that the most mistaken and most impossible policy imaginable.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will not trouble you about the documents since you have not known; we will come to another point. You remember Gauleiter Rainer, the gentleman with whom you had the fortuitous and I am sure very interesting talk on the eve of the Anschluss; Dr. Rainer, the witness? I would just like you to look at Dr. Rainer's view of the position when you took over, and tell the Tribunal whether you agree with that. My Lord, it is Page 6 of Document Book 11; the document is 812-PS. It starts on Page 6 and the passage which I am going to refer to is on Page 8. Have you got the passage that begins: "Thus began the first phase of battle, which ended with the July uprising of 1934. The decision for the July uprising was right; but many mistakes were made in carrying it out. The result was the complete destruction of the organization, the loss of entire groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the 'Altreith,' and, with regard to the political relationship between Germany and Austria, a formal acknowledgement of the existence of the Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram to Papen, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the two States, the Fuehrer liquidated the first stage of the battle and began a new method of political penetrations" Would you agree that that is a correct description of your work, "a new method of political penetration"?
VON PAPEN: No, Sir David. That is a very inaccurate description of my activity.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you don't agree with Dr. Rainer, tell me-you know, you must know very well, the witness Dr. Paul Schmidt. You know him?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well. Now I think you will agree with me that he is one of the personalities against whom nobody had said a word during this Trial. Do you agree? I haven't heard a word of criticism of Paul Schmidt. Don't you agree with me?
VON PAPEN: Do you mean the witness-the interpreter Schmidt or the Foreign Minister Schmidt?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Paul Schmidt, the interpreter.
VON PAPEN: Paul Schmidt, the interpreter. I will give you my opinion on that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you agree that he is a trustworthy person or not? Do you say that he is not a trustworthy person?
VON PAPEN: I have nothing to say against the human qualities of Herr Schmidt, but I have a very strong objection to the fact that Herr Schmidt takes the liberty of criticizing my political activities in Austria.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, before you explain it, just have a look at it. You will find Dr. Paul Schmidt's affidavit on Page 41 of Document Book 11, that is Page 37 of the German document book, Document 3308-PS. Now just listen to Dr. Paul Schmidt's view, Paragraph 8: "Plans for the annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi program from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder of Dollfuss necessitated a more cautious approach to this problem for a time; but the application of sanctions against Italy by the League of Nations plus the rapid increase of German military strength, made the resumption of thee Austrian program safer. When Goering visited Rome early in 1937, he declared that the union of Austria and Germany was inevitable and must be expected sooner or later. Mussolini, hearing these words in German, remained silent and uttered only a mild protest when I translated them into French. The consummation of the Anschluss was essentially a Party matter, in which Von Papen's role was to preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more devious ways of preparing conditions for the expected move." Then, Defendant, so that we are being quite clear, he makes a mistake, and it is a speech of Hitler's on 18 February to which, unfortunately, the translator has put your name. I am not relying on that. But what I do want to know whether you agree with is that it was your role, ". . . to preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more devious ways. . ." Do you agree with that as a correct description of your program, your mission in Austria?
VON PAPEN: On the contrary, Sir David, the exact opposite is the case. I explained my task in Austria very clearly and distinctly to the Tribunal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see.
VON PAPEN: It was a task of pacification and normalization and a continuation of the policy of the grafting together of the two States in an evolutionary way. And now may I say a few words more concerning this affidavit of Dr. Schmidt? At the time when the witness sat here in this chair we established the fact that this affidavit was placed before him when he was still in bed in the hospital after a severe illness, and this document was given to him for his signature. . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, with respect to that, the Tribunal will deal with it. We have heard all about it and Dr. Schmidt has been cross-examined and I think you may take it that the Tribunal know everything about the circumstances of the affidavit. If you have anything to comment on the contents of it, I am sure the Tribunal would willingly let you, but you need not comment on the circumstances. That is all before the Tribunal.
VON PAPEN: I will comment on the contents, I will state that Minister Schmidt, who later played a highly influential role with Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, in the years which are under discussion here had a very subordinate position in the Foreign Office which did not afford him insight-any exact insight-into conditions in Austria and into my policy and my reports.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if that is so. . .
VON PAPEN: Sir David, Herr Von Neurath will be able to confirm that for you tomorrow or the day after.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we won't argue that any further. The Tribunal have the whole of Dr. Schmidt's record before them and the affidavit. Now you said you told the Tribunal about your conception of your mission in Austria. If that was your conception of your mission in Austria, why was it necessary for you to get hold of the position of the explosive chambers in Austrian strategic roads? That was rather going back to the development of the "top hat" idea to which you objected so strongly, wasn't it?- Well, if you don't remember, let me remind you. It is Document D-689, Page 101. The Tribunal will find the passage actually on Page 102, and it is 90 and 91 in the German version of Document Book 11, becoming GB-504. This is the opening of the Grossglockner Road, which, as you know, is a road of some strategic importance going from Salzburg to Carinthia. Do you remember that, after your description about The people being in Salzburg and singing everything except the Horst-Wessel song, and then the German drivers competing, in the third and next paragraph you say: "The building of this road is undoubtedly a first-class work of culture, in which Reich-German construction firms took the main and decisive part. The chief engineer of the Reich-German firm which built the tunnel at the highest point offered to inform me of the position of the explosive chambers in this tunnel. I sent him to the military attaché." That was your combining culture and showing the excellence of German road constructions with obtaining the position of the explosives of the tunnel at the important strategic portion of the road. Why did you consider that of sufficient importance to send it to Hitler with three copies to the Foreign Office?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, I am giving an exact account of what happened at the inauguration of this road.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don't want that. The Tribunal can get that. What I am asking you is why you were sending to Hitler the fact that the Reich-German engineer was disclosing to you the explosive chambers on the important part of this road where this road could be blocked? Why were you sending that to Hitler? That is what I want you to tell the Tribunal.
VON PAPEN: Because it seemed interesting to me that this man approached me voluntarily and told me, "At this and this point, the tunnel can be blown up." You know that at that time our relations with Italy were very strained and that Italy mobilized on the Brenner border. For that reason it seemed of interest to me that this new connection between Italy and Germany could be broken again at any suitable time. Moreover, I referred the matter to my military attaché because it did not interest me personally.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you had then moved out of the class of doing that sort of thing yourself. You were the head of the mission and it was a matter for the military attaché. But was that your plan, Defendant, that, when you introduced German Kultur as showing the road making, at the same time you were getting the strategic information which you could pass on to your Government, undermining the Austrian Government's strategic plans to use the road?
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant said, did he not, that it was a road which joined Germany to Italy?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. The road actually goes from Salzburg, which is practically on the German border, to Carinthia in south Austria, so it was a new highway, taking traffic north and south in Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Did it actually connect Germany with Italy, or did it connect Austria with Italy?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Austria. [Turning to the defendant.] Well, let's take something else in which you were interested. You were also reporting as to where the Austrian supply of munitions and manufacture of munitions were going to be situated, were you not?
VON PAPEN: I do not remember.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, if you don't recall it, look at it yourself. It is Document D-694. You will find it a few pages on. It is Page 110, My Lord, in the English book; Page 108 of the German book. It will become Exhibit GB-505. Its date is 26 November 1935. It is Page 110 and the passage that I am going to read is Page 111. Defendant, you ought to find it just at the top of Page 112 of the German version. You are dealing with the influence of Herr Mandel, whose Jewish extraction you referred to, and then you go on to Prince Starhemberg. It reads: "After the manufacture of munitions for Italy in Hirtenberg had to be stopped because of Italian protests, he, Mandel, loaded the entire factory on to the railway, in order to continue work in Italy." Then, note the next words in brackets: "Incidentally, an interesting situation for Austria's supply of munitions . . ." Was that one of your conceptions of restoring normal relations, that you should report on the movements in the Austrian munition manufacture?
VON PAPEN: No, that was not my task proper, but this report shows, Sir David, that I was repeating a talk with the Polish Minister Gavronski, who told me that this munitions factory, the only one which existed in Austria, was being moved to Italy. I wrote, with regard to this, that it is a remarkable circumstance if a country has to get its munitions supplies from a foreign country. You must surely admit that that is a peculiar situation and one that deserves inclusion in a report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your explanation. I won't waste time on it. Now, I want to pass-and again I want to deal with it very quickly-to your own personal experiences in Austria. You remember when you went to the Salzburg Festival in 1935, when you had been there about a year; do you remember? I don't know because you probably went every year. The point that I want to remind you of is this. Do you remember when you went there that 500 National Socialists greeted you with music and made such a demonstration that some other guests in the hotel wanted to telephone or telegraph to the Federal Chancellery to say that the German Ambassador had caused a great Nazi demonstration? Do you remember that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the reference to that is at Page 102, Document D-689, which I have already referred to, Page 102 of Document Book 11. Well now, let me take another example. Do you remember the meeting of the comrades of the first World War at Wels?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was, if my recollection is right, in 1937, was it not?
VON PAPEN: Quite right, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And all the preparations had been made for a nonpolitical meeting, a reunion of the Austrian regiments and old comrades from the German regiments, and after the meeting they were to have a sort of dinner or lunch together, and the evening was to finish in jollity and song. That was the program, wasn't it?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That meeting was addressed by General Glaise-Horstenau and yourself?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Glaise-Horstenau- without any disrespect to him-I think you will agree made a not very powerful speech. That was your impression, wasn't it, a not very powerful speech? Interesting but not dynamic? Believe me, I am not being offensive to the general. I am merely trying to get the point.
VON PAPEN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You made a speech which lasted for quite a short time, didn't you? Do you remember?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: After your speech, there was beating and shooting through the streets of Wels, wasn't there? There was a riot there, wasn't there?
VON PAPEN: May I give you a more exact description?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you can. I wanted to establish the fact. You are perfectly entitled now to give your explanation.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there a document on this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is no document on this.
VON PAPEN: A meeting had been arranged in Wels between organizations of the old German Army from the first World War, the so-called Warriors' Society, (Kriegerverein) and the veterans' associations of Austria. It was perfectly legitimate and in the spirit of our joint policy that the mutual experiences during the first World War should be renewed between these formations. At this meeting, which according to my wish and that of the Austrian Government was to be completely nonpolitical in character, the following events took place: When I arrived, the place where this meeting of veterans' associations was held, was surrounded by between 5,000 and 10,000 people. The Austrian Government, to receive their German guests, brought an honor company of the Army, and when the Austrian band played the Austrian national anthem on my arrival, these 10,000 people who surrounded the place sang the German national anthem, for the tune is the same, as you know. When in the course of the celebration I made a brief speech I found myself constantly interrupted by thousands of people, in a demonstrative manner. Of course, I immediately realized that the Austrian National Socialists had planned a big political demonstration here; so I broke off my speech, and shortly afterwards I left the place, and left Wels also. It is quite true, as Sir David said, that when the celebration broke up and the Austrian police wanted to proceed against the thousands of persons who were demonstrating, very unfortunate incidents occurred.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if that is your explanation, I have put the facts of the incident. Now I want to pass to another point, because I can only give examples of your activities in Austria. Before you heard the evidence of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, do you remember the phrase "the Trojan Horse technique" being referred to with regard to Austria?
VON PAPER: Yes. Seyss-Inquart did not want to lead the Trojan Horse.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but before that, you know, you had referred to the Trojan Horse technique. My Lord, it is Document Book 11, Page 133. The passage I am referring to is from Page 134. The document is D-706, which will become GB-506. It is Page 163, Sergeant Major. That is your report of 21 August 1936, where you quote an instruction of the Prague Secret Service to its Vienna branch, which says: "Unfortunately it must be noted that the wild National Socialist excesses of 29 July of this year have not had the result we expected. Austria's approach to the Third Reich in the field of foreign politics is making further progress, as well as the process of cultural collaboration between the two sister nations. One can also assume from your most recent reports that the Trojan Horse of National Socialism is bringing greater confusion into the ranks of the Fatherland Front and particularly into the ranks of the Heimatschutz (Home Guard). Opposition to the normalizing of German-Austrian relations, which is extremely dangerous to Austrian independence, appears nevertheless to be relatively very great; it obviously lacks only good organization." Now, does that Czech report describe correctly what was going on, the superficial normalization of relations and the Trojan Horse movement working inside the country?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, that is the opinion of the Czech Secret Service and perhaps of the Czech Government.