dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GEN. ZORYA: As a political compensation for her participation, Hungary will receive territory in Yugoslavia and in Soviet Russia (the ancient Principality of Halicz) and the land at the foot of the Carpathian Mountains, up to the River Dniester." In March 1941 Eberhard Kienzl, a colonel of the German General Staff, visited Budapest. The purpose of this visit was to make final arrangements about the question of attack on Yugoslavia This is what Ujszaszy has to say on the matter-Page 5 of the Russian text, Paragraph 3, from the bottom of Page 152 of the document book: "The Colonel of the German General Staff, Eberhard Kienzl, detachment Foreign Armies East in the OKH (High Command of the Army), arrived in Budapest in March 1941 bringing with him a letter from Generaloberst Halder to Generaloberst Werth. This letter contained an insistent request on the part of Germany that Hungary should participate in the possible war against Yugoslavia by mobilizing the following army corps: I. Budapest, II. Szekesfeherwar, III. Szombathely, IV. Pees, V. Szeged, and in the war against Soviet Russia by mobilizing 15 operational units, including 1 cavalry division, 2 mechanized brigades, and 1 mountain (rifle) brigade. "The letter announced the imminent arrival in Budapest of a German delegation, headed by Lieutenant General Paulus, for discussing combined operations and the deployment of German troops against Yugoslavia through Hungarian territory. "In reply to this letter General Werth issued an invitation to the German commission, held out prospects of Hungary's participation in the war against Yugoslavia and of producing, for this purpose, 3 army corps, that is, the 1st, 4th, and 5th. "Concerning the war against Soviet Russia, he agreed in principle, promising at least to mobilize the 8th Army Corps (Kressikosice) as well as the mechanized operation units demanded by Halder. "I was informed personally about this exchange of correspondence by Colonel of the German General Staff, Kienzl."
THE PRESIDENT: General, speaking for myself, I cannot see that it makes the slightest difference to this Tribunal whether Hungary was going to put one army corps, or two army corps, or three army corps against the Russians. It was absolutely clear from what you have already read, if we are to believe it, that Field Marshal Keitel, in December 1940, was demanding that Hungary should put at Germany's disposal, for the war against Russia, certain units. What does it matter if subsequent negotiations alter the number of units? It seems to me that this evidence which is given is entirely cumulative. It doesn't add anything in the least to what you have already given us, and you could go on to the next document, which is Number USSR-150 (Exhibit Number USSR-150): Everything up to there is simply the negotiations between members of the German and Hungarian General Staffs as to exactly what units of the Hungarian Army were to be used.
GEN. ZORYA: I quite agree with the President that the presentation of the documents on this question should be restricted.
THE PRESIDENT: The next one is 150?
GEN. ZORYA: The Ujszaszy document contains certain information pertaining not only to the number of units pledged by Hungary to Germany in case of war with the Soviet Union; but there is, for example, an indication as to what methods in the preparation for war were being used by the fascist clique in Hungary, in agreement with the Hitlerite conspirators. I consider it imperative to dwell on these methods, and that is why I request your permission to quote certain passages in this document. What I now have in mind, for instance, is the falsification of the information regarding the number of Soviet units concentrated on the Hungarian-Russian border.
THE PRESIDENT: Please, go on.
GEN. ZORYA: Page 155 of the document book reads as follows: "My immediate superior, General Laszlo, as chief of the operational group ordered the second section of the General Staff to prepare a situation report according to which 14 Soviet Russian operational units were concentrated on the Hungarian border, including 8 motorized units. This situation report was prepared by Colonel Cornel Hidai, of Intelligence. "I should like to point out that according to subsequent explanations supplied by the second section of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, there were only four Soviet operational units actually concentrated on the Hungarian border. This circumstance I truthfully reported to Generaloberst Werth and General Laszlo, but the latter altered my truthful, objective report in accordance with his wishes." Further, Ujszaszy speaks of plans for provocation drawn up by the militarist clique in Hungary for the purpose of creating incidents abroad to justify an attack on the Soviet Union. Ujszaszy states-Page 10, Line 4 from the top of the document, Page 157 of the document book: "These plans emanated from Lieutenant General Putterer, from his assistant Lieutenant Colonel Frimond, and from General Laszlo. They proposed that, if necessary, German aircraft, camouflaged as Russian planes, should bomb the eastern border districts of Hungary, with bombs of Soviet Russian origin." And finally, Ujszaszy describes the events of the few days preceding the attack on the Soviet Union-this is Page 11 of the document, Page 158 of the document book: "On 24 June 1941 (if I remember correctly), at 12:30 noon, I was informed that Soviet Russian planes were bombing Raho in Carpathian Russia and firing on trains in the vicinity with machine gun fire. On the same afternoon news reached us that Soviet Russian planes were bombing Kassa (Kosice). The Crown Council, with the Regent in the chair, met on the same evening and, on the strength of Soviet Russia's provocation, decided to declare war on that country.
GEN. ZORYA: I am convinced that the bombarding was carried out by German planes with Russian markings. My conclusion was based on the following facts: "a) Lieutenant General Putterer and the German propaganda machine publicized this bombing on a very vast scale. "b) Lieutenant General Lazslo immediately gave me orders, through the Propaganda Subsection of Section 2 of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, to obtain photographs of such fragments of the 'Soviet Russian bombs' as could still be found and to publish these photographs in the press of the fascist countries. "c) Lieutenant General Fiitterer, General Laszlo, and Lieutenant General Frimond spread, by a whispering campaign, the rumor that Slovakian pilots in Russian service had bombed KassA (Kosice). The excellence of the hits was explained by the fact that these pilots were well acquainted with the terrain." This happened, according to Ujszaszy, on 24 June 1941, at 12:30 p.m. We have a document that establishes the fact that long before this date the participation of Hungary in the war against the Soviet Union had been decided. The document presented to the Tribunal and which contains the depositions of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger explains the reasons for the Hungarian assault on the Soviet Union. It may be that Ruszkiczay-Ruediger's viewpoint is not shared by everybody, but still, as it is the testimony of the Hungarian Deputy Minister of War, this statement can, of course, not be devoid of interest. On Page 10 of the Russian text of his testimony, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger states that towards the end of May 1941 he received an order to supply, first of all, the troops concentrated in the Transcarpathian Ukraine; 2 days afterwards a secret meeting of the army corps commanders took place at the headquarters of General Werth, Chief of the General Staff, at which the forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union was announced. I quote from the testimony of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger-Page 108 of the document book and Page 9 of the document itself. I am only quoting the passages underlined, in order to save time. I quote: ". . .
GEN. ZORYA: General of the Infantry Werth gave us an account of the military and political situation. "It appears that an attack against the Soviet Union by Germany is forthcoming, in which Romania and Hungary will take an active part on the side of Germany." Ruszkiczay-Ruediger further points out that: "The decision to declare war was taken by the Council of Ministers, after Premier Bardossy and Minister Bartha had made their reports, and was ratified by the Crown Council. The question was not submitted to Parliament. "These decisions of the Council of Ministers and the Crown Council caused no surprise at all, and were the result of the voluntary military collaboration with Germany which had actually existed for many years past. "The Hungarian General Staff and the political leaders of Hungary as from the beginning of the aggression against Czechoslovakia, considered Germany as their mainstay in their plans of revision. Afterwards followed the occupation of Transcarpathian Ukraine and the strategic organization of this region as a military base in preparation for an attack on Soviet Russia." Ujszaszy, in his report, mentioned the German military attaché in Budapest, Krappe. The former Lieutenant General of the German Army, Gunther Krappe, was the German military attaché in Budapest from November 1939 to 30 April 1941. After that, Krappe commanded the 10th Corps of SS troops of the Army Group "Vistula," and was captured by Red Army units. I request the Tribunal to accept in evidence a statement made by Krappe in January of this year and presented as Exhibit Number USSR-150 (Document Number USSR-150). It should be noted that the main circumstances mentioned in Krappe's statement coincide with those on Ujszaszy's report. I shall therefore read only a few excerpts from Page 4 of Krappe's document, corresponding to Page 165 of the document book: "In October 1940 I was ordered by the OKH to report on the conditions of fortifications in the region bordering Russia, that is, in the Carpathian Ukraine.
GEN. ZORYA: The Chief of the Operations Section, Colonel Laszlo, informed me that, so far, there were only simple antitank obstacles in existence, varying in depth from 1 to 2 kilometers and that the construction of barracks for quartering troops had just begun. The necessary surveys for building concrete pillboxes along the border and the highways would be made during the winter and in the spring of 1941 it would be possible to proceed with the actual construction. It appeared to be a question of raising some 6 million pengo "General Werth gave me permission to make an automobile trip through Munkac to Urzok Pass.... "I communicated the results of the inspection trip and of the information obtained from Colonel Laszlo to Berlin. Some time later Colonel Laszlo informed me that the necessary sums for the building of these fortifications had already been allotted." In order to save time, Your Honors, I shall briefly expose the remaining part of Krappe's testimony. An agreement was reached with the War Minister, Von Bartha, to organize war communications and war transports of the German Army in Hungary. In connection with this a special organization therefore arrived which was entrusted with these transports. At the same time, Your Honors, permission was received to establish jointly with the postal services, a special communication system for military needs, and, furthermore, a number of German officers were attached to the Hungarian Army for the interchange of experiences and instruction of the troops. Krappe states that as from December 1940, Hungarian industry was reorganized and worked for the increase of the German military potential. General Leeb, the Chief of the Armament Department, was in charge. In concluding the presentation of documents concerning the setting up of an aggressive bloc against the Soviet Union by the fascist war criminals, I consider it necessary to make a few comments of a general nature as derived from these documents.
GEN. ZORYA: The fascist conspirators began to adopt immediate measures for securing the participation of Romania, Finland, and Hungary in the preparation for the predatory attack on the Soviet Union at least as early as September 1940, when a military mission was sent to Romania. The negotiations concerning the military preparations for aggression against the Soviet Union, in each of these countries, were mainly concluded during the period September-December 1940. The negotiations were conducted by the general staffs of the German and the satellite armies. The subject of the negotiations in each case was of a purely military character, such as the retraining of the troops, the transportation of military units, the coordination of strategic plans, the deciding on the number of divisions needed to attack the Soviet Union, et cetera. Such character of negotiations testifies to the fact that there existed between the fascist Government of Germany and the Governments of Romania, Finland, and Hungary, a preliminary agreement with regard to aggression against the Soviet Union even before the negotiations began. And, finally, the documents submitted reveal that to each of these countries, one way or the other, the fascist conspirators had promised some territory belonging to the Soviet Union. I should like to point out one more circumstance. In order fully to grasp the consequences of the predatory fascist attack on the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, it is not enough to confine ourselves to Plan Barbarossa. This is a strategic plan, a plan for military attack, a plan for the beginning of aggression. 12 Feb. 46 And close on the heels of the attack followed, as it is well known, the so-called "assimilation" and "organization" of the occupied territories. The plans for the "assimilation" and "organization," which were plans for the extermination of the peaceful civilian population and the plundering of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, were also prepared in advance, in the same way as Plan Barbarossa.
GEN. ZORYA: The Soviet Prosecution declares that the documents at the disposal of the Tribunal, and especially such documents as the directive of 13 March 1941 (Document Number 447-PS), signed by the Defendant Keitel; the order for the application of military jurisdiction, dated 15 May 1941 (Document Number C-50), also signed by Keitel; the propaganda directive for Plan Barbarossa (Document Number C-26); and others, testify to the destruction not only of legal but of all moral standards of behavior by the hordes of the fascist usurpers on the temporarily occupied Soviet territories, this destruction having been premeditated and planned long before the attack on the Soviet Union. Even before the attack on the Soviet Union, the Hitlerites had decided and outlined in appropriate paragraphs of these instructions, directions, and orders, the terroristic methods for dealing with the civilian population and the measures and means for plundering the land of the Soviet Union and reducing it to a colony of the Third Reich. And when war did break out and the whole secret was laid bare, the fascists did not hesitate to publish all these plans in their press. I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-59 (Document Number USSR-59), an article, published on 20 August 1942, in Das Schwarze Corps , an SS paper and organ of the Reich Fuehrer of the SS. This article, entitled, "Should We Germanize?"-Page 180 of the document book-states openly: "The Reich Fuehrer of the SS chose the following slogan for one of the editions of the newspaper Deutsche Arbeit, devoted to the problems of resettlement in the East: "Our duty in the East is not Germanization in the former sense of the term, that is, imposing the German language and the German laws upon the population, but to ensure that only people of pure German blood should inhabit the East." This negation of Germanization is not new. However, falling from the lips of the Reich Fuehrer of the SS, acting as Reich Commissioner for the strengthening of the Volkstum, it becomes an order.
GEN. ZORYA: Such is the exact meaning of these words. The rejection of the idea of germanizing the population of the occupied territories, and the assertion that the East should be inhabited only by people of pure German blood, signified, in practice, the mass extermination of Soviet citizens, their spoliation and their deportation to slave labor, the annihilation of centuries of Russian culture, and the destruction of our cities and villages. I shall confine myself to what I have just said, as the same theme, or rather themes, have already been elaborated and will be presented to the Tribunal by my colleagues. On 22 June 1941, after prolonged preparations, the German fascist hordes hurled themselves on the Soviet Union. One hundred and seventy divisions, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, started the invasion. The military problems connected with the attack were formulated in Plan Barbarossa: "The German Army should be ready, even prior to the end of the war with England, to defeat Soviet Russia by operating with lightning speed. "To this end the Army will have to utilize all units at its disposal, with the sole reservation that the territories occupied must be adequately protected against all unexpected eventualities." Plan Barbarossa foresaw the necessity of annihilating the Red Army, of cutting off the possible retreat towards the interior of all Red Army units still fit for battle and of permitting the German fascist invaders speedily to reach a line of combat which would place the land of Germany beyond the range of the Soviet Air Force. As an ultimate aim, Plan Barbarossa provided for the strengthening of the Astrakhan-Archangel line, the destruction by bombardment of the Ural industries, the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt, and finally, the capture of Moscow.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good time to break off?
THE PRESIDENT: Please continue.
GEN. ZORYA: Your Honors, yesterday afternoon I dwelt on the fact that Plan Barbarossa had foreseen the necessity of annihilating the Red Army, of excluding the possibility of a retreat into the interior of such Red Army units as were still capable of fighting, and of obtaining, by rapid action, a combat line for the German-fascist invaders which would place the regions of Germany beyond the range of the Soviet Air Force. The final aim, according to Plan Barbarossa, was fortification of the Astrakhan-Archangel Line, the destruction from the air of the Ural industries, the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt and, as a decisive finale, the capture of Moscow. The political aims which determined the military plans were formulated by the Hitlerites in the many documents which were read into the record in this courtroom. But these aims were stated particularly clearly at the meeting in Hitler's headquarters on 16 July 1941. This document was presented by the United States Prosecution as Document Number L-221. You will find it on Page 141 of the document book. At this meeting Hitler, Goering, Rosenberg, Keitel, and other fascist conspirators were deciding, as they thought, the subsequent fortunes of the Soviet Union. The Crimea, together with the adjoining regions of the Ukraine, the Baltic regions, the Bialystok Forests and the Kola Peninsula, were declared as "annexed" to Germany. The Volga colonies were also to become a part of the Reich. The Baku area was envisaged as a German military colony. Bessarabia and Odessa were to be handed over to Romania, while Finland was to acquire Eastern Karelia, Leningrad, and the Leningrad region. As you well know, Your Honors, the Hitlerites always strove to prevent their real piratical aims from receiving publicity.
GEN. ZORYA: At the same meeting at general headquarters, on 16 July 1941, Hitler, for · instance, said that it was most important not to reveal their aims to the whole world, not to complicate their path by unnecessary declarations, and, when offering reasons for their actions, to ascribe them primarily to tactical intentions. The Defendant Rosenberg stated, 20 June 1941, at a conference on the Eastern question-a record of which was presented by the United States Prosecution as Document Number 1058-PS-that tactics were very important and that political aims would be determined as the occasion arose, when one slogan or another could be given publicity. This particular excerpt from Rosenberg's declaration you will find on Page 17 of the Russian text of the document, which corresponds to Page 201 in the document book. Taking this circumstance into consideration, Your Honors, it appears of value for our investigation to refer to some statements by the fascist war criminals which refer to the period when they considered it possible to make public some of their political aims. In 1941-42 the fascist hordes broke through territories of the Soviet Union on an extensive scale and approached Moscow. Battles were waged on the banks of the Volga. The specter of a "Greater Germany" ruling the world appeared as a beacon before the eyed of the Hitlerite conspirators. It would appear that the opportunity had arrived about which Defendant Rosenberg spoke when, from the standpoint of the fascist criminals, it was possible that "certain political slogans could be made public." I presented to the Tribunal, under Exhibit Number USSR-58 (Document Number USSR-58), a document from the archives of the Defendant Rosenberg's office relating to questions of German policy in the occupied regions of the Caucasus. Once again I ask you to refer to this document. I turn to Page 203 in the document book and Page 9 of the Russian text, which is the translation of this document.
GEN. ZORYA: Rosenberg, on 27 July 1942, solved the Eastern problem in this fashion, and I quote: "The Eastern problem consists in bringing the Baltic peoples under the influence of German culture and in preparing widely conceived military frontiers for Germany. The Ukrainian problem consists in securing food supplies for Germany and Europe and supplies of raw materials for the Continent. "The problem of the Caucasus is primarily a political task, and its solution means the expansion of continental Europe, under German leadership, from the Caucasian isthmus to the Near East." On 27 November 1941 the Defendant Ribbentrop made a report on the international situation. The text of this report was published in Number 329-A of the Hamburger Fremdenblatt. I present this report as Exhibit Number USSR-347 (Document Number USSR-347). Ribbentrop said in this report: "I should like to summarize the consequences of this defeat of Soviet Russia and of the occupation of the far greater part of European Russia in 1941, as follows: "First, from a military point of view, England's last ally on the Continent has thereby ceased to exist as a significant factor. Germany and Italy, with their allies, thus become unassailable in Europe. And powerful forces will be released. "Second, in the economic field the Axis powers, together with their friends, which means the whole of Europe, have achieved independence from countries overseas. Europe has once and for all been freed from the threat of blockade. The grain and raw materials of European Russia can fully cover the needs of Europe. Its war production will serve Germany's war economy and that of her allies, as a resort of which Europe's war potential will increase, and increase more powerfully. The organization of this gigantic area is already in full swing. "Thus, the last two decisive prerequisites for the victory of the Axis and its allies over England have been created." I shall take the liberty of presenting another document on this same subject.