dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want you to tell the Tribunal is: What was the subject of conversation when you had, not only the Defendant Kaltenbrunner there, but you had SS Obergruppenfuehrer Steiner, your own captain in attendance, and Lieutenant General Winter? What were these gentlemen there for, and what were you hearing from them?
DOENITZ: Who is the captain and who is Lieutenant General Guenther?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Captain Von Assmann; I took it he was the captain in attendance on you, though I may have been wrong-Kapitaen zur See Von Assmann. Then there was Lieutenant General Winter, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Steiner, and SS Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrurnner. What were you discussing on the 26th of February 1945?
DOENITZ: I must mention one fact in this connection: Captain Von Assmann was present at every discussion of the general situation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just a moment. You can tell us something afterwards, but first of all listen to my question. What were you discussing with these people from the SS on 26 February 1945?
DOENITZ: I cannot remember that now. I do remember, however, that Steiner received an order in regard to the army groups in Pomerania which were to make the push from the north to the south in order to relieve Berlin. I think that when Steiner was present perhaps this question, which did not concern me, was discussed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want you to think, before I leave this point. You have agreed with me that at a number of meetings, a large number, there were present Keitel and Jodl, at not quite so many Goering, who would give you the army and air situation in Germany; there was present the Defendant Speer, who would give you the production position; there was present Himmler, 9 May or his representative Fegelein, who would give you the secure position; and you yourself were present, who would give the nave position. At all meetings there was present the Fuehrer who would make the decisions. I put to you, Defendant, that you were taking as full a part in the government of Germany during these years as anyone, apart from Adolf Hitler himself.
DOENITZ: In my opinion that description is not correct. At tines' discussions of the general situation neither Speer nor anybody else supplied a complete survey of the work being done. On the contrary, only acute questions of the day were discussed. As I hay' said, the happenings of the last 24 hours were discussed, and what should be done. That there was a staff there which in its report' gave an over-all picture-that was quite out of the question; it was not at all like that. The only one who had a complete picture o the situation was the Fuehrer. At these discussions of the military situation the developments of the last 24 hours and the measure' to be taken were discussed. These are the facts. Therefore, one cannot say that any one of the participants hat an over-all picture. Rather every one had a clear view of his owl department for which he was responsible. An over-all picture it the mind of any of the participants is out of the question. Only the Fuehrer had that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I won't argue with you but I suppose, Defendant, that you say-as we have heard from s many other defendants-that you knew nothing about the slave labor program, you knew nothing about the extermination of the Jews, and you knew nothing about any of the bad conditions in concentration camps. I suppose you are going to tell us you knew nothing about them at all, are you?
DOENITZ: That is self-evident, since we have heard here how all these things were kept secret; and if one bears in mind the fact that everyone in this war was pursuing his own tasks with the maximum of energy, then it is no wonder at all. To give an example I learned of the conditions in concentration camps... SIR DAVID MAXW1;LL-FYFE: I just want your answer for the moment, and you have given it to me. I want you to come to a point which was well within your own knowledge, and that is the order for the shooting of Commandos, which was issued by the Fuehrer on 18 October 1942. You have told us that you got it when you were Flag Officer of U-boats. Now, do you remember the document by which the Naval Operations Staff distributed it? Do you; remember that it said this: "This order must not be distributed in writing by flotilla leaders, section commanders, or officers of this rank. "After verbal notification to subordinate sections the above officers must hand this order over to the next higher section, which is responsible for its withdrawal and destruction." Do you remember that?
DOENITZ: Yes, I read that again when I saw the order here. But on the other side it says also that this measure had already been announced in the Wehrmacht order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to know from you is: Why was there this tremendous secrecy about this order in the naval distribution?
DOENITZ: I did not understand that question. I do not know whether tremendous secrecy was being observed at all. I am of the opinion that in 1942 all naval officers had been informed about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is on 28 October, 10 days after the order was issued. I am not going to quarrel with you about adjectives, Defendant. Let me put it this way: Why did the naval distribution require that degree of secrecy?
DOENITZ: I do not know. I did not make up the distribution chart. As an officer at the front I received this order at that time. I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Within 3 months you were Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Did you never make any inquiries then?
DOENITZ: I beg your pardon.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you never make any inquiries?
DOENITZ: No, I did not. I have told you that I saw this order as Commander of U-boats and that as far as my field of activities was concerned this order did not concern me in the least and, secondly, that men captured during naval engagements were expressly excepted; so, as far as that goes, this order at that time had no actual, no real significance. In view of the enormous number of things that I had to deal with when I became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, it was quite natural that it did not occur to me to take up the question of this new order. I did not think of the order at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am going to put to you when the time comes a memorandum from the Naval Staff showing that it was put before you. Don't you remember that?
DOENITZ: If you are referring to the memorandum which is in my trial brief, then I can only say that this memorandum was not submitted to me, as can be clearly seen from this note.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to ask you before the Tribunal adjourns is: Did you approve of this order or did you not?
DOENITZ: I have already told you, as I. . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you haven't. I want you to tell the Tribunal now, and you can answer it either "I approved" or "I did not approve." Did you or did you not approve this order to your commanders?
DOENITZ: Today I do not approve of that order since I have learned here that the basis was not so sound. ..
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with it when you were Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy at the beginning of 1943? Did you approve of it then?
D0NITZ: As Commander-in-Chief of the Navy I was not concerned with this order. While I was Commander of U-boats, as I have already explained to you, I considered it simply a reprisal order. It was not up to me to start an investigation or to take it up with the office which had issued the order to find out whether the basis was correct or not. It was not up to me to start an investigation on the basis of international law. And it was quite clear in Point 1 of the order that here the enemy, the opponent, had placed himself outside the bounds of the Geneva Convention, because they were murdering prisoners, and that therefore we had to do certain things as reprisals. Whether these reprisal measures were necessary or whether they were fully justified by the conditions in Point 1, that is something I did not and could not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is the last question. I want you to try and answer it with a straight answer if you can. At the beginning of 1943 did you or did you not approve of this order?
DOENITZ: I cannot give you an answer, because at the beginning of 1943 I did not think of the order and was not concerned with it. Therefore I cannot say how that order affected me at that particular time. I can tell you only how it affected me when I read it as Commander of U-boats; and I can also tell you that today I reject this order, now that I have learned that the basis on which it was issued was not so sound. And thirdly, I can tell you that I personally rejected any kind of reprisals in naval warfare-every kind, in every case, and whatever the proposal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will ask some more questions about it tomorrow, as the time has come to break off. [The Tribunal adjourned until 10 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I understand there are some supplementary applications for witnesses and documents, which would probably not take very long to discuss. Is that so?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not actually received the final instructions. I can find out in a very short time. I will get Major Barrington up. I am told that is so.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, therefore, proposes to sit in Open session tomorrow until a quarter to 12 dealing with the Trial in the ordinary course and then to take the supplementary applications at a quarter to 12 and then to adjourn into closed session.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we shall be ready for them at a quarter to 12 tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, the first document that I want you to look at with regard to the Fuehrer Commando Order of 18 October 1942 is on Page 65 of the English document book and on Page 98 of the German document book. It is Document Number C-178, Exhibit USA-544. You will see that that document is dated 11 February 1943. That is some 12 days after you took over as Commander-in-Chief and you will see from the reference that it went to "1. SKL Ii." That is the international law and prize law division of your operations staff, isn't it-Admiral Eckardt's division?
DOENITZ: No. It is addressed to the first section of the Naval Operations Staff, that is, the operational section. It originates with Eckardt and is sent to the first section, that is, to the section chief.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But I think I am quite right- the reference about which I asked you, 1. SKL Ii, that is Admiral Eckardt's department. That is the reference for Admiral Eckardt's international law department?
DOENITZ: No, no, no. It is the department in which Admiral Eckardt was also an official. Admiral Eckardt was an official in that department.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the third SKL in the next line is the press department as you said, isn't it?
DOENITZ: No. The third section of the SKL collected information sent in for the Navy and reported on it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I note it was intelligence and press. Is that right or not?
DOENITZ: Yes, it was intelligence and press.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to help the Tribunal on three points in this document. You remember I asked you yesterday about the secrecy standard of the original Fuehrer order of 18 October. If you will look at the second paragraph you will see that it says: ".. . was given the protection of top secret merely because it is stated therein (l) that . . . sabotage / organization . . . may have portentous consequences... and (2) that the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on military orders must be carried out even after they have surrendered voluntarily and asked for pardon." Do you see that?
DOENITZ: Yes, I have read it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that that was one of the reasons for giving the order top secrecy?
DOENITZ: This exchange of notes between Eckardt and the section chief was not submitted to me, as is obvious from the initials noted in the book...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the reason for you not answering my question? Do you agree that that is the reason for giving top secrecy to this document?
DOENITZ: I do not know. I cannot tell you that, because I did not issue this Commando Order. It says in the Commando Order, on the one hand that these people had killed prisoners. That is to e way I had read it as Commander, U-boat Fleet; and on the other hand . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I shall give you one more opportunity of answering my question. You were Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. Do you say that you are not able to answer this question: Is the reason stated in Paragraph 2 of this document a correct reason for attaching top secrecy to the Fuehrer order or 18 October? Now you have this final opportunity of answering that question. Will you answer it or won't you?
DOENITZ: Yes, I will do that. I consider it possible, particularly as the legal expert here thinks so. I do not know if it is correct, because I did not issue the order. On the other hand, it says in the order that these things would not be published in the army orders.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was the next point. The next paragraph says that what is to be published in the army orders is the annihilation of sabotage units in battle, not, of course, if they are shot-as I would say, murdered-quietly, by the SD after battle. I want you to note the next paragraph. The next paragraph raises the difficulty as to how many saboteurs were to be considered as a sabotage unit and suggests that up to ten would certainly be a sabotage unit. Now, if you look at the last paragraph-I will read it to you quite slowly: "It is to be assumed that Counterintelligence III is acquainted with the Fuehrer orders and will therefore reply accordingly to the objections of the Army General Staff and the Air Force Operations Staff. As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether or not this case should be used to make sure"-note the next words-"after a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that all departments concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of members of Commando units." Are you telling the Tribunal that after that minute from Eckardt's department, which was to be shown to 1. SKL, your Chief-of-Staff's department., that you were never consulted upon it?
DOENITZ: Yes, I do say that, and I will prove by means of a witness that there are no initials or distribution list here; and this witness will prove quite clearly that I did not receive a report on it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Admiral Wagner was your Chief of Staff?
DOENITZ: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, we will not occupy further time.
DOENITZ: He was not my Chief of Staff; he was chief of this section. He was Section Chief 1. SKL, to which this order was directed. He knows beyond doubt that no report was made to me. The circumstances are perfectly clear.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will leave that, if you say that you have not seen it; and I will ask you to look at Document Number 551-PS. My Lord, I will pass the Tribunal a copy. This is Exhibit USA-551, and it was put in by General Taylor on 7 January. [Turning to the defendant.] Now, that is a document which is dated 26 June 1944; and it deals with the Fuehrer order; and it says how it will apply after the landing of the Allied Forces in France; and if you will look at the distribution, you will see that Number 4 is to the OKM, 1. SKL. That is the department on which you were good enough to correct me a moment ago. Now, did you-were you shown that document, which says that the Fuehrer order is to apply to Commando units operating outside the immediate combat area in Normandy? Were you shown that document?
DOENITZ: No, that was not shown to me in any circumstances- and quite rightly, as the Navy did not take part in the affair.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told me yesterday that you were concerned with the matter and that you had small boats operating in the Normandy operations. That is what you told me yesterday afternoon. You have changed your recollections since yesterday afternoon?
DOENITZ: No, not at all. But these one-man submarines were Boating on water and had nothing to do with Commandos on the land front. That is clear from this document, too-I do not know if it is the original of the 1. SKL because I cannot see the initial. I am convinced, however, that it was not submitted to me, because it had nothing to do with the Navy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Will you just look at Document Number 537-PS, which is dated 30 July 1944. My Lord, that is Exhibit USA-553, also put in by General Taylor on 7 January.
DOENITZ: Where is it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The sergeant major will point to the place. That is the document applying the Commando Order to "military missions," and you will see again later that the distribution includes OKM, Department SKL. Did you see that order?
DOENITZ: Yes, I can see it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you see it at the time that it was distributed, at the end of July 1944?
DOENITZ: It is quite certain that this order was not submitted to me because again it has nothing to do with the Navy. The Navy had nothing to do with fighting partisans.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you now just to look very quickly, because I do not want to spend too much time on it, at Document Number 512-PS. My Lord, that is Exhibit USA-546, which was also put in by General Taylor on 7 January. [Turning to the defendant.] Now, that is a report dealing with the question of whether members of Commandos should not be murdered immediately in order that they could be interrogated, and the question is whether that is covered by the last sentence of the Fuehrer order, and I call your attention to the fact that it refers, with regard to interrogations, in the second sentence: "Importance of this measure was proven in the cases of Glom fjord, the two-man torpedo at Trondheim, and the glider plane at Stavanger."
DOENITZ: I cannot find it at the moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is 512-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps you ought to read the first sentence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
DOENITZ: This document dates from 1942. At that time I was Commander of U-boats from the Atlantic Coast to the Bay of Biscay. I do not know this paper at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your answer, but it is 14 December 1942; and the point is put up which is raised in the first sentence which My Lord has just directed be read: "Top secret: According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer order of 18 October, individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation." Then follows the sentence I have read. That was the point that was raised, and what I was going to ask you was, did that point come up to you when you took over the Commandership-in-Chief of the Navy in January 1943? Just look at the last sentence. "The Red Cross and the BDS protested against the immediate carrying out of the Fuehrer order..."
DOENITZ: I beg your pardon, but I still cannot find where that is. I have not yet found the last sentence. Where is it?
THE PRESIDENT: Our translation says "after the immediate carrying out...."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "After," My Lord: I am sorry. It is my fault. I am greatly obliged to Your Lordship. "Protested after the immediate..." I beg Your Lordship's pardon-I read it wrong.
DOENITZ: That dates from December 1942.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is only six weeks before you took over.
DOENITZ: Yes. I do not know this teleprint. In any case, that is probably not Red Cross, but probably Reiko See, Reich Commissioner for Shipping-or so I assume. BDS is probably the SS Leader in Norway.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the point that I thought might have some interest for you was the two-man torpedoes. I thought that might have been referred to you as a matter of Navy interest. However, if it was not I will come to a document after you took over. Give the defendant Document Number 526-PS, on 10 May 1943. My Lord, that is USA-502, and was put in by my friend Colonel Storey on 2 January. [Turning to the defendant.] You see that that is an account-it is from the Defendant Jodl's department, and it is annotated for the Defendant Jodl's department-about an enemy cutter which carried out an operation from the Shetlands, a cutter of the Norwegian Navy; and it gives its armament, and it says that it was an organization for sabotaging strong points, battery positions, staff and troop billets, and bridges and that the Fuehrer order was executed by the SD. That was a cutter which was blown up by the Norwegian Navy, I suppose after they were attacked, and ten prisoners were murdered. Was that brought to your attention?
DOENITZ: This was shown to me during an interrogation, and I was also asked if I had not had a telephone conversation with Field Marshal Keitel. It was afterwards found to be the Wehrmacht area commander who had contacted the OKW. It was a matter for the Army and for the SD, not for the Navy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you deny that you ever heard about that, will you turn to Page 100 of the document book. My Lord, it is Page 67 of the British document book. [Turning to the defendant.] And that is a summary, a summary of the trial of the SD. ..
DOENITZ: Where is it? I cannot find it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 100, I have told you. If you will look for it, I think you will find it. It is Page 67 of the English, if you prefer to follow it in that language. Now I will explain to you; I think you have read it before because you have referred to it. That is a summary by the judge advocate at the trial of the SS men of the evidence that was given, and I just want to see that you have it in mind. If you will look at Paragraph 4, you will see that they set out from Lerwick, in the Shetlands, on this naval operation for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coasts and for the purpose of laying mines. Paragraph 5: "The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was wearing uniform at the time of capture; and there was abundant evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that they were wearing uniforms at all times after their capture." Now. you mentioned this yesterday. You see that in Paragraph 6: "Deponent states that the whole of the crew was captured and taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral Von Schrader, the Admiral of the West Coast. The crew were taken to the Bergenhus; and there they were interrogated by Lieutenant H.P.K. W.Fanger, a lieutenant of the Naval Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitan Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval Counterintelligence; and this interrogation was carried out upon the orders of the Admiral of the West Coast. Lieutenant Fanger reported to the officer in charge of the intelligence branch at Bergen that, in his opinion, all members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the West Coast."-And that is Admiral Von Schrader. Now I want just to read you the one sentence which, in view of that, I do not think you will think is taken out of context of the evidence given by Lieutenant Fanger at this trial.