dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. HORN: Are you acquainted with an article by Goebbels in the Reich or perhaps the Volkischer Beobachter , dealing with lynch justice?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. Once by chance I came to Ribbentrop when he was reading a paper and was again very excited. He asked me if I had read the article yet, this shocking article by Goebbels. It was an article on lynch justice.
DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop lodge a protest with Goebbels about this article?
VON STEENGRACHT: As far as I know, he charged our press chief who had the liaison with Goebbels to lodge a protest against this article. But to his surprise he was forced to see that this protest was useless since the article had not only been inspired but, I believe, ordered by Hitler, and thus there was nothing more to be done.
DR. HORN: What attitude did the Foreign Office take in view of the trend of this article?
VON STEENGRACHT: The Foreign Office repudiated the article vehemently, because it comprised an offense against international law and thus made us depart from international law in another field. Moreover, it appealed to the lower instincts of man, and both in internal and external policy did great damage. Besides, such an article, that has been read by several hundred thousands or by millions, does irreparable damage anyway. We therefore insisted that under no circumstances should such things appear in the press again. I must regretfully state, however, that we had a very difficult stand in this matter, especially since lowflying enemy craft often shot peasants in the fields and pedestrians in the streets, that is to say, purely civilian people, with their murder weapons. And our arguments that in our field we wanted to observe international law under all circumstances, were not taken into account at all either by most German offices, or above all by Hitler personally. On the contrary, in this case too we were regarded again only as formal jurists. But later we did try, as much as we could, with the help of military offices, to prevent the carrying out of this order.
DR. HORN: Do you know of a Battalion Gunsberg?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not know of a Battalion Gunsberg. I know, of course, of a former Legation Counsellor Von Gunsberg in the Foreign Office. This Legation Counsellor Von Gunsberg received, as far as I recall -- I did not at that time do any work at all connected with these matters -- received from Ribbentrop the assignment of following, with a few people from the Foreign Office and a few drivers, the fighting troops, and seeing to it that, firstly, the foreign missions, for instance in Brussels and Paris, and so forth, that stood under the protection of the protective powers, should not be entered by our troops. And at the same time Gunsberg was charged with protecting the files in the Foreign ministries that were of foreign political interest. After the conclusion of the French campaign, Gunsberg, as far as I recall, was no longer in the active service of the Foreign Office, but was listed with the Secret Field Police, from which he had received a uniform, because as a civilian he could not enter these countries.
DR. HORN: How and when did Gunsberg's job end?
VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop lost interest after these events in Gunsberg and the original assignment. Then, after the beginning of the Russian campaign, Gunsberg, so far as I remember, reported again for duty and said that he intended to do the same thing in the East, and Ribbentrop told him: But he did not consider himself any longer as belonging to the Foreign Office and apparently received orders from other offices. Then, as I later heard, he had a large number of men under him and had many automobiles which he could not have received from the Foreign Office any more than he could have received a military uniform from the Foreign Office so he was apparently working for other offices.
DR. HORN: He no longer belonged to the Foreign Office at any rate not in a military capacity?
VON STEENGRACHT: No. And, in addition, when Ribbentrop heard that he had undertaken such a large job, he charged me personally to call immediately on the SS and say that he, Ribbentrop, did not want to have Gunsberg any longer, and at that time I told ObergruppenFuehrer Wolff that I should like to point out that we wanted nothing more to do with Gunsberg. See to it that you keep him with the Waffen-SS along with all his subordinates. That is all I know about the matter of Gunsberg.
DR. HORN: Would Your Lordship like to interrupt the examination or should I continue to put further questions?
THE PRESIDENT: Unless you are going to conclude almost immediately, we had better adjourn. Will you be some time longer with this witness?
DR. HORN: I have a number of further questions. [The Tribunal adjourned until 27 March 1946 at 1000 hours.]
DR. HORN: Witness, you knew Count Ciano. Where and when did you meet him?
VON STEENGRACHT: I knew Count Ciano but not in a political sense, only personally. I cannot remember exactly when I met him; probably it was on the occasion of a state visit. I was working, at the time in the Protocol Department in the Foreign Office.
DR. HORN: What experiences did you have with Count Ciano?
VON STEENGRACHT: Since I did not work with him politically, I had no political experience with him.
DR. HORN: Now, another matter. Is it correct that Herr Von Ribbentrop gave orders that under all circumstances the French franc should be sustained against inflation?
VON STEENGRACHT: Such measures can apply only to a time when I was not yet State Secretary. But I know that the basic attitude towards France and all occupied territories was that under all circumstances their currency was to be preserved as far as possible, or rather should be preserved by all means. That is why we often sent gold to Greece in order to attempt to maintain the value of the currency there to some extent.
DR. HORN: What was accomplished in Greece by sending this gold there?
VON STEENGRACHT: By sending gold to Greece we lowered the rate of exchange of foreign currencies. Thus the Greek merchants who had hoarded food to a large extent, became frightened and threw the food on the market, and in this way it was made available to the Greek population again.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop gave strictest orders not to undertake any confiscation in occupied territories but to deal directly only with their governments?
VON STEENGRACHT: If you put the question like that, it is basically correct, but I say, as I said yesterday, that in principle we had no functions at all in the occupied territories, therefore no power to confiscate, nor was such power within the jurisdiction of other agencies; but it is correct that we negotiated only with the foreign governments and that Von Ribbentrop had most strictly forbidden us to support any direct measures concerning an occupied country which were carried out by other departments.
DR. HORN: For the time being I have no further questions to put to this witness.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen ): Witness, are you well acquainted with Von Papen as a result of the period during which you were working in the Foreign Office and particularly during the time you were active as State Secretary in the Foreign Office?
VON STEENGRACHT: I had known Herr Von Papen for several years before 1933, but privately. Then I lost track of him for some time and re-established contact with him when I became State Secretary in the German Foreign Office. Then I was continually associated with him in an official and unofficial capacity.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you, particularly in the last period of your activities as State Secretary, continually receive the reports which Von Papen, as Ambassador in Ankara, sent to Berlin?
VON STEENGRACHT: Unless Herr Von Papen sent reports directly to Von Ribbentrop -- which may have been possible; I do not know -- I received them weekly through official channels.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you remember that after two previous refusals Von Papen took over the post of Ambassador in Ankara, in April 1939, on the day that Italy occupied Albania, whereby an acute danger of war arose in the Southeast?
VON STEENGRACHT: At that time I was not State Secretary and also had no political position, so that I am not acquainted with the events of that period. But today I have the impression that he took over that position after the Italians had occupied Albania. And he himself told me later that at that time there was danger that the Italians would advance further into the Balkans, possibly causing a conflict with Turkey, as a result of which world peace would have been endangered. For that reason he had decided at the time to accept the post. Exactly on which day that was, I cannot say.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What can you say in general about Herr Von Papen's efforts toward peace?
VON STEENGRACHT: I am under the impression that Herr Von Papen always strove to preserve peace by every means. He certainly considered that it would be a great disaster for Germany and the world if war were to break out.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were the efforts which Von Papen made during the war towards establishing peace aimed at foregoing any annexations regardless of the military outcome and completely reestablishing the sovereignty of occupied territories, in short, to achieve, by means of reasonable renunciation, a bearable status for all European states?
VON STEENGRACHT: In principle it was quite clear that Von Papen always worked for the re-establishment of peace under conditions which would have re-established full sovereignty for all countries, and so that no encroachment nor damage, material or otherwise would be inflicted on any foreign countries.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was that Von Papen's attitude even at the time of the greatest German military successes?
VON STEENGRACHT: I believe that his basic attitude in this respect never changed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were his continuous personal efforts to establish peace held against Von Papen by Hitler, and was he considered a disagreeable outsider in that connection?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not have an opportunity to discuss it with Hitler; I only know that he was quite generally criticized by Hitler and other persons as a man who always followed a weak line.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen frankly acknowledge that peace would be impossible as long as Hitler and the Party existed in Germany and the necessary credit for negotiating abroad was lacking?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I think it must have been about April 1943 or May 1943, that I spoke to Von Papen in detail about the whole subject, since, at that time, I had just become State Secretary. At that time he very clearly voiced the opinion to me which you have just sketched. It was quite plain to him that foreign countries would conclude no peace with Hitler and the methods he employed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Just one last question, Witness: The Indictment accuses the Defendant Von Papen of being an unscrupulous opportunist. You, Witness, know the defendant from the reports and from all the official relations the defendant had with his superior office for a number of years. Did you, on the strength of that knowledge, get the impression that this characterization of Von Papen is correct, or can you say, on the strength of these reports and these official relations, that Von Papen appears to you to be a man who always tells the truth, even when that truth is disagreeable to his quite unpleasant superiors, and even when the voicing of that truth involves personal danger for him?
VON STEENGRACHT: I can say that is absolutely so. I find the best evidence of it is that Herr Von Papen was finally completely eliminated from the position of Vice-Chancellor and resigned from the government, then he became a private citizen and only in the greatest emergency was he called upon. In my opinion, Von Papen made himself available only because he said to himself, "I have still got a certain amount of credit, I am a good Catholic, and accordingly I represent an attitude which is opposed to all inhumanity, et cetera . Perhaps I can, through my intervention, exercise some influence in that direction." I myself never attended a meeting or a conference which took place between Hitler and Von Papen, but, particularly from my liaison officer with Hitler, I often heard that Von Papen, in his smooth way, often told Hitler many things which no one else could have told Hitler and I believe that through his manner he prevented a number of things, at least for a time.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel ): Witness, you have stated that Hitler, because of the terrible bombing attack on Dresden, intended to issue an order according to which thousands of prisoners of war were to be killed in reprisal.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Do I remember your testimony of yesterday correctly, that all you have said about this matter is information from, or based on information from Herr Von Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: No.
DR. NELTE: What do you know from your own personal knowledge?
VON STEENGRACHT: From my own personal knowledge I only know that our liaison man with Hitler called me on the telephone and told me that Goebbels had proposed to Hitler that 10,000 or more British and American prisoners of war be shot in reprisal, and that Hitler would agree or had agreed. I immediately reported this to Von Ribbentrop, and he went there at once and told me after half an hour that the order had been withdrawn. About Field Marshal Keitel I know nothing at all in that connection.
DR. NELTE: You do not know, therefore, who was the originator of that order?
VON STEENGRACHT: No.
DR. NELTE: Who suggested it, I mean.
VON STEENGRACHT: The suggestion for that order evidently came from Goebbels according to the information which I received.
DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop, do you mean?
VON STEENGRACHT: Who?
DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, Von Ribbentrop had nothing to do with that.
DR. NELTE: Then from Herr Hewel?
VON STEENGRACHT: Herr Hewel told me that. He called me up and told me that.
DR. NELTE: And you know nothing about the participation of military men?
VON STEENGRACHT: I know nothing at all about the participation of military men.
DR. NELTE: Thank you very much. DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): Witness, I have only one question. Did you, as State Secretary, or did the Foreign Office regularly inform military offices, for instance, the Army High Command or the High Command of the Navy, with reference to pertinent matters of German politics?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, they were not informed.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESEDENT: Does the British Prosecutor wish to crossexamine?
COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): Witness, you told us yesterday that the Defendant Ribbentrop was against the persecution of the churches, was against the persecution of Jews, and did not know what was going on in the concentration camps. You have told us that he was not a typical Nazi. What are the qualities of a typical Nazi?
VON STEENGRACHT: By a typical National Socialist, I mean a man who fanatically acknowledges and represents all the doctrines of National Socialism. Herr Von Ribbentrop, as I said, followed Hitler personally, but he really knew uncommonly little of any of the other ideology and never bothered about it. He never spoke at meetings, never participated in large rallies, and therefore, he really knew extremely little about the people and the mood of the people.
COL. PHILLIMORE: By "a typical Nazi," do you mean someone who was persecuting the churches?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand that question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will repeat it. By "a typical Nazi," do you mean a man who was engaged in persecution of the churches?
VON STEENGRACHT: At any rate, someone who, if Adolf Hitler considered it right, did not state his personal opinion on the matter.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And a man who would take his full share in persecution and extermination of Jews?
VON STEENGRACHT: That I would not like to say either. That was limited to a certain circle of people. A large number even of fanatical Nazis knew nothing about these atrocities and repudiated them and would have repudiated them, had they been properly informed of them.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I understand you to say that you knew nothing of them yourself. Is that so?
VON STEENGRACHT: That I knew nothing?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes.
VON STEENGRACHT: In my position as State Secretary and because I read foreign papers, and particularly since I had contact with the opposition, I knew of many things connected with concentration camps. In all these cases, as far as it was in my power, I intervened. But regarding the things which I have heard here now, I knew nothing at all.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to ask you about another matter. You have told us that Ribbentrop had no responsibility in the occupied territories. Your words were that "the Foreign Office lost responsibility at that moment at which the German bayonet crossed the frontier." Is that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: I said that at that moment at which the German bayonet crossed the frontier the Foreign Office lost the sole right to negotiate with foreign governments everywhere. Beyond that, in most countries, the Foreign Office did not have the right to have even a diplomatic observer without authority, particularly in Norway and the Eastern Territories.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You have said the Foreign Office had no right to have an observer there, and that direct relations with occupied territories were withdrawn, is that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, I said that in all occupied territories the Foreign Office no longer had the sole right to negotiate with the government, since there was then either a civil administration in those countries or a military government with auxiliary command offices and a military administrative head, and that these offices themselves then approached the foreign governments and their executive organs in the countries occupied at that time. Consequently one can no longer say that the Foreign Office had the sole right to negotiate with the governments. But in some countries, as in the North and the East, we no longer had any of our people at all, and Hitler had issued the order that we withdraw our observers from the other countries, such as Holland, Belgium and so on. However, we did not do so.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You say that in France you had an ambassador reporting direct to Ribbentrop, did you not?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And his duties included advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police by the impounding of politically important documents and securing and seizure of public property; further, of private and, above all, Jewish artistic property on the basis of instructions especially given for the matter. Isn't that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: I already emphasized yesterday that only since 1943 had I anything at all to do with political affairs. If I understood your question correctly, Mr. Prosecutor, you are of the opinion that the Secret State Police and the German executive organs in France were under our jurisdiction. That is incorrect.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question. I asked you if the Minister Abetz had not got those duties.
VON STEENGRACHT: He did not have the assignment of confiscating any French property or carrying out any action against the Jews. No orders of that kind went through my hands during my time, and he could ...
COL. PHILLIMORE: [Handing the document to the witness.] Will you look at Document 3614-PS. My Lord, that was put in as French Exhibit Number RF-1061 on the 4th of February. It is a letter dated the 3rd of August 1940, signed by Ribbentrop, to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW). It reads: then it sets out a number of tasks and Number 6 is the one I put to the witness: Then the concluding paragraphs: I want to ask you one or two questions about the Jews. You have told us that you and the Defendant Ribbentrop...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the Tribunal would like to know why this witness told them that Ambassador Abetz did not have the task of confiscating property. [Turning to the witness.] Why did you say that?
VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz had no executive powers, and he was expressly forbidden to intervene in French internal affairs. He could therefore, address himself exclusively to the French Government, and if the French Government did anything by means of their executive power, then that was a transaction on the part of the French Government but never a confiscation carried out by Abetz.
COL. PHILLIMORE: That is not an answer to the question. The question is why, when you were asked whether Abetz had the task of advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police on the impounding of politically important documents, did you not say so?
VON STEENGRACHT: I said that no order went through my hands, since I did not become State Secretary until May 1943. This is an order of 3 August 1940. But here we are concerned only with an official directive addressed to Ambassador Abetz.
COL. PHILLIMORE: At this time you were Ribbentrop's personal adjutant, weren't you?
VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, but not political secretary. I was only ...
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were adjutant?
VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, that is to say I was concerned with technical matters. At that time I never presented a political report to him. But I should add, if I may, this concerns a directive to Ambassador Abetz and this directive was completely outdated by actual conditions. Because advising the Secret Field Police ...
COL. PHILLIMORE: How do you know that, if you were only personal adjutant and not acting in political matters?
VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz was ambassador until May 1945. Therefore from 1943 to 1945 I continuously corresponded with him, and during that time Ambassador Abetz continually fought against the measures which were carried out by the Secret State Police anyway. It was a bitter struggle and he was personally threatened in all possible matters. One can talk about advice, but whether people heeded him -- he had no power -- that is quite another question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Does it come to this, that your answer about occupied territories applies only after 1943?
VON STEENGRACHT: From my own experience I can speak only about the period after 1943.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to turn to the question of Jews. You have told us that you and Ribbentrop, by adopting a policy of delay, prevented the holding of the Anti-Jewish Congress in 1944; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And that you were against the policy of persecution of the Jews.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And so was the Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I want you to look at Document 3319-PS. [Handing the document to the witness.] My Lord, that is a new document. It will be Exhibit GB-287. [Turning to witness.] Now you have got a photostat there. Will you look at Page 4 of the German -- that's the first page of the English. That is a letter dated the 28th of April on the subject of anti-Jewish action in foreign countries. It is marked at the bottom of Page 4.
VON STEENGRACHT: I have not found it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you look at Page 4, marked in a black square at the bottom of the page. You see a letter dated the 28th of April 1944, Subject: Anti-Jewish action in foreign countries, and it is addressed to practically every German legation and mission abroad.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Turn to Page 10. You will see that it purports to be signed by you; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You remember the letter? I will read you the first paragraph to refresh your memory. "The Reich Foreign Minister... "