dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DOENITZ: I did not know about the entry in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. That was done in Berlin, and I was Commander of the Submarine Fleet in France at the time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Weil, if you tell the Tribunal that you did not know about it in September, then we will pass on to another document. That is what you say, that you did not know about it in September 1942?
DOENITZ: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like you-I do not want to take you through the Laconia in any detail, but I want you just to tell me about one, I think, one or two entries. I think it is Page 40 of your own document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that not on Page 41? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE I am very much obliged to Your Lordship. [Turning to the defendant.] It is Page 41, at the bottom. It is on 20 September, 1320 hours. That is your wireless message to the U-boat Schacht. Do you see that?
DOENITZ: Yes, and I explained that in great detail yesterday. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE I just want to know: Is it true what is stated in your wireless message that the boat was dispatched to rescue Italian allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that true?
DOENITZ: That is correct, because the vessel had reported to me that it had four boats in tow-and it says on Page 40, ". . . with British in tow." It was clear, considering the whole situation, that a submarine with vessels in tow could not remain on the surface without the greatest danger to itself. Hence on Page 40 under heading 2 the order and the instructions given, "Boats with British and Poles to be cast adrift." I wanted to get rid of the boats. That was the only reason. And it was only afterwards- Page 41-when a long radio message came from him, which in itself was a repetition but which was interpreted to mean that after the two air attacks had taken place he had again endangered his boat by stopping and picking up men, only then did he receive this wireless message, after it had gradually dawned on me- during the first four days, or perhaps three days, I had nothing against rescuing the British-that the Italians, who after all were our allies, were getting the worst of it, which indeed proved to be the case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have given a long explanation. Now, is that wireless message true, that the boat was dispatched to rescue Italian allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that true or not true?
DOENITZ: Of course; this wireless message contained both instructions and it becomes unequivocally clear from these two instructions as well as from the impression I had that the British who were rescued far outnumbered the Italians, who were left to drown.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, there is one point I want you to make a little clearer, When you were interrogated about this matter, you said that you were under great pressure at the time; and, I think, that the pressure came to you from Hitler only through Captain Fricke. Is that right?
DOENITZ: No, "only" is not correct. It was "also." The pressure, as I have very clearly explained here, was due to worry and anxiety regarding the fate of my submarines, because I knew that they were now being greatly jeopardized. We had evidence of that already from the bombing attacks; secondly, of course, from the Fuehrer's orders which Fricke gave. But I have also stated here that in spite of that order, even if it was not militarily correct to act in this way, I continued rescuing. However, the pressure, my worry and anxiety, were mostly caused by the fate of the submarines themselves.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that at this time you had had the report to the Fuehrer on 14 May; you had then had the Laconia incident, and during that incident you had had the pressure from the Fuehrer. Now, was it not because of this...
DOENITZ: I beg your pardon, but...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Allow me to ask my question.
DOENITZ: I think there is an error that has crept in here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well, I will correct it. You had had the report to the Fuehrer on 14 May. You have told me that. There was then the Laconia...
DOENITZ: That has nothing to do with the Fuehrer's order in the case of the Laconia. In the case of the Laconia the Fuehrer had given orders, and quite rightly, that no boats should be endangered by the rescue. That is something quite different from the subject of 14 May.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am trying to assemble for the moment what matters you had to deal with. You had had the 14th of May, the Laconia incident, and then an order to stop, coming through from the Fuehrer.
DOENITZ: No, in the case of the Laconia incident I never thought at all of the order or of the discussion of 14 May with the Fuehrer, and I could not, because that was an entirely different subject. This is quite another matter, here it was purely a matter of rescue. There is no connection whatsoever between the two.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will see about that. Turn to Page 36 in the British document book, or Pages 71 to 75 in the German document book. Now, you have told us that what mainly concerned you was the safety of your own boats and of your own personnel.
DOENITZ: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you put into the order, "The elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of ships and crews are contrary to rescuing"? What was the point of putting these words in, unless you meant to encourage people to destroy enemy ships and crews?
DOENITZ: I explained that in great detail yesterday. I preached during all these years: You must not rescue when your own safety is in danger. In the case of the Laconia I myself in my anxiety and worry wirelessed that to the troops many times. Apart from that, I found again and again that submarine commanders were taking the danger from the air too lightly. I also showed how that is to be explained psychologically. I described yesterday the overwhelming increase of the air force, and consequently in no circumstances would I have again given my people as a reason that, if there is danger from the air, or since you are being endangered from the air, et cetera, you must not rescue, or rescuing would be contrary to the elementary demands of warfare; because I did not want to leave it to my commanders to discuss whether there was danger from the air or not. After all my experience of the losses suffered and in view of the ever present air force, which as history has shown was becoming stronger and stronger, I had to give a clear-cut order to the commanders based on that experience: "You cannot go on like that, or while we rescue the enemy we shall be attacked and killed by the enemy." Therefore this reasoning must not enter into it. I did not wish to give the commanders another opportunity of deliberating or discussing. I told you already yesterday that I could have added, "If now, in view of the danger from the air, we are killed by that selfsame enemy while rescuing him, then rescue is contrary to the elementary demands of warfare." I did not want to do that, because I did not want any more discussion. We all had the impression that this refrain, "Do not rescue if there is danger from the air," was outworn, because this would have meant that the commanders would nevertheless lose their liberty of action, and might slip into this thing.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if you had simply said, "You are forbidden to rescue," and if you had wanted to give a reason, "You are forbidden to rescue because in view of the Allied air cover it is a matter of too great danger for the safety of yourself and your boat ever to rescue at all," that would have been quite clear. Why did you not put it that way?
DOENITZ: No, that is just what I could not do. I have just said so, because some commander in some naval theater might get the idea that there was no danger from the air, and the next moment the plane would appear and he would be struck down. I have already said all that in reply to your suggestion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you had two experienced staff officers with you at the time that you got this order out- Captains Godt and Hessler, had you not?
DOENITZ: Yes, that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And both Captain Goat and Captain Hessler advised you strongly against the issue of this order, did they not?
DOENITZ: As far as I can remember, they said something like this, "The bulk of the submarines"-I have said that here-"the bulk of the U-boats, that is, more than 90 percent of the U-boats, are already fighting the convoys, so that such an order is out of the question for them." That was the question: Should we issue such a general order at all, and would not the further developments which forced us all the time to issue new orders, namely, "Remain on the surface as little as possible," make such an order superfluous? However, since I was responsible for warding off every possible danger to a submarine, I had to give this order and my staff agreed with me perfectly as far as this measure was concerned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you not say when you were interrogated on 22 October and on other occasions: "Godt and Hessler told me, 'Do not send this wireless message-you see, one day there may be a wrong impression about it; there may be a misinterpretation of that.' " Did you not say that?
DOENITZ: Yes, I said that, and it is true too that such a remark may have been made. But it was not misinterpreted by the U-boats; nobody thought of that or we would not have issued the order. But we were thinking of the effects on the outside world.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And was not the effect that you wanted to produce: That you would have an order which could be argued was merely a prohibition of rescue, and would encourage the submarine commanders who felt that way to annihilate the survivors of the crews?
DOENITZ: No, that is absolutely wrong, and it is also proved by the documents which we have submitted. Apart from the Mohle case, nobody misunderstood this order and when we compiled the order we were aware of that fact. That becomes clear from the communications which we had with U-boat commanders, and it becomes clear from my searching inquiries when I asked whether they had in any way thought of that. The order does not show that at all, neither does the reason which led to it. The fact is that we were rescuing for all we were worth. The question was, "to rescue or not to rescue," and nothing else. That is the key to the Laconia case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said that "we issued the order." Do you remember saying this in an interrogation on 6 October: "I am completely and personally responsible for it, because Captains Godt and Hessler both expressly stated that they considered the telegram as ambiguous or likely to be misinterpreted." Do you remember saying that, "I am completely and personally responsible" because both your staff officers had pointed out that it was ambiguous? Did you say that?
DOENITZ: I do not think so. I cannot think I said it that way. I am not sure, but I will say the following: During the interrogation I was told that Captains Goat and Hessler made this order, and in reply to that I said, "It is quite immaterial, I am responsible for the order." Moreover, the main point of discussion on that order was whether one ought to issue such an order. That it should ever have entered Captain Godt's or Captain Hessler's mind that such an order could be misunderstood by us-by the U-boats-is completely erroneous. I emphatically stated that, too, during the interrogation. I clearly stated that this consideration and the discussion of the question whether the order was to be issued or not had nothing whatever to do with it as far as these two gentlemen were concerned. That is quite clear; and that also was contained in the interrogation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were making clear that it was the first occasion. I made it clear that you were not blaming your junior officer who had advised you against this, and you were taking the responsibility on this occasion yourself. That is true, these junior officers advised you against it? In your own words, they both expressly stated that they considered the telegram ambiguous and liable to be misinterpreted; that is right, is it not, they did say that?
DOENITZ: I did not see the discussion after it was put down, and I did not sign it. I can tell you quite clearly-and this is clear from another discussion-that I said that I myself will assume full responsibility. For me that was the essential thing. The only reason why the whole question came up was because the interrogating officer told me these officers had drafted the order, and then, as I recall it, the idea was that on no account should these officers be held responsible for my order. That was the point of the matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, at any rate, you are not changing what you said a few minutes ago that both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler advised you against issuing this order, are you?
DOENITZ: According to my recollection, at first both advised against it. I have now heard that both are saying they did not advise against it, but that perhaps I or somebody else might have advised against it. I do not know for certain. I recollect that at first both advised me against issuing such an order at a time when 90 percent of our submarines were already engaged in fighting convoys and when we were being forced under the water anyway and it was absolutely impossible to make any more rescues since we were below the surface; and I said, "No; there will surely still be cases where such a thing can happen and where the commander will be faced with an awkward situation and in that case I want to relieve him of such a decision." That was the reason and the meaning of the discussion, nothing else.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will continue. That is the first part of the order. Now take Paragraph 2, "Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply." Now, Defendant, you know perfectly well that in order to find the captain or chief engineer, the U-boat has got to go around the lifeboats or wreckage and make inquiries, "Where is the captain?" And you know very well that the usual practice of the British merchant navy was to try and hide the captain and prevent them finding out who he was. Is that not the practical position that had to be met, that you had to go around the lifeboats asking for the captain if you wanted to bring him in? Is that not so?
DOENITZ: Not exactly, no. I stated quite clearly yesterday that, first, the risk of taking aboard one man was much less as far as time was concerned, and would not limit the crash diving ability of the boat, whereas rescuing activities would limit severely the crash diving ability. Secondly, that that had a military aim ordered by the Naval Operations Staff for which, as is always the case in war, a certain risk would have to be taken; and, thirdly, that the significance of that paragraph appeared to all of us to be unimportant, the results being always poor. This order, if you want to construe it like this and take it out of its context, militates against your contention that I wanted to destroy these people; because I wanted to take prisoners, and if I intended to kill somebody first, then I certainly could not have taken him prisoner. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE I am putting it to you that the second part of the order is that you are to bring in captains and chief engineers to find out what you can from them. Look at the third paragraph: "Rescue ship crews only if their statements will be of importance for U-boats," that is, of importance for you to learn from them the position of Allied ships or the measures the Allies are taking against submarines. That is the point against two and three, is it not? You are only to take prisoners if you can find out some useful thing from them?
DOENITZ: I think it is taken for granted that we should try to get as much information as possible, and since I cannot take the whole crew as prisoners on a U-boat, I have to confine myself to the most important persons. Therefore I remove these people from further engagement, whereas the others may engage again. Of course, in view of the limited room on a U-boat, I do not take unimportant people but the important ones.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not want to take up a lot of time, but I want you to tell me this: Did I' understand your explanation of the word "again" in the War Diary to be that you had drawn the attention of certain submarine commanders to your telegrams during the Laconia incident, is that your explanation?
DOENITZ: No, it did not refer. to U-boat commanders; and I believe the word "again," as my staff says, referred to those four wireless messages which we have read as meaning this during the last few days and which were submitted to the Tribunal yesterday.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put to you a moment ago a question and you said the "again" refers to the messages you sent out during the Laconic incident. I think you agree with that, do you not? Do not be afraid to agree with what I say. When was that?
DOENITZ: Yesterday it was explained to me that there were four wireless messages, and I assumed that the person was summarizing the whole event, and that was probably his way of putting it. He was a chief petty officer and I do not know what he meant when he used the word "again."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now you say you had never heard of the Hitler and Oshima conversations which I put to you a few moments ago?
DOENITZ: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Therefore, one may assume, may one not, that Lieutenant Heisig, who gave evidence, had not heard of the Hitler and Oshima conversations either; do you not think he could not have heard about it?
DOENITZ: I assume it was out of the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you notice that Heisig said in his evidence that during a lecture he heard you put forward the same argument as Hitler put forward in his conversations with Oshima?
DOENITZ: First of all I want to state that Heisig here in this witness box said something different from what he said during his interrogation. During cross-examination he has admitted here that I have not said anything about fighting against shipwrecked personnel; secondly, everything else he said is so vague that I do not attach much value to its credibility; thirdly, he stated quite clearly that I did not say this in a lecture but during a discussion, which is in itself of no importance; and fourthly, it may well be that the subject of America's new construction program and the manning of the new ships by trained crews was discussed. It was possible during that discussion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now say you agree you never opened any discussion having reference to the American shipbuilding program and the difficulty of finding crews? Do you agree with Heisig on that?
DOENITZ: The German press was full of that. Everybody read and knew about the shipbuilding program. Pictures were made...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the argument I am suggesting to you, you know, was that the building program would be useless if you could destroy or frighten off sufficient merchant navy crews. That is the point in Himmler's conversation, and that Heisig said you said. Did you say that?
DOENITZ: I have always taken the view that losses of crews would make replacement difficult, and this is stated in my war diary together with similar ideas, and perhaps I said something of the kind to my midshipmen.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Page 37 of the Prosecution document book, Page 76 in the German translation? It is an order dated 7 October 1943 (Document Number D-663, Exhibit Number GB-200). I just want you to look at the last sentence: "In view of the desired destruction of ships' crews, their sinking is of great value."
DOENITZ: I have read it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "In view of the desired destruction of ships' crews, their sinking is of great value," and it is continually pressing, the need for ships' crews.
DOENITZ: Yes, of course, but in the course of fighting. It is perfectly clear that these rescue ships were heavily armed. They had aircraft and could be sunk just like other convoy ships. If there were steamer crews on hand it was naturally our desire to sink them since we were justified in sinking such crews. Moreover they were used as U-boat traps near the steamers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On the question of the rightness or wrongness of sinking rescue ships, the destruction of ships' crews, now, I want to ask you one or two questions about Mohle. He commanded the U-boat Flotilla from 1942 until the end of the war. That is nearly three years; and as he told us, he has a number of decorations ' for gallant service. Are you telling the Tribunal that Commander Mohle went on briefing submarine commanders on a completely mistaken basis for three years without any of your staff or yourself discovering this? You saw every U-boat commander when he came back.
DOENITZ: I am sorry that Korvettenkapitan Mohle, being the only one who said he had doubts in connection with this order, as he declared here, did not report this right away. I could not know that he had these doubts. He had every opportunity of clearing up these doubts and I did not know, and nobody on my staff had any idea, that he had these thoughts.
SIR DAVID MAXWEL-FYFE: Now, I have a letter here, a letter from a widow of one of your submarine commanders. I cannot get the commander and this is a letter from his widow. I want you to say what you think of a passage in it. She says-in the second paragraph-"Captain Mohle says he has not found one U-boat commander who objected to the order to fire at helpless seamen who were in distress in the water." FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBt1HLER: I object to the use of this letter. I think this is the sort of letter which cannot be used as an exhibit. It is not sworn, and it is a typical example of the kind of letter which Mr. Justice Jackson has already repeatedly characterized.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The only point I make is this: The man himself has not come back. His widow can give information as to how he understood his orders before he went out. I should have submitted it with probative value. I think it occurs in Article 19. I will not use it if there is the slightest doubt about it before the Tribunal.
DOENITZ: It is full of incorrect statements, too. It says there that he, Prien, died in a concentration camp, which is not true.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait just a minute.
DOENITZ: It is not true.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBOEHLER: Mr. President, I have only just finished reading the whole letter.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal is considering the matter at the moment.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: May I state one argument in this connection first?
THE PRESIDENT: Welt we have heard your argument and we are considering the matter. The Tribunal thinks that it is undesirable and that this document should not be used.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As Your Lordship pleases. [Turning to the defendant.] Now I want to deal just for one moment with a passage in your own document book which Dr. Kranzbuehler put to you yesterday. It is Volume 2, Page 92, Exhibit 42. Before I ask you a question about it, there is one point that I would like you to help me on. In your interrogation you said that on 22 October that about two months after that order of 17 September you issued orders forbidding U-boats to surface at all. Is that right? You gave orders forbidding U-boats to surface, is that right?
DOENITZ: So far as it is possible for a submarine not to do so at all. We were always making changes, day and night, and it depended upon the degree of danger and weather conditions whether we gave orders for the U-boats to surface and re-charge when on the move.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They were not to surface after attacks, were not to surface at all before or after attacks; is that not the effect of your order?
DOENITZ: Of course submarines, for example at night, had to be on the surface for attacks, but the main thing was to avoid every risk when on the move.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then two months later there was an order that they were to surface as little as possible, and you tell me it was your order?
DOENITZ: As far as possible they were to try by all means to avoid danger from the air.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you give orders as to surfacing?