dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
WAGNER: I only saw Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop perhaps five or six times at these conferences, and I cannot remember that he ever said anything during the entire session. He was only present at the conference for his own information.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: How about Minister Speer, what did he do?
WAGNER: Minister Speer also very seldom brought in armament problems during the discussion. I know that questions of armament were always discussed between Hitler and Speer in special discussions. However, some exceptions may have occurred.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What was Himmler doing there, or his permanent deputy Fegelein? Did they discuss questions of security, or what was their mission?
WAGNER: No. During the military conference security problems were never discussed. Himmlerand his deputy appeared very frequently in connection with the Waffen-SS, and Fegelein had always to give reports about the setup, organization, arming, transportation and engagement of the SS divisions. At this time the SS divisions, according to my impression, still played a very important part, for ostensibly they represented a strategic reserve and were much discussed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I have a record of the meeting which was written by you. It has the Number GB-209. It is not found in the document book. It says in the third paragraph -and I am just reading one sentence: "The Deputy of the Reichsfuehrer SS at the fuehrer's headquarters, SS Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein, transmits the request of the Reichsfuehrer as to when he can count on the arrival of the 'Panther"'-those are tanks-"coming from Libau." Is this typical of SS Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein's work?
WAGNER: Yes. That was the kind of questions which were dealt with at every one of these sessions.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: At the end of the war Kaltenbrunner appeared several times also. Did he speak or report?
WAGNER: I cannot remember one single utterance on Kaltenbrunner's part during one of these military conferences.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What role did Admiral Doenitz play at the session discussions?
WAGNER: Even when Grossadmiral Doenitz was present the naval situation was reported by the deputy from the OKW, Commodore Assmann. However, the Admiral used this occasion to present, in connection with the individual theaters of war, or in summary at the end, those questions which he had in mind. The Admiral was neither asked nor did he give any opinion on questions dealing with air or land warfare which had no connection with the conduct of the naval war. In his statements he strictly confined himself to the sphere of the Navy, and very energetically objected if someone else during the session tried to interfere in questions of naval warfare.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I have come to a break. If the Tribunal agrees to declare a recess...
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will adjourn. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30 in order to sit in closed session.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral Wagner, as time went on a close relationship developed between Admiral Doenitz and Adolf Hitler. Was this due to the fact that the Admiral was particularly ready to comply with the fuehrer's wishes?
WAGNER: No, not at all. Admiral Doenitz' activity as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy began with a very strong opposition to Hitler. It was Hitler's intention to scrap the large ships of the Navy, that is to say, the remaining battleships and cruisers. Admiral Raeder had already rejected that plan.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That story is already known, Admiral. You need not go into it in detail.
WAGNER: Very well. Apart from that, Hitler's respect for Doenitz was due to the fact that every statement which the Admiral made was absolutely reliable and absolutely honest. The Admiral attached particular importance to the fact that particularly unfavorable developments, failures, and mistakes were to be reported at headquarters without digression, objectively, and simply. As an example, I should like to mention that the Admiral had given me the order...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we need examples of that sort of thing. Surely the general statement is quite sufficient.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did the Admiral in any way show himself particularly willing to comply with the fuehrer's political wishes or those of the Party?
WAGNER: No. Such wishes of the Party were, in my opinion, only put to the Navy in three cases. One was the question of the churches, which for the most part came up during the time of Admiral Raeder. I think it is generally known that the Navy retained its original religious organization and, in fact, extended it as the Navy grew. The second request made by the Party was that, modeled on the Russian example, political commissary should be set up within the Armed Forces. On that occasion Admiral Doenitz went to see Himmler and prevented the carrying out of that plan. When after 20 July 1944 Bormann nevertheless succeeded in getting the so-called "NSFO"-the National Socialist Leadership Officers-introduced into the Armed Forces, it did not happen in the way the Party wished, by appointing political commissary. It was merely done by using officers who were under the jurisdiction of the commander and who could not in any way interfere with the leadership of the troops. The third case was the intention on the part of the Party to take away from the Armed Forces the political penal cases.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: This case is also already known, Admiral. You kept the records of the visits at the fuehrer's headquarters, is that correct?
WAGNER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: A number of these records have been introduced as evidence in this Court. Will you please explain to the Tribunal what was the purpose of keeping these records of visits of commanders-in-chief to the fuehrer's headquarters?
WAGNER: The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, the Chief of the Naval Armaments, and the Chief of the General Navy Department-that is to say, the three leading men in the High Command of the Navy-were to be informed by means of these records of all happenings which took place in the presence of the Admiral, as far as they were of any interest to the Navy. That was one of my tasks.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You have just said "informed about happenings which took place in the presence of the Admiral." Does that mean that he himself must have heard everything that has been put down in these records?
WAGNER: Not necessarily. It happened quite frequently that during situation reports, when they took place in a large room and when subjects were discussed which did not interest him so much, the Admiral would retire to another part of the room and deal with some business of his own or discuss Navy questions with other participants in the meeting. It was possible that on such occasions I heard things and put them down in the record which the Admiral himself did not hear. But, of course, he would know about them later when he saw my record.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I am going to have shown to you one of your own records of discussions on 20 February 1945. It is Exhibit Number GB-209, and it is on Page 68 of the document book of the Prosecution. This deals with considerations regarding the renouncing of the Geneva Convention. Will you please describe exactly what happened as you remember it?
WAGNER: Approximately two or three days before the date in this record-in other words, on or about 17 or 18 February 1945-Admiral Voss telephoned me from headquarters, which at that time was situated in Berlin, and informed me that in connection with Anglo-Saxon propaganda to induce our troops to desert in the West, Hitler had stated his intention to leave the Geneva Convention.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What did he hope to achieve?
WAGNER: According to my first impression at the time, the intention was evidently to express to the troops and the German people that captivity would no longer bring any advantage. Thereupon, I immediately telephoned to the Naval Operations Staff, since I considered the intention to be completely wrong, and I asked them for a military opinion and an opinion from the point of view of international law. On the 19th, when taking part in the situation discussion, Hitler once more referred to this question, but this time not in connection with happenings on the western front; but in connection with the air attacks by the western enemies on open German towns- attacks had just been made on Dresden and Weimar. He ordered the Admiral to examine the effects of leaving the Geneva Convention from the point of view of naval warfare. An immediate answer was not expected and it was not given. Generaloberst Jodl was also quite strongly opposed to these intentions and he sought the Admiral's support. Thereupon it was agreed to have a conference and that is the conference which is mentioned in the record under Figure 2,
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That is the conference of 20 February, Admiral?
WAGNER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Who participated in that conference?
WAGNER: Admiral Doenitz, Generaloberst Jodl, Ambassador Hewel, and myself.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What was the subject?
WAGNER: The subject was the Fuehrer's intention of renouncing the Geneva Convention. The result was the unanimous opinion that such a step would be a mistake. Apart from military consideration we especially held the conviction that by renouncing the Geneva Convention both the Armed Forces and the German people would lose confidence in the leadership, since the Geneva Convention was generally considered to be the conception of international law.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In your notes there is a sentence, "One would have to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning and at all costs 'to save face' with the outer world." What is the significance of that sentence?
WAGNER: That sentence means that on no account should there be any irresponsible actions. If the leaders considered it necessary to introduce countermeasures against air attacks on open German towns, or against the propaganda for desertion in the West, then one should confine oneself to such countermeasures which appear necessary and justifiable. One should not put oneself in the wrong before the world and one's own people by totally repudiating all the Geneva Conventions and announce measures which went far beyond what appeared to be necessary and justifiable.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were any concrete measures discussed in this connection or were any such measures even thought of?
WAGNER: No. I can remember very well that no specific measures were discussed at all during the various conferences. We were mainly concerned with the total question of whether to repudiate the Geneva Convention or not.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did you ever learn anything about a so-called intention on Adolf Hitler's part to shoot 10,000 prisoners of war as a reprisal for the air attack on Dresden?
WAGNER: No, I have never heard anything about that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The expression "to save face"-doesn't that mean secrecy, hiding the true facts?
WAGNER: In my opinion it was certain that there was no question of secrecy, for neither the countermeasures against air attacks nor the measures of intimidation against desertion could be effective if they were concealed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: How long did this whole conversation which you recorded last?
WAGNER: Will you please tell me which conversation you mean?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The discussion of 20 February which contains the sentences which I have just read to you.
WAGNER: It took perhaps ten minutes or a quarter of an hour.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: So that your record is a very brief condensed summary of the conversation?
WAGNER: Yes, it only contains the important points.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did Admiral Doenitz also submit his objections to the Fuehrer?
WAGNER: As far as I recollect, it never reached that point. One became convinced that Hitler, as soon as he put his questions to the Admiral, could gather from the Admiral's expression and the attitude of the others that they rejected his plans. We passed our views on to the High Command of the Armed Forces in writing and heard no more about the whole matter.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I am now going to show you another record which is submitted under GB-210. It is on the next page of the document book of the Prosecution and it refers to conferences at the fuehrer's headquarters from 29 June to 1 July 1944. You will find an entry under the date of 1 July which reads, "In connection with the general strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer says that terror can be subdued only with terror." Was this statement made during a conversation between Hitler and Admiral Doenitz or in which connection?
WAGNER: This is a statement made by Hitler during a situation discussion and addressed neither to Admiral Doenitz nor to the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Well, if it was not addressed to the Navy, then why did you include it in your record?
WAGNER: I included in my record all statements which could be of any interest to the Navy. The High Command of the Navy was, of course, interested in the general strike in Copenhagen because our ships were repaired in Copenhagen; and apart from that Copenhagen was a naval base.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And to whom did you pass this record? Who received it?
WAGNER: According to the distribution list on Page 4, the paper went only to the Commander-in-Chief and department 1 of the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff have anything to do with the treatment of shipyard workers in Denmark?
WAGNER: No, nothing at ale From 1943 on the shipyards were entirely under the Ministry of Armaments.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The Prosecution sees in this statement and its transmission to a department of the OKW an invitation to deal ruthlessly with the inhabitants. Does that in any way tally with the meaning of this record?
WAGNER: There can be no question of that. The only purpose of this record was to inform the Departments of the High Command.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I am now going to have another document shown to you. It is Exhibit Number USA-544. It is in the document book of the Prosecution on Pages 64 and 65. It is a note by the international law expert in the Naval Operations Staff regarding the treatment of saboteurs. Do you know this note?
WAGNER: Yes. I have initialed it on the first page.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: At the end of that note you will find the sentence: "As far as the Navy is concerned, it should be investigated whether the occurrence cannot be used, after reporting to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, to make sure that the treatment of members of Commando troops is absolutely clear to all the departments concerned." Was this report made to Admiral Doenitz who at that time had been Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for ten days?
WAGNER: No, that report was not made, as the various remarks at the head of it will show.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Will you explain that, please?
WAGNER: The international law expert in the Naval Operations Staff IA made this suggestion through the Operations Of lice IA to me as Chief of the Operational Department. The chief of the IA Section in a handwritten notice beside his initials, wrote, "The subordinate commanders have been informed2' That means that he had objected to the proposal of the international law expert and considered that an explanation of the orders within the Navy was superfluous. I investigated these matters and I decided that the operations officer was right. I sent for the international law expert, Dr. Eckardt, informed him orally of my decision, and returned this document to him. Thus the suggestion to report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy made in connection with the explanation of this order was not actually carried out.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Can you remember whether Admiral Doenitz on some later occasion received reports on this Commando order?
WAGNER: No, I have no recollection of that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I have submitted to you GB-208, which is a record regarding the case of a motor torpedo boat at Bergen. It is the case which is contained in the British document book on Pages 66 and 67. Have you ever heard about this incident before this Trial?
WAGNER: No. I heard about it for the first time on the occasion of interrogations in connection with these proceedings.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I gather from the files of the British court-martial proceedings, which have been submitted by the Prosecution during cross-examination, that before the shooting of the crew of that motor torpedo boat there had been two telephone conversations, between the Chief of the Security Service in Bergen and the SD at Oslo, and between the SD at Oslo and Berlin. Can you recollect whether such a conversation took place between the SD at Oslo and yourself or one of the representatives in the High Command?
WAGNER: I certainly had no such conversation, and as far as I know neither did any other officer in my department or in the High Command.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Do you consider it at all possible that the SD at Oslo might get in touch with the High Command of the Navy?
WAGNER: No, I consider that quite out of the question. If the SD in Oslo wanted to get in touch with a central department in Berlin then they could only do so through their own superior authority, and that is the RSHA.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I now put to you another document; it is Exhibit GB-212 which appears on Page75 of the document book of the Prosecution. It mentions an example of a commandant of a German prisoner-of-war camp and it says he had communists who had attracted attention among the inmates suddenly and quietly removed by the guards. Do you know of this incident?
WAGNER: Yes, such an episode is known to me. I think we received the report from a prisoner of war-a man who had been severely injured and who had been exchanged-that the German commandant of a prisoner-of-war camp in Australia, in which the crew of the auxiliary cruiser Cormoran were detained, had secretly had a man of his crew killed because he had been active as a spy and traitor.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: But this order does not mention the word "spy." It says "communist." What is the explanation?
THE PRESIDENT: It does not say "communist." It says "communists" in the plural.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: "Communists," plural.
WAGNER: In my opinion the only explanation is that the true state of affairs was to be concealed so as to prevent the enemy intelligence from tracing the incident and making difficulties for the senior sergeant in question. Thus, a different version was chosen.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: It was the opinion of the Soviet Prosecution that this showed there was a plan for the silent removal of communists. Can you tell us anything about the origin of this order, whether such a plan existed and whether it had ever come under discussion?
WAGNER: First of all the order was addressed to those personnel offices which were responsible for choosing young potential officers and noncommissioned officers in the Navy. There were about six or seven personnel offices. Beyond that I can only say that of course...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Just a moment, Admiral, please.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, is it necessary to go into all this detail? The question is, was there an order with reference to making away with the people of this sort or was there not-not all the details about how the order came to be made.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In that case I shall put the question this way: Was there any order or any desire in the Navy to kill communists inconspicuously and systematically?
WAGNER: No, such an order or such a plan did not exist. Of course, there were a considerable number of communists in the Navy. That was known to every superior officer. The overwhelming majority of those communists did their duty as Germans just as any other German in the war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral Doenitz has been accused by the Prosecution because as late as the spring of 1945 he urged his people to hold out obstinately to the end. The Prosecution considers that evidence of the fact that he was a fanatical Nazi. Did you and the majority of the Navy consider this to be so?
WAGNER: No, the Admiral's attitude was not considered to be political fanaticism. To them it meant that he was carrying out his ordinary duty as a soldier to the last. I am convinced that this was the view of the great majority of the entire Navy, the men and the noncommissioned officers as well as the officers.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant's counsel want to ask any questions?
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral Wagner, you have already briefly sketched the positions you have held. In supplementing I should like to make quite sure who held a leading position in the Naval Operations Staff under Grossadmiral Raeder in the decisive years before and after the outbreak of the war. Who was the Chief of Staff during the two years before the war, and at the beginning of the war?
WAGNER: The Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff from 1938 until 1941 was Admiral Schniewind. From 1941 until after Raeder's retirement it was Admiral Fricke.
DR. SIEMERS: Those, therefore, were the two officers who worked in the highest posts under Admiral Raeder in the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: They were the immediate advisers of the Admiral.
DR. SIEMERS: And the Naval Operations Staff had several departments?
WAGNER: Yes, it consisted of several departments, which were given consecutive numbers.
DR. SIEMERS: Arid which was the most important department?
WAGNER: The most important department of the Naval Operations Staff was the Operations Department, which was known as Number 1.
DR. SIEMERS: And the other departments, 2, 3-what did they do?
WAGNER: They were the Signals and Communications Department and the Information Department.
DR. SIEMERS: Who was the chief of the Operations Department?
WAGNER: From 1937 until 1941 it was Admiral Fricke. From 1941 until after Raeder's retirement I was the chief of that department.
DR. SIEMERS: In other words, for many years you worked under Admiral Raeder. First of all I should like to ask you to speak briefly about Raeder's basic attitude during the time you were working in the Naval Operations Staff.
WAGNER: Under Admiral Raeder the Navy was working for a peaceful development in agreement with Britain. The foremost questions were those regarding the type of ships, training, and tactical schooling. Admiral Raeder never referred to aggressive wars during any conference which I attended. Nor did he at any time ask us to make any preparations in that direction.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember that in 1940 and in 1941 Raeder declared himself emphatically against a war with Russia?
WAGNER: Yes, he was very strongly opposed to a war with Russia, and that for two reasons; first, he considered that to break the treaty of friendship with Russia was wrong and inadmissible, and secondly, for strategic reasons he was convinced that our entire strength should be concentrated against Britain. When in the autumn of 1940 it appeared that the invasion of Britain could not be carried out, the Admiral worked for a strategy in the Mediterranean to keep open an outlet against Britain's policy of encirclement.
DR. SIEMERS: The Navy had rather a lot to do with Russia during the friendship period between Russia and Germany in the way of deliveries. As far as you know did everything in that respect run smoothly?
WAGNER: Yes, I know that a large number of deliveries from the Navy stocks went to Russia; for instance, uncompleted ships heavy guns, and other war material.