dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
the arrival in Rumania will be reported step by step by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission in Rumania. "Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent, also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties." (1541-PS) Another "Top Secret Directive" carries the plan a little farther. It deals with decisive action in support of the Italian forces in Tripoli and in Albania. The first short paragraph reads: "The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations demands for strategical political and psychological reasons German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies." (448-PS) Paragraph three, after dealing with the forces to be transferred to Albania, sets out what the duties of the German forces will be: "a. To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case, should new crises arise there. "b. To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim: "To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a far-reaching operation. "To open up the straits west of Salonika from the back in order to support thereby the frontal attack of list's Army." (448-PS) That directive was signed by Hitler, and, as shown on the original, was initialed by both Keitel and Jodl. A copy went to Raeder, and the copy sent to Foreign intelligence presumably reached Ribbentrop. A conference took place on 19 and 20 January between Keitel and the Italian General, Guzzoni. This was followed by a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, at which Ribbentrop, Keitel, and Jodl were present. In the speech which the Fuehrer made on 20 January 1941, after the conference with the Italians, he declared: "* * * The massing of troops in Roumania serves a threefold purpose: "a. An operation against Greece. "b. Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey. "c. Safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania. "Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time. "Desirable that this deployment
purpose: "a. An operation against Greece. "b. Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey. "c. Safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania. "Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time. "Desirable that this deployment is completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment." (C-134) At a conference between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarians, on 8 February, the following plans were discussed: "Minutes of questions discussed between the representatives of the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German Supreme Command-General Field Marshal List-in connection with the possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their commitment against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she should involve herself in the war." "* * * The Bulgarian and the German general staff will take all measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the operations and to assure in this way the most favorable conditions for the execution of the German operations as planned. "The representatives of the two general staffs consider it to be suitable to inform their governments that it will be good to take the necessity of secrecy and surprise into consideration when the three-power treaty is signed by Bulgaria, in order to assure the success of the military operations." (1746-PS) A further top secret directive of 19 February sets the date for the Operation Marita (C-59). It states that the bridge across the Danube is to be begun on 28 February, the river crossed on 2 March, and the final orders to be issued on 26 February at the latest. On the original of this order the actual dates are filled in in the handwriting of Keitel. The position of Bulgaria at this moment was this: Bulgaria adhered to the Three-Power Pact on 1 March 1941. On the same day the entry of German troops into Bulgaria began in accordance with the Plan Marita and associated directives already referred to. The landing of British troops in Greece on 3 March, in accordance with the
of Bulgaria at this moment was this: Bulgaria adhered to the Three-Power Pact on 1 March 1941. On the same day the entry of German troops into Bulgaria began in accordance with the Plan Marita and associated directives already referred to. The landing of British troops in Greece on 3 March, in accordance with the guarantee given in the spring of 1939 by the British Government, may have accelerated the movement of the German forces. In any event, as has been shown, the invasion of Greece had been planned long beforehand and was already in progress at this time. A short extract from a report by Raeder on an interview with Hitler, which the original shows took place in the presence of Keitel and Jodl at 1600 hours on 18 March, shows the ruthless nature of the German intentions: "The C in C of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement. "Fuehrer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement." (C-167) This report shows, it seems clear, that the Nazi conspirators, in accordance with their principle of liquidating any neutral which did not remain disinterested, had made every preparation by the end of January and were at this date in the process of moving the necessary troops to ensure the final liquidation of Greece, which was already at war with, and getting the better of, their Italian allies. C. Lulling the unsuspecting Victim. They were not yet, however, ready to deal with Yugoslavia, towards which their policy accordingly remained one of lulling the unsuspecting victim. On 25 March, in accordance with this policy, the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three-Power Pact was secured. This adherence followed a visit on 15 February 1941 by the Yugoslav Premier Cvetkovic and the Foreign Minister Cinkar-Markvic to Ribbentrop at Salzburg and subsequently to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, after which these ministers were induced to sign the pact at Vienna on 25 March. On this occasion Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of assurance. The first made this guarantee: "Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade. "at the same time, when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the governments of
were induced to sign the pact at Vienna on 25 March. On this occasion Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of assurance. The first made this guarantee: "Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade. "at the same time, when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the governments of the Axis Powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the following identical notes: "'Mr. Prime Minister: "'In the name of the German Government and at its behest, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following: "'On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry today into the Tri-Partite Pact, the German Government confirms its determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.'" (2450-PS) That letter was signed by Ribbentrop, who was present at the meeting in August 1939 when he and Hitler tried to persuade the Italians to invade Yugoslavia. It was in fact 11 days after this letter was written that the Germans did invade Yugoslavia, and two days after the letter was written that they issued the necessary order. The second letter reads: "Mr. Prime Minister: "With reference to the conversations that occurred in connection with the Yugoslavian entry into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of the Reich Cabinet [Reichsregierung], that in the agreement between the Axis powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government, the governments of the Axis powers during this war will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of troops through Yugoslavian national territory." (2450-PS) The position at this stage, 25 March 1941, was therefore that German troops were already in Bulgaria moving towards the Greek frontier, while Yugoslavia had, to use Hitler's own term in his letter to Mussolini, "become disinterested" in the cleaning up of the Greek question. The importance of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three-Power Pact appears very clearly from an extract from the minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Ciano. The first paragraph states: "The Fuehrer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia's joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the resulting definition of her position. This is of special importance in view of the proposed
Three-Power Pact appears very clearly from an extract from the minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Ciano. The first paragraph states: "The Fuehrer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia's joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the resulting definition of her position. This is of special importance in view of the proposed military action against Greece, for, if one considers that for 350 to 400 kilometers the important line of communication through Bulgaria runs within 20 kilometers of the Yugoslav border, one can judge that with a dubious attitude of Yugoslavia an undertaking against Greece would have been militarily an extremely foolhardy venture." (2765-PS) Again, it is a matter of history that on the night of 26 March 1941, when the two Yugoslav ministers returned to Belgrade, General Simovic and his colleagues effected their removal by a coup d'etat, and Yugoslavia emerged on the morning of 27 March ready to defend, if need be, its independence. D. Further Planning for Attack. The Nazis reacted rapidly to this altered situation, and the immediate liquidation of Yugoslavia was decided on. A conference of Hitler and the German High Command on the situation in Yugoslavia took place on 27 March 1941. Those present included the Fuehrer; the Reich Marshall (Goering); Chief, OKW, (Keitel); and the Chief of the Wehrmacht Fuehrungstab, (Jodl). A report of the conference notes that "later on the following persons were added," and among them is included Ribbentrop (1746-PS). Hitler's statement proceeded as follows: "The Fuehrer describes Yugoslavia's situation after the coup d'etat. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the coming Marita action and even more in regard to the Barbarossa undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never pro-German." "The present moment is for political and military reasons favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country's attitude toward us, for if the overthrow of the Government would have happened during the Barbarossa action, the consequences for us probably would have been considerably more serious." "The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order
toward us, for if the overthrow of the Government would have happened during the Barbarossa action, the consequences for us probably would have been considerably more serious." "The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No Diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav government, which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready. "It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Roumania's main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassador have already been notified. During the day a message will still be addressed to the Duce. "Politically, it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking. In this way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to these states; the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria. "This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest time." (1746-PS) Thus it appears that two days after Yugoslavia had signed the Tri-Partite Pact and the Nazis had given assurances, simply because there had been a coup d'etat and it was possible that the operations against Greece might be affected, the destruction of Yugoslavia was decided on without any question of taking the
time." (1746-PS) Thus it appears that two days after Yugoslavia had signed the Tri-Partite Pact and the Nazis had given assurances, simply because there had been a coup d'etat and it was possible that the operations against Greece might be affected, the destruction of Yugoslavia was decided on without any question of taking the trouble to ascertain the views of the new Government. The report of the meeting continues: "5. The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrade in attacks by waves." (1746-PS) It is again a matter of history that the residential areas of Belgrade were bombed at 7 o'clock on the following Sunday morning, 6 April 1941. At that same meeting of 27 March 1941 a tentative plan, drawn up by Jodl, was offered: "In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory." (1746-PS) An order (Directive No. 25) was issued after the meeting of 27 March. The first paragraph reads: "The military putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her protestations of loyalty, for the time being be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible." (C-127) As another result of the meeting, a telegram, containing a letter from Hitler to Mussolini, was forwarded to the German Ambassador in Rome by Hitler and Ribbentrop. It was written to advise Mussolini of the course decided on, and under the guise of somewhat fulsome language the Duce was given his orders. The first five paragraphs read: "Duce, Events force me to give you, Duce, by this the quickest means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences which may result from it. "(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as a dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the purely military point of view, German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at all justified, as long as the attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous and she
from it. "(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as a dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the purely military point of view, German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at all justified, as long as the attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous and she could threaten the left flank of the advancing columns, on our enormous front. "(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly have endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together by mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet with success, or they were begun too late to produce any definite result. Today's reports leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia. "(3) I don't consider this situation as being catastrophic, but nevertheless a difficult one, and we on our part must avoid any mistake if we do not want in the end to endanger our whole position. "(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that you should cover and screen the most important passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all available forces. "These measures should not be considered as designed for a long period of time, but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent for at least fourteen days to three weeks a crisis arising. "I also consider it necessary, duce, that you should reinforce your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available means and with utmost speed. "(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only personalities who necessarily must be notified know anything about them. These measures will completely lose their value should they become known." (1835-PS) Hitler continues with a further emphasis on the importance of secrecy. An operational order (R-95) followed, which was signed by General von Brauchitsch, and which merely passed to the Armies the orders contained in Directive No. 25. (C-127) E. Explanations. The
completely lose their value should they become known." (1835-PS) Hitler continues with a further emphasis on the importance of secrecy. An operational order (R-95) followed, which was signed by General von Brauchitsch, and which merely passed to the Armies the orders contained in Directive No. 25. (C-127) E. Explanations. The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took place in the morning of 6 April 1941. On that day Hitler issued a proclamation (TC-93). The following passage is an extract: "From the beginning of the struggle it has been England's steadfast endeavor to make the Balkans a theatre of war. British Diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War, succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to her, and then finally in misusing her for Britain's purposes. "The documents published today [the German 'White Book'] afford a glimpse of a practice which, in accordance with very old British recipes, is a constant attempt to induce others to fight and bleed for British interests. "In the face of this I have always emphasized that: "(1) The German people have no antagonism to the Greek people but that "(2) We shall never, as in the World War, tolerate a power establishing itself on Greek territory with the object at a given time of being able to advance thence from the southeast into German living space. We have swept the northern flank free of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in the south." "In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it has been my endeavor since the day of my assumption of power above all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. I have consciously put out of mind everything that once took place between Germany and Serbia. I have not only offered the Serbian people the hand of the German people, but in addition have made efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all difficulties which existed between the Yugoslav State and various Nations allied to Germany." (TC-93) One can only think that when he issued that proclamation Hitler must momentarily have forgotten the meeting with Ciano in August 1939, and the meeting with Ribbentrop and the others on 27 March, a few days earlier. In a lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943,
State and various Nations allied to Germany." (TC-93) One can only think that when he issued that proclamation Hitler must momentarily have forgotten the meeting with Ciano in August 1939, and the meeting with Ribbentrop and the others on 27 March, a few days earlier. In a lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943, he sets out his views, two and a half years later on the action taken in April, 1941. in paragraph 11 he stated: "What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an Ally in the Balkans in consequence of the 'extra-turn' of the Italians against Greece. The attack, which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part which-taking a long view of the matter-would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the North was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil area from that country." (L-172) F. Summary. To summarize: The invasion of Greece was decided on at least as early as November or December 1940 and was scheduled for the end of March or the beginning of April, 1941. No consideration was at any time given to any obligations under treaties or conventions which might make such invasion a breach of International Law. Care was taken to conceal the preparations so that the German Forces might have an unsuspecting victim. In the meanwhile, Yugoslavia, although to be liquidated in due course, was clearly better left for a later stage. Every effort was made to secure her cooperation for the offensive against Greece, or at least to ensure that she would abstain from any interference. The coup d'etat of General Simovic upset this plan and it was then decided that, irrespective of whether or not his Government had any hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the Greeks, Yugoslavia must be liquidated. It was not worth while to the Nazis to take any steps to ascertain Yugoslavia's intentions, for it would be so little trouble, now that the German troops were deployed,