dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
come about where there would be two masters on the same front. SCHELLENBERG evaded the question as to whether he knew of any case where a member of the Security Police or SD had been punished by the Army. He insisted, however, that as stated in his Affidavit the Einsatzgruppen and SD agents were under the disciplinary control of the Army Commander. Jews With regard to the extermination of Jews, very little evidence was given on this subject, except to the effect that the High Command were in no sense concerned with the activities of EICHMANN. 125 Col. Neave Rep. MANSTEIN reiterated that he had only once heard of the shooting of Jews. On the night before he moved his headquarters from Nikolawew an officer had told him that the SS had recently shot some Jews in a town to the rear. MANSTEIN left a message for the Commander to the effect that he would not tolerate such activities. His observation on the statement of Ohlendorf that Einsatzgruppe D had killed 90,000 Jews in one year within the area of the 11th Army was as follows: The Army area was from Chernovitz to Rostov about 1200 kilometers long and 400 kilometers wide. Three or four German armies operated in this area. There were very few Jews in the sector as they had already taken refuge elsewhere. If the SD did in fact shoot Jews, it would have been done in a very lonely spot. At any rate, he never heard of it. Shooting of Civilians He explained the alleged shooting of civilians in the caves of Inkerman as being due to demolitions by the Russians themselves. The destruction of the railroad station at Sebastopol was undertaken purely because it was a stronghold. The Army had no idea that there were civilians hidden there. He thought it was completely impossible that 195,000 people were shot at Kiev. He also regarded as impossible the charges that 250 school children were poisoned at Kirch and 144,000 persons drowned in the Black Sea. Witnesses for the General Staff also testified that the Army was not concerned in the deportation of foreign workers. If they were asked to provide workers for SAUCKEL, which was the case with MANSTEIN, they requested that agricultural workers should not be removed. The allegation that the German Army removed 7,000,000 horses from Russia is incorrect. This number of
that the Army was not concerned in the deportation of foreign workers. If they were asked to provide workers for SAUCKEL, which was the case with MANSTEIN, they requested that agricultural workers should not be removed. The allegation that the German Army removed 7,000,000 horses from Russia is incorrect. This number of horses would have been sufficient for 750 divisions on the basis of 4000 to a division, whereas the German Army had only 150 to 200 Infantry Divisions at any one time on the Eastern Front. (5) The Revolt of the Polish Resistance in Warsaw in 1944 REINHARDT was in charge of Army Group Center at the time of the Warsaw uprising. General von dem BACH, who was in charge of the Einsatzgruppe engaged in suppressing the rising, was not under his command but immediately under the Reichsfuehrer SS. The 9th Army, which was in his Army group, was especially interested in the early suppression of the rising because 126 Col. Neave Rep. of the Russian attack pressing on Warsaw from the East. When he took over command of the Army group, he had heard of the atrocities committed by the SS Brigade Kaminsky. This SS unit consisted entirely of Russians who were later convicted of these atrocities and shot. REINHARDT asked von dem. BACH to bring the action to an early conclusion and was personally active in procuring the surrender of General BOR. The order for the total destruction of the city came from HIMMLER. In cross-examination REINHARDT admitted that there were a number of Army troops, such as engineers and artillery men, specially attached to von dem. BACH during the suppression of the Warsaw rising. (6) The Treatment of Prisoners of War in the East The witnesses declared that they tried to see that prisoners were treated according to the Geneva Convention. They admitted that Germans killed Russians in revenge for the killing of German soldiers. Prisoners of war were not the responsibility of the fighting troops but were sent to camps at the rear. MANSTEIN claimed that he had punished a soldier for hitting a prisoner of war. REINHARDT admitted that owing to the extremely large numbers of prisoners of war captured in the East it was necessary for the Army group to play some part in their administration. He was aware that
camps at the rear. MANSTEIN claimed that he had punished a soldier for hitting a prisoner of war. REINHARDT admitted that owing to the extremely large numbers of prisoners of war captured in the East it was necessary for the Army group to play some part in their administration. He was aware that many died but this was largely due to the encirclement actions that took place, to the lack of housing facilities, the general poverty of the countryside and the severe winter of 1941. He said that a number of Russian prisoners of war felt that they were being treated well since they remained with the German troops and did not choose to escape. Some of them even fought with the Germans. Cross-examined on Document 108-PS, regarding the shooting of weak and starving prisoners of war in front of the population, he said that he had never heard of this. REINHARDT acknowledged that fur boots were removed from Russian prisoners of war during the winter of 1941 and 1942. He considered this justified because the Russian soldiers in question had other shoes. (7) The Treatment of Prisoners of War in the West RUNDSTEDT also declared himself to be a firm believer in the treatment of captured prisoners of war according to the Geneva Convention. He said that he had heard of the shooting of 100 American soldiers at Malmedy, whereupon he immediately ordered a 127 Col. Neave Rep. detailed report from General MODEL. (This was when RUNDSTEDT was Commander-in-Chief West at the time of the Battle of the Bulge.) The statement of the witness von DERESSEN that the order for this execution must have come from the High Command is completely false. The actual order was that as many prisoners as possible should be taken in order to create favorable propaganda in Germany. (8) Operations Against the French Resistance and Underground Movements in Western Europe-The Oradour Incident RUNDSTEDT said that the only way to prevent the execution of repressive measures against the Resistance was to sabotage HITLER'S orders. He did not think that combined opposition by all the Generals against the illegal methods proposed in Russia and France would have resulted in their withdrawal. The only result of such opposition would have been the replacement of a good type of
measures against the Resistance was to sabotage HITLER'S orders. He did not think that combined opposition by all the Generals against the illegal methods proposed in Russia and France would have resulted in their withdrawal. The only result of such opposition would have been the replacement of a good type of General officer by SS men. The same form of sabotage that was applied to the Commissar Order was applied to measures in France against the resistance. The military commander worked with the SD and Security Police, receiving orders from the OKW. Commander-in-Chief West, the post held by RUNDSTEDT, also maintained order in France when the resistance movement became more intense in the winter of 1943-1944. HITLER accused the High Command in France of too much indulgence with the Petain Government and lack of energy in repressing the resistance movement. RUNDSTEDT said that for a long time he accepted the losses of his troops as a result of activities of the resistance without reprisal. He made frequent appeals to Petain to warn the underground to stop their aggressions. Finally it became necessary to take severe measures against the resistance movement. In the operations that followed no planes and very few tanks were used. The German troops never bombarded the whole locality but confined their action to particular strongpoints. Oradour With regard to the Oradour incident, RUNDSTEDT learned about this from the Vichy Government. The SS Division who had set fire to the church in which women and children were hiding 128 Col. Neave Rep. was on the march from Southern France to Normandy. He did not know the results of the inquiry into, the incident. The SS Division in question was one which the witness had requested as a reinforcement. He declared, however, that he was powerless in regard to disciplinary matters where SS formations were concerned. With regard to the order of the OKW instructing military commanders to fight the resistance with all means, RUNDSTEDT was of the opinion that such harshness was necessary and could not be avoided. (9) The Commando Order With regard to the Commando Order, 498-PS and 493-PS , RUNDSTEDT, KESSELRING and LIST claimed to have sabotaged this order in the same way as had been done with the Commissar Order in Russia. According to RUNDSTEDT
the opinion that such harshness was necessary and could not be avoided. (9) The Commando Order With regard to the Commando Order, 498-PS and 493-PS , RUNDSTEDT, KESSELRING and LIST claimed to have sabotaged this order in the same way as had been done with the Commissar Order in Russia. According to RUNDSTEDT no one was ever actually handed over to the SD under these orders. The SD cooperated with him in this respect. In cross-examination RUNDSTEDT admitted that strictly speaking his act in sabotaging the order constituted disobedience. He said he sent in no reports concerning it in spite of paragraph 4 of Document 551-PS, USA-551, which called for daily reports from the Commander-in-Chief on the subject. He was shown Document 3702-PS, USA-531 from his own headquarters in which it was reported that Commando units had received the treatment prescribed for them. His answer was that two or three cases may have taken place but on the whole the order was sabotaged. WESTPHAL describing operations in the desert in 1942, said that a nephew of Field Marshal Alexander wearing a German cap and armed with a German pistol was found behind the lines. ROMMEL ordered that he should be treated as an ordinary prisoner of war. (10) Treatment of the Civilian Population in Occupied Territory in the West RUNDSTEDT declared that the High Command at all times attempted to maintain good relations with the civilian population in France and Western Europe. He cooperated with Marshal Petain, doing all in his power to alleviate the situation of the French population. 129 Col. Neave Rep. (11) The Charge of Bombing open Cities The only evidence given on this point was by General BUSSE, who gave an account of the bombing of Rotterdam. He said that he was under orders to establish contact with German airborne troops as soon as the bridges north of Rotterdam were constructed. He arrived about 24 hours after it was captured. The military commander in the town told him that it had not been possible to stop the attack because the surrender discussions had been retarded. He was informed through other reports while he was in contact with the airborne troops that the reason for the release of the bombs after the city had capitulated was that a certain divisional radio link
town told him that it had not been possible to stop the attack because the surrender discussions had been retarded. He was informed through other reports while he was in contact with the airborne troops that the reason for the release of the bombs after the city had capitulated was that a certain divisional radio link was not functioning properly. VII. Knowledge of Specific Crimes The Generals of the High Command declared that they simply received orders and that they were unacquainted with the plans of the politicians. MANSTEIN said that they did not participate in any political discussions and were not informed of them until after the decisions had been reached. The giving of advice by a subordinate is an idea that does not exist in the German Army. Consequently, the conception of a council of war or High Staff conference was not even considered. The extent of the knowledge of military leaders depended largely on their rank. Those who knew most were the immediate groups surrounding HITLER, e.g., the heads of staff of OKW and Commanders-in-Chief. They would know decisions earlier than other people. They possibly were able to speak with HITLER before a decision was made public. Chiefs of Staffs of different branches of the OKW, with the exception of GOERING, were not asked concerning the decisions made. They might, however, be asked to give advice concerning the decision if it affected their own departments. The Commanders-in-Chief of the Armies in the field, however, only learned of a decision after it had been made. According to the rules of secrecy, they only learned what was of immediate use to them. Meetings with HITLER before the beginning of a campaign consisted of an announcement of his intentions, and even a general discussion of any kind was impossible. MANSTEIN said that on several occasions he tried to get HITLER to give up his military leadership but without any success. All the witnesses denied that they knew of the atrocities carried out by the Einsatzgruppen. (This has already' been referred to in Section VI, paragraph 6.) RUNDSTEDT denied that HITLER 130 Col. Neave Rep. had informed the various Commanders-in-Chief of the proposed liquidation of the Jews in Russia. It was his opinion that the entire
that they knew of the atrocities carried out by the Einsatzgruppen. (This has already' been referred to in Section VI, paragraph 6.) RUNDSTEDT denied that HITLER 130 Col. Neave Rep. had informed the various Commanders-in-Chief of the proposed liquidation of the Jews in Russia. It was his opinion that the entire Jewish operation was carried out under the cover of secrecy. As to conditions in concentration camps, he gave evidence that Generals HALDER and FALKENHAUSEN had been sent to Dachau as prisoners for a year and had not had the slightest idea of what was happening. VIII. Whether membership of the High Command was Compulsory and whether Resignation was Possible The General Staff witnesses declared that resignation was not possible. This was particularly so after Stalingrad. Various witnesses gave evidence that they requested their removal as a result of differences of opinion with HITLER. This particularly applied to RUNDSTEDT and von LEEB, who were dismissed, although the former was later reinstated and in March 1943 became Commander-in-Chief West. Any resignation against the will of HITLER would have been impossible and would have been considered mutiny. Disastrous consequences to the family of the General would have followed. Various witnesses were asked why they took over command of the Army at the end of the war when the situation was already desperate. BUSSE, for instance, said that he was moved by the sight of miserable groups of countrymen travelling west and wished to protect them from the enemy coming from the East. He said that he followed the example of many other soldiers who have preferred death to surrender. As the war progressed, HITLER's attitude towards his Generals became increasingly distrustful. The Generals considered that they could not refuse responsibility in spite of the fantastic orders they received because such conduct would have been unsoldierly. It would have constituted desertion of their troops. The case of General HOEPPNER who had refused an order was cited. HOEPPNER was disgraced and his family persecuted. REINHARDT expressed the opinion that HITLER could have been induced to resign immediately after Stalingrad, but he did not believe that HITLER at any time could have been persuaded from his opinions by any united action
case of General HOEPPNER who had refused an order was cited. HOEPPNER was disgraced and his family persecuted. REINHARDT expressed the opinion that HITLER could have been induced to resign immediately after Stalingrad, but he did not believe that HITLER at any time could have been persuaded from his opinions by any united action of the higher military leaders. 131 Col. Neave Rep. MANSTEIN thought that the removal of HITLER in 1944 would, if successful, have led to civil war in Germany and to a complete military defeat. The troops themselves believed in HITLER and consequently it was the duty of the officers to carry on. THE REICH CABINET The only witness for the Reich Cabinet was Franz SCHLEGELBERGER. SCHLEGELBERGER was "State Secretary" (Under Secretary) in the Ministry of Justice, having previously held the same position in the von PAPEN cabinet. He remained in the HITLER cabinet until August 1942. The transcript of the witness' evidence seems vague and confused. He said that in 1933 the Nazis were given power to issue new laws and to modify the constitution. In 1934 the offices of Reich Chancellery and Reich President were merged in HITLER, and all parties prohibited except the National Socialist. With the outbreak of war, all departments became more and more concentrated. As early as 1937 and 1938 the HITLER Government had become a "tyranny". The functions of the Fuehrer were further coordinated by the Reichstag decree of 26 April 1942. Cabinet Meetings The witness said that as State Secretary he only participated in one cabinet meeting in 1933. On this occasion he was asked by HITLER whether it was possible to impose the death sentence or a severe imprisonment on a person who abused the SA uniform. He replied that no such law existed and HITLER violently reprimanded him, but later shook hands and said that he was right. The practice grew up whereby HITLER preferred to talk to ministers individually rather than hold cabinet meetings. It was HITLER's practice that no one must know more than was necessary for carrying out his own task. The last cabinet meeting where there was any discussion took place was in 1937. HITLER did not inform his ministers before making important political decisions or announcing laws. In cross-examination, SCHLEGELBERGER
was HITLER's practice that no one must know more than was necessary for carrying out his own task. The last cabinet meeting where there was any discussion took place was in 1937. HITLER did not inform his ministers before making important political decisions or announcing laws. In cross-examination, SCHLEGELBERGER admitted that there was some cooperation between ministers on specific matters. Legislation was brought about by circulating drafts of laws among the cabinet members. The drafts, however, were only signed by those whose department was concerned. 132 Col. Neave Rep. Applications to resign were refused except in one case, which was referred to in cross-examination. SCHLEGELBERGER then gave some evidence as to conflict between the Party and the Ministry of Justice. The Party tried to obtain control of Justice within the State in spite of the opposition of the Ministry. Guertner tried to stop such incidents as the appearance of Gauleiters at trials to influence Judges and interference with the police by the SS. On cross-examination the witness stated that it was possible that he had introduced police and SS jurisdiction in occupied territories. It is not entirely clear what this witness was meant to establish. It seems that the Defense wished to show: (1) That all functions of the State gradually became concentrated in HITLER, who promulgated laws on his own initiative without consulting other departments. (2) That after 1937 there was no meeting of the Reich cabinet at which any discussion took place. (3) That HITLER dealt with individual ministers, as a result of which there was no coordination among the different departments. (4) That the Ministry of Justice opposed the interference of the Nazis in the legal system, and the distortion of justice for political ends. Nothing, however, is said concerning the attitude of other government departments towards the Party. THE SA The Defense called the following seventeen witnesses: MAX JUETTNER, SA Obergruppenfuehrer, Permanent Deputy of the Chief of Staff of the SA. DR. EMMERICH DAVID, Vicar of the Diocese of Cologne since 1931. THEOPHIL BURGSTAHLER, Clergyman. WERNER SCHAEFFER, Commandant of Oranienburg Concentration Camp from 1933 to 1934 and later in charge of penal institutions in Emsland.
SA Obergruppenfuehrer, Permanent Deputy of the Chief of Staff of the SA. DR. EMMERICH DAVID, Vicar of the Diocese of Cologne since 1931. THEOPHIL BURGSTAHLER, Clergyman. WERNER SCHAEFFER, Commandant of Oranienburg Concentration Camp from 1933 to 1934 and later in charge of penal institutions in Emsland. FRIEDRICH HABENICHT, SA Brigade Leader in Wuppertal in 1933 and President of Police in 1934. 133 Col. Neave Rep. FRIEDRICH KLAEHN, Chief of Amt "Schrift" (Publications Department of the SA). FRANZ BOCK, SA Obergruppenfuehrer in Dusseldorf. HANS OBERLINDOBER, President of the National Socialist War Veterans Associations (Frontkaemphferbundes). DR. GOTTFRIED BOLEY, Ministerialrat in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin. DR. KURT WOLF, Lawyer. DR. FRINHART RATHCKE, Konsistorialrat of the Evangelical Church. DR. ERNST GEIER, former Hauptsturmfuehrer. President of Nuremberg Branch of the State Railways. The following witnesses appeared for organizations alleged to have been incorporated into the SA at its foundation: For the Stahlhelm: MARTIN HAUFFE, Chief of Administration in Sigmaningen, and Landesfuehrer (Provincial Leader) of the Stahlhelm. OTTO FREIHERR VON WALDENFELS, Landesfuehrer (Provincial Leader) in Bavaria. THEO GRUSS, Paymaster of the Stahlhelm who subsequently directed its liquidation. For the NS Reiterkorps (Riding Units): KARL OTTO VON DER BORCH, Provincial Riding Leader in the Ostmark. RICHARD WALLE, Obertruppfuehrer in Westphalia. It seems that the defense wished to establish the following: (1) That the SA did not conspire with HITLER and the Party to commit crimes under Article 6 of the Charter. (2) They were not employed as a tool of the Party to eliminate all hostile forces by terror or to suppress the trade unions. (3) They were not engaged in spreading anti-Semitic and militaristic propaganda. Their training and activities were not military. (4) They did not encourage the persecution of the Church or the suppression of religious views. (5) Through their contacts with foreign countries they endeavored to maintain peaceful international relations and were ignorant of any plans for an aggressive war. 134 Col. Neave Rep. (6) Certain groups within the organization such as the Stahlhelm and the XS Reiterkorps were