dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SCHULTE-MONTING: As the things we suspected were confirmed from Norway, Raeder considered this so serious that he went immediately to Hitler.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you also know what he suggested to Hitler?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Hitler wanted to talk to Quisling himself.
DR. SIEMERS: And that took place?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, it did.
DR. SIEMERS: Was a final decision made then concerning Norway, in December 1939?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, Hitler directed that as a countermeasure theoretical preparations should be made for a German landing in Norway. The order, the final order, as far as I know was not given until March.
DR. SIEMERS: Was the landing in Norway an undertaking which you and Raeder considered a risky one or was it considered absolutely safe to do so? SCHULTE-MONTING No, Raeder and the gentlemen from the Naval Operations Staff and also the front commanders considered that undertaking very risky. I remember Churchill's speech in Parliament when he said, after he had been questioned about that matter, that he did not believe the German Navy would undertake that risk in face of the British Navy.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Churchill made that statement, approximately? SCHULTE-MONTING I believe it was between 7 and 9 April
DR. SIEMERS: 1940?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: What was your estimate at the Naval Operations Staff of the risks of losses?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder had told Hitler that he would have to reckon on the possible complete loss of the fleet, and that if the operations were carried out successfully he would have to be prepared for the loss of about 30 percent of the forces used.
DR. SIEMERS: And how much was lost?
SCHULTE-MONTING: About 30 percent.
DR. SIEMERS: In view of the risk of losing the entire fleet, was Raeder at first in favor of that operation?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No. He considered a neutral attitude on the part of Norway as much better than having to take this risk.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder and the Naval Operations Staff recommended the occupation of Norway out of the desire for fame and conquest. What do you say about that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: The desire for fame was not in Raeder's character. The plans for operations which came from his desk bore the mark of bold daring, but also of thorough planning. One does not work out plans to the minutes" detail covering the distance from German ports up to Narvik, which is about that from Nuremberg to Madrid, and one does not use the Navy against a superior British fleet for the sake of fame. Raeder had told the Naval Operations Staff and the front commanders that he had to carry out that operation against all the rules of warfare because there was a compelling necessity to do so.
DR. SIEMERS: When did the actual drafting of the military operation take place at the Naval Operations Staff?
SCHULTE-MONTING: February 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: During the period from December 1939 until March 1940 did you continue to receive reports from the sources you have mentioned?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did these later reports contain a clearer indication as to the place of the landings, or did you not see the details about that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, they covered the areas between Narvik via Bergen to Trondheim, from Bergen to Oslo.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder-excuse me, I want to put the question differently: What was the basis which Raeder suggested to Hitler for the relations between Germany and Norway?
SCHULTE-MONTING: To that I would like to...
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, I mean in the period after the operation was carried out and Germany had occupied Norway.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder in speaking to Hitler advocated a policy of peace. He suggested repeatedly that attempts should be made for peace with Norway. He was in agreement in that respect with the German Commander-in-Chief in Norway, Generaladmiral Bohm, while Terboven, who was directing political matters, was of a somewhat different opinion.
DR. SIEMERS: Did serious conflicts arise in that respect between Terboven and his civil administration on the one side, and Raeder and Bohm and his colleague, Korvettenkapitan Schreiber, on the other?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, there were serious differences and quarrels all the way up the line to Hitler. Hitler at that time told Raeder that he could not make peace with Norway because of France.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said, '`because of France." Was it not possible to make peace with France also, and what was Raeder's attitude in that regard?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder advocated the same thing concerning France.
DR. SIEMERS: And what did he say?
SCHULTE-MONTING: He tried to arrange a conference with Admiral Darlan in an effort to forward these matters. He had pointed out to Hitler, when the Atlantic Coast was fortified, that it would be better and more practical to make peace with France than to make great though inadequate sacrifices for defense. Hitler replied that he fully agreed but out of consideration for Italy he could not conclude a peace treaty with France.
DR. SIEMERS: Did the conversations between Raeder and Darlan take place?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, near Paris.
DR. SIEMERS: Were you present?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, Admiral Schultze, the Commanding Admiral in France.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you whether the results of the conversation were favorable?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, he told me about the very favorable results.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder report on that to Hitler?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: And in spite of that, Hitler refused?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Out of consideration for Mussolini.
DR. SIEMERS: According to your knowledge, did the Party or the leadership of the SS through Heydrich attempt to fight Raeder?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Heydrich repeatedly attempted to bring Raeder and the Navy into discredit with Hitler through defamatory remarks and by spying, either by posting spies in the officers corps or the casinos, or by misrepresenting or distorting news. Against these attacks, Raeder defended himself tenaciously and successfully.
DR. SIEMERS: Why was the Party against Raeder?
SCHULTE-MONTING: That is a question which is very difficult to answer. I believe mainly because, first of all, there were differences in the religious field. Many commanders before they put to sea for combat turned to Raeder for help so that during their absence their relatives would not have their religious freedom curtailed.
DR. SIEMERS: When did the first differences occur between Raeder and Hitler, and during what period did Raeder ask for his dismissal?
THE PRESIDENT: We have had that from that defendant himself, have we not? Raeder told us when he asked for it. No crossexamination about it.
DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you for what reasons Raeder remained? SCHULTE-MONTING First, because Hitler himself had asked him to stay, and gave him assurances for the integrity of the Navy. Furthermore, at that time, there were discussions about combining the Navy and the merchant marine into one ministry and putting Party people into that ministry. In that event we did not see a strengthening but a weakening of our fighting force. Besides, during that period there occurred a gap in the line of successors, due to illness and losses. And last but not least, Raeder remained in the war out of a sense of responsibility and patriotism.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you yourself ask Raeder to remain in of lice?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. I had to ask Raeder frequently and very seriously. I myself was once ordered by Hitler to come to the Reich Chancellery.
DR. SIEMERS: When was that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: In the beginning of 1939, when he explained his standpoint to me in a long conversation and asked me to convince Raeder that he had to stay. Moreover, he enjoyed the confidence of the Navy. The senior officers and officials of the Navy had asked me orally and in writing to try to persuade Raeder not to leave his office prematurely. Since 1928 he had led the Navy with a firm hand through all political vicissitudes.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I return again to your conversation with Hitler in the beginning of 1939? Did you speak with Hitler alone?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, that was a private conversation of about an hour and a half.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler tell you anything about his political plans on that occasion?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No; not about political plans in the sense of what is called politics, but he tried once more to bridge political differences with Raeder. He told me one should not weigh each individual word of his. His visitors were right, but only after they had left; he would put forward records and witnesses; all he wanted was to appeal to the emotions of his listeners and to stir them up to do their utmost, but not to commit himself with words. In the future he promised he would try to give the Navy independence in all technical questions.
DR. SIEMERS: You just said "not to weigh each individual word." Admiral, were the speeches of Hitler ever taken down accurately, that is, by stenographers?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, but as far as I know only in the later part of the war. Hitler was against having his words put on record, because everyone who listened to him returned home with his own opinion. He himself did not stick to his text; he thought out loud and wanted to carry his listeners away, but he did not want his individual words to be taken literally. I spoke about that to Raeder very frequently. We always knew what was expected of us, but we never knew what Hitler himself thought or wanted.
DR. SIEMERS: If Hitler did not want to be taken at his word, how did it come about that he agreed in the war to have his speeches taken down by stenographers?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I told you before that too many misunderstandings had occurred, and that Hitler as well as those who reported to him believed that everyone had convinced the other of his opinion. Thereupon they started keeping minutes. The minutes kept up to then were personal impressions of those who were not instructed to keep them but who did so on their initiative.
THE PRESIDENT: What time is the witness speaking of? He said up to then the minutes had been kept on the personal initiative of the person who took them. What time is he speaking of?
DR. SIEMERS: From what time, according to recollection, were these minutes taken by the stenographers?
SCHULTE-MONTING: From 1942, I believe.
DR. SIEMERS: From 1942?
SCHULTE-MONTING: It might also be 1941. During the war, at any rate.
DR. SIEMERS: But your conversation with Hitler was in January 1939? SCHULTE-MONTING Yes, January 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what did the stenographic minutes look like later on? Did you ever see them?
SCHULTE-MONTING: We repeatedly asked for excerpts from the minutes and tried to compare them with the prepared text and they too contained contradictions.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, I come to the period when Hitler prepared for war against Russia, and I am going to show you the Directive Number 21, of 18 December 1940, concerning the Case Barbarossa. Mr. President, that is Document Number 446-PS, Exhibit USA-31, in the Document Book of the British Prosecution Number 10a, Page 247. [Turning to the witness.] The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder or the Naval Operations Staff had taken part in the drafting of that directive; is that correct?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, that is not correct. The Navy had nothing to do with the drafting of that directive.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have any previous knowledge of Hitler's plan to attack Russia, before he received that directive?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, by an oral communication from Hitler to Raeder, about the middle of August 1940-or October 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: October 1940. Did Raeder inform you about his conferences with Hitler concerning Russia, and what attitude did he adopt in these conferences?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder informed me fully, because the prospect of war with Russia was much too serious to be taken lightly. Raeder opposed most energetically any plan for a war against Russia; and, I should like to say, for moral reasons because Raeder was of the opinion that the pact with Russia should not be broken as long as the other side gave no cause for it. That, as far as Raeder knew, was not the case in October. That economic treaty -as we called it at that time-to our knowledge was about 90 percent at the expense of the Navy. We gave Russia one heavy cruiser, heavy artillery for battleships, artillery installations, submarine engines, submarine installations, and valuable optical instruments for use on submarines. Besides, Raeder was of the opinion that the theater of operations should not be allowed to be carried into the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea was our drill field, I might say. All our recruits were trained there; all our submarine training took place in the Baltic Sea. We had already partly stripped the Baltic coast of batteries and personnel for the purpose of protecting the Norwegian and the French coasts. We had very small oil reserves at our disposal, the synthetic oil production was not yet in full swing. The Navy had to turn over some of its reserves to industry and agriculture. Consequently, Raeder was strongly opposed to waging war against Russia.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution believe that Raeder was only opposed to the date set for the war against Russia and concludes this from the War Diary in which actually the entries refer to the date. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, that is not correct. After the receipt of Directive 21, called Barbarossa, Raeder approached Hitler again with reference to the war against Russia, and also put down his thoughts in a memorandum. He tried to convince Hitler of the following: Poland had been crushed, France had been occupied, and, for military reasons, an invasion of England was out of the question. He said clearly that now the time had arrived when the further conduct of the war could not be decisive on the Continent, but in the Atlantic. Therefore, he told him that he had to concentrate all forces at his disposal on one objective: To hit the strategic points of the Empire, especially the supply lines to the British Isles in order to compel England to sue for negotiations or, if possible, to make peace. He suggested, as has been mentioned before, that the policy of peace with Norway should be pursued, peace with France, and closer co-operation with the Russian Navy, such as was provided for in the economic treaty, and the repurchase of submarine equipment or submarines. He said that the decision or the date for a decision no longer rested with us because we did not have the necessary sea power and that in case of a long duration of the war the danger of the participation of the United States had also to be considered; that therefore the war could not be decided on the European continent and least of all in the vastnesses of the Russian steppes. That point of view he continued to present to Hitler as long as he was in office.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said at first that Raeder had protested, in principle as you have expressed it, for moral reasons, that is, for reasons of international law.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Why was not that entered into the War Diary when the other reasons that you have mentioned can be found in the War Diary? At least they are alluded to.
SCHULTE-MONTING: That I can answer, or at least give you an explanation. Raeder, as a matter of principle, never criticized the political leadership in the presence of the gentlemen of the Naval Operations Staff or the front commanders. Therefore, he did not speak to me and the others about the private conversations which he had with Hitler, except when it was necessary for military reasons.
DR. SIEMERS: When were the preparations by the Navy, on the basis of Directive 21 that you have in front of you, made? Do you remember that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe about 3 months later.
DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, certainly after the directive?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, after the directive.
DR. SIEMERS: Were they made on the basis of that directive?
SCHULTE-MONTING: On the basis of that, yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Was that directive already a final order or was it just a precautionary strategic measure?
SCHULTE-MONTING: In my estimation it should not be considered as an order, and that can be seen from Points IV and V.
DR. SIEMERS: In what way?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Point V says that Hitler was still waiting for reports from commanders-in-chief. And Raeder still reported to Hitler after he had received the directive.
DR SIEMERS: Is Point IV, if you will look at it once more, also in accordance with your opinion?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, absolutely. The words "precautionary measures" are underlined.
DR. SIEMERS: Precautionary measures for what?
SCHULTE-MONTING: In case of war against Russia.
DR. SIEMERS: Well, I think, Admiral, since you have mentioned it yourself, you should read the sentence which follows the words "precautionary measures."
SCHULTE-MONTING: "In case Russia should change her attitude, she is..."
THE PRESIDENT: You cannot argue with your own witness about the meaning of the words. He has given his answer.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. [Turning to the witness.] Was Raeder of the opinion, at any time, that he had succeeded in dissuading Hitler from the unfortunate plans against Russia?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. After he had made his report at that time, he returned and said, "I believe I have talked him out of his plan." And at first we did have that impression because in the following months there were no more conferences about it, to my knowledge, not even with the General Staff.
DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you quite briefly then about Greece. According to Document C-152, which I will have shown to you, Raeder made a report to Hitler on 18 March 1941, in which he asked that the whole of Greece should be occupied What were the reasons that caused the High Command, that is, Raeder and you, to make that suggestion?
SCHULTE-MONTING: When Raeder asked for authorization, as it says here in the War Diary, for the occupation of the whole of Greece, even in the event of a peaceful settlement, we, according to my recollection, had already been for 3 months in possession of the directive which was concerned with the occupation of Greece, and when . . .
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. Was that Directive Number 20? I will have it shown to you. Is that the one you mean?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, "Marita," that is the one.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is Document Number 1541-PS, Exhibit GB-13, in the Document Book of the British Prosecution 10a, Page 270. That is Directive Number 20, Case Marita of 13 December 1940. [Turning to the witness.] Admiral, what caused Raeder, apart from that point which Hitler had already explained, to ask that specific question again in the month of March, that is to say, on 18 March?
SCHULTE-MONTING: A British landing had already occurred in the south of Greece a few days before.
DR. SIEMERS: Did this landing make it necessary to occupy the whole of Greece?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, for strategic reasons, absolutely. The menace of an occupation from the sea or from the air, or the formation of a Balkan front against Germany, or the menace from the air to the oil fields, had to be eliminated under all circumstances. May I only remind you of the Salonika operation in the first World War. I believe that was a similar situation.
DR. SIEMERS: Here again the Prosecution say this was governed by the desire for conquest and fame. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I should like to answer that fame requires achievements, and I do not know what the Navy could have conquered in the Mediterranean. We did not have a single man or a single ship down there; but Raeder, of course, for the strategic reasons I have mentioned, had to advise Hitler in that direction.
DR. SIEMERS: Were breaches of neutrality on the part of Greece known to you before this time, before we occupied Greece?
SCHULTE-MONTING: We had been informed that in 1939, certain Greek political and military circles had been in the closest connection with the Allied General Staff. We knew that Greek merchantmen were in British service. Therefore we were compelled to consider the Greek merchantmen which sailed through the prohibited zone to England as enemy ships. And, I believe, in the beginning of 1940, or the middle of 1940, we received information that the Allies intended to land in Greece or to establish a Balkan front against Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] 2Z May 46 Afternoon Session
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, as the last point in my questions dealing with Russia, I should like to show you the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution, Document USSR-113. This document is a communication from the Naval Operations Staff of 29 September 1941 to Group North, that is, Generaladmiral Carls. Under II it states as to the result of a conversation between Admiral Fricke and Hitler: "The Fuehrer is determined to make the city of St. Petersburg disappear from the face of the earth." Raeder has been accused of not having done anything to oppose such a monstrous intention and has been accused because the Naval Operations Staff passed on this communication. I ask you, Admiral, did you know of this communication in 1941? [Turning to the President.] I beg your pardon, Mr. President, I should like to remark that at this moment, I am sorry to say, I have no photostatic copy of this document. I tried to procure it. I have this very moment received it, and I should like to submit the photostatic copy at this point, instead of the written copy.
SCHULTE-MONTING: This seems to be the original which I have before me?
DR. SIEMERS: No, Admiral, it is a copy, an exact copy of the photostatic copy with all paragraphs and names, made for my own special use. Were you acquainted with this piece of writing in 1941?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I did not know it in 1941, it is submitted to me at this moment for the first time.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe that Admiral Raeder saw this communication before it was sent off, even though you yourself had not seen it?
SCHULTE-MONTING: That would have been a miracle. Communications which were submitted to Admiral Raeder all went through my hands. They always had the notation, either "the Commander-in-Chief has taken due note," and were initialed by me personally in order to certify this notation, or "this order or this directive is to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief," and in this case too my initials were affixed. This order and this copy which you have just shown to me I have never seen before; I am not acquainted with it; and I consider it impossible that Admiral Raeder should have seen it, because on 29 September 1941 I was in good health and exercising my duties in Berlin.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what do you know about this question of Leningrad and the Navy? 22 May {6