dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Danzig was raised simply as an excuse, as so-called justification, not for the seizure of Danzig, but for the invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland, and we see it starting now. As we progress with the story it will become ever more apparent that that is what the Nazi government were really aiming at only providing themselves with some kind of crisis which would provide some kind of justification for walking into the rest of Poland. I turn to the next document. It is again a document taken from the Polish White Book, T-73, Number 45, which will be GB-27 (b). TC-73 will be the Polish White Book, which I shall put in later. That document sets out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, gave to Mr. Lipski to hand to the German Government in reply to the suggestion put forward by Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on the 24th of October. I need not read the first page. The history of Polish-German relationship is set out, and the needs of Poland in respect of Danzig are emphasized. I turn to the second page of that exhibit, to Paragraph 6: "In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish Government, the Danzig question is governed by two factors: The right of the German population of the city and the surrounding villages to freedom of life and development, and fee fact that in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely bound up with Poland." It then sets out the guarantees to Poland under the existing statute, and I pass to Paragraph 7: "Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a friendly understanding with the Government of the German Reich, the Polish Government proposes the replacement of the League Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bilateral Polish-German agreement.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: This agreement should guarantee the existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of national and cultural life to its German majority, and also should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the complications involved in such a system, the polish Government must state that any other solution, and in particular any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of Posh-German understanding in all its aspects." And then finally in Paragraph 8: "In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I already to have final conversations personally with the governing circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would be dangerous for the future." The first stage in those negotiations had been entirely successful from the German point of view. They had put forward a proposal, the return of the City of Danzig to the Reich, which they might well have known would have been unacceptable. It was unacceptable, and the Polish Government had warned the Nazi Government that it would be. They had offered to enter into negotiations, but they had not agreed, which is exactly what the German Government had hoped. They had not agreed to the return of Danzig to the Reich. The first stage in producing the crisis had been accomplished. Shortly afterward, within a week or so of that taking place, after the Polish Government had offered to enter into discussions with the German Government, we find another top-secret order, issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed by the Defendant Keitel.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It goes to the OKH, OKM, and OKW and it is headed, "The First Supplement to the Instruction Dated the 21st of October 1938": "The Fuehrer has ordered: Apart from the three contingencies mentioned in the instructions of that date of 21 October 1938, preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise ...."The preparations will be made on the following basis: Condition is a quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland." We remember, of course, that at that moment the remainder of Czechoslovakia had not been seized and therefore they were not ready to go to war with Poland. That document does show how the German Government answered the proposal to enter into discussions. That is C-137 and will become GB-33. On the 5th of January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler. It is unnecessary to read the first part of that document, which is the next in the Tribunal's book, TC-73, Number 48, which will become GB-34. In the first part of that conversation, of which that document is an account, Hitler offers to answer any questions. He says he has always followed the policy laid down by the 1934 agreement. He discusses the Danzig question and emphasizes that in the German view it must sooner or later return to Germany. I quote the last but one paragraph of that page: "Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult problem. He added that in the Chancellor's suggestion he did not see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this matter. "In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite new, some new form, for which he used the term Korperschaft, which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the German population, and on the other the Polish interests.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be quite at ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig, and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the Polish Government." The Tribunal will remember that in the very last document we looked at, on the 24th of November, orders had already been received, or issued, for preparations to be made for the occupation of Danzig by surprise; yet here he is assuring the Polish Foreign Minister that there is to be no fait accompli and he can be quite at his ease. I turn to the next step, Document TC-73, Number 49, which will become GB-35, conversation between Mr. Beck and Ribbentrop, on the day after the one to which I have just referred between Beck and Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw attention to the fact that the last conversation took place in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very obliged to you. No, I did not. As I say, it was on the next day, the 6th of January. The date in actual fact does not appear on the copy I have got in my book. It does appear in the White Book itself. "Mr. Beck asked Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that whereas previously, after all his conversations and contacts with German statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today, for the first time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement." I emphasize this last paragraph: "In answer Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy towards Poland was still a desire for the further building upon friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and interests of the two parties concerned." The Defendant Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with that one expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same month, January 1939, some fortnight or three weeks later, he was in Warsaw and made another speech, of which an extract is set out in PS-2530, which will become GB-36: "In accordance with the resolute will of the German national leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German foreign policy. The political foresight and the principles worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take the momentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that an other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of both sides.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual relations." And even so, the Nazi Government must have been still anxious that the Poles were beginning to sit up_Your Lordship will remember the expression "sit up" used in the note to the Fuehrer_and to assume they would be the next in turn, because on the 30th of January Hitler again spoke in the Reichstag, 30th of January 1939, and gave further assurances of their good faith. That document, that extract, was read by the Attorney General in his address, and therefore, I only put it in now as an exhibit. That is TC-73, Number 57, which will become GB-37. That, then, brings us up to the March 1939 seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia and the setting up of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. If the Tribunal will now pass to the next part, Part IV, of that document book, I had intended to refer to three documents where Hitler and Jodl were setting out the advantage gained through the seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. But the Tribunal will remember that Mr. Alderman, in his closing remarks yesterday morning, dealt very fully with that matter showing what advantages they did gain by that seizure and showing on the chart that he had on the wall the immense strengthening of the German position against Poland. Therefore, I leave that matter. The documents are already in evidence, and if the Tribunal should wish to refer to them, they are found in their correct order in the story in that document book. As soon as that occupation had been completed, with a week of marching into the rest of Czechoslovakia, the heat was beginning to be turned on against Poland. If the Tribunal would pass to Document TC-73, which is about half way through that document book_it follows after Jodl's lecture, which is a long document--TC-73, Number 61. It is headed: "Official documents concerning Polish-German Relations." This will be GB-38. On the 21st of March Mr.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Lipski again saw Ribbentrop and the nature of the conversation was generally very much sharper than that that had been held a little time back at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden: "I saw Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked me to call in order to discuss Polish-German relations in their entirety. "He complained about our press, and the Warsaw students' demonstrations during Count Ciano's visit." I think I can go straight on to the larger paragraph, which commences with "further" "Further, Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Hitler put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland's frontiers in exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig into the Reich. He said that there had been further conversations between you and him-- in Warsaw"--that is, between him, of course, and Mr. Beck_"He said that there had been further conversations between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had pointed out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an unfavorable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his suggestions. Ribbentrop had talked to the Chancellor, only yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in favor of good relations with Poland, and had expressed a desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the subject of our mutual relations. Ribbentrop indicated that he was under the impression that difficulties arising between us were also due to some misunderstanding of the Reich's real aims. The problem needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his opinion, our two States were dependent on each other." I think it unnecessary that I should read the next page. Briefly, Ribbentrop emphasizes the German argument as to why Danzig should return to the Reich, and I turn to the first paragraph on the following page: "I stated"--that is Mr.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Lipski--"I stated that now, during the settlement of the Czechoslovakian question, there was no understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was already hard enough for the Polish public to swallow, for, despite our disputes with the Czechs, they were after all a Slav people. But in regard to Slovakia, the position was far worse. I emphasized our community of race, language, and religion, and mentioned the help we had given in their achievement of independence. I pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that the Polish man in the street could not understand why the Reich had assumed the protection of Slovakia, that protection being directed against Poland I said emphatically that this question was a serious blow to our relations. "Ribbentrop reflected for a moment, and then answered that this could be discussed. "I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that I might go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk the matter over. He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his offers. "Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania. Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszyson the latter's return from Rome, and that they had discussed the Memel question, which called for a solution." That conversation took place on the 21st of March. It teas not very long before the world knew what the solution to Memel was. On the next day German Armed Forces marched in. If the Tribunal would turn over--I think the next document is unnecessary--turn over to TC-72, Number 17, which becomes GB-39. As a result of these events, not unnaturally, considerable anxiety teas growing both in the government of Great Britain and the Polish Government, and the two governments therefore had been undertaking conversations with each other. On the 31st of March, the Prime Minister, Mr.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Chamberlain, spoke in the House of Commons, and he explained that as a result of the conversations that had been taking place between the British and Polish Governments--I quote from the last but one paragraph of his statement: "As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in the meantime, before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect. "I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government." On the 6th of April, a week later, a formal communique was issued by the Anglo-Polish Governments which repeated the assurance the Prime Minister had given a week before and in which Poland assured Great Britain of her support should she, Great Britain, be attacked. I need not read it all. In fact, I need not read any of tit. I put it in. It is TC-72, Number 18. I put it in as GB-40. The anxiety and concern that the governments of Poland and Great Britain were feeling at that time appear to have been well justified. During the same week, on the 3rd of April, the Tribunal will See in the next document an order signed by Keitel. It emanates from the High Command of the Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3rd of April 1939. Its subject is: "Directive for the Armed Forces 1939-40": " 'Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces for 1939-40 is being reissued. "Part I (Frontier Defense) and Part II (Danzig) will be issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: "Part II, Case White"--which is the code name for the operation against Poland--"Part II, Case White, is attached herewith. The signature of the Fuehrer will be appended later. "The Fuehrer has added the following directives to Case White: "1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time from 1st of September 1939 onwards."--This is in April, the beginning of April. "2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise timetable for Case White and to arrange by conferences the synchronized Tunings among the three branches of the Armed Forces. "3. The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by the 1st of May." That document, as the Tribunal will see on the following page under the heading "Distribution", went to the OKH, OKM, OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Are those words at the top part of the document, or are they just notes?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: They are part of the document.
THE PRESIDENT: Directives from Hitler and Keitel, preparing for war.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon; no, they are not. The document starts from under the words "Translation of a document signed by Keitel."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The first words being "top-secret." If the Tribunal will look at the second page, following after "Distribution", it will be seen that there follows a translation of another document, dated the 11th of April, and that document is signed by Hitler: "I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of the war."--No question about war--"conduct of the war." "Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following eventualities: "I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and protection against surprise air attacks; "II. Case White; III. The Annexation of Danzig. "Annex IV contains regulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike development." Again that document goes to the OKH, OKM, OKW. On the next page of the copy the Tribunal have, the translation of Annex I is set out, which is the safeguarding of the frontiers of the German Reich, and I would quote from Paragraph (2) under"Special Orders": "Legal Basis. It should be anticipated that a state of defense or a state of war, as defined in the Reich defense law of the 4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures and demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are to be based on the laws valid in peacetime." My Lord, that document is C-120. It becomes GB-41. It contains some other later documents to which I shall refer in chronological order. The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, followed by the Anglo-Polish communiqué of the 6th of April, was seized upon by the Nazi Government to urge on, as it were, the crisis which they were developing in Danzig between themselves and Poland.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On the 28th of April the German Government issued a memorandum in which they alleged that the Anglo-Polish Declaration was incompatible With the 1934 agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of entering into or by reason of entering into that agreement, Poland had unilaterally renounced the 1934 agreement I would only quote three short passages, or four short passages, from that document. It is TC-72, Number 14. It becomes GB-42. Some of these passages are worth quoting, if only to show the complete dishonesty of the whole document on the face of it: "The German Government have taken note of the Polish British declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According to this declaration there has been concluded between the Polish Government and the British Government a temporary understanding, to be replaced shortly by a permanent agreement, which will provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two states being directly or indirectly threatened." Thereafter, the document sets out in the next three paragraphs the history of German friendship towards Poland. I quote from the last paragraph, Paragraph 5, on that page: "The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish Government with the British Government is in such obvious contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago that the German Government can take note only with surprise and astonishment of such a violent and fundamental reversal of Polish policy. "Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British agreement is intended as a regular pact of alliance which, by reason of its general sense and of the present state of political relations, is directed exclusively against Germany.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: From the obligation now accepted by the Polish Government, it appears that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to take an active part in any possible German-British conflict, in the event of aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect Poland and her interest. This is a direct and open blow against the renunciation of an use of force contained in the 1934 declaration." I think I can omit Paragraph 6. Paragraph 7: "The Polish Government, however, by their recent decision to accede to an alliance directed against Germany, have given it to be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German Government. In view of this, the German Government are obliged to conclude that the Polish Government do not at present attach h any importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by means of direct, friendly discussion with the German Government. The Polish Government have thus abandoned the path, traced out in 1934, to the shaping of German-Polish relations." All this would sound very well, if it had not been for the fact that orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued and the Armed Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable. The document goes on to set out the history of the last negotiations and discussions. It sets out the demands of the 21st, which the German Government had made; the return of Danzig, the Autobahn, the railway, the promise by Germany of the 25 years' guarantee, and I go down to the last but one paragraph on Page 3 of the Exhibit, under the heading (1): "The Polish Government did not avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them by the German Government for a just settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safeguarding of Poland's frontiers with the Reich and thereby for permanent strengthening of the friendly, neighborly relations between the two countries. The Polish Government even rejected German proposals made with this object.