dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. STAHMER: For he had too much political insight not to recognize the tremendous and at the same time senseless dangers which would perforce result for the German people from such a brutal and horrible act of extermination. Goering had already made it clear in the above-mentioned speech to the Gauleiter that he did not wish to fall foul of the world public and world opinion because of the treatment of the Jews. It is therefore out of the question that Goering should have approved of such an undertaking or participated therein in any manner, although it is natural that it should be put to the defendant that he must have been informed about such horrible measures as the second man in the State. Furthermore it is no wonder that the statements of the defendant that he knew nothing of these atrocities should meet with a certain amount of distrust. Despite such doubts, however, the defendant insists that no information about such acts ever reached him. This ignorance of the defendant, which can be completely understood only by one familiar with German conditions, may be explained from the fact-and this is the sole solution of the riddle- that Himmler, as was also emphasized by General Jodl during his interrogation, knew truly masterfully how to keep his actions secret, to obliterate all traces of his atrocities, and to deceive the surrounding world and even his and Hitler's closer entourage. In this connection I also refer to the testimony of the witness Hoess, who confirms Himmler's instruction concerning absolute secrecy toward everyone. The question may come up here: Did not a legal obligation exist for the defendant to make investigations about this matter and to get reliable information as to the true whereabouts of supposedly evacuated Jews and as to their fate? And what legal consequence results if he negligently refrained from investigating and by such negligence violated his legal obligation to act, incumbent on him by virtue of his position?
DR. STAHMER: The decision of this extremely complicated question of law and fact may be considered a moot question, because Goering, even as the second man in the State, did not have the power to prevent such measures if they were carried out by Himmler and were ordered, or at any rate approved, by Hitler. Mr. President, yesterday I already stated that I still wished to deal with the Katyn case; and I intend to do so now, before I go on with my conclusion. I am sorry I was not able to get any translations because the testimony was only given a few days ago. However, this matter is not very long. The interpreters have a copy. I shall begin with this report now. A detailed opinion has still to be given on the Katyn case, in which the taking of evidence was concluded only a few days back. The Russian Prosecution based their indictment on the findings of an investigation which is set down in Document USSR-54. The following conclusion is drawn from the entire evidential material as presented: , (1) Polish prisoners of war, who were in three camps west of Smolensk, were still there in these three camps when the Germans came into Smolensk, up to and including September 1941. (2) In the Katyn forest German occupation troops undertook the mass shootings of the prisoners of war from the aforesaid camps in the autumn of 1941. (3) The mass shooting of the Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn woods was carried out by the German military authorities who had camouflaged themselves under the code name "Staff of Construction Battalion 537" at whose head was Lieutenant Colonel Ahrens, together with his collaborators First Lieutenant Rex and Lieutenant Hodt. The question is, did the Prosecution prove this accusation? This question must be answered in the negative. No confirmation of guilt can be found from the contents of this document. The accusation is made against a definite military unit and names specific officers. The time mentioned for the perpetration of this deed is September of 1941. The Katyn forest is given as the scene of the crime.
DR. STAHMER: In view of the scanty facts, which considerably restricted the accusation, it was merely the task of the Defense to prove that this assertion would not bear examination. First of all, let us consider the persons involved. Colonel Ahrens, who is obviously the Lieutenant Colonel Ahrens mentioned, is eliminated as the perpetrator because this deed is said to have been committed in September 1941, while Ahrens did not take command of Regiment 537 until the end of November 1941. He arrived only at that time at Katyn and had never before been in the eastern theater of war. Before Ahrens, Colonel Bedenck was in command of the regiment and he joined the regimental staff in August 1941. Before Bedenck, First Lieutenant Hodt took lodgings in the little Dnieper castle in July 1941, immediately after the capture of Smolensk. He came with an advance unit of the 537th Regiment and remained there until the arrival of the regimental staff, to which he was not yet attached at that time. He was transferred to the regimental staff only in September 1941, and from that time on he lived permanently in the little castle. Special facts which would incriminate Hodt or Bedenck cannot be derived from the document which has been submitted, and such facts have not been presented here. Therefore, it is not proved that Bedenck and Hodt could be considered as perpetrators. The following circumstances contradict the theory that Unit 537 or any other military unit had participated in this act. The Polish prisoners allegedly fell into the hands of the Germans in the three camps west of Smolensk. Thereby they would have become German prisoners of war. The fact that they had been captured would have had to have been reported to Army Group Center. Such a report was not made, as testified by the witness Eichborn. Considering the tremendous number of prisoners, it is quite out of the question that anyone could inadvertently have failed to make a report of that nature. Apart from that, the capture of 11,000 Polish officers could under no circumstances have been concealed from the Army Group.
DR. STAHMER: As results from the testimony of General Oberhauser, the Army Group never had any knowledge of this. From the statements of the two witnesses, Eichborn and Oberhauser, it can be concluded that at the time of the capture of Smolensk by the Germans there could not have been any Polish officers present in these camps. Moreover, no eye witnesses who saw the officers after that date were interrogated by the Russian commission. The railroad employee who was interrogated on this subject knows nothing from his own observation. Now, allegedly these 11,000 prisoners were taken from the camps to Katyn. The transport of so many Polish prisoners could not have been concealed from the Russian population even if the transport had been carried out most unobtrusively and secretly, nor could shootings on such a large scale have taken place without the Russian population taking notice of them. Even though this little wood was blocked off, at a distance of about 200 meters there was a public highway open to traffic, and this highway was used daily and to a great extent by the Russian civilian population. Anything that took place in the little wood of Katyn could be seen from this highway. In the direct vicinity of the Dnieper castle there were isolated homesteads which remained occupied by the owners during the whole time of the German occupation, and there was constant contact with the regimental staff. There are no reliable statements and testimony dealing with either transport or the observation of shootings. The Germans would hardly have chosen the site on which the graves were found for such a mass execution. Owing to its situation between the main road and the regimental quarters, this site was quite unsuitable for such a misdeed. As I have already stated, there was lively traffic not only on the near-by road, but also in the direct vicinity of the graves which were near a small road connecting the regimental headquarters with the main road. The executions could also have been observed by soldiers who had nothing to do with it.
DR. STAHMER: Even the unit selected to carry out the deed would have been very unsuitable. A technical unit, such as a signal corps unit, is the least suitable for such a task. The witnesses Eichborn and Oberhauser did not move into these quarters near the site of the deed until 20 September 1941, and they can only testify as to what they themselves observed from that date on. But from the end of July there was an advance unit near the castle and from August, a regimental staff. It is, however, quite out of the question that in this span of time or perhaps 6 weeks this act could have been perpetrated. The few people who were available were so overburdened with military tasks that in this short time it would have been quite impossible for them not only to kill 11,000 prisoners, but also to remove the bodies. According to the statement of the Prosecution, Russian prisoners of war allegedly helped to remove the bodies. That has not been proved. None of the Russian population had ever seen such prisoners. In no case could all traces of the deed be effaced so quickly and the scene so speedily cleared that the witnesses Oberhauser and Eichborn on their frequent trips to the Dnieper castle would not have noticed some suspicious signs. The testimony of the witness who was heard here is not sufficient. He merely heard a story of such shootings from a certain Menchagin who cannot be found now. This witness did not make any personal observations. He himself did not see any Poles. He was told by students that they had seen Poles but they did not know the number of Poles or where they were being kept. Testimony which is so scanty in every respect is worthless, and the testimony given by the two doctors heard as witnesses is not adequate for use in the sense of the Indictment. Within the scope of the evidence admitted by the Tribunal, it would not have been possible to clarify completely all the medical questions which were decisive for the experts in the facts you have established. Therefore, the Defense has also refrained from calling a medical expert to exonerate the defendant.
DR. STAHMER: There is one thing, however, which must not be overlooked in this connection. The expert opinion obtained by the German Government was given by 12 members of a commission of leading representatives of legal medicine from European universities, while the expert opinion referred to by the Prosecution was deposed by a group of Russian experts only. The first expert opinion should be given preference since it was compiled by experts who were completely nonpolitical. Now, the witness Professor Markov in his examination went back on the opinion contained in the report of 30 April 1943. He claims that already at that time, due to his findings upon making an autopsy on the bodies, he failed to agree with the report that the shooting took place in the months of March and April 1940. However, this testimony must be met with considerable misgivings. The witness could give no plausible explanation why, in view of his opinion, he did not lodge an immediate protest against the version of the report of 30 April 1943 or refuse his signature, nor why, at least, he later...
THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing] Dr. Stahmer, you realize, of course, that you have not offered in evidence the report of this German commission. You expressly refrained, as I understand it, from offering the report of the German commission. And you...
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, that is a mistake. I did not refrain from doing so. I was not permitted to submit the White Book, but I was permitted to submit the report of 30 April 1943. However, I could not submit it immediately, for it was contained in the White Book and I was to have copies made. These copies were made and submitted. I used some of the passages from the protocol, with the express approval of the High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: I know you did, and of course if you want to offer it there will be no objection to your offering it; but certainly I understood that you were only offering in evidence the parts which you read to the witness. That, I think, was put to you at the time you were cross-examining the witnesses on behalf of the Prosecution. That is what I understood, but if you say that your interpretation was different and that you want to offer the whole of the report, then the matter will be considered by the Tribunal, if the Tribunal has not already considered it. ~ Are you saying that the Tribunal has already allowed the whole of that report to be offered in evidence?
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, unfortunately the book . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, what you are desiring to offer in evidence is the conclusion of the report or the protocol or whatever it is called, is that right? That, I take it, is not a very long document, is it?
DR. STAHMER: No, MR. President. May I explain again. I am sorry but I have not received the transcript of the session. Therefore, I do not know just what is contained in this protocol; but I do recall-and one of my colleagues confirmed this to me just now- that at the time I was permitted to submit the entire so-called report of the commission, and I quoted certain passages not only from the conclusion but from the whole report, and with the permission of the High Tribunal I proposed to submit the entire report later.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I do not know what you mean by the whole report or what you mean by the protocol.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, may I describe it once more. This was a rather comprehensive protocol which described the findings of the investigations. It contained the entire facts of the case and it concluded with a joint expert opinion. It is composed, as I have stated, of facts and reasons. It contains, first of all, a very comprehensive statement in which the facts as they appeared to the experts are described individually. For instance, that they interrogated the Russian population on the spot, checked over the site of the graves, held a post mortem-all of these things were presented by me from the record with the permission of the High Tribunal. Mr. President, may I be permitted to make another remark to clarify these matters? I remember this incident quite particularly because you, Mr. President, first mentioned it and asked whether I had another copy of this protocol. I answered, "No, I have only the White Book." Then that was submitted to the witness, whereupon I suggested that the other witness be called so that in the meantime I could have a copy made of this protocol. Then you, Mr. President, thought it had better not be so but that I should take the book and then submit a copy afterward.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will look at the record to see exactly what happened.
DR. STAHMER: As I said, I did not see the transcript myself. If it was not taken down like that, then the record is not complete. However, I do remember quite clearly that that is what took place. Tide; PRESIDENT: We will continue then.
DR. STAHMER: The statement of the witness is subject to considerable doubt. The witness could give no plausible explanation as to why, in view of his attitude concerning the form of the protocol of 30 April 1943, he did not lodge an immediate protest and refuse to sign it or why he did not at a later date at least acquaint the other experts who participated with his true scientific conviction. Through this testimony the German experts' opinion cannot lose its weight and become weakened, especially since the other 11 experts obviously endorsed the statements set forth in this report. Considering this state of affairs it will not be necessary to set forth the individual reasons which speak for the correctness of the statements contained in the German White Book of 30 April 1943. The time given by the Russian experts for the shooting, that is, the autumn of 1941, is determined arbitrarily; and it cannot be true in any case for the corpses wore winter clothing, as the witness Markov noticed on the corpse upon which he performed an autopsy. The fact that ammunition for pistols of German make was found in the graves does not permit the conclusion that this shooting was necessarily carried out by Germans. In the German White Book it has already been pointed out that the German factory which produced this ammunition delivered a great deal to other countries, especially to the East. In conclusion, it can be said that the task of this proceeding is solely to determine whether the 11,000 Polish officers were shot after the capture of Smolensk by the Germans, in other words, that this deed could have been committed by Germans. The Prosecution have not succeeded in proving this fact and therefore this accusation will have to be struck from the Indictment. Mr. President, I come now to my closing sentences, my conclusion. I imagine it will take me roughly a little more than 10 minutes and think it would be best to give this conclusion in unbroken continuity.
DR. STAHMER: Either I will have to speak until after one o'clock; or, if I may be permitted to make a suggestion, the Tribunal might recess now. Shall I continue now?
THE PRESIDENT: If you can finish in 10 minutes we will go on until you finish, Dr. Stahmer.
DR. STAHMER: I will not quite have finished in 10 minutes, and I should like to point out particularly that I would not like to have to interrupt my concluding remarks.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps if it would be more convenient to you-we will do whichever you like; we will recess now, if you like. It is a very hot day and we will recess now if you prefer.
DR. STAHMER: I would prefer to have the recess now. I do feel the heat a little today, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
DR. STAHMER: I come now to the summary. In reviewing the personality and life of the Defendant Goering, the following points must be considered for the appreciation of his actions: Provided at home with a good educational background and training in character, he was moulded decisively as a young officer and combat airman during the first World War, in which he proved his outstanding worth, receiving the highest award for bravery, the decoration Pour le Merite. He experienced the collapse of the German war effort as a consequence of, as he saw it, German treachery from within. After the rule of the Kaiser had been overthrown, the German people wanted to give themselves a New-constitution on a democratic basis and then hoped to be able to work their way up again by industry and perseverance. In this, the confidence in the farsightedness of the victor powers of that time, and especially in the 14 points of Wilson, played a great part. But when the Treaty of Versailles utterly frustrated these hopes, the Weimar democracy fell into a serious crisis from which it was not to recover. This, together with the subsequent world economic crisis, formed the undeniable prerequisite for the fact that Hitler was able to seize power. First, the "fight against Versailles" made his rise as a Party leader possible. Goering, as a witness, described how he agreed with Hitler at their first meeting that nothing could be achieved by written protests. The powerlessness of the German democracy had by then become apparent to the entire world. Goering like Hitler was convinced that Germany inevitably must become a victim of Bolshevism unless it was possible to muster against it sufficient defensive strength by the re-establishment of German self-confidence at home. That Germany was also forced to take a firm stand against the Versailles powers was a matter of course. In this Hitler unquestioningly seized upon the fact that Germany belonged to the West- culturally, economically, and also politically.
DR. STAHMER: He believed that the Bolshevist danger, which in the first place was directed against Germany, would ultimately also threaten the Western countries. Therefore he was of the opinion that he would be able gradually to gain their recognition and support if he took up the ideological struggle against the East. From this basic attitude alone is it possible to explain his entire policy until the actual collapse. One may rightly condemn it today as having been a failure from the outset, but one cannot ignore the fact that initially certain things in the development clearly seemed to justify it. And this explains how Hitler succeeded in making an ever-increasing part of the Germans his followers. Goering firmly believed that salvation could come only through Hitler. He recognized in him the born national leader who knew how to influence and to guide the masses and whose hypnotic will power shrank before no obstacle. He realized that under a democratic constitution only sum a man of demoniacal demagogic talent was able to prevail. And therefore he joined him. Because Goering was a true and honest German, inspired only by love for the fatherland, he did not even think of using Hitler only as a tool for his own advancement. On the contrary, he took it upon himself from the beginning to recognize in him the man who alone decides, in other words, the Fuehrer, and to be satisfied with a subordinate role. Therefore the famous Air Force captain and holder of the order Pour le Merite did not hesitate to swear the oath of allegiance to the then still unknown Hitler, an oath which was to hold good for the rest of his life and actually did so. It is tragic that a struggle such as that led by Goering and Hitler could be so completely misunderstood as to be considered from the very outset as a conspiracy for the purpose of committing crimes. His aim was at first directed towards freeing Germany from the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles.
DR. STAHMER: It is true that the Weimar Government had made repeated attempts to be released from the most onerous obligations of this treaty. However, Germany was not successful in her endeavors for a revision. No progress was made by negotiating. Did not international law appear to be only an instrument in the hands of the victors of Versailles to keep Germany down permanently? Was it not still true in the world that might came before right and that the Germans would achieve something only if they had the courage to shake their fists? Such considerations appear absolutely understandable from the situation of that time. To construe from them a proof for the conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution would mean a complete misunderstanding of the facts. Actually, the development after 1933 seemed at first to prove Hitler completely right. He easily achieved with his methods much more than-if given voluntarily-would have kept the Weimar Government in power. From the willingness of the foreign countries not only to conclude treaties with Hitler-such as the. Naval Agreement of 1935 and the Munich Pact of September 1938-but also to participate to the end in the Party rallies, the German people could only conclude that Hitler had chosen the correct road for reaching international understanding. This impression and this judgment were absolutely correct until the fall of 1938. Had Hitler afterwards observed loyally the Munich Agreement, then he would probably have stayed the arguments for the "stop" policy which was initiated against him. Not only would peace have been maintained, but Hitler could also have harvested the fruits of his domestic and foreign policy pursued until then and recognized by all powers. Basically, the argument today centers only on the question of whether the developments since then and their catastrophic consequences should be charged solely to him or to others. All Germans who followed Hitler at any time and in any way are accused.