dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
to Berlin. Continuous day and night teleprinter communications had been established from Hofdirect to Amt III of the SD in Berlin. To the best of my recollection the head of the Hof office was Daufeldt. The head of Amt III in Berlin at this time was Jost and his assistant was Filbert. "* (Rifles and machine guns were of doubtful serviceability due to inferior ammunition)." "3. The bulk of the intelligence we collected came from Heinlein Free Corps, which had its headquarters in a castle at Dondorf, outside Bayreuth; the distance between Hof and Bayreuth is not very great, and we had daily access to all intelligence received by the Free Corps. There was a continuous liaison maintained with Czech territory by runners. Exploitation of this Intelligence was carried out every day in Berlin and was placed before Heydrich and Himmler. "4. I remember that the Free Corps made continuous complaints that they had not received sufficient supply of arms. Negotiations by letter and teleprint message went on for a number of days with Berlin until it became quite a nuisance. After that arms were supplied from the army, but I believe it was only a small quantity. "5. Hof was the center for all intelligence collected by the SD on the Czechoslovak question. The SD had agents all along the border in every town. The names of these agents were reported to Hof, and two motor cars toured the border every day to collect the intelligence which had been unearthed. In addition, I remember that two or three companies of the SS-Totenkopf units were stationed in the neighborhood of Asch. "The facts stated above are true: this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this statement I have signed and executed the same at Nurnberg, Germany this 20th day of November 1945. "(signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks." (3029-PS) Offensive operations along the Czechoslovak border were not confined to skirmishes carried out by the Free Corps. Two SS Totenkopf battalions were operating across the border in Czech territory near Asch. Item 36 in the Schmundt file (388-PS), an OKW most secret order signed by Jodl and dated 28 September, states: "Those SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch Promontory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only
across the border in Czech territory near Asch. Item 36 in the Schmundt file (388-PS), an OKW most secret order signed by Jodl and dated 28 September, states: "Those SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch Promontory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the German-Czech frontier." (388-PS, Item 36) According to the 25 September entry in General Jodl's diary these SS Totenkopf battalions were operating in this area on direct orders from Hitler. (1780-PS) As the time for X-day approached, the disposition of the Free Corps became a matter of dispute. On 26 September Himmler issued an order to the Chief of Staff of the Sudeten German Free Corps directing that the Free Corps come under control of the Reichsfuehrer SS in the event of German invasion of Czechoslovakia (388-PS, Item 37). On 28 September Keitel directed that as soon as the German Army crosses the Czech border the Free Corps will take orders from the OKH. In this most secret order of the OKW Keitel discloses that Heinleins men are already operating in Czechoslovak territory: "For the Heinlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from the Fuehrer and that they carry out their operations only in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the frontier. "Those units remaining forward of the frontier should-in their own interests-get into communication with the frontier guard as often as possible. "As soon as the army crosses the Czech border the Heinlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later." (388-PS, Item 34) On 30 September, when it became clear that the Munich settlement would result in a peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland, Keitel ordered that the Free Corps Heinlein in its present composition be placed under command of Himmler: "1. Attachment of Heinlein Free Corps: "The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Heinlein Free Corps in its present
Munich settlement would result in a peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland, Keitel ordered that the Free Corps Heinlein in its present composition be placed under command of Himmler: "1. Attachment of Heinlein Free Corps: "The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Heinlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under command of Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police. "It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of the police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS." (388-PS, Item 38) J. Occupation of the Sudetenland under the Terms of the Munich Agreement. Under the threat of war by the Nazi conspirators, and with war in fact about to be launched, the United Kingdom and France concluded a pact with Germany and Italy at Munich on the night of 29 September 1938. This treaty provided for the cession of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce. (TC-23) On 1 October 1938 German troops began the occupation of the Sudetenland. During the conclusion of the Munich Pact the Wehrmacht had been fully deployed for attack, awaiting only the word of Hitler to begin the assault. With the cession of the Sudetenland new orders were issued. On 30 September Keitel promulgated Directive #1 on "Occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia" (388-PS, Item 39). This directive contained a time table for the occupation of sectors of former Czech territory between 1 and 10 October and specified the tasks of the German armed forces. The fourth and fifth paragraphs provided: "2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks: "The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained completely, for the present also in the West. Order for the rescinding of measures taken is held over. "The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into operation 'Gruen'." (388-PS, Item 39) It contained one further provision about the Heinlein forces: "Heinlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October." (388-PS, Item 39) The Schmundt file contains a number of additional secret OKW directives giving instructions
'Gruen'." (388-PS, Item 39) It contained one further provision about the Heinlein forces: "Heinlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October." (388-PS, Item 39) The Schmundt file contains a number of additional secret OKW directives giving instructions for the occupation of the Sudetenland and showing the scope of the preparations of the OKW. Directives specifying the occupational area of the army and the units under its command; arranging for communications facilities, exchange facilities, supply, and propaganda; and giving instructions to the civil departments of the government were issued over Keitel's signature on 30 September (388-PS, Items 40, 41, 42). By 10 October von Brauchitsch was able to report to Hitler that German troops had reached the demarcation line and that the order for the occupation of the Sudetenland had been fulfilled. The OKW requested Hitler's permission to rescind Case Green, to withdraw troops from the occupied area and to relieve the OKH of executive powers in the Sudeten German area as of 15 October. (388-PS, Items 46, 47, 49) On 18 October, in a formal letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch, Hitler announced that the civil authorities would take over responsibility for the Sudeten German territory on 21 October and that the OKH would be relieved of executive powers as of that date (388-PS, Item 51). On the same date additional demobilization of the forces in the Sudetenland was ordered by Hitler and Keitel. Three days later the OKW requested Hitler's consent to the reversion of the RAD from the control of the armed forces. (388-PS, Items 52, 53) As the German forces entered the Sudetenland Heinleins Sudetendeutsche Partei was merged with the NSDAP of Hitler. The two men who had fled to Hitler's protection in mid-September, Heinlein and Karl Hermann Frank, were appointed Gauleiter and Deputy Gauleiter, respectively, of the Sudetengau. In the parts of the Czechoslovak Republic that were still free the Sudetendeutsche Partei constituted itself as the National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei in der Tschechoslovakei (NSDAP in Czechoslovakia) under the direction of Kundt, another of Heinleins
Gauleiter, respectively, of the Sudetengau. In the parts of the Czechoslovak Republic that were still free the Sudetendeutsche Partei constituted itself as the National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei in der Tschechoslovakei (NSDAP in Czechoslovakia) under the direction of Kundt, another of Heinleins deputies. These events are set forth in the Czechoslovak official report. (998-PS; 3061-PS) The stage was now prepared for the next move of the Nazi conspirators. K. Planning for the Conquest of the Remainder of Czechoslovakia. With the occupation of the Sudetenland and the inclusion of the German-speaking Czechs within the Greater Reich it might have been expected that the Nazi conspirators would be satisfied. Thus far in the Nazi program of aggression the conspirators had used as a pretext for their conquests the union of the Volksdeutsche, the people of German descent, with the Reich. Now, after Munich, substantially all the Volksdeutsche in Czechoslovakia had been returned to German rule. On 26 September, at the Sportspalast in Berlin, Hitler spoke these words: "And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be solved and which will be solved. It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve, and which I will satisfy God willing." "I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the limits of our patience. "I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities peacefully and with our oppression, I will no longer be interested in the Czech State. And that as far as I am concerned I will guarantee. We don't want any Czechs at all." (2358-PS) Yes no more than two weeks later Hitler and Keitel were preparing estimates of the military forces required to break Czechoslovak resistance in Bohemia and Moravia. Item 48
interested in the Czech State. And that as far as I am concerned I will guarantee. We don't want any Czechs at all." (2358-PS) Yes no more than two weeks later Hitler and Keitel were preparing estimates of the military forces required to break Czechoslovak resistance in Bohemia and Moravia. Item 48 of the Schmundt file is a top secret telegram sent by Keitel to Hitler's headquarters on 11 October 1938 in answer to four questions which Hitler had propounded to the OKW. These were the questions: "Question 1: What reinforcements are necessary in the present situation to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia? "Question 2: How much time is required for the regrouping or moving up of new forces? "Question 3: How much time will be required for the same purpose if it is executed after the intended demobilization and return measures? "Question 4: How much time would be required to achieve the state of readiness of October 1st?" (388-PS, Item 48) Whereupon, in the same telegram, Keitel reported to Hitler the considered answers of the OKW and the Luftwaffe. On 21 October, the same day on which the administration of the Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities, a directive outlining plans for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia was signed by Hitler and initialed by Keitel. In this Top secret Order, of which 10 copies were made, the Nazi conspirators, only three weeks after the winning of the Sudetenland, were already looking forward to new conquests: "The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down by me in a later Directive. "Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the following eventualities: "1. The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection against surprise air attacks. "2. The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. "3. The occupation of the Memelland." "It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany. "The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those for 'Gruen'; they must, however, guarantee a continuous
"It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany. "The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those for 'Gruen'; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The organization, order of battle and state of readiness of the units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that at the same time 'Grenzsicherung West' (the measures of frontier defense in the West) can be carried out. "The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows: "a. Army "The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise type of attack. Their number will be determined by the forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing the frontiers or sent after the attack army. "b. Air Force "The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by an early elimination of the Czech Air Force. "For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peace-time bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger forces may be required can only be determined from the development of the military situation in Czechoslovakia. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be prepared." (C-136) This order was signed by Hitler and authenticated by Keitel. It was distributed to the OKH, to Goering's Luftwaffe, and to Raeder at Navy headquarters. Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Keitel issued an appendix to the original order stating that by command of the Fuehrer preparations for the
(C-136) This order was signed by Hitler and authenticated by Keitel. It was distributed to the OKH, to Goering's Luftwaffe, and to Raeder at Navy headquarters. Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Keitel issued an appendix to the original order stating that by command of the Fuehrer preparations for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia are to continue. Distribution of this Top Secret order was the same as for the 21 October order. The order provides: "2. COROLLARY TO DIRECTIVE OF 21.10.38. "Reference 'Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia' the Fuehrer has given the following additional order: "The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be expected. "To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is merely an action of pacification and not a warlike undertaking. "The action must therefore be carried out by the peace time Armed Forces only, without reinforcements from mobilization. The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by adjustment within the units. "Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march must, as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form up systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary for previous organization should be limited to the minimum and will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements, if any, of single units and particularly of motorized forces, to the troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the approval of the Fuehrer. "The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar general directives. "For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly occupied territory and only for a short period. "Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. "KEITEL" (C-138) This particular copy of the order, an original carbon signed in ink by Keitel, was the one sent to the OKM, the German naval headquarters. It bears the initials of Fricke, head of the Operational Division of the Naval War Staff, of Schniewind, Chief of Staff of the Naval War
the Armed Forces. "KEITEL" (C-138) This particular copy of the order, an original carbon signed in ink by Keitel, was the one sent to the OKM, the German naval headquarters. It bears the initials of Fricke, head of the Operational Division of the Naval War Staff, of Schniewind, Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff, and of Raeder. As the Wehrmacht moved forward with plans for what it clearly considered would be an easy victory, the Foreign Office played its part. In a discussion of means of improving German-Czech relations with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, in Berlin on 21 January 1939, Ribbentrop urged upon the Czech government a "quick reduction" in the size of the Czech army. The captured German Foreign Office notes of this discussion bear the following footnote, in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction in the Czech army would be decisive in our judgment." (2795-PS) L. Extension of Fifth Column Activity As in the case of Austria and the Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators did not intend to rely on the Wehrmacht alone to accomplish their calculated objective of "liquidating" Czechoslovakia. With the German minority separated from Czechoslovakia, they could no longer use the cry, "home to the Reich." One sizeable minority, the Slovaks, remained within the Czechoslovak State. The Czechoslovak Government had made every effort to conciliate Slovak extremists in the months after the cession of the Sudetenland. Autonomy had been granted to Slovakia, with an autonomous cabinet and parliament at Bratislava. Nonetheless, despite these concessions, it was in Slovakia that the Nazi conspirators found men ready to take their money and do their bidding. The following picture of Nazi operations in Slovakia is based on the Czechoslovak official report. (998-PS; 3061-PS) Nazi propaganda and "research" groups had long been interested in maintaining close connections with the Slovak autonomist opposition. When Bela Tuka, who later became Prime Minister of the puppet state of Slovakia, was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence established that he had already established connections with Nazi groups within Germany. Prior to 1938 Nazi aides were in close contact with Slovak traitors living in exile and
opposition. When Bela Tuka, who later became Prime Minister of the puppet state of Slovakia, was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence established that he had already established connections with Nazi groups within Germany. Prior to 1938 Nazi aides were in close contact with Slovak traitors living in exile and were attempting to establish more profitable contacts in the semi-fascist Slovak Catholic Peoples Party of Monsignor Andrew Hlinka. Out of sympathy with the predominantly anti-clerical government in Prague, some Catholic elements in Slovakia proved willing to cooperate with the Nazis. In February and July 1938 the leaders of the Heinlein movement conferred with top men of Father Hlinka's party and agreed to furnish one another with mutual assistance in pressing their respective claims to autonomy. This understanding proved useful in the September agitation when, at the proper moment, the Foreign Office in Berlin wired the Heinlein leader, Kundt, in Prague to tell the Slovaks to start their demands for autonomy. (See 2858-PS.) By this time, mid-summer 1938, the Nazis were in direct contact with figures in the Slovak autonomist movement and had paid agents among the higher staff of Father Hlinka's party. These agents undertook to render impossible any understanding between the Slovak autonomists and the Slovak parties in the government at Prague. Franz Karmasin, later to become Volksgruppenfuehrer, had been appointed Nazi leader in Slovakia and professed to be serving the cause of Slovak autonomy while on the Nazi pay roll. On 22 November the Nazis indiscreetly wired Karmasin to collect his money at the German Legation in person. The telegram, sent from the German Legation at Prague to Bratislava (Pressburg), reads as follows: "Delegate kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin that he would appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum which is being kept for him at the treasury of the embassy. "HENCKE" (2859-PS) Karmasin proved to be extremely useful to the Nazi cause. A captured memorandum of the German Foreign Office, dated Berlin, 29 November 1939-eight months after the conquest of Czechoslovakia-throws a revealing light both on Karmasin and on the German Foreign Office: "On the question of payments to KARMASIN "Karmasin receives 30,000 Marks for the