dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in some cases some kind of an order was made, was it not, that they were full Aryans, notwithstanding Jewish parentage?
BODENSCHATZ: At the moment I can remember no such case.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You spoke of the requests for help from Goering coming from broad masses of the people, and those requests were submitted to his staff. Is that right?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was the head of that staff?
BODENSCHATZ: At the head of that staff stood the Chief of Staff, Dr. Gritzbach.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How many assistants did he have?
BODENSCHATZ: There were three sections, a press section, with Dr. Gerner in charge of that, and the private secretariat -- there were three sections.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And which of these sections handled the peoples' requests for relief from arrest?
BODENSCHATZ: Dr. Gritzbach and Dr. Gerner were concerned with that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To whom did they talk about these matters, do you know?
BODENSCHATZ: These gentlemen, as well as myself, submitted these matters to the Reich Marshal.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that he was kept fully informed of what you did and of what they did?
BODENSCHATZ: Please repeat the question.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Reich Marshal was kept fully informed of these applications to you and to the other sections?
BODENSCHATZ: He was informed by me.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, as I understand you, he never failed to give his assistance to any one of the applications that was made to him, so far as you know?
BODENSCHATZ: As regards requests addressed to my office or to me personally he never refused assistance and actually help was always given.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And never inquired into the guilt or innocence of the person he was helping?
BODENSCHATZ: They were innocent; that was clearly established.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you were present on the 20th of July at the bomb explosion, as I understand from your direct testimony?
BODENSCHATZ: On 20 July I was present at that meeting and stood very near the bomb.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where was Hermann Goering on that day?
BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Goering was in his headquarters on that day, about 70 kilometers from the Fuehrer's headquarters.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Only 70 kilometers away; is that right? And at what time were you instructed to represent him at that meeting?
BODENSCHATZ: I was not instructed to represent him at this meeting. I took part in this conference, as in any other, as a listener. I had no orders to represent Goering, to represent him in the Fuehrer's headquarters. I was merely in the Fuehrer's headquarters to inform him of what went on there.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You represented him to listen, but not to talk; is that right?
BODENSCHATZ: I did not say very much during those years. I was simply a listener and had to inform him as to what took place at the conference; what would interest him in his capacity as Reich Marshal.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How far in advance of that meeting were you instructed to attend?
BODENSCHATZ: At this meeting? On 20 July? On 19 July I was on a special commission, sent to the Munster Camp to take part in the review of an Italian division. On 20 July, at noon, I came by air to the Fuehrer's headquarters, gave Hitler a military communication, and Hitler said to me, "Come and discuss the situation." I did not want to go, but I went with him and after 15 minutes the attempted assassination took place.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who sent you with the message? Whose message was it that you were delivering?
BODENSCHATZ: I was commissioned at that time by Reich Marshal Goering to attend the review of the Italian division at the Munster Camp and to tell Field Marshal Graziani that the men in that division were to be used to command flak guns. After Field Marshal Graziani had declared himself in disagreement with this, I was obliged to go to the Fuehrer's headquarters by air. It had been proposed that I should go by Mussolini's special train which was in Munster, and on the night of 19 to 20...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Answer my question, Witness. Just answer the question, please, and you will save us a great deal of time. Whose messages were you carrying to the Fuehrer?
BODENSCHATZ: I brought the message that Graziani was not disposed to hand over these soldiers of the Italians division.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And before you started for the Fuehrer's headquarters you communicated with Goering about it, did you not?
BODENSCHATZ: Before my departure, when I flew to Munster Camp -- that was a few days before -- I spoke to him and when I returned, before reporting to the Fuehrer, I telephoned Hermann Goering in his headquarters and gave him the same message.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he instruct you to go to the Fuehrer's headquarters at that time and give the message to the Fuehrer?
BODENSCHATZ: This trip from Munster Camp I made on my own initiative because it was important for Adolf Hitler to know of this information before Mussolini, who was expected to arrive at the Fuehrer's headquarters at 3 o'clock in the afternoon on 20 July....
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As I understand you, Goering wanted a peaceful outcome of the negotiations at Munich?
BODENSCHATZ: He said that to me several times.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he was highly pleased with the outcome that was achieved there?
BODENSCHATZ: He was very pleased. I emphasized that before when I said that when he came from the conference room, he said spontaneously, "That means peace."
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you say that Goering wanted peace with Poland, he also wanted that same kind of a peace, did he not?
BODENSCHATZ: Regarding peace with Poland, I did not speak to him.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he send someone or induce Hitler to take someone to Munich in order to countercheck Ribbentrop?
BODENSCHATZ: All I know personally on this subject is this: Here, in imprisonment, Captain Wiedemann told me that Hermann Goering had expressed the wish that Von Neurath should be taken, and Wiedemann told me that Hitler had granted that wish.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you were interrogated by the United States about this subject before Wiedemann got here, were you not?
BODENSCHATZ: Before?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Before Wiedemann was brought here.
BODENSCHATZ: I was not interrogated on this subject -- the Munich Agreement and Von Neurath.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you interrogated on the 6th of November 1945, and did you not then say that Goering used very harsh words about Ribbentrop and asked Hitler to take Neurath to Munich with him in order to have a representative present? Did you not say that to the interrogators of the United States?
BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember at the moment. If that is in the record then it must be so.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This meeting as to which you have --  oh, by the way, after Munich you know that Goering gave his word of honor to the Czechs that there would be no further aggression against them, do you not?
BODENSCHATZ: Please repeat the question.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know that after Munich, when Goering was pleased with the outcome, he gave his word of honor that there would be no further aggression against the Czechs. Do you know that?
BODENSCHATZ: No, I did not know that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This meeting that took place in London, I mean the meeting that took place when the Englishmen were present . . .
BODENSCHATZ: In Husum, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the Swedish person who was present?
BODENSCHATZ: Herr Dahlerus was the Swede who was present.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who were the English who were present?
BODENSCHATZ: There were six to eight English economic experts. The names I do not know.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And at that time -- by the way, have you fixed the time of that? What was the date?
BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say precisely. It was the beginning of August.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it not 7 August?
BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was Mr. Dahlerus there?
BODENSCHATZ: The question as to whether Dahlerus was there -- I cannot remember one hundred percent whether he was there. I know only that when I spoke to my lawyer he said that Dahlerus was there, but I cannot swear one hundred percent that he was there. I assumed he was, since the Defense Counsel Dr. Stahmer told me that he was there. That was the reason why I said previously that Hermann Goering and Dahlerus were present at that meeting.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the subject under discussion was the Polish relations with the German Reich?
BODENSCHATZ: Polish relations were not discussed, but relations between England and Germany. There was no talk of relations with Poland.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Goering wanted the English gentlemen to see that England did not attack Germany?
BODENSCHATZ: He did not express it quite that way. He said, as I have already stated, the English gentlemen should, when they returned home, work in the same way that he was working -- for peace, and to make their influence felt in important circles.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was that not said in connection with the Polish negotiations that were then going on?
BODENSCHATZ: With the Polish negotiations? I cannot remember that any mention was made of Polish negotiations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you with Hermann Goering when the Polish war broke out?
BODENSCHATZ: When the Polish war broke out I was in Berlin.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you still in your office under Hermann Goering's command?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I was at that time under Hermann Goering's command.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did you first begin preparing for a movement of your forces in the direction of Poland?
BODENSCHATZ: I cannot make any definite statement on that subject; that was a matter for the General Staff. I know only that during the period before the outbreak of war the Chief of the General Staff several times visited the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Hermann Goering, and that such matters were discussed. I, myself, was not informed as to how many forces were to be used in the Polish campaign.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you present at the conference in which Hermann Goering stated that he, right after Munich, had orders to multiply the Air Force by five?
BODENSCHATZ: I cannot recall having been present at any such discussion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know that the Air Force was greatly enlarged after Munich?
BODENSCHATZ: No, I do not know that. The Air Force was augmented according to plan. In this connection I can say for certain that the German Air Force, at the beginning of the Polish campaign, as regards leadership, planning, or material, was not equal to its task.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, would you like to adjourn now or would you like to go on in order to finish?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This would be a convenient time. I am sure we cannot finish before lunch hour.
THE PRESIDENT: You would like to adjourn now?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
THE PRESIDENT: We will have no open session tomorrow.
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U. S. S. R.): I want to say a few words with respect to the statement of Defense Counsel Stahmer. When speaking about the document concerning the German atrocities at Katyn, Defense Counsel Stahmer stated that it was not in his possession. I do not want to speak about the nature of this document. I want to report to the Tribunal that on 13 February this document, as Exhibit USSR-54 -- 30 copies of it, all in the German language -- was given to the Document Room for the purposes of the Defense. We did not think that we had to present the document to each Defense Counsel separately. We considered that if the document were given to the Document Room, the Defense would take the necessary steps concerning it. That is all I wish to say on this matter.
DR. LATERNSER: There must be a misunderstanding about the number of this document. It was submitted at that time in open session by the Russian Prosecutor as Exhibit Number USSR-64. USSR-64 has not been distributed. I have not received it, and upon request at Information Room of the Defense, upon two requests, I have not been able to obtain it.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will inquire into the matter. [The witness Bodenschatz took the stand.]
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Previous to the spring of 1943, as I understand you, Hermann Goering was a man of great influence in the councils of the Reich?
BODENSCHATZ: Before the year 1943 -- that is, until the year 1943 -- Hermann Goering always had access to the Fuehrer, and his influence was important.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In fact, it was the most important in Germany outside of the Fuehrer himself, was it not?
BODENSCHATZ: Within the Reich he had great influence, very great influence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Air power was his special mission and his special pride, was it not?
BODENSCHATZ: As an old airman, he was very proud to be able to build up and lead the Air Force.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He had more confidence in air power as a weapon of war than most of the other men of his time, did he not?
BODENSCHATZ: At any rate he was convinced that his Air Force was very good. But I have to repeat what I said before, that at the beginning of the war, in the year 1939, that stage had not been reached by the Air Force. I repeat that at that time the Air Force was, as far as leadership, training, and material were concerned, not ready for war.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But ever since you first went with Hermann Goering you had been rapidly building up the Air Force, had you not?
BODENSCHATZ: The building up of the Air Force went relatively fast.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you first went with Goering  -- I have forgotten what year you said that was.
BODENSCHATZ: I came to Hermann Goering in April 1933. At that time there was no Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, but only a Reich Commissariat for Aviation. But even at that time, the beginning of the building up of the Air Force -- the first beginnings --  started. It was only after 1935, however, when freedom from armament restriction was declared, that it was speeded up.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the building up of the Air Force was very largely in bombers, was it not?
BODENSCHATZ: It was not mainly bombers; it was mixed, both fighters and bombers.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Goering also had charge of the Four Year Plan?
BODENSCHATZ: He was commissioned by the Fuehrer to carry out the Four Year Plan.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He also held several other offices, did he not?
BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Goering, besides being Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, was put in charge of the Four Year Plan. Before that, at the beginning of the seizure of power, he was Minister of the Interior and Prime Minister of Prussia, President of the Reichstag and Reichsforstmeister.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I notice that you use here, as you have used in your interrogations by the United States, the expression "seizure of power." That was the common expression used in your group, was it not, to describe the coming to power of Adolf Hitler?
BODENSCHATZ: It cannot be used in this sense. At that time it was completely legal because the National Socialist Party was then the strongest party, and the strongest party nominated the Reich Chancellor, and the strongest party had, as such, the greatest influence. It must not be interpreted to mean that they usurped the power, but that they had the most influential and prominent position among the parties, that is, by the completely legal means of election.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You want to change the word "seizure"?
BODENSCHATZ: I have to change that. It is only an expression which was common usage in the press at that time.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Goering got along without any open break with Hitler until 1945, did he not?
BODENSCHATZ: Until the year 1945 there was no open break. The arrest was only quite at the end, as I have said before.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the arrest was the first open break that had occurred between them, was it not?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, the first big break between the two which was apparent to the public. But since the year 1943, as I have said before, there was already a gradual estrangement in the attitude of the two men.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But that was kept from the public, was it not, kept from the German people?
BODENSCHATZ: It was not so visible to the public. It was a development which took place gradually from the spring of 1943 to 1945 -- first to a small extent, and then the tension became greater and greater.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When the arrest was made it was made by the SS, was it not?
BODENSCHATZ: I only heard that. It was said that in Obersalzberg a unit of SS had arrived which arrested Hermann Goering in his small house and confined him there. As to that, perhaps the witness who is going to testify later, Colonel Brauchitsch, who was present at this arrest and who was arrested himself, can give more details.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were not arrested by the SS?
BODENSCHATZ: At that time . . . since 20 July 1944, when I was seriously injured, I had been in the hospital. I was close to Berchtesgaden, at Bad Reichenhall, convalescing.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whenever there were conferences which you attended, was it not the custom, at the conclusion of Hitler's address to the group, for Goering as the ranking man present, to assure the Fuehrer on behalf of himself and his fellow officers of their support of his plans?
BODENSCHATZ: Of course I was not present at all conferences; I only took the part of listener. At these discussions, or shall we say conferences, in which I took part, it happened from time to time that the Reich Marshal made a remark at the end and gave assurance that the will of the Fuehrer would be carried out. But at the moment I cannot remember specifically any such conference.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You cannot remember any conference at which he did not do it either, can you?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes. It was not always done; on the contrary, he did not do it as a rule. In the Reichstag Hermann Goering always made a concluding speech, after a session had ended, expressing his confidence in Adolf Hitler.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he not do that at every meeting of officers at which the Fuehrer was present?
BODENSCHATZ: May I ask you to repeat the question? I have not quite understood it. I beg you to excuse me, but I would like to mention that owing to my injury I have lost 60 percent of my hearing, and therefore I beg you to excuse me if I ask for repetitions. Please, repeat your question.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Quite all right, Sir. Do you know of any conference between Hitler and his High Command at which Goering did not close the meeting, as the ranking officer present, by making assurances of support to Hitler's plans?
BODENSCHATZ: Some of the conferences I attended were concluded by a declaration of that nature. There were, however, many conferences -- in fact most of the conferences -- when nothing further was said at the end. When the Fuehrer had finished his speech, the meeting was ended.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In 1943, when Goering began to lose influence with Hitler, it was a very embarrassing time for Goering, was it not?
BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Goering suffered from this fact. He often told me that he would suffer very much on that account.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From the fact that the Fuehrer was losing confidence in him?
BODENSCHATZ: What was that?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was suffering from the fact that the Fuehrer was losing confidence in him? Was that what was causing his suffering?
BODENSCHATZ: That may have been part of the reason, but differences of opinion arose about the Luftwaffe.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in the spring of 1943 it was apparent to you and apparent to him that the war was lost for Germany, was it not?
BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say that. The Reich Marshal did not tell me in 1943 that the war was lost, but that there were great difficulties, that it would become very dangerous; but that the war was definitely lost -- I cannot remember that the Reich Marshal at that time, in the spring of 1943, made a statement to me of that kind, or a similar one.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Reich Marshal had given his assurance to the German people, had he not, that it would not be possible for them to be bombed, as Warsaw, Rotterdam, and other cities were bombed?
BODENSCHATZ: As far as I know, he did not give the assurance in those words. Before the war, when our Air Force was growing -- I mean at the beginning of the war, when the great successes in Poland and in France were manifest -- he said to the German people that the Air Force would do its job and do everything to spare the country from heavy air raids. At the time that was justified. It was not clearly foreseen then that matters would develop differently later.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then he had given his assurance to the German people, had he not, that the Luftwaffe would be able to keep enemy bombers away from Germany?
BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember that he gave an official assurance to the German people in the form of a decree or a big speech. At times it was said that the German Air Force, after the successes in Poland and France, was at its peak. I do not know of any official statement whereby it was made known to the German people.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At all events, it became apparent in the spring of 1943 that any such assurance, if it had been given, was misleading? BODENSCHATZ In the year 1943 the conditions were entirely different, owing to the fact that the British and American Air Forces came into the picture in such large and overwhelming numbers.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was also true that the air defenses of Germany were proving entirely inadequate to cope with the situation; is that not a fact?
BODENSCHATZ: The air defense of Germany was very difficult, as the entire defense did not depend on the air crews alone, but it was also a radio-technical war, and in this radio-technical war, it must be admitted frankly, the enemy was essentially better than we were. Therefore it was not only a war in the air, but it was also a radio war.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It had become apparent that Germany could not cope with it -- is that not a fact? -- by 1943.
BODENSCHATZ: In the year 1943 it was not yet a hundred percent clear. There were fluctuations, low and high points. Efforts were made to increase the fighter strength at the expense of the bombers. It was not one hundred percent obvious that the enemy air force could not be opposed successfully. That became obvious only after the middle of 1944.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Fuehrer lost confidence in Goering as the bombing of German cities progressed, did he not?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, indeed, from the moment the British Air Force started with their large-scale attacks on German cities, particularly when the first heavy British air attack on Cologne took place. From that moment it was obvious that differences of opinion, at first not too serious, were arising between the two men.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Hitler accused Goering, did he not, of misleading him as to the strength of the air defenses of Germany?
BODENSCHATZ: I do not know that the Fuehrer ever accused the Reich Marshal of any offense in this respect. Discussions between Adolf Hitler and the Reich Marshal were, in spite of all tension, always very moderate. The criticism is said to have become more vehement only later, in 1944 and the beginning of 1945. But I was not present, because I had been off duty since 20 July 1944.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you a question. I did not intend to imply that the Fuehrer accused him of an intentional misstatement, but he had misled him or he had misunderstood the strength of Germany's air defenses. Was that not generally understood in your circle?
BODENSCHATZ: There could be no question of misleading. The reports which the Air Force made to the Fuehrer were always correct. The weaknesses of the Air Force were also reported to the Fuehrer.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What were the efforts that were made by Goering, which you refer to as tremendous efforts, to recapture his influence with the Fuehrer?