dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
COL. PHILLIMORE: In 1941, and on the same day the entry of German troops into Bulgaria began in accordance with the Plan Marita and the directives to which I have referred the Tribunal The landing of British troops in Greece on the 3rd of March in accordance with the guarantee given in the spring of 1939 by His Majesty's Government may have accelerated the movement of the German forces; but, as the Tribunal will have seen, the invasion of Greece had been planned long beforehand and was already in progress at this time. I pass now to the next document in the bundle, C-167, which I put in as GB-122. I am afraid it is not a very satisfactory copy, but the original which I have put in shows that both the Defendants Keitel and Jodl were present at the interview with Hitler which this extract records. It is a short extract from a report by the Defendant Raeder on an interview with Hitler in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. It is perhaps interesting as showing the ruthless nature of the German intention. "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of Greece win have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement. "Fuehrer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement." The above document . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is it dated?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It took place on the 18th of March at 1600 hours.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that on the original document?
COL. PFTTT1IMORE: Yes, on the original document.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The document I have referred to shows, it is submitted, that the Nazi conspirators in accordance with their principle of liquidating any neutral who did not remain disinterested had made every preparation by the end of January and were at this date in the process of moving the necessary troops to ensure the final liquidation of Greece, which was already at war with and getting the better of their Italian allies. They were not, however, yet ready to deal with Yugoslavia towards which their policy accordingly remained one of lulling the unsuspecting victim. On the 25th of March 1941 in accordance with this policy, the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three Power Pact was secured. This adherence followed a visit on the 15th of February 1941 by the Yugoslav Premier Cvetkovic and the Foreign Minister Cinkar-Markovic to the Defendant Ribbentrop at Salzburg and subsequently to Mimer at Berchtesgaden, after which these ministers were induced to sign the Pact at Vienna on the 25th of March. On this occasion the Defendant Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of assurance, which are set out in the next document in the bundle, 2450-PS, which I put in as GB-123 - If I might read from half-way down the page: "Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade. "At the same time when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the Governments of the-Axis Powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the following identical notes: " 'Mr. Prime Minister: " 'In the name of the German Government and at their behest I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following: -" 'On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry today into the Tri-Partite Pact the German Government confirm their determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.' " That letter was signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop, who you will remember, was present at the meeting in August of 1939 when he and Hitler tried to persuade the Italians to invade Yugoslavia.
COL. PHILLIMORE: In fact it was 11 days after this letter was written that the Germans did invade Yugoslavia and 2 days after the letter was written that they issued the necessary order. If I might read the second letter: "Mr. Prime Minister: "With reference to the conversations that occurred in connection with the entry of Yugoslavia into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of the Reich Cabinet" -Reichsregierung- "that in the agreement between the Axis Powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government the Governments of the Axis Powers during this war will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of troops through Yugoslavian national territory." The position at this stage, the 25th of March 1941, was therefore, that German troops were already in Bulgaria moving towards the Greek frontier, while Yugoslavia had, to use Hitler's own term in his letter to Mussolini, "become disinterested" in the cleaning-up of the Greek question. The importance of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three Power Pact appears very clearly from the next document in the bundle, 2765-PS, which I put in as GB-124. It is an extract from the minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Ciano, and if I might just read the first paragraph: "The Fuehrer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia's joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the resulting definition of her position.
COL. PHILLIMORE: This is of special importance in view of the proposed military action against Greece, for if one considers that for 350 to 400 kilometers the important line of communication through Bulgaria runs within 20 kilometers of the Yugoslav border, one can judge that with a dubious attitude of Yugoslavia an undertaking against Greece would have been militarily an extremely foolhardy venture." Again it is a matter of history that on the night of the 26th of March, when the two Yugoslav Ministers returned to Belgrade, General Simovic and his colleagues effected their removal by a coup d'etat; and Yugoslavia emerged on the morning of the 27th of March ready to defend, if need be, her independence. The Yugoslav people had found themselves. The Nazis reacted to this altered situation with lightning rapidity, and the immediate liquidation of Yugoslavia was decided on. I ask the Tribunal to turn back to 1746-PS, which I put in as GB-120, to the second part on Page 3 of the document consisting of a record of a conference of Hitler and the German High Command on the situation in Yugoslavia dated 27th of Mark 1941. It shows that those present included the Fuehrer; the Reich Marshal, that is of course, the Defendant Goering; Chief, OKW, that is the Defendant Keitel; Chief of the Wehrmacht Fuhrungsstab, that is the Defendant Jodl. Then over the page - "later on the following persons were added." I call the Tribunal's attention to the fact that those who came in later included the Defendant Ribbentrop. If I might read the part of Hitler's statement set out on Page 4: "The Fuehrer describes Yugoslavia's situation after the coup d'etat .. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the coming Marita action and even more in regard to the Barbarossa undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never pro-Germans." I think I can pass on to the second paragraph: "The present moment is for political and military reasons favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country's attitude towards us.
COL. PHILLIMORE: For if the overthrow of the government would have happened during the Barbarossa action, the consequences for us probably would have been considerably more serious." And then the next paragraph to which I would particularly draw the Tribunal's attention: "The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav Government which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready. "It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Romania's main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian Ministers have already been notified.. During the day a message will still be addressed to the Duce. "Politically it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking. In this way Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to there.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to these states; the Adriatic coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria "This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest time." Well, of course, the Tribunal will have noted that in that third paragraph - 2 days after the pact had been signed and the assurances given-because there has been a coup d'etat and it is just possible that the operations against Greece may be affected, the destruction of Yugoslavia is decided upon without any question of taking the trouble to ascertain the views of the new government. Then there is one short passage on Page 5, the next page of the document, which I would like to read: "5) The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrade in attacks by waves ...." I pause there to comment; we now know, of course, how ruthlessly this bombing was done when the residential areas of Belgrade were bombed at 7 o'clock on the following Sunday morning, the morning of the 6th.
THE PRESIDENT: The 6th of April? COL. PHILLIMORE The 6th of April. Then again still in the same document, the last part of it, Part V at Page 5; a tentative plan is set out, drawn up by the Defendant Jodl and I would read one small paragraph at the top of the following page, Page 6: "In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory." I read that because the plan is issued from the office of the Defendant Jodl. Now passing to the next document in the bundle, ~127, I put that in as Exhibit GB-125. It is an extract from the order issued after the meeting from the minutes of which I have just read, that is the meeting of the 17th of March recorded in 1746-PS, Part II. It is worth reading the lust paragraph: "The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her protestations of loyalty, for the time being be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible." I pass to the next document, 1835-PS, which I put in evidence as GB-126. It is an original telegram containing a letter from Hitler to Mussolini forwarded through the German Ambassador in Rome by Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop. It is written to advise Mussolini of the course decided on and under the guise of somewhat fulsome language the Duce is given his orders. If I might read the first five paragraphs: "Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this the quickest means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences which may result from it. "(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as the most dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the purely military point of view, German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at all justified as long as the attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous, and she could threaten the left flank of the advancing columns on our enormous front.
THE PRESIDENT: "(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly have endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together by mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet with success, or they were begun too late to produce any definite result. Today's reports leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia. "(3) I do not consider this situation as being catastrophic, but nevertheless a difficult one, and we on our part must avoid any mistake if we do not want in the end to endanger our whole position. "(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that you should cover and screen the most important passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all available forces. "These measures should not be considered as designed for a long period of time, but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent for at least 14 days to 3 weeks a crisis arising. "I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available means and with utmost speed. "(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only personalities who necessarily must be notified know anything about them. These measures will completely lose their value should they become known ...." Then he goes on to emphasize further the importance of secrecy. I pass to R-95; the next document in the bundle, which I put in as Exhibit GB-127. It was referred to by my learned friend, the Attorney General. It is an operational order signed by General Von Brauchitsch which is merely passing to the armies the orders contained in Directive Number 25, which was the Document C-127, an extract of which I put in as Exhibit GB-125.
THE PRESIDENT: I won't trouble the Tribunal with reading it. I pass to TC-93, which has already been put in with TC-92 as GB-114. The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took place on this morning, the 6th of April, on which Hitler issued the proclamation from which this passage is an extract: "From the beginning of the struggle it has been :England's steadfast endeavor to make the Balkans a theater of war. British diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War, succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to her and then finally in misusing her for Britain's purposes. "The documents published today afford" - that refers to the German White Book which they published of all the documents leading up to the invasion - "The documents published today afford a glimpse of a practice which in accordance with very old British recipes is a constant attempt to induce others to fight and bleed for British interests. "In the face of this I have always emphasized that: (1) The German people have no antagonism to the Greek people but that (2) we shall never as in the World War tolerate a power establishing itself on Greek territory with the object, at a given time, of being able to advance thence from the southeast into German living space. We have swept the northern flank free of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in the south." Then the paragraph to which I would draw the Tribunal's particular attention: "In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it has been my endeavor since the day of my assumption of power above all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. I have consciously put out of mind everything that once took place between Germany and Serbia.
THE PRESIDENT: I have not only offered the Serbian people the hand of the German people, but in addition have made efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all difficulties Which existed between the Yugoslav State and various nations allied to Germany." One can only think that when he issued that proclamation Hitler must momentarily have forgotten the meeting with Ciano in August of 1939 and the meeting with the Defendant Ribbentrop and the others on 27th March a few days earlier. I pass to the last document in the bundle. It is a document which has already been put in, L-172, and it was put in as Exhibit USA-34. It is a record of a lecture delivered by the Defendant Jodl on 7th November 1993. At Page 4 there is a short passage which sets out his views two and a half years later on the action taken in April 1941. I refer to Paragraph 11 on Page 4: "What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an ally in the Balkans in consequence of the 'extra-turn' of the Italians against Greece. The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part whim -taking a long view of the matter-would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the north was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Romanian oil area from that country." If I might summarize the story: The invasion of Greece was decided on at least as early as December or November 1940 and planned for the end of March or the beginning of April 1941. No consideration was at any time given to any obligations under treaties or conventions which might .make such invasion a breach of international law. Care was taken to conceal the preparations so that the German forces might have an unsuspecting victim.
THE PRESIDENT: In the meanwhile Yugoslavia, although to be liquidated in due course, was clearly better left for a later stage. Every effort was made to secure her co-operation for the offensive against Greece or at least to ensure that she would abstain from any interference. The coup d'etat of General Simovic upset this plan and it was then decided that irrespective of whether or not his government had any hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the Greeks, Yugoslavia must be liquidated. It was not worth while to take any steps to ascertain Yugoslavia's intentions when it would be so. little trouble now that the German troops were deployed to destroy her militarily and as a national unit. Accordingly in the early hours of Sunday morning, the 6th of April, German troops marched into Yugoslavia without warning and into Greece simultaneously with the formality of handing a note to the Greek Minister in Berlin informing him that the German forces were entering Greece to drive out the British M. Koryzis, the Greek Minister, in replying to information of the invasion from the German Embassy, replied that history was repeating itself and that Greece was being attacked by Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned, he said, the same reply as in the preceding October. That concludes the evidence in respect of Greece and Yugoslavia. But as I have the honor to conclude the British case I would like, if the Tribunal would allow me, to draw their attention, very shortly indeed, to one common factor which runs through the whole of this aggression. I can do it, I think, in 5 minutes. It is an element in the diplomatic technique of aggression which was used with singular consistency not only by the Nazis themselves but also by their Italian friends. Their technique was essentially based upon securing the maximum advantage from surprise even though only a few hours of unopposed military advance into the country of the unsuspecting victim could thus be secured. Thus there was, of course, no declaration of war in the case of Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small hours of the night of April 8-9 and was well under way as a military operation before the diplomatic explanations and excuses were presented to the Danish Foreign Minister at 4:20 a.m. on the morning of the 9th and to the Norwegian Minister between half past 4 and 5 on that morning. The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland began not later than 5 o'clock, in most cases earlier in the small hours of the 10th of May, while the formal ultimatum delivered in each case with the diplomatic excuses and explanations. was not presented until afterwards. In the case of Holland the invasion began between 3 and 4 in the morning. It was not until about 6 when The Hague had already been bombed that the German Minister asked to see M. Van Kleffens. In the case of Belgium where the bombing began at 5, the German Minister did not see M. Spaak until 8. The invasion of Luxembourg began at 4 and it was at 7 when the German Minister asked to see M. Beck. Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o'clock on the morning of the 28th of October in 1940 when his Minister in Athens presented a 3-hour ultimatum to General Metaxas. The invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia, as I have said, both began in the small hours of April 6, 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia no diplomatic exchange took place even after the event, but a proclamation was issued by Hitler-a proclamation from which I read an extract-at 5 o'clock that Sunday morning some 2 hours before Belgrade was bombed. In the case of Greece, once again, it was at 20 minutes past 5 that M. Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering Greek territory. The manner in which this long series of aggressions was carried out is in itself further evidence of the essentially aggressive and treacherous character of the Nazi regime. Attack without warning at night to secure an initial advantage and proffer excuses or reasons afterwards.
THE PRESIDENT: Their method of procedure is clearly the method of the barbarian, of the state which has no respect for its own pledged word nor for the rights of any people but its own. One is tempted to speculate whether this technique was evolved by the honest broker himself or by his honest clerk, the Defendant Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you be ready to go on after a short adjournment? That's what you were intending to do? MR. ALDERMAN!LAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We'll adjourn for 10 minutes. [A recess was taken.]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, before proceeding with the presentation of the evidence relating to the aggression against the Soviet Union, I shall take about 15 minutes to offer two further documents relating to the aggression against Austria. These two documents are stapled in a supplementary book, supplement to Document Book N. Both documents are correspondence of the British Foreign Office. They have been made available to us through the courtesy of our British colleagues. First I offer in evidence Document 3045-PS as Exhibit USA-127. This is in two parts. The first is a letter dated 12 March 1938, from Ambassador Nevile Henderson at the British Embassy, Berlin, to Lord Halifax. It reads: "My Lord: "With reference to your telegram Number 79 of March 11th, I have the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter white I addressed to Baron Von Neurath in accordance with the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on the same evening. "The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron Von Neurath at the same time." The enclosure is the note of March 11th from the British Embassy to Defendant Von Neurath and it reads as follows: "Dear Reich Minister: "My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding, inter alia, the resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be National - Socialists and the readmission of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping order in Vienna. "I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to the German Government that if this report is correct His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feel bound to register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of coercion backed by force against an independent state in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence.