dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SCHWEBEL: I was Oberverwaltungsgerichtsrat at the Prussian Administrative Court in Berlin.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did you come to the Netherlands?
SCHWEBEL: On 18 May 1940.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that, beginning with June 1940, you were the delegate or plenipotentiary of the Reich Commissioner in the province of South Holland, including the cities of The Hague and Rotterdam?
SCHWEBEL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this capacity, as plenipotentiary for this province, did you have constant contact with the Dutch administrative authorities in this province and with the local authorities?
SCHWEBEL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know how many of the former mayors in the province were left in their office?
SCHWEBEL: At the end, about one-half to two-thirds.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner replace and change many of the officials of the province and of the local government?
SCHWEBEL: No, he made very few changes. Shall I discuss these changes?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, but briefly. Perhaps you can just cite the reasons for the changes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the changes have already been stated by other witnesses, have they not, and have not been cross-examined to. Is not that right? Did not Seyss-Inquart state the changes, and they were not cross-examined to?
DR. STEINBAUER: Then I shall turn to another question. [Turning to the witness.] Is it true that in the second half of the year 1944 a state of emergency was declared?
SCHWEBEL: Yes, on 4 September.
DR. STEINBAUER: And the executive powers were turned over to the Armed Forces within a radius of 30 kilometers?
SCHWEBEL: Yes, but this transfer did not take place due to the regulation declaring this emergency state but as a result of a special military regulation.
DR. STEINBAUER: Due to military developments?
SCHWEBEL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that at the beginning of the year 1945 special Kommandos of the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler began to place time bombs in the public buildings of your province in case of an evacuation of this territory?
SCHWEBEL: As far as these special Kommandos of Himmler's were concerned, I know nothing about them. I know only one case in which an Oberleutnant appeared, but I believe that that was prior to the time you mentioned. He wanted to take such steps. I immediately got in touch with the Reich Commissioner and the military commander, and I learned that none of these gentlemen knew about this. Thereupon, at the request of the Reich Commissioner, this Oberleutnant was told to cease his activity, to remove the bombs which he had already planted, and to leave immediately. I know of no other cases like that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that difficulties arose in Gouda as a result of the so-called "Wehrfahige ins Reich" drive, meaning that these who were fit for military service should be taken into the Reich?
SCHWEBEL: Yes; the Armed Forces was carrying through this drive at the time and with them a deputy of Minister Goebbels in his capacity as Reich Delegate for Total War Effort. They set up special agencies in Gouda and in two other places in the province. The director of the Gouda office carried these duties out in an improper way-rather harshly. Thereupon I discussed this matter with the Reich Commissioner, and he immediately got in touch with the commanding general and had this officer dismissed on the spot.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know anything about the extent of the resistance movement in your province?
SCHWEBEL: The resistance movement was fought by the Security Police in connection with the Armed Forces. What I know is not from my own experience in my administrative post, but knowledge I received through my connection with the agencies. Thereby I know that the resistance movement approached 50,000, as an estimate. These were people who might be counted as such. By that I do not mean that they were people who were organized in groups or in permanent action.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that the Reich Commissioner started a food drive for 250,000 Dutch children?
SCHWEBEL: Yes, I know that he initiated this drive.
DR. STEINBAUER: You were an eye and ear witness to the attempt on the part of Seyss-Inquart to end the war quickly. Will you tell us briefly how connections were established with the Chief of Staff of General Eisenhower?
SCHWEBEL: At the beginning of April 1945 a M. Van der Vlugt approached me. He was the leader of the so-called IKO. That was an interdenominational organization to assist in the food problems.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, please speak a little more slowly and clearly. I cannot understand you even in German.
SCHWEBEL: I was approached by M. Van der Vlugt, who was the director of an interchurch group whose purpose was to supply the population with special foodstuffs. I knew him for that reason. He told me that he was acting on behalf of the Dutch Government in London. He asked me whether the Reich Commissioner would be ready to negotiate with him briefly on three questions: 1. A more extensive food supply for the Netherlands people through the Allies, 2. The stopping of flooding, and 3. The cessation of the fight against the resistance movement. I immediately got in touch with the Reich Commissioner and he immediately declared himself ready to enter into discussions. Then, 2 days after that, we dealt with M. Van der Vlugt and another representative . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, the yellow light means that you are going too fast, you see. So when you see the yellow light go a little more slowly.
SCHWEBEL: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: You were telling us what Seyss-Inquart did.
SCHWEBEL: Yes. Seyss-Inquart declared himself ready to negotiate about these questions immediately. A discussion then took place between us and M. Van der Vlugt and another representative of the Dutch Government in London. That was Jonkheer Six. This discussion took place among the four of us. On this occasion we agreed first of all about one point, to the effect that any combating of the resistance movement was definitely to be stopped immediately; and the resistance group, on its part, undertook to dispense with sabotage. Secondly, the Reich Commissioner declared himself ready to give his permission to a generous food supply for the population on the part of the Allies and to stop the floorings. However, there were to be more detailed negotiations in this respect. The result of this discussion was communicated to London and I brought two Dutchmen through one part of the front line as truce officers. Then, after various negotiations had been going on for some time, we received an inquiry from London as to whether the Reich Commissioner was ready to negotiate with the Commander-in-Chief, General Eisenhower, and deal with him about these questions. The immediate answer was "yes." Thereupon, first of all, I crossed the front line on 28 April at Amersfoort, and there I briefly negotiated with General Sir Francis Gengard, who was the Chief of Staff of Field Marshal Montgomery, and...
THE PRESIDENT: You do not need any more detail about it, do you?
SCHWEBEL: . . . and in this discussion with Sir Francis Gengard we agreed that another discussion was to take place 2 days later between . . .
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, we are not really concerned with the details. We are concerned with the results of this conversation, and how it worked out in the interests of the Dutch population.
SCHWEBEL: Yes. This discussion took place on 30 April, between the Reich Commissioner and the Chief of Staff of General Eisenhower, who was General Bedell Smith. In this discussion the Reich Commissioner agreed completely to the wishes of General Bedell Smith that there should be a very generous food supply for the Dutch population.
THE PRESIDENT: If he said he agreed with the demands of General Bedell Smith, surely that is all you want, isn't it?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, that is quite sufficient. [Turning to the witness.] Through these negotiations-I would like to ask you-the war was ended 2 months earlier, was it not?
SCHWEBEL: One cannot say that exactly. The situation was as follows. For the Dutch population, of course, the war ended, practically speaking, on that day, because the supplies that could be carried by air, over highways, over canals, rivers, and by sea to Rotterdam, were so generous. In order to make these transports possible, an armistice had to be arranged from place to place, so that in fact, though not formally, we had a general armistice and the population at that time immediately benefited by it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask this witness.
SCHWEBEL: May I just make a few remarks, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: I think not. If counsel has finished examining you, we do not want any more remarks. Do any other counsel wish to ask questions? Is there any cross-examination?
M. DEBENEST: Witness, you spoke a short while ago of the negotiations which you undertook with delegates of the London Government. Are you aware of the fact that these delegates, before undertaking the negotiations with the Reich Commissioner in April 1945, laid down as a condition that no more people would be shot because of attacks against any German civil or military authority unless a court sentence had first been pronounced?
SCHWEBEL: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: As a further question did those delegates not request the Reich Commissioner whether the SS would conform to the conditions of an agreement which would put an end to hostilities?
SCHWEBEL: That also took place. After that time, nothing more was undertaken against the resistance movement.
M. DEBENEST: Very good. Is it correct to say that the Reich Commissioner replied that in his capacity as Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS he was in a position to force the SS to observe the conditions of this agreement and that he could answer for it?
SCHWEBEL: An agreement in its true sense-all these conversations were gentlemen's agreements...
M. DEBENEST: Wait a minute. No, I am asking you whether the Reich Commissioner made that reply to the negotiators, that is, the delegates of the London Government?
SCHWEBEL: He said he was Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS as well, and in that capacity he was able to see to it that the SS would comply with this agreement.
M. DEBENEST: Thank you. The last question is this: Did you know Kiehl? He was an official in the Reich Commissariat.
SCHWEBEL: Kiehl? Yes, I knew him.
M. DEBENEST: Didn't he give instructions to flood the Wieringer Sea in April 1945?
SCHWEBEL: Herr Kiehl, to my knowledge, did not give any instructions; he could not do so. Herr Kiehl was an expert on waterworks, and he was a very good expert. But orders for the flooding could be given only by the highest military authority, and that was Generaloberst Blaskowitz.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I object to this manner of questioning the witness. The Prosecution is again questioning this witness in order to charge the General Staff and the OKW. In the objection I mentioned previously I said that if I must not question the witnesses with a view to exoneration, the same must apply to the Prosecution with regard to incriminating questions. I ask that the last statement be stricken from the record.
M. DEBENEST: I beg your pardon.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I merely wanted to say that if I ask this question, it is based on the information that was given to me. There is no question of the Army; but of instructions that were given by a civil servant of the Reich Commissioner, and therefore originating from the Reich Commissariat. Therefore, I do not understand the interference of the defense counsel. There is no question of the Army and I am completely ignorant as to whether the witness is going to tell me whether the Army was responsible or an office of the Reich Commissioner, when I was talking of an official of the Reich Commissioner.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You may ask the question.
M. DEBENEST: Will you proceed?
SCHWEBEL: Herr Kiehl was the hydrostatic expert for the Reich Commissioner; but at the same time, he was a hydrostatic expert under the military commander. He was consulted by both authorities as an expert only. He was a very fine expert. But nobody had given him any right to give instructions. ..
M. DEBENEST: Please, do not make any speeches; answer directly. "Yes" or "no," did Kiehl transmit the order to flood the Wieringer Sea?
SCHWEBEL: But I must say how it was! Kiehl? No. He could not have done that.
M. DEBENEST: I am not asking you whether he gave the order; I am asking whether he merely transmitted this order.
SCHWEBEL: I know absolutely nothing about that. I do not know how far Kiehl was involved in this order.
M. DEBENEST: That is sufficient. What was the interest at that time in flooding the Wieringer Sea? Did not people think that the war was over?
SCHWEBEL: No. When the Wieringer Sea-the Wieringer Polder-was flooded, the war had not yet ended and these agreements had not been concluded either. When the Wieringer Polder was flooded-and I found this out later from military men-there was the danger that an aerial landing on the terrain of the Wieringer Sea would take place, which might place the dike in the hands of the enemy, giving them access to Friesland and North Holland. That was the reason why the military authorities considered this flooding necessary. That is what I was told.
M. DEBENEST: But at that moment in Holland wasn't the war considered as being lost for Germany?
SCHWEBEL: No. At that time, it was not considered lost. At any rate, our Army had, at that time, the order to defend us which it had to carry out. There was the danger that this landing would take place.
M. DEBENEST: I have finished, Mr. President.
DR. STEINBAUER: I would not have had to put another question to you if the French prosecutor had not broached a certain subject. What did General Smith tell you about the flooding of the Wieringer Sea?
SCHWEBEL: General Smith said toward the end of the negotiation that any flooding that had been undertaken up to that time could be justified on the basis of military necessity. But no more was to be undertaken from that moment.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was any undertaken after that?
SCHWEBEL: No, none was undertaken after that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. [The witness left the stand.]
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, with this I have concluded my examination of witnesses. Now I should like to refer to those documents contained in my document books and which I have submitted to the Tribunal. I was notified that Document Book Number 3 has been submitted to the Tribunal, and to conclude my case I should like to submit another document, as Number SeyssInquart-91, concerning the Apostolic letter of the Catholic bishops on the plebiscite in Austria. In this statement, reference is made to the attitude of Gauleiter Burckel. We can gather from it that the persecution of the Churches cannot be charged to Seyss-Inquart, but rather the responsibility is to be placed on Burckel. In order to save time, I should like to ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of this document without my reading it, and I conclude herewith my presentation of evidence on the case of Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, have you offered all the documents that you want to offer in your books? Have you offered them as evidence?
DR. STEINBAUER: I did not understand the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you offered all the documents that you want to offer as evidence and given them exhibit numbers?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President. Only a few affidavits are missing, affidavits which were admitted by the High Tribunal: Volkers', Bolle's, and Rauter's. I hope that we shall have them within a short time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you see, you must offer each of these documents as evidence; you must say so. Merely putting them in the book does not offer them as evidence; and, therefore, you must offer these things to us as evidence, if you wish to do so, giving them the numbers. You can offer them all together, saying you offer . . .
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to offer your Documents Numbers 1 to-I do not know what the last number is; 105 seems to be the last one.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President. I ask that all numbers in my three document books be included, up to 107.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, are the numbers given in the books the exhibit numbers which you wish to give to the documents?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President. They are in numerical order and they are found in that order in my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish, then, to offer Numbers 1 to- whatever the last number is, as evidence. Is that right?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: You offered some in the course of your presentation of the witnesses.
DR. STEINBAUER: Some of them I submitted and quoted according to the numbers given in my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: You now wish, then, to offer the remainder?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, the remainder as well.
THE PRESIDENT: Under the numbers which they bear in your document book?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you are offering all the originals under those numbers?
DR. STEINBAUER: Insofar as they are in my possession and I can say upon oath that the extracts tally with the books.
THE PRESIDENT: You have certified that they are true copies of the originals in accordance with the Tribunal's rules?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): Mr. President, I ask the permission of the High Tribunal that the Defendant Fritzsche be absent Monday and Tuesday of next week. He requires this time for the preparation of his defense. imp; PRESIDENT: Certainly.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, I wanted to put the same request on behalf of my client, as he will be in the witness box immediately after Von Papen, who is the next, and I ask that he have permission to be absent Monday or Tuesday.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I shall only take a little of the Tribunal's time, but I must make a motion which is particularly important to me, a motion which concerns procedure; and I should like to give the reasons for my motion. I move that the Tribunal, first of all, rescind the resolution given on 8 June 1946, and secondly...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, if your motion is an important motion, it should be in writing. If it is not in writing, it must be put in writing. You know perfectly well that is the rule of the Tribunal.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, it is very important to me that this motion should appear in the record. May I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Laternser, it will appear in the record if you make the motion in writing. You have been here for many months and you know perfectly well what the rule of the Tribunal is, that motions be made in writing.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but since we are concerned with a motion which applies to procedure and which applies to a resolution announced by word of mouth, I believe I am justified in putting my motion in this manner.
THE PRESIDENT: No, the Tribunal does not think so. The Tribunal would wish to have your motion in writing in accordance with the rule of the Tribunal. Now the Tribunal will continue with the case against the Defendant Von Papen, which is, I believe, the next.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I am beginning with my presentation of evidence on behalf of my client, Von Papen, by calling the Defendant Von Papen as a witness. [The Defendant Von Papen took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
FRANZ VON PAPEN (Defendant): Franz von Papen.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The defendant repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please give the High Tribunal, briefly, a picture of your life, especially from the time you entered politics.
VON PAPEN: In order to describe my life briefly, I shall emphasize only such points as are essential for the High Tribunal to form a judgment of my personality and how they influenced my life and my political attitude and opinion. I was born on soil which has been in the possession of my family for 900 years. I grew up with conservative principles which unite a man most closely to his own folk and his native soil, and as my family has always been a strong supporter of the Church, I of course grew up in this tradition as well. As the second son I was destined for a military career. At the age of 18 I became a lieutenant in a cavalry regiment and I went...
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you gave us the date of your birth.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please give the date of your birth.
VON PAPEN: The date of my birth is 29 October 1879.
THE PRESIDENT: You have told us you joined a cavalry regiment at the age of 18.
VON PAPEN: Important for my development was my marriage with the daughter of a Saar industrialist, Geheimrat Von Boch. The relatives of this family brought me in contact with many French and Belgian families, and in this way I acquired an intimate knowledge of the spiritual and cultural factors of these neighboring countries, which made a very strong impression on me at the time. From that time on, that is from 1905, I have been convinced of how wrong a certain political attitude can be, namely, that France and Germany should be condemned to consider themselves eternal enemies. I felt how much these two peoples had to offer each other on a mutual basis, provided their peaceful development was not disturbed. In the years that followed I graduated from the Kriegsakademie (War Academy), and in 1913, after training for 5 years, I was taken into the General Staff. At the end of 1913, at the command of His Imperial Majesty, I was appointed military attaché in Washington and Mexico. In this capacity, in the summer of 1914, I accompanied the U.S.A. Expeditionary Corps, which was dispatched to Vera Cruz as a result of the incident at Tampico. In Mexico, I was surprised by the outbreak of the first World War. Until the end of 1915 I remained at my post in Washington. This period is of decisive significance for my political life. Our strife, carried on with legal methods, against the unilateral supplying of our enemies with war materials, led to heated polemics and propaganda. This propaganda, which was fostered by the enemy, tried by all means to cast suspicion upon the military attaches of Germany, accusing them of illegal acts and especially of having organized acts of sabotage. At the end of 1915 I left the United States. I regret to say that I never tried to rectify and correct this false propaganda; but this propaganda followed me until the thirties and even until today, and has impressed its stamp upon me.
VON PAPEN: In order to cite just one example, even after 1931, the Lehigh Valley Company stated before the Mixed Claims Commission that their claim of ~ 50,000,000 against the German Reich was justified, since I, the German military attaché, had caused an explosion which had taken place in the year 1917, 2 years after I had left the United States. I am just mentioning this fact, Mr. President, since this propaganda honored me with titles such as "master spy," "chief plotter," and other pretty names; for this propaganda was the background for the judging of my personality, as I found out in 1932 when I entered public life.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the Defendants Funk and Speer are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kubuschok.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, we stopped when you were talking about the formation of public opinion concerning you personally. Please continue telling us of your career.