dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
COL. TAYLOR: The initial superiority over the Polish frontier guards and surprise, both of which can be expected with certainty, are to be maintained by quickly bringing up other parts of the Army as well as by counteracting the marching up of the Polish Army. "Accordingly, all units have to keep the initiative against the foe by quick action and ruthless attacks." Finally, a week before the actual attack on Poland, and when all the military plans are laid, we find the group as defined in the Indictment all in one place, in fact, all in one room. On August 23 the Oberbefehlshaber assembled at Obersalzberg to hear Hitler's explanation of the timing of the attack and for political and diplomatic orientation from the head of the State. This speech has already been read from at length. It is found in Document 798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-29; and I pass over it, except to note and emphasize that it is addressed to the very group defined in the Indictment as the General Staff and High Command group. It is, incidentally, the second of the two examples referred to in the affidavits by Halder and Brauchitsch, Numbers 1 and 2, which I read previously. We have now come to the point where Germany actually launched the war. Within a few weeks, and before any important action on the Western Front, Poland was overrun and conquered; German losses were insignificant. The three principal territorial questions mentioned in the Blomberg and Blaskowitz affidavits were all solved. The Rhineland had been reoccupied and fortified; Memel was annexed; the Polish Corridor had been annexed. And a good deal more, too: Austria, a part of the Reich; Czechoslovakia occupied; all of western Poland in German hands. Germany was superior in arms and in experience to her Western enemies, France and England.
COL. TAYLOR: Then came the 3 black years of the war, 1939, 1940, and 1941, when German armed might swung like a great scythe from north 4 Jan.46 to south to east: Norway and Denmark; the Low Countries; France; Italy became an ally of Germany; Tripoli and Egypt; Yugoslavia and Greece; Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria became allies; the western part of the Soviet Union overrun. I would like to deal as a whole with this period from the fall of Poland in October 1939 to the attack against the Soviet Union in Tune of 1941. In this period occurred the aggressive wars in violation of treaties, as charged in the Indictment, against Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece. I cannot improve on or add much to the presentation of these matters by the British Delegation. From the standpoint of proving Crimes against Peace, our case is complete. But I would like to review this period briefly from the military standpoint and view it as the German military leaders viewed it. And of one thing we may be sure: neither the Nazis nor the generals thought during this period in terms of a series of violations of neutrality and treaties. They thought in terms of a war, a war of conquest, a war for the conquest of Europe. Neutrality, treaties, non-aggression pacts-these were not the major considerations. They were annoying obstacles, and devices had to be formed and excuses manufactured to fit the circumstances. Von Blomberg has told us in his affidavit, which I have read, that after 1939 some generals began to condemn Hitler's methods and lost confidence in his judgment. Which particular Hitler methods some of the generals condemned is not stated, but I think the Tribunal will not hear any substantial evidence that many of the generals condemned the march of conquest during the years 1939 to 1941. In fact the evidence is rather that most of the generals were having the time of their lives during those years.
COL. TAYLOR: Six weeks after the outbreak of war and upon the successful termination of the Polish campaign, 9 October 1939, there was issued a memorandum and directive for the conduct of the war in the West. This is Document Number L-52, and becomes Exhibit Number USA-540. It is not signed. It was distributed only to the four service chiefs, Keitel, Brauchitsch, Goering, and Raeder. From the wording there is every indication that it was issued by Hitler. I will read the pertinent extracts, starting with Page 2 of the document, about two-thirds of the way down in the first paragraph, starting with the words, "The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war": "The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or disintegrate the 80-million-state,'-meaning Germany-"again so that in this manner the European equilibrium, in other words, the balance of power which serves their ends, may be restored. This battle, therefore, will have to be fought out by the German people one way or another. Nevertheless, the very great successes of the first month of the war could serve, in the event of an immediate signing of peace, to strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially to such an extent that from the German viewpoint there would be no objection to ending the war immediately, insofar as the present achievement with arms is not jeopardized by the peace treaty. "It is not the object of this memorandum to study the possibilities in this direction, or even to take them into consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively to the other case: the necessity to continue the fight, the object of which, as already stressed, consists, insofar as the enemy is concerned, in the dissolution or destruction of the German Reich. In opposition to this the German war aim is the final military dispatch of the West, that is, destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to oppose the state consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe.
COL. TAYLOR: As far as the outside world is concerned, however, this internal aim will have to undergo various propaganda adjustments, necessary from a psychological point of view. This does not alter the war aim. It is and remains the destruction of our Western enemies." I now pass to Page 3 of the translation, Paragraph 2, and the subheading "Reasons": "The successes of the Polish campaign have made possible first of all a war on a single front, awaited for past decades without any hope of realization; that is to say, Germany is able to enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving only a few covering troops in the East. The remaining European states are neutral either because they fear for their own fates or lack interest in the conflict as such or are interested in a certain outcome of the war, which prevents them from taking part at all, or at any rate too soon. The following is to be firmly borne in mind...." At this point I interpolate that here follows a succession of references to countries, and I pass to Belgium and Holland at the foot of Page 3: "Belgium and Holland: Both countries are interested in preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding prolonged pressure from England and France. The preservation of their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and thus the securing of their interior economy, even of their very life, depend wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore in their decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions both countries are dependent upon the West in the highest degree. If England and France promise themselves a successful result at the price of Belgian neutrality, they are at any time in a position to apply the necessary pressure. That is to say, without covering themselves with the odium of a breach of neutrality, they can compel Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality.
COL. TAYLOR: Therefore, in the matter of the preservation of Belgo-Dutch neutrality, time is not a factor which might promise a favorable development for Germany." The final paragraph to be read is as follows: "The Nordic States: Provided no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed. The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible even in a war of long duration." Six weeks later, on 23 November 1939, our group as defined in the Indictment-the Oberbefehlshaber-again assembled, as found in Document Number 789-PS, already in the record as Exhibit Number USA-23, and heard from Hitler much of what he had said previously to the four service chiefs. This speech, part of which is already in the record, contains other portions, not previously read, which are now of interest; and the first extract which I would like to read is on Page 2 of the translation, about half-way down in Paragraph 1, starting with the words, "For the first time in history we have to fight only on one front..." I quote: "For the first time in history we have to fight only on one front; the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time whether I should strike first In the East and then in the West. In principle I did not organize the Armed Forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Sooner or later I wanted to solve the problem. Inevitably it was decided that the East was to be annihilated first. If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our Armed Forces. The most glorious experience in our history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and material. Now the Eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The opponent in the West lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him.
COL. TAYLOR: The decisive question is: How long can we endure this situation?" Passing to Page 3 of that document, line 3: "Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable now; in 6 months it might not be so any more." The final passage on Page 4 of the translation, in the long paragraph about half-way down, beginning, "England cannot live without its imports. We can feed...": "England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can occur only if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I risk the loss of this achievement. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Frederick the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there, the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Frederick the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. The arguments we will choose for the breach of neutrality shall not be as idiotic as they were in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful, no one can answer. Everything depends upon favorable providence." Thereafter the winter of 1939 and 1940 passed quietly, the winter of so-called "phony war." The General Staff and High Command group all knew what the plan was-they had all been told.
COL. TAYLOR: To attack ruthlessly at the first opportunity; to smash the French and English forces; to pay no heed to treaties with, or neutrality of, the Low Countries. "Breaking of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won." That is what Hitler told the Oberbefehlshaber. The generals and admirals agreed and went forward with their plans. Now it is not true that all the steps in this march of conquest were conceived by Hitler and that the military leaders embarked on them with reluctance and misgivings. To show this we need only hark back for a moment to what Major Elwyn Jones told the Tribunal about the plans for the invasion of Denmark and Norway. The Tribunal will recall that Hitler's utterances in October and November, which I have just read, although they are full of threatening comments about France and England and the Low Countries, contain no suggestion of an attack on Scandinavia. Indeed, Hitler's memorandum of 9 October, from which I read Document L-52, affirmatively indicates that Hitler saw no reason to disturb the situation to the north, because he said that unless unforeseen factors appeared the neutrality of the northern states could be assumed. Trade could be continued with those countries even in a long war. But a week previously, on the 3rd of October 1939, the Defendant Raeder had caused a questionnaire to be circulated within the Naval Staff seeking comments on the advantages which might be gained from a naval standpoint by securing bases in Norway and Denmark. That document is C-122, Exhibit Number GB-82. And another document introduced by Major Elwyn Jones, Document C-66, which is Exhibit Number GB-81, shows that Raeder was prompted to circulate this questionnaire by a letter from another admiral named Carls, who pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany.
COL. TAYLOR: Admiral Carls, Rolf Carls, later attained the rank of Admiral of the Fleet and commanded Naval Group North and in that capacity is a member of the group as defined in the Indictment, as well as Raeder. The Tribunal will also recall that the Defendant Doenitz, who at that time was flag officer of submarines, replied to the questionnaire from Raeder on 9 October 1939. The document in question is Document C-5, Exhibit Number GB-83. And Doenitz replied that from his standpoint Trondheim and Narvik met the requirements for a submarine base, that Trondheim was better, and that he proposed the establishment of a U-boat base there. The next day Raeder visited Hitler, and this visit and certain subsequent events are described in a document which has not previously been introduced. Now, Your Honors, owing to a confusion in numbering, the German document is C-71, but the translation appears in your books in Document L-323, and that will be Exhibit Number USA-541. The translation will be found in L-323, the middle of the page, entitled, "Entry in the War Diary of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, naval war staff, on 'Weserubung'," that being the code name for the operation against Norway and Denmark. Diary entry for 10 October 1939: "First reference of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, when visiting the Fuehrer, to the significance of Norway for sea and air warfare. The Fuehrer intends to give the matter consideration. "12 December 1939. Fuehrer received Q and H"-those being presumably Quisling and Hagelin. "Subsequent instructions to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to make mental preparations. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is having an essay prepared which will be ready in January." I may interpolate. The translation of the next sentence is somewhat in error and should read: "With reference to this essay Kapitan zur See Krancke is working on 'Weserubung' at OKW." "During the time which followed H"-Hagelin-"maintained contact with the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
COL. TAYLOR: His aim was to develop the Party Q"-Quisling- "with a view to making it capable of action aunt to give the Supreme Command of the Navy information on the political developments in Norway and military questions. In general he pressed the speeding up of preparations, but considered that it was first necessary to expand the organization." I think that is all I need read of that. Another document, which is Document C-64, Exhibit Number GB-86, already in the record, shows that on 12 December the Naval War Staff discussed the Norwegian project with Hitler-I am not going to read from that document, Your Honors-at a meeting which the Defendants Keitel and Jodl also attended. In the meantime Raeder was in touch with the Defendant Rosenberg on the possibilities of using Quisling; and Major Elwyn Jones very properly pointed out to the Tribunal the close link between the service chiefs and the Nazi politicians. As a result of all this, on Hitler's instructions, Keitel issued an OKW directive on 27 January 1940 stating that Hitler had commissioned him to undertake charge of preparations for the Norway operation, to which he then gave the code name Weserubung. On 1 March 1940 Hitler issued the directive setting forth the general plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. That is Document C-174, Exhibit Number GB-89, which Major Elwyn Jones put in the record. The directive was initialed by Admiral Kurt Fricke, who at that time was head of the operations division of the naval war staff and who at the end of 1941 became Chief of the naval war staff and in that capacity is a member of the group as defined in the Indictment. So, as these documents make clear, the plan to invade Norway and Denmark was not conceived in Nazi Party circles or forced on the military leaders; on the contrary, it was conceived in the naval part of the General Staff and High Command group, and Hitler was persuaded to take the idea up. Treaties and neutrality meant just as little to the General Staff and High Command group as to the Nazis.
COL. TAYLOR: As to the Low Countries, neither Hitler nor the military leaders were disturbed about treaty considerations. The Tribunal will remember that at a conference between Hitler and the principal military leaders in May 1939, as shown in Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27, already in the record, when the intention to attack Poland was announced, Hitler, in discussing the possibility of war with England, said that the Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. "Declarations of neutrality will be ignored." And later, in his speech to the Oberbefehlshaber in November 1939, Hitler said that they must first invade the Low Countries and "no one will question that when we have won." Accordingly, one can well imagine that the winter of 1939 and 1940 and the early spring of 1940 was a period of very intensive planning in German military circles. The major attack in the West through the Low Countries had to be planned and the attack on Norway and Denmark had to be planned. The Defendant Jodl's diary for the period 1 February to 26 May 1940, Document 1809-PS, Exhibit Number GB-88, contains many entries reflecting the course of this planning. Some of the entries have been read into the record and others are now of interest. The Tribunal will see from these entries which have already been read that during February and early March there was considerable doubt in German military circles as to whether the attack on Norway and Denmark should precede or follow the attack on the Low Countries and that at some points there even was doubt as to whether all these attacks were necessary from a military standpoint. But the Tribunal will not find a single entry which reflects any hesitancy from a moral angle, on the part of Jodl or any of the people he mentions, to overrun these countries. I will make several references now to Document 1809-PS and several of the entries in it. I do not plan to quote verbatim from any one of them.
COL. TAYLOR: The Court will note that on 1 February 1940 General Jeschonnek, the Chief of the Air Staff and a member of the group as defined in the Indictment, visited Jodl and made a suggestion that it might be wise to attack only Holland, on the ground that Holland alone would offer a tremendous improvement for Germany's aerial warfare. On 6 February Jodl conferred with Jeschonnek, Warlimont, and Colonel Von Waldau, and what Jodl calls a "new idea" was proposed at this meeting: That the Germans should carry out only "Action H" (Holland) and the Weser Exercise (Norway and Denmark) and should guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war. I suppose the German Air Force may have felt that the occupation of Holland alone would give them sufficient scope for air bases for attacks on England and that if Belgium's neutrality were preserved the German bases in Holland would be immune from attack by the French and British armies in France. If, to meet this situation, the French and British should attack through Holland and Belgium, the violation of neutrality would be on the other foot. But whether or not this new idea made sense from a military angle, it appears to be a most extraordinary notion from a diplomatic angle. It was a proposal to violate without any excuse the neutrality of three neighboring small countries and simultaneously to guarantee the neutrality of a fourth. What value the Belgians might have attributed to a guarantee of neutrality offered under such circumstances, it is difficult to imagine; and in fact, the "new idea" projected at this meeting seems a most extraordinary combination of cynicism and naiveté. In the meantime, as Jodl's diary shows, on 5 February 1940 the "special staff" for the Norway invasion met for the first time and got its instructions from Keitel.
COL. TAYLOR: On 21 February Hitler put General Von Falkenhorst in command of the Norway undertaking; and Jodl's diary records that 'Falkenhorst accepts gladly." On 26 February Hitler was still in doubt whether to go first to Norway or the Low Countries, but on 3 March he decided to do Norway first and the Low Countries a short time thereafter. This decision proved final. Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April and the success of the adventure was certain by the 1st of May. The invasion of the Low Countries took place 10 days later. So France and the Low Countries fell, Italy joined the war on the side of Germany, and the African campaign began. In October 1940 Italy attacked Greece. The Italo-Greek stalemate and the uncertain attitude of Yugoslavia became embarrassing to Germany, particularly because the attack of the Soviet Union was being planned and Germany felt she could not risk an uncertain situation at her rear in the Balkans. Accordingly, it was decided to end the Greek situation by coming to Italy's aid, and the Yugoslavian coup d'etat of 26 March 1941 brought about the final German decision to crush Yugoslavia also. The documents have already been introduced by Colonel Phillimore, and there is little that I need to add for my present purpose. The decisions were made; the Armed Forces drew up the necessary plans and executed the attacks. The onslaught was particularly unmerciful and ruthless against Yugoslavia for the special purpose of frightening Turkey and Greece. The final deployment instructions were issued by Brauchitsch and appear in Document R-95, Exhibit Number GB-127, which has not been read before. Two extracts from this are of interest. These extracts are very short: "The political situation in the Balkans having changed by reason of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be considered an enemy even should it make declarations of loyalty at first.