dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): There were no discussions and consultations about these directives of the Reich Chancellor; they were binding upon the ministers. Bieberstein wrote about this in his thesis, on Page 528: "The situation is different as regards the encroachments which ... his (the minister's) free decision suffers through the binding force of the Chancellor's directives. Since it was his duty to conform with these, his position was similar to that of a subordinate in the hierarchy of authorities in regard to the orders of a superior; thus he himself was not able to examine whether in his conduct he was complying with duty, and the result was that he could only show that he had acted in accordance with orders, and not whether he had acted rightly. Thus the responsibility is shifted to the person giving the orders." This was equally true of the proceedings before the State Court, the German "impeachment." Thus we have to admit that, already in a period of a purely democratic German form of government and state procedure, "cabinet solidarity" did not exist in spite of regular Cabinet meetings, and that the ministers certainly did not work in cohesive cooperation as soon as at the Cabinet meeting the Reich Chancellor asserted his right to determine policy. For the period prior to the establishment of the Hitler Government, it will further have to be considered that the government authority had slowly devolved upon the person of the Reich President by the application of the Emergency Decree Law. Already at that time the normal legislative body, the Reichstag, was enacting laws only to a diminishing extent; the decisive laws were being issued by the Reich President on the strength of the Emergency Decree Law. The ministers, therefore, were no more than advisers of the Reich President. It is a symptom of this development that the Papen Cabinet had already been, established purposely by Hindenburg as a Presidential Cabinet, whereby the Cabinet was composed of people in whom Hindenburg had confidence, and whom he had appointed as departmental ministers.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): The position of the Reich Chancellor therefore gained considerably in importance, because neither the ministers nor the Reich Chancellor had been appointed as exponents of the parties, with the result that their position with relation to the parties was more independent than had been the case previously. The Reich Chancellor was the liaison man between the Cabinet and the Reich President. It was this position in particular which gave him a distinct superiority over the other ministers. That was the situation when Hitler became Reich Chancellor. In its early stages his Cabinet also was a Presidential Cabinet, which depended on the confidence of the Reich President and his Emergency Decree Law. Up to the time of the passing of the Enabling Act of 24 March 1933, all laws were issued on the strength of the emergency powers and therefore were under the responsibility of the Reich President. The Enabling Act was the decisive factor in the further development. The legislative powers were now transferred to the Reich Cabinet. These were not conferred on Hitler personally but on the Reich Cabinet. I do not claim that the Reichstag of that time already regarded Hitler as the Reich Cabinet. But it is certain that the Reichstag was influenced by the system of emergency decrees which had been the Government's policy for a long time. Therefore by its nature this new emergency legislation created by the Reichstag had no other purpose than to legalize this state of affairs for a future emergency. Thus a Reich Cabinet whose inner structure and working methods had been shaped during the time of the Presidential Cabinet came to hold power. It is true that the sole responsibility, such as was assumed by the Reich President when passing the emergency decrees, was not transferred to Hitler. Yet to a certain extent he filled the gap caused by the elimination of the Reich President. This became apparent to the outside when the Reich President's right to sign laws was transferred to him. To this was added his right as Chancellor to determine the basic guiding principles of policy.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): Both factors together doubtlessly resulted in a considerable strengthening of Hitler's position and power in the Cabinet over and against his ministers. The seeds for his later autocracy had been sown. At first this was not clearly manifest in the working methods of the Cabinet. True, resolutions were no longer passed, but objections by the ministers were taken into consideration, which in individual cases led to the withdrawal or modification of radical bills. Nevertheless the Reich Chancellor's right to determine the principles of political directives was already more manifest. Hitler laid claim to this right for himself and made it clear that the responsibility was his alone. But more important than this development within the Cabinet were the influences from outside. The Party now set to work and took upon itself everything the Government was careful to refrain from doing. The boycott of the Jews and the smashing of the trade unions were measures taken by the Party. The ideas of the Party began to take hold of the masses. They undertook what the Party liked to term a "revolution." The witness Gisevius has summarized this development in the following terms, which are taken from his book, Pages 141 to 143: "It is not individuals that espouse the cause of National Socialism; it is the masses which are roused. Because nobody wants to lag behind events, all strive together to outstrip the revolutionary development by a short lead. These easily swayed impulses, this irrational spiritual upheaval of the masses can alone explain the Nazi co-ordination which occurred in the early summer of 1933 with sudden intensity, although voluntarily and spontaneously.... As a mass they create a new will, open up a new road." This movement also gripped the old political parties. They dissolved themselves voluntarily. They went even further; they assured Hitler that their former members would loyally collaborate with the National Socialist State; they called upon their former members to do so.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): The Bavarian People's Party "...cleared the way for every former member of their party to collaborate in the construction of the new Germany under Adolf Hitler's direct leadership." The Catholic Party by its dissolution -- I quote -- "...enabled its supporters to put their forces and experience unreservedly at the disposal of the national front under the leadership of the Reich Chancellor for positive collaboration in the consolidation of our national, social, economic, and cultural life, and to work for the reconstruction of a state order based on law." Even the Social Democrat Party partly followed, when the provincial committee of the Social Democrat Party of Wuerttemberg suggested to the holders of their mandates "...to carry on their activity in such a way as to leave no doubt as to their national sentiments or their good will to support Germany's new political structure according to the plans of the national revolution." The attitude of the masses, similarly influenced, is reflected in the results of the Reichstag election of 12 November 1933, in which over 90 percent of the electors voted for the NSDAP. I am aware of the fact that the correctness of these election results and the method of carrying out the election have been questioned. Whatever may have happened in regard to influencing and falsifying the election, one thing must have been clear to any impartial observer of the conditions prevailing at that time: that such manipulations can hardly have been of such significance that they could by themselves have brought about an overwhelming majority. It cannot be denied that in the conditions as they were at that time the majority of the voters, in the hope of bringing about a change of the existing difficult situation, put their trust in the Party, in which they believed they already saw the partial success of its economic measures.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): If one considers how the ideas of the Party had taken hold of the masses, and how the idea of the Party centered around the personality of Adolf Hitler, the result of the voting and the public feeling at the time was in itself a confirmation of the leadership idea. The vote was a carte blanche for the Supreme Party Leader, the Leader of the Cabinet, the Reich Chancellor. By this development, Hitler's claim to power was strengthened on the one hand, while on the other most of the Cabinet members did not feel that they ought to prevent such a development. These considerations may also have been influenced by the realization that they could not effectively oppose Hitler's seizure of power. In the main one restricted oneself, therefore, to seeking to avoid a radical development and, as far as possible, to render less rigorous those changes made outside the state apparatus. Thus we see legislation clearing up a situation created from without, giving it legally a more moderate orderly form. If the members of the Cabinet are reproached for moderating illegal conditions and yet at the same time giving them a legal basis, such reproaches should mainly be directed at the men from the non-radical camp in the Cabinet. When the Reich Cabinet was formed, they had been appointed with intent to restrict National Socialist influence, but later they failed to use all their efforts to stem the disastrous development. They should have warned the easily-influenced irrational masses and even have resigned from office, protesting loudly. It is idle to examine whether the conduct of these men was politically right or not, whether they were weak men who believed that they should avoid a perhaps hopeless resistance. Me criminal aspect of these things can really only be judged from the angle as to whether it could be discerned at that time that the development was a preparation for the things that happened later and which are indicted under the Charter.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): If by the formation of the Cabinet a real revolution, a civil war, was avoided, they were entitled to believe that they might thus at least sacrifice something to popular feeling in order to avoid a dangerous reaction of the incited masses. It was not unreasonable to hope that this trend would remain within the bounds of legality and reason and find its natural level. Politically, this was doubtless a false idea. The radical tendencies of those who even after that kept tending towards extremes were underestimated. It must be borne in mind, however, that those Cabinet members who came from the non-radical parties still clung to the idea that the responsible leader of the State would bring reason to bear and call a halt to this trend. Those ministers who did not agree with this course tried to halt the development, but with diminishing success. Their attempts met with still less success when the authority of the Reich President, the weight of the bourgeois Right and the position of the Reichswehr ceased to form a counter-balance. Hitler understood how to use Hindenburg for his own purpose. The bourgeois Right no longer presented a closely united front; many dissented and went over to the National Socialists. The parties dissolved themselves, and their followers were now robbed of their cohesion; Blomberg became a follower of Hitler. The ministers concerned had no support from any other quarter. Hitler made full use of the fact that he had been called by the people and that he was solely responsible to the people. To make open protest would have been impossible. The publication of Papen's Marburg speech was prohibited; his exit from the Cabinet as the result of this only served to make the circle of ministers dissatisfied with developments smaller and thereby less influential. Any minister who entertained thoughts of resigning knew that his post would be filled by a new man who would not hinder, but would only further this development.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): Any minister who really had the interests of his department at heart did not like the idea of transferring his field of work into these new hands. It is clear that those who were confronted with this question did not want to endanger that which they in their fields of activity had laboriously achieved by curbing and correcting the effects of the laws, in conducting their policy as regards personnel and in other ways, and all they wanted to do was to continue this work also in the future. The Head of the State Law of 1 August 1934 is the legal conclusion and the final word of the previous development. It is a Cabinet law. Hitler demanded the consolidation of his office with that of Reich President. According to his declaration this consolidation was not to be the final solution; only the momentary situation was to be considered, which was that he personally would not recognize a new head of the State above himself, although on the other hand he could not give up his office as Reich Chancellor. He pointed out that this measure would be sanctioned by a referendum, to take place after the death of Hindenburg. In this state of affairs the Cabinet did not consider themselves able to oppose the demand of Hitler. The result of the plebiscite was a foregone conclusion. In any case Hitler would have achieved his aim, even if the Cabinet had refused to pass the law. The Cabinet law of 1 August 1934 is therefore actually nothing but a preparatory law, which in any case could be and was achieved by a plebiscite. The legal sanctioning of the dictatorship therefore was only a confirmation of the powers held hitherto, and a consequence of the overwhelming will of the people at that time. This law clarified the situation not only as regards power-policy, but also as regards constitutional law. The law represents the complete establishment of the monocratic principle in the state sector.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): In his person Hitler consolidated the rights of the Reich President, especially the Emergency Decree Law, with the right of the Reich Chancellor to determine the fundamental principles of policy. As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces he finally held in his hand the strongest instrument of power in the State. Actually every state organ became dependent on his will and had to follow his directions. The Reich Cabinet was not excepted. This became outwardly apparent by the law concerning the oath of the Reich Ministers of 16 October 1934. The new oath for the ministers was the same as the general oath for civil servants and soldiers, and showed that the position of the minister had changed to that of a high-level state official bound by directives. In line with this legal situation, the working procedure of the Cabinet and the significance of the Cabinet sessions also underwent a change. Insofar as foreign policy decisions were concerned, Hitler only announced what his resolve was, mostly in one long monologue on the general political situation. Later on he only informed the Cabinet of the accomplished facts. He informed the Cabinet of the occupation of the Rhineland after the troops had already entered it. In the case of fundamental domestic political measures, for example the Nuremberg Laws, the Cabinet was not previously consulted. The majority of the ministers were surprised when the law was proposed in the Reichstag Session of the Nuremberg Party Rally. In the drafting of minor laws of administrative importance only the completed draft and the reasons for it were submitted. In order to avoid the expression of departmental objections in a Cabinet session, the drafts were previously made "cabinet-ripe" in accordance with a directive of Hitler, that is to say, the departmental ministers were given the opportunity in a preliminary discussion to voice their departmental objections to the minister responsible for the initial draft. Only after these objections had been removed did the draft reach the Cabinet session.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): Therefore, no allowance was made for a consultation in the Cabinet session. General political considerations which concerned these drafts were subject to the sole decision of Hitler. If therefore a general political question did arise, about which Hitler's point of view was not yet known, the department was not able to deal with it until his directive had been obtained. Thus the Cabinet sessions not only lacked all political significance, but also all practical purpose. Hitler therefore convoked the Cabinet at less and less frequent intervals, until finally, after a last session in February 1938, which was merely called to listen to a statement by Hitler, no further Cabinet sessions whatsoever took place. Henceforth the Cabinet sessions were completely replaced by circulation procedure. The working minister submitted the bills to the other members of the Cabinet to enable them to raise objections in their own departmental fields. It stands to reason that basic political questions and political measures which Hitler decided as he saw fit were never dealt with by the circulation procedure. As was shown during the hearing of the witnesses, most of the ministers did not know any more about important political events than any other person. In most cases they learnt of the facts afterwards by press or radio, unless it happened that something leaked through to them through secret channels which they too were forbidden to use. This may have happened more frequently in the sphere of the ministers than elsewhere. But this casual information did not give a comprehensive and authenticated total picture of the actual situation. Only the few close confidants of Hitler were really fully and authentically acquainted with the events. This confidence, however, was not necessarily given to a person occupying the post of a minister.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): The overwhelming majority of the ministers who did not belong to this close circle learned for example of the march into Austria, of the setting-up of a Protectorate, and of the introduction of the various war measures only after the measures had become effective and been publicized. The circulation procedure did not bring about any personal cohesion among the ministers. Even though as a rule the bills were submitted to all ministers -- although this was not always done, as shown by Schacht's testimony -- this did not mean a joint collaboration among all the ministers. This was only done to enable each minister to examine whether the interests of his department might be affected by the draft. The individual minister was thereby more strictly limited to his particular department, His task was merely to submit the objections of his department and to see to it that the powers of his department were not diminished or its competence impugned. Departmental interests are special interests and if things are restricted to them no room is left for general aims and purposes. The whole manner and form of the circulation procedure was designed to avoid close co-operation among the ministers. In the last phase of the development this intention of Hitler manifests itself clearly and openly. The hearing of the witnesses has shown that his ministers, except for the very small number who enjoyed his confidence, were not allowed access to him for years on end and that all efforts of the ministers to this end were in vain. Several ministers made attempts to have the Cabinet meetings reintroduced, thus to provide an opportunity to express their opinion and obtain information. Hitler refused this with the remark that he wished to have nothing more to do with this defeatists' club. He even forbade a personal gathering of the ministers arranged by Lammers in the form of an evening beer party.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): If the Prosecution work on the assumption that the Cabinet members as a group held the authoritative power in the conduct of the State and wilfully directed its whole policy towards a contemplated, unlawful war, then it can be said in rebuttal that the Cabinet had disintegrated and was no longer a cohesive whole; out of this there had evolved a single directing head in the person of Hitler. Other facts too, prove that there was no functional cohesion between the ministers. Between Hitler's directives and their execution by the departments of the individual ministers, high-level offices were inserted, which, in their turn, had authority to issue directives to the minister. The departmental minister was thereby even further removed from the headquarters of the decisive authority; he was now merely the executive agent of two superimposed directing offices. The "Delegate for the Four Year Plan," the "Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich," the "Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor," and similar offices were created by Hitler himself and provided with full legislative powers by him personally. Not only were these offices able to compel the departmental minister to issue specific administrative directives and ordinances, but, what is more, they could themselves issue these directives to the subordinate offices over the heads of the departmental ministers. This dismemberment was obviously brought about by Hitler intentionally. The Cabinet as an apparatus for the execution of his legislative orders seemed too unwieldy, too complicated and too obstructive, and the position of the minister in his department still too independent. He therefore delegated legislative power to isolated or minor groups who, as men enjoying his special trust, insured the prompt execution of his wishes. By the creation of these new subordinate offices, he restricted the power of the department.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): Amidst the confusion of the complex relations between the various levels, the difficulty of defining where competencies and authorities began and ended, Hitler's order was the ultimate remedy, the sole reliable guide. His directive now became more than ever indispensable, and the ministers had to refer to it. The picture given by the Prosecution of a close group assembled in Cabinet sessions and functioning efficiently is thus considerably altered. An entirely new state apparatus was put into operation, a culmination of absolute powers in the person of Hitler, with an intermediate stratum, introduced by Hitler and subordinate only to him, in the form of the newly-created institutions discussed above, headed by men who were not all members of the Reich Cabinet as defined by the Prosecution, and finally the various departmental ministers as executive organs, who in this organizational structure were naturally restricted solely to their own field of work. Finally the keeping of absolute secrecy by Hitler was a further factor which prevented the ministers from combining. No minister was to know more than was absolutely necessary for him to carry out the task specially assigned to him. Even things which happened in his own department could be kept secret from the minister. I refer to the affidavit of Harmening, from which it appears that the state secretary was entrusted with the preparations for the intended war with Russia over the head of the minister and was ordered to keep it secret from his minister. No clearer proof is needed to show that Hitler revealed his plans only to those to whom he entrusted the task of carrying them out, and whom he considered specially suited for it, irrespective of the position they held. Everything which in a democratic government is considered a matter concerning everybody, which affects the entire Cabinet, is here shifted to one department and considered as its exclusive task.