dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: How high were your losses?
DOENITZ: According to my recollection, our total losses were 640 or 670.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And crew members?
DOENITZ: Altogether, we had 40,000 men in the submarine force. Of these 40,000 men 30,000 did not return, and of these 30,000, 25,000 were killed and only 5,000 were taken prisoner. The majority of the submarines was destroyed from the air in the vast areas of the sea, the Atlantic, where rescue was out of the question. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBt1HLER: Mr. President, I come now to a new subject. Would this be a suitable time to recess? [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon' Session
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I am turning now to the theme of the so-called conspiracy. The Prosecution is accusing you of participating from 1932, on the basis of your close connections with the Party, in a conspiracy to promote aggressive wars and commit war crimes. Where were you during the weeks of the seizure of power by the National Socialists in the early part of 1933?
DOENITZ: Immediately after 30 January 1933, I believe it was on 1 February, I went on leave to the Dutch East Indies and Ceylon, a trip which lasted well into the summer of 1933. This leave journey had been granted me, at Grossadmiral Raeder's recommendation, by President Hindenburg.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: After that, you became commander of a cruiser at a foreign station?
DOENITZ: In the autumn of 1934 I went as captain of the cruiser Emden through the Atlantic, around Africa into the Indian Ocean, and back.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Before this sojourn abroad or after your return in 1935 and until you were appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in the year 1943 were you politically active in any way?
DEWITT: I was not active politically until 1 May 1945, when I became head of the State, not before then.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The Prosecution has submitted a document, namely, an affidavit by Ambassador Messersmith. It bears the number USA-57 (Document Number 1760-PS) and I have the pertinent extracts in my document book, Volume II, Page 100. In this affidavit, Ambassador Messersmith says that from 1930 until the spring of 1934 he acted as Consul General for the United States in Berlin. Then, until July 1937, he was in Vienna and from there he went to Washington. He gives an opinion about you with the remark, "Among the people whom I saw frequently and to whom my statements refer were the following...." Then your name is mentioned. From this one must get the impression that during this period of time you were active in political circles in Berlin or Vienna. Is that correct?
DOENITZ: No. At that time I was Lieutenant Commander and from the end of 1934 on I was Commander. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBt]HLER: With the permission of the Tribunal I sent an interrogatory to Ambassador Messersmith , 9 May 46 in order to determine upon what facts he was basing his opinion. This interrogatory was answered and I am submitting it as Exhibit DOENITZ-45. The answers will be found on Page 102 of the document book, and I quote: "During my residence in Berlin and during my later frequent visits there as stated in my previous affidavits, I saw Admiral Karl DOENITZ and spoke to him on several occasions. Howeyer, I kept no diary and I am unable to state with accuracy when and where the meetings occurred, the capacity in which Admiral DOENITZ appeared there, or the topic or topics of our conversation. My judgment on DOENITZ expressed in my previous affidavit is based on personal knowledge and on the general knowledge which I obtained from the various sources described in my previous affidavits." Did you, Admiral, see and speak with Ambassador Messersmith anywhere and at any time?
DOENITZ: I never saw him, and I hear his name here for the first time. Also, at the time in question, I was not in Berlin. I was in Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea coast or in the Indian Ocean. If he alleges to have spoken to me it would have had to be in Wilhelmshaven or in the Indian Ocean. Since neither is the case, I believe that he is mistaken and that he must have confused me with somebody else.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were you a member of the NSDAP?
DOENITZ: On 30 January 1944 I received from the Fuehrer, as a decoration, the Golden Party Badge; and I assume that I thereby became an honorary member of the Party.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: When did you become acquainted with Adolf Hitler and how often did you see him before you were appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
DOENITZ: I saw Adolf Hitler for the first time when, in the presence of Grossadmiral Raeder in the autumn of 1934, I informed him of my departure for foreign parts as captain of the cruiser Emden. I saw him again on the day following my return with the Emden. From the autumn of 1934 until the outbreak of war in 1939, in 5 years, I saw him four times in all, including the two occasions when I reported to him as already mentioned. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER And what were the other two occasions? Were they military or political occasions?
DOENITZ: One was a military matter when he was watching a review of the fleet in the Baltic Sea and I stood next to him on the bridge of the flagship in order to give the necessary explanations while two U-boats showed attack maneuvers. The other occasion was an invitation to all high-ranking army and navy officers when the new Reich Chancellery in the Voss Strasse was completed. That was in 1938 or 1939. I saw him there but I did not speak with him.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: How many times during the war, until your appointment as Commander-in-Chief, did you see the Fuehrer?
DOENITZ: In the years between 1939 and 1943 I saw the Fuehrer four times, each time when short military reports about U-boat warfare were being made and always in the presence of large groups. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBt1HLER: Until that time had you had any discussion which went beyond the purely military?
DOENITZ: No, none at ale FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER When were you appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy as successor to Grossadmiral Raeder?
DOENITZ: On 30 January 1943. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBt1HLER: Was the war which Germany was waging at that time at an offensive or defensive stage?
DOENITZ: At a decidedly defensive stage.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In your eyes was the position of Commander-in-Chief, which was offered to you, a political or a military position?
DOENITZ: It was self-evidently a purely military position, namely, that of the first soldier at the head of the Navy. My appointment to this position also came about because of purely military reasons which motivated Grossadmiral Raeder to propose my name for this position. Purely military considerations were the decisive ones in respect to this appointment.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You know, Admiral, that the Prosecution draws very far-reaching conclusions from your acceptance of this appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, especially with reference to the conspiracy. The Prosecution contends that through your acceptance of this position you ratified the previous happenings, all the endeavors of the Party since 1920 or 1922, and the entire German policy, domestic and foreign, at least since 1933. Were you aware of the significance of   this foreign policy? Did you take this into consideration at all?
DOENITZ: The idea never entered my head. Nor do I believe that there is a soldier who, when he receives a military command, would entertain such thoughts or be conscious of such considerations. My appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy represented for me an order which I of course had to obey, just as I had to obey every other military order, unless for reasons of health I was not able to do so. Since I was in good health and believed that I could be of use to the Navy, I naturally also accepted this command with inner conviction. Anything else would have been desertion or disobedience.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Then as Commander-inChief of the Navy you came into very close contact with Adolf Hitler. You also know just what conclusions the Prosecution draws from this relationship. Please tell me just what this relationship was and on what it was based?
DOENITZ: In order to be brief, I might perhaps explain the matter as follows: This relationship was based on three ties. First of all, I accepted and agreed to the national and social ideas of National Socialism: the national ideas which found expression in the honor and dignity of the nation, its freedom, and its equality among nations and its security; and the social tenets which had perhaps as their basis: no class struggle, but human and social respect of each person regardless of his class, profession, or economic position, and on the other hand, subordination of each and every one to the interests of the common weal. Naturally I regarded Adolf Hitler's high authority with admiration and joyfully acknowledged it, when in times of peace he succeeded so quickly and without bloodshed in realizing his national and social objectives. My second tie was my oath. Adolf Hitler had, in a legal and lawful way, become the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, to whom the Wehrmacht had sworn its oath of allegiance. That this oath was sacred to me is self-evident and I believe that decency in this world will everywhere be on the side of him who keeps his oath. The third tie was my personal relationship: Before I became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, I believe Hitler had no definite conception of me and my person. He had seen me too few times and always in large circles. How my relationship to him would shape itself was therefore a completely open question when I became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. My start in this connection was very unfavorable. It was made difficult, first, by the imminent and then the actual collapse of U-boat warfare and, secondly, by my refusal, just as Grossadmiral Raeder had already refused, to scrap the large ships, which in Hitler's opinion had no fighting value in view of the oppressive superiority of the foe. I, like Grossadmiral Raeder, had opposed the scrapping of these ships, and only after a quarrel did he finally agree.
DOENITZ: But, despite that, I noticed very soon that in Navy matters he had confidence in me and in other respects as well treated me with decided respect. Adolf Hitler always saw in me only the first soldier of the Navy. He never asked for my advice in military matters which did not concern the Navy, either in regard to the Army or the Air Force; nor did I ever express my opinion about matters concerning the Army or the Air Force, because basically I did not have sufficient knowledge of these matters. Of course, he never consulted me on political matters of a domestic or foreign nature.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You said, Admiral, that he never asked you for advice on political matters. But those matters might have come up in connection with Navy questions. Did you not participate then either?
DOENITZ: If by "political" you mean, for instance, consultations of the commanders with the so-called "National Socialist Leadership Officers," then, of course, I participated, because this came within the sphere of the Navy, or rather was to become a Navy concern. That was naturally the case.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Beyond those questions, did Hitler ever consider you a general adviser, as the Prosecution claims and as they concluded from the long list of meetings which you have had with Hitler since 1943 at his headquarters?
DOENITZ: First of all, as a matter of principle, there can be no question of a general consultation with the Fuehrer; as I have already said, the Fuehrer asked for and received advice from me only in matters concerning the Navy and the conduct of naval warfare- matters exclusively and absolutely restricted to my sphere of activity.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: According to the table submitted, between 1943 and 1945 you were called sometimes once and sometimes twice a month to the Fuehrer's headquarters. Please describe to the Tribunal just what happened, as far as you were concerned, on a day like that at the Fuehrer's headquarters-what you had to do there.
DOENITZ: Until 2 or 3 months before the collapse, when the Fuehrer was in Berlin, I flew to his headquarters about every 2 or 3 weeks, but only if I had some concrete Navy matter for which I needed his decision. On those occasions I participated in the noontime discussion of the general military situation, that is, the report which the Fuehrer's staff made to him about what had taken place on the fighting fronts within the last 24 hours. At these military discussions the Army and Air Force situation was of primary importance, and I spoke only when my Naval expert was reporting the naval situation and he needed me to supplement his report. Then at a given moment, which was fixed by the Adjutant's Office, I gave my military report which was the purpose of my journey. When rendering this report only those were present whom these matters concerned, that is, when it was a question of reinforcements, et cetera, Field Marshal Keitel or Generaloberst Jodl were generally present. When I came to his headquarters every 2 or 3 weeks-later in 1944 there was sometimes an interval of 6 weeks-the Fuehrer invited me to lunch. These invitations ceased completely after 20 July 1944, the day of the attempted assassination. I never received from the Fuehrer an order which in any way violated the ethics of war. Neither I nor anyone in the Navy-and this is my conviction-knew anything about the mass extermination of people, which I learned about here from the Indictment, or, as far as the concentration camps are concerned, after the capitulation in May 1945. In Hitler I saw a powerful personality who had extraordinary intelligence and energy and a practically universal knowledge, from whom power seemed to emanate and who was possessed of a remarkable power of suggestion.
DOENITZ: On the other hand, I purposely very seldom went to his headquarters, for I had the feeling that I would best preserve my power of initiative that way and, secondly, because after several days, say 2 or 3 days at his headquarters, I had the feeling that I had to disengage myself from his power of suggestion. I am telling you this because in this connection I was doubtless more fortunate than his staff who were constantly exposed to his powerful personality with its power of suggestion.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You said just now, Admiral, that you never received an order which was in violation of military ethics. You know the Commando Order of the autumn of 1942. Did you not receive this order?
DOENITZ: I was informed of this order after it was issued while I was still Commander of the U-boats. For the soldiers at the front this order was unequivocal. I had the feeling that it was a very grave matter; but under Point 1 of this order it was clearly and unequivocally expressed that members of the enemy forces, because of their behavior, because of the killing of prisoners, had placed themselves outside the Geneva Convention and that therefore the Fuehrer had ordered reprisals and that those reprisal measures, in addition, had been published in the Wehrmacht report.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0XLER: Therefore, the soldier who received this order had no right, no possibility, and no authority to demand a justification or an investigation; does this mean such an order was justified? As Commander of the U-boats did you have anything to do with the execution of this order?
DOENITZ: No, not in the slightest.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: As far as you remember, did you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy have anything to do with the carrying out of this order?
DOENITZ: As far as I remember I was never concerned with this order as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. (fine should not forget, first, that this decree excludes expressly those taken prisoner in battles at sea and, second, that the Navy had no territorial authority on land, and for this latter reason found itself less often in a position of having to carry out any point of this order. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER You know the document submitted by the Prosecution, which describes how in the summer of 1943 a Commando unit was shot in Norway. I mean the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-208. The incident is described there as showing that the crew of a Norwegian motor torpedo boat were taken prisoner on a Norwegian island. This motor torpedo boat was charged with belligerent missions at sea. The document does not say who took the crew prisoner, but it does say that the members of the crew were wearing their uniforms when they were taken prisoner, that they were interrogated by a naval officer, and that on the order of Admiral Von Schrader they were turned over to the SD. The SD later shot them. Did you know about this incident or was it reported to you as Commander-in-Chief?
DOENITZ: I learned about this incident from the trial brief of the Prosecution.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Can you explain the fact that an incident of this nature was not brought to your attention? Would this not have had to be reported to you?
DOENITZ: If the Navy was concerned in this matter, that is, if this crew had been captured by the Navy, Admiral Von Schrader, who was the commander there, would absolutely have had to report this matter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. I am also convinced that he would have done so, for the regulations regarding this were unequivocal. I am also convinced that the naval expert at the Navy High Command, who was concerned with such matters, would have reported this to me as Commander-in-Chief.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What is your opinion about this case now that you have learned about it through the document of the Prosecution? Dt5NITZ' If it is correct that it concerns the crew of a motor torpedo boat which had belligerent missions at sea, then this measure, the shooting which took place, was entirely wrong in any case, for it was in direct opposition even to this Commando Order. But I consider it completely out of the question, for I do not believe that Admiral Von Schrader, whom I know personally to be an especially chivalrous sailor, would have had a hand in anything of this sort. From the circumstances of this incident, the fact that it was not reported to the High Command, that this incident, as has now been ascertained by perusal of the German newspapers of that time, was never mentioned in the Wehrmacht communique, as would have been the case if it had been a matter concerning the Wehrmacht, from all these circumstances I assume that the incident was as follows. That the police arrested these people on the island; that they were taken from this island by vessel to Bergen; that there one or two, if I remember correctly, naval officers interrogated them, since the Navy, of course, was interested in this interrogation; and that then these people were handed over to the SD, since they had already been taken prisoner by the SD. I cannot explain it otherwise. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBt1HLER: You wish to say, then, that in your opinion these men had never been prisoners of the Navy?
DOENITZ: No. If they had been, a report to the High Command would have been made.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Quite apart from these questions I should like to ask you, did you not in your position as Commander-in-Chief, and during your visits to the Fuehrer's headquarters, have experiences which made you consider disassociating yourself from Adolf Hitler?
DOENITZ: I have already stated that as far as my activity was concerned, even at headquarters, I was strictly limited to my own department, since it was a peculiarity of the Fuehrer's to listen to a person only about matters which were that person's express concern. It was also self-evident that at the discussions of the military situation only purely military matters were discussed, that is, no problems of domestic policy, of the SD, or the SS, unless it was a question of SS divisions in military service under one of the army commanders. Therefore I had no knowledge of all these things. As I have already said, I never received an order from the Fuehrer which in any way violated military ethics. Thus I firmly believe that in every respect I kept the Navy unsullied down to the last man until the end. In naval warfare my attention was focused on the sea; and the Navy, small as it was, tried to fulfill its duty according to its tasks. Therefore I had no reason at all to break with the Fuehrer.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Such a reason would not necessarily refer to a crime; it could also have been for political considerations, having nothing to do with crimes. You have heard the question broached repeatedly as to whether there should have been a Putsch. Did you enter into contact with such a movement and did you yourself consider or attempt a Putsch?
DOENITZ: No. The word "Putsch" has been used frequently in this court-room by a wide variety of people. It is easy to say so, but I believe that one would have had to realize the tremendous significance of such an activity. The German nation was involved in a struggle of life and death. It was surrounded by enemies almost like a fortress. And it is clear. to keep to the simile of the fortress, that every disturbance from within would without doubt perforce have affected our military might and fighting power. Anyone, therefore, who violates his loyalty and his oath to plan and try to bring about an overthrow during such a struggle for survival must be most deeply convinced that the nation needs such an overthrow at all costs and must be aware of his responsibility. Despite this, every nation will judge such a man to be a traitor, and history will not vindicate him unless the success of the overthrow actually contributes to the welfare and prosperity of his people. This, however, would not have been the case in Germany. If, for instance, the Putsch of 20 July had been successful, then a dissolution, if only a gradual one, would have resulted inside Germany-a fight against the bearers of weapons, here the SS, there another group, complete chaos inside Germany-for the firm structure of the State would gradually have been destroyed and disintegration and a reduction of our fighting power at the front would have inevitably resulted.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the defendant is making a long and political speech., It really hasn't very much to do with the questions with which we have to deal.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I was of the opinion that the question of whether a Commander-in-Chief is obliged to bring about a Putsch was regarded as a main point by the Prosecution, a point having a bearing on the question of whether he declared himself in agreement or not with the system which is being characterized as criminal. If the Tribunal considers this question irrelevant I do not want to press it further.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think the Prosecution has put forward the view that anybody had to create a Putsch.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: It seemed to me a self-evident view of the Prosecution. Admiral, the Prosecution has submitted two documents, dating from the winter of 1943 and May 1945, containing speeches made by you to the troops. You are accused by the Prosecution of preaching National Socialist ideas to the troops. Please define your position on this point.