dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON BRAUCHITSCH: England and France had declared war on Germany. Both powers had not taken advantage of Germany's moment of greatest weakness in September. Therefore, it was questionable to me whether they would start a winter offensive now, at a time when the Western Front was daily being strengthened. Beyond that, I personally was in great doubt whether these two powers seriously wanted to wage war. I believed that in view of the reception which Chamberlain had in London and Daladier in Paris, after the Munich Agreement, their people would not be inclined to wage, a war. I believed that the breaches of neutrality which had been committed by the Allies up until that time would not weigh so heavily in the eyes of the world. Since the year 1914 1 fully appreciated the consequences of violating neutrality, and this had been seared into my memory. In my opinion, this would apply again in this case to the one that would be the first really to cross the border with strong ground forces. We had gone into the question very carefully, in the High Command of the Army, of whether the crossing of the border for reasons of ground operations would be necessary as the first step. We had reached the conclusion that this was not the case, but that, if it was necessary at all, we could do so in answer to an enemy move.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you call Hitler's attention to the fact that in the event of an offensive in the West, the countries of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg would be drawn into war?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: I took the very next opportunity at which I could talk with Hitler alone after 27 September 1939, to tell him my opinion. However, he was not open to any discussion and remained steadfast in his well-known opinion.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you try to prevent the Western offensive from being started?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: Before as well as afterwards, I was convinced that it would have to be possible to end this entire war once and for all politically. I considered it madness that Europe once more would have to tear herself to pieces instead of progressing by peacefully working at the common task. The Wehrmacht, according to the principle Si vis pacem para bellum, was in line with this. German soldiers of every rank had been trained to defend and protect their homeland. They did not think about wars of conquest, or the expansion of German domination over other peoples. It was quite clear to me that the entire question could be cleared up only by political means, if a sincere will to this end existed. But any political developments, of course, need time; and I was only concerned with gaining time for these political negotiations, matters upon which I had no influence, however. Therefore, I asked on 5 November 1939 to be granted an audience with the Fuehrer. As I could no longer put political reasons before him, I had to give purely military reasons, and as such I used the condition of the Army. Hitler listened at first to my statements quietly. Then he flew into a rage so that any further conversation was impossible. So I left. On the evening of the same day, the order was issued to attack on 12 November, which order was rescinded on 7 November.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you not even use the bad weather as a pretext to gain time and to postpone matters?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: In view of the extremely difficult terrain, I pointed out the fact that if we were to march in at all, this would only be possible if we had an extended period of good weather. But above all the use of the Luftwaffe was dependent on a long period of good weather. DR. LATERI~TSER: And after the address of Hitler to the generals on 23 November 1939, which has been discussed here quite frequently, you offered your resignation? How did that happen?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: In the evening of 23 November I was once more ordered to appear before the Fuehrer. In a lengthy discussion with him alone, he once more raised all the accusations against the Army. In the course of this conversation I offered my resignation which he rejected by saying that I had to fulfill my duty and obligation just like every other soldier. Through these incidents a breach had occurred which was later closed but was never completely mended.
DR.LATERNSER: To what extent, in your capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, did you participate in the decision to occupy Norway and Denmark?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: In no way at all.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you participate in its preparation and execution?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Then the campaign in the West started. At that time, what was your relationship with Hitler?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: As I have already mentioned before, it was difficult. In the course of the campaign in the West, there was a series of smaller and larger differences. I should like to cite but one. This concerned the stopping of the German Panzers before Dunkirk, a matter which brought about a serious conflict. The result was that the mass of the personnel of the British Expeditionary Force escaped to England across the Channel.
DR. LATERNSER: On the part of the High Command of the Army, after the conclusion of the campaign in the West, were measures for demobilization worked on, or were they suggested?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: At that time, two measures were taken. A commission for demobilization was established, and secondly a number of generals were asked whether they wished to remain in the Army after the conclusion of peace.
DR. LATERNSER: And what was your collaboration in the decision to intervene in Greece and Yugoslavia?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: I did not participate in any way in these decisions. When with the Chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst Halder, I was ordered by the Fuehrer to appear before him, he received us with the words, "I have decided to destroy Yugoslavia." And then he stated the reasons for his decision. I believe they are well known here already.
DR. LATERNSER: At that time, was there a plan for any interference in Yugoslavia or Greece?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, neither a plan nor any preparation existed. We did not even have maps.
DR. LATERNSER: And where were you to get these divisions from? From all parts of Germany?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: The divisions had to be brought in from all parts of Germany and the occupied territories.
DR. LATERNSER: Is the assertion of Field Marshal Paulus true that the occupation of the Balkans was one of the prerequisites of the campaign against the Soviet Union?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: That is a mistake on the part of Field Marshal Paulus. The Yugoslavian issue was the direct consequence of the collapse there. Before that time, just somewhat previous, Yugoslavia had joined the Tripartite Pact and this question was the result of the British landing in Greece and the catastrophic position of the Italians in Albania.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, let us turn to the Eastern campaign. What was your attitude with reference to the Trade Agreement with the Soviet Union?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: The Trade Agreement with the Soviet Union was concluded in September 1939 and we had hailed it joyfully. In this step we saw the end of a period of mistrust, and hoped that, above and beyond that, Germany would be able to be a bridge across the heart of Europe.
DR. LATERNSER: Did any military leader suggest the thought of attacking the Soviet Union? 9 Aug. 4
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, never.
DR. LATERNSER: When did Hitler tell you for the very first time that the possibility of war with the Soviet Union would be considered?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: In August of 1940 he made a remark to me to the effect that he was worried by the thought that the attitude of Russia might change. Thereupon, I talked with the Chief of the General Staff and told him that we would have to collect the data required, for in this connection we had not done anything up to that time.
DR. LATERNSER: Were there any maps in existence?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: Neither maps nor anything else. In the month of September, Hitler ordered that the question of Russia would have to be investigated. In my opinion, no decision to put the plan into effect was in existence; in any event, it was not mentioned. All the work which was done was General Staff work, consisting of preparatory and precautionary measures which have to be taken in such a case everywhere.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the transfer of some of the divisions into the territory of the Government General, which you ordered after the conclusion of the Western campaign, have any connection with the start of the Eastern campaign, or what were the reasons for this transfer of divisions?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: The transfer of the divisions had already been started before. The reasons for it were quite different ones. The guarding of the Russian-German demarcation line in Poland was mainly carried out by the Zolldienst (Customs service). Border crossings had been ascertained in innumerable cases. The Zollgrenzschutz (Frontier Guard) was urgently needed at other places. The SS intended to take over the guarding of the frontier by the Zondienst (Customs service) and for that reason they wanted to create new units. But I wanted to prevent that, and therefore Hitler was requested to have divisions transferred from the West to the East. Beyond that, we wanted to relieve France of the burden of the many divisions which were stationed there.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the High Command of the Army, in the conference of 3 February 1941, have any misgivings about a war with the Soviet Union? [Turning to the Tribunal.] I refer to Document Number 872-PS, USA-134, My Lord.
VON BRAUCHITSCH: According to the statement made by Hitler in the case of Russia, we were concerned with the fact that if a war were to break out at all, it was to be a preventive war. In the conference I limited myself to the purely military misgivings. General Halder and I reported on three points. One was the size of the Russian area which even today cannot be bridged by motor vehicles alone. The second point was the number of the population, and therewith the large number of picked reserves which were available, and the quite different level of education and enlightenment of the Russian population as compared with the years 1914-1918, matters which I could see for myself when I was a guest of the Red Army in the year 1931. And the third point was the high armament potential of Russia. According to our estimate, Russia at that time had at her command approximately 10,000 tanks. Hitler must have given some thought to these problems, for he answered immediately and refuted the first two points; namely, by saying that the domination of the Soviets was so much in disfavor among the Russian population, that the system would collapse. Everything would depend only on the decisiveness of the first successes. As far as the third point was concerned, the point of armament, he mentioned, on the bases of detailed figures that he had, as always, at his finger tips, that the armament of Russia could not be at the level which we imagined it to be. Exact proof, however, we did not have at our disposal.
DR. IATERNSER: Therefore, Hitler did not listen to any of the misgivings which you had?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: He would not enter into any further discussion.
DR. LATERNSER: When did you tell the commanders-in-chief of the army groups and armies under your command about the plans with regard to Russia?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: On 18 December 1940, the High Command of the Army issued the order and subsequently, at the end of December, the first directives went to the army groups.
DR. LATERNSER: What was your relationship with Hitler during the Russian campaign?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: During the Russian campaign the difficulties increased more and more. I should like to mention only two of the very numerous incidents that occurred. The Army had, in the areas occupied by it, restored the churches to public use as far as this was desired by the population. German chaplains had frequently officiated at the request of the population. However, Hitler prohibited this, and now the remarkable picture was offered by the chaplains of the Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, and other divisions officiating while the Germans could not do so. The second point, which was a weighty one, was the question of the operational conduct of the war. Once the war had started, the measures for its continuance in the following year had to be taken now, and in my opinion and that of the High Command, the area around Moscow not the city itself-played a decisive role in this respect. It is the traffic center of the whole country, and accordingly was the required site for the setting up and distribution of the main reserves. There %were numerous armament installations which made it possible to equip the new formations. The High Command of the Army, therefore, was of the opinion that after the Dnieper-Smolensk-Lake Peipus line had been reached, one would then have to come into possession of the entire Moscow region. Hitler was of, a different opinion. He put the decisive importance on Leningrad and then he demanded the offensive at Kiev. It was he who took the decision in this matter. And then, afterwards, it was too late. The offensive in the Moscow region was doomed to fail because of weather conditions.
DR. LATERNSER: Regarding the Eastern campaign, I should like to clear up certain matters of subordination. Do you know of an agreement between the Quartermaster General of the Army, General Wagner, and Heydrich concerning the Einsatz groups?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: It was reported to me that a conference between General Wagner and the Chief of the SS Main Office, Heydrich, had taken place. According to an order of the High Command of the Armed Forces this conference was to settle those questions which were necessary to regulate the commitment of the Kommandos in the operational region of the Army, as ordered by Hitler. It was reported to me that the problems involved were things such as the matter of boundary violations, the questions of economic supply, and the right of way on the roads. Nothing else was reported to me, and )whether other subjects were discussed I do not know, but at the best, the question might perhaps have been discussed as to whether Kommandos which were sent to the front area became subordinated to the local commander. All directives for these detachments were issued through the usual channels by the Reichsfuehrer SS. At the request of the Army, army groups and armies were given liaison detachments. They had only the task of informing these units about the objective, et cetera, of the operations as far as it applied to them. In this order of the High Command of the Armed Forces it says, regarding the purpose and the task of these detachments: "It is intended to transform the occupied territories, as soon as possible, into political states. In order to prepare the measures, these Kommandos are to be used. This was the only information received by the High Command of the Army."
DR. LATERNSER: Did General Wagner report to you that through these Einsatz groups mass exterminations would be carried out?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No.
DR. LATERNSER: The witness SS Fuehrer Schellenberg was interrogated here, and he stated that he was of the conviction that the High Command of the Army knew of mass exterminations: and had reported this to the commanders-in-chief through official channels. Is this right?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: He is speaking of a conviction, not of a certainty, and this conviction is not right.
DR. LATERNSER: To whom were these units subordinated?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: The subordination of the Einsatzkommandos, as I have already mentioned, was set up in such a way that all orders emanated solely from the Reichsfuehrer SS. They were not subordinated to the Army in any way.
DR. LATERNSER: How about supply? Were they subordinated to the Army in that way?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, not even in that way. They were instructed to obtain their supplies from the Army for there was no other way of supplying rations or fuel. DR.'LATERNSER: Did you receive official reports from these Einsatz groups?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No.
DR. IATERNSER: Now, the subordination of the Waffen-SS will have to be cleared up as well. Just what was the subordination of a Waffen-SS division to the Army?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: The Waffen-SS was subordinated to the Army only for tactical purposes. It was subordinated to the Army neither for discipline nor for judicial matters. The Army had no influence on promotions or demotions of people, and so forth.
DR. IATERNSER: To whom was a Waffen-SS division subordinate, when it was not engaged in a tactical task? That is, when it was neither in battle nor in the operational area?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: In any event, not the Army. It was subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer SS or to, the High Command of the Armed Forces.
DR. LATERNSER: And to whom was it subordinate in the home area?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: To the Reichsfuehrer SS.
DR. LATERNSER: Was the Waffen-SS paid out of the budget of the Wehrmacht?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: Certainly not from the budget of the Army.
DR. LATERNSER: And the budget of the Luftwaffe and the Navy would be even less concerned ... ?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: Just as little, I think. As far as I know, the SS not only had its own budget, but it also had its own armament, clothing, and administrative departments, et cetera.
DR. LATERNSER: Therefore, between a Waffen-SS division and the Army there was close and tactical contact only when this Waffen-SS division was actually in combat?
VON -BRAUCHITSCH: It was under the Army the moment it was used in an operational area, or when, in order to be moved up, it was placed at the Army's disposal.
DR. LATERNSER: Would it be a good comparison if I were to say that between a Waffen-SS division and the Army no closer connection existed than if, for instance, an Italian or Spanish division had been subordinate to the Army for a battle?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: That would have been similar.
DR. LATERNSER: In general, what was the relationship of the leadership of the Waffen-SS to that of the Army, Luftwaffe, or Navy? Was it a particularly harmonious one?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: Under battle conditions, yes, otherwise there was little connection.
DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, can you give us the circumstances under which Hitler issued the notorious Commissar Order?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: In March 1941 Hitler had summoned the military leaders, and in a rather lengthy address he once more stated the reasons for the attitude to be adopted towards Russia. He went on to say that it was a battle which was of an ideological nature, which could not be fought with the chivalrous methods to which the Army was accustomed. He knew that the officers could not make this opinion their own, but he was demanding the unconditional execution of the orders he issued. And in connection with this, he issued the order dealing with the treatment to be given to the commissars.
DR.LATERNSER: What did you do in order to prevent the carrying out of this order and to prevent excesses on the part of the troops in the East?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: At the conclusion of the conference, after Hitler had left, some of the commanders-in-chief came to me and I remember particularly well that the commanders-in-chief of the three army groups, Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, Field Marshal Von Bock, and Field Marshal Von Leeb, as well as another group of army commanders, came to me and in an excited manner expressed themselves to the effect that such a way of waging war was intolerable to them. I agreed with their point of view and told them that as far as the High Command of the Army was concerned no order like that would be issued. I would first have to think things over as to what steps I might take. In the meantime I had come to know Hitler well enough to know that once he had reached a decision and announced it publicly, in this case to the military leadership, nothing in the world could change this attitude. I knew also that I had to give a pretext to the Army for not adhering to this order. For this reason I issued an order dealing with the maintenance of discipline.
DR. LATERNSER: And what was the approximate wording of this order on discipline?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: It is not possible for me to give you the wording; however, the substance of the order, briefly, was as follows: Discipline in the Army was to be strictly observed, along the lines and regulations that applied in the past. The attitude towards the population was to remain correct in every way, and any excesses were to be punished.
DR. LATERNSER: Would an open refusal or your threatened resignation have been successful with Hitler?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: I have already said so-no.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, one more question dealing with the Eastern campaign. Did the German Army, in 1941, in its push through Russia, find considerable destruction wrought by the Soviet Army when it retreated?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: The situation was quite what we expected it to be. The lack of consideration of Russia for her own country, in such circumstances, was well known for a century past. There were numerous bridges and railways which had been destroyed; power plants and numerous factories too. The mines in the Donets Basin were damaged in such a way that even though we worked for months they could hardly be used by us. In the cities we met special detachments of young Russian troops, who had partly carried out their task of burning the villages; in Kiev and other places we found delayed action mines which had been prepared by them, which caused us considerable loss.
DR.LATERNSER: Before the entry of Italy into the war, or before the declaration of war on America, were you advised of it in advance?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No. We regretted both incidents very much.
DR. LATERNSER: Were military agreements with Japan known to you?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: I do not even know them today.
DR. LATERNSER: The records dealing with the testimony of Gisevius are known to you through the fact that I gave them to you for your perusal. Do you know the witness Gisevius?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: In April 1946, 1 learned of the existence of Herr Gisevius for the first time from the newspapers. In the papers I read that he was to appear here as a witness. I would have overlooked it, if the name had, not struck me as familiar, for a Dr. Gisevius was our family physician in the nineties.
DR.LATERNSER: But the witness gave various and quite detailed statements about your person and especially to the effect that he talked with you about taking part in a "Putsch" together. What can you say about that?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: I believe that anyone who knows me, however slightly, would laugh at the thought that I would discuss plans of a Putsch against the head of the State with a young person who is a complete stranger to me.
DR. LATERNSER: These statements ...
VON BRAUCHITSCH: I can only try to reconstruct the situation from the records; from these my impression is that those are the entirely unsupported fabrications of a man who believes that the whole world is revolving about him alone.
DR. LATERNSER: Gisevius further stated that the generals had enriched themselves. Is that true?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: I do not quite know in which way.
DR. LATER.NSER: Did you yourself receive any grants?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal you furnished two affidavits to the Prosecution, Affidavit Number 2, Exhibit Number USA-532, and Affidavit Number 4, Exhibit Number USA-535; both of them bearing the date 7 November 1945. Were you under arrest at that time?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: Two American officers had asked me to tell them about the organization of the Army, and so forth.