dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
illegal literature or staging illegal demonstrations, accompanied by numerous press comments of more or less violence. The Austrian Government sought to counteract this pressure in some way by allowing activity in favor of a restoration of the Hapsburgs. On his visit to Vienna in late February 1937, von Neurath took occasion to register Germany's emphatic opposition to any such move. I remember von Neurath's visit very clearly. I had known him well and was on friendly terms with him while I was stationed in Berlin. At that time and after the Nazi came into power, he told both Ambassador Dodd and me that he had remained as Foreign Minister when the Nazi came into power in order that he might exercise "a restraining influence" and render service to his country. This may have been the initial motive of von Neurath but he rapidly became one of the most complete and in some ways effective instruments of the Nazis. If he was not in accord with what they did, he was a perfect instrument in helping to carry it through. Although I had known him well in Berlin and had on occasions been in his house in small gatherings, when he came to Vienna in 1937, there were a number of ceremonies and receptions given by the Austrian Government to which the Diplomatic Corps was invited. When he met me at these meetings he treated me with great coolness and even disdain, knowing my complete lack of sympathy with the program to which he had committed himself, and this manner of treating me with disdain and open disregard was probably his way of protecting himself and his own feelings of shame. Shortly after the visit of von Neurath, Chancellor Schuschnigg in my conversations with him told me that in his conversations with von Neurath, during the visit, Von Neurath had been just as bad as if Habicht or Frauenfeld had been talking when they had discussed the German demands for the inclusion of Nazis in the Austrian Cabinet. About the same time, Schuschnigg made some concessions to ease the pressure from the Nazis. In February, he appointed a so-called "Committee of Seven", consisting among others of Dr. Jury and a man named Tavs, to discuss "nationalistic ambitions" with him. In June, following the visit of Glaise-Horstenau and
About the same time, Schuschnigg made some concessions to ease the pressure from the Nazis. In February, he appointed a so-called "Committee of Seven", consisting among others of Dr. Jury and a man named Tavs, to discuss "nationalistic ambitions" with him. In June, following the visit of Glaise-Horstenau and General Kraus and Leopold to Hitler in Berlin, and the increased Nazi activities following, Schuschnigg appointed Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Pembauer to devise a means whereby the "Nationalists" could be incorporated into the Patriotic Front. Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna Lawyer, who had long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the Nazi into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany, and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria's independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive that a man who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to destroy the independence of his country in order
who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for himself. I left Vienna on July 11, 1937, in order to assume the post of Assistant Secretary of State in Washington. I, therefore, left Vienna before the final tragedy occurred. The final outcome, however, was then already foreseeable. From the tenor of the Italian Minister's conversations with me it was clear that Italy would not or could not any longer defend Austria militarily against German aggression. It was also clear that Austria could not resist the German pressures alone. Although France had given very definite assurances as to her interest in maintaining Austria's independence and England had expressed her interest therein, the Austrian Government was less and less able to be assured of real support. When the Austrian government could no longer expect the full military support of Italy, it knew that its fate was sealed. Hitler was, therefore, free to work his will in Austria. The only question remaining was when he would do it and when he considered it opportune. The work of disintegration, set forth in this statement, had had its effect. Early in 1938, apparently satisfied that England and France would not move and knowing that Italy could not and would not oppose him, Hitler struck the final blow at Austria's independence, bringing to a climax what must be recorded in history as one of the most insidious, dastardly, unjustified and altogether effective series of measures to undermine and bring about the end of a sovereign state, during the course of which machinations and operations the Nazi Government nevertheless consistently openly proclaimed its friendliness towards Austria and its intentions of maintaining its respect for its sovereignty and independence. [Signed] G. Messersmith Subscribed and sworn to before me, William L. Brewster, a Vice Consul of the United States of America, duly commissioned and qualified, in Mexico, D.F., Mexico, this 28th day of August 1945. [Signed] William L. Brewster Vice Consul of the United States of
for its sovereignty and independence. [Signed] G. Messersmith Subscribed and sworn to before me, William L. Brewster, a Vice Consul of the United States of America, duly commissioned and qualified, in Mexico, D.F., Mexico, this 28th day of August 1945. [Signed] William L. Brewster Vice Consul of the United States of America Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946 Previous Document Volume IV Menu
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Document No. 1765-PS Previous Document Volume IV Menu Next Document TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1765-PS The commissioner for the four year plan Plenipotentiary for special missions Berlin W8, Behrenstr. 43, 15 Jan 43 SECRET To 1. His excellency, the Reich marshal of the Greater German Reich-commissioner for the four-year plan- a. Attention the secretary of state Koerner or his representative b. Attention the ministerial dirigent of Dr. Gramsch or his representative c. Attention ministerial councillor Dr. Kadgien or his representative d. Attention ministerial councillor Legler, or his representative 2. the commissioner for the four-year-plan- central planning-Attention state councillor Schieber or his representative. 3. The high command of the armed forces a. Office of economics-attention General Thomas or his representative b. Special staff HWK, attention Admiral Groos, or his representative c. Office of foreign intelligence, attention Admiral Canaris, or his representative d. Army Administration Office, attention General Osterkamp, or his representative e. Armed forces budget dept., attention Ministerial dirigent Dr. Tischbein, or his representative f. Armed forces administrative dept., attention Intendant General Dr. Biehler, or his representative. 4. The High Command of the army-Quartermaster General, attention, Maj. Gen. Wagner or his representative. 5. The Reich minister for Aviation and supreme commander of the Airforce, attention Field Marshal Milch, or his representative b. Administrative office of the airforce, attention General Crosrav or his representative c. Dept. GI-attention, chief engineer Sellschopp, or his representative 6. The high command of the navy, attention Admiral-General Witzell, or his representative. 7. The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police a. SS Main office of economic administration, attention SS brigadier General Loerner, or his representative. b. SS-Office for raw materials-SS-Colonel Kloth, or his representative. 8. The Foreign Office a. Attention Ministerial Director Wiehl, or his representative b. Attention VLR. Bisse, or his representative c. Attention Minister Hemmen, or his representative 9. The Ammunition Ministry a. Attention Reichsminister Speer,
for raw materials-SS-Colonel Kloth, or his representative. 8. The Foreign Office a. Attention Ministerial Director Wiehl, or his representative b. Attention VLR. Bisse, or his representative c. Attention Minister Hemmen, or his representative 9. The Ammunition Ministry a. Attention Reichsminister Speer, or his representative b. Attention Commercial Attache Ruckenbrod, or his representative 10. Reich Minister for Nutrition a. Attention Secretary of State Backe, or his representative b. Attention Ministerial Director Dr. Moritz, or his representative 11. Reich Minister of Finance a. Attention Reichsminister Count Schwerin-Krosigk, or his representative b. Attention Ministerial Councillor von Knorre, or his representative c. Attention Government Councillor Nitschke, or his representative 12. The Reichsminister of Economy a. Attention the secretary of State Dr. Landfried, or his representative b. Attention to the under secretary of state von Jagwitz, or his representative c. Attention for the President Kehrl, or his representative d. Attention to the Ministerial Councillor Dr. Drexl, or his representative e. Attention of the Chief Councillor of government Dr. Goetze, or his representative 13. The Main Office for Reich Security [RSHA] a. Attention SS-Brigadier General Ohlendorf, or his representative b. Attention SS-Colonel Schellenberg, or his representative 14. The Reich Commissioner for price control a. Attention Minister Fischboeck, or his representative b. Attention Government councillor Dr. Wurst, or his representative 15. The Auditor-Generals Office of the German Reich a. Attention Ministerial Councillor Kuesel-Glogau, or his representative b. Attention Office Councillor Rueger, or his representative 16. The Military Commander in France a. Attention KVCh Dr. Michel, or his representative b. Attention KVACh Frhr. v. Mahs, or his representative c. Attention OKVR Bolck, or his representative d. Attention Intendant of General Staff Lenz, or his representative 17. The Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France a. Attention KV Chief Reeder, or his representative b. Attention Ministerial dirigent Dr. Schlumprecht, or his representative c. Intendant in charge, Intendant of General Staff Fritsch, or his representative 18. Commissar of the
representative 17. The Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France a. Attention KV Chief Reeder, or his representative b. Attention Ministerial dirigent Dr. Schlumprecht, or his representative c. Intendant in charge, Intendant of General Staff Fritsch, or his representative 18. Commissar of the Reich for the occupied Dutch Territories a. Reichscommissar Dr. Seyss-Inquart, or his representative b. Dept. of industrial economy, attention Chief Councillor of government Dr. Heinemann, or his representative c. Dept. of the four-year plan, attention Mr. Pluemer, or his representative 19. Commander of the Armed Forces in the Netherlands a. General Christiansen, or his representative b. Intendant in charge, intendant of General Staff Dr. Geyer, or his representative 20. The Plenipotentiary General for Economy in Serbia, Counsul General Neuhausen, or his representative 21. The Supervisory Office in Paris, attention Lt. Col. Koch, or his representative, two copies 22. The Supervisory Office in Belgium, attention Lt. Col. V. Parish, or his representative, two copies 23. The Supervisory Office in Lille, attention Major Woehlke, or his representative, two copies 24. The Supervisory Office Netherlands, attention SS-Major Hanke, or his representative, two copies 25. The Supervisory Office Belgrade, attention Major Werner, or his representative, two copies 26. The Roges trading Company Ltd., attention Director Kraney, or his representative Enclosed I send copy of my second report of findings with the request for acknowledgement. Heil Hitler signed: J. Veltjens Col AC certified: Hillmann office employee The commissioner for the four-year plan plenipotentiary for special missions SECRET 2. Report of findings of the plenipotentiary for special missions A. Obtaining of war important goods on the black market in the occupied western territories and in Serbia. I. The black market up to the issue of the order to the plenipotentiary for special missions. II. Development of the black market since the 1 July 1942. 1. General 2. The organization created by the plenipotentiary for special missions. 3. Scope of the previous purchases (per 30 Nov. 1942). III. The further development B. Obtaining of harbor
issue of the order to the plenipotentiary for special missions. II. Development of the black market since the 1 July 1942. 1. General 2. The organization created by the plenipotentiary for special missions. 3. Scope of the previous purchases (per 30 Nov. 1942). III. The further development B. Obtaining of harbor installations and machines from shut down plants. I. Harbor installations II. Machines C. Christmas action. D. Miscellaneous. A. Providing of war important goods on the black market in the occupied western territories and in Serbia. I. The black market up to the issue of the order to the plenipotentiary for special missions. The beginning of a black market in the occupied territories can already be ascertained in the time before the German troops entered. It started however, on a large scale after the German occupation and as matters were, the occupation authorities could not prevent this.-The following reasons have necessarily led to its rise: 1. The scarcity of goods in consequence of the exploitation and rationing as a result of hoarding as an escape into material values (particularly in metals) and as a result of removal for the purpose of sabotaging the German Military power. 2. The impossibility of enforcing price limits completely and consequently a constant enlargement of the divergence of price between raw materials and finished products on one hand and between goods and wages on the other. 3. The impossibility of controlling the prices on the German model because of the lack of personnel in the German supervisory organizations. 4. The lack of effective support of the counter-measures by the individual administrative state authorities, primarily in France. 5. The inefficient criminal justice of the individual state criminal authorities. 6. The lack of discipline in the civilian population. This development was accelerated-particularly since the year 1942-by the attitude of numerous offices of the armed forces and other German organizations. The raw materials and finished products needed by these offices could often not be placed at disposal on the desired scale by the home land within the framework of existing priority measures. Consequently it became often actually the
of numerous offices of the armed forces and other German organizations. The raw materials and finished products needed by these offices could often not be placed at disposal on the desired scale by the home land within the framework of existing priority measures. Consequently it became often actually the practice simply to use the way of supply through the black market. The activity of German agencies on the black market gradually reached an extent which led to increasingly more unbearable conditions; it was daily routine for the black marketeers to offer their goods simultaneously to several offices for sale and that that office which offered the best price received the merchandise so that the individual German formations in this manner not only snatched the merchandise away from one another, but also, inflated the prices. Finally the black market dealings took a course which gave impetus to the most serious fears with respect to market- and currency policy. The military commanders in France, Belgium and northern France and the Reichscommissar for the occupied territories of the Netherlands therefore took measures during the course of the year 1941 to bring this development to a halt. However, in this respect the lever was not-at any rate not primarily-inserted at the price side because this promised only little success in the face of the internal conditions prevailing in the occupied territories; just as little could a stricter control of prices be considered at that time. The central occupation authorities rather began to do business themselves on the black market, with the aim of slowly gaining control of it and then to kill it gradually. These actions can be viewed as the predecessors of the organization of the Bfs, (Plenipotentiary for special missions) here also the purchased goods were distributed centrally and because the winding up was also executed through the Roges (in France) or through the AWG (in Belgium) and the Bfs. in Holland in conjunction with the department "four year plan" of the Reich commissioner on the one hand and the departments of the Reich on the other. The purchase was at times made through a single purchasing agency. However, such a procedure had to be denied the desired
AWG (in Belgium) and the Bfs. in Holland in conjunction with the department "four year plan" of the Reich commissioner on the one hand and the departments of the Reich on the other. The purchase was at times made through a single purchasing agency. However, such a procedure had to be denied the desired success as long as it was not possible to hold off all the other offices from activity on the black market; it would have been a prerequisite for this, that all central authorities in the Reich had instructed the departments subordinated to them accordingly, but this was only done in part. Finally, in June 1942 the plenipotentiary for special missions [Bfs] in agreement with all central authorities was ordered to take charge of the seizure and central control of the black markets. With that, the prerequisite for an effective beginning regarding the problem of the black market and with it the struggle against it existed for the first time. II. Development of the black market since 1 July 1942. 1. General. The plenipotentiary for special missions has from the beginning on viewed the purpose of the mission given to him less in presenting the highest possible figures of purchases; the final aim was set rather to combat the black market that is, to bring it to an end. The starting point had to be however, that as long as in the occupied territories an essential part of the goods existing or produced at all, disappears by reason of inefficient control or various other reasons in the black market, in the interest of supplying the German war economy with the most important raw materials and finished products, as textiles and PX rations, seizure of these goods could not be avoided. One fact is overlooked again and again: that the black market is not a phenomenon evoked through the activity of the plenipotentiary for special missions or other departments, but-as is shown under I-has developed inevitably from the economic situation of the market and will exist and have to be exploited in the German interest as long as no way has been found to break it up completely or at least check it to the extent that the amount of goods caught through it are meaningless within the framework of the total supply.
from the economic situation of the market and will exist and have to be exploited in the German interest as long as no way has been found to break it up completely or at least check it to the extent that the amount of goods caught through it are meaningless within the framework of the total supply. However, the figures given later on in detail show that for the time being there cannot be any question about it. But the figures given later on show also that the purchases made on the black market could contribute essentially to the covering of many gaps in the supply of the German war economy without impairing the quota of deliveries in the occupied territories. Therefore the purchases can already for this reason not be refrained from as long as it has not been established that the goods can be secured in another way. The objection that these goods could have been secured anyhow within the frame work of the normal supply-and then much cheaper,-is incorrect. A typical example is the result of the last negotiations with France regarding leathergoods: Upon the desire of the Reichsminister of economics, the chief plenipotentiary for special missions had agreed to stopping the purchases on the leather and hide market, if the French who had complained about the German buying activity on the black market, would oblige themselves to deliver additionally in 1943 the same amount which had been bought in 1942 on the black market; the French declared that they did not feel in a position to do this. The objection mentioned is overlooking the fact that merchandise which had once been withdrawn from production or had been produced illegally, will never again become "white". What is done cannot be undone, the black market is in existence and would also exist without any doubt if not a single German department would work in this field. The black market receives new impulse again and again and that on the one hand from the supply side, and 1. from the large hidden stocks still in existence, 2. from the illegal production which is taking place continuously (this subject will have to be investigated later on more in detail) 3. in France-at any rate up to date-through continuous supply from the unoccupied territory; on the other hand, at the always increasing scarcity of goods every item finds a buyer, either from