dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. NELTE: I shall later deal more in detail with this problem, which is closely connected with the rearmament. Here it is only important that the circles to which Keitel belonged-and I should like to add, between 1933 and 1938- (1) had no contact with the Party program; (2) had no relationship with Party circles; (3) sympathized with a part of the Party program because it corresponded to their national attitude; (4) did not think of realizing these national points by an aggressive war, because it would have been hopeless from the military point of view. Now one could argue that although the generals themselves did not think of waging an aggressive war, they certainly recognized, f or should have recognized, that Hitler had the intention, if not now, then in the near future, of waging an aggressive war. The Prosecution believes it can be presumed that the Defendant Keitel had this knowledge from 1933 on. The argument of the Prosecution that this knowledge is equivalent to knowledge of the National Socialist program has been refuted; the same holds true of the knowledge of the book Mein Kampf-assuming he possessed the book. Therefore, the question is only whether Keitel had knowledge of Hitler's intentions regarding an aggression for other reasons. For the period up to 1938 Keitel could not have obtained knowledge from Hitler himself because Keitel spoke with him late in January 1938 for the first time. The speeches which Hitler made before that time, just as those of the other Party leaders, were unambiguously aimed at preserving peace. Looking back, one might call it propagandistic camouflage of opposite intentions. If that were the case, then this camouflage successfully deceived not only many millions of Germans, but also the foreign countries which were partly critical and partly hostile toward National Socialism. Keitel believed the protestations of peaceful intentions, and saw their honesty confirmed also by official proposals of disarmament and treaties with England and Poland.
DR. NELTE: He believed them all the more because, as has already been said, an aggressive war appeared to him an impossibility. The Codefendant Von Neurath too, frequently declared here that all his information and knowledge of Hitler's policy up to 5 November 1937 justified his firm conviction that Hitler did not want to realize his political aims by force or aggressive wars. It was only by the speech of 5 November 1937 that this conviction of Von Neurath's was shaken. In the arguments in Dr. Schacht's defense to which I referred, those facts were presented which show a contradiction between the former conduct of the victorious powers and the thesis which the Prosecution advances on this question. Through their official relations and beyond these, the victorious powers showed that, despite their knowledge of all the circumstances of which the defendants are now being accused, they, that is, the victors, did not believe in Hitler's intentions, or did not recognize these intentions of realizing his aims by aggressive war. The Prosecution now makes the accusation against the defendant that he knew, or ought to have known, such intentions of Hitler. This is not convincing, and I can leave it to the Tribunal to judge who-if all contingencies are taken into consideration-had better possibilities of obtaining information on Hitler's true intentions. I believe the Defendant Keitel may claim for himself the same good faith and the same ignorance, unless such knowledge or participation itself results from other circumstances. Such circumstances during the years 1933 through 1938 may have concerned Keitel's activity in connection with rearmament and in the Reich Defense Committee. The charge of illegal rearmament includes two facts which have been summed up by the Prosecution: (1) Secret rearmament by circumventing the Treaty of Versailles; (2) Rearmament with the purpose of planning wars of aggression.
DR. NELTE: For a judicial consideration, however, these facts must be kept 'strictly apart; for they are different with respect to cause and effect, and they must also be legally assessed from different points of view. The time between 1933 and 1938 is the fateful period, a period of development and conversion. The forces of the hitherto existing order are struggling against the new which have not yet taken definite shape. Everything is in fermentation. The aims remain obscure. They are camouflaged by the adoption of existing nationalistic tendencies. By clever propagandistic utilization of these tendencies, the psychological basis for the aims pursued by the new rulers is being created without being noticed by those whom it concerned. Here lies the problem of the Armed Forces leadership and of the Defendant Keitel during this period with which I am going to deal now. This problem cannot be solved without taking into consideration Germany's military position. In judging the then Colonel Keitel another consideration enters the picture: how the special sphere to which he belonged was affected by this situation. Keitel considered the Treaty of Versailles, and especially the military clauses, as a humiliation for Germany. He considered it a duty toward his country to collaborate in putting an end to this situation. He was convinced that the Treaty of Versailles, because of its impossible military and territorial stipulations, would have to be revised some day. Such a revision appeared to him imperative, in the interest of justice as well as of reason, if a lasting world peace was to be preserved. On the basis of this conviction he believed that as a German and a soldier, he was entitled, in the official capacities in which he acted during this period, to interpret the military stipulations of the Versailles Treaty literally, even if this was in contradiction to the spirit of the stipulation.
DR. NELTE: His justification for this was that the stipulations limited the possibilities of development in an unbearable manner, that is, in a manner altogether insufficient for an effective defense. Though he did not participate personally, he did not consider it wrong for Germany' under the given circumstances, to construct submarines in Finland, not for herself, but for the purpose of gathering experience and training specialists; or to maintain construction and designing offices in Amsterdam in order to observe the progress achieved in the field of aeronautics and to make use of it without actually building planes. Symptomatic of the way democratic Germany of that time thought-without consideration of position and party-was Dr. Bruning's statement which on 15 February 1932 was broadcast over all U.S.A. radio stations on the occasion of the meeting of the disarmament conference. I am going to quote some passages from that speech: "The inner-political fights in Germany are very bitter in their outward forms, to be sure; but this must not lead one to overlook the fact that despite many differences there exist indisputably many things in common also. On the two decisive foreign-political questions of today, the questions of disarmament and reparations, uniform opinions prevail among the German people. The demand for equal rights and equal security is shared by the entire German people. Every German Government will have to uphold these demands. That the fight of the parties as to the road which our politics must take is perhaps more bitter in Germany today than in some other countries, is a result of the deep misery which weighs heavily upon Germany and greatly burdens the people's soul." In connection with this point I also refer to the testimony which the Codefendant Von Neurath gave on 22 June 1946. These words which Bruning spoke prove that there was a demand which was upheld by the entire people irrespective of the difference in parties: The demand for equal rights and equal security.
DR. NELTE: The objection to that is: A demand, even if upheld by the entire people, does not in itself create the right to violate or circumvent established regulations. In principle, one can accept that. However, things were not as simple as that. I do not wish to harp upon a fundamental law applying to all countries and giving every nation the right to create for itself a certain state of defense. But even if one is not prepared to recognize such a fundamental law, one will still perhaps understand the state of emergency which actually exists when a country is so limited in its military potential that it is not only liable to military attack by any neighbor but also condemned to political impotency. In the course of the hearing of evidence the Tribunal has had occasion to recognize that this was true with regard to the situation in which Germany found herself in the year 1933. I want to call your attention to the following passages of the Field Marshal's report which was submitted to the Tribunal. The following passages, written by this outstanding soldier, summarize as follows the experience of a patriotic and military life as regards the point discussed here under the title "Rearmament": "Nature is inclined to pass over weak people. The law that only the strong survive is generally recognized..." I quote further: "The world does not take seriously the wishes of the weak. Weakness is too great a temptation for the strong." And finally I quote: "Above all, it seems to me, we must correct the tragic misunderstanding that a policy directed at security is a war policy." The best witness with regard to this question, which is so important for the Defendant Keitel, is the book by a British Major General, A. C. Temperley, (Publishers Collins, 1938) The Whispering Gallery of Europe, for which the British Foreign Secretary of the second World War, Mr. Anthony Eden, wrote a very friendly, concurring preface.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, wouldn't it be possible for you to pass over the reading of these passages which come from the book of Major General Temperley? The Tribunal will take notice of them. There are quite a number of long speeches from the book.
DR. NELTE: I intended to ask the Tribunal whether it would kindly take judicial notice of these passages if I submit them. They carry particular weight because Temperley reports and judges retrospectively from the year of 1938. The statements made by Temperley, who witnessed the disarmament conference, the official negotiations and the negotiations behind the scenes, are deeply moving because they reveal the tragic-I must use the word-fateful- and primary conflict: fateful because the thesis presented by the representatives of the different countries-which was derived from the national, given conditions and from traditionally bound conceptions-proved that the difficulties could not be overcome and thus formed the origin of the confusion the last consequences of which we have just experienced. Temperley says: 1) (Page 50) "The French had studied the question of disarmament much more thoroughly than any other nation, and some of their best brains of the General Staff and Naval Staff had examined the problem for months ... To characterize their problem roughly, it was their goal to disarm themselves as little as possible although they were the strongest power of the world, but at the same time to keep Germany in a state of disarmament down to the minutes" detail according to the conditions of the peace treaty... (page 71) "`In the report which I gave, I spared neither the French nor us. We had made big mistakes, but at that time I came to recognize that in reality the French never thought of disarming at all... M. Paul Boneour certainly was honest and worked intensively in order to achieve success,, but the pressure of the French General Staff upon the Government was too great... 621~ 2) (Page 126) "Mr. Stresemann knew his people best. It was a race against time. How long could he keep his people in an atmosphere of cooperative acquiescence any tangible success in the form of concessions on the part of the Allies? Ought the Allied Governments to have given faster and more willingly what they were ready to give? Would this gesture have prevented the catastrophe? .
DR. NELTE: . . Doubtless, history will provide the answer. I do not know what kind of an answer it is going to be, but it seems certain to me that the most important period, when Germany turned away from the road of peace, will be found to be the period of co-operation between 1929 and 1930... Would a less hesitating policy as regards the Cancellation of the debts, economic reconstruction, and concessions in the treaties have prevented Hitlerism and all its consequences? Who knows? . . . In his Review of International Affairs, 1930, Professor Arnold Toynbee writes: 'For the foreign observer who visited Germany at that time it was a terrible and strange drama to see a whole nation-one of the greatest and most civilized nations of the world-engaged in a heroic struggle against fate, had paralyzed already in titanic battle, driven by the conviction that its steps had already irresistibly been led on to the path of destruction.' (Pages 128 and 129) "The German people had lost hope. .. The French had always contended that Germany would maintain a pretext of modesty as long as the Rhineland was occupied, and that when the occupation ceased the true color would show... This has proved to be a good prediction, yet it was a concurrence of circumstances and the expression of a people taking its last gasp rather than premeditated planning... 3) (Page 151) "I was present at the session and was profoundly moved in the face of the attitude of the French delegation and that of the Little Entente. They believed that they now had Germany financially by the throat and that her utter ruin was only a question of weeks. Our Foreign Office recognized the situation. Yet after a discussion with Henderson I ask myself whether he really did recognize the abyss which was gaping before us..." Perhaps one certain passage might be of interest, on Page 38, under (4): "I also name the general staffs, because there is no greater illusion than that they, taken as a whole, are in favor of war.
DR. NELTE: I know the general staffs of many countries very well, and have never known any general staff which would have glorified war or would have wished for war. They knew too much about it. If they advocated strength, it was because ~ they believed in the idea that armed strength can prevent war. "fin opposition to the bloodthirsty pacifists who reject modern weapons, but who immediately clamor for their presence on the battlefield when one must resist attackers... This leads to the conclusion that armaments are not the main reason for wars. The history of the years 1926 to 1931 is not that of a race for rearmament, But that of a slowly developing deterioration of the international situation because of the economic and political chaos, which made disarmament impossible and rearmament unavoidable... (Page 222) "The Germans actually repeated their successful tactics in circumventing treaties, the very tactics they had used id Napoleon's time. And yet, one wonders what other honor-loving nation in the same circumstances would not also have done its utmost to Circumvent a treaty which had been forced upon it at the point of the bayonet... (Page 232) "The following 6 months brought Germany's return, Hoover's failure and that of the French plans, and the complete change in the atmosphere through Hitler seizure of power. However dreadful this was for the peace of the world-the other powers, above all France, have only themselves to blame for it... We should have exerted more pressure upon the French and made greater efforts to keep a moderate government in office in Germany. (Page 256) ''. . . they felt they were still being treated as outlaws . . ." B22 I would like to ask that these opinions of the British general which, as I already said, had the approval of the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, be taken into consideration. In this connection I want to refer also to the statements by the following statesmen: Paul Boneour, Henderson, Briand, and Cecil, these statements were submitted by Dr.
DR. NELTE: Schacht's defense (Schacht Document Book Number 3 Exhibit Schacht-12) on the same subject matter and were accepted by the Tribunal; I also want to refer to the book by Viscount Rothermere: Warnings and Predictions (Page 100). In examining and deciding whether the Defendant Keitel knowingly violated the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in the meaning of the Indictment, the Tribunal will have to consider the facts which have been presented. Individual charges against him on this point have not been made. It is unquestionable that from 1933 on rearmament took place in the Reich. The Defendant Keitel has admitted that, and he stated that in the official positions he held up to 30 September 1934 and from 1 October 1935 on he participated in this rearmament in accordance with the functions incumbent on him. Like everything the Germans do, the rearmament too was well thought out and organized. The Prosecution collected data for that; especially Document Number 2353-PS and the transcripts of the sessions of the Reich Defense Committee. During the hearing of evidence the total picture of this period from 1935 to 1938 was not clearly defined. The Prosecution arranged its presentation of evidence retrospectively and drew a conclusion from the results of the war as to the motive for the rearmament, but at the same time it deduced from the fact, which cannot be denied and has not been denied, that this rearmament could not have been planned and carried out by any one man, that it constituted a joint plot for the purpose of aggressive war. Now, where is the decisive criterion: in military armament or in other preparations for war from which the conclusion may be drawn that these measures have an aggressive character, that is to say, that they aim at an aggressive war? In principle, from armament itself nothing can be deduced as to the alleged intentions; armament may, in fact it must, look just the same if carried out for security and defense as it would if applied to aggressive war.
DR. NELTE: Therefore, if the intention of rearmament for the purpose of a plot is to be determined, distinction must be made between: (a) Armament and preventive measures which must be taken in case a mobilization should become necessary for defense at any time; (b) Rearmament and enacting of measures which exceed, in quantity or quality, the volume under (a) to such an extent that the intention of the political leadership to begin a war will be recognized by those concerned, in which case the political question of whether an aggressive, defensive, or preventive war is intended may be disregarded. Therefore, in the end, the decisive question will be whether in connection with these measures the intention of planning for an aggressive war was expressed or had become otherwise noticeable, or whether the measures, because of their nature and volume, demand the conclusive deduction that an aggressive war was being prepared. In retrospect, the events are presented as the logical chain of a development according to plan. In reality, not only Hitler's far reaching intentions and his planning were subject to an actual course of events in which, objectively viewed, a certain causality seems to be inherent, but the knowledge and approving support of co-operating circles were equally subject to this. There can be no dispute over the statement that the economic capacity of a country, which in its totality must be regarded as armament for the case of war, will eventually get to a point which must be considered of decisive importance in solving the question of when the rearmament, that is, the status of the entire industry essential for war, exceeds the capacity of armament for defense. While considering this, it must be taken into account, especially for the Defendant Keitel as a soldier, that until he took over the of lice of Chief of OKW on 4 February he had not held an important position.
DR. NELTE: Now, what part did the Defendant Keitel play at that time, (a) In the field of rearmament with regard to material and personnel; (b) in the field of administrative and-as charged by the Prosecution-military-political rearmament as dealt with under the heading of the Reich Defense Council? I shall now skip Pages 43 to 46, since they contain the historical development of the organizational principles, and I beg the Tribunal, if it can make use of this information, to consider it in reaching a verdict. I shall continue on Page 47. When on 1 October 1935 the Defendant Keitel became the Chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces in the Reich Ministry of Von Blomberg, there was a Military Economy Branch headed by Colonel Thomas. He was appointed by Von Blomberg as an expert adviser for the organization. This Military Economy Branch, later called the Military Economy Staff, as a ministerial service post had to represent the Reich Minister of War with the competent and authoritative economy posts, later also with the Plenipotentiary General for Economy (GB), nominated in 1935. The Minister of War, Von Blomberg, generally communicated directly with Thomas at the time when Field Marshal Keitel was Chief of the Armed Forces Department. To clarify the part Keitel had in the organizational development of rearmament in this period, I would explain the following: I. The position at the start in 1933 (for the period 1933-38) was as follows: Lack of any kind of basis for production as a consequence of the destruction of the armament industry following the Treaty of Versailles. Consequence: no capacity for production, no motor vehicles, no mechanical equipment, no offices for construction, no experience. Thus the first stage for rearmament: the restoration of a basis for production, and equipment and reconversion of factories. IT.
DR. NELTE: Basic initial factors to procure armaments: (a) Branches of the Armed Forces, in issuing orders to firms through their ordnance offices as purchasing agents, were handicapped by budget means and their incorporation in the budget year. Consequence: Subsidizing of firms for lack of long term orders and through the impossibility of calculation. (b) War Economy Office in the OKW as the central organizer and representative of the producer firms through War Economy Dater Armament) Inspectorates as intermediary offices in the military area, to serve the branches of the Armed Forces as executive. Duties of the organization, which was run by a military staff: (1) To gain information about and recommend firms to the military branches. (2) To adjust the orders of the military branches to the capacity. (3) To provide for the allotment of raw materials, machinery, and manpower. (4) To further the extension and capacity of industrial plants. (5) To protect the plants from bad investments, air raids, espionage, et cetera. (c) The Plenipotentiary for Economy, GBW, as from the autumn of 1935 was the declared organizer of the entire German economy for its mobilization in case of war and its prospective leader during a war. His duties in peacetime were preparatory only: 1. Statistical co-ordination of' the individual industrial and economic branches, including the armament authorities connected with the OKW, and the War Economy office under Thomas. 2. Provision and storing of raw materials obtainable by importation only. 3. Procurement of foreign currencies for importation. 4. Financing of domestic rearmament. 5. Planning of reconversion of the entire economy to war needs, and extension of the special armament industry. 6. Duties as mentioned already under II (b), (3), and (4), together with the War Economy office in the OKW.