dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): As Plenipotentiary Funk was charged with insuring the economic conditions for the production of the armament industry, according to the requirements of the High Command. Frick as Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration (Document Number 2978-PS), with Funk and Keitel, formed the Three Man College planning the necessary steps and decrees in case of war. It is unnecessary in assessing this work of rearmament to do more by way of summary than to quote the words of Hitler himself in the memorandum which Jodl described as written during two nights of work by the Fuehrer personally and which he sent to the Defendants Raeder, Goering, and Keitel. In that memorandum of 9 October 1939, Hitler finally disposes of the evidence of these defendants that Germany was never adequately prepared for war (Document Number L-52): "The military application of our people's strength has been carried through to such an extent that within a short time at any rate it cannot be markedly improved upon by any manner of effort." And again: "The warlike equipment of the German people is at present larger in quantity and better in quality for a great number of German divisions, than in the year 1914. The weapons themselves, taking a substantial cross section, are more modern than is the case with any other country in the world at this time. They have just proved their supreme warworthiness in a victorious campaign. In the case of the armaments of other countries this has yet to be demonstrated. In some arms Germany today possesses clear indisputable superiority of weapons." And then, speaking of the ammunition available after the conclusion of the Polish campaign: "There is no evidence available to show that any country in the world disposes of a better total ammunition stock than the German Reich.... The Air Force at present is numerically the strongest in the world....
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): The anti-aircraft artillery is not equalled by any country in the world." That, then, was the practical result of 6 years of intensive rearmament carried out at the expense and with the knowledge of the whole of the German people. Meanwhile the youth of Germany was educated and drilled in semimilitary formations for war and then, on reaching the age for conscription, was called up for more intensive training. This was going on throughout the Reich, together with the enormous work of economic preparation. Is it to be believed that any one of these men did not guess-did not, indeed, know-the purpose of this terrific effort? If, indeed, any of them was in doubt, the successful actions in which-to use the words of one of Neurath's witnesses-"the Nazis were able to reap cheap laurels without war through the successfully practiced tactics of bluff and sudden surprise,"-must have opened their eyes. The first step was the Rhineland and the technique became the model for each subsequent move. On 21 May 1935, Hitler gave a solemn assurance that the stipulations of Versailles and Locarno were being observed. Yet 3 weeks earlier on the very day of the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact, later to become the official excuse for the reoccupation of the Rhineland, and the defense for it, before this Tribunal, the first directive for reoccupation had been issued to the service chiefs. The Defendant Jodl, having perhaps noted the significance of the date, has sought to persuade the Tribunal that his first admission, that "Operation Schulung" referred to the reoccupation of the Rhineland, was wrong, and that it applied to some military excursion in the Tyrol. Yet on the 26th of June he himself was addressing the Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council on the plans for reoccupation and revealing that weapons, equipment, insignia, and field grey uniforms were being stored in the zone under conditions of the greatest secrecy (Document Number ECHO). Can anyone who reads his words doubt that this process had been going on at least for 7 weeks?
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): Any representative of the innumerable departments who attended that meeting and heard Jodl's remarks on the 26th of June 1935 or who subsequently read the minutes knew what to expect. On the 2d of March 1936 the final orders were given and passed to the Navy 4 days later (Document Number C-194). The Defendants Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Frick, Schacht, and Goering were all involved in the necessary executive action and, if his U-boats complied with the instruction of the 6th of March, the Defendant Doenitz, as well. From the beginning, at every stage you see the common plan worked out-and worked out as it could only be if each of those men played his allotted part. First the period of apparent quiet, during which treaties are concluded, assurances given, and protestations of friendship made while beneath the surface the Auslands Organisation under Hess and Rosenberg begins to undermine and disrupt. The victim is deceived by open promises and weakened by underhand methods. Next, the decision to attack is taken and military preparations are hastened. If the victim shows signs of suspicion, the assurances of friendship are redoubled. Meanwhile, the finishing touches are put to the work accomplished by the fifth column. Then when all is prepared, what Hitler called "the propagandist cause for starting the war" is chosen, frontier incidents are faked, abuse and threats take place of fair words and everything is done to terrify the victim into submission. Finally, the blow is struck without warning. The plan varies in detail from case to case, but essentially, it is the same, the perfect example repeated again and again, of treachery, intimidation, and murder. The next step was Austria. First, the Nazis arranged the murder of Dollfuss in 1934. After the evidence in the case of the Defendant Neurath, there can be little doubt as to his assassination being plotted in Berlin and arranged by Habicht and Hitler some six weeks before.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): The failure of that Putsch made it necessary to temporize, and accordingly in May 1935 Hitler gave a complete assurance to Austria (Document Number TC-26). At the same time the Defendant Papen was sent to undermine the Austrian Government. With the occupation of the Rhineland, Austria was next on the program but Hitler was still not yet ready, hence the solemn agreement of July 1936 (Document Number T-22). By the autumn of 1937 Papen's reports showed progress and accordingly the plot was divulged at the Hossbach meeting (Document Number 386-PS). A slight delay was necessary for the removal of the refractory Army leaders, but in February 1938, Papen having completed his plotting with Seyss-Inquart, Schuschnigg was lured to Berchtesgaden and bullied by Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Keitel. Shortly afterward, the final scene took place; Goering played his part in Berlin. The defendants, Goering, Hess, Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Frick, Schacht, Papen, and Neurath, were all aware of this Austrian plot, Neurath and Papen from the very beginning of it. With the exception of Goering, each one of them has attempted to put forward a defense of ignorance which cannot be regarded as other than ludicrous in the light of the documents. Not one of them has suggested that he protested, each one of them remained in office thereafter. Already the plan for Czechoslovakia was ready; it had been discussed at the Hossbach meeting in November 1937, within 3 weeks of the Munich Agreement the directive to prepare to march in had been given and on the 15th of March 1939, President Hacha having been duly bullied by Hitler, Ribbentrop, Goering, and Keitel, Prague was occupied and the Protectorate established by Frick and Neurath. You will remember the astonishing admission of Goering that although he certainly threatened to bomb Prague he never really intended to do it. Ribbentrop also seems to have considered that in diplomacy any lie is permissible. The stage was now set for Poland.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): As Jodl explained (Document Number L-172): "The peaceful solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and the annexation of Czechoslovakia rounded off the territory of greater Germany so that it was possible to consider the Polish problem on a basis of more 'or less favorable strategic premises." And now the time has come when, to use Hitler's words (Document Number 386-PS): "German policy must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and France." And accordingly followed the policy laid down by Ribbentrop in January 1938 (Document Number TC-75): "The formation in great secrecy but with wholehearted tenacity of a coalition against England." In the case of Poland, however, the German Foreign Office had already advised Ribbentrop as long ago as a month before Munich in the following terms (Document Number TC-76): "It is unavoidable that the German departure from the border problems in the southeast and their direction to the east and northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact is that after the solution of the Czech problem it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in turn. But the later this assumption sinks in in international politics as a firm factor the better. In this sense, however, it is important for the time being to carry on German policy under the well-known and proved slogans of the right to autonomy and racial unity. Anything else might be interpreted as pure imperialism on our part and create resistance to our plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically than our forces could stand up to." In this case, therefore, the usual assurances were reiterated and again and again Hitler and Ribbentrop made the most explicit statements.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): Meanwhile the usual steps were taken, and following the meeting of the 23d of May 1939 (Document L-79), which Raeder described as an academic lecture on war, the final military economic and political preparations for war against Poland were taken and in due time war was commenced; and you get that quotation that you have heard so often, and it ought to be remembered for all times (Document Number 1014-PS): . "The victor shall not be asked later on whether we were telling the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the right is what matters, but victory." These were Hitler's words, but those men echoed and implemented them at every stage. That was the doctrine underlying Nazi policy. Step by step the conspirators had reached the crucial stage and had launched Germany upon an attempt' to dominate Europe and involve the world in untold horror. Not one of these men had turned against the regime. Not one of them except Schacht-to whose vital contribution to the creation of the Nazi monster I shall return later-had resigned and even he continued to lend his name to the Nazi Government. Would that be a convenient place to adjourn?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we will adjourn now. [A recess was taken.]
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: If it please the Tribunal: Holland having been overrun, the course of the war soon showed that Germany's military aims and the interests of her strategy would be improved by further aggression. I do not propose to take time now by tracing again the various steps. As Hitler said at the meeting in November 1939 (Document 739-PS): "Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring forth as silly a reason for the breach of neutrality as in 1914." Norway and Denmark were invaded. No kind of excuse, then or now, has been put forward for the occupation of Denmark, but a strenuous attempt has been made in the course of this Trial to suggest that Norway was invaded only because the Germans believed that the Allies were about to take a similar step. Even if it were true, it would be no answer, but the German documents completely dispose of the suggestion that it was for such a reason that the Germans violated Norwegian neutrality. Hitler, Goering, and Raeder had agreed as early as November 1934, and I quote (Document Number C-190): "...no war could be carried on if the Navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia." Accordingly, as the European struggle drew near, a nonaggression pact was made with Denmark on 31 May 1939 (Document Number TC-24) following the mutual assurance to both Norway and Denmark which had already been given a month earlier (Document Number TC-30). At the outbreak of the war a further assurance was made to Norway (Document Number TC-31), followed by another on the 6th of October (Document Number TC-32).
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: On the 6th of September, 4 days after his assurance, Hitler was discussing with Raeder the Scandinavian problem and his political intentions in regard to the Nordic states, expressed in Admiral Assman's diary as: "a North Germanic community with limited sovereignty in close dependence on Germany." On the 9th of October, 3 days after his most recent assurance, in his memorandum for the information of Raeder, Goering, and Keitel, Hitler was writing of the great danger of the Allies blocking the exits for U-boats between Norway and the Shetlands and of the consequent importance of "the creation of U-boat strongpoints outside these constricted home bases" (Document Number L-52). Where outside the constricted home bases if not in Norway? It is significant that the very next day D8nitz submitted a report on the comparative advantages of the different Norwegian bases (Document C-5), having discussed the matter with Raeder some 6 days before (Document C-122). The strategic advantages were apparent to all these men and the hollowness of the defense that the invasion of Norway was decided upon because it was believed that the Allies were going to invade is completely exposed when you consider the statement in Hitler's memorandum preceding the passage I have just quoted, that (Document Number L-52): "Provided no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed. The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible even in a war of long duration." Hitler saw no threat from the Allies at that time. Rosenberg and Goering's deputy, Korner, had been in touch with Quisling and Hagelin as early as June and it is clear from Rosenberg's subsequent report that Hitler had been kept fully informed (Document Number 004-PS). In December the time for planning had arrived and the decision to prepare for invasion was accordingly taken at a meeting between Hitler and Raeder (Document Number C-66).
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: It was not long before Keitel and Jodl issued the necessary directives and in due course as necessary, Goering, Doenitz, and Ribbentrop were involved. On the 9th of October, as I have already said, Hitler was confident that there would be no danger to the Nordic states from the Allies. All the alleged intelligence reports contain no information which comes within miles of justifying an anticipatory invasion based-you might think it is laughable-on the doctrines of selfpreservation. It is true that in February 1940 Raeder pointed out to him that if England did occupy Norway the whole Swedish supply of ore to Germany would be endangered (Document Number D-881), but on the 26th of March he advised that the Russo-Finnish conflict having ceased, the danger of an Allied landing was no longer considered serious. Nonetheless he went on to suggest that the German invasion, for which all the directives had been issued, should take place at the next new moon, on the 7th of April (Document Number R-81). It is interesting to note that Raeder's own war diary signed by himself and his chief of staff operations records a similar opinion 4 days earlier. If further evidence were needed to show that the actual step was taken regardless of any risk of interference from the West, it is to be found in telegrams from the German ministers at both Oslo and Stockholm and from the German military attaché at Stockholm, advising the German Government that, far from being worried over invasion by the British, the Scandinavian Governments were apprehensive that it was the Germans who intended to invade (Documents Number D-843, D-844, D-845). Perhaps Jodl's comment in his diary for March that Hitler "is still looking for an excuse" (Document Number 1809-PS) with Raeder's lame explanation that this refers to the text of the diplomatic note which would have to be sent and Ribbentrop's assertion that he was informed of the invasion only a day or so before it was to take place are as conclusive as anything else of the dishonesty of this defense.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Once again all these men in their different spheres were playing their appointed parts-notably, of course, Rosenberg, who paved the way, Goering, Raeder, Keitel, Jodl, and Ribbentrop who took the necessary executive action. Not one of them protested: Even Fritzsche's only defense is that he was not told until a very late stage when he was as usual required to broadcast. He does not suggest that he protested. Once again, a completely ruthless invasion of two countries was undertaken in breach of every treaty and assurance, solely because it was strategically desirable to have Norwegian bases and to secure Scandinavian ore. And so it went on: Yugoslavia, her fate settled before the war, Greece, and then Soviet Russia. The German-Soviet Pact of the 23d of August 1939 paved the way. Complete worthlessness of a Ribbentrop signature is made clear by Hitler's memorandum 6 weeks later, where he remarked (Document Number L-52): "The trifling significance of treaties of agreement has been proved on all sides in recent years." By the 18th of December 1940 it must have become apparent that the German hopes of overcoming the resistance of Great Britain-then and for many months holding the fort of freedom and democracy alone against an enemy never more powerful than at that time- were vain, and so the first directive was issued for an attack in another direction this time-against Soviet Russia (Document Number 446-PS). It is indeed true-and it is interesting-that on this occasion a number of the defendants did make some objection. Little Norway might be violated without protest: There was no danger there. There was happy acquiescence in the rape of the gallant Netherlands and of Belgium. But here was an enemy which might perhaps strike fear in the heart of the bully. The defendants objected, of course, if at all, on purely military grounds, although Raeder does say that he was influenced by the moral wrong which a breach of the German Soviet treaty would involve. It is for you to say.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: These moral scruples which ought so properly to have manifested themselves on countless other occasions are only previously recorded when one of his of fleers wishes to marry a lady of doubtful reputation. The truth is that some of these men were beginning to become apprehensive. Great Britain's resistance had already begun to make them think. Was Hitler now taking on another enemy whom he could not defeat? Once the decision was taken, however, every one of them set to work to play his part with his usual disregard for all laws of morality or even decency. In no single case did a declaration of war precede military action. How many thousands of innocent, inoffensive men, women, and children, sleeping in their beds in the happy belief that their country was and would remain at peace, were suddenly blown into eternity by death dropped on them without warning from the skies? In what respect does the guilt of any one of these men differ from the common murderer creeping stealthily to do his victims to death in order that he may rob them of their belongings? In every single case, as the documents (Documents 386-PS, L-79) make clear, this was the common plan. The attack must be "blitzartig schnell"-without warning, with the speed of lightning-Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland-Raeder repeating Keitel's directive for "heavy blows struck by surprise" (Document Number C-126)- Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Russia. As Hitler had said in the presence of a number of these men (Document Number L-79): "Considerations of right or wrong or treaties do not enter into the matter." The killing of combatants in war is justifiable, both in international and in municipal law, only where the war itself is legal. But where a war is illegal, as a war started not only in breach of the Pact of Paris but without any sort of warning or declaration clearly is, there is nothing to justify the killing, and these murders are not to be distinguished from those of any other lawless robber bands.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Every one of these men knew of these plans at one stage or another in their development. Every one of these men acquiesced in this technique, knowing full well what it must represent in terms of human life. How can any one of them now say he was not a party to common murder in its most ruthless form? But I am dealing now not with the murders which alone so well justify the condemnation of these men, but with their crime against peace. Let me say something about the legal aspect of this matter, for it is one to the firm establishment of which His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom, and indeed all the chief prosecutors here, attach great importance. The distinguished speech by Professor Jahrreiss for the Defense was free of ambiguity. The effect was that though the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the other international declarations and treaties rendered aggressive war illegal, they did not make it criminal. In support of this contention it was argued that they could not have done so because any such attempt to make aggressive war a crime would be contrary to the sovereignty of states, and that, in any event, the entire system of prohibition of war had collapsed before the outbreak of the second World War and therefore ceased to be law. It was further argued that these treaties were not taken seriously by numerous jurists and journalists whose opinions were cited and were not really entitled to be treated seriously because they contained no provision for coping with the problem of the peaceful change of the status quo. With regard to the Pact of Paris itself, counsel contended that there could be no question of a criminal-or even unlawful-breach of that Pact of Paris because it left to each state, including Germany, the right to determine whether it was entitled to go to war in self-defense.