dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SEYSS-INQUART: No, not that, but I was fully aware of my difficult position. It was quite obvious to me that I could be misused for such purposes, that behind the back of my ministerial post a situation could be prepared so that Austria would be overrun.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you used that expression after you had been talking to the Fuehrer for some time, did you?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the course of the discussion, but the thought itself had come to me previously; I only brought it up during the discussion.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes, you had had this thought for some time?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Ever since you had gotten into this Austrian matter actively you had had the thought, I suppose?
SEYSS-INQUART: The possibility of dissension and of a difference of opinion about this situation was quite clear to me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That your actions might be misconstrued?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all; and secondly, that the fact of my activity could be exploited in a way that I did not intend.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of course, because you represented both sides at the same time and that was always a difficult position, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is correct.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well now, let us take up this matter of declaring forfeited property of enemies of the State. You made those declarations, I presume, did you not, as Reich Commissioner?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And was that made under a decree of the Fuehrer's giving you authority to do that?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was a basic practice which was current in the Reich, and if I did not get the order I nevertheless had a sort of directive...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now wait a minute. I did not ask you about the practice. It was made under a decree, was it not? That practice was under a decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And that decree applied to all occupied countries, did it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think so. I first announced this decree in the Netherlands myself. The measures in the Netherlands came about on the basis of my directive.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I understand that. I do not want to get you confused. Your action was taken under a decree of the Fuehrer, was it not, giving you that authority; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Let us say on the basis of a directive.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of a directive of the Fuehrer; right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that directive in evidence? Has it been put in evidence?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think so.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. Now tell us what was in it. What was in that directive?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was the general directive that the property of persons who committed acts inimical to the Reich was to be confiscated. I had already issued a decree similar to this in Austria. The first one was issued in the Reich itself; that was the model.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, you were the person in the Netherlands who had complete discretion to make the determination of who was an enemy of the Reich, did you not? That was your decision under the decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that was actually a matter for the Police and the courts.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see.
SEYSS-INQUART: I only had influence.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, the Police did not have to go to the courts to get that determination surely, did they?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. Either the Police directly made a decision of this kind or the people were put at the disposal of the court and the court sentenced the people on the basis of certain offenses, and then on the basis of the judgment the property suffered the legal consequences.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, the property of the Freemasons was confiscated under that decree. What other property, of what other groups, was confiscated in the Netherlands under that direction of the Fuehrer? I do not mean individuals; I mean groups.
SEYSS-INQUART: At the moment I cannot think of any others, although there were a few other groups.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But, in effect-see if I state the practice correctly-the Police would decide that an individual or group of individuals, on account of their words or their actions,, were enemies of the Reich, and then their property would be confiscated; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. And the decisive office at the time was that of Heydrich.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): The decisive factor was Heydrich?
SEYSS-INQUART: And the Netherlands agencies carried through his decisions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And you carried through Heydrich's decisions; right?
SEYSS-INQUART: I carried through Heydrich's decisions when it came to property rights. The association of Jehovah's Witnesses belonged to those groups.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, Jehovah's Witnesses belonged to the group too?
SEYSS-INQUART: They were also among them.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And the property of Jehovah's Witnesses was confiscated also, since they were enemies of the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: They probably did not have very much, but what they had was confiscated because of their attitude in refusing to serve in the war effort.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): They refused-let me get this straight. This is interesting. Jehovah's Witnesses refused to fight or to serve in the German war effort and therefore their property was confiscated. Is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not quite. Jehovah's Witnesses in Germany refused to serve in the German Army. So first of all they were prohibited there and then this prohibition was expanded for all other regions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. I am not talking about that. I am talking about the Netherlands. Was that true in the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; but Jehovah's Witnesses in the Netherlands were not prohibited because they refused to serve in the German Army, but rather because we were against this group on principle.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I see, on general principles. As pacifists, you were against them, so you confiscated their property; right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock. [The witness Glaise-Horstenau took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
EDMUND GLAISE-HORSTENAU (Witness): Edmund Glaise-Horstenau.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what position did you have in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was born in 1882 in Braunau in Upper Austria. I came of an officer's family of French descent. In 1918 I was a major in the General Staff of the Austrian headquarters as adviser on politics and the press.
DR. STEINBAUER: What position did you have then in the Austrian Republic?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: After the overthrow of 1918 I was in the civil service as director of archives at the university, a historian and author. Among other things, I was the author of a basic work about the collapse of old Austria, which...
DR. STEINBAUER: General, I am sorry to interrupt you, but we want only your public positions; I am interested in knowing about them only. What public positions did you have?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Director of archives; then, from 11 July 1936 on, I was Minister in the Cabinet of Schuschnigg, as guarantor of the July Agreement; and then during the March days of 1938, I was in the Cabinet of Seyss-Inquart. In November 1939 I voluntarily entered the German Army, first in the obscure fob of a graves registration inspector; and from 1941 on I had to do with military diplomatic tasks and was on duty at Zagreb without troop command. In September 1944 I was dismissed from my post in Zagreb because, being an Austrian of the old regime, I was against the official policy and was one of the basic opponents of the Ustashi terror. Another reason was that I was supposed to have called the head of the State, who was elected and appointed by us, Ante Pavelich, a "criminal subject," among other undiplomatic things.
DR. STEINBAUER: General, I shall put a few brief questions to you, and it is quite sufficient if you just answer them with a characterizing phrase. The Tribunal does not want to know very much about the Anschluss itself, but everything as to how it came about. Therefore I ask you very briefly: After the July Putsch of 1934, were you in any way connected with Chancellor Schuschnigg?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the economic situation at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The economic situation at that time may be characterized through the average figure of unemployment. Out of 6 million inhabitants, 400,000 were unemployed, and that means, counting their families, that more than a million were in the misery of unemployment.
DR. STEINBAUER: What possibilities were there regarding the expansion of the economic area?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: In this connection I can say openly and immediately that all the possibilities always received "no" as an answer. If Austria wanted the Anschluss, the answer was "no." If Austria wanted to call the Hapsburgs back, the answer was "no." If Austria wanted to enter a German customs union in order to expand her economic area, the answer was "no." And when great men like Briand and Tardieu spoke of a Danube federation, we received only cold shoulders from our autarchically minded neighbors. That is the Austrian tragedy.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now a party was formed which took up the Anschluss as the main point of its program. What were the combat methods of this party?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: In the year 1918 the standard bearer of this Anschluss was no less than the Social Democratic Party led by Otto Bauer who the year before had declared the Anschluss to be the only possibility for the Austrian proletariat. Later the National Socialist Party crowded to the front, though it was not unified, to be sure, until the end of the twenties by unconditional subordination to the leadership of Adolf Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was the leader of the NSDAP in Austria at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The leaders themselves changed frequently. Hitler, however, sent a land inspector by the name of- what was his name; a Prussian-I cannot think of the name at the moment-who was evicted from the country by Dollfuss in 1933. Habicht-Dr. Habicht is his name.
DR. STEINBAUER: And after him, is it correct that it was Captain Leopold?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: After him, Captain Leopold rose to the leadership of the Party.
DR. STEINBAUER: And how did the Austrian National Socialists stand with respect to Adolf Hitler?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: They considered themselves bound by absolute obedience and loyalty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now the famous Agreement of 11 July 1936 was reached. After this agreement, you met Seyss-Inquart. What did he tell you about his political objectives?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I became well acquainted with SeyssInquart shortly before this agreement. I do not remember exactly what he told me then about his political objectives. In general, it coincides with what he later set up as his political objectives.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what was that, briefly?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The Party, not as an organization, but only as a support for an ideology in the totalitarian instrument of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime, in the Fatherland Front-at the same time its members were to acknowledge the State and Constitution in Austria, and had Adolf Hitler's blessing in addition.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you yourself deal with the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, or did you talk with him?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Apart from the March days of 1938, I had three opportunities to speak with Adolf Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did Seyss-Inquart enter the Government?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Seyss-Inquart entered the Government after 12 February 1938.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he visit Adolf Hitler?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: As far as I can remember, he visited Adolf Hitler on 17 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he make a report about his visit with Hitler to Schuschnigg and the other members of the Cabinet?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Certainly he told Schuschnigg, and he told me as well.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he collaborate in the planned plebiscite which was to take place on 13 March 1938?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: At that time, without knowing about the plebiscite, I left, on the 6th of the month, on 2 weeks' leave. Therefore, I cannot give you a reliable answer to this question.
DR. STEINBAUER: But do you know whether this plebiscite had been decided upon in the Ministerial Council with the consent of Seyss-Inquart or not? Did he tell you about that subsequently?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: To my knowledge, the plebiscite was not handled by any Ministerial Council.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the National Socialists agree to the plebiscite?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: So far as I could judge on my return from my leave, certainly not.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, it became known that Schuschnigg wanted to have a plebiscite. Where were you and what did you experience at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: On 6 March, as I have already said, I went on leave, and in Stuttgart I gave a lecture, something I had planned for a long time. And the subject of my speech was "Central Europe in the Year 1000 A. D."
DR. STEINBAUER: We are not interested in details, only in the facts.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Then I undertook a private visit to Landau in the Pfalz to visit my French relatives, and there Burckel, whom I had told nothing about my arrival, came to see me, and in his home I heard over the radio the speech made by Schuschnigg at Innsbruck. Immediately it was obvious to me that the scheduled plebiscite would, in view of Hitler's nature, certainly bring about some form of grave countermeasure, and I decided to fly to Vienna at once. Burckel was to have arranged this. However, he telephoned to the Reich Chancellery and Hitler expressed the wish that I should come to Berlin. I gave the reasons for complying with his request to the American interrogator, and subsequently, only here, I found out why Hitler had called me to Berlin. I heard from the mouth of an absolutely authentic witness that he did not want me to return to Austria. He knew that I was an enemy of all solutions by force. During the night between 9 and 10 March I reached Hitler and entered upon a discussion which lasted for 21/s hours, a conference which assumed no concrete proportions and led to no concrete decision. Instead he told me that during the course of the day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, he would have me called in. In fact, he did not call me until 8 o'clock in the evening in order to give me the drafts for Seyss-Inquart: a) of an offer of resignation for Schuschnigg, and b) of a radio speech. I declared that I could not bring these notes to Austria myself, and I asked that it be taken care of in the regular way by courier. Later on I received a third draft from Goering, who was Field Marshal at the time. There was a telegram therein, containing a second request to Hitler asking for the marching-in of German troops. I should like to say from the beginning, all these drafts-as far as I know also the third draft-had no actual significance. These were my experiences on the 11th in Berlin.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you flew to Vienna and met SeyssInquart. What did you do with him on that critical morning of 11 March?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Seyss-Inquart met me at the airport. I advised him briefly about what had taken place in Berlin, and made entirely clear to him the grave misgivings which I had. Together, Seyss-Inquart and I, at 11 o'clock in the morning, shortly after my arrival, went to see Schuschnigg. While Seyss-Inquart placed before Schuschnigg certain inner political problems which I did not know about because I had been absent, I pointed out to Schuschnigg, who was on the verge of tears, that there was great danger of new world complications, even of a new world war, and implored him to give in and to rescind the plebiscite which was scheduled for Sunday.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you and Seyss-Inquart offer to resign?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I cannot recall whether we went so far orally. This discussion was comparatively brief, but afterwards, at about 1 o'clock, we offered to resign. For this neither a decree by Hitler nor a decree by the National Socialist leader, Klausner, was necessary. Already on Thursday evening I had made my decision in the home of Burckel that, in connection with the plebiscite, I would also make use of this traditional method of ministerial resignation in order to prevent the worst, if possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: And how did Schuschnigg react to this proposal to postpone the plebiscite?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Schuschnigg at first was rather reserved, but at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Guido Schmidt and Guido Zernatto-I do not have to tell you who these gentlemen were- made efforts to establish a modus vivendi with Seyss-Inquart. I myself kept in the background since my mission had already been fully accomplished on 12 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what did Seyss-Inquart do in the afternoon?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Shortly after this discussion, which led to no result, Schuschnigg still hesitated. But finally, he declared that in accordance with the wishes expressed he would postpone the Sunday plebiscite. I believed that the worst had passed. A short time thereafter Seyss-Inquart was called to the telephone, and returned visibly agitated, saying that he had been advised from Berlin that Hitler could not work any longer with Schuschnigg, and that Seyss-Inquart was to demand succession to the post of Chancellor. Seyss-Inquart invited me to go with him to Schuschnigg. I turned this down for reasons of delicacy. Seyss-Inquart went in alone and returned after a brief period, and we had a discussion which seems to me to be of importance to this Court. He was confident of receiving the Chancellorship, and said to me, almost with an undertone of regret: "Now we will have to take in the Nazis after all, and we shall work with the Catholics and others who are of similar trends to establish a political combine with which I shall govern." However, he was going to demand of Hitler, as far as internal politics were concerned, an agreement of 5 years' tranquillity.
DR. STEINBAUER: And, of course, Hitler did not agree to that. Instead he marched into Austria and you were confronted with a law. You were named Vice Chancellor. Did you sign this law, and why?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was a cosignatory of this law. I entered into the Government after Keppler requested me to and I countersigned this law, for three reasons: First, under the impression that Austria was completely alone in the world, and that no one was lifting a finger on our behalf; secondly, and I must say something here which has been said in the southern German press, I entered under the impression of the overwhelming street demonstrations that were taking place. You can call this mass psychology, or what you will, but this mass psychology was present and it was an unequaled popular demonstration. Thirdly, on the Ballhausplatz, on the night that I received this law into my hands-I did not participate in the origination of this law- the German tanks were rolling past below me, and the occupation of the country by Adolf Hitler was accomplished. With him this meant "bend or break." If Austria had tried to assert a different will it would not have been possible. Of course, one is easily inclined to say about my home country that it should have committed suicide from fear of death. ..
DR. STEINBAUER: That is sufficient, General, thank you. Mr. President, I have no further questions to address to this witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was the July Agreement concluded as a result of pressure from Germany or through mutual desire and mutual interest?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: It was concluded on the basis of mutual desire and mutual interest.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you then and later have complete confidence in Schuschnigg and he in you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Up until the winter of 1937-38, my relationship to Schuschnigg was one of complete confidence.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know anything about the intention of Herr Von Papen to effect the removal of Chancellor Schuschnigg?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Never did I have the slightest hint of that sort.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the so-called "Langot aid fund"?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The Langot aid fund was a fund which was established quietly by the Government in typical Austrian if dune 40 fashion-this is not intended as criticism, my saying that it is a typical Austrian fashion-for the help of National Socialist family members of National Socialists who had been imprisoned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Schuschnigg and the Government have knowledge of this fund?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Both of them knew about this and they both knew definitely of Langot.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the attitude of the NSDAP and particularly of Leopold to Herr Von Papen?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The NSDAP and Leopold were completely opposed to Von Papen. They were inimical toward him to begin with because he was a Catholic, and they distrusted him additionally in every sort of way.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: Did you know a man named General Muff?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Yes, very well indeed.
MR. DODD: You were in the habit of telling him everything that went on in the Ministerial Consulate of Austria, were you not?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No.
MR. DODD: Do you know Stephan Tauschitz, the Austrian Ambassador to Germany?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Not him either. We spoke to him about some topic but that I should let myself be used as an informer was contrary to my tradition as a soldier of the Empire.
MR. DODD: Then what did you think you were being brought to Berlin for by Burckel from Stuttgart?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I cannot follow you, I am sorry.
MR. DODD: What did you understand to be the purpose of your trip when you were being brought to Berlin from Stuttgart in March 193S, when Hitler wanted to see you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I did not go to Berlin from Stuttgart, but rather from the Pfalz. Hitler had had me advised to come at all costs. I considered this matter and finally accepted, a) because I wanted to know what was going on in Berlin...
MR. DODD: I wanted to know what you thought was the purpose of your trip when you left, from wherever it was, to go to Berlin. That is all. What did you understand was the purpose?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: My intention was to comply with Hitler's invitation and to see just what was tailing place in Berlin. . 120
MR. DODD: All right. Now you have told the Tribunal that you were interested only in a peaceful solution of the question. Surely, when you got this false telegram and the draft of the radio speech for Seyss-Inquart, you certainly did not think you were proceeding in a peaceful and loyal manner insofar as Austria was concerned, did you?