dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. STAHMER: I believe this testimony is quite short, considering that it deals with the essential circumstances leading to war. However, I think that we shall not take too much more of the Tribunal's time.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dahlerus, the Tribunal wish you to come to the crucial matter as soon as possible.
DAHLERUS: I met Goering shortly after midnight on Wednesday, and he told me the nature of the proposals made to Poland. He showed me the note. I called up Forbes to give him this information. He then told me that Ribbentrop had refused to give him the note, after he had read it through very quickly. I went to Goering immediately and told him it was impossible to treat the ambassador of an empire like Great Britain in this way. I suggested to him that he should allow me to telephone Forbes and give Forbes the contents of the note on the telephone. I did this at about 1 o'clock on Thursday morning.
DR. STAHMER: Did Goering not emphasize that he was taking a great responsibility on himself in giving you this permission?
DAHLERUS: Yes. Goering emphasized that he was doing this on his own responsibility.
DR. STAHMER: Did you then on the next morning go to the British Embassy in order to convince yourself as to whether your telephonic communication had been understood correctly?
DAHLERUS: Yes, I saw Henderson on Thursday morning, the 31st, at 10 o'clock, discussed the note with him, and he requested me then to go at once to the Polish Ambassador, M. Lipski, and give him a copy.
DR. STAHMER: Was that done?
DAHLERUS: He sent Forbes with me to Lipski, and I read the note to Lipski, but he did not seem to grasp its purport. I, therefore, left the room, dictated a note to the secretary, and handed it to him. In the meantime, Lipski stated to Forbes that he would not be interested in discussing this note with the German Government.
DR. STAHMER: Would you reconstruct this conversation as far as you are able? It seems to me particularly important.
DAHLERUS: He said that he had no reason to negotiate with the German Government. If it came to war between Poland an Germany, he knew -- since he had lived 51/2 years in Germany -- that a revolution would break out in Germany, and that they would march on Berlin.
DR. STAHMER: Did you then inforin London of your conversation by telephone?
DAHLERUS: I telephoned at once from the British Embassy an informed Sir Horace Wilson of the conference that we had had.
DR. STAHMER: Was there then another discussion in the afternoon with Goering?
DAHLERUS: I saw Goering at 1 o'clock in the afternoon. He received then a copy of the cablegram from the Polish Governmery to Lipski, to the effect that Lipski should not, without special instruction from Warsaw, negotiate with the German Government. It was obvious that the Poles under those circumstances were afraid to take any action. The German Government was, however, much disturbed at this telegram.
DR. STAHMER: On that afternoon did you again meet Goering together with the British Ambassador?
DAHLERUS: The situation already seemed to have become impossible. Hitler had quarreled with Henderson. Ribbentrop, too, had quarreled with him. Therefore, I was of the opinion that the only possibility lay in Goering coming to an understanding with Henderson. I suggested a meeting between them. This took place at 4:50 in the afternoon, at Goering's house. Forbes was present, and I too.
DR. STAHMER: What was said during this meeting?
DAHLERUS: Even before the meeting, Henderson expressed his suspicion that the German Government would try to arrange a settlement with Britain and cause a break between England and Poland. Henderson was therefore very cautious during the 2-hour session, and the result of the conversation was only that both parties agreed that a meeting of delegates from both countries would be necessary if war were possibly to be avoided.
DR. STAHMER: Did you on this occasion likewise suggest that Goering should meet the British delegates immediately?
DAHLERUS: I suggested that a meeting in Holland should be arranged at once, at which Goering should represent Germany.
DR. STAHMER: How did Henderson react to this proposal?
DAHLERUS: Henderson promised to submit this proposal to his Goverrunent. However, I had the impression that he already knew that German military forces were on the march, and it did not seem to me that he had much confidence in any fortunate outcome.
DR. STAHMER: Are you acquainted with a statement of Goering to the effect that if the Poles did not give in, Germany would kill them like lice; and if Britain should decide to declare war, he would regret it very much but it would be very unwise of Britain?
DAHLERUS: I cannot recollect these words, but it is possible that during the 2-hour conversation they were uttered.
DR. STAHMER: How did this conference end then?
DAHLERUS: At 7 o'clock in the evening it broke up and both parties were agreed that they would endeavor to arrange for a meeting in Holland.
DR. STAHMER: Did you then on 1 September meet Goering again?
DAHLERUS: On 1 September I met Goering at 8 o'clock at his headquarters. After some hesitation he told me that the war had broken out because the Poles had attacked the radio station of Gleiwitz and blown up a bridge near Dirschau. Later he gave me more details from which I concluded that the full force of the German Army was employed in the attack on Poland.
DR. STAHMER: Did you then on 3 September meet Goering again, and did you on this occasion, make the suggestion that Goering should fly to London immediately for a personal conference?
DAHLERUS: Well, before I mention what happened then, I should like to mention that I met Hitler on 1 September, immediately after his Reichstag speech in the Kroll Opera House. He was at that time exceedingly nervous and very agitated. He told me he had all along suspected that England wanted the war. He told me further that he would crush Poland and annex the whole country. Goering interrupted, and pointed out that they would advance as far as certain given points. But Hitler was in an uncontrollable frame of mind. He began to shout he would fight for 1 year, 2 years, and ended up in great agitation that he would, in fact, fight 10 years. Then, on Sunday, 3 September, I was informed early in the morning by Forbes that at 9 o'clock that morning an ultimatum would be given. The conditions were that the hostilities must cease immediately and the German forces must be withdrawn to the German border. I went immediately to Goering's headquarters near Potsdam. He was there and not with Hitler. I appealed to him to try at least to arrange for a reasonable reply to the ultimatum. I had the impression that certain members of the German Government were in favor of war and I was afraid if a written reply were giver it would not be worded so as to avoid war with England. I therefor suggested that Goering should declare himself prepared to go to England, at once, before 11 o'clock, to negotiate there.
DR. STAHMER: How did Goering react to this suggestion?
DAHLERUS: He accepted this suggestion and telephoned Hitler, who likewise concurred with it.
DR. STAHMER: Did you then telephone London?
DAHLERUS: Yes. I telephoned London and got in touch with the Foreign Office. They gave the reply that they could not consider this proposal before they had received a written reply to the ultimatum.
DR. STAHMER: Did you forward this communication to Goering?
DAHLERUS: Yes, I told Goering this.
DR. STAHMER: What impression did your communication make on Goering?
DAHLERUS: Goering seemed to be sorry that the proposal was not accepted.
DR. STAHMER: Then on 4 September did you speak once more with Goering?
DAHLERUS: Yes, I had a short conversation with Goering on 4 September, but it was not of great importance.
DR. STAHMER: On this occasion did Goering say to you that, come what might, he would endeavor to carry on the war as humanely as possible? That Germany would under no circumstances begin hostilities against England first, but if England should attack Germany then the answer would be forthcoming?
DAHLERUS: Yes, that is correct.
DR. STAHMER: Did you publish a book entitled Last Attempt ?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: Is the account given in this book in accordance with the truth?
DAHLERUS: Yes, it was written with greatest care. The contents are absolutely accurate and correct.
DR. STAHMER: Is this account based on notes that you took on these events?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: When did you write these notes?
DAHLERUS: I wrote them immediately after my return to Sweden on 5 September 1939.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I have three more brief questions -- should I stop now? -- they pertain to the subsequent period.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you could ask them now.
DR. STAHMER: [Turning to the witness.] On 24 September 1939, did you speak to Forbes in Stockholm?
DAHLERUS: No, I met Forbes on 24 September in Oslo. That was after the occupation of Poland. It was an endeavor to ascertain if there was still a possibility of averting a world war. He gave me in writing the viewpoint of the British Government. It was briefly as follows: "The British and French Governments..."
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment. What has this got to do with the Defendant Goering?
DR. STAHMER: This is evidence that he made efforts even later to bring about peace. I have only one more question which concerns Goering directly.
THE PRESIDENT: The fact that he met Sir George Ogilvie Forbes in Oslo on 24 September does not at present appear to have anything to do with Goering.
DR. STAHMER: It appears significant in that it was the occasion for Mr. Dahlerus to get in touch with Berlin and Goering again in order to try once more, at this stage of events, to bring about peace.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on with your next question then.
DAHLERUS: The conditions were: "To save Europe from continued German aggressions and to enable the peoples of Europe..."
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What has the letter that Sir George Ogilvie Forbes wrote got to do with Goering?
DR. STAHMER: Dahlerus discussed this letter, the contents of this letter on 26 September with Goering, and tried on this basis to reach an agreement.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, may I enter a further objection? It has nothing to do with the Indictment. We have not charged that the war against England was an aggressive war. The charge is that the war against Poland was an aggressive war. All of this negotiation to keep England out of the war while they took Poland is utterly irrelevant to the Indictment. I respectfully submit that because it has nothing to do with the Indictment, with the charge, it should be rejected.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, if the witness had an interview with Goering afterwards, you can come to that, but not to preliminary conferences with Sir George Ogilvie Forbes.
DR. STAHMER: But that will not be comprehensible; he really must state what Forbes told him. He saw Forbes, Forbes made certain suggestions to him and with these suggestions Mr. Dahlerus went to Berlin and, of course, informed Goering what Forbes said to him. Thus, it will not otherwise be possible at all...
THE PRESIDENT: Let the witness give the account of his meeting with Goering.
DR. STAHMER: Very well. [Turning to the witness.] Mr. Dahlerus, you then on 26 September looked up Goering in Berlin, did you not?
DAHLERUS: Yes, I met both Goering and Hitler on 26 September.
DR. STAHMER: Did you inform Goering of the proposals Forbes had made to you?
DAHLERUS: I discussed with Hitler on what conditiohs he would be prepared to make good the harm he had done to Poland, and make peace. To my great disappointment he then definitely declared that he was not prepared at all to discuss the question of Poland. Poland was occupied and that was no business any longer of Great Britain. I then realized that his aim had been to split Poland and Britain and thus, with the consent of Great Britain, to have the opportunity of occupying Poland without running the risk of being involved in a war with Great Britain and France.
DR. STAHMER: In July 1940 did you again meet Goering?
DAHLERUS: Yes, Goering suggested in July, 1940 that His Majesty, the King of Sweden, should endeavor to bring the various powers together for peace negotiations.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 2:10 p.m. [The Tribunal recessed until 1410 hours.]
THE PRESIDENT: Do the defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions?
DR. HORN: Witness, can you tell us the reason why the conference between Hitler and Henderson on 29 August took an unfavorable course?
DAHLERUS: No, I heard only the report that they disagreed and a quarrel started.
DR. HORN: Do you know on which of the six points the quarrel started?
DAHLERUS: As far as I recollect, it was on the wording of the German reply saying that they expected representatives from Poland during the next 24 hours.
DR. HORN: Did Hitler not explain to you then in the presence of Goering why he made this demand and that was because the two armies, the Polish and the German, were already facing each other in readiness, and at any moment a serious conflict was to be expected. Therefore Hitler did not want to present an ultimatum as to the sending of a negotiator from Poland, and thereby wanted solely to avoid the outbreak of a conflict?
DAHLERUS: Yes, explanations to that effect were given.
DR. HORN: Is it correct, Witness, as you state in your book, that at the Polish Embassy the Polish Ambassador Lipski told you that in case of war the Polish Army would march to Berlin in triumph?
DAHLERUS: No, he did not say that to me, but he made remarks to that effect to Forbes.
DR. HORN: And Forbes transmitted these remarks then to you.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
DR. HORN: How did your meeting with Mr. Forbes in Oslo on 24 September come about?
DAHLERUS: I took the initiative and went to Oslo to see him.
DR. HORN: Can you please tell us briefly the contents of the letter from Forbes?
DAHLERUS: I read that before.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already said that it does not want to hear that. And I do not see what it has to do with Von Ribbentrop.
DR. HORN: The former Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, is under indictment for the leadership of the entire German foreign policy. I therefore consider it important that this letter, which will give decisive information about the further course of foreign policy, as Ribbentrop saw it -- about his later attempt in the direction of peace, for instance -- be read to the Tribunal.
DAHLERUS: To redeem Europe from the perpetually recurring fear of German aggression...
THE PRESIDENT: Was this letter ever shown to Von Ribbentrop?
DAHLERUS: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that it will not have the letter read.
DR. HORN: You had then on 26 September 1939 a discussion with Hitler. Is it correct that Hitler told you at that time he could not negotiate with England concerning Poland because the major part of Poland was occupied by Russia, and Russia, to his knowledge, would certainly not give it up?
DAHLERUS: He declared that he was not prepared to discuss the question of Poland, and added afterwards that, apart from his decision, he did not think Russia was prepared to discuss the territory occupied by Russia.
DR. HORN: Were you politically independent at the time you were conducting your negotiation?
DAHLERUS: Absolutely.
DR. HORN: Thank you, I have no further question.
DR. LATERNSER: I have only one question for the witness: [Turning to the witness.] Witness, did high military leaders at any time participate actively in the numerous negotiations which you had with German authorities at that time?
DAHLERUS: Never.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Do other defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Dahlerus, will you tell me whether I understood your last answer to Dr. Stahmer correctly? Did you say "I then realized that it was on the 26th of September, that his" -- that is Goering's -- "aim had been to split Poland and Great Britain and to occupy Poland with the consent of Great Britain"? Is that right?
DAHLERUS: Yes, it is correct, but I should like to say it was the German Government, including Goering.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wait ... the German Government. Thank you. Now, I just want you to tell the Tribunal quite shortly why you did not realize that aim earlier.
DR. STAHMER: As far as I understood the witness' answer before, he said in answer to my question that that was Hitler's opinion. The witness did not speak of Goering at all.
THE PRESIDENT: You will be able to re-examine him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you just to explain to the Tribunal -- and listen to the question I put to you -- why did you not understand that aim at the time? Your original object in seeing Goering at the beginning of July was to inform him that British public opinion had hardened and would not stand another act of aggression; that is right, is it not?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELIFYFE: The reason you went to Goering is shown on Page 8 of your book, if you have got the English version.
DAHLERUS: Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWEL1,FYFE: And, Mr. Dahlerus, I want you to be absolutely sure that when I quote your book I do not take anything out of its context. I shall try to make it as short as I can. Just before the break on Page 8 you say this: That was the reason you went to Goering?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And when you put your point of view to Goering his first reaction was that the British Government was bluffing over Danzig and Poland.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXVTELTFYFE: And you wanted and succeeded in arranging the first meeting in order to convince Goering that, according to British public opinion, the British Government was not bluffing, is that right?
DAHLERUS: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to turn to Page 29 of your book, at the very top of the page, which describes the end of your conversation with the Defendant Goering in the train before the meeting at the begirming of August. Do you remember?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Goering explained what his aim was. And if you look at the second line: "This was a mutual agreement regarding the holding of an Anglo-German conference. .. " and note the next words, Mr. Dahlerus, "with plenipotentiary representatives from both Governments." One matter which Goering had always made clear was that he would demand the return of Danzig and certain rights over the Corridor -- the Polish Corridor -- is that not right?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And from the very start he wanted a plenipotentiary conference at which territory could, if necessary, be ceded to Germany, did he not?
DAHLERUS: Evidently.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come straight on to 24 August, when you saw Goering and he asked you to go to London. One of the points that he wanted you to stress was that he and the German Government thought that there had been a great improvement in their military situation because of the German-Soviet treaty.
DAHLERUS: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the other -- if you turn to the bottom of Page 35 in your book and then look at the top of Page 36: "The reason was his disbelief that the German Foreign Office would be able or willing to establish a sufficiently close contact with the British Foreign Office."
DAHLERUS: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember that day you had the conversation with him, and later on he rang you up at 11:30 before your departure?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to tell the Tribunal one or two of the things he did not tell you on that day. He did not tell you, did he, that 2 days before, on the 22nd of August, at Obersalzberg, Hitler had told him and other German leaders that he - Hitler -- had decided in the spring that a conflict with Poland was bound to come. He did not tell you that, did he?
DAHLERUS: I never had any indication or information on the political intentions, either on the 11th of April; or the 23rd of May, or the 22nd of August.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You never heard of -- that is Document Number 798-PS, the one of the 22nd of August -- you told us, you never heard of the Fall Weiss that had been prepared in April, but I want to get it quite clear about the other one, Document Number L-75 of the 23rd of May. He never told you that Hitler had said to him on that day that Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. "It is a question of expanding our living space in the East." And I think he also did not tell you that Hitler had said on that day, "Our task is to isolate Poland; the success of the isolation will be decisive." He never spoke to you about isolating Poland?
DAHLERUS: He never indicated anything in that direction at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But I think he did tell you in the earlier interview that he was going to see M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did not tell you, as I understand you, that he was going to inform M. Lipski that the main obstacle to any diminution of the tension between the two countries was Poland's alliance with Great Britain. He did not tell you that, did he?
DAHLERUS: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is Exhibit Number GB-39, Document Number 72-PS, Page 119. So that, while he was asking you to go to England to deal with one side of the matter, he was dealing with M. Lipski on the other. I just want to get a clear picture of the situation on the 24th. Did he tell you that the decision had been made to attack Poland on the morning of the 26th?
DAHLERUS: No, in no way whatsoever.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you were asked to go with these general purposes, as I put it to you? You know now, Mr. Dahlerus, that on the next day our note verbale was given to Sir Nevile Henderson by Hitler -- on the 26th.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that note, as distinguished from what was said to you later on, stated in general terms that the Polish question must be solved, so that the effect of the plans, as they stood on the evening of the 24th, when Goering rang you up, was that you were going off in the morning with the expression of a general desire for a peaceful solution. The note verbale was to be given to Sir Nevile Henderson on the afternoon of the 25th and at that time the plan was that Poland would be attacked on the morning of the 26th, when you had delivered your message, and Sir Nevile had sent on the note verbale. That was the position?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did Goering ever tell you why the plan of attack was changed from the 26th to the 31st?
DAHLERUS: No, he never mentioned anything about the plan of attack; nor that it was changed.
SER DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did not tell you that -- this is Document Number TC-90, Exhibit Number GB-64 -- I quote Goering's own words: Goering never told you that, at the time you were being sent to London, all that was wanted was to eliminate British intervention?
DAHLERUS: Not at all.