dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SEYSS-INQUART: It is true that I prohibited one pastoral letter, which may happen in times of occupation-because it publicly opposed the measures of the occupational power and incited people to disobedience. That was an isolated case, and it never happened again-for the good reason, too, that there were no more provocations of such a kind in the pastoral letters. In fact, I even intervened and canceled the prohibition issued by the Police, whenever it was a matter only of a criticism toward the measures taken by the occupational powers, and there was no incitement to resistance. I myself never sent priests to concentration camps. On the contrary, at the beginning of 1943 after having made repeated urgent requests, I finally received a list from the Security Police with the names of the priests who were shut up in concentration camps. There were 45 or 50 of them altogether. Three or four were mentioned as having died in the concentration camp. On the grounds of the facts of their case, I sought out about a third of them and demanded their release; for the second third I demanded investigation within the coming 6 months; and it was only as far as the last third was concerned that it was impossible for me to intervene without violating my own responsibility towards the Reich. Dutch hostages were also taken for purposes of reprisal. When the Netherlands came into the war, the Germans in the Dutch East Indies were put into prison and allegedly mistreated. The Reich demanded the arrest of 3,000 Dutchmen. The Security Police arrested 800 and took them to Buchenwald. When I heard that the mortality \vas high, I made such urgent appeals that the hostages were finally returned. They were then accommodated in such a way that one could no longer talk of a prison. They were given leave, and when necessary I released them. In the end, I had less than 100.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, you are said to have prohibited prayers in church, and especially prayers for the Queen.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is incorrect. The prayers in Dutch churches were obvious demonstrations. Prayers were made-as was quite natural-for the Queen of the Netherlands, and for her happiness and prosperity, and the fulfillment of her wishes. At the same time there were prayers for the Reich Commissioner, for his enlightenment. I was severely reproached for tolerating these demonstrations. But I found nothing wrong with these prayers, and did not prohibit them. Perhaps, in some isolated cases a subordinate authority would put in his say, but this was always suppressed.
DR. STEINBAUER: That would not have been so bad; but it is said that you were particularly cruel and had a large number of people shot without legal proceedings. What have you to say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as I can remember, there was only one real case of hostages being shot-that is, people were shot without there being any causal connection with a crime. This occurred in' August 1942, and the case has already been brought up here. It was handled strictly according to the so-called Hostage Law, which has been quoted here. It was in connection with an attack on an army transport, and 50 or 25 hostages were to be shot. It was, I think, the Higher SS and Police Leader who made the demand through the Military Commander upon request of the High Command of the Army. My intervention consisted in reducing this figure to 5 and in looking over the list which had been submitted to me by other departments, and which has been read out here in court. I, too, noticed something peculiar about it. The Higher SS and Police Leader had expressly emphasized that the list had been drawn up strictly in keeping with the directives, saying that the attack could be traced back to rightist circles of resistance, not to those on the Left, so that no workers could be shot. I only exercised my influence insofar as I caused the Higher SS and Police Leader to cross off the list the names of fathers with several children.
DR STEINBAUER: Witness, what do you know, in detail, about the people who were shot when the camp at Vught was evacuated?
SEYSS-INQUART: When the British and Canadians were advancing through Belgium toward the south of Holland, I had so much to do to keep order in my province that I could not pay any special attention to the camp at Vught, which was under police direction. The Higher SS and Police Leader informed me generally that the most seriously charged political prisoners, numbering about 200, would be transferred to the Reich, that the less seriously charged political prisoners would be set free, and that ordinary criminals would be placed under the command of a Dutch police officer and handed over to the Canadians. It was only here that I heard some people had been shot, and the only way I can explain it is that at the last minute the Reich forbade these people to be transported into the Reich and gave orders for them to be shot. I do not believe there were 600 of them, because from what the witness Kollpuss said there seem to have been some 130 to 150. But even that is enough.
DR. STEINBAUER: What do you know about the shooting of hostages after the attack on the SS and Police Leader Rauter?
SEYSS-INQUART: The attack on the Higher SS and Police Leader came from the resistance movement, and was carried out with British weapons.
DR. STEINBAUER: What do you know about the Putten case?
SEYSS-INQUART: Excuse me, I have not finished my previous statement.
DR. STEINBAUER: Oh, you want to give a more exact. . .
SEYSS-INQUART: Himmler, at that time, gave orders for 500 hostages to be shot. Rauter's deputy Dr. Schongarth refused, and informed me that there were a number of Dutchmen in the prisons who were to be shot, in accordance with the Fuehrer's order, because they had been convicted of other acts of sabotage. He had hesitated, he said, since the number was somewhat larger, but now he could not hesitate any longer. He did not give me the actual figure. In this situation I could not, in my opinion, prevent him from carrying out the order, because we had to suppress the resistance movement by all means. The movement had been organized and supplied with arms by the Dutch Government in London, and it presented a serious danger to the German occupational forces. Two hundred and thirty Dutchmen were supposed to be shot- amongst them 80 in Apeldoorn alone-and this seemed to me a lot. But Dr. Schongarth told me that in the north of Apeldoorn there was a center of the illegal resistance movement.
DR. STEINBAUER: I want to ask you, last of all, what do you know about the Putten case?
SEYSS-INQUART: In Putten there was an attack on German officers. Three were murdered. The whole thing took place within the Armed Forces, the SS, and the Police; and I knew that measures of reprisal were planned. I myself, at that time, was concerned with the construction of defenses. The Higher SS and Police Leader informed me that he had received the order to burn the village of Putten, and to transfer the male population to a concentration camp in the Reich. However, he had reduced the figure to 40 percent, and later on he reported to me that there was a high mortality rate in German concentration camps. Both he and I applied to the military commander to have these men returned. The military commander agreed. Whether this order could still be carried out I do not know.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, perhaps at this point we could have a short recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. [A recess was taken.]
DR. STEINBAUER: Your Lordship, I should like to come back to the question of the embargo on foreign currencies. The Defendant Reich Marshal Goering has just informed me, during the recess, that in this conflict, Fischbock, Trip, and Wohlthat on the one hand, and on the other Funk, who was against it, and he himself, Goering, as head of the Four Year Plan, made a decision to lift the embargo on foreign currencies. And he writes me here, "I bear the responsibility." So it was a decision which was taken by Goering.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, it is not, of course, a regular way in which to inform the Tribunal about anything, to tell them what one of the defendants may have said to you during an adjournment.
DR. STEINBAUER: He wrote it.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that doesn't make it any better. You may ask the witness any question about it.
DR. STEINBAUER: As regards the question of shooting without a court sentence, I should like to refer to a very important document. Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-77, Page 199. This is Document F-224 D, a report made by Kriminalkommissar Mund. He says the following on Page 3: "In my opinion it is very likely that General Christiansen demanded the maximum number of victims to be executed. Christiansen spoke of numerous measures of reprisal to Rauter, who was an impulsive and tactless man, and he on his part applied pressure to the Commander of the Security Police (Dr. Schongarth) . . ." He reports further on Page 5: "It was often a question of prisoners who had already been sentenced to death by the Higher SS and Police Leader. "Reprisals for punishable acts were a matter for the Police. After August 1944, and in accordance with an order of the Fuehrer's, these measures of reprisal were interpreted in such a way that a number of Dutchmen were shot for acts of sabotage and attempts at murder although they had been arrested for entirely different reasons."
SEYSS-INQUART: May I explain that briefly?
DR. STEINBAUER: Please do.
SEYSS-INQUART: For example, leading members of the resistance movement were arrested, and on examination by the Higher SS and Police Leader it was decided that they should be shot according to the Fuehrer's orders. The Higher SS and Police Leader had called upon his court officer for this examination. When later on an attempt to blow up a bridge was made, instead of shooting hostages these men were taken and shot. That was the exact opposite of the shooting of hostages-or at least, it was supposed to be.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I come to Chapter IV-B, "Concentration Camps and Prisons." My first question: Who was competent in these matters?
SEYSS-INQUART: For concentration camps and for police detention prisons, the Police were competent. For court detention prisons, and court authorities, I myself was competent-that is, the court prisons were under my charge.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were there concentration camps in the Netherlands, too?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, especially the big concentration camp of Putten near Hertogenbosch. Then also a police transit camp near Amersfoort, and a Jewish assembly camp in Westerborg. I have already spoken of St. Michelsgestel; that was a protective custody camp. And then there might be mentioned the camp at Ommen, which was neither a police nor a concentration camp, but abuses occurred there.
DR. STEINBAUER: What can you tell me about the Hertogenbosch Camp?
SEYSS-INQUART: Hertogenbosch was originally meant as a Jewish assembly camp, at the time when we intended to keep the Jews in the Netherlands. But Reichsfuehrer Himmler gave orders for it to be turned into a concentration camp. After some reflection I was satisfied with this idea. In consideration of the fact that I could not prevent Dutchmen from being put into concentration camps, I preferred them to be in concentration camps in the Netherlands, where I might still be able to exert a certain influence.
DR. STEINBAUER: But there are supposed to have been excesses in these concentration camps, too-for example, especially in the Vught Camp, which you mentioned.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite true. There were excesses in prisons, as well as in concentration camps. In wartime I consider this almost unavoidable, because subordinates get unlimited power over others and it cannot adequately be controlled. Whenever I heard of any excesses, I took steps-the first time toward the end of 1940, or 1941, when the president of my German court reported to me that a prisoner had been brought up with injuries from blows on the head. I had the case investigated, and the prison warden received disciplinary punishment and was sent back to the Reich. In the Vught Concentration Camp, soon after its opening, there was a high mortality rate. Immediately I had an investigation started, using the services of Dutch medical personnel. Every day- and later on every week-I had the mortality figures reported to me, until they sank to what was approximately a normal level. Of course, I do not know whether the director of the camp reported the normal death cases only, or whether he included the cases of shooting-I could not say. In this cams there were excesses due to drinking parties and reveling; brawls and fights were also heard now and then. The head of the camp was removed and sent to the Reich. I noted that the Higher SS and Police Leader had apparently himself tried to maintain order, although he was not in charge of the camps; they were under Gruppenfuehrer Pohl. There was one very serious case which, in Document Number F-224 D, is described under the title, "Women in Cell.", The head of the camp. allegedly for disciplinary reasons. had a large number of women crowded into a cell overnight, whereby three or four women were smothered to death. When we heard of that, we demanded court action. The Central Administration in Berlin refused. and we turned to Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and did not give in. The head of the camp was put on trial and received at least 4 years-I believe even a sentence of 8 years. That is indicated, moreover, in the French report.
DR. STEINBAUER: What about the Amersfoort Camp?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was a police transit camp-that is, for police prisoners who were to be turned over to the courts, or who were to be sent to the Reich; or persons who refused labor service who were being sent to the Reich. In general, they were not to be there more than 6 or 8 weeks. There were Dutch guards in this camp-not Dutch Police, but a voluntary SS guard company, I believe. Excesses did occur here. General Secretary Van Damm called my attention to the fact that a Dutchman was supposed to have been beaten to death there. I urged the Higher SS and Police Leader to bring this case to light. He did this through his court officer, and sent the documents to me. According to the documents, severe mistreatment occurred, but no one was killed, and the persons responsible were punished. I repeatedly called the attention of the Higher SS and Police Leader to the fact that concentration camps and prisons in wartime actually favored the perpetration of brutal excesses. If, here or there, not a severe case but certain mistreatment was reported to me, I always called his attention to it. He then reported to me either that the case had not occurred, or that he had taken steps, and so forth. In particular, I always had the food ration statistics of the concentration camps and prisons reported to me. The food rations were satisfactory. I believe that the Dutch in the concentration camps and prisons, at the end of 1944 and in 1945, received more than the Dutch in the western Netherlands. Of course, I do not want to give too much importance to this fact-, because the Dutch did suffer from hunger.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then there was the Westerborg Camp.
SEYSS-INQUART: The Dutch Government had already set up Westerborg as a completely free camp for Jews who had fled from Germany. This was enlarged into an assembly camp for Jews. In the camp itself there were Jewish guards to maintain order. Dutch Police guarded the camp on the outside. There was only a detail of the Security Police for supervision in the camp. In all the files I found no report about excesses in the camp itself. Every Sunday clergymen went to the camp, at least one clergyman for the catholic Jews, and one for the so-called Christians. They, too, never reported anything.
DR. STEINBAUER: We will speak about their removal later on. Now I would like to speak about Ommen. There is a long report on that.
SEYSS-INQUART: Ommen was intended as a training camp for those Dutch who voluntarily wanted to be employed in the economy in the Eastern Territories. They were given instruction on the country, the people, and their language. The head of the camp borrowed prisoners from a neighboring Dutch prison for the work. Then I received reports that these prisoners were being mistreated. The judges of Amsterdam turned to me. I gave the Dutch judges of Amsterdam permission to personally inspect the camp and speak to the prisoners. That was done, according to Document F-224(d), on March 1943. Thereupon the Amsterdam judges wrote a long letter to the General Secretary for Justice. They complained about the mistreatment of the prisoners, which they had noted, and about the fact that Dutch prisoners were transferred to prisons in the Reich for labor assignment. The complaints were justified, and I ordered that the prisoners be sent back from the Ommen Camp to the Dutch penal institution, and that Dutch prisoners be returned from German prisons to Dutch prisons. This procedure was correct, and therefore I necessarily took due steps to settle the matter.
DR. STEINBAUER: But now I have to ask you a certain question and confront you with a charge. Document RF-931 shows that you removed judges who made such complaints, namely, in Leeuwarden.
SEYSS-INQUART: In my eyes the procedure of the court of Leeuwarden was incorrect. These judges did not consult me, but publicly asserted in a verdict that the Dutch prisoners were being sent to German concentration camps and shot. According to the facts, which lay before me, that was false. I then informed them of the results obtained by the Amsterdam judges. The Leeuwarden judges refused to pass further judgments. I asked them to continue to officiate, but they refused. I then dismissed them as persons who refused to work. Of course, I could have had them tried by a German court with charges of making atrocity propaganda.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive complaints from the Red Cross about conditions in the camps?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the Netherlands we had the arrangement that a representative of the Dutch Red Cross, Mrs. Van Overeem, could visit all concentration camps and prisons, especially for the purpose of verifying whether the food packages were being delivered. Neither Mrs. Van Overeem nor the heads of the Dutch Red Cross ever directed any complaint to me. I should like to say that this circumstance Divas especially gratifying for me, because the Dutch complained about everything, and if for a change I received no complaints, then that was a certain relief for me. I should like to remark that about the beginning of 1944, according to the reports submitted to me, about 12,000 Dutch persons were in concentration camps or prisons. That is the same as if today, in an of Germany, 120,000 Germans were in prisons or camps. That occasioned my setting up legal commissions which had to visit the camps and the prisons in order to make investigations and determine what prisoners could be released or placed on trial. Naturally, in cases where there were orders for arrest from Berlin, I could do nothing.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, so you say that you waged a constant struggle with the Police on this question?
SEYSS-INQUART: I would not like to call it a struggle.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you believe that you were successful?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I believe so, on the basis of certain definite facts. I have followed the proceedings here very carefully, and-we have heard most terrible things. The reports from the Netherlands, it seems to me, are not that bad. I do not want to say that I disclaim every excess. However, such reports as those about Breedonck in Belgium, do not exist. The reports show beatings as the most serious charge. There is only a single report here-that is Document F-677, the report of the tax collector Bruder-which attains the level of the usual atrocity reports. But I do not believe that this report should be accepted at its face value, since Bruder does not even say who told him this. And the information itself is not credible. Me asserts, for example, that the prisoners who were at work had to prostrate themselves before every SS guard. I do not believe that the camp authorities would have permitted that, because then the prisoners would not have been able to work. It is hard for me to say, but I do not think that conditions in the Netherlands were quite as bad as all that.
DR. STEINBAUER: I think that I can now conclude this chapter and turn to Point V of the Indictment, which deals with the question of labor commitment. What problems did you have in the Netherlands in the field of labor commitment?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the field of labor commitment we must distinguish between three or perhaps four different phases. When I came to the Netherlands, there were about 500,000 unemployed: registered unemployed, those who might become so due to demobilization of the Dutch land and naval forces, part-time workers, and so forth. It was an urgent problem-not only a social one-for me to reduce the number of unemployed. For, in the first place, such an army of unemployed is without doubt a good source of recruits for illegal activities. In the second place, as the war continued, it was to be expected that the material condition of the unemployed would steadily become worse. At that time we instituted measures which I must, despite all charges, call voluntary labor recruitment. That lasted until the middle of 1942-that is, about 2 years. During that period, I gave neither the German nor the Dutch labor authorities full power to press any worker to work abroad. Without doubt there was a certain economic pressure, but I believe that always exists in this connection. The recruitment was carried out by the Dutch labor offices, which were subordinate to the Dutch General Secretary for Social Administration. There were German inspectors in the labor offices. There were also private hiring agencies; companies from the Reich sent their own agents over. On the whole, about 530,000 Dutchmen were engaged to work in the Reich. In the period which I call "voluntary," 240,000 to 250,000 volunteers went to the Reich and about 40,000 to France. By the first half of 1942, this reservoir had been used up. The Reich demanded more workers. We then considered introducing compulsory labor service. I recall I did not receive instructions to this effect from Sauckel, but from Bormann as a direct Fuehrer order. Now, labor commitment occurred predominantly, but not exclusively, in the following way. Young and, as far as possible, unmarried Dutchmen were called to the labor of lice, where they received certificates of conscription for work in the Reich. The Dutch report itself says that only a few refused.