dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. STAHMER: To what extent did you assist in the economic and military preparation of Case Barbarossa? Goering: As Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force I naturally took all the measures which were necessary in the purely military field for the preparation of such a campaign. Consent or refusal, as I have already recently explained.... I took the obvious military preparations which are always necessary in connection with a new strategic deployment, and which every officer was in duty bound to carry out, and for which the officers of the Air Corps received their command from me. I do not believe that the Tribunal would be interested in the details as to how I carried out the deployment of my air fleet. The decisive thing at the time of the first attacks was, as before, to smash the enemy air arm as the main objective. Independent of the purely military preparations, which were a matter of duty, economic preparations seemed necessary according to our experiences in the previous war with Poland, and in the war in the West; and doubly necessary in the case of Russia, for here we encountered a completely different form of economic life from that in the other countries of the Continent. Here it was a matter of state economy and state ownership; there was no private economy or private ownership worth mentioning. That I was charged with this was again a matter of course resulting from the fact that I, as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, directed the whole economy and had to provide the necessary instructions. I had therefore instructed the War Economy Staff to formulate a general economic plan for the invasion, in consultation with economic experts on Russia, especially as we had to expect that with our advance, Russia, according to long-established procedure, would destroy large parts of its economy.
DR. STAHMER: The result of these prepared economic mobilization studies was the so-called "Green File." I am of the opinion that in every future war, as in past wars on other sides, there must always be an economic mobilization besides a military and political mobilization; otherwise one would get into very unpleasant situations. The Green File has been cited repeatedly, and also here some of the quotations have been torn from their context. In order to save time I do not wish to read further passages from this Green File. That can perhaps be done when documentary evidence is given. But if I were to read the whole Green File from beginning to end, from A to Z, the Tribunal would see that this is a very useful and suitable work for armed forces which have to advance into a territory with a completely different economic structure; the Court will also realize that it could be worked out only that way. This Green File contains much positive material, and here and there a sentence which, cited alone, as has been done, gives a false picture. It provides for everything, among other things for compensation. If an economy exists in a state, when one enters into war with that state, and if one then gains possession of that economy, it is to one's interest to carry out this economy only insofar, of course, as the interests of one's own war needs are concerned -- that goes without saying. But in order to save time I shall dispense with the reading of those pages which would exonerate me considerably for, I am stating, as a whole as it is, that our making claims on the Russian state economy for German purposes, after the conquest of those territories, was just as natural and just as much a matter of duty for us as it was for Russia when she occupied German territories, but with this difference, that we did not dismantle and transport away the entire Russian economy down to the last bolt and screw, as is being done here. These are measures which result from the conduct of war. I naturally take complete responsibility for them.
DR. STAHMER: A document has been submitted as Document Number 2718-PS, and this reads as follows: "Memorandum concerning the result of today's conference with the state secretaries in regard to Barbarossa. "1. The war can be continued further only if the entire Armed Forces can be supplied with food by Russia in the third year of war. "2. Millions of people will hereby doubtless starve if we take from this country that which is needed by us." Were you informed of the subject of this conference with the state secretaries and of this document. Goering: I became familiar with this document only when it was submitted to me here. This is a rather unreliable document. We can not tell clearly just who was present, where this was discussed, and who was responsible for the nonsense that is expressed in it. It is a matter of course that, within the framework of all the conferences of official experts, many things were discussed which proved to be absolute nonsense. First of all the German Armed Forces would have been fed, even if there had been no war with Russia. Therefore it was not the case, as one might conclude from this, that, in order to feed the German Armed Forces, we had to attack Russia. Before the attack on Russia the German Army was fed, and it would have been fed thereafter. But if we had to march and advance into Russia it was a matter of course that the army would always and everywhere be fed from that territory. The feeding of several millions of people, that is, two or three, if I figure the entire troop deployment in Russia with all its staff, cannot possibly result in the starvation of many, many millions on the other side. It is impossible for one soldier on the one side to eat so much that on the other side there is not enough left for three times that number. The fact is moreover that the population did not starve. However, famine had become a possibility, not because the German Army was to be fed from Russia, but because of the destruction or the sending back by the Russians of all agricultural implements, and of the entire seed stocks.
DR. STAHMER: It was first of all impossible to bring the harvest, which had been partly destroyed by the retreating Russian troops, in from the fields to an extent even approaching what was necessary, because of inadequate implements; and, secondly, the spring and autumn crops were greatly endangered owing to the lack of implements and seed. If this crisis was met, it was not because the Russian troops had not destroyed or removed everything, but because Germany had to draw heavily on her own stocks. Tractors, agricultural machines, scythes, and other things had to be procured, even seed, so that for the time being the troops were not fed by the country, but food had to be sent from Germany -- even straw and hay. Only through the greatest efforts of organization and administration, and in cooperation with the local population could a balance gradually be achieved in the agricultural sector, and also a surplus for the German territories. As far as I know, famine occurred only in Leningrad, as has also been mentioned here. But Leningrad was a fortress which was being besieged. In the history of war I have until now found no evidence that the besieger generously supplies the besieged with food in order that they can resist longer; rather I know only of evidence in the history of wars that the besiegers do everything to force the surrender of the fortress by cutting off the food supply. Neither from the point of view of international law nor from the point of view of the military conduct of war were we under any obligation to provide besieged fortresses or cities with food.
DR. STAHMER: And what part did the Air Force play in the attacks on Leningrad? Goering: The air force at Leningrad was very weak. The most northern sector of our position had the poorest air protection, so that the air force there had to carry out very many tasks simultaneously. At no time was there a concentrated attack by the Air Force on Leningrad, such as we have made on other cities or as have been carried out on German cities on the largest scale. The Fuehrer not once but repeatedly, in the presence of other gentlemen at briefing sessions, reproachfully said that apparently the German Luftwaffe dared not venture into Leningrad. I replied: "As long as my Air Force is ready to fly into the hell of London it will be equally prepared to attack the much less defended city of Leningrad. However I lack the necessary forces, and besides you must not give me, so many tasks for my Air Force north of, the front, such as preventing reinforcements from coming over Lake Ladoga and other tasks." Attacks were therefore made only on Kronstadt and on the fleet which was left in the outer bay of Leningrad, and other targets such as heavy batteries. I was interested to hear from the sworn testimony of the Russian professor for museums, that he was under the impression that the German Air Force was mainly out to destroy museums, and then from the testimony -- not, sworn to-by I believe he called  -- himself a metropolitan, who had the impression that my Air Force had mainly chosen his cathedrals as targets. I would like to call your attention to this contradiction -- perhaps understandable for people who are not experts. St. Petersburg was in fact at the very front of the fighting, and it was not necessary to attack by air, for medium and heavy artillery was sufficient to reach the center of the city.
DR. STAHMER: Was confiscation by the occupying power in Russia limited to state property? Goering: In connection with the last question I forgot to mention something briefly. There has been a great deal of talk here about the great destruction in Russia. Pictures and films were shown, impressive in themselves, but not so impressive to a German, for they showed only a modest proportion of the destruction which we personally experienced in our own cities. But I would like to point out that much of this destruction took place in the course of battle, in other words, that destruction was not intended, by the Air Force or by the artillery, but that cities, historical cities or art monuments were very frequently destroyed by battle action. Also, in Germany men of the rank of the musician and composer Tschaikovsky, and the poets Tolstoy and Pushkin are too highly revered for deliberate destruction of the graves of these great and creative men of culture to have been intended. Now to the question whether only state property was confiscated; as far as I know, yes. Private property, as has been mentioned here from state documents -- I can easily imagine that in the cold winter of 1941-42 German soldiers took fur shoes, felt boots, and sheep furs here and there from the population -- that is possible; but by and large there was no private property, therefore it could not be confiscated. I personally can speak only of a small section, namely of the surroundings of the city of Vinnitza and the city of Vinnitza itself. When I stopped there with my special train as headquarters, I repeatedly visited the peasant huts, the villages, and the town of Vinnitza, because life there interested me. I saw such abject poverty there that I cannot possibly imagine what one could have taken. As an insignificant but informative example I would like to mention that for empty marmalade jars, tin cans, or even empty cigar boxes or cigarette boxes, the people would offer remarkable quantities of eggs and butter because they considered these primitive articles very desirable.
DR. STAHMER: In this connection I would also like to emphasize that no theaters or the like were ever consciously destroyed either with my knowledge or that of any other German person. I know only the theater in Vinnitza that I visited. I saw the actors and actresses there and the ballet. The first thing I did was to get material, dresses, and all sorts of things for these people because they had nothing. As the second example, the destruction of churches. This is also a personal experience of mine in Vinnitza. I was there when the dedication took place of the largest church which for years had been a powder magazine, and now, under the German administration, was reinstated as a church. The clergy requested me to be present at this dedication. Everything was decorated with flowers. I declined because I do not belong to the Greek Orthodox Church. As far as the looting of stores was concerned, I could see only one store in Vinnitza that was completely empty.
DR. STAHMER: What was the significance for the Air Force of the work camp Dora, which has been mentioned by the French Prosecution? Goering: Before I go on to that I must addthat the accusation that we destroyed industry everywhere is incorrect, but rather for our own purposes we had to reconstruct a great part of industry. Thus I would like to recall the famous dam of Dniepropetrovsk which was destroyed and which was important for the electricity supply of the entire Ukraine, and even for the Donetz area. As far as industry and agriculture are concerned, I have spoken of that before and mentioned the scorched earth policy as it was described in the Russian order and as it was carried out. This scorched earth policy, the destruction of all stock, of everything, created a very difficult situation which was hard to overcome. Therefore, from the economic point of view, we also had much reconstruction to do. As far as destruction of cities is concerned, I would like to add that over and beyond that which was shot to pieces in the course of battle, during the advance or retreat, there were considerable parts and important buildings of cities that had been mined and at the proper time went up in the air, involving, of course, many German victims. I can cite Odessa and Kiev as two main examples. Now I come to the question of Camp Dora. I also heard about Camp Dora here for the first time. Of course, I knew of the subterranean works which were near Nordhausen, though I never was there myself. But they had been established at a rather early period. Nordhausen produced mainly V-1's and V-2's. With the conditions in Camp Dora, as they have been described, I am not familiar. I also believe that they are exaggerated. Of course, I knew that subterranean factories were being built. I was also interested in the construction of further plants for the Luftwaffe. I cannot see why the construction of subterranean works should be something particularly wicked or destructive.
DR. STAHMER: I had ordered construction of an important subterranean work at Kahla in Thuringia for airplane production in which, to a large extent, German workers and, for the rest, Russian workers and prisoners of war were employed. I personally went there to look over the work being done and on that day found everyone in good spirits. On the occasion of my visit I brought the people some additional rations of beverages, cigarettes, and other things, for Germans and foreigners alike. The other subterranean works for which I requested concentration camp internees were not built any more. That I requested inmates of concentration camps for the aviation industry is correct, and it is in my opinion quite natural because I was, at that time, not familiar with the details of the concentration camps. I knew only that many Germans also were in concentration camps -- people who had refused to join the Army, who were politically unreliable, or who had been punished for other things, as also happens in other countries in time of war. At that time everyone had to work in Germany. Women were taken into the ranks of labor, including those who had never worked before. In my own home parachute production was started, in which everyone had to participate. I could not see why, if the entire people had to take part in work, the inmates of prisons, concentration camps, or wherever they might be, should not also be put to use for work essential to the war. Moreover I am of the opinion, from what I know today, that it certainly was better for them to work and to be billeted in some plane factory than in their concentration camps. The fact per se that they worked, is to be taken as a matter of course, and also that they worked for war production. But that work meant destruction is a new idea. It is possible that it was strenuous here or there. I for my part was interested that these people should not be destroyed, but that they should work and thereby produce.
DR. STAHMER: The work itself was the same as done by German workers -- that is, plane and motor production -- no destruction was intended thereby.
DR. STAHMER: Under what conditions were prisoners of war used in anti-aircraft operations? Goering: Prisoners of war were used for anti-aircraft operations mainly for those stationary batteries at home which were for the protection of factories and cities. And indeed these were auxiliary volunteers. They were chiefly Russian prisoners of war, but not entirely as far as I remember. One must not forget that in Russia there were various racial groups who did not think alike and did not all have the same attitude to the system there. Just as there were so-called East Battalions made up of volunteers, so there were also a great number of volunteers who, after the announcement in the camps, reported for service in the anti-aircraft batteries. We also had an entire company of Russian prisoners of war who volunteered to fight against their own country. I did not think much of these people, but in time of war one takes what one can get. The other side did the same thing. The volunteer auxiliaries liked to go to the anti-aircraft because they had considerably less work there and their food was better as it was soldiers' rations; whatever other reasons they may have had I do not know. However, if one did look at a local German anti-aircraft battery in the year 1944 or 1945 it made, I admit, a rather strange impression. There were German youths from 15 to 16 and old men from 55 to 60, some women and some auxiliary volunteers of all nationalities, I always called them my "gypsy batteries." But they shot, and that was what mattered.
DR. STAHMER: What was Sauckel 's official relation to you? Goering: I mentioned that in the Four Year Plan in 1936 there was already a Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. In the year 1942, after he had become ill and was being represented by somebody else, I was taken aback by the direct appointment of a new Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor -- an appointment made directly by the Fuehrer, and without my being consulted. But at that time the Fuehrer had already begun to intervene much more strongly and directly in such problems. If he did it here too, he did so because the labor problem became more acute from day to day. It had been suggested to him that he should appoint a new deputy for the time being, perhaps a Gauleiter of a different name, the one from Silesia. But the Fuehrer decided on the Gauleiter from Thuringia, Sauckel, and made him plenipotentiary. This order was countersigned by Lammers, not by me, but that is of no significance; and it was formally included in the Four Year Plan, for the Four Year Plan had general plenary authority for all matters concerning economy. For this reason, up to the end even the appointment of Goebbels as Plenipotentiary General for the total war, which had nothing at all to do with me, was also included in the plenary power of the Four Year Plan, since otherwise the entire legislative work of the Four Year Plan, which I had gradually built up with its plenary powers, would have collapsed and we should have had to create entirely new conditions. If Sauckel from that time on received his orders mainly from the Fuehrer, it was because the Fuehrer now intervened more effectively in all these matters; but I welcomed the appointment of Sauckel, for I considered him one of the calmest and most reliable Gauleiters and was also convinced that he would fully dedicate himself to this new task.
DR. STAHMER: The connection with the offices of the Four Year Plan was of course maintained, and in the case of important legislative decrees Sauckel and my offices of the Four Year Plan worked together, as far as I know. Sauckel himself spoke to me on several occasions after he had been with the Fuehrer, and sent me also a few of the reports which he sent to the Fuehrer. Even if not in full detail I was, on the whole, informed.
DR. STAHMER: In March of 1944, 75 English Air Force officers escaped from the prisoner-of-war camp Stalag Luft III. As you probably know from the proceedings, 50 of these officers after their recapture were shot by the SD. Did this order for shooting come from you, and did you know of this intention? Goering: I came to know of the course of events, but unfortunately not until a later period. When these 75 or 80 English Air Force officers attempted to escape during the last 10 days of March, I was at the moment on leave, as I can prove. I heard 1 or 2 days later about this escape. As, however, prior to that, a few large escapes had already taken place and each time a few days later most of the escaped prisoners had been brought back to camp, I assumed that would happen in this case also. On my return from my leave, the chief of my general staff told me that a part, but he could not give me the figure at the time, of these escaped officers had been shot. This had to a certain extent caused talk and excitement in our Luftwaffe; one also feared reprisals. I asked from whom he had his information and what had really happened. He said he knew only that part of the escaped men had been recaptured by the camp guards in the vicinity of the camp, and by the police authorities in the immediate neighborhood, and had been brought back to camp. Nothing had happened to these men. On the other hand, of the fate of those who had been recaptured at a greater distance from the camp he knew only that some of them had been shot. I then went to Himmler and asked him. He confirmed this without mentioning a definite figure, and told me that he had received the order from the Fuehrer. I called his attention to the fact that such a thing was utterly impossible, and that the English officers in particular were bound to make at least one or two attempts to escape and that we knew this.
DR. STAHMER: He said, I believe, that he had at least opposed the Fuehrer in this matter at first, but that the Fuehrer had absolutely insisted on it, since he maintained that escapes to such an extent represented an extreme danger to security. I told him then that this would lead to the most severe agitation among my forces, for no one would understand this action, and that if he were to give such orders, he could at least inform me before carrying them out so that I might have the opportunity of countermanding them if possible. After giving these instructions I talked to the Fuehrer personally about the matter, and the Fuehrer confirmed the fact that he had given the order and told me why -- the reasons just mentioned. I explained to him why this order, according to our opinion, was completely impossible and what repercussions it would cause with regard to my airmen employed against the enemy in the West. The Fuehrer -- our relations were already extremely bad and strained -- answered rather violently that the airmen who were flying against Russia have to reckon with the possibility of being immediately beaten to death in case of an emergency landing, and that airmen going to the West should not want to claim a special privilege in this respect. I then told him that these two things really had no connection with each other. Then I talked with the Chief of my General Staff and asked him -- I believe he was the Quartermaster General -- to write to the OKW and say that I was now requesting, that the Air Force was requesting, that these camps be taken from our control. I did not want to have anything more to do with prisoner-of-war camps in case such things should happen again. This letter was closely connected with those events, a few weeks after those events. That is what I know about this matter.