dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFFE: Then, in D/781, GB 314, your office wanted to get quite clear what the defendant Goering meant, so you write to him again for the attention of von Brauchitsch: "It is unfortunately not possible to gather from your letter whether the Reich Marshal has agreed to the facts communicted to him which are to be regarded as terroristic actions in the publication of a case of lynch law, and he has prepared to give the Commandant of the Air Force Reception Camp of Oberursel the verbal instructions to this effect. It is again requested that the Reich Marshal be induced to give his consent and that this office be notified if possible, by the 27 inst." Then, just passing along, D/872, GB 315, it says that the Foreign Minister will reply in a day or two, and in D/783 of the 26th -- that will be GB 316 -comes the answer, a telephone memorandum, a telephone call, Adjutant's Office of the Reich Marshal, Captain Bueuer: "The Reich Marshal agrees with the formulation of the concept of terror fliers as stated and with the proposed procedure. He asks for information this very day about measures taken." So it is not right, is it defendant, that defendant Goering disagreed with the procedure? Here is a call from his adjutant's office -- and it is noted 
     by your office -- saying that he agrees with the formulation of the concept and with the proposed procedure. This must be right, must it not? A Yes, I had never seen this document, but I understand under these measures that these men were to be taken to Oberursel Camp, not lynching, and perhaps I may say something about that? Q It is quite clear. I am not going through the correspondence again. I pointed it out as we went along. Your letters are saying both lynching and the measures to be taken for the publication of lynching and the other procedure of segregating these people in the hands of the SD pending confirmation of suspicion of terror fliers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFFE: It is quite clear, I have taken you through nearly ten letters in which it is stated implicitly that it is put to the Reich Marsha on both these points, publication of lynching and segregation from other prisoners of war. He is saying, I agree with the proposed procedure. A May I add something? Q Yes, do. A I recall my discussion with Goering on the Berghof. We expected Hitler to give a speech to the generals, and this must have been at the same time and in this discussion two points were mentioned, Point one was that my influence with Hitler had not been strong enough to set aside this matter or to do away with it, and I talked with Goering that day about these two points. We established that the entire method which was mentioned here was to be a condi tion for an announcement of lynch law. We agreed that as soldiers we rejected that, and I asked him most urgently to use his influence with Hitler again so that these things would be stopped. This discussion did take place on the Berghof in an ante-room before the actual speech by Hitler took place, and I remember this very distinctly. The correspondence which took place I just looked over now. I know some of the fragments only. These matters were discussed in writting this way and that, pro and con, regarding some measures which had been discussed by Hitler, but, thank goodness, these measures never did come through, and orders were not issued to that effect. Q Would you look at the next document, D/784, GB 317. That is a note from General Warlimont to you. Paragraph (1) says that the Foreign Office have 
     agreed. Ambassador Ritter telephoned on the 29th that the Reich Foreign Minister has agreed to this draft. Paragraph (2) says: "The Reich Marshal is in agreement with the formulation of the cooncept "terror flier" as proposed by the OKW and with the method suggested." That is sent to you, and on it there is a pencilled note, initialed by Warlimont: "We must act at last. What else is necessary for this?" Didn't you act on it A No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFFE: Q Then, why - A As a matter of fact - Q Then whay, if you did not act on it, were you asking the Luftwaffe four days later if they had given instructions to the Camp at Oborursel? Look at D/785, GB 318.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, it appears to be initialed by the defendant -D/784.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My copy is initialed "W", Warlimont.
THE PRESIDENT: D/784 on the copy I have is initialed "K" at the top, along side Warlimont's note.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, yes. I am sorry, My Lord. The fault is entirely mine. My Lord is quite right. Q So, before I pass from D/784 that was submitted to you and initialed by you? A No, as far as this document D/784 is concerned, I only put my "K" on it to show that I saw the document, but I did not put any note on it. Q. But the document was submitted to you, and so you did see that docu- ment? You know that both the Foreich Office and Goering were agreeing to this procedure being adopted? A. Yes, I did read the document. I have seen the document. Q. And four days later, in D-735, your department is asking Goering through von Brauchitsch as to whether they have been carried out: "Please report whether instructions have been given to the Commandant of the Air Force reception camp of Oberursel in the sense of the statements of the Supreme Command of the Armed Froces/Operational Staff of the Armed Forces of the 15th June, or when it is intended to do so." A. I have not seen this document before, but it seems to me that I asked the Reich Marshal about the taking back of these people to Oberursel, not whether he wanted lynch law, whether he approved it or whether he considered it just or right, and that, I think, would answer the question. The question itself I do not know. Q. Please lock at 736, GB 319. You were going beyond that the next day. This is the fifth of July. It is actually a report of the meeting on 5 July. It says that Hitler decreed the following: "According to press reports, the Anglo-Americans intend in future to attack from the air small places, too, which are of no importance to war economy or militarily, as a retaliatory measure against the 'V-1's'. Should this news prove true, the Fuehrer wishes it to be made know through the radio and the press that any enemy airman who takes part in such an attack and is shot down will not be entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war, but, as soon as he falls into German hands will be killed and treated as a murderer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This measure is to apply to all attacks on small places which are not military targets, communications centres armament targets, etc., and which are not of importance to the war. "At the moment nothing is to be ordered; the only thing to be done is to discuss such a measure with the WR and the Foreign Office." So that, far from modifying the matter, you were increasing the severity of the measures to be taken. A. I do not remember this matter, but if that note was made at that time, something like that must have been mentioned by him in this situation, but I do not remember the incident. Q. I only want to put this point to you. You have said twice -- on Friday and again to-day -- that no order of the Wehrmacht had been issued. It would not need an order of the Wehrmacht to encourage the population to lynch fliers who had crashed. All that would be required to produce that result would be to hold off the police from arresting people who murdered them, would it not? You would not need an order of the Wehrmacht to encourage your population to murder fliers who had crashed, would you? A. No, we were only concerned with the question of the Wehrmacht, which alone was justified in taking a shot-dawn airman into custody, should take then away from lynching and prevent that lynching or anything similar should take place. Q. You will agree with me that once an American or British airman was handed over to the SD, his chance of survival would not be, what, one in a million? He would be killed, would he not? A. I did not know that. I just learned about that here. I did not know that at the time. Q. You will agree that that was in fact what happened; when an airman was handed over to the SD, he would be killed, would he not? That is what would happen? A. I do not believe that was so, but here -- Q. I am not saying what you believe. Now we know what would happen? A. No. Q. You have told us several times that you did not know anything about the SD. In fact, at one time, you were a sort of a court of appeals from the SD in France, were you not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You confirmed the killings by the SD in France, did you not? A. I do not recall that I did any -- Q. French Exhibit 1244. I am afraid that I do not have a German copy, but this is what it says. "In the criminal proceedings against the French citizens: "(1)  Jean Marechal, born on the 15th October 1912 "(2)  Emmanuel Thepault, born on the 4th June 1916 "Fieldmarshal Keitel, acting within the powers given to him on the 26th and 27th June, 1942, by the Fuehrer in his office as Commander-in-Chief of the land armies has refused to pardon these two men condemned to death and has ordered that the sentences should only be executed within the scope of the general punishments." They were condemned by the Tribunal de la Folkcommandantur at Evroux, and this was sent to the Commandant de la Police de Surete et du S.D., sent to the Commandant of the Police of the Surete and of the SD. Does that not show that you were dealing with a confirmation of sentences of death and passing on your confirmation to the SD? A  This entire incident is on enigma to me. In several cases it was such that there were judgments or convictions given or confirmed by the Fuehrer, which had to be submitted to him for confirmation. Perhaps I submitted these to him, and perhaps signed as a Deputy for the Fuehrer in this case. However, I do not know anything else about this matter. Q Well, it doesn't look like that. Let me remind you of the words: Mareshal Keitel, dans le cadre des pouvoirs qui lui ont ete donnees les 26 et 27 Juin 1942" That date. It is acting within the powers given to you by the Fuehrer. Had you not been given the powers? A No, I did not have any such powers in that case. That is a mistake. However, I may have signed as the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and I would put that down, "acting as a deputy, Field Marshal Keitel."
THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFFE: Yes, I was going to pass on.
THE PRESIDENT: Well. isn't D-775 relevant to that? the last line of the first paragraph.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFFE: My Lord, I am very gratefull to you.
THE PRESIDENT: D-775.  As I understand it, the defendant was saying that he didn't know what would necessarily happen to these prisoners if they were handed over to the SD.  Those are the last words of the first paragraph.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFFE: Very good, My Lord. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFFE: Q The words are:  "the handing over of enemy prisoners of war airmen from the Air Force Reception Camp at Oberursel to the SD for special treatment." We now know, defendant, that "special treatment" means death, Didn't you Know, in 1944, what "special treatment" meant? A Yes, it was generally known what "special treatment" was. Q Now, there is just one other point in the document which my friend General Rudenko put to you on Saturday, I think it was, or Friday evening, EC-338 . You remember General Rudenko put this. This document is the report of Admiral Canaris about the treatment of prisoners of war, dealing with the position of the Soviet Union as not being signatory to the Convention. You remember the point that Admiral Canaris put to you, that although they weren't signatories, since 
     the 18th century there had been established a practice that war captivity was neither revenge nor punishment, but solely protective custody. Do you remember the document? It was a report from Canaris to you as of the 15th of September. 1941, putting out the position of prisoners of a country that had not signed the Convention. You remember, you said you agreed with it, but that you had to put on this statement that it was nonsense from the point of view of the present situation because it arose from a military concept of chivalrous warfare, that this was the destruction of an ideology. You said that you had to put that on, on Hitler's instructions. Do you remember? A I had told him about the procedure and about the matter; I asked that he read this, and then put on this note. Q Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFFE: Now, there is a paragraph 3-aa, which I want you to have in mind at the moment, on the point I am dealing with now: "The screening of the civilian and politically undesirable prisoners of war, as well as the decision ever their fate, is effected by the action detachments of the Security Police,Sicherheits Polizei "  That is underlined in purple --that is, it is your underlining--and opposite it is your pencilled note, "very efficient."  That Is, "action detachments of the Security police, very efficient. Then it goes on, "...and the SD."  Then Admiral Canaris says, "...along principle? which are unknown to the "Wehrmacht authorities", and you have put opposite " unknown to the Wehrmacht authorities". "not at all". Do you remember doing that? A         No. At this moment, I am sorry, I do not recall. I must have meant this remark to refer to the fact that this was unknown to the Wehrmacht, and I believe I recall it that way. Q You see, it is perfectly clear. Admiral Canaris says it is unknown to the Wehrmacht authorities, and you put opposite to that, in your penciled notation, "not at all". You couldn't have gotten that from Hitler; that must have been your own point, was it not, if you put in, in pencil, "not at all"? You must have known they were known to the Wehrmacht. A Not at all. I cannot clarify this statement. I put these remarks down rather hurriedly, and I cannot identify them at present. They are very hard to decipher or to recognize. I cannot give any clear informamation or explanation, because I do not know. However, as I recall, I wanted to make, or did make, a note to the effect that the Wehrmacht knew nothing about it, and that is correct. Q Now, I just want to take you quite shortly on the last of my points, and then ask you one question about it. You have said to the Tribunal, I should think probably at beast twenty-five times, that you were not interested in politics, that you simply took your orders as to military preparations. I just want to ask you a little about that. First of all, let's take the Austrian problem..
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFFE: There I only want to put one document to you. You remember defendant General Jodl's account in his diary about the pretended military movements which, according to defendant Jodl -- I gather that you said that General Lahousen took a different view--had an immediate effect in Austria? Do you remember that? You must remember that. A Yes. Q Now you suggested, did you not, these false military movements? A No, I did not think of them and I did not propose them. Those were instructions of the Fuehrer, when he admitted me that evening. I would not have thought of that myself. Q You have the document books that I gave you. Just look at that. It is 113 of the German document book. It is 131 of Your Lordship's document book, the larger document book. Now, this is your document of the 13th, defendant. A    Yes, I recall. Q And it says, if you look at pragraph 1, to take no real preparatory measuresin the Army or Luftwaffe, no troop movements or redeployments, to spread false but quite credible news which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria. And it is through people in Austria and your customs personnel and through agents that you set out the news, and by a make-believe wireless exchange and through maneuvers. Now, you put that up to Hitler. As of the 14th, Captain Eberhard gives the information by phone that the Fuehrer has given his approval on all points. You were putting up what the false news and the false preparations were to be in order to get a politicaleffect in Austria, were you not? A I made the proposal on the basis of instructions which had been given to me on my return to Berlin. Q Well now, I only want to deal quite shortly with this, and I think I can, but I want to show the same point with regard to Czechoslovakia. Before you became Chief of the OKW you had been under von Blomberg at the Ministry of War. Had you seen von Blomberg's plan for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the directive dated the 24th of June 1937? A Yes, I knew that Q You have? A Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFFE: It was not instructions for an invasion, it was preparations for an invasion, and I am familiar with those matters. Q Well, paragraph 2 reads:  "The task of the  German Armed Forces is to prepare in such a way that the bulk of the whole strength can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, with the greatest force." I should have thought that was a preparation for an invasion. All I want at the moment is to know this. You knew of that plan, defendant, did you not? A I believe, yes, that I read it at that time, but of course I do not remember the details at this time. Q Now, you told this Tribunal that the first that you heard of the Fuehrer's plans against Czechoslovakia in 1933 was the interview with the Fuehrer that you had on the 21st of April 1938. It is very easy to forget something, and I am not putting it to you that you are lying, defendant, on 
     this point. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Q. I want to ask you very few questions on this part of the case, Defendant. Do you remember, you told the Tribunal that on the 21st of April, when you saw Hitler, that he had either read to you or handed you a copy of the minutes which appear there, taken by Schmundt, about the basis of the Fall Gruen operation against Czechoslovakia?
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, isn't this really a matter of argument rather than a matter for cross examination?  The witness says that in so far as the port he took in all these matters, it was military.  The case of the prosecution is that the part he took was political. SIR DAVID MAXWELL_FYFE:  My Lord, if I may say so, it is a very fair comment and received with greatest respect.  The difficulty is, when a witness has said several times it is only military. I wanted to bring out the points that show it is political and I don't want to cross anything which the Tribunal had in mind.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the  Tribunal have all the documents before them upon which they can judge, really, unless you have new documents?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there are not; and,,my Lord, I will of course, accede at once to what the Tribunal says.  My lord, I should like to point out one document.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think the Tribunal does feel that the cross examination is apt to get a little bit too long and sometimes too detailed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship please, I am sorry if that has been done, but, my Lord, the witness was in examination in chief, I think, two full days and in examiniation by the other defense counsel for half a day, and so far the prosecution have only spent just four hours. So I hope you Lordship won't hold it too much against us. My Lord, the only document which I should like to -- I shall not pursue the point in view of what your Lordship has said -- it is page 31 of the document book. I only wanted you to have this in mind, because your Lordship will remember that the witness said that the state of German preparations was such that he, himself, and the other generals, did not think that a campaign against Czechoslovakie will succeed. Your Lordship will see that on that day, General Malder, then Chief of Staff, said that the operation will definitely succeed and almost will be reached in the second day. My Lord, I only want to pass on that and I think it is only fair that the Tribunal should have-that point in mind. I don't think it has been referred to before. I will leave that point, as your Lordship has indicated, and I will leave the other point on this part of the case, which I intended to do. I only want to deal with a different point entirely and then I shall finish. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Q. Defendant, the document which I have now passed to you is a document which gives the account of a conference between Hitler and yourself on the 20th of October 1939, with regard to the future shape of Polish relations and I want you to look at paragraph 3, the second sub-paragraphs. I want to put one interview to you that arose out of that. That paragraph says:  "The Polish intelligentsia must be prevented from forming a ruling class. The standard of living in the country is to remain low. We only want to draw harbor forces from there," How, do you remember General Lahousen giving evidence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He said that Admiral Canaris had protested vehemently to you against, first of all, the projected shooting and extermination measures that were being directed particularly against the Polish intelligentsia, nobility and clergy, as well as elements that could be regarded as embodiments of the national resistance movement. According to General Lahousen, Canaris said: "The world will at some time make the armed forces, under whose eyes there events have occurred, also responsible for these events."  Do you remember Admiral Canaris saying that to you or words to that effect? A. I only know what General Lahousen testified here in court. I don't know anything about that. Q. Did Lahousen ever give you any warning of any kind as to the fact that the armed forces might be held responsible for these actions that were being taken in Poland? A. No. It was my opinion, though, that the armed forces would be made responsible, and my objections were taken without their being agreeable to them 
     or without passing their opinion upon them. That was the reason for the conference. Q. And that was a point that did worry you very much; didn't it? A. Yes, I was extremely worried and I had serious discussions about it, though not at that particular time. Q. And wouldn't it be fair to put it this way, that if you had known at the time all that you know now, you would have refused, even with all that you have told us, you would have refused to have anything to do with actions that produced concentration camps, mass murder, and misery to millions of people, or do you say that you still, knowing all that you know now, would have gone on with these actions? A. No. I am convinced that if the German armed forces and their Generals had know it then they would have fought against these things.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.