dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ALDERMAN: Since the Russians only made grain deliveries when the Germans delivered orders placed by the Russians and since, in the case of the individual firms, these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill orders for the German Armed Forces, it was necessary for the Wi Mu office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate Russian orders with those of the Germans from the standpoint of priority. In accordance with the wishes of the Foreign Office German industry was instructed to accept all Russian orders even if it were impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for manufacture and delivery. Since, in May especially, large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed. to allow the equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance Commission, then however, to make such a detour during its transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack." Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to the treaty obligations with Germany but the evidence shows that she had no aggressive intentions toward any German territory. Our Document Number C-170, which is in evidence as Exhibit USA-136, is as I have previously stated, a file on Russo-German relations found in the files Of the Naval High Command covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack. The entries in this file demonstrate conclusively the point I have just stated. It will, I think, be sufficient to read to the Tribunal a few entries which include reports from the German Ambassador in Moscow as late as June 1941. I shall read the first entry, 165 on Page 21 of the English translation; that is 4 June: "Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia; Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian Government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict with Germany." In entry 167 on Page 22 of the English translation, it says: "6 June. Ambassador in Moscow reports . . .
MR. ALDERMAN: Russia will only fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have been made quietly-as far as can be recognized, only defensive. Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best possible relationship to Germany." The next one is entry 169, also on Page 22; the date, 7 June: "From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow . . . all observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the Government as well as the attitude of the press, which reports all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner, support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty with Germany proves the same thing." Now, that is the German Ambassador talking to you. The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. In truth, no doubt, as has been necessarily implied from the materials presented on planning and preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the Nazi conspirators to launch their aggression against the U.S.S.R. All of them, however, appear to blend into one grand motive of Nazi policy. The pattern into which these various reasons impelling the decision to attack may be said to fall is the traditional Nazi ambition for expansion to the East at the expense of the U.S.S.R. This Nazi version of an earlier imperial imperative -the "Drang nach Osten" (or the drive to the East)- had been a cardinal principle of the Nazi Party almost since its birth and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and economic aggrandizement.
MR. ALDERMAN: Politically such action meant the elimination of the powerful country to the east, white might constitute a threat to German ambitions, and acquisition of Lebensraum; while on the economic side, it offered magnificent opportunities for the plunder of vast quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies, going far beyond any legitimate exploitation under the Geneva Convention principles for military purpose. Undoubtedly the demands of the German war economy for food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness on the economic side of this theory while the difficulties Germany was experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of eliminating, as a political factor, their one formidable opponent on the continent. As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in Mein Kampf where he stated, and I quote from Page 641 of the Houghton Mifflin English edition, as follows: "There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a special examination the relation of Germany to Russia: (1) Here perhaps we are dealing with the most decisive concern of all German foreign affairs; and (2) this question is also the touchstone for the political capacity of the young National Socialist movement to think clearly and to act correctly." And again at Page 654 of the same edition: "And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We take up where we broke off 600 years ago. We stop the endless German movement to the south and-west, and turn our gaze toward the land in the East. At long last we break off: the colonial and commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to the soil policy of the future.
MR. ALDERMAN: "If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states." The political portion of this economy or purpose is clearly reflected in the stated purposes of the organization which the Defendant Rosenberg set up to administer the Occupied Eastern Territories. I have already discussed this material and need not repeat it now. In a speech, however, which he delivered 2 days before the attack to the people most interested in the problem of the East' Rosenberg re-stated in his usual somewhat mystic fashion the political basis for the campaign and its inter-relationship with the economic goal. I should like to read a short extract from that speech, which is Document Number 1058-PS and which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-147. The part I read is from Page 9 of the German text: "The job of feeding the German people stands this year, without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims in the East; and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to determine to what extent industries can still be maintained there (wagon factories, et cetera). The consideration and execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the evacuation into consideration. The conversion of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires the strongest characters.
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps this decision will also be approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but in a 100 years." As I have indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to defeat Great Britain had served to strengthen them further in their belief of the political necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a European factor before Germany could completely achieve her role as the master of Europe. The economic motive for the aggression was brought out clearly in our discussion of the organization set up under Goering and General Thomas to carry out the economic exploitation of the territories they occupied. The purely materialistic basis for the attack was unmistakable; and if any doubt existed that at least one of the main purposes of the invasion was to steal the food and raw material needed for the Nazi war machine regardless of the horrible consequences such robbery would entail, that doubt is dispelled by a memorandum, which bears our Number 2718-PS and which I introduced earlier during my opening statement as Exhibit USA-32, showing clear and conscious recognition that these Nazi plans would no doubt result in starving to death millions of people by robbing them of their food. Along the similar line, on June 20, 1941 General Thomas wrote a memorandum in which he stated that General Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler's present conception of the German economic policy concerning raw material. This policy expressed the almost unbelievably heartless theory that less manpower would be used in the conquest of sources of raw materials than would be necessary to produce synthetics in lieu of such raw materials. This is our Document Number 1456-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-148. I should like to read the first two paragraphs.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we better do that after the adjournment. [Afternoon Session]
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner is now in court. Will you stand up, please? [The Defendant Kaltenbrunner rose in the dock.]
THE PRESIDENT: In accordance with Article 24 of the Charter , you must now plead either guilty or not guilty
ERNST KALTENBRUNNER: I plead not guilty. I do not believe that I have made myself guilty.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just put in evidence our Document 1456-PS as Exhibit USA-148. I now read from that document on Page 17: "The following is a new conception of the Fuehrer, which Minister Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed later on by Field Marshal Keitel: "I. The course of the war shows that we went too far in our autarkical endeavors. It is impossible to try to manufacture everything we lack by synthetic procedures or other measures. For instance, it is impossible to develop our motor fuel economy to a point where we can entirely depend on it. All these autarkical endeavors demand a tremendous amount of manpower, and it is simply impossible to provide it. One has to choose another way. What one does not have but needs, one must conquer. The commitment of men which is necessary for one single action will not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim must therefore be to secure all territories which are of special interest to us for the war economy by conquering them. "At the time the Four Year Plan was established I issued a statement in which I made it clear that a completely autarkical economy is impossible for us because the need of men will be too great. My solution, however, has always been directed to securing the necessary reserves for missing stocks by concluding economic agreements which would guarantee delivery even in wartime." On this macabre note I come to the end of the story of this aggression. We have seen these conspirators as they planned, prepared, and finally initiated their wanton attack upon the Soviet Union. Others will carry on the tale and describe the horrible manner in which they waged this war of aggression and the countless crimes they committed in its wake.
MR. ALDERMAN: When I consider the solemn pledge of non-aggression, the base and sinister motives involved, the months of secret planning and preparation, and the unbelievable suffering intentionally and deliberately wrought-when I consider all of this, I feel fully justified in saying that never before-and, God help us, never again-in the history of relations between sovereign nations has a blacker chapter been written than the one which tells-of this unprovoked invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union. For those responsible-and they are here before you, the defendants in this case-it might be just to let the punishment fit the crime. I now turn to the final phase of the detailed presentation of the aggressive-war part of the case: German collaboration with Italy and Japan, and aggressive war against the United States. The relevant portions of the Indictment are set forth in Subsection 7 under Section IV (F) of Count One , appearing at Pages 9 and 10 of the printed English text of the Indictment. The materials relating to this unholy alliance of the three fascist powers and to the aggressive war against the United States have been gathered together in a document book, marked with the letter "Q." which I now submit to the Tribunal. Before moving on to the subject matter of this tripartite collaboration, I should like to invite the attention of the Tribunal to the significance of this phase. In the course of the joint presentation by the British and American Prosecution in the past several days, we have seen the swastika carried forward by force of arms from a tightly controlled and remilitarized Germany to the four corners of Europe. The elements of a conspiracy that I am now about to discuss project the Nazi plan upon a universal screen, involving the older world of Asia and the new world of the United States of America.
MR. ALDERMAN: As a result, the wars of aggression that were planned in Berlin and launched across the frontiers of Poland ended some six years later, almost to the day, in surrender ceremonies upon a United States battleship riding at anchor in the Bay of Tokyo. The first formal alliance between Hitler's Germany and the Japanese Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin on 25 November 1936. This agreement, on its face, was directed against the activities of the Communist International. It was subsequently adhered to by Italy on 6 November 1937. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these official state documents in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter . The German text of these treaties-the original German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact and the subsequent Protocol of Adherence by Italy- is to be found in Volumes 4 and 5 of the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, respectively. The English translation of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of 25 November 1936 is contained in our Document 2508-PS; the English translation of the Protocol 10 Dec.45 of Adherence by Italy of 6 November 1937 is contained in our Document 2506-PS. Both of these documents are included in the document books which have just been handed up to the Tribunal. It is an interesting fact, especially in the light of the evidence I shall submit regarding the Defendant Ribbentrop's active participation in collaboration with the Japanese, that Ribbentrop signed the Anti-Comintern Pact for Germany at Berlin even though at that time, November 1936, Ribbentrop was not the German Foreign Minister but simply Hitler's special Ambassador Plenipotentiary. On 27 September 1940 some four years after the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed and one year after the initiation of war in Europe, the German, Italian, and Japanese Governments signed another pact at Berlin, a 10-year military-economic alliance. Again I note that the Defendant Ribbentrop signed for Germany, this time in his capacity as Foreign Minister.
MR. ALDERMAN: The official German text of this pact, as well as the Japanese and Italian texts together with an English translation, is contained in our Document 2643-PS, which has been certified by the signature and seal of the United States Secretary of State. I now offer in evidence Document 2643-PS as Exhibit USA-149. The Tripartite Pact pledged Germany, Italy, and Japan to support of; and collaboration with, one another in the establishment of a New Ordering Europe and East Asia. I should like to read into the record parts of this far-reaching agreement: "The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it as a condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the world be given its own proper place. They have, therefore, decided to stand together and to co-operate with one another in their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to extend this co-operation to such nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to give to their endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that their aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan have agreed as follows: "Article 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a New Order in Europe. "Article 2: Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a New Order in Greater East Asia. "Article 3. Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to co-operate in their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic, and military means, if one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." I now skip to the first sentence of Article 6.
MR. ALDERMAN: "The present pact shall come into force immediately upon signature and remain in force for 10 years from the date of its coming into force." The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold announcement to the world that the fascist leaders of Germany, Japan, and Italy had cemented a full military alliance to achieve world domination and to establish a New Order presaged by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the ruthless Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi overflow into Austria early in 1938. I might also comment that this fact introduces the Fuehrerprinzip into world politics. I should like to read in this connection a statement by Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States, at the time of the signing of this Tripartite Pact. This statement appears in the official United States publication, Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1g31-1941, which has already been put in evidence as Exhibit USA-122. Mr. Hull's statement is Number 184 therein. It is also our Document Number 2944-PS, and both the English text and a German translation thereof are included in the document books. I now quote a statement by the Secretary of State, 27 September 1940: "The reported agreement of alliance does not, in view of the Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation which has existed for several years. Announcement of the alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long existed in effect, and to which this Government have repeatedly called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has been fully taken into account by the Government of the United States, in the determining of this country's policies." That ends the quotation. I shall not attempt here to trace the relationships and negotiations leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940. I shall note, however, one example of the type of German-Japanese relationship existing before the formalization of the Tripartite Pact.
MR. ALDERMAN: This is the record of the conversation of 31 January 1939 between Himmler and General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, which was referred to by the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening address. This document, which is signed by Himmler in crayon, is our Document Number 2195-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-150. I now quote the file memorandum: "Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over the following subjects: "1) The Fuehrer speech, which pleased him very much, especially because it has been spiritually well founded in every respect. "2) We discussed the conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the triangle Germany-Italy-Japan into an even firmer mold. He also told me that, together with German counter-espionage', -Abwehr-"he was undertaking long-range projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organization was to become effective only in case of war. "3) Furthermore, he had succeeded up to now in sending 10 Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional Russians whom he had also sent across had been shot at the frontier." Whatever the beginning and the course of development of the fascist triplice, the Nazi conspirators, once their military and economic alliance with Japan had been formalized, exhorted the Japanese to aggression against those nations with whom they were at war and those with whom they contemplated war. In this the conspirators pursued a course strikingly parallel to that followed in their relationship with the other member of the European Axis. On 10 June 1940 in fulfillment of her alliance with Germany, Italy had carried out her "stab in the back" by declaring war against France and Great Britain. These Nazi conspirators set about to induce similar action by Japan on the other side of the world.
MR. ALDERMAN: As I shall show, the nations against whom the German-Japanese collaboration was aimed at various times were the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America. I shall deal with each of these nations in the order named. At least as early as 23 February 1941-on the basis of documents available to us-these conspirators undertook to exploit their alliance with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the British Commonwealth. Again the figure of the Defendant Ribbentrop appears. On that date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese open hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as possible. The report of that conference, our Document 1834-PS, has already been offered in connection with the presentation of the case on aggression against the Soviet Union as Exhibit USA-129. A part of it has already been read into the record and I now intend to read other portions. I shall again come back to this document when dealing with the German-Japanese collaboration as regards the United States. As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation, Ribbentrop on 2 March sent copies of an extract of the record of this conference to his various ambassadors and ministers for their strictly confidential and purely personal information with the further note that-and I quote: "These statements are of fundamental significance for orientation in the general political situation facing Germany in early spring 1941." I shall now quote from the top of Page 2 of the English translation of 1834-PS, to the end of the first paragraph on that page, and then skip to the last three sentences of the second paragraph: "Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.