dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ALDERMAN: In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small Reichswehr would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Fuehrer aimed at-and has so happily been successful in bringing about- was the fusion of these two forces. "2. The seizure of power . . ."-I invite the Tribunal's attention to the frequency with which that expression occurs in an of these documents.- "The seizure of power by the Nazi Party in its turn had meant, in the first place, the restoration of military sovereignty." That is the German word "Wehrhoheit"-a kind of euphemism there-"the highness of defense." I think it really means "fighting sovereignty." Wehrhoheit also meant conscription, occupation of the Rhineland and rearmament, with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armored and air arm. "3. The Austrian Anschluss . . ."-Anschluss means "locking on to," I think. They latched on to Austria and-"The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfillment of an old national aim, but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas, up until then, the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers." I wish the Tribunal would contemplate the chart a moment and see that worm-like form of Czechoslovakia, which General Jodl calls a "wasp waist in the direction of France," and then he very accurately described what happened when Austria was taken by the Anschluss, that the "wasp waist" was "enclosed in the pincers." I resume reading: "Her own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with vigor before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive.
MR. ALDERMAN: "This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the West Wall, which, in contradistinction to the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear coverage for an active policy in the East. "4. bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939"-that is-the two phases in Czechoslovakia- "and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favorable strategic premises."-I think it needs nothing more than a glance at the progressive chart to see what those favorable strategic premises were.- "5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland, in itself unavoidable, was favorably selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in doubt, because the relatively strong opponent collapsed more quickly than expected, and the Western Powers who were Poland's friends, although they did declare war on us and form a second front, nevertheless made no use of the possibilities open to them of wresting the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course taken by the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said but that it proved to an extent which surprised the whole world a fact which until then had not been certain by any means, namely, the high state of efficiency of the young armed forces of Greater Germany." If the Court please, there is a long review by General Jodl in this document. I could read on with interest and some enthusiasm, but I believe I have read enough to show that General Jodl by this document identifies himself fully with the Nazi movement. This document shows that he was not a mere soldier.
MR. ALDERMAN: Insofar as he is concerned, it identifies the military with the political, and the immediate point on which I had offered the document was to show the deliberation with whim the Treaty of Versailles was abrogated by Germany and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was militarized and fortified. In one of Adolf Hitler's reviews of the 6-year period between his ascendancy to power and the outbreak of hostilities, he not only admitted but boasted about the orderly and coordinated long-range planning. I bring up again, if the Tribunal please, the Document L-79, which was offered in evidence yesterday as Exhibit USA-27. That is the minutes of a conference of the Fuehrer by Schmundt, his adjutant. In as large a staff as ours we inevitably fall into a kind of patois or lingo, as Americans say. We also refer to this as "Little Schmundt." The large file that I offered yesterday, we call "Big Schmundt." At this point, I merely wish to read two sentences from Page 1 of that document which we call "Little Schmundt." "In the period 1933 to 1939 progress was made in all fields. Our military system improved enormously." And then, just above the middle of the second page of the English translation: "The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims." One of the most significant direct preparations for aggressive war is found in the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, which I offered in evidence yesterday as Exhibit USA-24 and commented on then. I need not repeat that comment. The law went into effect upon its passage. It stated at the outset that it was to be made public instantly, but at the end of it Adolf Hitler signed the decree ordering that it be kept secret. I commented on that sufficiently yesterday.
MR. ALDERMAN: General Thomas, Thomas, as we call him, who was in charge of War and Armament Economy and for some time a high ranking member of The German High Council, refers to this law as "the cornerstone of war preparations." He points out that, although the law was not made public until the outbreak of war, it was put into immediate execution as a program of preparation. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of General Thomas' work, A History of the German War- and Armament-Economy, 1923-1944 , Page 25. We have the volume here, in German, so that anyone who wishes may examine it. I don't care to offer the entire volume in evidence unless the Court think I should. We do give it an exhibit number, Exhibit USA-35, but I simply should like to place it in the files as a reference work implementing judicial notice, if that is practicable.
THE PRESIDENT: You want it simply for the purpose of showing that General Thomas said that that law was the cornerstone of war? That has already been passed into the record.
MR. ALDERMAN: I want to say to counsel for the defendants that it is here if they care to consult it at any time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: I should have identified it by our number, 2353-PS. This secret law remained in effect until 4 September 1938, at which time it was replaced by another secret Defense Law, revising the system of defense organization and directing more detailed preparations for the approaching status of mobilization, which I think was the euphemism for war. These laws will be discussed more extensively in connection with other sections of our presentation. They have been discussed by Mr. Dodd in connection with the economic preparations for the war. The second secret Defense Law I offer in evidence as our serial number 2194-PS. I offer it as Exhibit USA-36. As to that document I only intend to read the two covering letters: "Reich Defense Law; the Ministry for Economy and Labor, Saxony; Dresden 6; 4 September 1939; Telephone: 52.151, long distance; Top Secret. "Transportation Section, attention of Construction Chief Counsellor Hirche or representative in the office; stamp of receipt of the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia; received Prague, 5 September 1939, No. 274. "Enclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938 and a copy each of the decrees of the Reich Minister of Transportation, dated 7 October 1938, RL/W/ 10.2212/38, Top Secret, and 17 July 1939, RL/LV 1.2173/39, Top Secret, for your information and observance. "By order, signed Kretschmar. 3 inclosures. Stamp: complete to Dresden, 4 September 1939, signed Schneider. "Receipt for the letter of 4 September 1939, with 3 inclosures, signed 5 September 1939, and returned to Construction Counsellor Kretschmar." The whole point being that it was enclosing a second secret Reich Defense Law under top-secret cover. Now, next I refer to Indictment, Paragraph IV (F) 2 (a). That paragraph of the Indictment refers to four points: (1) Secret rearmament from 1933 to March 1935; (2) the training of military personnel (that includes secret or camouflage training); (3) production of munitions of war; and, (4) the building of an air force.
MR. ALDERMAN: All four of these points are included in the general plan for the breach of the Treaty of Versailles and for the ensuing aggressions. The facts of rearmament and of its secrecy are self-evident from the events that followed. The significant phase of this activity insofar as the Indictment is concerned, dies in the fact that all this was necessary in order to break the barriers of the Versailles Treaty and of the Locarno Pact, and necessary to the aggressive wars which were to follow. The extent and nature of those activities could only have been for aggressive purposes, and the highest importance which the Government attached to the secrecy of the program is emphasized by the disguised financing, both before and after the announcement of conscription and the rebuilding of the Army, 16 March 1935. I have, if the Court please, an unsigned memorandum by the Defendant Schacht dated 3 May 1935 entitled "The Financing of the Armament Program" (Finanzierung der Ruestung). As I say, it is not signed by the Defendant Schacht, but he identified it as being his memorandum in an interrogation on the 16th of October 1945. I would assume that he would still admit that it is his memorandum. That memorandum has been referred to but I believe not introduced or accepted in evidence. I identify it by our Number 1168-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-37. I think it is quite significant, and with the permission of the Court I shall read the entire memorandum, reminding you that the German interpreter has the original German before him to read into the transcript. "Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler" identified by Schacht as Exhibit A, interrogation 16 October 1945, Page 40. May 3, 1935 is the date of the memorandum. "Financing of Armament. The following explanations are based upon the thought that the accomplishment of the armament program with speed and in quantity is the problem of German politics; that everything else therefore should be subordinated to this purpose as long as the main purpose is not imperiled by neglecting all other questions.
MR. ALDERMAN: Even after March 16, 1935 the difficulty remains that one cannot undertake the open propagandistic treatment of the German people for support of armament without endangering our position internationally (without loss to our foreign trade). The already nearly impossible financing of the armament program is rendered hereby exceptionally difficult. "Another supposition must also be emphasized. The printing press can be used only for the financing of armament to such a degree as permitted by maintaining of the money value. Every inflation increases the prices of foreign raw materials and increases the domestic prices and is therefore like a snake biting its own tail. The circumstance that our armament had to be camouflaged completely till 16 March 1935, and since this date the camouflage had to be continued to an even larger extent, made it necessary to use the printing press (bank note press) already at the beginning of the whole armament program, while it would have been natural to start it (i. e., the printing press) at the final point of finance. In the portfolio of the Reichsbank are segregated bills of exchange for this purpose (that is, armament) of 3,775 mil- lions and 866 millions, altogether 4,641 millions, out of which bills of exchange for armament amount to 2,374 million Reichsmark, that is of April 30, 1935. The Reichsbank has invested the amount of marks under its jurisdiction, but belonging to foreigners, in bank notes of armament. "Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of our political opponents. Furthermore, 500 million Reichsmark were used for financing of armaments which originated out of the federal loans which were invested in the saving banks in the year 1935. In the regular budget the following amounts were provided for the Armed Forces: "For the budget period 1933 to 1934-750 million Reichsmark; for the budget period 1934 to 1935-1,100 million Reichsmark; and for the budget period 1935 to 1936-2,500 million Reichsmark.
MR. ALDERMAN: "The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases after the budget 1935 to 1936 to 5 to 6 billion Reichsmark. This total deficit is already financed at the present time by short-term credits of the money market. It therefore reduces in advance the possibilities of utilization of the public market for the armament. The Reichsfinanzminister"-Minister of Finance-"correctly points out at the defense of the budget: " As a permanent yearly deficit is an impossibility, as we cannot figure with security increased tax revenues in an amount balancing the deficit and any other previous debits, as on the other hand a balanced budget is the only secure basis for the impending great task of military policy,"-I interpolate that evidently the Defendant Schacht knew about the impending great military task to be faced by Germany.- "for all these reasons we have to put in motion a fundamental and conscious budget policy, which solves the problem of armament financing by organic and planned reduction of other expenditures, not only from the point of receipt, but also from the point of expenditure, that is, by saving.' "How urgent this question is, can be deduced from the following, that very many tasks have been undertaken by the State and Party"-it isn't ever just the State; it is the State and the Party-"and are now in process, all of which are not covered by the budget, but from contributions and credits, which have to be raised by industry in addition to the regular taxes. The existence of various budgets side by side, which serve more or less public tasks, is the greatest impediment for gaining a clear view of the possibilities of financing the armaments. A large number of ministries and various branches of the Party have their own budgets, and for this reason have possibilities of incomes and expenses, though based on the sovereignty of finance of the State, but not subject to the control of the Finanzminister"-Minister of Finance-"and therefore also not subject to the control of the Cabinet.
MR. ALDERMAN: Just as in the sphere of politics the much too far-reaching delegation of legislative powers to individuals brought about various states within the State, exactly in the same way the condition of various branches of State and Party, working side by side and against each other, has a devastating effect on the possibility of finance. If, in this territory, concentration and unified control is not introduced very soon, the solution of the already impossible task of armament finance is endangered. "We have the following tasks: "(1) A deputy is entrusted with, I suppose, finding all sources and revenues, which have origin in contributions to the Federal Government, to the State and Party, and in profits of public and Party enterprises. "(2) Furthermore experts entrusted by the Fuehrer have to examine how these amounts were used and which of these amounts in the future can be withdrawn from their previous purpose. "(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of all public and Party organizations, to what extent this property can be used for the purpose of armament financing. "(4) The federal Ministry of Finances is to be entrusted to examine the possibilities of increased revenues by way of new taxes or the increasing of existing taxes. "The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank, under existing political conditions, was a necessity, and the political success proved the correctness of this action. The other possibilities of armament financing have to be started now under any circumstance. For this purpose all absolutely nonessential expenditures for other purposes must not take place, and the total financial strength of Germany, limited as it is, has to be concentrated for the one purpose of armament financing. Whether the problem of financing as outlined in this program succeeds remains to be seen, but without such concentration it will fail with absolute certainty." Being sort of a hand in finance myself, I can feel some sympathy with the Defendant Schacht as he was wrestling with these problems.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn for 10 minutes?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. [A recess was taken.]
MR. ALDERMAN: 21 May 1935 was a very important date in the Nazi calendar. As I have already indicated, it was on that date that they passed the secret Reich Defense Law, which is our Document 2261-PS. The secrecy of their armament operations had already reached the point beyond which they could no longer maintain successful camouflage and, since their program called for still further expansion, they made a Unilateral renunciation of the armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty on the same date, 21 May 1935. I refer to Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on 21 May 1935; our Document Number 2288-PS. We have here the original volume of the Völkischer Beobachter (the "Popular Observer", I suppose, is the correct translation), Volume 48, 1935, 122-151, May, and the date 22 May 1935, which gave his speech under the heading (if I may translate, perhaps): "The Fuehrer Notifies the World of the Way to Real Peace." I offer that part of that volume identified as our Number 2288-PS, as Exhibit USA-38, and from that I shall read, beginning with the fifth paragraph in the English translation. I am sorry, I said the fifth paragraph-this indicates on Page 3. It is after he discusses some general conclusions and then there is a paragraph numbered 1, that says: "1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva Resolution of 17 March.... "The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the Dictate of Versailles were violated, and consequently invalidated by those powers who could not make up their minds to follow the disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament as agreed upon by the Treaty. "2.
MR. ALDERMAN: Because the other powers did not live up to their obligations under the disarmament program, the Government of the German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles, which are nothing but a discrimination of the German nation"-I suppose "against the German nation"-"for an unlimited period of time, since through them, Germany is being nailed down in a unilateral manner, contrary to the spirit of the agreement." If the Tribunal please, needless to say, when I cite Adolf Hitler, I don't necessarily vouch for the absolute truth of everything that he presents. This is a public speech he made before the world, and it is for the Tribunal to judge whether he is presenting a pretext or whether he is presenting the truth. In conjunction with other phases of planning and preparation for aggressive war, there were various programs for direct and indirect training of a military nature. This included not only the training of military personnel, but also the establishment and training of other para-military organizations, such as the police force, which could be, and were absorbed by, the Army. These are shown in other parts of the case presented by the Prosecution. However, the extent of this program for military training is indicated by Hitler's boast of the expenditure of 90 billion Reichsmark during the period of 1933 to 1939 in the building up of the Armed Forces.
MR. ALDERMAN: I have another volume of the Völkischer Beobachter , Volume 52, 1939-I think the issue of 2 and 3 September 1939-which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-39; and there appears a speech by Adolf Hitler, with his picture, under the heading which, if I may be permitted to try to translate, reads: "The Fuehrer Announces the Battle for the Justice and Security of the Reich." That is a speech, if the Court please, by Adolf Hitler, on 1 September 1939, the date of the attack on Poland, identified by our number 2322-PS, and I read from the bottom of Page 3, the last paragraph starting on the page: "For more than 6 years now, I have been engaged in building up the German Armed Forces. During this period more than 90 billion Reichsmark were spent building up the Wehrmacht. Today, ours are the best-equipped armed forces in the world, and they are superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can never be shaken." The secret nature of this training program and the fact of its early development is illustrated by a reference to the secret training of flying personnel, back in 1932, as well as the early plans to build a military air force. A report was sent to the Defendant Hess in a letter from one Schickedantz to the Defendant Rosenberg for delivery to Hess. I suppose that Schickedantz was very anxious that no one but Hess should get this letter, and therefore sent it to Rosenberg for personal delivery. This document points out that the civilian pilots should be so organized as to enable their transfer into the military air force organization. This letter is our Document 1143-PS, dated 20 October 1932, and I now offer it in evidence as U. S. Exhibit 40. It starts: "Lieber Alfred" (referring to Alfred Rosenberg), and is signed: "Mit bestem Gruss, Dein Amo." Amo, I think, was the first name of Schickedantz. "Dear Alfred: I am sending you enclosed a communication from the RWM forwarded to me by our confidential mail" -Vertrauensmann-"which indeed is very interesting.
MR. ALDERMAN: I believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter will not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm. This report is not known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform even our long friend." I suppose that means "our tall friend." I may interpolate that the Defendant Rosenberg, in an interrogation on 5 October 1945, identified this "big friend" or "tall friend" as being one Von Alvensleben. "I am enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to transmit the letter to Hess by messenger, as I do not want to write a letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere. Mit bestem Gruss, Dein Amo." Then enclosed with that is "Air Force Organization": "Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel to provide for the case of the armament of the Air Force. "Entire management as a civilian organization will be transferred to Colonel Von Willberg, at present Commander of Breslau, who, retaining his position in the Reichswehr, is going on leave of absence. "(a) Organizing the pilots of civilian air-lines in such a way as to enable their transfer to the air force organization. "(b) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to be done within the organization for military flying of the Stahlhelm"-I believe that means the "steel helmet"- "which is being turned over to Colonel Hänel, retired. "All existing organizations for sport-flying are to be used for military flying. Directions on kinds and tasks of military flying will be issued by this Stahlhelm directorate. The Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots 50 marks per hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he himself carries out the flight. They are to be divided in case of non-owners of the plane, between flight organization, proprietor, and crew, in the proportion of 10-20-20... Military flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement (40). We therefore have to expect that most proprietors of planes or flying associations will over to the Stahlhelm organization.