dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have just one more question about these organizational matters. Were all the departments of the Armed Forces Operations Staff in the Fuehrer's headquarters?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No; for example we had the "Org." Department, an organizational department, which was not located at headquarters but in the neighborhood of Berlin.
DR. JAHRREISS: If I have understood you correctly, the affairs of Department "QU" by-passed Jodl, so to speak, and were handled with the Chief of OKW?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Not in every case, but in a certain number of cases.
DR. JAHRREISS: At all events the question of prisoners of war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Certainly, the question of prisoners of war.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Witness, what position did you have at the beginning of the war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: At the beginning of the war I was the second General Staff officer in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army.
DR. JAHRREISS: Would you speak a little more slowly. And what were your duties there?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: My department dealt with the filling of positions in the higher command of flees for mobilization.
DR. JAHRREISS: Those of the General Staff officers of the OKW too?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, those, too.
DR. JAHRREISS: General, do you know who was meant to be Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff in the event of mobilization from 1 October 1939 on?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, General Von Sodenstern was meant to hold this position for the next mobilization year.
DR. JAHRREISS: Am I to understand that if the war had broken out after 1 October-let us say on 5 or 6-then Jodl would not have been Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff: at all?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I am not sure of the date on which the new mobilization year of 1939 to 1940 began. From that time on...
MR. ROBERTS: I submit this testimony is not relevant to any issue in this case at all, and it may be somewhat interesting to know the answers that are submitted have no relevancy at ale
THE PRESIDENT: I don't quite understand what the relevancy of the evidence at the moment is.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if the Prosecution are right that the Defendant Jodl belonged to a group of conspirators aiming at world conquest and if, as the Prosecution say, that group of conspirators obtained use of the German state machine to achieve their aims, then it must be a somewhat peculiar state system when conspirators are changed periodically. To that extent I believe the case must be presented to the Tribunal for consideration.
THE PRESIDENT: Has he been given the dates of his exchanges, without any cross-examination? He went to Vienna at a certain date, he came back at another date, and we have no challenge of that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that is a different question. The Defendant Jodl has said that if mobilization was decreed before 1 October he was Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and had to leave Vienna for Berlin. Now the witness says that this was only up to the new mobilization year and that then the other would have come along if the war had broken out 14 days later. I think . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is extraordinarily remote, Dr. Jahrreiss. You show us a matter of surmise about what would have happened if something else would have happened. That does not help us very much.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, the testimony of the witness is not a mere conjecture. He only said that the person who held this important position was disposed of in a routine manner according to date. That was the only thing to be shown. May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: No, in the interest of time and an expeditious trial, the Tribunal rules you may not go into that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, if I now ask you about a certain field of activity which you just mentioned, it is because I assume that you have particularly expert knowledge of it. Is it true that you were officially connected with the suppression of partisans?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. The chief authority for combating guerrillas was turned over to my department toward the end of the summer of 1942, and the tactical basis for combating guerrillas was dealt with by my department from that date on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Are you familiar with the pamphlet on the suppression of partisans, issued in May 1944?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, the leaflet was drawn up in my department.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was that the first one, or had there been a previous regulation concerning guerrilla warfare?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. In the autumn of 1942 a short and incomplete directive had been issued on the subject of combating guerrillas. At that time we were still comparatively inexperienced; and since guerrilla fighting had not been anticipated in peacetime, we first had to get further experience.
DR. JAHRREISS: In this connection I am interested particularly in the guerrilla fighting in the East and Southeast, on the subject of which the Prosecution have shown that they have a very definite idea. Is it correct to speak of a "guerrilla war," as has been done here several times?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is correct according to the extent and danger which guerrilla fighting assumed, given its limitations in regard to time and space.
DR. JAHRREISS: Does that mean that the characteristics of this fighting went beyond the general conception of the franc-tireur system?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In extent, yes. In the methods, no.
DR. JAHRREISS: What do you mean by "extent"?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean by "extent" the dimensions of the area affected by guerrilla fighting.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it therefore unusual with regard to territory or with regard to people involved?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The guerrilla fighting was certainly unusual both in regard to its territorial extent and the people who took part in it.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether there were many Jews in these guerrilla groups in the East and Southeast?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I do not remember that among the hundreds of reports I received on guerrilla fighting, there was ever any mention of Jews. If there were Jews in these groups it can only have been to a very limited extent.
DR. JAHRREISS: But it has been asserted here that this anti-guerrilla warfare was carried on for the purpose of exterminating the Jews; is that true?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I never heard anything about that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Or the extermination of the Slavs?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: There again, I never heard so much as a hint of such a thing. Such an interpretation would have been quite contrary to the intentions of the military leaders.
DR. JAHRREISS: Why?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The military command had a very definite interest in seeing a peaceful country and a productive population behind every front; and every measure which aimed at this was always welcomed by the military authorities. Every soldier we had to use in guerrilla fighting was urgently needed at the front.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was the policy in the East carried out as the Wehrmacht command wished for their purposes?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Without any doubt that was not the case, because the Wehrmacht would have been glad to see a different policy in the East for the very sake of its volunteer units. We ourselves, with our own methods, made attempts to reach a bloodless pacification of the country even among the guerrillas. Big propaganda campaigns were undertaken there to induce the guerrillas to stop fighting. In certain cases there were special negotiations with individual groups; and, although they were limited to certain occasions and periods, these were most successful.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know General Von Pannewitz?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz was the Commander of the 1st Cossack Division. '
DR. JAHRREISS: When, please?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must have been during 1943.
DR. JAHRREISS: Is it correct that this General, as Commander of the 1st Cossack Division, this volunteer division, once complained to the OKW about the difficulties he was having in his division? VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS Yes. General Von Pannewitz is a friend of mine from my old regiment. He came to see me at headquarters and on that occasion-in the summer of 1943 or maybe during the autumn-talked to me in detail about the state of affairs in recruiting his troops and the difficulties he was experiencing with the morale of his unit, particularly because of the Government's policy in the East. At that time he complained particularly about the fact that the Government's policy held up no national aim for his division; and he made other complaints about the difficulties incurred by the members of his division at that time who were partly on the road and had to be settled.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Jodl take care Of the affair?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. After the visit I reported the subject of our conversation to the Generaloberst and asked him to use his influence in the interests of our volunteer units.
DR. JAHRREISS: Influence on whom do you mean?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Influence on the Fuehrer.
DR. JAHRREISS: But you told me that Jodl was not competent for this?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Generaloberst Jodl...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, what is the relevancy of this, about some general who commanded a Cossack Division and that he had difficulties with morale? What has that got to do with this case?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that was a preparatory question. I am now coming to the real question. It is the question of the dividing up of competency and responsibility. I was just about to ask the witness the decisive question. [Turning to the witness.] General...
THE PRESIDENT: What relevancy have the preparatory questions got to do with the decisive question? How can a visit of this general have anything to do with it? What is the decisive question?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if I am to give the reason for that, then I will have to tell the witness what I want him to tell me. Then my question will become a leading one.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is not an unusual thing in this Court.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but I did not want to make that mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on, Dr. Jahrreiss. The Tribunal hopes that you coronet take up too much time over these preliminary questions which are leading to decisive ones.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am sorry, but I did not understand.
THE PRESIDENT: I said, the Tribunal hopes that you will not take up too much time with these preparatory questions before the decisive one.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can abbreviate the examination of the witness a great deal because I am in possession of an affidavit by this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, why are you at the microphone?
DR. LATERNSER: I thought, My Lord, that Dr. Jahrreiss had finished with his interrogation, that he had no more questions to put to the witness.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, there is a misunderstanding. The witness has, in fact, already answered my question.
THE PRESIDENT: He has answered it, has he?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, he has answered it. I merely wanted to enlarge on it a little further but. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Then you have finished, have you, Dr. Jahrreiss'?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes. I now have no further questions to put to the witness.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can shorten the examination considerably because I have an affidavit from the witness which he made on 20 May 1946. If it is my turn, I propose to submit this affidavit to the Tribunal. But so that I may not be reproached for not having ascertained the facts when the witness was available in the courtroom, I will now ask the witness whether the contents of the affidavit of 20 May 1946, are correct. [Turning to the witness.] Witness, are the contents of the affidavit which was given me, dated 20 May 1946, correct?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: They are correct.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you know General Heusinger?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, I know General Heusinger.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution in their case against the General Staff submitted Affidavit Number 20, Document Number 3717-PS, Exhibit Number USA-564; and on Page 2, Figure 4, this general makes the following statement. I quote: "It has always been my personal view that the treatment of the civilian population in operational areas and the methods of guerrilla fighting in the operational zone offered a welcome opportunity for the supreme political and military leadership to carry out their aims, that is to say, to bring about the systematic reduction of Slavs and Jews." I want to ask you now, can you explain how General Heusinger could have arrived at that view?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I worked closely with General Heusinger and very often I talked to him about questions concerning anti-guerrilla warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: He never said anything to me which might express this view and I cannot explain this statement of his, because it is entirely contrary to the basic views of the military leaders in regard to the conduct of anti-guerrilla warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. Why was the general command over anti-guerrilla fighting in the East in 1943, as well as in Italy at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, transferred to Himmler by the Fuehrer's order?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The Fuehrer always held the view that anti-guerrilla warfare was predominantly a task for the Police and that police forces were more suited to carrying it out than the partly over-aged security forces of the Army which we could detail for these tasks. Just how far Himmler wanted to obtain a new increase of power in this connection I do not know, nor how far he might have suggested it to the Fuehrer.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the OKW and especially of the Armed Forces Operations Staff to this decree of Hitler's?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must be emphasized first of all in this connection that, so far as operational areas were concerned, there was no change. The operational area remained until the end, in the case of guerrilla warfare too, under the orders of the commanding generals. In the remaining areas the Armed Forces Operations Staff did not altogether disagree with this arrangement' because we hoped that in these zones the Reichsfuehrer SS would be in a position to use some of his reserves, which were mostly unknown to us; and we should then have some forces released for the front.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you remember, Witness, that the Commander, Southwest made an urgent request to be excepted from this measure, that is, from transferring his authority in anti-guerrilla warfare to Himmler?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These cases were discussed with General Westphal several times over the telephone, and I consider it possible that he might have made such a suggestion at that time.
DR. LATERNSER: You yourself did not discuss it with the Commander, Southwest?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: With the chief?
DR. LATERNSER: With the chief, yes. As you have just said, before the war you were in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army; and, as I know, the filling of the higher command positions was handled there, too. Now I want to ask you on what principles they based their selection of commanding generals of army groups and armies?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These appointments were made according to ability and length of service, and the peacetime appointments formed the framework for filling positions at the time of mobilization.
DR. LATERNSER: Were these appointments of the higher commanders carried out strictly from a military standpoint?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These nominations took place entirely on the strength of military considerations; and retired officers, some of whom I am convinced left because of political pressure, were again placed in responsible positions in the event of mobilization. I should like to cite as examples General Von Leeb, General Von Kressenstein, General Von Kleist, Generaloberst Von Hammerstein.
DR. LATERNSER: And these officers you have just mentioned had already retired before the outbreak of the war but were meant to take over higher positions of command in the event of a mobilization?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Central Department, which had to fill these positions, ever learn that the military leaders had formed a group with the aim of carrying out aggressive wars and of disregarding international law in these wars of aggression?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In the Central Department we knew nothing of the formation of such a group. Perhaps I may state in this connection that during the years 1937 to 1939 quite a number of General Staff officers came to see Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and me, as personnel administrators of the General Staff officers, and talked to us. The majority of these officers were chiefs of army corps, army, and army group general staffs; and they were, therefore, the confidential and responsible advisers of the commanding generals and commanders. These officers, just like their commanding generals, had fought in the first World War; and the opinion they always expressed to us was only that the German nation should be spared a second war. In spite of every positive attitude to the Fuehrer's successes, there was a certain anxiety about his policy and particularly about the rapid rearmament of the forces, which made careful work difficult. After the Munich negotiations confidence increased a great deal and it was the general opinion of the officers that the Fuehrer would continue to be successful in maintaining peace.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the higher commanders towards Hitler after the Munich Agreement?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: After the Munich Agreement I concluded from my talks with General Staff officers that there was a general conviction among them that, thanks to his policy, the Fuehrer would continue to preserve peace. I remember that as late as 25 or 26 August I saw the Fuehrer, at headquarters in Zossen, having a conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and several other officers. At that time these officers were still of the opinion that a war would not occur and that to render the Fuehrer's political aims feasible it was only necessary to keep the troops firmly under control so that no political catastrophe should be produced by the laying down of arms.
DR. LATERNSER: I think that is enough as far as this question is concerned. Now, regarding the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944, at what time were the preparations for that offensive begun?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: So far as I can remember...
THE PRESIDENT: How can that have any relevance after about 5 years of war?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for my next question I should like to ask the witness who of the commanding generals were informed of this offensive and when. It is important to ascertain what co-operation there was among the group. I beg you to allow me to put this question. It is the last but one. The one I just mentioned is the last.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.
DR. LATERNSER: When were the preparations for the Ardennes Offensive begun?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As far as I can remember, the first preparations were begun in about September 1944.
DR. LATERNSER: When were the commanding generals informed of these intentions and were commanding generals who did not take part in the offensive informed before it began?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: To the last question I can answer, "no." The first question I cannot answer as far as the date is concerned; but I do know that in the zone which was proposed for the offensive there had already been troop movements ordered by the supreme command before the Commander, West, who was responsible, was informed and that he therefore made frequent inquiries of us asking for an explanation of these movements.
DR. LATERNSER: The Commander, West, who later on had to direct the offensive, was not previously informed about the movements and transfer of divisions for the offensive, all of which took place in his very territory?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. Later on, of course, he was informed.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 8 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the Defendants Hess and Raeder are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the applications for witnesses and documents that were made the other day in Court, I will take them in the order in which they were dealt with in Court. The first application is the application of Kaltenbrunner, and the three witnesses which he asks for are allowed: Tiefenbacher, Kandruth, and Strupp. The application of the Defendant Schirach is rejected. The applications of the Defendants Hess and Frank for General Donovan are rejected. The applications of the Defendants Speer and Keitel are granted, and the application of the Defendant Jodl for an affidavit I think was granted yesterday. The application for the Defendant Goering for two witnesses, Stuckart and Burmath is granted, but on the condition that three witnesses only may be called upon the subject concerned. With reference to the application of the Defendant Hess, the Tribunal order as follows: The affidavit of the former Ambassador Gaus of the 17th of May 1946 is rejected on the ground that it is not in accordance with the permission given on May 14, 1946, but purports to incorporate not merely the substance but also the form of the secret treaties, and the form embraced in the affidavit is not identified as being correct either by a person who made the copies or by one who compared them with the originals. Such copies cannot be received in evidence, and the Tribunal have twice ruled to this effect. The matter of importance to the issues before the Tribunal is not the form of the treaties, but their contents, and evidence of their contents is already before the Tribunal by the testimony of three witnesses. The admission of this affidavit would add nothing to the proof before the Tribunal. The same is true of the proposal to call Gaus as a witness, who would only support evidence as to the contents of the treaties which has not been contradicted. The motion of the 23d of May 1946 to reconsider the Tribunal's former decision and the motion of the 24th of May 1946 to call Gaus as a witness are accordingly denied.
THE PRESIDENT: There is one other matter with which the Tribunal propose to deal, and it is this: In the future, counsel for the organizations which the Prosecution have asked the Tribunal to declare to be criminal will not be permitted to examine or to cross-examine any witnesses other than the defendants in this Court. If they wish to examine or to cross-examine those witnesses, they must call them before the commissions which are now sitting for the taking of evidence on the questions with which the organizations are concerned. That is all.