dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
JODL: Before this Himmler-Fuehrer conference, which caused me to send my teletype message to the Wehrmacht-Commander in Denmark, I never heard a word about the Jews being deported from Denmark, and I never heard that the Foreign Office had any part in it.
DR. HORN: Did you ever get to know anything about the basic attitude of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop toward the Jewish question?
JODL: Apart from this suggestion about the Hungarian Jews, I do not recall any talk by the Reich Foreign Minister, at which I was present, in which there was any mention of Jews.
DR. HORN: Thank you. I have no further questions.
DR. KRAUS: Did I understand you correctly, Generaloberst, when you testified yesterday that in 1935 it was decided to set up 36 divisions?
JODL: That is true, yes.
DR. KRAUS: I am interested to know how many divisions were ready by 1 April 1938? I am interested in this key date because on that day the financial aid of the Reichsbank stopped. Can you tell me how many divisions were ready on 1 April 1938?
JODL: At that time there were about 27 or 28 divisions actually ready-that is, as regards personnel and materiel.
DR. KRAUS: Can you tell me, Generaloberst, how they were made up?
JODL: I cannot say with certainty.
DR. KRAUS: Approximately?
JODL: I do know that only one Panzer division was ready at that time, one cavalry division, one mountain division, and the rest were probably infantry divisions. The other Panzer divisions were not yet equipped, and they existed only as skeleton formations.
DR. KRAUS: I would like to know to what extent this armament was increased between that date and the outbreak of the war on 1 September 1939-that is, increased from 27 divisions?
JODL: From the autumn of 1938 on, the picture became much more favorable because the preparations in the armament industry were now producing results, and plenty of equipment was being delivered for the divisions; also, because from this time on, the trained age groups were beginning to come in. Therefore, in the late autumn of 1938, we were in a position to set up approximately 55 divisions-including reserve divisions-even though some of them may have been only poorly equipped. In 1939-as I said before, according to my recollection-there were between 73 and 75 divisions.
DR. KRAUS: Therefore, the number of divisions set up after March or April of 1938, after President Schacht left the Reichsbank, increased by 200 percent in la or 16 months, whereas it took more than 3 years to set up 27 divisions?
JODL: That is true, except that these 55 divisions, or rather these 75, were still very short of equipment in the same way as the small number in the spring of 1938, or in April 1938, which I mentioned. But the fact that from that time on armament went much faster was due-as I have said-to the very nature of things.
DR. KRAUS: Thank you, I have no further questions.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you testified yesterday that the Intelligence Service during Kaltenbrunner's time was better organized than before. Please tell me, what position did Kaltenbrunner hold during your time in the OKW?
JODL: I met Kaltenbrunner when...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. Dr. Kauffmann, you have asked a general question. We have had all of Kaltenbrunner's positions given to us more than once. What is it you want to know?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, Kaltenbrunner only testified quite generally to the fact that his intelligence service was connected with the military Intelligence Service. This witness can tell us what this connection of the military Intelligence Service with the other intelligence service amounted to, especially as regards its scope and its influence on policy as a whole.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn't understand you to ask him anything about the Intelligence Service. You asked him a quite general question about what relations he had had with the OKW during the time that the defendant was connected with the OKW, in perfectly general terms. It might have involved an answer which would take about an hour.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I restate the question which apparently did not come through properly? Witness, you testified yesterday that in Kaltenbrunner's time the whole Intelligence Service was better organized than before that time-that is, under Canaris. Now, I ask you what position did Kaltenbrunner have within the Intelligence Service?
JODL: Kaltenbrunner...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the particular question that you want to ask? The Tribunal do not think that you ought to ask general questions of this nature. If you have got anything particular that you want to know about, you can ask it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What did Kaltenbrunner do during the situation discussions which took place daily?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, it is scarcely possible to imagine any more general question than that with reference to Kaltenbrunner: What was his activity over a number of years?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I said, during the situation report, that is) the daily military conferences-how did Kaltenbrunner conduct himself? What did he do? What did he say? Did he report? What did his reports consist of? That, in my opinion, is a concrete question.
THE PRESIDENT: What time are you asking about?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am asking about the time after his appointment as Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, the time from 1943 on. That is the only time which is in question.
THE PRESIDENT: You can ask him with reference to particular conferences, certainly. Why not ask him with reference to particular conferences, if you know any?
DR. KAUFFMANN: That was my intention. Witness, do you understand what the question is? Will you please tell me?
JODL: As far as I recall, until the spring of 1945 when the headquarters were finally moved to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, Kaltenbrunner did not take part in any situation discussions. I cannot recall ever seeing him at a discussion in the Fuehrer's headquarters.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Excuse me, do you mean 1944 or 1945?
JODL: 1945. From the spring of 1945-that is, from the end of January, I frequently met Kaltenbrunner in the Reich Chancellery. Before that time he came to the Fuehrer's headquarters, from time to time, and talked to me there-especially about taking over the Canaris Intelligence Service-but he was not present at the situation conferences of the Fuehrer.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did he submit written military situation reports?
JODL: Before he took over the Intelligence Service from Canaris- he took it over on 1 May 1944-before he took over the Intelligence Service, he sent me from time to time very good reports from the southeastern area, and these reports first called my attention to his experience in the Intelligence Service. He then took over the Intelligence Service, and although I was against it at first, after I had expressed my views to him I even supported him, for I had the impression that the man knew his business. After that, of course, I constantly received reports from Kaltenbrunner as I previously had received them from Canaris. Not only did I receive the daily reports from agents, but from time to time he sent what I should call a political survey on the basis of the individual agent's reports. These comprehensive situation reports about the political situation everywhere abroad attracted my special attention because they summed up our whole military situation with a frankness, soberness, and seriousness which had not been at all noticeable in Canaris' reports.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you also testified yesterday that after the daily military situation conference was ended, Hitler gathered around him his trusted confidants and his political men. I ask you now: Was Kaltenbrunner in this circle of confidants?
JODL: I never heard of Kaltenbrunner being in this private circle of the Fuehrer, and I never saw him there. What I saw was a purely official attitude.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you, I have no more questions.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUHLER (Counsel for Defendant Doenitz): Generaloberst, Grossadmiral Doenitz is accused of calling on the Navy to continue to fight in the spring of 1945. Did you yourself, as a responsible military adviser, advise the Fuehrer at that time to capitulate?
JODL: I did not advise him to capitulate at that time. That was completely out of the question. No soldier would have done that. It would have been of no use.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Not even after the failure of the Ardennes Offensive in February 1945?
JODL: Not even after the failure of the Ardennes Offensive. The Fuehrer realized the situation, as a whole, as well as we did, and probably much sooner than we did. Therefore, we did not need to say anything to him in this connection.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: What were the reasons for not doing this?
JODL: In the winter of 1944 there were many reasons for not doing this, apart from the fact that the question of capitulation or discontinuing resistance concerns only the Supreme Commander. The reasons against it were, primarily, that we had no doubt there could be only unconditional surrender, for tine' other countries left us in no doubt on that score; and even if we had had any doubt as to what faced us, it was completely removed by the fact that we captured the English "Eclipse"-the gentlemen of the British Delegation will know what that is. It was exact instructions about what the occupying power was to do in Germany after the capitulation. Now, unconditional surrender meant that the troops would cease to fight where they stood on all the fronts, and be captured by the enemy facing them. The same thing would happen as happened in the winter of 1941 at Viazma. Millions of prisoners would suddenly have to camp in the middle of winter in the open. Death would have taken an enormous toll. Above all, the men still on the Eastern Front, who numbered about 31/~ million, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy in the East. It was our endeavor to save as many people as possible by sending them into the western area. That could only be done by drawing the two fronts closer together. Those were the purely military opinions which we held in the last stages of the war. I believe that in years to come there will be more to say about this than I can say or wish to say today.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, how long have you known Field Marshal Keitel?
JODL: I believe I met him in 1932 when he was chief of the organizational department of the Army.
DR. NELTE: And from that time, except for the time you were in Vienna, you always worked with him?
JODL: There was a time when Field Marshal Keitel was not in the War Ministry but in the field. I believe that was in 1934-35. I then lost sight of him. Otherwise I was with him all the time.
DR. NELTE: Was your work with him only official, or did you have personal relations with him?
JODL: In the course of the years, as a result of all we went through together, these relations became very personal.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have characterized Field Marshal Keitel as one of the most powerful officers of the Wehrmacht. They charge him with using this position to influence Hitler. Other circles represented here called Keitel weak, and accused him of not being able to achieve his purpose in his position. I do not want to ask any questions which have previously been asked and answered; but there are questions which have been previously answered in various ways-as you have heard-and only a person like you can answer them, a person who worked with the Field Marshal for more than a decade. Therefore, please tell me briefly-making your sentences short-what the official relations were between Keitel and Hitler.
JODL: The official relations between the Fuehrer and Field Marshal Keitel were exactly the same as between the Fuehrer and me, but on a somewhat different level. They were purely official, especially in the beginning. They were interspersed, just as in the case of all other higher officers, by constant clashes between a revolutionary and a Prussian officer bound by tradition.
DR. NELTE: Then, these clashes, the result of differing opinions, were a daily occurrence?
JODL: They were a daily occurrence and in effect led to extremely unpleasant scenes, such scenes as made one ashamed, as a senior officer, to have to listen to such things in the presence of young adjutants. The entry in my diary proves that on 19 April 1940, for instance, Field Marshal Keitel threw his portfolio on the table and left the room. That is a fact.
DR. NELTE: May I ask what the reason was?
THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Nelte. If you want him to confirm the evidence which the Defendant Keitel has given, why don't you ask him whether he confirms it?
DR. NELTE: These are questions, Mr. President, which I have not submitted to Field Marshal Keitel My line of questioning became necessary because between the questioning of the defendant . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The question you put to him was: What were his relations with the Fuehrer? You could not have put it any wider than that, and you certainly covered that with the Defendant Keitel.
DR. NELTE: I discussed it with Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: You have put the question to Keitel, and Keitel answered it at great length.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, after Keitel was questioned, a witness appeared here who would discredit the statement of Field Marshal Keitel, if what he says is true. Therefore, in order to clarify, I must...
THE PRESIDENT: That is the very reason why I asked you whether you wanted this witness to confirm what the Defendant Keitel said, and-if you did-why you didn't ask him whether he did confirm the evidence of Keitel
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, you have heard that we can simplify the question on this matter. I submit to you that which the witness Gisevius said here, in this room, about Field Marshal Keitel. It was, for the main part, in contradiction to what Field Marshal Keitel, and the other witnesses questioned about Keitel, had said. I point out that Gisevius did not speak from his own knowledge, but that he was given information from the OKW. If you want to consider that, please answer the question now: According to your knowledge of these things, is it true what Field Marshal Keitel said under oath-and which was confirmed by others, with the exception of Gisevius-or is it true what Gisevius said?
JODL: Only that is true which Field Marshal Keitel said. I experienced it on thousands of days. What the witness Gisevius said in this connection are general figures of speech. Apart from Hitler, there was no powerful man; there was and could be no influential man next to him.
DR. NELTE: The witness Gisevius mentioned an example to prove that Keitel prevented certain reports from being presented to Hitler. Since you had a part in this document, I should like to have this one document presented to you, and ask you to comment on it. It is Document 790-PS. This document is not an actual set of minutes, but a note for the files, as you see. It is about the White Book which was prepared on the alleged Belgian and Dutch violations of neutrality. And in this connection, the witness Gisevius said: "I believe that I should cite two more examples which I consider especially significant. First of all, every means was tried to incite Keitel to warn Hitler before the invasion of Belgium and Holland, and to tell him-that is, Hitler-that the information which had been submitted by Keitel regarding the alleged violation of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was wrong. Counterintelligence"-that is Canaris- "was to produce these reports which would incriminate the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral Canaris, at that time, refused to sign these reports.... He told Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which were supposedly produced by the OKW, were wrong. "That is one instance when Keitel did not transmit to Hitler that which he should have." Generaloberst, I ask you to confirm, after you have looked over this document, that these notes show that Field Marshal Keitel and you were expected to cover false reports, and that on the basis of the Canaris report-contained in Part A-the OKW refused to cover this White Book. Is that true? [There was no response.]
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you understand the question, will you answer it?
JODL: I understand the question, and I should like to establish the facts here briefly, and tell how it really was as far as I can without being choked with disgust. I was present when Canaris came to the Reich Chancellery with this report to Field Marshal Keitel, and submitted to him the draft of the White Book of the Foreign Office. Field Marshal Keitel then looked through this book and listened carefully to the essential remarks which Canaris made, at the wish of the Foreign Office, to the effect that the intelligence needed perhaps some improvement, that he was to confirm that military action against Holland and Belgium was absolutely necessary, and that, as it says here, a final really flagrant violation of neutrality was still lacking. Before Canaris had said another word, Field Marshal Keitel threw the book on the table, and said, "I will not stand for that. How could I assume responsibility for a political decision? In this White Book are, word for word, the reports which you yourself-Canaris- gave me." Whereupon Canaris said, "I am of exactly the same opinion. In my opinion, it is completely superfluous to have this document signed by the Wehrmacht, and the reports which we have here, as a whole, are quite sufficient to substantiate the breaches of neutrality which have taken place in Holland and in Belgium." And he advised Field Marshal Keitel against signing it. That is what took place. The Field Marshal took the book with him, and I do not know what happened after that. But one thing is certain, that the imaginary reports of this Herr Gisevius turn everything upside down. All these reports about the violations of neutrality came from these people who now assert that we had signed them falsely. This is one of the most despicable incidents of world history.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, Admiral Canaris played a part in this case. Gisevius said, "It was not possible for Admiral Canaris to submit an urgent report to Hitler on his own initiative." He asserts that Canaris gave reports to Field Marshal Keitel who did not submit them. I ask you, is that true?
JODL: Of course, I did not follow up every document that came to Field Marshal Keitel; but Field Marshal Keitel submitted everything which was considered necessary for the Fuehrer to know about. I have already said that if Canaris had not been satisfied in this connection, he could have gone to the Fuehrer directly. He had only to go into the next office and inform the Fuehrer's chief adjutant, or he had only to tell me.
THE PRESIDENT: If you don't know, why don't you say so? If you don't know whether he gave it to the Fuehrer or not, say so.
DR. NELTE: I only asked whether the testimony is true, that Admiral Canaris could not go to Hitler. I wanted you to answer that question.
JODL: In fact, he went to the Fuehrer dozens of times.
DR. NELTE: If he wanted it, he had access at any time?
JODL: Absolutely, at any time.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, will you tell me what page in the shorthand notes this evidence is of Gisevius?
DR. NELTE: The evidence about Keitel is in the transcript of the session of 26 April 1946 (Volume XII, Pages 265 to 271).
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: I now want to show you two affidavits which you signed together with Field Marshal Keitel, which have also been submitted to the Tribunal. These are the Affidavit Number Keitel-9, High Command of the Wehrmacht and General Staff, and the Affidavit Number Keitel-13, Development of the Conditions in France, 1940 to 1945, and the military competencies. You remember that you signed these affidavits?
JODL: I did so, yes.
DR. NELTE: And if you are sure of that, do you remember the contents?
JODL: Yes. '
DR. NELTE: You confirm the accuracy of your affidavit?
JODL: I confirm this statement.
DR. NELTE: I will not read these affidavits or parts of them. On the subject of rearmament-that is, regarding General Thomas, who was also given here as a source of information-I should like to ask you a few questions. You know that the Prosecution submitted a voluminous book here, Document 2353-PS, which is a description of the rearmament, written by General Thomas. As General Thomas was also given by the witness Gisevius here as a source of information, I must question you about Thomas. In his affidavit, which is attached to Document 2353-PS, he said that on 1 February 1943 he was released from the OKW. Do you know whether that is true or not?
JODL: As far as I can recall, he was assigned to the group of officers for special employment by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. He was therefore at the disposal of Field Marshal Keitel.
DR. NELTE: Did he not have a special assignment when he was made available for special employment?
JODL: He took over several assignments after that, I believe.
DR. NELTE: I only wanted to ascertain that also after 1 February 1943, General Thomas was still given assignments by the OKW, especially that of writing this book which has been submitted here, is that true?
JODL: That is true, that he was engaged in writing what might be called the "History of Rearmament."
DR. NELTE: What was his relation to Field Marshal Keitel?
JODL: I know of that from the time when the two men worked together-that was only before the war and at the very beginning of the war, and the relations were good.
DR. NELTE: Do you know the reports of General Thomas concerning rearmament?
JODL: I have no exact recollection of any reports about our own rearmament. I can only recall reports about the war potential of our enemies. I remember those.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you going to be much longer, because it is 10 minutes past 5, and if you are not going to conclude tonight we had better adjourn.
DR. NELTE: I will need a quarter of an hour yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we will adjourn at this time. [The Tribunal adjourned until 6 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
DR. NELTE: General, yesterday in answer to my last question about General Thomas you said that he regularly made reports on the war potential of enemy powers to you and Field Marshal Keitel. Were these important reports always submitted to Hitler?
JODL: These reports, with detailed graphic descriptions, sketches, and drawings, were regularly submitted to the Fuehrer and often occasioned violent disputes, because the Fuehrer considered this representation of the enemy potential as greatly exaggerated.
DR. NELTE: Did you and Field Marshal Keitel hold the point of view that the representations of General Thomas were well-founded?
JODL: Field Marshal Keitel and' I were both of the opinion that, after a very careful study of enemy achievements in armament production, these statements of Thomas were doubtless on the whole completely accurate.
DR. NELTE: You heard the witness Gisevius say that Thomas was supposed to have been an opponent of Hitler's war leadership. In the course of years and in the reports made, did you ever realize this fact?
JODL: I did not observe this. The only thing that I observed was that he objected to this exaggerated optimism in which the Fuehrer habitually indulged, and that perhaps in his basic attitude he was of a pessimistic rather than an optimistic nature.
DR. NELTE: Was General Thomas dismissed from his position as head of the Economic Armament Of lice of the OKW through Keitel's efforts?