dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was there only traffic of German ships or also of neutral ships?
WAGNER: This traffic was in German and Swedish ships, but other neutrals also participated in this traffic, for instance, Finland. A similar situation applied in the Skagerrak where, besides the German supply traffic, a large part of the foodstuffs for the Norwegian population was transported. Of course, during-this time both German and neutral ships were lost.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I assume, therefore, that both German and neutral seamen lost their lives. Is that correct?
WAGNER: Of course, personnel losses took place as well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were the German merchantmen, at the time when these operational zones were declared, armed-that is, at the end of 1939 or the beginning of 1940?
WAGNER: Until the middle of 1940 German merchantmen were not at all armed. From then on they were comparatively slightly armed, especially with antiaircraft weapons. Transport ships of the Navy had always been armed, that is, government ships, which supplied German cruisers and auxiliary cruisers in the Atlantic.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Now I shall submit to you a document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-193, which is found in the Prosecution's document book on Page 29. This document deals with a proposal by the Commander of the U-boats that ". . . in the Channel, ships with blacked-out lights may be sunk without warning." Can you tell me just whose ideas we are dealing with in the statements set forth in this document?
WAGNER: From the signature found in this document it appears that we are concerned with a document by a U-boat expert in the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Who was that?
WAGNER: Lieutenant Fresdorf, who was my subordinate.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Are these statements in accord with the actual circumstances and were they approved by the Naval Operations Staff, or just what was the situation?
WAGNER: Here we are concerned with the rather romantic ideas of a young expert, ideas which were in no way commensurate with the situation. The situation was rather as follows: At this time, that is, in September 1939, the second wave of the British Expeditionary Corps left England for France. The transports ran mostly during the night and were blacked out. At this same time an order existed according to which French ships were neither to be stopped nor attacked; this was still in force for political reasons. It is quite obvious that at night a blacked-out French ship cannot be told from a blacked-out English ship, just as at night a merchant ship cannot, or only with difficulty, be told from a warship. These orders, therefore, meant that at night, in order to avoid a mistake, practically no shooting could be done, and therefore the English troop transport was entirely unhampered. This brought about really grotesque situations. It was ascertained that a German U-boat in a favorable position of attack let a fully-loaded English troop transport ship of 20,000 tons pass by, since there was the possibility of making a mistake. The Naval Operations Staff agreed completely with the commanders of the U-boats that no naval war could be carried on in this manner. If a blacked-out ship sails in a belligerent area, better still, in an area where there is a large supply and troop transport traffic, it is liable to suspicion and cannot expect the war to be halted at night for its sake. Therefore it was not a question of our explaining or excusing ourselves for sinking a ship without warning because we had mistaken it, but the obvious fact at hand was that the blacked-out ship alone was to blame if it was not properly recognized and was sunk without warning.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In these notes we find that the commanders of U-boats, when sinking a merchant ship without warning, were required to make the notation in their log that they had taken it for a warship and that an order, a verbal order, to this effect was to be given to the commanders of the U-boats. Is that correct, and was it done in actual practice?
WAGNER: No, we never did anything like that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was the Flag Officer of the U-boats given strict and clear orders that blacked-out ships at night in the Channel might be attacked without warning?
WAGNER: Yes. This clear order was issued, but nothing more.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: If the statements of this young officer are not correct, and if no orders were issued accordingly, how is it that these things can be found in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff? WAGNER. This paper is not a direct part of the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. The War Diary itself, in which the daily happenings were recorded, was signed by me, by the Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff, and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Here we are concerned with the entry of an expert which was destined for a file collection and motivated by the War Diary.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That means, then, that the considerations and opinions of experts were collected and filed no matter whether they were approved of or put into actual practice?
WAGNER: Yes. All of these files were collected for later purposes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff receive news of the incidents which happened after the sinking of the Laconia, and did it approve of the measures taken by the Commander of the U-boats?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff, then as always, listened in on all the wireless messages of the Commander-in-Chief in the Laconia case. It approved of the measures taken by him, but it would not have been at all surprised if the Commander of the U-boats had stopped the entire rescue work at the very first air attack upon the U-boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff know of the order of the Commander of the U-boats, dated 17 September, in which rescue work by U-boats was expressly prohibited?
WAGNER: This order given by the Commander of the U-boats was also heard by wireless.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was this order interpreted by the Naval Operations Staff to the effect that it was to be an order for the shooting of shipwrecked people?
WAGNER: No; no one ever had this idea.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, at this point I should like to put several questions to the witness which have a bearing on the credibility of the statements made by the witness Heisig. But I should like to ask in advance whether there are any objections to my putting these questions, since my documents referring to the witness Heisig were not ruled admissible.
THE PRESIDENT: Was the object of the questions which you were offering to put to this witness to show that the witness Heisig was not a witness who could be believed upon his oath? Was that your object?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The general object is to show how the testimony of this witness originated; that is, the testimony which was submitted to the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by "originated"?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That is to say, what influence on the witness Heisig forms the basis of this testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the exact question you wanted to ask? You may state it, and we will let the witness wait until we have seen what the question is.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I should like to ask the witness, "Did the witness Heisig report to you about the manner in which his affidavit, which was submitted to the High Tribunal as evidence by the Prosecution, originated?"
THE PRESIDENT: The question that you put, as I took it down, was: What did the witness Heisig report to you about the way his affidavit came about? Is that the question?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: What are you purporting to prove by getting the reports that Heisig may have made to this witness?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I should like to prove therewith, Mr. President, that Heisig was under a certain influence, that is, that he wrongly assumed that he could help a comrade through his testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: Who applied for Heisig's affidavit?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I did not understand, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Heisig has given an affidavit, has he not?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That was for the Prosecution, was it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That is right.
THE PRESIDENT: And have you asked to cross-examine him?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I interrogated him about this affidavit, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: You did?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, I did question him; and I called his attention to the contradictions between his affidavit and his testimony here in Court.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not read the transcript on this point for about 10 days. But I did read it then, and my recollection is that it was never suggested to the witness Heisig that he gave his affidavit under pressure, which I gather is the suggestion now. Your Lordship will remember that although we had the affidavit, we called the witness Heisig. He said that what was in his affidavit was true; and then he gave his evidence, giving a detailed account of all the relevant matters. So we made it perfectly possible for Dr. Kranzbuehler to cross-examine him at the time and to show any differences, as Dr. Kranzbuehler just said he purported to do, between the affidavit and his oral evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler has just said, I think, that he did actually cross-examine him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did cross-examine him on that point-on any differences that appeared between his affidavit and his oral testimony. But he was here to be cross-examined, and if it is going to be suggested that the affidavit was obtained by improper means, that suggestion ought to have been made at the time, and then it could have been dealt with. My Lord, I object to its coming in at this stage, after the witness Heisig has been away, and therefore no opportunity has been given to us either to investigate the matter or to have the evidence there, which could have been done when Heisig gave his evidence; and we could have been prepared for any contradictory evidence now. My Lord, as a matter of strictness, surely, if I may put it that way, there are two distinct lines. If it was a question of whether Heisig's evidence was admissible or whether it had been obtained under pressure, then it would be quite possible to have this trial within a trial as to whether it was admissible or not. But if this evidence is, broadly, merely directed to the credibility of Heisig's evidence, then I respectfully submit it falls within the same objections I made on Saturday to general evidence directed against the credibility of a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is suggested that there was any pressure put by the Prosecution upon Heisig. I do not understand that that is what you are suggesting, Dr. Kranzbuehler, is it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: No, no pressure; but the picture as drawn was not true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I understood Dr. Kranzbuehler -if I misunderstood him, so much the easier-I understood him to say that he wanted to give this evidence as to certain influence. I thought that was the word used.
THE PRESIDENT: I think he meant, not influence exerted by the Prosecution, but exerted by a mistaken notion in the witness' own mind that he was helping a friend.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. My Lord, then that merely goes to credibility and it does then fall within my general objection; that is, if we are going to have evidence as directed on credibility, we go on ad infinitum.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal will allow this question to be put in this particular instance, but they make no general rule as to the admissibility of such questions.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Admiral Wagner, in December you were in the prison here together with the witness Heisig. Is that correct?
WAGNER: Yes, from the first until the fifth of December.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And what did Heisig tell you about the underlying considerations of his affidavit?
WAGNER: He told me the following personally: At the interrogation he had been told that Lieutenant Hoffmann, officer of the watch of Kapitanleutnant Eck, had testified that at that time he had listened to the speech by Admiral Doenitz at Gotenhafen in the autumn of 1942, and that he had considered this as a demand for the killing of survivors of shipwrecks. Heisig had been told: "If you confirm this testimony of Hoffmann, then you will save not only Eck and Hoffmann, but also two others who would have been sentenced to death. You will prevent any kind of judicial proceeding against Captain Mohle from being instituted. Of course, you will thus incriminate Grossadmiral Doenitz but the material against Admiral Doenitz is of such tremendous weight that his life has been forfeited anyway." Further he told me, and without prompting, that at that time, on the occasion of the speech by the Admiral Doenitz, he had been deeply distressed. He had just returned from Lubeck, where he had experienced and seen the frightful consequences of an air attack; that is he had perhaps not experienced it, but at least he had seen the consequences. His mind was set on revenge for these brutal measures, and he considered it possible that this emotional state might have influenced his interpretation of Grossadmiral Doenitz' speech.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Now we shall turn to a different point.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: If the Prosecution desire to do so, they can, of course, recall Heisig for the purpose of investigating this further.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, Heisig is no longer here; that is the difficulty when this is done in this order. However, we can consider the matter, My Lord, and we are grateful to the Tribunal for the permission.
THE PRESIDENT: Is Heisig not in custody? Is that what you mean?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, he is no longer in custody.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: He is studying medicine at Munich; he can be very easily reached.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: From when on were you admiral for special tasks attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and what were your tasks in that capacity?
WAGNER: From the end of June 1944 onward, and the purpose of my assignment was the following: After the success of the AngloSaxon invasion in northern France, Admiral Doenitz counted on an increased tension in the military situation. He believed that one day he might be forced to leave the Naval Operations Staff, either to remain permanently at the Fuehrer's headquarters, or at least for a longer period of time, in order to keep up with the development of the entire war situation, or because a transfer of the Naval Operations Staff might be necessary because of the increasingly heavy air attacks on Berlin. For this purpose the Grossadmiral wanted an older and experienced naval officer in his immediate vicinity, an officer who was well-versed in the problems of sea warfare and who was acquainted with the duties and tasks of the Naval Operations Staff. My mission was, therefore, a sort of liaison between the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the Naval Operations Staff and the other offices of the High Command for the duration of the Grossadmiral's absence from the High Command.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did you accompany the Grossadmiral regularly on his visits to the fuehrer's headquarters?
WAGNER: Yes; from the period mentioned I was present regularly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Now I hand you a list of these visits which has been submitted by the Prosecution as GB-207. This may be found in the document book of the Prosecution on Page 56. Please look at this list and tell me whether the dates recorded there are essentially correct.
WAGNER: The dates are essentially correct. At the end the list is not complete, for the period from 3-no; from 10 April until 21 April 1945 is missing. On that day the Grossadmiral participated for the last time at the conferences in the fuehrer's headquarters. Beyond that, it seems to me that the list of the people present is incomplete. I also do not know according to what point of view or with what idea in mind this was compiled.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: If you carefully examine this list of people, can you tell me whether Admiral Doenitz was always with these people on the dates mentioned, or does this mean only that these persons were at the fuehrer's headquarters at the same time he was? Can you still recall these points?
WAGNER: Yes. If these people participated in the military conferences, then Admiral Doenitz at least saw them. Of course, people in high positions were frequently at the fuehrer's headquarters who did not participate in the military conferences and whom the Grossadmiral did not see unless he had special conversations with them.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: For what reason did Admiral Doenitz...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, upon this point, if the witness is saying that any one of these minutes is incomplete, I should be very grateful if he would specify it, because we can get the original German minutes here and confirm the affidavit.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I believe the witness said only that additional people participated in these discussions and that, at the end, some of the conferences are lacking. However, I do not know just what details I should question him about. Perhaps the Prosecution will deal with that matter later in cross-examination?
THE PRESIDENT: But Sir David wants him to specify which are the ones, if he can.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Very wed. [Turning to the witness.] Can you tell me more specifically as to any one of these dates, whether those present are correctly named or whether there were other people present, or whether Grossadmiral Doenitz was not present?
WAGNER: I can tell you exactly that this list is incorrect because it never occurred that neither Field Marshal Keitel nor Generaloberst Jodl was present at the headquarters. For example, on 4 March 1945 neither one of these men is mentioned, nor on 6 March or 8 March. Therefore I conclude that this list cannot be complete. In other places, however, the name of Jodl appears; for example, on 18 March 1945.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The decisive point seems to be whether Admiral Doenitz was present in the fuehrer's headquarters on all of these days. Can you confirm that point?
WAGNER: Of course, from memory I cannot confirm that with reference to every single day. However, I am under the impression that the list is correct in that connection, for the frequency of the visits of the Grossadmiral corresponds with the notes in this list; and spot checks show me that the dates are correct.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Why did Grossadmiral D8nitz come to the fuehrer's headquarters? What were the reasons?
WAGNER: The chief reason for the frequent visits, which became even more frequent toward the end of the war, was the desire to keep lip with the development of the general war situation so that he, Doenitz, could lead the Navy and carry on the naval war accordingly. Beyond that, questions usually came up which the Admiral could not decide for himself out of his own authority and which, because of their importance, he wanted to bring up personally or to discuss with the representatives of the OKW and of the General Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In each of these cases was there a personal report of the Grossadmiral to the Fuehrer?
WAGNER: This is what happened: Most of the problems and reports for the Fuehrer were taken care of during the conference in connection with the Admiral's report on the naval warfare situation.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: One moment. Was the Admiral always present at the military conferences when he was at the headquarters?
WAGNER: The Admiral took part at least in the discussion of the main session every day.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And what is the main session?
WAGNER: At noon every day there was a military conference which lasted several hours. This was the main conference. In addition, for months, sessions, including special sessions, were held in the evening or at night, at which the Admiral participated only when very important matters were to be discussed-matters of special importance for the conduct of the war. Then, as I said, he participated.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Now you say that most of the questions which the Grossadmiral had to put to the Fuehrer were taken care of at the military conference. Were there any personal reports besides this?
WAGNER: Personal reports on the part of the Grossadmiral to Hitler took place very seldom; on the other hand, personal discussions with the OKW and the other military offices at the headquarters took place daily.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Now, I would like to know something more in detail about this so-called "Lagebesprechung," the conferences. The Prosecution seem to consider this as a sort of War Cabinet at which, for instance, Ribbentrop would report about foreign policies, Speer about questions of production, Himmler about security questions. Is this a correct picture? Who took part in these sessions, what people participated regularly and who attended only once in a while?
WAGNER: The participants at the conferences were generally the following: Regular participants: from the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, General Jodl, General Buhle, Post Captain Assmann, Major Buchs, and a few more Chiefs of Staff. Then the Chief of the General Staff of the Army with one or two aides, and as a rule also the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force with one aide. Further regular participants were: the Chief of the Army Personnel Office, who was Chief Adjutant to the Fuehrer; General Bodenschatz, until 20 July 1944; Vice Admiral Voss who was the permanent deputy of the Grossadmiral; Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein, as Himmler's permanent deputy; Ambassador Hewel; Minister Sonnleitner, permanent deputy of the Foreign Minister; Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich. Frequently the following participated: the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; less frequently, Himmler. In addition to these there was a varying participation on the part of special officers, mainly from the General Staff of the Army, and on the part of higher front commanders of the Army and of the Air Force who happened to be in headquarters. Beyond that, toward the end of the war Reich Minister Speer in his capacity as Armament Minister also participated in an increasing measure, and in rare cases the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, both as listeners at the conferences. I believe that is the complete list.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Who reported at these conferences and what was reported on?
WAGNER: These sessions were for the sole purpose of informing Hitler about the war situation-about the Eastern situation through the General Staff of the Army, and through the OKW about the situation in all other theaters of war and concerning all three branches of the Wehrmacht. The report took place as follows: First of all, the Chief of General Staff of the Army reported about the Eastern situation; then Generaloberst Jodl reported on the situation in all other theaters of war on land. Next, Post Captain Assmann of the OKW reported on the naval situation. In between, frequent, often hour-long, conversations took place which dealt with special military problems, panzer problems, aerial problems and such. And after the aerial problems were dealt with the discussion was at an end, and we left the room. I frequently saw that Ambassador Hewel went in to Hitler with a batch of reports, apparently from the Foreign Office, and reported on them without the rest of us knowing what they contained.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In these conferences was there voting or was there consultation, or who gave the orders?
WAGNER: In these conferences all military questions were discussed and frequently decisions were reached by the Fuehrer, that is, if no further preparations were necessary for a decision.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What for example did the Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop do there when he was present?