dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MILCH: I remember the conference with Hitler which took place on the Obersalzberg before the Polish campaign. It was on 22 August. The commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces and the commanders of the armies attended. Hitler stood in front, behind a large desk, and the generals sat in chairs next to or behind each other. He made a speech giving the reasons, the political situation, as he usually did, and his intention. During this conference any reply or discussion on the part of the generals was impossible. Whether there was a subsequent conference dealing with the details I do not know. I know only of this speech of Hitler's. Then, before the attack on Russia, there was a different procedure. We sat around a very large table, and the respective commanders of the army groups and armies had to demonstrate on the map their intentions and the methods of executing the orders which they had received, whereupon Hitler agreed in general or, perhaps, in certain cases, said he would prefer greater strength here and less strength there: his objections, however, were only very slight.
DR. LATERNSER: That means these conferences were more in the nature of a briefing?
MILCH: Definitely, briefing.
DR. LATERNSER: Can you tell me whether any member of the group "General Staff" or of the so-called group "General Staff and OKW" ever made suggestions to deviate from the international law then in force?
MILCH: Not that I know of.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether members of this alleged group frequently met with politicians or high Party members?
MILCH: In my opinion, no. I mean that, of course, for the majority of these gentlemen. It goes without saying that the commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces, or the Chief of the OKW, must frequently have held conferences with politicians also. But the average commanders of the army groups, fleet, or army had no opportunity to do so.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the members of this so-called group, those who belonged to the Army, Navy, or Air Force, have discussions among themselves?
MILCH: If they were assigned to collaborate in a common task, for example, if the commander-in-chief of an army or an army group had a naval commander-in-chief working with him, there were naturally discussions of that kind. But with a neighboring commander-in-chief the relationship was certainly not close, and with a more remote neighbor it did not exist a:t all.
DR. LATERNSER: That means such discussions took place only with regard to the execution of a common task?
MILCH: Yes, for that purpose.
DR. LATERNSER: Within the Air Force, is it true that this circle of people included those officers who had held the position of Chief of Staff of the Air Force or commander of the Air Force or of an air fleet during a certain period? I have a list here of those generals of the Air Force who, belonged to that group, and I should like to ask you, with regard to a few of them, what rank and position these generals had when the war started. What was the rank of General Korten at the outbreak of war?
MILCH: I believe either colonel or lieutenant colonel, but I am not quite sure.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know what position he held?
MILCH: I believe he was Chief of Staff of the Munich Air Fleet.
DR. LATERNSER: Then, from August to October 1944 General Kreipe was Chief of Staff of the Air Force. What was this officer when the war started?
MILCH: I presume major or lieutenant colonel.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. Do you know what position he had?
MILCH: No, at the moment I could not say exactly. It may be that he was chief of staff of an air corps.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. And what rank did he have at the time as Chief of Staff of an air corps?
MILCH: From major to colonel; that depends.
DR. LATERNSER: General Koller also was Chief of Staff of the Air Force for a short time. What was this officer when the war started?
MILCH: I believe lieutenant colonel.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I have only a few more names. Do you know what rank and position Dessloch had at the outbreak of war?
MILCH: I do not remember exactly; perhaps major general or colonel. I do not know exactly.
DR.LATERNSER: And General Pflugbeil?
MILCH: The same.
DR.LATERNSER: General Seidel?
MILCH: Seidel, I believe, was already Major General at the outbreak of war.
DR. LATERNSER: And what position did he have at that time?
MILCH: He was Quartermaster General in the General Staff. DR.LATERNSER- What rank did that position have compared with commander, commander-in-chief, divisional commander ... ?
MILCH: Corps commander is about the same as a quartermaster pneral.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I have a few more questions concerning the Air Force itself and the highest military leaders. From your testimony it is to be concluded that in 1939 the Air Force was not fully prepared for war. As to this point, could you state the reasons for this unpreparedness of the Air Force for war?
MILCH: During the few years between 1935 and 1939 -- I gave the figures for industry before -- it would have been impossible for any soldier in any country to build an air force equal to the tasks with which we were faced from 1939 on. That is impossible. It is not possible to create the units nor to establish the schools and furnish them with adequate teaching staffs; nor is it possible to develop the planes which are necessary, and then to build them by mass production. Nor is it possible in that short period to train or produce air crews sufficiently qualified to meet the high technical standards necessarily demanded for modem aircraft. Likewise, it is impossible in such a short time to produce ground crews which are technically highly qualified and to put them at the disposal of the Air Force and also of the aviation industry. At the same time also....
THE PRESIDENT: He said that it is impossible. It should not be necessary to go into this detail on this subject.
DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more specific questions. [Turning to the witness.] Did the Air Force expect resistance against the invasion of Austria?
MILCH: No. We knew definitely that there would be no resistance. We did not take any arms with us.
DR. LATERNSER: How was the reception there?
MILCH: So friendly that it could not be more so in our own country.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you, as Field Marshal, informed in advance that war was to be declared against the United States?
MILCH: No.
DR. LATERNSER: In this Trial there are serious accusations against German soldiers and their leaders on account of cruelties committed. Was not every soldier sufficiently informed and instructed about the regulations of international law?
MILCH: Yes. Each soldier had a pay book. On the first page of the pay book were pasted ten commandments for the soldier. They included all these questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Can you give me examples of points contained in this memorandum?
MILCH: Yes. For instance, that no soldier -- no prisoner, should be shot; that looting was not permitted. By the way, I have my pay book here. Treatment of prisoners of war; Red Cross; civilian population inviolable; attitude of soldier when himself prisoner of war and, in conclusion, the threat of punishment for offenses.
DR. LATERNSER: If it became known that soldiers had committed offenses or outrages against the civilian population, did the commanders concerned, so, far as you know, interfere with the severity necessary?
MILCH: I know of some cases, I knew of some cases, where that was definitely the case, even the death penalty being imposed.
DR. LATERNSER: So the commanders; always strove under all circumstances to maintain the discipline of the troops?
MILCH: Yes. I can give a notable example. A general of the Air Force had appropriated jewelry which belonged to a foreign lady. He was sentenced to death and executed. I think it was in 1943 or 1944.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in particular during the critical days of 1939 you were in close official contact with Defendant Gbring. Did you ever hear through him about a large-scale plan for waging an extensive war?
MILCH: No.
DR. LATERNSER: In your opinion, did the other high military leaders hear or would they have heard more about it?
MILCH: No. All measures taken by Hitler -- beginning with the occupation of the Rhineland -- came very suddenly, as a rule after only a few hour's preparation. That applies to Austria; that also applies to Czechoslovakia and to Prague. The only time that we were told anything beforehand was the affair with Poland, which I mentioned before, where we had a conference on 23 May.
DR. LATERNSER: In all other cases, therefore, it was rather a surprise to the high military leaders?
MILCH: Yes, a complete surprise.
DR. LATERNSER: Now I have one more question: What was the possibility of resignation for high military leaders during the war?
MILCH: That has been told several times. I have also experienced it myself -- one was not permitted to hand in one's resignation. It was said if there was a reason for anyone to leave, he would be informed by his superiors. In an authoritarian state the subordinate, the citizen has no right to resign on his own initiative, whether he be a soldier or a civilian.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until Monday morning. [The Tribunal adjourned until 11 March 1946 at 1000 hours.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, had you finished your examination?
DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions to ask the witness. [The witness Milch resumed the stand.]
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like to refer again, very briefly, to the extent of the unpreparedness of the Luftwaffe for war in 1939. While on this subject I should like to ask whether the collaboration of the Luftwaffe with the OKW, the Army, and the Navy had been secured in 1939?
MILCH: In my opinion, the Luftwaffe was not prepared for a major war in 1939. No mutual agreements of any kind existed with the other branches of the Armed Forces. At any rate, I knew of no such agreements.
DR. LATERNSER: Had such agreements with other branches of the Armed Forces existed, would you have known about them?
MILCH: I imagine so, since at that time I certainly would have been involved in these matters.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the co-ordination like between the more important departments of the Luftwaffe?
MILCH: From 1937, it was rather loose. The General Staff, the technical branch and the personnel office were detached; they worked independently and more or less on their own.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you have just mentioned the General Staff. What do you understand by the German "General Staff of the Luftwaffe"?
MILCH: General Staff means in German leaders' assistants; in other words, junior officers who had been given specialized training, and who acted as assistants to troop commanders, from divisional commanders upwards.
DR. LATERNSER: Of whom did the General Staff of the Luftwaffe consist?
MILCH: It consisted of the officers in the administrative sections of the General Staff, from the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe himself downwards, and also of officers who had been assigned as staff officers to divisions and corps in the field and to air fleets.
DR. LATERNSER: What time limits were set for the formation of new units of the Luftwaffe?
MILCH: The formation of larger units had not yet been ordered, although they had been discussed quite a long time before the outbreak of war. It was intended to create a larger Air Force later, but, as far as I can remember, the plans envisaged were scheduled for completion in 6 or 8 years.
DR. LATERNSER: In what year would the plans have been completed?
MILCH: I should think about 1944-1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Not only is there some technical fault -- we are getting two translations at once -- but both the witness and the defense counsel are going too fast.
DR. LATERNSER: Did an organization exist already in 1939 for day- and night-fighter planes?
MILCH: No, it did not exist at that time.
DR. LATERNSER: Did an organization exist for bomb warfare?
MILCH: Not to the extent necessary for a war of aggression.
DR. LATERNSER: What progress had been made at that time in the building of airfields?
MILCH: Airfields had been built with runways up to 1,000 meters, but these were only suitable for fighter planes and not for loaded heavier bombers.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the position of the Luftwaffe Signal Corps network?
MILCH: The operational network, that is, the cable network for operations, did not exist at that time; it had to be improvised and built up later on during the war.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the position of the Aircraft Observer Corps?
MILCH: This also had not yet been organized. Reverting to the question of bombers, the most I can add is that originally, in the early years, models of 4-engine bombers, which would also have been suitable for night use, were put into production. Although technically perfect, these bombers were abandoned -- I believe in 1937. It was thought that the big expense entailed by such heavy bombers should be avoided, since, at that time, nobody was thinking of war. This was at the time when Field Marshal Kesselring was Chief of the General Staff, and the question was submitted for decision to the Reich Marshal, who agreed to the discontinuance of these large bombers.
DR. LATERNSER: When was that?
MILCH: One moment, I will just look it up. On 29 April 1937 the Reich Marshal, acting on the recommendations of the Chief of the General Staff, stopped the production. of these long-distance bombers. Therefore, in 1939, there were no night bombers which could in any way compare with English machines of the Lancaster type, et cetera .
DR. LATERNSER: What was the position of the Luftwaffe crews?
MILCH: We had just sufficient personnel replacemenfs for a comparatively small Luftwaffe at that time. The lack of personnel replacement was the greatest handicap of an in building up the Luftwaffe. The whole question of time limits, andso on, depended on the training of personnel. It was the personnel question which regulated the pace. It was possible to build planes more rapidly, but it was not possible to expedite the training of the crews. And, as I said on Friday, this was the main consideration when dealing with the question of time limits. Pilots and technical personnel are of no use unless thoroughly trained. It is much worse to have half-trained personnel than no personnel at all.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, I do not want to interrupt your cross-examination but we have been sitting here for nearly 20 minutes now, and all I have got from it is that the Luftwaffe was not ready for war in 1939. It seems to me too much is being taken up with detail.
DR. LATERNSER: I have one more question on this matter. Were there any reserves of aluminum, magnesium, and rubber; and did any means exist for producing these materials?
MILCH: Not in sufficient quantities.
DR. LATERNSER: And now -- one last question. Witness, during your testimony on Friday, you mentioned "Basic Order Number 1." You also gave us the contents of this order. In this connection I would like to ask: Was this order strictly observed, or not?
MILCH: Yes, very strictly.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions to ask the witness.
TBE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defendants' counsel want to ask the witness any questions?
DR. HANS FLACHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer ): I request permission to ask the witness a few questions. [Turning to the witness.] Witness, do you remember when Hitler demanded the construction of bomb-proof aircraft factories in caves or concrete shelters?
MILCH: As far as I remember it wis when the British started the heavy raids in 1943.
DR. FLACHSNER: Do you remember a conference on the Obersalzberg at the beginning of April 1944, and what you told Hitler at the time about the difficulties in the building industry, and the orders issued by Hitler on that occasion?
MILCH: Yes. On that occasion Hitler ordered very solid structures to be built. I believe he demanded six large bomb-proof factories, each with 600,000 square meters floor space. Later on, Speer, who hzid been absent from the April meeting through illness, raised objections to these orders. He considered this construction work to be on far too large a scale and that it was too late to undertake it. Later he obtained permission for all factories which by June 1944 were not in a sufficiently advanced stage of construction -- that is, which could not start working by the beginning of 1945 -- to be discontinued immediately.
DR. FLACHSNER: I am above all interested in the question of labor. At this discussion on the Obersalzberg, did the Fuehrer allocate the requisite labor for the construction of the factories demanded by him?
MILCH: Yes. I think I remember rightly that, in answer to the objection raised by one of the gentlemen bresent, he said that he himself would see that the labor was made available.
DR. FLACHSNER: Witness, you said that Herr Speer was opposed to these constructions. What happened then? Speer was not present at that meeting?
MILCH: No, he was ill at the time.
DR. FLACHSNER: Can you tell us briefly what happened?
MILCH: During Speer's illness, requests reached the Fuehrer from other quarters that Speer should be relieved of construction work. Difficulties arose owing to the fact that whereas in theory Speer still remained in charge of building, in practice the work was nearly all taken out of his hands. He was no longer able to have any say in construction work, since it had been decided that the construction department of the Todt Organization should receive orders direct from Hitler. Thus, Speer was excluded more and more from this sphere of activity. A great deal was said at that time about large scale constructions, but very little work was actually done on them.
DR. FLACHSNER: Did Hitler give a written order to Herr Dorsch, and did he have it shown to Speer? Do you know anything about it?
MILCH: As far as I can remember, such a written order was given and it was also sent to Speer. I have a vague recollection that Speer once showed me such an order.
DR. FLACHSNER: One last question on this matter. In this way, Dorsch, who had been directly commissioned by the Fuehrer, took over the responsibility for these buildings and the necessary manpower?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. FLACHSNER: Witness, you were a member of the Central Planning Board. Can you tell me if the Central Planning Board was authorized to make decisions on the use of foreign or German labor and its allocation?
MILCH: No.
DR. FLACHSNER: Did the Central Planning Board ever make decisions of this kind?
MILCH: The Central Planning Board had been set up for the distribution of raw materials only; but a certain control over transportation devolved upon it. However, the matter of transportation was independent' of any activity concerning allocation of raw material. It had no say in the allocation of labor. If the Central Planning Board attempted to obtain some influence as to the allocation of workers, it was because it was at the same time responsible for armaments, and therefore best able to judge the existing requirements. But here, too, considerable difficulties were encountered, and this branch of the Central Planning Board's work had to be dropped.
DR. FLACHSNER: So no decision was ever reached? We have records before us which show that labor problems were sometimes discussed by the Central Planning Board.
MILCH: Yes, very frequently, as the armament offices which were represented on the Central Planning Board were greatly concerned with labor problems; but these discussions mostly concerned food supplies and extra rations for the workers.
DR. FLACHSNER: And now -- one last question on the subject. Did the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in any way look upon the Central Planning Board as authoritative, that is, as the final arbiter in the total plan for the utilization of manpower?
MILCH: No, he could not do that, as he himself represented that authority.
DR. FLACHSNER: Were there any reserves of German workers in 1943 or 1944, and did Speer request the utilization of this German manpower instead of foreign labor?
MILCH: Yes, again and again Speer made strong representations that any German labor still available, even if difficult to mobilize, should be brought in and put to work. This reserve consisted mostly of female labor, women of professional circles and social stations who in wartime had nothing to do apart from domestic work.
DR. FLACHSNER: Witness, you have already told us that the Defendant Speer was a sick man in 1944. Could you tell us approximately when his illness began and when it ended?
MILCH: His illness started in February, and I think it lasted until about June.
DR. FLACHSNER: Thank you. Do you know anything about this long illness being exploited in order to undermine severely his influence and authority? Can you tell me who was primarily interested in doing that?
MILCH: His influence was undermined in the above-mentioned building projects. It is very difficult for me to name here the individuals who probably hoped to succeed him.
DR. FLACHSNER: Did matters improve, or did they become worse after 20 July?
MILCH: Actually, as time went on they became worse. Speer's position became more difficult than ever, as the whole of Speer's views differed more and more from Hitler's official opinion.
DR. FLACHSNER: Thank you. Now, may I remind you of something else? In February 1945, by a Hitler order, the Defendant Speer was entrusted with the distribution of motor vehicles; and you, if I am correctly informed, were appointed as his representative. Can you tell me what the transport situation was like at that time, and to what extent the armaments output depended on the transport situation?
MILCH: In those days, the transport situation was so deplorable, owing to the American daylight raids, that the transport system was no longer able to carry even the most essential commodities and aisnament materials. Our great forge, the Ruhr district, was particularly hard hit, as well as the transport system carrying products from the Ruhr to the finishing industries in Central Germany, Berlin, and Saxony. If very stringent measures had not been taken and extraordinary powers granted, total collapse, due solely to transport difficulties, would have become only a matter of hours. That was the situation at that time.
DR. FLACHSNER: Could Speer, in his position, be expected to give preferential treatment to armaments when available transport was allocated? What did he actually do?
MILCH: No; Speer, like myself, saw quite clearly that the whole armament question could no longer influence the situation at that stage. Therefore, acting on his own initiative, he gave priority to the movement of food supplies for the population. The most urgent job was to remove the foodstuffs from the German territory in danger of being lost to the enemy.
DR. FLACHISNER: Were these measures only taken to safeguard the current food supply, or were they long-term measures?
MILCH: The intention was to move all available and transportable food to a place of safety.
DR. FLACHSNER: Witness, motor transport was a particularly difficult problem at the time. Was the number of trucks and the quantity of fuel to drive them cut down when transport was allocated to the armaments industry; and what orders regarding trucks did Speer issue in mid-February? Do you know?
MILCH: I know that trucks were always in such short supply in the armament industry that not even essential orders could be filled. All kinds of alternative transport had to be found, such as electric trams, a great number of horse carts, and other vehicles. But, as far as my knowledge goes, here too, Speer used this means of transport for the benefit of the German population in order to maintain some sort of food distributing organization.
DR. FLACHSNER: Fuel was, at that time, one of the most serious bottlenecks, was it not?
MILCH: It was, in fact, the most serious bottleneck of all.
DR. FLACHSNER: Witness, do you happen to know that after February 1945 Speer granted priority to repair work on nitrogen factories producing fertilizers for agriculture, which meant that repairs to fuel producing plants had to take second place?