dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
KEITEL: Giraud's successful escape from the Fortress of Konigstein near Dresden on 19 April 1942 created a sensation; and I was severely reprimanded about the guard of this general's camp, a military fortress. The escape was successful despite all attempts to recapture the general, by police or military action, on his way back to France. Canaris had instructions from me to keep a particularly sharp watch on all the places at which he might cross the frontier into France or, Alsace-Lorraine, so that we could recapture him. The police were also put on to this job; 8 or 10 days after his escape it was made known that the general had arrived safely back in France. If I issued any orders during this search I probably used the words I gave in the preliminary interrogations, namely, "We must get the general back, dead or alive." I possibly did say something like that. He had escaped and was in France. Second phase: Efforts, made through the Embassy by Abetz and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to induce the general to return to captivity of his own accord, appeared not to be unsuccessful or impossible, as the general had declared himself willing to go to the occupied zone to discuss the matter. I was of the opinion that the general might possibly do it on account of the concessions hitherto made to Marshal Petain regarding personal wishes in connection with the release of French generals from captivity. The meeting with General Giraud took place in occupied territory, at the staff quarters of a German Army Corps, where the question of his return was discussed. The Military Commander informed me by telephone of the general's presence in occupied territory, in the hotel where the German officers were billeted. The commanding general suggested that if the general would not return voluntarily it would be a very simple matter to apprehend him if he were authorized to do so. I at once refused this categorically for I considered it a breach of faith. The general had come trusting to receive proper treatment and be returned unmolested.
KEITEL: Third phase: The attempt or desire to get the general back somehow into military custody arose from the fact that Canaris told me that the general's family was residing in territory occupied by German troops; and it was almost certain that the general would try to see his family, even if only after a certain period of time and when the incident had been allowed to drop. He suggested to me to make preparations for the recapture of the general if he made a visit of this kind in occupied territory. Canaris said that he himself would initiate these preparations through his Counterintelligence office in Paris and through his other offices. Nothing happened for some time; and it was surely quite natural for me to ask on several occasions, no matter who was with Canaris or if Lahousen was with him, "What has become of the Giraud affair?" or, in the same way, "How is the Giraud case getting on?" The words used by Mr. Lahousen were, "It is very difficult; but we shall do everything we can." That was his answer. Canaris made no reply. That strikes me as significant only now; but at the time it did not occur to me. Third phase: At a later stage -- Shall I continue?
DR. NELTE: Fourth phase.
KEITEIL: Fourth phase. This began with Hitler's saying to me: "This is all nonsense. We are not getting results. Counterintelligence is not capable of this and cannot handle this matter. I will turn it over to Himmler and Counterintelligence had better keep out of this, for they will never get hold of the general again." Admiral Canaris said at the time that he was counting on having the necessary security measures taken by the French secret state police in case General Giraud went to the occupied zone; and a fight might result, as the general was notoriously a spirited soldier, a man of 60 who lowers himself 45 meters over a cliff by means of a rope -- that is how he escaped from Konigstein. Fifth phase: According to Lahousen's explanation in Berlin, Canaris desire to transfer the matter to the Secret State Police, which Lahousen said was done as a result of representations from the departmental heads, was because I asked again how matters stood with Giraud and he wanted to get rid of this awkward mission. Canaris came to me and asked if he could pass it on to the Reich Security Main Office or to the police. I said yes, because the Fuehrer had already told me repeatedly that he wanted to hand it over to Himmler. Next phase: I wanted to warn Canaris some time later, when Himmler came to see me and confirmed that he had received orders from Hitler to have Giraud and his family watched unobtrusively and that I was to stop Canaris from taking any action in the case. He had been told that Canaris was working along parallel lines. I immediately agreed. Now we come to the phase which Lahousen has described at length. I had asked about "Gustav" and similar questions. I wanted to direct Canaris immediately to stop all his activities in the matter, as Hitler had confirmed the order. What happened in Paris according to Lahousen's detailed reports, that excuses were sought, et cetera , that the matter was thought to be very mysterious, that is, Gustav as an abbreviation for the G in Giraud, all this is fancy rather than fact.
KEITEIL: I had Canaris summoned to me at once, for he was in Paris and not in Berlin. He had done nothing at all, right from the start. He was thus in a highly uncomfortable position with regard to me for he had lied to me. When he came I said only, "You will have nothing more to do in this matter; keep clear of it." Then came the next phase: The general's escape without difficulty to North Africa by plane, which was suddenly reported -- if I remember correctly -- before the invasion of North Africa by the Anglo-American troops. That ended the business. No action was ever taken by the Counterintelligence whom I had charged to watch him, or by the police; and I never even used the words to do away with the general. Never! The final phase of this entire affair may sound like a fairy tale, but it is true nevertheless. The general sent a plane from North Africa to Southern France near Lyons in February or March 1944, with a liaison officer who reported to the Counterintelligence and asked if the general could return to France and what would happen to him on landing in France. The question was turned over to me. Generaloberst Jodl is my witness that these things actually happened. The chief of the Counterintelligence Office involved in this matter was with me. The answer was: "Exactly the same treatment as General Weygand who is already in Germany. There is no doubt that the Fuehrer will agree." Nothing actually did happen, and I heard no more about it. But these things actually happened.
DR. NELTE: To complete our information, I must ask you a few questions for the French Prosecution have mentioned that later, in a later phase, the family of General Giraud suffered inconveniences or losses of a rather serious nature. When you were searching for Giraud did you cause any trouble to his family, who were living in occupied France? Did you give any directives which would confine or inconvenience the family in any way?
KEITEL: No. I had only an unobtrusive watch kept on the family's residence in order to receive information of any visit which he might have planned. But no steps of any kind were ever taken against the family. It would have been foolish in this case.
DR. NELTE: Foolish of you?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. NELTE: To make matters quite, clear: You had no knowledge of anything having happened later on?
KEITEL: No, none at all.
DR. NELTE: Well, General Giraud is still alive and I will only ask you, in conclusion, under your oath: Can you confirm that you did not, at any time, give an order or a directive which might be interpreted to mean that General Giraud was to be killed?
KEITEL: No. I never gave such an order, unless the phrase "We must have him back, dead or alive" may be considered of weight in this respect. I never gave orders that the general was to be killed or done away with, or anything of the kind. Never.
DR. NELTE: I have concluded my direct examination of the Defendant Keitel. May I ask you to permit me to submit in evidence the affidavit, that last one, Number 6 in Document Book Number 2. I would like to submit that affidavit in evidence. It is on Page 51 and following and is Document K...
THE PRESIDENT: Didn't you put that in as K-12 yesterday?
DR. NELTE: Today I submit Keitel-13...
THE PRESIDENT: This affidavit that you want to submit now, where is it and what is the date of it?
DR. NELTE: It is Page 51 and following, and it is dated 9 March 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
DR. NELTE: This affidavit has also been attested to by Generaloberst Jodl. I ask permission to question him about the affidavit or to show it to him for confirmation when he is called to the witness stand.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: If the Court please, we have looked into the matter of the so-called interrogation of General Von Falkenhorst referred to yesterday by Dr. Nelte. Insofar as we can determine, this paper was never offered in evidence by any members of the Prosecution. It was referred to by M. Dubost -- I mean, it was not referred, to by him, but it was included in his brief. I did not refer to it, and I did not offer it in evidence. That is how it came into the hands of Dr. Nelte, but not in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte want to offer it in evidence now?
DR. NELTE: I ask to submit it as Document Number Keitel-14.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number or another number?
DR. NELTE: No, Mr. President, it has no other number.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Now, do any of the other Defense Counsel want to ask questions?
DR. STAHMER: Mr. Defendant, as you have corrected your former statement by answering the question put by your counsel with a statement that Reich Marshal Goering was not present at the conference in which Hitler gave orders for the airmen who had escaped from the Sagan Camp should be held by the police and since you further said that a conference with Reich Marshal Goering in Berlin did not take place, I have only the following questions on this subject: Some weeks after that escape, did you receive a letter from the Quartermaster General of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe informing you that the Luftwaffe wanted to hand over their prison camps to the OKW?
KEITEL: Yes, I received this letter and following an interview with Hitler I declined the offer.
DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.
DR. SEIDL: At the beginning of the war, the Defendant Dr. Frank was a lieutenant of the 9th Infantry Regiment; is that correct?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Do you remember receiving a letter from Dr. Frank, who was then Governor General, in 1942, saying that he wanted to rejoin the Wehrmacht? The purpose of that letter was, of course, that he be relieved of his office as Governor General in this way. Is that correct?
KEITEL: Yes, I received such a letter and handed it to the Fuehrer who merely made a movement with his hands and said "Out of the question." I informed Frank of that decision through the liaison officer who was temporarily with him at the time.
DR. SEIDL: That is all.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, it is 3 minutes to one and it will not take me very long, but it might take me beyond 1 o'clock, so it might be better to adjourn now. I would then put my question to the witness after the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn until 2:00 o'clock. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
DR. DIX: May it please the Tribunal, this witness is competent and an expert who can give the Tribunal definite figures about the armament expenditures of the Reich. However, the witness is certainly not in a position to remember these figures just at the moment. Professor Kraus, my colleague, therefore, during my absence, was kind enough to mark these figures down and to check them in co-operation with the witness. The written deposition was signed by the witness at that time, in order to avoid any misunderstanding. In order to help him recollect these figures, I now ask your permission to have submitted to the witness this deposition which he has signed. I have had translations made of this deposition into the three languages in question and I now submit to the Tribunal eight copies. I also have four copies for the four delegations of the Prosecution, and German copies for the counsels of the Defendants Keitel , Jodl , Raeder , Doenitz , and the OKW. May I ask for just one moment so that the witness can read it? [Turning to the defendant.] Witness, would you please look at the first column only, which bears the heading "Total Expenditures." The second and the third columns show which of those sums were raised through the Reichsbank, on the one hand, and which were raised from other sources, on the other hand. These figures I should like to have certified during the interrogation of Schacht himself, because they were the results of Schacht's calculations and the witness here can therefore give no information about them. May I ask you concerning these armament expenditures of the Reich, beginning with the fiscal year of 1935, the fiscal year running from 1 April to 31 March: The figures stated herein are: 5,000 millions for 1935, 7,000 millions for 1936, 9,000 millions for 1937, 11,000 millions for 1938, and 20,500 millions for 1939. Are these figures correct?
KEITEL: According to my conviction these figures are correct. May I add that at the beginning of my captivity I also had an opportunity to speak to the Reich Finance Minister about these figures and to co-ordinate our opinions.
DR. DIX: Now, a question about the armament strength of the Reich on 1 April 1938. Is it correct to say that at that time there existed: 24 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, no motorized division, 1 mountain division, 1 cavalry division, and that in addition 10 infantry divisions and I armored division were being formed? I wish to add, that of the 3 reserve divisions none had been completed on 1 April 1938; and only 7 to 8 were in the process of being formed and expected to be complete by 1 October 1938.
KEITEL: I consider these figures correct and I have therefore confirmed them in this affidavit.
DR. DIX: That is as far as the deposition goes. I would like to put two more questions to the witness which have not been discussed with him so that I do not know whether he remembers the figures in question. I consider it possible that the Tribunal would be interested in the proportion of strength between the Reich, on the one hand, and Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, at the time of Hitler's march into Czechoslovakia; that is the relation of strength (a) concerning the armed might and (b) concerning the civilian population.
KEITEL: I do not remember the accurate figures about that. In the preliminary interrogation I have been questioned about it and I believe the figures will be correct if I say that in the fall of 1938, going by military units, that is, divisions ...
DR. DIX: I mean now the time when Hitler marched into Czechoslovakia, in the spring of 1939.
KEITEL: That was in the same year of mobilization, that is to say at that time, as far, as figures are concerned, there were fewer divisions than Czechoslovakia had at her disposal. In the fall of 1938 the number of formations, that is, divisions, was probably equal. In the spring of 1939, when we marched in, the strength which was used then was less than that which stood ready in the fall of 1938. Accurate figures, if they are important to this Tribunal, you could get rather from General Jodl.
DR. DIX: As to the number of divisions which Czechoslovakia had at her disposal in March 1939, could you not tell us anything about that?
KEITEL: No, I do not know that exactly.
DR. DIX: Then I shall possibly ask General Jodl about that later.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you will actually offer this document in evidence when the Defendant Schacht gives evidence. Is that what you intend to do?
DR. DIX: I am going to submit it in evidence and it will be included in my document book. It is not necessary to keep it now because I have to take it up again when Schacht will be examined and you will find it then in the document book. However, I would like to suggest that the copy which I have given to the witness should become a part of the record, because my questions have referred to this document. For this reason it might be useful to make this copy a part of the record.
THE PRESIDENT: If you want to make it a part of the record it had better be given a number now. It had better be S-1 had it not?
DR. DIX: Yes. Your Lordship, may I suggest Schacht-1?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. DR. STAHMER (Representing Dr. Robert Servatius, Counsel for Defendant Sauckel, and the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party): Witness, on 4 January 1944, a conference allegedly took place between the Fuehrer and Sauckel about the procuring of manpower. Were you present at this conference?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: Did Sauckel on this occasion state that he could not fill, to the extent demanded, the manpower demands of those who asked for it?
KEITEL: Yes, he discussed it thoroughly and also gave his reasons for it.
DR. STAHMER: What reasons did he give?
KEITEL: He pointed out the great difficulties encountered in the areas from which he was supposed to draft or recruit manpower; the strong activity of guerillas and partisans in these areas, the great obstacles in obtaining sufficient police forces for protecting the action, and similar reasons. I do not remember any details.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Field Marshal, were you the leader of the German delegation which signed the capitulation with which the war in Europe was terminated?
KEITEL: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: When and where did that take place?
KEITEL: In Berlin on 8 May, that is to say during the night from 8 to 9 May 1945.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Were you asked for full powers which would authorize you to negotiate about the capitulation?
KEITEL: Yes. I took the full powers with me to Berlin. They had been signed by Grossadmiral Doenitz in his capacity as Chief of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht and stated in a few words that he had authorized and ordered me to conduct the negotiations and to sign the capitulation.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Were these full powers examined and acknowledged by the Allies?
KEITEL: In the course of the afternoon of 8 May I was asked to present the full powers. Obviously they were examined and several hours later they were returned to me by a high ranking officer of the Red Army who said that I had to show them again when signing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did you show them again?
KEITEL: I did have my credentials at hand during the act of capitulation and handed them over to become part of the record.
PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Witness, during your testimony you have explained the organization of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. This organization was based on a decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor of 4 February 1938. In that decree the OKW was designated as the military staff of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. So, in that aspect you were the Chief of Staff. Now, the Prosecution have repeatedly named Jodl as your Chief of Staff. Is that correct?
KEITEL: No, General Jodl never was my Chief of Staff, he was the Chief of the Armed Forces' Operations Staff and one of the departmental chiefs of the ATmed Forces High Command as I have already stated, although the first among equals.
DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say, the Chief of several collateral co-ordinated offices?
KEITEL: Yes; I never had a Chief of Staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mention was made here about the discussion between Hitler and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938. Do you remember that? A diary entry by Jodl referring to this conversation has been submitted to the Tribunal. Was Jodl present at this conference?
KEITEL: No, he was not present and his knowledge is derived from the conference which I described before and which I held with him and Canaris about the news to be disseminated as to certain military preparations during the days following the Schuschnigg conference; it is therefore an impression gained by General Jodl as a result of the description made to him.
DR. JAHRREISS: In the course of the preparations to make the German-Czechoslovakian question acute, that is, the Sudeten question, the plan to stage an incident played a great role. Did you ever give an order to the department Abwehr II (Counterintelligence) under Canaris, to stage such an incident in Czechoslovakia or on the border?
KEITEL: No, such orders were never given to the Abwehr, anyway, not by myself.
DR. JAHRREISS: After Munich, that is in October 1938, Field Marshal, the then Chief of National Defense, Defendant Jodl, left this position and was transferred to Vienna. Who was his successor?
KEITEL: Jodl was transferred to active service. He became chief of an artillery division in Vienna and his successor was Warlimont, at that time Colonel Warlimont.
DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say his successor...
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: If I understood you correctly, that is to say Jodl was not only sent on leave but he definitely left his office?
KEITEL: Jodl had definitely left the High Command of the Armed Forces and was personnel officer of a division; Warlimont was not his representative but successor in Jodl's position.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, the Prosecution has said that at the occasion of that famous conference of 23 May 1938 -- no, 1939 -- Warlimont was present as deputy designate for Jodl. What had Jodl to do with that conference?
KEITEL: Nothing at all, he was at that time a front-line officer and commander in Vienna.
DR. JAHRREISS: Why did you choose Jodl to be chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff?
KEITEL: That was in consequence of our co-operation from 1935 to 1938. My opinion was that I could not find a better man for that position.
DR. JAHRREISS: How did Jodl picture his military career, once his command as artillery commander in Vienna or Brunn had ended?
KEITEL: I knew about his passion and his desire to become commander of a mountain division. He has frequently told me about it.
DR. JAHRREISS: Well, would there have been any chance to get such a command?
KEITEL: Yes, I tried to use my influence with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and I remember that during the summer of 1939, I wrote him that his wish to become the commander of a mountain division in Reichenhall -- I do not remember the number -- would come true. I was glad to be able to give him that information.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it up to you to make the decision or was it up to the OKH?
KEITEL: I had made a request to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and he had made the decision.
DR. JAHRREISS: And if I understand correctly, you yourself notified Jodl?
KEITEL: I wrote him a letter because I knew that I would make him very happy.
DR. JAHRREISS: May I ask, Field Marshal, did you correspond regularly with Jodl?
KEITEL: No; I believe that was the only letter which I wrote to him during that year.