dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. SAUTER: I come now to the period after the fall of Mussolini, when Badoglio took over the government in Italy. Do you recall, Witness, that at that time the Defendant Von Schirach sent a wire with certain suggestions to you? Goering: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: What did he suggest and what did he want to accomplish? Goering: He suggested that I should tell the Fuehrer to make a change in the Foreign Office immediately and to replace Ribbentrop with Von Papen .
DR. SAUTER: Then, a last question on behalf of the Defendant Schirach. Do you recall another letter which the Defendant Schirach wrote, as far as I know, in the spring of 1943? This was a letter occasioned by one from Bormann and, so that you will know just which letter I mean, I shall briefly explain the connection. Bormann at that time dispatched letters, as a formality, to all Gauleiter, according to which the Gauleiter were to report whether they had any ties with foreign countries. Schirach was well aware at the time that this letter was meant solely for him, for the other Gauleiter had no relatives in foreign countries. Schirach wrote a letter which, as far as I know, you read. And thereupon you are supposed to have intervened on behalf of Schirach. Please tell us what kind of letter it was, what was the danger threatening Schirach, and what you and others did to avert this danger? Goering: I must correct that, and I am fully acquainted with this incident. This letter of Bormann's was not directed to the Gauleiter to establish whether they personally had connections abroad. Bormann sent, by order of the Fuehrer, a letter to all Gauleiter, and it was not a pro forma letter intended solely for Gauleiter Schirach, but was intended for all. They were to check the political leaders within their jurisdiction to establish whether any of their co-workers or any political leader subordinate to them had family ties or connections abroad, especially in enemy countries, whereby the individual affected might, in some circumstances, have a conflict of conscience or might be of questionable reliability. That was a general directive of the Fuehrer, which also applied to the Officer Corps and not solely to the case of Schirach. I was at headquarters when Schirach's letter arrived and Bormann gave it to the Fuehrer. Schirach replied that, before he could take any steps in this matter with regard to his collaborators or subordinates, he needed some clarification by the Fuehrer as far as his own person was concerned.
DR. SAUTER: He went on to describe in brief, in his letter, his family ties in the United States of America, on his mother's side, and also mentioned in this letter that his connection with his relatives abroad was a very cordial one and asked whether, under these circumstances, it was still possible for the Fuehrer to retain him in his position as Gauleiter. At that time the Fuehrer had not been kindly disposed to Von Schirach for several months and had repeatedly considered withdrawing him from office. He said on this occasion -- and that is how I came into possession of this letter, for he handed it to me: "Schirach seems to plan for his future protection. I have a certain suspicion." Then, in the presence of Bormann, I told the Fuehrer very clearly and definitely that this was entirely unfounded; that I could not understand his attitude toward Schirach, and that Schirach had done the only possible and decent thing when, before dismissing any of his collaborators or subordinates for such reasons, he demanded the clarification of his own position, since his connections were known; and that, in my opinion, this letter had no other purpose.
DR. SAUTER: Then, however, in connection with this letter, a rather strange suggestion seems to have been made by someone for further action against Schirach? Goering: I know that Bormann and Himmler were opposed to Schirach. Whether they wanted to give this letter an entirely different interpretation in order to induce the Fuehrer to recall Schirach and eliminate him, and how far Himmler's suggestion went, whether protective custody was considered, I do not know. But I heard about these things from other sources later on.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honor, I have no further questions.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUHLER (Counsel for Defendant Doenitz ): Reich Marshal, when did you become acquainted with Admiral Doenitz? Goering: I met Admiral Doenitz for the first time in his capacity as Admiral and Commander of U-boats during the war, as far as I remember in 1940, at a conference in my special train, in France, I believe.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Was the conference concerned with military or political questions? Goering: Purely military questions, namely, as to how far now and in the future the Air Force could provide reconnaissance for U-boats in the Atlantic. The then Admiral Doenitz complained that the reconnaissance was too weak and urgently requested me to strengthen it and, as far as I remember, to have it extended to as far as 30 degrees.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did you have further conferences with Admiral Doenitz before his promotion to Commander-in-Chief in 1943? Goering: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did you as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force use so-called emergency seaplanes for the rescue of fliers shot down in the Channel? Goering: There were several squadrons of emergency seaplanes assigned to the Channel for the rescue of fliers shot down, both German and enemy fliers, as the order clearly proves.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: What did these planes look like? Goering: These planes were, as far as I remember, marked with the Red Cross.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Were they armed? Goering: Not at first.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: And how were these emergency planes treated by the British? Goering: There were some instances where they were not molested, but there were a number of cases in which they were shot down while they were engaged in rescue actions. Since these cases became predominant, I said it would be more expedient not to use the Red Cross markings any longer, to have these planes armed and thus try to rescue our comrades from the sea. We had tremendous losses in these emergency sea squadrons.
FLOTTENRICHIER KRANZBUHLER: Did you have lifebuoys anchored in the Channel for shot-down fliers? Goering: Quite a number of lifebuoys were anchored, to which ropes were attached and to which fliers who had been shot down could cling. The lifebuoys were also equipped with foodstuff, drinking water, life-saving jackets, lifebelts, and the like. Besides these small lifebuoys there were larger ones in the form of small rafts which the fliers could board. There also food, drink, first-aid kits, blankets, and the like, were to be found.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: How were these lifebuoys treated by the British? Goering: In different ways. Some remained, others were destroyed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I have no further questions.
DR.EXNER: Is it known to you that particularly in 1942 a severe conflict arose between the Fuehrer and Colonel General Jodl ? Goering: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Is it known to you that at that time Jodl was even to be relieved? Goering: The conflict arose from the Caucasus crisis. The Fuehrer blamed General Jodl for the fact that no concentrated forces had been used to press forward in the direction of Tuapse; but that battalions of mountain troops had been marched from the valleys over the mountain chain of the Elbrus, which the Fuehrer thought was senseless. At that time, as far as I remember, Jodl pointed out to him that this matter had been discussed with, and approved by him. The Fuehrer severely criticized the commander who was in charge of this sector. Jodl defended him on those grounds, and this led to extremely strained relations. The Fuehrer mentioned to me that he wanted to relieve Jodl. The tension was so strong that from this moment on, as far as I remember, the Fuehrer withdrew from the Officers Club jointly used by both his Operations Staff and High Command, and even took his meals alone. For quite some time, for several months, he refused to shake hands with this gentleman. This illustration is just to show you how great the tension was at that time. As successor to Jodl, Paulus was already selected; the Fuehrer had special confidence in him. Just why this change did not materialize, I do not know exactly. I assume that here again, despite all tension, the decisive factor for the Fuehrer was that it was extremely hard for him to get used to new faces, and that he did not like to make any changes in his entourage. He preferred to continue working with men of his entourage whom he did not like rather than change them. In the course of the years, however, his confidence in Jodl's tactical ability increased again considerably; he had complete confidence in his tactical capacity. The personal relations of both gentlemen were never very close.
DR. EXNER: Is it known to you that, particularly in 1945, withdrawal from the Geneva Convention was being considered? Do you know what attitude Jodl took at that time? Goering: It may have been February 1945, when Minister Goebbels made this proposal to the Fuehrer. This proposal met with the utmost opposition by all of us. In spite of that the Fuehrer reverted to it again and again, and for days was inclined to withdraw from this Convention. The reason given was, oddly enough, that there were too many deserters in the west and that the troops were inclined to surrender too easily. The Fuehrer was of the opinion that if the troops knew that in captivity they were no longer protected by the Geneva Convention, they would fight harder and would not react to the extensive enemy propaganda telling them how well they would be treated if they stopped fighting. The united efforts, in which, of course, Jodl participated, succeeded in dissuading the Fuehrer with the argument that this action would cause great disturbance among the German people and anxiety for their relatives in captivity.
DR. EXNER: One more question. Before the Norwegian campaign, Jodl entered in his diary -- it has been mentioned here before: "The Fuehrer is looking for a pretense." But that is incorrect. The original reads: "for a basis." Now, to what extent did the Fuehrer look for a basis at that time? Goering: I remember this point also very well and therefore, I can state under oath that the use of the word "basis" or "pretense" is entirely out of place here. The case was as follows: The Fuehrer knew exactly, and we knew as well, and had rather extensive intelligence and reliable reports to the effect that Norway was to be occupied by the Allies, England and France. I mentioned this the other day. In order to prevent this, the Fuehrer wanted to act first. He spoke about the fact, that for us the basis of an Anglo-French attack was clear, but that we had not sufficient proof for the outside world. Hitler explained that he was still trying to get evidence. It would have been better if Jodl had written, not that the Fuehrer was still looking for a basis, but -- according to what the Fuehrer meant -- that the Fuehrer was still looking for conclusive evidence for the outside world. Evidence as such we had. This was one thing. The second was that generally, for such steps the Foreign Office had to execute the necessary preparatory work including the drafting of notes. In the case of Norway, however, the Fuehrer advised the Foreign Office only, I believe, 24 or 48 hours in advance. He did not want to inform it at all at that time because he kept the entire plan extremely secret. I remember that I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, was informed of this plan at a very late date. This secrecy was the second reason why he himself was concerned with finding a basis for the attack. These were the two reasons. I would like to state again that it would have been expressed much more clearly if he had said that the Fuehrer was looking for evidence, rather than for a basis.
DR. EXNER: If I understand correctly, you mean evidence showing that the British had the intention of occupying Norway? Goering: We had the report, but the final written evidence we received only later.
DR. EXNER: The Fuehrer had no doubt about this? Goering: Not for a moment, none of us had any doubt about it. We received the evidence later.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Is it correct that Hitler authorized you to conduct all negotiations for the purpose of forming a government under Hitler as it emerged on 30 January 1933, that is, that you alone were commissioned to do this? Goering: That is correct. I stated this the other day.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it correct that you talked about the formation of a government with Von Papen for the first time in January 1933? Goering: I talked with Papen for the first time on a Sunday, 8 days prior to the formation of the Government, in Ribbentrop's home.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: If then, Papen had carried on negotiations concerning the formation of a government between 4 January, the day of the meeting with Hitler in the home of Baron Schroder, and 22 January, he would have had to do this through you, and you would have known it. Goering: That is correct, because the Fuehrer was in Munich at that time and I was the sole authority in Berlin for the formation of this government. Besides, it was not, at all obvious at the beginning of January that within a reasonable length of time we should have to form such a government. Other negotiations were taking place which had nothing to do with Herr Von Papen.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the formation of a new government in the middle of January become inevitable for Hindenburg because Schleicher had no parliamentary backing and I-As efforts to receive such backing, by negotiations with Gregor Strasser to split the NSDAP were frustrated? Goering: I believe I have said already in a general way that Schleicher did not receive a parliamentary majority and his attempt at splitting the parties failed for the reason that the Fuehrer immediately eliminated Strasser, who actually had no following among the deputies. Since Schleicher's attempts to get a majority failed, he had to govern without parliament, and that he could do only with extraordinary powers from Hindenburg. Since he had told him previously that he would be able to get a majority, the Reich President refused his demand for extraordinary powers, such as held by the previous Cabinet of Papen, and then decided to do what I stated here the other day.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it correct that Von Papen gave up to you the prime ministership of Prussia on 20 April 1933, because in the elections for the Prussian Landtag of March 1933 the NSDAP had, obtained a clear majority in Prussia, and the Landtag therefore intended to elect you prime minister? Goering: It is not entirely correct, for the Prussian Landtag did not have to elect a prime minister at that time. But the fact that the NSDAP had the absolute majority, induced Von Papen, in connection with my conferences in Munich, to approach the Fuehrer on his own initiative, stating that he would agree to turn over to me the Prussian prime ministership.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: One last question: You mentioned yesterday that you as the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force granted many reprieves to people in Belgium and France who were sentenced for their resistance. Is it correct that Von Papen on various occasions conveyed to you wishes of relatives of those who had been sentenced; and that he did this for the reason that, in the interest of a later solidarity of the peoples, he did not wish that in such sentences, even if they were militarily justified, an impersonal attitude should develop, and that you complied with the wishes of Von Papen? Goering: I merely remember that on occasions -- I remember one case especially, for a prominent name was involved -- I received a request from Herr Von Papen, as to whether the person concerned could not be granted a reprieve. It concerned people sentenced because they had assisted enemy airmen to escape. In this case I complied to a large extent with the request of Herr Von Papen. I am no longer quite conversant with the reasons.
DR. WALTER BALLAS (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart ): I ask the Tribunal to permit me to put a few questions to the witness Goering. They concern the well-known telephone conversations of 11 March 1938, between Berlin and Vienna. [Turning to the witness.] Is it correct, that Dr. Seyss-Inquart, when he was appointed Austrian State Councillor in June of 1937, visited you in Berlin accompanied by State Secretary Keppler? Goering: The date, I do not remember; the visit, yes.
DR. BALLAS: Did Dr. Seyss-Inquart, at that time, express the idea that the Austrian National Socialists should be made entirely independent of the Reich Party? Goering: Wishes of that nature were discussed by him because he wanted as little friction as possible in his work in the cabinet.
DR. BALLAS: At that time he further mentioned -- and I would like you to answer, whether it is correct -- that the National Socialists were to be given permission to be active in Austria, in order to establish as close a relationship between Austria and Germany as possible within the framework of an independent Austria. Goering: As far as Party matters are concerned, I do not remember exactly what was discussed. The scheme of keeping Austria independent in its collaboration with Germany was repeatedly advocated by Seyss-Inquart, and I have recently outlined it. It seemed to me personally not extensive enough. Just because I knew this attitude of Seyss-Inquart, I must say frankly that I was a little distrustful of his attitude on the 11th and 12th of March, and therefore on the late afternoon that these telephone conversations took place, I sent Keppler to Vienna, so that, as regards the annexation, matters would take their proper course. I would rather have sent someone else, because Herr Keppler was too weak for me; but the Fuehrer's desire in this case was that, if anyone was to be sent, it should be Keppler.
DR. BALLAS: Is it correct that Dr. Seyss-Inquart explained his attitude by pointing out the advantage of having German interests represented by two States? Goering: It is absolutely correct that he said that. I answered that I was of a completely different opinion; that I would prefer having German interests represented by one state, which could act more energetically than two, as the second might not synchronize.
DR. BALLAS: Did you on 11 March 1938, or on the previous day, have another telephonic or other communication with Seyss-Inquart? Goering: As far as I recall, but I cannot say with certainty, I believe I did, on the previous Sunday. That is, these telephone conversations were on the 11th, a Friday; on the Monday or Tuesday before I questioned him, or one of his men, on the impression they had had in Graz and Styria. I vaguely remember this but I cannot say so under oath.
DR. BALLAS: Document Number 2949-PS submitted by the Prosecution regarding the conversations between Berlin and Vienna in the critical time of March 1938 shows that only at the time of the conversation between Dr. Dietrich and State Secretary Keppler, who was in Vienna then on your behalf, which took place at 2154 hours -- that only on that day was Dr. Seyss-Inquart's agreement to the telegram, which you had dictated in advance, conveyed by Keppler. Had the order to march into Austria already been given at that time? Goering: I explained this recently. The order to march in had been given and had nothing to do with the telegram as such. It was immaterial whether or not he was in agreement. The responsibility for the marching in rested with the Fuehrer and me.
DR. BALLAS: Then it is correct that the marching in would have occurred even without the telegram? Goering: Yes. Of course.
DR. BALLAS: What was the purpose then of this telegram? Had it perhaps something to do with foreign policy? Goering: I have explained that here in greatest detail.
DR. BALLAS: Do you remember, Witness, that in the night from 11 to 12 March, State Secretary Keppler, in the name of Dr. Seyss-Inquart, telephoned Berlin with the request not to carry out the entry into Austria? Goering: I remember this very distinctly for I was extremely enraged that such a senseless telegram -- after everything was ready -- should have disturbed the Fuehrer's rest when he was worn out and was to go to Austria the next day. I therefore severely reprimanded the Fuehrer's adjutant and told him that such a telegram should have been given to me. Because of this I remember the telegram distinctly, and its pointlessness.
DR. BALLAS: With the result then, that the Fuehrer, if I have understood you correctly, gave a flat refusal to this telegram? Goering: He no longer wasable to give a refusal because the entire troop movement was already underway. Such a movement cannot be halted in an hour. Once a troop movement is underway it takes days to halt it. At best we could have halted the movement at a certain point on the march. That was not at all in our interest, as I stated. From this moment on, not Seyss-Inquart, but the Fuehrer and I held the fate of Austria in our hands.
DR. BALLAS: I have only two more questions regarding the Netherlands. Is it correct that, in addition to the order of the Fuehrer which was promulgated on 18 May 1940 naming Dr. Seyss-Inquart Reich Commissioner of the Netherlands, there was an order, not promulgated, which made Seyss-Inquart directly subordinate to you? Goering: Of this secret order, I know nothing.
THE PRESIDENT: Put your questions more slowly. You can see that the light is flashing.
DR. BALLAS: Had the Four Year Plan its own independent office in the Netherlands? Goering: I have not yet answered your first question, I understood that you were to put this question once more, because it did not come through.
DR. BALLAS: I understood the Court to mean... Goering: I shall answer you now on this. Of this secret order, I know nothing. It would have been senseless, for a Reich Commissioner in the occupied territories could not have been subordinate to me separately. But if it is a question of subordination in economic matter, then it is clear that the Reich Commissioner was, of course, under my orders and directions in this field as all other major Reich positions were. To your second question, I can say that I do not know today in detail whether in the occupied territories, that is also in the Netherlands, there was here and there a direct representative of the Four Year Plan, or whether I used the military commander or the economic department of the Reich Commissioner of the territory concerned. As far as I remember now, without referring to documents, in the Netherlands the situation was that the economic counsellor, or the representative of the Reich Commissioner -- Fischbock at that time -- which was logical, executed the economic directions of the Four Year Plan. The Reich Commissioner would never have been in a position not to have carried out orders given by me. He could have protested against them only to me or, in extreme cases, to the Fuehrer, but in itself this did not lead to any suspension.
DR. BALLAS: I have no further questions.
TBE PRESEDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 18 March 1946 at 1000 hours.]