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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Document No. 2348-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2348-PS
Statement of Standarten Fuehrer Walther Rauff made on 19 October 1945:
I hereby acknowledge the attached letters, written by Dr. Becker (Lieut.) on 16 May 1942 and received by me on 29 May 1942, as a genuine letter.
I did on 18 October 1945 write on the side of this letter a statement to the effect that it was genuine.
I do not know the number of death vans being operated and cannot even give an approximate figure.
The vans were built by the Saurer Works, Germany, located, I believe, in Berlin. Some other firms built these vans also.
In so far as I am aware these vans only operated in Russia.
In so far as I can state these vans were probably operating in 1941, and I personally feel that they were operating up to the termination of the war.
I do not personally know the number of persons killed in the death vans.
I would like to state that the reason why Dr. Becker wrote this letter to me was due to the fact that I was the chief of the Section under which were included such divisions as
(1) Ammunition
(2) Telephone
(3) Telegraph
(4) Radio
(5) All Trucks.
This group was known as II D.
When this letter was received, I. referred it to a Captan Pradl for appropriate action. The letter was discussed by Captain Pradl and myself, and I believe that Pradl was instructed by me to have the technical matters, of which the letters complained, remedied. I only saw Dr. Becker once or twice and had no part in the actual appointing of Dr. Becker to this position. I was never present when the death vans were operating with persons in them being killed, however I did see a death van as a sample and was interested merely from a technical viewpoint. I was chief of this technical section from February 1940 until March 1940.
From May 1940 to May 1941 I was in the German navy. From September 1941 to May 1942 I was in Prague. I then became chief of the section again from May 1942 to June 1942.
sample and was interested merely from a technical viewpoint. I was chief of this technical section from February 1940 until March 1940. From May 1940 to May 1941 I was in the German navy. From September 1941 to May 1942 I was in Prague. I then became chief of the section again from May 1942 to June 1942.
I wish to point out that my specific interest in these death vans was the lower part where the motor was located.
I wish to state that my immediate superior was an individual of ministerial grade by the name of Standarten Fuehrer Siegert. He was chief of AMT II RSHA, and Siegert gave me orders to supply the chassis of these death vans. Insofar as I can recall I only supplied 5 or 6.
The immediate superior of Standarten Fuehrer Siegert was obergruppen Fuehrer Reinhardt heydrich, chief of S. D.
The immediate successor of Siegert was an individual by the name of Spacil who succeeded Sigert around July or August of 1942, taking over the same duties and same responsibilities as Siegert and remaining chief of the section until the termination of the war. I believe that Siegert returned to a position in the Ministry of Finance on being relieved by Spacil.
I understand that this statement was made under oath and I hereby swear that all statements contained in this affidavit are the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.
Standarten Fuehrer Rauft
Witnessed by the following:-
Captain J. F. C. Bagshaw,
Captain G. K. Heller,
Captain C. A. Crowther.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Document No. 2349-PS
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2349-PS
THE MYTH OF THE 20TH CENTURY by Alfred Rosenberg
Published by Hoheneichen Publishing House, Muenchen 1941.
[Page 215]
We recognize today that the central maximum values of the Roman and the Protestant Church as negative Christianity do not correspond to our soul, that they are in the way of the organic forces of the Nordic racially determined peoples, must give way to them (these forces), and must let themselves be re-evaluated in the sense of a Germanic Christianity. That is the thought behind today's religious searching.
[Page 514]
The idea of honor-national honor-is for us the beginning and end of our entire thinking and doing. It does not admit of any equal-valued center of force alongside of it, no matter of what kind. neither Christian love, nor the Free-Masonic humanity, nor the Roman philosophy.
[Page 608]
A German religious movement which would like to develop into a folk-church will have to declare that the idea of neighborly love is unconditionally to be subordinated to the idea of national honor, that no act of a German church may be approved which does not primarily serve the safeguarding of the folkdom.
[Page 616]
A German religion will, bit by bit, present in the churches transferred to it, in place of the crucifixion the spirit of fire- the heroic-in the highest sense.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Document No. 2351-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2351-PS
THE ARCHIVE, Vol. 34-36, Page 1716
Compiled by Ernst Jaenicke, Berlin.
Edited by Alfred-Ingomar Berndt.
Published by Otto Stollberg, publishers, Berlin, March 1937.
[Rosenberg in a speech on 7 March 1937 stated:]
The education of youth can only be carried out by those who have rescued Germany from disaster. It is therefore impossible to demand one Fuehrer, one Reich and one firmly united people as long as education is carried out by forces which are mutually exclusive of each other.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Document No. 2352-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2352-PS
THE ARCHIVE, Vol. 43-45, Page 1029
Compiled by Ernst Jaenicke, Berlin,
Edited by Alfred-Ingomar Berndt.
Published by Otto Stollberg, publishers, Berlin, November 1937
[Kerrl said in a speech at Fulda, 27 November 1937:]
We cannot recognize that the Church has a right to insure that the individual should be educated in all respects in the way in which it holds to be right; but we must leave it to the National Socialist State to educate the child in the way it regards as right.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Document No. 2353-PS Previous Document Volume IV Menu Next Document PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2353-PS BASIC FACTS FOR A HISTORY OF GERMAN WAR AND ARMAMENTS ECONOMY [Page 35] IV The influence of central organization on development and activities of the war economy organization Centralization of the Supreme Reich authorities, ordered in case of war, has influenced the development and the activities of the war economy organization to such an extent, that it is necessary to discuss this matter in detail. The foundations had already been laid for the central organization of the Supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war, prior to 1933 in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when the national socialists came into power and especially by the decease of Reichpresident von Hindenburg. The latest orders were decreed in the Reich Defense law of May 21, 1935, supposed to be published only in case of war, but already declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As this law (see Appendix IV, 1) fixed the duties of the Armed Forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization. XV [Page 135] War and Armament Economic Measures from entry into Austria (1938 till mobilization 1939) The discussion between the Fuehrer and the Austrian Chancellor of State Schuschnigg on February 12, led to the military political measures against Austria, which concluded with the entry into Austria on March 13. This action against Austria, disguised under the code name "Action Otto" prepared in a short time, has resulted in a wealth of experience of utmost importance, for the preparation of mobilization and especially for the economic preparations, and has in the course of the year led to changes in the regulations regarding mobilization. [Page 136] The action was prepared and started without the cooperation of the WStb. The result was, that the military measures created great confusion in the economic sphere leading to unpleasant conditions for the army and also for the economy for the time being. [Page 141] The experience gained during the action in Austria caused the OKW to issue
was prepared and started without the cooperation of the WStb. The result was, that the military measures created great confusion in the economic sphere leading to unpleasant conditions for the army and also for the economy for the time being. [Page 141] The experience gained during the action in Austria caused the OKW to issue new regulations, preparing the separating of the mobilization of the Armed Forces from the mobilization of the civilian elements. Mobilization of the Armed Forces without public announcement (X-case) was prepared; nevertheless there should be the possibility of proceeding at any time from the mobilization of the Armed Forces only, to a general mobilization of State, Nation and Economy. The basic idea is, that all actions and regulations in case-X are based on Civil law, a state of defense has not been declared and martial law has not been proclaimed. The appropriate measures were ordered on July 5 by the OKW. WStb and GBW expressed justifiable misgivings regarding these new regulations, as mobilization of the Armed Forces before mobilization of economy would create considerable confusion and endanger the smooth running of the economic mobilization. On the demand for a divided mobilization was necessary from a military-political point of view, it was accepted in spite of the objections of the WStb and GBW. [Pages 142-143] The first planned action of the war economy organization during an actual operation was at the time of the entry into the Sudeten territory. Liaison officers of the OKW [WStb] were attached to the corps commandos, they were in charge of technical war economy units and finally, War Economy Offices for special missions were created to take over definite Economic departments. The military-political developments during the occupation of the Sudeten German territory evolved in such a manner, that the liaison officers as well as the technical war economy units and the offices of WWi were rarely in action. The planned preparation for action by these administrative units and their activities in the Sudeten German territory nevertheless provided experience which was also very valuable for the later Mob-preparations. Primarily it was admitted by all departments, that the
and the offices of WWi were rarely in action. The planned preparation for action by these administrative units and their activities in the Sudeten German territory nevertheless provided experience which was also very valuable for the later Mob-preparations. Primarily it was admitted by all departments, that the installation of the liaison officers of the OKW [WStb] at the corps commandos is of great value not only to the troops but also for OKW, and is a necessity in modern warfare. This proved especially valuable insofar as the chiefs of the Civil government were as a rule not instructed in their duties and authority, and the offices for special missions, first had to give them the necessary directives for their task. [Page 146] At the beginning of the year 1939 a new level was reached as regards the military-political situation-the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by the German army and the abrogation of the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. These operations also were prepared "war economically" by the creation of war economy units, who had, as in the case Sudetenland, a very small scope for action. Immediately after the occupation, a war economy inspectorate for special missions was set up, which took over all the duties of the Czechoslovak secretaryship general for national Defense and which was transformed into the Inspectorate of War Economy Prague on March 30, 1939 already. The main duties of the Inspectorate are: Utilization of the total industrial economy of the Protectorate for the purpose of Reichdefense; Control of manufacture of war material for at home and abroad and Effect synchronization of demands to be made by military and civilian Reich authorities and the industrial economy of the Protectorate. Furthermore they are assigned: The instruction of the Reichprotector on the economic demands to be made in the interest of Reichdefense and to advise him concerning legislation resulting therefrom; Air raid precautions in industry and guarding of factories and the Defense Measures [Abwehrmassnahmen] in the factories. XVIII [Pages 181-184] Execution of the economic mobilization Before discussing the actual process of the economic mobilization I regard it as my duty, to
resulting therefrom; Air raid precautions in industry and guarding of factories and the Defense Measures [Abwehrmassnahmen] in the factories. XVIII [Pages 181-184] Execution of the economic mobilization Before discussing the actual process of the economic mobilization I regard it as my duty, to give my opinion on the possibility of successful warfare as regards war economy, from my experience as Chief of the WStb gained during August 1939. During this time many conferences were held with the then Generaloberst Keitel discussing our readiness for war and conditions in regard to armaments as compared with that of the prospective enemy states. During all these discussions I maintained the point of view, that a war with Poland would present no problem for us, but that for a great world war of long duration, our economic structure would be too weak and that, in the case of a world war, decisive measures, conforming to a total war, would have to be carried out immediately. These objections and the resulting demands were nevertheless ignored. The process of German mobilization in 1939 was most intensively influenced by the progress of the military-political situation and was carried out with the idea of surprising the enemy, at the right moment. The experience gained during the operations against Austria, Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, which led to separate and camouflaged mobilization, formed the basis for the measures to be taken. The tension, existing between Germany and Poland since July, was used to take all the measures, necessary for a surprise attack on Poland. Some of these preparations as far as war economy was concerned were the acceleration of the delivery of armaments, which in particular was carried out by the branches of the Armed Forces and, for the organization of War-economy, the forming of war economy units to be attached to the attacking armies. After August 1, the formation and distribution of VO of WStb took place, they were attached to the AOK; on August 24, formation of war economy units for the attacking armies concerned. On August 25, orders for the camouflaged mobilization were released, with Aug. 26, ordered as the first X-day. (see Appendix XVIII, 1 and Appendix XVIII, 2). In this manner the form of
WStb took place, they were attached to the AOK; on August 24, formation of war economy units for the attacking armies concerned. On August 25, orders for the camouflaged mobilization were released, with Aug. 26, ordered as the first X-day. (see Appendix XVIII, 1 and Appendix XVIII, 2). In this manner the form of mobilization was ordered, which represented the most unfavorable form for the mobilization of war economy. Reiterated objections against divided mobilization, submitted by WStb as late as August 24, were overridden by the Chief of OKW, while the Supreme Command was of the opinion, that a war with Poland did not necessitate a General mobilization, and any other form of mobilization was out of question for political reasons. On August 25 18.30 a copy of case X was remitted to the inspectorates of War economy (copy, see Appendix XVIII, 3). The decree of August 25 orders expressly that case X shall not be extended in its entirety to civilian matters. Even though it was ordered that future proposed mob measures must not be endangered by unplanned demands, requisitions and commandeerings, there was still considerable danger in the mobilization being divided and carried out at different times. This was especially applicable as far as economy was concerned insofar as regulations for economy read that with the utmost consideration of economy in general only the most important war factories should be maintained at their former level and that only isolated war factories should be immediately speeded up to produce a large output. These regulations, in consideration of the Economic Policy which was to oppose every unnecessary change, and also of the kind of propaganda adopted were bound to endanger the planned process of economic mobilization. The preparations, covering many years of work, for the mobilization of Economy were consequently, for the most part, invalid. This regulation was unfortunately to become an inconvenience later on when starting up the Armaments Industry and the economy of war and was even noticeable for the first four years of the war up to the declaration of total war in 1943. A large number of the measures, contained in the preparation for mobilization of the WStb and
an inconvenience later on when starting up the Armaments Industry and the economy of war and was even noticeable for the first four years of the war up to the declaration of total war in 1943. A large number of the measures, contained in the preparation for mobilization of the WStb and invalidated by the above regulation, were not executed until 1943 as a result of demands by the Reichminister for Armaments and ammunition. On August 27, 1939, the regulation on the administration of economy was issued, whereby the Oberpraesidenten were charged with executing and directing all economic measures of the GBW. Included in this was the official founding of the District Economy offices, the Provincial Food offices [Landesernaehrungsaemter], Offices of forestry and economy of timber [Holzwirtschaftsaemter] forming finally the organization, that should have been in force long ago as a result of the mobilization order by GBW. [Pages 273-275] B. War Economy The year 1940 was the first acid test for the value and necessity of the War Economy organization. After it had proved its value at home by the measures taken to strengthen the war economy of Germany especially in reestablishing the German war industry and reconstructing the armament industry and had earned the constant appreciation of Field Marshal Goering and the Reichminister for War, it now remained to prove that the organization was also able to support the combat troops, to administer the economy of occupied countries and put it into operation again, and that there was an absolute necessity for such an organization in the present war. That this point of view is correct, is proved by the fact, that all allied as well as enemy states constructed similar organizations, imitating the German pattern. The operations against Denmark and Norway and the western campaign against Holland, Belgium and France brought full proof; the year 1942 has more than confirmed this point of view. 1. War Economy Measures during the occupation of Denmark and Norway The occupation of Denmark and Norway brought for the German War Economy organization a gratifying and manifold task. The office Wi Rue was informed of the planned execution of these operations at the end of February, and
this point of view. 1. War Economy Measures during the occupation of Denmark and Norway The occupation of Denmark and Norway brought for the German War Economy organization a gratifying and manifold task. The office Wi Rue was informed of the planned execution of these operations at the end of February, and thereupon ordered the preparation of the measures to be taken as regards war economy. It was decided, that a small staff under the direction of Major Neef (Group leader in the dept. of raw materials Wi Rue) should carry out the appropriate, preliminary preparations, for the organization which were to be carried out in accordance with the directives of OKW-WFA and the Oberquartiermeisters of group XXI charged with the operational preparations. Commander in chief of Group XXI was von Falkenhorst, General in the infantry; Colonel of General staff Baentsch, Oberquartiermeister. The war economy specialists, coordinated under Major Neef, was assimilated into the staff of group XXI on March 20, under the title "Group War Economy" and VO of OKW/Wi Rue office. The first performance of the group was the compilation of material on the economic structure of Denmark and Norway. Then it worked on the war economy and armament part of the "Demands of OKW to the political plenipotentiaries of the Fuehrer in the Danish and Norwegian Governments", and the economic measures in the "Special instructions on conduct during occupation of Denmark and Norway". Furthermore, special tasks were given to the war economy officers concerned and their first duties defined as follows: a. Support of the military commanders in the utilization of the economy of the country in the interest of the armed forces; b. Identification and safeguarding of supplies against unauthorized seizure or transport; c. Starting or restarting of production plants; any further war economy and armament tasks should be undertaken only by special order of OKW. The working staff was able, during the four weeks available, to compile detailed material, providing the respective war economy departments with valuable material for their duties. All necessary orders, directives and so forth were issued in a special calendar in order of