dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In 1936, after the Nazi Government had re-occupied the Rhineland contrary to the treaties of Versailles and Locarno, the matter was brought before the Council of the League of Nations, and the defendant addressed the Council in defense of the action of Germany. His next position began on 11 August 1936, when he was appointed Ambassador in London. He occupied that position for a period of some 18 months, and his activities there, while having their own interest, are not highly relevant to the matters now before the Tribunal. But during that period, in the capacity which he still had as German Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, he signed the original Anti-comintern Pact with Japan in November 1936 and also the additional pact by which Italy joined it in 1937 . Finally, so far as this part of the case is concerned, on 4 February 1938 this defendant was appointed Foreign Minister in place of the Defendant Von Neurath and simultaneously was made a member of the Secret Cabinet Council (Geheimer Kabinettsrat) established by decree of Hitler of that date. That takes us up to the period of his holding the office of Foreign Minister, and his actions in that capacity will be dealt with in detail later on. I refer the Tribunal without reading further, because I have already summarized it, to the extract from Das Archiv, which is Document D-472, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-130; also to the membership extract of the SS, which consists in the examination of the descent of SS leaders and which I insert as Exhibit GB-131. Again I shall not trouble the Tribunal with the details. It shows his rank, which I have already mentioned. There is no question of any honorary rank. It is simply stated to be the rank of Gruppenfuehrer, and of course, it gives his ancestry in detail, in order to deal with the laws which related to that subject. It also deals with his adoption in order to secure the prefix of "van," but the defendant has now to deal with much more serious things than barren controversies with the Almanach de Gotha.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The only new document which I put before the Tribunal in this part of the case is Exhibit GB-129, Document 1337-PS, which shows the establishment of the Secret Cabinet Council and the membership of the Foreign Minister. These are the activities of this defendant in the earlier part of his career, and in the submission of the Prosecution they show quite clearly that he assisted willingly, deliberately, intentionally, and keenly in bringing the Nazis into power and into the earlier stage of their obtaining control of the German State. I now come to the second allegation in the Indictment, that this defendant participated in political planning and preparation with the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances; and again it might help the Tribunal if I took these quite shortly, in order of aggression, and stated briefly the constituent allegations that we make and the references to matters before the Tribunal, referring the Tribunal only to any new document which shall come along. The first is the Anschluss with Austria, and there the Tribunal will remember that the Defendant Ribbentrop was present at a meeting at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938, at which Hitler and Von Papen met the Austrian Chancellor Von Schuschnigg and his Foreign Minister, Guido Schmidt. The Tribunal will find the official account of that interview in Document 2461-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-132. What the Tribunal will find, I submit, is the truthful account of the interview in Exhibit Number USA-72, Document Number 1780-PS, which is the diary of the Defendant Jodl; and the relevant entries are those for 11 and 12 February 1938. They are extremely short, and I shall read-if the Tribunal will be kind enough to allow me, they do show quite clearly the case for the Prosecution-about the pressure that was used in Chancellor Schuschnigg's interview. It is at the foot of the first page in the Document Book; Document 1780-PS is the number.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on the 11th of February the Defendant Jodl writes: "In the evening and on 12 February General K"-Keitel- "with General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg, together with G. Schmidt are being put under the heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol. "13 February: In the afternoon General K"-Keitel-"asks Admiral C"-Canaris-"and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure, by shamming military action, should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval. "14 February: At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office VII and initiates the different measures. "The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations." It is rather interesting, after reading the frank statement of the Defendant Jodl, to look at the pale words of the official statement which I have also put in. That is the view of the meeting with Schuschnigg, which the Prosecution placed before this Court. Will the Tribunal be good enough to ignore an allegation that appears in the trial brief that this defendant visited Mussolini before the Anschluss, as is stated by a member of his staff at that time. It was disputed by another member. Therefore, I would rather the Tribunal ruled it out. The next point on which there is no dispute is the telephone conversation which took place between the Defendant Goering and the Defendant Ribbentrop on the 13th of March 1938, when this defendant was still in London. The Tribunal will remember that that we: dealt with fully by my friend, Mr. Alderman. It was passing on what the Prosecution submits is a completely false statement: that there was no ultimatum. The facts of the ultimatum were explained by the earlier telephone conversations with the Defendant Goering in Vienna.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant Goering then passed that on to the Defendant Ribbentrop in London in order that he might propagate the story of there being no ultimatum, in political circles in London. That appears in the telephone conversation, which is Exhibit Number USA-76, Document 2949-PS, and, as I say, it is fully dealt with in the transcript on Page 582 ( Volume II, Page 425 ). The third action which this defendant took occurred after his return from London. Although he had been appointed Foreign Minister in February, he had gone back to London to clear up his business at the embassy and he was still in London until after the Anschluss had actually occurred, but his name appears as a signatory of the law making Austria a province of the German Reich. That is Document 2307-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-133. And there is a reference in the Reichsgesetzblatt, which is given. These were the actions of the defendant with regard to Austria. Then we come to Czechoslovakia, and there you have an almost perfect example of aggression at work in its various ways. Again I simply remind the Tribunal of the outstanding points with the greatest brevity. First, there is the question of stirring up trouble inside the country against which aggression is going to be set forth. This Defendant, as Foreign Minister, was concerned with the stirring up of the Sudeten Germans under Henlein, and the contacts between the Foreign Office and Henlein are shown in Exhibit Numbers USA-93, 94, 95, and 96. These are Documents 3060-PS, 2789-PS, 2788-PS, and 3059-PS. They have all been read by my friend, Mr. Alderman, but I simply give to the Tribunal their eject on them, which is the stirring up of the Sudeten German movement in order to act with the Government of the Reich. Then, after that, the Defendant Ribbentrop was present on the 28th of May 1938 at the conference with Hitler, at which the latter gave the necessary instructions to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia. That was dealt with previously on Page 742 of the transcript ( Volume III, Page 42 ).
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I want to put before the Tribunal Document 2360-PS, which is a report of a speech of Hitler's in the Volkischer Beobachter; and, if the Tribunal would be good enough to look at it, it is a useful date- to fix with regard to the aggression against Czechoslovakia, because that was the day on which Hitler, on his own proclamation, had decided that aggression was to take place against Czechoslovakia. The extract which I have taken is quite short and-if the Tribunal would look at the extract which is on Page 1, columns 5 and 6, bottom-the important passage is: "On the basis of this unbearable provocation, which was still further emphasized by a truly infamous persecution and terrorizing of our Germans there, I have now decided to solve the Sudeten-German question in a final and radical manner." This was in January 1939. Then he goes on to say: "On 28 May . . . I gave the order for the preparation of military steps against this state, to be concluded by 2 October...." The important point is that the 28th of May was the date when the Fall Grun for Czechoslovakia was the subject of orders and it was thereafter put into effect to come to fruition at the beginning of October. That is the second stage: To lay well in advance your plans of aggression. The third stage is to see that the neighboring states are not likely to cause you trouble. So we find that on the 18th of July 1938 this defendant had a conversation with the Italian Ambassador Attolico, at which the attack on Czechoslovakia was discussed. That is Exhibit Number USA-85, Document 2800-PS. And there were further discussions which are contained in Exhibits USA-86 and 87, which are Documents 2791-PS and 2792-PS. I think it is sufficient for me to say to the Tribunal that the effect of these documents is that it was made clear to the Italian Government that the German Government was going to move against Czechoslovakia. The other country which was interested was Hungary, because Hungary had certain territorial ideas with regard to parts of the Czechoslovakian Republic.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So, on the 23rd and 25th of August, this defendant was present at the discussions and had discussions himself with the Hungarian politicians Imredy and Kania, and these are found in Exhibit Numbers USA-88 and 89, Documents 2796-PS and 2797-PS. This defendant endeavored to get assurances of Hungarian help, and the Hungarian Government at the time was not too ready to commit itself to action, although it was ready enough with sympathy. These are to be found in the documents which I have mentioned. And, again, unless the Tribunal desires, I shall not read any document that I summarize that way. Now I have already mentioned that there had been contact with the Sudeten Germans. That was the long-term grievance that had to be exploited. But the next stage was to have a short-term grievance and to stir up trouble, preferably at the fountainhead. And so, between the 16th and 24th of September, we find the German Foreign Office, of which this defendant was at the head, stirring up trouble in Prague; and that is shown very clearly in Exhibits Numbers USA-97 to 101, which are Documents 2858-PS, 2855-PS, 2854-PS, 2853-PS, and 2856-PS. I have read them in order of date. And it would be interesting for the Tribunal to look at these. They ought to follow quite shortly the document they have just been looking at, beginning with Document PS-2858. You will see the sort of thing of which I am reminding the Tribunal. Here you have the document of the 19th of September coming from the Foreign Office to the German Embassy in Prague: "Please inform Deputy Kundt at Conrad Henlein's request to get in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their demands for autonomy during the next day." And the others deal with questions of arrest and the action that would be taken against any Czechs in Germany in order to make the position more difficult. That was the contribution which this defendant made to the pre-Munich crisis. After, as the Tribunal will remember, on the 29th of September 1938, the Munich Agreement was signed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is GB-23, Document TC-23, which I have already read to the Tribunal And, after that-I just remind the Tribunal of an interesting document which shows the sort of action which the Wehrmacht expected and the advice that the Wehrmacht expected from the Foreign Office. You have, on the 1st of October, Document C-2, which is Exhibit Number USA-90, and that is a long document putting forward an almost infinite variety of breaches of international law, which were likely to arise or might have arisen from the action in regard to Czechoslovakia; and on all these points the opinion of the Foreign Office is sought. That, of course, remained a hypothetical question at that time because no war resulted. Then, if the Tribunal please, we come to the second stage in the acquiring of Czechoslovakia: That is, having obtained the Sudetenland, arranging so that there would be a crisis in Czechoslovakia which would give an excuse for taking the rest. The Tribunal will remember the importance of this because it is the first time that the German Government went outside its own statement about not going beyond German blood. On that point, again, this defendant was active. On the 13th of March, as events were moving to a climax, he sent a telegram to the German Minister in Prague, who was under him, telling him to "make a point of not being available if the Government there wants to get in touch with you in the next few days." That is Exhibit Number USA-116, Document 2815-PS. At the same time this defendant saw a delegation of pro-Nazi Slovaks in Berlin. At a conference with Hitler, at which this defendant was present, Tiso, one of the heads of the pro-Nazi Slovaks, was directed to declare an independent Slovak State, in order to assist in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. That is Exhibit Number USA-117, Document 2802-PS, and the Tribunal might care to compare it with a previous meeting with another Slovak, Tuka, a month before, which is shown in Document 2790-PS, Exhibit Number USA-110.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that this defendant was assisting in the task, again, of supporting internal trouble. Then on the 14th of March 1939, the next day, Hacha, the President of Czechoslovakia, was called to Berlin. This defendant was present at the meeting and the Tribunal will remember the usual pressure and threats which resulted in the aged President's purposing to hand over the Czechoslovak State to Hitler. The Tribunal will find that subject dealt with on Page 911 of the transcript ( Volume III, from Page 158 ), and the relevant exhibit is Exhibit Number USA-118, Document 2798-PS, which is the minutes of the meeting between Hitler and Hacha that this defendant attended. You will also find it dealt with in Exhibit Number USA-126, Document 3061-PS, which is the Czechoslovakian Government report. That was the end of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The following week this defendant signed a treaty with Slovakia which I now put in. It is Document 1439-PS, and I put it in as Exhibit GB-135, and the important part is Article 2, under which the German Government was given the right to construct military posts and installations and keep them garrisoned within Czechoslovakia. Again, I am not going to read it at length, but I hope the Tribunal will stop me if there are any of these documents which they would like read instead of summarized. In that way this defendant by the terms of that treaty, after completely finishing Bohemia and Moravia as an independent state, had got military control in Slovakia. Before I pass to Poland, there is one interesting little point on the Northern Baltic which I put before the Tribunal to show how this defendant could hardly keep his hands out of the internal affairs of other countries, even when it did not seem a very important matter. The Tribunal will remember that on the 3rd of April 1939, as shown in GB-4, TC-53(a), Germany had occupied the Memelland.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It would have appeared, as far as the Baltic States were concerned, that the position was satisfactory; but if the Tribunal will look at Document 2953-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-136, and Document 2952-PS, which I put in as GB-137, they will find that this defendant acted in close concert with the conspirator Heydrich, who is dead, in stirring up trouble in Lithuania with a group of pro-Nazi people called the "Woldemaras supporters." Document 2953-PS shows that Heydrich was passing to the Defendant Ribbentrop the request for financial support for the..
THE PRESIDENT: You are going to read 2953?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the one I was going to read. That is a letter from Heydrich to the Defendant Ribbentrop and it says: "Dear Party Comrade Von Ribbentrop: "Enclosed please find a further report about the 'Woldemaras supporters.' As already mentioned in the previous report the 'Woldemaras supporters' are still asking for help from the Reich. I therefore ask you to examine the question of financial support brought up again by the 'Woldemaras supporters' set forth on Page 4, Paragraph 2, of the enclosed report and to make a definite decision. "The request of the 'Woldemaras supporters' for financial support could, in my opinion, be granted. Deliveries of arms should not, however, be made under any circumstances." Then, 2952-PS, the next document, is a fuller report, and at the end of that there is added in handwriting, "I support small regular payments, e. g., 2,000 to 3,000 marks quarterly." It is signed "W." who I understand to be the Secretary of State. I merely quoted that to show the extraordinary interference, even with comparatively unimportant countries. Then we pass to the aggression against Poland, and again the Tribunal has had that fully dealt with by my friend Colonel Griffith-Jones; but again it might be useful if I just separated the various periods so that the Tribunal would have these in mind. The first was what one might call the Munich period, up to the end of September 1938; and at that time no language was too good for Poland. The Tribunal will remember the point. The important documents showing that aspect of the case are GB-30, which is Document 2357-PS, Hitler's Reichstag speech on the 20th of February 1938, and then GB-31, Document TC-76, which is the secret Foreign Office memorandum of the 26th of August 1938, and GB-27, Document TC-73, Number 40. TC-73 is the Polish Willie Book and 40 is the number of the document in the book. That is a conversation between M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, and this defendant.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Finally in this group is TC-73, Number 42, Hitler's speech at the Sportpalast on the 26th of September 1938, in which he said that this was the end of his territorial problems in Europe and expressed an almost violent affection for the Poles. Now the next stage was between Munich and the rape of Prague, and then in the next stage-part of the German aggressions in Czechoslovakia having been accomplished and parts still remaining to be done-there is a slight change but still a friendly atmosphere. That begins with a conversation between this defendant and M. Lipski, which is contained in Exhibit GB-27, Document TC-73, Number 44. There this defendant put forward very peaceful suggestions for the settlement of the Danzig issue. The Polish reply is in GB-28, TC-73.
THE PRESIDENT: You did not give the date of those, did you?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. The first one is 25 October 1938; the Polish reply which says that it is unacceptable that Danzig should return to the Reich, but making suggestions for a bilateral agreement, is the 31st of October 1938. Between these dates, the Tribunal will remember according to Document C-137, Exhibit GB-33, dated the 21st of October the German Government had made its preparation to occupy Danzig by surprise. But although these preparations were made, still some 2 months later, on the 5th of January 1939, while the rape of Prague had not taken place, Hitler was suggesting to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, a new solution. That is contained in Document TC-73, Number-48, Exhibit GB-34, the interview of Hitler and Beck on the 5th of January 1939. Then this defendant saw M. Beck on the next day and said there was no violent solution of Danzig, but a further building up of friendly relations. That is contained in GB-35, Document TC-73, Number 49. Not content with that, this defendant went to Warsaw on the 25th of January and, according to the report of his speech contained in Document 2530-PS, GB-36, talked of the continued progress and consolidation of friendly relations; and that was capped by Hitler's Reichstag speech on the 30th of January 1939, in the same sort of tone, contained in GB-37, TC-73, Number 57. That was the second stage-the mention of Danzig in honeyed words, because, of course, the rape of Prague had not been attained. Then one has to remember, as one comes to the summer, the meeting at the Reich Chancellery on the 23rd of May 1939, which is reported in Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27. It has been read many times to the Tribunal, and I remind them of only this point: That that is the document where Hitler makes it quite clear, and states in his own words, that Danzig has nothing to do with the real Polish question. He had to deal with Poland because he wanted Lebensraum in the East. That is the effect of that portion of the document which has been read so often to the Tribunal-that Danzig was merely an excuse.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is important to have in mind, if I may respectfully suggest it, that that meeting was on the 23rd of May 1939, because there is an interesting corroboration of the attitude of mind-in showing how clearly this Defendant Ribbentrop had adopted the attitude of mind of Hitler-in the introduction to Count Ciano's diary, which was put in as Exhibit Number USA-166, Document 2987-PS; but I do not think this part of the diary, the introduction, has been read before to the Court. It is Document 2897-PS, and it comes two after L-79, which is the "Little Schmundt" file, just after the Obersalzberg document. It is set out in the trial brief, if the Tribunal will care to follow it there. Count Ciano says: "In the summer of 1939 Germany advanced her claims against Poland, naturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop had several times denied to our Ambassador that Germany had any intention of carrying the controversy to extremes. Despite these denials I remained unconvinced; I wanted to make sure for myself, and on August 11th I went to Salzburg. It was in his residence at Fuschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while we were waiting to eat, of the decision to start the fireworks, just as he might have told me about the most unimportant and commonplace administrative matter. 'Well, Ribbentrop,' I asked him, while we were walking in the garden, 'What do you want? The Corridor or Danzig?' 'Not any more, . . . ' and he stared at me through those cold Musee Grevin eyes, 'We want war."' I remind the Tribunal how closely that corroborates the statement that Hitler had made at his Chancellery conference on the 23rd of May: That it was no longer a question of Danzig or the Corridor, it was a question of war to achieve Lebensraum in the East. Then I remind the Tribunal, without citing it, that the Fall Weiss for operation against Poland is dated the 3rd and 11th of April 1939, which certainly shows that preparations were already in hand.