dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DOENITZ: No, not as a rule; only if subsequently my anxiety was too great. For example, I had a report from a commander that, because he had remained too long with the lifeboats and thus had been pursued by the escorts perhaps-or probably-summoned by wireless, his boat had been severely attacked by depth charges and had been badly damaged by the escorts-something which would not have happened if he had left the scene in time-then naturally I pointed out to him that his action had been wrong from a military point of view. I am also convinced that I lost ships through rescue. Of course I cannot prove that, since the boats are lost. But such is the whole mentality of the commander; and it is entirely natural, for every sailor retains from the days of peace the view that rescue is the noblest and most honorable act he can perform. And I believe there was no officer in the German Navy-it is no doubt true of all the other nations-who, for example, would not consider a medal for rescue, rescue at personal risk, as the highest peacetime decoration. In view of this basic attitude it is always very dangerous not to change to a wartime perspective and to the principle that the security of one's own ship comes first, and that war is after all a serious thing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In what years was the practice you have just described followed, that U-boats did not rescue when they endangered themselves?
DOENITZ: In 1940, that is towards the end of 1939, economic warfare was governed by the Prize Ordinance insofar as U-boats were still operating individually. Then came the operations, close to the enemy coast, of 1939-40 which I have described; the order Number 154 applied to these operations. Then came the Norway campaign, and then when the U-boat war resumed in the spring of 1940, this order of rescue, or nonrescue if the U-boat itself was endangered, applied in the years 1940, 1941, and 1942 until autumn.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was this order put in writing?
DOENITZ: No, it was not necessary, for the general order about rescue was a matter of course, and besides it was contained in certain orders of the Naval Operations Staff at the beginning of the war. The stipulation of nonrescue, if the safety of the submarine is at stake, is taken for granted in every navy; and I made a special point of that in my reports on the cases which I have just discussed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In June of 1942 there was an order about the rescue of captains. This has the Number DOENITZ-22; I beg your pardon-it is DOENITZ Number 23, and is found on Page 45 of Document Book 1, and I hereby submit it. It is an - 9 May 46 extract from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff of 5 June 1942. I quote: "According to instructions received from the Naval Operations Staff submarines are ordered by the Commander of U-boats to take on board as prisoners captains of ships sunk, with their papers, if this is possible without endangering the boat and without impairing fighting capacity." How did this order come into being?
DOENITZ: Here we are concerned with an order of the Naval Operations Staff that captains are to be taken prisoners, that is, to be brought home and that again is something different from rescue. The Naval Operations Staff was of the opinion-and rightly-that since we could not have a very high percentage, say 80 to 90 percent, of the crews of the sunk merchantmen brought back-we even helped in their rescue, which was natural-then at least we must see to it that the enemy was deprived of the most important and significant parts of the crews, that is, the captains; hence the order to take the captains from their lifeboats on to the U-boats as prisoners.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB HLER: Did this order exist in this or another form until the end of the war?
DOENITZ: Yes, it was later even incorporated into the standing orders, because it was an order of the Naval Operations Staff. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER Was it carried out until the end of the war, and with what results?
DOENITZ: Yes, according to my recollection it was carried out now and then even in the last few years of the war. But in general the result of this order was very slight. I personally can remember only a very few cases. But through letters which I have now received from my commanders and which I read, I discovered that there were a few more cases than I believed, altogether perhaps 10 or 12 at the most. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER To what do you attribute the fact that despite this express order so few captains were taken prisoner?
DOENITZ: The chief reason, without doubt, was that on an increasing scale, the more the mass of U-boats attacked enemy convoys, the convoy system of the enemy was perfected. The great bulk of the U-boats was engaged in the battle against convoys. In a few other cases it was not always possible by reason of the boat's safety to approach the lifeboats in order to pick out a captain. And thirdly, I believe that the commanders of the U-boats were reluctant, quite rightly from their viewpoint, to have a captain on board for so long during a mission. In any event, I know that the commanders were not at all happy about this order.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral, now I turn to a document which is really the nucleus of the accusation against you. It is Document GB-199, Page 36 of the British document book. This is your radio message of 17 September, and the Prosecution asserts that it is an order for the destruction of the shipwrecked. It is of such importance that I will read it to you again. "To all Commanding Officers: "1. No attempt of any kind must be made to rescue members of ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the most elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews. "2. Orders for bringing back captains and chief engineers still apply. "3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of importance for your boat. "4. Be harsh. Bear in mind that the enemy takes no regard of women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities." Please describe to the Tribunal the antecedents of this order, which are decisive for its intentions. Describe first of all the general military situation out of which the order arose.
DOENITZ: In September of 1942 the great bunk of the German U-boats fought convoys. The center of gravity in the deployment of U-boats was in the North Atlantic, where the protected convoys operated between England and America. The U-boats in the north fought in the same way, attacking only the convoys to Murmansk. There was no other traffic in that area. The same situation existed in the Mediterranean; there also the objects of our attack were the convoys. Beyond that, a part of the boats was committed directly to American ports, Trinidad, New York, Boston, and other centers of congested maritime traffic. A small number of U-boats fought also in open areas in the middle or the south of the Atlantic. The criterion at this time was that the powerful Anglo-American air force was patrolling everywhere and in increasingly large numbers. That was a point which caused me great concern, for obviously the airplane, because of its speed, constitutes the most dangerous threat to the U-boat. And that was not a matter of fancy on my part, for from the summer of 1942-that is, a few months before September, when this order was issued-the losses of our U-boats through air attacks rose suddenly by more than 300 percent, I believe.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral, for clarification of this point, I am giving you a diagram which I would like to submit in evidence to the Tribunal as DOENITZ-99. Will you, with the use of the diagram, explain the curve of losses?
DOENITZ: It is very clear that this diagram showing the losses of U-boats corroborates the statements which I have just made. One can see that up to June 1942 U-boat losses were kept within reasonable limits and then-in July 1942-what I have just described happened suddenly. Whereas the monthly losses up till then varied as the diagram shows between 4, 2, 5, 3, 4, or 2 U-boats, from July the losses per month jumped to 10, 11, 8, 13, 14. Then follow the two winter months December and January, which were used for a thorough overhauling of the ships; and that explains the decrease which, however, has no bearing on the trend of losses. These developments caused me the greatest concern and resulted in a great number of orders to the submarine commanders on how they were to act while on the surface; for the losses were caused while the boats were above water, since the airplanes could sight or locate them; and so the boats had to limit their surface activities as much as possible. These losses also prompted me to issue memoranda to the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: When?
DOENITZ: The memoranda were written in the summer, in June.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In June of 1942?
DOENITZ: In June 1942 or July. At the pinnacle of my success, it occurred to me that air power might some day stifle us and force us under water. Thus, despite the huge successes which I still had at that time, my fears for the future were great, and that they were not imaginary is shown by the actual trend of losses after the submarines left the dockyard in February 1943; in that month 18 boats were lost; in March, 15; in April, 14. And then the losses jumped to 38. The airplane, the surprise by airplane, and the equipment of the planes with radar-which in my opinion is, next to the atomic bomb, the decisive war-winning invention of the Anglo-Americans- brought about the collapse of U-boat warfare. The U-boats were forced under water, for they could not maintain their position on the surface at alp Not only were they located when the airplane spotted them, but this radar instrument actually located them up to 60 nautical miles away, beyond the range of sight, during the day and at night. Of course, this necessity of staying under water was impossible for the old U-boats, for they had to surface at least in order to recharge their batteries. This development forced me, therefore' to have the old U-boats equipped with the so-called "Schnorchel," and to build up an entirely new U-boat force which could stay under water and which could travel from Germany to Japan, for example, without surfacing at all. It is evident, therefore, that I was in an increasingly dangerous situation.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral, in order to characterize this situation I want to call your attention to your war diary of this time. This will have the Number DOENITZ-18, reproduced on Page 32, Volume I. I want to read only the contents of the entries from the 2nd until the 14th of September; Page 32: "On 2 September U-256 surprised and bombed by aircraft; unfit for sailing and diving; "On 3 September aircraft sights U-boat; "On 4 September U-756 has not reported despite request since 1 September when near convoy; presumed lost. "On 5 September aircraft sights U-boat; "On 6 September U-705 probably lost because of enemy aircraft attack; "On 7 September U-130 bombed by Boeing bomber; "On 8 September U-202 attacked by aircraft in Bay of Biscay. "On 9 September..."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KRANZBUEHLER, the defendant has already told us of the losses and of the reason for the losses. What is the good of giving us details of the fact that U-boats were fighting aircraft?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I wanted to show, Mr. President, that the testimony of Admiral DOENITZ is confirmed by the entries in his diary of that time. But if the Tribunal. . .
THE PRESIDENT: That's a matter of common knowledge. We can read it. Anyhow, if you just draw our attention to the document we win read it. We don't need you to read the details of it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President. I win do it that way.
DOENITZ: That is a typical and characteristic entry in my war diary of those weeks and days just before the issuance of my order; but I wanted to add the following: The aircraft were very dangerous especially for psychological reasons: when no aircraft is on the scene, the commander of the U-boat views his situation as perfectly clear but the next moment when the aircraft comes into sight, his situation is completely hopeless. And that happened not only to young commanders, but to old experienced commanders who remembered the good old times. Perhaps I may, quite briefly, give a clear-cut example. AU-boat needs one minute for the crew to come in through the hatch before it can submerge at all. An airplane flies on the average 6,000 meters in one minute. The U-boat, therefore, in order to be able to submerge at all-And not to be bombed while it is still on the surface-must sight the aircraft from a distance of at least 6,000 meters. But that also is not sufficient, for even if the U-boat has submerged it still has not reached a safe depth. The U-boat, therefore, must sight the airplane even earlier, namely, at the extreme boundary of the field of vision. Therefore, it is an absolute condition of success that the U-boat is in a state of constant alert, that above all it proceeds at maximum speed, because the greater the speed the faster the U-boat submerges; and, secondly, that as few men as possible are on the tower so that they can come into the U-boat as quickly as possible which means that there should be no men on the upper deck at all, and so on. Now, rescue work, which necessitates being on the upper deck in order to bring help and take care of more people and which may even mean taking in tow a number of lifeboats, naturally completely interrupts the submarine's state of alert, and the U-boat is, as a consequence, hopelessly exposed to any attack from the air.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I wish now to take up the Laconia matter itself which I would be reluctant to have interrupted. If it is agreeable to the Tribunal, I would suggest that we have a recess now. [A recess was taken.]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral, you have just described the enemy's supremacy in the air in September 1942. During these September days you received the report about the sinking of the British transport Laconia. I submit to the Tribunal the war diaries concerning that incident under Numbers DOENITZ-18, 20, 21, and 22. These are the war diaries of the commanders of U-boats and of the commanders of the submarines which took part in this action, Kapitanleutnants Hartenstein, Schacht and Wurdemann. They are reproduced in the document book on Page 34 and the following pages. I shall read to you the report which you received. That is on Page 35 of the document book, 13 September, 0125 hours. I reads "Wireless message sent on America circuit: "Sunk by Hartenstein British ship Laconia." Then the position is given and the message continues: "Unfortunately with 1,500 Italian prisoners of war. Up to now picked up 90..." then the details, and the end is: "Request orders." I had the document handed to you. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Where are you now?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: On Page 35, Mr. President, the entry of 13 September, time 0125 hours, the number at the beginning of the line; at the bottom of the page. [Turning to the defendant.] I had the documents handed to you to refresh your memory. Please tell me, first, what impression or what knowledge you had about this ship Laconia which had been reported sunk, and about its crew.
DOENITZ: I knew from the handbook on armed British ships which we had at our disposal that the Laconia was armed with 14 guns. I concluded, therefore, that it would have a British crew of at least about 500 men. When I heard that there were also Italian prisoners on board, it was clear to me that this number would be further increased by the guards of the prisoners.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Please describe now, on the basis of the documents, the main events surrounding your order of 17 September, and elaborate, first, on the rescue or nonrescue of British or Italians and secondly, your concern for the safety of the U-boats in question.
DOENITZ: When I received this report, I radioed to all U-boats in the whole area. I issued the order: "Schacht, Group Eisbar, Wurdemann and Wilamowitz, proceed to Hartenstein immediately." Hartenstein was the commander who had sunk the ship. Later, I had to have several boats turn back because their distance from the scene was too great. The boat that was furthest from the area and received orders to participate in the rescue was 710 miles away, and therefore could not arrive before two days. Above all I asked Hartenstein, the commander who had sunk the ship, whether the Laconia had sent out radio messages, because I hoped that as a result British and American ships would come to the rescue. Hartenstein affirmed that and, besides, he himself sent out the following radio message in English... FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER That is on Page 36, Mr. President, under time figure 0600.
DOENITZ: "If any ship will assist the shipwrecked Laconia crew, I will not attack her, provided I am not being attacked by ship or air force." Summing up briefly, I gained the impression from the reports of the U-boats that they began the rescue work with great zeal.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: How many U-boats were there?
DOENITZ: There were three or four submarines. I received reports that the numbers of those taken on board by each U-boat were between 100 and 200. I believe Hartenstein had 156 and another 131. I received reports which spoke of the crew being cared for and taken over from lifeboats; one report mentioned 35 Italians, 25 Englishmen, and 4 Poles; another, 30 Italians and 24 Englishmen; a third, 26 Italians, 39 Englishmen, and 3 Poles. I received reports about the towing of lifeboats towards the submarines. All these reports caused me the greatest concern because I knew exactly that this would not end well. My concern at that time was expressed in a message to the submarines radioed four times, "Detailed boats to take over only so many as to remain fully able to dive." It is obvious that, if the narrow space of the submarine-our U-boats were half as big as the enemy's-is crowded with 100 to 200 additional people, the submarine is already in absolute danger, not to speak of its fitness to fight. Furthermore, I sent the message, "All boats are to take on only so many people..."
THE PRESIDENT: Are these messages in the document?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, where are they? Why did he not refer to the time of them?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: They are all messages contained in the three diaries of the U-boats. The first message is on Page 36, Mr. President, under group 0720. I will read it. "Radio message received"-a message from Admiral DOENITZ- " 'Hartenstein remain near place of sinking. Maintain ability to dive. Detailed boats to take over only so many as to remain fully able to dive."'
DOENITZ: Then I sent another message: "Safety of U-boat is not to be endangered under any circumstances."
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: This message is on Page 40, Mr. President, under the date of 17 September, 0140 hours.
DOENITZ: "Take all measures with appropriate ruthlessness, including discontinuance of all rescue activities" Furthermore, I sent the message: "Boats must at all times be clear for crashdiving and underwater use."
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That is on Page 37, under 0740, Heading 3.
DOENITZ: "Beware of enemy interference by airplanes and submarines."
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: "All boats, also Hartenstein, take in only so many people that boats are completely ready for use under water."
DOENITZ: That my concern was justified was clearly evident from the message which Hartenstein sent and which said that he had been attacked by bombs from an American bomber.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: This message, Mr. President, is on Page 39, under 1311 hours. It is an emergency message, and under 2304 hours there is the whole text of the message which I should like to read.
DOENITZ: At this occasion . . .
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: One moment, Admiral The message reads: "Radiogram sent: From Hartenstein"-to Admiral DOENITZ- "Bombed five times by American Liberator in low flight when towing four full boats in spite of a Red Cross flag, 4 square meters, on the bridge and good visibility. Both periscopes at present out of order. Breaking off rescue; all off board; putting out to West. Will repair."
DOENITZ: Hartenstein, as can be seen from a later report, also had 55 Englishmen and 55 Italians on board his submarine at that time. During the first bombing attack one of the lifeboats was hit by a bomb and capsized, and according to a report on his return there were considerable losses among those who had been rescued. During the second attack, one bomb exploded right in the middle of the submarine, and damaged it seriously; he reported that it was only by a miracle of German shipbuilding technique that the submarine did not fall to pieces.
THE PRESIDENT: Where has he gone to now? What page is he on?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: He is speaking about the events which are described on Pages 38 and 39, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: It would help the Tribunal, you know, if you kept some sort of order instead of going on to one page and then to 40, and then back to 38.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The reason is that we are using two different war diaries, Mr. President. Admiral, would you tell us now what measures you took after Hartenstein's report that he had been attacked repeatedly in the course of the rescue measures?
DOENITZ: I deliberated at length whether, after this experience, I should not break off all attempts at rescue; and beyond doubt, from the military point of view, that would have been the right thing to do, because the attack showed clearly in what way the U-boats were endangered. That decision became more grave for me because I received a call from the Naval Operations Staff that the Fuehrer did not wish me to risk any submarines in rescue work or to summon them from distant areas. A very heated conference with my staff ensued, and I can remember closing it with the statement, "I cannot throw these people into the water now. I will carry on." Of course, it was clear to me that I would have to assume full responsibility for further losses, and from the military point of view this continuation of the rescue work was wrong. Of that I received proof from the submarine U-506 of Wurdemann, who also reported- I believe on the following morning-that he was bombed by an airplane.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That report, Mr. President, is on Page 42 in the war diary of Wurdemann, an entry of 17 September, at 2343 hours. He reported: 'Transfer of survivors to Annamite completed."-Then come details "Attacked by heavy seaplane at noon. Fully ready for action."
DOENITZ: The third submarine, Schacht's, the U-507, had sent a wireless message that he had so and so many men on board and was towing four lifeboats with Englishmen and Poles.
FLOTTENRICEITER KRANZBUEHLER: That is the report on Page 40, the first report.