dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SCHACHT: JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, on the 24th of September, 1935-December-you wrote EC-293, which is Exhibit Number USA-834, and used this language, did you not: "If there is now a demand for greater armament, it is, of course, not my intention to deny or change my attitude, which is in favor of the greatest possible armament and which I have expressed for years both before and since the seizure of power; but it is my duty to point out the economic limitations of this policy." SCHACHT: That is very good. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is true? SCHACHT: Certainly. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came in the Four Year Plan in 1936? SCHACHT: Yes. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not like the appointment of Goering to that position? SCHACHT: I thought he was unsuited and, of course, it made an opening for a policy which was opposed to mine. I knew perfectly well that this was the start of exaggerated armament, whereas I was in favor of restricted rearmament. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Why do you say that Goering's appointment meant exaggeration of armament? Can you point to anything that Goering has said in favor of rearmament that is any more extreme than the things you have said? 601 2 May 46 SCHACHT: Oh yes. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, will you do it? SCHACHT: Yes, I think if you read the record of the so-called "small Ministerial Council," of the year 1936, and in particular 1938, which you yourself introduced, you will see at once that here the necessity of increased armament was emphasized. For instance, those of November or October 1936, I think. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it was also emphasized in your documents, was it not, throughout? SCHACHT: No. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You say that your statements of that sort were merely tactical. SCHACHT: No, I beg your pardon. I said arm within the limits of what is economically possible and reasonable. Goering, if I may say it again, wanted to go beyond those limits. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is exactly the point I want to make.
SCHACHT: Your difference with Goering over rearmament was entirely a question of what the economy of Germany would stand, was it not? SCHACHT: No. I said that the most important thing was that Germany should live and have foreign trade, and within those limits we could arm. However, it is out of the question that Germany should arm for the sake of arming, and thus ruin her economy. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well that's the difference between you and Goering; it was over what the economy would stand, was it not? SCHACHT: No, it was a question of the extent of rearmament. The point is, Mr. Justice Jackson, that German economy paid the price for Goering's action. The only question is, was it reasonable or unreasonable? If I may state it pointedly, I would say that I considered Goering's economic policy to be unreasonable and a burden to the German nation; while I considered it most important that rearmament should not be extended and that the German nation should have a normal, peacetime standard. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 3 May 1946 at 1000 hours.] 602
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I can't see the slightest relevancy to this. In the first place, we heard it once and secondly, after we had heard it it has no relevancy to the case. We have no charge against him that he did anything in China and we will stipulate that he was as pure as snow all the time he was in China. We haven't a thing to do with that and it is taking time here that just gets us nowhere and is keeping us away from the real charge in the case.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite understands that you say it is irrelevant. Why do you say it is relevant?
DR. DIX: I regret that Mr. Justice Jackson and I understand each other too little. The matter is relevant in the following connection: In this testimony and also in an affidavit which has been read...
THE PRESIDENT: I think we heard three times that the Defendant Schacht went to India. Three times in his evidence he dealt with the fact that he went to India and China. How is it relevant?
DR. DIX: I am not speaking of the journey to India. It had to be mentioned only briefly to explain the connection of time. I put a question, referring to Schacht's negotiations in Rangoon with the envoy from Chiang Kai-Shek-with the Chinese-and at that point Mr. Justice Jackson raised his objection. But the fact that Schacht maintained friendly connections with Chiang Kai-Shek's Government and gave support to it, that fact is relevant, and for the same reason for which I attached importance to the fact that it became clear here that in regard to the Union of Soviet Republics also Schacht pursued a pro-Soviet line in his economic policy during the years when Hitler was conducting a political campaign against Russia. Here we have a second instance, where he is demanding relations which were contrary to the principles of Hitler's policy; that is relations with Chiang Kai-Shek, and so against Hitler's ally, Japan. It is in this connection that the negotiations with the Chinese are of significance. They will take only a moment's time at most. They were merely to be mentioned in passing.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you consider his relations with China of any importance, it can be stated in one sentence.
DR. DIX: I am of the same opinion.
SCHACHT: I will sum it up in one sentence. In a written memorandum I advised Chiang Kai-Shek's government to continue holding out against Japan, giving as reason that the economic resources of China would last longer than the economic resources of Japan; and I advised Chiang Kai-Shek to rely primarily on the United States of America in his foreign policy.
DR. DIX: Then upon your return from India, that is, in August 1939, you found a situation which must have appeared quite tense to someone who was just coming back. Did you not then attempt to contact the Cabinet or Hitler in order to discuss this situation?
SCHACHT: Of course, I found a very tense situation in the question of Poland and I used my return as an occasion for writing a letter to Hitler, a letter to Goering, and a letter to Ribbentrop; that is to say, the three leading men, in order to inform them that I had come back from India, leaving it to their discretion and expecting that at least one of them would ask me for an account of my experiences; and then, I should have had an opportunity of talking to the leading men once again. To my very great surprise, I did not get an answer from Hitler at all; I received no reply from Goering; and Herr Von Ribbentrop answered me that he had taken note of my letter. There was therefore no other way for me but to make my own inquiries regarding the real state of affairs on Poland, and when things became critical I took the well-known step, which has already been described here by Herr Gisevius; namely the attempt to gain access to the Fuehrer's headquarters.
DR. DIX: We need not repeat that. The only question which I still want to ask you is what were you going to tell the generals, particularly General Von Brauchitsch, at that last moment?
SCHACHT: That he still had a chance to avert a war. I knew perfectly well that bare economic and general political statements would of course accomplish nothing with Von Brauchitsch because he would then certainly have referred to Hitler's leadership. Therefore I wanted to say to him something of quite a different nature and, in my opinion, that is of the most decisive significance. I was going to remind him that he had sworn an oath of allegiance to the Weimar Constitution. I wanted to remind him that the Enabling Act did not delegate power to Hitler but to the Reich Cabinet and I wanted to remind him that in the Weimar Constitution there was and still is a clause, which has never been annulled and according to which, war cannot be declared without previous approval by the Reichstag. I was convinced that Brauchitsch would have referred me to his oath sworn to Hitler and I would have told him: '`I also have sworn this oath. You have sworn no oath other than your military one, perhaps, but this oath does not in any way invalidate the oath sworn to the Weimar Constitution; on the contrary, the oath to the Weimar Constitution is the one that is valid. It is your duty, therefore, to see to it that this entire question of war or no war be brought before the Cabinet and discussed there, and when the Reich Cabinet has made a decision, the matter will go before the Reichstag." If these two steps had been taken, then I am firmly convinced that there would have been no war.
DR. DIX: You never reached Brauchitsch. We do not want to repeat the description of that whole affair or of your attempts at the Bendlerstrasse and so on. Have you anything to add to Gisevius' testimony or do you wish to change anything in it?
SCHACHT: I can only confirm that Gisevius' statement is correct in every single point and I myself merely want to add that Canaris mentioned among many reasons which then kept us from making the visit, that Brauchitsch would probably have us arrested immediately if we said anything to him against the war or if we wanted to prevent him from fulfilling his oath of allegiance to Hitler. But the main reason why the visit did not come about was quite correctly stated by Gisevius. Moreover it is also mentioned by General Thomas in his affidavit which we shall later submit. The main reason was: the war was canceled. And so I went to Munich on a business matter and to my surprise while in Munich, war was declared on Poland; the country was invaded.
DR. DIX: You mentioned the Reichstag a short time ago. A meeting of the Reichstag did in fact take place, though not before the war or before the declaration of war, but immediately thereafter. At the time you were still a Minister without Portfolio. Normally you would have had to sit on the minister's bench during that meeting. Did you take part in that meeting?
SCHACHT: I did not participate in that meeting at all and I would like to add at once that during the entire war, I was present at only one meeting of the Reichstag. I could not avoid it, considering the matters which I already mentioned here yesterday. It was after Hitler's return from Paris. I had to participate in this meeting of the Reichstag, which followed the reception at the station because, as I said, it would otherwise have been too obvious an affront. It was the meeting during which political matters were not dealt with at all, but at which the field marshal's rank was granted by the dozen.
DR. DIX: Now, this last effort which has just been mentioned to stop the outbreak of war through Canaris brings us to the particular chapter of your attempts at a coup to overthrow Hitler and his government. We want to make it a rule, if possible, not to repeat what the witness Gisevius has already stated but only to supplement or correct or state what you know from your own memory. Before I touch upon that chapter, however, may I ask you whether you know from information you received or from other indications, that your oppositional attitude and that of your similarly minded friends, and your oppositional aims, were known in authoritative circles abroad?
SCHACHT: I do not wish to repeat anything; I merely want to point out that I have already stated repeatedly here that I continually discussed the situation in Germany-thus also my own position-with my friends abroad-not only with Americans, Englishmen, and Frenchmen but also with neutrals-and I would like to add one more thing; foreign broadcasting stations did not tire at all of speaking constantly about Schacht's opposition to Hitler. My friends and family received a shock whenever information on this subject transpired in Germany.
DR. DIX: When did your attempts to overthrow the Hitler government begin?
SCHACHT: As early as 1937 I tried to determine which groups in Germany one might rely upon in an attempt to remove the Hitler regime. Unfortunately in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937, I got to know that all those circles in which I had placed my hope were failing, namely the scientists, the educated middle class, and the leaders of economy. I need only mention that the scientists permitted themselves to listen to the most nonsensical National Socialist lectures without opposing them in the least. I call attention to the fact that when the economic leaders saw that I was no longer a figure in economy, they disappeared from my anteroom and thronged into that of Goering. In a word, one could not rely upon these circles. Consequently, one could depend only on the generals, on the military, because according to my conception at the time, one could certainly count on an armed resistance even by the SS bodyguard. Therefore, as has been stated here-and I do not want to pursue it further-I tried at first to contact such generals as Kluge, for instance, merely in order to ascertain whether among the military there were people with whom one could speak openly. And this first occasion led me to a great many generals whom I contacted in the course of time.
DR. DIX: That was then in the year 1937; now we come to 1938, still limiting ourselves by what Gisevius has already said, merely touching on it briefly and confirming it. By the way, were you in any way directly or indirectly involved in the negotiations at Godesberg or Munich?
SCHACHT: In no way.
DR. DIX: Now we continue with your political work, aiming at a revolt. Is Gisevius' account of the year 1938 correct or is there something to be added to it?
SCHACHT: Gisevius' statement is complete and reliable.
DR. DIX: That also applies to the attempt at a coup d'etat in the late summer of 1938?
SCHACHT: Yes.
DR. DIX: Then came the war. Did you fold your arms after war broke out?
SCHACHT: No; throughout the entire war I pleaded with every general whom I could contact. I used the same arguments which I have just mentioned in connection with the prospective interview with Brauchitsch; therefore, it was not merely theory, but I actually spoke to all these generals.
DR. DIX: Was not a visit to General Hoeppner significant in this connection?
SCHACHT: In 1941 I tried not only to get in touch with General Hoeppner but in a whole series of conversations I attempted to make him take action. Hoeppner was perfectly willing and prepared and later he too, unfortunately, lost his life as a consequence of 20 July 1944. In the year 1942-and this has not been mentioned here up to now, because Gisevius did not participate-I tried again to mobilize General Von Witzleben to renewed activity. I went on a special journey to Frankfurt-on-the-Main, where he had his headquarters at that time, and Von Witzleben proved as ever to be completely resolved to act, but he told me that, of course, he could only do so if he again received a command at the front. Then I...
DR. DIX: At that time Frau Strunck, who knew of these matters, was in Frankfurt?
SCHACHT: She knew of these things and can confirm them.
DR. DIX: Perhaps I may tell the Tribunal at this point that Frau Strunck was granted me as a witness and she was here. In order to save time, however, I have decided to dispense with this witness since she could make only cumulative statements on what Gisevius has already said and I do not think it is necessary. Schacht himself has just stated the only piece of information which she could have added, namely this trip, this special journey to Frankfurt to Von Witzleben. On the strength of experience the Tribunal will itself know that in the course of a revolutionary movement, stretching over years such as this, many journeys are made and in respect to this particular journey it is not important to submit special evidence. In order to save time, therefore, I have decided to dispense with the testimony of Frau Strunck. Excuse me, I merely wanted to say this now. Then there is the next...
SCHACHT: May I perhaps say one more thing? I of course always participated in the conversations-mentioned by Gisevius here-with the other generals, that is the group of Beck, Fromm, Olbricht, et cetera. These things did not come about for some time an account of the negotiations abroad for which the generals were always waiting. I think that enough has been said here about this topic and I need not make further report on it. I come then to one last point, which does not become apparent from Gisevius' statement but about which an affidavit from Colonel Gronau will be submitted here. I can mention it quite briefly in order to save time. Naturally, together with the group of Beck, Goerdeler, my friend Strunck, Gisevius, and others I was completely informed of, and initiated into, the affair of 20 July. However, and I think it was mutual, we told each other whenever possible only those things which the other absolutely had to know, in order not to embarrass the other man, should he at any time be submitted to the tortures of the Gestapo. For that reason, apart from being in touch with Beck, Goerdeler, Gisevius, and Strunck, et cetera, I had another connection with the generals who were at the head of this revolt and that was the General of Artillery Lindemann, one of the main participants in the coup, who unfortunately also lost his life later.
DR. DIX: Perhaps it would be proper-and also more intelligible in connection with your participation in 20 July-if I read a brief part of Colonel Gronau's affidavit which refers to Lindemann. [Turning to the Tribunal.] It is Exhibit Number 39 of our document book, Page 168 of the German text and Page 176 of the English text. Is shall omit the first part of the affidavit, but I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it; essentially it contains only matters on which evidence has already been given. I shall read only the part that deals with 20 July. It begins on Page 178 of the English text and on Page 170 of the German text, and I start with Question 5: "Question 5) You brought Schacht and General Lindemann together. When was that? '`Answer 5) In the fall of 1943, for the first time in years, I again saw General Lindemann, my former school and regiment comrade. While discussing politics I told him that I knew Schacht well, and General Lindemann asked to be introduced to him, whereupon I established the connection. "Question 6) What did Lindemann expect from Schacht, and what was Schacht's attitude toward him? "Answer 6) The taking up of political relations with foreign countries following a successful attempt at revolt. He promised his future co-operation. At the beginning of 1944 Lindemann made severe reproaches that the generals"- that should read "he severely reproached Lindemann"; it is incorrectly copied here-"because the generals were hesitating so long. The attempt at revolt would have to be made prior to the landing of the Allies. "Question 7) Was Lindemann involved in the attempted assassination of 20 July 1944? "Answer 7) Yes, he was one of the main figures "Question 8) Did he inform Schacht of the details of this plan? "Answer 8) Nothing about the manner in which the attempt was to be carried out; he did inform him, however, of what was to happen thereafter. "Question 9) Did Schacht approve the plan? "Answer 9) Yes. "Question 10) Did Schacht put himself at the disposal of the military in the event of a successful attempt? "Answer 10) Yes.
DR. DIX: "Question 11) Were you arrested after 20 July 1944? "Answer 11) Yes. "Question 12) How were you able to survive your imprisonment? "Answer 12) By stoically denying complicity." Now, we have left the years 1941 and 1942 and to explain the Putsch in logical sequence we reached the year 1944, something that could not be avoided, but we must now go back again to the year 1941. You have already mentioned, in passing, the efforts made abroad. In 1941 you were in Switzerland. Did you make any efforts in that direction there?
SCHACHT: Every time I went abroad I talked at length to my foreign friends and again and again looked for some way by which one might shorten the war and begin negotiations.
DR. DIX: In this connection, the Fraser letter is of importance. I think the Fraser letter and the way it was smuggled into Switzerland has been sufficiently discussed by the witness Gisevius. I have on two occasions stated the contents briefly, once when the translation was discussed and again during the discussion on the admissibility of the letter as evidence before the Court. I do not think I need do it here nor that I need read it. I should merely like to submit it. It is Exhibit 31, on Page 84 of the German and Page 91 of the English text. And-I say this now, we shall discuss it later- the same applies to the article which appeared this year in the Baster Nachrichten and which deals with a conversation which an American had with Schacht recently. I shall not read that either since I have already stated the main points of its contents. I submit it as Exhibit Number 32, Page 90 of the German text and Page 99 of the English text. I might point out that this article has already been the subject of certain accusations made during the crossexamination of Gisevius by the representative of the Soviet Prosecution.
GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to raise one objection in regard to Document 32; this is an article about Dr. Schacht and his ideas by an unknown writer describing his conversations with an unknown economist. The article in question was published in the Baster Nachrichten on 14 January 1946, that is, when the present Trial was already well under way, and I cannot consider that this article can be presented in evidence with regard to Schacht's case.
DR. DIX: I might-may I, before the Tribunal decides, say some thing very briefly?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. DIX: The article has already been admitted as evidence. We have discussed it, and the Tribunal approved the article as evidence The Tribunal can, of course, revoke that decision. I think, for me it would...
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal has always made it clear that the allowance of these documents is a provisional allowance and that when the document is actually offered in evidence, they will then decide the relevancy or its admissibility, rather, and its relevancy.
DR. DIX: That is quite beyond doubt. I merely wanted to point out that we have already discussed the question once before. Of course, the Tribunal can today reject the document. I shall...
THE PRESIDENT: The allowance is provisional It is not a question of the Tribunal's reversing its previous decision. The previous decision was merely provisional, and the question of admissibility now comes up for decision.
DR. DIX: It is quite clear to me, Your Lordship. I am merely surprised at the objection raised by the Soviet Prosecution, inasmuch as the representative of the Soviet Delegation himself referred to that article in his observations during the cross-examination of the witness Gisevius. It is true, he did not submit it to the Tribunal but he referred to it in his observations to the witness Gisevius. However, if the Tribunal has the slightest objections to allowing the article as documentary evidence, then I shall ask permission to leave it. I will then-and I think I may-ask the witness Schacht whether it is true that in 1941 he had a conversation with an American who was a professor of national economy, a conversation which dealt with the possibility of peace. I leave it to the Tribunal For me, it is no-I thought it would be simpler, if I submitted the article.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, as you have raised the objection to this document, what have you to say about the point that Dr. Dix makes that you used the document yourself in crossexamination?
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, we did not use this document in the cross-examination of the witness Gisevius. An explanatory question was asked in order to reach a decision on this point and I particularly emphasize...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you say that again? I did not understand you.