dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
HERR BOEHM: It would have been necessary for the Prosecution to prove that the majority of the members of the SA had the intention, the inner win, and the knowledge of the criminal purpose and its component elements, besides being generally aware of its unlawfulness. Since this is impossible, they put forward the theory that the facts of the case and the objectives were so obvious that anyone could have recognized them. If all this was so clear to millions of ordinary people, why did the Allies maintain relations and make agreements until 1939 with this nation which was maintained by bands of criminals? The theory that in view of this state of affairs the members could have known, and ought to have known, the criminal aims and deeds, involves the abandonment of any real examination of the knowledge of the majority of the members. ' Practically speaking, the Prosecution content themselves with the fiction of premeditation. In doing so they tend to overlook innumerable speeches which were made in order to deceive the German people; they forget (1) that quotations from foreign sources concerning the value of the National Socialist State were reprinted in the press; (2) that in the course of these 12 years the actual events were presented to the German people and to the majority of SA members in a veiled or cleverly justified form. That, furthermore, premeditation can only be considered in conjunction with concrete facts, to which I propose to refer later, is so obvious that it is unnecessary for me to say anything further. I merely want to point but that innumerable affidavits contained in the collective summarization, which I have submitted prove ignorance of, and nonparticipation in, the following crimes: persecution of the Jews, the planning of a war of aggression, and the commission of atrocities of all kinds. But above all I should also like to point out that there is no connection between the main defendants and their actions and the members of the SA.
HERR BOEHM: The SA can -- if at all -- be rendered responsible only for actions committed by persons in their capacity as members or leaders of the SA, but not for those committed, for instance, in their capacity as Reich Ministers, Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, regional commissioners, or in other functions. Apart from a passing appearance in the SA before 9 November 1923, Goering played no part at all in this organization. Later on, his rank was only that of an honorary leader. The same applies to the Defendant Frank; the SA cannot be rendered responsible for his alleged deeds as Governor General of Poland. He was not the leader of the SA formations which were composed of the German nationals and racial Germans employed in Poland. Rosenberg, Bormann, Schirach, Streicher, Hess, and Sauckel had no relationship with the SA. As the witness Juettner emphasized in his evidence, Bormann was one of the bitterest opponents of the SA. Streicher was the man who removed SA-Obergruppenfuehrer Stegmann. The propaganda, to which the Prosecution has also fallen victim, shows a National Socialist state in which the Party, the State, and the Armed Forces on the one hand, and the Party and its organizations on the other, represent one uniform whole. In reality, there existed profound divergencies. It was just these divergencies that gave Adolf Hitler an unheard-of power over people and an unheard of independence of which he only availed himself with a few confidential friends, as is now becoming evident for the first time. In this connection I need only recall the divergent views held within the Party, as well as among the leading men such as Goering, Goebbels, Himmler, Lutze on the Church question and the Jewish problem. For the average man and to the average member of an organization it was no simple thing to perceive and find a clear line leading through this diversity of tendencies. However, none of the problems, especially those of war and peace, were of such a kind with respect to their solution that they could be the object of a conspiracy.
HERR BOEHM: Juettner's testimony, as well as the affidavits of Hoerauf and Freund, point to the fact that the Supreme Leadership of the SA maintained close relations with British and French circles for the purpose of forming a Western Pact, up to the moment when it was eliminated from politics. I have proved that the SA received financial assistance from abroad in connection with these negotiations; furthermore, I have shown that in 1932 the Leadership of the SA was actually engaged in negotiations with German Government circles for a coalition against Hitler. I have proved that from a political point of view there existed three deliberate trends as regards foreign policy, just as I also indicated that the eastern and the western trends were mutually opposed. In this connection, may I refer to the following sentence spoken by the British Prosecution according to the transcript of 31 July 1946. I quote: "If the German side could show that the British Government had given economic assistance to the SA in order to bring it into power, subject to the condition that Roehm were placed in control, the Defense would, indeed, have considerably advanced its own case, because it is obvious that the Government of 1946 could not join in the trial against the SA if it had supported the SA in 1934." The affidavit submitted by Hoerauf, however, shows clearly and unequivocally that the negotiations carried on between Anglo-French political quarters and the SA Leadership in those, days were, indeed, perfectly obvious. I have furthermore shown that the contacts with British and French quarters represent a clue to the events of 1934. The Indictment charges that the SA was at all times a willing tool in the hands of the conspirators. The best proof to the contrary is offered by the events of 30 June 1934. In connection with these events, the erroneous opinion is heard again and again that it was possible in those days to crush an SA Putsch or a Putsch of a small clique intent upon seizing power. There, can be nothing more mistaken than this train of thought.
HERR BOEHM: For the fact is that the SA led a life of its own within the Party, as shown by Freund's affidavit (General SA-83). It is clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that in the time of Chief of Staff Roehm the majority of the SA had little or no contact with the Party. The situation in 1934 was such that every free expression of opinion, above all in the Party itself, had already been suppressed, and that regimentation had become almighty. Everything was tending toward political co-ordination, coercion was triumphant and completely dominated public life. The Reich Cabinet had already been practically eliminated at that time. The Reichstag was nothing but a dummy and had no positive value whatsoever. There was a time when the SA had enthusiastically advocated a "Fuehrer State," but it now realized that Hitler, as Chief of Staff R6hm expressed it, surrounded himself with demagogues and nonpoliticians and, instead of becoming a national leader, had become a dictator. The Supreme Leadership of the SA viewed this development with growing distrust because it involved the great danger that the nation, which had given unlimited full powers to the Fuehrer might be completely eliminated from the future development of the Reich and its policy. This danger and the conditions created by coercion brought about an untenable situation. Thus there arose, at first strictly concealed, the opposition of the Supreme SA Leadership led by Chief of Staff Roehm. Their intention was to remove the existing system and to replace it with a genuinely popular government having the active cooperation of the people themselves. All the preparations, which have also been mentioned by the witness Juettner in the meeting of the Commission, were made along these lines. It was shown that R6hm intended to gather information at the Kulmbach convention about the situation of the workers which had come about from the dissolution of the trade unions by Ley.
HERR BOEHM: Here it should be expressly emphasized that Roehm authorized the participation of members of the SA in the liquidation of the unions only because the organizations of the Left had weapons stored in the trade union headquarters, and it was to be expected at any moment that civil war might spread from these trade union headquarters to the nation as a whole. Roehm intended to dissolve the SS. This is proved by the affidavit of former SA Brigadefuehrer Freund. Roehm's endeavor to achieve the consolidation of the Central European area by way of negotiations with the Western Powers is connected with this new State which was to be created. It has been shown that these negotiations had been under way for a number of years (Juettner's testimony, Freund's affidavit). One of the last negotiators was SA-Obergruppenfuehrer Von Detten, as revealed in the affidavit of Brigadefuehrer Freund. All the documents dealing with the military-political aspects of the SA submitted by the Prosecution are related to this unsuccessful attempt made by Chief of Staff Roehm. As the witness Juettner clearly testified, Roehm believed in the creation of a popular militia according to the Swiss model, and based upon the framework of the SA as part of the great plan for the creation of a Western Pact. It is regrettable that it was impossible to produce some witnesses who might have given further information on this matter to the Tribunal. Roehm's attempt failed. In addition, differences with the Reichswehr also contributed to his downfall. The 30th of June 1934 was the result of this development. The first attempt to eliminate Hitler's dictatorship definitely failed. More than 200 SA leaders were shot. Since that time Heinrich Himmler reigned behind the scenes in Germany. The true background of 30 June 1934 was not to become known in Germany and abroad, since this would have seriously shaken Hitler's prestige and that of his government.
HERR BOEHM: That was the reason why the huge smoke-screening machinery of the press was wound up and set in motion to divert the attention of the masses, and that was also why such a comparatively large number of persons were shot, who could no longer talk-that is, they were not to talk. Among Party members it was forbidden to discuss the very day. It is an interesting parallel that an SA leader was likewise involved on 20 July 1944, SA-Obergruppenfuehrer Count Helldorf. He was hanged. After 30 June 1934 the SA sank into complete insignificance. After 30 June 1934 the SA was regarded as a disagreeable appendage. The SA was considered politically unreliable. Therefore, as was repeatedly established by the testimony of witnesses before the Commission, it was not given any further duties. The SA's destiny from that day on was nothing but the search for a task. Officially the SA was supposed to handle military-political education and athletics. In reality, however, the Party entrusted the SA with totally inferior tasks. The attitude of the Party towards the SA became particularly evident in 1939, too. As the witness Juettner has clearly stated, it was Bormann who sabotaged the decree of 30 January 1939, and who did not permit the premilitary training duties of the SA to be carried out. The witness Bock has informed us of the preparation and beginning of the premilitary and postmilitary training program. But he also stated that this task of the SA was terminated. Only the events of the war brought forth the so-called SA-Wehrmannschaften. Thus the SA was never able, as the Prosecution say, to "participate feverishly in the preparations for war." It is absolutely impossible that, as the Prosecution claim, 25,000 officers were trained in SA schools. This claim was unimpeachably refuted by the testimony of the witnesses Juettner and Bock. How unreliable the SA became in Bormann's eyes is shown by the fact that the Volkssturm. was not built up from the SA. We learn from one of the affidavits submitted that the reason for this was the unreliability of the SA (Number General SA-67).
HERR BOEHM: The elimination of the SA is demonstrated by purely external evidence, if we recall that Roehm was Chief of Staff, Reich Leader, and Reich Minister; Lutze, Chief of Staff and Reich Leader; and Schepmann, only Chief of Staff. During the meetings of the Commission there was much discussion about the "Wehrsport" work of the SA. Nothing has been more completely misunderstood than this. The SA is described by the Prosecution as a semimilitary organization of volunteers, although the duties of the Wehrmacht and the SA were clearly separate from each other. Misunderstandings resulted primarily from the fact that there is no correct English translation of the word "Wehr." Nevertheless, this concept ought to be clarified, for the Prosecution itself submitted Document 2471-PS. In this document it says: "The SA, the exponent of the desire for military preparedness (Wehrwille). The SA claims to be the exponent of the desire for military preparedness (Wehrwille) and of the defensive force (Wehrkraft) of the German people. "The emphasis on these qualities may have led to misunderstandings abroad, partly because foreign languages are unable to translate correctly the terms 'Wehrwille7 and 'Wehrkraft' but substitute for them the terms 'Kriegswille' or 'Kriegskraft,' while correctly 'Verteidigungswille' or 'Verteidigungskraft' (force) should be used. 'Sich wehren' is a linguistic derivation from 'Abwehr' (defense), therefore, 'der sich wehrende' (the one who is defending himself) in every case is the one who is attacked; and, therefore, the imputations of aggressive military intentions are plainly absurd." Ultimately, the Wehrmacht is the concentrated trained and directed force of all men able to defend themselves (wehrfaehig). At no time did the SA have anything to do with that technical military training which is given in the Wehrmacht. Therefore, the SA athletic badge has been misjudged by the Prosecution. It is admitted that it was the purpose in awarding the SA athletic badge to train citizens fit for military service.
HERR BOEHM: Indeed it is also stated in the first document of 15 February 1935: "The new state demands a tough and hardy breed." In the regulation concerning the implementation of the document of 18 March 1937 we find the following: "The training of the body in competitive sports is not a purpose in itself, but a means to strengthen German men spiritually and physically, to increase their efficiency, and to make them ready and able to serve for the maintenance of the nation even up to an advanced age." It is also admitted that parallels exist between the work of the Wehrmacht and the SA. The idea was that the SA would train the German man to be a National Socialist and a political fighter, while the Wehrmacht would give him the character and technical training of the man-at-arms; it would train him for the defense of the country. However, it would be going too far to call the SA a military unit. At no time did the SA possess any military value. The SA was nothing but an association whose members counted millions and marched in the same step. From time to time field games were played, but it was forbidden to base them on military situations. The SA man listened to an occasional lecture and practiced with small-bore rifles once every fortnight, just as is done in rifle clubs. Therefore, the SA is far from being a military unit, even if every company (Sturm) should have had a maximum of five small-bore rifles which, however, was not universally true. The SA never possessed heavy arms, much less practiced with them. The relationship of the SA to the Wehrmacht was accordingly strained. At no time was it recognized by the Wehrmacht. Service rank in the SA -- no matter how high it may have been-had not the slightest influence on rank in the Wehrmacht. On the contrary, it often had the effect of delaying promotion. Special training certificates of the SA, such as riding certificates, medical certificates, radio certificates, received no recognition in the Wehrmacht.
HERR BOEHM: It is actually comic to read in affidavits that SA men from engineer units were used in signal corps regiments and SA men from signal corps units in engineer units of the Army. It may be stated in detail: (1) The SA uniform was the most unsuitable uniform imaginable for military purposes. In this connection I refer to the testimony of the witness Bock. (2) Aside from the small-bore rifles already mentioned, only dagger and pistol were permitted. Moreover, the dagger was not introduced until after the year 1933. Only the Sturmfuehrer had pistols, and only part of the Sturmfuehrers at that, namely, only those carried pistols who fulfilled the customary conditions in Germany for the firearms permit. (3) There were no means of transportation in the SA. (4) The SA had no depots for heavy weapons and no arsenals for small arms. Therefore, nor training in them could take place. (5) The SA units did not correspond to the military units. Their composition and organization were not planned from the point of view of possible military service. With the exception of the "Feldherrnhalle" Standarte, the SA were not quartered in permanent barracks. The military jurisdiction (draft board and recruiting district headquarters) did not correspond with the SA classification. A "Standarte" in the country, for instance, was territorially split Lip into many small "Stuerme" and "Trupps," which were not fixed in number and not comparable with a military regiment. (6) Commands could not be passed on quickly. (7) No exercises in military formation took place. (8) The SA special units did not have any military tasks. They had no military equipment, just as they had no military value and no military mission. The SA riding companies served for riding and driving sports. The engineer companies were for emergency service in case of natural disasters.
HERR BOEHM: The signal companies had the task of reading signals with primitive, old-fashioned methods, without the use of radio, which was forbidden, as can be seen from an affidavit The medical companies of the SA served in giving first aid in the field of public health service. Their training was in keeping with the Geneva Convention (Testimony of Bock, Affidavit General SA-90). (9) The so-called "Feldherrnhalle" army units were not subordinate to the Supreme SA Leadership, as evidenced by the affidavit of the former Major General Pape (General SA-18). (10) The SA leaders were not chosen according to military consideration or ability (Bock's testimony). The examination of the Defendant Von Schirach showed that the SA was incapable of providing military training. During the war the draft of an agreement was submitted to the SA for over a year, according to which the SA, like the SS and the Police, was to furnish persons to the Hitler Youth for the purpose of training young men in military training camps. Documentary evidence in Exhibit, USA-867 establishes that the SA Leadership, did not grant this request. As reason for this the Defendant Von Schirach states that the SA was not capable of doing this. The concepts of "Wehrmannschaften" and "SA-Wehrmannschaften" were confused by the Prosecution. In the occupied territories the Wehrmannschaften constituted a consolidation of legal civilian offices which were generally only concerned with administration, but if the rear areas should become endangered they were to be organized for their defense. Furthermore, the term "Wehrmannschaften" in the occupied territories also included local residents such as Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, or White Ruthenians, who likewise had to defend themselves against partisans. However, the term SA-Wehrmannschaften signifies formations from the Reich itself which primarily were supposed to organize the SA men dismissed from military service in the Wehrmacht for the purpose of preserving their military efficiency.
HERR BOEHM: They were to be a kind of substitute for the former 'veterans' organizations. The British Prosecution has been good enough to submit among their Prosecution documents articles from the SA-Mann which reveal what is really to be understood by military training. Probably for purposes of comparison, to determine whether the SA gave military training, it quotes these articles which deal with the training of British, French, Russian, and Italian youth, as well as that of British Dominion youth and French youth. They make it quite clear that the Supreme SA Leadership did not give any such training. The connecting link between the military training of the SA and aggressive warfare was supposed to be a series of articles on the so-called "Lebensraum" question, which, indeed, the British Prosecution has meanwhile withdrawn, since this series of articles does riot indicate what it wished to maintain. The articles quoted by the British Prosecution on the colonial problem mention only a peaceful recovery of the colonies. As the proceedings before the Commission have shown, these articles showed no signs of any war-mongering spirit. Therefore, the leap which the Prosecution makes in order to prove the promotion of a war of aggression by the SA is a leap into empty space. On the contrary, I have shown that the Supreme SA Leadership did everything possible to contribute to understanding among nations. This was clearly shown by the statements of the witness Oberlindober. I have also shown that only individual ideological political training was given at the Fuehrer schools of the SA, no military training. We see from affidavits that songs which might perhaps have indicated an aggressive tendency were forbidden by the Supreme SA Leadership. I have shown that individual SA men who tried to preach a war of revenge were expelled from the SA. Finally, I have shown that preparations were made on the part of the SA Leadership for the Reich Party Rally of 1939, which were contrary to any possible plans for war.
HERR BOEHM: We have also made this clear through the testimony of the witness Dr. Geyer, and through the affidavits of Koch and Zellenhoefer. Finally, in the proceedings before the Commission there came to our attention an agreement between the SA and the Wehrmacht, which was intended to constitute a counterbalance against any possible military aggressive tendencies on the part of Hitler, Himmler, and Goebbels (Affidavit Number General SA-1). The Prosecution's view that the SA was founded in order to overthrow political opponents with terroristic methods and thus make the way clear for an aggressive war is likewise completely misleading. Anyone who knows political conditions in Germany and views them unclouded by propaganda will wonder how people can arrive at such an opinion. The arms depots of the KPD (Communist Party of Germany), which have been officially proved, and the unequivocal attitude of the KPD speak an unambiguous language (Document Number SA-287). The extent of the political street encounters of the KPD and the other Leftist radical elements can be seen from the testimony of the witness Bock before the Commission, who testified that the relief fund of the NSDAP had to be founded in order to care for members of the NSDAP who fell victim to the Leftist radical terror. It might be pointed out that it was the KPD, that considered civil war, general strike, and a political mass strike as necessary political fighting methods, as appeared from the decision of the State Court for the Protection of the German Republic, which I submitted to the Tribunal in my document book (Number SA-285).