dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SEYSS-INQUART: Of course, some of those who refused were arrested by the Police and taken to the Reich. The Higher SS and Police Leader reported to me that this totaled 2,600 people of about 250,000 to 260,000 labor conscripts, and of the total engaged 530,000 persons. So this meant only 1 percent, or even 0.5 percent. I believe that the figure resulting from compulsory measures in the Reich was no lower-or higher. At the beginning of 1943 the Reich demanded a large commitment of workers, and I was advised to draft whole age groups to send to the Reich. I call attention to the fact that all of these workers received free labor contracts in the Reich and were not put into labor camps. I decided to draft three young age groups-I believe 21 to 23 years of age-in order to spare married men. The success was satisfactory in the first group; in the second group it was moderate; and in the third it was quite bad. I realized that I could draft further groups only by sheer force. I refused to do so. But at that time I managed, due to Minister Speer's understanding, to arrange not to have the workers taken to their work, but that the work be brought to the workers. Big orders arrived in the Netherlands, and the industries charged with filling these orders were declared "blocked" industries. Among them was the Organization Todt. Dutchmen who were needed in the Netherlands were exempted. Over a million certificates of exemption were issued by the Dutch authorities. It was clear that that was Dutch sabotage, but I did not want to take steps against it. No woman was ever forced to work outside the Netherlands, nor were young people under 18. Reich Minister Lammers has confirmed here that at the beginning of 1944 he transmitted the Fuehrer order to me demanding that 250,000 workers be brought to the Reich. He also confirmed that I refused it. At that time Gauleiter Sauckel came to me and discussed this matter with me. I must state that he understood my arguments surprisingly quickly, and did not insist on carrying out the forced recruitment.
SEYSS-INQUART: By "forced recruitment," I mean blocking off whole districts and seizing the men. In the course of 1944 labor recruitment ceased almost completely. Instead of 250,000 I believe 12,000 were sent to the Reich. But something entirely different took place in the fall of 1944. From experience gathered in France and Belgium, the High Command of the Army decided that able-bodied Dutchmen were to be drawn from Holland-that is, the western Netherlands. That was because the Netherlands Government in England had set up an illegal army. I had the organizational charter in my hands. There was a complete General Staff and a complete War Ministry. We estimated that there were about 50,000 illegal troops. If an appeal was made and one more able-bodied Dutchman joined, the illegal forces would have been more numerous than the German troops in Holland. Moreover, they had received very good equipment from England. Full shiploads of the most modern tommy guns were confiscated by us, but I am convinced that the larger part of the weapons was not confiscated. The High Command of the Army, through the military commanders, ordered the removal of the able-bodied Dutchmen. The measure was entirely carried out by the Armed Forces. A general who was sent for that very purpose was entrusted with the task, with an operational staff of his own. This measure was carried out by the local commandants. My local authorities were informed of the action to be taken, sometimes at the last moment and sometimes not at all. Of course I knew about the measure. In view of these reasons I could not take the responsibility of protesting against it. I only intervened when it was necessary to protect civilian interests, and prevent the workers in the vital industries from being removed also. I entrusted this to the Plenipotentiary General for the Total War Effort, whom Dr. Goebbels had sent to the Netherlands in the meantime. His task was to issue exemption certificates. He issued 50,000 of them.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean Himmler? 10 June 9G
SEYSS-INQUART: Goebbels, the Delegate for Total War Effort. I admit that this measure led to conditions which were unbearable for the Dutch. I am certain that, as for feeding, temporary lodging, and transportation, the population in the bombed German territories did not live under any better conditions. But one could not demand this from the Dutch. Many Dutch people told me, at that time, that they would be willing to agree to this labor commitment-by no means in order to aid the German cause, but only in order to avoid these severe conditions-if they would be drafted in orderly proceedings. I then did that. The Plenipotentiary General for the Total War Effort issued the proclamation which has been submitted to the Court. The people were called to the labor offices, recorded on lists, sent home again to get clothes, and ordered to report to the railroad stations. Not the Police but labor officials took them to the Reich to be put to work under normal conditions. The Dutch report, in its objectivity, recognizes this fact. It speaks of the better transportation facilities for those mobilized for labor. I am responsible for this labor mobilization for the reasons which I have given.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I remark in this connection that my Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-78, Document 1726-PS, Exhibit USA-195, Page 200, excerpt from the Netherlands Government report, confirms the statement of my client fully. I should like to read it briefly because it is important. Page 2: ". . . workers who refused-relatively few-were prosecuted by the Security Service." Then, Page 3: ". . . apart from that, the measure was not very successful. Certain German authorities seem to have opposed its execution, because many former members of the armed forces received exemption; others went underground.... "The result was that in the last month of 1943, and in the greater part of 1944, relatively few persons were deported...." And then, Page 6: ". . . until the end of 1944, the method of transportation for deportees was bearable.... "Anyone who reported for the manpower mobilization in January 1945, enjoyed improved transportation facilities- that is, almost the whole journey by rail, although only in freight cars...."
SEYSS-INQUART: Even for our own use we had no other cars at that time. I should like to refer to the fact that I also drafted Dutch workers in order to carry out the construction work entrusted to me by the Fuehrer on the resistance lines east of the Ijssel. I used part of the transports which came from Rotterdam, et cetera, for this purpose, and thus I prevented these people from being sent to the Reich. I had no influence on the treatment in the Reich; I only forbade further transports into the Gau Essen, because it was reported to me that in the Rees Camp the treatment was very poor, and that some Dutch people had died.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to the next count of the Indictment-that is, to the Jewish question. The Netherlands Government report, Exhibit USA-195, sums up all ordinances submitted by the Prosecution. I should like to submit this Document 1726-PS to my client, so that it may remind him of the laws. The Court already has it. [Turning to the defendant.] What did you, as Reich Commissioner, do about the Jewish question?
SEYSS-INQUART: When I took over the functions of the Reich Commissioner, I of course realized that I had to take a definite attitude, and would have to take some steps with regard to the Jews in the Netherlands. Amsterdam, in western Europe, is perhaps one of the best known and one of the oldest seats of Jewish communities in western Europe. Moreover, in the Netherlands there were a great many German Jewish emigrants. I will say quite openly that since the first World War and the postwar period, I was an anti-Semite and went to Holland as such. I need not go into detail about that here. I have said ad that in my speeches, and would refer you to them. I had the impression, which will be confirmed everywhere, that the Jews, of course, had to be against National Socialist Germany. There was no discussion of the question of guilt as far as I was concerned. As head of an occupied territory I had only to deal with the facts. I had to realize that, particularly from the Jewish circles, I had to reckon with resistance, defeatism, and so on. I told Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, that in the Netherlands I would remove Jews from leading posts in the economy, the press, and the administration. The measures taken by me from May 1940 to March 1941 were limited to that. The Jewish officials were dismissed, but were given pensions. The Jewish firms were registered, and the heads of the firms were dismissed. In the spring of 1941 Heydrich came to me in the Netherlands. He told me that we would have to expect that the greatest resistance would come from Jewish circles. He told me that the Jews would at least have to be treated like other enemy aliens. The English, for instance, in the Netherlands, were interned and their property confiscated. In view of the large number of Jews-about 140,000-this was not so simple. I admit frankly that I did not object to this argument of Heydrich's. I also felt that this was necessary in a war which I absolutely considered a life and death struggle for the German people.
SEYSS-INQUART: For that reason, in March 1941 I ordered that the Jews in the Netherlands be registered. And then things went on step by step. I will not say that the final results-as far as the Netherlands are concerned-were intended thus from the beginning; but we decided on this method. The regulations cited here, if they appeared in the Dutch Legal Gazette, were mostly signed by me personally. At least, they were published with my express assent. Individual measures mentioned here, however, were not by me. For example, in February 1,000 Jews were supposed to have been arrested and sent to Buchenwald and Mau1hausen. That much I know. In the Amsterdam ghetto.
THE PRESIDENT: February of what year?
SEYSS-INQUART: February 1941. In the Amsterdam ghetto, a National Socialist was killed by Jews. Reichsfuehrer Himmler thereupon ordered 400 young Jews sent to Mauthausen. I was not in the Netherlands at that time. That was, by the way, the reason for the general strike in Amsterdam in March 1941. After my return to the Netherlands, I protested against this measure, and to my knowledge such a mass transfer to Mauthausen did not occur again. Synagogues were also burned. Apparently someone ambitiously tried to imitate the 8 November 1938. I immediately intervened. Further incidents did not occur. On the other hand, the Police wanted to tear down the old temple in Amsterdam. General Secretary Van Damm called this to my attention, and I prevented it. I indicated earlier that the motive for the measures is to be found in the consideration to treat Jews like enemy aliens. Later, with other measures, the original intention was certainly abandoned; they became the same as those taken against the Jews in the Retch. Perhaps, in one case or another, this was even exceeded, for I know that, for example, in the Netherlands there was a drive to get the Jews sterilized. Our goal was to keep the Jews in the Netherlands-namely, in two districts of Amsterdam and then in the Westerborg Camp and in the Vught Camp. We had also prepared to create the necessary opportunities for Shirk. I instructed the General Secretary for Education to withdraw as much money from the Dutch budget for the education of the Jews as they should have according to their proportion of the population. It is certain that with this measure of concentrating the Jews in two districts and two camps, harshness occurred which was perhaps unavoidable, and which might even in some cases be considered as excessive. Finally, the Security Police demanded the introduction of the so-called Jewish Star. A not inconsiderable number of Jews were not in the confined areas, and the Security Police demanded that they be marked in order that it might be ascertained whether the Jews adhered to the other restrictions.
SEYSS-INQUART: In the eyes of Germans, this star was certainly considered a stigma. The Dutch did not consider it as such. There was many a Dutchman who, out of protest, wore such a star himself. About 1942, I believe, Heydrich came along with further demands-this time that the Jews be evacuated. He explained this by saying that Holland would sooner or later be a theater of war, in which one could not allow such a hostile population to remain. He pointed out that he was responsible for the police security of the Reich, and that he could not bear this responsibility if the Jews remained in Holland. I believe that we in the Netherlands opposed this evacuation project for 3 or 4 months while attempting to find other ways out. Finally, Heydrich had a Fuehrer decree sent to me, according to which he had unlimited powers to carry out all measures in the occupied territories as well. I inquired of Bormann what this meant, and this order was confirmed, whereupon the evacuation of the Jews was begun. At that time I tried to ascertain the fate of the Jews, and it is rather difficult for me to speak about it now because it sounds like mockery. I was told that the Jews were to be sent to Auschwitz. I had people sent from the Netherlands to Auschwitz. They came back with the report that that was a camp for 80,000 people with sufficient space. The people were comparatively well off there. For example, they had an orchestra of 100 men. A witness here, confirming that this orchestra played when victims arrived at Auschwitz, made me think of that report.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, you probably won't finish today.
DR. STEINBAUER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you are likely to be?
DR. STEINBAUER: I hope to be finished, at the latest, by noon tomorrow, but perhaps it will take only an hour. I still have questions on plundering, economic measures, and destruction. Then I will be finished.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. [The Tribunal adjourned until 11 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): Mr. President, I should like to clear up the matter that I raised yesterday with respect to the notes of the conference between this defendant and Hitler. I had the investigation made and I think these are the facts. Apparently, Colonel Williams of our staff, who interrogated this defendant late ~ October, was handed these notes by the defendant; and somehow or other they never did reach our files and have been misplaced. So the defendant was quite right in saying that he turned them over, but I think in error in saying that he turned them over to me.
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Yesterday we had reached one of the most important points in the Indictment, the question of the evacuation of Jews from the Netherlands. Witness, what did you do when you learned of this removal of the Jews from the Netherlands? Did you write any letters?
ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART (Defendant): Yesterday I stated that I had people sent from the Netherlands to the Auschwitz Camp in order to ascertain whether there were accommodations and, if so, what kind. I have given you the result of this inspection. I asked the Security Police, that is, Heydrich, whether it would not be possible for the evacuated Jews to keep up correspondence with the Netherlands. This concession was made. For about three quarters of a year or a year correspondence was maintained; not only short post cards but long letters were permitted. I do not know how the camp administration did this; but the letters were identified as authentic by the addressee. When the number of letters dropped off later-it never stopped completely-the Security Police told me that the Jews in Auschwitz now had fewer acquaintances in the Netherlands, meaning other Jews, because most of them were already in Auschwitz.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, did you turn to Bormann, too?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday I stated that, after learning of Heydrich's order, I requested Bormann to inquire of the Fuehrer whether Heydrich actually had such unlimited power. Bormann confirmed this. I admit frankly that I had misgivings about the evacuation.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you do anything to alleviate these misgivings?
SEYSS-INQUART: My misgivings-which increased in the course of the war-were that the hardships of the war would be a heavy burden, above all for the Jews. If there were too little food in the Reich, the Jewish camps in particular would receive little, while probably the Jews would be treated severely and for comparatively slight reasons heavy punishment would be imposed upon them. Of course, I also thought of the unavoidable tearing apart of families, to a certain extent, at least, in the case of labor commitment. That also was the reason why we brought forward difficulties for 3 or 4 months. The decisive argument, however, was the declaration of the competent authority, the Security Police, that in case of a landing attempt the Jews were not to be in the immediate theater of operations. I ask the Court to consider that the most important and most decisive motive for me was always the fact that the German people were engaged in a life-and-death struggle. Today looking at it from another perspective the picture looks different. At that time, if we told ourselves that the Jews would be kept together in some camp, even if under severe conditions, and that after the end of the war they would find a settlement somewhere, the misgivings caused by this had to be cast aside in view of the consideration that their presence in the battle area might weaken the German power of resistance. In the course of 1943 I spoke with Hitler and called his attention to this problem in the Netherlands. In his own convincing way he reassured me and at the same time admitted that he was thinking of a permanent evacuation of the Jews, if possible, from all of Europe with which Germany wanted to maintain friendly relations. He wanted to have the Jews settled on the eastern border of the German sphere of interest insofar as they were not able to emigrate to other parts of the earth. At the beginning of 1944 I spoke with Himmler, whom I happened to meet in southern Bavaria. I asked him in a determined manner about the Jews in the Netherlands.
SEYSS-INQUART: The fact that our Eastern Front was being withdrawn meant that the camps would be in the battle area in the course of time, or at least in the rear area. I was afraid that the lot of the Jews would become even more serious then. Himmler said something to the following effect: "Do not worry; they are my best workers." I could not imagine that the Jews capable of labor were working while their relatives were being destroyed. I believed that in that case one could expect nothing else than that every Jew would attack a German and strangle him.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, so you did learn of these evacuations? In your capacity as Reich Commissioner did you help carry out these evacuations through your administration?
SEYSS-INQUART: Since the evacuation was a fact, I considered it proper to concern myself with it to the extent that was possible for me as Reich Commissioner. I gave my deputy in Amsterdam, Dr. Boehmke, power to carry out the evacuation, to exercise control, and to take steps if excesses occurred other than unavoidable difficulties, or to report such to me. Dr. Boehmke was in constant opposition to the so-called Central Office for Jewish Emigration. We had to intervene again and again, but I am convinced that we did not put an end to all hardships. The Jews were collected in the Westerborg Camp. When the first transports left, I received a report that the trains were overcrowded. I vigorously remonstrated with the commander of the Security Police and asked him to see that the transport was carried out in an orderly manner. The Netherlands Report states that at the beginning the transports were made under tolerable conditions; later, conditions generally became worse. But that such excessive overcrowding of trains occurred as indicated in the report did not come to my knowledge. It is true that the Security Police made it very difficult to have the execution of these measures controlled. At the suggestion of some Dutch secretaries general, especially Van Damm and Froehlich, I effected an exception for a number of Jews. One could effect individual exceptions; the basic measures could not be changed. I believe that the number of exceptions is greater than indicated in the Netherlands Report, at least according to my reports. These Jews were, in the final stage, in the Westerborg Camp. When the invasion began Himmler wanted to remove them. Upon my objections this was not done. But after the battle of Arnhem he removed them, as he said, to Theresienstadt; and I hope that they remained alive there.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you also release property on this occasion?
SEYSS-INQUART: These Jews who were made exceptions retained control of their property.
DR. STEINBAUER: In closing this chapter I should like once more to call the attention of the Tribunal to Document 1726-PS, USA-195, in the document book of the Prosecution. This document sums up the whole Jewish problem in the Netherlands, and on Page 6 it gives all the agencies which dealt with the Jewish problem. Under Number 3 you will find the General Commissioner for Security, the Higher SS and Police Leader H. Rauter, General of Police. Under Number 4 is the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, Leader Aus der Funte-under the "General Commissioner," as under 3. The report says about this: "Apparently an organization for Jewish emigration; in reality, an organization to rob the Jews of their rights, to segregate them, or to deport them." This was the most important office, which was directly under Himmler's Higher Police Leader, and not under the defendant.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to point out that Rauter functioned as Higher SS and Police Leader in this case, and not as "General Commissioner for Security," for the measures were carried out by the German Police, and not by the Netherlands police.
DR. STEINBAUER: The witness in a speech also spoke about his views on the Jewish problem at one time The Prosecution has submitted a part of this speech.
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Dr. Steinbauer, you are putting this Document 1726-PS to the witness, which contains a historical statement, apparently. Does the witness agree that the historical statement is accurate? Do you, Defendant, agree that this historical statement is accurate?
SEYSS-INQUART: May I see the document? [The document was handed to the defendant.]
DR. STEINBAUER: It is Appendix 2. .
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Steinbauer, you put forward the document and it is for you to ascertain from the witness whether he agrees with the document or whether he challenges it.
SEYSS-INQUART: The presentation of facts is accurate, except for the addition of the correction which I made with reference to the "General Commissioner for Security."
THE PRESIDENT: There are certain passages in the document which your attention ought to be drawn to: February 1941, for instance. You have the document before you, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you look at the last entry under the heading February 1941? Do you see that?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You have to put that to the witness. He said that the facts are accurate.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, you will find under "February 1941" a statement-I have only the English here-saying that Jews were arrested and then sent to Buchenwald and Mauthausen.