dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in this Trial a group of people are under indictment with the purpose of declaring them criminals. Included in this group, to state it shortly, are all the commanders-in-chief of the several parts of the Armed Forces. Have you ever had any knowledge before the beginning of the attack against the Soviet Union that an order came out, according to which the captured commissary had to be executed?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you at any time speak to your commanding general, Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst, concerning this order?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: What opinion did Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst and yourself hold concerning this order?
BUSCHENHAGEN: That this was a criminal order. DR.
LATERNSER: Since you had that opinion, I would like to ask you whether, within your army, this order was carried out?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Actually it was not carried out.
DR. LATERNSER: For what reasons was it not carried out? Perhaps because the commander and his chief and you, Witness, were of the opinion that this order should not be carried out or because it would not have been practicable, for, as it is known, the Soviet commissars fought until the last and fell and, in cases where they were captured, their papers, which showed them to be commissars, had already been destroyed? For what reason was this order not actually carried out?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Firstly, in view of the line taken by Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst and myself, comments were added to it before it was passed on, in other words, we let the troops know that inwardly we were not in agreement with it-and we found our commanding generals to show a full understanding. Secondly, because of the reason given by you, because, as a matter of fact, not a single commissar fell into our hands, as far as I can remember.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you know any other commanders who had the same attitude as you had with regard to this order?
BUSCHENHAGEN: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you answer "no" because you did not speak to others?
BUSCHENHAGEN: I did not speak to others because in Norway I was so isolated from other armies that I had no opportunity of speaking to others.
DR.LATERNSER: Witness, aren't you of the opinion that the great majority of the commanding generals had the same attitude concerning this order as you and your commanding general?
BUSCHENHAGEN: I cannot answer that because I cannot speak the minds of the others.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants' counsel wish to ask questions? General, do you wish to ask any questions in re-examination?
GET. ZORYA: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness will retire. [The witness left the stand.]
GEN.ZORYA: This morning I had to stop before reading the testimony of Pantazi, Romania's former Minister of War, which I intend to present to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-154 (Document NumberUSSR-154). Pantazi describes in detail the preparations of Romania for war. I would ask you to accept this testimony as evidence. You will find it on Page 71 of the document book. I shall now read such extracts of this document as are of interest to us: "Romania's preparations for war against the Soviet Union began in November 1940 when, in accordance with the agreement signed by Marshal Antonescu in Bucharest, regarding Romania's adherence to the Tripartite Pact , there arrived in Bucharest German military missions, consisting of groups of German officer-instructors; those for the army were headed by General Hansen, those for the Air Force by Major General Speidel. "With the arrival of the German military missions in Romania, the Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Army, General Joanitiu, acting on the orders of Antonescu, issued an order to the army, regarding the admission of German officer instructors into units and groups, for the purpose of reorganizing and re-educating the Romanian forces in accordance with the code of regulations of the German Army. "At the same time, and still acting on Marshal Antonescu's orders, all reserve officers of the Romanian Army were called up for a course of 2 months of retraining and underwent instruction under German direction. "During the period of the retraining of officers, the General Staff of the Romanian Army drafted a plan for calling up into the Army 12 age groups due for mobilization in case of war, the training of all these groups to be carried out in accordance with the demands of the code of regulations of the German Army, to be completed by 1 July 1941. "The higher Romanian officers underwent similar retraining in their respective branches of the service.
GEN.ZORYA: "In this way, under German leadership and prior to the beginning of the war by Germany and Romania against the Soviet Union, the whole of the Romanian Army and Air Force were reorganized and retrained along German lines." I shall omit two paragraphs which are of no importance and I pass to the second paragraph, which you will find on Page 72 in the document book. These are also depositions of Pantazi.
THE PRESIDENT: General, in view of the evidence which you have already presented to the Tribunal, the Tribunal is inclined to think you could omit these details of the preparations made in Romania and go on to the place where you deal with the number of German divisions who deployed on the Romanian frontier.
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, this question is of importance. I hesitate at present to point out the exact passage which deals with it-it must be on Page 74 in the document book: "In this connection the following units which were already mobilized and ready for action against the Soviet Union were, in February 1941, on Marshal Antonescu's orders, directed to the frontiers of North Bukovina and Bessarabia: The 4th Alpine Rifle Division, the 7th, 8th, and 21st Infantry Divisions, the Infantry Division of the Guards, a cavalry corps and another infantry division whose name I do not recall at present. In addition, 3 German divisions, selected from the 21 German divisions moving to Greece across Romania, were sent to the U.S.S.R. frontier." I omit several paragraphs. On Page 73 of your book of documents we find the following extract from Pantazi's testimony, marked in pencil: "In accordance with instructions from Marshal Antonescu in May 1941, the following divisions were likewise sent to the frontier: The Frontier Division, the 3rd and 1st Alpine Rifle Divisions, the 13th Infantry Division, and a Panzer division. Concurrently with these divisions the Germans transferred to the U.S.S.R. frontier seven German divisions. "Consequently, prior to the beginning of the Romanian and German attack on the Soviet Union, there were concentrated on the frontier between Romania and the U.S.S.R. 12 Romanian and 10 German divisions, totalling up to 600,000 men." Thus the documents which have just been submitted to the Tribunal justify the assertion that Romania's preparations for aggression against the Soviet Union on the directions received from the staff of the fascist conspirators had begun long before they found expression on paper in Plan Barbarossa. Having attacked the Soviet Union, Hitler's lackeys expected gratitude from their masters for services rendered. On 27 July 1941 Hitler sent a letter addressed to Antonescu expressing gratitude to him and to his army.
GEN. ZORYA: I submit to the Tribunal this letter from Hitler, addressed to Antonescu as Exhibit Number USSR-237 (Document Number USSR237). Hitler writes in this letter-Page 1 of the Russian translation of the letter, Paragraph 3, Page 74 in the document book presented to the Tribunal: "To congratulate you wholeheartedly on this great success is for me personally as great a happiness as it is a satisfaction easy to understand. The winning back of Bessarabia will be the most natural reward for your effort and those of your gallant troops." The promises of the fascist bosses were not limited to Bessarabia alone. ,I beg for permission to return to the conversation of 12 February 1942, between Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop. This conversation is set forth in a document which I presented as Exhibit Number USSR-233 (Document USSR-233). I am now referring to Paragraph 3 of the Russian translation of this document-3rd paragraph from the top of this page-which you will find on Page 61 of the document book. It consists of the following entry made by Antonescu: "I reminded Herr Von Ribbentrop that, at the banquet given by him, he raised his glass to the happiness of a great Romania, to which I replied that we have entered into an alliance with the Axis in order to create a 'Great Romania.' " What, then, was this "Great Romania" to represent, to which the Defendant Ribbentrop had raised his glass? This can be seen from the document which I now submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-242 (Document USSR-242). This document is one of Antonescu's letters-a copy of a letter-to Hitler, dated 17 August 1941. I request you to read this document into the record, and I consider it necessary to read Paragraphs 2 and 4 from it, which correspond to Page 2 of the Russian translation in the document book in your possession. The corresponding text is on Page 78. I quote Paragraph 2.
GEN. ZORYA: Antonescu writes: "In compliance with the wish of Your Excellency, I take upon myself the responsibility for guarding the territory between the Rivers Dniester and Dnieper, for maintaining order there, and for its security, in which connection it will only be necessary to delineate a boundary to this territory on the north." Paragraph 4 of this letter: "In order to maintain order and to control the economic exploitation of the occupied territory, and foreseeing the continuation of the war, I consider it absolutely necessary that unity of command should be established. "I therefore beg Your Excellency to give precise instructions defining my rights and responsibilities for the administration and economic exploitation of the territory between the Rivers Dniester and Bug, as well as for the guarding, the maintenance . of order and the security of the whole territory between the Rivers Dniester and Dnieper. "I beg you, Your Excellency, to accept the best assurances from your devoted Marshal Antonescu." Two days after this letter was written Antonescu appointed a governor of the occupied regions of the Soviet Union, to which he gave the name of the "Transnistrian" regions. I present to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-295 (Document Number USSR-295), the testimony of this "governor," George Alexianu, who was taken prisoner by The Red Army, and beg you to accept it as evidence. Alexianu, giving details of his nomination, testifies as follows- Page 2, Paragraph 2, of the Russian text, Page 79 in the document book which is in your possession.
GEN. ZORYA: I quote: "Antonescu said that, in connection with the successful advance of the German Army, Hitler wrote him a personal letter in which he offered to annex to Romania the Soviet territories extending from the Dniester to the Dnieper which had been captured by the German troops and to establish there their own occupational authorities." On Page 80 of the document book at the top of Page 3 of the Russian text of the testimony, Alexianu states that in the summer of 1942 he was present at the Council of Romanian Ministers at which Marshal Antonescu, referring to the successes of the German and the Romanian armies on the Eastern Front, stated: "It is now evident for us all that I acted rightly when, as early as November 1940 I came to an agreement with Hitler on the joint attack against the Soviet Union." However, the generosity of the fascist Fuehrer, who gave Soviet territories away, right and left, to his vassals, diminished noticeably in the course of the war as the Red Army successes grew. I have here before me one of Hitler's letters to Ion Antonescu, dated 25 October 1943. I beg the Tribunal to accept it as evidence as Exhibit Number USSR-240 (Document Number USSR-240). Something like 2 years and 3 months had passed since the moment when Hitler complimented his Romanian satrap on the seizure of Bessarabia. Quite recently, Antonescu had still been worrying over the question of organizing a "unified" administration in Transnistria. Circumstances and conditions had altered. Hitler now writes-I quote the second paragraph from the top of Page 1, which you will find on Pages 82-83 of your document book: "My further request concerns the essential exploitation of Transnistria, that as a rear theater of operations for Army Groups A and South it should not be hampered by any formal juridical or economic considerations and difficulties.
GEN. ZORYA: I must further request you to put at the disposal of the German authorities the entire network of the Transnistrian railways...." As a poor consolation Hitler adds-Page 82 of the document book: "All military measures . . . have, as their final aim, the preservation of Transnistria for Romania." Then even Antonescu, who had so many times subserviently assured Hitler of his submissiveness, reached the end of his endurance. On 15 November 1943 he wrote a lengthy reply to Hitler. In this letter A7itonescu wrote unrestrainedly how he fulfilled the Will of his master at the expense of his people. I present Antonescu's letter to Hitler as Exhibit Number USSR-239 (Document Number USSR-239). His letter is dated Bucharest, 15 November 1943. I quote, beginning with Paragraph 2 of this letter, towards the end of Page 5 of the Russian text. It is on Page 88 of the document book: "As to the regime in Transnistria we agree with your Excellency that it is neither opportune nor timely to examine in the spirit of a banker the problem of this territory as a military zone, a zone of supply, et cetera. "I should like to begin by explaining the causes of my anxiety. "I do not know whether the truth about the Romanian participa1;ion in the war, from 1941 to the present moment, has always been told you: That this war has cost Romania 300,000 million led; that during this period we gave Germany more than 8 million tons of oil, thus threatening our own national stocks, as well as the deposits themselves; that we are bearing heavy expenses incurred in supporting the families of 250,000 men who lost their lives in battle." Here I omit four paragraphs which have no bearing in the gist of the matter and continue to read on Page 89 of the document book. "Of course, the arrival of troops on the Transnistrian territory is, as you say, a shield on the gates of Romania. Our only desire is that all be in good order and utilized in the most advantageous manner possible....
GEN. ZORYA: "As regards the transfer of the Transnistrian railways into German hands for the purpose of increasing transportation, I beg Your Excellency to reconsider this question. In our opinion this transfer is not necessary. "Transnistrian railways, from 1941 to the present day, functioned well under Romanian administration. They always satisfied German demands and their management was always highly appreciated." I request you to turn one page of the document book. I now read an extract from Page 90 of the book: "If the traffic capacity of the Transnistrian railways cannot still be further increased in pursuance to the generally established joint plan, we cannot bear any responsibility for that fact. Here too we kept our obligations." And two paragraphs further on, the same page, the following statement is made: "I am sure that our railway administration could -tarry out the measures necessary in order to increase the traffic capacity and to improve the organization. "As I personally was in charge of the organization of the administration and economics of this region, it would be a great mortification to me if the administration of the railways were to pass to German hands, since one would justly say that our incapacity in this respect was the reason for such measure." There came a moment in the relations between the two aggressors when the former harmony, based on the seizure of foreign lands and wealth, gave place to arguments on the question as to who should bear the great financial responsibility for the losses suffered as a result of the criminal adventure embarked upon by both partners. This is revealed by the following document, captured from the personal archives of Antonescu and which I intend to present to the honorable Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-245 (Document Number USSR-245). I should like to read a quotation from this document, which is lengthy but which is very important in enabling us to realize the relationship between fascist Germany and her satellites.
GEN. ZORYA: This document is entitled, "General Hansen's Meeting with Marshal Antonescu on 7 July 1943." As Your Honors will no doubt remember, General Hansen was the head of the German Military Mission of the German General Staff in Romania. I shall read into the record excerpts from this document, underlined in red pencil, on Pages 92 and 93 of the document book...
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn't it be possible for you to summarize these documents with reference to Romania? Because you have already drawn our attention to a considerable amount of evidence with reference to egomaniac participation, General Antonescu's statements and other evidence of that sort. Possibly you would be able to go on then to the question of the Hungarian participation- in Document Number USSR-294. What you are reading us now really shows the extent, no doubt, of the Romanian participation, but it is all after the aggression. I thought, from looking at it, that you could possibly go on to USSR-294.
GEN. ZORYA: If the Tribunal wishes, I shall certainly do so.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it would save time and would not detract from the case at an.
GEN. ZORYA: I shall summarize this document in a few sentences, and I shall then pass on to the next document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
GEN. ZORYA: The sense of this conversation is interesting insofar as it reveals the shameless bargaining which went on between Hansen and Antonescu. The objects of this bargaining were money, war supplies, and human lives. Antonescu, who was beginning to feel the disadvantage of the absence of any kind of proper agreement with Germany, insisted that all subsequent dealings, whether of a material or any other nature, be subjected to appropriate official agreements. He demanded from Germany the delivery of various war supplies either of a technical or, in last analysis, of a monetary nature. And when General Hansen said that Germany had no led, Antonescu replied, "If you have no led, give us at least arms and equipment.'' That is how the document describes the policy pursued by fascist Germany for extracting the most varied resources from her vassals. Now, I should like to touch briefly upon certain methods of foreign policy which the Hitlerites used in dealing with their vassals. I should like to dwell on the policy pursued by the Hitlerite conspirators in regard to the question of Transylvania. Holding out the question of Transylvania as bait, the Hitlerite conspirators forced their Hungarian and Romanian vassals to work out their own promotion. I submit, as Document Number USSR-294, the depositions of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger, a former Generaloberst of the Hungarian Army. Prior to May 1941, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger held important posts in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Subsequently, prior to September 1942 he commanded an army corps, after which he became Deputy War Minister of Hungary. Now, I should like to read the deposition of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger, concerning the Transylvanian question. The passages which I should like to read into the record are on Page 3 and on the top of Page 4 of the Russian text, which corresponds to Pages 102 and 103 of the document book: "The second Vienna Arbitration Treaty assumed the form of a decision which was of little profit to Hungary.
GEN. ZORYA: The district of Megyes-Kissarmes, where natural oil could be obtained, was reserved for Romania. In Hungarian political and military circles this was interpreted in such a way that in the Second Vienna Arbitration Treaty Hitler thought himself in alliance with Romania in the war against Soviet Russia. The fact that Hitler considered Romania a more important ally than Hungary was explained on the grounds that in an eventual war with the Soviet Union, Germany would undoubtedly need Romania's southern wing which extends to the Black Sea. "In an official conversation which took place towards November 1940 the Chief of the Operational Group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laszlo, told me the following: " 'The second Vienna Arbitration Treaty has aroused bitter envy of Romania in Hungary, and it is up to us to obtain advantages from Hitler.' " I would remind you that Antonescu, in his testimony, presented to the Tribunal earlier in the day, said, when speaking of his negotiations with Hitler: "In November 1941 Hitler told me that the final word had not been spoken in the Vienna Arbitration Treaty, thereby giving me to understand that Romania could still count upon a revision of the decision previously adopted on the question of Transylvania." However, soon after, while visiting Budapest, the Defendant Ribbentrop expressed an entirely opposite point of view. I shall present to the Tribunal three documents which illustrate the attitude of Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Goering under these circumstances. I submit in evidence Exhibit Number USSR-235 (Document Number USSR-235), containing the minutes of one of the subsequent conversations between Antonescu and Hitler2 which took place on 3 April 1942. This document will be found on Pages 113-116 of the document book. I shall read some excerpts from this document, on Page 3 of the Russian translation, which corresponds to Page 113 in the document book.
GEN. ZORYA: I quote: "I"-Antonescu-"reminded him"-Hitler-"that the Hungarian statesmen did not hesitate to declare openly in Parliament and in the press after Ribbentrop's visit to Budapest that should they intervene"-that is, should they send their troops-"Transylvania is to remain Hungarian; such rumors circulate, and they greatly demoralize the Romanians. Hitler gave me his word of honor that such promises had not been made and could not have been made, and that this does not correspond to actual facts." . In this way Hitler juggled with promises to encourage his satellites.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for 10 minutes? [A recess was taken.]