dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No government in the world, before the Nazis came to power, could have embarked upon and put into effect a policy of mass extermination in the way in which they did, without having a people who would back them and support them and without having a large number of people, men and women, who were prepared to put their hands to their bloody murder. And not even, perhaps, the German people of previous generations would have lent themselves to the crimes about which this Tribunal has heard, the killing of millions and millions of men and women. It was to the task of educating the people, of producing murderers, educating and poisoning them with hate, that Streicher set himself; and for 25 years he has continued unrelentingly the education - if you can call it so - or the perversion of the people and of the youth of Germany. And he has gone on and on as he saw the results of his work bearing fruit. In the early days he was preaching persecution. As persecutions took place he preached extermination and annihilation; and, as we have seen in the ghettos of the East, as millions of Jews were being exterminated and annihilated, he cried out for more and more. That is the crime that he has committed. It is the submission of the Prosecution that he made these things possible - made these crimes possible which could never have happened had it not been for him and for those like him. He led the propaganda and the education of the German people in those ways. Without him the Kaltenbrunners, the Himmlers, the General Stroops would have had nobody to carry out their orders. And, as we have seen, he has concentrated upon the youth and the childhood of Germany. In its extent his crime is probably greater and more far-reaching than that of any of the other defendants. The misery that they caused finished with their incarceration. The effects of this man's crime, of the poison that he has injected into the minds of millions and  millions of young boys and girls and young men and women lives on.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: He leaves behind him a legacy of almost a whole people poisoned with hate, sadism, and murder, and perverted by him. That German people remains a problem and perhaps a menace to the rest of civilization for generations to come. My Lord, I submit that the Prosecution's case against this man as set out in the Indictment is proved. My Lord, Lieutenant Brady Bryson, of the United States Delegation; will present to the Court the case against Schacht.
LIEUTENANT BRADY O. BRYSON (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, a document book has been prepared and filed and the appropriate number of copies has been delivered to the defendants. We ask the Tribunal's permission to file within the next few days a trial brief which now is in the process of preparation. Our proof against the Defendant Schacht is confined to planning and preparation of aggressive war.
THE PRESIDENT: What was it you said about the trial brief?
LT. BRYSON: We ask permission to file a trial brief within the next few days, as our brief is not yet ready.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
LT. BRYSON: Our proof against the Defendant Schacht is limited to planning and preparation for aggressive war and to membership in a conspiracy for aggressive war. The extent of Schacht's criminal responsibility as a matter of law, under the Charter of the Tribunal, will be developed in our brief. Only a few of our 50-odd documents have been previously submitted in evidence. We have taken special pains to avoid repetition and cumulative proof; but for the sake of continuity we would like, in several instances, simply to draw the Tribunal's attention to evidence previously received, with an appropriate reference to the transcript of the Record. Before commencing our proof, we wish to state our understanding that the Defendant Schacht's control over the German economy was on the wane after November 1937, and that by the time of the aggression on Poland his official status had been reduced to that of Minister without Portfolio and personal adviser to Hitler. We know too that he is sometimes credited with opposition to certain of the more radical elements of the Nazi Party; and I further understand that at the time of capture by United States forces he was under German detention in a prison camp, having been arrested by the Gestapo in July 1944. Be this as it may, our proof will show that at least up until the end of 1937 Schacht was the dominant figure in the rearming of Germany and in the economic planning and preparation for war, that without his work the Nazis would not have been able to wring from their depressed economy the tremendous material requirements of armed aggression, and that Schacht contributed his efforts with full knowledge of the aggressive purposes which he was serving. The details of this proof will be presented in four parts: First, we will very briefly show that Schacht accepted the Nazi philosophy prior to 1933 and supported Hitler's rise to power. Second, proof of the contribution of Schacht to German rearmanment and preparation for war will be submitted.
LT. BRYSON: This evidence will also be brief, since the facts in this respect are well known and have already been touched upon by Mr. Dodd in his presentation of the case on economic preparation for war. Third, we will show that Schacht assisted the Nazi conspiracy purposely and willingly with knowledge of, and sympathy for, its illegal ends. And last, we will prove that Schacht's loss of power in the German Government did not in any sense imply disagreement with the policy of aggressive war. We turn now to our proof that Schacht helped Hitler to power. Schacht met Goering for the first time in December 1930, and Hitler early in January 1931 at Goering's house. His impression of Hitler was favorable. I offer in evidence Exhibit USA-615 (Document 3725-PS), consisting of an excerpt from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht under date of 20 July 1945, and quote two questions and answers related to this meeting, near the middle of the first page of the interrogation.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to give us the Exhibit number? You haven't given us the other number?
LT. BRYSON: This is an interrogation, Sir, and it will not have two.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got a number for it?
LT. BRYSON: You will find it in your document book in the back, labeled "Schacht Interrogation of 20 July 1945." I quote from the middle of the first page: "Q: 'What did he"' that is, Hitler "'say?' "A: 'Oh, ideas he expressed before, but it was full of will and spirit."' And near the bottom of the page: "Q: 'What was your impression at the end of that evening?' "A: 'I thought that Hitler was a man with whom one could co-operate."' After this meeting Schacht allied himself with Hitler; and at a crucial political moment in November 1932, he lent the prestige of his name, which was widely known in banking, financial, and business circles throughout the world, to Hitler's cause. I offer in evidence Exhibit USA-616 (Document 3729-PS) consisting of excerpts from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht on 17 October 1945. I wish to quote, beginning at the top of Page 36 of this interrogation. This is the interrogation of 17 October 1945, at Page 36. I may say that when I refer to the page numbers, I speak of the page of the document book: "Q: 'Yes, and at that time"' referring to January 1931 "'you became a supporter, I take it, of . . . ' "A: 'In the course...' "Q: 'Of Hitler's coming to power?' "A: 'Especially in the course of the years 1931 and 1932."' And I quote further from the lower half of Page 37 of the same interrogation: "Q: 'But what I mean - to make it very brief - did you lend the prestige of your name to help Hitler come to power?' "A: 'I have publicly stated that I expected Hitler to come to power; for the first time, if I remember, in November '32.' "Q: 'And you know, or perhaps you don't, that Goebbels in his diary records with great affection...' "A: 'Yes.' "Q: '... the help that you gave him at the time?' "A: 'Yes, I know that.' "Q: 'November 1932?' "A: 'From the Kaiserhof to the Chancellery and back.' "Q: 'That's right.
LT. BRYSON: You have read that?' "A: 'Yes.' "Q: 'And you don't deny that Goebbels was right?' "A: 'I think his impression was that that was correct at that time."' I now refer the Tribunal to this statement of Goebbels, set forth in 2409(a)-PS. The entire diary of Goebbels is in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-262. The entry I wish to read, which appears in 2409(a)-PS, was made on 21 November 1932: "In a conversation with Dr. Schacht I assured myself that he absolutely shares our point of view. He is one of the few who stand immovable behind the Fuehrer." It is believed that Schacht joined the Party only in the sense that he allied himself with the cause. Dr. Franz Reuter, whose biography of Schacht was officially published in Germany in 1937, has stated that Schacht refrained from formal membership in order to be of greater assistance to the Party. I offer in evidence Document Number EC-460, Exhibit Number USA-617, consisting of an excerpt from Reuter's biography, and I quote the last sentence of the excerpt: "By not doing so, he was able eventually to help more toward the final victory than if he had become an enrolled Party member." It was Schacht who organized the financial means for the decisive March 1933 election) at a meeting of Hitler with a group of German industrialists in Berlin. Schacht acted as the sponsor or host of this meeting, and a campaign fund of several million marks was collected. Without reading therefrom, I offer in evidence Document Number EC-439, Exhibit Number USA-618, an affidavit of Von Schnitzler under date of 10 November 1945, and refer the Tribunal to the transcript for 23 November, Pages 282-283 (Volume II, Pages 223, 224), where the text of the affidavit already appears in the Record. Further evidence on this point is also contained in the excerpt from the interrogation of Schacht on 20 July 1945, from which I read a part a moment ago. Schacht lent his support to Hitler not only because he was an opportunist, but also because he shared Hitler's ideological principles.
LT. BRYSON: Apart from the entry in Goebbels' diary, this may be seen from Schacht's own letter to Hitler, under date of 29 August 1932, pledging continued support to Hitler after the latter's poor showing in the July 1932 elections. I offer this letter in evidence as Document Number EC-457, Exhibit Number USA- 619, and quote from the middle of the first paragraph and further from the next to the last paragraph: "But what you could perhaps do with in these days is a kind word. Your movement is carried internally by so strong a truth and necessity that victory in one form or another cannot elude you for long." And further down - and keep in mind that neither Hitler nor Schacht was then in the German Government - Schacht says: "Wherever my work may take me in the near future, even if you should see me one day behind stone walls, you can always count on me as your reliable assistant."
THE PRESIDENT: What do those words mean at the top: "The President of the Reichsbank in Retirement"? Are they on the letter?
LT. BRYSON: Yes, they are, Sir. Dr. Schacht had previously been a president of the Reichsbank. At this time he was in retirement. You will remember, this is prior to Hitler's accession to power.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course.
LT. BRYSON: And then Hitler reinstated Dr. Schacht as President of the Reichsbank after the Nazis had taken over.
THE PRESIDENT: And he put that at the top of his letter, did he?
LT. BRYSON: That I cannot say. I will also point out that Schacht signed this letter, "With a vigorous Heil." We turn now to the second part of our proof, relating to Schacht's contribution to preparation for war. The detailed chronology of Schacht's official career in the Nazi Government, as set forth in Document 3021-PS, has already been submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-11. However, it may be helpful at the outset to remind the Tribunal that Schacht was recalled to the Presidency of the Reichsbank by Hitler on 17 March 1933, which office he continuously held until 20 January 1939; that he was Acting Minister and then Minister of Economics from August 1934 until November 1937; and that he was appointed Plenipotentiary General for War Economy in May 1935. He resigned as Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary General for War Economy in November 1937, when he accepted appointment as Minister without Portfolio, which post he held until January 1943. His position as virtual economic dictator of Germany in the 4 crucial years from early 1933 to the end of 1936 is practically a matter of common knowledge. Schacht was the guiding genius behind the Nazi expansion of the German credit system for rearmament purposes. From the outset he recognized that the plan for the German military supremacy required huge quantities of public credit. To that end a series of measures was adopted which subverted all credit institutions in Germany to the over-all aim of supplying funds for the military machine. I will briefly mention some of these measures. By Cabinet decree of 27 October 1933 the statutory reserve of 40 percent in gold and foreign exchange required against circulating Reichsbank notes was permanently abandoned. By the Credit Act of 1934 the Government assumed jurisdiction of all credit institutions, and control over the entire banking system was centralized in Schacht as Chairman of the Supervisory Board for the Credit System and President of the Reichsbank. This act not only enabled Schacht to control the quantity of credit but also its use.
LT. BRYSON: On 29 March 1934 a system of forced corporate lending to the Reich was imposed on German business. And on 19 February 1935 the Treasury was authorized to borrow funds in any amounts approved by the Reich Chancellor, that is, by Hitler. On these points I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the Reichsgesetzblatt 1933, Part II, Page 827; Reichsgesetzblatt 1934, Part I, Page 1203; Reichsgesetzblatt 1934, Part I, Page 295; and Reichsgesetzblatt 1935, Part I, Page 198.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they found here in the document book?
LT. BRYSON: They're not in the document book, Sir. I asked only that judicial notice be taken of them as published laws of Germany. These measures enabled Schacht to embark upon what he himself has termed a "daring credit policy," including the secret financing of a vast amount of armaments through the so-called 'mefo' bill, a description of which appears in the transcript for 23 November at Page 295 (Volume II, Page 232). I offer in evidence Document Number EC-436, Exhibit Number USA- 620, consisting of a statement, dated 2 November 1945, by Emil Puhl, a director of the Reichsbank during Schacht's presidency, and quote the second paragraph thereof as follows: "In the early part of 1935 the need for financing an accelerated rearmament program arose. Dr. Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, after considering various techniques of financing, proposed the use of mefo bills to provide a substantial portion of the funds needed for the rearmament program. This method had as one of its primary advantages the fact that secrecy would be possible during the first years of the rearmament program; and figures indicating the extent of rearmament, that would have become public through the use of other methods, could be kept secret through the use of mefo bills." The extent of the credit expansion and the importance of mefo financing may be seen from Document Number EC-419, which I now offer as Exhibit Number USA-621 and which consists of a letter from Finance Minister Von Krosigk to Hitler, under date of 1 September 1938. I quote the following figures from the middle of the first page: "The Reich debt accumulated as follows: "As of 31 December 1932: Funded debt, 10,400 millions of Reichsmark; short-term debt, 2,100 millions of Reichsmark; debt not published in the budget (trade and mefo bills of exchange), 0. "As of 30 June 1938: Funded debt, 19,000 million Reichsmark; short-term debt, 3,500 million Reichsmark; and debt not published in the budget (trade and mefo bills of exchange), 13,300 million Reichsmark.
LT. BRYSON: "Total: as of 31 December 1932, 12,500 million Reichsmark; as of 30 June 1938, 35,800 million Reichsmark." The Reich debt thus tripled...
THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the next section, beginning with the words "Provisions were made to cover..."?
LT. BRYSON: "Provisions were made to cover the armament expenditures for the year 1938 (the same amount as in 1937) as follows: "Five thousand millions from the budget, that is, taxes; 4,000 millions from loans; 2,000 millions from 6-month treasury notes, which means postponement of payment until 1939; total: 11,000 millions." The Reich debt thus tripled under Schacht's management. More than one-third of the total was financed secretly and through the instrumentality of the Reichsbank by mefo and trade bills. It is clear that this amount of financing outside the normal public issues represented armament debt. I read further from Document EC-436, at the beginning of the last long paragraph: "These mefo bills were used exclusively for financing rearmament; and when in March 1938 a new finance program discontinuing the use of mefo bills was announced by Dr. Schacht, there was a total volume outstanding of 12,000 million marks of mefo bills which had been issued to finance rearmament." The character of Schacht's credit policy and the fact that it was ruthlessly dedicated to the creation of armaments plainly appear from his own speech delivered on 29 November 1938. I offer it in evidence as Document Number EC-611, Exhibit Number USA-622; and I quote from Page 6 at the beginning of the last paragraph: "It is possible that no bank of issue in peacetime carried on such a daring credit policy as the Reichsbank since the seizure of power by National Socialism. With the aid of this credit policy, however, Germany created an armament second to none; and this armament in turn made possible the results of our policy." Beyond the field of finance Schacht assumed totalitarian control over the German economy generally in order to marshal it behind the rearmament program. He acquired great power over industry as a result of the Nazi reorganization of German industry along military lines and in accordance with the so-called Leadership Principle.
LT. BRYSON: On this point I refer the Tribunal to the transcript for 23 November at Pages 287-290 (Volume II, Pages 227-228); and to the Reichsgesetzblatt 1934, Part I, Page 1194, of which the Tribunal is asked to take judicial notice. Schacht also exercised broad powers as a member of the Reich Defense Council, which was secretly established on 4 April 1933 and the function of which was preparation for war. The Tribunal is referred to the transcript for 23 November, Page 290 (Volume II, Pages 228-229). I also offer in evidence as Document Number EC-128, Exhibit Number USA-623, a report under date of 30 September 1934, showing the functions of the Ministry of Economics in this respect. The report reveals concentration upon all the familiar wartime economic problems, including stockpiling, production of scarce goods, removal of industry to secure areas, fuel and power supply for war production, machine tools, control of wartime priorities, rationing, price control, civilian supply, and so on. I wish to read into the Record merely an excerpt showing the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economics, beginning near the top of Page 2 of Document Number EC- 128: "With the establishment of the Reich Defense Council and its permanent committee the Reich Ministry of Economics has been given the task of making economic preparation for war. There should really be no need to explain the tremendous importance of this task. Everyone remembers vividly how terribly the lack of any economic preparation for war hit us during the World War." Finally, in 1934, Schacht acquired sweeping powers under legislation which authorized him, as Minister of Economics, to take any measure deemed necessary for the development of the German economy. In this connection reference is made to the Reichsgesetzblatt, 1934, Part I, Page 565, of which the Tribunal is asked to take judicial notice. The so-called "New Plan" devised by Schacht was announced in the fall of 1934 shortly after he became Minister of Economics.
LT. BRYSON: In this connection the Tribunal is referred to the Reichsgesetzblatt, 1934, Part I, Page 816 and the Reichsgesetzblatt, 1935, Part I, Page 105, with the request that judicial notice be taken thereof. The New Plan was Schacht's basic program for obtaining the necessary foreign-produced raw materials and foreign exchange required to sustain the rearmament program. With respect to the details of the New Plan, I offer in evidence Document Number EC-437, Exhibit Number USA-624, consisting of an affidavit of Emil Puhl, dated 7 November 1945. The entire text is pertinent. Therefore, permission is requested to submit the affidavit without reading therefrom, on condition that French and Russian translations be prepared and filed.
THE PRESIDENT: And German ones supplied, too.
LT. BRYSON: We will supply copies. I wish to say that the original is in English, but the affidavit has already been translated into German.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. BRYSON: This affidavit by a co-worker of Schacht describes in detail the many ingenious and often ruthless devices he used, including negotiating "stand-still" agreements, forcing payment in Reichsmark of interest and amortization on debts incurred in foreign currency, using scrip and funding bonds for the same purpose, suspending service on foreign-held debts, blocking foreign-held marks, freezing foreign claims in Germany, eliminating unessential foreign expenditures, requisitioning German-held foreign exchange, subsidizing exports, issuing restricted marks, bartering under clearing agreements, licensing imports, and controlling all foreign exchange transactions to the end of favoring raw materials for armaments. The Tribunal is also asked to take judicial notice of Reichsgesetzblatt, 1934, Page 997; Reichsgesetzblatt, 1933, Part I, Page 349; and Reichsgesetzblatt, 1937, Part I, Page 600, relating to the clearing bank, the conversion bank, and the maturity of foreign loans, all of which decrees are mentioned in the affidavit. Schacht even went so far as to invest foreign-held Reichsmark on deposit in German banks in rearmament notes, thus, as he put it, financing rearmament with the assets of his political opponents. Without reading therefrom, I refer your Honors to Document Number 1168-PS, Exhibit USA- 37, being a memorandum from Schacht to Hitler, dated 3 May 1935, which already appears in the transcript on Pages 412 and 413 (Volume II, Pages 312, 313). Moreover, Schacht even resorted to capital punishment to prevent the loss of foreign exchange when frightened capital began to flee from the country. In this connection reference is made to the Law against Economic Sabotage, found in 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 999, of which the Tribunal is asked to take judicial notice. Schacht took particular pride in the results which were accomplished under the stringent controls which he instituted under his New Plan.