dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ALDERMAN: "(b) Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann case. "(1) The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation) their significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work from 1935. "(2) Preparation for the restrengthening of the German U-boat arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925, relationship to Spain, Argentina, Turkey; the first post-war U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since 1927... 250-ton specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid assembly; electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in Spain and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an anti-U-boat school. "(3) Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparation for a Naval Air Arm, Finance Aircraft Company Several, later Luftdienst" -or Air Service-"GMBH; Naval Flying School Warnemuende; air station list, training of sea cadet candidates, military tactical questions 'Air Defense Journeys,' technical development, experimental station planning, trials, flying boat development Do X et cetera , catapult aircraft, arming, engines, ground organization, aircraft torpedoes, the Deutschland flight 1925, and the seaplane race 1926. "(4) Economic rearmament ('The Tebeg'-Technical Advice and Supply Company as a disguised naval office abroad for investigating the position of raw materials for industrial capacity and other war economic questions). "(5) Various measures (the NV Aerogeodetic Company-secret investigations). "(c) Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the Reich Government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies (1928 to the taking over of power). "(1) The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations; winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and carrying on of other work. "(2) Finance question ('Black Funds' and the 'Special Budget'). " (3) The Labor Committee and its objectives.
MR. ALDERMAN: "(d) The question of Marine attachés (the continuation under disguise; open reappointment 1932-1933). "(e) The question of disarmament of the fleet abroad and in Germany (the Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931; the League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932). "Part D (1933-1939-The German Navy during the military freedom period)." -which goes beyond the period with which I am at the moment dealing. A glance at the chapter headings following that will indicate the scope of this proposed work. Whether the history was ever actually written by Scherff, I do not know. I would like to call attention just to the first two or three headings, under this "Part D-The German Navy during the military freedom period": "I. National Socialism and the question of the fleet and of prestige at sea. II. Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State." -The main heading III in the middle of the page-"The Rearmament of the Navy under the direction of the Reich Government in a disguised way." The policy development of the Navy is also reflected from the financial side. The planned organization of the Navy budget for armament measures was based on a co-ordination of military developments and political objectives. Military political development was accelerated after the withdrawal from the League of Nations. I have here, if the Court please, a captured document, in German, headed "Der Chef der Marineleitung, Berlin, 12 May 1934," and marked in large blue printing "Geheime Kommandosache" (Secret Commando Matter), which is identified as our C-153. It has the facsimile signature of Raeder at the end. I assume it is the facsimile; it may have been written with a stylus on a stencil; I can't tell. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-43.
MR. ALDERMAN: It is headed with the title: "Armament Plan (R.P.) for the 3rd Armament Phase." This document of 12 May 1934 speaks of war tasks, war and operational plans, armament targets, et cetera, and shows that it was distributed to many of the High Command of the Navy. It shows that a primary objective was readiness for a war without any alert period. I quote from the third numbered paragraph: "The planned organization of armament measures is necessary for the realization of this target; this again requires a co-ordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This organization of financial measures over a number of years, according to the military viewpoint, is found in the armament program and provides: (a) for the military leader a sound basis for his operational considerations, and (b) for the political leader a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military means available at a given time." One other sentence from Paragraph 7 of that document: "All theoretical and practical R-preparations"-I assume that means armament preparations-"are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert period ."-And "without any alert period" is underscored in the original. The conspiratorial nature of these Nazi plans and preparations long before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other ways. Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the U-boat construction program; also the actual displacement and speed of certain ships. Work on U-boats had been going on, as already indicated, in Holland and Spain. The Nazi theory was rather clever on that. The Versailles Treaty forbade rearming by the Germans in Germany, but they said it didn't forbid them to rearm in Holland, Spain, and Finland. Secrecy was equally important then because of the pending naval negotiations with England. We have a captured document, which is a manuscript in German script, of a conversation between the Defendant Raeder and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. It is not signed by the Defendant Raeder.
MR. ALDERMAN: I might ask his counsel if he objects to my stating that the Defendant Raeder, in an interrogation on 8 November 1945, admitted that this was a record of this conversation and that it was in his handwriting, though he did not sign his name at the end. That document is identified in our series as C-189, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA - 4. It is headed: "Conversation with the Fuehrer in June 1934 on the occasion of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the 'Karlsruhe."' "1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning increased displacement of D. and E. (defensive weapons). "Fuehrer's instructions: No mention must be made of a displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton ships. Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may not be stated. "2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on, the Fleet must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35-centimeter guns (like the King George class.) "3. The Fuehrer demands to keep the construction of the U-boats secret, in consideration of the Saar plebiscite." In order to continue the vital increase of the Navy, as planned, the Navy needed more funds than it had available; so Hitler proposed to put funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy. We have another Raeder memorandum of a conversation between Raeder and Hitler on 2 November 1934. Of this I have a photostatic copy of the German typed memorandum, identified as our C-190. This one, again, is not signed, but it was found in Raeder's personal file and I think he will not deny that it is his memorandum. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-45. It is headed: "Conversation with the Fuehrer on 2. 11. 34 at the time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the 'Emden'. "1.
MR. ALDERMAN: When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available for the Armed Forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible that the Navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He considered it necessary that the Navy be speedily increased by 1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need he will get Dr. Ley to put 120 to 150 million from the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy, as the money would still benefit the workers. Later, in a conversation with Minister Goering and myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the Navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if the Navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia. "2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have six U-boats assembled at the time of the critical polit- ical situation in the first quarter of 1935,"-that's the following year, foreseeing-"he stated that he would keep this point in mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the assembling should commence." Then, there is an apostrophe and a note at the bottom: "The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in the middle of June '35 according to plan." The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign markets was a program encouraged by the Navy, so that this industry would be able to supply the requirements of the Navy in case of need. We have an original German document, again headed "Geheime Kommandosache" (secret commando matter)-a directive of 31 January 1933 by the Defendant Raeder for the German industry to support the armament of the Navy. It is identified in our series as C-29. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-46: "Top Secret.
MR. ALDERMAN: "General directions for support given by the German Navy to the German armament industry." "The effects of the present economic depression have led here and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an active participation of the German armament industry abroad, even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting. Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing 'self-sufficiency' would in any case make such participation superfluous. "However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the following contradictory corrective points: "a) The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce be overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in war politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to a certain extent. "b) The consequent estimation of the duties of the German armament industry lies mainly in the military-political sphere. It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting the deliveries to our Armed Forces. Its capacity must therefore be increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries over and above our own requirements. "c) Almost every country is working to the same end today, even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy, are making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament industries.
MR. ALDERMAN: The use of their diplomatic representations, of the propaganda voyages of their most modern ships and vessels, of sending missions and also of the guaranteeing of loans and insurance against deficits, are not merely to gain commercially advantageous orders for their armament industries, but first and foremost, to expand their output from the point of view of military policy "d) It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy has an ever increasing and really vital interest in furthering the German armament industry and preparing the way for it in every direction in the competitive battle against the rest of the world. "e) If, however, the German armament industry is to be able to compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the confidence of its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for our own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to be kept secret under all circumstances, in the interest of the defense of the country, is comparatively small. I would like to issue a warning against the assumption that at the present stage of technical development in foreign industrial states, a problem of vital military importance which we perhaps have solved, has not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, which may become known, if divulged to a third person by naturally always possible indiscretion, have often been already superseded by new better solutions on our part, even at that time or at any rate after the copy has been made. It is of greater importance that we should be technically well to the fore in any really fundamental matters, than that less important points should be kept secret unnecessarily and excessively. "f) To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing the continuous support of the industry concerned by the Navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed.
MR. ALDERMAN: If the purchasers are not made confident that something better is being offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the competitive battle and therefore will not be able to supply the requirements of the German Navy in case of need." This Navy program of surreptitious rearmament, in violation of the Treaty obligations, starting even before the Nazis came into power, is illustrated by a 1932 order of the Defendant Raeder, Chief of the Naval Command, addressed to the main Naval Command, regarding the concealed construction of torpedo-tubes for S-boats. He ordered that torpedo-tubes be removed and stored in the Naval Arsenal, but be kept ready for immediate refitting. By using only the permitted number-that is, permitted under the Treaty-at a given time, and storing them after satisfactory testing, the actual number of operationally effective S-boats was constantly increased. We have this German order, with the facsimile signature of Raeder, with the heading: "Der Chef der Marine Leitung, Berlin. 10 February 1932." Our series number is C-141. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-47, the order for concealed armament of S-boats. That is C-141. I read from the first paragraph of the text: "In view of our Treaty obligations and the Disarmament Conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first S-boat half-flotilla, which in a few months will Consist of exactly similar, newly built S-boats, from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats"-the German word being "Torpedoträger"-"and it is not intended to count these S-boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed to us. "I therefore order: "1. S2-S5 will be commissioned in the shipyard Luerssen, Vegesack, without armament and will be fitted with easily removable cover-sheetmetal on the spaces necessary for torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I."-a translator's note at the bottom says with reference to T.M.I.
MR. ALDERMAN: (Inspectorate of Torpedos and Mining)-"In agreement with the Naval Arsenal, for the Boat S-1 which will dismantle its torpedo-tubes on completion of the practice shooting, for fitting on another boat. "2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-boats will be stored in the Naval Arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a short time to be fitted and for practice shooting, so that only one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of temporary trials by the T.V.A." -I suppose that is not the Tennessee Valley Authority; the translator's note calls it the Technical Research Establishment.- "It should not anchor together with the other unarmed boats of the half-flotilla because of the obvious similarity of the type. The duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible. "3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all S-boats is intended as soon as the situation of the political control allows it." Interestingly enough, that memorandum by the Defendant Raeder, written in 1932, was talking about "as soon as the situation of the political control allows it." The seizure of power was the following year. Along similar lines the Navy was also carrying on the concealed preparation of auxiliary cruisers, under the disguised designation of 'Transport Ships 0'. The preparations under this order were to be completed by 1 April 1935. At the very time of construction of these ships as commercial ships, plans were made for their conversion. We have the original German document, again top secret, identified by our Number C-166, order from the Command Office of the Navy, dated 12 March 1934, and signed in draft by Groos. It has the seal of the Reichswehrministerium, Marineleitung, over the draft signature. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-48. I think the Defendant Raeder will admit, or at least will not deny, that this is an official document.
MR. ALDERMAN: "Subject: Preparation of auxiliary cruisers. "It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35 (AG Aufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary cruisers which are intended for use in operations in foreign waters. "In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations, the ships will be referred to as 'Transport Ships 0'. It is requested that in future this designation only be used." The short paragraph says: "The preparations are to be arranged so that they can be completed by 1. 4. 35." Among official Navy files, OKM files, which we have, there are notes kept year by year, from 1927 to 1940, on the reconstruction of the German Navy, and in these notes are numerous examples of the Navy's activities and policies of which I should like to point out some illustrations. One of these documents discloses that the displacement of the battleships "Scharnhorst-Gneisenau" and "F/G" -whatever that is-was actually greater than the tonnages which had been notified to the British under the Treaty. This document, our C-23, I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA - 9. That is a set really of three separate documents joined together. I read from that document: "The true displacement of the battleships 'Scharnhorst-Gneisenau' and the 'F/G' exceeds by 20 percent, in both cases, the displacement reported to the British." And then there is a table with reference to different ships, and two columns headed "Displacement by Type": one column "Actual Displacement" and the other column "Notified Displacement." On the "Scharnhorst" the actual was 31,300 tons; the notified was 26,000 tons. On the "F"-actual 41,700 tons, the notified 35,000. On the "III"-actual 56,200 tons, notified 46,850, and so down the list. I need not read them all.
MR. ALDERMAN: On the second document in that group towards the end, Page 2 on the English version, is the statement: "In a clear cut program for the construction, the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task of carrying out the aims of his foreign policy." The German Navy constantly planned and committed violations of armament limitation and with characteristic German thoroughness had prepared superficial explanations or pretexts to explain away these violations. Following a conference with the chief of "A" section, an elaborate survey list was prepared and compiled, giving a careful list of the quantity and type of German naval armament and ammunition on hand under manufacture or construction, and in many instances proposed together with a statement of the justification or defense that might be used in those instances where the Versailles Treaty was violated or its allotment has been exceeded. The list contained 30 items under "Material Measures" and 14 items under "Measures of Organization." The variety of details covered necessarily involved several sources within the Navy, which must have realized their significance. As I understand it, the "A" section was the military department of the Navy. We have this very interesting document among the captured documents identified by our Number C-32. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-50. It again is Geheime Kommandosache and it is headed "A Survey Report of German Naval Armament after Conference with Chief of 'A' Section", dated 9 September 1933, and captured among official German Navy files. This is a long document, if the Tribunal please, but I should like to call attention to a few of the more interesting items. There are three columns, one headed "Measure", one headed "Material, Measures, Details," and the most interesting one is headed "Remarks." The remarks contain the pretext or justification for explaining away the violations of the Treaty. They are numbered, so I can conveniently refer to the numbers: "Number 1. Exceeding the permitted number of mines."- Then figures are given.
MR. ALDERMAN: Remarks-"Further mines are in part ordered, in part being delivered." "Number 2. Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic artillery batteries."In the remarks column- "Justification: Necessity for overhauling. Cheaper repairs." "Number 6. Inlaying gun-platforms in the Kiel area." Remarks: "The offense over and above that in Serial Number 3 lies in the fact that all fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This justification will make it less severe; pure defense measures." "Number 7. Exceeding the caliber permitted for coastal batteries." The explanation: "Possible justification is that, though the caliber is larger, the number of guns is less." "Number 8. Arming of minesweepers. The reply to any remonstrance against this breach: the guns are taken from the Fleet reserve stores, have been temporarily installed only for training purposes. All nations arm their mine sweeping forces (equality of rights)." -Here is one that is rather amusing-"Number 13. Exceeding the number of machine guns et cetera, permitted." Remarks: "Can be made light of." "Number 18. Construction of U-boat parts." This remark is quite characteristic: "Difficult to detect. If necessary can be denied." "Number 20. Arming of fishing vessels." Remarks: "For warning shots. Make little of it."-And so on throughout the list. I think quite obviously that must have been used as a guide for negotiators who were attending the Disarmament Conference as to the position that they might take. Now to Paragraph IV (F) 2 (b) of the Indictment: the allegation that "On 14 October 1933 they led Germany to leave the International Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations." That is an historical fact of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. The Nazis took this opportunity to break away from the international negotiations and to take an aggressive position on an issue which would not be serious enough to provoke reprisal from other countries.