dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
Bureau [Rosenberg's organization]. "Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was assigned to the Naval Attaché in Oslo. Orders were given that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy." (007-PS) Here again is a further indication of the close link between the Nazi politicians and the Nazi service chiefs. D. Operational Planning The information available on the events of January 1940 is not full, but it is clear that the agitation of Raeder and Rosenberg bore fruit. An order signed by Keitel, dated 27 January 1940, marked "Most Secret, five copies; reference, Study 'N'", (an earlier code name for the Weseruebung preparations) and classified "Access only through an officer," stated: "C-in-C of the Navy [Raeder] has a report on this * * * "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Force wishes that Study 'N' should be further worked on under my direct and personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the general war policy. For these reasons the Fuehrer has commissioned me to take over the direction of further preparations. "A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the Armed Force Headquarters for this purpose, and this represents at the same time the nucleus of future operational staff." "All further plans will be made under the cover name 'Weseruebung.'" (C-63) The importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and to the date of this important decision, is this: Prior to this date, 27 January 1940, the planning of the various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had been confined to a relatively small group, whose aim had been to persuade Hitler of the desirability of undertaking the operation. The issuance of this directive of Keitel's on 27 January 1940, was the signal that the Supreme Command of the German Armed Force, the OKW, had accepted the proposition of the group that was pressing for the Norwegian adventure, and had turned the combined resources of the German military machine to the task of producing practical and coordinated plans for the Norwegian operation. From January onward the operational planning for the invasion of Norway and Denmark was
proposition of the group that was pressing for the Norwegian adventure, and had turned the combined resources of the German military machine to the task of producing practical and coordinated plans for the Norwegian operation. From January onward the operational planning for the invasion of Norway and Denmark was started through the normal channels. Certain entries in the diary of Jodl reveal how the preparations progressed (1809-PS). The entry for 6 February commences: "New idea: Carry out 'H' [Hartmundt, another code word for the Norwegian and Danish invasion] and Weser Exercise only and guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war." (1809-PS) The entry for 21 February reads: "Fuehrer has talked with General von Falkenhorst, and charges him with preparation of 'Weser Exercise.' Falkenhorst accepts gladly. Instructions issued to the three branches of the armed forces." (1809-PS) The entry for 28 February reads: "I propose, first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Fuehrer that Case Yellow [the code name for the invasion of the Netherlands] and Weser Exercise [the invasion of Norway and Denmark] must be prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one another as regards both time and forces employed. The Fuehrer completely agrees, if this is in any way possible." (1809-PS) It will be observed that the new idea of 6 February, that the neutrality of Belgium might be preserved, had been abandoned by 28 February. The entry for 29 February reads; "Fuehrer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copenhagen and a plan, elaborated in detail, showing how individual coastal batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont, Chef Landesverteidigung, instructed to make out immediately the order of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Director of Armed Forces to make out a similar order regarding the strengthening of the staff." (1809-PS) Then came Hitler's order to complete the preparations for the invasion of Norway and Denmark (C-174). It Bears the date of 1 March 1940, and reads as follows: "The Fuehrer and Supreme commander of the Armed Forces, Most Secret. "Directive for Fall Weseruebung. "The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the
for the invasion of Norway and Denmark (C-174). It Bears the date of 1 March 1940, and reads as follows: "The Fuehrer and Supreme commander of the Armed Forces, Most Secret. "Directive for Fall Weseruebung. "The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces-Fall Weseruebung. This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain. "In view of our military and political power in comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the Fall Weseruebung will be kept as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force will provide the necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance should be met with, all military means will be used to crush it." "I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the operation against Denmark and Norway the commanding General of the 21st Army Corps, General von Falkenhorst. * * *" "The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously. I emphasize that the operations must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply immediately our own counter-measures. "It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor in mind. "In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with fictitious objectives." (C-174)
measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor in mind. "In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with fictitious objectives." (C-174) The section on "The Occupation of Denmark" which is given the code name of "Weseruebung Sued", provides: "The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of Fuenen immediately after occupation of Seeland. "Added to this, having secured the most important places, the Group will break through as quickly as possible from Fuenen to Skagen and to the east coast." (C-174) There then follow other instructions with regard to the operation. The section on "The Occupation of Norway", given the code name of "Weseruebung Nord", Provides: "The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations. "The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the transport by sea of the landing troops. * * * The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will ensure air defense and will make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain." (C-174) Whilst these preparations were being made, and just prior to the final decision of Hitler, reports were coming in through Rosenberg's organization from Quisling. The third paragraph in Annex I, the section dealing with Norway, has this information: "Quisling's reports, transmitted to his representative in Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of intervention by the Western Powers in Norway with tacit consent of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent by January. These increasingly better substantiated communications were in sharpest contrast to the views of the German Legation in Oslo, which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian Nygardszvold Cabinet, and was convinced of that Government's intention and readiness to defend Norway's neutrality. No one in Norway knew that Quisling's representative for Germany maintained closest relations to him; he therefore succeeded in gaining a foothold within governmental circles of the Nygardszvold cabinet and in listening to the
of that Government's intention and readiness to defend Norway's neutrality. No one in Norway knew that Quisling's representative for Germany maintained closest relations to him; he therefore succeeded in gaining a foothold within governmental circles of the Nygardszvold cabinet and in listening to the cabinet members' views. Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the Bureau [Rosenberg's bureau], which conveyed the news to the Fuehrer through Reichsleiter Rosenberg. During the night of the 16th to 17th of February, English destroyers attacked the German steamer 'Altmark' in Jessingjord. * * *" (007-PS) (That is a reference to the action by the British destroyer Cossack against the German naval auxiliary vessel Altmark, which was carrying three hundred British prisoners, captured on the high seas, to Germany through Norwegian territorial waters. The position of the British delegation with regard to that episode is that the use that was being made by the Altmark of Norwegian territorial waters was in fact a flagrant abuse in itself of Norwegian neutrality, and that the action taken by H.M.S Cossack, which was restricted to rescuing the three hundred British prisoners on board, no attempt being made to destroy the Altmark or to capture the armed guards on board her, was fully justified under international law.) The Rosenberg report continues: "The Norwegian Government's reaction to this question permitted the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived at between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. Such assumption was confirmed by reports of Section Scheidt, who in turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling. But even after this incident the German Legation in Oslo championed the opposite view, and went on record as believing in the good intentions of the Norwegian." (007-PS) And so the Nazi Government preferred the reports of the traitor Quisling to the considered judgment of German diplomatic representatives in Norway. The result of the receipt of reports of that kind was the Hitler decision to invade Norway and Denmark. The culminating details in the preparations for the invasion are again found in Jodl's diary. The entry for 3 March relates: "The Fuehrer expressed himself very sharply
of German diplomatic representatives in Norway. The result of the receipt of reports of that kind was the Hitler decision to invade Norway and Denmark. The culminating details in the preparations for the invasion are again found in Jodl's diary. The entry for 3 March relates: "The Fuehrer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of a swift entry into N [Norway] with strong forces. "No delay by any branch of the armed forces. Very rapid acceleration of the attack necessary." (1809-PS) The last entry for 3 March reads: "Fuehrer decides to carry out 'Weser Exercise' before case 'Yellow' with a few days interval." (1809-PS) Thus, the important issue of strategy which had been concerning the German high Command for some time had been concerning the German High Command for some time had been decided by this date, and the fate of Scandinavian was to be sealed before the fate of the Low Country. It will be observed from those entries of 3 March that by that date Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea of aggression against Norway. The entry in Jodl's diary for 5 March reads: "Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about 'Weser Exercise.' Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till now. Won't listen to anyone and wants to show that all preparations so far made are worthless. "Result: (a) Stronger forces to Narvik. "(b) Navy to leave ships in the ports (Hipper of Luetzow in Trondheim). "(c) Christiansand can be left out at first. "(d) Six divisions envisaged for Norway. "(e) A foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen." (1809-PS) The entry for 13 March in one of the most remarkable in the documentation of this case. "Fuehrer does not give order yet for 'W' [Weser Exercise]. He is still looking for an excuse." (1809-PS) The entry of the next day, 14 March, shows a similar preoccupation on the part of Hitler with the search for an excuse for this aggression. It reads: "English keep vigil in the North Sea with fifteen to sixteen submarines; doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent operations by Germans. Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give for 'Weser Exercise.'" (1809-pS) The entry for 21 March reads: "Misgivings of Task Force 21 [Falkenhorst's Force, detailed to conduct the
vigil in the North Sea with fifteen to sixteen submarines; doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent operations by Germans. Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give for 'Weser Exercise.'" (1809-pS) The entry for 21 March reads: "Misgivings of Task Force 21 [Falkenhorst's Force, detailed to conduct the invasion] about the long interval between taking up readiness positions at 05.30 hours and close of diplomatic negotiations. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken, and even exaggerate them." (1809-PS) The entry of 28 March reads: "Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the other two commanders are worrying about matters which are none of their business. Franke sees more disadvantages than advantages. "In the evening the Fuehrer visits the map room and roundly declares tat he won't stand for the nary clearing out of the Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim and Oslo will have to remain occupied by naval forces." (1809-PS) The entry for 2 April reads: "Commanders-in-chief of the Air Force, Commanders-in-chief of the Navy, and general von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer. All confirm preparations completed. Fuehrer orders carrying out of the Weser Exercise for April 9th." (1809-PS) From the large number of operation orders that were issued in connection with the aggression against Norway and Denmark, two may be cited to illustrate the extent of the secrecy and deception that was used by the conspirators in the course of that aggression. The first dated 4 April 1940, reads in part: "* * * The barrage-breaking vessels (Sperrbrechers) will penetrate inconspicuously, and with lights on, into Oslo Fjord, disguised as merchant steamers. "Challenge from coastal signal stations and lookouts are to be answered by the deceptive use of the name of English steamers. I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the operation before zero hour." (C-115) An order for reconnaissance forces, dated 24 March 1940, entitled "Behavior during entrance into the harbor,"
stations and lookouts are to be answered by the deceptive use of the name of English steamers. I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the operation before zero hour." (C-115) An order for reconnaissance forces, dated 24 March 1940, entitled "Behavior during entrance into the harbor," reads in part: "The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as possible, All challenges in Morse by Norwegian ships will be answered in English. In answer to questions a text with something like the following content will be chosen: "Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent. "Challenges to be answered with name of British warships: "Koeln...........................................H.M.S. Cairo "Koenigsberg.....................................H.M.S. Calcutta "Bromso..........................................H.M.S. Faulkner "Karl Peters.....................................H.M.S. Halcyon "Leopard.........................................British destroyer "Wolf............................................British destroyer "E-boats.........................................British motor torpedo boats "Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke." (C-115) An order dated 24 March 1940, classified "Most Secret," provides: "Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of passing craft. To challenge in case of the 'Koeln' H.M.S. Cairo. Then to order to stop: (1) Please repeat last signal. (2) Impossible to understand your signal. In case of a warning shot: Stop firing. British ship. Good friend. In case of an inquiry as to destination and purpose: Gong Bergen. Chasing German steamers." (C-115) Doenitz's order in connection with this operation is headed "Top Secret, Operation Order 'Hartmut.' " "Occupation of Denmark and Norway. This order comes into force on the codeword 'Hartmut.' With its coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking part lose their validity. "The day and hour are designated as 'Weser-Day' and 'Weser-Hour', and the whole operation is known as "Weseruebung'. "The operation ordered by the codeword has its objective the
force on the codeword 'Hartmut.' With its coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking part lose their validity. "The day and hour are designated as 'Weser-Day' and 'Weser-Hour', and the whole operation is known as "Weseruebung'. "The operation ordered by the codeword has its objective the rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land side. * * * The naval force will as they enter the harbor fly the British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvik." (C-151) E. Nazi Justification of Invasion. On 9 April 1940 the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and almost unarmed people of Norway and Denmark was launched. When the invasions had already begun, a German memorandum was handed to the governments of Norway and Denmark attempting to justify the German action (TC-55). That memorandum alleges that England and France were guilty in their maritime warfare of breaches of international law; that Britain and France are making plans themselves to invade and occupy Norway; and that the government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such a situation. The memorandum further states: "The German troops therefore do not set foot on Norwegian soil as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations against England, so long as it is not forced to do so by measures taken by England and France. German military operations aim much more exclusively at protecting the north against proposed occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French forces." (TC-55) In connection with that statement it may be recalled that in his operation order on 1 March Hitler had given orders to the Air Force to make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain. That was on 1 March. And this is the memorandum which was produced as an excuse on 9 April. The last two paragraphs of the German memorandum to Norway and Denmark are a classic Nazi combination of diplomatic hypocracy and military threat: "The Reich Government thus expects that the Royal Norwegian Government and the Norwegian people will respond with understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to it. Any resistance would have to
German memorandum to Norway and Denmark are a classic Nazi combination of diplomatic hypocracy and military threat: "The Reich Government thus expects that the Royal Norwegian Government and the Norwegian people will respond with understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to it. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all possible means by the German forces employed, and would therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The royal Norwegian Government is therefore requested to take all measures with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of the German troops can take place without friction and difficulty. In the spirit of the good German-Norwegian relations that have always existed, the Reich Government declares to the Royal Norwegian Government that German has no intention of infringing by her measures the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Norway now or in the future." (TC-55) What the Nazis meant by "protection of the kingdom of Norway" was shown by their conduct on 9 April. A report by the Commander in Chief of the Royal Norwegian Forces states: "* * * The Germans, considering the long lines of communications and the treat of the British Navy, clearly understood the necessity of complete surprise and speed in the attack. In order to paralyze the will of the Norwegian people to defend their country and at the same time to prevent allied intervention it was planned to capture all the more important towns along the coast simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament and other military and civilian people occupying important positions were to be arrested before organized resistance could be put into effect and the King was to be forced to form a new government with Quisling as the head." "The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded towns along the coast were captured according to plan with only slight losses. In the Oslofjord, however, the cruiser 'Blucher', carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division, technical staffs and specialists who were to take over the control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture the King and members of the Government and Parliament failed in spite of the surprise of the attack; resistance was