dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
Oslofjord, however, the cruiser 'Blucher', carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division, technical staffs and specialists who were to take over the control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture the King and members of the Government and Parliament failed in spite of the surprise of the attack; resistance was organizes throughout the country." (TC-56) What happened in Denmark is described in a memorandum prepared by the Royal Danish Government (D-628). An extract form it reads: "Extracts from the Memorandum concerning Germany's attitude towards Denmark before and during the occupation, prepared by the Royal Danish Government. "On the 9th of April, 1940 at 4.20 hours the German Minister appeared at the private residence of the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Air Attaché of the Legation. The appointment had been made by a telephone call from the German Legation to the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 4.00 o'clock the same morning. The Minister said at once that Germany had positive proof that Great Britain intended to occupy bases in Denmark and Norway. Germany had to safeguard Denmark against this. For this reason German soldiers were now crossing the frontier and landing at various points in Zealand including the port of Copenhagen; in a short time German bombers would be over Copenhagen; their orders were not to bomb until further notice. It was now up to the Danes to prevent resistance as any resistance would have the most terrible consequences. Germany would guarantee Denmark's territorial integrity and political independence. Germany would not interfere with the internal government of Denmark, but wanted only to make sure of the neutrality of the country. For this purpose the presence of the German Wehrmacht in Denmark was required during the war. "The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was completely without foundation; there was no possibility of anything like that. The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested against the violation of Denmark's neutrality which according to the German Minister's statement was in progress. The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared further that he
British plans to occupy Denmark was completely without foundation; there was no possibility of anything like that. The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested against the violation of Denmark's neutrality which according to the German Minister's statement was in progress. The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared further that he could not give a reply to the demands, which had to be submitted to the King and the Prime Minister, and further observed that the German Minister knew, as everybody else, that the Danish armed forces had orders to oppose violations of Denmark's neutrality so that fighting presumably already took place in reply the German Minster expressed that the matter was very urgent, not least to avoid air bombardment." (D-628) What happened thereafter is described in dispatch from the British Minister in Copenhagen to the British Foreign Secretary (D-627). That dispatch reads: "The actual events of the 9th April have been pieced together by members of my staff from actual eye-witnesses or from reliable information subsequently received and are given below. Early in the morning towards 5 o'clock three small German transports steamed into the approach to Copenhagen harbor, whilst a number of airplanes circled overhead. The northern battery, guarding the harbor approach, fired a warning shot at these planes when it was seen that they carried German markings. Apart from this, the Danes offered no further resistance, and the German vessels fastened alongside the quays in the Free Harbor. Some of these airplanes proceeded to drop leaflets over the town urging the population to keep calm and cooperate with the Germans. I enclose a specimen of this leaflet, which is written in a bastard Norwegian-Danish, a curiously un-German disregard of detail, together with a translation. Approximately 800 soldiers landed with full equipment, and marched to Kastellet, the old fortress of Copenhagen and now a barracks. The door was and rounded up all the Danish soldiers within, together with the womenfolk employed in the mess. The garrison offered no resistance, and it appears that they were taken completely by surprise. One officer tried to escape in a motor car, but his chauffeur was shot before they could get away. He died in hospital two days later. After
the Danish soldiers within, together with the womenfolk employed in the mess. The garrison offered no resistance, and it appears that they were taken completely by surprise. One officer tried to escape in a motor car, but his chauffeur was shot before they could get away. He died in hospital two days later. After seizing the barracks, a detachment was sent to Amalienborg, the King's place, where they engaged the Danish sentries on guard, wounding three one of them fatally. Meanwhile, a large fleet of bombers flew over the city at low altitudes." "It has been difficult to ascertain exactly what occurred in Jutland. It is clear, however, that the enemy invaded Jutland from the south at dawn on the 9th April and were at first resisted by the Danish forces. Who suffered casualties. The chances of resistance were weakened by the extent to which the forces appear to have been taken by surprise. The chief permanent official of the Ministry of War, for instance, motored into Copenhagen on the morning of the 9 the April and drove blithely past a sentry who challenged him, in blissful ignorance that this was not one of is own men. It took a bullet, which passed through the lapels of his own men. It took a bullet, which passed through the lapels of his coat, to disillusion him." (D-627) The German memorandum to the Norwegian and Danish governments spoke of the German desire to maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of those two small countries. Two documents indicate the kind of territorial integrity and political independence the Nazi conspirators contemplated for the victims of their aggression. An entry in Jodl's diary for 19 April reads: "Renewed crisis. Envoy Braver is recalled: since Norway is at war with us, the task of the Foreign Office is finished. In the Fuehrer's opinion, force has to be used. It is said that Gauleiter Terboven will be given a post. Field Marshal [presumably a reference to Goering] is moving in the same direction. He criticizes as defects that we didn't take sufficiently energetic measures against the civilian population, that we could have seized electrical plant, that the Navy didn't supply enough troops. The Air Force can't do everything." (1809-PS) It will be seen from that entry and the
is moving in the same direction. He criticizes as defects that we didn't take sufficiently energetic measures against the civilian population, that we could have seized electrical plant, that the Navy didn't supply enough troops. The Air Force can't do everything." (1809-PS) It will be seen from that entry and the reference to Gauleiter Terboven that already by 19 April, rule by Gauleiters had replaced rule by Norwegians. A memorandum dated 3 June 1940,signed by Fricke, at that date the head of the Operations Division of the German Naval War Staff, which was a key appointment in the very verve center of German naval operations, relates to questions of territorial expansion and bases (C-41). It reads: "These problems are preeminently of a political character and comprise an abundance of questions of a political type, which it is not the Navy's province to answer, but they also materially affect the strategic possibilities open-according to the way in which this question is answered-according to the way in which this question is answered-for the subsequent use and operation of the Navy. "It is too well known to need further mention that German's present position in the narrows of the Heligoland Bight and in the Baltic-bordered as it is by a whole series of States and under their influence-is an impossible one for the future of Greater Germany. If, over and above this, one extends these strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by how or other an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the war. "The solution could perhaps be found among the following possibilities. "1. The territories of Denmark, Norway and Northern France acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied and organized that they can in future be considered as German possessions. "This solution will recommend itself for areas where the severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy and where a gradual 'Germanizing' of the territory appears practicable. "2. The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct connection with Germany's main body, and which like the Russian solution in Hango, remain permanently as an enclave in the
severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy and where a gradual 'Germanizing' of the territory appears practicable. "2. The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct connection with Germany's main body, and which like the Russian solution in Hango, remain permanently as an enclave in the hostile State. Such areas might be considered possibly around Brest and Trondheim. "3. The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas acquired in this war should result in the existing population if these areas feeling themselves politically, economically and militarily to be completely dependent on Germany. If the following results are achieved-that expansion is undertaken (on a scale I shall describe later) by means of the military measures for occupation taken during the war, that French powers of resistance (popular unity, mineral resources, industry, Armed Forces) are so broken that a revival must be considered out of the question, that the smaller States such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway war forced into a dependence on us which will enable us in any circumstances and at any time easily to occupy these countries again, then in practice the same, but psychologically much more, will be achieved." (C-41) Then Fricke recommends: "The solution given in 3, therefore, appears to be the proper one, that is, to crush France, to occupy Belgium, part of North and East France, to allow the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway to exist on the basis indicated above." "Time will show how far the outcome of the war with England will make an extension of these demands possible." (C-41) The submission of the prosecution is that that and other documents which have been submitted tear apart the veil of Nazi pretense. These documents reveal the menace behind the good-will of Goering; the expose as fraudulent the diplomacy of Ribbentrop; they show the reality behind the ostensible political ideology of tradesmen in treason like Rosenberg; and finally and above all, they render sordid the professional status of Keitel and of Raeder. LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST NORWAY AND DENMARK Document Description Vol. Page Charter of the international military Tribunal, Article 6(a)....... I 5 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1,
above all, they render sordid the professional status of Keitel and of Raeder. LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST NORWAY AND DENMARK Document Description Vol. Page Charter of the international military Tribunal, Article 6(a)....... I 5 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 5; V....... I 27,29 Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. a Double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court. *004-PS Report submitted by Rosenberg to Deputy of the Fuehrer, 15 June 1940, on the Political preparation of the Norway Action. (GB 140)......... III 19 *007-PS Report on activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau from 1933 to 1943 signed Rosenberg. (GB 84)........ III 27 *957-PS Rosenberg's letter to Ribbentrop, 24 February 1940. (GB 139)...... III 641 *1546-PS Raeder memorandum, 9 April 1940, concerning occupation of Norway....... IV 104 *1809-PS Entries from Jodl's diary, February 1940 to May 1940. (GB 88)........ IV 377 *3054-PS "The Nazi Plan", script of a motion picture composed of captured German film. (USA 167)...... V 801 *3596-PS Covering memorandum and notes of conversation on 8 August 1940, between Chief Custodian of Army Archives GOES and Major-General Himer....... VI 299 *C-5 Memorandum to Supreme Command of the Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, concerning base in Norway. (GB 83)...... VI 815 *C-41 Memorandum by Fricke, 3 June 1940, on questions of territorial expansion and bases. (GB 96)....... VI 868 *C-63 Keitel order on Preparation for "Weseruebung", 27 January 1940. (GB 87).......... VI 883 *C-64 Raeder's report, 12 December 1939, on meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. (GB 86)...... VI 884 *C-65 Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder concerning visit of Quisling. (GB 85)...... VI 885 *C-66 Memorandum from Raeder to Assman, 10 January 1944, concerning "Barbarossa" and
27 January 1940. (GB 87).......... VI 883 *C-64 Raeder's report, 12 December 1939, on meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. (GB 86)...... VI 884 *C-65 Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder concerning visit of Quisling. (GB 85)...... VI 885 *C-66 Memorandum from Raeder to Assman, 10 January 1944, concerning "Barbarossa" and "Weseruebung". (GB 81)........ VI 887 *C-115 Naval deception and camouflage in invasion of Norway taken from file of naval operation orders for operation "Weseruebung". (GB 90)....... IV 914 *C-122 Extract from Naval War Diary. Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 October 1939. (GB 82)...... VI 928 *C-151 Details for execution of operation "Weseruebung", 3 March 1940, signed by Doenitz. (GB 91)....... VI 965 *C-174 Hitler Order for operation "Weseruebung", 1 March 1940. (GB 89)......... VI 1003 *D-627 Dispatch from British Minister in Copenhagen to Foreign Secretary, 25 April 1940. (GB 95)......... VII 97 *D-628 Memorandum concerning Germany's attitude towards Denmark before and during occupation. (GB 94)....... VII 98 *D-629 Letter from Keitel to Ribbentrop, 3 April 1940. (GB 141).......... VII 99 *L-323 Entry in Naval War Diary concerning Operation "Weseruebung". (USA 541)....... VII 1106 *M-156 Year Book of the Ausland (Foreign) Organization of the NSDAP for 1942. (GB 284)........ VIII 49 *TC-17 Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Denmark, signed at Berlin, 2 June 1926. (GB 76)....... VIII 346 *TC-24 Treaty of non-aggression between German Reich and Kingdom of Denmark, 31 May 1939. (GB 77)........ VIII 373 *TC-30 German assurance to Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands, 28 April 1939, from Documents of German Politics, Part VII, I, PP. 1939, 172-175. (GB 78)...... VIII 379 *TC-31 German assurance to Norway, 2 September 1939, (GB 79)........ VIII 380 *TC-32 German assurance to Norway, 6 October 1939, from Documents of German Politics, Vol. VII, p. 350. (GB 80)........ VIII *TC-55 German ultimatum to Norway and Denmark, 9 April 1940, from Documents of German Politics, Part VIII, pp.21-31. (GB 92)..... VIII 410 *TC-56 German Plans for Invasion of Norway, 1 October 1945. (GB 93)...... VIII 414 **Chart No.12 German Aggression. (Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.)....... VIII 781 **Chart No.13 Violations of Treaties, Agreements and Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to
of German Politics, Part VIII, pp.21-31. (GB 92)..... VIII 410 *TC-56 German Plans for Invasion of Norway, 1 October 1945. (GB 93)...... VIII 414 **Chart No.12 German Aggression. (Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.)....... VIII 781 **Chart No.13 Violations of Treaties, Agreements and Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.)........ VIII 782 10. AGGRESSION AGAINST BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND LUXEMBOURG The independence of Belgium, which for so many centuries was the cockpit of Europe, was guaranteed by the great European powers in 1839. that guarantee was observed for 75 years, until it was broken by the Germans in 1914, who brought all the horrors of war, and the even greater horrors of German occupation, to Belgium. History was to repeat itself in a still more catastrophic fashion some 25 years after, in 1940. Among the applicable treaties are the Hague Convention of 1907 (TC-3; TC-4), the Locarno arbitration and Conciliation Convention of 1925, in which Belgium's independence and neutrality were guaranteed by Germany; the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, by which all the Powers renounced recourse to war; and the Hague Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation May 1926 between Germany and the Netherlands (TC-16). Article I of the letter treaty provides: "The contracting parties" (the Netherlands and the German Reich) "undertake to submit all disputes of any nature whatever which may arise between them which it has not been possible to settle by diplomacy, and which have not been referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, to be dealt with by arbitration or conciliation as provided," (TC-16) Subsequent clauses deal with the machinery of conciliation. The last article, Article 21, provides that the convention shall be valid for ten years, and then shall remain in force for successive periods of five years until denounced by either party. And this treaty never was denounced by Germany at all. The last of the applicable treaties, all of which belong to the days of the Weimar Republic, is the Treaty of arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Luxembourg, executed at Geneva in 1829 (TC-20). The first few words of Article 1 are familiar: "The contracting parties undertake to settle by peaceful means all disputes
applicable treaties, all of which belong to the days of the Weimar Republic, is the Treaty of arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Luxembourg, executed at Geneva in 1829 (TC-20). The first few words of Article 1 are familiar: "The contracting parties undertake to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any nature whatever which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle by diplomacy." (TC-20) Then follow clauses dealing with the machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes, which are in the common form. Those were the treaty obligations between Germany and Belgium at the time when the Nazi Party came into power in 1933. Hitler adopted and ratified the obligations of Germany under the Weimer Republic with regard to the treaties which had been entered into. Nothing more occurred to alter the position of Belgium until March 1936. Germany reoccupied the Rhineland and announced the resumption of conscription. And Hitler, on 7 March 1936 purported in a speech to repudiate the obligations of the German Government under the Locarno Pact, the reason being given as the execution of the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935. There was no legal foundation for this claim that Germany was entitled to renounce obligations under the Locarno Pact. But Belgium was left in the air, in the sense that it had itself entered into various obligations under the Locarno Pact in return for the liabilities which other nations acknowledge, and now one of those liabilities, namely, the liability of Germany to observe the Pact, had been renounced. And so on 30 January 1937, perhaps because Hitler realized the position of Belgium and of the Netherlands, Hitler gave solemn assurance-he used the word "solemn"-which amounted to a full guarantee (TC-33). In April 1937, France and England released Belgium from her obligations under the Locarno Pact. Belgium gave guarantees of strict independence and neutrality, and France and England gave guarantees of assistance should Belgium be attacked. It was because of those facts that Germany, on 13 October 1937, gave a clear and unconditional guarantee to Belgium: "I have the honor on behalf of the German Government to make the following communication to your Excellency: the German Government has taken
guarantees of assistance should Belgium be attacked. It was because of those facts that Germany, on 13 October 1937, gave a clear and unconditional guarantee to Belgium: "I have the honor on behalf of the German Government to make the following communication to your Excellency: the German Government has taken cognizance with particular interest of the public declaration in which the Belgium Government defines the International position of Belgium. For its part, it has repeatedly given expressions, especially through the declaration made by the British and French Governments on the 24th of April 1937 * * * "Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty of Locarno may still take some time, and being desirous of strengthening the peaceful aspirations of the two countries, the German Government regards it as appropriate to define now its own attitude towards Belgium. To this end, it makes the following declaration: First, the German Government has taken note of the views which the Belgian Government has thought fit to express. That is to say, (a) of the policy of independence which it intends to exercise in full sovereignty; (b) of its determination to defend the frontiers of Belgium with all its forces against any aggression or invasion and to prevent Belgian territory from being used for purposes of aggression against another state as a passage or as a base of operation by land, by sea, or in the air, and to organize the defense of Belgium in an efficient manner to this purpose. Two: The German Government considers that the inviolability and integrity of Belgium are common interests of the Western Powers. It confirms its determination that in no circumstances will it impair this inviolability and integrity and that it will at all times respect Belgian territory except, of course, in the event of Belgium's taking part in a military action directed against Germany in an armed conflict in which Germany is involved. The German Government, like the British and French Governments, is prepared to assist Belgium should she be subjected to an attack or to invasion. * * *" (TC-34) The following reply was made: "The Belgian Government has taken note with great satisfaction of the