dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
WAGNER: A plan for the war against England did not exist at all before the beginning of the war. Such a war seemed to us outside the realm of possibility. Considering the overwhelming superiority of the British fleet, which can hardly be expressed in proportionate figures, and considering England's strategical domination of the seas such a war appeared to us to be absolutely hopeless. The only means by which Britain could have been damaged effectively was by submarine warfare; but even the submarine weapon was by no means being given preferential treatment nor was its production accelerated. It was merely given its corresponding place in the creation of a well-balanced homogeneous fleet. At the beginning of the war all we had were 40 submarines ready for action, of which, as far as I can remember, barely half could have been used in the Atlantic. That, in comparison with the earthgirdling naval means at the disposal of the first-ranking world power England, is as good as nothing. As a comparison, I should like to cite the fact that both the British and the French Navy at the same time had more than 100 submarines each.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did the then Captain D8nitz, as chief of the submarines, have anything to do with the planning of the war?
WAGNER: Captain Doenitz at that time was a subordinate frontline commander, under the command of the chief of the fleet and he, because of his warfare experience, had the task of training and tactically guiding the inexperienced submarine personnel.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did he in turn make any suggestions or instigate any plans for the war?
WAGNER: No, these preparations and this war planning, in particular for the "Case White," were exclusively the task of the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did Doenitz at any previous time hear about the military intentions of the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did Admiral Doenitz hear of the military intentions of the Naval Operations Staff at a time earlier than necessary for the carrying out of the orders given him?
WAGNER: No, he heard of it by means of the orders reaching him from the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral Wagner, you know of the London Agreement of 1936 regarding submarine warfare. Did the Naval Operations Staff draw any conclusions from that agreement for their preparation for a war, in particular, for carrying on a possible economic war?
WAGNER: The Prize Regulations still existing from the last war were revised and made to conform with the London Agreement. For that purpose a committee was formed which included representatives from the High Command of the Navy, the Foreign Of lice, the Reich Ministry of Justice, and scientific experts.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were these new Prize Regulations made known to the commandants some time before the war or were they communicated to them just when they were published shortly before the outbreak of the war?
WAGNER: These new Prize Regulations were published in 1938 as an internal ordinance of the Navy, which was available for the purpose of training officers. During the autumn maneuvers of the Fleet in 1938 a number of exercises were arranged for the purpose of acquainting the officer corps with these new regulations. I, myself, at that time...
THE PRESIDENT: Where are the new Prize Regulations you are referring to?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I am talking about the regulations published on 26 August 1939, which are contained in my document book. They are on Page 137, in Volume III of my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President; the date is not 26, but 28 August.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness was saying that exercises were carried out?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, in the year 1938.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: [Turning to the witness.] Which conceptions did the Naval Operations Staff have after the beginning of the war regarding the development of the naval war against Britain?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff thought that Great Britain would probably start in where she had stopped at the end of the first World War. That meant that there would be a hunger blockade against Germany, a control of the merchandise of neutral countries, introduction of a system of control, the arming of merchant ships, and the delimitation of operational waters.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I am now going to have the battle order of 3 September 1939 shown to you. It is Document Doenitz-55. It can be found on Page 139, in Volume III of the document book. You will see from this that submarines, like all naval forces, had orders to adhere to this Prize Ordinance in the economic warfare. Then, at the end, you will find an order which I propose to read to you. This is on Page 140: "Order prepared for intensifying the economic war because of the arming of enemy merchant ships. "1) Arming of, and therefore resistance from, the majority of English and French merchant ships is to be expected. "2) Submarines will stop merchant ships only if own vessel is not endangered. Attack without warning by submarines is allowed against plainly recognized enemy merchant ships. "3) Battleships and auxiliary cruisers will watch for possibility of use of arms by merchant ships when stopped." I should like to ask you whether this order was prepared long ago or whether it was improvised at the last moment?
WAGNER: At the beginning of the war we were forced to improvise a great many orders we were issuing, because they were not prepared thoroughly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did this order become operative at all?
WAGNER: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Why not?
WAGNER: After consultation with the Foreign Office, we had decided that we would strictly adhere to the London Agreement until we had clear-cut evidence of the British merchant navy being used for military purposes. We remembered from the last war the power which the enemy propaganda had, and we did not under any circumstances want to give anyone cause once more to decry us as pirates.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: When, at what stage, did the military use of enemy merchant ships become clear to the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: The fact that enemy merchant vessels were armed became clear after a few weeks of the war. We had a large number of reports about artillery fights which had occurred between U-boats and armed enemy merchant ships. Certainly one, and probably several boats were lost by us. One British steamer, I think it was called Stonepool, was praised publicly by the British Admiralty for its success in combating submarines.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The Tribunal already has knowledge of the order of 4 October allowing attacks against all armed merchant ships of the enemy and also of the order of 17 October allowing attacks on all enemy merchant ships with certain exceptions. Were these orders the result of experiences which the Naval Operations Staff had regarding the military use of enemy merchant ships?
WAGNER: Yes, exclusively.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Both orders contain exceptions favoring passenger ships. They were not to be attacked even when they were members of an enemy convoy. To what were these exceptions due?
WAGNER: They were due to an order from the Fuehrer. At the beginning of the war he had stated that Germany did not have any intention of waging war against women and children. He wished, for that reason, that also in naval war any incidents in which women and children might lose their lives should be avoided. Consequently, even the stopping of passenger ships was prohibited. The military necessities of naval warfare made it very difficult to adhere to this order, particularly where passenger ships were traveling in enemy convoys. Later on, step by step, this order was altered as it became evident that there was no longer any peaceful passenger traffic at all and that enemy passenger ships were particularly heavily armed and used more and more as auxiliary cruisers and troop transport ships.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were the orders of the German Naval Operations Staff regarding the combating of armed enemy ships and later enemy ships as a whole made known to the British Admiralty?
WAGNER: Neither side made its war measures known during the war, and that held true in this case also. But in October the German press left no doubt whatsoever that every armed enemy merchant ship would be sunk by us without warning, and later on it was equally well known that we were forced to consider the entire enemy merchant marine as being under military direction and in military use. These statements by our press must no doubt have been known to the British Admiralty and the neutral governments. Apart from that, and I think this was in October, Grossadmiral Raeder gave an interview to the press on the same theme.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: A memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff was issued in the middle of October: "On the Possibilities of Intensifying the War against Merchant Shipping"; I am going to have this memorandum shown to you. Its number is GB-224. After looking at this memorandum please tell me what its purpose was and what the memorandum contains. Mr. President, some extracts can be found on Page 199, in Volume IV of the document book.
WAGNER: This memorandum was issued due to the situation that existed since the beginning of the war. On 3 September 1939 Britain had begun a total hunger blockade against Germany. Naturally that was not directed-only against the fighting men, but against all nonfighting members, including women, children, the aged, and the sick. It meant that Britain would declare all food rations, all luxury goods, all clothing, as well as all raw materials necessary for these items, as contraband and would also exercise a strict control of neutral shipping of which Germany would- be deprived insofar as it would have to go through waters controlled by Great Britain. Apart from that, England exercised a growing political and economic pressure upon the European neighbors of Germany to cease all commerce with Germany. That intention of the total hunger blockade was emphatically confirmed by the Head of the British Government, Prime Minister Chamberlain, during a speech before the House of Commons at the end of September. He described Germany as a beleaguered fort; and he added that it was not customary for beleaguered forts to be accorded free rations. That expression of the beleaguered fort was also taken up by the French press. Furthermore, Prime Minister Chamberlain stated around the beginning of October-according to this memorandum it was on 12 October-that in this war Britain would utilize her entire strength For the destruction of Germany. From this we drew the conclusion, aided by the experiences of the last World War, that England would soon hit German exports under some pretext or other. With the shadow of the total hunger blockade, which no doubt had been thoroughly prepared during long years of peace, creeping in upon us we now had a great deal to do to catch up, since we had not prepared for war against Great Britain. We examined, both from the legal and military point of view, the possibilities at our disposal by which we in turn might cut off Britain's supplies. That was the aim and purpose of that memorandum.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You are saying, therefore, that this memorandum contains considerations regarding means for countering the British measures with correspondingly effective German measures?
WAGNER: Yes, that was definitely the purpose of that memorandum.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Studying that memorandum you will find a sentence-C. 1. is the paragraph-according to which the Naval Operations Staff must remain basically within the limits of international law, but that decisive war measures would have to be carried out even if the existing international law could not be applied to them. Did this mean that international law was to be generally disregarded by the Naval Operations Staff, or what is the meaning of this sentence?
WAGNER: That question was duly studied by the Naval Operations Staff and discussed at great length. I should like to point out that on Page 2 of the memorandum, in the first paragraph, it states that obedience to the laws of chivalry comes before all else in naval warfare. That, from the outset, would prevent a barbarous waging of war at sea. We did think, however, that the modern technical developments would create conditions for naval warfare which would certainly justify and necessitate further development of the laws of naval warfare.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Which technical developments do you mean?
WAGNER: I am thinking mainly of two points: First, the largescale use of the airplane in naval warfare. As a result of the speed and wide range of the airplane, militarily guarded zones could be created before the coasts of all warfaring nations, and in respect to these zones one could no longer speak of freedom of the seas. Secondly, the introduction of electrical orientation equipment which made it possible, even at the beginning of the war, to spot an unseen opponent and to send fighting forces against him.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: It says in this memorandum that decisive war measures are to be taken even though they create new laws at sea. Did occasion arise for such measures?
WAGNER: No; at any rate, not at once. In the meantime, I think on 4 November, the United States of America declared the so-called American combat zone, and the specific reason given for it was that in that zone actual belligerent actions rendered the sea dangerous for American shipping. By this announcement some of the points of that memorandum were in immediate need of being revised. As a rule we remained within the limits of the measures as they had been employed by both parties during the first World War.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: By these measures do you mean the warning against navigating in certain zones?
WAGNER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: According to some of the exhibits used by the Prosecution, Numbers GB-194 and 226, submarines were permitted to attack all ships without warning in certain areas, beginning with January 1940. The attacks were to be carried out, if possible, unseen, while maintaining the fiction that the ships struck mines. Will you please tell the Tribunal which sea lanes or areas were concerned in this? I shall have a sea-chart handed to you for that purpose. I am submitting it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Doenitz-93. Will you please explain what can be seen on that map.
WAGNER: In the middle of the map you will find the British Isles. The large part of the ocean which is shaded on the edge shows the afore-mentioned American combat zone. The shaded parts of the sea near the British coast are those parts which were ordered to be German submarine operational zones. They were given letters from A to F in accordance with the time when they were set up.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Can you tell us up to which depth these German operational zones went?
WAGNER: I think perhaps as far as the 200 meter line.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Does this depth guarantee favorable use of mines?
WAGNER: Yes, down to 200 meters the use of anchored mines is possible without any difficulty.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In these operational zones certain dates have been entered. Will you please explain how it happened that on those particular dates, and in that sequence, these territories were made operational zones?
WAGNER: All those areas were declared to be operational zones where our fighting forces came into contact with enemy traffic and a concentration of the enemy defense, resulting in main combat areas. To begin with, they were the zones at the northern and southern end of the German-mined zones which had been declared along the British East Coast and in the Bristol Channel. You can see, therefore, that Zone A lies to the east of Scotland and is dated 6 January. The Bristol Channel Zone is dated 12 January, and finally at the southern end of this danger zone, that is, to the east of London, there is the date of 24 January. Later on, according to the fluctuations of the actual fighting, further areas around the British Isles and then off the French Coast were designated.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Up to what date did this development continue?
WAGNER: The last zone was declared on 28 May 1940.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Had neutrals been warned against navigating in these zones?
WAGNER: Yes, an official note had informed neutral countries that the entire U.S.A. fighting zone had to be considered as being dangerous, and that they should negotiate the North Sea to the east and to the south of the German mine area which was north of Holland.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What difference is there between the situation as shown by this map, and the German declaration of a blockade of 17 August 1940? That is, Mr. President, the declaration I have submitted as Doenitz-104, which can be found on Page 214 in Volume IV of the document book.
WAGNER: As far as the limits of the danger zone are concerned, there was really no difference. This fact was also stated by Prime Minister Churchill in the House of Commons at the time. However, the difference which did exist was that up to that time we confined ourselves to the area I have just described, near the British Coast, whereas now we considered the entire U.S.A. combat zone as an operational zone. The declaration regarding a blockade was based on the fact that in the meantime France had been eliminated from the war, and that Britain now was the focal point of all belligerent action.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did the German blockade zone in its entirety correspond exactly or more or less with the U.S.A. combat zone?
WAGNER: It was nearly exactly the same as the U.S.A. combat zone. There were merely a few insignificant corrections.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I am submitting another sea-chart as Doenitz-92, in which...
THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps that would be a good time to break off then. [A recess was taken.]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Now, Mr. President, as Doenitz-94, I submit a chart of the German blockade zone dated 17 August. Admiral Wagner, just for the sake of repeating, what were the limits of the German blockade region in relation to the U.S. fighting zone?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had already told us that. You told us that the blockade zone was the same as the American zone, didn't you?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President, I thought that we had not been understood quite correctly before the recess. [Turning to the witness.] What was the naval practice of the enemy as far as this operational zone was concerned? Was there any practice that they followed?
WAGNER: Yes, the practice on the part of the enemy was identical with ours. In the areas controlled by us in the Baltic, in the eastern part of the North Sea' around Skagerrak and later on in the Norwegian and French waters, the enemy used every suitable weapon without giving previous warning, without notifying us in advance by which means of combat other ships were to be sunk- submarines, mines, aircraft, or surface vessels. In these regions the same thing applied to neutrals, and especially to Sweden.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Now, I would like to confront you with a statement by the First Lord of the British Admiralty. You will find this on Page 208 of the document book, Plume IV. This statement is dated 8 May 1940, and I have ascertained, Mr. President, that unfortunately it is wrongly reproduced in the British document book; so I shall quote from the original. "Therefore we limited our operations in the Skagerrak to the submarines. In order to make this work as effective as possible, the usual restrictions which we have imposed on the actions of our submarines were relaxed. As I told the House, all German ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk as opportunity served." I should like to submit this as Exhibit Doenitz-102.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the difference that you were making in the copy we have before us-"... all ships were to be sunk by day and German ships by night..." Is that it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President. It should be corrected to read, "all German ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk."
THE PRESIDENT: I see; I said it wrong-"and all ships by night." Yes, very well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral Wagner, what was the significance of this statement and this practice so far as the German ships were concerned?
WAGNER: It means that all German ships by day and by night in this area were to be sunk without warning.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And what does it mean for the neutral ships?
WAGNER: It means that without warning all neutral ships in this area by night...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, surely the document speaks for itself. We don't need to have it interpreted by a witness who isn't a lawyer.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Very well. [Turning to the witness.] Then, tell me, please, from what period of time onward, according to German experiences, did this practice exist in the Skagerrak?
WAGNER: With certainty from 8 April 1940, but I believe I recall that even on 7 April this practice was already in existence.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Had this area at this period of time, that is, the 7th or 8th of April, already been declared a danger zone?
WAGNER: No, the first declaration of danger zone for this area took place on 12 April 1940.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Now I shall have a seachart handed to you dealing with the British danger zones, and this shall be Doenitz-92. Please explain the significance of this chart briefly to the Tribunal.
WAGNER: This chart shows the danger zones in European waters as declared by England on the basis of German data. The following areas are of special significance: First of all, the area in the Bay of Helgoland which on 4 September 1939, that is, on the second day of the war, was declared dangerous. Then the afore-mentioned danger zone, Skagerrak and the area south of Norway, which was declared on 12 April 1940. Then the danger zone in the Baltic, on 14 April 1940; and following upon that, the other danger zones as declared in the course of the year 1940. I should like to remark also that, according to my recollection, these danger zones were all declared mine danger zones, with the exception of the Channel zone and of the Bay of Biscay, on 17 August 1940. These were generally dangerous zones.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were these areas actually dominated by the British sea and air forces, or did German traffic still continue?
WAGNER: In these areas there was even very lively German traffic. Thus the Baltic Sea, which in its entire expanse from East to West, about 400 nautical miles in length, had been declared a danger zone, was in reality controlled by us during the entire war. In this area there was an extensive freight traffic, the entire ore traffic from Sweden and the corresponding exports to Sweden.