dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SEYSS-INQUART: I have said that a few thousand National Socialists had collected around the Federal Chancellery. Whether they were SS or SA men, that I do not know. There were quite a lot of women among them. This so-called mobilization order of the Party was unknown to me; but I told Dr. Schuschnigg that very morning that if we could not agree, then he would have to expect large-scale demonstrations by the Party.
MR. DODD: Now, one other matter. Did you tell the Tribunal- did I understand you correctly when I heard you testify that Miklas resigned without any request from you? That is, President Miklas, who was then the Bundesprasident of Austria. Is it your testimony that he resigned without any request from you?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was my request that he should sign the Anschluss Law, and he said he would not do that. According to the Constitution his powers would then pass to me. He did not want to stand in the way of developments. I do not think I told him to resign; I merely demanded that he sign the law.
MR. DODD: Well, he has testified before a court in Vienna, in which testimony he says that you demanded it. Now do you remember or have you forgotten or do you say that is untrue?
SEYSS-INQUART: No; I consider that is out of the question because I clearly remember that he said: 'I cannot sign the law, but I shall not stand in the way of developments. If you confirm to me that it is necessary that the Anschluss should be carried out, then I shall resign and you will have my powers." If he understood that as a demand to resign, then I do not want to contradict him. I do not want to make his position any more difficult, because I confess that I was in favor of the Anschluss.
MR. DODD: Well, I want to offer this in evidence, and you may look at it if you like. In any event, it is his testimony before a court in Vienna on 30 January 1946. It is Document 3697-PS, and it becomes USA-884. If you would like to see it, you may. He says just about what I put to you, that you talked around it a good deal, said it was very distasteful for you, but nevertheless you were bound to comply with the order from Germany and therefore he had to resign. That is on Page 17 of the English text of the testimony of President Miklas. Did you once write a letter to Himmler, or did you twice write letters to Himmler, about Burckel? One of them is in evidence, and I want to ask you if you remember the other one. Do you remember the letter that you wrote to Himmler in which you said that it was not true that you were interfering with the deportation of the Jews; that you. had only insisted that they be turned over to Kaltenbrunner's men, the SD?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know it. It was submitted here. I know I have seen it in this Court.
MR. DODD: I think you have seen it, but it has not been submitted in evidence; however, I wish to do so.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but the letter is certainly correct.
MR. DODD: It is Number 3398-PS, which is USA-885. In the letter you said that you gave instructions that the deportation of the Jews should be carried out only in agreement with the SD and through the SD and that you could not permit wild actions.
SEYSS-INQUART: Right. Do you want me to state my views with regard to it, Mr. Prosecutor?
MR. DODD: Well, I want to ask you this. Then you knew all about it, and I understood you to say that you did anyway, on your direct examination. You knew about the deportation of the Jews, and you were doing your part to see that the SD carried it out. That is the only point I am trying to make with your and I assume that you agree.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, of course I knew that a few trains had been loaded with Jews in Vienna. They were then taken to Poland and unloaded. No preparations whatsoever had been made, and the Jews were in serious difficulties. I opposed this state of affairs; and when Burckel complained, I told Himmler, "If such actions take place, then they ought to be carried out by the SD," because I was under the impression that then better preparations would be made. When I say that today it sounds very tragic and bitter, but I thought that at least emergency quarters and so on would be provided somewhere. Apart from that I knew from 9 November 1938 how these things were carried out. The Party forged ahead, and then the State had to take over these matters and carry them out.
MR. DODD: Yes. At any event, you knew that Kaltenbrunner at that time was deporting, or had charge of the transporting of the Jews out of Austria.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall Kaltenbrunner in this connection. I think that was done by the Party alone. I believe Kaltenbrunner had no part in it.
MR. DODD: Didn't you say the SD, and wasn't that under Kaltenbrunner in Austria, at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I said that it ought to do it, but these transports were not run by Kaltenbrunner, Globocznik ran them.
MR. DODD: Welt they were under Kaltenbrunner, were they not? He was the head of the whole police system in Austria at that time.
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, he was rather the commander of the Security Police; and how much influence he had there I could not say, but I think it was very little.
MR. DODD: You found out since you have been sitting here that he had quite a lot, didn't you? You now know that he had a lot to do with it.
SEYSS-INQUART: No.
MR. DODD: You mean to say you haven't heard here that Kaltenbrunner had something to do with the removal of the Jews? SEYSS-INQUART Yes, I shall leave that to Kaltenbrunner. From my own observations I do not know it.
MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to labor it, but that isn't what I asked you. I asked you if you haven't heard in this courtroom that Kaltenbrunner had much to do with the removal of the Jews.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Certainly. You relate that back to your letter, don't you? And don't you now know that he had something to do with the removal of Jews at the time you wrote the letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: In my opinion, Kaltenbrunner had nothing at all to do with the evacuation of Jews as mentioned here, because that was a wild action carried out by the Party or Gauleiter Globocznik.
MR. DODD: Do you remember when you got the authority, through Lammers, for the confiscation of property that you asked for in Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Have you seen these documents? They are new; your letter to Lammers, his reply back to you, and the order which was issued at your request. Those are three documents.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Your letter to Lammers is dated 23 October 1938, and it is 3448-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-886. And Lammers' reply to you is dated 24 October 1938 and it is 3447-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-887. The order itself is 3450-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-888. That was a confiscation of the property of the Jews in Austria, was it not, which you requested?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I testified yesterday, or the day before, that I co-operated in this matter by issuing decrees.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now?
MR. DODD: I can finish in 5 minutes, MR. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on, then. MR. DODD' I would like to finish up, and I think I can do it. Defendant, when did you first learn about the many Austrians who were dying in the concentration camps after the Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: About the many Austrians who died in concentration camps? I really learned about that in this courtroom, but about the numerous Austrians who were in concentration camps, perhaps in the course of 1943-44. In 1938-39 I knew that some political opponents were in concentration camps, but they were gradually being released again, or at least some of them.
MR. DODD: Didn't you know that they were being killed in Buchenwald as early as 1939? Didn't you know some of the people, and know about their deaths? Now think a minute before you answer this. Didn't you know about the death in Buchenwald of people who had been your political opponents?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember, Mr. Prosecutor.
MR. DODD: You never heard a word about it?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not mean to say that at all. If you give me a name, then I shall tell you at once what the situation is.
MR. DODD: I know if I tell you the name you will tell me you heard it, I suppose. However, I am asking you first if you didn't in fact know that some of them were dying in these camps. That is all I want to know. It was pretty common knowledge in Austria, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I shall most certainly admit that it is possible that I was told that one or another died in the camp even as early as 1938 or 1939.
MR. DODD: Well, you still continued to go on with the Nazis, although at least you knew that vast numbers of your fellow countrymen were being thrown into concentration camps. Didn't that make any difference to you? Whatever you thought before the Anschluss, you certainly knew what they were doing after it.
SEYSS-INQUART: That I knew that large numbers were dying is out of the question. That there were a few, one or another, who died would not have affected me particularly because, between 1934 and 1938, at least as many National Socialists had died in the concentration camps of Dr. Dollfuss and the Fatherland Front, that is to say, of the Austrian State.
MR. DODD: Well now, wouldn't you agree with me that conditions were very bad in Austria after the Nazis took over and they went from bad to worse and you knew it and everybody else in Austria knew it? Or do you want to take the position that they improved? I would just like to know what your opinion is.
SEYSS-INQUART: I will tell you quite frankly. Of course, if you listen today to the leaders of the political opposition, then it was terrible. However, if you saw the people up to 1939, then you could see that they had a new lease on life, because unemployment disappeared and there was quite a different spirit. But then the war altered all that.
MR. DODD: One last question, if you can answer it for me briefly. Do I understand you to accept responsibility for whatever went on in Poland, whatever is established as having gone on in Poland? That is, joint responsibility with Frank? Do you accept that as his deputy?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, that can only apply to the time when I was there and acted as deputy.
MR. DODD: Of course. I certainly don't mean after you left there. I am only talking about the time that you were there.
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, then, as deputy, only where I acted as deputy, or where crimes came to my knowledge without my taking measures against them. .
MR. DODD: I just want to read into the record one sentence from a document that has already been offered in evidence, MR. President. It is Document 2233-PS; and from that document, Page 1, Paragraph 4, I would like to read this, because part of it was read by the Defense, but this part was left out. It is under the small Arabic Figure 3: "The necessary police and other measures arising therefrom will be under the immediate direction of the Chief of the Security Police; every arbitrary action is to be strictly avoided." This had to do, by the way, with the "AB Action," concerning which this witness has testified. The records show that you, indeed, Mr. Defendant, were present at the time that the Defendant Frank discussed this AB Action and made this statement which I have just read into the record. Certainly you don't deny responsibility for whatever was done under the AB Action, do you? Because you did know about that.
SEYSS-INQUART: Neither in connection with the AB case nor in any other case did I deny anything. I spoke especially about the AB Action.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, Document 2233-PS, which is USSR-223, is now available in the French. It is already in evidence and has been accepted by the Tribunal, but a French copy was not available at the time it was offered. It has now been completely translated into the French, and I offer it to the Tribunal for assistance in the French. I have concluded my examination. Am; PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you said that the document of 11 November 1937, 3369-PS, was a new document. Did you give it a number?
MR. DODD: Just a moment, MR. President. I will check that. I meant to offer it, and I fear that I did omit to do so. That would become USA-889. It was a new document, and I did intend to offer it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn, and we will reconvene at 10 minutes past 2. [The Tribunal recessed until 1410 hours.] Afternoon Session
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, the French prosecutor asked you whether you were the deputy of Governor General Frank, and for that reason knew Auschwitz. Can you tell us where Auschwitz is located?
SEYSS-INQUART: Auschwitz was not in the region of the Government General, but rather in the area which belonged to the Gau Upper Silesia.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. Then the same prosecutor confronted you with the testimony of a girl of 20 years old, by the name of Kunze, in 3594-PS. According to this testimony you allegedly repeatedly sent reports to Himmler.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday evening, when I was confronted with this matter, I was rather tired, and made a statement somewhat in contradiction to the fact contained in the document, and said that under Paragraph 3 certain reports were mentioned which had no connection with me. Now this witness asserts that reports from me went to Himmler by way of the Security Police, dealing with the condition of the Jews. That is utter nonsense, which the results contradict. The Reich Commissioners were in no way subordinate to Himmler as far as the Jewish question was concerned. I sent perhaps two or three letters concerning individual cases. They went from my staff to the staff of Himmler; but never by way of the Security Police. DR. STEINBAUER' That is sufficient. You were, in addition, confronted with the testimony of a Dr. Karl Georg Schongarth in connection with the question of the shooting of hostages.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Schongarth was the successor, or more accurately, the deputy of Rauter; and it is correct that he came to me after he had inspected the scene of the assassination. He told me that Himmler demanded the shooting of 500 real hostages, prominent Dutchmen. I was aghast; and Schongarth said immediately that that was completely out of the question. Thereupon I most certainly said to Schongarth: "But we must do something, we must react in some way to this." He then told me that a number of cases of death sentences were on hand which were to be carried out by shooting within the next few days and weeks. He suggested that these people be shot and that an announcement be made to the effect that this was in retaliation for the assassination.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you and the Armed Forces commander in the Netherlands, in connection with the question of hostages, issue warnings to the population, as is customary under international law?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe there is a document available which contains a warning by me against sabotage, et cetera, in which I threatened, in the case of violation of the laws, to confiscate property and to draft the population for guard duty.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that this warning is contained in 1163-PS. [Turning to the defendant.] Further, I have to confront you with a document which is an interrogatory of the Defendant General Christiansen, in which he says that you were the one who issued the order for the shooting of hostages.
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that Christiansen does not say that. He admits that he issued the order; but what he means is that I, so to speak, was urging the matter behind the scenes. I made my statement, but perhaps the witness Wimmer can give us more exact details on this, since he was present at this discussion, as Christiansen himself states.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yesterday evening I once more studied this question, since the resolution of the Court remained in my mind to the effect that this statement by the witness, which is really the interrogation of an accused person, was admitted by the Court. In my opinion, Paragraph 21 of the Charter means something else here. I believe that a partial matter like that has no probative value, for it is theoretically possible that Christiansen could now be sentenced by the British on the grounds that his statement is not correct. Now, I do not want to delay this Tribunal, but I wish to call attention to the equivalent statement of Criminal Commissioner Munt, which I have already submitted in Document Number 77, Page 199. Then I call your attention to another matter. The French prosecutor asserted that the Dutch secretaries general were left behind by the Dutch Government to serve as a government, and that you were not justified in interfering with the sovereignty of the Netherlands. What have you to say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that and I also believe it is of no consequence. The Netherlands capitulated, and they did so for the entire region except Zeeland. The terms of capitulation consisted only of military details. From the civilian point of view it was unconditional surrender. I believe that on the basis of international law I was entirely justified in taking the government into my own hands.
DR. STEINBAUER: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I should like to submit a document which takes issue with this question. This is a verdict by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands of 12 January 1942. In my final speech I shall refer to this from the legal standpoint. It will be submitted to the Tribunal in certified form in four languages through the Prosecution who have agreed to this. The Exhibit Number is 96. Then further, the French prosecutor asserted that you carried out mass shootings and, particularly, deportations of civilian workers and the displacement of Jews, in order to weaken the biological power of the Netherlands.
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that I can cite concrete examples which show that I had the opposite intentions. It is certain that during a war losses do arise among the population, and perhaps if I had given more attention or put up greater resistance, I might have prevented something. That this did not take place, I truly regret. But two figures are decisive: the figures for mortality and those showing the increase in the population. Until the year 1944, the mortality rate in Holland, on the basis of the statistical data of the Netherlands Statistics Bureau, rose from 9.5 to 10 per thousand, whereas in the years 1914-18, the original rate of 12 per thousand increased to 17 per thousand, in other words by almost 50 percent even though the Dutch people were under their own Government, were not in the war, and were not under a blockade. According to the statistics which I received from the Netherlands Statistics Bureau, from 1914 to 1918 there was a decrease of about one-half. In the year of my administration, up until 1944, the population increased from 20 per thousand to 25 per thousand. That is a good one-fourth increase. Of course it is primarily the will to live of the Dutch people. But it is surely also a consequence of the measures of my civil administration.
DR. STEINBAUER: In order to prove the figures just cited by my client, I should like to submit a report of the Netherlands Central Statistics Bureau. I received this by way of the General Secretary in a German and English version, but it is not certified. The original should be in the office of the General Secretary.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to remark that in these statistics . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, how do you show the relevance of this?
DR. STEINBAUER: Because in the Indictment and in the proceedings here, it was claimed that Seyss-Inquart had the intention of germanizing the Dutch people and of breaking resistance, and because he is also held responsible for the poor state of health of the population, the decrease in births, and the mortality rate. These were all assertions made in the Dutch Government report and in part also produced here. Yesterday, with the permission of the Tribunal, I submitted this query to the Dutch Government and I received this answer. In fact it answered more than I requested, particularly taking war victims into account. But we will pay homage to the truth and submit it as we got it.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you putting that in then? Are you offering that in evidence?
DR. STEINBAUER: I submit it the way I received it from the General Secretary. It is Number 106.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to add that the reduction of the birth rate in the years 1914-18 is shown at a lower figure than the report which I received in January of 1945.
DR. STEINBAUER: I still have two brief questions regarding Austria. The first question is this: The American prosecutor has charged that you gave Muhlmann notes to take to Berchtesgaden. Can you say what the notes contained?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that was the outcome of the discussion which I had just had with Dr. Schuschnigg and it included, above all, the agreement to call upon Dr. Jury, Dr. Reinthaller, and Dr. Fischbock, and the institution of national political sections within the Fatherland Front-in short, things that we had agreed on, things which Adolf Hitler, at Berchtesgaden, did not in any way have to put through for the Austrian National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then the American prosecutor asked you whether you knew that Austrians died in concentration camps after the Anschluss. You answered, no, that you did not know this. But people did die in Austrian concentration camps. Here in this room, in the course of months, you have become familiar with concentration camps. Do you mean to say that they were identical with those which you meant?
SEYSS-INQUART: In no way at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is sufficient.
SEYSS-INQUART: And apart from that, I said I heard that it might have been possible that Austrians died in German concentration camps. The Austrian concentration camps can in no way be compared with what we have heard here about German concentration camps. ~
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have concluded my examination-in-chief of the defendant, and with the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to call my first witness on the Austrian question, General Glaise-Horstenau.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Defendant, you said that you had considered that the laws of land warfare were obsolete. Do you remember?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you consider that they were all obsolete?
SEYSS-INQUART: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Which ones did you consider were obsolete?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was of the opinion that the contractual stipulations for the protection of the civilian population were out dated by technical developments in weapons, for obviously certain warlike measures like total blockade, demolition bombing attacks, et cetera, are directed primarily at the destruction of the civilian population and consequently are only justifiable if the civilian population is considered a war potential like the troops at the front. But if that is the case, then the civilian population of the occupied countries must be considered in such a way also.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And when you say "considered in such a way," you mean therefore Germany had the right to use the civilian population to fight the war, make ammunition and so forth; is that not the conclusion?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is my conclusion, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was that conclusion reached?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe with the increase of the bombing attacks, approximately.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Never mind the increase of the bombing attacks. Just give me the date. When was it reached?
SEYSS-INQUART: At the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right; now there are two short questions. You said that you told the Fuehrer that you would not act as a Trojan Horse; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, of course.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, had he suggested to you that you should act as a Trojan Horse?