dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ALDERMAN: I think that practically all of the statements in Mr. Messersmith's affidavits have been fully supported by these documents, German documents, which we have introduced. Certain parts of the affidavits cannot be corroborated by documents, in the very nature of things, and I refer specifically to Mr. Messersmith's conversation with the Defendant Von Papen in 1934, which I read to the Tribunal yesterday. But I think those matters are manifestly just as true and just as clear of the defendant's guilt and complicity. Yesterday I was reading to the Tribunal selected excerpts from Mr. Messersmith's second affidavit, 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, relating to the diplomatic preparations for war. Prior to adjournment, I had read to the Tribunal excerpts which established the following propositions: First, Nazi Germany undertook a vigorous campaign to break up the diplomatic agreements existing in 1933; first-in the West the Locarno Pact supplemented by the French-Belgium Agreement; second-in the East the Little Entente, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and their respective mutual assistance pacts with France, and the French-Polish Pact; third-as for Austria, the special concern of Italy for her independence, that is for Austrian independence. In the second place, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with extravagant and sometimes inconsistent promises of territorial gain to countries in southeastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland. In the third place, Mr. Messersmith wrote an official communication to the State Department, pointing out that persons like Von Neurath and Von Papen were able to work more effectively in making these promises and in doing their other work, just because they, and I quote: "propagated the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime." In the fourth place, in fact, high-ranking Nazis openly stated that Germany would honor her international obligations only so long as it suited her to do so.
MR. ALDERMAN: There are two more excerpts which I wish to read from this affidavit: France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to counter German moves, as I said yesterday. France made attempts to promote an east Locarno pact and to foster an economic accord between Austria and the other Danubian powers. Italy's effort was to organize an economic bloc of Austria, Hungary, and Italy. But Germany foiled these efforts by redoubling her promises of loot, by continuing her armament, and by another very significant strategy, that is the Fifth-Column strategy; that the Nazis stirred up internal dissensions within neighboring countries to disunite and weaken their intended victims. I read now from Page 7 of the English copy of the second Messersmith affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, the paragraph beginning in the middle of the page: "At the same time that Germany held out such promises of reward for cooperation in her program, she stirred up internal dissensions within these countries themselves, and in Austria and Czechoslovakia in particular, all of which was designed so to weaken all opposition and strengthen the pro Nazi and Fascist groups as to insure peaceful acquiescence in the German program. Her machinations in Austria I have related in detail, as they came under my direct observation, in a separate affidavit. In Czechoslovakia they followed the same tactics with the Sudeten Germans. I was reliably informed that the Nazi Party spent over 6,000,000 marks in financing the Henlein Party in the elections in the spring of 1935 alone. In Yugoslavia she played on the old differences between the Croats and the Serbs and the fear of the restoration of the Hapsburg in Austria. It may be remarked here that this latter was one of the principal instruments, and a most effective one, which Nazi Germany used, as the fear in Yugoslavia in particular of a restoration of the Hapsburg was very real.
MR. ALDERMAN: In Hungary she played upon the agrarian difficulties and at the same time so openly encouraged the Nazi German elements in Hungary as to provoke the Government of Hungary to demand the recall of Von Mackensen in 1936. In Hungary and in Poland she played on the fear of communism and communist Russia. In Romania she aggravated the existing anti-Semitism, emphasizing the important role of the Jews in Romanian industry and the Jewish ancestry of Lupescu. Germany undoubtedly also financed the fascist Iron. Guard through Codreanou. "Such 'diplomatic' measures reinforced by Germany's vast rearmament program had a considerable effect, particularly in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary, and sufficient at least to deter these countries from joining any combination opposed to German designs, even if not enough to persuade them actively to ally themselves with Nazi Germany. "Important political leaders of Yugoslavia began to become convinced that the Nazi regime would remain in power and would gain its ends, and that the course of safety for Yugoslavia was to play along with Germany." I shall not take the time of the Tribunal to read into evidence the detailed official dispatches which Mr. Messersmith sent to the American State Department, showing that Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland were beginning to follow the German line. As for Italy, Germany's initial objective was to sow discord between Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia Italian territory, particularly Trieste. This was to prevent France from reaching agreement with them and to block an east Locarno pact.
MR. ALDERMAN: On that I quote again from Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, the second Messersmith affidavit, in the middle of Page 21 of the English version: "While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in 1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England, and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany's program in exchange for German support of Italy's plans in Abyssinia." That, if the Tribunal please, paved the way for the Austro-German Declaration or Pact of 11 July 1936; and in the fall of 1936 Germany extended the hand of friendship and common purpose to Italy, in an alliance which they called the "Rome-Berlin Axis." This, together with Germany's alliance with Japan, put increasing pressure on England and greatly increased the relative strength of Germany. And so by means of careful preparation in the diplomatic field, among others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a position for themselves, so that they could seriously consider plans for war and begin to outline time tables, not binding time tables and not specific ones in terms of months and days, but still general time tables, in terms of years, which were the necessary foundation for further aggressive planning, and a spur to more specific planing. And that time table was developed, as the Tribunal has already seen, in the conference of 5 November 1937, contained in our Document Number 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25, the Hossbach minutes of that conference, which I adverted to in detail on Monday last. In those minutes, we see the crystallization of the plan to wage aggressive war in Europe, and to seize both Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in that order. In connection with the exposition of the aggression on Austria, I have shown first the purpose of the Nazi conspiracy, with respect to the absorption of Austria, and then the steps taken by them in Austria up to this period, that is, November 1937.
MR. ALDERMAN: I have also outlined for the Tribunal the general diplomatic preparations of the Nazi conspirators, with respect to their program in Europe generally, and with respect to Austria in particular. It may now be profitable to reconsider the minutes of the meeting of 5 November 1937, in the light of this more-detailed background. It will be recalled that in that meeting, the Fuehrer insisted that Germany must have more space in Europe. He concluded that the space required must be taken by force; and three different possible cases were outlined for different eventualities but all reaching the conclusion that the problem would certainly have to be solved before 1943 to 1945. Then there was envisaged the nature of a war in the near future, specifically against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler said that for the improvement of Germany's military and political positions, it must be the first aim of the Nazis, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance westward. Hitler then considered that the embodiment into Germany of Czechoslovakia and Austria would constitute the conquest of food for from 5 to 6 million people, including the assumption that the comprehensive forced emigration of 1 million people from Austria could be carried out. And he further pointed out that the annexation of the two States to Germany, both militarily and politically, would constitute a considerable relief since they would provide shorter and better frontiers, would free fighting personnel for other purposes, and would make possible the reconstitution of large new German armies. Insofar as Austria is concerned, those minutes reveal a crystallization in the policy of the Nazi conspirators. It had always been their aim to acquire Austria. At the outset a revolutionary Putsch was attempted, but that failed.
MR. ALDERMAN: The next period was one of surface recognition of the independence of Austria and the use of devious means to strengthen the position of Nazis internally in Austria. Now, however, it became clear that the need, or the greed, for Austria, in the light of the larger aggressive purpose of the Nazi conspirators was sufficiently great to warrant the use of force in order to obtain Austria with the speed that was designed. In fact, as we shall see later, the Nazis were actually able to secure Austria, after having weakened it internally and removed from it the support of other nations, merely by setting the German military machine into motion and making a threat of force. The German armies were able to cross the border and secure the country without the necessity of firing a shot. Their careful planning for war and their readiness to use war as an instrument of political action made it possible, in the end, for them to pluck this plum without having to fight a blow for it. The German High Command had, of course, previously considered preparation against Austria. I offer in evidence another German document, C-175, as Exhibit USA-69. It, again, is "top secret", with the added legend in German: "Chefsache nur durch Offizier" (matter for the chief only to be delivered through an officer). This was a top-secret directive of 24 June 1937 of the Reichsminister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Von Blomberg. The importance of this top-secret directive is indicated by the fact that the carbon copy, received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, was one of only four copies establishing the directive for a unified preparation for war of all the Armed Forces. This directive from General Von Blomberg states that although the political situation indicates that Germany need not consider an attack from any side it also states that Germany does not intend to unleash a European war.
MR. ALDERMAN: It then states in Part 1, and I quote from Page 2 of the English text, which, I believe, is Page 4, third paragraph, of the German text: "The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continued preparedness for war by the German Armed Forces: (a) To counter attacks at any time; (b) To enable the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities, should they occur." The directive then indicates that there will be certain preparations for war of a general nature. I quote the first two portions of Paragraph 2, on Page 2 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the German text: "(2) The preparations of a general nature include: "(a) The permanent preparedness for mobilization of the German Armed Forces, even before the completion of rearmament, and full preparedness for war. "(b) The further working on 'mobilization without public announcement' in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise, both as regards strength and time." And the directive finally indicates that there might be special preparations for war against Austria. I quote from Part 3, (V Special Case Otto, Page 4 of the English text, and Page 19 of the German text. "Case Otto", as you will repeatedly see, was the standing code name for aggressive war against Austria. I quote: "Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the monarchy. "The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed force to give up a restoration. "Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian people, the march in will be made in the general direction of Vienna, and will break any resistance." I should now like to call attention to two conversations, held by United States Ambassador Bullitt with the Defendants Schacht and Goering, in November 1937.
PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): I should like to state my objection to the manner in which Document C-175 has been treated. This document is a study made by the General Staff, which was conceived to meet many different eventualities of war. It even mentions the possibility that Germany might have to go to war with Spain, and might have to carry out a military attack on her. Only part of this document was read, the part relating to Austria; and thus the impression was given that a plan had been made to march against Austria, whereas it actually says the German Reich had no intention to attack at that time, but was merely preparing for all eventualities. I should like to request that the reading of this document be supplemented by reading at least the headings of the paragraphs of this document. If these paragraphs of the document are placed before the Court, it will be seen that this was not a plan to march against Austria, but simply a document preparing for all eventualities.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, your objection does not appear to be to the admissibility of the document, but to the weight of the document. The Tribunal has already informed defendants' counsel that they will have an opportunity at the appropriate time, when they come to prepare their defense, to refer to any documents, parts of which have been put in by the Prosecution, and to read such parts as they think necessary then, and to make what criticism they think necessary then. Your objection is therefore premature, because it does not go to the admissibility of the document. It simply indicates a wish that more of it should be read. You will have the opportunity later to read any parts of the documents which you wish.
MR. ALDERMAN: I suppose, if the Tribunal please, that the fundamental basis of the objection just stated by the distinguished counsel, must have been his theory that Germany never made any plans to invade Austria, and if so, it would seem to follow that Germany never invaded Austria, and perhaps history is mistaken. I had adverted to two conversations, held by United States Ambassador Bullitt with the Defendant Schacht and the Defendant Goering, in November 1937. For this purpose, I offer in evidence our Document L-151, offered as Exhibit USA-70. It is a dispatch from Mr. Bullitt, American Ambassador in Paris, to the American Secretary of State on 23 November 1937. Now, again, if the Tribunal please, we are embarrassed because that document is not in the document book before the members of the Tribunal. It has been furnished in German translation to the Defense Counsel. If the Tribunal will permit, I will read from the original exhibit. On top is a letter from Ambassador Bullitt to the Secretary of State, November 23, 1937, stating that he visited Warsaw, stopped in Berlin en route, where he had conversations with Schacht and Goering, among others. On the conversation with Schacht, I read from Page 2 of the report: "Schacht said that in his opinion, the best way to begin to deal with Hitler was not through political discussion but through economic discussion. Hitler was not in the least interested in economic matters. He regarded money as filth. It was therefore possible to enter into negotiations with him in the economic domain without arousing his emotional antipathy, and it might be possible through the conversations thus begun to lead him into arrangements in the political and military field, in which he was intensely interested. Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany, and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia.
MR. ALDERMAN: At the present moment he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor and in his"-that is Schacht's- "opinion, it might be possible to maintain the Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia, and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor, uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany." And for the Defendant Goering's statements to Ambassador Bullitt, I read from the second memorandum, "Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and General Hermann Goering," on Page 2 of that document, following a part of a sentence which is underlined, just below the middle of the page: "The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve certain vital national necessities. "If France, instead of accepting collaboration with Germany, should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her legitimate aims, it was obvious that there would be conflict between France and Germany. '`I asked Goering what aims especially he had in mind. He replied: " 'We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans who are contiguous to the Reich and are divided from the great body of the German race merely by the artificial barriers imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.' "I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. The German Government, at the present time, was not pressing this matter because of certain momentary political considerations, especially in their relations with Italy. But Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. "He then added a statement which went further than any I have heard on this subject. He said: " 'There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, either with or without a Hapsburg at the head of the union.
MR. ALDERMAN: Such a solution is absolutely unacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an agreement would be an immediate casus belli.' Goering used the Latin expression casus belli ; it is not a translation from the German, in which that conversation was carried on. "I asked Goering if the German Government was as decided in its views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia, as it was with regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final solution of this question. The Sudeten Germans must enter the German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the Reich." These, if the Tribunal please, are official reports made by the accredited representative of the United States in the regular course of business. They carry with them the guarantee of truthfulness of a report made by a responsible official to his own government, recording contemporaneous conversations and events. My next subject is pressure and threats resulting in further concessions by Austria: a meeting at Berchtesgaden, 12 February 1938. As I have stated before, the Austrian Government was laboring under great difficulties imposed by its neighbor. There was economic pressure, including the curtailment of the important tourist trade; and there was what the Defendant Von Papen called "slowly intensified psychological pressure." There were increasing demon- strations, plots, and conspiracies. Demands were being presented by Captain Leopold and approval of the Nazis was being espoused by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, the new Councillor of the State of Austria. In this situation, Chancellor Schuschnigg decided to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden. The official communiqué of this conference is quite calm; I invite the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It is Document 2461-PS, the official German communiqué of the meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg, 12 February 1938, taken from the official Dokumente der Deutschen Politik , Volume 6, I, Page 124, Number 21-a.
MR. ALDERMAN: The communiqué states that the unofficial meeting was caused by the mutual desire to clarify by personal conversation the questions relating to the relationship between the German Reich and Austria. The communiqué lists among those present: Schuschnigg and his Foreign Minister Schmidt, Hitler and his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and the Defendant Von Papen. The communiqué concludes on a rather bright note saying, and I quote: "Both statesmen are convinced that the measures taken by them constitute at the same time an effective contribution toward the peaceful development of the European situation." A similar communiqué was issued by the Austrian Government. But in fact, and as I think history well knows, the conference was a very unusual and a very harsh one. Great concessions were obtained by the German Government from Austria. The principal concessions are contained in the official Austrian communiqué of the reorganization of the Cabinet and the general political amnesty, dated 16 February 1938. That communiqué, as taken from the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik , Volume 6, Page 125, Number 21-b, is translated in our Document 2464-PS and I invite the Court's judicial notice of that communiqué. That communiqué announced a reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet, including, most significantly, the appointment of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart to the position of Minister of Security and Interior, where he would have control of the police. In addition, announcement was made of a general political amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes. Two days later another concession was divulged. I invite the Court's judicial notice to our Document 2469-PS, a translation of the official German and Austrian communiqué con- 29 Nov.45 cerning the so-called equal rights of Austrian National Socialists in Austria, 18 February 1938, Dokumente der Deutschen Politik , Volume 6, I, Page 128, Number 21-d.
MR. ALDERMAN: That communiqué announced that pursuant to the Berchtesgaden conference, the Austrian National Socialists would be taken into the Fatherland Front, the single legal political party of Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you tell us what exhibit numbers those two documents were?
MR. ALDERMAN: I am sorry, Sir; Document 2469-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: We haven't had that yet. We have had 2461-PS, which is exhibit what?
MR. ALDERMAN: Well, I hadn't read it in. I was asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this as an official communiqué.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not going to give it an exhibit number?
MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Nor 2469?