dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
first priority, and interpreted it as follows: "Within the shortest time, the air force should be increased five fold; also the navy should create war weapons more rapidly, and the army should produce large amounts of war weapons at a faster rate, particularly heavy artillery and heavy tanks. Along with this a larger production of armaments must go, especially fuel, rubber, powders and explosives must be moved to the foreground. This should be coupled with an accelerated expansion of highways, canals, and particularly of the railroads." (1301-PS) In the course of these preparations for war, a clash of wills ensued between Goering and Schacht, as a result of which Schacht resigned his position as head of the Ministry of Economics and Plenipotentiary for the War Economy in November 1937. He was removed from the presidency of the Reichsbank in January 1939. Regardless of the details of this controversy, Schacht's departure in no way implied any disagreement with the major war aims of the Nazis. Schacht took particular pride in his vast attainments in the financial and economic fields in aid of the Nazi war machine. In a letter to General Thomas Schacht wrote: "I think back with much satisfaction to the work in the Ministry of Economics which afforded me the opportunity to assist in the rearmament of the German people in the most critical period, not only in the financial but also in the economic sphere. I have always considered a rearmament of the German people as condition sine qua non of the establishment of a new German nation." (EC-257) In a letter written to General Von Blomberg, on 8 July 1937, Schacht wrote: "The direction of the war economy by the plenipotentiary would in that event never take place entirely independent from the rest of the war mechanism but would be aimed at accomplishment of the political war purpose with the assistance of all economic forces. I am entirely willing, therefore, to participate in this way in the preparation of the forthcoming order giving effect to the Defense Act." (EC-252) In the spring of 1937, Schacht participated with representatives of the three branches of the armed forces in "war games in war economy" at Godesberg. A report
am entirely willing, therefore, to participate in this way in the preparation of the forthcoming order giving effect to the Defense Act." (EC-252) In the spring of 1937, Schacht participated with representatives of the three branches of the armed forces in "war games in war economy" at Godesberg. A report of these exercises, entitled "War economy tasks in Godesberg undertaken by General Staff between the 25th of May and the 2nd of June," records the speech welcoming Dr. Schacht: "Before I start with the discussion of the war game in war economy, I have to express how grateful we all are that you, President Dr. Schacht, have gone to the trouble personally to participate in our final discussion today despite all your other activities. This proves to us your deep interest in war economy tasks shown at all times and your presence is renewed proof that you are willing to facilitate for us soldiers the difficult war-economic preparations and to strengthen the harmonious cooperation with your offices." "I want to point out, however, that all matters and all information received has to be kept in strictest secrecy * * *." (EC-174) The annexation of Austria was apparently a goal which Schacht had long sought, for in a speech to the employees of the former Austrian National Bank he declared: "* * * Austria has certainly a great mission, namely, to be the bearer of German culture, to insure respect and regard for the German name, especially in the direction of the southeast. Such a mission can only be performed within the Great German Reich and based on the power of a nation of 75 millions, which, regardless of the wish of the opponents, forms the heart and the soul of Europe." "We have read a lot in the foreign press during the last few days that this aim, the union of both countries, is to a certain degree justified, but that the methods of effecting this union was terrible. This method which certainly did not suit one or the other power was nothing but the consequence of countless perfidies and brutal acts and violence which foreign countries have practiced against us * * *." "* * * I am known for sometimes expressing thoughts which give offense and there I would not like to depart from this consideration.
suit one or the other power was nothing but the consequence of countless perfidies and brutal acts and violence which foreign countries have practiced against us * * *." "* * * I am known for sometimes expressing thoughts which give offense and there I would not like to depart from this consideration. I know that there are even in this country a few people-I believe they are not too numerous-who find fault with the events of the last few days, but nobody, I believe, doubts the goal, and it should be said to all grumblers that you can't satisfy everybody. One person says he would have done it maybe one way, but the remarkable thing is that they did not do it, and that it was only done by our Adolf Hitler; and if there is still something left to be improved, then those grumblers should try to bring about these improvements from the German Reich, and within the German community, but not to disturb us from without." (EC-297-A) A memorandum of 7 January 1939, written by Schacht and other directors of the Reichsbank to Hitler, urged a balancing of the budget in view of the threatening danger of inflation. The memorandum continued: "* * * From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the reconstruction of the German armed forces. It [the Reichsbank] therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility to finance the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was the necessity, which pushed all other considerations into the background, to carry through the armament at once, out of nothing, and furthermore under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy possible." (EC-369) The Reichsbank directors, as experts on money, believed that a point had been reached where greater production of armaments was no longer possible. That was merely a judgment on the situation and not a moral stand, for there was no opposition to Hitler's policy of aggression. Doubts were merely entertained as to whether that policy could be financed. Hitler's letter to Schacht on the occasion of Schacht's departure from the Reichsbank paid high tribute to Schacht's great efforts in furthering the program of the Nazi conspirators. The armed
was no opposition to Hitler's policy of aggression. Doubts were merely entertained as to whether that policy could be financed. Hitler's letter to Schacht on the occasion of Schacht's departure from the Reichsbank paid high tribute to Schacht's great efforts in furthering the program of the Nazi conspirators. The armed forces by now had enabled Hitler to take Austria and the Sudetenland. Hitler, in his letter to Schacht declared: "Your name, above all, will always be connected with the first epoch of national rearmament." (EC-397) Even though dismissed from the presidency of the Reichsbank, Schacht was retained as a minister without portfolio and special confidential adviser to Hitler. Funk stepped into Schacht's position as president of the Reichsbank (Voelkisher Beobachter of 21 January 1939). Funk was uninhibited by fears of inflation, and like Goering, under whom he had served in the Four Year Plan, he recognized no obstacles to the plan to attack Poland. In a letter written on 25 August 1939, only a few days before the attack on Poland, Funk reported to Hitler that the Reichsbank was prepared to withstand any disturbances of the international currency and credit system occasioned by a large-scale war. He said that he had secretly transferred all available funds of the Reichsbank abroad into gold, and that Germany stood ready to meet the financial and economic tasks which lay ahead. (699-PS) It seems clear that the Nazi conspirators directed the whole of the German economy toward preparation for aggressive war. To paraphrase the words of Goering, the conspirators gave the German people "guns instead of butter." They also gave history its most striking example of a nation gearing itself in time of peace to the single purpose of aggressive war. Their economic preparations, formulated and applied with the energy of Goering, the financial wizardry of Schacht, and the willing complicity of Funk, among others, were the indispensable prerequisites for their subsequent campaign of aggression. LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY Document Description Vol. Page Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6(a)......I 5 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1,
prerequisites for their subsequent campaign of aggression. LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY Document Description Vol. Page Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6(a)......I 5 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Section IV (E).......I 21 Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court. *699-PS Letter from Funk to Hitler, 25 August 1939, reporting on economic affairs. (GB 49)......III 509 *1168-PS Unsigned Schacht memorandum to Hitler, 3 May 1935, concerning the financing of the armament program. (USA 37)......III 827 *1301-PS File relating to financing of armament including minutes of conference with Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 October 1938, concerning acceleration of rearmament. (USA 123)....III 868 *2261-PS Directive from Blomberg to Supreme Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council for defense of the Reich. (USA 24).....IV 934 *2353-PS Extracts from General Thomas' Basic Facts for History of German War and armament Economy. (USA 35)......IV 1071 *3787-PS Report of the Second Meeting of the Reich Defense Council, 25 June 1939. (USA 782)......VI 718 *3901-PS Letter written November 1932 by Schacht, Krupp and others to the Reich President. (USA 851).....VI 796 *D-157 Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 25 April 1933, with enclosure. (USA 765)......VI 1063 *D-167 Memoranda by Sonnenberg and Dr. Conn concerning exchange of intelligence involving Krupp works. (USA 766).....VI 1069 *D-203 Speech of Hitler to leading members of industry before the election of March 1933. (USA 767)....VI 1080 *D-204 Statement of Krupp concerning political organization of state and
1063 *D-167 Memoranda by Sonnenberg and Dr. Conn concerning exchange of intelligence involving Krupp works. (USA 766).....VI 1069 *D-203 Speech of Hitler to leading members of industry before the election of March 1933. (USA 767)....VI 1080 *D-204 Statement of Krupp concerning political organization of state and economy, 22 February 1933 (USA 768).....VI 1085 *D-206 Memorandum, 12 October 1939, on distribution of propaganda abroad through foreign connections of Krupp firm. (USA 769)....VI 1085 *D-317 Krupp speech, "Thoughts about the Industrial Enterpriser", January 1944. (USA 770).....VII 21 *EC-14 Speech before the Wehrmacht War College, 1 November 1937, by Major-General Thomas. (USA 758).....VII 246 *EC-27 Address of Major-General Thomas before the Staff Instructors' course, on 28 February 1939 in Saarow-Pieskow. (USA 759)....VII 250 *EC-28 Lecture of Major-General Thomas delivered, 24 May 1939, at the Foreign Office. (USA 760)....VII 250 *EC-128 Report on state of preparations for war economic mobilization as of 30 September 1934. (USA 623).......VII 306 *EC-174 Summary "war economy" trip to Godesberg undertaken by General Staff between 25 May and 2 June 1937. (USA 761).....VII 326 *EC-177 Minutes of second session of Working Committee of the Reich Defense held on 26 April 1933. (USA 390).....VII 328 *EC-252 Letter from Schacht to Blomberg, 8 July 1937. (USA 762).....VII 346 *EC-257 Personal letter from Schacht to Thomas, 29 December 1937. (USA 763).....VII 347 *EC-286 Correspondence between Schacht and Goering, March-April 1937, concerning price control. (USA 833)......VII 380 *EC-293 Letter from Schacht to Reich and Prussian Economics Minister, 24 December 1935, concerning army demands for raw material. (USA 834).....VII 391 *EC-297-A Address in Vienna of the Reichsbank President, Dr. Schacht, 21 March 1938. (USA 632)......VII 394 *EC-369 Correspondence between Schacht and Hitler, January 1939. (USA 631)......VII 426 *EC-383 Letter 16 January 1937 with enclosure-article about Schacht appearing in the Military weekly Gazette. (USA 640).....VII 436 *EC-397 Letter from Hitler to Schacht, 19 January 1939. (USA 650)......VII 438 *EC-404 Minutes of conference of Sixth Session of Working Committee of Reichs Defense Council, held
(USA 631)......VII 426 *EC-383 Letter 16 January 1937 with enclosure-article about Schacht appearing in the Military weekly Gazette. (USA 640).....VII 436 *EC-397 Letter from Hitler to Schacht, 19 January 1939. (USA 650)......VII 438 *EC-404 Minutes of conference of Sixth Session of Working Committee of Reichs Defense Council, held on 23 and 24 January 1934. (USA 764).....VII 443 *EC-405 Minutes of Tenth Meeting of Working Committee of Reichs Defense Council, 26 June 1935. (GB 160)......VII 450 *EC-408 Memorandum report about the Four Year Plan and preparation of the war economy, 30 December 1936. (USA 579)......VII 465 *EC-416 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 4 September 1936. (USA 635)......VII 471 *EC-436 Affidavit of Puhl, 2 November 1945. (USA 620).....VII 494 *EC-439 Affidavit of Schnitzler, 10 November 1945. (USA 618)......VII 501 *EC-461 Extracts from Ambassador Dodd's Diary, 1933-1938. (USA 58).....VII 515 Affidavit J Affidavit of Erhard Milch, 23 January 1946.....VIII 653 Chart No. 9 The Organization of German Business........VIII 778 Chapter VII Contents Chapter IX
Chapter X - The Slave Labor Program, The Illegal Use of Prisoners of War Chapter IX Contents Chapter XI Chapter X - THE SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM, THE ILLEGAL USE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SAUCKEL AND SPEER THEREFOR I In general terms, the basic elements of the Nazi foreign labor policy consisted of mass deportation and mass enslavement. It was a policy of underfeeding and overworking foreign laborers, of subjecting them to every form of degradation and brutality. It was a policy which compelled foreign workers and prisoners of war to manufacture armaments and to engage in other operations of war directed against their own countries. It was, in short, a policy which constituted a flagrant violation of the laws of war and the laws of humanity. Fritz Sauckel and Albert Speer are principally responsible for the formulation of this policy and for its execution. Sauckel, the Nazi's Plenipotentiary General for Manpower, directed the recruitment, deportation, and allocation of foreign civilian labor. Sanctioning and directing the use of force as a means of recruitment, he was responsible for the mistreatment of the enslaved millions. Speer-as Reichsminister for Armaments and Munitions, Director of the Organization Todt, and member of the Central Planning Board-bears responsibility for the determination of the numbers of foreign slaves required by the German war machine, for the decision to recruit by force, and for the use and brutal treatment of foreign civilians and prisoners of war in the manufacture of armaments and munitions, in the construction of fortifications, and in active military operations. Hermann Goering, as Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan, is also responsible for all the crimes involved in the Nazi slave labor program. In addition, Alfred Rosenberg as Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Hans Frank as Governor General of the Government-General of Poland, Artur Seyss-Inquart as Reichskommissar for the Occupied Netherlands, and Wilhelm Keitel as chief of the OKW share responsibility for the recruitment by force and terror and for the deportation to Germany of the citizens of the areas overrun or subjugated by the
General of the Government-General of Poland, Artur Seyss-Inquart as Reichskommissar for the Occupied Netherlands, and Wilhelm Keitel as chief of the OKW share responsibility for the recruitment by force and terror and for the deportation to Germany of the citizens of the areas overrun or subjugated by the Wehrmacht. 1. PLANNING FOR THE USE OF SLAVE LABOR The use of vast numbers of foreign workers was planned before Germany went to war and was an integral part of the conspiracy for waging aggressive war. On 23 May 1939 a meeting was held in Hitler's study at the Reichs Chancellery. Goering, Raeder, and Keitel were present. According to the minutes of this meeting, (L-79) Hitler stated that he intended to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. He further stated: "* * * If fate brings us into contact with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be able to rely upon record harvests, even less in time of war than in peace. "The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labor". (L-79) The slave labor program was designed to achieve two purposes. The primary purpose was to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war machine by compelling foreign workers, in effect, to make war against their own countries and its allies. The secondary purpose was to destroy or weaken peoples deemed inferior by the Nazi racialists, or deemed potentially hostile by the Nazi planners of world supremacy. These purposes were expressed by the conspirators themselves. In Sauckel's Labor Mobilization Program (016-PS) which he sent to Rosenberg on 20 April 1942, Sauckel declared: "* * * The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all the rich and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by our fighting Armed Forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, for the armament of the Armed Forces and also for the nutrition of the Homeland. The raw materials as well as the fertility of the conquered territories and their human labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and their allies." (016-PS) The theory of the "master race," which underlay the
Armed Forces and also for the nutrition of the Homeland. The raw materials as well as the fertility of the conquered territories and their human labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and their allies." (016-PS) The theory of the "master race," which underlay the conspirators' labor policy in the East, was expressed in the following words by Erich Koch, Reichskommissar for the Ukraine, at a meeting of the National Socialist Party on 5 March 1943 in Kiev: "1. We are the master race and must govern hard but just * * *. "2. I will draw the very last out of this country. I did not come to spread bliss. I have come to help the Fuehrer. The population must work, work, and work again * * * for some people are getting excited, that the population may not get enough to eat. The population cannot demand that, on has only to remember what our heroes were deprived of in Stalingrad * * * We definitely did not come here to give out manna. We have come here to create the basis for victory. "3. We are a master race, which must remember that the lowliest German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the population here". (1130-PS) And in a speech delivered to a group of SS Generals on 4 October 1943 at Posen, Himmler stated: "* * * What happens to a Russian, to a Czech, does not interest me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way of good blood of our type, we will take, if necessary by kidnapping their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our Kultur: otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished * * *." (1919-PS) A Top Secret memorandum prepared for the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories on 12 June 1944, and approved by Rosenberg, contains the following plans: "The Army Group 'Center' has the intention to apprehend 40-50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to 14 who are in the Army territory and to transport them to the Reich *
the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories on 12 June 1944, and approved by Rosenberg, contains the following plans: "The Army Group 'Center' has the intention to apprehend 40-50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to 14 who are in the Army territory and to transport them to the Reich * * *." "It is intended to allot these juveniles primarily to the German trades as apprentices to be used as skilled workers after 2 years' training. This is to be arranged through the Organization Todt which is especially equipped for such a task through its technical and other set-ups. This action is being greatly welcomed by the German trade since it represents a decisive measure for the alleviation of the shortage of apprentices." "1. This action is not only aimed at preventing a direct reinforcement of the enemy's military strength, but also at a reduction of his biological potentialities as viewed from the perspective of the future. These ideas have been voiced not only by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS but also by the Fuehrer. Corresponding orders were given during last year's withdrawals in the southern sector * * *." (031-PS) Rosenberg's approval is at the end of the document: "regarding the above-Obergruppenfuehrer Berger received the memorandum on June 14. Consequently the Reichsminister has approved the Action." (031-PS) 2. EXECUTION OF THE SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM The purposes of the slave labor program, namely, the strengthening of the Nazi war machine and the destruction or weakening of peoples deemed inferior, were achieved by the impressment and deportation of millions of persons into Germany for forced labor, by the separation of husbands from their wives and children from their parents, and by the imposition of conditions so inhuman that countless numbers perished. A. Poland. Poland was the first victim. Frank, as Governor of the Government-General of Poland, announced that under his program 1,000,000 workers were to be sent to Germany, and recommended that police surround Polish villages and seize the inhabitants for deportation. These intentions appear in the following letter from Frank to Goering, dated 25 January 1940 (1375-PS): "1. In view of the present requirements of the Reich for the defense industry, it