dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I am not going to argue politics with you on any point. I only remind you of this: That the Fall Grun and Hitler's plans on this matter had been known to His Majesty's Government only since the end of the war, when it came into our possession as a captured document. What I asked you was you say that as the Foreign Minister of the Reich, you did not know of these military plans, that the conquest of the whole Czechoslovakia was envisaged? You say that? You want the Tribunal to believe that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I repeat again that I read about Fall Grun and the conception of Fall Grun here for the first time in the documents. I did not know that term before, nor was I interested. That the Fuehrer envisaged a more far-reaching solution became, of course, clear to me later in the course of the subsequent developments and by the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just a moment. We will get to that in a moment. I just want you to look at the final act of preparation which you were doing, and I am suggesting for this clear aggression; if you will look at Page 45 in the book in front of you, you will see a note from the Foreign, Office to the Embassy in Prague. That was your office's further act, wasn't it, in order to make things difficult for the Government in Prague? You were getting your friends to induce -- to use your own word -- the Slovaks to start an advance for autonomy, is that right? Is that what your office was doing?
VON RIBBENTROP: This is, beyond doubt, a telegram from the Foreign Office. I do no longer recall the details, but according to the contents, Henlein apparently approached us to send a telegram because Henlein was apparently of the opinion, at that time, that he should put the demands for autonomy to the Prague Government. How that came about, I could not say in detail today. I would like to emphasize again that Conrad Henlein's activity -- I say, unfortunately, and I said so before -- was far beyond my control. I saw Henlein only once or twice during that entire time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to take you through all the details. You understand what I'm suggesting to you, that your office was now taking one of its last steps, because this was in the middle of the crisis, on the 19th of September, trying to weaken the Czech Government by inducing demands of autonomy from the Slovaks. You said that you were only passing on Henlein's wishes. If you like to leave it at that, I shall not trouble you further. Besides, you suggested -- I come on to what took place in the spring and ask you one or two questions about that. In the spring Hitler was out and you acquiesced in his wishes, without -- I was going to say swallowing, but I want to choose my language carefully -- to obtain the adherence of Bohemia and Moravia to the Reich and to make Slovakia separate from Bohemia and Moravia. Now, just look on to Page 65 of the book in front of you. That is a telegram in secret code from the Foreign Office, from yourself in fact, to the Embassy in Prague. Why were you so anxious that your ambassador should not carry out these ordinary functions and form a channel of communication with the Czech Government?
VON RIBBENTROP: That happened as follows. I remember verv well. That had the following reasons: The Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, Chvalkovsky, on one of these days, it must have been the same day, approached the envoy in Prague, saying that President Hacha wished to speak to the Fuehrer. I had reported that to the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer had agreed to receive the Czechoslovakian Prime Minister or the Czechoslovakian President. The Fuehrer said, at the same time, that he wished to conduct these negotiations himself and that he did not wish anybody else, even the legation, to interfere in any way. That, according to my recollection, was the reason for this telegram. No one was to undertake anything in Prague; whatever was done would be done by the Fuehrer personally. I wish to point out that also at that time signs of an impending crisis between Prague and ourselves became apparent. The visit of President Hacha or his desire to see the Fuehrer can be explained as being the result of this situation in general.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I would like to remind you what you and the Fuehrer were doing on that day. You will find that if you look at Page 66, which is 71 of the English book. You were having a conference, you and the Fuehrer, with Meissner and the Defendant Keitel and Dietrich and Keppler; and you were having the conference with the Slovaks, with M. Tiso. Do you remember that conference?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I remember that conference very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, I will ask you a general question and perhaps without putting the details to you. What Hitler and you were doing at that conference was saying this to the Slovaks: "If you do not declare your independence of Prague, we shall leave you to the tender mercies of Hungary." Isn't that in a sentence a fair summary of what Hitler and you were saying at that conference?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct to a certain degree. But I would like to add a further statement to that. The situation at the time was as follows, and one has to look at it from a political point of view: The Hungarians were highly dissatisfied and they wanted to regain the territories which they had lost by the peace treaty and today form a part of Czechoslovakia, that is the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia. There were, therefore, constantly great differences between Pressburg (Bratislava) and Budapest and, chiefly, also between Prague and Budapest. The outbreak of an armed conflict could be expected at any time; at least half a dozen times we were given to understand by the Hungarian Government that this could not go on forever; that they must have their revision in one way or the other. The situation was such that for quite some time very strong movements for independence existed among the Slovaks. We were approached on this matter quite frequently, at first by Tuka and later by Tiso. In this conference described here, the situation was that the Fuehrer, who knew for weeks of the endeavors of the Slovaks to become independent, finally received Tiso, later President of the State, and told him that now, of course -- I believe he told him during this conversation -- that he was not interested in the question for its own sake. But if anything should happen at all, then the Slovaks must proclaim their independence as quickly as possible. There is no doubt that at the time we expected an action by Hungary. It is, however, correct ...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can see how very anxious the Slovaks seemed to be for independence and what action Hitler and yourself were taking to secure it, if you try to find it, it will probably be at Page 67; it is at the end of a paragraph beginning, "Now he has permitted Minister Tiso to come here... " And just below the middle of that paragraph, Hitler is reported as saying that he would not tolerate that internal instability and he had for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not a question of days but of hours. He stated at that time that, if Slovakia wished to make herself independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it; he would stand by his words so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of the events for which he was no longer responsible. Then in the next paragraph he asks you if you had anything to say and you are reported as saying (Document Number 2802-PS, Exhibit USA-117): Are you denying, Witness, that Hitler and you were putting the strongest possible pressure you could on the Slovaks to dissolve connections with Prague and so leave the Czechs standing alone to meet your pressure on Hacha which was coming in a couple of days?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. Very strong pressure was not used. There is no doubt that on the part of Hungary -- and my remark refers to the possibility of war-like developments with the Hungarians -- but wishes for independence had for a long time been conveyed to us again and again by the Slovaks. It is possible that, at the time, as the document shows, Tiso was hesitating, because after all it was an important step. But in view of the wish of the Fuehrer, which must have been obvious by then, to solve the question of Bohemia and Moravia in one way or another, it was in the interest of the Fuehrer to do his part to bring about the independence of Slovakia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: One point. This is my last question before I come to the interview with President Hacha. Don't you remember that 2 days before Herr Burckel -- that is in my recollection -- Herr Burckel and another Austrian National Socialist, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart and a number of German officers, at about 10 in the evening of Saturday, the 11th of March, went into a Cabinet meeting at Bratislava and told the soi-disant Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia? Don't you know that? It was reported by our consul.
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall it in detail, but I believe that something of the kind took place but I do not know exactly what it was. I believe that it was directed by the Fuehrer. I had, I believe, less to do with that. I no longer recall that exactly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will deal very shortly ...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, it is a quarter to 1 now. We had better adjourn until 2. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, you were present at the interview between President Hacha and Hitler on 15 March 1939, were you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler's saying at that interview that he had given the order for German troops to march into Czechoslovakia, and that at 6 o'clock in the morning the German Army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the exact words, but I know that Hitler told Hacha that he would occupy the countries of Bohemia and Moravia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember his saying what I put to you, that he had given the order for German troops to march into Czechoslovakia?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is what I just said.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember the Defendant Goering, as he told the Tribunal, telling President Hacha that he would order the German Air Forces to bomb Prague?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything about that in detail, because at that discussion I was not ...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you for a detailed statement; I am asking you if you remember what I should suppose was a rather remarkable statement, that the Defendant Goering said to President Hacha that he would order the German Air Force to bomb Prague if Czech resistance was not called off. Do you remember that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know that; I was not present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there during the whole interview, were you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not. If the British Prosecutor will give me a chance I shall explain how it was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to answer my question at the moment. You say you do not remember that. At any rate, if the Defendant Goering said that he said it, would you accept that it happened?
VON RIBBENTROP: If Goering says so, then it must, of course, be true. I have merely stated that I was not present during that conference between President Hacha and the then Reich Marshal Goering. SIR DAVID ALAXWtLL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler saying that within 2 days the Czech Army would not exist any more?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall that in detail, no; it was a very long conference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler saying that at 6 o'clock the troops would march in? He was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to each Czech battalion.
VON RIBBENTROP: It is possible that something like that was said. However, I do not remember the details.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If these things were said, will you agree with me that the most intolerable pressure was put on President Hacha?
VON RIBBENTROP: Undoubtedly Hitler used very clear language. However, to that I must add that President Hacha, on his part, had come to Berlin in order to find a solution, together with Hitler. He was surprised that troops were to march into Czechoslovakia. That I know, and I remember it exactly. But he agreed to it eventually and then contacted his government and his chief of staff, so that there would be no hostile reception for the German troops. He then concluded with Hitler, with the Czech Foreign Minister and me, the agreement which I had drafted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree with me that that agreement was obtained through a threat of aggressive action by the German Army and Air Force?
VON RIBBENTROP: It is certain, since the Fuehrer told President Hacha that the German Army would march in, that naturally, this instrument was written under that impression. That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dont you think you could answer one of my question directly? I will ask it again. Will you agree with me that that document was obtained by the most intolerable pressure and threat of aggression? That is a simple question. Do you agree?
VON RIBBENTROP: In that way, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What further pressure could you put on the head of a country except to threaten him that your army would march in, in overwhelming strength, and your Air Force would bomb his capital?
VON RIBBENTROP: War, for instance.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What is that but war? Do you not consider it war that the Army would march in with a proportion of a division over a battalion, and that the Air Force would bomb Prague?
VON RIBBENTROP: President Hacha had told the Fuehrer, that he would place the fate of his country in the Fuehrer's hands, and the Fuehrer had...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to answer my question. My question is a perfectly simple one, and I want your answer to it. You have told us that that agreement was obtained after these threats were made.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is what you said a moment ago.
VON RIBBENTROP: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put to you that that agreement was obtained by threat of war. Is that not so?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that this threat is incomparably lighter than the threats under which Germany stood for years through the Versailles Treaty and its sanctions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, leaving whatever it is comparatively, will you now answer my question? Do you agree that that agreement was obtained by threat of war?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was obtained under a pressure, that is under the pressure of the march into Prague; there is no doubt about that. However, the decisive point of the whole matter was that the Fuehrer explained to President Hacha the reasons why he had to do this, and eventually Hacha agreed fully, after he had consulted his government and his general staff and heard their opinion. However, it is absolutely correct that the Fuehrer was resolved to solve this question under any circumstances. The reason was, that the Fuehrer was of the opinion that in the remainder of Czechoslovakia there was a conspiracy against the German Reich; Reich Marshal Goering had already stated that Russian commissions were said to have been at Czech airdromes. Consequently the Fuehrer acted as he did because he believed that it was necessary in the highest interest and for the protection of the German Reich. I might draw a comparison: For instance, President Roosevelt declared an interest in the Western Hemisphere; England has extended her interest over the entire globe. I think, that the interest which the Fuehrer showed in the remainder of Czechoslovakia was, as such, not unreasonable for a great power; about the methods one may think as one pleases. At any rate one thing is certain, and that is that these countries were occupied without a single drop of blood being shed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They were occupied without a single drop of blood being shed because you had threatened to march in overwhelming strength and to bomb Prague if they didn't agree, isn't that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, not because we had threatened with superiority, but because we had agreed beforehand that the Germans could march in unimpeded.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you again, that the agreement was obtained, however, by your threatening to march in and threatening to bomb Prague, was it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have already told you once that it was not so, but that the Fuehrer had talked to President Hacha about it and told him that he would march in. The conversation between President Hacha and Goering is not known to me. President Hacha signed the agreement after he had consulted his government and his general staff in Prague by telephone. There is no doubt that the personality of the Fuehrer, his reasoning, and finally the announced entry of the German troops induced President Hacha to sign the agreement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don't you remember -- would you mind standing up, General, for a second? [A Czechoslovakian Army officer arose.] Don't you remember that General Ecer asked you some questions once, this general from Czechoslovakia?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say to him that you thought that this action on the 15th of March was contrary to the declaration of Hitler given to Chamberlain but, in fact, that Hitler saw in the occupation a vital necessity for Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I was wrong in the first point; I will admit that openly; I remembered it afterward. In the Munich Agreement between Hitler and Chamberlain nothing like that is contained. It was not intended as a violation of that agreement. In the second place, I think I stated that Hitler believed he had to act that way in the interest of his country.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to tell us one or two general things about your views with regard to Great Britain. Is it correct that when you went to London as Ambassador of the Reich you thought there was very little chance of an agreement, in fact that it was a hundred-to-one chance of getting an understanding with Great Britain?
VON RIBBENTROP: When I asked the Fuehrer to send me to London personally ...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Here is a simple question I am asking you: Is it right th4t when you went to London as Ambassador you thought there was very little chance of an understanding with England, in fact, that the chance was a hundred-to-one?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, the chances were not good.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These, as you know, are your own words...
VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to add something.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: First answer my question. These are your own words, aren't they, that the chance was a hundred-to-one? Do you remember saying that?
VON RIBBENTROP: A hundred-to-one? I do not remember that, but I want to add something. I told Hitler that the chance was very small; and I also told him that I would try everything to bring about an Anglo-German understanding in spite of the odds.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when you left England did you believe that war was inevitable? When you left England, when you ceased being ambassador, did you believe that war was unavoidable?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not of the opinion that it was inevitable, but that, considering the developments which were taking place in England, a possibility of war existed, of that I was convinced.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to be careful about this. Did you say that you didn't think war was unavoidable when yoll left England?
VON RIBBENTROP: I can neither say that it was unavoidable nor that it was avoidable; at any rate, it was clear to me that with the development of the policy towards Germany which was taking place in England, an armed conflict might lie in the realm of possibility.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at page 211-E of the document book; English book, 170.
VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say 211?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now will you look at the second paragraph? It reads like this: Is that what you said to Ambassador Oshima?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether I said exactly that; at any rate, that is diplomatic language, Mr. Prosecutor, and it is quite possible that we at that time, as a result of the situation, in consultation with the Japanese ambassador, considered it opportune to express it that way. At any rate, that is not the important point; the important thing is that as I remember, when I left England a certainty and inevitability of war did not exist. Whether in later years I said this or that has no bearing on what I said when I left London. I do not think that there is the least bit of evidence for that. Perhaps I tried to draw him into the war against England and therefore used forceful language.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As you said "no," just look at Document Number TC-75, Exhibit GB-28, and at your conclusions that are to be drawn. You will see it at the end under Number 5, "Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us..." It is about the end of the third page: And the last sentence: Why did you tell the Tribunal a minute ago that you had not advised the Fuehrer that there should be outward friendly relations and in actuality a coalition against her?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know what kind of a document that is at all. May I see it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is signed by yourself on the 2d of January 1938. It is your own report to the Fuehrer.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite correct as such; that is the conclusive statement: Only thus can we, some day, come to an agreement or to a conflict with England. The situation at that time was clearly this, that England was resisting the German wishes for a revision which the Fuehrer had declared vital and that only through a strong diplomatic coalition did it seem possible to induce England, by diplomatic and not by bellicose means.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You probably told him what was untrue?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know, and I also do not know whether the details have been recorded accurately. It is a long record; I do not know where it comes from.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your own record of the meeting, from captured German documents.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is quite possible, but many things are said in diplomacy every word of which is not weighed carefully. At any rate, the truth is that when I left London there was no certainty that the war was inevitable, but there is no doubt that I was skeptical when I left London and did not know in what direction things would be drifting, particularly on account of the very strong prowar party in England.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, will you speak a little bit more slowly?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, Sir.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when you left England, was it not your view that the German policy should be pretended friendliness toward England and actual formation of a coalition against her?