dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
its justified life interests for centuries. To achieve this aim the Fuehrer created the National Socialist German Workers' Party. He filled it with his spirit and his will, and with it he conquered the power of the State on 30 January 1933. The Fuehrer's will is supreme in the Party. As supreme bearer of sovereignty in the Movement, he possesses the right of pardon in Party court matters. By authority of the law about the Chief of State of the German Reich, dated 1 August 1934, the office of the Reich President has been combined with that of the Reich Chancellery. Consequently, the powers heretofore possessed by the Reich President were transferred to the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler. Through this law, the conduct of Party and State has been combined in one hand. By desire of the Fuehrer, a plebiscite was conducted on this law on 19 August 1934. On this day, the German people chose Adolf Hitler to be their sole leader. He is responsible only to his own conscience and to the German nation. To assist him, particularly in party-political questions, the Fuehrer uses the Party Chancellery. The Chief of the Party Chancellery, to guarantee closest collaboration between the offices of the Party and the State authorities, has the powers of a Reich Minister and is a member of the Reich Cabinet. With the execution of tasks particular to the Party, the Fuehrer has entrusted the Reichsleiter within the Reich Directorate of the NSDAP. [Pages 148-149] THE REICH DIRECTORATE OF THE NSDAP The NSDAP represents the political conception, the political conscience, and the political will of the German nation. Political conception, political conscience, and political will are embodied in the person of the Fuehrer. Based on his directives and in accordance with the program of the NSDAP, the organs of the Reich Directorate directionally determine the political aims of the German people. It is in the Reich Directorate where the strings of the organization of the German people and the State meet. By endowment of the Chief of the Party Chancellery with the powers of a Reich Minister, and by special administrative directives, the penetration of the State apparatus with the political will of the Party is guaranteed. It is the task of the separate organs of the
the German people and the State meet. By endowment of the Chief of the Party Chancellery with the powers of a Reich Minister, and by special administrative directives, the penetration of the State apparatus with the political will of the Party is guaranteed. It is the task of the separate organs of the Reich Directorate to maintain as close a contact as possible with the life of the nation through their sub-offices in the Gaus. Observations at the front are to be collected and exploited by the offices of the Reich Directorate. The structure of the Reich Directorate is thus that the channel from the lowest Party office upwards shows the most minute weaknesses and changes in the mood of the people, and that the directives thereby produced in the Reich Directorate will reach the outer command posts of the Party quickly and clearly. The Reich Directorate, then, sees to it that the reports of the mood of the people will move from the lower to the higher echelons uninterruptedly and quickly, and that the will of the Fuehrer will reach the most distant branches quickly and accurately, even as in the healthy organism of a tree, where the roots receive the food from the soil and lead it into the leaves while the juices formed in the leaves are being sent to the most distant roots. This coordination guarantees and ever-renewed reception of power and an ever-strengthening anchorage of the roots, and it permits the crown to spread further and further, to reach higher and higher, and yet to withstand wind and weather. Since the National Socialist Movement has originated from the people, it is the most noble task of the Reich Directorate to watch that the strong roots of the Party-namely its ties within the nation-will not die off. Another essential task of the Reich Directorate is to assure a good selection of leaders. It is the duty of the Reich Directorate to see that there is leadership in all phases of life, a leadership which is firmly tied to National Socialist ideology and which promotes its dissemination with all its energy. Apart from the general great political tasks which are the responsibility of the Reich Directorate, it will also see that the Party is well organized in all its offices. For that purpose, the
which is firmly tied to National Socialist ideology and which promotes its dissemination with all its energy. Apart from the general great political tasks which are the responsibility of the Reich Directorate, it will also see that the Party is well organized in all its offices. For that purpose, the Reich Organization Leader exercises a continuous supervision of the organizations of the entire Party apparatus, and he prevents the birth of a bureaucracy which would paralyze the striking power of the Party. It is the supreme task of the Reich Organization Leader to preserve the Party as a well-sharpened sword for the Fuehrer. The inner organization of the Reich Directorate serves for the execution of the above-named tasks. The number of its offices is so arranged that there will be a representation of all phases of national life within the Reich Directorate. The offices will have subordinate organizations in the other zones of sovereignty as may become necessary. The tasks, jurisdiction, etc., of the offices are further defined in detail in the following chapters. Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946 Previous Document Volume IV Menu
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Document No. 1903-PS
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1903-PS
Decrees, Regulations, Announcements [Verfuegungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben], Vol. II. Edited by the Party-Chancellery. Published by: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Frz. Eher Nachf. GmbH., Muenchen. Page 510.
Decree of the Fuehrer on the execution of the decree concerning the Deputy General for the mobilization of labor [Arbeitseinsatz].
In the following the Fuehrer's decree on the extension of the authority of the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz is made public:
"Decree of the Fuehrer on the execution of the decree concerning the Deputy General for the Arbeitsdienst of 30 September 1942.
I herewith authorize the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Reich-governor and district-leader [Gauleiter] Fritz Sauckel to take all necessary measures for the enforcement of my decree referring to a Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz of 21 March 1942 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 179) according to his own judgment in the Greater German Reich, in the Protectorate, and in the Government General [Generalgouvernement] as well as in the occupied territories, measures which will safeguard under all circumstances the regulated deployment of labor [geordneter Arbeitseinsatz] for the German war-economy. For this purpose he may appoint commissioners [Beauftragte] to the bureaus of the military and civilian administration. These are subordinated directly to Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz, in order to carry out their tasks. They are entitled to issue directives to the competent military and civilian authorities in charge of the Arbeitseinsatz and of wage-policy.
More detailed directives will be issued by the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz.
Fuehrer-Headquarters 30 Sept 1942
The Fuehrer
Sign. Adolf Hitler
The Reichsminister and Chief of the Reich-Chancery
Sign. Dr. Lammers
The chief of the German High Command
Sign. Keitel."
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
More detailed directives will be issued by the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz. Fuehrer-Headquarters 30 Sept 1942 The Fuehrer Sign. Adolf Hitler The Reichsminister and Chief of the Reich-Chancery Sign. Dr. Lammers The chief of the German High Command Sign. Keitel." Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Document No. 1913-PS Previous Document Volume IV Menu Next Document TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1913-PS 1943 REICHSARBEITSBLATT, PART I, PAGE 588 Agreement between the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz and the German Labor Front concerning the care of non-German workers The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan The Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz VIc 5783/291 Berlin, 20 Sept. 1943 To the presidents of the Gau employment offices and to the Reich Trustees of Labor as well as to the directors of the employment offices. AGREEMENT The following agreement has been concluded between the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter and Reich Governor [Reichstatthalter] Sauckel and the Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisation leader Dr. Ley. 1. The German Labor Front, on the basis of decree Nr 4 of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz of 7 May 1942-GBA 405/42 (Nr 2b) has the sole and exclusive mission of caring for all foreign workers employed within the Reich. Excluded are the farm workers employed in the Reich food administration. 2. The Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisationleiter Dr. Ley, in collaboration with the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Sauckel, will establish a "central inspection" for the continuous supervision of all measures concerning the care of the foreign workers mentioned under 1. This will have the designation: "Central inspection for the care of foreign workers." The central inspection for the care of foreign workers exercises its functions upon directives and in the name of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz and of the Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front. In order to avoid all duplication of work, it will be its sole responsibility, to scrutinize all measures taken for the care of foreign workers employed in the factories and camps, also to remove immediately all defects discovered-as far as possible-on the spot and to issue the necessary instructions for this. The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz to empower the members of his staff and the presidents of the state employment offices to get direct
and camps, also to remove immediately all defects discovered-as far as possible-on the spot and to issue the necessary instructions for this. The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz to empower the members of his staff and the presidents of the state employment offices to get direct information on the conditions regarding the employment of foreigners in the factories and camps, will remain untouched. 3. The central inspection for the care of foreign workers will be continuously in touch with the main office VI of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz. It will instruct the office on the general observations made and will make suggestions for changes, if that should become necessary. 4. The offices of the administration of the Arbeitseinsatz will be constantly informed by the "central inspection for the care of foreign workers" of its observations, in particular immediately in each case in which action of State organizations seems to be necessary. This agreement becomes effective on the day of its signing. Berlin, 2 June 1943Berlin, 2 June 1943 Dr. Robert LEY Fritz SAUCKEL For the carrying out of this agreement I order the following: 1. The supervision of all welfare measures in the realm of the employment of foreign workers is the sole responsibility of the central inspection for the care of foreign workers. Complaints about bad quarters, food, deficient provision of free time activities and cultural and propagandistic care will in the future be directed by me to the central inspection for investigation and elimination of possible deficiencies. The labor offices and Gaulabor offices must direct complaints and protests coming to them to the locally competent office of the German Labor Front. The central inspection will inform the Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz regarding its decisions and the measures instituted by it and their completion. 2. The employment of foreign workers, their identification, equalization between the plants, transfers, supervision of practical and vocationally correct employment in the plant, the promotion of instructional measures to increase production, as well as drafting of the labor-contract regulations, the carrying out
employment of foreign workers, their identification, equalization between the plants, transfers, supervision of practical and vocationally correct employment in the plant, the promotion of instructional measures to increase production, as well as drafting of the labor-contract regulations, the carrying out of pay regulation measures, and the supervision of the orderly paying of foreign workers, remain as formerly the task of the competent offices of the administration of the Arbeitseinsatz and Reich trusteeship. 3. The directives for the employment of eastern and western laborers given in Va 5780.28/90 of 9 January and Va 5780/196 of 4 February 1943 remain in force with the provision that the labor offices and Gau labor offices and the specialists employed with them for the inspection of camps for eastern laborers need only undertake the tasks mentioned under No. 2. 4. The close interrelationship of the tasks of the Arbeitseinsatz and the care of foreign labor demands, independently of the measures to be effected, for the execution of the above agreement, a constant and close cooperation between the offices of the administration of the Arbeitseinsatz and offices of the German labor front. If, for example, it is determined in the execution of Arbeitseinsatz measures, that an insufficient labor performance on the part of foreign labor results from absence of welfare work, then the competent agencies of the German Labor Front are to be informed of this without delay so that the latter may effect the correction of existing deficiencies. On the other hand the offices of the German Labor Front will bring to the attention of the competent agencies of the Arbeitseinsatz administrative findings made in the course of their welfare work which require an evaluation from the point of view of the Arbeitseinsatz. For the adjustment of individual questions of cooperation between the offices concerned and the erection of a permanent exchange of findings the Gau labor offices will enter into negotiations with the appropriate administration [Gauwaltungen] of the German Labor Front and will inform the labor offices on the rulings effected for the districts. By order Dr BEISIEGEL The German rearmament. The German rearmament began
of a permanent exchange of findings the Gau labor offices will enter into negotiations with the appropriate administration [Gauwaltungen] of the German Labor Front and will inform the labor offices on the rulings effected for the districts. By order Dr BEISIEGEL The German rearmament. The German rearmament began approximately in the year 1935; at first to a modest extent, after we had withdrawn from the League of Nations and had re-established the German sovereignty of arms. Question: How much was the total expenditure for the German Armament up to 1 September 1939? Answer: For the Armed Forces about 30 and not more than 40,000,000,000. Q. Do you know about the speech of Adolf Hitler, delivered at the Sport Palace on 1 September 1939, in which he admitted to have spent 90,000,000,000 marks for German rearmament? A. Yes. I know of his speech and also of the figure mentioned. I was utterly surprised by this figure and I nearly fainted when I heard this figure. As far as my knowledge went, this figure was exaggerated by about two thirds. Q. Was it the purpose of German rearmament to prepare for a war of aggression? A. Even during the years 1938 and 1939 none of us soldiers gave thought to a war of aggression. I knew that we were not at all prepared for a war of aggression, and even less for a world war. Q. Did you ever advocate a German war of aggression in your official capacity? A. I was in favor of a war of aggression under certain conditions, e.g. if by such a war of aggression a certainly impending attack of an adversary was to be prevented. Q. What were the reasons for the German attack on the Soviet Union? A. Because we had sure knowledge of the preparations of the Soviet Union for an attack and wished to prevent it. Q. Did you know that some individuals in Germany, both military and civilian, advocated a total war? A. No. Q. Did you yourself favor total war, i.e. a war disregarding international law of warfare? A. No. Q. Was Germany prepared for a world war at the time of the Munich crisis? A. No, for at that time no preparations had been made on our side, neither strategically nor operationally. Q. Would Germany have begun the military attack if France
war disregarding international law of warfare? A. No. Q. Was Germany prepared for a world war at the time of the Munich crisis? A. No, for at that time no preparations had been made on our side, neither strategically nor operationally. Q. Would Germany have begun the military attack if France and Gt. Britain had not agreed to the Munich Treaty? A. Hardly, in my opinion, because as I said before, we were not prepared for a war at that time, especially if France had fulfilled her obligation to help Czechoslovakia. Q. Had Adolf Hitler made up his mind firmly to get his political aims, even at the price of war of aggression waged by Germany or even of a world war? A. I do not know that, but I am firmly convinced that he did not want a world war. Q. Did you, in your capacity as Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, never sign an ordinance which might have implied a violation of the International Law of Warfare? A. Not that I know of. The investigating officer submits at this instance an ordinance of the Fuehrer concerning a General Trustee for the Employment of Labor to Wilhelm Keitel, an ordinance dated 21 March 1941. Q. Were you one of the signatories of this ordinance? A. Yes. Q. Were you aware of the fact that a rule of International Law is violated by the employment of prisoners of war and the civilian population of the occupied countries in the German armament industry? A. No, as long as the ordinance is applied in accordance with International Law. I am not responsible for further ordinances issued later on the basis of this ordinance in order to carry it into effect. I add, that the Fuehrer would have issued the ordinance also without my counter-signature; or to put it better that he would not have made the ordinance of 21 March 1942 dependent on my counter-signature. The Czechoslovakian Problem. Q. Who conceived the idea to solve the problem of the Sudeten-Germans by means of an occupation by German forces, and to solve the whole problem of Czechoslovakia forcibly by means of an occupation of the remainder of the Republic? A. That was exclusively the idea of the Fuehrer, although possibly political advisers co-operated; about this
of the Sudeten-Germans by means of an occupation by German forces, and to solve the whole problem of Czechoslovakia forcibly by means of an occupation of the remainder of the Republic? A. That was exclusively the idea of the Fuehrer, although possibly political advisers co-operated; about this I know nothing, though. Q. Was there a part-mobilization or were there movements of German forces against Czechoslovakia during the second half of May 1938 with the purpose of solving the Sudeten-German problem by the used of force? A. No. The idea of military action was not yet discussed at that time, so far as I know. Q. Do you remember an order of Adolf Hitler's of 28 May 1938, ordering the preparation of military action against Czechoslovakia for the 2 October? A. I do not remember such an order, although I should have known about it. The investigating officer now reads to Wilhelm Keitel the following passage from the Reichstag speech of Adolf Hitler's of 30 January 1939, page 453 of the book "Dokumente der deutschen Politik" (Documents of German Policy), vol. 7, part 2: As Germany had not mobilized, let alone any intentions to attack Czechoslovakia, the situation was bound-there is no doubt about it-to lead to a grave loss of prestige of the Reich. This unbearable provocation, made still worse by a really infamous prosecution and terrorization of our Germans living there, has led me to the decision to solve the Sudeten-German problem now finally and radically. On 28 May (1) I ordered to prepare military interference against this state for the 2 October. (2) I ordered the enormous and speedy completion of our defensive front in the West. Keitel declares thereto: Such orders may have been given, although from my memory I do not know anything about it; for according to my memory the respective preparatory measures were ordered only later, during the summer. I believe, though, that the declarations of Hitler's are correct, but I do not know where they come from. I stress the fact that Germany was not prepared for military action against Czechoslovakia in May 1938. I know, it is true, that the Fuehrer had made up his mind to solve the Sudeten-German problem in any case and within a reasonable space of time. Q.
correct, but I do not know where they come from. I stress the fact that Germany was not prepared for military action against Czechoslovakia in May 1938. I know, it is true, that the Fuehrer had made up his mind to solve the Sudeten-German problem in any case and within a reasonable space of time. Q. Was the danger of a Czechoslovakia mobilization discussed at the time of the invasion of Austria by German forces? A. I myself have drawn the attention of the Fuehrer to the fact that we were not prepared and could not occupy Austria if Czechoslovakia would mobilize. This indication was rejected by the Fuehrer. Q. Do you know that at the time of the Austrian crisis Goering and Neurath gave guarantees, both in their own names and that of the Fuehrer, to Czechoslovakia that Germany felt bound by the Treaty of Arbitration concluded with Czechoslovakia in 1925 and that Germany had no intentions of attacking Czechoslovakia? A. I do not know anything about such a guarantee. Munich. I was present, I admit, in Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich when Neville Chamberlain visited the Fuehrer. But I did not participate in any of the discussions and was but passively present, ready for any military information required. Q. Did the Fuehrer consult you with regard to the military possibilities of Germany before the meetings with Chamberlain? A. No. He was well informed about the military possibilities proper, and he knew that we were not at all prepared for war at the time of the Munich crisis. Q. Was then Adolf Hitler in favor of war at that time? A. No, because Germany was not prepared for war, as I have to stress again. Q. What would have happened militarily, if Gt. Britain, France and the Soviet Union had taken the side of Czechoslovakia, and if they had declined the discussions with Germany and Italy, which led to the Munich Treaty? A. The military means of the German Reich were by no means sufficient against such a constellation. An action at such a time would have been madness. Q. Was it the political purpose of the Munich Treaty to eliminate the Soviet Union from the European affairs? A. That is correct, for Czechoslovakia was considered to be a virtual field of deployment of the