dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with vigour before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive." (L-172) (b) Czechoslovakia The steps in the planning for the invasion of Czechoslovakia ("Case Green" or Fall Gruen) bear the evidence of knowing and willful participation by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the General Staff and High Command Group. The Hossbach minutes of the conference between Hitler and the four principal German military leaders on 5 November 1937 show that Austria and Czechoslovakia were then listed as the first intended victims of German aggression (386-PS). After the absorption of Austria in March 1938, Hitler as head of the State and Keitel as Chief of all the armed forces lost no time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia. In the Hitler-Keitel discussions on 21 April 1938 a nice balance of political and military factors was worked out (388-PS): "A. Political Aspect 1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland. 2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war. 3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g. assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration). B. Military Conclusions 1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2 and 3. Case 2 is the undesired one since "Gruen" will have taken security measures. 4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize "Gruen". Therefore: bridging the time gap between
action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize "Gruen". Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pi past Pr) [Pilsen, Prague]. (388-PS) From this point on, nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt file (388-PS) and in Jodl's diary (1780-PS). These two sources of information demolish in advance what will, no doubt, be urged in defense of the military defendants and the General Staff and high Command Group. They will seek to create the impression that the German generals were pure military technicians; that they were uninterested and uninformed about political and diplomatic considerations and events; that they passed their days mounting mock battles at the Kriegsakadamie; that they prepared plans for military attack or defense on a purely hypothetical basis. They will say all this in order to suggest that they did not share and could not estimate Hitler's aggressive intentions, and that they carried out politically conceived orders like military automatons, with no idea whether the wars they launched and waged were aggressive or not. If these arguments are made, the Schmundt file (388-PS) and Jodl's diary (1780-PS) make it abundantly apparent that aggressive designs were conceived jointly between the Nazis and the generals; that the military leaders were fully posted on the aggressive intentions of the Nazis; that they were fully informed of political and diplomatic developments; that indeed German generals had a habit of turning up at diplomatic gatherings. If the documents did not show these things so clearly, a moment's thought must show them to be true. A highly successful program of conquest depends on armed might, and cannot be executed with an unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military leadership. It has, of course, been said that war is too important a business to be left to soldiers alone. It is equally true that aggressive diplomacy is far too dangerous a business to be conducted
on armed might, and cannot be executed with an unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military leadership. It has, of course, been said that war is too important a business to be left to soldiers alone. It is equally true that aggressive diplomacy is far too dangerous a business to be conducted without military advice and military support. No doubt some of the German generals had qualms about Hitler's timing and the boldness of some of his moves. Some of these doubts are rather amusingly reflected in an entry in Jodl's diary for 10 August 1938: "The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer's attention to the defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top it off he claims to quote from General Adams [die er noch dazu dem General Adams in den Mund legt] that the western fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. 'I assure you, General, the position will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years.' The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it [the General Staff] is restrained by old memories; political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the General's opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that [?] the Fuehrer will be able to boost the morale of the people in an
this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the General's opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that [?] the Fuehrer will be able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment comes." (1780-PS) But if this entry shows that some of the German generals at that time were cautious with respect to Germany's ability to take on Poland and the Western Powers simultaneously, nonetheless the entry shows no lack of sympathy with the Nazi aims for conquest. And there is no evidence in Jodl's diary or elsewhere that any substantial number of German generals lacked sympathy with Hitler's objectives. Furthermore, the top military leaders always joined with and supported his decisions, with formidable success in the years from 1938 to 1942. If it is said that German military leaders did not know that German general policy toward Czechoslovakia was aggressive, or based on force and threat of force, it may be noted that on 30 May 1938 Hitler signed a Most Secret directive to Keitel (388-PS Item 11) in which he said: "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment. "An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe Creating a surprisingly favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may cause me to take early action. "The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once." (388-PS Item 11) Jodl was in no doubt what this meant. He noted in his diary that same day: "The Fuehrer signs directive 'Green', where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line". (1780-PS) The succeeding evidence in the Schmundt file (388-PS Items 14, 16, 17) and in the Jodl diary (1780-PS) shows how those military preparations went forward "all along the line." Numerous examples of discussions, planning, and preparation during the last
initiates military preparation all along the line". (1780-PS) The succeeding evidence in the Schmundt file (388-PS Items 14, 16, 17) and in the Jodl diary (1780-PS) shows how those military preparations went forward "all along the line." Numerous examples of discussions, planning, and preparation during the last few weeks before the Munich Pact, including discussions with Hungary and the Hungarian General Staff in which General Halder participated, are contained in the Jodl diary (1780-PS) and the later items in the Schmundt file (338-PS Items 18 to 22, 24, 26 to 28, 31 to 34, 36 to 54-PS). The day the Munich Pact was signed, Jodl noted in his diary: "The Munich Pact is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way." (1780-PS) Plans for the "liquidation" of the remainder of Czechoslovakia were made soon after Munich (388-PS Item 40; C-136; C-138). Ultimately the absorption was accomplished by diplomatic bullying in which Keitel participated for the usual purposes of demonstrating that German armed might was ready to enforce the threats (2802-PS). Once again, Jodl in his 1943 lecture (L-172) explained clearly why the objective of eliminating Czechoslovakia lay as close to the hearts of the German military leaders as to the hearts of the Nazis: "The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it then became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favorable strategic premises." (L-172) This serves to recall the affidavits by Blomberg (3704-PS) and Blaskowitz (3706-PS) already quoted: "The whole group of German staff and front officers believed that the question of the Polish Corridor would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms." "A war to wipe out the political and
(L-172) This serves to recall the affidavits by Blomberg (3704-PS) and Blaskowitz (3706-PS) already quoted: "The whole group of German staff and front officers believed that the question of the Polish Corridor would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms." "A war to wipe out the political and economic losses resulting from the creation of the Polish Corridor was regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity." "Before 1938-39, the German generals were not opposed to Hitler." "Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired." (c) Poland. The story of the German attack on Poland furnishes an excellent case study of the functioning of the General Staff and High Command Group. Reference is made to the series of directives from Hitler and Keitel involving "Fall Weiss" (C-120). The series starts with a re-issuance of the "Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed Forces". This periodically re-issued directive was encountered previously in the case of Czechoslovakia. In essence these directives are (a) statements of what the Armed Forces must be prepared to accomplish in view of political and diplomatic policies and developments, and (b) indications of what should be accomplished diplomatically in order to make the military tasks easier and the chances of success greater. They constitute, in fact, a fusion of diplomatic and military thought and strongly demonstrate the mutual inter-dependence of aggressive diplomacy and military planning. The distribution of these documents early in April 1939, in which the preparations of plans for the Polish war is ordered, was limited. Five copies only are distributed by Keitel: one to Brauchitsch (OKH), one to Raeder (OKM), one to Goering (OKL), and two to Warlimont in the Planning Branch of OKW. Hitler lays down that the plan must be susceptible of execution by 1 September 1939, and that target date was adhered to. The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is clearly brought out by the following part of one of those documents: "1. Political Requirements and Aims. German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on the same principles
thought is clearly brought out by the following part of one of those documents: "1. Political Requirements and Aims. German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland. "The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the Reich-territory at the outbreak of the conflict, at the latest. "The political leadership considers it its task in this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only. "The development of increasing internal crises in France and the resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in the not too distant future. "Intervention by Russia so far as she would be able to do this cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this would imply Poland's destruction by Bolshevism. "The attitudes of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by German military exigencies. "On the German side, Hungary cannot be considered a certain German ally. Italy's attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis. "2. Military Conclusions. The great objectives in the building up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the 'Western Democracies'. 'Fall Weiss' constitutes only a precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military settlement with the Western opponents. "The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes. "The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air over them." (C-120) It cannot be suggested that these are hypothetical plans, or that the General Staff and High
with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes. "The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air over them." (C-120) It cannot be suggested that these are hypothetical plans, or that the General Staff and High Command Group did not know what was in prospect. The plans show on their face that they are in earnest and no war game. The point is reinforced by Schmundt's notes on the conference in Hitler's study at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, on 23 May 1939 (L-79). At this conference Hitler announced: "There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision: to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity". (L-79) Besides Hitler and a few military aides and adjutants, the following were present: Goering (C-in-C Luftwaffe); Raeder (C-in-C Navy); Keitel (Chief, OKW); von Brauchitsch (C-in-C Army); Col. General Milch (Inspector General of the Luftwaffe); Gen. Bodenschatz (Goering's personal assistant); Rear Admiral Schnievindt (Chief of the Naval War Staff); Col. Jeschonnek (Chief of the Air Staff); Col. Warlimont (Planning Staff of OKW). All except Milch, Bodenschatz, and the adjutants are members of the Group as defined in the Indictment. The initial and general planning of the attack on Poland, however, had to be examined, checked, corrected, and perfected by the field commanders who were to carry out the attack. In a document issued in the middle of June 1939 (C-142), von Brauchitsch as C-in-C of the Army passed on the general outlines of the plan to the field commanders-in-chief (the Oberbefehlshaber of Army Groups and Armies) so that they could work out the actual preparation and deployments in accordance with the general plan: "The object of the operation is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. High policy demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. The intention of the Army High Command is to prevent a regular mobilization and concentration of the Polish Army by a surprise invasion of Polish territory and to destroy the mass of the Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of the Vistula-Narve line. This
to achieve quick results. The intention of the Army High Command is to prevent a regular mobilization and concentration of the Polish Army by a surprise invasion of Polish territory and to destroy the mass of the Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of the Vistula-Narve line. This is to be achieved by a concentric attack from Silesia on one side and Pomerania-East Prussia on the other side. The possible influence from Galicia against this operation must be eliminated. The main idea of the destruction of the Polish Army west of the Vistula-Narve Line with the elimination of the possible influence from Galicia remains unchanged even if advanced preparedness for defense on the part of the Polish Army, caused by previous political tension, should have to be taken into consideration. In such a case it may be a question of not making the first attack mainly with mechanized and motorized forces but of waiting for the arrival of stronger, non-motorized units. The Army High Command will then give the correspondingly later time for the crossing of the frontier. The endeavour to obtain a quick success will be maintained. "The Army Group Commands and the Army Commands (A.O.K.) will make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy. There will be alterations necessary if surprise should have to be abandoned: these will have to be developed simply and quickly on the same basis: they are to be prepared mentally to such an extent, that in case of an order from the Army High Command they can be carried out quickly." (C-142) A document of approximately the same date reveals an Oberbefehlshaber at work in the field planning the attack (2327-PS). This document, signed by Blaskowitz, at the time the commander-in-chief of the Third Army Area Command and commander-in-chief of the 8th Army during the Polish campaign, states in part: "The commander-in-chief of the army has ordered the working out of a plan of deployment against Poland which takes in account the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war by surprise and for quick success. "The order of deployment by the High Command, 'Fall Weiss' authorizes the Third Army Group [in Fall Weiss, 8th Army Headquarters] to give necessary directions and orders to
deployment against Poland which takes in account the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war by surprise and for quick success. "The order of deployment by the High Command, 'Fall Weiss' authorizes the Third Army Group [in Fall Weiss, 8th Army Headquarters] to give necessary directions and orders to all commands subordinated to it for 'Fall Weiss'." "The whole correspondence on 'Fall Weiss' has to be conducted under the classification Top Secret [Chefsache]. This is to be disregarded only if the content of a document, in the judgment of the chief of the responsible command is harmless in every way-even in connection with other documents. "For the middle of July a conference is planned where details on the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered later on. Special requests are to be communicated to Third Army Group before 10 July. "I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the divisional commanders and the commandants to limit as much as possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to limit the extent of the information and ask that all suitable measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting information. "The Commander-in-Chief of Army Area Command "(signed) F. Blaskowitz." "Aims of Operation 'Fall Weiss' "1. a. The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial superiority over the Polish frontier-guards and surprise that can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly bringing up other parts of the army as well to counteract the marching up of the Polish Army. "Accordingly all units have to keep the initiative against the foe by quick action and ruthless attacks." (2327-PS) Finally, a week before the actual onslaught, when all the military plans have been laid, The General Staff and High Command Group all gathered in one place, in fact all in one room. On 23 August 1939 the Oberbefehlshaber assembled at Obersalzberg to hear Hitler's explanation of the timing of the attack, and to receive political and diplomatic orientation