dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the opinion of the Reich Cabinet and according to the decisive judgment of Reich President Von Hindenburg, domestic political needs required that the open toleration of Communist acts of terror by the Prussian Cabinet in office be brought to an end. Hindenburg drew the logical conclusion and issued the Emergency Decree of 20 July 1932. By a decision of the then still independent Reich Supreme Court, it was determined that this decree with regard to constitutional law was permissible within the framework of state political necessities. If in carrying out this decree the request was indeed actually conveyed by police authorities to the Minister of the Interior, who had been suspended, that he leave his offices, the word coup d'etat lends a meaning to this measure which goes far beyond what actually happened. Also in considering the effects of this measure any assumption that here the way was paved for National Socialism is not justified by any facts. The appointed Reich Commissioner Bracht belonged to the Center Party. The key position of police president in Berlin was entrusted to a man on whom the hitherto existing Braun Cabinet had previously conferred the office of police president in Essen. Briefly, the result of the change was only that, on the one hand, an effective co-operation was now assured with the Reich authorities and, on the other hand, new people filled some political positions which up to now had been the almost exclusive monopoly of the Social Democrat Party to an extent which, from the point of view of parity, could no longer be justified. That in filling these positions the National Socialists were passed over was a charge which was made against Papen time and again by the National Socialists.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Consequently, Papen's entire term of office in the Government constitutes a clear line of realistic politics which show that, on the one hand, he did not relinquish the pilot wheel in carrying out necessary measures, especially economic ones, while, on the other hand, he tried to get a numerically large opposition party to collaborate. Papen's attitude toward the NSDAP became even more manifest after he had been asked by the Reich President, late in November 1932, to collaborate in the efforts to form a new cabinet. In this he showed he had the courage to go to the extreme. Realizing that it was impossible to go on with a non-National-Socialist Government, according to parliamentary principles, he submitted to the Reich President the proposal to rule with the aid of armed force, even if he thus caused a violation of the Constitution and risked causing a civil war. It is just as difficult to reconcile oneself with such a proposal, when one adheres to thinking along lines of constitutional law, as it is impossible to overlook in retrospect that the proposed temporary violation of the Constitution was probably the only way to avoid the solution which then became necessary on 30 January 1933. Any other temporary solution could not have had a satisfactory result. Sooner or later the opposition party would have forced the resignation of any non-National-Socialist cabinet. With that political unrest with its consequences on the entire economic life would have become a latent state-a state of affairs, which, through its repercussions, would only strengthen the National Socialist movement to such an extent that in the end the result would have been the fulfillment of its entire totalitarian claim for assuming unlimited power. The part played by Papen in the formation of the Cabinet of 30 January 1933 might in itself be disregarded.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It is sufficient to be aware of the fact that all endeavors to bring about a parliamentary government without Hitler could not succeed from a purely numerical standpoint, and that such a parliamentary solution with Hitler was wrecked by his opposition. A measure born out of political and constitutional necessity cannot, according to the Indictment, be considered as evidence of intentional planning of a crime in the sense of the Charter. The purpose of this count of the Indictment must be considered. By maintaining all parliamentary rules Hindenburg, in his capacity as chief of State, appoints a Government the head of which is the leader of the strongest party. This Government, when presented before the Reichstag, finds an overwhelming majority. That which Papen is accused of, the knowledge of the activities of the National Socialist Party in the past, holds true to the same extent also for the other participants, for Hindenburg and all consenting members of the Reichstag. The reproach leveled against Papen thus includes also an accusation against Hindenburg and the entire consenting Reichstag. For this reason alone probably the first attempt to include in an Indictment a self-evident, constitutional procedure of a sovereign state must fail. If despite this fact I go into the events which occurred before the formation of the Government, it is only in order to show clearly the unequivocal standpoint of Papen, who on the one hand did not wish to close his eyes to the real facts, but on the other hand desired to undertake everything in order to prevent the danger of an uncontrollable development of this reorganization. The Prosecution consider the Hitler-Papen meeting at the home of Schroeder on 4 January as being the beginning of the efforts to form the Government of 30 January 1933.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As a matter of fact the meeting at Schroeder's was nothing else than an exchange of ideas on the existing situation during which Papen and Hitler maintained their previous opinions and Papen pointed out that Hindenburg, owing to the apprehensions which he had expressed, would in no case agree to Hitler's taking over the position of Reich Chancellor. Hitler would have to accept the position of Vice Chancellor, since Hindenburg took the standpoint that further development would take place after he had stood the test of time. This meeting in Cologne took place upon Hitler's request. I refer in this instance to Schroeder's communique published by the press, which I submitted as Defense Document Number Papen-9, and which I erroneously indicated during the cross-examination as being a joint communique issued by Papen and Schroeder. Schroeder established in it that he alone took the first step toward having this meeting. That this meeting was in no way the basis for the formation of the Government of 30 January is obvious from the fact that the discussion was immediately reported by Papen to Schleicher and Hindenburg and that subsequently until 22 January Papen had nothing to do with the solution of the problem of a new government. Schleicher as well as Hindenburg endeavored to obtain parliamentary support for the Schleicher Cabinet through negotiations with the leaders of the parties, efforts which failed, however, due to the pressure of the political facts. The main effort was to split up the National Socialist Party by inviting the collaboration of the Strasser wing in the Government. These efforts failed when Hitler's position became so strong after the result of the elections in Lippe that he regained absolute control over the Party against all attempts to split it up. The outcome of the elections in Lippe of 15 January 1933 was generally considered as a barometer of public opinion with respect to the political situation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: All parties had mobilized their entire organization and propaganda machinery, and therefore one could gauge public opinion from the result of this election. The result showed that the losses suffered during the November elections were almost completely regained. Thus everybody could recognize that the decline of the National Socialist movement was stopped and that with the continuance of the momentary political and economic situation a further gain was to be feared. The necessity for a decision became more and more urgent when, on 20 January 1933, the Aeltestenrat (Council of Seniors) of the Reichstag-by convening the Reichstag for 31 January-granted to Schleicher's Cabinet a period of grace up to that date, since a vote of no confidence by the left and the NSDAP meant its immediate fall. The meeting in the house of Ribbentrop on 22 January, when Hindenburg wanted to learn through his son and the State Secretary of the Presidential Chancellery, Dr. Meissner, Hitler's opinions about the political situation, has to be considered from this point of view. The part Meissner played and also his general part in the formation of the Hitler Government cannot be established with certainty by means of the data at hand. In any case, as a member of the immediate circle around Hindenburg who finally took the ultimate decision, he was by no means uninterested in the matter. He has been judged at least very differently. Because of his own interest in the case he can in no event be considered as a classical witness for the judgment of the events of that time. His testimony seems certainly in one point highly improbable. He maintains that her opposed Hindenburg's decision, after the latter decided to appoint Hitler to the office of Reich Chancellor.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This is said by the same man who during the session of the Cabinet concerning the Enabling Act did not consider it necessary to maintain the right of the Reich President to proclaim laws, the same man who after the events of 30 June 1934 obviously collaborated in isolating Hindenburg from all those who could give him a true presentation of the events. I make these remarks because a part of a Meissner Affidavit was read during the hearing of evidence against Papen. Although according to the decision of the Tribumal the part which was read will not constitute a basis for the verdict, during the cross-examination questions were nevertheless asked in reference to the affidavit which might raise doubts. The decision of the Tribunal relieves me of the obligation further to discuss in detail the contents of the affidavit and to indicate a number of inaccuracies which could be easily refuted. The hearing of evidence has shown that until 28 January 1933, Papen made no attempts whatsoever as regards the formation of a government. On that day, in view of the imminent meeting of the Reichstag, Schleicher had to bring about a decision. On 1 December 1932 he advised Hindenburg against an open fight with the Reichstag and declared that the use of armed force in a possible civil war would be hopeless. Now he thought that he himself could find no other solution than to beg to be permitted the use of those forces which he previously considered as being insufficient. But since no change in the situation had occurred since that time which could offer reasons for Schleicher's change of opinion, since moreover the position of the NSDAP was strengthened by the elections in Lippe and the general political situation had become still more tense through the attitude of the parties, Hindenburg upheld his decision of 2 December. Thus the resignation of the whole Schleicher Cabinet was inevitable. Now the events took the course which necessarily and logically they had to take if the use of arms was to be avoided.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There was only one solution now: negotiations with Hitler. Hindenburg commissioned Papen to conduct the negotiations for the formation of the government. On Hitler's part it was clear that he could maintain his unwavering demands-namely, to take over the office of Reich Chancellor himself. The task, clearly recognized by Papen, was now to set limits to the political activities of the new party which had not yet been tested on such a large scale. First of all, a change of course had to be avoided in those ministries in which any radicalism would have been particularly detrimental-namely, the Foreign Office and the War Ministry. Hindenburg reserved for himself the right to fill these two key positions. In order not to entrust the new chancellor with appointing the remaining ministers, as had been customary heretofore, Papen was charged with this task as homo regius. He succeeded in limiting the number of National Socialist ministers to a minimum. Three National Socialist members of the Government faced eight non-National-Socialists, who for the main part were taken over from the former Cabinet and who guaranteed a conservative policy in their ministries. That was not all; within the framework of the Constitution the authority of the Reich Chancellor was to be limited in a manner hitherto unknown. Papen was appointed to the position of Vice Chancellor. His function was not connected with a special department but mainly intended to constitute a counterpoise to the position of the Reich Chancellor. It was decided that Hitler in his capacity of Reich Chancellor should report to Reich President Von Hindenburg only in the presence of the Vice Chancellor. Thus, a certain control was established when the Reich President formed his opinion on the requests presented by the Reich Chancellor. In view of Hindenburg's personality, which one might reasonably expect to have exerted quite considerable influence upon Hitler, this control over the information Hindenburg received promised that a shift toward a radical course would be avoided.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This was the part the defendant had in the formation of the Hitler Government. The Prosecution see herein a decisive, conscious step toward the transfer of full power to National Socialism. By considering the case objectively, even in retrospect, one can only arrive at the conclusion that in view of the inevitable necessity of ceding the leadership of the Cabinet to the National Socialist Party, every possibility for limiting the importance of this measure was exhausted. The position of Reich Chancellor and the appointment of only two National Socialist ministers represented the concession made to Hitler's demands. For the consideration of the present proceedings it would not matter if the solution adopted on 30 January was the only possible one or not. Even if one were of a different opinion, the only thing that matters in looking at the case from a criminal angle is whether Papen could consider this solution as a necessity or in general only as a mere political expediency. Even if, contrary to all the facts, one regarded his opinion as utopian, it should be taken into consideration from the point of view of penal law that one could only speak of guilt if he had known the future consequences and the future plans of aggression and if in spite of this he had collaborated in the formation of the Government. The facts just mentioned have proved that there is not even the slightest supposition for this. In considering the case, it is of decisive importance also that the two ministries, which in connection with the accusation of breaking the peace are the most important or which are the only ones to play a part at all-namely, the Foreign Office and the War Ministry-were placed in the hands of men who enjoyed Hindenburg's confidence and had had no connection at all with Hitler, and from whom an unbiased direction of the ministries could be expected. It is not unimportant to consider in this instance what expectations one might have from Hitler and his future policy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The leader of the opposition party now took for the first time the responsibility of a party, the structure and development of which could certainly occasion many misgivings and apprehensions, a party which had developed on the basis of an absolutely negative attitude toward the hitherto existing government leadership, a party which, noisy and boisterous as it was, had certainly made many concessions with regard to the composition of its membership, a party which had laid down a new program including points which seemed far from reality and impossible to carry out but which-and this is the only essential fact within the scope of. our consideration of the case-apparently did not have any criminal character. On the other hand one cannot disregard the experience of life and history that propaganda and responsible work are two very different things, that a party which develops from nothing needs, according to experience, more negative and noisy propaganda than an old existing party. Even if the Cabinet of 30 January had consisted exclusively of National Socialists, even if there had been no moderating element in the person of Hindenburg, one could have assumed according to the rules of reason and experience that Hitler, who acceded to power by means of propaganda, would take into account the existing conditions in this practical, responsible work and would show himself in his activities essentially different from what he appeared during the propagandistic preparation before his accession to power. One instance had already shown the difference between a party in opposition and in responsible government work: The same National Socialists with their same program and their same propaganda who now on 30 January took over the position of Reich Chancellor had already held the leadership or participated in the governments of some German states. We see Frick, the leader of the Reichstag faction, acting as responsible minister in Thuringia.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: His field of action included even the police and we saw the National Socialists zealously tackling various economic problems in these states. But we did not see them commit excesses or even pursue an unreasonable policy, which would have been at least in approximate agreement with their propaganda. Could it not be expected then that now in the Reich too, with the greater tasks, the natural sense of responsibility would increase? And that, especially in view of the safety measures taken, matters would not take a dangerous course? It is not superfluous to discuss Hitler's personality in this connection. Hitler, especially after the failure of the attempt to split the Strasser group, was the absolute autocrat of his party. Undoubtedly he did not show in the leadership of his party, in his speeches, and in his appearance that reserve which should have been a matter of course for the leader of such a big party. However, all signs indicated that Hitler had his party under control to such an extent that he would be able to put through even unpopular measures which had to be taken under the pressure of reality. In the questions concerning the participation in the government he had pursued a policy in keeping with his intentions, wise in its tactics but often unpopular with the impatient masses, because he took the facts into account. Could it not be expected then that this man who now had reached his aim-namely, to take over the leadership of the Cabinet-would abandon the unrealistic ideas he advocated when he was in the ranks of the opposition and would submit to the real exigencies of national and international life?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It is also a general fact known from experience that a man confronted with particularly great aims and with a particularly grave responsibility grows as a ruler and as a man in proportion with these aims and this responsibility; In view of this general historic experience one could not assume that a man entrusted with responsibility, after certain attempts which could be interpreted as being promising, would soon revert to the theses of his former opposition ideas, that after a couple of years this man would throw overboard every positive idea he had emphasized-I remember for instance Hitler's professing his adherence to the Christian foundations of the state-and that he would even surpass the negative ideas he formerly advocated and increase to an immeasurable extent his aims and his methods. We see now Hitler in his full development before us; and we are perhaps tempted to interpret his actions during the last years-because they represent something which is so monstrous and therefore so impressive-as being the manifestations of his whole personality, assuming that during the preceding time he had already been such. It is not possible, within the scope of this Trial, on the basis of events, his speeches, and especially his actions, to interpret and to understand Hitler psychologically from the beginning of his political activity until its end. His well-known fear of disclosing himself and the mistrust he showed more and more toward nearly everybody in his immediate surroundings makes it particularly difficult to judge his personality. The individual facts which occurred lead, however, to the certain conclusion that Papen, too, despite the fact that he was close to Hitler, could not suspect him in 1933 of being the man he showed himself during later years. Papen as homo regius was fully aware of his responsibility in agreement with Hindenburg's wishes and did what he could to prevent radicalism from getting the upper hand.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: After the formation of the Cabinet he did not sit back and take the easy way favorable for him from an opportunist point of view. He undertook to form a counterpart to the National Socialists at the elections of 5 March 1933 through a union of the conservative parties of the right. Nor one who had adopted the National Socialist ideas or even agreed to offer blind obedience to their leader, the next thing to do would have been to put an end to the opposition of this large newly constituted conservative group and to let it effect a union with the party which had recently come to power, a way which at that time appeared to many absolutely natural. Papen entered the election contest as leader and organizer of the oppositional group "Black-White-Red." His speeches of that time, excerpts of which I submitted in the document book, give a clear picture of his aims and intentions. They were the affirmation of a national idea, free from the unrestrained propaganda of National Socialism and its doctrines. In any case his program was in irreconcilable contrast to what.later turned out to be the unpredictable extension and unlimited transgression of the confirmed aims of the NSDAP. The formation of the political action bloc Black-White-Red was to guarantee what Papen had tried to achieve by the composition of the Cabinet of 30 January: a coalition cabinet which, as an inevitable result of parliamentary rules and the entire political situation, left the post of Reich Chancellor to the leader of the strongest party, who, however, was forced to rule within the framework of a coalition cabinet with all the limitations which derived from it.
THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to recess? [A recess was taken.7