dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. SAUTER: If I may say so, Mr. President, the first time I wanted to ask whether Funk tried to have Dr. Trip retained on the administrative council of the International Bank in Basel although he was actually no longer competent to represent Dutch interests, you said that that question was immaterial. The present question refers to whether Dr. Funk endeavored to have the Dutchman, Dr. Trip, retained as president of the Dutch Bank. That is the last question which I have to ask, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: [Turning to the witness.] Well, do you know?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes. I should like to explain this a little. To understand this matter it is necessary...
THE PRESIDENT: Please, be very short about it then.
HIRSCHFELD: It is necessary to know that the Reich Commissioner and Dr. Fischbock were in favor of Rost van Tonningen, although it was known that we in the Netherlands considered Rost van Tonningen a traitor. When Trip was forced to resign, Wohlthat, the German Reichsbank Commissioner, told me that this matter was discussed in Berlin, and the basis of this information. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but I think what you were asked was whether Funk tried to get Trip appointed to the presidency of the Dutch Bank when this other man was appointed by Seyss-Inquart. Do you know whether Funk...
HIRSCHFELD: I only know from Wohlthat that Funk attempted to do so and that Goering made a different decision at the suggestion of the Reich Commissioner and Dr. Fischbock.
DR. SAUTER: Anyway, you confirm that Funk attempted to have the Dutchman, Dr. Trip, retained as president of the Dutch State Bank?
HIRSCHFELD: I confirm that, having been told so by Wohlthat.
DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross-examination?
M. DUBOST: Of what nature were the orders left to you by the Dutch Government when it left for England?
HIRSCHFELD: There were written instructions by the Dutch Government for all Netherlands officials of the administration. These instructions were based on the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare.
M. DUBOST: These orders, therefore, did not imperil the German Army?
HIRSCHFELD: No.
M. DUBOST: Will you then please explain, if you are capable of doing so, why Holland had an exceptional regime, since she was the only country in the West to have a Gauleiter immediately after the invasion?
HIRSCHFELD: We considered the appointment of a Reich Commissioner who was chief of the civilian administration in the Netherlands as an indication that the German Government had political intentions in the Netherlands and not purely the intentions of an occupying power.
M. DUBOST: In your opinion, therefore, Seyss-Inquart was appointed the day after the invasion had started because the German Government had the intention of altering the Dutch national institutions in contravention of international law?
HIRSCHFELD: We were convinced-and this was confirmed by experience-that all possible forms of National Socialist institutions would be introduced in the Netherlands and that one would attempt to force them upon the Netherlands.
M. DUBOST: This attempt was made?
HIRSCH.: Yes.
M. DUBOST: Is it true that during the occupation a great number of the members of the Dutch National Socialist Party were at the head of the police and carried out German orders to arrest Jews or members of the resistance movement or to take hostages?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
M. DUBOST: When the Dutch police itself became involved in these arrests, did it make them only because it was forced to do so?
HIRSCHFELD: The conditions were such that old Netherlands policemen, if they ever took part in such matters, did so because they were forced to; but there were Dutch policemen who had been appointed by the German authorities. They were, in general, members of the NSB and they, in part, volunteered for such malodorous tasks.
M. DUBOST: Is it true that the wives and children of those members of the Dutch police who refused to carry out German orders were taken as hostages?
HIRSCHFELD: I know that in various cases the families were taken as hostages when police officials refused to carry out orders. It is further known that this did not happen only in the case of the police, but also in other cases.
M. DUBOST: It has been alleged here that the diamonds taken at Arnhem had all been found in Holland. Does that agree with the facts?
HIRSCHFELD: What was stolen at Arnhem?
M. DUBOST: Diamonds.
HIRSCHFELD: Diamonds. The diamonds affair is a typical example of how they wanted to deal with Dutch property. These diamonds were in a bank safe in Arnhem. After the invasion of Normandy attempts were made by the Germans to seize these diamonds. The director of the Netherlands agency which is concerned with diamonds and later I myself were asked for the keys to the bank safe. We refused. And then on the day of the airborne landings near Arnhem, the German Armed Forces blew up this safe. Apparently only half of the diamonds were found and they were sent to the Reichsbank in Berlin. When I protested, Fischbock said that they had only been put in the custody of the Reichsbank in Berlin. Then I demanded that these diamonds should be given back. Meanwhile, it was learned that half of the diamonds were still in Arnhem. The Currency Protection Command again demanded the keys which were in my personal possession. I refused and had another discussion with Fischbock. The matter was obviously distasteful to him; and he agreed to the concession that the remaining diamonds, which we later found in Arnhem, be returned to the owner. But they were willing to give back the half which had been sent to Berlin only if they could be placed under German lock in a bank in the eastern Netherlands. I demanded from Fischbock that they be turned over without restrictions. Apparently Fischbock could not agree, and for this reason, after the liberation of the Netherlands, these diamonds were not given back; and as far as I know they have not yet been returned.
M. DUBOST: Did Seyss-Inquart return the property of the 1,000 Jews who were deported to Theresienstadt?
HIRSCHFELD: As to the Jews who were deported to Theresienstadt, I know that these people, on the basis of a promise given to my colleague Frederiks, were to be given preferential treatment; but that their property had been given back is not known to me and I do not believe it.
M. DUBOST: Was that property returned to them?
HIRSCHFELD: It had been confiscated. I did not hear that it was returned to them.
M. DUBOST: Seyss-Inquart said that in February 1941, 400 Jews had been transported from Amsterdam to Mauthausen as a measure of reprisal for the fact that a member of the NSB was supposedly murdered at Amsterdam by Jews. What do you know about this?
HIRSCHFELD: I know that in February 1941 there were two difficult situations in Amsterdam. One referred to shipyard workers. I believe 3,000 of them were to be forcibly sent to Germany. I intervened with Seyss-Inquart and succeeded in preventing this. There was, however, unrest in Amsterdam on this subject. In the second place, Jews were already being arrested in Amsterdam, which was the occasion for a strike. The incident of these 400 Jews of whom you speak took place after this strike in Amsterdam as far as I recall, because they wanted to make the Jews responsible for the strike. Fischbock told me so himself, and I said that I did not believe it and that this was only an excuse.
M. DUBOST: If I have understood you correctly, these Jews were arrested because the population in Amsterdam was opposed to their deportation. There were demonstrations and riots during which members of the NSB were killed. These Jews were therefore not deported in reprisal for the murder of the members of the NSB; on the contrary, the men of the NSB were killed at the time when they were going to arrest the Jews, before there was any idea of reprisal.
HIRSCHFELD: I recall that in these days the Amsterdam workers resisted when the Jews were being arrested, and this led to an uprising in Amsterdam and to the strike. Exactly what happened I do not know from my own experience.
M. DUBOST: Did Seyss-Inquart prohibit ration cards to be given to workers who evaded deportation to Germany?
HIRSCHFELD: When in May 1943 the so-called age groups were called up for labor commitment in Germany, instructions were sent on 6 May to the competent Netherlands authorities announcing that workers who were called in these age groups could no longer receive any food cards. That was a decree of 6 May 1943, signed by an official of the Reich Commissariat by the name of Effger. We received this instruction; and although it reached us when martial law was in effect, the instruction was not carried out by the Netherlands authorities. What the German authorities argued, in effect, was: "Whoever does not work for Germany gets nothing to eat."
M. DUBOST: Seyss-Inquart claimed that the Dutch people who left to work in Germany up to 1942 were all volunteers. Is that correct?
HIRSCHFELD: No, they could not all be volunteers. The unemployed in the Netherlands received unemployment compensation, and shortly after the occupation a directive was issued that people who were suited for work in Germany and refused to volunteer for this work were no longer entitled to receive unemployment compensation. Thus they were under economic pressure.
M. DUBOST: Much has been said here as to whether Rauter was subordinate to Seyss-Inquart. Could you inform us on this?
HIRSCHFELD: So far as we in the occupied territories knew, Rauter was appointed by Seyss-Inquart at the beginning of June 1940 as Commissioner General for Security. No order which was then known indicated that Rauter had any kind of special position. The decree of the German Reich Chancellor of 18 May 1940 made it clear to us Dutch that the Reich Commissioner was the only responsible man in the Netherlands for the occupying power within the civilian sphere. Much later, from talks, I, and perhaps others who were better informed, realized that Rauter received direct orders from Himmler or from the Reich Security Main Office. But the population of the Netherlands could not know this.
M. DUBOST: Perhaps you know the result of the abolition of the "currency frontier" and its repercussion on life in Holland.
HIRSCH.: Yes. I will try to describe this matter in a few words. At the outbreak of war there was a clearing agreement between the Netherlands and Germany. Thus we Netherlands officials, at the beginning of the occupation, were able to exercise special control for deliveries of goods and such to Germany, because there was not only border control by customs officials, but we could also control payment. It was particularly disagreeable to Fischbock that Dutch authorities could still refuse anything, and this was a cause for friction. He attempted to remove this clearing, and on the 1st of April 1941 the foreign currency border was removed. This made it possible for call goods to be bought in the Netherlands for Reichsmark, and they could be taken to Germany under the protection of the German authorities. I will give an example: According to an investigation, which I ordered at that time, there were a few hundred buyers of jewelry and gold and silver articles in the Netherlands. These articles are easy to carry with one. If there had been control of payment, it would not have been possible that in 1942 alone, according to our estimate, 80 to 100 million guilders' worth of such goods was taken away at high prices to Germany. The important point was that by lifting this control of foreign currency one could operate more freely. Furthermore, this was a possibility of buying Dutch securities on the Amsterdam stock exchange, for one of the German aims at that time was to tie Netherlands and German economy together. The easiest way to do this was to lift the "currency frontier," or more exactly, the currency control between the occupied territories and Germany; and thus Netherlands interests were prejudiced more severely than those of other occupied territories where this currency control was retained. I should like to add that of course even there ways of carrying out this exploitation were found. The lifting of the currency control made the German policy in this connection much easier.
HIRSCH.: This was clearly shown by an order of Hermann Goering of 1942, in which the control of the Netherlands German border was abolished and the Delegate for the Four Year Plan could write that there must be no control at the border even when price regulations or rationing regulations were infringed. That was what Hermann Goering added.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, the Tribunal thinks that this should be shortened, this discussion of the question of the abolition of the frontier policy for money.
M. DUBOST: I have no more questions on this point, Mr. President. [Turning to the witness.] What amount of money did Holland pay Germany for the cost of occupation?
HIRSCHFELD: The total sum which was paid by the end of the occupation was 8,500 million Builder.
M. DUBOST: In what form were these payments demanded?
HIRSCHFELD: These 8,500 million guilder consisted of credits which the Armed Forces demanded for the direct occupation costs in the Netherlands; furthermore, for the cost of the machinery of the Reich Commissariat; and third, payments which were imposed on the Netherlands under the expression which was used at first, "outside occupation costs," that is, expenses which the Armed Forces incurred in Germany in the interest of the occupation forces in the Netherlands. The form in which it was paid, as far as it concerned payments in the Netherlands, was in Dutch money. Payments in Germany were made in gold, which was demanded from the Netherlands Bank, or were taken from the account which the Netherlands Bank had with the Reichsbank.
M. DUBOST: Were these payments the result of one of the conditions of capitulation?
HIRSCHFELD: I know the capitulation conditions of 14 May 1940 and they do not mention anything about occupation costs.
M. DUBOST: What is the damage sustained by Holland in other ways as a result of the looting of the means of construction, machinery, stocks, ships, and so forth? HIRSCHFELD It is extremely difficult to give an exact figure because it could not be determined during the occupation. But, after the German capitulation, the Netherlands Government reported the sum of about 25,000 million guilders to the Reparation Committee in Paris as damages for occupation. This would include the 8,500 million in occupational costs which I just mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, isn't this all contained in the Dutch report?
M. DUBOST: Oh no, Mr. President, certainly not. How did Seyss-Inquart's attitude change during the occupation?
HIRSCHFELD: I should like to make a clear distinction with regard to his point of view after September, after the autumn of 1944, and during the first 4 1/2 years. After the autumn of 1944 he was much more outspoken in the Netherlands' interests than previously.
M. DUBOST: Before being the secretary general of the various administrations, which you administered during the German occupation, you were Director of Foreign Trade in Holland; and as such you were present at international negotiations, and in particular, you negotiated with the representatives of Germany about economic questions concerning your country. You therefore knew Schacht?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes, I believe I first met Schacht in 1933 at the World Economic Conference in London.
M. DUBOST: During your negotiations with Schacht were you not led to ask him to restrict the rearmament of Germany which was ruining her credit?
HIRSCHFELD: If I am to answer this question, I must go back to a conversation in 1936, when I was in Berlin and saw Schacht in connection with trade treaty negotiations. During this conversation the international financial situation came up for discussion because there were various currency devaluations at that time affecting the French franc, the Swiss franc, and the Dutch guilder. The situation of German currency was also discussed in this connection. When I voiced my criticism, Schacht said, "How would you do it?" I said I could only give him my private opinion. Then I asked if Germany-a question under discussion at that time-when taking up more international loans, would be ready to assume the consequences, as the interests and amortizations would imply a blocking of the importation of raw materials which would have an unfortunate effect on the labor market and on rearmament. Would Germany be wining to accept such consequences? If so, then, according to what was my private opinion in 1936, international loans might be discussed. If not, such a discussion would have little point. Then Schacht gave me his opinion. Germany needed rearmament in order to be equal to the other great powers in international politics. Only on such a basis could one negotiate. And Schacht said to me in his own ironical pointed way, "I want a big and strong Germany; and to achieve that, I would even ally myself with the devil." In the course of this discussion, Schacht asked a few questions. First, he wanted to clear up the currency question, and secondly, he considered the colonial question important. Regarding the colonial question, he said to me that in his opinion it was possible for Germany to take over colonies again and that she would accept the responsibility not to arm these colonies and not to set up any naval bases there. If such a policy was to be adopted, he believed that German economic and foreign policy might be reoriented. In this connection Schacht told me that he did not approve of the anti-Semitic tendencies then prevalent in Germany.
HIRSCHFELD: He gave me examples of his attitude toward anti-Semitism and how he rejected it. I may add one example here that he gave me, his conversation with a certain Klagges, who was Prime Minister of Brunswick, and who made Hitler a German citizen.
M. DUBOST: That is of no interest to me. Schacht told you he had defended the Jews. Now, as to the General Staff, was it not the German General Staff who gave the order to have raids carried out in Rotterdam? DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of German Armed Forces): Mr. President, if I understood the question correctly, the witness is to be questioned about the charges against the General Staff and the OKW. I object to this question for the following reasons...
THE PRESIDENT: You go too fast. Do you not see the light?
DR. LATERNSER: As defense counsel for the General Staff and the OKW, I was prohibited by a court decision promulgated on 8 June to question or cross-examine any witnesses. The same ought to apply to the Prosecution. If I am not allowed to question witnesses, then the Prosecution must not be allowed to question them either since the rules must be the same for Prosecution and Defense.
M. DUBOST: I will forego my question.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear what you said, M. Dubost.
M. DUBOST: I said, Mr. President, that I would forego my question about the General Staff; and I have two more questions about Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, just one moment-go on, M. Dubost.
M. DUBOST: Did Seyss-Inquart give the order to have raids carried out in all the large Dutch cities?
HIRSCHFELD: Not to my knowledge.
M. DUBOST: Who gave the order for these roundups to be carried out? Who was it? HIRSCHFELD These raids were carried out by the German Armed Forces. I do not know who gave the orders. It is only known that in Rotterdam, when these raids-I believe it was on 11 November 1944-were carried out, the divisional commander in Rotterdam made a speech in the town hall on the subject and organized this raid.
M. DUBOST: But didn't Seyss-Inquart have orphan children from the hospitals taken away for work in Germany?
HIRSCHFELD: The question is not clear.
M. DUBOST: Was it Seyss-Inquart who had orphan children seized and sent to work in the service of Germany?
HIRSCHFELD: From my own experience I know nothing about this.
M. DUBOST: Were orphan children compelled to serve in certain of the SS units, on Seyss-Inquart's orders?
HIRSCHFELD: I know that the SS in the Netherlands recruited soldiers. As far as I know from the newspapers, bulletins, and handbills, it was always done by the SS as such.
M. DUBOST: Who pledged himself not to use chemical products made in Holland for war? Was it Seyss-Inquart who had pledged himself not to do so?
HIRSCHFELD: I beg your pardon?
M. DUBOST: Who had pledged himself not to use chemical products made in Holland for warfare and to have them reserved exclusively for Dutch agricultural purposes?
HIRSCHFELD: This is the question of the nitrogen fertilizer?
M. DUBOST: Yes.
HIRSCHFELD: With regard to the nitrogen fertilizer, the promise was made from the beginning that the nitrogen fertilizer industries in the Netherlands should only produce artificial fertilizers. This was done until about the middle of August 1944, when instructions came that the nitrogen fertilizer industry was to change its production over to explosives. These instructions had been issued by an office of the Reich Commissioner. It was signed by a certain Herr Brocke. Thereupon, after I had spoken to an official of the industry, I attempted to speak to Seyss-Inquart personally on this matter and to intervene. I was given the answer by his adjutant that he had already made his decision and that I could establish contact with Herr Fiebig, the representative of Speer in the Netherlands. I discussed the matter with Herr Fiebig and told him that Netherlands industry and Netherlands labor could not work on explosives. Thereupon I was told...
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, cannot this question be answered a little more shortly? The question is, did Seyss-Inquart promise that chemicals should be used, I suppose, on the land in Holland and not used for purposes in the Reich? Isn't that the question?
M. DUBOST: You have heard what Mr. President has said. Try to answer more briefly.
HIRSCHFELD: We had the promise that only artificial fertilizer would be produced. Then the demand was made to produce explosives.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, we do not want it all again. Can't you get the question answered?
M. DUBOST: I did not hear the answer of the witness, Mr. President. It did not come through.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [A recess was taken.]
M. DUBOST: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall ask the witness one more question. Witness, do you know under what conditions and for what reasons the newspaper published in The Hague was destroyed by the agencies of the Reich Commissioner?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
M. DUBOST: Can you tell us?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes. The newspaper published in The Hague was destroyed because the employees of this newspaper refused to publish an article which spoke against the railroad strike-an article which had been compiled by the information chief of the Reich Commissioner. That was the reason for refusing to publish it.
M. DUBOST: Yes. It was destroyed by means of dynamite, was it not? The buildings and machinery were blown up, were they not?
HIRSCHFELD: The equipment was blown up with dynamite.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, with the permission of the High Tribunal, I should like to call my last witness to the witness stand, Ernst Schwebel. [The witness Schwebel took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
ERNST AUGUST SCHWEBEL (Witness): Ernst August Schwebel.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what functions did you have before you assumed service in the Netherlands?