dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GEN. ZORYA: Did Ribbentrop attempt in any form whatsoever to protest against the inclusion of his name in the roster of honorary members of this congress?
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I can recall he very unwillingly took over this post, but I do not believe that he really intended to take any active part in this matter.
GEN. ZORYA: If I have understood you correctly, you have recently testified to the fact that relations between Ribbentrop and Himmler were hostile.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, bad relations.
GEN. ZORYA: But can you state whether any contact existed between Ribbentrop and Himmler in their work, whether they maintained this contact in any one particular sphere or branch of their work?
VON STEENGRACHT: As a matter of fact, there was no working contact such as would have been considered right in a well-organized state. Of course, now and then there were matters somewhere that concerned both of these men, and to that extent they did have contact, yes.
GEN. ZORYA: What was the nature of this contact, and what, exactly, did it represent?
VON STEENGRACHT: It really only amounted to this: that Ribbentrop or Himmler saw each other every few months. Besides that, we had a liaison man in the Foreign Office for the ReichsFuehrer SS Himmler.
GEN. ZORYA: Then how does all this fit in with the hostility which, as you have just mentioned, existed between Himmler and Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: I presume you are referring to the second question I answered. In every normal state it was the case that the ministers saw each other at least once a year and exchanged opinions. This, however, did not take place, since, as we have already heard today at some length, the fields of jurisdiction overlapped to a great extent and the activity of one man touched very closely on the activity of the other. Therefore some connection had to be established whether one wanted it or not.
GEN. ZORYA: Do I understand you to say that Himmler and Ribbentrop never even met?
VON STEENGRACHT: They met perhaps once every 3 months. It might have been every 4 months and they usually met only if, by chance, both Ribbentrop and Himmler were visiting Hitler at the same time.
GEN. ZORYA: And there were no special meetings, no business contact between them at all?
VON STEENGRACHT: Actually not.
GEN. ZORYA: I should like you to familiarize yourself with Document Number USSR-120, which has already been submitted as evidence to the Tribunal. You will see that this is an agreement between Himmler and Ribbentrop regarding the organization of intelligence work. Are you familiar with this agreement?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, certainly.
GEN. ZORYA: The contact between Himmler and Ribbentrop was evidently closer than you wished to describe.
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not believe, Mr. Prosecutor, that I wanted to give you any impression other than the one that actually existed. This refers to Hitler's order of 12 February 1944. On the basis of this order Himmler took charge of all activity abroad without the participation of the Foreign Office, and after he had become the successor to Canaris, through this order he secured a predominant position abroad. And if the Foreign Office in one way or another had not tried to contact this organization, then the Foreign Office would have had no influence at all even in foreign countries. We had to fight vigorously over this document, for on the basis of this document Himmler wasobliged for the first time to communicate to us also the information that he brought to Germany. Otherwise he brought these reports in without telling us about them. That was the reason why we reached this working agreement. But so far as I recall, it was not put into practice at all, because Hitler's order was issued on 12 February 1944 and we had not come to an agreement until February 1945. Then it gradually came about. That must be approximately the date. At any rate it took quite a while.
GEN. ZORYA: You say that this agreement never became valid?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not say that. An agreement becomes effective at the moment in which it is signed. But it was not put into practice or hardly put into practice.
GEN. ZORYA: I think we shall have to content ourselves with your reply and pass over to some other questions. Did you ever come in contact with Kaltenbrunner ?
VON STEENGRACHT: Did I come into contact with Kaltenbrunner? Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: On what questions?
VON STEENGRACHT: On precisely those questions which, for example, the Nuncio addressed to me and also about people who because of the Nacht und Nebel decree had been deported from abroad and about whom we were not allowed to give information, I often went privately to Kaltenbrunner and pointed out to him that this order was inhuman. As a favor Kaltenbrunner then frequently gave me information; and I, contrary to the orders, transmitted this information abroad because I considered it justified for humanity's sake. Those were the main points of contact which I had with Kaltenbrunner.
GEN. ZORYA: Did you, in particular, have any conversation with him on the subject of the Danish policemen interned by the Gestapo,in a concentration camp without any concrete charges presented against them? Please reply to this question by saying "yes" or "no."
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: During one interrogation, an interrogation conducted by an American interrogator, you stated that, although these policemen were eventually sent back to Denmark, they were very badly treated.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: What did this ill-treatment consist of?
VON STEENGRACHT: I learned at that time, I believe through the Danish Minister, that 1600 Danish policemen...
GEN. ZORYA: I must ask you to be brief. Of what did the ill-treatment consist which was meted out to the Danish policemen who were interned in a concentration camp without any concrete charges being presented against them?
VON STEENGRACHT: These policemen were transported from Denmark. When I learned of it, I went to Kaltenbrunner on the same day and asked him under all circumstances to treat these people as civilian internees or as prisoners of war.
GEN. ZORYA: I beg your pardon, but you are not answering my question. What did the ill-treatment of the Danish policemen consist of ? VON STEENGRACiIT: I assume that you want to know whether Kaltenbrunner is personally responsible for it and to this I would have to tell you the opposite. I am ...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you answer the question? It was repeated. You must understand what the question is: What was the bad treatment? Either you know or you do not know. If you know, you can say so.
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I can remember, 10 percent of these prisoners died.
GEN. ZORYA: Is that all you can say in reply to the question?
VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding details of the ill-treatment I was informed by Denmark that the men were not allowed to keep their uniforms and had to wear concentration camp clothes, that this concentration camp clothing was too thin and the men frequently died of inflammation of the lungs, also that the food was insufficient. I did not learn any more at the time. They were also flogged.
GEN. ZORYA: Witness, please tell us: Did you ever come across the activities of the Defendant Sauckel?
VON STEENGRACHT: I came into touch with Sauckel's activities only insofar as we objected that so many people from abroad were brought into Germany by force.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you perhaps remember a conference at which both you and Sauckel were present? You have already mentioned this fact in the course of your interrogation prior to the opening of the current Trial.
VON STEENGRAGHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you perhaps remember you testified in the course of this interrogation: "But the measures adopted for recruiting people in Russia and similar countries are beyond description."
VON STEENGRACHT: In the session -- I did not understand the question.
GEN. ZORYA: You stated, during the interrogation of 28 Septeniber 1945 -- I am quoting verbatim: "But the measures adopted for recruiting people in Russia and similar countries are beyond description." Do you remember your testimony?
VON STEENGRACHT: I confirm that statement.
GEN. ZORYA: Then you confirm it? Will you kindly enumerate, if only in brief, what precisely were the indescribable measures adopted by the Defendant Sauckel in Russia and other countries?
VON STEENGRACHT: I know of only one case that was reported to me at the time. It concerned the fact that in a certain sector, people were invited to a theatrical performance and the theatre was surrounded, and the people who were inside were brought to Germany for forced labor. It concerns these measures of which I have heard.
GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions to ask.
COL. POKROVSKY: I request permission to ask one more question, or rather, to have one more question elucidated.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal has already indicated that it wishes the cross-examination to be cut down as far as possible, and it really cannot hear more than one counsel on behalf of each of the four countries. It doesn't wish to hear more than one on behalf of each of the four countries. I am afraid we can't hear any further cross-examination from you.
COL. POKROVSKY: The question is not a new one. The witness has not answered a question which was repeated four times.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a new counsel though.
COL. POKROVSKY: No. The Soviet Prosecutor asked which of the defendants influenced the foreign policy of Germany. The witness replied, "The Armed Forces." I wished to ...
THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry, Colonel Pokrovsky, but I have given you the Tribunal's ruling. We cannot hear more than one counsel. I hope, as I say, that the prosecutors will make their examination as short as possible.
M. EDGAR FAURE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): This witness having been already interrogated at considerable length, I wish to ask only a very short question. Witness, I should like you to confirm precisely what you have already declared, that the German Embassy in Paris was under the authority of Ribbentrop and was responsible only to him; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand that question in German.
M. FAURE: Is it correct from your declaration, and from what you know, that the German Embassy in Paris was under the authority of Ribbentrop and that it was responsible only to him?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
M. FAURE: Does it mean that every important measure taken by the Embassy would have to be known by the Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
M. FAURE: I simply wanted to have this point elucidated in view of the interrogatory of the witness, and I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 2 o'clock. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President, I request permission to ask one question which I could not ask before. The Russian Prosecutor asked whether the witness had discussed the question of the Danish policemen with Kaltenbrunner. In this connection it remained entirely unanswered how Kaltenbrunner himself behaved. I simply want to ask this one question.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kauffmann.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, would you please tell the Tribunal how Kaltenbrunner behaved when you discussed with him the question of the Danish police who had been inhumanly treated -- how Kaltenbrunner behaved in this connection and what he did.
VON STEENGRACHT: The question is perhaps not quite correct the way you put it when you say "who had been inhumanly treated," for they could not have been dealt with. They had just been turned over to the concentration camp. So the moment I heard about it I went to Kaltenbrunner and told him that these people could not be put into a concentration camp. They had to be treated either as prisoners of war or as civilian internees. Kaltenbrunner listened to this and said he was also of that opinion, and in my presence gave the order that these men should be transferred from the concentration camp to a prisoner-of-war camp. I therefore assumed that the matter was thereby settled and then found out a fortnight later that they were still in the concentration camp. I appealed to Kaltenbrunner earnestly. Kaltenbrunner said he could find no explanation for it. I could not find any either, since the order to transfer these people had been given in my presence. We subsequently carried on many negotiations regarding this matter. I had the impression that other influences were at work there and that Kaltenbrunner could not enforce his opinion.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was he against this inhuman treatment?
VON STEENGRACHT: He always told me that he was in favor of their being put in a prisoner-of-war camp. That was naturally a substantial improvement.
DR. KAUFFMANN: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you wish to re-examine this witness?
DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop in favor of violating the Treaty of Versailles or was he opposed to that?
VON STEENGRACHT: I should like to say...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Could you say "yes" or "no" and then explain later?
VON STEENGRACHT: He wanted a modification.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop in favor of the reoccupation of the Rhineland?
VON STEENGRACHT: At that time I did not know Ribbentrop and consequently cannot answer this question.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop opposed to rearmament?
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer this question either, because I did not know him at that time. I saw him for the first time in the year 1936.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was he in favor of the Anschluss?
VON STEENGRACHT: That I assume.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was he in favor of the Tripartite Pact?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire. [The witness Von Steengracht left the stand.]
DR. HORN: Yesterday I concluded the presentation of my documents with the submission of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 10 (Document Number Ribbentrop-10) -- on page 35 of the document book. From this document I proved that Von Ribbentrop conducted his foreign policy according to lines laid down by Hitler. I should like to prove with the following documents what the foreign political situation was that Ribbentrop found when he took office in February of 1938. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the following documents, the numbers of which I shall now communicate to the Tribunal, without my reading anything from them, in order that I may later be able to come back to them in my final speech. The first of these documents is the document which bears the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 14 (Document Number Ribbentrop-14). It is a question here again of an extract from the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik , Volume 1, and carries the heading "Proclamation of the Reich Government to the German People of 1 February 1933." This document describes briefly Germany's position at that time and the intentions of the Hitler Government that came to power on 30 January 1933. The next document that I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of is Ribbentrop Exhibit 15 (Document Number Ribbentrop15). This document is also taken from the first volume of' the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik . It carries the title "Adolf Hitler's Address on the Occasion of the Inauguration on 21 March 1933 in Potsdam". In this document, too, basic expositions are made regarding the internal and external policy agreed upon by the new government. As the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 16 (Document Number Ribbentrop-16). Again it is a document from the above-mentioned volume of documents. It is headed "Adolf Hitler's Speech on His Program at the Meeting of the Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House on 23 March 1933." I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the next document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 17 (Document Number Ribbentrop-17).
DR. HORN: It is again an excerpt from the Documente der Deutschen Politik.
COL. POKROVSKY: I would not like to interrupt Dr. Horn, but not one single document among those which he now mentions, beginning with Number 14, and as far as I understand, until Number 44, inclusive, was put at the disposal of the Soviet Prosecution, and I cannot see any possibility of aiding the Tribunal in the study of these documents until we have received them. I suppose that the Tribunal will judge it necessary to put off the studying of these documents until the Soviet Prosecution have received them.
DR. HORN: May I give a short explanation please. I have inquired as to what extent the translations have progressed. Three weeks ago I turned in my documents in the prescribed manner, the last of them about 10 days ago. I was informed that the Translation Division unfortunately had too few French and Russian translators available to have the translation of the documents in these two languages as far advanced as is the case in the English language up to now. These are, of course, things over which I have no influence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal appreciates that you have done what fulfills the obligations which rested upon you and they, therefore, think that the documents should go in, subject of course to any objection being taken to them when the translations are available.
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr.President, as a precaution I have already informed Colonel Pokrovsky that this was the case, without knowing in detail what documents had been translated into Russian. That was as far as I could possibly go to reach an understanding, because the other thing was beyond my control.
MR. DODD: I wonder if it would be possible for Dr. Horn to indicate very briefly the purpose for which he offers these documents as they come up. We will have objection to some, I know, but some of that objection may be clarified if we hear beforehand just what the purpose of the offer is.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, Dr. Horn is putting in a large number of documents at the present moment and asking the Court to take judicial notice of them and if the Prosecution finds that there is something specific that they want to object to, wouldn't it be best that they should do that hereafter?
MR. DODD: I thought it might be of assistance and save us from rising very often if he gave us some idea of the purpose for which the offer is made.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it would take longer probably.
DR. HORN: May I make a short explanation on this subject? Since 1933 my client has occupied official positions that were closely tied up with foreign policy. The direction of a foreign policy that had, as its aim, the waging of aggressive war, has been charged against him. I now submit with these documents the evidence which demonstrates how the policy developed and that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop on his part made long and continuous efforts to avoid a war of aggression, for example, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 17, (Document Number Ribbentrop-17) of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. It is in the document book on Page 40 and contains a speech of 17 May 1933 by Hitler before the German Reichstag on the National Socialist Peace Policy.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: This document of 17 May 1933 1 cite as proof of Germany's general will to disarm and as proof that the Reich Govermnent made efforts to bring about a general pacification of Europe. As to the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 18 (Document Number Ribbentrop-18). It is again a document from the same collection and in headed "Treaty of Agreement and Co-operation of 15 July 1933," known in brief as the "Four Power Pact." It is on Page 42 of the document book. This Four Power Pact between Germany, France, England, and Italy was inspired by Mussolini. Its purpose was to bring about general disarmament and particularly, to make effective the revision article -- Number 19 -- in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This pact did not come into being because France did not ratify it. As to the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 20 (Document Number Ribbentrop-20). It concerns a "Proclamation of the Reich Government to the German People in Connection with the Withdrawal from the League of Nations on 14 October 1933," This proclamation of the Reich Government affirms the failure of the disarmament conference and gives a short account of Germany's reasons for withdrawing from the League of Nations. In connection with this proclamation, Hitler on the same day made a speech over the radio in order to state the reasons for Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations. I submit this speech to the Tribunal as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 21 (Document Number Ribbentrop-21), and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. The speech is on Page 45 of the document book. In order to justify the then existing foreign policy to the people as well as to obtain a confirmation of the policy at that time, Reich President Von Hindenburg, on 11 November 1933, called the German people to the ballot box. The proclamation in that connection is contained in Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 23 (Document Number Ribbentrop-23), which is found on Page 48 of the document book.
DR. HORN: I present it to the Court again with the request for judicial notice. I further ask the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibit Number 24 (Document Number Ribbentrop-24) in which the text of the question and the results of the election are to be found. It is on Page 49 of the document book which is before you. In the course of her disarmament policy, Germany, on 18 December 1933, issued a German Memorandum on the disarmament question and Germany's attitude regarding the disarmament problem. I offer the Court this document for judicial notice as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 25 (Document Number Ribbentrop-25). The next document is contained on Page 51 of the document book and describes the course of the disarmament negotiations and Germany's attitude toward these negotiations. I submit it to the Court for judicial notice as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 26 (Document Number Ribbentrop-26). The document is on Page 51 of the document book, and is headed "The German Memorandum on Disarmament of 19 January 1934." The German view on disarmament is again set forth in the following document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 27 (Document Number Ribbentrop-27), set forth on Page 53 of the document book, and is entitled "German Memorandum of 13 March 1934." I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. The German Government answered an English disarmament memorandum on 16 April 1934 with an aide-memoire to the English Government. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of this document as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 28 (Document Number Ribbentrop-28). In the course of the disarmament negotiations, France, in 1934, suggested a pact which became known under the name of the "Eastern Pact." Regarding this Eastern Pact, the German Government expressed their view in a communique of the German Reich Government of 10 September 1934, which is on Page 56 of the document book, and to which I have given the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 30 (Document Number Ribbentrop-30), again with the request that judicial notice be taken of it.