dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
[Stosstrupp] the factory chairman deputizes a shock squad leader [Stosstruppfuehrer]. Membership in the Factory Troops: Membership in the Factory Troops is voluntary and it presupposes readiness to fight for a National Socialist conception of work and for a German worker's community. TASK OF THE FACTORY TROOPS
Under the leadership of the factory chairman, it is the task of the Factory Troops to guarantee, under all circumstances and by all means, the political security and readiness of the factory to commit itself.
Not through words and speeches alone, but primarily through their example, the Factory Troops shall convince the community of their fellow-workers of the justice of the National Socialist will, and educate them to utmost effort, to highest accomplishments, and to most extreme devotion.
It must remain the aim of the Factory Troops to fuse the factory into a closely-meshed, single-willed community capable of the highest accomplishments for the people and the Reich.
Commitment:
Directives and regulations for physical coordination, commitment and utilization of the Factory Troops are issued by the Reich Organizational Leader, or on his behalf by the head of the Central bureau, or the German Labor Front chairmen of district [Gau] county [Kreis] and locality [Ort], so far as it is not a question of Factory Troops tasks falling within the professional sphere of activity of the factory.
The competent regional chairmen (district, county and locality) are solely responsible for the over-all commitment of the Factory Troops.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Document No. 1822-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1822-PS
[Item 1]
1. Letter of the Fuehrer with wording of 25 August 1939 transmitted to me by telephone from the Reich Labor Ministry.
2. Telegram No. 370 of 25 August 1939 concerning transmittal of Fuehrer's letter to Duce.
3. Second letter of Fuehrer to Duce, dated 25 August 1939 transmitted by telephone by the Reich Labor Ministry to the Ambassador.
4. Tel. No. 371 of 25 August 1939 concerning transmission of second letter of Fuehrer.
5. Note of Envoy von Plessen concerning telephone call from Berlin, dealing with alleged contradiction between telegram 370 and a letter transmitted by Ambassador Attolico in Berlin.
6. Note of 26 August 1939 on same subject.
7. Letter of Duce to Fuehrer of 26 August, transmitted at 1210 hours by telephone in Berlin by Count Ciano to Attolico.
[Item 2]
Rome, August 25, 1939.
Embassy Courier (Btsch./Kr.)
Telegram in code (Secret Ch. V.)
(Valid)
Foreign Affairs
Berlin
Citissime
No. 370 of 25 August
Top Secret
To: The Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Subject: Today's Telephonic Instructions.
V. 1. Encoding: Fink/Grade/Haupmann.
2. Dispatched: Krueger/Limberg/Zimmerm.
3. To me dispatched in sections (last one at 11 p. m.)
[Illegible notations]
I have personally handed on to the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia at 1520 o'clock in the presence of Ciano the contents of today's letter of the Fuehrer conveyed here by telephone. The Duce, who was possessed of great calmness, at first, read the letter through entirely, and then went over it, with me sentence for sentence, at which time, he translated the sentences into Italian for Ciano, who is not conversant with German, and, in fact, as I was able to convince myself, completely, correctly, and true to the meanings.
Among this comments upon the individual themes, I shall single out the following:
He was entirely satisfied with the non-aggression pact with Moscow
sentences into Italian for Ciano, who is not conversant with German, and, in fact, as I was able to convince myself, completely, correctly, and true to the meanings. Among this comments upon the individual themes, I shall single out the following: He was entirely satisfied with the non-aggression pact with Moscow. He, himself, already in the Spring had offered such a suggestion to Field Marshal Goering, pointing out, indeed, at this juncture, the need of adopting a moderate attitude, since our two nations, who for ten years on account of ideological reasons have been oriented for a fight against Moscow, must have the time needed for a readjustment. In spite of the suggestion made at that time, he, himself, is and remains an implacable anticommunist.
(Here I interrupted with the view that the German position against communism self-evidently remains entirely unchanged and that in regard to this fact Moscow has never been left in doubt.)
The comment in the letter concerning the attitude of the Japanese Cabinet he regarded as being correct. The fault lies with the Japanese Ministry of the Navy, which is opposed to adopting an unambiguous position against England.
The reaction he also expects the pact with Moscow to have upon Rumania appeared to be of most lively interest to him. Consideration for Bessarabia would paralyze Rumania's freedom of movement in favor of Poland in the case of conflict. Thus Rumania would be left to the Hungarians.
With an approving nod of the head he agreed that Turkey would now have to revise its attitude.
He described the worsening of German-Polish relations as so acute that an armed conflict can no longer be avoided. The moment to consider possibilities of preventing the conflict has now passed, because the Polish mentality-supported by England's attitude-is no longer responsive to reasonable suggestions, no matter from which side they might come
relations as so acute that an armed conflict can no longer be avoided. The moment to consider possibilities of preventing the conflict has now passed, because the Polish mentality-supported by England's attitude-is no longer responsive to reasonable suggestions, no matter from which side they might come. Otherwise he might have imagined that the Poles would have sought, for example, immediate reapproachment with Germany, if they correctly appreciated the danger threatening their existence; and, to prove clearly their willingness to negotiate, they would first of all have given Danzig to Hitler, without reservations and without any talks on negotiations. Then one might have considered the removal of further reasons for discord-he cited the Polish Corridor and Silesia-by means of direct German-Polish talks; in his opinion that would have been possible. Finally, a general conference might have followed in order to solve the other big controversial questions-points of differences between Italy and France, German colonies, distribution of raw materials, armament questions. This would have assured European peace for 15-20 years, as is desired by all. Such considerations, however, are outdated by the precipitous course of events. He had now adjusted himself to the fact that the outbreak of a general conflagration is not only unavoidable but immediately imminent. The question of the exact date interested him most, and he wanted to know whether I could tell him more about that. I answered the question by pointing out the corresponding places in the letter. He seemed to realize that nothing more could be said at the moment by anybody. But he emphasized that he attached much value, for obvious reasons, to the fact that he should be informed as fast as possible. But in view of the speed of the developments he understood the difficulties of such notification. Finally, he stated again that he would have preferred open conflict 2 to 3 years hence and gave his reasons
for obvious reasons, to the fact that he should be informed as fast as possible. But in view of the speed of the developments he understood the difficulties of such notification. Finally, he stated again that he would have preferred open conflict 2 to 3 years hence and gave his reasons. And he believed the reasons also applied to us, especially in view of the condition of our fleet. However, developments are now forcing us in another direction. In any case, he expressly emphasized, he is with us, unconditionally and with everything.
At the end of the talk he made comments about the prospects of an armed German-Polish conflict which should be decided in our favor by our army in a very short time.
Ciano, who led me out after I took leave of the Duce, summarized his impressions of the situation by saying that any discussion over possibilities to keep the peace was outdistanced by the course of events. No longer the word "peace," but "victory" would govern his action.
Mackensen
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Document No. 1823-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1823-PS
Telegram in Cipher (Good)
Sent Berlin 27 Aug 1939 	00-32 hours
Rec Rome same day 	02-25
Rec Embassy 27 Aug 1939 	03-40
Deciphering Nr. 403 of 26 Aug 1939
[illegible pencil mark] For Chief of Agency personally. Sealed matter. Decipher personally. Strictly secret. To Ambassador v. Mackensen personally.
The Reich Minister requests that the following reply of the Fuehrer be forwarded to the Duce immediately.
Duce!
Embassy 27 Aug 1939 03-40 Deciphering Nr. 403 of 26 Aug 1939 [illegible pencil mark] For Chief of Agency personally. Sealed matter. Decipher personally. Strictly secret. To Ambassador v. Mackensen personally. The Reich Minister requests that the following reply of the Fuehrer be forwarded to the Duce immediately. Duce!
I have received the information concerning your final attitude. I respect the motives and influences determining your resolution. Perhaps it will nevertheless be for the best. Of course, in my opinion, this will be true only if the world does not receive any inkling of the intended attitude of Italy, at least not till actual fighting starts. For this reason I beg you heartily to support my struggle psychologically in your press and any other means. I also beg of you, Duce, if it is possible for you to force at least England and France to immobolize certain parts of their strength, by demonstrative military actions, or to keep them in any case, in a state of uncertainty. But the most important thing is this, Duce: should, as mentioned, the big war start, the situation in the East will be solved, before the two Western powers can achieve any success. This winter or at the latest by spring I intend to deploy in the West forces at least equal to those of France and England. The blockade will be of little effect, especially under the altered circumstances in the East and as a result of my autarchic preparations. Its danger during the progress of war will not increase but decrease. Now I have a big favor to ask you, Duce. You and your people could help me most in this hard struggle by supporting me with Italian manpower, manpower for industrial as well as agricultural purposes. Should you later on in the course of developments be forced or be in a position to intervene, the intensified autarchic basis of the Reich would be of the utmost importance to you. In reiterating my entreaty for the granting of this special favor, I wish to thank you for all the efforts you have made in our common cause.
Adolf Hitler
developments be forced or be in a position to intervene, the intensified autarchic basis of the Reich would be of the utmost importance to you. In reiterating my entreaty for the granting of this special favor, I wish to thank you for all the efforts you have made in our common cause. Adolf Hitler
End of Letter: Schmidt.
COPY
Letter of the Fuehrer transmitted telegraphically to his Excellency Ambassador v. Mackensen, received at 3:40 o'clock, 27 August 1939, for immediate delivery to Il Duce.
DUCE!
[Text of message the same as above].
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Document No. 1828-PS
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1828-PS
Extract from Memorandum handed to German Foreign Office by Count Magistrati, forwarded by von Weizacker to Ambassador von Mackensen in Rome 7 August 1939.
2. Above all it must be most clearly and unmistakably stated that when the Fuehrer decides that the opportune time to start a war has come, Italy is ready to agree a hundred percent. If Germany has to mobilize, Italy will also do so at the same time, since it intends to meet its obligations fully and with all its forces. As said already before, this should be clearly understood.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Document No. 1831-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1831-PS
BTSCH/KR
NOTE
On behalf of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, VLR Kordt calls at 11, 15 with the information that two telegrams, numbered 439 and 440 are on the way to me. The Reich MInister for Foreign Affairs requests that I should get in touch with the postal authorities to have these telegrams delivered to me with the greatest possible speed. They contained the text of two letters by the Fuehrer to the Duce, but I was to keep this information to myself. I was to hand these to the Duce personally as quickly as possible. When I asked when were the telegrams sent off and how long they were which I had to know in order to estimate for when to make an appointment with the Duce, Mr. Kordt stated that until then only No. 439 had been sent off at 10:30, whereas No. 440 was still being in the process of coding. One of the telegrams was about half a page long, the other, two. I told Mr. Kordt that I would take the necessary steps, but that I had to point out already now that one should not entertain any false hopes as to the time that would elapse.
At 11:50 the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs calls me up from the Reich Chancellery personally and requests me to have the Fuehrer's two letters to the Duce received immediately by telephone, as their transmission by telegraph would presumably take too long and then to deliver the letters to the Duce with greatest speed. Then the telephonic transmission of the text of the two telegrams followed immediately.
Immediately afterwards VLR Kordt called me and told me that he had just transmitted to us the Fuehrer's two letters to the Duce by telephone. Referring to our previous telephone conversation he asked me to take the further steps. I answered that meanwhile the MInister for Foreign Affairs has called me personally and that I had already received the text of the letters over the telephone through another line
two letters to the Duce by telephone. Referring to our previous telephone conversation he asked me to take the further steps. I answered that meanwhile the MInister for Foreign Affairs has called me personally and that I had already received the text of the letters over the telephone through another line. We ascertained together that thus the text of these letters has arrived here over three routes.
At 12:15, I informed the office RM by telephone that the Duce would receive me at 1 o'clock.
After the audience with the Duce, I informed by telephone the Office RM at 1:50 about the delivery of the letters, adding that a telegram about my conversation with the Duce would be sent immediately.
ROME, 1 September 1939
(Signed) Mackensen
Coded, Telegram (Copy)
From Berlin: 3 September 1939, 2:50 hours
Arr. Rome: 2 September 1939, 3:00 hours.
Arr. Embassy: 3 September 1939, 6:30 hours
DECODING
No. 450 dated 2 September 1939.
For High Officials or their representatives in person.
Top Secret. To be decoded in person.
Top Secret.
For the Chief of the Mission for personal and confidential information.
The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the Duce's order following copy for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and for The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:
Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every decision to the Fuehrer, that it still has a chance to call a conference with France, England and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice which would leave the Army Corps where they are at present.
2. Calling the conference within 2-3 days. 3. Solution of the Polish-German controversy which would be certainly favorable for Germany as matters stand today.
This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost exponent in France.
Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already securities which guarantee most of her demands
Calling the conference within 2-3 days. 3. Solution of the Polish-German controversy which would be certainly favorable for Germany as matters stand today. This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost exponent in France. Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany has had already its "moral satisfaction." If it would accept the plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at the same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect of being universal and of extremely long duration.
Duce does not insist on it, but he lays particular emphasis that above should be brought to the immediate attention of von Ribbentrop and of the Fuehrer.
End of Copy
The answer to the Italian Ambassador was promised by 3 September.
Woermann
Telegram Heading in Italian
773 S Berlin AW1/2 977 630/626 3/9 2051 Etat-459
For the Ambassador
I request that the following message from the Fuehrer be forwarded to the Duce personally:
Duce
I first want to thank you for your last attempt at a mediation. I would have been ready to accept, but only under condition, that there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that the conference would be successful. Because, for the last two days the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid advance in Poland. It would have been impossible to devaluate the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues. Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found, if England would not have been determined to wage war under all circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because, Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more than 1/2 year or 1 year. Under these circumstances, I thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was better for resistance. At present, the superiority of the German armed forces in Poland is too overwhelming in all fields that the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time
maintained for more than 1/2 year or 1 year. Under these circumstances, I thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was better for resistance. At present, the superiority of the German armed forces in Poland is too overwhelming in all fields that the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt whether this fast success could be achieved in one or two years. England and France would have armed their allies to such an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German armed forces could not have become so apparent anymore. I am aware, Duce, that the fight which I enter, is one for life and death. My own fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also aware that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and that one has to choose after cold deliberation the moment for resistance in such a way that the probability of the success is guaranteed and I believe in this success, Duce, with the firmness of a vouch. Recently you have given me the kind assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a few fields. I acknowledge this in advance with sincere thanks. But I believe also-even if we march now over different roads-that fate will finally join us. If the National Socialistic Germany were destroyed by the Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have to face a grave future. I was personally always aware of this community of the future of our two governments and I know that you, Duce, think the same way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to make the brief remark that we lay aside, of course, all unimportant things, that we do not waste any man in unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of great operational considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is the Corridor, has already been completely encircled by our action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops are far beyond all expectations
the light of great operational considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is the Corridor, has already been completely encircled by our action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops are far beyond all expectations. The superiority of our air force is complete, although scarcely one third of it is in Poland. In the West I will be on the defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then the moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all your assistance which you have given to me in the past and I ask you not to deny it to me in the future.
(Signed) Adolf Hitler
End of message. Cable report is requested
Ribbentrop
Rome, 4 September 1939
Foreign. Berlin
No. 418 of 4 September 1939
Telegram, secret code procedure (good)
CITISSIME to telegram No. 495 of 3rd of this month and in connection with telegram No. 414 of 3 September.
TOP SECRET
Duce remarked during the presentation of the Fuehrer's message, which took place in Ciano's presence at 0940, that he would forward his view point by letter. He explained somewhat as follows, during the ensuing conversation of a half an hour: they never had considered in the least to let himself be used in an action of arbitration, which had as pre-requisite the withdrawal of German troops. No man on earth can seriously consider the thought as worthy of discussion, to make such an offer to troops, which, furthermore, are advancing successfully. He refused such ideas with actual indignation, also he would not consider the "symbolic withdrawal" suggested by Paris. In view of the strong appeal by France to make one last attempt, he had forwarded the suggestion under the self-evidence supposition, that the remaining of the army corps, where it should be a prerequisite. In this case, if we had considered the agreement of the Fuehrer to the suggestion possible, he would perhaps even have advised it