dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, there is some error here. This document was put in by the Prosecution here as proof of the assertion that the Defendant Keitel had given the order to kill these paratroopers. I received the document here.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will tell me if that is so, but I cannot think of any document having been put in here that has not had an exhibit number.
MR. DODD: We have no recollection of having put it in. Many of these interrogations did not have document numbers; but, of course, if they were put in, they would have USA or Great Britain exhibit numbers.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps the best way would be for Counsel for the Prosecution to verify whether it was read in evidence.
MR. DODD: That will take me a few minutes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I mean at your leisure. Would that be a convenient time to break off for 10 minutes?
DR. NELTE: Yes. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at a quarter to 5. They will then sit again in this Court in closed session, and they desire that both Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense should be present then, as they wish to discuss with those counsels on both sides the best way of avoiding translating unnecessary documents. There have, as you know, been a very great number of documents put in, and a great burden has fallen upon the Translation Division. That is the problem which the Tribunal wish to discuss in closed session with Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense. They will, therefore, as I say, sit here in closed session where there is room for all the Defense Counsel. That is at 5 o'clock.
DR. NELTE: Do you remember an inquiry of the Commander-in-Chief West, in June 1944, regarding the treatment of sabotage troops behind the invasion front? A new situation had been created by the invasion and, therefore, by the problem of the Commandos.
KEITEL: Yes, I remember, since these documents too have been submitted to me here, and there were several documents. It is true that the Commander-in-Chief West, after the landing of Anglo-American forces in Northern France, considered that a new situation had arisen with reference to this Fuehrer Order of 18 October 1942 directed against the parachute Commandos. The inquiry was, as usual, reported, and General Jodl and I represented the view of the Commander-in-Chief West, namely, that this order was not applicable here. Hitler refused to accept that point of view and gave certain directives in reply, which, according to the document, had at least two editions; after one had been cancelled as useless, the Document 551-PS remained as the final version as approved by the Fuehrer during that report. I remember all this so accurately because, on the occasion of presenting that reply during the discussion of the situation, this handwritten appendix was added by General Jodl with reference to the application in the Italian theatre, too. With that appendix, this version, which was approved and demanded by Hitler, was then sent out to the Commander-in-Chief West.
DR. NELTE: In this connection, was the question discussed as to how the active support of such acts of sabotage by the population could be judged from the point of view of international law?
KEITEL: Yes, that question arose repeatedly in connection with the order of 18 October 1942, and the well-known memorandum previously discussed. I am of the opinion that, giving any assistance to agents or other enemy organs in such sabotage acts, is a violation of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare. If the population takes part in, aids, or supports such action, or covers the perpetrators -- hides them or helps them in any way or in any form -- that, in my opinion, is clearly expressed in the Hague Rules for Land Warfare, namely that the population must not commit such actions.
DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have submitted a letter of 30 July 1944, which is Document 537-PS. This document is concerned with the treatment of members of foreign military missions caught together with partisans. Do you know this order?
KEITEL: Yes I do. Yes, I have already been interrogated on this Document 537-PS during the preliminary investigation, and I made the statement which I will repeat here: It had been reported that, attached to the staffs of these partisans, particularly those of the leaders of the Serbian and Yugoslav partisans, there were military missions which, we believed, were certainly individual agents or teams for maintaining liaison with the states with which we were at war. It had been reported to me, and I had been asked what should be done if such a mission, as it was called, were captured. When this was reported to the Fuehrer he decided to reject the suggestions of the military authority concerned, namely, to treat them as prisoners of war, since, according to the directive of 18 October 1942, they were to be considered as saboteurs and treated as such. This document is, therefore, the transmission of this order which bears my signature.
DR. NELTE: The problem of terror-fliers and lynch law has been mentioned during the examination of Reich Marshal Goering. I shall confine myself to a few questions which concern you personally in connection with that problem. Do you know what we are concerned with in the conception of terror-fliers and their treatment? What was your attitude toward this question?
KEITEL: The fact that, starting from a certain date in the summer of 1944, machine-gun attacks from aircraft against the population as has already been mentioned here, increased considerably, with 30 to 40 dead on certain days, caused Hitler to demand categorically an adequate ruling on this question. We soldiers were of the opinion that existing regulations were sufficient, and that new regulations were unnecessary. The question of lynch law was dragged into the problem and the question of what was meant by the term terror-flier. These two groups of questions resulted in the very large quantity of documents which you all know, and which contain the text of the discussion on these subjects.
DR. NELTE: I think it will not be necessary to repeat the details which have already been discussed. In connection with your responsibility, I am interested in the words which you have written across this document. Please, will you explain those?
KEITEL: I merely wanted to state, first of all, that I had suggested, following the lines of the warning issued when German prisoners of war taken at Dieppe were shackled, that a warning should be issued here, too, in the form of a similar official note, saying that we should make reprisals unless the enemy commanders stopped the practice of their own accord. That was turned down as not being a suitable course of action. And now let us turn to the documents, which are important to me.
DR. NELTE: Document 735-PS.
KEITEL: There are some notes in handwriting made by Jodl and myself. That is the record of a report written by me in the margin which runs as follows: "Courts-martial will not work"; at least that was the content. That was written at the time because the question of sentence by courts-martial came up for discussion since this very document laid down in detail for the first time what a terror-flier was, and because it stated that terror attacks were always attacks carried out from low-flying aircraft with machine guns. I was led to think that crews attacking in low-level flights could not, generally speaking, in 99 out of 100 cases be captured alive, if they crashed; for there is no possibility of saving oneself with a parachute from a low-level attack. Therefore, I wrote that remark in the margin. Furthermore, I considered, apart from the fact that one could not conduct proceedings against such a flier, one would, secondly, not be able to conclude a satisfactory trial or a satisfactory investigation if an attack had been carried out from a considerable height, because no court, in my opinion, would be able to prove that such a man had had the intention of attacking those targets which possibly were hit. Finally, there was one last thought, which was that, in accordance with the rules, court-martial sentences against prisoners of war had to be communicated to the enemy state through the protecting power, and 3 months' grace had to be given during which the home state could object to the sentence. It was, therefore, out of the question that, through those channels the deterrent results desired could be achieved within a brief period. That was really what I meant. I also wrote another note, and this refers to lynch law.
KEITEL: It states: "If you allow lynching at all, then you can hardly lay down rules for it." To that I cannot say very much, since my conviction is that there is no possibility of saying under what circumstances such a method could be regulated or considered justified by mob justice, and I am still of the opinion that rules cannot be laid down, if such proceedings are tolerated.
DR. NELTE: But what was your attitude regarding the question of lynch law?
KEITEL: It was my point of view that it was a method completely impossible for us soldiers. One case had been reported by the Reich Marshal in which proceedings against a soldier who had stopped such action were suppressed. I know of no case where soldiers, with reference to their duty as soldiers, behaved towards a prisoner of war in any way other than that laid down in the general regulations. That is unknown to me. I should also like to state, and this has not been mentioned yet, that I had a discussion with Reich Marshal Goering at the Berghof about the whole question, and he, at that time, quite clearly agreed with me: We soldiers must reject lynch law under any circumstances. I requested him in this awkward position in which we found ourselves to approach Hitler once more personally, to persuade him not to compel us to give an order in these matters or to draft an order. That was the situation.
DR. NELTE: We are now turning to questions relating to prisoners of war.
KEITEL: May I just say finally that an order from the OKW was never submitted and never issued.
DR. NELTE: There is hardly any problem in the law of warfare in which all nations and all people are so passionately interested as the prisoner-of-war question. That is why, here too, the Prosecution have stressed particularly those cases which were considered to be violations of laws for prisoners of war, according to the Geneva Convention, or to international law in general. Since the OKW, and you as its Chief, were responsible for prisoner-of-war questions in Germany, I should like to put the following questions to you: What had been done in Germany to make all departments and offices of the Wehrmacht acquainted with international agreements which referred to prisoners of war?
KEITEL: There was a special military manual on that subject, which I think is available, and which contained all the clauses in the existing international agreements and the provisions for carrying them out. That is, I think, Directive Number 38, which applied to the Army and the Navy, and also to the Luftwaffe as a military manual. That was the basis, the basic order.
DR. NELTE: How was that put into practice? Were people who were concerned with such questions in practice instructed, or was it sufficient to draw their attention to the Army directives?
KEITEL: Every department right down to the smallest unit had these directives, and every soldier up to a certain point was instructed on them. Apart from that, no further explanations and regulations were issued at the beginning of the war.
DR. NELTE: I am thinking of the courses of instruction instituted in Vienna for that particular purpose. Do you know that they took place in Vienna?
KEITEL: It is known to me that such matters were the subject of courses of instructions suitable for those people who were actually in contact with prisoner-of-war matters. They took the form of training courses.
DR. NELTE: Is it, furthermore, correct that every soldier had a leaflet in his pay book?
KEITEL: Yes. That has already been confirmed by General Milch the other day, who had it with him.
DR. NELTE: When were the first instructions regarding prisoners of war given in our case?
KEITEL: As far as I know, the first instructions appeared after the beginning of the Polish campaign in the East, since every -- I should like to say -- preparatory measure for reception of prisoners of war had been rejected by Hitler. He had prohibited it. Afterwards things had to be improvised at very short notice.
DR. NELTE: What was ordered?
KEITEL: It was ordered that the three branches of the Wehrmacht, the Navy, Army and Luftwaffe -- the latter had to do with it only to a limited extent -- but particularly the Army should make appropriate preparations for camps, guards, and whatever was necessary for the establishment and the organization of such things.
DR. NELTE: Please tell us what the functions of the OKW were regarding the treatment and care of prisoners of war?
KEITEL: The principal instruction was treatment according to Directive KGV-38 (Prisoner of War Regulation 38) based on international agreements; in my opinion it contained absolutely everything which the people concerned should know. Apart from that, no additional instructions were issued at that time, but the above directive was applied.
DR. NELTE: I should like to know first of all how far the OKW had jurisdiction regarding the treatment of prisoners of war.
KEITEL: The OKW was, shall I say, the ministerial directing department which had to issue and prepare all basic regulations and directives concerning these questions. It was entitled to make sure, by means of inspections and surprise visits, that the instructions were carried out. In other words, it was the head office which issued directives and was entitled to make inspections, but was not in command of the camps themselves.
DR. NELTE: Should one not add the contact with the Foreign Office?
KEITEL: Of course, I forgot that. One of the main tasks of the entire Wehrmacht, and therefore of the Navy and Luftwaffe too, was to communicate with the protecting powers, through the Foreign Office and also to communicate with the International Red Cross and all agencies interested in the welfare of prisoners of war. I had forgotten that.
DR. NELTE: Therefore the OKW was, generally speaking, the legislator and the control organ.
KEITEL: That is correct.
DR. NELTE: What did the branches of the Wehrmacht have to do?
KEITEL: The Navy and the Luftwaffe had camps under their command, which were restricted to prisoners of war belonging to their own arms; and so did the Army. But owing to the large numbers belonging to the Army, the deputy commanding generals of the home front, that is, the commanders of the Wehrkreise were the commanding authorities who in their area were in charge of the camps.
DR. NELTE: Now, let us take the prisoner-of-war camps. Who was at the head of such a camp?
KEITEL: In the Wehrkreis command, there was a commander or a general responsible for questions relating to prisoners of war in the Wehrkreis concerned, and the camp itself was under the charge of a camp commandant who had a small staff of officers, among them an intelligence officer and similar personnel who were necessary for such matters.
DR. NELTE: Who was the superior officer of the general for prisoner-of-war affairs in the Wehrkreis?
KEITEL: The commander of the Wehrkreis was the superior officer of the commander for prisoner-of-war affairs in the Wehrkreis.
DR. NELTE: Who was the superior of the Wehrkreis commander?
KEITEL: The Wehrkreis commanders were under the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army and the Reserve, and he in turn under the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 5 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]
DR. NELTE: The last question I asked you yesterday concerned the channel through which orders were transmitted in matters concerning prisoners of war. You said that orders went from the camp commander to the army district commander and then by the commander of the reserve army to the OKH, the High Command of the Army. I should now like to have you tell me who was responsible if something happened in a PW camp which violated the Geneva Convention or was a breach of generally recognized international law. Was that your business? Was the OKW responsible?
KEITEL: The OKW was responsible in the case of incidents which violated general orders, that is, basic instructions issued by the OKW, or in the case of failure to exercise the right to inspect. In such circumstances I would say that the OKW was responsible.
DR. NELTE: How did the OKW exercise its right to inspect camps?
KEITEL: At first, in the early days of the war, through an inspector of the Prisoners of War Organization (the KGW), who was at the same time the office or departmental chief of the department KGW in the General Office of the Armed Forces. In a certain sense, he exercised a double function. Later on, after 1942 I believe, it was done by appointing an inspector general who had nothing to do with the correspondence or official work on the ministerial side.
DR. NELTE: What was the control by the protecting powers and the International Red Cross?
KEITEL: If a protecting power wished to send a delegation to inspect camps, that was arranged by the department or the inspector for the prisoner-of-war matters, and he accompanied the delegation. Perhaps I ought to say that, as far as the French were concerned, Ambassador Scapini carried out that function personally and that a protecting power did not exist in this form.
DR. NELTE: Could the representatives of the protecting powers and the Red Cross talk freely to the prisoners of war or only in the presence of officers of the German Armed Forces?
KEITEL: I do not know whether the procedure adopted in camps was always in accordance with the basic instructions, which were to render possible a direct exchange of views between prisoners of war and visitors from their own countries. As a general rule, it was allowed and made possible.
DR. NELTE: Did you as the chief of the OKW concern yourself personally with the general instructions on prisoner-of-war matters?
KEITEL: Yes. I did concern myself with the general instructions. Apart from that, my being tied to the Fuehrer and to headquarters naturally made it impossible for me to be in continuous contact with my offices. There were, however, the KGW branch office and the inspector, as well as the Chief of the General Armed Forces Office who was, in any case, responsible to me and dealt with these matters. These three departments had to deal with the routine work; and I, myself, was called on when decisions had to be made and when the Fuehrer interfered in person, as he frequently did, and gave orders of his own.
DR. NELTE: According to the documents presented here in Court, Soviet prisoners of war seem to have received different treatment from the other prisoners. What can you say on that subject?
KEITEL: It is true that in this connection there was a difference in treatment due to the view, frequently stated by the Fuehrer, that the Soviet Union on their part had not observed or ratified the Geneva Convention. It was also due to the part played by "ideological conceptions regarding the conduct of the war." The Fuehrer emphasized that we had a free hand in this field.
DR. NELTE: I am now going to show you Document EC-388, Exhibit USSR-356. It is dated 15 September 1941. Part 1 is the minutes of a report by the Foreign Intelligence Department of the OKW. Part 2 is a directive from the OKW, dated 8 September 1941, regarding the treatment of Soviet Russian prisoners of war. Part 3 is a memorandum on the guarding of Soviet prisoners of war, and the last document is a copy of the decree by the Council of People's Commissars regarding the prisoners of war matters dated 1 July 1941. [The document was submitted to the defendant.]
KEITEL: Perhaps I can say by way of introduction that these directives were not issued until September, which can be attributed to the fact that at first an order by Hitler existed, saying that Russian prisoners of war were not to be brought back to Reich territory. This order was later on rescinded. Now, regarding the directive of 8 September 1941, the full text of which I have before me, I should like to say that all these instructions have their origin in the idea that this was a battle of nationalities, for the initial phrase reads, "Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of National Socialist Germany." That, in my opinion, immediately shows the basis on which these instructions were made and the motives and ideas from which they sprang. It is a fact that Hitler, as I explained yesterday, did not consider this a battle between two states to be waged in accordance with the rules of international law but as a conflict between two ideologies. There are also several statements in the document regarding selection from two points of view: Selection of people who seem, if I may express it in this way, not dangerous to us; and the selection of those who, on acdount of their political activities and their fanaticism, had to be isolated as representing a particularly dangerous threat to National Socialism. Turning to the introductory letter, I may say that it has already been presented here by the Prosecutor of the Soviet Union. It is a letter from the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the OKW, Admiral Canaris, reminding one of the general order which I have just mentioned and adding a series of remarks in which he formulates and emphasizes his doubts about the decree and his objections to it. About the memorandum which is attached I need not say any more. It is an extract, and also the orders which the Soviet Union issued in their turn I think on 1 July, for the treatment of prisoners of war, that is, the directives for the treatment of German prisoners of war.
KEITEL: I received this on 15 September, whereas the other order had been issued about a week earlier; and after studying this report from Canaris, I must admit I shared his objections. Therefore I took all the papers to Hitler and asked him to cancel the provisions and to make a further statement on the subject. The Fuehrer said that we could not expect that German prisoners of war would be treated according to the Geneva Convention or international law on the other side. We had no way of investigating it and he saw no reason to alter the directives he had issued on that account. He refused point-blank, so I returned the file with my marginal notes to Admiral Canaris. The order remained in force.
DR. NELTE: What was the actual treatment accorded to Soviet prisoners of war? Was it in compliance with the instructions issued or was it handled differently in practice?
KEITEL: According to my own personal observations and the reports which have been put before me, the practice was, if I may say so, very much better and more favorable than the very severe instructions first issued when it had been agreed that the prisoners of war were to be transported to Germany. At any rate, I have seen numerous reports stating that labor conditions, particularly in agriculture, but also in war economy and in particular in the general institution of war economy such as railways, the building of roads, and so on, were considerably better than might have been expected, considering the severe terms of the instructions.