dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MAJOR JONES: I was going to turn to the last paragraph but one, My Lord, which I think is helpful "As a soldier and a seaman, the Grossadmiral has proved himself to be the Fuehrer's first and foremost naval collaborator." This, in my submission, is a summing up of his status and position in Nazi Germany. I now propose to deal with Raeder's personal part in the Nazi conspiracy. The evidence indicates that Raeder, from the time of the Nazi seizure of power, became increasingly involved in responsibility for the general policies of the Nazi State. Long before he was promoted to General-Admiral in 1936, he had become a member of the very secret Reich Defense Council, joining it when it was founded on the 4th of April 1933. And thus, at an early date, he was involved, both militarily and politically, in the Nazi conspiracy. The relevant document upon that is Document EC-177, Exhibit Number USA-390, at Page 68 of the document book, which I would remind the Tribunal contains the classic Nazi directive: "Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they can be denied by us in Geneva." On the 4th of February 1938 Raeder was appointed to be a member of a newly formed secret advisory council for foreign affairs; and the authority for that statement is Document 2031-PS at Page 88 of the document book, which will be Exhibit GB- 217. Three weeks after this a decree of Hitler's stated that, as well as being equal in rank with a cabinet minister, Raeder was also to take part in the sessions of the Cabinet. That has already been established in Document 2098-PS, which was submitted as Exhibit GB-206. In my submission, therefore, it is thus clear that Raeder's responsibility for the political decisions of the Nazi State was steadily developed from 1933 to 1938 and that in the course of time he had become a member of all the main political advisory bodies.
MAJOR JONES: He was, indeed, very much a member of the inner councils of the conspirators and, I submit, must carry with them the responsibility for the acts that led to the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and the outbreak of war. As an illustration, I would remind the Tribunal that Raeder was present at two of the key meetings at which Hitler openly declared his intention of attacking neighboring countries. I refer the Tribunal to Document 386-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-25 and is found at Page 81 of the document book, which the Tribunal will remember is the record of Hitler's conference at the Reich Chancellery on the 5th of November 1937 about matters which were said to be too important to discuss in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet. The document, which Mr. Alderman submitted, establishes conclusively that the Nazis premeditated their Crimes against Peace. Then there was the other conference of Hitler's on the 23rd of May 1939, the minutes of which are found in the Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27, at Page 74 of the document book. That, the Tribunal will. remember, was the conference at which Hitler confirmed his intention to make a deliberate attack upon Poland at the first opportunity, well knowing that this must cause widespread war in Europe. Now, those two were key conferences. At many, many others Raeder was also present to place his knowledge and his professional skill at the service of the Nazi war machine. His active promotion of the military planning and preparation for the Polish campaign is by now well known to the Tribunal, and I am not proposing to reiterate that evidence again. Once the war did start, however, the Defendant Raeder showed himself to be a master of the most typical of the conspirators' techniques, namely that of deceit on a grand scale. There are few better examples of this allegation than that of his handling of the case of the Athenia.
MAJOR JONES: The Athenia, as the Tribunal will be aware, was a passenger liner which was sunk in the evening of the 3rd of September 1939, when she was outward bound to America, about a hundred lives being lost. On the 23rd of October 1939 the Nazi Party paper, the Volkischer Beobachter, published in screaming headlines the story, "Churchill Sank the Athenia." I would refer the Court to Document 3260- PS, at Page 97 of the document book, which will be Exhibit GB-218. And I would like the Tribunal to look for a moment at the copy of the Volkischer Beobachter here, and see the scale with which this deliberate lie was perpetrated. I have a photostat of the relevant page of the Volkischer Beobachter for that day. That is the third page and the Tribunal will see on this front page, with the big red underlining, there are the words, "Now We Indict Churchill." The extract from the Volkischer Beobachter, which is at Page 97 of the document book, reads as follows: "Churchill Sank the Athenia. The above picture" and the Tribunal will see it is a fine picture of this fine ship `'shows the proud Athenia, the ocean giant, which was sunk by Churchill's crime. One can clearly see the big radio equipment on board the ship. But nowhere was an SOS heard from the ship. Why was the Athenia silent? Because her captain was not allowed to tell the world anything. He very prudently refrained from telling the world that Winston Churchill attempted to sink the ship through the explosion of a time bomb. He knew it well, but he had to keep silent. Nearly 1,500 people would have lost their lives if Churchill's original plan had resulted as the criminal wanted. Yes, he longingly hoped that the 100 Americans or' board the ship would find death in the waves so that the anger of the American- people, who were deceived by him, should be directed against Germany, as the presumed author of the deed. It was fortunate that the majority escaped the fate intended for them by Churchill. Our picture on the right shows two wounded passengers.
MAJOR JONES: They were rescued by the freighter City of Flint, and as can be seen here, turned over to the American coast guard boat Gibb for further medical treatment. They are an unspoken accusation against the criminal Churchill Both they and the shades of those who lost their lives call him before the tribunal of the world and ask the British people, 'How long will the office, one of the richest in tradition known to Great Britain's history, be held by a murderer?"' Now, in view of the maliciousness of this Volkischer Beobachter announcement and in fairness to the men of the British Merchant Navy, I think it is proper that I should say, that contrary to the allegation in this Nazi sheet, the Athenia of course made repeated wireless distress signals which were in fact intercepted and answered by His Majesty's ship Electra, in escort, as well as by the Norwegian steamship Knut Nelson and the yacht Southern Cross. I shall submit evidence to the Tribunal to establish that, in fact, the Athenia was sunk by the German U-boat U-30. So unjustifiable was the torpedoing of the Athenia, however, that the German Navy embarked upon a course of falsification of their records and on other dishonest measures, in the hope of hiding this guilty secret. And for their part, as the Tribunal has seen, the Nazi propagandists indulged in their favorite falsehood of seeking to shift the responsibility to the British. The captain of the U-30, Oberleutnant Lemp, was later killed in action; but some of the original crew of the U-30 have survived to tell the tale, and they are now prisoners of war. And so that the truth of this episode may be placed beyond a peradventure, I submit to the Tribunal an affidavit by a member of the crew of the U- 30, as to the sinking of the Athenia and as to one aspect of the attempt to conceal the true facts. I refer to Document C-654, Exhibit GB- 219, at Page 106 of the document book. The affidavit reads: "I, Adolf Schmidt, Official Number N 1043-33 T. of the German Navy and former member of the crew of the U-30, do solemnly declare that: "1.
MAJOR JONES: I am now confined to Camp No. 133, Lethbridge, Alberta. "2. That on the first day of war, 3 September 1939, a ship of approximately 10,000 tons was torpedoed in the late hours of the evening by the U-30. "3. That after the ship was torpedoed and we surfaced again, approximately half an hour after the explosion, the commandant called me to the tower in order to show me the torpedoed ship. "4. That I have seen the ship with my very eyes, but that I do not think that the ship could see our U-boat at that time on account of the position of the moon. "5. That only a few members of the crew had an opportunity to go to the tower in order to see the torpedoed ship. "6. That apart from myself, Oberleutnant Hinsch was in the tower when I saw the steamer after the attack. "7. That I observed that the ship was listing. "8. That no warning shot was fired before the torpedo was launched. "9. That I myself observed much commotion on board the torpedoed ship. "10. That I believe that the ship had only one smoke stack. "11. That in the attack on this steamer one or two torpedoes were fired which did not explode but that I myself heard the explosion of the torpedo which hit the steamer. "12. That Oberleutnant Lemp waited until darkness before surfacing. "13. That I was severely wounded by aircraft 14 September 1939. "14. That Oberleutnant Lemp, shortly before my disembarkation in Reykjavik 19 September 1939, visited me in the forenoon in the petty officers' quarters where I was lying severely wounded. "15. That Oberleutnant Lemp then had the petty officers' quarters cleared in order to be alone with me. "16. That Oberleutnant Lemp then showed me a declaration under oath according to which I had to bind myself to mention nothing concerning the incidents of 3 September 1939 on board the U-30. "17.
MAJOR JONES: That this declaration under oath had approximately the following wording: " 'I, the undersigned, swear hereby that I shall shroud in secrecy all happenings of 3 September 1939 on board the U-30, regardless whether foe or friend, and that I shall erase from my memory all happenings of this day.' "18. That I have signed this declaration under oath, which was drawn up by the commandant in his own handwriting, with my left hand very illegibly. "19. That later on in Iceland when I heard about the sinking of the Athenia the idea came into my mind that the U-30 on the 3 September 1939 might have sunk the Athenia, especially since the captain caused me to sign the abovementioned declaration. "20. That up to today I have never spoken to anyone concerning these events. "21. That due to the termination of the war I consider myself freed from my oath." Doenitz' part in the Athenia episode is described in an affidavit which he has sworn, which is Document D-638, Exhibit GB-220, at Page 102 of the document book. The affidavit was sworn in English, and I invite the Tribunal to look at it and observe the addition in Doenitz' handwriting of four words at the end of the affidavit, the significance of which will be seen in a moment. me Defendant Doenitz states: "U-30 returned to harbor about mid- September. I met the captain, Oberleutnant Lemp, on the lockside at Wilhelmshaven, as the boat was entering harbor, and he asked permission to speak to me in private. I noticed immediately that he was looking very unhappy and he told me at once that he thought he was responsible for the sinking of the Athenia in the North Channel area. In accordance with my previous instructions he had been keeping a sharp lookout for possible armed merchant cruisers in the approaches to the British Isles, and had torpedoed a ship he afterwards identified as the Athenia from wireless broadcasts, under the impression that she was an armed merchant cruiser on patrol. I had never specified in my instructions any particular type of ship as armed merchant cruiser nor mentioned any names of ships.
MAJOR JONES: I dispatched Lemp at once by air to report to the SKL at Berlin; in the meantime, I ordered complete secrecy as a provisional measure. Later in the same day or early on the following day, I received a verbal order from Kapitan zur See Fricke" - who was head of the operations division of the naval war staff "that: "Firstly, the affair was to be kept a total secret. "Secondly, the OKM considered that a court-martial was not necessary as they were satisfied that the captain had acted in good faith. "Thirdly, political explanations would be handled by the OKM. "I had had no part whatsoever in the political events in which the Fuehrer claimed that no U-boat had sunk the Athenia. "After Lemp returned to Wilhelmshaven from Berlin, I interrogated him thoroughly on the sinking and formed the impression that, although he had taken reasonable care, he had still not taken sufficient precaution to establish fully the identity of the ship before attacking. I had previously given very strict orders that all merchant vessels and neutrals were to be treated according to naval prize law before the occurrence of this incident. I accordingly placed him under cabin arrest, as I felt certain that a court-martial would only acquit him and would entail unnecessary publicity" and then Doenitz had added the words "and loss of time." It is right, I think, that I should add the Doenitz' suggestion that the captain of the U-30 sank the Athenia in mistake for a merchant cruiser must be considered in the light of a document which Colonel Phillimore submitted the Document C- 191, Exhibit GB-193, dated the 22 of September 1939 - in this period, which contained Doenitz' order that "the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser." Now, the U-30 returned to Wilhelmshaven on 27 September 1939.
MAJOR JONES: I submit another fraudulent naval document, Document D-659, Page 110 of the document book, which will be Exhibit GB-221, which is an extract from the War Diary of the chief of U-boats, and it is an extract for the 27th of September 1939. The Tribunal will see that it reads: "U-30 comes in. She had sunk: S. S. Blairlogies; S. S. Fanad Head." There is no reference at all, of course, to the sinking of the Athenia. But perhaps the most elaborate forgery in connection with this episode was the forgery of the log book of the U- 30, which was responsible for sinking the Athenia; and I now submit that original log book to the Tribunal as Document D- 662, which will be Exhibit GB-222, and an extract from the first and relevant page of it is found at Page 111 of the document book. I would like the Tribunal to examine the original, if you will be good enough to do so, because the Prosecution's submission is that the first page of that log book is a forgery, but a forgery which shows a curiously un-German carelessness about detail. The Tribunal will see that the first page of the text is a clear substitute for pages that have been removed. The dates in the first column of that page are in Arabic numerals. On the second and more authentic looking page, and throughout the other pages of the log book, they are in Roman numerals. The Tribunal will also see that all reference to the action of the sinking of the Athenia on the 3rd of September is omitted. The entries are translated on Page 111 of the document book for the Court's assistance. The log book shows that the position at 1400 hours, of the U-30 on the 3rd of September, is given as AL 0278, which the Tribunal will notice is one of the very few positions quoted at all upon that page, and which was, in fact, some 200 miles west of the position where the Athenia was sunk. The course due south, which is recorded in the log book, and the speed of 10 knots those entries are obviously designed to suggest that the U-30 was well clear of the Athenia's position on the 3rd of September.
MAJOR JONES: Finally, and most curiously, the Tribunal will observe that Lemp's own signature upon the page dealing with the 3rd of September differs from the other signatures in the text. Page 1 shows Lemp's signature with a Roman "p" as the final letter of his name. On the other signatures, there is a script "p," and the inference submit is that either the signature is a forgery or it was made up by Lemp at some other, and probably considerably later date. Now, in my submission, the whole of this Athenia story establishes that the German Navy under Raeder embarked upon deliberate fraud. Even before receiving Lemp's reports, the German Admiralty had repeatedly denied the possibility that a German U-boat could be in the area concerned. The charts which showed the disposition of U-boats and the position of sinking of the Athenia, which Colonel Phillimore introduced, have shown the utter dishonesty of these announcements; and my submission upon this matter is this: Raeder, as head of the German Navy, knew all the facts. Censorship and information control in Nazi Germany were so complete that Raeder, as head of the Navy, must have been party to the falsification published in the Volkischer Beobachter, which was a wholly dishonorable attempt by the Nazi conspirators to save their faces with their own people and to uphold the myth of an infallible Fuehrer backed by an impeccable war machine. The Tribunal has seen that truth mattered little in Nazi propaganda, and it would appear that Raeder's camouflage was not confined to painting his ships or sailing them under the British flag, as he did in attacking Norway and Denmark. With regard. to that last matter - the invasion of Norway and Denmark - I think it is hardly necessary that I should remind the Tribunal of Raeder's leading part in that perfidious Nazi assault, the evidence as to which has already been presented.
MAJOR JONES: I think I need only add Raeder's proud comment upon those brutal invasions, which is contained in his letter in Document C-155 at Page 25 of the document book, which is already before the Tribunal as Exhibit GB-214. That document, which is a letter of Raeder's to the Navy, part of which I have already read, states: "The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for all time remain the grand contribution of the Navy to this war." Now, with the occupation of Norway and of much of Western Europe safely completed, the Tribunal has seen that Hitler turned his eyes towards Russia. Now, in fairness to Raeder, it is right that I should say that Raeder himself was against the attack on Russia and tried his best to dissuade Hitler from embarking upon it. The documents show, however, that Raeder approached the problem with complete cynicism. He did not object to the aggressive war on Russia because of its illegality, its immorality, its inhumanity. His only objection to it was its untimeliness. He wanted to finish England first before going further afield. The story of Raeder's part in the deliberations upon the war against Russia is told in the Document C-170, at Page 37 of the document book, which has already been submitted as Exhibit Number USA-136. That document consists of extracts from a German compilation of official naval notes by the German naval war staff. The first entry, at Page 47 of the document book, which bore the date of 26 September 1940, which is at Page 11 of Document C-170, showed that Raeder was advocating to Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy in which, of course, the Navy would play a paramount role, as opposed to a continental land policy. The entry reads: "Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer. Naval Supreme Commander presents his opinion about the situation: The Suez Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez, advance through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. The Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. Russia is fundamentally frightened of Germany.
MAJOR JONES: It is questionable whether action against Russia. from the north will then be still necessary." The next entry at Page 48 of the document book, for the 14th of November: "Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer. Fuehrer is 'still inclined' to instigate the conflict with Russia. Naval Supreme Commander recommends putting it off until the time after the victory over England, since there is heavy strain on German forces and the end of warfare is not in sight." Then there is the entry on Page 50 for 27 December 1940: "Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer. Naval Supreme Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most urgent need of the hour. On the one hand, England has gained strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support. On the other hand, however; she can be hit mortally by a strangulation of her ocean traffic which is already taking effect. What is being done for submarine and naval air force construction is much too little. Our entire war potential must work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for the Navy and Air Force, every dispersion of strength prolongs the war and endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander voices serious objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of England." At Page 52 of the document book, on the 18th of February 1941, there is the entry: "Chief of Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of Malta even before Barbarossa." On the next page, on the 23rd of February, there is this interesting entry: "Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that seizure of Malta 'is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the execution of Barbarossa~ " which the Tribunal may think is a sublime example of wishful thinking. The next entry, for the 19th of March 1941, which is at Page 54 of the document book, shows that by March of 1941 Raeder had begun to consider what prospects of naval action the Russian aggression had to offer.
MAJOR JONES: There is the entry: "In case of Barbarossa, Supreme Naval Commander describes the occupation of Murmansk as an urgent request of the Navy; Chief of Supreme Command Armed Forces considers compliance very difficult...." In the meantime, the entries in this document show that Mussolini, the flunky of Nazism, was crying out for a more active Nazi Mediterranean policy. I refer the Court to Page 57 of the document book, the entry for the 30th of May. The word "Duce" is omitted from the first line, and the entry should read: "Duce demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall 1941; 12 divisions needed for that. 'This stroke would be more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London'; Chief, Naval Operations, agrees completely...." And then, finally, the entry for the 6th of June, indicating strategic views of Raeder and the German Navy at this stage, reads as follows. It is at Page 58 of the document book: "Supreme Naval Commander with the Fuehrer. Memorandum of the Chief, Naval Operations: 'Observation of the strategic situation in the eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the occupation of Crete and further conduct of the war."' A few sentences below: "The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the decisive aims of the war in the Near East. Their advancement has moved into grasping distance by the successes in the Aegean area and the memorandum emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the present favorable situation must take place with the greatest acceleration and energy, before England has again strengthened her position in the Near East with help from the United States of America.