dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. HAENSEL: Were you told that concentration camps were places in which the political opponents of the regime were to be interned without anything worse happening to them than loss of liberty?
SEVERING: Whether I was told that?
DR. HAENSEL: Whether you were told that, whether you heard that?
SEVERING: No. On the contrary, I heard that concentration camps meant to the population the very incarnation of all that is terrible.
DR. HAENSEL: What do you mean by "population"? Do you also mean those sections of the population who had some official connection with the Party: small Party members, small SA men and small members of the SS?
SEVERING: I cannot say anything about that since I conversed nearly exclusively with opponents of the system.
DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that these opponents with whom you conversed presented a united front against anyone who wore a party emblem or a badge of some organization?
SEVERING: No. This question upon which you are dwelling affects wide sections of the population, their general humanitarian feeling, and their feeling of indignation about conditions in the camps, as and when the facts became known.
DR. HAENSEL: I asked my question with the intention of hearing whether this feeling of indignation was noticeable even in people who actually wore the emblem of the Party.
SEVERING: I assume so, but I cannot offer it to the Tribunal as a fact.
DR. HAENSEL: But were even these people exposed to the considerable pressure which you have alluded to?
SEVERING: They probably felt that their Party membership rendered them, in a certain sense, immune.
DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that many people became members in order to benefit by this immunization?
SEVERING: Yes, I believe so.
DR. HAENSEL: I heard that you yourself were a member of the NSV; is that true?
SEVERING: No.
DR. HAENSEL: Is it true that you were arrested after 20 July 1944?
SEVERING: I have already answered that question this morning. I was not arrested.
DR. HAENSEL: You were never arrested at all?
SEVERING: No, with the exception of the one case which I also mentioned this morning.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you at any time express the opinion that what had been achieved in Germany in the social sphere after 1933 did, to a considerable extent, represent the ideal of previous governments?
SEVERING: Yes, I expressed this as follows: "What was new was not good, and what was good was not new."
DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that any German, be he a Party member, a member of the SS or not, must have had any knowledge of events at Auschwitz of which you yourself knew nothing at all?
SEVERING: No. He would not necessarily have to possess this knowledge. I would not go so far as to say that. But he might, perhaps, have known about it.
DR. HAENSEL: And what exactly do you mean by "He might, perhaps, have known about it"?
SEVERING: Through guards escorting the transport echelons. They did not always remain in the area of the concentration camps; they usually returned.
DR. HAENSEL: And if they were sworn to the strictest secrecy?
SEVERING: Then they could not tell anything.
DR. HAENSEL: Do you know of cases where people were condemned for speaking of such matters?
SEVERING: No.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you ever hear anything about the activities of the "special courts"?
SEVERING: No, in any case I heard nothing in connection with these particular activities of the "special courts."
DR. HAENSEL: But the sentences pronounced against people who listened to foreign broadcasts (Schwarzhorer) and to people accused of spreading so-called false rumors, were published very often in the papers. Did you never read them?
SEVERING: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I have only one question to ask you. You told us this morning that in 1919 you were a member of the Weimar National Assembly. May I ask what the attitude of the National Assembly was-particularly of the faction of the Social Democrats of whom you too were a leader-towards the problem of the Austrian "Anschluss"?
SEVERING: During the time of the sessions of the Weimar National Assembly I was Reich and State Commissioner for the Rhineland and Westphalia, and was seldom able to participate in the debates of the Weimar National Assembly. I therefore have no detailed knowledge as to how these matters were formulated or expressed. But one thing I do know and that is, that it was practically the unanimous wish of the Assembly to include a paragraph, or an article in the Constitution, ratifying the "Anschluss" of Austria to Germany.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MAJOR JONES: Herr Minister, you have told the Tribunal that in 1928 the Defendant Raeder assured you solemnly that there would be no further violations of the Treaty of Versailles without the knowledge of the Reich Cabinet. Did Raeder fulfill that assurance?
SEVERING: I have already stated this morning that I cannot answer that in any positive sense. I can only state that violations of the agreement of 18 October 1928 by the Naval Command did not come to my knowledge.
MAJOR JONES: Did you know, for instance, of the construction in Cadiz, in Spain, of a 750-ton U-boat under German direction between the years 1927 and 1931?
SEVERING: No, no.
MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the authority for that statement of fact is the Document D-854. And, Herr Minister, did you know that after its completion in 1931 that U-boat carried out trial runs under German direction and with German personnel?
SEVERING: No, I did not know anything about that either.
THE PRESIDENT: I think he said he didn't know of any violations.
MAJOR JONES: I am putting to you certain matters, and I suggest to you, Herr Minister, that it may well be that you were being deceived during this time. Do you agree with me about that?
SEVERING: I would not deny the possibility of deception, but I must very definitely declare that I did not know anything of the construction of a submarine.
MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at the Document C-156. This is a new extract from Captain Schuessler's Fight of the Navy against Versailles . You will see that the following entry appears on Pages 43 and 44: "In 1930 Bartenbach succeeded, in Finland also, in making preparations for the construction of a U-boat answering to the military demands of the German Navy. The Naval Chief of Staff, Admiral Dr.h.c. Raeder, decided, as a result of the reports of the Chief of the General Naval Office, Konteradmiral Heusinger Von Waldegg, and of Captain Bartenbach, to supply the means required for the construction of the vessel in Finland. A 250-ton plan was chosen for this U-boat, so that the amount of 1 1/2 minion Reichsmark was sufficient for carrying out the project. "The fundamental intention was to create a type of U-boat which would permit the inconspicuous preparation of the largest possible number of units which could be assembled at shortest possible notice." Herr Minister, did you know that 1 1/2 million Reichsmark were spent in 1930 in connection with this U-boat construction?
SEVERING: I have stated this morning that I was Minister in the Reich Ministry of the Interior from 1928 to 1930. I consider it necessary to determine these dates a bit more precisely. I resigned on 30 March 1930. If the year 1930 is mentioned in a general way, then it is not impossible that everything mentioned here was carried out after 30 March 1930.
MAJOR JONES: You have said that the rearmament that went on when you were connected with the Government of Germany was purely defensive. When did you realize that the Nazi Government's rearmament was not defensive but aggressive? At what date did you come to that conclusion?
SEVERING: From 30 January 1933 on. That both the choice and the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of the Reich meant war, was not in the least doubted by me and my political friends.
MAJOR JONES: So that you realized from the first day of Nazi power that the Nazi Government intended to use force or the threat of force to achieve its political aims; is that right?
SEVERING: I do not know if knowledge and conviction are identical. I was convinced of it, and so were my political friends.
MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about the Defendant Von Papen. Did Papen use force in carrying out the Putsch which brought him to power in July 1932?
SEVERING: Von Papen did not personally exercise such force, but he did order it. When, on the morning of 20 July 1932, I refused to surrender voluntarily the office of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to the man who had been appointed by Von Papen as my successor, I explained to him that I had no intention of doing so and in order to make my protest more emphatic, I pointed out that I would only give way to force. And then force was used in the evening of 20 July in my office. The newly appointed police president of Berlin appeared in my office, accompanied by two police officers. I asked these gentlemen whether they were authorized by the President of the Reich or by the Reich Chancellor to carry out this mission. When they answered "yes," I stated that I would leave my office rather than cause the shedding of blood.
MAJOR JONES: Did the Defendant Papen, when he secured power, purge the police and the government of anti-Nazis?
SEVERING: Yes. There are numerous indications that the intention existed to purge the police of all republican elements and to replace them with men who were first devoted to Von Papen and then to the National Socialists.
MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about the Defendant Goering. The Defendant Goering has stated, and the entry is on Page 5837 of the transcript of the proceedings (Volume IX, Page 258), that the institution of protective custody existed in Germany before the Nazis came into power. Is that true?
SEVERING: I would say that the institution of protective custody did exist, theoretically, and it was last formulated in the Prussian Police Administrative Law, in Paragraph 15. During my term of office protective custody was never applied in normal civilian life. The regulations in Paragraph 15 of the Police Administrative Law stipulated quite definitely that if anybody was taken into protective custody the police administration was obliged to bring him before the courts within 24 hours. This procedure is in no way identical with that protective custody, the threat of which for decades remained suspended over the peaceful citizens of the State.
MAJOR JONES: And, of course, there were no concentration camps in pre-Nazi Germany, I take it?
SEVERING: Never.
MAJOR JONES: How many of your political associates and colleagues of the Social Democratic Party were murdered in concentration camps while Goering was still Chief of the Gestapo?
SEVERING: It is very difficult to make an estimate. You might say 500, you might also say 2,000. Reliable information is now being collected. My estimate is that at least 1,500 Social Democrats, or trade union officials, or editors were murdered.
MAJOR JONES: And how many Communist leaders do you think were murdered during Goering's period of power over the Gestapo?
SEVERING: I would assume that if you include among the Communist leaders also such trade union officials, who considered themselves members of the Communist Party, then approximately the same figure would be reached.
MAJOR JONES: Did Goering personally have any knowledge of these murders?
SEVERING: That I cannot say. If I were to answer that question, then I should have to ask myself what I would have done in case it had been one of my functions to administer camps in which the fate of tens of thousands was being decided. I am not sure whether it is of any interest to the Tribunal if I were to give you one or two examples from my own experience. In 1925 I had to create a camp for refugees from Poland.
MAJOR JONES: You need not trouble to go into that, Herr Minister.
SEVERING: No? At any rate I would have considered it my first and foremost task to inquire whether, in the camps which I had installed, the principles of humanitarianism were being adhered to. I was under the impression that this was not being done. I always reminded my police officials that they were servants of the people and that everyone in those camps should be humanely treated. I told them that never again should the call resound in Germany, "Protect us from the police." ("Schutz vor Schutzleuten"). I myself demanded punishment for police or other officials when I was under the impression that defenseless prisoners were being ill-treated by members of the police.
MAJOR JONES: As Minister of the Interior, did you become familiar with the organized terror of the SA against the non-Nazi population of Germany in the years after 1921?
SEVERING: Oh yes. Keeping an eye on the so-called armed organizations was one of my most important tasks during my term of office in Prussia. The roughest of all the armed organizations proved to be the SA. They sang songs such as: "Clear the streets for the Brown Battalions" and with the same arrogance with which they sang these songs, they forcibly became masters of the streets, wherever they encountered no adversary worth mentioning. Another rowdy song of theirs seemingly illustrated their program: "Hang the Jews and shoot the bigwigs." Wherever the SA could exercise terror unhindered, they raged and blustered in such style. They waged beer-hall battles with people of different opinion. These were not the customary skirmishes between political opponents during election fights. No, this was organized terror. During the first Jewish boycott in 1933, they stood on guard to frighten those customers from buying in department stores who were accustomed to buy in these stores. As the Tribunal already know, they organized the terror actions of 8 November 1938. In 1930 they also damaged numerous Jewish shops in Berlin, possibly as a worthy prelude to the convening of the Reichstag into which 107 National Socialists entered at the time, as we know.
MAJOR JONES: Finally, I want to ask you one or two questions about the Defendant Schacht. When did you first hear of Schacht's relations with the Nazi leaders?
SEVERING: In 1931 I received information from the police administration in Berlin, that interviews had been taking place between Mr. Schacht and the leaders of the National Socialist German Workers Party.
MAJOR JONES: Did you have any connections with Schacht in 1944?
SEVERING: If the matter is of any interest here to anybody, I actually refused these connections. Schacht-although I held him in high esteem as an economic expert-was known to me as a rather unreliable person in political matters. By joining the Harzburg Front, Schacht betrayed the cause of democracy. This was not only an act of ingratitude, for it was only through the Democrats that he ever reached the post of President of the Reichsbank, but it was also a great mistake since he and others of the same social standing by joining the Harzburg Front first made the National Socialists-so to speak-socially acceptable. I could not, for this very reason, agree to any co-operation with Schacht on 20 July 1944, and when in March 1943 I was asked to join a government which was to overthrow Hitler, I categorically refused to do so, giving Schacht's machinations and sundry other circumstances as my excuse.
MAJOR JONES: What was your reason for that?
SEVERING: I have just indicated these reasons. My friend Leuschner, who was hanged, together with other young Social Democrats-Von Harnack, Weber, Maas-my friend Leuschner and I discussed the composition of such a government. Leuschner informed me that a general would probably be the President of the Reich, and another general would be the Minister for War. I pointed out that Schacht in all probability would become financial or economic dictator, since Schacht was suitable for such a post through his actual or alleged connections with American business circles. But these connections between Schacht and-in National Socialist parlance-between plutocracy and militarism, this connection, I say, appeared to me so compromising to the cause of democracy, especially to the cause of Social Democracy, that I was under no circumstances prepared to become a member of any cabinet in which Schacht would be the financial dictator.
MAJOR JONES: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?
DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, the Prosecutor has just talked about the construction of a U-boat in Finland and of a U-boat in Cadiz. With regard to the construction of the U-boat in Cadiz, he has referred to D-854. I presume that this document is unknown to you.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, the witness said he knew nothing about either of those instances.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you. [Turning to the witness.] Do you not remember that during that discussion Admiral Raeder and Reichswehrminister Groener mentioned the Finland U-boat?
SEVERING: I do not remember.
DR. SIEMERS: You do not know about it? And now-a leading question: Is it true that the agreement made on 18 October 1928 stipulated that the Chief of the Naval Command Staff was obligated to keep the Reichswehrminister informed and the Minister of the Reichswehr, in his turn, would inform the other Ministers of the Cabinet?
SEVERING: As far as I can remember, the agreement or the promise of the two Chiefs of the Command Staffs was that the Cabinet should, generally speaking, be kept informed about all questions. That was technically possible only in the manner in which you have just indicated, that is to say, that the Reichswehrminister would be the first to be informed and that he, in turn, would pass this information on to the Cabinet.
DR. SIEMERS: So that there was no obligation, on Raeder's part, currently to report to you or to appear before the Cabinet?
SEVERING: That would have been quite an unusual measure, just as the meeting of 18 October was in itself unusual; the members of the Cabinet consisted either of the Ministers or of their official representatives.
DR. SIEMERS: So that the further management of the matter would technically be handled by the Reichswehrminister?
SEVERING: Technically by the Reichswehrminister and politically by the Cabinet.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. I have no further questions to put to the witness.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): On what legal regulation was your exemption from the duties of Minister of the Interior in Prussia, on 20 July 1932, based?
SEVERING: The release from my duties?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. The release from your duties.
SEVERING: It was based on Article 48.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Who, on the strength of Article 48, issued emergency decrees?
SEVERING: This emergency decree was issued by the Reich President, who alone was entitled to do so.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was the fact that you were removed from office on 20 July, under the circumstances which you have just described, based on the fact that Von Papen and Hindenburg, who issued the decree, were of the opinion that the emergency decree was legal, whereas it was your point of view that the legal basis for the emergency decree did not exist and in consequence you remained in your office?
SEVERING: I was of the opinion, and it was later confirmed by the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) that the President of the Reich was authorized on the strength of Article 48 to issue directives for the maintenance of peace and order; and if he did not see in the Prussian Ministers, and particularly in myself as Minister of Police, sufficient guarantee that this peace and order would be insured in Prussia, he had the right to relieve us of our police functions, and especially to exclude us from all other executive measures. But he did not have the right to discharge us as ministers.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it known to you that the highest court in Germany, the State Court of Justice, on 25 October 1932 issued a statement to the effect that the decree of the Reich President of 20 July 1932 was compatible with the Constitution insofar as it had appointed the Reich Chancellor as Reich Commissioner for Prussia and authorized him temporarily to deprive Prussian Ministers of their official functions and to assume these functions personally.
SEVERING: I have just explained the meaning of that decision of the High Court of Justice.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: One more question: Did Von Papen, then Reich Commissioner, in carrying out certain changes in personnel, bring National Socialists into the police force?
SEVERING: I cannot say. The political character of the police officials was not outwardly recognizable. That might be the case with Oberpraesidenten, Regierungspraesidenten and police presidents, but not with every simple police official.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it true that Von Papen gave the key position of police president in Berlin to the former police president of Essen, Melcher, who in your time was already police president of a large city?
SEVERING: That is correct.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Now then, the witness can retire and the Tribunal will now adjourn. How many more witnesses have you got?
DR. SIEMERS: I now have the witnesses, Freiherr Von Weizsaecker and Vice Admiral Schulte-Moenting, the Chief of Staff. The examination of Schulte-Moenting will take up some time, whereas I shall be through with Freiherr Von Weizsaecker in a short while.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. [A recess was taken.]
DR. SIEMERS: If it please Your Honors, may the Witness Freiherr Von Weizsaecker, be called? [The witness Von Weizsaecker took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
ERNST VON WEIZSAECKER (Witness): Ernst von Weizsaecker.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SIEMERS: Baron Von Weizsaecker, at the beginning of the war you were State Secretary in the Foreign Office, is that correct?
VON WEIZSAECKER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: You will recollect that on 3 September 1939, that is on the first day of the war between Germany and England-the English passenger ship Athenia was torpedoed northwest of Scotland. There were American passengers on board. The sinking of the ship naturally caused a great sensation. Please tell the Tribunal how this matter was treated politically, that is, by you.
VON WEIZSAECKER: I remember this incident, but I am not certain whether it was a British or an American ship. In any case, the incident alarmed me very greatly at the time. I inquired of the Naval Operations Staff whether a German naval unit could have sunk the ship. After this was denied, I begged the American Charge d'Affaires, Mr. Alexander Kirk, to call on me and told him that no German naval unit could have participated in the sinking of the Athenia . I asked the Charge d'Affaires to take cognizance of this fact and to cable this information to Washington without delay, adding that it was most important in the interests of our two nations-Germany and America.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsaecker, you had contacted the Navy before taking these steps?
VON WEIZSAECKER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you, at this first conversation, talk to Admiral Raeder personally or did you speak with some other officer?
VON WEIZSAECKER: I could not say that now, but I did get definite information. I am sorry I cannot give you the full details. But I did receive a definite answer that no German naval unit was involved. That satisfied me.
DR. SIEMERS: In connection with this subject did you, on the same day or shortly after, visit Admiral Raeder and discuss this matter further with him?
VON WEIZSAECKER: I believe that is true. I can recap. Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you on this occasion that it could not have been a German U-boat, since reports coming in from the U-boats said that the distance from the nearest U-boat was too great, that is-about 75 nautical miles?