dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SCHRAMM: My appointment to the Armed Forces Operations Staff was due to the fact that my civilian profession is professor of history at the University of Gottingen. At that time an expert was sought whose name would constitute a guarantee for expert work. General Jodl appointed me to the position at the suggestion of the deputy chief.
DR. JAHRREISS: If you were to write a war diary in the way a historian would wish to do, you would require an insight into all the events connected with that staff, would you not?
SCHRAMM: Yes. I did not attend the Fuehrer's situation discussions or the internal conferences; but I did participate every day in the situation discussions of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and every important document passed through my office during those two years.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, considering that you had perhaps more insight into the activities of the Armed Forces Operations Staff than anyone else, I should like you to tell us here what you know of the range of General Jodl's activities.
SCHRAMM: It is impossible to overestimate the range of the General's activities. As proof of this, I may say that in 1944 alone, according to information which I received from a competent officer, 60,000 teleprint messages went through the teleprint department of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. There was also a large courier correspondence which, of course, was even larger. Then there was internal correspondence between individual departments. The bulk of that correspondence appeared on the General's desk at some time or other. To look at it from another angle, the General was responsible for four theaters of war: North Finland and Norway; West Holland, Belgium, France; then the Southwest, in the first place Africa and Italy; and then the Southeast.
DR. JAHRREISS: Please speak more slowly.
SCHRAMM: It was the General's task not only to have up-to-date information based on incoming reports, but also to act as operational adviser to the Fuehrer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as saying that the four theaters you have just mentioned were the so-called OKW main theaters of war?
SCHRAMM: Precisely. The East was under the General Staff of the Army, and the General was concerned only insofar as the main difficulty always lay in co-ordinating the interests of the other theaters of war with those of the Eastern Front.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as mentioning 60,000 teleprint messages in a year?
SCHRAMM: Yes, 60,000. I remember the exact figure. And I remember it exactly, because my clerk calculated that 120 volumes of files passed through the War Diary office, and that they were so [demonstrating] thick. Therefore, about 12 yards of material passed constantly through my of lice. That represents 10,000 sheets of paper, if not 100,000.
DR. JAHRREISS: Perhaps you may be able to help us with a question which has been repeatedly touched upon here, but to which no precise answer has ever been given. Do you know anything about an order from Hitler saying that generals must not resign?
SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember that very exactly from an order which appeared in the middle of 1944, repeating with great strictness an order already issued before my time-that must have been during 1940 or 1941. That order was about 11/~ typewritten pages in length and most forcefully worded. Its contents are still clear in my mind, because I discussed it afterwards with several of my comrades. The order stated that every commanding officer-and the departments under him correspondingly-was entitled to mention any objections he might have to the measures of the Supreme Command, but that he would then have to obey unconditionally the order once it was given him by higher quarters-that is to say, he would have to do something which meant acting contrary to his intentions. It added that it was impossible for a commander to resign in consequence of this. The reason stated was that the sergeants in the trench could not tell their company commander that they wanted to resign when they were not in agreement with his orders. I repeat, it was so emphatically worded that we talked about it a great deal. From that time on, the commanders had even less chance of evading an order from the Supreme Command.
DR. JAHRREISS: Professor Schramm, might I ask you to speak just a little more slowly? This order-the contents of which you have just described to us, and by means of which you have established the date of the final and most stringent formulation of this order also apply to a man like General Jodl?
SCHRAMM: If it applied to the commanders, it naturally applied all the more to General Jodl.
DR. JAHRREISS: I now turn to another question. General Jodl has been described as a political general. You are a civilian and a professor; and I assume, therefore, that you possess the detachment required to enable you to make up your mind on the matter and to supply the Tribunal with facts which will permit it to form its decision. Can you give us facts which would of necessity form a basis for judgment for or against?
SCHRAMM: If the question aims at establishing whether or not the General was a Party general, then I deny it most emphatically. It was utterly immaterial to the General whether the members of his staff were Party members or not. Although I was on that staff for 2 years, I personally could not tell you which of the officers were Party members. That was completely unimportant. As to whether the General tried to exercise political influence, I must again draw your attention to the tremendous amount of work for which he was responsible. He would not have had time for it; and with regard to my documents I can only tell you that I do not remember any papers from which such a conclusion might be drawn. What the General committed to paper-and these papers, as I have seen myself, run into thousand was always strictly confined to military matters, and in no way encroached upon the sphere of politics. To be more exact, I do not remember in the course of those 2 years ever having seen in my files any document of a political nature inspired by the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff or written by himself.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; but perhaps he was fond of the limelight and had great ambitions; and perhaps, and outside of the files...
SCHRAMM: I can answer that question with a definite 'no," because I know from his associates, and from conversations with him, that all diplomatic procedure was repugnant to him and that he disliked it because it had nothing to do with soldiers. I did not notice any ambition, because if the General was ambitious he certainly had chosen the least suitable position for such a purpose, since he thus exposed himself to criticism from those below him- from people who did not know the underlying reasons. From that time on he was criticized a good deal, and he did not receive from higher quarters the recognition he deserved. I always thought it peculiar, and even grotesque, that the General, at the time of Adolf Hitler's death, had scarcely more German war decorations than I had myself, as a mere major in the reserve. I did not see whether he had foreign decorations. I never saw him wearing a foreign order. At any rate, there were no indications of ambition or of political aspirations.
DR. JAHRREISS: During this Trial there has been frequent mention of a speech made by the General during the winter of 1943-44 addressed to the Gauleiter. I do not know whether you know anything about that speech.
SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember it exactly.
DR. JAHRREISS: What do you remember exactly?
SCHRAMM: First of alp let me tell you that the reason why I remember it exactly is because I received the material on which the speech was based. After it was no longer needed, it was given to me for my War Diary. It was like this: That was a speech for which material was collected in the various departments. For this purpose an enormous map was needed, which was difficult to prepare because it was larger than the offices in which we were working. The speech was made at this annual meeting in Munich on 8 or 9 November. The particular reason for the General making a speech outside the usual military circle was the following: Italy's dropping out of the war in September 1943 had led to a break in the Southern Front extending from Marseilles to Athens, a distance of 4,000 km. We had succeeded in filling the gap again, but a good deal of uneasiness was felt by all those who understood the situation.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I object to long reasons being given for the speech being made. The speech is in evidence and, in my submission, the reasons for the speech are entirely immaterial
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, please go on telling us about the attack.
SCHRAMM: This was the one reason...
THE. DR. JAHRREISS: PRESIDENT: No, no, I said that the Tribunal upheld Mr. Roberts' objection as to what the witness must say. That's a mistranslation. It was a misunderstanding. I am sorry. It was wrongly translated. [Turning to the witness.] Witness, I want to show you a document which was submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution 2 days ago, Document 1808-PS. Perhaps you will just look through the whole of the document first. [The document was submitted to the witness.]
THE PRESIDENT: Is it among the Jodl documents?
DR. JAHRREISS: No, it is a document which the Prosecution submitted in the course of the cross-examination 2 days ago.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, that document was handed up separately by me during the cross-examination, and I am afraid it is not in the book. It is one of those documents which received a new GB number, and was handed up loose towards the end of the crossexamination, Document 1808-PS.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. May I go on?
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, does your signature appear at the foot of the second last page, on the right?
SCHRAMM: Yes. This is a file which I started after the attempt of 20 July 1944, in order to have a permanent record of what was being done in the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I want to add in this connection that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was in no way involved in that conspiracy. This copy presumably comes from the war archives. The signature and the corrections are partly mine, and partly those of my clerk.
DR. JAHRREISS: I want to draw your attention to Number 5 in this file of documents.
SCHRAMM: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: It is dated 25 July. Do you have it?
SCHRAMM: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you draw it up? SCHRAMM Yes, I drew it up myself. DR. JAHRREISS Please, will you tell us what the basis for this work of yours was?
SCHRAMM: The officers of the staff were called to our mess hall at short notice. We were told that the General wanted to address his staff. As not all the officers were able to attend, I was ordered to take notes, so that the other officers could be informed of what the General had said. I remember clearly that I jotted down a few key words, still standing, so this is not a shorthand record. I cannot write shorthand. There was no time to find a stenographer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did you base this on your notes? SCHRAMM Yes. Afterwards, probably on the following day, I reconstructed the General's speech as far as possible from my notes. I am not certain, of course, if all the details are quite accurate, because the notes which I had taken standing up were much too sketchy for that. And, of course, I am particularly doubtful about the accuracy of the actual words spoken. I now. see that there are 41/2 pages. The speech was, of course, very much longer than that. It is therefore a compressed account.
DR. JAHRREISS: A compressed account only . . .
SCHRAMM: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, I should like to know more about the circumstances in which the General made that speech, the actual words of which we do not possess. That was...
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is my respectful submission-again in the interests of saving time-to mention that these matters are all very irrelevant. We know that an attempt was made on Hitler's life, and that Jodl addressed his staff. It is my submission that the circumstances are not relevant at all.
DR. JAHRREISS: - Mr. President . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hope you'll do it briefly.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; thank you. [Turning to the witness.] Witness, will you please be very brief and quote the personal circumstances?
SCHRAMM: The General appeared on the scene with white bandages around his head. We were all most surprised that he should have recovered so quickly from the attempt considering that he had been standing right next to the explosion. I must say that, at that time, we were deeply impressed by the concentrated energy with which he reappeared before his staff and by his moral attitude to such an attempt.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions? [There was no response.] Does the Prosecution want to?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further questions. May I now call the next witness, General Winter? [The witness Winter took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
AUGUST WINTER (Witness): August Winter.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you take part in the beginning of the Russian campaign? ~
WINTER: Yes, I took part as the first general staff officer of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt's army group.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, may I point out to you that I want you to allow a small pause after my question and to speak in general more slowly than you have just been doing.
WINTER: Yes. . .
DR. JAHRREISS: Can you tell me-since you had a very responsible position-what was officially said to be Hitler's reason, at that time, for the German attack on the Soviet Union?
WINTER: The official reason, given to me at the time by my commander and my chief, was that an attack from Soviet Russia was to be expected shortly, and that this was therefore a preventive measure.
DR. JAHRREISS: And then you experienced the first battles on the frontier, did you not?
WINTER: Yes, in this staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: That was toward the south?
WINTER: It was in the Ukraine, Army Group South.
DR. JAHRREISS: Even after those first battles, you had a certain amount of experiences and certain impressions of the opponent, did you not?
WINTER: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Were they, General, such impressions as to confirm the official reason given, that of a preventive war?
WINTER: It was the uniform impression of the command of the army group-including the commander, the chief, and the operations department under my command-that the reason given for the campaign was the true one. Our own impression at the time was that we had hit on active preparations for an offensive campaign.
DR. JAHRREISS: But did you have the facts on which to base this impression?
WINTER: We had a number of facts which confirmed that impression, according to our ideas. I may state them briefly. First of all, there was the strength of the troops we encountered which, although I cannot give you figures now, was greater than the figures mentioned in our marching orders. Then there was the extraordinary deployment of troops, so near and like a front, which struck us, with unusual large proportions of armored troops far exceeding anything we had expected, and the deployment of a comparatively strong group opposite the Hungarian border which we could not explain to ourselves as a defensive force. One point is particularly significant; the fact that during the first week we found that captured enemy staffs were equipped with maps which covered a large area of German or ax-Austrian territory which, again, did not seem in keeping with purely defensive considerations. In addition we observed a number of smaller things, not very important in themselves.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, just now you spoke of evidence which, in your opinion, was particularly significant-namely, the finding of these maps which you described a few minutes ago. Why is that particularly significant-more significant than the other things you have mentioned?
WINTER: It is particularly noticeable that the units on the Russian Front were equipped with maps covering much more than the area which would normally be included in a defensive reconnaissance area-even allowing for the fact that at the beginning of a campaign such reconnaissance might go beyond the enemy's frontier.
DR. JAHRREISS: There has been mentioned in this courtroom the fact that after marching into the Ukraine, our troops found themselves faced with exceptional circumstances and difficulties in certain Ukrainian cities. Have you any idea of what I mean?
WINTER: Yes, that is obvious. We encountered an enormous number of these difficulties when we approached the Dnieper. I imagine that you are referring to the matter of remote-controlled explosions, or delayed-action explosions, which were carried out, as it seemed, on a very large scale in our fighting zone in the Kiev-Kharkov-Poltava area. They caused us a great deal of trouble, and they forced us to adopt extensive countermeasures at the time.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know whether that applies to Odessa?
WINTER: I heard that things were blown up in Odessa, but I cannot give you details.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know the details about Kharkov?
WINTER: I know about Kharkov indeed, because something happened there which caused us to adopt certain security measures. In the battles along the west border of Kharkov which were rather long and serious, a divisional staff with all its main material-I cannot remember its number-was destroyed by a delayed-action explosion of this kind. This caused orders to be issued for the carrying out of special security searches in all buildings which had to be used for accommodation of staffs and other authorities from that time on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you, Witness, actually handle a Russian map, or see one, which indicated plans for such blowing-up operations?
WINTER: No, I cannot remember seeing such a map.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another point. You said a few moments ago that Field Marshal Von Rundstedt was your commanding officer. Who was your chief?
WINTER: Infantry General Von Sodenstern.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another subject. If I remember correctly, Field Marshal Von Rundstedt retired at that time or was dismissed; is that right?
WINTER: When the attack on Rostock failed in November 1941 and permission to withdraw his leading units had been refused by the OKH, Field Marshal Von Rundstedt sent a report to the OKH, to the army to which we were subordinated, in which he said that if the necessary confidence was not felt in his leadership, he must ask the Fuehrer to nominate a new commander for that army group I have a painfully accurate recollection of this incident, because I myself drafted the telegram and the Field Marshal made that addition with his own hand. The telegram was dispatched in the evening, and Hitler's answer, relieving him of his post, arrived in the course of the same night.
DR. JAHRREISS: So that his application was granted?
WINTER: The application was granted. But perhaps I may tell you that there were repercussions later with Hitler. A few days afterwards Hitler himself flew to Mariupol in order to obtain information about the actual situation on the spot. On his homeward flight, he visited Field Marshal Von Rundstedt's Poltava headquarters and had a discussion with him. In the course of this discussion, Hitler-I cannot tell you for certain whether I witnessed this scene myself, or whether the Chief Adjutant Oberst Schmundt told me about it immediately afterwards-I repeat, there was a personal discussion in the course of which Hitler again reproached the Field Marshal for having put that alternative question, and said to him: "In the future I do not intend to tolerate any such applications to resign. When I have once made a decision, the responsibility is transferred to me. I myself am not in a position to go to my superior, for instance, God Almighty, and to say to him, 'I am not going on with it, because I don't want to take the responsibility."' We considered, at the time, that that scene was of basic importance, and I may add that, to judge from the orders later given on that point, our impression was correct.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether Hitler, at some later date, altered his decision not to allow that in the future?
WINTER: No, he certainly did not alter his decision. Because, as I know, there were two occasions, I believe, on which orders to that effect were issued, forbidding resignations on the part of a commander, or an officer in a leading position, on grounds of unwillingness to assume responsibility.
DR. JAHRREISS: I now come to another point. If I am properly informed, you were in the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the later stages of the war, were you not?
WINTER: On 15 November 1944 I was called there to succeed General Warlimont who had fallen ill; and I took over his functions on 15 November 1944. My appointment was dated from 1 December 1944.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you regularly attend the situation discussions with the Fuehrer?
WINTER: Yes, I was there on an average of 5 days out of 7 during the week.
DR. JAHRREISS: There has been a great deal of discussion about these situation conferences in this courtroom, and a great many events took place at them which are of importance for this Trial; but up to now, no real picture has yet been presented to us of what those situation discussions really were. Can you explain the procedure of such a situation discussion with reference to its length and the number of people present?
WINTER: The situation discussion was a permanent part of the afternoon's program, and was attended by a fairly large number of people, while there was a second situation discussion at 2 o'clock in the morning, of no importance to us here. In it, reports were made only by the junior General Staff officers of the OKH for the Eastern Front and of the Operations Staff of the OKW for the Western Front.
MR. ROBERTS: Mr. President, I have a submission again in the interest of time. The Defendant Jodl gave evidence as to these conferences, and no one put one word of cross-examination to suggest that his evidence was not accepted. Therefore, I would like to submit that this is pure repetition on a point which is not disputed.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not wish to hear anything of a general or detailed nature about these conferences unless there is something in particular that you want to prove about them.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, so as to clarify matters, may I ask at this time whether the objection raised by Mr. Roberts means that in this case the rule applies that something which has not been touched upon-in cross-examination can be considered proved? I am not sure whether I have made myself understood. The objection from the prosecutor apparently is based on the supposition that something has been heard...