dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
M. DUBOST: I beg the Tribunal to excuse me; I was completing the work which they had requested me to do in relation to concentration camps. In a few moments, when I have completed the expose on the question of prisoners of war, I shall present to the Tribunal the end of the French presentation concerning concentration camps. This will not be much, for we shall have only a few documents to cite, Subject to counter evidence which the Defense may bring, the systematic repetition of the same methods seems so far sufficiently established. We were at the point of reading a document of the Dutch Government, which was already presented to the Tribunal under Document Number F-224 (Exhibit Number RF-324) and which establishes that a protest was formulated, following the secret condemnation to death and the execution of three officers: Lieutenants J. J. B. ten Bosch, B. M. C. Braat, and Thibo. I think that the document to which I alluded this morning, which is the official report of the French Government concerning prisoners, is now in the hands of the Tribunal. It is the document submitted by M. Herzog under Exhibit Number RF-46, Document Number UK-78. I ask the Tribunal to excuse me, as I cannot present this document again. I have no more copies. It is evident from this document that the Nazis had a systematic policy of intimidation. They strove to keep the greatest possible number of prisoners of war in order to be able, if necessary, to exercise efficacious pressure over the countries from which these prisoners came. This policy was exercised by the irregular or improper capture of prisoners, and also by the refusal, which was systematically upheld, to repatriate the prisoners whose state of health would have justified this measure. Concerning the irregular or improper capture of prisoners of war, we can cite the example of what happened in France after the signing of the armistice.
M. DUBOST: The report of the Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees, to which we refer, indicates, on Page 4: "In 1940 certain French military formations laid down their arms at the time of the armistice under the assurance given by the German Army that troops who had thus surrendered would not be taken into captivity. These troops were, nevertheless, captured. The Alpine Army had passed over the Rhone in order to be demobilized and was west of the region of Vienne. They were taken prisoners and were sent to Germany until the end of July 1940. "Moreover, noncombatant formations of special civilians were led into captivity and imprisoned in accordance with Himmler's orders, which said that all Frenchmen of military age were to be seized indiscriminately. In short, it was only through the making of special exceptions and the private initiative of unit commanders that all Frenchmen were not transferred to Germany. "Because of the enormous number of prisoners and the difficulties that faced the German Army in taking all those men to Germany, the' German Army decided, in 1940, to create what, they called 'Front-Stalags.' "The promise had been made to the Vichy Government, which was established after the armistice, that soldiers who were kept in these 'Front-Stalags' would be kept in France. Yet, the men in these camps began to be sent to Germany in October 1940. In an additional report appended to the document book which is before you, the Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees points out the irregular capture of the troops of the fortified sector of Haguenau, the 22d R.I.F., the 81st B.C.P, the 51st and 58th Infantry Regiments and a North African division. It is Document F-668 which I submit under Exhibit Number RF-361, the pages of which are not numbered, it is appended to the document book. I quote the document: "Troops of the fortified sector of Haguenau: the 22d R.I.F. and the 81st B.C.P.
M. DUBOST: "These troops fought until 25 June, 1:30, and only stopped firing after an agreement between the colonel in charge of the fortified sector of Haguenau and the German generals, an agreement which guaranteed the troops the honors of war and particularly that they would not be made prisoners. The 51st and 58th Infantry Regiments, as well as a North African Division, withdrew towards Toul only after an agreement, signed on the 22 June, between the French General Dubuisson and the German General Andreas, at Thuilleaux-Groseilles, Meurthe-et-Moselle, an agreement guaranteeing military honors and confirming that the troops would not be taken prisoners."
THE PRESIDENT: What official document does this document come from?
M. DUBOST: From the Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees. It is the additional report which was made by the French Government. We submit it under Exhibit Number RF-361.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the report on the captivity?
M. DUBOST: This report will be submitted to you, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: It appears to be Addition Number 2 to the report on the captivity, for the attention of the French Delegation to the Court of Justice at Nuremberg.
M. DUBOST: That is correct, Mr. President. The information which I have just read to the Tribunal consists of extracts from a note from Darlan to Ambassador Scapini on 22 April 1941.
THE PRESIDENT: But M. Dubost, is there anything to show that it is an official document, such as this book?
M. DUBOST: This document, Mr. President, bears no relation to the one which I am quoting.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I know it does not, but this is an official document produced by the Republic of France, is it not?
M. DUBOST: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: How do you show that this Addition Number 2 to the report on captivity is equally an official document with this one? That is what we want to know.
M. DUBOST: Mr. President, it is a report which was submitted in the name of the Government of the French Republic by the delegation which I have the honor to represent.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you see, this one here is headed "Service of Information of War Crimes, Official French Edition." Now, that seems to us to be different from this mere typewritten copy, which has on it the "Appendix Number 2 to the Report on the Captivity." We do not know whose report on the captivity.
M. DUBOST: Mr. President, you have before you the official note of transmission from our government. The clerk of the Court has just handed it to you.
THE PRESIDENT: We have this document, which appears to be an official document, but this addition has no such seal upon it as this has.
M. DUBOST: There is mention of an appendix to this document.
THE PRESIDENT: The other is marked: Appendix. It must be identified by a seal.
M. DUBOST: The covering letter has a seal and the fact that it alludes to the document is sufficient, in my opinion, to authenticate the document transmitted. May I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: No. This document here has a letter attached to it. This document here is not referred to in that letter specifically. Therefore, there is nothing to connect the two documents together.
M. DUBOST: I think there is a manuscript note in the margin. I have not the document before me here and cannot be positive about it but I think there is a manuscript note in the margin.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wishes you to put this in as one document. I see there is a manuscript note here at the side, in writing, which refers to the Appendix. If you will put the whole thing in together...
M. DUBOST: It is all submitted in one file. Now I wish to read to the Tribunal extracts from two letters addressed to the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden by the ex-Ambassador Scapini, both dated 4 April 1941. The Tribunal will find them reproduced in the document book before them, Pages 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22: "4 April 1941. "M. Georges Scapini, Ambassador of France. "To his Excellency Monsieur Abetz, German Ambassador in Paris. "Subject: Men captured after 'the coming into force of the Armistice Convention and treated as prisoners of war ....... At the bottom of the page: "I. The Geneva Convention applies only during a state of war as far as captures are concerned. Armistice, however, suspends war operations; therefore, any man captured after the Armistice Convention came into force and treated as a prisoner of war, is wrongfully retained in captivity ...... Page 17, third paragraph: "The Armistice Convention, in its second paragraph, states only that the French Armed Forces stationed in regions to be occupied by Germany are to be brought back quickly into unoccupied territory and demobilized, but does not say that they are to be taken into captivity, which would be contrary to the Geneva Convention ...." Fifth paragraph of the same page: "1. Civilians. If it is admitted that civilians captured before the armistice cannot be treated as prisoners of war, as discussed in my previous letter, surely there is all the more reason not to consider as such those captured after the armistice. I note in this respect that captures, some of which were collective, were carried out several months after the end of hostilities ...... Then on Page 18, the top of the page: "To the categories of civilians defined in my first letter, I wish to add one more-that of demobilized civilians who were going back to their homes in the occupied zone after the armistice and who,, more often than not, were captured on their way home and sent into captivity as a result of the initiative of local military authorities. 'T. Soldiers.
M. DUBOST: As such I would define, by convention, men who, though freed after the armistice, could not for some reason due to the difficult circumstances of that period-be provided with the regular demobilization papers. Many of them were captured and taken into captivity under the same condition as those mentioned above ...... I think the Tribunal will not require the reading of that example, but if the President wishes, I shall read it.
THE PRESIDENT: No.
M. DUBOST: Let us turn to Page 19, the last paragraph, entitled: "A. Civilians not subject to military service. "It is obvious that these men could not be considered soldiers according to French law. They can be classified, according to age, into three groups: "(a) Men under 21 not yet called to the colors. Example: Flanquart, Alexandre, 18 years old, captured by the German troops at Courrieres, Pas-de-Calais, at the time of the arrival of the latter in that region. His address in captivity was Number 65/388, Stalag II-B. "(b) Men between 21 and 48 who were not mobilized, who were demobilized, or who were considered unfit for service." There follows a rather lengthy list which the Tribunal will perhaps accept without my reading it. It consists merely of proper names. In the middle of the page: "(c) Men specially assigned to the army. I will classify them into two groups: "1. Men mobilized into special corps, which are military formations established at the time of the mobilization by different ministerial departments, according to the following chart ...... At the top of Page 21: "2. Men specially assigned, who at mobilization were kept in the positions which they held in time of peace in military services or establishments. Example: Workmen in artillery depots. "Civilians specially assigned. Contrary to those mentioned above, the civilians who were specially assigned did not belong to military formations and were not subject to military authority. Nevertheless they were arrested. Example:"-I skip several lines- "Moisset, Henri, specially assigned to the Marret-Bonin factory."-I skip a few more lines. "Address in captivity: Number 102 Stalag II-A." Those people were not all freed, far from it. Some remained prisoners until the end of the war. We shall cite now a document submitted under Exhibit Number RF-362 (Document Number F-224), the text of which is in your document book, on Page 15a. This text may be summarized in a few words.
M. DUBOST: It is the story of Dutch officers who were freed after the capitulation of the Dutch Army and recaptured shortly afterwards and sent in captivity to Germany. Paragraph 3 of this document: "On 9 May 1942 a summons addressed to all regular officers of the former Dutch Army who were on active service on 10 May 1940 was published in the Dutch newspapers, according to which they were to present themselves on Friday, 15 May 1942, at the Chassee Barracks in Breda ...... Paragraph 5: "More than one thousand regular officers reported to the Chassee Barracks on 15 May 1942. The doors were closed after them...." Paragraph 7: "A German officer of high rank came into the barracks and declared that the officers had not kept their word to undertake no action against the Fuehrer and, as a result of this, they were to be kept in captivity...." The following paragraph states that "they were taken from the station at Breda to Nuremberg, in Germany." Numerous obstacles were placed in the way of the release of French prisoners of war who, for reasons of health, should have been sent back to their families. I shall quote a document already submitted under Exhibit Number EF-297 (Document Number F-417), Page 23 of your document book; and I read, Paragraph 1: "The question of releasing French generals, prisoners of war in German hands, for reasons of health or age was taken up on several occasions by the French authorities." This reproduction of the stencil is not quite clear. I continue with Paragraph 2: "So far as this question is concerned, the Fuehrer has always refused to consider either their release or allowing them to be placed in hospitals in neutral countries." Paragraph 3: "Today release or sending to hospitals is more out of the question than ever ......
M. DUBOST: And a written note reads: "No reply to be given to the French note." This note, in fact, was addressed by the Supreme Command of the German Army to the German Armistice Commission, who had asked for instructions as to whether or not they should reply to the request concerning the release of French generals who were ill, a request made by the Vichy Government. Much more serious measures were undertaken against our prisoners of war by the German authorities when, for reasons of a patriotic nature, some of our prisoners gave the Germans to understand that they were not willing to collaborate with Germany. The German authorities considered them as incapable of being assimilated and dangerous; their courage and their determination gave much concern to Germany, and the measures taken against them amounted to nothing less than murder. We know of numerous examples of murder of prisoners of war. The victims were mainly: 1) men who had taken part in commando actions; 2) airmen; 3) escaped prisoners. These murders were carried out by means of deportation and the internment of these prisoners in concentration camps. While interned in these camps, they were subjected to the regime about which you know and which was bound to cause their death, or else they were killed quite simply with a bullet in the back of the neck, according to the KA method which has been described by our American colleagues and on which I will not dwell. In other cases they were lynched on the spot by the population, in accordance with direct orders, or with the tacit consent of the German Government. In yet other cases, they were handed over to the Gestapo and the SD, who, as you will see at the end of my statement, during the last years of the occupation had the right to carry out executions. With the Tribunal's permission, we shall study two cases of extermination of combat troops captured after military operations: that of commandos and that of airmen. As the Tribunal knows, men who were commandos were almost always volunteers.
M. DUBOST: In any case, they were selected from among the most courageous fighters and those who showed the greatest physical aptitude for combat. We can consider them, therefore, as the elite and the order to exterminate them as an attempt to annihilate the elite and spread terror through the ranks of the Allied Armies. From a legal point of view the execution of the commandos cannot be justified. The Germans themselves, moreover, used commandos quite extensively; but whereas, in the case of their own men being taken prisoners, they always insisted that they be recognized as belligerents, they denied that right to our men or to those of the Allied Armies. The main order concerning this was signed by Hitler on 18 October 1942, and it was extensively carried out. Moreover, this order was preceded by other orders of the OKW, which show that the question had been carefully studied by the General Staff before becoming the subject of a final order by the head of the German Government. Under Document Number 553-PS, the Tribunal will find, on Page 24 of the document book, an order signed by Keitel which we submit as Exhibit Number RF-363. This order prescribes that all isolated parachutists or small groups of parachutists carrying out a mission shall be executed. It is dated 4 August 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: Do not read it.
M. DUBOST: I thank the Tribunal for sparing me the reading of it. On 7 October 1942 a communique of the OKW, disseminated by the press and radio, announced the decision taken by the High Command to execute saboteurs. On Page 26 the Tribunal will find in the document book extracts from the Volkischer Beobachter of 8 October 1942 (Document Number RF-364): "In future an terrorist and sabotage units of the British and their accomplices, who do not behave as soldiers but as bandits, will be treated as such by the German troops and shot on the spot without mercy, wherever it may be." Under the Exhibit Number RF-365 (Document 1263-PS), we submit the minutes of a meeting of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, dated 14 October 1942. Paragraph 3: "During the era of total warfare sabotage has become one of the most important elements in the conduct of war. It is sufficient to state our attitude to this question. The enemy will find evidence of it in the reports of our own propaganda units .... 23 Page 29, the end of Paragraph 3: "Sabotage is an essential element ... we ourselves have strongly developed this means of combat," Then the sixth paragraph. "We have already announced by radio our intention of liquidating, in future, all groups of terrorists and saboteurs acting like bandits. Therefore the VVFSt has only to issue regulations to the troops how to deal with terrorist and sabotage groups., Page 30. The Tribunal will see what orders were given concerning the treatment of what the German General Staff called groups of terrorists and British saboteurs. It is certain that the German General Staff never called their own commandos groups of terrorists and saboteurs. Paragraph A refers to groups of the British Army without uniform or in German uniform.
M. DUBOST: I quote: "In combat or in flight they are to be killed without mercy." Paragraph B: "Members of terrorist and sabotage groups of the British Army wearing uniform, who in the opinion of our troops are guilty of acting dishonorably or in any manner contrary to the law of nations, are to be kept in separate custody after capture.... "Instructions concerning the treatment to be inflicted upon them will be given by the WFSt in agreement with the Army legal service and the Counter-Intelligence Department, Foreign Section (Amt Ausland Abwehr)." Finally, Page 31, Paragraph 2: "Violation of the laws of war by terrorist or sabotage troops is in the future always to be assumed when individual assailants as saboteurs or agents, regardless of whether they were soldiers or whatever their uniform might be, place themselves outside the laws of war by committing surprise attacks or brutalities which in the judgment of our troops are inconsistent with the fundamental rules of war." Paragraph 3: "In such cases the assailants will be killed without mercy to the last man, in combat or in flight." Paragraph 4: "Confinement in prisoner-of-war camps, even temporarily, is forbidden." Thus in carrying out these orders, if British soldiers, even in uniform, were captured during a commando operation, the German troops were to judge whether they had acted according to the laws of war or not; and without any appeal, subordinates could annihilate them to the last man, even when they were not engaged in active fighting. These orders were applied to British commandos. We shall now quote Document Number 498-PS, which was submitted by our American colleagues under Exhibit Number USA- 501 and which confirms the information which we have just given to the Tribunal by the reading of the preceding documents. It seems useless to read this document.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, there are two points to which I wish to draw your attention. In the first place, it is said that you are not offering these documents in evidence, you are simply reading them, and they must be offered in evidence so that the document itself may be put in evidence. You have not offered in evidence any of these documents; you have just been reading from them or have given them numbers.
M. DUBOST: Mr. President, I have submitted them all-absolutely all-except those which were already submitted by our colleagues; and all were filed with a number, and can be handed to you immediately. I shall ask the French secretary to hand them to you with the exhibit numbers which I read out.
THE PRESIDENT: They have all been put in evidence already?
M. DUBOST: Mr. President, some have been put in evidence and I quoted them with their exhibit numbers; but those which have not been submitted, I shall give French numbers when submitting.
THE PRESIDENT: You are saying, "have been put in evidence by some other member of the Prosecution"; is that right?
M. DUBOST: That is correct, Mr. President. When I quote them I give the number under which they were filed by my American colleagues.
THE PRESIDENT: That was filed by the American Prosecution, was it not: 498?
M. DUBOST: 498-PS on Page 32 has already been filed by my American colleagues under the Number USA-501, as I said before, sir. I shall not read it. I shall merely comment on it briefly.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. With reference to the document which preceded it on Pages 27, 29, 30, and 31 ...
M. DUBOST: I shall ask the French secretary to give them to you with the numbers under which they were filed.
THE PRESIDENT: Have they been filed by the American prosecutor too?
M. DUBOST: Not all, Mr. President. Some were filed by the American Prosecution, others were filed by me.
THE PRESIDENT: What the Tribunal wants you to do is, When you put in a document, if it has not already been put in, give it a number and announce the exhibit number so that the record may be complete. Is that clear?
M. DUBOST: It is clear, Mr. President, but I believe that I have done so from the beginning, since the French secretary has just given you the file.
THE PRESIDENT: You may have put numbers on the documents, but you have not announced them in some cases. There is another matter which I wish to state and it is this: When I spoke before, what I asked you to do was to confine yourself to any new points, and you are now giving us evidence about commandos and about British commandos, all of which has been already gone into in previous stages of the Trial, and that appears to us to be unnecessary.
M. DUBOST: The Tribunal will pardon me, but I have not read any of the documents already mentioned. The documents I read were documents not cited before. I had just reached a document which had been mentioned before, and I asked the Tribunal to excuse me from even commenting on it, since I thought the document was already well known to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have had a good deal of evidence already about the treatment of commandos and sabotage groups, evidence, if I remember right, which attempted to draw some distinction between troops which were dropped from the air, for instance, close up to the battle zone and troops that wen- dropped at a distance behind the battle zone. You had quite a lot of evidence upon that subject. If there is anything which is of special interest to the case of France we would be most willing to hear it, but we do not desire to hear cumulative evidence upon subjects which we have already heard.