dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "While recognizing that the draft resolution does not constitute a regular legal instrument, which would be adequate in itself and represent a concrete contribution towards security, the Third Committee unanimously agreed as to its great moral and educative value." Then he asked the Assembly to adopt the draft resolution, and I will read simply the terms of the resolution, which shows what so many nations, including Germany, put forward at that time: "The Assembly, recognizing the solidarity which unites the community of nations, being inspired by a firm desire for the maintenance of general peace, being convinced that a war of aggression can never serve as a means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence an international crime; considering that a solemn renunciation of all wars of aggression would tend to create an atmosphere of general confidence calculated to facilitate the progress of the work undertaken... with a view to disarmament: "Declares: 1. That all wars of aggression are and shall always be prohibited: 2. That every pacific means must be employed to settle disputes of every description, which may arise between states. "The Assembly declares that the states, members of the League, are under an obligation to conform to these principles." After a solemn vote taken in the form of roll call the President announced-which you will see at the end of the extract: "All the delegations having pronounced in favor of the declaration submitted by the Third Committee, I declare it unanimously adopted." The last general treaty which I have to place before the Tribunal is the Kellogg-Briand Pact . The Pact of Paris of 1928, which my learned friend, the Attorney General, in opening this part of the case read in extenso and commented on fully, I hand in as Exhibit GB-18-the British Document TC-19, which is a copy of that pact.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did not intend, unless the Tribunal desired otherwise, that I should read it again, as the Attorney General yesterday read it in full, but of course I am at the service of the Tribunal and therefore I leave that document before the Tribunal in that way. Now all that remains for me to do is to place before the Tribunal certain documents which Mr. Alderman mentioned in the course of his address, and left to me. I am afraid that I haven't placed them in a special order, because they don't really relate to the treaties I have dealt with, but to Mr. Alderman's argument. The first of these I hand in as Exhibit GB-19. It is British Document TC-26, and comes just after that resolution of the League of Nations to which the Tribunal had just been giving attention-TC-26. It is the assurance contained in Hitler's speech on 21 May 1935, and it is very short, and unless the Tribunal has it in mind from Mr. Alderman's speech, I will read it again; I am not sure of his reading it: "Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the domestic affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to attach that country to her. The German people and the German Government have, however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of the simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent, that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed not only to foreign nations, but to the German people everywhere. I myself believe that no regime which is not anchored in the people, supported by the people, and desired by the people, can exist permanently." The next document which is TC-22, and which is on the next page, I now hand in as Exhibit GB-20. It is the copy of the official proclamation of the agreement between the German Government and the Government of the Federal State of Austria on 11 July 1936 and I am almost certain that Mr.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Alderman did read this document but I refer the Tribunal to Paragraph 1 of the agreement to remind them of the essential content: "The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria in the sense of the pronouncements of the German Leader and Chancellor of the 21st of May 1935." I now have three documents which Mr. Alderman asked me to hand in with regard to Czechoslovakia. The first is TC-27, which the Tribunal will find two documents further on from the one of Austria, to which I have just been referring. That is the German assurance to Czechoslovakia, and what I am handing in as GB-21 is the letter from M. Masaryk, Jan Masaryk's son, to Lord Halifax dated the 12th of March 1938. Again I think that if Mr. Alderman did not read this, he certainly quoted the statement made by the Defendant Goering, which appears in the third paragraph. In the first statement the Field Marshal used the expression, "ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort," which I understand means, "I give you my word of honor," and if you will look down three paragraphs, after the Defendant Goering had asked that there would not be a mobilization of the Czechoslovak Army, the communication continues: "M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding assurances on this subject, and today spoke with Baron Von Neurath-that is the Defendant Von Neurath-who, among other things assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925." So there I remind the Tribunal that in 1925 Herr Stresemann was speaking on behalf of Germany in an agreement voluntarily concluded. Had there been the slightest doubt of that, here is the defendant Von Neurath giving the assurance on behalf of Hitler that Germany still considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention on 12 March 1938, 6 months before Dr. Benes made a hopeless appeal to it, before the crisis in the autumn of 1938.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course the difficult position of the Czechoslovak Government is set out in the last paragraph, but M. Masaryk says- and the Tribunal may think with great force-in his last sentence: "They cannot however fail to view with great apprehension the sequel of events in Austria between the date of the bilateral agreement between Germany and Austria, 11 July 1936, and yesterday, 11 March 1938." I refrain from comment, but I venture to say that is one of the most pregnant sentences relating to this period. Now the next document which is on the next page is the British Document TC-28, which I hand in as Exhibit GB-22. And that is an assurance of the 26th of September 1938, which Hitler gave to Czechoslovakia, and again-the Tribunal will check my memory- I don't think that Mr. Alderman read this but . . .
THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I think if he did not, the Tribunal ought to have it before them, because it gives very important point as to the alleged governing principle of getting Germans back to the Reich, which the Nazi conspirators purported to ask for a considerable time, while it suited them. It says: "I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the limits of our patience." The Tribunal will remember this is between the Godesberg visit and the Munich Pact: "I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say, when the Czechs have come to an agreement with their other minorities peacefully, and without oppression, I will no longer be interested in the Czech State, and that, as far as I am concerned, I will guarantee it. We don't want any Czechs. But I must also declare before the German people that in the Sudeten-German problem my patience is now at an end. I made an offer to Herr Benes which was no more than the realization of what he had already promised. He has now peace or war in his hands. Either he will accept this offer and at length give the Germans their freedom, or we shall get this freedom for ourselves." Less than 6 months before the 15th of March Hitler was saying in the most violent terms that "he didn't want any Czechs." The Tribunal has heard the sequel from my friend, Mr. Alderman, this morning. The last document which I have been asked to put in and which I now ask the Tribunal to take notice of, and hand in, is Exhibit GB-23, which is the British Document TC-23 and a copy of the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938. That was signed by Hitler, the late Mr. Neville Chamberlain, M.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Daladier, and Mussolini, and it is largely a procedural agreement by which the entry of German troops into the Sudeten-Deutsche territory is regulated. That is shown by the preliminary clause: "Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement which has been already reached in principle, for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten-German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure fulfillment." Then I don't think, unless the Tribunal want me, I need go through the steps. In Article 4 , it said that "The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on 1 October." The four territories are marked on a map. And by Article 6, "The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission." And it provides also for rights of option and release from the forces-the Czech forces of Sudeten Germans. That is what Hitler was asking for in the somewhat rhetorical passage which I have just read out, and it will be observed that there is an annex to the agreement which is most significant. "Annex to the Agreement: "His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer contained in Paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French Proposals of the 19th September, relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. "When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy, for their part, will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia." The Polish and Hungarian minorities, not the question of Slovakia which the Tribunal heard this morning. That is why Mr.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Alderman submitted-and I respectfully joined him in his submission-that the action of the 15th of March was a flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of that agreement. That, My Lord, is the part of the case which I desired to present.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases Thank you.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, Count Two of the Indictment charges these defendants with participating in the planning, the preparation, the initiation, and waging of various wars of aggression, and it charges that those wars are also in breach of international treaty. It is our purpose now to present to the Tribunal the evidence in respect of those aggressive wars against Poland and against the United Kingdom and France. Under Paragraph (B) of the particulars to Count Two, reference is made to Count One in the Indictment for the allegations charging that those wars were wars of aggression, and Count One also sets out the particulars of the preparations and planning for those wars, and in particular those allegations will be found in Paragraph (F) 4 . But, My Lord, with the Tribunal's approval I would propose first to deal with the allegations of breach of treaties which are mentioned in Paragraph (C) of the particulars, and of which the details are set out in Appendix C . My Lord, those sections of Appendix C which relate to the war against Poland are Section 2, which charges a violation of the Hague Convention in respect of the pacific settlement of international disputes, on which Sir David has already addressed the Court, and I do not propose, with the Court's approval, to say more than that. Section 3 of Appendix C and Section 4 charge breaches of the other Hague Conventions of 1907 . Section 5 , Sub-section 4, charges a breach of the Versailles Treaty in respect of the Free City of Danzig, and Section 13 , a breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact . All those have already been dealt with by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, and it remains, therefore, only for me to deal with two other sections of Appendix C: Section 10 , which charges a breach of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland, signed at Locarno on the 16th of October 1925; and Section 15 of Appendix C which charges a violation of the Declaration of Non-Aggression which was entered into between Germany and Poland on the 26th of January 1934.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): If the Tribunal would take Part I of the British Document Book Number 2, I will describe in a moment how the remaining parts are divided. The document book is divided into six parts. If the Tribunal will look at Part I for the moment-the document books which have been handed to the Counsel for the Defense are in exactly the same order, except that they are bound in one and not in six separate covers, in which the Tribunal's documents are bound for convenience. The German-Polish Arbitration Treaty, the subject matter of Section 10 of Appendix C , is Document TC-15 and appears the one but end document in the book. It has already been put in under the Number GB-16.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): My Lord, I would quote the preamble and Articles 1 and 2 from that treaty: "The President of the German Empire and the President of the Polish Republic: "Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Poland by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries; "Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for international tribunals; "Agreeing to recognize that the rights of a state cannot be modified save with its consent; "And considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause of division between states; "Have decided...." Then, go on to Article 1: "All disputes of every kind between Germany and Poland with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, as laid down hereafter." I go straight to Article 2: "Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute may, by agreement between the parties, be submitted, with a view to amicable settlement, to a permanent international commission, styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission, constituted in accordance with the present treaty." My Lord, thereafter the treaty goes on to lay down the procedure for arbitration and for. conciliation.
THE PRESIDENT: It is in the same terms, is it not, as the arbitration treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and Germany and Belgium?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well-yes, it is, My Lord, both signed at Locarno.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The words of the charge in Section 10 , will be noted particularly in that Germany did, on or about the 1st of September 1939, unlawfully attack and invade Poland without first having attempted to settle its dispute with Poland by peaceful means. The only other treaty to which I refer, the German-Polish Declaration of the 26th of January 1934, will be found as the last document in Part I of the Tribunal's document book, which is the subject of Section 10 of Appendix C : "The German Government and the Polish Government consider that the time has come to introduce a new era in the political relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding between the states. They have therefore decided to establish by the present declaration a basis for the future shaping of those relations. "The two Governments assume that the maintenance and assurance of a permanent peace between their countries is an essential condition for general peace in Europe."
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary to read all this? We are taking judicial notice of it.
LT COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged; I am only too anxious to shorten this, if I can. In view of what is later alleged by the Nazi Government, I would particularly draw attention to the last paragraph in that declaration "The declaration shall remain in effect for a period of 10 years counting from the day of exchange of instruments of ratification. In case it is not denounced by one of the two governments 6 months before the expiration of that period of time, it shall continue in effect but can then be denounced by either Government at any time 6 months in advance." My Lord, I pass then from the breach of treaties to present to the Court the evidence upon the planning and preparation of these wars and in support of the allegations that they were wars of aggression. For convenience, as I say, the documents have been divided into separate parts and if the Tribunal would look at the index, the total index to their document, which is a separate book, on the front page it will be seen how these documents have been divided. Part I is the "Treaties"; Part II is entitled "Evidence of German Intentions prior to March 1939." It might perhaps be more accurately described as "pre-March 1939 evidence," and it will be with that part that I would now deal. My Lord, it has been put to the Tribunal that the actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia were in themselves part of the preparation for further aggression, and I now-dealing with the early history of this matter-wish to draw the Court's particular attention only to those parts of the evidence which show that even at that time, before the Germans had seized the whole of Czechoslovakia, they were perfectly prepared to fight England, Poland, and France, if necessary, to achieve those preliminary aims; that they appreciated the whole time that they might well have to do so.
LT COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And, what is more, although not until after March 1939 did they commence upon their immediate and specific preparations for war against Poland, nevertheless, they had for a considerable time before had it in mind specifically to attack Poland once Czechoslovakia was completely theirs. During this period also-and this happens throughout the whole story of the Nazi regime in Germany -during this period, as afterwards, while they are making their preparations and carrying out their plans, they are giving to the outside world assurance after assurance so as to lull them out of any suspicion of their real object. The dates, I think-as the learned Attorney General said in addressing you yesterday-the dates in this case, almost more than the documents, speak for themselves. The documents in this book are arranged in the order in which I will refer to them, and the first that I would refer to is Document TC-70, which will go in as GB-25. It is only interesting to see what Hitler said of the agreement with Poland when it was signed in January 1934: "When I took over the Government on the 30th of January, the relations between the two countries seemed to me more than unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing differences, which were due to the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the mutual tension resulting therefrom, would gradually crystallize into a state of hostility which, if persisted in, might only too easily acquire the character of a dangerous traditional enmity." I go down to the one but last paragraph. "In the spirit of this treaty the German Government is willing and prepared also to cultivate economic-political relations with Poland in such a way that here, too, the state of unprofitable suspicion can be succeeded by a period of useful co-operation. It is a matter of particular satisfaction to us that in this same year the National Socialist Government of Danzig has been enabled to effect a similar clarification of its relations with its Polish neighbor." That was in 1934.
LT COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Three years later, again on the 30th of January, speaking in the Reichstag, Hitler said-this is Document PS-2368, which will be GB-26. I will, if I may, avoid so far as possible repeating passages which the Attorney General quoted in his speech the other day. The first paragraph, in fact, he quoted to the Tribunal. It is a short paragraph but perhaps I might read it now, but I will-dealing with this evidence-so far as possible avoid repetition: "By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tension and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the European atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland which has worked out to the advantage of both sides .... True statesmanship will not overlook realities, but consider them. The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities. The German nation and the German Reich are equally realities. And to my own fellow citizens I would say that the Polish nation and the Polish State have also become a reality." That was on the 30th of January 1937. On the 24th of June 1937 we have a top-secret order, C-175, which has already been put in as USA-69. It is a top-secret order issued by the Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, signed "Von Blomberg." It has at the top, "Written by an officer.... Outgoing documents in connection with this matter and dealing with it. .. are to be written by an officer." So it is obviously highly secret. And with it is enclosed a directive for the unified preparation for war of the Armed Forces to come into force on the 1st of August 1937. The directive enclosed with it is divided into Part 1, "General Guiding Principles"; Part 2, "Likely Warlike Eventualities"; Part 3, "Special Preparations." The Tribunal will remember that the Attorney General quoted the opening passages: "The general political position justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side." It goes on-the second paragraph: "The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little by Germany.