dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON NEURATH: In the Reich, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And so far as you were concerned, in spite of the fact that you sided with the opposition, nothing happened; that is true, is it not?
VON NEURATH: I did not understand.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): So far as you were concerned, in spite of the fact that you declared yourself for the opposition, nothing of the kind happened?
VON NEURATH: No, but I always expected it.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And could you not tell us whether Sir Nevile Henderson, in his book, the Failure of a Mission, expressed the facts concerning you personally correctly or not? Do you consider that Sir Nevile Henderson expressed the facts correctly concerning you personally? Does he express them correctly?
VON NEURATH: I must admit frankly that I read this book by Sir Nevile Henderson only once, 3 or 4 years ago. I cannot remember now what he said about me. I heard excerpts from it here once or twice but I cannot say what he writes about me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But I assume that you are familiar enough with the excerpts presented by your defense counsel in his document book?
VON NEURATH: Yes. Thai TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Now, for instance, that which is expressed in his excerpts so far as you are concerned, is it correct or not?
VON NEURATH: I assume so, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): That is to say, it is correct. And is it quite correct what he writes in reference to your membership in the Party? He writes that "Baron von Neurath himself remained in the regime of Hindenburg, and he was not a member of the Nazi Party."
VON NEURATH: Yes, I believe I have said so repeatedly here in the last few days.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And further on he informs us that "he (Neurath) became a member of the Party later."
VON NEURATH: I have already explained how that happened. In 1937 I received a Golden Party Badge without my...
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes, we have heard that before, but is it true or not that you became a member of the Nazi Party later, as Sir Nevile Henderson states?
VON NEURATH: No, I...
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): So this particular part is not correct, is it?
VON NEURATH: I received the Golden Party Badge with Hitler's statement that this involved no obligations towards the Party.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): We have heard this already. That means that in Sir Nevile Henderson's statements not everything is true as far as your person is concerned?
VON NEURATH: I do not know. With the best intentions I cannot remember what Sir Nevile Henderson wrote about me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And the last question I have, which is in regard to your memorandum: I did not quite understand the explanations which were given by you to Sir David and later to your defense counsel. Now, in forwarding Frank's memorandum, in the fetter' addressed to Lammers, you wrote that you considered this memorandum absolutely correct. Is that true?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is true. I should also like to tell you the reasons. This memorandum...
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You already explained the reasons before. I just wanted to establish the fact that you really wrote this.
VON NEURATH: Up to now I have not told the reason why I wrote this to Lammers. The reason why I wrote to Lammers to this effect was that he was the one who submitted this memorandum to the Fuehrer. So I had to write to the same effect.
THE PRESIDENT: There are two subjects I want to ask you about and the first relates to the letter that you wrote on the 31st of August 1940. That is the letter which General Nikitchenko has just referred to; you remember that?
VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.
THE PRESIDENT: And you remember that you said in that letter that you fully agreed with the memorandum which your Secretary of State Frank had drawn up independently of you. He said that "Germanization provides for the changing of the nationality of racially suitable Czechs; and secondly, the expulsion of racially unassimilable Czechs and of the intelligentsia who are enemies of the Reich or special treatment for these and all destructive elements." My question is: What did you understand by "special treatment"?
VON NEURATH: Well, as far as I read this extract at all at the time, I had in no way ever thought of the term "special treatment" as it has become known here during the Trial. I was certainly not at all in agreement with this attitude of Frank as represented in the report, and I only had the intention of frustrating this whole affair in order to sidetrack it. The content of these reports was only intended to present this to Hitler in Hitler's language, or in the language of Himmler and others, in order to dissuade him from it later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Was it not misleading to write to Herr Lammers with the view that it should be put forward to Hitler, saying that you fully agreed with the memorandum with which you did not agree?
VON NEURATH: Mr. President, as things were, I could not write to Lammers. I did not intend to carry out anything which is written in there, but since Lammers was presenting this to Hitler, I first had to tell him I agreed with it. Afterward I reported to Hitler and gave him an explanation in a personal conference during the meeting with Frank and Gurtner which has been mentioned here.
THE PRESIDENT: Then your answer is that you do not know what was meant by "special treatment"?
VON NEURATH: No; in any case I did not know at the time.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, there is one other question that I should like to put to you. You remember when you were called on the 11th of March 1938, at the time of the Anschluss with Austria, and you wrote the letter of the 12th of March 1938, in answer to the memorandum which you received from the British Government through Sir Nevile Henderson. You knew Sir Nevile Henderson quite well, did you not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And in that letter you said this: "It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring about this development; especially the assertion, which was spread later by the former Chancellor, that the German Government had presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is pure invention. According to the ultimatum, he had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German Government, otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect." And then you go on to say what you allege was the truth of the matter. You know now, do you not, that your statements in that letter were entirely untrue?
VON NEURATH: That did not come through.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you heard any part of the question that I was putting to you?
VON NEURATH: Unfortunately not.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a pity that you did not say so earlier. Do you remember the 11th of March 1938 and being called in to represent the Foreign Office, and you have told me just now that you knew Sir Nevile Henderson quite well?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you remember the letter which you wrote on the 12th of March 1938?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you admitted to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe that the statements in that letter were untrue?
VON NEURATH: Untrue, yes-not entirely. They are presented incorrectly.
THE PRESIDENT: What steps did you take to find out whether or not they were true?
VON NEURATH: I did not learn of the incorrectness of this presentation until much later.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to my question. I said, "What steps did you take to find out whether the statement was correct?"
VON NEURATH: The statement which Hitler gave me I first simply presumed to be true. I certainly could not check up on it in any way.
THE PRESIDENT: Why should you assume it to be true when it was in contradiction of what the British Government had stated?
VON NEURATH: I had no other knowledge of the events which had occurred and therefore could only say what I knew.
THE PRESIDENT: You had the letter, the protest from the British Government, had you not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You knew Sir Nevile Henderson perfectly well?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you then wrote this letter contradicting the statements which had been made on behalf of the British Government; that is right, is it not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you took no steps to check the facts which had been stated to you by Hitler? Will you answer that, please?
VON NEURATH: Yes. Your Lordship, how was I to do that? There was no one else who knew about it. It was only what Hitler had commissioned me to tell the Foreign Office. The draft of this note was drawn up by the Foreign Office according to the information which I had received from Hitler. I had no other chance to clear this up.
THE PRESIDENT: There were all the other persons who were concerned with the matter whom you could have communicated with, but your statement is that you did nothing?
VON NEURATH: I can only repeat that I had no opportunity to procure any other information. No one knew about it except Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you telling the Tribunal that Goering did not know about it? '
VON NEURATH: Perhaps Goering knew about it.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all. The defendant can return to the dock.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I ask permission to call the first witness, the former Ministerial Director, and head of the political section in the Foreign Ministry, Dr. Kopke. [The witness Kopke took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
GERHARD KOPKE (Witness): Gerhard Kopke.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Dr. Kopke, how long have you known Herr Von Neurath?
KOPKE: I have known Herr Von Neurath for over 40 years His career is well known. Therefore I can limit myself to stating that we worked together as vice consuls in London, as legation counsellors in the Foreign Office and later, after Herr Von Neurath became Minister in 1932, until my resignation in 1935. In the meantime Von Neurath was in Copenhagen, Rome, London, and for some time at his home, and finally in Prague. We met only occasionally when I was in Berlin, and we kept up a comparatively lively correspondence with each other as old friends. I myself was employed in the Foreign Office during the entire period. From 1921 on I was director of the Legal Department, and from \923 I was director of the political, so-called Western Department, which I directed until I left the service. I voluntarily tendered my resignation at the/ end of 1935.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about the attitude, the fundamental attitude of Herr Von Neurath on domestic and foreign policy, but only on broad lines?
KOPKE: In domestic politics, Herr Von Neurath stood close to the conservative circles but he was never a member of the Conservative Party. From this basic conservative attitude and also because of his outstanding character traits of loyalty to duty and reliability, he had the confidence of Reich President Von Hindenburg, and retained it without interruption until the latter's death. Herr Von Hindenburg esteemed Von Neurath as a prudent, moderate, reliable diplomat. Men of other party inclinations also had confidence in Von Neurath. I shall mention only the deceased Reich President, Ebert, who recalled Neurath to office during his term.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about Von Neurath's appointment as Reich Foreign Minister in the summer of 1932?
KOPKE: The appointment of Herr Von Neurath as Reich Foreign Minister was based on a personal wish of President Von Hindenburg. Neurath did not become Foreign Minister within the Von Papen Cabinet, but became Foreign Minister as the special confidant of President Von Hindenburg.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Then how did it happen that Von Neurath remained Foreign Minister in the new Hitler Government also?
KOPKE: Von Neurath did not participate so far as I know in the negotiations with Hitler about the assumption of power. If I can rely only on my memory, he was sick abed with a heart disease during the decisive days, but he remained Foreign Minister, again at the special wish of Von Hindenburg.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Can you tell us anything about the attitude, the relationship of Neurath to Hitler?
KOPKE: I should like to remark by way of introduction that I cannot testify on this subject from my own immediate observation. I was never present at conferences which Herr Von Neurath held with Hitler. I myself never had any official conversation with Hitler whatsoever. But, according to Neurath's own description, and according to the information which I received from other important personalities in the course of time, I had the impression that, especially in the first years, Hitler treated Herr Von Neurath carefully and politely. To what extent this was out of respect for the Reich President, whose regard for Von Neurath was, of course, known to Hitler, I cannot say. In any case, Neurath was never actually in the confidence of Hitler and was not in the small circle close to Hitler, the powerful men of the Party. After the death of President Von Hindenburg, Von Neurath remained because he had promised the Reich President to do so. During the following period also, Neurath repeatedly attempted to exercise his moderating and calming influence on the Party. However, I know that as disappointments and differences of opinion multiplied, Herr Von Neurath tried many times to separate from Hitler. In this connection I can recall two occasions on which he offered his resignation, and one of these appeals he showed me. It was in writing and must have been dated from the beginning of the year 1936. For at that time I had already resigned and visited Herr Von Neurath as a friend in a purely private capacity.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now can you also give us a brief picture of Neurath's attitude toward the National Socialist Party?
KOPKE: At first Herr Von Neurath adopted an attitude of reserve toward the Party and in particular its leading men. To my knowledge he was personally acquainted with hardly any of these men, since, indeed, he had lived most of the time abroad. Neurath was convinced that by reason of his years of experience as an old diplomat and supported by his confidential position with the Reich President, and the latter's moderating influence, he would succeed in working in accordance with his policy, which was directed toward compromise and understanding. Before me, and I believe also before his other colleagues, Neurath frequently referred to experiences of this sort which he had had with Fascism in Rome. He occasionally said that such revolutionary elements-should just be allowed to develop and that these hotheads would come to their senses if they were given time and opportunity to gather experience themselves in responsible positions. By the way, Neurath also shared the opinions of State Secretary Von Bulow in this respect. He retained this State Secretary of Reich Chancellor Bruning, and also protected him until his death against repeated attempts of the Party to get rid of him. Moreover, I should like to mention a small detail which was very valuable to us in the of lice at the time. When State Secretary Von Bulow, who was generally popular, died suddenly, Neurath managed to get Hitler to attend the funeral at the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church. The old officials of the Foreign Of lice saw in that a gratifying and reassuring sign for the strong position of our Minister in relation to the Party. This event, which in itself is perhaps unimportant, happened exactly 10 years ago today.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: As head of the Political Department of the Foreign Office, you were one of Neurath's foremost coworkers, and can surely tell us what was the dominant tendency of Neurath's foreign policy.
KOPKE: Neurath's political attitude on the whole was, in accordance with his whole character and his years of experience in politics, inclined toward compromise, waiting, negotiation. Measures backed up by ultimatums and attempts at solution by violence did not suit Von Neurath's temperament. Neurath was neither a gambler nor a fighter by nature.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to individual important foreign political events which occurred during the period in which you worked under Herr Von Neurath and were head of the political section. In October 1933 Germany left the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Now, I should like to ask you whether this step of Germany's, leaving the Conference and the League of Nations, was based on any aggressive or belligerent tendencies for the moment or for the future?
KOPKE: No. As far as the picture of the events mentioned by defendant's counsel was clear to us, the experts, it was as follows: No one of us in the Foreign Office thought of warlike plans or preparations for war. It was only done to proclaim as impressively as possible that Germany would no longer allow herself to be considered a nation without the same rights and obligations as other peoples. In the same way the militarization of the Rhineland was not based on any aggressive intention, either for the moment or for the future.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In the next few years, in 1935, Germany's military sovereignty was reintroduced, and a year later, the demilitarized Rhineland zone was remilitarized. I should like to read you one sentence from the affidavit of the former minister and interpreter Paul Schmidt of the Foreign Office. He says the following with regard to the events in the spring of 1935: "The conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance between France and Russia on 2 May 1935 followed the proclamation of the establishment of a German Air Force and the introduction of general compulsory military service in March 1935." Will you please give us a brief review of the historical development of these matters which led to the reintroduction of military sovereignty in 1935 and to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936?
KOPKE: I believe...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, we have had the historical development of these matters over and over again. Surely we do not want it from this witness.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Only very briefly, only the dates, in proper order, Mr. President; no explanations about it. I should only like to emphasize strongly once more how the individual events are connected with each other.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have the dates in their minds. We really have had these dates in our minds for some months.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Very well. If the Court believes that it does not need to be informed about it, I must, of course, dispense with it. Then I come to a last...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can put any question you really want to put about it, but you said, "Will you give us the historical developments from the 2d of May 1935?" We have heard that over and over again.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, Mr. President. I was interested only in the following: From this affidavit of Herr Schmidt which I have just quoted, one could directly follow...
THE PRESIDENT: Ask the question, whatever you want to ask about this affidavit.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Then I shall formulate the question as follows: [Turning to the witness.] I have just read this sentence by Herr Schmidt, and I have also told you what can be read from it; namely, that the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Pact of 2 May 1935 was the result of the restoration of military sovereignty. Is that true or what was the case?
KOPKE: That question is difficult to answer if one merely considers these two events in chronological order. The conclusion of the Franco-Russian Pact was on 2 May 1935; the restoration of military sovereignty was already in March 1935. However, the negotiations for this treaty of assistance go back much farther, and I should like to recall the fact that the critical stage, into which these negotiations had entered before the restoration of military sovereignty, is shown very clearly in the report of the French Military Committee's reporter in which the latter speaks quite openly of a close entente between the two nations. That was on 23 November 1934.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to another question and should like to ask you whether you know the opinions and attitude of Von Neurath concerning the Austrian question, at least during your time?
KOPKE: I have known Herr Von Neurath's attitude toward the Austrian question for a much longer time than the period when we worked together during his term as Minister, for as a southern German he was always particularly interested in the problem and I recall many conversations which I had with him even when I was still a vice consul. His attitude and intentions had always been to make the relations between Germany and Austria closer in the economic sphere, chiefly in the interests of Austria, and politically to guarantee a similar policy by treaties, but otherwise not to encroach on Austria's independence; that is what we in the Foreign Office had already learned several years before he became Minister, from our experience with the customs union, which at that time was actually intended only in an economic sense. The fact that this attempt was quite generally considered as a political union gave pause for thought and should have warned everyone who had resolved to touch this hot iron again. Therefore, Neurath during his period of office, whenever he discussed the problem with me and worked on it, thought along just these lines. I should like to add here that the critical time on the Austrian question was probably after I left office. Moreover, even Hitler originally shared Neurath's moderate conception, as was shown in his conversation with Mussolini in Venice in the summer of 1934. Especially interesting, however, are the remarks which Hitler made on the Anschluss problem to Sir John Simon during the negotiations in Berlin in March 1935. At that time Hitler expressed himself to the English statesman about that as follows: If the people in London knew Austria as well as he did, they would believe his assurance that he could not want to increase our economic troubles by adding another field of economic difficulties. Germany did not want to interfere in this country at all.
KOPKE: He was perfectly aware that any interference in Austrian affairs, even if it meant carrying out the wish of the Austrian people themselves for an Anschluss, could not be legalized. That was Hitler's opinion at that time. Neurath also rejected all interference in Austrian internal affairs and strongly condemned the attempts which could be noticed in Party circles to give direct support to the Austrian National Socialists. During my time Neurath did everything he could to keep the Foreign Office out of the internal political struggle in Austria.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Still one more question. Up to the time of your resignation at the beginning of 1936, was there ever any talk in the Foreign Office of attacking Czechoslovakia or not observing existent treaties with Czechoslovakia?
KOPKE: Never, neither the one nor the other. Our economic and political relations with Czechoslovakia were, as long as I was in office, very good. We had no occasion whatsoever to change them, not even the slightest.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And now my last question. Can you tell us anything about Herr Von Neurath's attitude toward the race question?