dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SCHACHT: Yes, I should like to have permission to quote one very brief paragraph. I see there are only two sentences. This report contains the following statement: Referring to the experiences of World War I, that is 1914 to 1918, and I quote-I shall have to do it in English since I have only the English, I quote: "At that time we were able to extend our bases for raw materials and production toward the West: Longwy, Briey, Tourcoing, Roubaix, Antwerp (textiles), and toward the East, Lodz, and Southeast (ore mines in Serbia and Turkey, mineral oils in Romania). Today we have to reckon with the possibility of being thrown back in our own country and even of being deprived thereby of most valuable industrial and raw material in the West and in the East." I think that if anyone wanting to prepare an aggressive war had calculated in September 1934 that one would have to protect oneself against the possibility of such a situation arising, that this is the best proof that there can be no question of an aggressive war at all.
DR. DIX: In that connection, under the heading of "peaceful efforts," can you perhaps also tell the Tribunal what your peaceful efforts were, to have the reparations clauses of the Versailles Treaty modified or even abolished?
SCHACHT: From the very first moment, after the reparations were determined in 1921 or so, I fought against this nonsense with the argument that the carrying out of those reparations would throw the entire world into economic chaos. One cannot, during one generation, pay 120,000,000,000 Reichsmark or about 2,000,000,000 Reichsmark yearly, as at that time...
DR. DIX: We would like to make it brief. Will you please talk only about your peaceful efforts and not about national economy?
SCHACHT: All right, I will not talk about national economy. I fought against it and, as time went by, I did succeed in convincing the people of almost all the countries that this was sheer nonsense. Therefore in July of 1932, if I am not mistaken, the then Reich Chancellor Papen was in a position to affix his signature to an agreement at Lausanne, which reduced reparations, de jure , to a pending sum of 3,000,000,000, and which, de facto , canceled reparations altogether.
DR. DIX: Did you then continue your definitely peaceful efforts in other fields? You have already touched upon the negotiations in Paris regarding the colonial question. I wonder if you have anything to add to that in this connection?
SCHACHT: I do not remember at the moment how far I had gone at the time, but I think I reported on the negotiations in detail, so I need not repeat.
DR. DIX: George Messersmith, the often-mentioned former Consul General of the United States in Berlin, states in his affidavit Document Number EC-451, Exhibit Number USA-626, to which the Prosecution have referred, that he is of the opinion that the National Socialist regime could not have been in a position to stay in power and build up its war machine if it had not been for your activity. At the end of the case for the Prosecution, the Prosecution present that thesis of Messersmith. Therefore I should like you to make a statement on this subject.
SCHACHT: I do not know whether that completely unsubstantiated private opinion of Mr. Messersmith has any value as evidence. Nevertheless, I should like to contradict it by means of a few figures. I had stated earlier that until 31 March 1938, the Reichsbank had given 12,000,000,000; that is to say, during the first fiscal year, about 2,250,000,000, and during the subsequent 3 years, 3,250,000,000 per annum. During those years-the Codefendant Keitel was asked about that when he was examined here-the armament expenditures, as Keitel said, amounted to the following: In the fiscal year 1935-1936-5,000,000,000. In the fiscal year 1936-1937-7,000,000,000. In the following fiscal year-9,000,000,000. And at that stage the assistance from the Reichsbank ceased. In spite of that, during the following year and without any assistance from the Reichsbank, the expenditure for armament increased to 11,000,000,000, and in the following year it climbed to 20,500,000,000. It appears, therefore, that even without the financial genius of Herr Schacht, they managed to raise the funds. Just how they did so is another question.
DR. DIX: I duly put these figures to the Defendant Keitel. I do not think that the Tribunal had the document at the time. It is now available and has the Exhibit Number Schacht-7. It is Page 15 of the German text and Page 21 of the English text. Herr Keitel could, of course, only refer to the first column, that is to say, total expenditure; but there is a second and a third column, in this account, and these two are calculations made by Schacht, calculations regarding what was raised with the help and without the help of the Reichsbank. I do not intend to go through it in detail now. I should merely like to have your permission to ask Dr. Schacht whether the figures calculated by him, in Columns 2 and 3 of the document, were calculated correctly.
SCHACHT: I have these figures in the document before me. The figures are absolutely correct and again I want to declare that they show that, during the first year after the Reichsbank had discontinued its assistance, no less than 5,125,000,000 more were spent without the assistance of the Reichsbank, that is to say, a total of 11,000,000,000.
DR. DIX: Up to now you have stated to the Tribunal that you were active against a dangerous and extensive rearmament and you showed that by tying up the money bag. Did you oppose excessive rearmament in any other way, for instance, by giving lectures and such?
SCHACHT: Many times I spoke not only before economists and professors who were my main auditors, but I often spoke upon invitation of the Minister of War and the head of the Army Academy before high ranking officers. In all these lectures I continually referred to the financial and economic limitations to which German rearmament was subject and I warned against excessive rearmament.
DR. DIX: When did you first gather the impression that the extent of German rearmament was excessive and exaggerated?
SCHACHT: It is very difficult to give you a date. Beginning in 1935, I made continuous attempts to slow down the speed of rearmament. On one occasion Hitler had said-- just a moment, I have it here-that until the spring of 1936 the same speed would have to be maintained. I adhered to that as much as possible, although, beginning with the second half of 1935, I continuously applied the brake. But after 1935 I told myself that, since the Fuehrer himself had said it, after the spring of 1936 the same speed would no longer be necessary. This can be seen from Document 1301-PS in which these statements of mine are quoted, statements which I communicated to the so-called "small Ministerial Council" (kleiner Ministerrat). Goering contradicted me during that meeting, but I of course maintain the things which I said at the time. After that I constantly tried to make the Minister of War do something to slow down the speed of rearmament, if only in the interest of general economy, since I wanted to see the economic system working for the export trade. Proof for the fact of just how much I urged the Minister of War is contained in my letter dated 24 December 1935, which I wrote him when I saw the period desired by Hitler coming to an end, and when I was already applying the brake. It has also been presented by the Prosecution as Document Number EC-293. In the English version of the document it is on Page 25. I beg to be allowed to quote very briefly-all my quotations are very brief-from that document. I wrote a letter to the Reich Minister of War, and I quote: "I gather from your letter dated 29 November"-and then come the reference numbers-"that increased demands by the Armed Forces for copper and lead are to be expected, which will amount to practically double the present consumption. These are only current demands, whereas the equally urgent provisions for the future are not contained in the figures.
SCHACHT: You are expecting me to obtain the necessary foreign currency for these demands, and to that I respectfully reply that under the existing circumstances I see no possibility of doing so." In other words, Blomberg is asking that I should buy raw materials with foreign currency, and I am stating quite clearly that I do not see any possibility of doing so. The document goes on to say-and this is the sentence regarding the limit up to 1 April. I quote: "In all the conferences held with the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor up to now, as well as with the leading military departments, I have expressed my conviction that it would be possible to supply the necessary foreign currencies and raw materials for the existing degree of rearmament until 1 April 1936. Despite the fact that, due to our cultural and agrarian policies which are being repudiated all over the world, this has been made extremely difficult for me and continues to be difficult, I still hope that my original plan may be carried out." That is to say, that I thought this proposed program could be carried out up to 1 April, but not over and beyond that.
DR. DIX: It is a fact that Minister of Transportation, Dorpmueller, was trying to raise credits for railway purposes. What was your attitude as President of the Reichsbank towards this?
SCHACHT: During a conference between the Fuehrer, Dorpmueller, and myself, at which the Fuehrer strongly supported Dorpmueller's demands, I turned that credit down straightway, and he did not get it.
DR. DIX: The meeting of 27 May 1936 of the so-called "small Ministerial Council," presided over by Goering, has been discussed here. The Prosecution contend that intentions of aggressive war became apparent from that meeting. Did you have any knowledge of that meeting?
SCHACHT: What was the date, please?
DR. DIX: 27 May 1936.
SCHACHT: No. I was present during that conference and I see nothing in the entire document pointing to an aggressive war. I have studied the document very carefully.
DR. DIX: It has furthermore been stated against you what is contained in the report of Ambassador Bullitt, Document Number L-151, Exhibit USA-70, dated 23 November 1937. You have heard, of course, that the Prosecution are also drawing the conclusion from that report that there were aggressive intentions on Hitler's part. Will you please make a statement about that?
SCHACHT: I see nothing in the entire report to the effect that Hitler was about to start an aggressive war. I was simply talking about Hitler's intentions to bring about an Anschluss of Austria, if possible, and to give the Sudeten Germans autonomy if possible. Neither of those two actions would be aggressive war, and apart from that, Mr. Bullitt says the following with reference to me in his report about this conversation. I quote: "Schacht then went on to speak of the absolute necessity for doing something to produce peace in Europe...."
DR. DIX: The memorandum of this conversation is also contained in my document book as Exhibit Number Schacht-22. It is on Page 64 of the English text and Page 57 of the German text. We shall now have to deal in greater detail with your alleged knowledge of Hitler's intentions to start war. First of all, speaking generally, did Hitler ever, as far as you know...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I asked Dr. Dix if he would object if the Tribunal would allow me, since he is passing to a new point, to mention the question of the Raeder documents. I had a discussion with Dr. Siemers. There are still some outstanding points, and we should be grateful if the Tribunal would hear us this afternoon, if possible, because the translating division is waiting for the Raeder documents to get on with their translations.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not more than a half hour, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: If the translation department are waiting, perhaps we had better do it at 2 o'clock.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: If it is only going to take a half hour. It isn't likely, I suppose, to take more than that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don't think it will take more than that.
THE PRESIDENT: We will do that at 2 o'clock, and now we will adjourn. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please Your Lordship, the Tribunal should have in front of them a statement of our objections to certain of the documents, arranged in six groups. Attached to that sheet they will find an English summary of the documents, presenting shortly the contents of each one of them. My Lord, with regard to the first group, might I make two erasures from our objection to Number 19, which has been allowed in the case of Schacht, and if I understand Dr. Siemers correctly he doesn't press for Number 76. Now, My Lord, the others in that group: Number 9 is a series of quotations from Lersner's book on Versailles . Number 10, the quotation from a book by the German leftwing publicist, Thomas Mann. Number 17 is the Failure of a Mission , by Nevile Henderson. Number 45 is a quotation from a book of Mr. Churchill's. Number 47 is the report on a complaint to Lord Halifax about an article in News Chronicle criticizing Hitler. My Lord, Number 66 is rather different. If the Tribunal would be good enough to look at it, it is a report by a German lawyer, Dr. Mosler I think his name should be, who is an authority on international law, dealing with the Norway action. Dr. Siemers has been, of course, absolutely frank with me and he said that it would be convenient to him to have this, which is really a legal argument, embodied in his document book. Of course, that is not really the purpose of these document books; but, of course, it is a matter for the Tribunal, and we felt we had to draw attention to it. Then, My Lord, Number 76 comes out. Numbers 93 to 96 are quotations from Soviet newspapers. Number 101 is a quotation from Havas, the French News Agency. Numbers 102 to 107 are minor orders relating to the Low Countries which, the Prosecution submit, have no evidential value. Then in the second group, there are a number of documents which, the Prosecution submit, are not relevant to any of the issues in the case.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you didn't deal with Number 109, did you?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, it is on the second line. That is another legal argument, the effect of the war on the legal position of Iceland, which is a quotation from the British Journal of Information in Public Law and International Law .
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the second group, the Prosecution submit, is irrelevant. Number 22 is a Belgian decree of 1937 dealing with the possible evacuation of the civil population in time of war. Number 39 is a French document of the Middle East. Numbers 63 and 64 are two speeches, one by Mr. Emery and another by Mr. Churchill, dealing with the position in Greece at the end of 1940, some two months after the beginning of the Italian campaign against Greece. Number 71 is an undated directive with regard to the study of routes in Belgium, which doesn't seem to us to have any evidential importance. Number 76 comes out as the Altmark .
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 76 came out?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the Altmark . It is the same one that is in Number 71. I am sorry, My Lord, it should have been marked out. Number 99 is the minutes of the ninth meeting of the combined Cabinet Council on the 27th of April 1940, and it deals with a suggestion of M. Reynaud with regard to the Swedish ore mines. As it was long after the Norway campaign and it was never, of course, acted upon in Norway, it seems to us to have no relevance for this Trial. Numbers 102 to 107 I have dealt with under one. They have certain very small unimportant memoranda relating to the Low Countries. Number 112 is a French document in which Paul Reynaud quotes a statement from Mr. Churchill that he will fight on to the end, which again doesn't seem of much importance in 1946. Now, My Lord, the next group are documents which were rejected by the Tribunal when applied for by the Defendant Ribbentrop. The first two deal with British rearmament and the others with the Balkans and Greece. The Tribunal will probably remember the group which they did reject in the Ribbentrop application; and the fourth group are other documents of the same series as those rejected by the Tribunal in the case of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. The fifth group are really objectionable on the tu quoque basis. I think they are entirely French documents which deal with proposals in a very tentative stage and which were arranged, but never followed out, with regard to the destruction of oil fields or the blocking of the Danube in the Middle East. My Lord, they are documents dated in the spring of 1940 and, as I say, they deal with the most tentative stages and were never put into operation. The plans were never in operation. The sixth group are documents dealing with Norway, which were captured after the occupation of France. As I understand Dr. Siemers' argument, it is not suggested that these documents were within the knowledge of the defendants at the time that they carried out the aggression against Norway; but it is stated that they had other information.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, as to their own information, we have not made any objection at all; and that these documents might be argued to be corroborative of their agents' reports. Actually, as is shown by Document Number 83, to which we make no objection, they also deal with tentative proposals which were not put into effect and were not proceeded with; but in the submission of the Prosecution, the important matter must be what was within the knowledge of the defendants before the 9th of April 1940; and it is irrelevant to go into a large number of other documents which are only arguably consistent with the information which the defendants stated they had. My Lord, I tried to deal with them very shortly because I made a promise to the Tribunal on the time, but I hope that I have indicated very clearly what our objections were.
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Your Honors, it is extremely difficult to define my position with reference to so many documents, especially since I know that these documents have not yet been translated and that the contents, in the main, are therefore not known to those concerned. Therefore, I might point out that there is a certain danger in treating documents in this way. In part they are basic elements of my defense. Therefore, I should like to state now that in dealing with these documents I shall be compelled, in order to give the reasons for the relevancy of this evidence, to point out those passages which I shall not need to read separately into the record, for as soon as the document book is ready they will be known to the Tribunal and can be read there. I shall follow the order as outlined by Sir David. First of all, the first group, Document Numbers 9 and 10. The note submitted by Sir David to the Tribunal points out that the submission of these documents conflicts with the ruling given by the Tribunal on 29 March. In reply I should like to point out that this opinion of the Prosecution is an error. The ruling of the Tribunal said that no documents might be submitted concerning the injustice of the Versailles Treaty and the pressure arising from it. These documents do not concern the injustice and the pressure; rather they serve to give a few examples of the subjective attitude of a man like Noske, who was a Social Democrat and certainly did not want to conduct any wars of aggression. A few other statements in Numbers 9 and 10 show the thought of the Government and the ruling class at that time in regard to defensive measures and the fear that in case of an attack on the part of Poland, for instance, the German Armed Forces might be too weak. These are facts pure and simple; and I give you my, express assurance that I shall not quote any sentences which might introduce a polemic. Moreover, I need this mainly as a basis for my final pleading. Number 17 is a very brief excerpt from the book by Henderson, Failure of a Mission , written in 1940.
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): I believe there are no objections to my quoting about 15 lines, if I wish to use them in my final pleading in order to show that Henderson, who knew Germany well, still believed in 1940 that he had to recognize certain positive good points in the regime at that time; and I believe that the conclusion is justified that one cannot expect that a German military commander should be more sceptical than the British Ambassador at that time. Then we turn to Document Number 45. It is true this document is taken from a book by Churchill; but it deals with a fact which I should like to prove, the fact that already many years before World War I there existed a British Committee for Defense. In the table of contents which Sir David has submitted, the word "Reichsverteidigungsausschuss" is used, and I therefore conclude that this is a mistake on the part of the Prosecution who took it to mean a German Reich Defense Committee; that is not correct. This document shows how it came about that the Prosecution wrongly overestimated the importance of the German Reich Defense Committee, as the Prosecution naturally compared it with the British Committee for Defense, which went very much further in its activities. Number 47 is evidence to show that when the German Embassy pointed out that an extremely scathing article on Hitler had appeared in the paper News Chronicle , Lord Halifax pointed out in reply that it was not possible for him to exert any influence on the newspaper. I should merely like to compare this with the fact that the Prosecution made it appear as though Raeder had had something to do with the regrettable article in the Voelkischer Beobachter : "Churchill sank the Athenia ." Raeder was no more connected with that article than Lord Halifax with the article in the News Chronicle and was unfortunately even more powerless, as far as this article was concerned, than the British Government. Number 66 deals with the opinion given by Dr.