dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. LATERNSER: Neither after Italy's war against Greece, nor after the Abyssinian war, nor after the war of the Soviet Union against Finland, were the soldiers of these countries indicted before a Tribunal. The fact always remains that soldiers simply plan wars, not wars of aggression. That the classification of a war has nothing to do with war in itself cannot be judged on defensive or offensive strategy, as the Prosecution itself admits. Even the Prosecution admits that it is permissible to prepare military plans (including plans for an offensive), to carry them out, and, finally, to participate in a war. The classification of a war as a war of aggression is a purely political opinion. The planning of wars of aggression by soldiers is thus only possible when soldiers enter the political arena. The decisive factor, therefore, is that an officer participating in such planning knew that he was concerned with a political plan for a definite war of aggression, that his war of aggression was an unlawful one, and that by his own participation he himself was committing an unlawful act. Now, how does the history of the last years before the second World War present itself to the military leaders? The decisive point for the conclusions to be drawn as to guilt or innocence is not how after the war and defeat these events are today clearly recognizable in their past development, but how they appeared at the time to the typical German military leader. Whenever the world has passed through the upheavals of great wars, the, longing for eternal peace makes itself felt. This longing is strongest in the case of those who made the greatest sacrifices in the war. In the first World War, they were the German officers' families from which the majority of the indicted military leaders come. Those who witnessed the death of their own young generation are not eager to sacrifice their own sons in a new war. And should precisely these men be inclined to start another war of aggression?
DR. LATERNSER: It was not the waging of wars, but the education of youth to a decent attitude, to a clean mind, to honesty and comradeship, which was considered by the officer to be his real task. The abolition of the Treaty of Versailles was not a specific objective of the German generals, but it was the obvious aim pursued by German policy as such. Reich Chancellor Bruening, who is certainly above suspicion, declared on 15 February 1932, that "the demand for equality of rights and equality of security is shared by the entire German nation. Any German Government will have to put forward this demand." The endeavor to regain control of the lost German territories was not a matter for the generals alone, but was a common objective of all Germans, and certainly not an immoral one. I merely remind the Court of the same endeavors made by France with regard to Alsace-Lorraine after 1870-71. When Hitler definitely renounced Alsace-Lorraine before the German Reichstag, the German generals also considered this declaration as a political necessity, and were in perfect agreement with this manifestation of his will not to start a war. The wish for a modification of the eastern frontiers was generally supported by the German nation. The separation of Danzig from the Reich and the creation of the Corridor were considered intolerable by the whole of Germany--and, by the way, were severely criticized by Allied statesmen after 1918. The union with Austria was, in the first place, an idea emanating from Austria herself. Its justification cannot be denied, if it could be realized voluntarily. The soldier as a realist knew better than anyone else that these objectives could not be achieved through violence and war. But if the conquest of parts of Finland, of Poland, and of Bessarabia by the Russian soldier is not considered a crime, how can the German officer be reproached with pursuing as his aim the improvement of Germany's international position by peaceful methods?
DR. LATERNSER: How can this attitude of the German officer justify the conclusion that he endeavored to reach this goal only by way of wars of aggression? I can, therefore, sum up the situation as follows: The indicted military leaders, as a whole, did not want to put an end to the Treaty of Versailles in order to wage war, but only in order to give Germany equality of rights and security. They did not want to conquer half the world, but to rectify a frontier which was insupportable morally, militarily, and economically; they did not want to wage aggressive wars, or war in general, at any price, but they considered war in the same way as all soldiers of the world, namely, as a final irrevocable issue after all other possibilities have been exhausted. Now, the plan for a later war of aggression, according to the Prosecution, manifested itself already in rearmament and in the occupation of the Rhineland. The Prosecution here again resort to the slogan of German "militarism," which they say existed independently, was older than the Party, and worked, even before the accession of the Party to power, along the lines followed by Hitler's later plans. But what was the actual military situation, say in 1935? Germany had an Army of a maximum strength of 250,000 men including reservists, no modern arms, no guns of more than 105 nun. caliber, no Air Force, and entirely obsolete fortifications. The Navy had only 15,000 men, was not allowed to have ships bigger than 10,000 tons, and had no submarines. The so-called frontier guard, which already infringed upon the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, was so insignificant as regards its organization, armament, and supply of ammunition, that it could be used only for defense purposes for a limited period; and its military value was equal to that of an almost untrained militia. The "Black Reichswehr," which has been so extensively dealt with by foreign propaganda, was dissolved as early as 1923.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, as opposed to the poorly-armed Reich, there were: France, with 600,000 men in peacetime and 1,500,000 men in war; Czechoslovakia, with a war strength of 600,000 men; and Poland, with a war strength of 1,000,000 men. All these states were equipped with the most modem armament, they possessed an Air Force and armored formations. Is there really anyone who could consider these modest and, measured by the requirements of a modern war, positively ridiculous German measures of rearmament, compared to the armaments of neighboring countries, as a preparation of, and the foundation for, ultimate wars of aggression? In the same way, the whole mentality of the military circles of that period was exclusively directed towards defense. The aim pursued in the training of the troops was the formation of subleaders in sufficient number to expand the Army threefold in the case of a conflict. This would, at best, have been just sufficient to ward off one of the possible enemies. In battle training, the main subject was delaying resistance. In the same way the training of officers exclusively provided for defense and the temporary stoppage of an enemy attack -- in the majority of cases, only inside Germany. As for the war-time organization, involving an approximately threefold expansion of the Army in the case of war, to take effect as from 1 April 1930, the available stocks of arms fell far short of actual requirements. Until 1935, there was no planning of deployment. It cannot be objected that even these modest preparations were absolutely superfluous even as defense measures since nobody was threatening Germany. It was only under strong Anglo-American pressure that France had renounced the left bank of the Rhine. Czechoslovakia claimed the Glatz mountain district and the Lausitz region. In Poland the annexation of Upper Silesia was openly demanded. Where is there to be found as much as a trace of German "militarism" as a precursor and advance planner of Hitler's schemes of aggression?
DR. LATERNSER: The officers of that period worked only in a spirit of peace and humanity, in order to render defense possible in the case of an enemy attack. The military leaders had no part in the political events of the years from 1935 to 1937, namely, the actual abolition of the Treaty of Versailles, the withdrawal from the League of Nations, and the declaration of Germany's armaments sovereignty. The military leaders believed in Hitler's declaration that the territorial frontiers laid down by the Treaty of Versailles would be respected, and the Locarno agreement observed, just as the whole German nation and the rest of the world believed in these statements. The points which the Prosecution omits because they do not fit into the picture of conspiracy built up by them, namely, the renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine, the treaty with Poland, and the Naval Agreement with Great Britain, were interpreted by the soldier as the end of the "Nightmare of Coalitions." Only the increasing estrangement from Russia was looked upon with misgivings. The reoccupation of the Rhineland was to the soldier a morally perfectly justified move resulting from Germany's position as an equal and sovereign state. In spite of this, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army gave such an emphatic warning that the number of garrisons posted on the left bank of the Rhine was limited to only three battalions. The indicted military leaders as a whole had no influence on the course of developments. In fact, they themselves were surprised by them. If in all those years Hitler's moves were tolerated by foreign countries and recognized at least de facto , then the reason may be, as Justice Jackson believes, that these foreign countries had "weak governments." But the fact remained that there was international recognition. If even foreign countries failed at that time to recognize all these developments as the "beginning of the execution" of wars of aggression, how could the German military leaders as a whole possibly have been aware of such plans on Hitler's part?
DR. LATERNSER: The military expert will find his last doubts about the intentions of the military leaders removed when he looks into the military plans of that period, which contained nothing but directives for defense. In that respect, the final address made by General Beck to a circle of high-ranking officers at the conclusion of an operational task concerning the subject "War with Czechoslovakia" may be considered as characteristic. In this address he spoke with great seriousness of the results of the preceding studies and stressed the fact that although Germany would be able to defeat the Czech Army within a few weeks, she would subsequently not be in a position to offer any serious resistance to the French forces which would, in the meantime, have crossed the Rhine and invaded Southern and Central Germany; so that the initial success against Czechoslovakia would bring in its wake a formidable catastrophe for Germany. These arguments can certainly not be interpreted as indicative of the German generals' lust for war, nor for their approval of Hitler's possible plans of aggression. In the following period, the German military leaders likewise earnestly repeated that German policy, whatever its aims might be, should never create a situation which would lead to a war on two fronts. In view of the numerous mutual assistance pacts, guarantee obligations, and alliances among all the neighbors of Germany, this attitude excluded, as a matter of principle, any idea of waging a war of aggression. History has justified the opinion held by the generals. Hitler disregarded their warnings, and exclaimed in indignation: "What sort of people are these generals, that I as head of the State should have to drive them to war? If things were as they should be, I would not know where to turn from their clamorings for war!" Only those who do not desire to see the truth can overlook these facts.
DR. LATERNSER: If ever there was unanimity among the military leaders, it certainly did not exist with regard to the planning of wars of aggression, although, based on the very sober realization of the dangers and consequences of any war for Germany and the world, agreement did exist in the rejection of such plans of the head of State. Hitler, the man who thought he knew best, considered these men unsuitable as "participants" in his plans, and dismissed them. Nor did he consider any other officer from the so-called "circle of conspirators" suitable to become the Supreme Commander and the future participant in possible plans, so that he personally assumed Supreme Command, of the Armed Forces, and thus became their immediate military superior. The expressions of his will and his directives to the Armed Forces now took the character of military orders. Although protests were still possible, nothing remained but the duty of the subordinate to obey if he who gave the orders abided by his opinion. This, I imagine, is a principle governing all armies of the world. At this point, I must refer to a document which the Prosecution has particularly stressed as proof of the plans of the "criminal organization." I am referring to the so-called "Hossbach minutes," dealing with the meeting of 5 November 1937. What actually did happen? It was not an "influential group of Nazi conspirators meeting Hitler to consider the situation," but Hitler, in his capacity as head of the State, had convened some military leaders and the Foreign Minister for a meeting. He developed his own ideas. He began by declaring that the problem of Austria and Czechoslovakia must be solved between 1943 and 1945; then he referred to the Poles as possible aggressors. There was no question of settling the Corridor problem, or of conquests to be made in the East, and similar subjects.
DR. LATERNSER: As regards the reliability of these minutes, Affidavit Number 210, deposed by General Hossbach, which I have submitted to the Court, clearly shows that Hossbach did not take down the actual text of the speech while it was being made, but wrote an account of it from memory a few days later. Everybody knows how easily mistakes liable to distort actual events can occur whenever records are made subsequently, because the writer employs his own words or leaves gaps where his memory fails him. The following at any rate is certain: (1) The Reich War Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army not only did not agree to any warlike plan, but pointed out in all seriousness, and with due emphasis, the danger threatening from Britain and France, referring at the same time to Germany's weakness. (2) Whatever may have been the meaning of Hitler's speech, none of the other military leaders were informed of the ideas expressed by Hitler at that meeting. General Von Fritsch did not even inform his successor of them when he obtained his discharge. (3) Even if some individual officer had gained knowledge of the subject of this conference, no conclusions can be drawn from this fact against the bulk of the military leaders. If Hitler envisaged war in six or eight years, that was no reason to worry. During such a long period numerous political solutions would still be possible. Nor was it possible to recognize Hitler's true ideas from this speech any more than from any of his other speeches. (4) The few officers present at the meeting were bound to draw from his speech at least the positive conclusion that Hitler himself was contemplating definitely peaceful development until 1943. Where, therefore, is the proof of participation by the generals in Hitler's plans? Again, the Prosecution is endeavoring to draw conclusions as to the attitude of the generals towards the entire plan from their reactions to the union with Austria and to the Czechoslovakian question.
DR. LATERNSER: The special emphasis which was laid on the participation of some officers in the conference held between Hitler and the Austrian statesmen on the Obersalzberg in February 1938 is particularly well illustrated by the words which Hitler spoke some time later: "I selected my most brutal-looking generals to appear as supernumeraries in order to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation to Schuschnigg." The actual march into Austria and the occupation of that country were political actions, the background of which was unknown to the generals. The officer only saw that when his troops marched into Austria they were everywhere showered with flowers and enthusiastically welcomed by hundreds of thousands of people, and that not a single shot was fired. The deployment plan "Gruen" against Czechoslovakia, to which the Prosecution refers, was not a consequence of the meeting of 5 November 1937, but constituted a purely precautionary measure contemplated in the event of a war with France, and was already in the hands of the General Staff on 1 October 1937; that is to say, before the meeting of 5 November. Although in this case too an agreement was reached which provided for the entry of the German troops, the Chief of the German General Staff, General Beck, in a memorandum drawn up with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, warned against a policy which might lead to armed conflict. In this memorandum he emphasized that any war launched by Germany in Europe must ultimately lead to a world war and to a tragic end for Germany. General Beck was dismissed. When Hitler turned directly to the chiefs of the general staffs of the armies on 10 August 1938, obviously hoping to overcome the resistance of the older commanders-in-chief with the help of the younger generation, the objections raised by these younger officers were such that he became even more suspicious of the generals. Where, then, was the enthusiasm of the generals for Hitler's plans? Where was their participation in them?
DR. LATERNSER: Hitler's constantly changing utterances in the Sudeten question made it all the more impossible for the military leaders to realize that he might seriously be planning a war. On 5 November 1937 he declared that he would settle the Czech problem between 1943 and 1945. On 20 May 1938 he declared in a military directive: "I do not intend to smash Czechoslovakia in the near future by military action without provocation." On 30 May 1938 he issued a directive to the Armed Forces in which he said: "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future." On 16 June 1938 he said in another directive: "The immediate objective is the solution of the Czech problem by my own free decision." On 24 August 1938 he specified that an "incident" in Czechoslovakia must be the prerequisite for a German attack. On 16 September 1938 the military preparations began at the frontier. But political negotiations were opened simultaneously. On 1 October 1938 the territories ceded were peacefully occupied in accordance with the political agreements. The Protectorate was occupied as a consequence of a purely political action; the military leaders merely received the order for a peaceful entry. When in December 1938 a written order to the Army High Command decreed that the Army was to devote itself until 1945 exclusively to the tasks of its organization, structure, and training, and that it was to abstain from any kind of preparations for a war, including preparations for the defense and safeguarding of the frontier, the military leaders gained the firm conviction that a peaceful development had been secured. Which of these events was to permit the conclusion that the military leaders had participated in a general plan directed toward a war of aggression? In each case the military leaders did nothing but execute their purely military orders after political decisions had been made. The political development which led to the war with Poland has been sufficiently dealt with in this Trial.
DR. LATERNSER: It merely remains my duty to explain how this development appeared in the eyes of the military leaders. How were the relations between the generals and Hitler at that time? He was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. In other words, he was their immediate military superior. Their political objections had everywhere been refuted by events; in the case of the occupation of the Rhineland, in connection with the union with Austria, in the Sudeten problem, and on the occasion of the creation of the Protectorate. It is easy, from our present knowledge of things, simply to deny these facts, but in those days the belief in Hitler's political ability was a tangible reality for the majority of the German citizens and soldiers. After all, he had achieved all his successes only by political means, not in a single case by war: To realize that he would risk a war, a war of aggression with Poland, the military leaders would have had to be crystal-gazers. How were they to perceive his aims? The Foreign Office was prevented from informing them of the political situation. Neither as individuals nor as a group were they able to participate in political decisions. The proposals made by the German Foreign Minister to the Polish Ambassador in October 1938, the conferences between Hitler and the Polish Foreign Minister himself, could only be judged by the soldiers as Attempts at a political settlement of the Polish problem, but never as an indication of an intended war of aggression. The first military directive of April 1939 amounted to nothing more than the preparation for an "eventuality." If a military leader considered the situation realistically, the assurances of British and French help for Poland were bound to make the idea of a war of aggression against Poland appear absurd. The conference held on 23 May 1939 was a unilateral speech addressed by the Supreme Commander to the military leaders he had summoned.
DR. LATERNSER: When Hitler declared, in the course of his address, "I would be an idiot to blunder into a world war on account of the lousy Corridor problem like the inefficient statesmen of 1914"; and when, in reply to an observation made by Field Marshal Milch that the production of heavy bombs was quite inadequate in the event of a war and must immediately be increased, Hitler said that there was ample time to take steps in that matter, the military leaders were bound to conclude from this that Hitler had made military preparations only to support the initiated political moves, but that he would on no account run the risk of armed conflict with Poland. Nor was the conference held on 22 August 1939 a consultation with advisers, but an address by the Supreme Commander directed to the military leaders whom he had called together. When Hitler said in his speech, "We have no choice; we must act," he did not indicate how he intended to "act." At any rate, the military leaders were by no means under the impression that a war against Poland had been decided upon. On the contrary, the obvious relief with which Hitler announced that a trade agreement had just been reached with the Soviet Union impressed all those present at the meeting with the firm belief that he would find a diplomatic solution in the Polish question, too. Until then, Hitler had always masterly seized the right Opportunity. No one ever used bluff with greater virtuosity than he did. Bluff and military pressure, however, are recognized instruments of politics. It is quite wrong to conclude that a man who practices or supports one or the other of those methods thereby also approves of a war of aggression. If Hitler had really conceived the plan for an aggression against Poland at some earlier date, the military leaders were not even able to recognize this plan as such. In the last analysis, they themselves were "bluffed." But what were they to do once the die was cast? Were they to declare, "We cannot do this," or were they to refuse to obey? They had to do their duty.