dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
M. DEBENEST: Very well. In that case I am going to read a document to you, and you will tell me what you think of it, whether Seyss-Inquart had no authority; and you can also make any explanations you choose. That is Document 3430-PS, which has already been submitted as Exhibit USA-708. This is an excerpt from Seyss-Inquart's speeches made in Holland, and is to be found on Pages 124 and 125 of the German text. I submit it to the Tribunal. It will most probably also be found in the trial brief of Seyss-Inquart. I am afraid I do not have the exact page but I think it is Page 57 or 58. [Turning to the witness.] Seyss-Inquart in that speech of 29 January 1943 said: "I will give the orders, and they must be strictly carried out by everybody. In the present situation, the refusal to carry out such an order cannot be called anything except sabotage. It is equally certain that we must, more than ever, eliminate and do away with all resistance directed against the struggle for life." And further on, he says: "At a time when our husbands, our sons, our fathers are fighting and meeting death in the East with bravery and fortitude and without weakening and are making the greatest sacrifices, it is unthinkable that we should tolerate conspiracies which seek to render insecure the rear of the front in the East. The person who dares to do that must perish." If Seyss-Inquart had had no authority over the Police, would he have been able to make such a speech and say that he would issue the orders?
WIMMER: I did not say that Seyss-Inquart had no authority with regard to the Police, I only said that the orders were given by the Higher SS and Police Leader. The relationship with the Police was as follows: The Reich Commissioner could, of course, turn to the Police in any case in which he needed them; but this only amounted to a wish and not a binding order. In such cases, if they were important, the Police first consulted the Reichsfuehrer SS or his office; and only if this office approved could a wish of the Reich Commissioner be carried out by the Police.
M. DEBENEST: The question is simpler than that. Could he- "yes" or "no"-issue orders in cases such as are mentioned in his speech? He himself mentioned this, you know.
WIMMER: He could make a request but not give orders.
M. DEBENEST: I merely note that you do not agree with Seyss-Inquart's speech. I will now speak to you of another document; and you will tell us how you explain that Seyss-Inquart could only make requests, as you term it, and not give orders. This is Document F-860, which I submitted yesterday. This document is a letter from Seyss-Inquart to Dr. Lammers. In this letter he writes that he had wanted to reorganize the Dutch police in order to adapt it to the German police organization; and in the same document he states the opinion that the police must be the strongest expression of the internal administration of a country, which should not be transferred to another agency. That is what Seyss-Inquart says in that document. How can you then co-ordinate your answer with what Seyss-Inquart writes?
WIMMER: This reorganization was not suggested by the Reich Commissioner but originated from the Police itself. The Reich Commissioner by this reorganization-and I myself, too-tried to have the Dutch police at least not completely separated from the administration, which in the main was already the case in Germany, and was what the German Police in the Netherlands- also wanted.
M. DEBENEST: You contradict what Seyss-Inquart himself wrote in this document. How do you explain what Seyss-Inquart wrote further on in the same document: "I would not like to appoint expressly as administrator of court procedure the Higher SS and Police Leader here, for this appointment suggests to the Dutch a limitation of the authority of the Reich Commissioner. This is of particular importance because the Reich Commissioner was appointed as the guardian of the interests of the Reich by order of the Fuehrer. But I have myself given to the Higher SS and Police Leader all the powers which an administrator of courts needs."
WIMMER: Would you please read the first two sentences again?
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the document is before us; don't you think?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: It is scarcely worth while to argue with the witness about it.
M. DEBENEST: I will not insist upon it, Mr. President. Witness, how do you explain the fact that Schongarth-you saw the document yesterday, did you not, which counsel for the defense submitted to you, the interrogatory of Schongarth-how do you explain the fact that Schongarth, on the very morning after the attempt on Rauter's life, went to Seyss-Inquart and that Seyss-Inquart gave him the order, as he himself states in the document, to take increased measures of reprisal and to execute 200 prisoners, and this with the aim of intimidating the population?
WIMMER: Yesterday, I believe, I exhausted this subject. I said everything I knew about it.
M. DEBENEST: Will you give me the explanation I am asking you to make?
WIMMER: I said yesterday that Brigadefuehrer Schongarth came to me and-to be brief about it-represented the matter to me to the effect that the Reichsfuehrer SS had demanded 500 shootings and that Schongarth, on the advice and the request of the Reich Commissioner, had succeeded in reducing the number to 200. That is what I said yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: You maintain that he had received orders previous to the ones he received from the Reich Commissioner then?
WIMMER: Not from the Reich Commissioner but from the Reichsfuehrer SS.
M. DEBENEST: Yes, from the Reichsfuehrer?
WIMMER: I can only say that Brigadefuehrer Schongarth reported the matter to me in that way. I was not there when he telephoned the Reichsfuehrer SS.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. Didn't you yourself take part in a meeting during which hostages were chosen?
WIMMER: A meeting?
M. DEBENEST: A meeting-a conference, if you prefer.
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: On what occasion?
WIMMER: I recall that in the Rotterdam case the Reich Commissioner had a conference with the Commissioners General, and the matter was reported.
M. DEBENEST: Were you present at the meeting with General Christiansen?
WIMMER: I cannot say with certainty; I believe I was.
M. DEBENEST: Do you know what Seyss-Inquart said during that meeting, what his attitude was?
WIMMER: His attitude was that the intention of the Armed Forces to carry out 50-or as I heard yesterday, 25 shootings-was going too far and could not be done. In this connection, I already testified yesterday that the Reich Commissioner was able, after repeated remonstrations, to persuade the Armed Forces to agree finally to have only five hostages shot.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Debenest, this has all been gone over with Seyss-Inquart, has it not?
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And with this witness?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President. I just wished to see whether the witness agreed with the document which I submitted to the Tribunal I have finished, Mr. President
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to re-examine, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no questions to put to the witness, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: With the approval of the Court, I shall call the witness Dr. Hirschield to the stand. [The witness Hirschfeld took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HEINZ MAX HIRSCHFELD (Witness): Heinz Max Hirschfeld.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, when the Netherlands was occupied on 12 May 1940, were you Secretary General of the Economic and Agricultural Ministries?
HIRSCHFELD: Before I answer your question, I should like to state that I would have preferred to speak Dutch, but in order not to delay the proceedings, I will speak the foreign language which I speak best; I will speak in German.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
HIRSCHFELD: As for your question, I can say "yes."
DR. STEINBAUER: In this same capacity, did you direct the affairs of both Ministries until the end of the occupation?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that the Reich Commissioner, in the first conference, told all the secretaries general that he expected loyal fulfillment of their duties, but that no one would have to fear any disadvantage if he should resign?
HIRSCHFELD: In answer to that, I should like to say that the Netherlands secretaries general, who were ordered by the Netherlands Government to remain in the Netherlands, told the Reich Commissioner at that time that, in the interests of the Netherlands people, they would remain in of lice after they had received approval to do so from the Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Army who, at that time, was the authorized representative of the Netherlands Government. In answer to the question of the Reich Commissioner we said, yes, under those conditions. As for his remark about not fearing disadvantages if we should resign, we answered that that had nothing to do with our decision.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the secretaries general who resigned receive their pension? For example, Mr. Trip, who was president of the Netherlands Bank.
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Secretary General of the Interior, Frederiks, remain in office until September 1944?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we will speak of your own department, Agriculture and Economy. Did the Reich Commissioner interfere in the administration of your Ministry? In particular, did he release or transfer officials from the food service?
HIRSCHFELD: The Reich Commissioner personally did not interfere. His officials attempted to do so several times, but we refused to allow it.
DR. STEINBAUER: A so-called State Political Secretariat of the NSB existed. Did it have any influence on the administration?
HIRSCHFELD: According to the order of the Reich Commissioner, this State Political Secretariat had no influence on the Netherlands administration. However, I should like to add that through the appointments of NSB secretaries general later such influence actually took place in various departments, though not in mine.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner have the head of the food service, Louwes-who was known as being hostile to the Germans-retained in the interest of the food supply for the population?
HIRSCHFELD: I believe the Netherlands officials left behind by the Government had in general the same attitude as M. Louwes. However, M. Louwes was left in his office.
DR. STEINBAUER: Although it was demanded that he should be removed?
HIRSCHFELD: This was reported to me by M. Van der Vense at that time.
DR. STEINBAUER: When the trade economy was reorganized, was this done by order of the Reich Commissioner or by the secretary general?
HIRSCHFELD: The reorganization of the trade economy was carried out on the basis of an order signed by me; although there was originally a draft, which was to be signed by the Reich Commissioner. I refused this because I was of the opinion that this was a Dutch affair, and if the order was signed by me the danger of German influence could be prevented.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Reich Commissioner organized agriculture in the so-called "Landstand." Did this Landstand receive any executive powers?
HIRSCHFELD: The Landstand did not receive any executive powers. I should like to add that in a personal talk I advised the Reich Commissioner not to form the Landstand.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was the so-called Conscription Order of 1941 enforced to a great extent, particularly in the Netherlands?
HIRSCHFELD: As far as I know, the Conscription Order was only enforced to a limited extent in the Netherlands; but it was applied all the more to the deportation of Dutch workers to Germany.
DR. STEINBAUER: There was also a drive to remove members of the population who were capable of military service, especially from Rotterdam and The Hague-who carried out this drive?
HIRSCHFELD: Which drive do you mean?
DR. STEINBAUER: To remove members of the population capable of military service.
HIRSCHFELD: In 1944?
DR. STEINBAUER: 1944.
HIRSCHFELD: This drive was carried out by the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner weaken this action by making exemptions, particularly in your department?
HIRSCHFELD: As for issuing exemptions, I heard very little of this at the time.
DR. STEINBAUER: The shipyards and dock installations in Rotterdam and Amsterdam were to be blown up. Do you know the attitude of the Reich Commissioner on this subject?
HIRSCHFELD: I only know, from statements of the deputy of the Reich Commissioner, Volkers, in Rotterdam, that he resisted these measures in the face of the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I must remark that Volkers' affidavit has not yet arrived and at the moment cannot be traced at all; that is why I am putting this question to the witness. [Turning to the witness.] Do you confirm the fact that through the intervention of the Reich Commissioner the area which was to be flooded was reduced by about 100,000 hectares?
HIRSCHFELD: I know that through the intervention of the Reich Commissioner, or his office, the area to be flooded in 1933 was reduced; I do not know exactly to what extent.
DR. STEINBAUER: You mean 1943. You made a mistake; you said 1933; it must be 1943.
HIRSCHFELD: 1943.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it possible that this figure of 100,000 hectares is correct?
HIRSCHFELD: I recall that it might be about half of what the Armed Forces had intended to flood at that time.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that the Reich Commissioner, in view of the blockade, changed agriculture over to the production of food at an opportune moment?
HIRSCHFELD: When in 1940 the Netherlands was invaded and occupied by the Germans, the authorities who dealt with agriculture were of the opinion that a reorganization of agriculture was necessary. The Reich Commissioner and his office did not oppose us in this work.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true, in particular, that the stock of high quality cattle in the Netherlands was retained by these measures?
HIRSCHFELD: The livestock in the Netherlands was, to my knowledge, reduced by about 30 percent in the period of occupation. These measures of reorganization of agriculture made it possible to retain this 70 percent of the livestock throughout the war. Pigs, however, had been reduced to a much greater extent and it was necessary to slaughter almost all the poultry.
DR. STEINBAUER: The question of the embargo in 1944 was discussed in detail here. I have one question to put to you: When did you speak to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart for the first time about lifting the embargo?
HIRSCHFELD: In answering this question, I must go back a little. When the railroad strike was proclaimed, M. Louwes and I on 17 September-I beg your pardon, on 22 September 1944-were visited by Van der Vense who on behalf of the Reich Commissioner told us that he expected that M. Louwes and I would issue an appeal to the railroad men in order to put an end to the railroad strike in the interests of the food supply for the country. If we did not do so, countermeasures would immediately be taken to threaten the Netherlands population in the west of the country with famine. We refused to issue such a statement, and we told Van der Vense that he should report to the Reich Commissioner that reprisals against the population in connection with the railroad strike would place responsibility for the famine on the Reich Commissioner. That was the decisive discussion. Nevertheless, the embargo came into being. Thereupon protests were issued on this subject to the various agencies of the Reich Commissioner, and on 16 October 1944 the first discussion took place in which it was announced that the intention was to lift this embargo.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that unfortunately in this particular year the frost came earlier than in other years?
HIRSCHFELD: Perhaps it came a little earlier than in other years; but in Holland the question of frost is always uncertain. From the Dutch side it was pointed out-I did this myself in a press report-that we always have to expect an early frost.
DR. STEINBAUER: When the invasion threatened and a large part of the population was drawn upon to build fortifications, did the Reich Commissioner agree to your suggestion that a large number of the agricultural workers should be allowed to go home early?
HIRSCHFELD: I know of two cases. In the first place, it was a question of workers from the big cities who were sent to the northeastern provinces in order to dig potatoes; and the promise was made that these workers would not be used for fortification work. This promise was kept. Secondly, at the same time a large number of agricultural workers in the province of Drente, who were already being used for fortification work, were released for digging potatoes.
DR. STEINBAUER: I was unfortunately not able to ask the witness Fischbock about questions relating to finance. Do you know that M. Trip, who resigned on the question of the foreign currency blockade, was left in the Bank for International Payments by the Reich Commissioner in agreement with Funk, the Minister for Economy?
HIRSCHFELD: I recall in this connection that M. Trip intended to resign as a member of the administrative council of the International Bank. When this became known, the Germans were apparently somewhat scared; and M. Trip was asked not to hand in his resignation. I know that he did not hand it in. What this implied and what reasons were behind it, I do not know from my own experience.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have two last questions, which are extremely important. We know of an order of the Reich authorities under the title "scorched earth." It was actually issued in March 1945 for the Netherlands. Locks, pump stations, dikes, et cetera , were to be destroyed. Do you know what was the opinion of the Reich Commissioner with respect to this important matter? Did you speak with him about this question?
HIRSCHFELD: This question was discussed for the first time in a conversation which I had with the defendant on 14 December 1944. In this conversation he told me that in view of military developments he feared that the Armed Forces might receive an order to destroy the western part of the country. At that time he discussed with me to what extent it would be possible to keep the western part of the Netherlands out of hostilities. On 7 January 1945 this conversation was continued. As a result of this conversation I attempted to establish contact with London on this question. I did not succeed in obtaining an answer. These reports had to be made by secret radio stations. I never learned whether it was even possible to get one through. Then the Reich Commissioner visited me on 2 April and told me that the "scorched earth" order had arrived and that he had called on Speer for that reason. Speer had told him that the Reich Commissioner did not need to carry out this order in the civilian sphere. But Speer could not speak for the Armed Forces. Therefore, the Reich Commissioner had also talked with General Blaskowitz. Blaskowitz had told him that orders were orders, but if a way could be found to avoid this order he would be ready to do so. Then the Reich Commissioner asked me what possibilities I could see. This discussion was the result of a communication which I reported to London by telegram in April 1945. It was confirmed to me that this report had reached London. Further conversations followed then.
DR. STEINBAUER: The last question: Did the Reich Commissioner, in contrast to the central authorities, establish any contact with the agents of the resistance movement in order to stop the war prematurely?
HIRSCHFELD: A few days after the conversation on 2 April 1945 I had a talk with the deputy of the Reich Commissioner, Schwebel. He asked me to what extent the Reich Commissioner could have been in contact with the agents and whether the few men designated by Herr Schwebel were the proper men. I then confirmed this.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defendants' counsel want to ask-questions?
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Funk): I should like to ask the witness a few questions. Dr. Hirschfeld, you just said that the former president of the Dutch State Bank, Dr. Trip, was in the administrative council of the Bank for International Payments at Basel and remained there after he had resigned his office as bank president in Holland. You just confirmed that. I should like to ask you, do you know that the Reich Minister of Economy, Funk, urged the bank in Basel to allow Dr. Trip to remain in the International Bank in Basel although Dr. Trip was no longer authorized to represent Dutch interests?
THE PRESIDENT: How are we concerned with this, Dr. Sauter?
DR. SAUTER: In questioning the Defendant Seyss-Inquart the French Prosecution brought out the fact that the former president of the Dutch State Bank, Dr. Trip, was forced to resign or did resign; and the Defendant Seyss-Inquart was charged with this. As defense counsel for the Defendant Funk I should like to prove that the Defendant Funk took the part of Dr. Trip as president of the Netherlands State Bank and saw to it that Dr. Trip was retained in the International Bank at Basel.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks it so remote and so trivial that really it is quite a waste of time for the Tribunal to listen to this sort of thing.
DR. SAUTER: Very well, Mr. President, then I will ask another question. Witness, do you know that at the time when Dr. Funk was president of the Reichsbank, the Reichsbank shares in the possession of Dutch capitalists were taken over and that Dutch circles generally acknowledged that this was done in a fair and satisfactory way by Dr. Funk?
HIRSCHFELD: I know nothing at all about taking over shares in the Reichsbank.
DR. SAUTER: Do you know anything, Dr. Hirschfeld, about the opinion Dr. Funk expressed to you on the question of the treatment of the clearing debts?
HIRSCHFELD: After the outbreak of the war between Holland and Germany I never spoke to Funk. Therefore he did not express any opinion at all to me during the war.
DR. SAUTER: Did you not learn from any other source what Funk's point of view was on the action to be taken in regard to the clearing debts?
HIRSCHFELD: I know from various reports and from publications during that time that the Germans represented these clearing debts as actual debts. We Dutch, however, never believed this; and if an expert on national economics had observed the development from the time when central clearing was organized during the war, he could have realized without difficulty that these debts could not represent any de facto value. In the course of the war they rose to more than 42,000 million marks. When the president of the Dutch Bank, who was appointed by Seyss-Inquart, compared the Reichsmark to the pound sterling in his annual reports, we in Holland laughed at it.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Hirschfeld, you just spoke of a president of the Dutch State Bank who was appointed by Seyss-Inquart. I believe that was M. Rost van Tonningen?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Do you know that the Defendant Funk, who was the president of the German Reichsbank at that time, endeavored to prevent the appointment of Rost van Tonningen and wanted Dr. Trip to remain in office as president of the Dutch State Bank?
THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question again, isn't it? That is practically the same question as we have already said we did not want to hear about-about Funk's support of Dr. Trip?