dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MOEHLE: No, Sir. One cannot make such an order.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did you ever hear of any case where a U-boat commander, on the basis of your briefings, destroyed rescue equipment or killed shipwrecked persons?
MOEHLE: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Was it permitted to attack neutral vessels outside the fixed blockade zones?
MOEHLE: Only in cases where they were not marked as neutrals according to regulations.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Was the Commander of the U-boat fleet particularly severe in enforcing this order for the protection of neutral ships?
MOEHLE: As I know of no such cases, I cannot say anything on that subject.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you know that the commanders were threatened with court-martial if they did not obey the orders given for the protection of neutrals?
MOEHLE: Yes; I remember one case which happened in the Caribbean Sea.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you remember an order of 1944 directing that neutral ships be stopped and searched?
MOEHLE: Yes, it was ordered, but I do not remember the date, that particular Spanish and Portuguese ships in the North Atlantic should be stopped and searched.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did you pass on that order to the commanders?
MOEHLE: As far as I recollect, this order was given in writing and was contained in one of the official sets of orders. I passed on orders to commanders only when they were not contained in a set of orders.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: In passing that order on, did you make an addition as to whether that order should be executed or not?
MOEHLE: Yes, I remember that I said - when that order came by radio and the commanders did not know of it yet - that they should be exceedingly careful, when stopping neutrals, as there was always the danger that also a neutral ship might disclose the position of the U-boat by radio. Owing to the air superiority of the enemy in the North Atlantic, it would always be safer or better not to be compelled to stop these ships.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Had you orders from the Commander of the U-boat fleet to make this additional remark?
MOEHLE: As far as I remember, one of the departmental chiefs in the U-boat command - I assume it was Commander Hessler - told me or took particular care to point out that any stopping of ships, even neutrals, involved considerable danger to the U-boat.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Because of the air patrol?
MOEHLE: Because of the air patrol.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Your attention has been called to the order concerning the so-called rescue ships.
MOEHLE: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you remember that?
MOEHLE: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Were these "rescue ships" recognized under international law as hospital ships, with appropriate markings?
MOEHLE: As far as I know, they were not.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: What orders existed that hospital ships should be protected?
MOEHLE: Where these orders were laid down - whether in writing I do not remember - I only know that the Commander of the U-boats fleet frequently reminded the commanders of the absolute inviolability of hospital ships.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you know of any case in which a hospital ship was attacked by a U-boat?
MOEHLE: No; I don't know of such a case.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: If the Commander of the U-boat fleet had been interested in destroying helpless human beings in violation of international law, the destruction of hospital ships would have been an excellent means, don't you think?
MOEHLE: Without any doubt. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to cross-examine this witness? [No response.]
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you ever save any of the survivors of the vessels that you torpedoed?
MOEHLE: I have not been in a position to do that due to the military situation.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean to say it was dangerous to your boat to do it?
MOEHLE: Not only that. A great number of the ships which I sunk were in a convoy or else there was a rough sea, so that it was impossible to undertake any rescue measures owing to navigation conditions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, do you want to reexamine?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have about three questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. PHILLIMORE: [Turning to the witness.] When you were a U-boat commander yourself, what was the order with regard to rescue?
MOEHLE: At the beginning of the war we had been told that the safety of one's own boat was the decisive thing, and that the boat should not be endangered by rescue measures. Whether these orders already existed in writing at the outbreak of the war I do not remember.
COL. PHILLIMORE: When you got this order of the 17th of September 1942, did you take it merely as prohibiting rescue or as going further?
MOEHLE: When I received that order I noticed that it was not entirely clear, as orders of the B. d. U. normally were. One could see an ambiguity in it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You have not answered my question. Did you take the order to mean that a U-boat commander should merely abstain from rescue measures, or as something further?
MOEHLE: I took the order to mean that something further was implied, only it was not actually ordered but was considered desirable.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The instance you were given about the Bay of Biscay, had you any knowledge of the facts of that incident?
MOEHLE: No, the circumstances of that case are not known to me.
COL. PHILLIMORE: What were the actual words you used when you passed that order on to commanders?
MOEHLE: I told the commanders in so many words: We are now approaching a very delicate and difficult chapter; it is the question of the treatment of lifeboats. The Commander of the U-boat fleet issued the following radio message in September 1942 - I then read the radio message of September 1942 in full. For most of those present the chapter was closed; no commander had any questions to ask. Explanations were not given unless questions were asked. In some few instances the commanders asked, "How should this order be interpreted?" Then as a means of interpretation I gave the two examples which had been related to me at the U-boat command and added, "Officially such a thing cannot be ordered; everybody has to reconcile that with his own conscience."
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember any comment being made by commanding officers after you had read the order?
MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. Several commanders, following the reading of this radio message said, without making any further comment, 'That is very clear, but damned hard.'
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes. [A recess was taken.]
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I would now put before the Tribunal two cases where that order of the 17th of September 1942 was apparently put into effect. The first case is set out at the next document in the document book, which is D-645. My Lord, I put that document in and it becomes Exhibit GB-203. It is a report of the sinking of a steam trawler, a fishing trawler, the Noreen Mary, which was sunk by U-247 on the 5th of July 1944. The first page of the document contains an extract from the log of the U-boat. The time reference 1943 on the document is followed by an account of the firing of two torpedoes which missed, and then, at 2055 hours, the log reads: "Surfaced. Fishing Vessels...." bearings given of three ships "Engaged the nearest. She stops after 3 minutes." Then there is an account of a shot fired as the trawler lay stopped, and then, the final entry: "Sunk by flak, with shots into her side. Sank by the stern." The Tribunal will notice there is no mention in the log of any action against the torpedoed or the shipwrecked seamen.
THE PRESIDENT: Why is it entered as 5. 7. 1943?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is a typing error. I should have pointed it out. My Lord, the next page of the document is a comment on the action by the U-boat command, and the last line reads: "Recognized success: Fishing vessel Noreen Mary sunk by flak." And then there is an affidavit by James MacAlister, who was a deckhand on board the Noreen Mary at the time of the sinking. My Lord, reading the last paragraph on the first page of the affidavit. He has dealt earlier with having seen the torpedo tracks which missed the trawler. The last paragraph reads: "At 2110 hours, while we were still trawling, the submarine surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50 yards to the northeast of us, and without any warning immediately opened fire on the ship with a machine gun. We were 18 miles west from Cape Wrath, on a northwesterly course, making 3 knots. The weather was fine and clear, sunny, with good visibility. The sea was smooth, with light airs." My Lord, then there is an account of the firing in the next paragraph, and then, if I might read from the second paragraph on Page 2.
THE PRESIDENT: Why not read the first?
COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases: "When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of the conning tower. The skipper thought at first the submarine was British, but when she opened fire he immediately slackened the brake to take the weight off gear" that is, the trawl "and increased to full speed, which was about 10 knots. The submarine chased us, firing her machine gun, and with the first rounds killed two or three men, including the skipper, who were on deck and had not had time to take cover. The submarine then started using a heavier gun from her conning. tower, the first shot from which burst the boiler' enveloping everything in steam and stopping the ship. "By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this all but four were killed. The submarine then commenced to circle round ahead of the vessel, and passed down her port side with both guns firing continuously. We were listing slowly to port all the time but did not catch fire. "The mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat, which was aft, but the mate was killed whilst doing so, so I abandoned the attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which was below the waterline, for shelter: The ship was listing more and more port, until finally at 2210 she rolled right over and sank, and the only four men left alive on board were thrown into the sea. I do not know where the other three men had taken cover during this time, as I did not hear or see them until they were in the water. "I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge, but deliberately steamed in my direction and when only 60 to 70 yards away fired directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As their intention was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The submarine had been firing her guns for a full hour." My Lord, then the affidavit goes on to describe the deponent and others attempting to rescue themselves and to help each other, and then they were picked up by another trawler. The last paragraph on that page: "Whilst on board the Lady Madeleine the second engineer and I had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the second engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 21/2 inches long embedded in his body." And there is a sentence on which I don't rely, and the last sentence: "I had 14 shrapnel wounds." My Lord, and then the last two paragraphs of the affidavit: "This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the whalers Sylvester (mined) and New Seville (torpedoed), and the trawler Ocean Tide, which ran ashore. "As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were six killed... two missing... two injured...." My Lord, the next document, D-647, I put in as Exhibit GB-204. My Lord, this is an extract from a statement given by the second officer of the ship Antonico, torpedoed, set afire, and sunk, on the 28th of September 1942, on the coast of French Guiana. The Tribunal will observe that the date of the incident is some 11 days after the issue of the order. My Lord, I would read from the words "that the witness saw the dead," slightly more than halfway down on the first page. An account has been given of the attack on the ship, which by then was on fire: ". . .
COL. PHILLIMORE: that the witness saw the dead on the deck of the Antonico as he and his crew tried to swing out their lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20 minutes; and that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to get away from the side of the Antonico in order to avoid being dragged down by the same Antonico and also because she was the aggressor's target; that the night was dark, and it was thus difficult to see the submarine, but that the fire aboard the Antonico lit up the locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that the enemy ruthlessly machine- gunned the defenseless sailors in Number 2 lifeboat, in which the witness found himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the witness gave orders to his company to throw themselves overboard to save themselves from the bullets: in so doing, they were protected and out of sight behind the lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even so the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At that time the witness and his companions were about 20 meters in distance from the submarine...." My Lord, I haven't got the U-boat's log in that case, but you may think that, in view of the order with regard to entries in logs, namely that anything compromising should not be put in, it would be no more helpful than in the case of the previous incident. My Lord, the next Document, D- 646(a), I put in as Exhibit GB-205. It is a monitored account of a talk by a German naval war reporter on the long wave propaganda service from Friesland. The broadcast was in English, and the date is the 11th of March 1943. It is, if I may quote: "Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these waters - dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the colored people who were at their beck and call. Recently a U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a decoy ship, the submarine steamed close, within 20 yards, when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder of the Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank. There remained only wreckage, lifeboats packed with men, and sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed for Britain and America." My Lord, the next page of the document I don't propose to read. It is an extract from the log of the U-boat believed to have sunk this ship. It was, in fact, the C. S. Flight. My Lord, I read that because, in my submission, it shows that it was the policy of the enemy at the start to seek to terrorize crews, and it is a part with the order with regard to rescue ships and with the order on the destruction of seamen. If I might say so, in view of the cross-examination, the Prosecution do not complain of rescue ships being attacked. They are not entitled to protection. The point of the order was that they were to be given priority in attack, and the order, therefore, is closely allied with the order of the 17th of September 1942. In view of the Allied building program, it had become imperative to prevent the ships being manned. My Lord, I pass to the period after the defendant had succeeded the Defendant Raeder. My Lord, the next document is 2098-PS. It has been referred to but not, I think, put in. I put it in formally as Exhibit GB-206. My Lord, I won't read it. It merely sets out that the Defendant Raeder should have the equivalent rank of a minister of the Reich, and I ask the Tribunal to infer that on succeeding Raeder the Defendant Doenitz would presumably have succeeded to that right.
THE PRESIDENT: This is from 1938 onward?
COL. PHILLIMORE: From 1938 onward. The next document, D-648, I put in as Exhibit GB-207. It is an affidavit by an official, or rather it is an official report certified by an official of the British Admiralty. The certificate is on the last page, and it sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings and those present, on the occasion of meetings between the Defendant Doenitz or his representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder until the end. The certificate states: "... I have compiled from them" that is, from captured documents "the attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz attended conferences at Hitler's headquarters. The list of other senior officials who attended the same conferences is added when this information was contained in the captured documents concerned. I certify that the list is a true extract from the collective documents which I have examined, and which are in the possession of the British Admiralty, London." My Lord, I won't go through the list. I would merely call the Tribunal's attention to the fact that either Admiral Doenitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss, was present at each of these meetings; and that amongst those who were also constantly there were the Defendants Speer, Keitel, Jodl, Ribbentrop, and Goering, and also Himmler or his lieutenants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. My Lord, the inference which I ask the Tribunal to draw from the document is that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, this defendant was one of the rulers of the Reich and was undoubtedly aware of all decisions, major decisions of policy. My Lord, I pass to the next document, C-178. That has already been put in as Exhibit Number USA-544. It is an internal memorandum of the naval war staff, written by the division dealing with international law to another division, and the subject is the order with regard to the shooting of Commandos, of the 18th of October 1942, with which the Tribunal are, I think, familiar.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The point of the document is that some doubt appeared to have arisen in some quarters with regard to the understanding of the order, and in the last sentence of the memorandum it is suggested: "As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, that all departments concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of members of Commando units." My Lord, whether that conference took place or not I do not know. The document is dated some 11 days after this defendant had taken over from the Defendant Raeder. But the next document in the book, D-649, which I put in as Exhibit GB-208, is an instance of the Navy in July of that year July 1943 handing over to the SD for shooting Norwegian and British naval personnel whom the Navy decided came under the terms of the order. My Lord, it is an affidavit by a British barrister-at-law who served as judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the order. Paragraph 1 sets out that the deponent was judge advocate at the trial of 10 members of the SD by a military court held at the law courts, Oslo, Norway, which sat on Thursday, 29 November 1945, and concluded its sitting on Tuesday, 4 December 1945. My Lord, the next paragraph sets out who convened the court and the names of the prosecuting and defending counsel, and the third paragraph states: "The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July 1943, in violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the killing of..." Then there follow the names of six personnel of the Norwegian Navy, including one officer, and one leading telegraphist of the Royal Navy, prisoners of war.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I might read from Paragraph 4: "There was evidence before the court which was not challenged by the Defense that Motor Torpedo Boat Number 345 set out from Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area. The persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the torpedo boat." Paragraph 5: "The Defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that they were wearing uniform at all times after their capture." Paragraph 6: "On 27th July 1943, the torpedo boat reached the island of Aspo off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral Von Schrader, the admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to the Bergenhus where they had arrived by 11 p.m. on 28th July. The crew were there interrogated by Lieutenant H. P. K. W. Fanger, a naval lieutenant of the Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitan Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon the orders of the staff of the admiral of the west coast. Lieutenant Fanger reported to the officer in charge of the intelligence branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and that officer in turn 15 Jan. 46 reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander Bergen, and in writing to the admiral of the west coast. "7. The interrogation by the naval intelligence branch was concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the immediate orders of the Sea Commander Bergen, to Obersturmbannfuehrer of the SD Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was at that time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen.
COL. PHILLIMORE: This followed a meeting between Blomberg and Admiral Von Schrader, at which a copy of the Fuehrer Order of 18 October 1942 was shown to Blomberg. This order dealt with the classes of persons who were to be excluded from the protection of the Geneva Convention and were not to be treated as prisoners of war, but when captured were to be handed over to the SD. Admiral Von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this torpedo boat were to be handed over, in accordance with the Fuehrer Order, to the SD. "9. The SD then conducted their own interrogation...."
THE PRESIDENT: You can summarize the rest, can't you?
COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases. My Lord, Paragraph 9 described the interrogation by officials of the SD, and that these officials took the same views as the naval intelligence officers, that the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war; that despite this they were taken out and shot by an execution squad composed of members of the SD. Then there is a description of the disposal of the bodies. My Lord, the last paragraph is perhaps important in connection with the case against the Defendant Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, read it.