dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you need lay down any hard and fast rules, but General Jodl gave general evidence about the nature of these "situation conferences," and he was not cross-examined on it. It doesn't seem at all necessary to go into the general nature of these conferences with any other witness.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. [Turning to the witness.] Witness, it is possible in military life for an officer to receive an order with which he does not agree, is it not?
WINTER: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: In that case, is it possible for him to put his divergent opinion on record?
WINTER: In the German Army, if I remember rightly, such a possibility existed from the time of Moltke. An order from Hitler which came out in 1938-I think, in winter 1938-39-removed such a possibility once and for all. An order was issued at the time prohibiting even chiefs of general staffs and command authorities from putting their divergent opinions on record.
DR. JAHRREISS: In order to avoid creating difficulties for the interpretation, will you please explain the word ''Aktenklindig''?
WINTER: According to that it was not possible to include in the official files or in the war diaries of events kept by command staffs any comments to the effect that the chief was not in agreement with the decision or order of his superior.
DR. JAHRREISS: It was canceled?
WINTER: These possibilities existed previously, but since 1938 they no longer existed as they were done away with.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, General, I am now going to have a document shown to you, Document D-606, a document which the Prosecution also submitted during cross-examination 3 days ago. I am afraid I do not know the exhibit number. Perhaps it is...
MR. ROBERTS: Well, that's the Number 3606. It's Exhibit GB-292, My Lord. I put it in separately in cross-examination, in their book...
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know this document?
WINTER: I am acquainted with the document. It has my file reference number on it.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you write it yourself?
WINTER: No, General Jodl wrote it personally. But I can see a blank space under Figure 11. I do not know whether it is complete. The document consists of a preliminary draft, which is not contained here; but now that I have looked at it, I can see that it is dealt with in the file copy from my quartermaster's department. The third copy must have been sealed and attached to the same records. Immediately after the attacks on Dresden, when Hitler had raised the question of leaving the Geneva Convention, this preliminary draft was drawn up at my headquarters under the responsibility of General Jodl, and the order stated that all angles should be worked on which would prevent the Fuehrer from coming to such a decision-that is, of leaving the Geneva Convention. This document was carefully worked out from the point of view of international law and from the point of view of the psychological effect on the enemy troops, as well as on our own at home. I myself did it. The following day, my chief, General Jodl, received me. He had this document, the contents of which I have not checked now, and he told me that he was completely in agreement with this negative treatment, but that he had felt obliged to work on the draft in more detail, and bring it into line with the information he had from the Navy and so formulate it tactically in such a way that would guarantee its success with Hitler under all circumstances-for his idea must not be allowed to be put into practice.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendant's counsel want to ask questions?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I ask whether the prohibition regarding interrogation applies to this witness? And I want to point out that this witness is a member of the indicted group of the General Staff and of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether he is or not, but it does not matter whether he is or not. You can question him before the Commission. I mean, you can call him yourself before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: I merely wanted to clarify the matter by means of this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thanks. Dr. Laternser, if there is any witness who is not residing in Nuremberg, you can have him kept for the purpose of having him examined before the Commission if you want to do so.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I only want to ask one question. [Turning to the witness.] You have told us that Germany attacked the Soviet Union in breach of their Non-aggression Pact, because Germany feared an attack from the Soviet Union.
WINTER: May I be more precise by saying that we, as General Staff officers in the high command of an army group that was deployed in the Ukraine, were given that reason by our commanding officer. Whether politically...
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. We know now from the evidence in this Court that Hitler decided, in July 1940, to attack the Soviet Union; that on 18 December 1940-446-PS, it is Page 53 of Book 7- that on 18 December Hitler stated that the Armed Forces must be prepared to overthrow Soviet Russia in a single attack of lightning-like speed. We know that the attack was not until 22 June. It does not look as though the leaders of Germany were very much frightened, does it, of Russia, or should we say the Soviet Union, breaking the Non-aggression Pact.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Diddle): Witness, you had to take retaliation measures in the Ukraine, did you not?
WINTER: We did not undertake any reprisals-as far as the troops were concerned-in the operational zone of the Ukraine; at least, I have no recollection now of any such instances.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Diddle): What measures did you take against the resistance of the population?
WINTER: During the entire campaign in which Army Group South was involved, there was no resistance by the population in the operational zone In the Ukraine. Only in rear areas were there fights, at that time, with struggling Russian troop units. A resistance on the part of the population did not occur-as far as I know-until later when the operational zone had already been limited in the rear, and then there was resistance against political Reich commissioners.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Very well. You were not there at that time?
WINTER: The command to which I belonged was withdrawn from the front at the end of January, or in the early days of February 1943. The rear area lines were at the Dnieper at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, in conclusion I have only two interrogatories to submit to the Tribunal; and I want to read a few lines from one of them-something which was forgotten. To begin with, the interrogatory, Exhibit AJ-8, Document Jodl-61, an interrogatory of Waizenegger, which I herewith submit and beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice R its contents. And then there is Exhibit AJ-6, Document Jodl-59, an interrogatory of Brudermuller, with reference to which I wish to make a similar request. Then, from the last to be submitted, Exhibit AJ-12, Document Jodl-65, General Greiffenberg's statement, I should like to quote the important parts. It is a question of the attack against Yugoslavia and the question of whether or not, after the Simovic Putsch, Yugoslavia had already taken up a position against us. This is in the third volume of my document book on Page 211. The Simovic Putsch was over, and the question was whether there was an immediate threat from Yugoslavia at the time. "Question: Is it a fact that Yugoslavia, immediately after the coup d'etat of the army, started to deploy her armies on all her borders? "Answer: I know only the front which was opposite the German Twelfth Army, located at the Bulgarian border. Here the Yugoslavs had deployed their armies at the border. "Question: Is it a fact that the Army 'List,' of which you were the commander at the time, had the order, before the coup d'etat in Yugoslavia, to respect strictly the neutrality of Yugoslavia during the pending attacks on Greece, and that not even supply trains should be dispatched through Yugoslavian territory? "Answer: I can testify that the strictest order had been given to respect Yugoslavia's neutrality. "Question: Did you hear of any violations of this order? "Answer: No." Gentlemen of the Tribunal, a number of interrogatories have not yet come in. Whether we are going to get them or not, I do not know. At any rate, I shall have to reserve to myself the right to submit them later. Apart from that, I have completed my case.
DR. EXNER: THE PRESIDENT: On Monday the Tribunal will hear the case of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, will it not? Very well, the Tribunal may adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 10 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Your Lordship, High Tribunal, I open the defense case with the last words spoken by Dr. Schuschnigg as he resigned from the Austrian Chancellorship on 11 March 1938: "God protect Austria." It is a coincidence in history that at a time when the question of the Anschluss is being discussed here with reference to the person of Seyss-Inquart, the four Foreign Ministers are preparing the peace treaties on the basis of the same events. May I, therefore, draw the Tribunal's attention to my documents on this matter and ask that I be permitted to quote from them at somewhat greater length than I had originally intended? Now, with the permission of the Tribunal, may I begin with the examination of the defendant as witness in his own defense. [The defendant took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART (Defendant): Arthur Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The defendant repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, when and where. were you born?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was born in 1892 in Iglau, situated in what was up to now a German-speaking enclave in Moravia. Moravia, at that time, was a crown province of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. There and in the German-speaking enclave Olmutz, also in Moravia, I lived until the age of 15, when with my parents I moved into the vicinity of Vienna where I completed my studies at the Gymnasium and the legal faculty of the University of Vienna. In August 1914 I enlisted in the Army.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you in the Army during the whole of the war?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I served with the Tyrolean Kaiserjager and saw fighting in Russia, Romania, and in Italy. On a furlough during the war I passed my final examinations, and in 1917 I received my doctor's degree. I was wounded once, decorated several times, three times for bravery in the face of the enemy.
DR. STEINBAUER: What impressions of importance for your later life did you retain from the time of your youth?
SEYSS-INQUART: Relevant to my case is, I think, only the experience of the struggle between the nationalities in Moravia, between the Germans and the Czechs. The Germans in those days were in favor of a unified Austrian state, while the Czechs pursued a predominantly nationalistic policy. It is, however, not without significance that a language compromise was agreed upon in Moravia.
DR. STEINBAUER: What lasting impressions did you retain from your service in the war?
SEYSS-INQUART: Apart from the experience of comradeship at the front, I remember especially the discussion toward the end of the war on the Fourteen Points of President Wilson.
DR. STEINBAUER: Their essential content being the people's right of self-determination?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was clear to us that the realization of those Fourteen Points would mean the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. We Germans regarded it as at least a compensation that in pursuance of this right of self-determination the German Erblande (the domain of the Holy Roman Emperors) would be able to return to the Reich from which they had been separated just 50 years before, in 1866. Yes, these territories had been created by the German Reich and had been part of it for 950 out of the 1,000 years of their existence.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did you do after your return from the war?
SEYSS-INQUART: I devoted myself to my legal profession. In 1921 I set up my own practice, which in time grew into a very successful one.
DR. STEINBAUER: What of your political attitude? Were you a member of any political party?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was not a member of any political party, because I did not want to Me myself to partisan politics. I had good friends in all parties, including the Christian Social and Social Democratic Parties; but the party programs seemed to me rather one-sided, too much designed for individual groups of the community.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you a member of any political clubs, for instance, the Austro-German Volksbund?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I was a member of the executive of the Austro-German Volksbund, because the only political idea to which I adhered after 1918 was Austria's Anschluss with the German Reich. I witnessed 12 November l918, when the Provisional National Assembly, in fulfillment of the right of self-determination, decided that "Austria is a part of the German Republic." Furthermore, the Constitutional National Assembly repeated the decision 6 months later. But the Treaty of St. Germain forbade the Anschluss. Thereupon the various districts tried to hold plebiscites; in Salzburg and the Tyrol 98 percent of those entitled to the vote were in favor of the Anschluss. Dr. Schuschnigg describes these events in his book, Three Times Austria . The answer was a serious attempt to divide Austria among its non-German neighbors; but they could not agree on the booty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I at this point submit to the Tribunal and refer briefly to several documents of my document book? The first document, to which I have given the Document Number Seyss-Inquart-1, is on Page 2 of the document book and contains the proclamation of the German-Austrian deputies after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on 21 October 1918. There the second sentence reads: "The German-Austrian State claims the territorial jurisdiction over the entire territory of German settlement areas, especially in the Sudetenland. The German-Austrian State will fight any annexation by other nations of territories which are inhabited by German farmers, workers, and citizens." Then, as Document Number Seyss-Inquart-2, I should like to submit-it is on Page 4 of the document book-the resolution which the witness has already mentioned, passed by the Provisional Austrian National Assembly on 12 November 1918, which says: "German-Austria is a democratic republic. All public authorities are installed by the people. German-Austria is a part of the German Republic." The leader of the biggest national party of the time, Dr. Karl Renner, explained the reasons for this law on 12 November and said the following, which appears on Page 6 as Document Number Seyss-Inquart-3: "Our great people is in distress and misery, the people whose pride it has always been to be called the people of poets and thinkers, our German people of humanism, our German people which loves all mankind is deeply bowed in misery. But it is just in this hour in which it would be so easy and convenient and perhaps also tempting to settle one's account separately and perhaps to snatch advantages from the enemy's ruse, in this hour our people in all provinces wish to proclaim: We are one family and one people living under a common fate." Then I come to Document Number Seyss-Inquart-4, which is on Page 18...
THE PRESIDENT: Page 8, is it not?
DR. STEINBAUER: Page 18. I beg your pardon, yes, Page 8. That refers to the plebiscite on 24 April 1921 in the Tyrol, when 145,302 voted for the Anschluss and 1,805 against it. On 18 May 1921, there were 98,546 votes for the Anschluss in the district of Salzburg, and 877 votes against it. Your Honors, while submitting the document, I said that I maintain there were three component factors leading to the Anschluss: First, the economic emergency which runs as a recurring theme through the entire history of the period. Second, the disunity among the democratic parties, resulting therefrom. Third, the attitude of the rest of the world, particularly the big powers, toward our small country. Those thoughts are laid down in my document book, and I should like now with reference to the economic emergency of that time to submit as my next exhibit the speech of Prelate Hauser, President of the Austrian Parliament. The speech, made on 6 September 1919, appears on Page 14 of my document boor:. As President of the Parliament he suggested the acceptance of the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, giving the following reason: "The National Assembly has no choice. Country and people need lasting peace which will open the world to them again morally and economically and which can once again procure work for the masses of our people at home and abroad...." Then in the second paragraph he says: "It also has no other choice because our country depends on the big powers for its supply of food, coal, and industrial raw materials as well as in the re-establishment of its credit and its currency." The same point of view was expressed by the two statesmen Seipel and Schober. In Document Number Seyss-Inquart-17, Seipel, regarded as the greatest Austrian statesman, said at that time: "But we will never believe that the Central European question is solved as long as the great state which virtually makes up Central Europe, the German Reich, is not a party to the solution." I shall now continue with the examination of the witness.
DR. STEINBAUER: I want to ask you, Witness, do you still remember the time and the conditions after 1927?
SEYSS-INQUART: On account of the economic situation which you have just described, the League powers again and again forced Austria to make so-called voluntary declarations renouncing the Anschluss. This had repercussions in Austrian domestic politics. The Austrians, who in 1918 had been resolved to have a democratic parliamentary form of government, turned to radical ideas of an authoritarian character.
DR. STEINBAUER: At that time a new party was formed. Which one was that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Then there occurred the so-called Palace of Justice fire, an uprising of the Marxists, which brought in its wake the creation of the anti-Marxists Home Guard, a militant organization. Thus uniforms were introduced into the political life of Austria. The controversy between the Marxists and the anti-Marxists became ever more marked. The only nonpartisan organization at that time was the German-Austrian Volksbund, and the Anschluss idea was the only political objective which still held all parties together. Around the year 1930-at least then it was first noticeable-the National Socialist German Workers Party made its appearance.
DR. STEINBAUER: What impression did that Party make on you, particularly with reference to the seizure of power in the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: I want to say quite openly that amidst Austrian conditions the Party appeared somewhat strange. Uniforms had, of course, already been introduced into politics by the Republican Guard of the Marxists and the Home Guard, but in the NSDAP even the actual political leaders wore uniforms and marched in close formation. And also the kind of political intransigence which they displayed was not in keeping with our customary political thinking.
DR. STEINBAUER: But what then were the reasons for that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well' let me say that the NSDAP did not recognize any value in any other party and was never prepared to co-operate with any other.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then, what positive successes did you think the Party had gained in the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think that the influence of the Party in Austria-undoubtedly very great as time went on-was due to its unqualified determination to attain the Anschluss. I am of the opinion that the radicalism is to be attributed, for instance, to the negation of the customs union by the Hague decision, to please the democratic party leaders.
DR. STEINBAUER: In addition, were there not economic reasons which brought success to the NSDAP?
SEYSS-INQUART: What was discussed in the Reich, and what we heard from the Reich...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I suppose you are hearing the words spoken by Dr. Steinbauer direct, and you are answering them without any pause, which gives the interpreter no chance.
SEYSS-INQUART: We in Austria observed after 1933 the removal of the discriminations imposed by the Versailles Treaty and above all, the elimination of unemployment in the Reich. In Austria, too, about 10 percent of the population were unemployed at that time. Especially the Austrian workers, therefore, were hoping that the Anschluss would put an end to their unemployment; and Austrian farmers were greatly interested in the Reich Food Estate and in the German market control.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understand you correctly, then, it was the Anschluss idea which brought you, too, in contact with the Party? I do not want to speak of the Party program, which has been discussed here again and again; but I just want to ask you briefly: When did you join the Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: Officially, I became a member of the Party on 13 May 1938, and my membership number is above 7 million.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have any contact with Dr. Dollfuss?
SEYSS-INQUART: I met Dr. Dollfuss in the period after the war. I knew that he wanted to take me into his Ministry in 1933; and a week before 25 July 1934, at his invitation, I had a discussion with him.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you participate in any way in the murder of Federal Chancellor Dr. Dollfuss on 25 July 1934?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, in no way. Dr. Dollfuss planned to have another discussion with me. He was interested in my view regarding the calming of the very radical situation of that time. I told Dr. Dollfuss already at that time that there were no more nationalists in Austria but only National Socialists, and that the National Socialists were acting only on Hitler's orders.
DR. STEINBAUER: But, I must remind you, Doctor, that the Prosecution have submitted a photograph which shows the murder of Dollfuss being extolled.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is the so called Annual Commemoration in the year 1938. During that celebration nobody thought of Dollfuss; it was a Commemoration by the Party in honor of the seven SS men who had been hanged in connection with the Putsch attempt at that time. None of us referred to that death as murder.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well, Dr. Schuschnigg succeeded Dollfuss as Federal Chancellor, and I want to ask you: What conclusions were drawn by the NSDAP from this event, as far as you could gather?
SEYSS-INQUART: The NSDAP itself was completely broken up and disorganized, and a small circle of men was formed at that time; I also found my way to those men, and we drew the following conclusions from the events of 25 July: First, that they represented a considerable danger. I recall the meeting of statesmen in Stresa and their resolutions against Germany. And even though we were never worried about Italy, one had nevertheless to realize that in this very troubled atmosphere anything could easily lead to war. We all agreed that the main task of German policy must be to avoid war.