dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, I have here a copy of the transcript of what was said before the Commissioner. I only need to read one sentence, and it is at Page 1352 of the English version. According to what I have here you said that "the opinion concerning the neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands was very much doubted within the higher military circles." Now, all I want to ask you about that: If you discussed that question, was that not a political discussion?
VON RUNDSTEDT: May I just put that right. This statement before the Commission was made concerning 1939, when we had drawn up our troops in the West, and when the question arose whether Holland and Belgium would remain neutral or not. My answer was given in that connection at the time.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Very well. You have also said that you opposed or you fought Nazi totalitarian ideas; is that right?
VON RUNDSTEDT: May I ask you to repeat that question to me, please?
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: You have said, I believe, that you opposed Nazi totalitarian ideas?
VON RUNDSTEDT: We could not put up any resistance. I opposed it, as so many of my comrades did.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, wasn't that a political attitude, a political standpoint?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Everybody can have a political standpoint for himself, but a soldier cannot participate in political activities. That is what I understand by political standpoint. .COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: A soldier then, in your view, has political views but may not express them; is that right?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, that could be applicable. Of course it was possible to talk to some friend about such questions and discuss them, but there was never a meeting or a body called together for the purpose of discussing political questions.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Now I want to move on to the late thirties. When you say that all the generals-I forget your exact words this morning, but most of the generals, you said, did maintain the old nonpolitical attitude. I want to show you a docu-ment. My Lord, this is Document Number 4060-PS and it will be Ex-hibit USA-928. Now this is a sketch of a speech which General Reinecke proposed to give in the auturnn of 1938 to some of the up-and-coming military people. General Reinecke held a very high position in the German Army, didift he?
VON RUNDSTEDT: At the end he was the chief chairman of that National Socialist leadership training outfit; in 1938 he must still have been a junior staff officer, a low-grade staff officer.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: What do you mean by a junior staff officer? By the middle of the war he was one of the few people who were immediately s~bordinated to Keitel, wasn't he?
VON RUNDSTEDT: About that I cannot give you any in-formation.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: But, anyhow at this time, he was a Colonel. It is Page 2.
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: After all, he was a very high-ranking officer.
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes. But still one of the younger officers. About this entire subject I cannot give any testimony. I have never at any time had anything to do with it. As I have mentioned, I was no longer active in November 1938, and so I cannot give you any information about these training courses which Reinecke held.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: All I am asking you to do is to look at certain passages in this document which I shall indicate to you and which, in my submission, show that the extreme non--political attitude of the generals was not maintained at this time.
VON RUNDSTEDT: That will be applicable insofar as Hitler tried everything to make the Armed Forces National-Socialist--minded ...
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Calvacoressi, the witness has said that he was retired at the time and has never seen the document. You can put it in if it is a new document.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Should I read from this point or would it be more convenient at the end of the cross-examination?
THE PRESIDENT: I think we can look at it ourselves.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: If Your Lordship pleases. My Lord, there is another document which bears on the same subject and which I will also put in at this point. That is Document Num-ber 4065-PS, and it will be Exhibit USA-929.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the PS?
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: 4065, My Lord. [Turning to the witness.] Now, Field Marshal, I want to ask you a few questions about the rearmament of Germany. You have told us that that was purely defensive. Do you maintain that?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I had said before that the measures against Poland mentioned in Blomberg's affidavit were of a purely defen-sive nature. After rearmament was carried out up to 36 divisions, the German Army alone was still too weak to conduct an aggres-sive war against Poland, not to speak of aggression against a western or an eastern neighbor. I still maintain my opinion that we are here concerned with a defensive measure. If Hitler had planned a war of aggression, he would at least have been com-pelled to have 3 to 4 times as many divisions. This was utterly im-possible.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, if you are defending yourselves, you must be defending yourselves against somebody, and you said before the Commission that you were, among other things, taking defensive measure's against the Lithuanians.
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Are you still asking the Tri-bunal to believe that you were very much concerned with the defense of Germany against the Lithuanians?
VON RUNDSTEDT: May I answer? I called it, at the time, the basis for the various games of war. Lithuania was menacing the isolated province of East Prussia, where at that time there was only one, although later three divisions. The Poles and Czechs added together were fully in a position to attack and to occupy the whole of Eastern Germany, not to mention - that the French might have crossed the Rhine in the West. Those were the thoughts which I expressed, and which were the basis for our games of war: how were we going to defend ourselves against an invasion from the East and West,, or from the East or the West.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, now, we have already had that. You have never agreed with General Von Blomberg on any point, but I think I'll draw your attention to the fact that in June 1937 Marshal Von Blomberg, who was, after all, War Minister and Commander-in-Chief at that time, issued a directive in which he said that Germany need not consider an attack from any side. That is already in evidence, My Lord. It is a quotation from Docu-ment Number C-175, Exhibit USA-69. Now, you said that you thought Germany was to act outside a war. Was it your opinion that Hitler was rearming too fast?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No, on the contrary.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: He wasn't arming fast enough?
VON RUNDSTEDT: He was rearming too quickly. That was what he accused Generals Von Fritsch and Von Blomberg of, namely, that they had tried to slow down the speedy rearmament. Many divisional commanders adopted the same attitude. We could not keep pace with the rearmament program, since we did not have enough trained reservists.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Then it is fair to say that what you objected to about Hitler in this matter were his methods?
VON RUNDSTEDT: That I do not understand. I do not under-stand what you mean.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: What aims did you and your colleagues hope to gain through Hitler on the question of rearma-ment if not through the methods Hitler himself was using?
VON RUNDSTEDT: The aim itself to ' be achieved by rearma-ment was to protect ourselves from an aggressive war, particularly coming from the East. This had been attempted earlier by the Stresemann Government, by peaceful means through Geneva. What I said regarding the speed of the rearmament was in answer to a question by counsel as to whether Hitler ever criticized the generals. I myself have never discussed rearmament with Hitler, giving him my point of view.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Now, you knew, from reading the newspapers, didn't you, that Hitler was adopting what I would call a diplomatic offensive?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I do not know what you mean by that. He effected a diplomatic offensive at Munich and at Godesberg.  Is that what you mean by it?
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Let me put i t in a slightly different way. Was it not clear to any reasonably well-informed citizen that a strong military machine was an essential part of Hitler's general foreign policy; was it or was it not clear?
VON RUNDSTEDT: That was evident, for with Hitler's creation of this military machine, Germany could feel secure against any attack from abroad. What we had not succeeded in doing by peace-ful means, Hitler achieved with a stroke of his pen; that is, the rearmament program. But I stress this fact once more: for an attack even on Poland, these miserable 36 divisions were far too weak.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Now, is it your opinion that Schuschnigg would have turned down and given in to Hitler if he had not known that Hitler had a strong military machine?
VON RUNDSTEDT: That I do not believe ...
DR. LATERNSER: I object, Mr. President. This question is not permissible because the witness does not know what Schuschnigg thought at the moment and he cannot testify as to what was in the mind of Schuschnigg. I request that this question be ruled out.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: My Lord, I should have thought it was a question of common knowledge and that everyone was discussing this matter at the time. I am not asking him what was in Schuschnigg's mind, but I am asking whether in his mind he thought Hitler could have achieved what he did achieve without a strong arm. He can give an answer to that question.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the Tribunal can judge for them-selves about it.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: If My Lord pleases. I do not want to go over ground that has already been very well covered, but I only want to draw your attention to this matter which, of course, has not been gone over in connection with this particular part of the case. My Lord, if the Tribunal wish to refresh their minds on this point, I would ask them to, refer to that part of the transcript (Morning Session of I April 1946, Volume X, Page 328 et sequentes) where the Defendant Ribbentrop was cross-examined on matters concerning these.
VON RUNDSTEDT: I am very willing to answer the question.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I do not think, Witness, that the Tribunal is interested in having any more on this point. Now, the last point with which I want to deal is the question of the conduct of the war. You know, of course, about the Commando Order and it is not necessary for us to look at it again. You had said today that it was never carried out in your area when you were in the West?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And you told the OKW in 1944 that it had been carried out?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Will you please state, cate-gorically,, which of those two statements is true, because they cannot both be true.
VON RUNDSTEDT: They do not conflict, because I told counsel that the Commando Order was not carried out by us, but passed up under silence. Since, however, it came to the Army from Hitler and had been announced in the Wehrmacht commumqué, one might have had to say at that time: "No, I will not carry out that order," whereupon one would have been dismissed or something. We simply did not carry out the order, and when I asked to have it rescinded, I wrote in Paragraph 1: "Action was taken accordingly." That was, I do not mind saying so openly, an insincerity. I told you. Why I said so, I cannot explain it in any other way. Anyhow, I ask you to believe me that it was not carried out.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Whether it was issued or not there is no doubt, is there? Whether it was carried out or not-and there is no doubt that it was issued through regular army channels -and whatever may be the true picture of the number of men who, may have lost their lives as a result of the issuance of this illegal order, it is clear, isn't it, that the mere issuing of this order through regular army channels shows that there was something wrong, something rotten with the military leadership of Germany?
VON RUNDSTEDT: There was not a single person in the West who lost his life on the strength of that Commando Order.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: The German soldier is well known for his discipline, is he not?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And you wouldnt suggest,j, suppose, that he is more liable to commit excesses than any other soldier?
VON RUNDSTEDT: That did not happen in this case wish to repeat that in the West not a single man was killed on account of that Commando Order.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, I want to leave the Commando Order now. In general, supposing for the sake of argument that we find that the German soldier is normally well-disciplined and well-behaved, if he would act and behave with unnecessary brutality, would you not feel compelled to look for some extraordinary outside motive?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Within my field of authority no brutalities occurred.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: If that did occur, you would have to look for some such motive, would you not?
VON RUNDSTEDT: If the Commando Order was carried out elsewhere in another theater of war then the commander or the unit in question acted in accordance with Hitler's order, which they had to assume was founded on international law.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I have already said that we are not talking about the Commando Order any more.  I am going to suggest to you that if these German soldier, for the sake of argument, behaved badly in occupied territory, a logical reason for it would be the knowledge by them that their commanders had a ruthless disregard and indifference for the sufferings of the population.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that it is too hypothetical a question to put to him.
COMMANDER CALVACORE: Your Lordship, if you please. You commanded the Army Group South in Russia in the autumn of 1941, didn't you?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, Army Group South.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And one of your subordinate commanders was Field Marshall Von Reichenau?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And you no doubt heard many times about the order which Field Marshall Von Reichenau issued to the 6th Army about how to behave in Russia?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I never discussed that with him nor do I recollect that I had seen that order before I came to England and my chief of staff spoke about it.  Von Reichenau had repeatedly given orders which the army group never received, and which did not concern them either. I do not recollect having seen the so--called "severity order" (Härtebefehl), but I do not deny on the other hand that through some channels it may have reached my army group and probably got into the office. At any rate, my former first General Staff officer, who is also interned here in Nuremberg, cannot recollect either that we received that order for our in-formation. It was a matter of course that one could not approve of that order, particularly since it was in contradiction to the clear order ...
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, just a minute, please. I only asked you if you knew of its existence, and I take it from what you have been saying that you do know of its existence. Are you saying that Reichenau was exceptional in these matters?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, correct.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: That he was exceptional?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Considering Reichenau's entire attitude and his character, I assume that to be the case. General Von Manstein, General Von Kleist, General Von Schobert, General Von Stuelpnagel would never have issued such an order on their own, especially since -- may I go on? -- General Von Brauchitsch had given the strictest orders that the conduct of the war in the East was to be carried out in an absolutely soldierly manner and in accordance with the rules and regulations.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: You see, yesterday we had put in evidence an order of Field Marshal Von Manstein which was strikingly similar to the "Rundstedt" order. In some passages ...
VON RUNDSTEDT: The "Reichenau" order, you mean.
THE PRESIDENT: You said the "Rundstedt" order.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I beg your pardon, My Lord. Now, you commanded three, or was it four, armies in Army Group South?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I had four armies under my command, besides the Romanians.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And of these four armies which fought so far away so many years ago, we have recovered orders of this kind from two. I put it to you that any soldier of the 6th Army or the 11th Army who received this order would be justified in assuming that his commanders-in-chief were encourag-ing or at least tolerating excesses, and now, just to show you that these matters were not confined to one army group or even to one front, I want you to look at this signal, Document Number 4067-PS, and it will be Exhibit USA-930. My Lord, it is convenient to put this in at this point: I am not suggesting that the witness is himself personally concerned with it. This is a signal that was made to the Panzer Army Africa in June 1942, and I will read it, as it is pretty short, in fun: "For Panzer Army Africa via the German General with the Supreme Command of the Italian Armed Forces in Rome--OKH/Quartermaster General for information -- General for special duty with the OKH for information-Air Force/Quar-termaster General for information-OKW/WR for information. Top Secret, only to be transmitted via officers. According to information received, numerous German political refugees are supposed to be amongst the Free French units in Africa. The Fuehrer has ordered that they are to be treated with the greatest severity. They are therefore to be disposed of with-out mercy in battle. Where this has not happened, they are to be shot retroactively on the command of the nearest Ger-man officer immediately and without further ado, as long as they do not have to be kept back for the time being for pur-poses of intelligence. Handing over a written copy of this order is forbidden. Commanders are to be informed verbally." It is unsigned. You see, whoever sent this order was conscious of its criminality as appears quite clearly from the last two sentences. "The Fuehrer has ordered that they are to be treated with the greatest severity." The order which the Army puts on that in sending it out is to kill. Do you remember the death of Field Marshal Rommel?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: It was generally supposed at the time, was it not, that there was something suspicious about the death of Rommel; did you hear these rumors at that time?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No, I did not hear these rumors; otherwise I would have refused to act as representative of the Fuehrer at the State funeral for Field Marshal Rommel; that would have been an infamy beyond words. I only heard of those rumors from the American papers after I was taken prisoner. According to these, Rommel's young son was supposed to have said that his father took poison in order not to be hanged.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: You never heard during all these months that succeeded the death of Rommel up to the end of the war, that it was generally, said that Rommel had been "bumped off "?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No, it was merely said that he had been under suspicion.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: My Lord, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other cross-examination? Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, you have been questioned with reference to Affidavit Number 4, which comes from Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and is Exhibit USA-335. The Prosecution attached value to the assertion made in this affidavit that in this manner-referring to personal visits of the commanders-in-chief- the commander-in-chief was in a position to obtain the advice of the other commanders under him. What was the nature of such advice; on which subject could it have been given and in which way?
VON RUNDSTEDT: The matter was very simple. Let me go back a bit. Say I am the commander of a regiment and am giving a task to my battalion commander, saying: "You will attack that village with your battalion." When I go to see him and ask him, "How do you propose to do this?" he will reply, "I propose to do this and that, Sir, and if I may say so, I would like to go to the left where there is better terrain." It is the same on a higher level.  If the Commander-in-Chief of the Army should come to see me, as the army group commander, he might say: "Herr Von Rundstedt, how are you going to tackle your task?" and I might say, "In such and such a way, and perhaps I will need one more division." That is the only way of doing it, a friendly discussion. But I would never say to my superior: "What you are doing is wrong, do it differently." Is this intelligible, the way I have put it?
DR.LATERNSER: I think so; then it amounted to a discussion as to how the special task assigned to some commander was to be carried out?
VON RUNDSTEDT: It was not a discussion with the com-mander-in-chief as to whether it was to be carried out, but a short discussion on how it was to be carried out and how it could best be achieved. You see, sometimes a subordinate has quite a clever idea which the superior will accept gratefully. That was out of the question as far as Hitler was concerned, though.
DR. LATERNSER: And on the other hand, there were always discussions and meetings concerning the solving of tasks in all the armies?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, I imagine so.
DR. LATERNSER: Now with reference to Affidavit Number 5, by General Blaskowitz. The Prosecution has emphasized that leaders of army groups and armies had been in contact by means of telephone, teletype, and radio and had thus been in a position to get situation reports from each other. Are we not concerned with the ordinary daily communiqués which every unit commander had to make so as to facilitate military leadership?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, definitely. These situation reports were made up in the morning on what happened during the pre-vious night, and in the evening on what happened during the day. If there was an action which was of particular importance to me as the superior commander, then I would ask for reports not only once or twice but possibly three times, by telephone or by teletype: "How are things going; how are you doing? Are you advancing or retreating?" That is the meaning of this.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution still refers -to this Affidavit Number 5 by General Blaskowitz, and for the purpose of clearing up this statement, as the interpretation by the Prosecution might lead to misunderstandings, I have asked General Blaskowitz to make a statement on his affidavit. I shall read part of it to y6u now and subsequently I shall ask you whether the facts are correct as General Blaskowitz has given them. I quote: "The purpose of the present declaration is to make clear a restrictive clause I mentioned in my affidavit of 10 November 1945: 'In their sphere!' This restriction was intended to convey what I am explaining in today's supplementary declaration. I did not mean a conference of commanders at the front forming a 'group' or an actual 'advisory circle.' Both ex-pressions might be misunderstood; they only designate a circle from which individual advisers could be heard by their superiors on matters affecting the latter's spheres." Would this supplement to the previous explanation correspond to what a commander could actually do?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, that is so, and it removes the misunder-standing which I never believed had originated with General Blaskowitz in that sense.
DR. LATERNSER: You were furthermore asked regarding the misunderstanding which occurred before the opening of the Rus-sian campaign between you and Field Marshal Von Bock con-cerning a gap due to by-passing a large swamp area.