dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. STAHMER: The question is: What about responsibility for acts committed during the period of nonmembership? The Prosecution appears to be of the opinion that a person entering into the conspiracy thereby approves anything previously done by any conspirator in pursuance of the common plan. Such an assertion seems to arise out of the civil law theory of a subsequent ratification of a business transaction. This theory is not tenable in criminal law. The Charter does not mention anything of the sort; after all, the common plan, in the execution of which the act was perpetrated, was common only to those who were members at that time. Even if one takes the act of joining the conspiracy to be an approval of any acts so far committed, the approval of a crime already committed does not establish partnership in such crime. The person joining later has nothing to do with these crimes. The same applies to the withdrawal from the conspiracy. The person withdrawing can be made responsible only for what happened during his membership, even if the result has come about only after his withdrawal. Any other opinion would again lead to the result that an ex post facto law is being applied. Now, did the 22 defendants participate in a conspiracy within the meaning of the Indictment, namely, a conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, usages of war, and humanity? If such a conspiracy had existed, then Hitler would have been- nobody can doubt it-the leader of these conspirators. But it has already been emphasized that a conspiracy headed by a dictator is a contradiction in itself. Hitler would have ridiculed the suggestion that he had made an agreement with his Ministers, Party leaders, and generals to wage this or that war, or to conduct the war by such or such means. He was an autocrat. He was not concerned with the approval of these men, but merely with having his decisions executed, whether they agreed with these decisions or not.
DR. STAHMER: Quite aside from legal considerations, Hitler's environment, in fact, was quite different from a band of conspirators, as visualized by the Prosecution before the hearing of evidence. Apart from a small Party clan, he was surrounded by an atmosphere of distrust. He trusted neither the "defeatist club" of his Ministers nor his "generals." Such was already the case before the war, and his surroundings during the war have been described by witnesses with great impressiveness. A cunning system of secrecy insured that the plans and aims of the Fuehrer remained unknown to his associates as long as at all possible, so that his most intimate assistants time and again were taken by surprise by the events, and, in fact, were shocked to learn some of them only et the present Trial. This system of secrecy also insured an isolation of the individual collaborator, since one person was not allowed to know what the other did. Does this look like a conspiracy? In fact, Hitler complained at times that the generals were "conspiring" against him, and used, strangely, this very word while speaking of those who today are charged with having conspired with him. The hearing of evidence repeatedly mentions conspiracies, but conspiracies against Hitler. From a psychological point of view it is, to say the least, highly improbable that the score of survivors of the Third Reich selected and put in the dock by the Prosecution should have formed a gang of conspirators in the sense of the Indictment. In this group of people all homogeneity as to outlook, background, education, social position, and function is lacking, and some of the defendants only met in the dock. The Prosecution considers the Party with its organizations as the nucleus around which the conspiracy formed. We should, however, in this connection consider the different attitude displayed by the individuals. Some of the defendants have never been Party members at all, or, at any rate, not for a long time, and only a few of them have played an important part in the Party.
DR. STAHMER: Some held top positions in the Party and its organizations, and devoted their entire activity to the aims of these organizations, while others did everything in their power to eliminate from their sphere of activity any influence of Party and SS. The NSDAP was founded in a period of utter powerlessness of the State and of general war-weariness of the people at a time when, truly, no intelligent person thought of a second war, much less of a war of aggression. But were not some of the defendants' aims attainable without war? Presumably every true German from the bottom of his heart desired the union of all adjoining German territory with the Reich. This applied to the Saar territory, Austria, Memel, Danzig, and, as a hope lingering in the far future, also to the Sudeten territory. In the past they all had been parts of the German Reich, they all would have returned to the German Reich already in 1919, had the right of self-determination solemnly promised to all peoples been realized. But these objectives of German longing could be reached by peaceful means. And in fact, they had been reached without a shot or a stroke with the one exception of Danzig, which would have been managed in the same peaceful way if the Fuehrer had had a shred of patience and the Poles a shred of good will. But they neither wanted nor believed in a war. Hitler was thought capable of large-scale bluffing, but not of launching the catastrophe of a war. I cannot, therefore, believe in a conspiracy to commit crimes against peace and the usages of war. May I add two points of general importance: (1) The first point refers to Goering's attitude immediately previous to the outbreak of war. He was at that time Hitler's confidant and friend, the country's second string, and he is now the chief figure among the defendants.
DR. STAHMER: If there had been, in truth, a conspiracy to launch wars of aggression at that time, then he would have taken second place within such a conspiracy, yet it was actually he who tried everything within his power during the last days of August 1939 to prevent the attack on Poland, and who tried behind Hitler's back to maintain peace. How can this be consistent with a conspiracy for initiating wars of aggression? Nor did he approve of a war against Russia and strongly advised the Fuehrer against such a war. (2) If there had been a conspiracy to commit war crimes, then the war would have been waged, from the very beginning, with utter ruthlessness and disregard of rules of war. Just the contrary actually happened. In fact, during the first years of the war, international law was on the whole respected. Especially in the beginning every endeavor was made to wage war with decency and chivalry. If any evidence is needed, a glance at the orders of the German High Command of the Armed Forces regulating the behavior of the soldiers in Norway, Belgium, Holland is sufficient proof.
MARSHAL: The Tribunal adjourns until tomorrow. [The Tribunal adjourned until 5 July 1946 at 1000 hours.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer.
DR. STAHMER: I continue. Number 2. If there had been a conspiracy to commit war crimes, then the war would have been waged from the beginning with utter ruthlessness and disregard of rules of war. Just the contrary happened. In fact, during the first years of the war. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks you got a little bit further with your speech.
DR. STAHMER: I had gone somewhat further, that is true; but in order to get this into the context again I have started again with Number 2, but if the Court wishes, I can continue where I stopped. Especially in the beginning every endeavor was made to wage war with decency and chivalry. If any evidence is needed, a glance at the orders of the High Command of the Army regulating the behavior of the soldiers in Norway, Belgium, Holland, is sufficient proof. Moreover, a leaflet with "10 Commandments for the Conduct of the German Soldier in Wartime" was issued to the soldiers when they went into the field. Field Marshal Milch has read them out from his pay book, during this Trial. They all obliged the soldier to act in a proper manner and according to international law. A gang of conspirators at the head of the state, which plans to wage a war regardless of right and morals, would certainly not send their soldiers into the field with a detailed written order saying just the opposite. I believe the assumption of the Prosecution that these 22 men are conspirators against peace and the laws of war and humanity is quite erroneous. It is up to counsel for the individual defendant to show what connection his client might have had with the alleged conspiracy. I just mentioned that Reich Marshal Goering was the second man in the State. During the Trial the Prosecution also referred repeatedly to this elevated position of Goering's and tried to make it the basis of a special charge against the defendant, pointing out that Goering, by virtue of this advantageous position, knew about everything, even the most secret matters, and had the possibility of intervening independently in a practical way in the course of government business. This opinion is wrong and is based on ignorance of the importance of his position. It meant that according to rank Goering was the second man in the State. This rank was due to the fact that Hitler, in the fall of 1934, had made a will and by a secret Fuehrer order had appointed Goering as his successor in the Government.
DR. STAHMER: In 1935 or 1936 this succession was confirmed in an unpublished Reich law which was signed by all the ministers. On 1 September 1939 Hitler announced this law in the Reichstag. In this way the successorship of Goering became known to the German people. Goering's task of deputizing for the Fuehrer in the Government was to apply only in the event of Hitler's being incapacitated by illness or absence from Germany-this occurred when in March 1938 Hitler spent a few days in Austria. During Hitler's presence, that is, as long as Hitler exercised office himself, Goering derived no special powers from the deputyship. In this instance his authority was limited to the offices directly under him, and he was not entitled to issue any official directives to other offices. From this follows that, although the second man in the State, Goering could neither rescind, nor change, nor supplement Hitler's orders. He could give no orders whatsoever to offices of which he was not directly in charge. He had no possibility of giving any binding orders to any other office, whether it were an office of the Party, the Police, the Army, or Navy, nor could he interfere in the authority of those offices which were not his own. This position as second man in the State cannot, therefore, be judged as especially incriminating for Goering; nor is it qualified to serve as a basis for the assumption of a conspiracy. The Defendant Goering never participated in the drafting or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy which was concerned with the crimes stated in the Indictment. As already emphasized, the participation in such a conspiracy presupposes in the first place that such a common plan existed at all and that, therefore, the participants had the intention and were agreed to carry out the crimes of which they are accused. These presuppositions are not in evidence in the case of Goering. In fact, one may assume the contrary. It is true that Goering wanted to do away with the Treaty of Versailles and to secure again a position of power for Germany.
DR. STAHMER: But he believed he could obtain this goal, if not with the legal means of the League of Nations, at least with political means alone. The purpose of rearmament was only to give more weight to the voice of Germany. The Weimar Government, which could not even express the self-determination of the Germans after 1918 in the surely very modest form of a German-Austrian customs union, though they advocated this determination themselves, owed the lack of success of their foreign policy, in Goering's opinion just as in Hitler's, mainly to the lack of respect for the German means of imposing power. Goering hoped, strengthened in his belief by Hitler's surprising initial successes, that a strong German army by its mere existence would make it possible to secure German aims peacefully, as long as these aims kept within reasonable limits. In politics a state can only have its say and make its voice heard if it has a strong army to back it up, which demands the respect of other states. Only recently the American Chief of Staff, Marshall, said in his second annual report that the world does not seriously consider the wishes of the weak. Weakness is too big a temptation for the strong. There was no arming for an aggressive war; not even the Four Year Plan, the purpose and aim of which have been clearly explained by the defendant himself and by the witness Korner, was aimed at the preparation of an aggressive war. Field Marshals Milch and Kesselring have both testified in perfect agreement that the Air Force created by the armament program was only a defensive air force which was not fit for an aggressive war and which was therefore looked upon by them as a risky proposition. Such a modest rearmament does not allow for any conclusions of aggressive intentions. After all this it is clear that Goering did not want a war. By nature he was an opponent of war. Outwardly also, in his conferences with foreign diplomats and in his public speeches, he has expressed with all possible frankness his opposition to war at every opportunity.
DR. STAHMER: The testimony of General Bodenschatz explains most clearly the attitude of Goering toward war. He knew him intimately from the first World War, and he has exact knowledge of the attitude of Goering toward war from frequent conversations he has held with him. Bodenschatz states that Goering repeatedly told him that he knew the horrors of war very well from the first World War. His aim was a peaceful solution of all conflicts and to spare the German people, as far as possible, the horrors of a war. A war was always an uncertain and hazardous thing and it would not be possible to burden with a second war a generation which had already experienced the horrors of one great world war and its bitter consequences. Field Marshal Milch also knows from conversations with the Defendant Goering that the latter opposed a war, and that he advised Hitler in vain against a war with Russia. In public the Defendant Goering, in his many speeches since 1933, frequently emphasized how he had his heart set on maintaining peace and that rearmament had only been undertaken to make Germany strong outwardly, thus to enable her to play a political role again. His serious and honest will for peace can best be seen from the speech which he made at the beginning of July 1938 in Karinhall before all the Gauleiter of the German Reich. In this speech he emphasized energetically that the foreign policy of Germany had to be directed in such a way that it would under no circumstances lead to war. The present generation had still to get over the last world war; another war would shock the German people. Goering had not the slightest reason to hide his true opinion before this gathering, which consisted exclusively of the highest Party leaders. For that reason, this speech is a valuable and reliable proof for the fact that Goering really and truly wanted peace.
DR. STAHMER: How deeply the Defendant Goering was interested in maintaining good relations with England is shown by his conduct at the conference with Lord Halifax in November 1937 at Karinhall, in which Goering, with full candor, put before Lord Halifax the aims of German foreign policy: (a) Incorporation of Austria and the Sudetenland into Germany; (b) return of Danzig to Germany with a reasonable solution of the Corridor problem. He pointed out at the same time that he did not want to reach these aims by war and that England could contribute to a peaceful solution. The meeting in Munich in the fall of 1938 was arranged at his suggestion. The conclusion of the Munich Pact is essentially due to his influence. When, due to the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the relations with England had deteriorated considerably because England was very angry about this step of Hitler's, which was a violation of the Munich Pact, Goering made serious efforts for the restoration of normal relations. In order to achieve this goal he arranged the meeting, described by the witness Dahlerus, with English industrialists at the beginning of August 1939 in the Sonke-Nissen-Koog. In an address he pointed out that under no circumstances must a war with England come about, and he asked those present to contribute to the best of their ability to the restoration of good relations with England. When, after the often-quoted speech of Hitler's to the commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces on the Obersalzberg on 22 August 1939, the danger of a war became imminent, Goering immediately-that is, already on the following day-summoned the witness Dahlerus from Sweden and endeavored, passing over the Foreign Office, to reach an agreement with England for the prevention of war on his own responsibility. The objection was raised here that Goering had left Dahlerus in the dark as to his true intentions.
DR. STAHMER: His efforts were not aimed at the maintenance of peace but only at persuading England to deny to the Poles the support guaranteed to them and thus to separate England from Poland, which would enable Germany, after this separation, to exert pressure on Poland to submit to the German demands or to attack Poland and to realize her plans toward Poland without any risk. Any doubt about the honest will for peace is unjustified; the imputed intention was far from Goering's thoughts. If this objection is substantiated by the fact that Goering did not inform the witness Dahlerus either of the content of the Fuehrer speech of 23 May 1939 or that of 22 August 1939, then it cannot be considered relevant and nothing is gained by it. Under no circumstances could Goering inform a third person-and especially a foreigner-of those strictly confidential speeches without exposing himself to the accusation of high treason or treason against his country. These speeches were all without significance as far as the task given to the witness was concerned, especially since the peculiar situation arose here that Goering-after the efforts of the diplomats had reached a deadlock-as a last resort knew of no other way out than to use his personal relations, his personal influence, and his personal prestige. The only thing that mattered for the activity of Dahlerus was that the foreign political situation, which had become dangerously critical through the quarrel between Germany and Poland and of which the witness was fully aware, had to be straightened out by an appropriate attitude on the part of England. That Goering's aim was not to separate England from Poland has been clearly proven by the fact that Goering, to begin with, had transmitted to the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, the text of the note which contained the propositions made by Germany to Poland-propositions which were called moderate by Henderson-and that, hereby, he tried to come to direct negotiations with Poland. Poland, however, obviously did not want an agreement with Germany.
DR. STAHMER: Several circumstances point to that. The conflict with Poland lasted for almost a year. Why did Poland not ask for a decision by a court of arbitration on the basis of the concluded arbitration agreement? Why did Poland not appeal to the League of Nations? Obviously Poland did not want any arbitration regarding Danzig and the Corridor. The utterance of the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, to the First Secretary of the British Embassy, Mr. Forbes, which was stated by the witness Dahlerus, is even greater proof of the unwillingness of Poland to come to an understanding. Lipski said he was not interested in any note or proposition by Germany; he was convinced that in the event of war there would Soon be a revolt in Germany and the Polish Army would march in triumph to Berlin. This intransigent and incomprehensible attitude of Poland obviously finds its explanation in the fact that she felt too strong and secure as a result of England's assurance. The reference to the imminent revolt makes one believe that Poland was informed of the plans of the Canaris group. There can therefore be no question of an ambiguous attitude or false play on the part of Goering. The serious will of the Defendant Goering to maintain peace and to restore good relations with England is expressly recognized by Ambassador Henderson, who, due to his thorough knowledge of the German conditions and his connections with the leading men of Germany, summed up Goering correctly. I refer here to his book Failure of a Mission, in which, on Page 83, it says: "I would like to express here my belief that the Field Marshal, if it had depended on him, would not have gambled on war as Hitler did in 1939. As will be related in due course, he came down decisively on the side of peace in September l938." Lord Halifax also, according to the information he gave, had no doubts that Goering's efforts for the prevention of war were sincere.
DR. STAHMER: That after the outbreak of the wary which he had wanted to prevent with all the means at his disposal but had been unable to prevent, Goering, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, exerted all his strength to win the victory for Germany is not contrary to the sincerity of his will to avoid the war. From that moment on he knew only his duty as a soldier to his fatherland. At different times Hitler made addresses to the commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces, thus for instance in November 1937, on 23 May 1939, and on 22 August 1939. The Defendant Goering at his personal interrogation has already given extensive explanations as to the importance and the purpose of these addresses. For the question of whether the fact that he was present at these addresses might constitute perhaps a complicity in a conspiracy in the sense of the Indictment, it is important that on these occasions Hitler solely and one-sidedly made known his own opinion about military and political questions. The participants were only informed of what possible political developments Hitler expected. The participants were never asked for their opinion nor had they even any possibility to express their criticism of Hitler's opinion. Hitler did not ask his generals to understand his orders; all he asked of them was to carry them out. His autocratic leadership of the State was exclusively directed by the principle sic volo, sic jubeo, which he carried through to its logical conclusion. How rigidly Hitler followed this principle can be seen from the fact that after the address of 23 May 1939 as Milch stated in his testimony-he expressly forbade all participants to comment on the speech, even among themselves. That Hitler was irrevocably resolved on an aggressive war could not be deduced by the listeners of the said speeches, and they did not do so. This has been confirmed unanimously by all witnesses who were present when those addresses were given. At that time Hitler had actually not yet planned a war. In that respect the testimony of Field Marshal Milch is very informative.