dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. NELTE: I quote the following passages: "5. The Fuehrer pointed out that all German offices in occupied territories and countries within the Tripartite Agreement must become convinced of the necessity of taking in foreign labor, in order to be able to give uniform support to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in carrying out the required organization, propaganda, and police measures." I quote from the penultimate paragraph: "In my opinion the decree should in the first place be sent to the following offices... "3. The Chief of the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, for the information of the Military Commanders in France and Belgium, the Military Commander Southeast, the General accredited to the Fascist Republican Government of Italy, the chiefs of the army groups in the East." The document therefore proves that Field Marshal Keitel took part in a conference, without, however, stating his point of view on the problem of labor procurement; and that he was to be informed of the Fuehrer decree so that the military commanders might be informed. This confirms what the Defendant Keitel stated in the passages which I have not read as to how he came to be concerned with this question. The second and third documents refer to a conference in the Reich Chancellery on 11 July 1944, in which Field Marshal Keitel did not take part. Now the French prosecutor has made the statement that the teletype is an order issued by Field Marshal Keitel to the military commanders to carry out the decisions of the conference of 11 July. M. Herzog has said in this connection that Keitel's order was dated 15 July 1944. A brief examination of the document, a photostat, shows it to be a teletype dated 9 July, containing an invitation from the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, to a conference on 11 July, which invitation Keitel transmitted to the military commanders. This was, therefore, an error. The conclusions based by the Prosecution on this document are therefore also invalid, but the document is interesting from another point of view as well.
DR. NELTE: It contains the following statement: "The following directives will govern the attitude of military commanders or their representatives: ". . . I refer to my directives for the collaboration of the Armed Forces in the procurement of labor from France (OKW/West/ku (Verw. 1 u. 2 West) Or. 05210/44 geh.)." The Defendant Keitel requested me to call the attention of the Court to this method of expression for the following reasons: Numerous documents bearing the signature "Keitel" have been submitted here. In accordance with his position, which has already been described and which excluded all powers of command, Keitel never used the first person in communications or transmissions of orders. Apart from this document, only one other teletype was submitted by the Prosecution in which the first person is used. In consideration of the large number of documents which bear out Keitel's statement, his claim that he was transmitting an order from the Fuehrer must be believed; and, indeed, the whole style of wording is that of a Fuehrer order. General Warlimont (Document 3819-PS) also expressly refers during the conference of 11 July to a "recently issued Fuehrer order," the contents of which as reproduced by him are exactly as contained in the teletype directive bearing the signature "Keitel." The newly-submitted Document F-824 (RF-1515) is also significant and confirms the evidence given by the Defendant Keitel. This is a letter written on 25 July 1944 by the Commander-in-Chief West, Von Rundstedt, who in the meantime had become the Chief of the Military Commanders in France and Belgium. It states that "by order of the Fuehrer the demands of the GBA and of Speer are to be fulfilled"; further, that in the event of evacuation of the battle area measures must be taken to secure refugees for labor and finally, that reports on the measures taken must be sent to the OKW. This reference to the Fuehrer's order shortly after 11 July 1944 shows, as does Warlimont's statement, that no directives from Keitel or the OKW existed.
DR. NELTE: It may therefore be considered proved that neither Keitel himself nor the OKW had any part in measures for the recruitment or conscription of labor. The OKW was the office responsible for transmitting the orders which Hitler as Sauckel's superior wished to forward to the military commanders; it had no competence and no legal responsibility. Nor is this complex in line with subjects within the ministerial scope of the OKW, where at least there functioned a team of experts providing an opportunity for voicing objections. In the sphere of labor procurement and labor commitment Keitel was in contact with Sauckel's activities at the following points: (a) He was cosignatory of the Fuehrer's decree of 21 March 1942 concerning the appointment of the GBA; (b) He transmitted Hitler's orders to support the activities of the GBA by special instructions to the local military authorities in the occupied territories. Now, the French Prosecution, at the session of 2 February 1946, made the following statement in regard to the deportation of the Jews, within the scope of the Defendant Keitel's responsibility: "I shall discuss the order for the deportation of the Jews later; and I shall prove that in the case of France this order was the result of joint action on the part of the military government, the diplomatic authorities, and the Security Police. This leads to the conclusion that: (1) the Chief of the High Command, et cetera; (2) the Reich Foreign Minister, and (3) the Chief of the Security Police and Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) must necessarily have been informed of and have agreed to this action, for it is clear that through their official functions they must have learned that such measures concerning important matters were taken, and also that the decisions were invariably made jointly by the staffs of three different administrations.
DR. NELTE: These three persons are therefore responsible and guilty." If you examine the very detailed treatment of this point of the Indictment you will find that the High Command of the Armed Forces is not mentioned and that no document is produced which originates either with the OKW or with the Defendant Keitel. It appears from the Keitel affidavit, Document Book 2, that the military commander for France, who is mentioned several times, was not subordinated to the OKW. In handling this question the Prosecution have attempted to prove that the "Army" as M. Faure says, co-operated with the Foreign Office and the Police, and is endeavoring to place responsibility for this co-operation upon the highest authorities, that is, in the case of the Army,' on the OKW, and therefore on Keitel. This deduction is erroneous. In order to make that clear, I must point out that there was a military commander in France. This military commander was invested with civil and military authority and represented the defunct state authority, so that in addition to military tasks he had police and political functions. The military commanders were appointed by the OKH and received their orders from the latter. It follows that on this question they had no direct relations with the OKW. Since the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW was not superior to the OKH, there is likewise no direct relation either of subordination or seniority. M. Faure's statement in this connection is unfortunately true. In France there existed a large number of authorities who worked along different lines, contradicted each other, and frequently encroached upon each other's spheres of competency. The OKW and the Defendant Keitel had actually nothing to do with the Jewish question in France or with the deportations to Auschwitz and other camps; they had no powers of command or control, and therefore no responsibility.
DR. NELTE: The fact that the letter K in the telegram of 13 May 1942 (Document RF-1215) was interpreted to mean Keitel is characteristic of the attitude adopted by the prosecuting authorities, all of whom assumed that the Defendant Keitel was implicated. The French Prosecutor has fortunately cleared up the error. The Prisoner-of-War Question. The fate of prisoners of war has always aroused considerable feeling. All civilized nations have tried to alleviate the fate of soldiers who fell into the hands of the enemy as far as was possible without prejudicing the conduct of the war. The reaching of an agreement to be adhered to even when the nations were engaged in a life and death struggle has been considered one of the most important advances of civilization. The torturing uncertainty with regard to the fate of these soldiers seemed to be ended; their humane treatment guaranteed; the dignity of the disarmed opponent assured. Our belief in this achievement of human society has begun to waver, as in the case of so many other instances. Although the agreement was formally adhered to originally owing to the determined resistance of the general officers, we must nevertheless admit that a brutal policy oblivious of the nation's own sons and of anything but its own striving after power, has in many cases disregarded the sanctity of the Red Cross and the unwritten laws of humanity. The treatment of the responsibility of the Defendant Keitel in the general complex of the prisoner-of-war system comprises the following separate problems: (1) The general organization of the treatment of prisoners of war, that is, the German legislation on the prisoner-of-war system; (2) the power of command over prisoner-of-war camps, which are classified under Oflag, Stalag, and Dulag; (3) the supervision and control of this legislation and its application; (4) the individual cases which have been brought before the Court in the course of the indictment.
DR. NELTE: Since the organization of the prisoner-of-war system has been set forth as part of the presentation of evidence, I can restrict myself to stating that Keitel was, by order of Hitler and within the scope of his assignments as War Minister, in accordance with the decree of 4 February 1938 competent and to that extent responsible: (a) for the material right to issue ordinances within the entire local and pertinent sphere, restricted in part by co-operation and coresponsibility regarding the utilization of prisoner-of-war labor; (b) for the general allocation of prisoners of war arriving in Germany to the corps area commander, without having powers of command over prisoner-of-war camps and prisoners of war themselves; (c) for the general supervision of the camps in the OKW area not including those within the zone of operations, the rear Army area, or the area of the military commanders, nor the Navy and Air Force prisoner-of-war camps. The competent of lice in the OKW was the "Chief of the Prisoner-of-War Organization," who was several times made personally responsible by the Prosecution. The Defendant Keitel attaches importance to the fact that the Chief of the Prisoners of War Organization was his subordinate through the Armed Forces Department. Hence the responsibility of the Defendant Keitel in this domain is self-evident, even in those cases in which he did not personally sign orders and decrees. The basic regulations for the treatment of prisoners of war were: (1) The service regulations issued by the Chief of the OKW within the scope of normal preparations for mobilization, and laid down in a series of Army, Navy, and Air Force publications; (2) the stipulations of the Geneva Convention, to which special reference was made in the service regulations; (3) the general decrees and, orders which became necessary from time to time in the course of events.
DR. NELTE: Apart from the treatment of Soviet Russian prisoners of war who were subject to regulations on an entirely different basis, to which I shall later make particular reference, the provisions of the service regulations in accordance with international law, that is the Geneva Convention, held good. The OKW exercised supervision over the strict observance of these Army service regulations through an Inspector of the Prisoners of War Organization and, from 1943 on, through a further control agency, the Inspector General of the Prisoners of War Organization. The representatives of the protecting powers and the International Red Cross may be considered as constituting an additional control agency, which no doubt submitted to the various governments reports on inspections and visits to the camps, in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention. No such reports have been submitted here by the Prosecution; I shall come back to the charges made here by the French prosecutor. But the fact that the British and American prosecutors, for instance, have not submitted such reports may well permit the conclusion that the protecting powers did not discover any serious violations with regard to the treatment of inmates of prisoner-of-war camps. The treatment of prisoners of war, which led to no serious complaints during the first few years of the war with the Western Powers-I except isolated cases like that of Dieppe-became more and more difficult for the OKW from year to year, because political and economic considerations gained a very strong influence in this sector. The Reichsfuehrer SS tried to get the Prisoners of War Organization into his own hands. The resulting struggles for power caused Hitler to turn over the Prisoners of War Organization to Himmler from October 1944 on, the alleged reason being that the Armed Forces had shown itself to be too weak and allowed itself to be influenced by doubts based on international law.
DR. NELTE: Another important factor was the influence exerted on Hitler, and through him on the OKW, by the labor authorities and the armament sector. This influence grew stronger as the labor shortage increased. The Party Chancellery, the German Labor Front, and the Propaganda Ministry also played a part in this question, which was in itself purely a military one. The OKW was engaged in a constant struggle with all these agencies, most of which had more influence than the OKW. All these circumstances must be taken into consideration in order properly to understand and evaluate the responsibility of the Defendant Keitel. As he himself had to carry out the functions "by order," and since Hitler always kept the problem of the Prisoners of War Organization- under his personal control for reasons previously described, the Defendant Keitel was scarcely ever in a position to voice his own, that is, military, objections against instructions and orders. The Treatment of French Prisoners of War. As a result of the agreement of Montoire, the keynote to apply to relations with French prisoners of war became "collaboration." Their treatment moved in the direction indicated by this; and discussions with Ambassador Scapini brought about a considerable improvement for them. In this connection I refer to the affidavit of Ambassador Scapini, who states among other things: "It is correct that General Reinecke examined the questions at hand objectively and without hostility, and that he attempted to regulate them reasonably when this depended on his authority alone. He took a different attitude when the pressure exercised on the OKW by the Labor Service-that is by the Allocation of Labor-and sometimes by the Party made itself felt." The prisoners of war used for labor were scarcely guarded, and those employed in the country had almost complete freedom of movement.
DR. NELTE: By virtue of the direct understanding with the Vichy Government there were considerable alleviations in comparison Ninth the rules of the Geneva Convention, after repatriation under the armistice provisions had very considerably lessened the number of the original prisoners of war. To mention just a few...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, is there anything very important in these next few pages, until you get to Page 183?
DR.NELTE: It is the treatment of the French...
THE PRESIDENT: If you would only deal with it in a very general way. I should have thought there was nothing very important until you get to Page 183 where you begin to deal with the accusation in reference to the Sagan case. You see, it is 12 o'clock now.
DR. NELTE: I believe that by 1 o'clock I shall be through. Or am I to. understand your remark to mean that you are limiting my speech to a certain time? I asked you to grant me 7 hours for my speech, and my request...
THE PRESIDENT: That is what the Tribunal's order was.
DR. NELTE: I submitted my request to the Tribunal, and believed I could assume that in this particular case my request was granted, but if that is not the case...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will give you until 12:30 on account of any interruptions which I may have made. But I again suggest to you that there is really nothing between 178 and 183 which is of any real importance.
DR.NELTE: I hope, Mr. President, that that does not mean that these statements are to be considered irrelevant. I think my subjective opinions... 9 July 4G
THE PRESIDENT: I said "of real importance."
DR. NELTE: (1) Release of all prisoners of war born in or before 1900; (2) release of fathers of families with numerous children and widowers with children; (3) considerable alleviation of the mail and parcel facilities; increased German support for officers' and enlisted personnel camps by establishing institutions for entertainment and physical welfare of the prisoners of war; (4) for officer candidates, facilitation of their further training in their civilian occupation and care by a French General, Didelet. As Ambassador Scaloppini himself has testified, he and the members of his delegation had complete freedom of Correspondence with and access to all camps and labor detachments, except for special military reasons in isolated eases. The members of the delegation were able to speak to their prisoner comrades privately, like every, representative of a protecting power, and they were particularly able to make detailed inquiries about conditions with the French camp leader or the trustees, who were elected by the prisoners of war themselves. In addition to this, officers who had been selected by him personally were placed at his disposal as his assistants. The subsequent regrettable occurrences, as presented by the French Prosecution here resulted from the deterioration of the political and military situation. One of these occurrences was the escape of General Giraud, which Hitler, in spite of all arguments brought by the ORW, used to have measures against the French generals and officers increased in severity. The second decisive incident was the Allied invasion of Africa, which led to general unrest and to numerous attempts at escape. Finally, at the time of the last stage of the war, measures were applied which Can only be explained by the-I would call it catastrophic-morale. In examining the responsibility of the Defendant Keitel it must be considered that he did not possess any direct influence on the occurrences in the camps and workshops.
DR. NELTE: His responsibility can only be determined if it is proven that he had caused a lack of necessary supervision, or that no intervention had taken place after learning of such occurrences. In this respect, however, there is no proof of guilt of the OEW. The French Prosecution, in the charges against the Defendant Keitel, have presented a note from Ambassador Scapini to the German Ambassador, Abetz, of 4 April lg41 under a collective number, F-668. This refers to the retaining of French civilians in Germany as prisoners of war. This document states on Page 5: "In order to facilitate the examination of the categories to be released, I am transmitting enclosed a summarized chart. I am also enclosing a Copy of the note of the German Armistice Commission Number 178/41 of 20 January 1941, which refers to the decision of the OKW to liberate all French civilians who are being treated as prisoners of war. "I hope that the execution of this decision win be expedited through this report, which I have the honor to submit to you." I have asked the French Prosecution to pass on to me the note of the German Armistice Commission Number 178741 of 20 January 1941, in which this decision of the OK-W is mentioned. I believe that the copy of this note, which was attached to the communication of 4 April 1941 (Document F-668) should have been handed over with this document, because it was part of this document. Unfortunately this has not been done. From the reference it can be seen that the ORW, and thereby the Defendant Keitel, held the view that things would have to be dealt with in a correct manner in accordance with the agreements with France, and that the OKW, which was the proper authority for these fundamental orders with regard to the prisoners of war, had decided to release all French civilians who were being treated as prisoners of war. It is difficult to recognize how this document can serve as evidence of guilt of the Defendant Keitel.
DR. NELTE: Rather will this document have to be regarded as symptomatic of the fact that the Defendant Keitel, when violations against existing agreements came to his knowledge, saw to it that they were stopped. The Treatment of Soviet Russian Prisoners of War. Hitler already regarded the prisoner-of-war problem as a personal domain of his legislation, and the more time passed, the less he regarded it from the points of view of international law and military needs, but rather from a political and economic angle. The problem in the treatment of Soviet Russian prisoners of war from the very beginning was also subject to ideological considerations which for him was the primary motive in the war against the Soviet Union. The fact that the Soviet Union was not a member of the Geneva Convention was exploited by Hitler, in order to obtain a free hand in the treatment of Soviet Russian prisoners of war. He stated to the generals that the Soviet Union felt equally free from all stipulations which had been created by the Geneva Convention for the protection of prisoners of war. One must read the decrees of 8 September 1941 (Document Number EC-338, Exhibit Number USSR-356) in order to understand clearly Hitler's attitude. In the official document of the counterintelligence office (Amt Ausland Abwehr) of 15 September 1941, rules were laid down, which were to be observed according to international law, concerning the treatment of prisoners of war where the Geneva Convention did not apply between belligerents. The Defendant Keitel has testified on the witness stand that he had accepted the viewpoints laid down in this document and had presented them to Hitler. The latter strictly refused to rescind the decree of 8 September 1941. He told Keitel: "Your doubts originate from the soldierly conception of a chivalrous war.