dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON MANSTEIN: I did not worry about that at the time, as I had nothing to do with the economic plans in the occupied territories, nor with the political plans from which we were excluded. I can only say that we soldiers had the one thought of keeping the population in occupied territories quiet by treating them reasonably, and our considerations did not go beyond that.
COL. TAYLOR: Whether you worried about it or not, didn't you know who Hitler and the other political leaders thought were the elements in the Soviet population most likely to be obstructive? I'm asking you, didn't you know?
VON MANSTEIN: Naturally he considered the political commissars to be harmful and to be our enemies; and that was expressed by him in the Commissar Order. Apart from the Commissar Order, I do not know to what extent he thought of annihilating such elements; he did not tell us that, nor did we receive an order to that effect.
COL. TAYLOR: Didn't he also think the Jews should be exterminated for exactly the same reasons?
VON MANSTEIN: That may be; but never once did he discuss the question of the Jews with me.
COL. TAYLOR: You didn't know anything about that?
VON MANSTEIN: No, I knew nothing of the plan of extermination.
COL. TAYLOR: I'd like to ask you a few more questions about the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos. Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not know that one of the most important missions of those units was to assist in exterminating the commissars and the Jews in accordance with these policies?
VON MANSTEIN: No, I did not know that.
COL. TAYLOR: Was there an Einsatzgruppe attached to your army, the 11th Army?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes. As Ohlendorf has testified, this Einsatzgruppe was active in the area of my army.
COL. TAYLOR: I think you told us earlier that the Einsatzgruppe was entirely under the orders of Himmler for operational purposes. I think you also told us that Himmler was a bitter enemy of the Army. What did you do when you learned there was an Einsatzgruppe attached to the Army? What were you told about it?
VON MANSTEIN: At that time it was reported to me-I do not even know if the name "Einsatzgruppe" was mentioned at the time-that organs of the SS were to investigate the population in the operational areas from a political point of view and that they had received orders for that from Himmler. I could not do anything against that, because I could not possibly assume that these units of the SS were given criminal tasks.
COL. TAYLOR: Is the commander-in-chief pleased to have an independent unit operating in his area which he cannot order around? Is that customary? Do you like it?
VON MANSTEIN: No, of course one does not like it, but then there were numerous other independent units. I should like to mention that the Air Force did not come under our command in any way. When we were fighting together we had to make arrangements with them. We could not give them any orders. The same applied to the Organization Todt and the organization of the Economic Staff East, and to the Police. In short, we were confined to the actual military leadership, and in the last analysis that is the best thing for a soldier because, according to popular judgment, he knows very little about other matters.
COL. TAYLOR: Did it not even arouse your curiosity to have an independent unit under Himmler's orders operating in your area? Did it not stimulate you to find out what it was doing?
VON MANSTEIN: The task of investigating the population for their political reliability was reported to me. I have already said that I was at army headquarters only for 2 or 3 days, after which I went to the front. I might say that the actual fighting made such demands on me during the entire winter when I was a commander that there was no room for curiosity about things of which I could have no idea.
COL. TAYLOR: You talked to the chief of staff and other staff officers from time to time, did you not?
VON MANSTEIN: I only met the other commanders-in-chief when there was a conference with any of them at the OKH. Naturally I talked to my officers. But this question of the SD never cropped up, because as far as we were concerned, it did not appear to us to be an important question.
COL. TAYLOR: Did you not ever ask your chief of staff or any staff officer to keep you very carefully informed on what these independent groups under Himmler were doing in your area?
VON MANSTEIN: No. One cannot speak of independent troops of Himmler, for this Einsatzgruppe was comparatively small and never put in an appearance. It only appeared when they supplied us with men for combating the partisans in the Crimea. I know that my staff was negotiating with the SS leader about that.
COL. TAYLOR: I have still two or three documents dealing with this matter which are already in evidence. I would like to show them to you and ask a few questions about them. The first one is the Affidavit Number 12, which is already in evidence. It is USA-557. The first part of this affidavit concerns matters which you probably do not know about directly. You should know about the second paragraph, certainly. This is an affidavit by Walter Schellenberg. I would like to read the first two paragraphs. The Tribunal will find this in the first document book on the General Staff. "In. the middle of May 1941, as far as I remember, the chief of Amt IV of the Reich Security Main Office (SS Brigadefuehrer Muller), in the name of the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office (SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich), held discussions with the Generalquartiermeister of the Army (General Wagner) about questions connected with the operations of the Sipo and SD within the bounds of the Field Army during the imminent campaign against Russia. Wagner could c6me to no agreement with Muller, and therefore Heydrich asked to send another representative. I was at that time chief of Section E in Amt IV of the RSHA under the chief of Amt IV, Muller, and because of my experience with protocols I was sent by Heydrich to Wagner for the purpose of drawing up the final agreement. According to the instructions given to me, I was supposed to make sure that this agreement would provide that the responsible headquarters in the Army would be firmly obligated to give complete support to all activities of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos of the Sipo and SD. I discussed the problem of this mutual. relationship in great detail with Wagner. In accordance with this discussion I then presented him with the completed draft of an agreement, which met with his full approval. This draft was the basis for a final discussion between Wagner and Heydrich towards the end of May 1941.
COL. TAYLOR: "The contents of this agreement, as far as I remember, were substantially as follows: Its basis was the Fuehrer's order, mentioned at the very beginning of the agreement, that the Sipo and SD should operate within the combat elements of the Field Army with the mission of utterly smashing all resistance in conquered rear areas of the front as well as in conquered rear supply zones by every means and as quickly as possible. The various areas were then set down in which the Sipo and SD were to be assigned and in which they were to operate. The individual Einsatzgruppen were then assigned to the army groups which were to take part in the campaign, and the individual Einsatzkommandos to the respective armies. "The Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were to operate in detail: "1) In front-line areas: in complete sub-ordination to the Field Army, tactically, technically, and as regards troop service; 2) in rear of conquered areas: in subordination to the Meld Army only as regards troop service, but otherwise under the command and technical control of the RSHA; 3) in rear army areas: the same arrangement as in 2; 4) in areas of the civil administration in the East: same as in the Reich. "The tactical and technical authority and responsibility of front-line headquarters of the Field Army over the Einsatzkommandos was not limited under the agreement and therefore needed no further clarification."
THE PRESIDENT: This is already in evidence, so we do not need the details.
COL. TAYLOR: It is in evidence. It was never read before. I have just one more paragraph I would like to read with your permission.
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.
COL. TAYLOR: "The agreement made it clear that subordination as regards troop service embraced not only disciplinary subordination, but also the provisioning of rear headquarters of the Field Army, the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos being subordinated in matters of supply (gasoline, rations, et cetera), as well as in the use of the communications network." That is all that needs to be read, Your Honor. Witness, is it now true that the Army made it possible for these Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos to operate; that you furnished them with the supplies and transports arid other things they had to have to carry out their mission?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes, certainly. We know that because of the economic contribution the SS made to the Army. COL. TAYLOR. Is it not also true that the commanding generals had to keep track of what these units were doing, so that their operations would not interfere with military operations?
VON MANSTEIN: No. Actually the commanding generals did not have to bother with the Einsatzgruppen unless they appeared at the front and caused disturbance. As I have told you, I, as commanding general, did not meet any such Einsatzgruppe in my area.
COL. TAYLOR: Have you told the Tribunal it was only at the front wher6 military operations could be disturbed? Is it not also true that rear areas are also important as regards the securing of communications and pacifying the population? Were you not concerned about the rear areas, too?
VON MANSTEIN: In the rear areas we were interested in securing our lines of supply, that is, the roads and railroads. Mostly we did this ourselves. A disturbance could only have taken place if, for instance, mass executions or some such things-as I have heard now did take place-caused difficulties and unrest amongst the population. The commanders of the rear areas would have heard about this, and they would certainly have interfered.
COL. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I would like next to read a little bit from Document 447-PS, in evidence as USA-135. May I call your attention to Paragraph 2, Subdivision a)., beginning with "The area of operations..." Do you see that?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: I would like to read two paragraphs: "a). The area of operations created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority to the commanders of the army groups and armies. "b). In the area of army operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is entrusted on behalf of the Fuehrer with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried 'out between two conflicting political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and on his own responsibility. The executive power vested in the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS." I am asking you again, Witness, whether it was the responsibility of you and your headquarters to make sure that the operations of these groups did not interfere with military operations and that you must have kept yourself fully informed on what they were doing?
VON MANSTEIN: If there had been disturbance of military operations in any form, naturally the commanders would have had to intervene, but the fact that the Political Police supervised an occupied area and, in that occupied area, investigated the political reliability of people, is by no means reason to assume that wrongs were committed or that there were mass shootings, or any shootings at all, in this area. The political supervision by Political Police is a phenomenon which exists in every occupied territory.
COL. TAYLOR: I think you have already testified that you did not know of any mass shootings in your area. Is that right? You did not know of any?
VON MANSTEIN: No, I did not know of any.
COL. TAYLOR: I wish to present Document R-102, which is now in evidence as USA-470, and would like to read two paragraphs from the last page of the translation. I think the two paragraphs in question are marked in your copy. They are on Page 17 or 18. You will see the original report covering the activities of the Einsatzgruppen in the U.S.S.R. during the month of October, and it covers the activities of all four Einsatzgruppen, including Group D, which was attached to your army. The section beginning on Page 16 relates to the activities of the Einsatzgruppen C and D, which were, in the Ukraine. Under that you will note Paragraph b, which is headed "Arrests and executions of Communists and functionaries." Do you find that?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: I quote: "The search for leading Communists resulted in the arrest of Kaminski, former GPU chief of Cherson. In the years 1919 to 1921 he had carried out the liquidation of the Czarist officers. The head of the prison work shops of the NKVD was also caught. "In Kiev a number of NKVD officials and political commissars were rendered innocuous." And the next subheading "Jews." The first two paragraphs relate to cities outside your area, I believe. Then there is a paragraph which deals with Cherson. Cherson is about 40 miles from Nikolaievsk. Would you say that 60 kilometers would be right?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes, that must be right.
COL. TAYLOR: I quote: "In Cherson 410 Jews were executed as a measure of retaliation for acts of sabotage. Especially in the area east of the Dnieper, the solution of the Jewish question has been taken up energetically by the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the SD. The areas newly occupied by the Kommandos were purged of Jews. In the course of this action, 4,891 Jews were liquidated. At other places the Jews were marked and registered. This rendered it possible to put at the disposal of the Wehrmacht for urgent labor Jewish worker groups up to 1,000 persons." Are you still telling the Tribunal that you knew nothing of the operations of this Einsatzgruppe under your army?
VON MANSTEIN: If you mean the case of Cherson, then I have to tell you that I never received a report about such incidents, nor did I receive a report of the arrest of the GPU man, Kaminski. I remained in Nikolaievsk only until about 24 September; then I had my command post in the vicinity of Melitopol, which is far to the east. As far as the liquidation of Jews east of the Dnieper is concerned, I would point out that the operational zone of my army at that time was the Nogai Steppe, a steppe with very few settlements, and part of these settlements, former German villages, were completely evacuated and the inhabitants taken away by the Red Army. Therefore, there could not have been any liquidation of Jews worth mentioning, since there were hardly any Jews there. These 4,000 Jews can only have come from the district east of the Dnieper, that is, where the large operations of the Donets area started, and that was already the operational territory of the First Panzer Army; it was already beyond my territory.
COL. TAYLOR: Did the commanding generals on the Eastern Front submit special instructions to the troops which support this program to liquidate the Jews and commissars?
VON MANSTEIN: No, that is quite out of the question.
COL. TAYLOR: Did General Reichenau issue such an instruction?
VON MANSTEIN: No. I only know of one order of General Reichenau, which has been brought up in court, and in which he discusses the fighting in the East. This order was sent to us on Hitler's instructions as an example. I personally turned down the order and did not apply it in any way in the orders I issued, and I know of no other commander who attached any weight to it.
COL. TAYLOR: That order of General Reichenau instructed troops to take the most severe revenge on subhuman Jews and all elements of Bolshevism, did it not? Have you seen the order?
VON MANSTEIN: No, I remember that I received an order from General Von Reichenau, but I do not remember that it demanded the liquidation of the Jews, and I consider it entirely out of the question that he did order that.
COL. TAYLOR: What did you do yourself when it was suggested that you issue an order like General Reichenau's order?
VON MANSTEIN: It was not suggested to me. It was sent to us as an order of Hitler's as a model. I did nothing about it and I considered such an order as quite beside the point, because I wanted to conduct the fight in a military manner and in no other way.
COL. TAYLOR: So you did not do anything about it?
VON MANSTEIN: No, what should I have done?
COL. TAYLOR: I ask to be shown to the witness, as I said first, the document by General Reichenau. It is USA-556. I will now ask that the witness be shown a new Document 4664-PS, USA-92-7. Will you look at this order, Witness, and tell us if this is not a document issued out of your headquarters and signed with your facsimile signature, on 20 November 1941? It is already in, the record.
VON MANSTEIN: I must first read the document thoroughly I do not recollect this order.
COL. TAYLOR: Is that your signature?
VON MANSTEIN: It looks like it, but I must first of all read the order to see whether I gave it or not.
COL. TAYLOR: The document, as indicated at the top of the page, states; "XXX. Corps Ref. IC." That is the intelligence office, is it not?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes, that is the name of the office that dealt with enemy intelligence and countering enemy espionage. It has nothing to do with Secret Service as such.
COL. TAYLOR: And just below there is a stamp of the 72d Division, 27 November 1941, Diary Number IC, and at the left it appears to have been issued by Army High Command XI at army headquarters, 20 November 1941. Secret. I quote: "Since 22 June the German people have been engaged in a life-and-death struggle against the Bolshevist system. "This struggle is not being carried on against the Soviet Armed Forces alone in the established form laid down by European rules of warfare. "Behind the front too, the fighting continues. Partisan snipers dressed as civilians attack single soldiers and small units and try to disrupt our supplies by sabotage with mines and infernal machines. Bolshevists left behind keep the population freed from Bolshevism in a state of unrest by means of terror and attempt thereby to sabotage the political and economic pacification of the country. Harvests and factories are destroyed and the city population in particular is thereby ruthlessly delivered to starvation. "Jewry constitutes the middleman between the enemy in the rear and the remainder of the Red Armed Forces which is still fighting, and the Red leadership. More strongly than in Europe it holds all the key positions in the political leadership and administration, controls commerce and trades, and further forms the nucleus for all unrest and possible uprisings. "The Jewish-Bolshevist system must be exterminated once and for all. Never again must it encroach upon our European living space. "Th6 German soldier has therefore not only the task of crushing the military potential of this system. He comes also as the bearer of a racial concept and as the avenger of all the cruelties' which have been perpetrated on him and on the German people. "The fight behind the lines is not yet being taken seriously enough. Active co-operation of all soldiers must be demanded in the disarming of the population, the control and arrest of all roving soldiers and civilians, and the removal of Bolshevist symbols.
COL. TAYLOR: "Every instance of sabotage must be punished immediately with the severest measures and all signs thereof must be reported. "The food situation at home makes it essential that the troops should as far as possible be fed off the land and that furthermore the largest possible stocks should be placed at the disposal of the homeland. Particularly in enemy cities a large part of the population will have to go hungry. Nevertheless nothing which the homeland has sacrificed itself to contribute may, out of a misguided sense of humanity, be given to prisoners or to the population unless they are in the service of the German Wehrmacht. "The soldier must appreciate the necessity for the harsh punishment of Jewry, the spiritual bearer of the Bolshevist terror. This is also necessary in order to nip in the bud all uprisings which are mostly plotted by Jews. "It is the task of leaders of all grades to keep constantly alive the meaning of the present struggle. Support for the Bolshevist fight behind the front by way of thoughtlessness must be prevented. "The non-Bolshevist Ukrainians, Russians, and Tartars are expected to acknowledge the New Order. The nonparticipation of numerous alleged anti-Soviet elements must give place' to a definite decision in favor of active co-operation against Bolshevism. Where it does not exist it must be forced by suitable measures. "Voluntary co-operation in the reconstruction of occupied territory is an absolute necessity for the achievement of our economic and political aims. "It demands as a primary condition the just treatment of all non-,Bolshevist sections of the population, some of whom have for years fought heroically against Bolshevism. "The ruling of this country demands from us results, strictness with ourselves, and submergence of the individual. The bearing of every soldier is constantly under observation. It can make enemy propaganda ineffective or give it a springboard.
COL. TAYLOR: If the soldier in the country takes from the peasant the last cow, the breeding sow, the last chicken, or the seed, then no restoration of the economy can be achieved. "In all measures it is not the momentary success which is decisive. All measures must, therefore, be judged by their lasting effectiveness. "Respect for religious customs, particularly those of Mohammedan Tartars, must be demanded. "In pursuance of these concepts and other measures to be carried out by the later administration, such as the enlightenment of the population by propaganda, encouragement of personal initiative, for instance by rewards, significance must be given to extensive collaboration of the population for combating the partisans and to, the development of the local Auxiliary Police. "For the achievement of this object the following must be demanded: "Active co-operation of soldiers in the fight against the enemy in the rear; no soldier to go about alone at night; all motor vehicles to be equipped with adequate armament; a self-assured, but not overbearing attitude on the part of all soldiers; restraint towards prisoners and the other sex; no waste of food. "Severest action to be taken: against despotism and self-seeking; against lawlessness and lack of discipline; against every transgression of the honor of a soldier." And it appears that it is to be distributed right down to the regiments and independent battalions. Did you not issue that order as a result of the suggestion which came to you together with the Reichenau order? The resemblance between the two is, to say the least, striking and the date is about the same.