dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
tasks should be undertaken only by special order of OKW. The working staff was able, during the four weeks available, to compile detailed material, providing the respective war economy departments with valuable material for their duties. All necessary orders, directives and so forth were issued in a special calendar in order of mobilization. [Pages 276-282] On April 2 it was decided to select April 9 as the day on which the operation should be carried out. The execution of the operation was on the whole carried out according to plan. Provision was made that the WO should reach their posts together with their respective staffs, namely, Major Neef by air, the WO Osbjerg and Aarhus over-land, the remaining gentlemen in the warships in which the staffs were transported, while all WO, though partly under heavy fighting, reached their objective on April 9, Major Neef was not able to reach Oslo until April 12, because of the opposition near Oslo. The unified War Economy Organization which had been prepared for Norway and Denmark depended upon the regulation that the Senior Command for special missions XXXI in Denmark was subordinate to group XXI in Norway. When it soon became evident that this arrangement did not work because of distances and because of the conflicting behavior of the Norwegian and Danish governments, it was decided on April 10 to make the Senior Command for Denmark directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Army, while group XXI together with the forces operating in Norway was to remain subordinate to the OKW. As a result of this change it also became necessary to divide the War Economy organization. the War Economy Liaison Office Denmark was placed under the supervision of the administrator of Danish economy, on the staff of the political plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer in Copenhagen; the organization Norway under Major Neef remained attached to group XXI. In Norway as well as in Denmark the assignment of War Economy Offices to the military detachments has proved successful. The War Economy Offices were burdened with so many problems that their small staff barely sufficed; they were very quickly maids of all work. As soon as the offices were well established in their new districts and the most
as in Denmark the assignment of War Economy Offices to the military detachments has proved successful. The War Economy Offices were burdened with so many problems that their small staff barely sufficed; they were very quickly maids of all work. As soon as the offices were well established in their new districts and the most important military problems had been settled, they quickly attended to the construction of the War Economy Organization. In Norway for the first few days after the occupation, the German Ambassador Dr. Braeuer, remained the political plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer. As Foreign Office commissioner, dealing with economic problems, Min. Direktor Sarnow of the Reich Wi. M. was attached to him. Major Neef immediately tried to secure a definition of the fields of work. However, when this did not meet with any success, for the sake of the work, he arranged with Min. Dir. Sarnow that the office of WO Norway as should be incorporated into the Staff of the commissioner dealing with economic problems, as Main Division II. This measure, however, was never carried out, because both Dr. Braeuer and Min. Dir. Sarnow were recalled on April 22 and the Gauleiter of the NSDAP Terboven was named by the Fuehrer as Reichcommissioner of the occupied Norwegian territories. All attempts by Major Neef to clarify the status and spheres of activity with the 2nd in Command of the Reich Commissar Gauwirtschaftsberater Otte, were for the time being unsuccessful. On April 27 the former Liaison Office was changed to the War Economy Staff Norway. The WO as a branch office was subordinate to the latter. In Denmark, Commander Dr. Forstmann quickly succeeded in coming to an understanding with the German Ambassador von Renthe-Fink and his commercial attache Dr. Krueger in regard to the spheres of activity. On May 27 the Office was renamed "War Economy Staff Denmark." The details concerning the establishing of the War Economy offices, their growth, and their manifold tasks have been thoroughly described in the accounts of the WStb Denmark and Norway. Hence, within the scope of this report the details will not come under discussion. In short, attention should only be drawn to the tasks as a whole, and the most important experiences
the War Economy offices, their growth, and their manifold tasks have been thoroughly described in the accounts of the WStb Denmark and Norway. Hence, within the scope of this report the details will not come under discussion. In short, attention should only be drawn to the tasks as a whole, and the most important experiences during this first large-scale operation of the War Economy Organization. The problems which faced the war economy officers during the occupation of Denmark and Norway were very extensive and embraced both military as well as economic problems in all fields of economy. The military leaders were glad that officers trained in war economy were at their disposal, who were qualified to solve questions of an economic-organizational character and, as authorities, could negotiate with Danish and Norwegian Officials. At this moment the manner in which the War Economy Organization had been formed, proved, its worth in that there was personnel trained in military as well as industrial and commercial fields. Thus it happened that problems were entrusted to the WO which really lay beyond the scope of their activities. The following may be named: Supplying troops with food, Motor vehicles and fuel, Procuring billeting possibilities for the troops, Securing money and regulating the currency problem, Procuring material (cement, wood, etc.), Providing coal, Regulating transportation, Loading troops onto ships, Procuring raw materials and finished products, Putting the fishing industry into operation, Rationing food for the armed forces and the civilian population, Rationing of fuel, Cooperating with the sailings of ships putting in and out, Administering the loading of ships, Checking over claims for compensation for war damage and requisitions, Utilization of fish garbage and the manufacture of fish flour, Price regulations for the purchase and renting of real estate for the armed forces, The loaning of horses and seed for agriculture. These and similar problems had to be taken over by the WO, because the competent offices of the Armed Forces Departments were not there or were not in the position to solve these problems. Only after these problems had been solved, was it possible for the Wo to cope with the real problems affecting war
These and similar problems had to be taken over by the WO, because the competent offices of the Armed Forces Departments were not there or were not in the position to solve these problems. Only after these problems had been solved, was it possible for the Wo to cope with the real problems affecting war economy, which dealt immediately with the seizing and securing of the most important agricultural supplies and the reestablishing of the means of subsistence. Then the problems in Denmark and Norway shaped themselves in different ways as a result of the war situation (see appendix XX, 6). As early as June 15 the order could be issued regarding Denmark that the country be treated as being in the domestic theatre of operations; and therefore it was possible to quickly begin to make full use of the Danish defence and armament industry. The exploitation of the armament industry in Norway could only follow at a slower pace and at a later period, because it was regarded as being enemy territory. The utilization of the Danish and Norwegian economy followed within the framework of the "Proposals by the armed forces for the regulating of the general questions in regard to war and armament economy." (see appendix XX, 7). Very soon it was necessary for the Wi Rue department and the War Economy offices in Denmark and Norway to take sharp measures in order to avoid duplication of work and the overlapping of the WT in Danish and Norwegian concerns. Above all, it was important for the sake of currency stabilization to keep a firm hand over the buyers of the WT, because they were causing danger to the currencies of the countries by flooding them with fiduciary monetary tender. It very soon became finally necessary to adopt measures to make the raw material available for those orders placed with Denmark and Norway, because, in part, the raw materials needed for the purpose of filling these orders were not to be had there. In order to hasten the process of getting Norwegian industry into operation again, the Wi Rue Amt. sent German industrial and economic personnel to Norway, who, as middle-men, were to quickly establish confidential relationships and who on account of their expert knowledge were to accelerate the revival
be had there. In order to hasten the process of getting Norwegian industry into operation again, the Wi Rue Amt. sent German industrial and economic personnel to Norway, who, as middle-men, were to quickly establish confidential relationships and who on account of their expert knowledge were to accelerate the revival of Norwegian Economy. The experiences of the first months of the occupation show that it is absolutely necessary to provide units operating independently with War Economy Offices, since in a modern war economic problems are submitted to the commanders which can only be solved by trained personnel. It is self evident that, later on, a major portion of the problems must be transferred to the civilian Economic departments, which will be set up, and that the soldier confines himself to the solution of economic problems that serve the troops, as long as no solution is found, as later proved to be the case, in the Netherlands. The staffing of the WO for Denmark and Norway was in most cases too small, because the problems were too complex and the fields of operation allotted to them were too large. Yet it is an established fact that the War Economy Offices, in Denmark and Norway especially, rendered invaluable services to the troops during the first months and that an organization for the reopening of industrial operations and to carry out the commissions of the WT was an absolute necessity. Moreover, the outstanding work of the War Economy offices in Denmark and Norway was the main reason for the fact that, in 1941, it was possible to carry out, according to plan, the enormous work for the defense of the country, which was required of the Economies of Denmark and Norway by the Supreme Command. [Pages 283-284] 2. Campaign in the West The operations against France, Holland and Belgium brought about the first real use of the war economy organization in enemy territory. It was accomplished in close cooperation with General Qu. of the Army. At the start of the war, the armed Forces operating in the West were, by reason of the experience gained during the campaign in Poland, supplied with Army Economic Officers [Armeewirtschaftsfuehrer-A Wi Fue] who simultaneously were the liaison with
in close cooperation with General Qu. of the Army. At the start of the war, the armed Forces operating in the West were, by reason of the experience gained during the campaign in Poland, supplied with Army Economic Officers [Armeewirtschaftsfuehrer-A Wi Fue] who simultaneously were the liaison with the armament offices in the border territory. The primary duties of the A Wi Fue attached to the Western armies were the tasks of economic evacuation and immobilization and only at the end of 1939 did the preparations for the entry into Holland, Belgium and France come to the foreground. The process of economic evacuation in the homeland rested mainly with the competent Rue commands of the homeland, who had arranged the necessary preparations by way of mobilization, in accordance with the clearance measures already prepared during peacetime. Especially in the Saar territory the VO had a complicated task to perform, and was able to demonstrate the value of its existence for defense also. [Pages 313-315] Negotiations with friendly and neutral states on war economy and also delivery of war material. The year 1940 brought special problems for the office of Wi Rue as far as trade in war material was concerned as a result of the deliveries, necessitated by the military political situation, to Russia, Finland, Roumania and Italy. As previously reported in 1939, according to the German-Russo treaty of August 19, 1939, the German deliveries on credit were to attain in the next two years the sum of 200 millions RM, 120 millions RM, thereof during the first year. It was indicated that German deliveries of material to the value of 500 millions RM were desired during the first year alone. As such quantities of machines, vehicles, apparatus, etc., could not be obtained from the production point of view in such a short time, and as the Russians had also included war material in their request, the preponderent desire, from the beginning, at the Foreign office and the Reichministry of economy was, to put at the disposal of the Russians as much finished war material as possible. As reported previously, the Russians had made ready for their first reciprocal delivery valuable foods and raw material (1 million tons cereals, 500,000 tons
at the Foreign office and the Reichministry of economy was, to put at the disposal of the Russians as much finished war material as possible. As reported previously, the Russians had made ready for their first reciprocal delivery valuable foods and raw material (1 million tons cereals, 500,000 tons wheat, 900,000 tons of oil by-products, 100,000 tons of cotton, 500,000 tons phosphates, 80 millions RM of timber, 10000 tons of flax, manganese, platinum, and the transit for 1 million tons of Soybeans), and in consideration of the importance of these quantities to the German war economy and the importance which the Supreme Command attached to the maintaining of pleasant relations with Soviet Russia, the question of immediate reciprocal deliveries became steadily more pressing. The desire to produce war material became stronger from week to week, so strong that OKW created a special Referat at Wi Rue charged with working on the Russian demands and arranging them in accordance with the German production program. Appendix XX, 21 and XX, 22 gives an idea of the progress of the arrangements. As the Russians delivered quickly and well, it was imperative to accelerate German deliveries. Consequently the German High Command decided to offer the Russians even more war material, that was already manufactured or under construction, and whose monetary value was great. The great cruiser Luetzow especially came into this category, other ordnance installations for ships, patterns for heavy artillery and tanks and important patents [lizenzen] for war material. As these contracts for this material did not satisfy the Russian requests, the Fuehrer ordered, on March 30, that - as far as necessary - the delivery of war material to the Russians should have priority over the delivery to the German Armed Forces. This order put some of the Army departments in a difficult position, as the High command also wanted production for the German requirements stepped up and demanded punctual delivery. On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference with Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the Fuehrer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the
requirements stepped up and demanded punctual delivery. On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference with Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the Fuehrer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands. This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rue to give priority to matters concerning Russian War Economy. By the end of October 1940, Reichmarshal Goering insisted once more, on pressure being exerted for accelerated deliveries to the Russians according to plan. (file notice from Oct. 5, see Appendix XX, 23). Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as preparations for the campaign in the East were already under way. The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up to the start of the attack; even during the last few days, transports of India-rubber from the Far East were completed by Express transit trains. [Pages 323-324] The production program ordered by decree of the Fuehrer on Aug. 20, and instituted by reason of urgency, on Sept. 20, was stepped up again on Sept. 27, and amended insofar as the equipment under the code word "Achse" (African campaign) was to be given priority over all other equipment, including the ones in the special category. As both the Army and Minister Todt were urging the high priority of the Panzer-and Achse-program, the Navy demanded its "Seeloewe" -measures accelerated and aerial armaments were being even more intensified, the Chief of Wi Rue office, at a conference of Chiefs of departments, presided over by Fieldmarshal Keitel, pointed to the difficulties of accelerating everything at the same time, with the bad situation as regards manpower. He demanded once more a clarification of the organization, which was really the most important thing. Resulting from this the following decision was made by the WFSt on Dec. 3.40, enclosed as Appendix XX, 35. This decision affected future measures as follows: 1. there is no longer any mention of an Invasion of England but only of a siege of England,. 2. aerial defence of the homeland was placed at the top of the list for the first time. 3. the prospective big action (Russia) mentioned
XX, 35. This decision affected future measures as follows: 1. there is no longer any mention of an Invasion of England but only of a siege of England,. 2. aerial defence of the homeland was placed at the top of the list for the first time. 3. the prospective big action (Russia) mentioned for the first time, and its postponement to some later date admitted as possible. Shortly before-on Nov. 6, 1940-Reichmarshal Goering, for the first time made a statement to the effect, that we should prepare ourselves for a long war, and therefore planning of raw material should be considered in this perspective. (see file on Report at Beauvais on Nov. 6.40, Appendix XX, 36). At the beginning of December, instructions were received, that for the time being there was no question of an Invasion of England, and that the "Seeloewe"-preparations should merely be concluded. [Pages 368-373] War Economy The year 1941 was, as far as war economy was concerned, mostly dominated by the preparations, respectively the execution of the action in the Balkans, the war in the East and the war in Africa. The respective preparations go back to the year 1940. The development of the Italo-Albanian-Greco war, the establishing of a German military mission in Roumania and the possibility of German participation in the Italian war in Africa had led as early as August 1940 to a War Economy Staff Roumania and in October a War Economy Staff Africa being created by the office of Wi Rue to deal with the problems connected with these theatres of war and charged with working out all the questions appertaining thereto. By the middle of November 1940 Colonel Gen. staff Spalcke was delegated to Roumania as member of the German military mission, and charged with the representation for war economy in the Balkan countries and in Africa and the completion of the necessary basis as regards war economy for an operation were intensively processed in the office of the Wi. Rue. In November 1940, the Chief of Wi Rue together with Secretaries of state Koerner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East. By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the action in
in the office of the Wi. Rue. In November 1940, the Chief of Wi Rue together with Secretaries of state Koerner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East. By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi rue at the end of 1940. The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first of all the following tasks: 1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament industry, its location, its capacity and its associate industries. 2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament centers and their dependency one on the other. 3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of the Soviet Union. 4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and Petroleum (crude oil). 5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries in the Soviet Union. These points were concentrated in one big compilation, "War Economy of the Soviet Union" and illustrated with detailed maps, etc. Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for the use of the German War Economy Organization. For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later on in charge of brigadier General Schuberth. The work was carried out according to the directives from the Chief of the Office resp. the group of depts. for foreign territories with the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and any other persons, possessing information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent collection of material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the operations and for administering the territory. Simultaneously detailed investigations were made of the situation as regards fuel and rubber in the case of a major action in the East, on the basis of the demands made by the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Gen. Qu. of the Airforce, which will be discussed later on. Included in the processing of the Russian problem were matters of war economic