dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSIVE WAR
the world; they were a deliberate and essential part of Nazi foreign policy. From the beginning, the National Socialist movement claimed that its object was to unite the German people in the consciousness of their mission and destiny, based on inherent qualities of race, and under the guidance of the Fuehrer.
For its achievement, two things were deemed to be essential: the disruption of the European order as it had existed since the Treaty of Versailles, and the creation of a Greater Germany beyond the frontiers of 1914. This necessarily involved the seizure of foreign territories.
War was seen to be inevitable, or at the very least, highly probable, if these purposes were to be accomplished. The German people, therefore, with all their resources were to be organised as a great political-military army. schooled to obey without question any policy decreed by the State.
PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSION.
In " Mein Kampf " Hitler had made this view quite plain. It must be remembered that " Mein Kampf " was no mere private diary in which the secret thoughts of Hitler were set down. Its contents were rather proclaimed from the house-tops. It was used in the schools and Universities and among the Hitler Youth, in the SS and the SA, and among the German people generally, even down to the presentation of an official copy to all newly married people. By the year 1945 over 61 million copies had been circulated. The general contents are well known. Over and over again Hitler asserted his belief in the necessity of force as the means of solving international problems, as in the following quotation:
"The soil on which we now live was not a gift bestowed by Heaven on our forefathers. They had to conquer it by risking their lives. So also in the future, our people will not obtain territory, and therewith the means of existence, as a favour from any other people, but will have to win it by the power of a triumphant sword."
" Mein Kampf " contains many such passages, and the extolling of force as an instrument of foreign policy is openly proclaimed.
The precise objectives of this policy of force are also set forth in detail The very first page of the book asserts that " German-Austria must be restored to the great German Motherland," not on economic grounds, but because " people of the same blood should be in the same Reich."
THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSIVE WAR
policy is openly proclaimed. The precise objectives of this policy of force are also set forth in detail The very first page of the book asserts that " German-Austria must be restored to the great German Motherland," not on economic grounds, but because " people of the same blood should be in the same Reich."
The restoration of the German frontiers of 1914 is declared to be wholly insufficient, and if Germany is to exist at all, it must be as a world power with the necessary territorial magnitude.
" Mein Kampf " is quite explicit in stating where the increased territory is to be found:
" Therefore we National Socialists have purposely drawn a line through the line of conduct followed by pre-war Germany in foreign policy. We put an end to the perpetual Germanic march towards the South and West of Europe, and turn our eyes towards the lands of the East. We finally put a stop to the colonial and trade policy of the pre-war times, and pass over to the territorial policy of the future.
But when we speak of new territory in Europe to-day, we must think principally of Russia and the border states subject to her."
" Mein Kampf " is not to be regarded as a mere literary exercise, nor as an inflexible policy or plan incapable of modification.
lts importance lies in the unmistakable attitude of aggression revealed throughout its pages.
THE PLANNING OF AGGRESSION.
Evidence from captured documents has revealed that Hitler held four secret meetings to which the Tribunal proposes to make special reference because of the light they shed upon the question of the common plan and aggressive war.
These meetings took place on the
5th of November, 1937,
the 23rd of May, 1939, the 22nd of August, 1939, and the 23rd of November, 1939.
At these meetings important declarations were made by Hitler as to his purposes, which are quite unmistakable in their terms.
The documents which record what took place at these meetings have been subject to some criticism at the hands of defending Counsel.
Their essential authenticity is not denied, but it is said, for example that they do not purpose to be verbatim transcripts of the speeches they record, that the document dealing with the meeting on the
5th November, 1937,
was dated five days after the meeting had taken place, and that the two documents dealing with the meeting of August 22nd, 1939, differ from one another, and are unsigned.
THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSIVE WAR
that they do not purpose to be verbatim transcripts of the speeches they record, that the document dealing with the meeting on the 5th November, 1937, was dated five days after the meeting had taken place, and that the two documents dealing with the meeting of August 22nd, 1939, differ from one another, and are unsigned.
Making the fullest allowance for criticism of this kind, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the documents are documents of the highest value, and that their authenticity and substantial truth are established.
They are obviously careful records of the events they describe, and they have been preserved as such in the archives of the German Government, from whose custody they were captured. Such documents could never be dismissed as inventions, nor even as inaccurate or distorted, they plainly record events which actually took place.
CONFERENCES OF THE 23RD NOVEMBER, 1939 AND 5TH NOVEMBER, 1937
It will perhaps be useful to deal first of all with the meeting of the 23rd November, 1939, when Hitler called his Supreme Commanders together. A record was made of what was said, by one of those present. At the date of the meeting, Austria and Czechoslovakia had been incorporated into the German Reich, Poland had been conquered by the German armies, and the war with Great Britain and France was still in its static phase. The moment was opportune for a review of past events. Hitler informed the Commanders that the purpose of the Conference was to give them an idea of the world of his thoughts, and to tell them his decision. He thereupon reviewed his political task since 1919, and referred to the secession of Germany from the League of Nations, the denunciation of the Disarmament Conference, the order for re-armament, the introduction of compulsory armed service, the occupation of the Rhineland, the seizure of Austria, and the action against Czechoslovakia. He stated:
THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSIVE WAR
since 1919, and referred to the secession of Germany from the League of Nations, the denunciation of the Disarmament Conference, the order for re-armament, the introduction of compulsory armed service, the occupation of the Rhineland, the seizure of Austria, and the action against Czechoslovakia. He stated:
"One year later, Austria came; this step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the East and then in the West or vice versa . . . Basically I did not organise the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the East was to be attacked first."
This address, reviewing past events and re-affirming the aggressive intentions present from the beginning, puts beyond any question of doubt the character of the actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the war against Poland.
For they had all been accomplished according to plan, and the nature of that plan must now be examined in a little more detail.
At the meeting of the 23rd November, 1939, Hitler was looking back to things accomplished, at the earlier meetings now to be considered, he was looking forward, and revealing his plans to his confederates. The comparison is instructive.
The meeting held at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on the
5th November 1937, was attended by Lieut.-Colonel Hoszbach
, Hitler's personal adjutant, who compiled a long note of the proceedings, which he dated the 10th November, 1937, and signed.
THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSIVE WAR
his confederates. The comparison is instructive. The meeting held at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on the 5th November 1937, was attended by Lieut.-Colonel Hoszbach , Hitler's personal adjutant, who compiled a long note of the proceedings, which he dated the 10th November, 1937, and signed.
The persons present were Hitler, and the defendants Goering, von Neurath and Raeder, in their capacities as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Reich Foreign Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy respectively, General von Blomberg, Minister of War, and General von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Hitler began by saying that the subject of the conference was of such high importance that in other States it would have taken place before the Cabinet. He went on to say that the subject matter of his speech was the result of his detailed deliberations, and of his experience during his four and a half years of Government. He requested that the statements he was about to make should be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament. Hitler's main theme was the problem of living space, and he discussed various possible solutions, only to set them aside. He then said that the seizure of living space on the continent of Europe was therefore necessary, expressing himself in these words:
" It is not a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two generations.... The history of all times Roman Empire, British Empire- has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable: neither formerly nor to-day has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor."
He concluded with this observation:
" The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could- be made at the lowest cost."
THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSIVE WAR
and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable: neither formerly nor to-day has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor." He concluded with this observation: " The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could- be made at the lowest cost."
Nothing could indicate more plainly the aggressive intentions of Hitler, and the events which soon followed showed the reality of his purpose. It is impossible to accept the contention that Hitler did not actually mean war; for after pointing out that Germany might expect the opposition of England and France, and analysing the strength and the weakness of those powers in particular situations, he continued:
" The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk.... If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions 'when' and 'how'. In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases."
The
first of these three cases
set forth a hypothetical international situation, in which he would take action not later than 1943 to 1945, saying:
" If the Fuehrer is still living then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem not later than 1943 to 1945. The necessity for action before 1943 to 1945 will come under consideration in Cases 2 and 3."
The
second
and
third cases
to which Hitler referred show the plain intention to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in this connection Hitler said:
" For the improvement of our military-political position, it must be our first aim in every case of entanglement by war to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance westwards."
He further added:
" The annexation of the two states to Germany militarily and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new armies up to a strength of about twelve divisions."
This decision to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia was discussed in some detail, the action was to be taken as soon as a favourable opportunity presented itself.
THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSIVE WAR
the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new armies up to a strength of about twelve divisions." This decision to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia was discussed in some detail, the action was to be taken as soon as a favourable opportunity presented itself.
The military strength which Germany had been building up since 1933 was now to be directed at the two specific countries, Austria and Czechoslovakia.
The defendant Goering testified that he did not believe at that time that Hitler actually meant to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, and that the purpose of the conference was only to put pressure on von Fritsch to speed up the re-armament of the Army.
The defendant Raeder testified that neither he, nor von Fritsch, nor von Blomberg, believed that Hitler actually meant war, a conviction which the defendant Raeder claims that he held up to the 22nd August, 1939. The basis of this conviction was his hope that Hitler would obtain a " political solution" of Germany's problems. But all that this means, when examined, is the belief that Germany's position would be so good, and Germany's armed might so overwhelming, that the territory desired could be obtained without fighting for it. It must be remembered too that Hitler's declared intention with regard to Austria was actually carried out within a little over four months from the date of the meeting, and within less than a year the first portion of Czechoslovakia was absorbed, and Bohemia and Moravia a few months later. If any doubts had existed in the minds of any of his hearers in November, 1937, after March of 1939 there could no longer be any question that Hitler was in deadly earnest in his decision to resort to war. The Tribunal is satisfied that
Lt.-Col. Hoszbach's account
of the meeting is substantially correct, and that those present knew that Austria and Czechoslovakia would be annexed by Germany at the first possible opportunity.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
Judgement : von Neurath
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M. DE VABRES:
Von Neurath is indicted under all
Four Counts
. He is a professional diplomat who served as German Ambassador to Great Britain from 1930 to 1932. On 2nd June, 1932, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the von Papen cabinet, a position which he held under the cabinets of von Schleicher and Hitler. Von Neurath resigned as Minister of Foreign Affairs on 4th February, 1938, land was made Reichs Minister without Portfolio, President of the Secret Cabinet Council and a member of the Reich Defence council On 18th March, 1939, he was appointed Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia, and served in this capacity until 27th September, 1941. He held the formal rank of Obergruppenfuehrer in the SS
Crimes against Peace
As Minister of Foreign Affairs, von Neurath advised Hitler in connection with the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations on 14th October, 1933, the institution of rearmament, the passage on 16th March, 1935, of the law for universal military service; and the passage on 21st May, 1935, of the secret Reich Defence Law. He was a key figure in the negotiation of the Naval Accord entered into between Germany and England on 18th June, 1935. Von Neurath played an important part in Hitler's decision to reoccupy the Rhineland on 7th March, 1936, and predicted that the occupation could be carried through without any reprisals from the French. On 18th May, 1936, he told the American Ambassador to France that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing in foreign affairs until " the Rhineland had been digested " and that as soon as the fortifications in the Rhineland had been constructed and the countries of Central Europe realised that France could not enter Germany at will, "all those countries will begin to feel very differently about the foreign policies and a new constellation will develop."
Von Neurath took part in the
Hoszbach conference
the fortifications in the Rhineland had been constructed and the countries of Central Europe realised that France could not enter Germany at will, "all those countries will begin to feel very differently about the foreign policies and a new constellation will develop." Von Neurath took part in the Hoszbach conference
of 5th November, 1937. He has testified that he was so shocked by Hitler's statements that he had a heart attack. Shortly thereafter, he offered to resign, and his resignation was accepted on 4th February, 1938, at the same time that von Fritsch and von Blomberg were dismissed. Yet with knowledge of Hitler's aggressive plans he retained a formal relationship with the Nazi regime as Reichs Minister without Portfolio, President of the Secret Cabinet Council and a member of the Reichs Defence Council. He took charge of the Foreign Office at the time of the occupation of Austria, assured the British Ambassador that this had not been caused by a German ultimatum, and informed the Czechoslovakian Minister that Germany intended to abide by its arbitration convention with Czechoslovakia. Von Neurath participated in the last phase of the negotiations preceding the
Munich Pact
but contends that he entered these discussions only to urge Hitler to make every effort to settle the issues by peaceful means.
Criminal Activities in Czechoslovakia
to abide by its arbitration convention with Czechoslovakia. Von Neurath participated in the last phase of the negotiations preceding the Munich Pact but contends that he entered these discussions only to urge Hitler to make every effort to settle the issues by peaceful means. Criminal Activities in Czechoslovakia
Von Neurath was appointed Reichs Protector for Bohemia and Moravia on 18th March, 1939. Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by military force. Hacha's consent, obtained as it was by duress, cannot be considered as justifying the occupation. Hitler's decree of 16th March, 1939, establishing the Protectorate, stated that this new territory should belong henceforth to the territory of the German Reich ", an assumption that the Republic of Czechoslovakia no longer existed. But it also went on the theory that Bohemia and Moravia retained their sovereignty subject only to the interests of Germany as expressed by the Protectorate. Therefore even if the doctrine of subjugation should be considered to be applicable to territory occupied by aggressive action, the Tribunal does not believe that this Proclamation amounted to an incorporation which was sufficient to bring the doctrine into effect. The occupation of Bohemia and Moravia must therefore be considered a military occupation covered by the rules of warfare. Although Czechoslovakia was not a party to the
Hague Convention of 1907
, the rules of land warfare expressed in this Convention are declaratory of existing international law and hence are applicable.
As Reichs Protector, von Neurath instituted an administration in Bohemia and Moravia similar to that in effect in Germany. The free press, political parties and trade unions were abolished. All groups which might serve as opposition were outlawed. Czechoslovakian industry was worked into the structure of German war production, and exploited for the German war effort. Nazi anti-Semitic policies and laws were also introduced. Jews were barred from leading positions in Government and business.
unions were abolished. All groups which might serve as opposition were outlawed. Czechoslovakian industry was worked into the structure of German war production, and exploited for the German war effort. Nazi anti-Semitic policies and laws were also introduced. Jews were barred from leading positions in Government and business.
In August, 1939, von Neurath issued a proclamation warning against any acts of sabotage and stating that " the responsibility for all acts of sabotage is attributed not only to individual perpetrators but to the entire Czech population." When the war broke out on 1st September, 1939, 8,000 prominent Czechs were arrested by the Security Police in Bohemia and Moravia and put into protective custody. Many of this group died in concentration camps as a result of mistreatment.
In October and November, 1939, Czechoslovakian students held a series of demonstrations. As a result, on Hitler's orders, all universities were closed, 1,200 students imprisoned, and the nine leaders of the demonstration shot by Security Police and SD. Von Neurath testified that he was not informed of this action in advance, but it was announced by proclamation over his signature posted on placards throughout the Protectorate which he claims, however, was done without his authority.
On 31st August, 1940, von Neurath transmitted to Lammers a memorandum which he had prepared dealing with the future of the Protectorate, and a memorandum with his approval prepared by Carl Herman Frank on the same subject. Both dealt with the question of Germanisation and proposed that the majority of the Czechs might be assimilated racially into the German nation. Both advocated the elimination of the Czechoslovakian intelligentsia and other groups which might resist Germanisation, von Neurath's by expulsion, Frank's by expulsion or " special treatment."