dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GEN. ZORYA: I do not know what sources Canaris used, but he told me that the attack on the Soviet Union was fixed for 15 May." The Soviet Prosecution also has at its disposal the testimony of the former chief of Department III of the German Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, Lieutenant General Franz von Bentivegni of the former German Army, which was given by him on 28 December 1945. I present those documents under Document Number USSR-230 I shall at the same time also only read into the record those parts of Bentivegni's testimony underlined in red pencil, which have a direct bearing on the beginning of military preparations against the Soviet Union. These first two excerpts of the testimony are on Page 37 in the document book which is submitted to the Military Tribunal: "I learned first of Germany's preparation for a military attack on the Soviet Union in August 1940, from the head of the German Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service, Admiral Canaris. In an unofficial conversation which took place in Canaris' office he told me that Hitler had started to take measures for an Eastern campaign, which he had spoken about as early as 1938 in his speech at a meeting of Gauleiter in Berlin. "Canaris said to me that these plans of Hitler's had now begun to take concrete form. This was evident from the fact that divisions of the German Army were being forwarded in large numbers from the West to the eastern frontiers and, in accordance with a special order by Hitler, were taking up positions from which to start the coming invasion of Russia." These are the first two paragraphs of Bentivegni's testimony. And finally, in order to finish with the question of the actual time of fascist Germany's military preparations for the treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, I should like to dwell for a moment on the testimony of General Muller. This testimony, dated 8 January 1946, was written in a camp for prisoners of war. I present it to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-149.
GEN. ZORYA: All the material to which I have so far referred emanated from circles of the highest commanding officers of the German Army.
THE PRESIDENT: General, on this document of General Muller, does it appear where that document was made and where General Muller is now?
GEN. ZORYA: The photostat bears a date written in General Mueller's hand. This date is 8 January 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Where?
GEN. ZORYA: If I might have a look at the photostatic copy which I have just presented to the Tribunal, I would be able to tell you where the date is written.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but there are many prisoners-of-war camps. We want to know which one and where it is.
GEN. ZORYA: In a camp located near Moscow.
THE PRESIDENT: Has this document got any authenticating signature on it at all? So far as we are concerned, isn't it simply a photostatic copy of a writing by somebody?
GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, this document, like all other documents which have been submitted so far by the Soviet Delegation, is a noncertified photostatic copy. Taking into consideration the wish of the Tribunal and in execution of this wish the Soviet Prosecution took measures to ensure that only the originals of these documents or documents whose authenticity is certified will be presented in complete order to the General Secretary. This will be done in the course of several days and all the material will be given in best order to the General Secretary.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us where the writer of the document is now?
GEN. ZORYA: I am hardly in a position to say more than I have already. If the Tribunal will permit me, I can consult my colleagues, make inquiries, and report to the Tribunal as soon as possible on the general's whereabouts.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will adjourn now. That will enable you to consult your colleagues. [A recess was taken.]
DR.NELTE: Mr. President, to my regret I must present the same objections to this document submitted by the prosecutor of the Soviet Union under USSR-149, and must submit the same request which I made this morning. As far as I know, the High Tribunal have not yet made a decision in regard to this question.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, Dr. Nelte. The Tribunal has already made a decision. I think it would be better if, when defendants' counsel go to the place from which they wish to speak, they would arrange these earphones before they speak. I say the Tribunal has already made a decision which governs this case. They pointed out the other day to counsel for the Soviet Union that documents which were not identified as authentic documents, must be identified as authentic, and the Soviet prosecutor at that time undertook to certify that all documents which he made use of were certified as authentic documents. And if they are not so certified, they will be struck out of the record. That ruling applies to this document. This document is a document which appears to be a document, a letter, or report to the Government of the Soviet Union, but it does not contain upon its face any certification showing that it is an authentic document. The Counsel for the Soviet Union said before we adjourned, that he undertook-as he had already undertaken-to produce a certificate that the document was an authentic document; that is to say, that it was written by the person who purported to write it, and in those circumstances, the Tribunal accepts the document provisionally. If no such certificate is forthcoming, then the document will be stricken from the record.
DR.NELTE: If I understand you correctly, the Tribunal will accept a letter written to the Soviet Government or a statement as documentary evidence for the contents of this statement.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. I have already said provided that it is certified as an authentic document. I have said that more than once.
DR. NELTE: In this way, every letter sent to the Prosecution or the Government of the Soviet Union or to any other Prosecution would become documentary evidence by the certification that it has actually been written by the person who signed it, which would make it impossible for the Defense to cross-examine the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: That depends on where the witness is. We are dealing with witnesses who are scattered all over the globe, and as we are informed that it is not the practice in the Soviet Union for affidavits to be made in such cases, the Tribunal considers such a document to fall within Article 19-provided it is an authentic document. We are affording the defendants' counsel the greatest assistance in bringing witnesses to this Court, but we cannot undertake to bring witnesses from all over the world upon questions which are very often of very little importance.
DR. NELTE: I quite appreciate the difficulties, and I am grateful to the Tribunal for their willingness to assist us. Therefore I only request to ascertain in each case where the person, who has made that statement, has his residence, so that the Defense may try to reach him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If the witness is in, or in the immediate vicinity of, Nuremberg, the Tribunal would think that it was only fair, if such a document as this were to be put in evidence, that he should be produced for examination or cross-examination by the defendants' counsel, but we do understand that the man who wrote this letter is not in the vicinity of Nuremberg. We have no reason to think he is, and I am reminding defendants' counsel that they can always apply, if they think right, to issue interrogatories which would be put to any such person as this who has written such a document as this.
DR.NELTE: Thank you.
GEM. ZORYA: I have availed myself of the recess to make inquiries about General Muller. General Muller is in a prisoner-of-war camp, Number 27, in Krasnogorsk, in the MOSCONV region. May I continue my statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
GEN. ZORYA: All the material, Your Honors, which I have mentioned to date emanated from circles of fiche Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. If I can so express myself, General Muller belonged to the middle category of German generals. He was Chief of Staff of an army; he commanded an army group. His testimony reflects a series of events which may be considered worthy of attention, since they explain the circumstances accompanying Germany's preparations against the Soviet Union. I wish to refer to Page 40 of the document book. There you will find the first page of General Mueller's statement. The first paragraph, Page 1, of the statement is marked with red pencil. I now proceed to quote from it: "The preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union began as early as July 1940. At that time I was first general staff officer in the staff of Army Group C at Dijon in France. General Field Marshal Von Leeb was commander-in-chief. This army group consisted of the 1st, 2d, and 7th Armies, which were occupation armies in France. Besides this, Army Group A (Rundstedt), whose task was to prepare 'Case Sea Lion' (the invasion of England by Army Group B-Von Bock) was also in France. The staff of Army Group B was transferred to the East (Poser) during July and was given the following forces, transferred from France-part of the armies of occupation: The 12th Army Command (List), 4th Army Command (don Kluge), and 18th Army Command (don Kuchler), plus several general commands and about thirty divisions. A greater part of this number was taken from Army Group C (don Leeb). "Directly after the campaign in the West, the OKH gave the order for the demobilization of 20 divisions. This order was cancelled, and the 20 divisions were not demobilized. Instead of this, after their return to Germany they were sent on leave, and thus kept ready for rapid mobilization.
GEN. ZORYA: "Both measures, the transfer of about five hundred thousand men to the Russian frontier and the cancellation of the order disbanding about three hundred thousand men, show that already in July 1940 plans existed for war operations in the East. "The next order which gives evidence of Germany's preparations for attacking the Soviet Union, was the written OKH order issued in September 1940 regarding the formation in Leipzig of a new army command (A.O.K. 11) of several general commands and about forty divisions and panzer divisions. The forming of these units was carried out from September 1940 onwards by the commander of the reserve army (Generaloberst Fromm), partly in France, but mainly in Germany. Towards the end of September 1940 the OKH called me to Fontainebleau. The Chief Quartermaster I in the General Staff of the Army, then Lieutenant General (afterwards Field Marshal) Paulus, informed me, at first orally, of the order that my staff (Army Group C) was to be transferred to Dresden by 1 November and that Army High Command II (Generaloberst Weichs) which was under the command of the staff, should be transferred at the same time to Munich. The task was the leading of training of the abovementioned 40 divisions which were to be newly created. "In accordance with this order, confirmed later by signature by the Chief of the General Staff Halder, the transfer of these units was carried out on time. These 40 divisions were put into action in the invasion of the Soviet Union." Thus initiated, the preparation for the military attack on the Soviet Union was carried out at a heightened tempo and with customary German pedantry. I would, Your Honors, remind the Tribunal that the witness, Paulus, stated at this session that in August 1940 the elaboration of the previous plan of attack on the Soviet Union, known as Plan Barbarossa, was already so far advanced as to render possible the conducting of two military exercises under the direction of Paulus.
GEN. ZORYA: THE PRESIDENT: General, I don't think it is necessary to read the statement of Field Marshal Paulus, as he has already given the evidence tin the witness box.
GEL. ZORYA: I am not reading it into the record. I am merely referring to a circumstance which will enable me to proceed to General Mueller's statement that this system of military exercises, which originated in the General Staff of the German Army, eventually spread over the entire Army and that the entire armed forces participated in the execution of these games which, per se, were already a preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union. I am reading into the record that passage of the statement which is underlined in blue pencil, Page 41 of the bundle of documents: "Insofar"-General Muller states-"as in the future the Army was to attack the Soviet Union, the first plan was to train soldiers and general staff officers. "Towards the end of January 1941 I received telegraphic orders from the Chief of the General Staff Halder to attend the military exercises of Rundstedt's army group at St. Germain, near Paris. The object of this military exercise was the attack and advance from Romania and South Poland in the direction of Kiev and southwards. The plan had in mind the intention also of the participation of Romanian troops. In the main this military exercise anticipated the conditions of the future order concerning the strategic deployment of forces, to which I will refer later. "The director of the military exercises was the Chief of the General Staff of the Rundstedt army group. There were present: Rundstedt, Halder, the Chiefs of the General Staff of the 6th Army, Colonel Heim, of the 11th Army, Colonel Wohler, and of Kleist's tank group, Colonel Zwickler and several generals of the panzer forces. The military exercises were held at the place occupied by Rundstedt's army group, approximately between the 31st January and 2d February 1941.
GEL. ZORYA: The exercise demonstrated the necessity for a strong concentration of tank forces." The documents I have presented to date characterize the measures of the military command of the German Armed Forces for the preparation of the strategic deployment of the German armies for launching an attack against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. As for time, these measures embraced a considerable period of 1940 and were put into action at least 6 months prior to the appearance on the scene of Directive Number 21 concerning the Plan Barbarossa. I shall now proceed to the second group of documents presented by the Soviet Prosecution which characterize the espionage measures undertaken by the fascist conspirators in preparation for war against the Soviet Union. Trend and task of espionage work in connection with Plan Barbarossa were, as we know, determined by a directive from the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, addressed to counterintelligence on 6 September 1940 and signed by the Defendant Jodl. This document was presented by the American Prosecution under Number 1229-PS; it is to be found on Pages 46 and 47 of our document bundle. I do not intend to quote this document again, but I do consider it essential to remind you that in it the intelligence organizations demand that the regrouping of armies on Germany's Eastern front should be camouflaged in every possible way and that the Soviet Union should remain under the impression that action of some kind Divas brewing against the Balkans. The activities of the intelligence organizations were strictly regulated. These activities included measures for concealing, as far as possible, the number of German forces in the East and of giving an impression of insignificant concentrations in the north of the Eastern provinces, at the same time conveying the impression of very considerable concentrations of forces in the southern part, in the Protectorate and in Austria.
GEL. ZORYA: The necessity was pointed out of creating an exaggerated impression of the number of antiaircraft units and of the insignificant extent of roadbuilding activities. I here take the liberty of, making two pertinent observations. According to Pieckenbrock's testimony, the intensification of the work of this intelligence organization against the Soviet Union began prior to the appearance of this directive in August 1940. And this work, of course, was not limited to the spreading of false information on the regrouping of forces from West to East. I beg you, Your Honors, to revert to the testimony, which I have already presented, of the former Chief of Department III of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the German Armed Forces, Von Bentivegni. On Pages 1, 2, and 3 of the Russian text of Bentivegni's deposition, it is said-I quote the passage underlined in blue pencil-beginning at the last paragraph, Page 1 of the document which corresponds to Page 37 of the document book: "In connection with this, as early as November 1940 I received from Canaris orders to intensify the work for counterintelligence in the localities where concentration of the German armies on the Soviet German frontier was taking place." On Page 2 of the statement, Page 38 of the document book, Paragraph 1, Bentivegni continues: "In accordance with this order, I immediately gave a corresponding order to the German Abwehr agencies, Danzig, Konigsberg, Posen, Krakow, Breslau, and Vienna." And finally, on Page 3 of the statement, which corresponds to Page 39 of the document book, I read: "In March 1941 I received from Canaris the following directives for the preparations for the execution of the Plan Barbarossa.
GEL. ZORYA: "a) Preparation of all links of Abwehr III for carrying out active counterintelligence work against the Soviet Union, as for instance the creation of the necessary counterintelligence groups, their distribution among various fighting units intended for taking part in the operations on the Eastern front, and paralyzing the activity of the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence organs. "b) Spreading false information via their foreign intelligence agencies, partly by creating the semblance of an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and of preparations for a blow against Great Britain. "c) Counterintelligence measures to keep secret the preparations being made for war with the Soviet Union and to ensure that the transfer of troops to the East be kept secret." The same question is touched upon in the minutes of the interrogation of the Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Department I of the German Army,. Pieckenbrock, which I have already presented in evidence. This statement contains the following passage regarding the activities of the intelligence service of the German Army in connection with the preparations for the realization of Plan Barbarossa. I would refer you to Page 35 of the document book and to Paragraph 2 from the top. This corresponds to Page 2 of Pieckenbrock's testimony. Pieckenbrock states "In March 1941 I was present at a conversation between Canaris and the chief of the espionage detachment (Abwehr II), Colonel Lahousen, about measures connected with Plan Barbarossa. During this conversation they kept referring to a written order on this subject, which Lahousen had. I, personally, as head of Abwehr I, beginning in February 1941 and up to 22 June 1941, more than once had official talks with the Chief Quartermaster IV, Lieutenant General Tippelskirch, and with the head of the detachment Foreign Armies East, Colonel Kienzl.
GEL. ZORYA: These conversations dealt with the more precise definition of tasks assigned to Abwehr, with regard to the Soviet Union, and in particular with the verification of old intelligence data about the Red Army, and also details about the dislocation of the Soviet armies during the period of preparation of the attack on the Soviet Union." , I now skip one paragraph of Pieckenbrock's statement and read further: "All Abwehrstellen which were working with the espionage against Russia were given the task of intensifying the dispatch of agents to the U.S.S.R. A similar task-the intensification of espionage work against Russia-was given to an intelligence organs existing in the armies and army groups. For the more successful direction of an these field Abwehr organs, a special intelligence staff was created in May 1941 under the code name of Wally I. This staff was in the vicinity of Warsaw in the village Sulajewek. Major Baun, as the best specialist on work against Russia, was appointed chief of the staff of Wally I. Later, when following our example, Abwehr II and Abwehr III had also established staffs Wally II and Wally III, this organ became known as a whole staff Wally, and directed the entire intelligence, counterintelligence, and diversionary work against the U.S.S.R. as a staff had to become active in the front line. At the head of staff 'Wally' was Lieutenant Colonel Schmalschlager." I now pass on to the last paragraph of Pieckenbrock's statement on Page 36 of the document book: "From numerous reports given by Colonel Lahousen and Canaris, at which I was also present, I know that a great amount of preparatory work for the war with the Soviet Union was carried out by this department. In the period of February to May 1941 many conferences of the leaders of Abwehr II took place at the quarters of Jodl's deputy, General Warlimont They were held in a cavalry school in Krampnitz.
GEL. ZORYA: One particular question settled at these conferences in accordance with the needs of the war with Russia, was that of increasing the special task units, Brandenburg 800, and of distributing contingents of these units among the individual army groups." In Pieckenbrock's testimony which has just been read into the record, special attention is drawn to his references to the special tasks with which Lahousen's department had been entrusted, and to special task units known under the code name of Brandenburg 800. Here these points are clarified by the testimony of a former colonel of the German Army, Erwin Stolze, who was Lahousen's deputy in Department II, Ausland Abwehr, attached to the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. Stolze was taken prisoner by the Red Army. I wish to submit to the Tribunal as evidence Stolze's testimony of 25 December 1945, which was given to Lieutenant Colonel Burashrikov, of the Counterintelligence Service of the Red Army and which I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-231 (Exhibit Number USSR-231), which I beg you to accept as evidence. I shall read into the record individual extracts from this testimony which are underlined in red pencil. I begin the quotation from Page 48 of the document book. Stolze testified as follows: "I received instructions from Lahousen to organize and to lead a special group under code name 'A,' which had to engage in the preparation of diversionary acts and in the work of disintegration of the Soviet rear in connection with the intended attack on the U.,S.S.R. "At the same time, in order that I should become acquainted with it and for my guidance, Lahousen gave me an order which came from the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces and which contained basic directives for the conduct of subversive activities in the territory of the U.S.S.R. after Germany's attack on the Soviet Union.