dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
COL. TAYLOR: Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol." The General Von Reichenau referred to there was at that time the head commander of Wehrkreis 7, one of the military districts into which Germany was divided. He subsequently commanded the 10th Army in Poland and the 6th Army in France and was a member of the group as defined in the Indictment . Sperrle, who was in Spain during the civil war and then commanded Luftflotte 3, the 3rd German Air Fleet, practically throughout the war, was also a member of the group. Two days later Keitel and other military leaders were preparing proposals to be submitted to Hitler which would give the Austrian Government the impression that Germany would resort to force unless the Schuschnigg agreement was ratified in Vienna. These proposals are embodied in a document dated February 14, 1938, 1775-PS, Exhibit Number USA-73, and signed by Keitel. Portions of Keitel's proposals to the Fuehrer are as follows: "1) Take no real preparatory measures in-the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments. "2) Spread false but quite credible news which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria: a) through V-men"-that means agent "in Austria, b) through our customs personnel at the frontier, c) through travelling agents." Going down the document to 4), Keitel proposed: "4) Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich. "5) Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the mountain troops near the frontier. "6) Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14 in the Service Command Headquarters VII in order to carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW." As Jodl's diary shows under the entry for 14 February, these deceptive maneuvers were very effective and created in Austria the impression that these threats of force might be expected to create.
COL. TAYLOR: About a month later armed intervention was precipitated by Schuschnigg's decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria. Hitler ordered mobilization in accordance with the pre-existing plans for the invasion of Austria, these plans being known as "Case Otto," in order to absorb Austria and stop the plebiscite. Jodl's diary under the entry for 10 March 1938 tells us as follows on Page 2: "By surprise and without consulting his ministers Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring a strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation. "Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General Von Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee, General Von Schober is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with Gauleiter Burckel in the Palatinate." The General Von Schober referred to succeeded General Von Reichenau as Commander of Wehrkreis 7 and later was Commander of the 11th Army in Russia and was a member of the group as defined in the Indictment. The invasion of Austria differs from the other German acts of aggression in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed in advance. This is the case simply because the invasion was precipitated by an outside event, that being Schuschnigg's order for the plebiscite. But, although for this reason the element of deliberately timed planning was lacking, the foregoing documents make clear the participation of the military leaders at all stages. At the small policy meeting of November 1937, when Hitler's general program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was outlined, the only others present were the four principal military leaders and the Foreign Secretary. In February Keitel, Reichenau, and Sperrle were ad present to help subject Schuschnigg to the heaviest military pressure. Keitel and others immediately thereafter worked out and executed a program of military threat and deception to frighten the Austrian Government into acceptance of the Schuschnigg protocol.
COL. TAYLOR: When the actual invasion took place, it was, of course, directed by the military leaders and executed by the Armed Forces, and we are indebted to the Defendant Jodl for a clear statement of why the German military leaders were only too delighted to join with the Nazis in bringing about the end of Austrian independence. In his lecture in November 1943 to the Gauleiter, which appears in Document L-172, which is Exhibit Number USA-34, Jodl explained-this is Page 5, Paragraph 3 of the translation: "The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only fulfillment of an old national aim, but also had the effect both of re-inforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas until then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and air base for the Allies, in particular Russia) Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Her own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any vigorous attack before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive." The foregoing extract from Jodl's speech makes a good transition to the case of Czechoslovakia-"Case Green," or "Fall Grun." I propose to treat this very briefly. Mr. Alderman has covered the general story of German aggression against Czechoslovakia very fully and the documents he read from are full of evidence showing the knowing participation in this venture by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the group. Once again the Hossbach minutes of the conference between Hitler and the four principal military leaders, Document 386-PS, Exhibit Number USA-25, may be called to mind. Austria and Czechoslovakia were then listed as the most proximate victims of German aggression. After the absorption of Austria, Hitler as head of the State and Keitel as Chief of all the Armed Forces lost no time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia.
COL. TAYLOR: From this point on nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt file, Document 388-PS, Exhibit Number USA-26, and Jodl's diary, both of which have been read from extensively. These two sources of information go far, I think, to demolish what is urged in defense of the military defendants and the General Staff And High Command group. They seek to create the impression that the German generals were pure military technicians, that they were not interested in or not informed about political and diplomatic considerations-that they prepared plans for military attack or defense on a purely hypothetical basis. They say all this in order to suggest that they did not share and could not estimate Hitler's aggressive intentions, that they carried out politically conceived orders like military automatons, with no idea whether the wars they launched were aggressive or not. When these arguments are made, Your Honor, may I respectfully suggest: Read the Schmundt file and read General Jodl's diary. They make it abundantly clear that aggressive designs were conceived jointly between the Nazis and the generals, that the military leaders were fully posted on the aggressive intentions and fully informed on the political and diplomatic developments, that, indeed, German generals had a strange habit of turning up at diplomatic foregatherings; and indeed, if the documents did not show these things, a moment's thought must show them to be true. A highly successful program of conquest depends on armed might. It cannot be executed by an unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military leadership. It has, of course, been said that war is too important a business to be left to soldiers alone; and this is no doubt true, but it is equally true that an aggressive diplomacy is far too dangerous a business to be conducted without military advice and support, and no doubt some of the German generals had qualms about Hitler's timing and the boldness of some of his moves.
COL. TAYLOR: Some of these doubts are rather interestingly reflected in an entry from Jodl's diary which has not yet been read. That is Document 1780-PS again-the entry for 10 August 1938. It appears on Page 4 of the translation of 1780-PS: "10 August 1938. The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Forces groups, Lieutenant Colonel Jeschonnek, and I are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost 3 hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer's attention to the defects of our preparations, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remarks of General Von Wietersheim, in which, to top it off, he claims to quote from General Adams that the Western fortifications can be held for only 3 weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and flares up, bursting into the remarks that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. 'I assure you, General, the position will be held not only for 3 weeks, but for 3 years.' "The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it"-the General Staff-"is prejudiced by old memories and feels responsible also for political decisions instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking, because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. One does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the generals' opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that this, as well as the morale of the people, will encourage the Fuehrer enormously when the right moment comes."
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we break off now for 10 minutes?
COL. TAYLOR: The extract from the Jodl diary from which I have just read may indeed show that some of the German generals at that time were cautious with respect to Germany's ability to take on Poland and the Western Powers simultaneously; but, nonetheless, the entry shows no lack of sympathy with the Nazi aims for conquest. And there is no evidence in Jodl's diary or elsewhere that any substantial number of German generals lacked sympathy with Hitler's objectives. Furthermore, the top military leaders always joined with and supported his decisions, with formidable success in these years from 1938 to 1942. So, if we are told that German military leaders did not know that German policy toward Czechoslovakia was aggressive or based on force or threat of force, let us remember that on 30 May 1938 Hitler signed a most secret directive to Keitel-already in the transcript, Document 388-PS, Exhibit Number USA-26-in which he stated clearly his unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. The Defendant Jodl was in no doubt what that directive meant. He noted in his diary, the same day, that the Fuehrer had stated his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and had initiated military preparation all along the line. And the succeeding evidence, both in the Schmundt file and in the Jodl diary, shows how these military preparations went forward. Numerous examples of discussions, plans, and preparations during the last few weeks before the Munich Pact , including discussions with Hungary and the Hungarian General Staff, in which General Halder participated, are contained in the Jodl diary and the later items in the Schmundt file. The day the Munich Pact was signed, the 29th of September, Jodl noted in his diary-Document 1780-PS- the entry for 29 September: "The Munich Pact is signed, Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2d and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October.
COL. TAYLOR: The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a world war have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak, and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way." Plans for the liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia were made soon after Munich . Ultimately the absorption of the remainder was accomplished by diplomatic bullying, in which the Defendant Keitel participated, for the usual purpose of demonstrating that German armed might was ready to enforce the threats-as shown by two documents already in, and which I need not read: Document 2802-PS, Exhibit Number USA-117; and 2798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-118. And once again the Defendant Jodl, in his 1943 lecture, Document L-172, Exhibit Number USA-34, tells us clearly and in one sentence why the objective of eliminating Czechoslovakia lay as close to the hearts of the German military leaders as to the hearts of the Nazi: "The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and the spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it then became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favorable strategic premises." And this serves to recall the affidavits by Blomberg and Blaskowitz, from which I have already read. The whole group of German staff and front officers believed that the question of the Polish Corridor "would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms," they told us. "Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired," they have told us. I turn now to Poland. The German attack on Poland is a particularly interesting one from the standpoint of the General Staff and High Command. The documents which show the aggressive nature of the attack have already been introduced by Colonel Griffith-Jones of the British Delegation.
COL. TAYLOR: I propose to approach it from a slightly different angle, inasmuch as these documents serve as an excellent case study of the functioning of the General Staff and High Command group as defined in the Indictment. This attack was carefully timed and planned, and in the documents one can observe the staff work step by step. Colonel Griffith-Jones read from a series of directives from Hitler and Keitel, embodied in Document C-120, Exhibit Number GB-1, involving "Fall Weiss", which was the code word for the plan of. attack on Poland. That is a whole series of documents, and the series starts C-120- with a reissuance of a document called, "Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed Forces." We have encountered this periodically reissued directive previously. That was a sort of form for standing instructions to the Armed Forces laying out what their tasks during the coming period would be. In essence these directives are: Firstly, statements of what the Armed Forces must be prepared to accomplish in view of political and diplomatic policies and developments and; secondly, indications of what should be accomplished diplomatically in order to make the military tasks easier and the chances of success greater. They constitute, in fact, a fusion of diplomatic and military thought and they strongly demonstrate the mutual interdependence of aggressive diplomacy and military planning. Note the limited distribution of these documents, early in April 1939, in which The preparation of the plans for the Polish war is ordered. Five copies only are distributed by Keitel: One goes to Brauchitsch at OKH; one to Raeder at OKM; one to Goering at OKL; and two to Warlimont in the planning branch of OKW. Hitler lays down that the plans must be capable of execution by 1 September 1939; and, as we all remember, that target date was adhered to. The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is clearly brought out by a part of one of these documents which has not previously been read; that is Document C-120, Subdivision D, and it is to be found at Page 4.
COL. TAYLOR: The sub-heading is "Political Requirements and Aims": "German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland. "The aim, then, will be to destroy Polish military strength and create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the Reich territory at the outbreak of the conflict, at the latest. "The political leadership considers it its task in this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only. "The development of increasing internal crises in France and the resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in the not too distant future. "Intervention by Russia, so far as she would be able to do this, cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this would imply Poland's destruction by Bolshevism. "The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by German military exigencies. "On the German side Hungary cannot be considered a certain ally. Italy's attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis." Sub-heading 2, "Military Conclusions": "The great objectives in the building up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the Western Democracies. Fall Weiss constitutes only a precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military settlement with the Western opponents. "The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.
COL. TAYLOR: "The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air over them." Let no one suggest that these are hypothetical plans or that the General Staff and High Command group did not know what was in prospect. The plans show on their face that they are no war game. But, to clinch this point, let us refer briefly to Mr. Alderman's socalled "pin-up" document on Poland, Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27. These are Schmundt's notes on the conference in Hitler's study at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, on 23 May 1939 when Hitler announced-and I quote just one sentence: "There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity." Note who was present besides Hitler and a few military aides: The Defendant Goering, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; the Defendant Raeder, Navy; the Defendant Keitel OKW; Von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army; Colonel General Milch, who was State Secretary of the Air Ministry and Inspector General of the Luftwaffe; General Bodenschatz, Goering's personal assistant; Rear Admiral Schniewind, Chief of the naval war staff; Colonel Jeschonnek, Chief of the Air Staff; Colonel Warlimont, Planning Staff. All of them, except Milch, Bodenschatz, and the adjutants' are members of the group. So far these documents have shown us the initial and general planning of the attack on Poland. These general plans, however' had to be checked, corrected, and perfected by the field commanders who were to carry out the attack. I offer Document C-142, which will be Exhibit Number USA-538.
COL. TAYLOR: This document was issued in the middle of June 1939, and in this document Von Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, passed on the general outlines of the plan for the attack on Poland to the field commanders-in-chief-to the Oberbefehlshaber of army groups and armies-so that the field commanders could work out the actual preparation and deployment of troops in accordance with the plans. This is from Page 1 of the translation, and I quote: "The object of the operation is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. High policy demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. The intention of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army is to prevent a regular mobilization and concentration of the Polish Army by a surprise invasion of Polish territory and to destroy...the mass of the Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of the Vistula-Narev Line." I skip to the next paragraph: "The army group commands and the army commands will make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy. There will be alterations necessary if surprise should have to be abandoned. These will have to be developed simply and quickly on the same basis; they are to be prepared mentally to such an extent that in case of an order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army they can be carried out quickly."
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that document?
COL. TAYLOR: The date of that document is the middle of June 1939; I believe it is the 15th or 14th of June 1939. The date is on the original. The next document is 2327-PS, which will be Exhibit Number USA-539. It is signed by Blaskowitz. It is dated 14 June 1939, and it shows us an Oberbefehlshaber at work in the field planning an attack. Blaskowitz at that time was Commander of the 3rd Army Group and he became Commander-in-Chief of the German 8th Army during the Polish campaign. I read some extracts from this document found on Page 1 of the translation: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has ordered the working out of a plan of deployment against Poland which takes into account the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war by surprise and for quick success. "The order of deployment by the High Command of the Army, known as Fall Weiss, authorizes the 3rd Army Group (in Fall Weiss 8th Army headquarters) to give necessary directions and orders to all commands subordinated to it for Fall Weiss." I skip to Paragraph 7 on Page 1: "The whole correspondence on Fall Weiss has to be conducted under the classification 'top secret.' This is to be disregarded only if the content of a document, in the judgment of the chief of the responsible command, is harmless in every way- even in connection with other documents. "For the middle of July a conference is planned where details of the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered later on. Special requests are to be communicated to 3rd Army Group before 10 July." That is signed, "The Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Army Group, F. Blaskowitz." I skip to Page 2 to read one further extract under the title at the top of Page 2 of the translation, "Aims of Operation Fall Weiss": "The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish mobilization, is to be opened by surprise with forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed on alert in the neighborhood of the border.