dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SCHULTE-MONTING: I recall that at the so-called daily discussions regarding the general situation one of the officers of the Naval Operations Staff reported on the intentions of the Army regarding the future of Leningrad-not Petersburg. Whereupon Raeder expressed the desire that it be kept in mind during the operations that Leningrad should, under all circumstances, fall intact into our hands, for he needed shipyards and adjoining territory for naval construction; and he wished that the Army be informed of the urgency of this desire, because in view of the ever-increasing danger of air attacks, we intended to shift part of our shipyard facilities to the East. At that time we had already begun, if I remember correctly, to move installations from Emden to the East and wanted, furthermore, as Raeder wished, to evacuate Wilhelmshaven subsequently and move the installations there as far to the East as possible. He emphasized expressly that the city should also be left as undamaged as possible because otherwise there would be no place for the workers to live. This is all I can truthfully tell you about the case of Leningrad.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know that this wish of Raeder's was rejected by Hitler because he said it was not possible?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I do not recall that this case was taken up again. For the operations in the North soon came to a standstill, I believe.
DR. SIEMERS: Did other high officers tell you anything at all about this document?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I never heard anything about this document, nor did I see any reason to discuss it with anyone.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, if it is agreeable to the Tribunal, I should like to submit a document which was granted me, Exhibit Raeder-111, because of its connection with this problem. It is to be found in my Document Book 6, Page 435. It is an affidavit by Rear Admiral Hans Butow, dated 21 March 1946. I should like to read this document since it is very brief.
THE PRESIDENT: What page is this?
DR. SIEMERS: Page 435 in Document Book 6, Exhibit Number Raeder-111. It reads as follows: "During the period from 20 June 1941 to 20 October 1941, namely, the period to which Document USSR-113, (l), UK-45, refers, I was stationed in Finland as Naval Commander. I was under Generaladmiral Carts, the Commander-in-Chief of Group North. I declare that the document in question, USSR-113, (1), UK-45, a communication of 29 September 1941 sent by the Naval Operations Staff to Group North, and its contents have never come to my knowledge, as it doubtless would have if Generaladmiral Carls had passed on the letter to the offices subordinate to him. As far as I know, no one else in my command received this communication. "I myself first obtained knowledge of this order of Hitler's in November 1945 on the occasion of a conversation with Dr. Siemers, the defense counsel for Admiral Raeder. "Other officers, especially other naval commanders, have never spoken to me about this order. It is thus clear that the other commanders likewise had no knowledge of this order." Then there is the certification and the signature of the senior naval judge before whom this affidavit was made. Admiral, then I should like to turn to a new topic, the alleged war of aggression which Raeder is supposed to have planned against America. Did Raeder at any time try to instigate Japan to a war against America?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, never. We never had any military discussions with Japan at all before her entry into the war. Quite on the contrary, he warned Hitler against war with America in view of England's naval superiority and her co-operation with America.
DR. SIEMERS: For what reasons did you, Raeder, and the High Command especially, warn Hitler?
SCHULTE-MONTING: First of all, for the reasons which I outlined before, reasons of over-all strategy which motivated Raeder during the entire course of the war. Raeder considered the enemy on the sea primarily, and not on land. If the largest sea power in the world were added to England, which was already superior, then the war would have taken on unbearable proportions for us. Besides, through the reports of our naval attaché in Washington, Vice Admiral Witthoft, Raeder was very well informed about the tremendous potential at the disposal of the United States. I might also say with reference to the conversion of the normal economy into a war economy, that the tremendous outlay of shipyards and installations, as Witthoft stated a few months before the war, permitted the construction of a million tons of shipping each month. These figures were very eloquent and were naturally at the same time a terrible warning to us not to underestimate the armament potential of the United States.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution believes it must draw a contrary conclusion from the fact that Raeder on 18 March 1941, according to the War Diary, proposed that Japan should attack Singapore.
SCHULTE-MONTING: In my opinion, that was an absolutely correct measure and a correct proposal, which was in line with Raeder's reasoning. He was interested in dealing blows to England's important strategic centers. That he tried to ease our situation is understandable and self-evident. But at no time did he propose that Japan should enter into a war against America, but rather against England.
DR. SIEMERS: Were there any discussions about these strategic questions at that time between you and Raeder on the one hand and Japanese military authorities on the other?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I have already stated that before Japan's entry into the war no military discussions with Japan had ever taken place. The Japanese attitude was very reserved.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder ever discuss the fact that Japan should attack Pearl Harbor?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No. We heard about this for the first time over the radio.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, during the time of your activity in the High Command of the Navy or during your activity as a commanding admiral at Trondheim did you have any knowledge about the treatment of Allied prisoners of war by the German Navy?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I might reply that I know of no case in which Allied prisoners of war, as long as they were under the control of the Navy, were treated other than properly and chivalrously. I could refer to the testimony given by the English commander of the midget U-boat, which attacked the Tirpitz in the Alta Fjord, who after his return to England from imprisonment, gave a press interview on the occasion of his being awarded the Victoria Cross. In this interview he mentioned the particularly chivalrous and correct treatment he had received at the hands of the commander of the Tirpitz . From my own command in Norway I could mention a case in which members of the Norwegian resistance movement dressed in civilian clothing were treated just as chivalrously and correctly. I had to investigate these cases in the presence of British authorities, and the correctness of the treatment became evident.
DR. SIEMERS: When did you have to investigate this at the order of the British Military Government?
SCHULTE-MONTING: After the capitulation.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, not the Military Government, but the British Navy.
SCHULTE-MONTING: The British Navy at Trondheim, while I was a commanding admiral.
DR. SIEMERS: And the cases which were investigated there, first by you and then by the competent British admiral, were not contested?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Were not contested. The naval officer handed them over to me for safekeeping, and I had to present the findings of the courts of inquiry in writing.
DR. SIEMERS: And the result...
SCHULTE-MONTING: The result was good, proper, and occasioned no protests.
DR. SIEMERS: And the result was presented to the competent British officer?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, it was on his very order that I had to do it.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the case of the Athenia has been dealt with here in detail and is known to the Tribunal. Therefore, in order to save time, I should like merely to touch this case in passing. I should like you to tell me: Did the High Command know, did you and Raeder know, at the beginning of September 1939 that the Athenia had been sunk by a German U-boat? SCHULTE-MONTING. No. The Commander of U-boats reported on the ad that the Athena could not have been sunk by a German U-boat since, if I remember correctly, the nearest boat was about 70 nautical miles away.
DR. SIEMERS: When did you learn that a German U-boat had sunk the Athenia ?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe 2 or 3 weeks afterwards, after this U-boat returned.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I should like to refer to a document, according to which the date was 27 September. [Turning to the witness.] Do you know that a declaration had been made by State Secretary Von Weizsacker on 3, 4, or 5 September to the effect that it was not a German U-boat? When it was established that it actually had been a German U-boat, what did Raeder do about it?
SCHULTE-MONTING: The assumption that it had not been a German U-boat was at first justified and State Secretary Von Weizsacker therefore acted in the best of faith, as did we. After this regrettable mistake became known, Raeder reported this fact to Hitler. Hitler then gave the order that he did not want the statement which had been made by the Foreign Office denied. He ordered that the participants, that is those who knew, should give their oath to remain silent until, I believe, the end of the war. 2Z May 46
DR. SIEMERS: Did you give your oath of silence?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I personally did not give my oath of silence, and neither did Admiral Raeder. In the High Command we were the only ones, I believe, with the exception of Admiral Fricke who had knowledge of that, and we should probably have taken the oath.
DR. SIEMERS: At Hitler's order you were obliged to administer an oath to the others who knew about this?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. I am of the opinion that it was the crew of the U-boat, insofar as they knew about this mistake.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of not having gone to Freiherr Ton Weizsacker to tell him that it actually was a German U-boat and of not having said to the American naval attaché, "I am sorry; it was a German U-boat after all."
SCHULTE-MONTING: Such thoughts occurred to us as well, but we thought that any discrepancies which might arise and lead to political ill-humor in America were to be avoided as much as possible. Stirring up this case once more would have greatly aroused public feeling. I remember, for instance, the Lusitania case during the first World War. To have stirred up this case again after a few weeks and to arouse public opinion, and then to force entry into the war would have had little sense.
DR. SIEMERS: And that was the train of thought which caused Hitler to issue this decree?
SCHULTE-MONTING: It was the train of thought which we also shared.
DR. SIEMERS: You said it was not to be stirred up again but regrettably, as you know, this case was stirred up again. On 23 October 1939 in the Volkischer Beobachte r a very unfortunate article appeared with the heading "Churchill Sinks the Athenia ." Do you remember that article?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, of course. That article was published without Raeder's knowledge and without the knowledge or complicity of the Navy. Even today I do not know yet who the author of the article was. It originated in the Propaganda Ministry, and Raeder and the rest of us in the High Command of the Navy were most indignant, not so much because this topic was being stirred up again, but rather because of the tenor of the article for whether deliberately or unintentionally-we did not know which it was-there was a misrepresentation. We were obliged to keep silence. To what extent the Propaganda Ministry had been informed about this matter by Hitler, we did not know. We also had no opportunity to speak with the Propaganda Ministry about this case and we were completely surprised when this article appeared several weeks later in the Volkischer Beobachter . We were therefore deeply indignant, especially Raeder, because it was fundamentally against his principles that leading foreign statesmen be attacked in a caustic manner; and, in addition, the facts were completely distorted. And besides-this may also be important-this involved Raeder's opponent whom Raeder did not in the least wish to disparage before the German public, for Raeder took him only too seriously; and this was, I believe, no other than Churchill.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question: Did the Propaganda Ministry call you or Raeder up before this article appeared?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, no.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to turn to the last question of my examination. This is the last point.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is about the sixth final question you have asked.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, the translation must have been wrong. The previous question was the final question on the Athenia problem. Now, this is actually the final question which I wish to put. [Turning to the witness.] The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of not supporting Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch after the latter had been exonerated and acquitted in court and accuses Raeder of not having used his influence to reinstate Fritsch in office and restore his dignity. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, that is not correct. Raeder gave me all the files of the legal proceedings against Generaloberst Von Fritsch sometime in the beginning of 1939 to be kept in the safe. At that time he told me how the course of the proceedings had impressed him and also of the fact that he had made Generaloberst Von Fritsch the offer of a complete reinstatement, going so far as to have him reinstated in his previous of lice. Von Fritsch thanked him for that and told him personally that he would never assume his former office again, that he would not even consider returning after what had happened, for which reason he was requesting Raeder not to make any efforts in this direction. Besides, Fritsch and Raeder were on good personal terms-to say that they were friends is going perhaps too far, but I have often seen Fritsch at Raeder's house even after his dismissal.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you, Admiral. Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Admiral Schulte-Monting , you just spoke about the correct treatment of prisoners in connection with a U-boat attack on the Tirpitz . Do you mean by that the attack in November 1943 in the Alta Fjord?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, that is the one I mean.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Was it a two-man U-boat?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Whether it was a two-man or three-man U-boat, I do not know, but it was a midget U-boat. Several U-boats attacked simultaneously. Some of them were sunk, and the commander who successfully, I believe, placed his magnetic mine was taken prisoner.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: And this commander was treated according to the Geneva convention?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Absolutely.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you first about the Athenia episode. I take it you agree that the article in the Volkischer Beobachter was thoroughly dishonorable, lying, and discreditable.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I heard nothing at all in German.
MAJOR JONES: I will repeat my question. With regard to the Athenia -do you hear me now?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: With regard to the Volkischer Beobachter article on the Athenia , do you agree that it was a thoroughly dishonorable publication?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, I agree that it was a dishonorable publication, untrue and dishonorable.
MAJOR JONES: Perhaps if you keep your headphones on-I have a number of questions to ask you, I am afraid-it might be more convenient for the work we have to do. And you say that the Defendant Raeder thought it was dishonorable?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, he did as wed.
MAJOR JONES: What action did he take to manifest his displeasure?
SCHULTE-MONTING: In this case he valued the interests of the State more than a newspaper article. The interests of the State required that in any event all complications with the United States were to be avoided.
MAJOR JONES: That appears to be a characteristic on the part of Raeder that runs throughout the history from 1928 to 1943, that throughout he put what he thought were the interests of the Nazi State before conditions of morality, honor, and public decency, is that not so?
SCHULTE-MONTING: That I do not believe. I believe that in this he acted consistently as a good patriot would act.
MAJOR JONES: You see, with regard to the invasion of Russia, for example, you said to the Tribunal that on both moral and strategic grounds, Raeder was against the invasion of Russia. Why did he not resign?
SCHULTE-MONTING: By way of reply I must mention first Hitler's answer to Raeder's statements against a war with Russia. This answer was to the effect that he saw no possibility of avoiding a conflict for the following reasons: First, because of the personal impression which he, Hitler, had received from Molotov's visit, which had taken place in the meantime. By "in the meantime" I mean between the directive and the carrying through of the directive. Secondly, the fact that allegedly the economic negotiations had not only been dragged out by the Russians but, as Hitler expressed it, had been conducted with blackmail methods. Thirdly, as he had been informed by the German General Staff. Russian troop deployment had taken on such threatening proportions that he, Hitler, could not wait for the first blow from the other side because of the air threat to Brandenburg and the capital and to the Silesian industry. Raeder then, of course, had to realize that he could not refute these arguments or prove the opposite.
MAJOR JONES: You are not suggesting that you thought that the war between Germany and Russia was a defensive war so far as Germany was concerned, are you?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, we were of the opinion that the deployment of troops on both sides had reached such an extreme point that it would not take long for the storm to burst, and that from the military point of view anyone who sees that a conflict is inevitable, naturally likes to have the advantages which result from dealing the first blow.
MAJOR JONES: The invasion of Russia was a brutal aggression on the part of Nazi Germany, you admit that now, do you not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, I do admit that.
MAJOR JONES: I want you to turn your mind for a moment, if you will, to Document L-79, which is in the British Document Book 10, Page 74. Those are the minutes of the Hitler conference on 23 May 1939 which you discussed in your evidence-in-chief this morning. I take it that you have read those minutes, Witness?
SCHULTE-MONTING: May I look at them now? I have never seen these minutes before. If I were to be asked about them, I would first have to read them in toto.
MAJOR JONES: Well, you need not trouble to do that, Witness. You gave evidence this morning as to Raeder's discussion with you about this conference. Did Raeder tell you that Hitler had said on 23 May 1939, for instance: "There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czechoslovakian affair. There will be war." Then further, Page 76 of the report: "The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict.... England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life and death struggle." And then the next paragraph but one: "The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored." Now, I am suggesting to you that those statements of Hitler's represented Hitler's considered policy, and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action. Is that not so?
SCHULTE-MONTING: First of all, I must correct a mistake. I thought that you had shown me a record on Russia and not the one on Poland. I saw it in different writing, and I thought it was another record. If it is the same record which I mentioned this morning, then I must state again that Raeder did not agree with the belligerent wording of these minutes as written down by Schmundt.
MAJOR JONES: Just one moment, Witness, if you please. I have read out certain extracts from that document, which I take it that you heard interpreted. Do you agree with me that those extracts represented Hitler's considered policy at the time and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action? If you keep your headphones on-I know it is difficult. Just move them back if you wish to talk. Now, see if you can answer my question.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I should like to remark in this connection that Hitler in his speeches pursued a certain purpose. In preparations for war he saw a means of political pressure, and in the phrase "war of nerves" (which was not used in Germany only, but went everywhere through the ether far beyond Europe's boundaries) he tried to find a means of preventing war as well as a means of exerting pressure. This document itself contains contradictions which lead to the conclusion that he himself could not seriously have thought that a war would develop. I can prove this by saying, for example, that he states that the General Staff or the general staffs are not to concern themselves with this question; but toward the end he says that all the branches of the Wehrmacht must get together to study the problem. He says that a war with Poland must in no event result in war with England; politics must see to that. But in the next paragraph one reads: "But if a war actually does arise, I shall deal short sharp blows for a quick decision." In the next paragraph it says again, "But I need 10 to 15 years to prepare," and in the concluding paragraph it says: "The construction program of the Navy will in no wise be changed." If, therefore, Hitler at that time had really been serious in his speech, that is, that an armed conflict with Poland would result shortly, then he would not have exclaimed first that we would have time until 1943 and, secondly, that there were to be no changes as far as the Navy was concerned. Rather he would have said to Raeder, privately at least: "In all haste prepare a strong U-boat program because I do not know what course events will take."
MAJOR JONES: But it is a fact that at about this time, the Fall Weiss operation was being prepared to the very last detail, was it not? That is the operation against Poland.
SCHULTE-MONTING: The operation was prepared to such a stage that when it was canceled at the last minute we thought that we would not be able to reach our forces at sea by wireless. We considered this an extreme policy of exerting pressure in the form of a war of nerves. Since at the last minute everything was canceled we believed without doubt that it was only a means of pressure and not an entry into war. Not until we heard the cannons were we convinced that the war was no longer to be prevented. I personally believe . . .
MAJOR JONES: If you would shorten your answers as best you can, it would be very convenient. I want to go from Poland to Norway. The first conference of the Defendant Raeder with regard to Norway took place on 10 October, you have told us. I want you to hear the record of that conference, which is found in Admiral Assmann's headline diary. It is dated 10 October 1939: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states conquering the Belgian coast no advantage for U-boat warfare; refers to value of Norwegian bases." I suggest to you that the interests of the German Navy in Norway from the point of view of requiring submarine bases was manifesting itself at that time; is that not so?
SCHULTE-MONTING: May I look at this document first? It is unknown to me.
MAJOR JONES: You shall see the original diary, if you want to reassure yourself that I am reading it correctly. [The document was handed to the witness.]
SCHULTE-MONTING: In this sentence, I do not see any belligerent intentions. It says expressly that he attaches importance to the winning of Norwegian bases.