dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to voice a further request for the case of Von Papen. I already submitted a written request on 6 June. This was discussed with the Prosecution, and the General Secretary has instructed me to bring this matter to the attention of the Court. Prince Erbach-Schonberg has filled out an interrogatory. His answers, however, are partially incomplete and sometimes misleading, and it is therefore necessary to supplement them. I suggest that Prince Erbach, who is in Gmunden in the American occupied zone of Austria, be brought here and interrogated-outside of this Court but in the presence of the Prosecution-to supplement this interrogatory. My associate received a letter some days ago from Count Pfeil, who is living in Bad Ischl, which is also in the American-occupied zone of Austria, not far from Gmunden, the residence of Prince Erbach. In this letter he has made detailed statements about the contacts which the Defendant Von Papen had with the circle of conspirators involved in the attempted assassination of 20 July. Since this question was raised by the witness Gisevius, the Defense feel themselves bound to discuss it in the presentation of evidence, although they attach no great importance to it. This evidence can probably be produced by means of an affidavit. I ask that Count Pfeil be brought here with Prince Erbach at the same time so that he can depose an affidavit in the presence of the Prosecution. It is absolutely essential to bring both of these witnesses here, because the case of Von Papen is imminent, and we could not take care of these matters by correspondence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, will you draw our attention to the particular points in which you say that the interrogatory of Prince Erbach-Schonberg is incomplete or misleading?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with one of the preceding questions of this interrogatory, Prince Erbach answered that the Defendant Von Papen had desired to achieve his assignment by peaceful means rather than by the use of force. The witness answered a later question as to whether the Defendant Von Papen acted in accordance with these political principles as follows: "As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant Von Papen acted in accordance with these principles- that is, the establishment of relations by peaceful means rather than by the use of force." This last statement contradicts the first half of the answer. Moreover, this latter phrasing scarcely corresponds to the facts.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that that answer is incomplete or contradictory?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is a contradiction. "Rather than by force" contradicts the first half of his reply, that he acted according to these principles. These questions... Em; PRESIDENT: The answer that I have got is: "As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant Von Papen acted according to this policy of establishing relations through peaceful means rather than force." There is nothing contradictory in that, in English
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German text it says, "rather than with force." The word "rather" disturbs me, and is a contradiction. It does not mean the same thing-namely, that he wanted to bring about connections in a peaceful manner only and not by force.
THE PRESIDENT: It means the same thing It means that he wanted to establish the relations by peaceful means rather than with forceful means. "Not by force" he means.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This version might lead to the assumption that the Defendant Von Papen may even have considered non-peaceful means. We want to prove, in accordance with the foregoing answer, that he rejected all means other than peaceful means from the beginning, and never introduced them into his discussions. However, if the High Tribunal interpret the interrogatory in the manner which has just been stated, then I have no further reason to supplement it.
THE PRESIDENT: It couldn't mean anything else in English I don't know what it could mean in German.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German version it is translated, "I would prefer peaceful means to force; as a last resort, other than peaceful means might have to be considered." That would be the interpretation placed on the German translation. We want to establish clearly the fact that none other than peaceful methods were ever considered.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To save any trouble, I should like to assure the Tribunal that the Prosecution accepted the answer in the sense which Your Lordship has just put. We shouldn't suggest for a moment that Prince Erbach would make any other answer than in the sense the Tribunal have accepted it.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps a way of meeting the difficulty would be if you would agree to read the words in the sense "and not by force."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then, of course, I quite agree. And I should like to have the Tribunal's decision as to whether Count Pfeil is to be brought here to depose an affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the other witness?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The second witness, Count Pfeil, who wrote the letter which we wish to submit to the High Tribunal in the form of an affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that when we have heard Sir David. Are there any other inconsistencies or contradictions which you wish to draw our attention to in the Prince's interrogatory?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the letter of Count Pfeil been translated?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, it has not as yet been translated. But it is simply a letter, the identity of which we cannot prove, and that is why we wanted the affidavit in the proper form.
THE PRESIDENT: Would the letter itself be sufficient if the Prosecution were prepared to admit the letter?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, it would suffice, for we could certainly prove nothing more with the affidavit than what is contained in the letter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have no objection to admitting the letter, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Sir David. Then the interrogatories of Prince Erbach-Schonberg will be amended in the way that we have indicated, and the letter of Count Friedrich Karl von Pfeil will be admitted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if Your Lordship will allow me to mention one point that arose on Tuesday. Your Lordship may remember that the Defendant Jodl said that he had not been permitted by the Prosecution to mention a document. My Lord, a misunderstanding arose in this way. Your Lordship may remember that at an early stage in dealing with witnesses and applications, I objected to general evidence of shackling because I said that the Prosecution had not made the evidence as to shackling by the Germans a part of their case, and therefore it did not seem to me an issue that need be pursued. I put that forward, and Mr. Roberts, who was dealing with the later stages, adopted the same line. Apparently that was understood as including an objection to the Wehrmacht order which the Defendant Jodl mentioned, and which he wanted to use as an answer to a broadcast of the British War Office. This, I think, is a further remark which could be made. I certainly didn't wish to object to the Defendant Jodl clarifying a Wehrmacht order that was part of the preparations for the Commando Order, and I said so at the time. I should not like the Tribunal to think that I was making any reflection on the learned professors who are conducting the Defendant Jodl's case, or putting forward that they had made a basic accusation against me. I thought, therefore, the Tribunal would allow me just a moment to explain that it was a misunderstanding, and that neither of us feels that we have been injured in any way by the other by what has been said.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything further that needs to be done with reference to the admission or introduction of this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, because I waived any objection to it, and the Defendant Jodl was permitted, in giving his evidence, to make a full explanation concerning it. I only wanted it understood how the misunderstanding had arisen, and that I did not feel that Professor Exner or Professor Jahrreiss had made any baseless charges against me in so doing.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you very much.
DR. NELTE: I should like to put one question to the witness. Witness, the charge has been made against the Defendant Field Marshal Keitel that-and I quote-"rather than back up his subordinate officers and protect them, he threatened them; yes, he threatened to turn them over to the Gestapo." Can you give us facts about this charge which prove that this was not the case?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I can testify that Field Marshal Keitel, as superior, was always very well-disposed toward the officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. For instance, the relations between himself and Colonel Moench, who was closely connected with him in his military capacity of Chief of the Organization Division, were almost that of father and son; and he deeply lamented his death in action on the Eastern Front. I can also say that I myself, along with Lieutenant Colonel Ziehrvogel, the A-1 man on my staff, on the basis of factual disagreement with the staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS, was in 1944 accused in a letter to Field Marshal Keitel of sabotaging the co-operation between OKW and Reichsfuehrer SS and the conduct of the war. In his reply, which I saw myself, Field Marshal Keitel defended us in every way, and said that he would take entire responsibility for everything done by his subordinate officers.
DR. NELTE: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross-examination?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not propose to cross-examine. That, of course, will not be taken that the Prosecution is accepting the truth of this evidence at all. But the whole question of atrocities in the East has been so thoroughly covered by evidence and by document, My Lord, I think it would be wrong and repetitious if I cross-examined.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there was one other point. Dr. Laternser, in the interests of saving time, produced an affidavit of this witness dated the 20th of May 1946. My Lord, of course, we are most anxious to assist Dr. Laternser in any effort on his part to save time, and we do not put any objection to this affidavit. But I am not quite certain as to what the affidavit is, and as to whether it has been put in as an exhibit- in which case it should be given a number-or whether it should go to the commission.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it necessary for it to be given an exhibit number. It was put to the witness, and he says the evidence was correct. That enables Dr. Laternser to refer to it hereafter.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. Then I propose the Prosecution should get copies. Could that be conveniently arranged?
THE PRESIDENT: Of course.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Mr. Dodd is pointing out that we have not seen this affidavit; we do not know what its contains. But we will get a copy, and if we have any further application to make, we can make it.
THE PRESIDENT: When an affidavit is used in this way and put to a witness who is in the witness box, of course the affidavit ought to be supplied to the Prosecution in order that they may see what is in it, and so be able to cross-examine if they wish to do so.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That has not been done in this case. The best course would be for the affidavit to be supplied to the Prosecution, and they may, if they wish, apply to examine on it before the commission. Do you think it is necessary? Perhaps you could see the affidavit soon and decide whether it is necessary to keep the witness here.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I respectfully agree.
THE PRESIDENT: And we shall hold the witness in Nuremberg?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, we accept the invitation to examine the affidavit over the week end, and then, if necessary, we could make an application on Monday.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; that is quite all right. Then, the witness can retire. [The witness left the stand.] Yes, Dr. Jahrreiss, will you call the next witness?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, if it is the Tribunal's wish. With the permission of the Tribunal, I wish to call Major Buchs as my next witness. Major Buchs. [The witness Buchs took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HERBERT BUCHS (witness): Herbert Buchs.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold nothing and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, what position did you have in the last years of the war?
BUCHS: From November 1943 I was a General Staff officer of the Air Force serving with the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff:; and in that capacity I was second adjutant to General Jodl
DR. JAHRREISS: And were you in this position until the end of the war? ~
BUCHS: I remained in this position until the end, until our arrest on 23 May 1945.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, during this time in which you were in the Fuehrer's headquarters, were you in the various compounds of these headquarters?
BUCHS: Yes. I was in the headquarters in East Prussia, and in addition to that I was in the headquarters in Berlin, and in 1944 also in Berchtesgaden.
DR. JAHRREISS: It has been said that there was a Party clique at the Fuehrer's headquarters. Do you know anything about that?
BUCHS: If I am to understand by that a circle of people, I would name Fegelein, Bormann, and Burgdorf.
DR. JAHRREISS: You would say that that was a clique?
BUCHS: These were three gentlemen who were in very close personal and official contact, and who made that impression on outsiders.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was this very close official and personal relationship between themselves or with others?
BUCHS: They not only had very close relations among themselves, but I also observed that these three gentlemen had very strong influence on Adolf Hitler himself.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, would you ascertain the names of the three again? They did not come to us quite clearly.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes. [Turning to the witness.] Major, will you please pronounce slowly the names of these three gentlemen you just mentioned?
BUCHS: There is Fegelein, Himmler's liaison officer to Adolf Hitler; then Bormann, the head of the Party Chancellery and the representative of the Party; and General Burgdorf, who had a dual position as Chief of the Army Personnel Office and at the same time Chief Adjutant of the Armed Forces with the Fuehrer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did General Jodl have official relations with each of these three gentlemen?
BUCHS: If I may start with Fegelein: Fegelein as Laison officer to Himmler was, as far as the Fuehrer was concerned, the man to whom he turned in all questions of material and personal equipment of the Waffen-SS divisions whenever these questions arose during the situation discussions in connection with putting these divisions into operation. In this connection, points which fell within Fegelein's sphere were frequently raised during situation reports. But the official connection between Jodl and Fegelein was otherwise very distant.
DR. JAHRREISS: And how about Bormann?
BUCHS: In dealing with Bormann as Deputy of the Party, General Jodl always strictly defined his own sphere of military tasks. He always rejected complaints or unjustifiable accusations or possible attacks against the Armed Forces. I witnessed this especially while the war was fought on German soil and there was often friction with the Gauleiter who had been appointed Reich Defense Commissars. For instance, I saw that General Jodl on receiving complaints or letters from Bormann simply returned the originals with rather abrupt marginal notes of his views. If that had no effect, he did not hesitate to express his views to the Fuehrer in every possible way in order to obtain his decision as to the dispute in question.
DR. JAHRREISS: And the third of these gentlemen, Burgdorf?
BUCHS: To my recollection Generaloberst Jodl had very little official contact with General Burgdorf, although it was Burgdorf who discussed the important questions of the appointment of the commanders and higher officers with the Fuehrer. It was in just such a case that I saw General Burgdorf first of all discuss these matters with the Fuehrer alone, so that General Jodl had comparatively little influence in that direction.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now I should like to hear from you, Witness, what personal relations existed between Generaloberst Jodl and each of these three gentlemen.
BUCHS: Jodl disliked Fegelein, because-I believe-he discerned the defects of his character at a very early stage. I have known him on several occasions to call Fegelein to account and reprimand him. As for Bormann, I should say General Jodl had no connection with him at all. I also have never noticed any personal or informal relations between them. What I have said about Fegelein also applies to his relations with General Burgdorf, whom General Jodl probably also disliked personally.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now I turn to a different point. Witness, do you know anything about the fact that in the last phase of the war the possibility of exposing a certain category of captured enemy airmen to the popular rage was under consideration? Did you hear about that?
BUCHS: Yes. I recall that in the spring of 1944, at Berchtesgaden, the Fuehrer vehemently demanded that Allied flyers who made emergency landings in Germany no longer be protected by the Armed Forces against the enraged populace. This demand was based on reports alleging that a Kreisleiter of the Party and an officer of the Air Force had protected an Allied airman. At that time the Fuehrer made this demand in a very sharp and pointed manner. He demanded that the Armed Forces issue the appropriate orders to put a stop to this once and for all.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Hitler also make this demand of General Jodl?
BUCHS: This demand was made at a situation conference attended by these gentlemen and Jodl himself; but I do not think that General Jodl had any direct connection with the handling of the whole question, as it was not directly connected with military matters.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did the General make no comment at all on the matter?
BUCHS: General Jodl, like all the other gentlemen, rejected this demand and, on his part, did everything he could to try to dissuade the Fuehrer from this demand. He began immediately by adopting a critical attitude, which expressed itself later in details he gave of four cases of violation of international law on the part of Allied airmen.
DR. JAHRREISS: I really do not need to ask you about this, for we have documentary proof of it. If Hitler was so enraged and demanded a decree with the urgency you have described, was it possible to pursue a delaying action?
BUCHS: In a case of this kind, in which the Fuehrer in the heat of his rage made such demands, it was impossible for the gentlemen to whom the demand was put to oppose him at the moment, let alone flatly refuse to carry out the order. There was nothing else for them to do-General Jodl used these tactics frequently-but to try by obtaining data, arguments pro and con, and asking for comments and opinions from all the offices concerned-to collect the material and at a quiet opportune moment approach the Fuehrer on the matter again and try to dissuade him from his extravagant demand. Outwardly, this resulted in a lengthy correspondence, in which the files of the various departments involved were sent back and forth, all with the intent of delaying the matter to the utmost and, if possible, shelving it completely. My impression, as far as the treatment of the terror-fliers was concerned, was that in this case we really succeeded even though the Fuehrer's attention was repeatedly called to this question through new reports and statements and he demanded that a decree be put into execution.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then was no such order issued?
BUCHS: I know of no such order.
DR. JAHRREISS: Can you cite an incident which shows clearly that no such decree was issued?
BUCHS: On one occasion in August 1944 I personally was called to account by the Fuehrer rather sharply. After an air raid on Munich, Fegelein had described low-level attacks to Hitler rather crudely and reported the incident where a plane was shot down by antiaircraft artillery, and two Allied airmen had made an emergency parachute landing. When they were captured and brought off by a Wachtmeister of the antiaircraft artillery, he himself said that he had called this man to account, and had asked him why he had not shot the two fliers. The man replied, "because I had no orders to do so." At that moment I interpolated on my own account that no such order existed. And then the Fuehrer reproached me in the most violent manner because the leading men of the Armed Forces had not issued a decree like that. Then, of course, he again demanded that the order be carried out.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it carried out then?
BUCHS: No, for that was the period after 20 July, and the time of the campaign in the West when there were more urgent questions in the foreground. And because of all of these questions that of the treatment of terror-fliers was again put aside.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know about an incident in Berlin-I believe in March 1945-which is supposed to have taken place in the Reich Chancellery, where the Fuehrer again complained that in spite of his demand this decree had not been issued?
BUCHS: I recall that in March 1945 the Fuehrer again expressed himself very heatedly on this problem to General Koller, who was then Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force. I myself was not present at the beginning of this conversation. I was called in, however, and heard the Fuehrer say something to the effect that on the basis of the attitude taken by the Armed Forces, and especially by the Air Force, it had been impossible for him to counteract the terror of the Allied fliers over Germany by means of a corresponding counter/error. . .
DR. JAHRREISS: Just a moment, Witness. You said that you had not been present at the entire discussion. Mr. President, we have an interrogatory which we want to submit to the Tribunal. It is in our document book, Volume II, Page 178, and is the testimony of General of the Air Force, Koller. This testimony under Number 5, which is on Page 180 of the document book, contains all the details worth preserving of this extremely important conference in Berlin. Only part of this conversation took place in the Fuehrer's room. Another part took place in the anterooms-as, for instance, that with Kaltenbrunner- while the conversation with Goering was carried on by telephone. In order to save time and to avoid splitting up the matter, I should like to have the Tribunal's permission to present it as a whole, even though the witness heard only a part. With regard to JODL the last sentence says, as a whole-I believe, Mr. President, we can save time if I may present it now. First of all, I must read the first question put to General Koller, which is to be found on Page 179. Here the witness was asked: "How long have you been Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force?" The answer is on the next page and is: "From 1 September 1943 to 3 September 1944 I was Chief of the Air Force Operations Staff; from 23 November 1944, Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force." Question 5-and that is the question which concerns us-is on Page 179: "Do you recall that about March 1945, in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery, the Fuehrer censured you and the Air Force because such an order was not given?" Answer, Page 180: "Yes, I remember exactly. A notice taken from the Allied press reporter survey between the beginning and the middle of March 1945 was laid before the Fuehrer by Bormann during the situation discussion. In brief it read somewhat to this effect: " 'An American combat air crew, shot down over Germany a short time previously, was overtaken by advancing American troops.