dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. LATERNSER: I have just referred to the fact that this list mentions General Hoeppner who, because of his participation on 20 July, had been sentenced to death. That may be seen from the last two columns, and I wanted to call the attention of the High Tribunal in this connection to the fact that this is the same general who, in the opinion of the author of Document L-180, allegedly had very close collaboration with Einsatzgruppe A. Now I should like to submit Document General Staff Number 9, which will be found on Pages 49 to 54 of Document Book Number 1. I shall merely point out that this list contains the names of those 31 officers who served less than 6 months in positions which are included in the Indictment. Most of these officers, as will also be seen from this list, had not been appointed commanders-in-chief (Oberbefehlshaber) but had been entrusted with matters of administration. Now I shall turn to Document General Staff Number 10 to which I particularly wish to call the attention of the High Tribunal. It will be found on Pages 55 to 61 of Document Book Number 1. From this document the High Tribunal will be in a position to see which ranks were held by the officers indicted at the times that exceptional events took place, for instance, at the outbreak of the war. This compilation, therefore, permits drawing certain definite conclusions as to how far these officers had a decisive influence on the events. As can be computed from the first column of List 5 on Pages 58 to 61 (the total will be found on Page 55 under Figure 1), on I September 1939-that is, at the beginning of the war-of a total of 107 generals and admirals now living, 47 still ranked as staff officers. They were majors, or lieutenant colonels, or colonels. 48 were generals of a lower rank. And of the entire 107 involved in the Indictment, only seven held top ranks. Five were full generals, and there were two Field Marshals. For five of those still alive we do not have any definite information.
DR. LATERNSER: I shall merely call your attention to the other summaries dealing with earlier events, as 'Computed on-Pages 56 and 57. The following should be remarked 'concerning the composition of these alleged groups. Holders of the position of permanent deputy of the Armed Forces Operation Staff, on the basis of Affidavit Number 6 of General Halder, Exhibit USA-533, are also accused by the Prosecution. With reference to the tasks and the significance of the position, I should like to call your attention to the cross-examination of Halder before the Commission. According to this, the holders of this position did not concern themselves decisively with strategic questions. Their position did not in any way correspond with the positions which are included in the Indictment. Thus, I conclude my evidence dealing with the group as indicted. The Prosecution is of the opinion that the circle of people as indicted consisted of an organized group. The affidavits submitted by the Prosecution to prove this point, Number 1, by General Halder, Exhibit USA-531, and Number 2, by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, Exhibit USA-532, do not have the meaning indicated to us by the Prosecution. In this connection, I should like to refer first of all to the cross-examination of General Halder, which I conducted before the Commission, and I should like to ask the High Tribunal to permit me to read one passage from this transcript so that this point will be complete in the record. "By Dr. Laternser: "Question: 'In your Affidavit Number I you have used the word "group" four times. Did this expression "group" emanate from you' "Answer: 'No; it was contained in the text, which has been changed several times, in which I left this word as it was.' "Question: 'Had you previously used this expression "group)) in a similar connection, for instance, in characterizing the military as a "group"' "Answer: 'No. "Question: 'What sense did you give this word "group" at the moment when you signed the statement "Answer: 'I did not hesitate to use this word.
DR. LATERNSER: "Group" is used in the sense of "number".' "Question: 'You therefore mean several generals? Or did you mean a certain circle of people who had been grouped for a certain purpose' "Answer: 'A number of generals who perhaps might be characterized as leading generals.' "Question: 'Subsequently the Prosecution is now interpreting this expression "group" as if an organization of military leaders existed. Was there an organization, or an organized group of that sort?' "Answer: 'No.' Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch was examined by me before this High Tribunal with regard to Affidavit Number 2. Concerning the allegation that the front commanders-in-chief were actually the consulting body for the High Command, the Prosecution has quoted Exhibit USA-537, Affidavit Number 5, by General Blaskowitz. I should like to refer to Affidavit General Staff Number 55 which has been translated, in which General Blaskowitz, on my request, gives an interpretation of the affidavit. According to this affidavit, the Oberbefehlshaber, the commanders-in-chief, were not a consultant body, but they were individual consultants in their own sphere, as is true in every army. The interpretation which the Prosecution gives to Affidavit Number 5 is, accordingly, not correct. Further I should like to refer to Affidavits Numbers 1-55, which also prove that the highest military authorities did not form an organization-like "group." I should like you to turn your special attention to Affidavits 1-4 which have been translated, but which I do not wish to quote That the Navy and the Air Force did not form a "group" with the Army generals may be seen from Affidavits Numbers 3145, 12 and 3097 of Admiral Schniewind and of the Generals Stumpf and Keller. Particularly from Affidavit Number 3145 by Admiral Schniewind can the High Tribunal infer all that which is important with reference to the commanders-in-chief of the Navy and their judgment.
DR. LATERNSER: I should also like to refer to the testimony of all the generals who were heard before the Commission, who all denied the existence of a "group." Of special importance seems to me the testimony of General Von Buttlar, who testified as to how nominations to these positions covered by the Indictment were effected. Mr. President, thus I conclude my evidence on the question of whether a "group" actually existed or not. Now I shall turn briefly to my proof dealing with the common attitude of the generals involved. Their general attitude as described in the opening speech by Mr. Justice Jackson is based on rather doubtful premises. Document Number 1947 was referred to by Mr. Justice Jackson in this connection. This Document Number 1947-PS, which is of basic significance to his statement, is a letter allegedly written by General Von Fritsch on 11 December 1938 to a Baroness von Schutzbar-Milehling, in which he is said to have declared that three battles would have to be won: The first, against the workers; the second, against the Catholic Church; and the third, against the Jews. Despite several demands I received neither the original nor a photostat copy of this document. I was told that I would have access to it if and when it could be found. I should like to refer in my refutation to the affidavit deposed by Baroness von Schutzbar-Milchling, who in her affidavit states that the alleged letter by General Von Fritsch was never received by her. If this key document, 1947-PS, cannot be submitted until the end of this proceeding-I should like to emphasize it has not been submitted until now but used all the same-then-and I make a special application for this-that part of the opening speech by Mr. Justice Jackson which refers to this document, which after all has not been submitted, should be struck from the record.
THE PRESIDENT: If the document has not been proved the Tribunal will pay no attention to it. If it is not in evidence then it is quite unnecessary to produce the document denying its existence. We will take no notice of it. What I understand you to be saying is that Mr. Justice Jackson referred to a letter. That letter has not been offered in evidence. If it has not been offered in evidence then the Tribunal takes no notice of anything Mr. Justice Jackson said about it in his speech and it is unnecessary for you to produce an affidavit -denying the existence of the letter. Is that clear?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but, Mr. President, it has been used. Mr. Justice Jackson ...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have pointed out to us now that it ought not to have been used because it is not in evidence. We wish to be strict in these matters and only to allow factual documents to be referred to which had been offered in evidence.
DR. LATERNSER: Concerning the mistrust which Hitler brought to the military leadership, that is a matter which has been stated and proven several times in this proceeding. I should like to refer the Tribunal to Affidavit Number 200, deposed by General Engel, an officer who for quite some time was in the closest proximity to Hitler and could observe the latter's growing mistrust. I will not read from that affidavit. In this connection I should also like to refer to Affidavit Number 3182, deposed by General Warlimont, who reproduced significant statements made by Hitler, and in order to be brief I shall merely refer to the same. Regarding the attitude taken by the military leaders toward the Party and its methods, I should like to refer as an example only to Affidavit Number 175, which has been translated.. The officer who at that time was competent, Major General Seegers, describes the battle waged by the military against the removal of Jewish officers. I should further like to refer to the contents of Affidavits Number 160 to 177, from which many particulars dealing with the unpolitical attitude taken by the military leadership may be gleaned. Dealing with the question of rearmament, I should like to, refer to Affidavit Number 126, in which General Berlin testifies that the General Staff eliminated from its armament program for 1933/34 the construction of ultra-heavy artillery with the explicit statement that Germany did not propose to wage aggressive wars. I should like to refer further to Affidavit Number 127 deposed by Major General Hesselbarth, from which it may be seen that at the beginning of the war the equipment and weapons for the units called up in case of mobilization were insufficient. As far as the rest of the interesting contents of this document is concerned', I .shall merely refer your attention to it. Dealing with rearmament in the Luftwaffe, the Prosecution submitted Document Number L-43, Exhibit Number GB-29, from which, allegedly, the rearmament intentions of the Luftwaffe are to be seen.
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to refer to the contents of Affidavit Number 101 of the then Chief of the General Staff, General Stumpf, who expressly testifies that this was a private organizational study undertaken by General Kammhuber. Continuing, I refer to the contents of Affidavits Numbers 102 to 152. Through details of the most varied kinds we can see that the military leadership, at any event, did not seriously take into consideration aggressive wars when carrying through the rearmament program. I should further like to refer to the contents of Affidavits Numbers 181 to 205, from which we can see, as is corroborated by many details, that foreign officers participated in certain training courses and exercises; that maneuvers were only of a defensive nature, and that the Military Academy which existed for the training of General Staff officers mainly had courses in defense tactics. As far as the deliberate participation of the military leaders in wars of aggression is concerned, the Prosecution has been trying to prove that the military leaders at an early date had been advised and informed of Hitler's plans, and in this connection they produced the Hossbach Minutes of 5 November 1937, (Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25). I should like to refer to the affidavit of the author of this record, General Hossbach, dealing with the background and the origin of this document. General Hossbach in his Affidavit Number 210, which he sent to me, expressly states that he did not take notes at the conference and that he only wrote down these minutes several days later. This document has been translated.
THE PRESIDENT: Does he say in this affidavit whether he was shown a copy of the notes or whether he had any comments to make on them?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I must state quite frankly that in view of the great bulk of material I cannot give you this information at the moment. In any event I would have asked for a recess now. I shall check on these matters and I shall be able to tell the Tribunal afterward. In addition, I should like to condense the material a bit, which I am sure will have beneficial effects later on.
I THE PRESIDENT: Very well. [A recess was taken until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, may I say something briefly about the order in which the final speeches for the organizations will be delivered? I am- submitting a list drawn up after brief consultation with my colleagues. According to this, counsel for the Political Leaders and the Gestapo could speak beginning Thursday or Friday. Beginning Monday, the SS and SD; Tuesday, the General Staff and the Reich Cabinet; and Wednesday, the SA. In the second column I have indicated by what date these documents can be turned in for translation; and in the last column I have given the time when the speeches could presumably be delivered. If there is no session on Saturday, Friday could be filled with the Political Leaders and the Gestapo. That is what I wanted to say.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean Friday this week could be taken up with the Political Leaders?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, and then the Gestapo. If there is no session on Saturday, the SS could begin on Monday so that there would be no interruption. The difficulty lies in whether the Translation Division can keep up with this pace.
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose that the difficulty in the Translation Division is partly due to their having nothing to translate.
DR.LATEANSER: Mr. President, the Court desired information on whether the Hossbach document was made available for information. As is shown in the document itself, Hossbach told Hitler of the existence of this document and gave it to him twice to read; but Hitler refused to initial it. General Hossbach does not recall whether he presented the record to Generaloberst Von Fritsch; but he certainly did show it to Generaloberst Beck. He also says that this record was not signed by the participants in the conference.
THE PRESIDENT: It was initialed by Blomberg, I see he says.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, initialed but not signed. May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, certainly.
DR.LATERNSER: Affidavits 213 A, B, and C show that the most important agencies were not informed of this conference of 5 November 1937. Numerous officers offered evidence that the equipment and training of the Wehrmacht made the idea of a war of aggression impossible; that is shown in Affidavits 223 to 225, 220 and 277. Generaloberst Adam, in Affidavit 211, discusses the entirely opposite views on the situation as held by the Wehrmacht on the one hand, and Hitler on the other. Field Marshal Von Weichs, in Affidavit 215, rebuts the opinions of Field Marshal Von Blomberg in his affidavit Number 3, Exhibit USA-536. Field Marshal Sperrle reports in Affidavits 237 and 237-a that he and Reichenau did not know the purpose of their visit to the Berghof during the Schuschnigg conference in February 1938. Only later did Hitler comment on this event, then rather drastically, however. The surprise orders to march into Austria caused the troops to improvise measures, as is shown by Affidavits 238 to 244. The same is true of the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia; on this subject I refer to Affidavits 246, 252, and 254. General Warlimont, in Affidavit 217, describes how, up to the day of the attack on Poland, a peaceful outcome of the tension had been expected. The same is shown by Affidavits 227, 246, and 255 to 257. Hitler's statements confirming this view of the generals are discussed in Affidavits 219, 211, 212, and particularly 277. The surprise which the final order to march against Poland caused is shown in Affidavits 228 to 231, as well as 255, 256, and 257. In July 1939, Admiral Raeder had told the Navy that the Political Leaders had definitely assured him that during the next few years there would be no hostilities. That is shown in Affidavit 3115 by Rear Admiral Kratzenberg. At the beginning of the war the German battleship Gneisenau had written orders that no hostilities were to be expected; at that time it was on a training cruise near the Canary Islands, without ammunition supplies. That is shown from the statement of Admiral F6rste, Number 3114.
DR.LATERNSER: According to Admiral Backenk6hler, in Affidavit 3116, preparations for production had been so inadequate that in August of 1940 there was still a lack of torpedoes for the small number of U-boats available at that time. Only a few officers learned of the preparations for the Norwegian campaign. That is shown by Affidavit 259. Affidavits Number 263, 264, 266, 267, and 269 quote statements by Hitler that he did not want to risk facing a war on two fronts. Unfortunately, owing to lack of time I cannot quote the detailed material exhaustively. In regard to the Russian campaign too, I must limit myself to brief references. According to the reports available, which were given to the generals at the time, it was represented as a preventive war. This is shown from Affidavits 270-a to 270-n, as well as 271, 272, 274, and 275. I refer further to Document General Staff Number 14, Pages 83 to 96 in my Document Book 1. The reference is sufficient. I now turn to the evidence on individual points, which I shall present in the following order. 1. Connections with Einsatzgruppen. 2. Commissar Order. 3. Partisan warfare. 4. Treatment of prisoners. 5. Destructions. 6. Treatment of civilian population. 7. Jurisdiction in the East. 8. Commando Order. 9., Deportation of laborers. 10. Crimes against rules of warfare and against humanity. First the Einsatzgruppen. The Prosecution contends that the Einsatzgruppen were in every respect subordinate to the commander-in-chief, and has referred to: 1. The testimony of Ohlendorf. 2. The testimony of Schellenberg. 3. Document L-180. 4. Affidavit 16, by General Rottiger, and finally, 5. Affidavit 18, by SS Fuefrer Rode. - I shall now show to the Court that these proofs of the Prosecution are not conclusive. Above and beyond that I shall offer counter-proof that the alleged connections did not exist, so that the crimes committed by the Einsatzgruppen cannot be charged against the persons whom I represent.
DR.LATERNSER: First, concerning the testimony of Ohlendorf, I refer to Affidavits Number 703 and 703-a by General W61iler, which have been translated, and, which refute the testimony of Ohlendorf on the points of the charge. I should like to call the attention of the Court particularly to the fact that General W61iler at that time was Chief of Staff of the 1lth Army, with whom the witness Ohlendorf alleges that he negotiated in the implicating manner which he describes. The affidavits of General Wohler completely refute the testimony of Ohlendorf. Secondly, Affidavit Number 12 of the witness Schellenberg, submitted by the Prosecution as Exhibit USA-557, is based-I should like to call the attention of the Court to this fact-mainly on assumptions. I cross-examined the witness Schellenberg at some length before the Commission; the record of this cross-examination appears in the Commission transcript, and I should like to ask expressly that the Tribunal refer to it, because it shows that the witness was not in a position to give facts as a basis for his assumptions. Schellenberg asserts that an agreement between General Wagner and SS Fuehrer Heydrich existed, whereby the Einsatzgruppen in the operational area were completely subordinated to the commanders-in-chief. As evidence to the contrary, I submit Affidavit 704 by Judge General Mantel, who spoke with General Wagner, who lost his life in connection with the 20th of July 1944, about this point specifically, and received the clear reply that the Einsatzgruppen were not under any military command but only under that of the Reichsfuehrer SS. In this connection I refer to Document 447-PS, submitted by the Prosecution, on Pages 99 and 100 of my Document Book 1. In Figure 2 to 2-b thereof it is shown clearly that the Reichsfuehrer SS that is, Himmler-received special assignments in the operational area of the Army, and that within these assignments he was acting independently and on his own responsibility.
DR.LATERNSER: That is shown on Pages 99 and 100 of my Document Book 1, in a document which the Prosecution itself submitted. The witness Schellenberg, in Affidavit Number 12,, mentions the close co-operation between Armored Group IV, under Generaloberst Hoeppner, and the Einsatzgruppen. I should like to call the special attention of the Tribunal to the way in which the testimony on this point came about. During his examination by the Prosecution, the report of Einsatzgruppe A was handed to the witness. From the report itself the witness Schellenberg obtained knowledge of this alleged close co-operation, and he then used this knowledge in his affidavit. I should, therefore, like to quote a part of the cross-examination before the Commission. "Question:..."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, what you are now doing is argument, is it not? We don't want to hear argument at this stage. I mean, you are referring us now to the case of the Prosecution, and you are arguing upon the affidavits which you are producing that they are satisfactory answers to the Prosecution. Well that is not necessary now.
DR. LATERNSER: I believe, Mr. President, I was misunderstood. I am contrasting assertions of the Prosecution and evidence of the Defense. To enable the Tribunal to see why I am presenting this evidence, I must show the evidence in its relationship to the charge of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: . You have done that already, and you have done it, if I may say so, very satisfactorily. You have given us ten different categories of these individual points, and you are now drawing our attention to your evidence which deals with the Einsatzgruppen. Well, that is all we need; we don't need to have references, or argument, at any rate, upon the Prosecution's evidence with reference to Einsatzgruppen. If you would continue to give us the references to your affidavits which deal with the Einsatzgruppen, that will be sufficient for us.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I regret to have to say one more thing. I can conduct my defense either by invalidating the Prosecution's evidence, or by producing evidence to the contrary. In this case I want to show the Tribunal that the affidavit of the witness Schellenberg-which was presented by the Prosecution, and in which the witness speaks of the particularly close co-operation between the Einsatzgruppe and Hoeppner-that this affidavit does not contain the knowledge of Schellenberg, but, that it ...
THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that. I have got down here that Ohlendorf and Schellenberg are the witnesses for the Prosecution who say that the High Command was concerned with and actually commanded the Einsatzgruppen. That is a fact you are contesting, and you are referring us to the evidence which you say contests it. You don't want to give us the Prosecution's evidence. You have told us what it is: Ohlendorf and Schellenberg, and L-180. Will you continue?
DR. LATERNSER: May I quote a brief passage from the testimony of Schellenberg?