dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE PRESIDENT: Pogroms on the largest scale would have been the natural result of a truly anti-Semitic attitude of the people. But nothing like that happened. Apart from some minor incidents, evidently caused by local or personal conditions, no attacks on Jews or their property took place anywhere. It is quite clear that a feeling of hatred for the Jewish people did not prevail anywhere at least up to 1933, and the charge brought by the Prosecution against the defendant that ever since the very outset of his fight he successfully educated the German people to hate the Jews can thus be dropped. The year of the seizure of power by the NSDAP also put Der Sturmer to a decisive test. Had Der Sturmer been considered by the broad masses of the German people as the authoritative champion against the Jews and therefore indispensable for that fight, an unusually large increase in the circulation would have followed. No such interest was, however, shown. On the contrary, even in Party circles demands were made that Der Sturmer should be discontinued entirely; or at least that its illustrations, style, and tone should be altered. It became more and more clear that the already small interest in Streicher's Jewish policy was steadily declining. It must be added that with the seizure of power by the Party the total press apparatus came under the control of the Party, which immediately undertook to co-ordinate the press, that is, to direct it from a central office in the spirit of the National Socialist policy and ideology. This was done through the Minister of Propaganda and the Reich Press Chief via the official "National Socialist Correspondence." Particularly Dr. Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, described by various witnesses such as Goering, Schirach, Neurath, and others as the most bitter advocate of the anti-Semitic trend in the Government, is said to have given each week to the entire German press several anti-Jewish leaders, which were printed by more than 3,000 dailies and illustrated papers. If in addition we take into account that Dr.
THE PRESIDENT: Goebbels vitas making broadcasts of an anti-Semitic nature, we need no further explanations for the fact that the interest in a one-sided anti-Semitic journal should diminish and that is what actually happened. It is particularly significant that at that time it had been repeatedly suggested that Der Sturmer should be suppressed altogether. This is brought out clearly in the testimony given by Fritzsche, on 27 June 1946, who stated in addition that neither Streicher nor Der Sturmer had any influence in the Ministry of Propaganda and that he was considered so to speak as nonexistent. It may have been for the same reason that Der Sturmer was not even declared a press organ of the NSDAP and was not even entitled to show the Party symbol. It was looked upon by the Party and State administration, in contrast to all papers which were considered to be of any importance, as a private paper belonging to a private writer. The firm which published Der Sturmer, and which belonged at that time to a certain Hardel, was not inclined, however, to accept so quietly the dwindling of its circle of readers, for it was now aided by the fact that Streicher had become the highest leader in Franconia; and it knew how to make the most of this circumstance. Already at that time pressure was exerted on many sections of the population to prove their loyal political attitude and trustworthiness by subscribing to Der Sturmer. The witness Fritzsche also has alluded to this circumstance, stating that many Germans only decided to subscribe to Der Sturmer because they thought it would be a means of paving the way for their intended membership in the Party. So as not to give a false impression of the circulation figures of Der Sturmer during the years between 1923 and 1933, the following analysis will show the different stages of its development. In the years 1923 to 1933 Der Sturmer was able to increase its circulation from some 3,000 to some 10,000 copies, and this in turn went up to some 20,000 shortly before the seizure of power.
THE PRESIDENT: On the average, however, between 1923 and 1931 the circulation was only some 6,000 copies. Following the seizure of power, by the end of 1934 it had reached an average of some 28,000 copies. It was not until 1935 that Der Sturmer became the property of the Defendant Streicher who, according to his statement, bought it from the widow of the previous owner for 40,000 RM-a not very considerable sum. From 1935 on the management of the business was taken over by an expert, who succeeded by clever canvassing in increasing the circulation to well over 200,000 copies; and this figure was later increased still further until it more than doubled. The relatively low circulation figures for Der Sturmer up to the beginning of 1935 show that, despite the Party's rise to power, popular interest in Der Sturmer existed only to a small extent. The extraordinary increase in the circulation which began in 1935 is to be traced to the adroit canvassing methods already mentioned which were carried out by the new director Fink. The use of the Labor Front, as explained by the proclamation of Dr. Ley in Number 36 of Der Sturmer, 1935-which copy, Mr. President, I have taken the liberty of submitting as an exhibit-and the acquisition thereby of many thousands of forced subscribers must be ascribed to the personal relations of the manager Fink with Dr. Ley. In that connection I further refer to a quotation from the Pariser Tageblatt of 29 March 1935 reproduced in Der Sturmer of May 1935. Here, too, it is stated that the increase of Der Sturmer's circulation cannot be ascribed to the desire of the German people for such kind of spiritual food. It is neither presumable nor probable in any way that the compulsory subscription to Der Sturmer, forced on the members of the Labor Front in such a manner, could have actually turned subscribers into readers of Der Sturmer and followers of its line of thought.
THE PRESIDENT: On the contrary, it is known that bundles of Der Sturmer in their original wrappings were stored in cellars and attics and that they were brought to light again only when the paper shortage became more acute. When, therefore, the Defendant Streicher wrote in his paper in 1935-Document Number GB-169-that the 15 years' work of enlightenment of Der Sturmer had already attracted to National Socialism an army of a million of "enlightened" members, he claimed a success for which there was no foundation whatsoever. The men and women who joined the Party after 1933 did not apply for membership as a result of the so-called enlightenment work of Der Sturmer but either because they believed the Party's promises and hoped to derive advantages from it or because by belonging to the Party they wanted, as the witness Severing expressed it, to insure for themselves immunity from political persecution. The sympathy for the Party and its leadership very soon decreased in the most marked manner. Thus the Defendant Streicher, too, lost authority and influence to an ever-increasing extent even in his own district of Franconia, at least from 1937 on. The reasons for this are sufficiently known. Toward the end of 1938 he saw himself deprived of practically all political influence, even in his own district. The controversy between him and Goering ended with the victory of the latter. Hitler, when pressed to do so by the Defendant Goering, had dropped Streicher completely, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe at that time was naturally more important and far more influential than the Gauleiter, Streicher. The defendant even had to submit to Aryanization as carried out in the district of Franconia with its correctness being checked by a special commission sent by Goering. In the course of the year 1939 Streicher was completely pushed aside and was even forbidden to speak in public. At the outbreak of the war, in contrast to all other Gauleiter, he was not even appointed to the position of Wehrkreiskommissar of his own district.
THE PRESIDENT: During the last phase, in the war years, the Defendant Streicher had no political influence whatsoever. As from February 1940 he was relieved of his position as a Gauleiter and lived on his estate in Pleikershof, cut off from all connections. Even Party members were forbidden to visit him. Since the end of 1938 he had no connections whatsoever with Hitler, by whom he had been completely cast off from that time on. In what way now did Der Sturmer exert any influence during the war period? It can be said that during the war Der Sturmer no longer attracted any attention worth mentioning. The gravity of the times, the anxiety for relatives on the battlefield, the battles at the front, and finally the heavy air attacks completely diverted the German people's interest from questions dealt with in Der Sturmer. The people were weary of the continuous repetition of the same assertions. The best proof of how little Der Sturmer was desired as reading matter can be seen in the fact that in restaurants and cafes Der Sturmer was always available for perusal, whereas other papers and magazines were permanently being read. The circulation figures decreased steadily and unceasingly in those years. Certainly the influence of Der Sturmer in the political sphere no longer amounted to anything. During. the periods mentioned Der Sturmer was rejected by large circles of the population from the very outset. Its crude style, its often objectionable illustrations, and its one-sidedness aroused widespread displeasure. There can be no question of any influence being exercised by Der Sturmer upon the German people or even the Party. Although the German people for years had been deluged with Nazi propaganda, or rather because of that very fact, a journal such as Der Sturmer could exert no influence upon its inner attitude.
THE PRESIDENT: Had the German people-as maintained by the Prosecution-actually been saturated with the spirit of fanatical racial hatred, other factors certainly would have been far more responsible for it than Der Sturmer and would have contributed far more essentially to a hostile attitude towards the Jews. But nothing of such nature can be established. The general attitude of the German people was not anti-Semitic, at any rate, not in such a way or to such a degree that they would have desired, or approved of, the physical extermination of the Jews. Even official Party propaganda with regard to the Jewish problem had exerted no influence upon the broad masses of the German people, neither had it educated them in the direction desired by the State leadership. This is shown by the fact that it was necessary to issue a number of legal decrees in order to segregate the German population from the Jewish. The first example of this is the so-called Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor of September 1935, by the provisions of which any racial intermingling of German people with the Jewish population was subject to the death penalty. The passing of such laws would not have been necessary if the German people had been predisposed to an anti-Semitic attitude, for they would then of their own accord have segregated themselves from the Jews. The law for the elimination of the Jews from German economic life, promulgated in November 1938) was along the same lines. In a people hostile towards the Jews, any trade with Jewish circles would have necessarily ceased and their business would have automatically come to a standstill. Yet in fact the intervention of the State was needed to eliminate Jewry from economic life. The same conclusion can be drawn from the reaction of the greater part of the German populace to the demonstrations carried out against the Jews during the night of 9-10 November 1938.
THE PRESIDENT: It is proved that these acts of violence were not committed spontaneously by the German people but that they were organized and executed with the aid of the State and Party apparatus upon instructions of Dr. Goebbels in Berlin. The result and the effect of these State-directed demonstrations-which in a cynical way were depicted for their effect abroad as an expression of the indignation of the German people at the assassination of the Secretary of the Embassy in Paris, Vom Rath-were different from that visualized by the instigators of this demonstration. These acts of violence and excesses based upon the lowest instincts found unanimous condemnation, even in the circles of the Party and its leadership. Instead of creating hostility towards the Jewish population they roused pity and compassion for their fate. Hardly any other measure taken by the NSDAP was ever rejected so generally. The effect upon the public was so marked that the Defendant Streicher in his capacity as Gauleiter found it necessary in an address in Nuremberg to give a warning against exaggerated sympathy for the Jews. According to his statement he did not do this because he approved of these measures but only in order to strengthen by his influence the impaired prestige of the Party. Previously, as appears from the testimony of the witness Fritz Herrwerth examined here, he refused SA Obergruppenfuehrer Von Obernitz' request to take part personally in the demonstration planned and called it useless and prejudicial He publicly expressed this point of view later also, during a meeting of the League of Jurists at Nuremberg. In doing so he risked placing himself in open opposition to the official policy of the State. All these facts show that despite the anti-Jewish propaganda carried on by the Government, actual hostility against the Jewish population did not exist among the people themselves. Thus it is as good as proved that neither Streicher's publications in Der Sturmer nor his speeches incited the German people in the sense maintained by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Therefore the general attitude of the German nation provides no proof of incitement to hatred of the Jews having been successfully carried out by the Defendant Streicher and leading to criminal results. The Prosecution, however, has further supported its accusation by the specific assertion that only a nation educated to absolute hatred of Jews by men like the defendant could approve of such measures as the mass extermination of Jews. Thereby the charge is made against the whole of the German people that they knew about the extermination of the Jews and approved of it; the severity and consequences of such a charge on the whole future of the German nation is impossible to estimate. But did the German nation really approve of these measures? A fact can only be approved of if it is known. Therefore should this assertion of the Prosecution be considered as proved, then logically it must also be considered as proved that the German nation actually had knowledge of these occurrences. However, evidence in this respect has shown that Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, who was entrusted by 1 litter with the mass assassinations, and his close collaborators shrouded all these events in a veil of deepest secrecy. By threatening with the most severe punishments any violations of the rule of absolute silence which was imposed, they managed to lower before the events in the East and in the extermination camps an iron curtain which hermetically sealed off those facts from the public. Hitler and Himmler prevented even the corps of the highest leaders of the Party and State from gaining any insight and information. Hitler did 'not hesitate to give false information to even his closest collaborators, like Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, who was heard here as a witness, and to make him believe that the removal of the European Jews to the East meant their settlement in the Eastern Territories but by no means their extermination.
THE PRESIDENT: However much the statements of the defendants may diverge on many points, in this connection they all agree so completely with one another and with the statements of other witnesses that the veracity of their testimonies simply cannot be questioned. If it was not possible for even the Defendant Frank in his capacity as Governor General of Poland to get through to Auschwitz, because without Hitler's special consent even he was denied entrance, then this fact speaks for itself. If even the leading personalities of the Third Reich, with the exception of a very small circle, were not informed and if even they had at best very vague information, then how could the general public have known about it? Under these circumstances the possibilities for finding out what was going on in the camps were extremely slight. For the majority of the people, foreign news did not exist as a source of information. Listening to foreign radio stations was punishable with the heaviest penalties and therefore did not take place. And if it did, the news broadcast by foreign radio stations concerning events in the East, although, or rather because, it corresponded to facts, was so crass, so horrible beyond any human understanding, that it was bound to appear to any normal individual, as in fact it did, as intentional propaganda. Germany could only gain factual knowledge of the extermination measures against the Jews from people who either were working in the camps themselves or came in contact with the camps or their inmates or from former concentration camp inmates. There is no need to explain that members of the camp personnel who were concerned with these happenings kept silent, not only because they were under stringent orders to do so, but also in their own interest. Furthermore, it is known that Himmler had threatened the death penalty for information from the camps and for spreading news about the camps and that not only the actual culprit but also his relatives were threatened with this punishment.
THE PRESIDENT: Finally, it is known that the extermination camps themselves were so hermetically sealed off from any contact with the world that nothing concerning the events which took place in them could penetrate to the public. The prisoners in the camps who came into contact with fellow workers in their 'work kept silent because they had to. People who came to the camps were also under the threat of this punishment insofar as they could obtain any insight into things at all, which was all but impossible in the extermination camps. From these sources, therefore, no knowledge could come for the German people. But the order for absolute silence was compulsory to a still greater measure for every concentration camp inmate who had been released. Hardly anybody ever came back to life from the actual murder camps; but if, once in a while, a man or woman was released, in addition to the other threatened punishments the threat of being sent back to the camp hung over them if they violated the order for silence. And this renewed detention would have meant gruesome death. It was therefore nearly impossible to learn from released concentration camp prisoners positive facts concerning the occurrences in the camps. If this was the case with regard to normal concentration camps in Germany, it applied in a still greater measure to the extermination camps. Every lawyer who, as I did, defended people before detention in a concentration camp and who was visited by them again after their release, will be able to confirm that it was not possible, even in such a position of trust and under the protection of professional legal secrecy, to get former concentration camp inmates to talk.
THE PRESIDENT: If men such as Severing, who testified here-a Social Democrat of long standing, who was highly trusted by his party comrades and who was, because of this, in touch with many former concentration camp inmates-came to know of the real facts connected with the extermination of the Jews only very late and even then to a very restricted extent, then such considerations must apply even more to any normal German. It can be derived with absolute certainty from these facts that the leaders of the State, that Hitler and Himmler, wanted under all circumstances to keep secret the extermination of the Jews; and this forms the base for another argument-in my opinion, a cogent one-against the anti-Semitism of the German people asserted by the Prosecution. If the German people had indeed been filled with such hatred of Jewry as the Prosecution affirms, then such rigorous methods for secrecy would have been superfluous. If Hitler had been convinced that the German nation saw in the Jews its principal enemy, that it approved of and desired the extermination of Jewry, then he would obviously have published the planned and also the effected extermination of this very enemy. As a sign of the "total war" constantly propagandized by Hitler and Goebbels, there would indeed have been no better means to strengthen the faith in victory and the will of the people to fight than the information that Germany's principal enemy, these very Jews, had already been annihilated. So unscrupulous a propagandist as Goebbels certainly would not have failed to use such a striking argument if he could have based it on the necessary presupposition, that is, the German people's absolute determination to exterminate the Jews. However, the "final solution" of the Jewish question had by all possible means to be kept secret even from the German people who had for years been subjected to the heaviest pressure by the Gestapo. Even leading men in the State and the Party were not allowed to be told of it.
THE PRESIDENT: Hitler and Himmler were evidently themselves convinced that even in the midst of a total war, and after decades of education and gagging by National Socialism, the German nation-and above all its Armed Forces-would have reacted most violently on the publication of such a policy against the Jews. The policy of secrecy followed here cannot be explained by any considerations of the enemy nations. In the years 1942 and 1943 the whole world was already engaged in a bitter war against National Socialist Germany. An intensification of this struggle seemed hardly possible, at any rate not by the mere publishing of facts which had long since become known abroad. Apart from this, considerations of making a still worse impression on the enemy countries could hardly influence men such as Hitler, Goebbels, and Himmler. If they had expected to achieve even the slightest tangible results by proclaiming to the German people the extermination of the Jews, they would certainly not have omitted to proclaim it. On the contrary, they would have tried in every way to strengthen by this means the German people's faith in victory. The fact that they did not do this is the best proof that even they did not consider the German people radically anti-Semitic, and it is also the best proof that there can be no question of such anti-Semitism on the part of the German people. I may therefore sum up by saying that all this stands in contradiction to the Prosecution's assertion that the Defendant Streicher brought up the German people to hate the Jews to an extent which made them approve of the extermination of Jewry. Therefore, even if the defendant by means of his proclamations had aimed at achieving such an end he was not successful. In this connection, light must also be thrown upon the part attributed by the Prosecution to the Defendant Streicher, namely that he had educated German youth in the spirit of anti-Semitism and had inculcated the poison of anti-Semitism so deeply into their hearts that these pernicious effects would be felt long after his death.