dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ALDERMAN: In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening, not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the German soldiers naturally rank high above the Americans. "In the further course of the discussion, the Fuehrer pointed out that Germany, on her part, would immediately take the consequences if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved, whether with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joint action; their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually. "Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them because the Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States. "As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later.
MR. ALDERMAN: His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan, many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated that if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present. "The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself had been in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of Armed Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight, at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to reply instantly to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them. "Matsuoka replied that the United States, or rather their ruling politicians, had recently still attempted a last maneuver towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas, provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignment of rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.
MR. ALDERMAN: "The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything, but that the United States had the hope that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan. "The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany. "Matsuoka that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he, Matsuoka, in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, could not utter in Japan a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things, and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he, as Foreign Minister, had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully, in the first place, the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.
MR. ALDERMAN: "Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed. "On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis. "Besides this, Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore, because he had reason to fear that by cabling, something might leak out. If necessary, he would send a courier. "The Fuehrer agreed and assured, after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence. "Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same for Japan. "The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words. "Berlin, the 4th of April 1941. (Signed) Schmidt." This completes the presentation of what I have called the "handful of selected documents," offered not as a detailed treatment of any of these wars of aggression, but merely to prove the deliberate planning, the deliberate premeditation with which each of these aggressions was carried out. I turn to a more detailed and more or less chronological presentation of the various stages of the aggression.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow. [The Tribunal adjourned until 27 November 1945 at 1000 hours.]
THE PRESIDENT: I call on the counsel for the United States. Mr. Alderman, before you begin, I think it would be better, for the purpose of the Tribunal, when citing documents, if you would refer to them not only by the United States exhibit number and the PS document number, but also by the document book identification. Each document book, as I understand it, has either a letter or a number. They are numbered alphabetically, I think. If that is not done, when we have got a great number of document books before us, it is very difficult to find where the particular exhibit is.
MR. ALDERMAN: I can see that, yes. May it please the Tribunal, the handful of selected documents which I presented yesterday constitute a cross section of the aggressive war case, as a whole. They do not purport to cover the details of any of the phases of the aggressive war case. In effect they do amount to a running account of the entire matter. Before moving ahead with more detailed evidence, I think it might be helpful to pause at this point, to present to the Tribunal a chart. This chart presents visually some of the key points in the development of the Nazi aggression. The Tribunal may find it helpful as a kind of visual summary of some of the evidence received yesterday and also as a background for some of the evidence which remains to be introduced. I am quite certain that, as your minds go back to those days, you remember the maps that appeared from time to time in the public press, as these tremendous movements developed in Europe. I am quite certain that you must have formed the concept, as I did in those days, of the gradually developing head of a wolf. In that first chart you only have an incipient wolf. He lacks a lower jaw, the part shown in red, but when that wolf moved forward and took over Austria-the Anschluss-that red portion became solid black. It became the jaw of the wolf, and when that lower jaw was acquired, Czechoslovakia was already, with its head and the main part of its body, in the mouth of the wolf. Then on chart two you see the mountainous portions, the fortified portions of Czechoslovakia. In red, you see the Sudetenland territories which were first taken over by the Pact of Munich, whereupon Czechoslovakia's head became diminutive in the mouth of the wolf. And in chart three you see the diminishing head in red, with its neck practically broken, and all that was necessary was the taking over of Bohemia and Moravia and the wolf's head became a solid, black blot on the map of Europe, with arrows indicating incipient further aggressions, which, of course, occurred.
MR. ALDERMAN: That is the visual picture that I have never been able to wipe out of my mind, because it seems to demonstrate the inevitability of everything that went along after the taking over of Austria. The detailed more or less chronological presentation of the aggressive war case will be divided into seven distinct sections. The first section is that concerning preparation for aggression during the period of 1933 to 1936, roughly. The second section deals with aggression against Austria. The third section deals with aggression against Czechoslovakia. The fourth section deals with aggression against Poland and the initiation of actual war. For reasons of convenience, the details of the Polish section will be presented after the British Chief Prosecutor presents his opening statement to the Tribunal. The fifth section deals with the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression, by invasions into Scandinavia, the Lowlands, and the Balkans. The details on this section of the case will be presented by the British Chief Prosecutor. The sixth section deals with aggression against the Soviet Union, which I shall expect to present. For reasons of convenience again, the details on this section, like the details on aggression against Poland, will be presented after the British Prosecutor has made his opening statement to the Tribunal. The seventh section will deal with collaboration with Italy and Japan and the aggression against the United States. I turn now to the first of these sections, the part of the case concerning preparation for aggression during the period 1933 to 1936. The particular section of the Indictment to which this discussion addresses itself is paragraph IV (F) and sub-paragraph 2 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), which I need not read at a glance, as the Tribunal will recall the allegation.
MR. ALDERMAN: It will be necessary, as I proceed, to make reference to certain provisions of the Charter, and to certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and the Treaty between the United States and Germany restoring friendly relations, 25 August 1921, which incorporates certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and certain provisions of the Rhine Treaty of Locarno of 16 October 1925.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, is it not intended that this document book should have some identifying letter or number?
MR. ALDERMAN: "M", I am informed. I do not offer those treaties in evidence at this time, because the British will offer all the pertinent treaties in their aspect of the case. The Nazi plans for aggressive war started very soon after World War I. Their modest origin and rather fantastic nature, and the fact that they could have been interrupted at numerous points, do not detract from the continuity of the planning. The focus of this part of the Indictment on the period from 1933 to 1945, does not disassociate these events from what occurred in the entire preceding period. Thus, the ascendancy of Hitler and the Nazis to political power in 1933, was already a well-advanced milestone on the German road to progress. By 1933 the Nazi Party, the NSDAP, had reached very substantial proportions. At that time, their plans called for the acquisition of political control of Germany. This was indispensable for the consolidation within the country of all the internal resources and potentialities. As soon as there was sufficient indication of successful progress along this line of internal consolidation, the next step was to become disengaged from some of the external disadvantages of existing international limitations and obligations. The restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development of strength in all the fields necessary, if one were to make war. Although there had been an increasing amount of circumvention and violation from the very time that Versailles came into effect, such operations under disguise and subterfuge could not attain proportions adequate for the objectives of the Nazis. To get the Treaty of Versailles out of the way was indispensable to the development of the extensive military power which they had to have for their purposes. Similarly, as part of the same plan and for the same reasons, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. It was impossible to carry out their plans on the basis of existing international obligations or of the orthodox kind of future commitments.
MR. ALDERMAN: The points mentioned in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the Indictment are now historical facts of which we expect the Tribunal to take judicial notice. It goes without saying that every military and diplomatic operation was preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all participating forces. At the same time each point was part of a long-prepared plan of aggression. Each represents a necessary step in the direction of the specific aggression which was subsequently committed. To develop an extensive argument would, perhaps, be the unnecessary laboring of the obvious. What I intend to say is largely the bringing to light of information disclosed in illustrative documents which were hitherto unavailable. The three things of immediate international significance referred to in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the Indictment are: First, the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations; second, the institution of compulsory military service; and, third, the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Each of these steps was progressively more serious than the matter of international relations. In each of these steps Germany anticipated the possibility of sanction being applied by other countries and, in particular, a strong military action from France, with the possible assistance of England. However, the conspirators were determined that nothing less than a preventive war would stop them, and they also estimated correctly, that no one or combination of Big Powers would undertake the responsibility of such a war. The withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations was, of course, action that did not violate any international obligation. The League Covenant provided the procedure for withdrawal. However, in this case and as part of the bigger plan, the significance of these actions cannot be disassociated from the general conspiracy and the plans for aggression. The announcement of the institution of universal military service was a more daring action with a more overt significance.
MR. ALDERMAN: It was a violation of Versailles, but they got away with it. Then, came the outright military defiance, the occupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Still on the Indictment, Paragraph IV (F) 2, which alleges the determination of the Nazi conspirators to remove the restrictions of Versailles, the fact that the Nazi plans in this respect started very early is not only confirmed by their own statements, but they boasted about their long planning and careful execution. I read to you yesterday at length from our Exhibit 789-PS, Exhibit USA-23, Hitler's speech to all Supreme Commanders, 23 November 1939. I need not read it again. He stated there that his primary goal was to wipe out Versailles. After 4 years of actual war, the Defendant Jodl, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, delivered an address to the Reich and to the Gauleiter in which he traced the development of German strength. The seizure of power to him meant the restoration of fighting sovereignty, in- cluding conscription, occupation of the Rhineland, and rearmament, with special emphasis on modern armor and air forces. I have, if the Tribunal please, our Document Number L-172. It is a photostat of a microfilm of a speech by General Jodl, and I offer that photostat as Exhibit USA-34. I shall read, if the Tribunal please, only a part of that, but starting at the beginning. The speech is entitled "The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the Fifth Year of War." It is a kind of retrospective summary by the Defendant General Jodl. "A lecture by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces to the Reich- and Gauleiter, delivered in Munich on 7 November 1943." I am reading from the English translation: "Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you a review today of the strategic position at the beginning of the fifth year of war. "I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I undertook this none-too-easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities.
MR. ALDERMAN: It is not necessary to talk about what will come but one must say frankly what the situation is. No one, the Fuehrer has ordered, may know more or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all in my mind, gentlemen, but that you need a great deal, in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your Gaue, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the widespread enemy propaganda, defeatism, and malicious rumors are concentrated. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or-as they call it-a political solution. They say we must negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use of to attack the natural feeling of the people, that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the nation; the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to know the true situation, and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and unvarnished account of the present state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you. to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by force of arms, but by the will to resist of the entire people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home. Italy suffered not military defeat but moral defeat. She broke down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected but-through the cowardice of these criminal traitors -a fate a thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal, without restriction, for application in your activities as leaders of the people.
MR. ALDERMAN: "The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and, by attacking, parried the danger which menaced us . . . both from Poland and from the Western Powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean and into Russia-these also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war, so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask themselves whether, perhaps, we had not undertaken more than we could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own work of enlightenment, is one of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts: "I. A review of the most important questions of past developments; "II. Consideration of the present situation; "III. The foundations of our confidence in victory. "In view of my position as Military Advisor to the Fuehrer, I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time, that in view of the Protean nature of this war, I shall in this way, be giving expression to only one aspect of the events. "I. The review: "1. The fact that the National Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the dictate of Versailles, is not one on which I need expatiate, in this circle. I should like, however, to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful professional soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National Socialist movement in reawakening the military spirit (the Wehrwille), in nurturing fighting strength (the Wehrkraft), and in rearming the German people.