dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. KUBUSCHOK: From the sources which were accessible to him, Papen had of course heard of the excesses of which individual SA men had become guilty in this unsettled period. If on 12 March 1933 Hitler categorically forbade such actions by individuals and ordered the strictest punishment for any culprits in the future, Papen could assume with a clear conscience that this order which emanated from the highest authority would henceforth be obeyed. In passing it is interesting in this connection to refer to a public announcement of the League of Jewish Front Soldiers of 25 March 1933. This proclamation also stated the fact that the situation with respect to the Jewish population was in general quiet and that excesses were confined to actions by individuals, which had now been forbidden by Hitler. I shall submit this publication of the League in my document book for the Reich Government. The same standpoint was taken in a publication of the American Chamber of Commerce in Cologne on 25 March 1933, which publication I shall also present during the hearing of evidence for the Reich Government. The anti-Jewish boycott, which was announced some days later and which was carried out on 1 April 1933, was, contrary to the opinion of the Prosecution, no government measure but exclusively a Party measure which Papen, too, as well as others in the Cabinet, sharply opposed. The publication of the Times submitted with Defense Document Number Neurath-9 proves that over and beyond this Papen made representations to Hindenburg and had the latter intervene with Hitler. For the rest, one must take into consideration the fact that the anti-Jewish boycott had been announced as a defensive countermeasure which was to be limited in time and to be extended only to business life. It had been expressly forbidden to use force and excesses were to be prevented by corresponding measures.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution have presented the domestic policy in such a light that it would seem that through the measures taken the position of the National Socialist Party was to be strengthened, so that it should then be possible to turn to the aims dictated by a foreign policy of force which had been decided upon beforehand. Still more important than the discussion of domestic conditions is, therefore, an examination of the foreign policy of the Reich during the time Papen was Vice Chancellor. Hindenburg's reservation that he would appoint the Foreign Minister and the appointment of Von Neurath, who had been Foreign Minister until then and was not a National Socialist, to this post necessarily led one to expect a foreign policy along the course hitherto taken. Hitler's first measures seemed not only to justify this expectation but even to go beyond it. The first speech on matters of foreign policy, made on 17 May 1933, dealt with Germany's relations with Poland which in the past had never been entirely satisfactory. The subject of the annexation by Poland, recently revived, of large territories formerly belonging to the German Reich had brought with it a latent tension between these states. Hitler was the first to take up this problem and to resolve, according to his declaration in the Reichstag, to bring about a policy of friendship with Poland by recognizing the Polish State and its needs. If one considers the fact that the thought of renouncing all claims to a revision in regard to Poland was not only generally unpopular but also stood in sharp opposition to previous propaganda, it was impossible to foresee the development of later years. One was necessarily convinced that here was an internally strong government supporting its domestic reconstruction with a policy of peace abroad. Germany's joining the Four Power Pact and her renewed profession of adherence to Locarno served to underline this conviction. The struggle in foreign politics for ideological values lay in a different direction.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The question of eliminating the clause in the Versailles Treaty which stipulates Germany's exclusive guilt and the question of equal rights for this large country, which had pursued a persistent policy of peace since 1918, were demands which, on one hand, did not seem to burden the other side with unbearable sacrifices but which were suited to remove from the German people an ideological burden which was considered oppressive. Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference must be considered from these viewpoints. It took place after lengthy negotiations had produced no positive results and because it was in no way evident that the powers were inclined to bring about a fulfillment of the German demands. The declaration of the Reich Government and of Hindenburg that this step was to be looked upon as a tactical step and that the same objectives were to be retained, namely, the preservation of peace under recognition of equal rights-all this therefore had to appear credible and reasonable. From the same points of view Papen also approved of this step. With regard to the simultaneous withdrawal from the League of Nations opinions could have differed. Here, too, one might hold the view that the withdrawal was necessary as a movement of protest and that one could prove through factual efforts in the matter itself that it was intended to adhere to a policy of peace. Papen figured among those who felt obliged to advise against withdrawal from the League of Nations, even though he himself had experienced as Reich Chancellor that the negotiations in the assembly of the League of Nations caused certain difficulties in some questions. On the other hand, however, he was so convinced of the institution of the League of Nations being an instrument of understanding and an instrument to facilitate the technical possibilities for agreement that he wished to avoid withdrawal from the League of Nations. He advocated this opinion very strongly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Since he could not persuade Hitler in Berlin, he followed him to Munich shortly before the decision in order to lay his well-founded opinion before him there. We see Papen here working actively in a field for which in his position as Vice Chancellor he actually had no responsibility, aiming at a solution which, if one takes as a basis the views of the Prosecution concerning the withdrawal from the League of Nations, can only be considered as a step toward peace. Because of the fundamental importance of the withdrawal from the League of Nations the measure was submitted to the German people in the form of a plebiscite enabling it to state its opinion. On the occasion of this plebiscite, Hitler, the Government, and Hindenburg issued proclamations which emphasized expressly that this step was not intended to constitute a change of policy but merely a change of method. Preparations for the plebiscite were carried out in line with this statement. The Prosecution accuse Papen of having glorified in his Essen speech the successes of Hitler's Government and of having unconditionally advocated an affirmative attitude toward the questions to be decided by the plebiscite. If Papen did the latter, it was because he felt obliged to do so, the decision having been cast once and for all-a decision which had to be justified before the world. If the responsible leaders actually did not strive for anything but a change of methods, no objections could be made. The position of German foreign policy would have been shaken if the people had shown in the plebiscite that they opposed the measure already taken. It was therefore quite natural to approve of this policy in public within the framework of the solemn assurances which had been given. Moreover, it could not be overlooked that in a plebiscite on government measures the vote of confidence could not fail to affect internal politics altogether. We have to take the date of the speech into consideration.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In November 1933 Hitler had made progress in urgent matters which were in the foreground-namely, the amelioration of economic distress and the elimination of unemployment. His measures were taken on a large scale and at first showed apparent success. Here, too, one cannot measure things by the same standard that one Applies to them today in full knowledge of their development. At that time the course taken seemed justified by its success. In his electoral speech which demanded demonstration of confidence for the Government for the purpose of acknowledging a matter of foreign policy, Papen felt obliged to refer appreciatively to this positive development in domestic politics. In his introductory speech Mr. Justice Jackson himself acknowledged in the following words the conditions of 1933 which have been described: "After the reverses of the last war we saw the German people in 1933 regain their position in commerce, industry, and art. We observed its progress without distrust and without malice." Of all problems of foreign policy it was perhaps the question of German-French relations which interested Papen most. In his own testimony he has stated his views on this subject and has related how, as early as in the twenties, he collaborated in various political and Catholic bodies with the idea of promoting mutual understanding between France and Germany. I refer in this connection to Document Number Papen-92 and to the meeting between Papen and the French Colonel Picot described therein, which is characteristic of Papen's attitude. In the new Government, Papen, as Commissioner for the Saar territory, paid special attention to this question. We see how he tried to avoid in the Saar question as well everything that could in any way impair, even temporarily, the relations between the countries. Therefore he suggested that there should be no recourse to a plebiscite which might give renewed impetus to political chauvinism in both countries.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Hitler, himself, not only before he took over power but as responsible chief of the Cabinet, had stated time and again that Germany had no intention of bringing up the question of Alsace-Lorraine, but that the Saar question was the only problem still to be settled between the two countries. And in so doing he followed entirely the suggestions of Papen, which aimed at a peaceful settlement. Papen is also accused of having deceived the contracting party, namely, the Vatican, by concluding the Concordat in July 1933. By concluding the Concordat Papen allegedly intended to strengthen Hitler's position and to enhance his reputation abroad. The hearing of evidence has shown that the Concordat in its effects, too, was a bilateral pact, and that the legal obligations of the Concordat during the treaty violations on the part of Germany which followed soon afterward, also offered certain legal protection for the violated party. The questionnaire of Archbishop Groeber concerns the conclusion of the Concordat. I refer to Document Number Papen-104 which I submitted today, and I summarize it as follows: Archbishop Groeber is of the conviction that the Concordat was concluded because of the initiative of Papen. Furthermore, he confirms that Papen succeeded in persuading Hitler to the conditions of the Concordat. In the answer to Question 4, in particular, he confirms that Papen's activities while the Concordat was concluded were dictated by his positive position toward religion. Finally he confirms, in the answer to Question 6, that the Concordat was a legal "bulwark" and a support in face of the later persecution of the Church. Answer 7 confirms in fact that the Work Association of Catholic Germans, which I shall mention later, was not an organization protected by the Concordat. In any case, it is entirely wrong to suppose that Papen had any knowledge of intended future violations of the treaty and that for that reason he had brought about its conclusion.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: If he had wished to enhance Hitler's reputation abroad, this means would have been the least suitable that could be imagined. A struggle against the Church without the Concordat would have met, it is true, with an unfavorable reception abroad, but it would nevertheless have been an internal German affair. The existence of the interstate treaty made these Church persecutions at the same time a violation of an international treaty and lowered our prestige. One cannot conclude a treaty for the purpose of gaining prestige if immediately after its conclusion one proceeds to violate the same treaty. This consideration alone refutes the assumption of the Prosecution. Beyond this the accusation of the Prosecution shows a characteristic tendency. Every action of Papen's which has in any way come to light must be interpreted, they feel, in the sense of the conspiracy theory to Papen's disadvantage; and the simplest procedure for doing so is to place the later development into the foreground, claiming Papen's co-operation in and knowledge of this development and to denote his previous contrary statements of opinion as ambiguous and double-faced. This procedure is simple, if one considers the knowledge of later developments in retrospect as self-evident and if one does not picture the true factual situation at the time-above all, if one makes no effort to go into the logic in the proclaimed original intention and the further developments. Only in this manner can one, as in this instance, come to a conclusion which on closer consideration presupposes the folly of the person acting at the time. But quite apart from these deliberations, the attitude of the defendant toward religious matters removes the slightest doubt of the sincerity of his intentions.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the hearing of the evidence it was set forth that not only his closest personal advisers in Church affairs but also the highest dignitaries of the Church, who were in closest personal as well as professional contact with the defendant in these matters, emphasized that his attitude as a Catholic was absolutely beyond reproach at all times. The lack of foundation of the whole Indictment with regard to Church questions is already made clear by the refutation of the assertion of the Prosecution that Papen himself broke the Concordat by dissolving the Work Association of Catholic Germans. I refer in this respect to the unequivocal testimony of the former secretary of the Work Association of Catholic Germans, Count Roderich Thun, Defense Document Number Papen-47. It must be stated, however, that Papen not only regretted the subsequent violations of the Concordat by the Reich but that he actively tried to oppose them. The entire activities of the Work Association of Catholic Germans consisted practically of nothing else but the establishment of such violations of the Concordat in order to furnish Papen with evidence for his constant interventions with Hitler. After Papen's departure for Vienna, the practical possibility of such interventions ceased to exist. From all of Papen's speeches it is evident that his attempt at safeguarding the churches did not emanate from considerations of political expediency of the day but from his fundamental religious attitude. I believe there is no speech in which he did not express himself on this problem, emphasizing time and again that only the Christian philosophy of life and thus the Christian churches, could be the foundation for the orderly government of a state. In just this Christian foundation he saw the best protection against the tendency of the Party to give preference to an ever-increasing extent to the idea of sheer might over right.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: With regard to Papen's report to Hitler of 10 July 1938, Document Number 2248-PS, which was submitted during the cross-examination, the Prosecution fell victim to a quite obvious misunderstanding. Papen refers in it to the favorable result there would be in the field of foreign politics if one could succeed in eliminating political Catholicism without touching the Christian foundation of the state. Papen does not state here his opinion on the past and present situation but furnishes advice for the future. The content of this advice is definitely positive in the ecclesiastical sense. It states that one may eliminate political Catholicism; but the purely ecclesiastical interests themselves, that is, the Christian foundation of the state, must remain untouched. These directives destined for future times obviously contain criticism of the past as well. We see here how, in connection with foreign political activities, matters could be discussed and brought up to Hitler which in themselves belong to another field. In his own testimony Papen replied to the accusation of the Prosecution that as a good Catholic he should have resigned after the Pope had issued his Encyclical Letter "With Grave Apprehension" of 14 March 1937. Papen could refer, in this connection, without any criticism and with full approval to the standpoint of the Church itself, which has always been of the opinion that one should hold a position so long as it still offers the slightest opportunity for positive work. Owing to this wise attitude and to its feeling of responsibility for the German Catholics, the Church up until the end never completely broke with the Third Reich. One cannot ask an individual Catholic to take any other standpoint in this respect. This all the less as Papen, in his purely foreign political activities, came into no conflict whatsoever with his Catholic conscience. The accusation that in the fall of 1938 he should have protested to Hitler about the treatment of Cardinal Innitzer is also without foundation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Papen himself can no longer remember today when and in what form he heard of these occurrences at all. The German press did not publish anything about it, and in no case did such matters reach the public via internal Church Channels, as the Prosecution assume. In any case at that time Papen had no possibility whatsoever to intervene, being merely a private person and besides in very bad standing with Hitler at the moment. I have already dealt with Hitler's development into an autocrat. After the cessation of joint reports to Hindenburg, Papen's influence was reduced to a minimum. Protests in Cabinet sessions coming from a single man, who was unable to base these protests on requirements of his own department, were of purely declaratory nature. Meanwhile the Nazi doctrines were being applied more and more in practice. It became clear that the willingness of the early days to compromise in agreeing to a rule by a coalition was slowly abandoned and that the National Socialist doctrine kept gaining ground in all fields. It was clear to Papen that he would not follow that course. It was likewise clear that within the framework of his official position he could not alter the general trend, apart from his efforts to help in many individual cases. On the other hand his position of Vice Chancellor, which still existed in theory, gave him certain weight in public life. Thus he had to face the problem as to whether he should launch out on a policy of public criticism of all the prevailing abuses as a last attempt to influence the development by public discussion of the problems. In case of failure, he would have at least publicly branded these abuses even if, as a natural consequence, Papen would have to give up his position and would thus no longer be able to aid many people in individual cases. In his Marburg speech of 17 June 1934 Papen distinctly branded all abuses which had become apparent until then. Such extensive public criticism remained unique in the history of the Third Reich.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He realized that the danger of Nazism lay in the fact that its different doctrines were so interlocked that they formed an iron ring of oppression on all of public life. Had only one link of that ring been smashed, the dangerous character of the entire system would have been averted. If only one of the points discussed had met with practical success in a favorable sense, it would have meant a total change of conditions. The system objected to could not have existed another day if the freedom of speech demanded by Papen had been granted. It could not have been upheld if the conception of justice and of equality before the law were recognized. It could not have existed if freedom of religion were guaranteed. A Marxist mass theory cannot be upheld if the maxim of the individual's equality, common to all confessions, is advocated. Each of Papen's attacks in his Marburg speech-he had dealt with the racial issue already in his Gleiwitz speech-was in itself an attack upon the development of the entire Nazi doctrine. Here a leading member of the opposition in the Government clearly indicated the source of the abuses. The consequences of such an action were foreseen by Papen from the very beginning. Either Hitler would take into consideration the new state of affairs after it had become a matter of public discussion, or Papen was going to offer his resignation, since he could no longer reconcile further co-operation with the path chosen by Hitler. Evidently Hitler at that time did not consider it necessary to make a concession to public opinion by deviating from his line of action. He tried to kill the opposition by forbidding the publication of the speech and by penalizing its distributors. Papen resigned. Hitler did not accept this resignation immediately, since he obviously had to take Hindenburg into consideration, wishing to clear up the situation first of all with him. Meanwhile the events of 30 June took place. What fate had originally been destined for Papen in the course of those events will probably never be known definitely.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Particularly, it will never be elucidated whether different people were moved by different intentions. The course of the actions becomes most apparent by the manner in which they were carried out against the office of the Vice Chancellor. Bose was the first victim, in the very building of the Vice Chancellery. Jung, who was arrested outside of Berlin, was also shot. His fate, however, became known to Papen and the public only much later, as it had been hoped at the beginning that he had left Berlin and had gone to Switzerland, having been warned by the measures taken as a result of the Marburg speech. The other members of the staff who could be apprehended were taken into custody by the police and later sent to concentration camps. As to Papen himself one hesitated to make a final clear decision as to his fate. His close relationship to Hindenburg made it seem advisable not to add to the list of victims of 30 June so prominent a name, especially after it had been burdened enough, as far as Hindenburg is concerned, with the crime camouflaged as self-defense against Schleicher. At any rate, within the framework of the Indictment it suffices to establish that whatever Papen's fate has been in the end, the measures taken against him and his people demonstrate his absolute opposition against Hitler and the Nazi policy. During the cross-examination the Prosecution presented letters to Papen which outwardly seem to show at first a certain divergence from his usual attitude. In those letters Papen assures Hitler of his attachment and loyalty and hides his real and material desires under polite phrases which otherwise were in no way customary in his relations with Hitler. It may appear surprising that a man who opposed the system, who had been persecuted for that reason, and upon whose associates such incredible things had been inflicted, chose to write such letters. But for a fair judgment a correct understanding of the state of affairs at that time is required. A state of lawlessness existed at that time.