dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
RAEDER: With the beginning of the offensive in the West, Hitler also wanted a certain more energetic pursuit of the war at sea. For that reason, he asked me to introduce only at this point the intensified measures which I considered already justified because of the attitude of the British forces. These intensifications were very carefully considered in that memorandum, and they followed step by step the different steps taken by Britain.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will deal with the memorandum. You need not be afraid that I will omit that, but what I am putting to you at the moment is this: That so far from disapproving of the violation of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium, you on behalf of the Navy were quite prepared to accompany it by the intensification of submarine warfare; isn't that right?
RAEDER: That is twisting my words. I had nothing to do with this violation of neutrality for we were not there when they marched into these two countries. The only thing I was interested in was to intensify the submarine war step by step, so as to meet the measures introduced by the British, which also violated international law.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am going to come to submarine warfare, but at the moment I want to try to keep in compartments. There are only two more points on this aggressive war. I am now going to pass-you can leave that document for the moment. I will come back to it, Defendant; you need not be afraid, and I want you to help me on one or two points in Norway. With regard to Norway, you were quite content to leave Norway neutral, not occupied, so long as you had a protected channel up the Norwegian coast in neutral waters, is that right? That was an important point for you, to have a channel in neutral waters so that not only your ships, but also your submarines, could go up and start out from neutral waters, is that right?
RAEDER: No, I have very clearly explained the origin of the Norwegian campaign in documents. There was the danger that the British might occupy Norway, and information of all sorts indicated that. Of course, if we were forced to occupy the Norwegian coast, then, apart from all the numerous disadvantages which I have explained, we had the advantage that we would gain this or that base for our Atlantic submarines. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Are you telling the Tribunal that the Navy seriously thought that the British wanted to occupy Norway?
RAEDER: I most certainly thought that. We had so much information about it that I could have no doubt whatever, and it was fully confirmed later on.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just ask you, then, to look at just one or two typical Navy reports. We won't refer to the document again, but we will start from there, just to get the time. You remember, on the 13th of March 1940, General Jodl entered in his diary that the Fuehrer was still looking for justification; do you remember that? You remember that, don't you?
RAEDER: I have already explained once that the expression just used, "justification," is wrong, wrongly translated, Jodl wrote "Begruendung," "reason." But that is also wrong-please will you let me finish-even that is incorrect, because the Fuehrer  had an abundance of reasons, which he laid down in the instruction issued on the 1st of March, and it was known to all of us. I have said that by the expression "Begruendung," "reason," he probably meant that he had not yet had a diplomatic note compiled. He had not told the Foreign Minister anything about it at that stage. I told you that recently under oath and I repeat it under oath today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is the meaning that you have given to it. Well now, will you look at your own Raeder Exhibit Number 81, in Raeder Document Book 5, Page 376.
RAEDER: May I have Document Book 5?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, you have not got it. I'm sorry. I will get you one. Now, that is dealing with the first point, encroachment by the English into Norwegian territorial waters, and it says: "An examination of the question as to whether a mass encroachment by the English into the Norwegian territorial waters was so immediately imminent that it might represent a danger to present German shipping produces the opinion that this is not to be expected at the present time. The ore transports are to be continued, as no losses have yet occurred." Was that your information, that no mass encroachment of Norwegian territorial waters was to be expected on the 22d of March?
RAEDER: That was not at all my conception. It was the view of Kapitaen zur See Fricke, who was at that time the Chief of the Operations Department. He did not quite agree with me about the whole of this question. He was of the opinion that the British should be allowed to enter Norway first, and then we should throw them out through Sweden, a completely distorted idea which I could not approve of in any way. I had such clear information from Quisling and Hagelin, particularly at that time, the second half of March, that there was no longer any doubt whatever that within a reasonable time the British would intervene on a big scale.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that that was Admiral Fricke's view, and you didn't pay attention to it. Well, now, let me look . . .
RAEDER: I did not concern myself with it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know, Admiral Assmann, whom you have described as a sound historian, kept a headline diary, and on the next day he gives an account of a meeting between you anti Hitler, and he says this. This is the same day. You may have read it, because he turns down your proposal to use U-boats off? Halifax. It is the same day, the 23d of February. Then, at that date, you are quoted as saying that to insure the supply of ore from Narvik, it would be best to preserve the neutrality of Norway. Then, on the 26th of March, Admiral Assmann in his report of the meeting between you and Hitler records your answers as follows. It is quite short: "British landing in Norway not considered imminent-Raeder suggests action by us at the next new moon-to which Hitler agrees." That is Admiral Assmann's report of the meeting between you and Hitler on the 26th of March: "British landing in Norway not considered imminent-Raeder suggests action by us at the next new moon, the 7th of April-to which Hitler agrees." Do you remember that?
RAEDER: No. I mean, it is quite improbable that at that moment I should not have been fully convinced of the imminent landing about which the whole of Documents 004-PS and 007-PS gave me reliable information. I did not see the documents, but the information contained in them was fully available. Admiral Assmann compiled his notes from all sorts of war diaries and records. I most certainly never said that because at that time I reported to Hitler again and again that our preparations which had already been started a time ago would be complete at the end of January, and that that would be the time when the landings had to be carried out for the reasons I always put forward. It is completely wrong to assume that at that time I had the slightest doubt. Later everything was proved right. . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now really we must...
RAEDER: And later on, it all turned out to be correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We must get down to this matter. You have told us that Admiral Assmann was a trustworthy officer and good at naval history.
RAEDER: He is not a deceiver, but he compiled the document from all sorts of papers and I cannot imagine how he could have arrived at that statement, I certainly never made it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, but the second part of it, the second sentence, is right, isn't it? "Raeder suggests action by us at the next new moon, the 7th of April." That is right; that is when you did invade. That was when your armada started off to arrive there on the 9th, wasn't it?
RAEDER: But yes, of course. I was in favor of carrying out the landings in Norway at the earliest possible time, after ice conditions had improved, as we had previously decided and as had been ordered by Hitler. For that I assume full responsibility. There was every reason for that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well. Again I mustn't argue with you, but the point comes to this, that you are saying that Admiral Assmann, who is right in his second sentence, is not only wrong but entirely wrong-I mean, stating the opposite of the truth -when he says that the British landing in Norway was not considered imminent. Well now, we will just pursue that a little.
RAEDER: I only submitted to the Fuehrer this matter of landing in Norway on the supposition that this information was available and would continue to be available.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, what was that document of the 26th of March 1940?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was an extract from the Assmann Diary which I have used before, and I will have one made up and put in for identification. I haven't got it copied yet, My Lord, I am sorry. I shall have it done.
RAEDER: I should be grateful if perhaps you could show me the document. You have shown me all the others, but not this one, the one I contest.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is such a short extract I thought you would take it from me, but the last thing I want is not to show you any documents. You see the entry for the 26th of March: "British landing in Norway not considered imminent. Raeder suggests action by us at next new moon, 7th of April, to which Hitler agrees. Further discussions about laying of mines at Scapa before German invasion of Norway. Hitler agrees with Raeder and will issue instructions accordingly."
RAEDER: May I come back to it now. Here it says, the 26th of March 1940: "Occupation of Norway by British was imminent when the Russian-Finnish peace was concluded." That very Russian-Finnish affair was making it particularly urgent for us to carry out a landing because the danger existed that the British, under the pretext of supporting the Finns, would carry out a bloodless occupation of Norway. Then I go on to the question of the Fuehrer, whether a landing by the British in Norway might be imminent. One must consider that Assmann had summarized all that from war diaries, and this question is explained by the fact that the Fuehrer wanted to know whether the situation had changed in any way, because the peace had been signed. However, the situation had not changed at all, because we knew in reality that the landings by the British were not to be carried out to help the Finns, but for other reasons. That question, therefore, whether at the time, because of the peace treaty, the British landings might be particularly imminent, was answered by me in the negative. Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action by us at next new moon, 7th April-Fuehrer agrees. Everything remained as before. Only the question whether because of this peace treaty we ought to land at once, I answered "no." That is completely different from what you have been telling me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You read out the entry for the 26th of March. What is the entry for the 26th of March? You read it out in German and we can translate it.
RAEDER: "Occupation of Norway by the British was imminent when the Russian-Finnish peace treaty was signed. Apparently, because of the treaty, it was postponed. Question by the Fuehrer, whether at that moment a landing by the British in Norway was imminent, was answered in the negative by the Commander-in-Chief Navy...." Yes, that did not mean that because of that we had to renounce the idea. "Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action by us at next new moon." The reasons for our landing remained the same as before; only the Finnish business could no longer be used by the British.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The peace treaty, the end of the war with Finland, had taken place in the middle of March. That was off the map at that time?
RAEDER: Of course, it was no longer important for us, but our reasons remained as before.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, will you look at Document Number D-843. This will be Exhibit Number GB-466. This is a report from your diplomatic representative in Norway, dated the 29th of March, and at the end of the first paragraph you will see: "The British apparently did not want to take upon themselves the responsibility for openly violating Norwegian 'territory and Norwegian territorial waters without cause, and for carrying out warlike operations in them." That is a quotation from the Norwegian Foreign Minister. Then your diplomatic representative takes it up: "The future will show whether Foreign Minister Koht sees things quite right. It definitely appears, however, as I"- that's the German Foreign Minister's representative-"have frequently pointed out, that the British have no intentions of landing, but that they want to disturb shipping in Norwegian territorial waters perhaps, as Koht thinks, in order to provoke Germany. Of course, it is also possible that the British behavior of last week, which I have pointed out as well, will grow into more or less regular and increasing interference in territorial waters to attack our ore traffic of e the Norwegian coast." And then Paragraph 3: "The firm intention of Norway to maintain her neutrality and to insure that Norway's neutrality rules be respected can be accepted as a fact." Were you told that your diplomatic representative in Oslo was reporting that the British had no intentions of landing?
RAEDER: Yes. Dr. Breuer, the Minister to Norway, held a completely wrong view. He believed Foreign Minister Koht's assurances even though our naval attache kept reporting that Koht was completely on the side of the British and his assurances were not to be believed. At the same time, information had been received from Hagelin that the Norwegians were giving assurances on paper but they themselves had said that they were doing that only as subterfuge and that they would continue to co-operate with the British. That is contained in the documents which we have submitted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us look at another document. Look at Document Number D-844. This is what your diplomatic representative in Sweden was saying at the same time. That will be Exhibit Number GB-467, that is from your representative in Sweden and you will notice that he quotes Foreign Minister Guenther of Sweden, as first of all-about ten lines down, just after the name of "Weizsaecker," you will see: "The Swedish Government had no reason at all to believe in an impending action by the Western Powers against Scandinavia. On the contrary, on the strength of all official reports and other information, they considered the situation lately to be much calmer." And then he says there is no prospect of a coup against Swedish ore. Then he goes on to deal with Norway. Without being Anglophile, Guenther did not believe in a British act of war against Norway either, but, of course, he could not speak of this with as much certainty as with regard to Sweden. At any rate, however, the Norwegian Government, with whom he was in close contact, was of the same opinion. And if you look two paragraphs farther on, it says: "In conclusion, Guenther requested me to report his statements to my government, and repeated that the Swedish Government attached the greatest value to the German Government not erroneously getting the impression of the existence of circumstances which might evoke the possibility -he would not use the word necessity at all-of special measures by Germany with regard to Scandinavia." And then he says in the last paragraph that the Swedish Foreign Minister had probably heard of the German preparations. Now, would you look at Document Number D-845 which will be Exhibit Number GB-468-that is the next day-from your diplomatic representative in Stockholm: "Serious anxiety exists in Swedish military and government circles regarding possible German military preventive measures in Scandinavia against the announced intensification of war measures by the Western Powers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Swedish and Norwegian military and government authorities consider it unlikely that military measures will be taken against Scandinavia by the Western Powers. Press reports on this subject by the Western Powers are attempting to provoke Germany." That is from your military attache in Stockholm. Were you told about these reports from Stockholm, were you told of that?
RAEDER: I assume the Fuehrer told me this. But we had no reason at all to believe these assurances because obviously, quite obviously, Sweden had considerable interest in our not going to Norway, because Sweden believed that by so doing we would be able to exercise pressure on Sweden also. That was what the British wanted, according to the information we received later. Our minister was completely misinformed and as a result was not informed by us because it was known that he sided with Foreign Minister Koht. Our information was so clear, so frequent and so unequivocal, that we could certainly carry out our landing with a clear conscience and in fact this proved to be true. Therefore, there is no point in discussing whether the order on the part of the British to land in Norway-it was Trondheim, Stavanger and, I believed, Kristiansand-whether this order was given on 5 ApriL On the 7th, during the night of the 7th to 8th, as the British reported in a wireless message, the mine-laying in Norwegian waters was completed by British ships and on the 7th, troops were shipped on cruisers, the names of which I forget. Therefore, this actually took place and my conception was correct and not Herr Breuer's who was dismissed immediately after this because he was a failure. Thereupon, we carried out the landings on the strength of quite positive information which we can prove in detail. Sweden's action is thoroughly understandable.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with you although you ought to know and I think you do know that there was no British order for an invasion at all; there was an order for laying mines; but you took this course as I suggested, you, knowing quite well that no British invasion was imminent, contrary to your own Chief of Operations, Captain Fricke, and contrary to all the information from your diplomatic representatives in Norway. Now, I want to come to another point with regard to Norway and then I am finished with that. You told the Tribunal that in your view, using the enemy's colors was a permissible ruse de guerre so long as you stopped before you went into action. Do you remember saying that?
RAEDER: I did not understand.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember telling the Tribunal that morning that using the enemy's colors on a warship was a permissible ruse de guerre so long as you stopped before you went into action. Do you remember saying that?
RAEDER: Yes; of course, that is the principle which is absolutely recognized in naval warfare, that at the moment of firing you have to raise your own flag.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that it is a recognized procedure in naval warfare to use another country's colors in making an attack on a neutral country, an unannounced attack on a neutral country? There was no war between you and Norway and there was no reason for there to be any ruse. You were at peace with Norway. Are you saying that?
RAEDER: It was all a question of pulling down the flag and raising the German flag if we met the British. We did not want to fight with the Norwegians at all. It says somewhere that we should first of all try to effect a peaceful occupation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you give me a precedent even where the German Navy, before this operation, had ever attacked a neutral country with which it was at peace, using enemy colors? You tell me-when you did it before? .
RAEDER: I do not know. I cannot tell you whether any other navy did it. I have. . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can assume any other navy-I even ask-have you ever done it?
RAEDER: No, we have not done it and apart from that, we did not do it because on 8 April, we gave the order by wireless-and you know from our War Diary-that this should not be done, so it is quite useless to talk here about what might have been done if it has not been done.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to get clear on what your views on the permissibility of naval warfare were. I want to come to one other point, and then I am finished with this section of the case. With regard to the attack on the Soviet Union, I am not going to ask you about all your own views and what you said to Hitler, because you told us that at length; but I would just like you to look at Document Book 10a, Page 252 of the English book and Page 424 of the German book.
RAEDER: Which document is it, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The big one.
RAEDER: I have not got that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Document Number 447-PS. I am so sorry, My Lord, this is entirely my fault. I beg the Tribunal's pardon. I have given the wrong reference. I really wanted him to look at Page 59 in Document Book 10, Document Number C-170. I am very sorry, My Lord. [Turning to the defendant.] Now, that is the extract from the Naval War Diary, the one that I want you to look at is on Page 59, for the 15th of June. "On the proposal of the Naval Operations Stan (SKL) the use of arms against Russian submarines south of the northern boundary of Oeland warning area..." Have you got it?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ". . . is permitted immediately, and ruthless destruction is to be aimed at." Now, would you mind, before I ask you a question, turning back to Document Number C-38, which is on Page 11, which is Page 19 of your own document book, German document book, Document Number C-38; Page 11 of the British document book, and Page 19 of the German. That is an order of the same date, signed by Defendant Keitel, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. "Offensive action against submarines south of the line Memel to the southern tip of Oeland is authorized if the boats cannot be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German naval forces. The reason to be given up to 'B' Day"- that is Barbarossa-"is that our naval forces are believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines." Why did you suggest that you should attack the Soviet submarines 6 days before your own invasion when they wouldn't be expecting any attack and there was no question of any war?
RAEDER: As it has already been explained once here, it had happened just before, that is before the 15th of June, that a submarine had penetrated into the area of Bornholm, which is a long way to the west, and then had given wrong recognition signals when the patrol boat near Bornholm called it. If the wrong recognition signals are given, then it means that it could not be a German submarine but it must be a foreign one. In this case, the course of the ship and the location would bring us to the conclusion that it must be a Russian boat. Apart from that, Russian submarines at that time had repeatedly been located and reported off German ports-Memel, for instance, and others. Consequently, we had the impression that Russian submarines were already occupying positions outside German ports, either to lay mines or to attack merchant or warships. For that reason, as a precaution, I had to report this and I had to propose that we should take action against non-German submarines in these areas outside German ports. That suggestion was passed on the same day and this additional statement was made, which, in my opinion, was not necessary at all, but which prevented complications from arising.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is still not an answer to my question. I will put it this way. You considered it right to attack and urge the ruthless destruction of Soviet submarines 6 days before you attacked the Soviet Union? You consider that right? And then, to blame it on penetrating British submarines-this is Keitel's suggestion-is that your view of proper warfare?