dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. DODD: Now, maybe I can help you a little if you have forgotten. Did not Von Papen say that he would not shake hands with Seyss-Inquart?
SCHMIDT: He did say that. He said that he would-that he would have-it must have been some time after the Anschluss- refused to shake hands with him, and actually he referred to his behavior in 1938.
MR. DODD: And he said his behavior was utterly impossible? Is that not the language that Von Papen used about SeyssInquart, or some of the language?
SCHMIDT: He did express himself in that way.
MR. DODD: What were the other things that he said? You told down there in Vienna that Von Papen used the harshest language imaginable in describing Seyss-Inquart and his conduct in March 1938. I think that is of some interest to the Tribunal, and I wish you would tell us exactly what it was. It is only 3 years ago, you know, that you and Von Papen had this conversation, and you have not told us very much about it.
SCHMIDT: He spoke in a very vehement way, passing judgment to the effect that Seyss had offered no protection to the Austrians and that he had done nothing to keep order in Austria, that is, to safeguard Austria's individuality and Austria's interests. That was Papen's basic thought. His second thought was that the German interests had not been served by this either, by which he meant more or less that a quite justified interest of the German Reich had been made to look wrong in the eyes of the world because of the way in which it had been handled and that the foreign political interests of the Reich had been damaged thereby. That was the principal thought in his conversation, and I think he made similar remarks during conversations with other people.
MR. DODD: All right. I am afraid I have passed on from Berchtesgaden and have omitted something that is probably of some importance. Do you remember-some time, I guess not long before you broke up your session there-Hitler turning to Von Papen and saying, `'Von Papen, you made it possible for me to be Chancellor, and I shall never forget it." Did you hear Hitler say that to Von Papen that day at Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: Yes, some such remark was made.
MR. DODD: What did Von Papen say?
SCHMIDT: That I can no longer tell you.
MR. DODD: He said, "Yes, my Fuehrer," or something like that, did he not?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I assume so, because upon being addressed like that he had to give an answer.
MR. DODD: He certainly did not deny it, did he?
SCHMIDT: I do not assume he did, but I cannot remember the answer. I can only remember the question.
MR. DODD: The night in Vienna, when the SS and the SA people were climbing in the windows and doors of the Chancellery, did Seyss-Inquart do anything to have them excluded?
SCHMIDT: Not to my knowledge. I do not know; I was on the other side.
MR. DODD: Yes. It was a very tense situation, as we know. As a matter of fact, you were fearful that some harm would be done to Schuschnigg, were you not?
SCHMIDT: It was a very tense situation.
MR. DODD: How did you and Schuschnigg go home that night from the Chancellery?
SCHMIDT: We left in three cars-the Federal Chancellor in one, the President in the other, and I was in the third. The departure was escorted and organized and accompanied by SS men.
MR. DODD: Schuschnigg was not taken home in Seyss-Inquart's private automobile by Seyss-Inquart; he was taken home by the SS; is that so?
SCHMIDT: No, they left in a car together. I myself heard SeyssInquart say: "Then I will take him home." Whether it was the Federal Chancellor's car or Seyss-Inquart's car, I do not know, but at any rate they traveled in the same car.
MR. DODD: Escorted by the SS?
SCHMIDT: No, that was not the case. The SS, as far as-I do not know whether there were SS in the Chancellor's car. The SS only escorted us during the actual departure, that is, out of the house. There was nobody else in my car, or the President's car, after that.
MR. DODD: That is not what you told the court in Vienna. Down there you said, "Dr. Schuschnigg and I were driven home, escorted by the SS."
SCHMIDT: No, I said the SS escorted or conducted us during the departure from the Ballhaus Platz. There were about 40 SS men present who conducted the departure from there. Whether someone remained in the car after that, I do not know.
MR. DODD: All right. You probably can help us clear up one other question. When Seyss-Inquart made his radio speech, he was not actually a member of the Government, was he, or was he not?
SCHMITT: There has been a lot of debate about that question. The Federal Chancellor had resigned in the afternoon session. At first, the President had not accepted the resignation, so therefore he was still Chancellor, and Seyss was still Minister. Whether the resignation was accepted later on I cannot say. Some are of the opinion that the President may, for all practical purposes, have entrusted the Federal Chancellor with the continuation of business, and Seyss-Inquart along with him. Others think that that would not have happened. Only the head of the State himself can answer that question.
MR. DODD: As a former member of that Government, I want you to look at one document, and perhaps you can tell us whether or not you have seen it before. It is Document 4015-PS. It becomes Exhibit USA-891. That states that President Miklas had relieved not only Schuschnigg as the Federal Chancellor, but all other members of the Federal Government, as well as all secretaries of state, of their respective offices; and that is March 11.
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: That establishes, does it not, that Seyss-Inquart was not in office when he made this radio speech? That is our understanding of it. Is that so?
SCHMIDT: Well, I believe that I have had a lot of experience in this question, because I worked with the Federal President for a long time. Releases of this kind go...
MR. DODD: Just tell us exactly-is that true or not? Is our understanding correct?
SCHMIDT: It does not necessarily have to be interpreted in that way. Releases of this kind go out to the offices days later, because red tape will have its way, despite revolutions and in disregard of history. Therefore, it cannot be said when that was actually done. I assume that this release was not issued until long after 11 March.
MR. DODD: Did Seyss-Inquart use the term "Trojan Horse" quite often in the days preceding the events of 12 March? Was that a common expression of his?
SCHMIDT: He has stated a few times that he was not a "Trojan Horse leader," by which he wanted to express his loyalty, and wanted to explain that it was not his job to open the back doors to National Socialism.
MR. DODD: Did you ever think he protested too much?
SCHMIDT: Against what?
MR. DODD: About not being a Trojan Horse.
SCHMIDT: I did not hear that expression more than two or three times and it was used by Zernatto.
MR. DODD: That is all.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have only one brief question in connection with these last events. Witness, did Seyss-Inquart not also post men from the guards battalion outside the Minister's room?
SCHMIDT: Guards were present.
DR. STEINBAUER: At what time did Schuschnigg's actual resignation occur?
SCHMIDT: Well, it is difficult to say when that happened; at any rate when the new Government was formed. I assumed that it must have taken place roughly between 9 and 10 o'clock, since the Federal President had conducted serious negotiations at this time about the choice of a new Chancellor, and I think the former Federal Chancellor, Dr. Enders, was up for debate.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions for this witness. 1~; PRESIDENT: The witness may retire. [The witness left the stand.]
DR. STEINBAUER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now call Chief of Police Dr. Skubl as witness. [The witness Skubl took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
MICHAEL SKUBL (Witness): Michael Skubl
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the absolute truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what offices did you hold in the Austrian Republic?
SKUBL: At the end I was Chief of Police in Vienna, and State Secretary for Matters of Public Security. Apart from that, I was the Inspector General of the Austrian executive authorities.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you called to these offices at the suggestion of Dr. Dollfuss, in accordance with instructions he gave before he died?
SKUBL: Dr. Dollfuss had appointed me Inspector General of the Police the day before he was murdered on 24 July. I had enjoyed his full confidence.
DR. STEINBAUER: Can one, therefore, describe you as having had the confidence of his successor and friend, Dr. Schuschnigg?
SKUBL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: When Seyss-Inquart became Minister, were you attached to him in your capacity as State Secretary and Inspector General at the same time?
SKUBL: Yes. When Seyss-Inquart was appointed Minister of the Interior and of Security, I was attached to him as State Secretary. Consequently, I was directly subordinate to him, whereas until that time I had been subordinated directly to the Federal Chancellor as Chief of Security.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were the police and the constabulary in your hands or in the hands of Seyss-Inquart, practically speaking?
SKUBL: Practically speaking, they had been in my hands.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have the particular task of combating illegal movements?
SKUBL: As Chief of Police and State Secretary for Matters of Public one of my leading tasks was, of course, to combat illegal movements, and particularly National Socialist aggression.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you observe any connection between Seyss-Inquart and the July 1934 Putsch? I mean, when Dollfuss was murdered.
SKUBL: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was his attitude in general towards National Socialism?
SKUBL: Dr. Seyss-Inquart admitted being a National Socialist. However, as far as I know, the so-cared 120 or 150 percent National Socialists-that is to say, the leaders of the illegal movement lid not consider him a 100 percent National Socialist. He was, however, considered a very suitable person to be used as a piece on the chessboard of the National Socialist movement.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understand you correctly, then, he was more a person who was led than a person who was leading?
SKUBL: It was my impression that he was more led than leading.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, how did you work together with Seyss-Inquart in his capacity as Minister of the Interior?
SKUBL: There were no rifts in our understanding. It was a completely harmonious understanding.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he exert any influence upon the police? Did he, for instance, bring National Socialists into the police corps?
SKUBL: No; that happened in no case.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have an opportunity to bypass the Minister and report directly to Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg?
SKUBL: Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg was the chief of the Government, and in that capacity he was naturally my highest superior. It was natural that I should make reports to the Federal Chancellor regularly and upon special summons, and that I should also have received instructions from him in return.
DR. STEINBAUER: Soon after Dr. Seyss-Inquart was appointed Minister he went to visit Hitler in the Reich. Was that an official journey, or was it kept secret?
SKUBL: It was official
DR. STEINBAUER: How did you come to that conclusion?
SKUBL: It had been announced. I knew about the journey; and Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, so far as I know, also knew about the journey. It was also suggestive that in his capacity as liaison man between the Austrian Government and the Reich he must necessarily have an opportunity to speak to Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well then, when Seyss-Inquart came back, did he make a report on the contents of his discussions with the Fuehrer?
SKUBL: Yes. Upon his return I met Seyss-Inquart at the station, and I asked him how the conferences with Hitler had gone off. Seyss-Inquart, still being fresh under the impression of the meeting and discussions, informed me of what he had stated to the Fuehrer. I still remember the individual points exactly. SeyssInquart told the Reich Chancellor the following: "Herr Reich Chancellor: "1. I am an Austrian Minister, and as such I have taken an oath of allegiance to the Austrian Constitution. I have taken an oath, therefore, to Austria's autonomy and independence. "2. I am a believer and an active Catholic, and therefore, I could not follow a course which might lead to a cultural battle. "3. I come from a country where a totalitarian regime is out of the question."
DR. STEINBAUER: In spite of these views, did the Reich appoint a new Landesleiter for the illegal NSDAP?
SKUBL: Yes. As far as is known to me, on 21 February Klausner was appointed Landesleiter.
DR. STEINBAUER: When Dr. Schuschnigg announced the plebiscite, did he order any special security measures?
SKUBL: The order for the plebiscite naturally had the effect of a bombshell on the National Socialists, not only on the National Socialists in Austria, but also in the Reich. There was feverish activity, therefore, and preventive measures naturally had to be introduced. This special activity can be explained by the fact that the National Socialists were afraid that in the event of a plebiscite they would suffer a great defeat, for the election slogans would have been accepted by the overwhelming majority of the Austrian population. In this connection it is most interesting to draw your attention to an article which appeared on 11 March in the Deutsch-Osterreichische Tagesreitung , in which the fear could be read that this plebiscite would open the way for a democratization of Austria, the formation of a people's front, and subsequently as a result of this, for bolshevization. From this one could recognize the consciousness that the Austrian National Socialists were a minority.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we come to the memorable 11th of March 1938. When did you, as chief of the executive authorities, learn that German troops were marching in?
SKUBL: The 11th of March was, of course, an exceptionally exciting and eventful day. The feeling of time was completely lost during those hours. I know that in the evening hours a report was submitted to me showing that German troops had crossed the border, a report which could not be verified, however, but which was supplemented by the fact that unusually alarming troop movements were taking place on the Austrian border.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did not Seyss-Inquart, after Schuschnigg's resignation, say on the radio that in order to avoid chaos he was asking the population to remain quiet and orderly since he was still Minister of Security?
SKUBL: Seyss-Inquart did make that statement on the radio.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you make any observations to the effect that before Schuschnigg's resignation he, Seyss-Inquart, gave instructions, sent telegrams, made telephone calls, or transmitted any other information regarding the seizure of power in the State by himself?
SKUBL: What I observed was that Seyss-Inquart's behavior until the critical moment was certainly very passive, and as I have already said earlier, he did in fact give more the impression of a man who was being led rather than a man who was leading, and indeed there were clear indications that he felt embarrassed.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you not yourself, in the afternoon or evening, receive an offer from President Miklas to take over the Federal Chancellorship?
SKUBL: Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg first summoned me in the late afternoon, and he stated to me there had been an ultimatum from Germany-that is to say, from Hitler-to the effect l that he would no longer be satisfied with calling off the plebiscite, but was demanding Schuschnigg's resignation. Then Schuschnigg told me that he personally was ready to resign, but that he could not expect his staff to accept Seyss-Inquart's appointment as Federal Chancellor. He had a question to ask me, he said, and that was whether I was prepared to take over the Chancellor's office. He did this in agreement with the President who, a few moments later, made me the same offer. I refused this offer, and I refused it because I considered that my appointment as Chancellor would, in Hitler's eyes, mean a declaration of war. As State Secretary for Matters of Public Security I was at the head of the defensive front against National Socialist aggression, and consequently was also in personal opposition to Hitler. Therefore, had I accepted the Chancellorship, this would have offered Hitler a welcome opportunity to have his troops march in. My acceptance of the Chancellorship, therefore, would have meant the beginning of the struggle against invasion, and such a struggle was probably hopeless, in view of the superiority of the German Armed Forces compared with the Austrian Armed Forces and Austrian executive personnel.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then Seyss-Inquart formed his Cabinet and took you over, too, as State Secretary. Why did you join that Ministry?
SKUBL: Seyss-Inquart proposed that I retain direction of matters of public security in the State Secretariat under his Government. I accepted the offer, having confidence that Seyss-Inquart would remember the conditions which he had stipulated with the Fuehrer; that is, that he would be Federal Chancellor of an independent Austria. Apart from that, I was impelled by the desire and hope that I could keep the executive force in my hands, and that in the event that Seyss-Inquart had difficulties in representing the Austrian point of view, I could be of assistance to him. In other words, there should be an Austrian strong point, an Austrian enclave, in the Cabinet of the Austrian Federal Chancellor SeyssInquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart still at that time speak in favor of Austrian independence?
SKUBL: He did not speak about it in detail. We took that for granted during the conference.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did you leave the Cabinet, and why?
SKUBL: During the night between March 11 and 12 I took over the task of going to the airfield to receive the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, who had been announced from Berlin On that occasion he did not arrive alone, but with a whole entourage. I can no longer remember the names of the individuals, the number was toe large; one name I understood very clearly, and that was the name of Meissner-Meissner, the Austrian naval officer who had joined the National Socialist uprising on 25 July, and who then, after the collapse of this uprising, had fled to the Reich and now had returned under Himmler's protection. That to me was such an impossible situation that I made the firm decision not to have any more to do with all this, and so when I entered the Federal Chancellery at noon and received the surprising news from Glaise-Horstenau that Himmler had demanded my resignation, I answered, "He can have that very cheaply, because I had already decided on that in the early hours of the morning.' Subsequently I also informed Federal Chancellor Dr. SeyssInquart that I had had knowledge of Himmler's request, and that I had naturally decided to resign and asked him to take official notice of my resignation. Upon this Seyss-Inquart replied, "It is true that Himmler has demanded your resignation, but I am not going to have anything dictated to me from outside. At the moment the situation is such that I think it is perhaps better for you to disappear for a few weeks, but then you must come back because I consider your cooperation important." Naturally I declared that I would not do that. And the following day, in writing, I handed in my resignation as Chief of Police and State Secretary, after I had already on the evening of the 12th actually handed the affairs of the office over to Kaltenbrunner, who had been attached to me as a so-called political leader of the executive force.
DR. STEINBAUER: You were then confined and have not gone back to Vienna to this day?
SKUBL: First of all, I was held prisoner in my official apartment under SS and police guard and then, on 24 May, two officials of the Kassel Gestapo conducted me to a forced residence in Kassel, where I remained until my liberation by the Allies.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions of this witness, Mr. President, and perhaps this would be a suitable moment for a recess. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions? The Prosecution?
MR. DODD: No questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. [The witness left the stand.]
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I now call the next witness, Dr. Friedrich Wimmer? [The witness Wimmer took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
FRIEDRICH WIMMER (Witness): Dr. Friedrich Wimmer.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the  oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have finished the questions concerning Austria with the cross-examination of the witness Skubl and I shall now proceed to deal with the Netherlands. Witness, were you, from July 1940 until May 1945, commissioner general for internal administration and justice in the Netherlands?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: In that position did you have to deal with internal administration, justice, education, health, archives, museums, and the legislature?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you not also, at the same time, the deputy of the Reich Commissioner?
WIMMER: In exceptional cases, not otherwise.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you also participate in the regular weekly official conferences of the commissioners general and the secretaries general with the Reich Commissioner?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Therefore, you were fully informed about events in the occupied Netherlands?
WIMMER: In general, yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I ask you: Was the German Police a part of the offices of the RK, or the Reich Commissioner, or was it not rather independently subordinate to the Berlin central offices?
WIMMER: The German Police was a distinct office, separate from the Reich Commissioner's office, and was subordinate to the respective central offices in the Reich, both administratively and actually.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is to say, then, directly subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler?
WIMMER: It was directly subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer SS.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, did the German Police, apart from the duties of the Regular and Security Police, have other special duties in the Netherlands?
WIMMER: They had a number of special duties in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: Can you enumerate them?
WIMMER: I could not enumerate them completely but, for example, the combating of resistance movements in the Netherlands belonged exclusively to their sphere of activity; furthermore, the establishment, direction, and supervision of concentration camps belonged to their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the removal of Jews from the body of the Dutch nation belonged exclusively to their sphere of activity.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, we come to internal administration. At the head of each of the former ministries there was a secretary general, that is to say, a Dutchman. Were these men persecuted in any way if they resigned?
WIMMER: No. The Reich Commissioner had told the Dutch secretaries general upon assuming office that if they should feel in any way embarrassed by the decrees or demands of the occupation authorities, they should apply to him without any fear and explain their difficulties to him, and that then, if so desired, he would let them resign from their office in such a manner that in no way would they ever have to fear any unpleasantness, of any kind whatsoever, and that they would also be assured of financial security and get their pensions.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner also dismiss provincial commissioners?
WIMMER: He probably dismissed provincial commissioners also, but these changes also occurred-I can recall two cases-through the death of the provincial commissioner.
DR. STEINBAUER: What about the mayors?