dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Were you aware, or did you know from previous activities of Herr Von Neurath in his various positions as Ambassador but especially in his last post in London, that; Herr Von Neurath was a faithful follower and an impassioned champion of a policy of peace?
VON PAPEN: That was known to me and to everyone in Germany.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And you yourself approved of this also?
THE PRESIDENT: I think you are going a little too fast. Go on.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself also approve of this peace policy?
VON PAPEN: Of course I approved of this policy. Otherwise we would not have found ourselves side by side in this Cabinet engaged in common work.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath, a few months later, take any part in the negotiations leading to the transfer of the Reich Chancellorship to Hitler?
VON PAPEN: In no way.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: But do you know that Reich President Von Hindenburg made the express condition that Herr Von Neurath was to remain as Reich Foreign Minister also in the new Hitler Government?
VON PAPEN: I have already mentioned here that this was an express condition of Hindenburg's.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And what was Hitler's attitude to that in principle? Did he accept it only in order to be able to form the Government at all, or did he approve of Hindenburg's choice?
VON PAPEN: I believe that Hitler approved completely of the choice of Neurath as Foreign Minister.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself ever talk to Hitler about this?
VON PAPEN: Yes, frequently. And I learned from Hitler that he thought highly of Herr Von Neurath's personality and capacity.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And did you ever talk to Herr Von Neurath himself about it?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did he make the decision to form this Cabinet readily?
VON PAPEN: I imagine that Herr Von Neurath also had the same inner reservations I had at that time.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now, according to your knowledge, as far as you could learn from statements of Hitler's, what were Hitler's foreign political aims and efforts at that time?
VON PAPEN: Hitler's foreign political aims at that time were quite limited: Abolition of discrimination by peaceful means and by strengthening Germany's position in the world.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Until the end of 1937, did you ever hear any statements from Hitler indicating that he might be determined to use armed force if his peaceful efforts did not have the desired result?
VON PAPEN: I never heard from Hitler of any such intentions.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And then it is always asserted that in leading Party circles he expressed such sanguinary intentions?
VON PAPEN: I never heard that in the Party, even among the most radical National Socialists, anyone ever spoke of the idea of a war.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Then to sum up, you agreed fully with the aims of a peaceful policy that were intended and advocated by Herr Von Neurath?
VON PAPEN: Absolutely.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now the charge is made against Herr Von Neurath of having co-operated in the rearmament of Germany. What was Hitler's reason and motive for this rearmament, which it may be supposed started before the actual taking over of the military sovereignty?
VON PAPEN: I stated yesterday that the actual rearmament began only after I had resigned from the Cabinet. But as far as I am informed, all of my former colleagues held the view that a rearmament was only to serve the purpose of giving Germany a defensive protection for her borders.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to the problem of Austria. Do you know the attitude of Herr Von Neurath concerning the Austria problem?
VON PAPEN: Herr Von Neurath's attitude concerning the Austria problem was the same as mine. Like myself, he constantly protested in the Cabinet against the terror measures staged by the Party in 1933 and 1934.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Were you yourself, when Hitler sent you on an extraordinary mission to Vienna, under Herr Von Neurath? And did you receive your instructions from him or only from Hitler?
VON PAPEN: I was not subordinate to Herr Von Neurath but had asked that I might be directly subordinate to Hitler. But, of course, I reported all steps which I took to Herr Von Neurath and the Foreign Office, as is proved by the documents submitted here.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath's attitude toward the negotiations in the summer of 1936 which led to the Agreement of 11 July between Germany and Austria?
VON PAPEN: Herr Von Neurath had exactly the same opinion as I had, that this agreement was to serve and had to serve the cause, once and for all, of peace between these two peoples of the same race.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did he influence Hitler in this direction, too?
VON PAPEN: I do not know, but I certainly assume he did.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And that he was honest and sincere in this agreement? What is your opinion? I point out here that the Prosecution asserts and makes it a charge against Herr Von Neurath that this agreement was concluded with a treacherous intention.
VON PAPEN: I spoke in detail on that point yesterday, and protested against the Prosecution's charging us with treacherous intentions. Herr Von Neurath had such intentions just as little as I did.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now I have two more brief questions. Do you know what attitude Herr Von Neurath took as to Germany's leaving the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in 1933?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I know that very well. Herr Von Neurath was of the opinion that it was advisable to leave the Disarmament Conference. But, like me, he was of the opinion that it was a mistake to leave the League of Nations. With his approval, as I told the Court yesterday I followed Hitler to Munich at that time in order to persuade him not to leave the League of Nations.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I have no more questions, Mr. President.
DR. SEIDL: With the approval of the Court, substituting for my absent colleague, Dr. Stahmer, I should like to ask a question on behalf of the Defendant Goering. Witness, this morning you said that in connection with the murder of your friend Ketteler in 1938 you turned to Goering because he was in charge of the Gestapo. Is it not a fact, and were you not aware of this fact, that from 1936 on, at the latest, the Gestapo was exclusively under Himmler and was formally under the Reich Minister of the Interior?
VON PAPEN: It is possible that through my 4 years' absence from Germany in Austria I did not know that fact. It has been established here, of course. In any case, I had the feeling when I turned to Goering that he was in a position to defend me against the Gestapo; and after Hitler had refused to speak to me on this matter, it was only natural that I should turn to him as the second man in Germany.
DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? Sir David, would you prefer to start after the adjournment?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I was thinking that I might have the documents arranged then and it might be more convenient for the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: We will sit again at 5 minutes to 2.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very much obliged, Your Lordship. [The Tribunal recessed until 1355 hours.] Afternoon Session
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do you remember saying in your interrogation on 19 September of last year that your present view was that Hitler was the greatest crook that you had ever seen in your life?
VON PAPEN: That is quite true. That is the opinion which I arrived at after I learned here of all the crimes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that was on 19 September 1945. But I am more interested in your next answer. Was that not when you were asked when you made your mind up that Hitler was the greatest crook you had ever seen in your life, "only after I have known the facts after which he started to go to war"? Do you remember saying that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was not that rather a long time for you to discover that somewhat obvious truth after your close co-operation with Hitler?
VON PAPEN: My opinion about Hitler and his inner political significance was completely clear after 30 June 1934. But, like all other human beings, I could assume that in the field of foreign politics at least he would be sensible and I was of this opinion until after the Munich Agreement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let us see whether you had not had an opportunity of forming that view much earlier. When you were Reich Chancellor in 1932 it was necessary for you to acquaint yourself with the personalities and aims and methods of the Nazi Party, was it not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you did so, did you not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you remember-I do not want to delay by referring to the document, but you may take it as an exact quotation-that on 16 November 1932 Hitler wrote to you and said: "You must be aware of my attitude and the attitude of my Party."
VON PAPEN: Of course, I knew the aims of his Party; but I may add, if a party forms a coalition with another party it has to eliminate a great deal from its program and form a coalition program. That was what Hitler did on 30 January.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but before we come to 30 January I want to ask you-get your view in 1932. You had very little doubt in 1932, during the period of your Chancellorship, that if Hitler got into power Germany was in danger of being ruled by violent and unconstitutional methods, had you not, if Hitler got into power?
VON PAPEN: Doubtless the program of the National Socialists was revolutionary in this connection, but I explained in detail to the Court that when we came to this forced solution of 30 January we established a number of safeguards and drew up a joint coalition program which in our opinion eliminated the points of danger which you have mentioned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was very strongly the view of President Von Hindenburg in the middle of 1932 that it would be most dangerous to put power into Hitler's hands, was it not?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that was indeed his opinion, that Hitler had to be controlled by restricting his power.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just will give you one sentence from the affidavit of Herr Meissner, which the Tribunal will find in Document Book lla on Page 43. This will be GB-495. The number is 3309-PS. This was after, in August 1932. According to Meissner: "Hindenburg stated that because of the tense Situation he could not with a clear conscience risk transferring the power of government to a new party, such as the National Socialists, which did not command a majority and which was intolerant, noisy, and undisciplined." That is a very moderate statement of the Reich President's views at that time, is it not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you know, Defendant-I am not talking about a coalition, I am talking about if the National Socialists came into power themselves-it was obvious to you that they had few scruples and would make short work of their political opponents, is that not so?
VON PAPEN: One cannot say that. In political life it always happens that a radical party-any party, but particularly a radical party-if it comes to power and is made responsible, has to eliminate much of its program. For example, we have seen that in the case of the socialist parties of all countries.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, is it true, as the Defendant Goering stated under oath, that he told you in 1932 that whatever else the Nazis would do Hitler would not become a "Vice" or second man; that he would oppose any political set-up which did not give him the first place? Is that correct?
VON PAPEN: Yes, Hitler always told me that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And therefore you realized that Hitler and his accomplices wanted a full opportunity to put their program and intentions into effect, did you not?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not know that. That is a statement which you make here which does not reflect the conditions at that time. You need only read the government program, our coalition of 1 February.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do not be afraid that I am not coming to the period of your coalition of 30 January. For the moment I am just asking you one or two questions about your view of Hitler, and Hindenburg's view of Hitler in 1932 because I want to take it by very quick but very clear stages. I am still asking you about 1932. The question I put to you was: Did you realize that if Hitler and his accomplices came into power they wanted, and would be content only with, a full opportunity of putting their program and intentions into effect?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not know that; otherwise I would not have made the attempt in 1933 to bring them into a joint coalition program.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you have told us, I think, but I just want to get it quite clear, that your views as to what was necessary for Germany in the second half of 1932 was an easing of the political differences and strife internally, and an adjustment of relations with the Western Powers to ease the requirements of Versailles. I am trying to put it quite shortly as I understand it from you. That is right?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And were these aims think your first approach was to invite Hitler to be Vice Chancellor in your Government in August 1932, was it not?
VON PAPEN: That is quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Hitler refused that and he refused a repetition of your offer in November 1932, is that not right?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, in order to save time I just want to see if Herr Meissner puts the position correctly in Paragraphs 6 and 7 of his affidavit. I will summarize it for you, and believe me, I will be most pleased to read anything of which you have any doubt. He puts it in this way: That in November 1932 you thought that the general situation and the Nazi Party, in particular, could be controlled if the President gave you the power to make decrees under Article 48 and you had the support of the Reichswehr and the Police, and at that time General Von Schleicher disagreed because he thought that the Reichswehr was not capable of keeping order in Germany. Is that right?
VON PAPEN: It is incorrect insofar as this process cannot be covered by any paragraph of the Constitution, but constitutes a breach of the Constitution. Otherwise it is correct. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE That he might have had to use ultra-constitutional methods to keep control, is that what you 'mean?
VON PAPEN: Yes. As I have said here he gave me this assignment on 1 December.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but originally, is Meissner right in saying that you desired, after you had failed to get Hitler into your Government, to rule by decree and by keeping control with the Reichswehr, and General Von Schleicher said that it could not be done?
VON PAPEN: Now, that is not true. After President Von Hindenburg had decided that he did not want to break the Constitution he appointed General Von Schleicher Reich Chancellor, as is well known. At that time Herr Von Schleicher wanted to create a majority by splitting the Party and, of course, I supported this attempt of Herr Von Schleicher's.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just in case it is any mistake of mine may I just give you Meissner's own words. It is Paragraph 5, Page 44 of Document Book 11a. I think, Defendant, it would be convenient for you to follow it, if you do not mind, so that there is no possibility of mistake.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Paragraph 5 of Herr Meissner's statement: "Papen's reappointment as Chancellor by President Hindenburg would probably have taken place if he had been prepared to take up an open fight against the National Socialists, which would have involved the threat or use of force. Almost up to the time of his resignation Papen and some of the other ministers agreed on the necessity for pressing the fight against the Nazis by employing all means at the disposal of the State and taking recourse to Article 48 of the Constitution, even if this might lead to armed conflict. But the other ministers believed that such a course would lead to civil war. "The decision was provided by Schleicher who earlier had recommended energetic action against the National Socialists even if this meant the use of the Police and the Army. Then in the decisive Cabinet meeting he abandoned this idea and declared himself ready for an understanding with Hitler." Is that correct?
VON PAPEN: In part it is correct, and in part it is not correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now tell us as shortly as you can the part which is not correct.
VON PAPEN: My reappointment as Chancellor by Hindenburg, as Herr Meissner puts it, would have been possible if I had been ready to wage an open battle against the Nazis. That is completely false historically. On 1 December I suggested to Hindenburg that he violate the Constitution and thereby wage open battle against the Nazi Party. Herr Von Schleichert contradicted that. That is the historical truth.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just so that we will have it in sequence, if you will look at Paragraph 6 of the same document, about the second sentence, it begins: "When it became clear that Hitler was not willing to enter Schleicher's Cabinet, and that Schleicher on his part was unable to split the National Socialist Party as he had hoped to do with the help of Gregor Strasser, the policy for which Schleicher had been appointed Chancellor was shipwrecked. Schleicher was aware that Hitler was particularly embittered against him and would never agree to co-operate with him. Therefore he changed his mind and decided to fight against the Nazis, which meant that he now wanted to pursue the policy which he had sharply opposed a few weeks before, when Papen had suggested it." Is that right?
VON PAPEN: That is quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you see-I want to get the position quite clear. You told us that you had approached Hitler first in August; before you approached Hitler you had already legalized the position of the SA and the SS, which had been made illegal by Chancellor Bruning. You did that on 14 June, did you not?
VON PAPEN: I had lifted the prohibition, yes, but only for 4 weeks. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE. Did you think it was a good thing to lift the prohibition against the SA, the terror of the streets?
VON PAPEN: I stated expressly to the Court how the lifting of this prohibition came about. The intention was to bring Hitler and his Party to tolerate my Cabinet. The second reason was that the prohibition of these formations was one-sided, if the socialist and communist fighting formations were not also prohibited.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on 20 July you had forcefully got rid of the Braun-Severing Government and got control of Prussia and the Prussian police under your own hand?
VON PAPEN: It cannot be expressed in that way, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you had got rid of the Braun-Severing Government and got power over Prussia and the Prussian police under your own hands, had you not?
VON PAPEN: I did not have the Prussian police in my hands. The Reich Commissioner for Prussia, whom I had appointed-a very moderate man-now had charge of the Prussian police.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And under the Weimar Constitution you, as Chancellor, had the right to dictate all lines of broad policy, and the Commissioner for Prussia and every other minister had to take his broad policy from you; was that not right?
VON PAPEN: After I had appointed a commissioner, I had the right to determine the general lines of policy for Prussia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like you to look at a speech of yours which you made at Essen in November 1933, where you speak about this time. It is Document Book 11, Page 54, and it is Page 47 of the German document book. [Turning to the defendant.] Now, you see the introductory words: "Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of the national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I have tried to support with all my strength the work of the National Socialist movement and its leader." Is that true?
VON PAPEN: Absolutely, yes, that refers to...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just asked you if it is true. I may come back to it again. "Just as I, when I took over the Chancellorship"-that refers to you, your taking over the Chancellorship-"advocated paving the way to power for the young fighting liberation movement." Was your work in paving the way to power for the young fighting liberation movement to legalize the SA and to turn out the moderate Government in Prussia and centralize the control of the police?
VON PAPEN: No, that would have been a very bad comparison.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just pause there and tell me if that was not what you had done. Tell the Tribunal how you had paved the way to power for the young fighting liberation movement, if it was not by doing that.
VON PAPEN: Yes, I will say that very exactly. The program of the National Socialist Party provided for the liberation of Germany from the discrimination to which we were subjected by the Versailles Treaty. I have spoken here in detail about this. I have explained what efforts I made to obtain the co-operation of the big powers in this connection. We wanted to become a big power again, after being a second-rate nation. That was the meaning of it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I do not want to stop you, and the Tribunal will give you every opportunity of repeating what you said on that point, but I do want you to answer my question. If I am wrong in what I have put to you as the two things you have done to pave the way, just tell us quite shortly: What else had you done to pave the way for this fighting liberation movement? That is the question. What had you done?
VON PAPEN: I had asked Hitler twice to join my own Government, and, when at the end of January 1933 there was no other way out, I formed a coalition at Hindenburg's request with the National Socialist Party.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you believe at that time that Hitler was absolutely necessary for Germany?
VON PAPEN: I was of the opinion that a man who in March 1932, before I was in the Government, had 36.8 percent of all German votes in the presidential election, that that man and his party had to be included in responsible government work.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But beyond his electoral success, did you think that Hitler, from his personality, aims, and program, was essential for Germany at that time?
VON PAPEN: I do not know how a party which controlled 36.8 percent of all German votes could be dealt with by means of the policed
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look at your own words in the next paragraph of that letter. You do not seem to refer to merely electoral success: "The dear Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times of deep distress a leader who will lead it through all crises and moments of danger, with the assured instinct of the statesman, into a happy future." That was, shall we say-we will not say extravagant-but rather strong language for an ex-cavalry officer to use of a political figure if he did not think, or if he did not want other people to think, that he firmly believed in him. Did you really mean what you are saying there?
VON PAPEN: May I say the following in answer? After I had formed the coalition with Hitler, I was convinced that he would keep this pact of coalition, and repeatedly-not only in this speech- I professed my allegiance to Hitler and to our joint program, and I have already told the Court why I took his part precisely in this speech. This was a question of stating before the whole world that Hitler's solemn promise to keep peace was a serious promise to which we all subscribed.