dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. DIX: Thank you. May I interrupt you for a moment? I would like to call the attention of the Tribunal now to the fact that the witness is referring to a passage, to a suggestion, contained in the letter. This letter is in English. I have no German translation, and I must therefore read this sentence in English. "My feeling is that the earlier discussions be opened, the easier it will be to influence the development of certain existing conditions." The question is now... Now, I would like to ask you: What did Dr. Schacht mean by the "certain existing conditions" that were to be influenced? Did he mean your efforts?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I must interpose an objection. I am not sure whether you have misunderstood it. I think that what Schacht meant is not a question to be addressed to this witness. I shall have no objection to Dr. Schacht telling us what he meant by his cryptic language, but I don't think that this witness can interpret what Schacht meant unless he has some information apart from anything that now appears. I don't want to be over technical about this, but it does seem to me that this is the sort of question which should be reserved for Dr. Schacht himself.
DR. DIX: Mr. Justice Jackson, of course, is right, but this witness said that he smuggled the letter into Switzerland, and I assume that he discussed the contents of the letter with Schacht and was therefore in a position to explain the cryptic words.
THE PRESIDENT: He didn't say this yet; he hasn't said he ever saw the letter except the outside of it. He hasn't said he ever saw the letter.
DR. DIX: Will you please tell us whether you saw the letter and knew its contents?
GISEVIUS: I am sorry that I did not so clearly at once, but I helped in drafting the letter. I was there when the letter was drafted and written.
DR DIX: Then I believe Justice Jackson will withdraw his objection.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.
DR. DIX: Will you please answer my question; what is meant by those cryptic words?
GISEVIUS: We wanted to suggest that we, in Germany, were interested in forcing certain developments and that we now expected an encouraging word from the other side. I do not, however, want any misunderstanding to arise here. In this letter it also states very clearly that President Roosevelt had in the meantime been disappointed many times by the German side, so that we had to beg, to urge him to take such a step. It is a fact that President Roosevelt had taken various steps for peace.
DR. DIX: Let us go on now. If I give you the cue "Vatican Action"? . . .
GISEVIUS: In addition to this attempt to enter into discussions with America, we believed we should ask for a statement from the British Government. Again it was our aim solely to...
THE PRESIDENT: Is the original of this letter still available or is this only given from memory?
DR. DIX: The original copy, yes; that is, a copy signed by Schacht is here. It was kept during the war in Switzerland and was brought back to us from Switzerland by this witness. [Turning to the witness.] Now, let us go on to the "Vatican Action."
GISEVIUS: We tried in every possible way to prove to General Halder and General Olbricht that their theory was wrong, that there could be no longer a question of dealing with a decent German government. We believed that we should now follow a particularly important and safe road. The Holy Father made personal efforts in these matters, as the British Government had, with justification, become uncertain whether there really existed in Germany a trustworthy group of men with whom talks could be undertaken. I remember that shortly afterwards the Venlo incident took place when, with the excuse that there was a German opposition group, officials of the English Secret Service were kidnapped at the Dutch border. Therefore, we were anxious to prove that there was a group here which was honestly trying to do its best and which, if the occasion arose, would stand by its word under all circumstances. I believe that we kept our word regarding the things we proposed to do, while we said quite frankly that we could not bring about this revolt as we had said previously we hoped to do. These negotiations began in October-November 1939. They were only concluded later in the spring, and if I am asked I will continue.
DR DIX: Yes, please describe the conclusion.
GISEVIUS: I believe I must add first that, during November of 1939, General Halder actually had intended a revolt, but that these intentions for a revolt again came to naught because at the very last minute Hitler called off the western offensive. Strengthened by the attitude of Halder at that time, we believed that we should continue these discussions at the Vatican. We reached what you might call a gentleman's agreement, on the grounds of which I believe that I am entitled to state that we could give the generals unequivocal proof that in the event of the overthrow of the Hitler regime, an agreement could be reached with a decent civil German government.
DR. DIX: Did you read the documents yourself, Doctor?
GISEVIUS: These were oral discussions which were then written down in a comprehensive report. This report was read by the Ambassador Von Hassell and by Dr. Schacht before it was given to Halder by General Thomas. Halder was so taken aback by the contents that he gave this comprehensive report to Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch was enraged and threatened to arrest the intermediary, General Thomas, and thus this action which had every prospect of success, failed.
DR. DIX: Doctor, you have testified . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the last notes that I have got down in my notebook are these: "That we knew that if Holland, Belgium, and the other countries were attacked, it would have very grave consequences and we therefore negotiated with Halder and Brauchitsch and they weren't prepared to help us to stop the war at that time. We wanted peace with honor, eliminating politics. We took all possible steps." Well, now, since I took these notes down, I think we spent nearly 10 minutes in details, which are utterly irrelevant, about further negotiations. If they took all possible steps, what is the point of giving us these details about it?
DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, if a witness is called in a matter of such importance, where he as well as the defendants' counsel must always take into account that people who are of a different opinion may say "these are just generalities, we want facts and particulars," then I cannot forego having the witness testify at least in broad outline that, for example, a detailed action had been undertaken through His Holiness in the Vatican. If he merely says that the result of this action was a comprehensive report, if with Halder and Brauchitsch the above mentioned. . .
THE PRESIDENT: I agree with you that the one sentence about some negotiations with the Vatican may have been properly given, but all the rest of it were unnecessary details.
DR. DIX: Anyway we have already concluded this chapter, Your Lordship. [Turning to the witness.] You have already testified that the revolt which was planned for November did not occur because the western offensive did not take place. Therefore, we need not pursue this subject any further. I would merely like to ask you at this point: Did your group of conspirators remain inactive during the winter, and particularly during the spring, or were further plans followed and acted upon?
GISEVIUS: Constant attempts were made to influence all generals within our reach. Besides Halder and Brauchitsch we tried to reach the generals of the armored divisions in the West. I remember, for instance, there was a discussion between Schacht and General Hoeppner.
DR. DIX: Hoeppner?
GISEVIUS: Hoeppner. We also tried to influence Field Marshal Rundstedt, Bock, and Leeb. Here, too, General Thomas and Admiral Canaris were the intermediaries.
DR DIX: And how did the generals react?
GISEVIUS: When everything was ready, they would not start.
DR DIX: Now, we come to the summer of 1941. Hitler is in Paris. The aerial offensive against England is imminent. Tell us about your group of conspirators and their activity during this period and the period following.
GISEVIUS: After the fall of Paris, our group had no influence at all for months. Hitler's success deluded everyone, and it took much effort on our part, through all channels available, to try at least to prevent the bombardment of England. Here again the group made united efforts and we tried, through General Thomas and Admiral Canaris and others, to prevent this evil.
DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly, when you use the word "group" you mean the group which was led by Beck, in which Schacht collaborated?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR. DIX: Now, at that time did Schacht have several talks, or one talk, along the same line in Switzerland?
GISEVIUS: That was a little later. We have now come to the year 1941, and on this trip to Switzerland Schacht tried to urge that a peace conference should be held as soon as possible. We knew that Hitler was thinking about the attack on Russia, and we believed that we should do everything to avert at least this disaster. With this thought in mind Schacht's discussions in Switzerland were conducted. I myself took part in arranging a dinner in Basel with the president of the B. I. Z., Mr. McKittrick, an American, and I was present when Schacht tried to express at least the opinion that everything possible must now be done to initiate negotiations.
DR. DIX: In this connection I would respectfully like to remind the Tribunal of the article in the Basler Nachrichten , of which I presented the essential contents when we discussed the admissibility of the document. It deals with a similar conversation between Schacht and an American economist. That is the same trip which the witness is now discussing. I will take the liberty of referring to this article later, when presenting documentary evidences. [Turning to the witness.] Now, the war continued. Do you have anything to say about Russia; about the imminent war with Russia?
GISEVIUS: I can say only that Schacht knew of all the many attempts which we undertook to avert this catastrophe.
DR. DIX: Now let us go further to the time of Stalingrad. What was done by your group of conspirators after this critical period of the war?
GISEVIUS: When we did not succeed in persuading the victorious generals to engineer a revolt, we then tried at least to win them over to one when they had obviously come up against their great catastrophe. This catastrophe, which found its first visible signs in Stalingrad, had been predicted in all its details by Generaloberst Beck since December of 1942. We immediately made all preparations so that at the moment, which could be forecast with almost mathematical exactitude, when the army of Paulus, completely defeated, would have to capitulate, then at least a military revolt could be organized. I myself was called back from Switzerland and participated in all discussions and preparations. I can only testify that this time a great many preparations were made. Contact was also made with the field marshals in the East, with Witzleben in the West but again, things turned out differently, for Field Marshal Paulus capitulated instead of giving us the cue at which Kluge, according to plan, was to start the revolt in the East.
DR. DIX: This was the time of the so-called Schlaberndorff attempt?
GISEVIUS: No, a little later.
DR. DIX: Now I shall interpose another question. Until now you have always described the group led by Generaloberst Beck and supported by Schacht, Goerdeler, et cetera , as a revolt movement, that is, a group which wanted to overthrow the government. Did you not now more and more aim at an assassination?
GISEVIUS: Yes, from the moment when the generals again deserted us, we realized that a revolt was not to be hoped for, and from that moment on we took all the steps we could to instigate an assassination. DR HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): Mr. President, I must object at this point to the testimony of the witness. The witness, Dr. Gisevius, by his testimony has incriminated the group which I represent However, some of this testimony is so general that it cannot be referred to as fact. Furthermore, he has just testified that the field marshals in the East had "deserted" the group of conspirators. These statements are opinions which the witness is giving, but they are not facts, to which the witness must limit his testimony, and therefore I ask-Mr. President, I have not yet finished. I wanted to conclude with the request for a resolution by the Court that the testimony given by the witness, where he asserted that the generals had "deserted" the group of conspirators, be stricken from the record.
DR. DIX: May I please reply briefly? I cannot agree with the opinion of my esteemed colleague Dr. Laternser that the statement "the generals deserted us" was not a statement of fact...
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need to hear further argument upon it. It certainly won't be stricken from the record until we have had time to consider it, and Dr. Laternser will have his opportunity of examining this witness, and he can then elucidate any evidence he wants to.
DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, if I make the motion for the reason that the witness is giving testimony which is beyond his scope as a witness, and that he is giving his opinion, then to that extent it is inadmissible testimony which would have to be stricken from the record.
THE PRESIDENT: If you mean that the evidence is hearsay, that will be perfectly obvious to the Tribunal, and doesn't make the evidence inadmissible, and you will be able to cross-examine him about it.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have been misunderstood. I did not say, and I am not basing my request to strike the testimony from the record on the allegation that the witness made statements from hearsay; but I say that it is not a statement of fact, but an opinion which the witness is giving when he says that "the generals in the East deserted the group of conspirators."
DR. DIX: May I answer briefly to that? If I try to influence a group of generals to organize a revolt and if they do not do so, that is a fact and I can state this fact with the words, "They deserted us." Naturally I can also say, "They did not revolt," but that is merely a matter of expression. Both are facts and not an opinion. He is not appraising the behavior of the generals in an ethical, military, or political sense, he is merely pointing out, "They were not willing."
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. DIX: [Turning to the witness.] If I recall correctly, you were just about to tell us that now the policy of the conspirators' group changed from a revolt to an assassination. Is that correct?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR. DIX: Do you wish to state anything further? GISEVIUS You had asked me about the first step in this direction after Generaloberst Beck had given up all hope of being able to win over another general to a revolt. It was said at that time that there was now nothing left for us but to free Germany, Europe, and the world from the tyrant by a bomb attack. Immediately after this decision, preparations were started. Oster spoke to Lahousen and Lahousen furnished the bombs from his arsenal. The bombs were taken to the headquarters of Kluge at Smolensk, and with every possible means we tried to bring about the assassination, which was unsuccessful only because at a time when Hitler was visiting the front, the bomb which had been put in his airplane did not explode. This was in the spring of 1943.
DR. DIX: Now, an event took place in the Abwehr OKW, which as a result of further developments, strongly affected Schacht's further attitude and also your remaining in Germany. Will you please describe that?
GISEVIUS: Gradually even Himmler could not fail to see what was happening in the OKW, and at the urgent request of SS General Schellenberg a thorough investigation of the Canaris group was now started. A special commissioner was appointed and on the first day of this investigation Oster was relieved of his post and a number of his collaborators were arrested. A short time afterwards Canaris was also dismissed from his post. I myself could no longer remain in Germany and thus this group, which until now had in a certain sense been the directorate of all the conspiracies, was eliminated.
DR. DIX: During that time, that is January 1943, Schacht was also relieved of his position as Reich Minister without Portfolio. Did you meet Schacht after that time?
GISEVIUS: Yes. By chance I was in Berlin on the day this letter of dismissal arrived. It was an unusually sharp letter and I remember that that night I was asked to the country house of Schacht, and as the letter had simply stated that Schacht was to be dismissed, we wondered whether he was also going to be arrested.
DR. DIX: I would like to remind the Tribunal that I read this letter into the record when Lammers was examined and showed it to him. This letter-I mean Schacht's letter of dismissal signed by Lammers-has already been read into the record and is probably contained in my document book. [Turning to the witness.] You were in Switzerland at that time, but on 20 July you were in Berlin. How did that happen?
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the 20th of July 1944?
DR. DIX: Yes, the well-known day of the 20th of July. We are rapidly approaching the end now.
GISEVIUS: A few months after the elimination of the Canaris Oster circle we formed a new group around General Olbricht. At that time Colonel Count Von Stauffenberg also joined us. He replaced Oster in all activities, and when after several months, and after many unsuccessful attempts and discussions, the time finally arrived in July 1944, I returned secretly to Berlin in order to participate in the events.
DR. DIX: But you had no direct connection with Schacht at this attempted assassination?
GISEVIUS: No; I, personally, was in Berlin secretly and saw only Goerdeler, Beck, and Stauffenberg; and it was agreed expressly at this time that no other civilian except Goerdeler, Leuschner, and myself were to be informed of the matter. We hoped thus to protect lives by not burdening anyone unnecessarily with this knowledge.
DR. DIX: Now I come to my last question. You know that Schacht had after all held high government positions under the Hitler regime. You, Doctor, as is shown by your testimony today were an arch enemy of the Hitler regime. Despite that you had, as can also be seen from your testimony today, special confidence in Schacht. How do you explain this fact which at first sight seems to be contradictory in itself?
GISEVIUS: My answer can, of course, only express a personal opinion and I will formulate it as briefly as possible. However, I would like to emphasize that the problem of Schacht was confusing not only to me but to my friends as well; Schacht was always a problem and a puzzle to us. Perhaps it was due to the contradictory nature of this man that he kept his position in the Hitler government for so long. He undoubtedly entered the Hitler regime for patriotic reasons, and I would like to testify here that the moment his disappointment became obvious he decided for the same patriotic reasons to join the opposition. Despite Schacht's many contradictions and the puzzles he gave us to solve, my friends and I were strongly attracted to Schacht because of his exceptional personal courage and the fact that he was undoubtedly a man of strong moral character, and he did not think only of Germany but also of the ideals of humanity. That is why we went with him, why we considered him one of us; and, if you ask me personally, I can say that the doubts which I often had about him were completely dispelled during the dramatic events of 1938 and 1939. At that time he really fought, and I will never forget that. It is a pleasure for me to be able to testify to this here.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now through with the questioning of this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants counsel want to ask questions of the witness?
HERR GEORG BOEHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, yesterday you said that you were a member of the Stahlhelm. When and for how long were you a member?
GISEVIUS: I entered the Stahlhelm in 1929, I believe, and left that organization in 1933.
HERR BOEHM: You know the mentality of the members of the Stahlhelm. You know that, almost without exception, they were people who had served in the first World War, and I would like to ask you now whether the internal and foreign political goals of the Stahlhelm were to be reached by its members in a legal or in a revolutionary mariner?
GISEVIUS: To my knowledge the Stahlhelm always favored the legal way.
HERR BOEHM: Yes. Was the fight of the Stahlhelm against the Treaty of Versailles which every organization with national tendencies took up, to be carried on by legal or revolutionary means, or means of force?
GISEVIUS: It is very hard for me to answer for the entire Stahlhelm, but I can only say that I, and the members of the Stahlhelm organization with whom I was acquainted, knew that the Stahlhelm wanted to take the legal way.
HERR BOEHM: Is it correct to say that in the year 1932 and 1933 hundreds of thousands, regardless of party and race, entered the Stahlhelm organization?
GISEVIUS: That is correct. The more critical matters became in Germany, the more people went to the right. I myself having experienced this growth of the Stahlhelm as an official speaker at public meetings, from 1929 to 1933, I would describe it in this way: That those who did not want to join the NSDAP and the SA, deliberately entered the Stahlhelm so that within the German rightist movement there would be a counterbalance against the rising "brown" tide. That was the underlying reason of our recruitment for the Stahlhelm at that time.
HERR BOEHM: You know, of course, that in the year 1933 the Stahlhelm organization as a whole was taken into the SA. Was it possible at that time for the individual member of the Stahlhelm to say "no," or to protest against being taken over into the SA?
GISEVIUS: That was possible, of course, as everything was possible also in the Third Reich.
HERR BOEHM: What would have been the possible consequences of such a step?
GISEVIUS: The possible consequences would have been a violent discussion with the regional Party leaders or SA leaders. At that time I was no longer a member of the Stahlhelm and I can merely say that it undoubtedly must have been very difficult for many people, particularly those living in the country, to refuse being transferred to the SA. After they had been betrayed by their leader, Minister Seldte, or as it was said at that time "sold" to the SA, refusal to transfer to the SA was naturally a sign of open distrust toward National Socialism.