dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you disagree with that, look at Document Number D-718, which will become Exhibit GB-501, and see what you say the next day: "Most honored Chancellor: "After you have given the nation and the world last night your great account of the internal developments which led up to 30 June, I feel the need to shake your hand, as I did on 30 January 1933, and to thank you for all you have given anew to the German nation by crushing the intended second revolution and by announcing irrevocable and statesmanlike principles. "Painful, tragic circumstances have prevented me for the first time since 30 January from appearing at your side. You yourself excused me and showed understanding for the fact that a Vice Chancellor cannot take his seat on the ministerial bench as long as he finds himself subjected to special treatment. (My confiscated files have still not been returned to me, in spite of Goering's and your own orders.) "Your statements clearly show to history that any suspicion of a connection between my person and these treasonable practices was an intentional defamation and calumniation. I thank you for stating this." Then, after saying that people are still believing it, in the penultimate paragraph you say: "I should, therefore, be grateful if you could soon find the occasion to point out positively that up to today"-that was 14 July-"I have loyally stood by and fought for you, your leadership, and your work for Germany." Now, Defendant, do you deny what I put to you a moment ago, that all you wanted was your loyalty to the regime to be made clear to the world? It was not worrying you at all that Von Schleicher and his wife, and Von Bose, and Jung, and all these other people had been murdered by the Government of the Reich; otherwise, why did you write a letter like that?
VON PAPEN: I wrote this letter, as the letter itself shows, because I was still being accused of having agreed to the attempts on the lives of Goebbels and Goering and of various other conspiracies. That is the reason why it was important to me to have Chancellor Hitler state that I was not involved in any conspiracies against him in connection with the various actions of this revolt. Of course, first of all I dealt in this letter with my position and the position of my associates. The restoration of General Von Schleicher's honor was the task of the Army, and not my task.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I will come to that when we deal with the Army, but at the moment, you see, what I am putting to you is this: That even after you knew that your own friends had been murdered, to say nothing of your old colleagues, your own friends had been murdered, you again and again protest your loyalty and the fact that you had always worked and cooperated with Hitler in all his work. Was that honest? Is what is contained in these letters honest, or do you say they were just lies in order to protect yourself?
VON PAPEN: No, I wrote that because, in fact, the entire action against me, Himmler's attempt to murder me, the fact that I was arrested, were all based on the supposition that I had participated in a conspiracy against Hitler's Government. It had therefore to be clarified that as long as I was a member of this Government, I had acted toward it with absolute loyalty. That is the reason why I was asking for this clarification.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember your learned counsel, on your instructions, putting an interrogatory to Baron van Lersner? It is Number 2(a) on Page 212 of Defense Document Book 3, Question 2(a): "Did the Defendant Von Papen continue to hope to change Hitler's policy to his own way of thinking by impregnating it with conservative ideas, until the murders taking place on 30 June 1934 and Hitler's justification of them had convinced him that his efforts and his hope had been in vain?" And Baron von Lersner, not unnaturally, answers "yes" to that question. Does that correctly express your point of view ". . . until the murders taking place on 30 June 1934 and Hitler's approval of them had convinced him..."-that is you-"that your efforts and your hopes had been in vain"? Do you agree with that? It is an interrogatory put by your own learned counsel.
VON PAPEN: Yes, I agree with that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that is your view, why did you write these letters expressing this fulsome admiration of Hitler?
VON PAPEN: What I wished to express in the interrogatory, or rather what I wanted Herr Von Lersner to be asked was the following: Is it correct...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The answers the witness expects are in his question. It is one of the best examples of a leading question I have ever seen. You say that your interrogatory expresses your view, do you not?
VON PAPEN: I might say that if I were of this opinion that with the 30th of June it became apparent that further co-operation with Hitler was no longer possible and that, therefore, the coalition program which had been agreed upon between us had collapsed...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say again that you have an unchanged loyalty and admiration and that you have cooperated? "I remain loyally devoted to you for your work, for our Germany." If your view is put in that interrogatory, that the foundations of your faith had been shaken, why do you write that you remain loyally devoted to Hitler's work for Germany?
VON PAPEN: I have already told you and the Tribunal that I hoped that, in spite of the collapse of the domestic situation, Hitler would at least in the field of foreign policy pursue a reasonable course. He was there; we could not remove him. We had to reckon with Hitler and his Government. All the gentlemen continued to co-operate; I was the only one who stepped out. All these letters with which you are trying to prove I am insincere or that I am not truthful, or, as you call it, that I am a liar or a deceiver, cannot deny to the world the fact that I resigned at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took another job within 11 days. Eleven days after the last letter you had taken the job of representing this-well, I will not say a gang of murderers-this Government which had adopted murder as an instrument of policy, as Plenipotentiary to Austria, within 11 days of your last letter. Let us just see whether the murder motif did not come into that. Did you think that Hitler had been behind the July Putsch in Austria, which had resulted in the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss?
VON PAPEN: I know that Herr Habicht, who had been appointed by him to lead the Austrian Party, at any rate had some connection with this affair. That Herr Hitler himself had approved this act, that was not known to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, did you think that the German Foreign Office had been behind the July Putsch?
VON PAPEN: The German Foreign Office, in my opinion, had nothing at all to do with the July Putsch.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think that Dr. Rieth- if I have his name, yes, Rieth, the German Minister in Vienna- did you think that he had been behind the Putsch?
VON PAPEN: No. I knew only that Dr. Rieth had negotiated with the Austrian Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know that Hitler had been behind it. You deny that the German Foreign Office had been behind it. You did not know That Dr. Rieth had been behind it. Just look at Page 96 of Document Book 11a. It is Pages 79 and 80 of the German book. This is a report, your report a year later. I am taking it slightly out of time because of this sentence where you recapitulate the facts, and if you will look at paragraph-I think it is the last paragraph on Page 79 in the German text. My Lord, it is the second last paragraph on Page 96 in the Document Book 11a. "The hope that the personal conversation between the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and the head of the Italian State at Stresa would lead to a settlement of German-Italian differences has been changed into the exact opposite by the threatening attitude taken up by Mussolini because of the assassination of his friend Dollfuss, and by the partial mobilization of Italian corps on the Brenner. It became apparent that the attempt to re-establish normal and friendly relations by sending me to Vienna was not immediately possible after what had just happened. Mistrust of the forcible methods of the Austrian NSDAP"-now look at the next words-"influenced, as became more and more apparent from the trials which were held, by leading Reich-German persons, was too strong. The impression caused by the terrorist methods and the death of the Federal Chancellor was too lasting in the widest circles." Now, Defendant, tell the Tribunal who the leading German personalities were to whom you were referring as supporting the Putsch in July 1934 and the murder of Dollfuss? Who were they?
VON PAPEN: By no means the former German Minister to Vienna, Herr Rieth, but only Herr Habicht and the persons subordinate to him who at the time were running the Austrian Nazi policy at Hitler's order. But I might point out that it says in this sentence that mistrust of the methods of force employed by the Austrian Nazis had become more and more apparent from the trials held, and that is something which we discovered a year later and not at the time when I was given the task.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to know is this. My question was: Who were the leading German personalities? You are not going to tell the Tribunal that Habicht, who was a liaison man with the NSDAP in Austria, was a leading Reich-German personality. Who were they? You are not going to say that Austrian Nazis were leading Reich-German personalities. Who were they? Who were the leading Reich-German personalities that you were talking about?
VON PAPEN: The leading personality was, no doubt, Herr Habicht. But this letter was written to tell Hitler: "Here, look what you have done."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you seriously want the Tribunal to understand this as a statement on which they will judge your veracity, that by a leading Reich-German personality you mean Herr Habicht, and you have no one else in mind although you use the plural? Is that what you want the Tribunal to understand? I do not know if you remember, Defendant just think of it before you answer-but General Glaise-Horstenau could not even remember Habicht's name when he was giving his evidence. You cannot seriously mean that you meant a liaison agent with the Austrian NSDAP when you referred to prominent Reich-German personalities. Surely you can do better than that. Think again and tell the Tribunal whom you had in mind.
VON PAPEN: Mr. Prosecutor, Herr Habicht was not an agent. Herr Habicht had been appointed by Hitler as the leader of the Party in Austria, so I am surely justified in calling him a leading personality. If Herr Hitler himself had knowledge of these matters at that time, then when reading my letter he would know what I was hinting at.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Even if I were to allow you Herr Habicht, which I certainly never would, he is only one man. Who were the others? You referred to Reich-German personalities. Who were the other people who had been behind this Putsch and this murder?
VON PAPEN: Quite candidly I must tell you that after the 12 or 15 years which have passed since then I can no longer remember which people I might have had in mind when I wrote that. At any rate, the purpose of the letter was-and you will appreciate this-to tell Hitler that the methods which had been employed were doing more damage and were much more incredible than we had known at the time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will accept it. We will go on from the point that you knew there were some unspecified prominent Reich-German personalities who had been behind the murder of Dollfuss. Now, let us just, advancing from that, let us consider what you say with regard to Mr. Messersmith. As I understand it, you deny- if I may say so, with some vigor-what Mr. Messersmith says regarding you. Therefore, let us just look at what he says and see how much of it you can seriously suggest is not true. I think I gave Your Lordship the references yesterday. The reference to the affidavit 1760-PS is Document Book 11, and Page 22 is the relevant part; and the other affidavit, Document 2385-PS, is lla, Page 24. This is rather shorter. I think the one that I would like you to look at, Defendant, is 1760-PS, and I think it begins on Page 3. I want you to come to the bit in the affidavit-and I am afraid I cannot give you the exact German place-where he deals with yourself. It is Page 22, My Lord. The paragraph begins: "That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was confirmed to me by Franz Von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as German Minister." Have you got the passage, Defendant?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if you look down a few lines in Mr. Messersmith's statement, he says: "When I did call on Von Papen in the German Legation he greeted me with: 'Now you are in my Legation and I can control the conversation.' In the baldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded to tell me that all of southwestern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was Germany's natural hinterland, and that he had been charged with the mission of facilitating German economic and political control over all this region for Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government, and from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the governments in the other states to the south and southeast. He said that he intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, toward that end. He said that he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this objective of getting this control of southwestern Europe and there was nothing which could stop it, and that our own policy and that of France and England was not realistic." Then Mr. Messersmith says that he told you that he was shocked, and that you merely smiled and said that, of course, this conversation was between you and Mr. Messersmith, and you would not talk so clearly to other people. Then he says: "I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives." Now, you have told the Tribunal that you said nothing like that to Mr. Messersmith. Apart from whether you said it to Mr. Messersmith or not, do you deny that these were your aims and intentions?
VON PAPEN: Yes; I absolutely deny that my purposes and aims were those which Mr. Messersmith is describing in his affidavit here. I told the Court yesterday...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want to take these quickly Would you just refer back to the document you were looking at a short time ago, which is Document 2248-PS? That is Page 96, My Lord. It starts there, in 11a, and I want to pass on to Page 97. That is Page 81 of the German book. Now, Defendant, this was your view in 1935, if you will look at the beginning of Page 81 of the German text. My Lord, it is the first break in Page 97. "The great historical speech of the Fuehrer's on 21 May of this year, and later the naval treaty, caused a strong détente in the field of foreign policy as regards England. But the clear and final definition of the attitude of National Socialism to the Soviet doctrine of state naturally doubled Franco-Russian attempts to cripple us in the east and southeast, without at the same time achieving a détente in the other direction by clearly renouncing the annexation, or Anschluss, of Austria. "Any attempt at an economic and, even more so, at a political offensive by the newly-formed Third Reich in the direction of southeastern Europe must inevitably come up against a front formed by the whole of Europe." Who put into your mind the question of a commercial or a political offensive in the direction of southeastern Europe? Had you discussed that with the Defendant Von Neurath?
VON PAPEN: No, not at all. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Do you think you spoke for yourself?
VON PAPEN: Certainly. I am making a negative assertion, Sir David, namely, that an advance into the southeastern area would come up against a front formed by all of Europe. I am thus warning of that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You appreciate, Herr Von Papen, that I cannot make any comments at the moment. I can merely draw your attention to matters. All that I am asking you is whether you had got that idea from, say, the Foreign Minister, or whether it was your own idea. You say it is your own idea. Just look on Page 82.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 82. There is a paragraph- My Lord, it is the same page, 97, in the English version-where you go on to say: 18 June 46 ' "This realistic political survey of the European constellation shows immediately that the German-Austrian problem cannot, at least in the near future, be successfully approached from the direction of foreign politics. We must for the time being be content with not allowing Austria's international status to deteriorate in view of a later solution. In this connection the danger of a nonintervention pact with bilateral treaties of assurance seems to be successfully prevented. The maturing of a solution was and still remains dependent on nothing but the shape of German-Austrian relations." Why were you so afraid of a nonintervention pact, if your idea was that there should only be an evolutionary solution of Austria based on Austria's will? Why were you afraid of a nonintervention pact which would bind the Reich to not interfering in Austria?
VON PAPEN: For a very simple reason. All political combinations which our opponents were making at the time had only one end, that Austria should be pushed into such a situation, whether it was a Danube pact or a pact with Italy and France, which would make it impossible to advance the thought of the Anschluss. For that reason it had to be and remain our natural political aim that the international status of Austria should not be allowed to deteriorate, as I have expressed it here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. That is the answer which I thought you would have to give. Now, just look at Page 83, which is in the very next paragraph: "The German nation has for centuries had to pursue a veritable path of suffering in order to secure its unity. With the dawn of National Socialism and the founding of the Third Reich by means of the final overthrow of all particulars, an opportunity, unique and never to be repeated, seemed to present itself to complete Bismarck's work and to bring relations between Germany and Austria nearer to a solution, as a dynamic result of internal events in Germany." I will see if I can put quite shortly what you mean by the completion of this man's work, because I hope we shall not disagree about ancient history, whatever we do about the other. As I understand, your view is that this, Bismarck's setting up the German Empire in 1871, was merely an attempt at a solution which left the Hapsburg Empire separated from Germany, and the final completion of his work was that the old Hapsburg dominions should be brought back with the states which had been in the Holy Roman Empire. Is that roughly the truth?
VON PAPEN: Quite right; not all the Hapsburg states, but Austria, the German part.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The original Hapsburg domains?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite right. I hope I am putting it objectively enough.
VON PAPEN: Oh, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With regard to that, what did you mean by saying that the solution of the relations between Germany and Austria should be brought about by "dynamic consequences of internal events in Germany"? What did you mean by that?
VON PAPEN: By that I mean the following: Never in Germany's history had it happened that a large party whose aim was Germany's unity existed in both nations. That was a unique historical event. And I wished to state that the dynamic force of this movement in the two countries, which was urging unity, gave promise of a solution. '
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, Defendant, the difficulty that I want you to explain is: How do you square an approval of centralization in Germany with a Nazi Government whose unscrupulous message you then knew after the affairs since 30 June 1934 how do you square an unscrupulous centralized Germany with an evolutionary solution of the Austrian problem? That is what that paragraph is saying, you know. What I am suggesting is that it means a much simpler thing than you have told us. It means that you were out to get an annexation of Austria at the earliest opportunity under the National Socialist Reich.
VON PAPEN: Of course, I had to reckon with existing conditions, and I did reckon with them, as any realistic politician would. I wanted to attempt, with the help of the factors present in the National Socialist Party in both countries, to come to a solution. But I see no contradiction, Sir David. You are saying, how could I achieve my aim by centralization. But if you would be good enough to look at the end of this report of mine, then you will find that I am proposing decentralization to Hitler. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE At the moment, you see, I was really asking you for an explanation of what you meant by the expression, "dynamic result of internal events in Germany." In short, I want you to realize, Defendant-I am not going to argue with you, because I ought not to-that the first point of Mr. Messersmith was a question of this action in southeastern Europe; the second point, that Austria was the first line, the first thing to be dealt with. Now, I wonder if you will be good enough to take the same bundle and turn over to Page 102 which is a report of your own dated 8 October 1935. I want you to deal with Mr. Messersmith's third suggestion against you, which you deny, that you were going to work in Austria by a weakening of the regime. Now I will just read the first sentence so that you will get the point into your mind. The report that I am dealing with is of 18 October 1935. You are dealing with the Austrian Government reshuffle, and you are saying-My Lord, this is a new document. It is GB-502, Document Number D-718. It is in 11a, Page 106. It begins: "Yesterday's Cabinet reshuffle resembles a bloodless insurrection led by Prince Starhemberg and the Heimwehr (Austrian Home Defense Organization). It is clear that Minister Fey heard early of his intended dismissal and that as early as yesterday afternoon he had the public buildings in Vienna occupied by the Viennese Heimwehr, which is loyal to him. The Government countered this measure by simultaneously reinforcing the occupation by Police forces." Now you go on to discuss the matter. That is at the beginning of the report.
VON PAPEN: Then, if you turn to the next page, at 102, and refer about halfway down the page, you say this: "In spite of the Vice Chancellor's clear victory and of the strenuous efforts of the Austrian press to make it appear plausible that the Cabinet reshuffle was carried out for reasons of internal consolidation, the feeling of moving towards a completely uncertain development prevails in the Austrian public, as also in the Heimwehr circles. "From our point of view the change of affairs is only too welcome. Every new weakening of the system is of advantage, even if it at first seems in fact to be directed against us. The fronts are starting to move and it will have to be our task to keep them moving." Now, Defendant, by that it is quite clear, is it not, that you meant that so long as there is political uncertainty or political trouble in the Austrian State, it does not matter whether the move may be an anti-German one, so long as the struggle grows with distrust spreading? That was an advantage to Germany, and that is what you want. That is what the lines mean, is it not?
VON PAPEN: No, not quite.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not quite?