dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: "Second car, Generals Flavigny, and Buisson. Third car, Generals Mesny and Vauthier. On 19 January, when the first car left at the appointed time, the other two did not, as both their order of departure and the times were changed. Second car, 7 a.m., General Mesny alone, for, according to information given to General Buisson through the German interpreter Rosenberg, an order had arrived from the High Command of the Armed Forces during the night, canceling General Vauthier's departure. Third car... Generals Flavigny and Buisson. The orders for the journey were draconian,, destination unknown; it was strictly forbidden to make any stop on the way; the door handles were taken off the cars; there was a German officer in each car with an automatic pistol on his knees and his finger on the trigger. "Upon our arrival in Colditz, (Oflag IV C) the reprisal camp, toward noon on 19 January, we noticed the absence of General Mesny, who had not arrived; we thought he had been sent to another camp, although his luggage was in the truck with that of the four other generals. On 20 January, in the morning, Commander Prawitt, head of Oflag IV C, came into the rooms of the French generals and made the following announcement: 'I inform you officially that General Mesny was shot yesterday in Dresden while trying to escape. He was buried in Dresden with military honors by a detachment of the Wehrmacht."' And then, if it please the Tribunal, General Buisson goes on with this comment, and it should be remembered that when he wrote this letter, he, of course, had no knowledge of the plot as we know it today. He said: "Two facts remain obscure in the sombre tragedy: 1. the transport of General Mesny alone (second car), the choice of General Vauthier; then the canceling of the order seemed very suspicious to us, given the attitude of the general, who was a volunteer for work in Germany, and whose transfer to a reprisal camp seemed inexplicable. 2.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: General Mesny, whose eldest son is in a camp for political deportees in Germany, said to me several times during the course of our conversations, 'If up to 1944 1 always tried to prepare my escape, I gave, up trying altogether afterward, even if I had every chance of succeeding. First of all, the end of the war is only a question of weeks; and moreover, especially, I should be much too afraid that my flight would cost my eldest son his life! An hour before his departure from K6nigstein on 19 January, General Mesny repeated those words to me again."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I wonder if Your Lordship will allow me to mention a point before Dr. Laternser commences. My Lord, as a result of the general evidence given before the Commission and the announcement that a number of summarizing affidavits will be tendered by certain organizations, the Prosecution have secured 11 affidavits of general scope made by State ministers, local counsellors and officials, and a publisher of a newspaper, dealing with the same matter as the summarized affidavits which the Defense are about to submit. They could, of course, be put in cross-examination to the witnesses for the SA who would be called, but I suggest for the consideration of the Tribunal that at this stage of the Trial it would probably be more convenient if they were simply offered after the counsel for the organization have dealt with their documents. If that course commended itself of the Tribunal, I should give German copies to the Counsel for the Defense at once so that they have an opportunity of considering them. Otherwise, of course, I should reserve them to be put in cross-examination and preserve the element of surprise. My Lord, I am in the hands of the Tribunal, but it seemed to me that that was the more convenient course than occupying more time in cross-examination at this stage when so many facts are known.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I did not understand the translation of Sir David's suggestion; may I have it repeated so that possibly the Defense Counsel can explain their views in regard to it.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you put it again?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have 11 affidavits which were taken from various gentlemen, including ex-State ministers of the Social Democratic Party and other non-Nazi parties, local officials, and one publisher of a newspaper. They are designed to deal generally with the matters which have been given before the Commission and which are going to be dealt with, as I understand, in the summarized affidavits, the affidavits summarizing the large quantity of affidavits. I suggested for the consideration of the Tribunal that, instead of taking up time in putting the contents of these affidavits to the witnesses for the SA, witness Juttner and others, who would probably deal with most of the points, I should offer them after the Defense Counsel have offered their documents, and in order that the Defense Counsel would not be prejudiced in any way, I suggest that, if that course were adopted, I should give them copies of these affidavits in German at once so that they would have an opportunity of seeing the contents. The object is to keep the documents together and also, I hope, to save time at this stage of the Trial in cross-examination. I hope, My Lord, that is clear.
THE PRESIDENT: That seems to the Tribunal to be a convenient course and to give the German Defense Counsel a longer period in which to study the affidavits.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will do that, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Herr Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall call as my first witness, Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch.
COLONEL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): My Lord, might I make a brief observation before the witness comes in?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes-Marshal, keep the witness out for a moment.
COLONEL TAYLOR: My Lord, I wanted to make a very brief observation concerning the scope of the testimony of the witness Von Brauchitsch. The other two witnesses that Dr. Laternser is calling-Field Marshals Von Manstein and Rundstedt-were called in the first instance by Dr. Laternser and have testified before the Commissioner on practically every question relating to the General Staff and High Command. That will appear from the summaries of their, evidence which, I think, are in the hands of the Court. The case of the witness Von Brauchitsch is somewhat different. The witness Von Brauchitsch signed two affidavits which the Prosecution offered and which are in the record before the Tribunal as Exhibits USA-532 and 535. Those affidavits relate exclusively to the question of the composition and organization of the General Staff and High Command group. Before the Commissioner, the witness Von Brauchitsch was cross-examined by Dr. Laternser only within the scope of those affidavits. No other matters were touched upon before the Commissioner. I now understand that Dr. Laternser proposes to examine the witness Von Brauchitsch before the Tribunal on a great variety, or on at least several other matters other than those covered in the affidavits. The Prosecution merely wishes to point out that to the extent that the witness Von Brauchitsch covers other matters other than those in the affidavits, he becomes a witness for the Defense and the Prosecution may possibly, though not necessarily, have to cross-examine him 'on those distinct matters. We also wish to respectfully suggest that, unless the witness Von Brauchitsch is going to talk about matters other than those that Manstein and Rundstedt have covered at length, it would be entirely fair and expeditious to confine the testimony of Von Brauchitsch to the matters 'of the affidavits, unless, as I say, it is proposed that Von Brauchitsch discuss matters which Rundstedt and Marlstein are not going to cover.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal wishes you to go on and examine Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. They hope that insofar as his evidence covers the same ground as the other two witnesses that you are proposing to call, you will be as short as possible.
DR. LATERNSER: I now call Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch as my first witness. [The witness Von Brauchitsch took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? Can you hear now?
WALTER VON BRAUCHITSCH: Walter von Brauchitsch.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR.LATERNSER: Field Marshal, what was the last position which you held?
VON- BRAUCHITSCH: Commander-in-Chief of the German Army.
DR.LATERNSER: During what period were you Commander-in-Chief of the German Army?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: 1938 to 1941.
DR.LATERNSER: On 4 February 1938 you succeeded Generaloberst Von Fritsch as Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. When you took over this position, did Fritsch inform you of the intentions which Hitler made known in-the conference on 5 November 1937?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No.
DR.LATERNSER: Did, by any chance, Hitler himself inform you of these intentions?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No.
DR.LATERNSER: Or did Generaloberst Beck, who was then Chief of the General Staff of the Army, inform you of them?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, he did not either.
DR. LATERNSER: In case such plans had existed, would it have been necessary to inform you of them on your taking over the post of Commander-in-Chief of the German Army?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: In my view, certainly.
DR. LATERNSER: When did you learn what was discussed at that conference of 5 November 1937?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: Only here in Nuremberg.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you, as Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, consulted by Hitler before the occupation of Austria?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No.
DR.LATERNSER: Did a plan exist for military action against Austria?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No; at least I do not know of one.
DR.LATERNSER: Did that action come as a surprise to you?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: It came as a complete surprise to me. I was not, as the witness Gisevius said, called away from the session of the court. I was not in Berlin at all, but away on official business. I heard of the orders which were given only after my return.
DR. LATERNSER: Did not doubts arise in your mind at that time?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: I was afraid of fraternal strife and I was also afraid that this action would result in further conflict.
DR.LATERNSER: Did not Papen meet you in the Reich Chancellery on 11 March 1938 and congratulate you after the order for the march into Austria had been withdrawn again in the course of that day? VON BRAT~CHITSCH: I heartily welcomed the withdrawal of the order to march in. I was in the Reich Chancellery, and it is quite possible that Papen congratulated me on that occasion.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you consulted on the political questions before the occupation of the Sudetenland?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, never.
DR. LATERNSER: Did a plan for military action exist in this case?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: For Austria?
DR. LATERNSER: No, for the occupation of the Sudetenland.
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, no plan existed in this case either.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you not, before the end of the Sudeten occupation, request Field Marshal Keitel to use all his influence to insure that the demarcation lines agreed on should under no circumstances be overstepped?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: That is correct.
DR. LATERNSER: The witness Gisevius testified here that after May 1938 Generaloberst Beck no longer handled the affairs of the Chief of the General Staff. Is that correct?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: That is an error. Generaloberst Beck handled the affairs of the Chief of the General Staff in their entirety until I September 1938.
DR. LATERNSER: . Generaloberst Beck had written a memorandum which has already been dealt with here, and which therefore I shall not again bring up in detail. In that memorandum he opposed the occupation of the Sudetenland, and warned against a war on two fronts. What did you do with that memorandum?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: I had very serious doubts about a policy supported by military measures. Generaloberst Beck had composed a memorandum in which he reached the conclusion, from a military point of view, that a war in the heart of Europe would lead to a world conflict. Since I believed these considerations to be absolutely fundamental, I took the opportunity of presenting them to the commanding generals, whom, for another reason for the discussion of internal Army affairs-I had ordered to a conference in Berlin. I asked everyone present for his -opinion, and we approved unanimously the ideas contained in the memorandum. This memorandum was then sent to Hitler. This resulted in a heated argument, in the course of which he told me, among other things, that-this was the essence of it-he alone knew quite well what he had to do.
DR. LATERNSER: When, approximately, was that?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: That was at the end of July, the second half of July 1938.
DR. LATERNSER: In what connection was Generaloberst Adam relieved of his command?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: A conference of officers of the General Staff with the Fuehrer, who had convened it, had taken place in August. During that conference General Adam's chief of staff General Adam was group commander in Wiesbaden at that time had expressed ideas similar to those contained in the memorandum, and in doing so had cited the authority of his commanding officer. That was the first incident leading to his release which, however, did not take place until October 1938, after a personal report by General Adam. The issue concerned an inspection tour of the West Wall, during which General Adam had expressed his views.
DR. LATERNSER: What military preparations did you order before the occupation of Czechoslovakia?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: I issued no orders at all. Hitler had ordered at that time that the troops in the near-by Army districts be kept in an increased state of alert.
DR.LATERNSER: Did a military plan exist for the occupation of Czechoslovakia?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: A plan did not exist. Only Hitler's orders were executed.
DR. LATERNSER: Then things gradually came to a head. Did you, during 1939, warn Hitler against a war? VON'BRAUCHITSCH: Yes, on account of the instructions given in connection with the Polish problem, I had very grave fears that against Hitler's and the German nation's will we might drift into a war. For that reason I again spoke of this memorandum in July 1939 during a talk with Hitler alone. I also said that he would be staking all the gains gotten by peaceful means. Hitler would not allow any argument, as was his habit, and merely replied that it was a matter for the political leaders which had nothing to do with me.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you not, at that time, have a discussion with Lutze, who was then the Chief of Staff of the SA?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: I talked to the Chief of Staff of the SA, and mentioned to him the fears- of which I have just spoken. Lutze shared my views. I had discussed these matters with him in the hope that he would find an occasion to express these views to Hitler.
DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, were you in touch with the Foreign Office during this period of tension?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, because the Foreign Office was not allowed to send any information to the High Command of the Army.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you in touch with other leading political organs?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No.
DR.LATERNSER: The conference on 23 May 1939 is of particular importance. Did you, at that time, gain the impression that war had been decided upon?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No. There are quite a number of circumstances and facts which gave me the clear impression that there was no intention of war. May I point out that since the autumn of 1938, negotiations with Poland had been in progress to clear up the pending questions. Hitler had spoken in the Reichstag about this problem. He had said that this was the only question which still required a solution. In previous speeches he had said that the rebuilding of the Wehrmacht was being carried out only to protect the homeland. At the end of December 1938, or during the first days of January 1939, the High Command of the Army received the following order from the High Command of the Wehrmacht: The Army will carry out the proposed and planned construction program by the year 1945. All preparations for any military action or any other operation were prohibited. At the meeting of 23 May 1939, Hitler said literally: "I should be an idiot if on account of Poland I were to drift into a war, like those incapable people of 1914." He ordered that rearmament should continue within the allotted time, that is, up to the years 1942 and 1943, and that order was directly connected with the one which I had received at the beginning of the year. Finally, he ordered that commissions were to be appointed to investigate all the other problems which had been touched upon. For me, all these facts were the clearest proof that in the case of Poland, too, it was merely a policy supported by military measures.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you raise objections of any kind during that conference on 23 May, of which you have just spoken?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: It was not a conference. It was an address of the Fuehrer to his subordinates. There was no discussion about it.
DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, I think you misunderstood me.
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No.
DR. LATERNSER: I was asking you whether during the conference of 23 May you voiced objections of any kind?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: Well, I gave my answer to that.
DR. LATERNSER: Was a plan of attack against Poland ever worked out before that time, before May 1939?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, never.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you, on 22 August 1939, still hope that war would be avoided?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: The reasons for that, which I have already mentioned, remained unchanged. An additional reason was that the trade agreement signed with the Soviet Union would, in my view, convince Poland that to settle differences by negotiations was the best way. Moreover, it was my opinion that the isolation of which Hitler had spoken would also result in Poland's readiness to negotiate. The decisive point was that Hitler expressly said the negotiations with Poland were continuing.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the purpose of that speech, that speech of 22 August, as you saw it?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: In my view, that conference was first of all the consequence of the objections which I had made to Hitler. Secondly it was, in my view, Hitler's intention to increase the confidence of the leaders under him in the policy which he was pursuing, and to convince them completely of the logic of his intentions.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session [The witness Von Brauchitsch resumed the stand.]
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Hess is absent.
DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, this morning we had reached the period of tension just before the outbreak of the war. On 25 August 1939 the first order for marching in was rescinded. During those days, did Hitler let you know that negotiations would continue?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: He personally gave me the order for the withdrawal of the order to march in, and on that occasion he told me that negotiations with Poland were still in progress.
DR. LATERNSER: In contrast to the previous occupations of foreign areas, all preparations before the Polish campaign had been drawn up for the actual event. Did this lead you to believe that actually there would be a war then?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, for the following reason: After the Sudeten crisis, Hitler had heard from the various military leaders that military preparations had not been taken seriously by them, for the preparations in their scope were not commensurate with the seriousness of the task at hand. Of course, it is self-evident that if in political negotiations one wishes to use the threat of military might, there must be the absolute impression of seriousness as far as the other party to the negotiations, as well as one's own people, is concerned. For this very reason Hitler in the case of Poland emphatically demanded that the preparations be considered very seriously. But there was a second point. On Hitler's order, a time schedule had been set up in which the various phases were set down exactly. Only on his express order could a new phase be started, and from this also I could see that he wanted to adjust the preparations to the political negotiations.
DR. LATERNSER: At the beginning of the Polish campaign did you know that, an agreement with the Soviet Union had been reached, setting up a line of demarcation?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, I had no idea of that at all.
DR. LATERNSER: After the conclusion of the war you had made provision for military administration in Poland. Why was this not effected?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: The High Command of the Army had made preparations and issued directives to the effect that the appeasement of the occupied areas was to be brought about as soon as possible. At the beginning of October, I learned about excesses against the Poles, carried out by personalities who were not under the jurisdiction of the Army. I reported these matters to the High Command of the Armed Forces and took the next occasion to see Hitler personally and report about them. I asked him to see to it that matters like these be prevented once and for all. Hitler did not take any notice of this report of mine. Frank originally was to be civil commissioner with the military commander-in-chief of Poland. In the second half of October he was charged with the entire administration. The Army relinquished its authority.
DR. LATERNSER: After the campaign against Poland, did not tension arise between the High Command of the Army and Hitler, and if so, what were the reasons?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: There were constant conflicts with the leadership of the Party, and they arose from the most varied causes. It would take me too far afield to enumerate all of them, but I should like to stress just two points. One of them concerned the chaplains which I wanted to have retained in the Army under all circumstances, and the second point applied to the influence which the leadership of the Party demanded in the settlement of complaints. The third point was the decree of Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler concerning the problem of marriage and women, which matter I answered in the form of a decree given to the Army.
DR. LATERNSER: Now I should Eke to put a few questions relating to the time before the Western offensive. Following the Polish campaign, did the High Command of the Army prepare for an offensive against the Western Powers?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: In no way had an offensive been planned. On the basis of the order which I just mentioned previously all preparations had been prohibited, and therefore no special measures had been taken in advance for the defense. All directives issued after the Polish campaign to the troops which were being sent to the West were purely of a defensive nature.
DR. I ATERNSER: Who, later on, made plans for attack?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: On 27 September 1939, Hitler announced his decision to attack in the West. He ordered the necessary preparations to be made, which would have to be concluded by 12 November.
DR. IATERNSER: What position did you and the High Command of the Army take with reference to this plan?