dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
course be preserved, and that she will have to contribute by her general attitude to a release of the tension. It is doubtful whether Poland will be willing to do so; for hitherto she had rejected the German proposals. The Fuehrer personally made these proposals to Beck on the occasion of his visit to Obersalzberg. They were very favorable for Poland. In exchange for the political return of Danzig to Germany, with complete preservation of Polish economic interests and the establishment of a connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany conceded a border guarantee, a 25-year friendship pact, and Polish participation in influence on Slovakia. At that time Beck acknowledged the proposal with the remark that he wanted to examine it. The sharp refusal was only the consequence of English intervention. Poland's aims can, moreover, be seen clearly in her press. All of East Prussia should be occupied, they want to advance to Berlin, etc. In the long run it is unbearable for a big power to tolerate such a hostile neighbor at a distance of only 150 km from its capital. The Fuehrer is therefore determined to use the opportunity of the next political provocation, in the form of an ultimatum, brutal mistreatment of Germans, an attempt to starve out Danzig, or something similar, to attack Poland within 48 hours and to solve the problem in this way. This would mean a considerable strengthening of the Axis, just as an Italian liquidation of Yugoslavia would mean a considerable increase of power for the Axis. Count Ciano asked when such an undertaking against Poland is to be expected, since Italy must of course prepare for all eventualities. The Fuehrer replied that under the prevailing circumstances and attack on Poland is to be expected at any moment. A telegram from Moscow and one from Tokyo were handed to the Fuehrer during this exchange of opinions. The conference was interrupted for a short time, and then Count Ciano was informed of the contents of the Moscow telegram. The Russians agreed to the sending of a German political mediator to Moscow. The Reich foreign minister added that the Russians were completely informed about Germany's intentions against Poland. He himself had informed the Russian charge
short time, and then Count Ciano was informed of the contents of the Moscow telegram. The Russians agreed to the sending of a German political mediator to Moscow. The Reich foreign minister added that the Russians were completely informed about Germany's intentions against Poland. He himself had informed the Russian charge d'affaires, by order of the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer remarked that in his opinion Russia would not be willing to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the western powers. Stalin's position is endangered as much by a victorious Russian army as by a defeated Russian army. Russia is, at the most, interested in enlarging her access to the Baltic a little. Germany has no objection to that. Besides, Russia would hardly take the part of Poland, whom she hates from the bottom of her heart. The sending of the English-French military mission to Moscow has only the purpose of averting the catastrophic state of political negotiations. After further discussion of the communique proposed by Count Ciano, the Fuehrer said that he wanted to think over for a day, this proposal as well as Count Ciano's explanation of the general situation, and he therefore suggested that the discussion be resumed the next day. Salzburg 12 August 1939 signed Schmidt. Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946 Previous Document Volume IV Menu
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Document No. 1874-PS
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Notes on the Conference Between General Field Marshal GOERING and the DUCE in the Presence of Count CIANO
15 April 1939
[Page 4, par. 2]
However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any case, how dangerous this country could have been, even after Munich, in the event of a serious conflict. Because of Germany's action the situation of both axis countries was ameliorated, among other reasons because of the economic possibilities which result from the transfer to Germany of the great production capacity (armament potential) of Czechoslovakia. That contributes toward a considerable strengthening of the axis against the Western powers. Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a single division for protection against that country in case of a bigger conflict. This, too, is an advantage by which both axis countries will, in the last analysis, benefit.
[Page 5, par. 2]
the action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be viewed as an advantage for the axis in case Poland should finally join the enemies of the axis powers. Germany could then attack this country from 2 flanks and would be within only 25 minutes flying distance from the new Polish industrial center which had been moved further into the interior of the country, nearer to the other Polish industrial districts, because of its proximity to the border. Now by the turn of events it is located again in the proximity of the border.
[Page 6, par. 2]
Furthermore the Fieldmarshal happened to talk about the date at which Germany would be prepared best for a greater test of strength. In this connection he pointed out that Germany at the moment was comparatively weak on the sea because both the new battleships which had been launched recently would be ready for commissioning only next year and two additional battleships would be launched only next year
best for a greater test of strength. In this connection he pointed out that Germany at the moment was comparatively weak on the sea because both the new battleships which had been launched recently would be ready for commissioning only next year and two additional battleships would be launched only next year. In the airforce also, regrouping and adaptation of a new bomber type "JU 88", the production of which had yet to begin, was taking place. This new German bomber had such a range that it would be possible to attack not only England herself, but moreover that would push forward into a western direction, in order to bomb the ships which come from the Atlantic to England. Of course, Germany was ready for action, if suddenly some conflict should come up. But if one was considering at what period of time the armament situation was most favorable, both the facts mentioned above-the insufficient armament at sea and the reconversion of the airforce to the new type of bomber-should not be disregarded. Besides in the fall already a monthly production of 280 planes of the "JU 88" and at the end of the year of 350 planes, could be counted upon. On the basis of these calculations he came to the conclusion that in 9 months or one year the situation for the axis, from a military point of view, would be more favorable. On the other hand it was true that the rearmament in England and France had not made very much progress. In many cases, the factories for the production of war material were only in a state of construction. England would most likely not be able to show any reresults worth mentioning before 1942 for her new beginning high pressure rearmament in the air.
Furthermore, the Fuehrer considered it almost out of the question that England and France would not stand together. According to the German point of view, both countries would in any conflict eventually support each other to the utmost
mentioning before 1942 for her new beginning high pressure rearmament in the air. Furthermore, the Fuehrer considered it almost out of the question that England and France would not stand together. According to the German point of view, both countries would in any conflict eventually support each other to the utmost. Only if England should execute a complete reversal of her policy, and the costs and risks of her present political line should become too high, she would perhaps adapt herself to confining her efforts to the preservation of the empire and give the authoritarian countries a free hand for the securing of their vital necessities. At the present time England had a weak government which had yielded to the pressure of the leftist circles. England had deviated from her old line in a way that it offers assistance only on the basis of her own judgment of the situation in question from case to case and she had, in completely turning away from her traditional policy of giving support from time to time only on the basis of her own judgment of the situation at the time, now obliged herself in advance to render support, and that under conditions which could be determined by the other partner. It was another question, of course, how England could fulfill her guarantee obligation in fact. How was she going to help Poland or Rumania, for instance? She did not have the possibility of sending troops and could actually fulfill her obligations only by setting ablaze a general war.
All in all, however, it had to be stressed, that the situation of the axis was very strong and that it could defeat all possible opponents in a general conflict.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Report RAM 19/41
REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS [RAM] AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941.
The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the latter's impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on Singapore, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM) however believed, that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan had of course even less reason to be afraid than ever, if it wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible-fears of Russia.
He could not know of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain, whether or not Stalin would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to Matsuoka in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible
his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to Matsuoka in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such, that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible.
Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears, expressed by the Japanese, of possible attacks by submarines, based on the Philippines and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter had stated, that the British Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the U.S. submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother about them at all.
Matsuoka replied immediately, that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view, that in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However it was afraid, that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.
The RAM replied, that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan
with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan. The RAM replied, that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan. For while on one hand he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the American President, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing with which to offset such a loss.
In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the East. Therefore it might be possible, that his attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.
In this connection, Matsuoka stated, that his tactics were based on the certain assumption, that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. ("Nothing succeeds like success," the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: "You open fire, then the nation will be united". The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken
("Nothing succeeds like success," the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: "You open fire, then the nation will be united". The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all, as an oriental, he believed in the fate, which would come, whether you wanted it or not.
Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.
The RAM replied, that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer-who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time-could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at their disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately.
Matsuoka remarked, that Japan was less concerned with the British fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications.
The RAM replied, that here too, the Fuehrer had developed new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, which he could make available to the Japanese.
Matsuoka replied in this connection, that some of the younger expert Japanese naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the opinion, that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious foreign minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed, he could stave off any danger which threatened from America, for six months
expert Japanese naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the opinion, that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious foreign minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed, he could stave off any danger which threatened from America, for six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year, the situation with America would become extremely critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.
If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on this area, the oilfields would be set afire. They could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.
The RAM added, that Japan would gain decisive influence over the Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore.
Berlin, the 31st of March 1941.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Document No. 1881-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1881-PS
Notes Fueh 20/41
NOTES
regarding the discussion between the FUEHRER and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and of the Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin on the 4th of April 1941.
Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavors for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal Caspari.
Furthermore he had endeavored to convince the Pope, that the United States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in Europe and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America or its President were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or wrong, one had to state the fact that they prolonged the war in Europe and in China. In regard to China, he tried to convince the Pope that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire Far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism.
The Fuehrer interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with Bolshevism.
he tried to convince the Pope that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire Far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism. The Fuehrer interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with Bolshevism.
Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the Fuehrer should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. he (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. The Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason, the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.
To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities should place those developments and inventions concerning navy and army which were needed by the Japanese at their disposal.
submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan. To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities should place those developments and inventions concerning navy and army which were needed by the Japanese at their disposal.
The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the German soldiers naturally rank high above the American.
In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore, Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joint action, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.