dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
follows: 'For the first time in my life, I have changed my mind. You must sign the demands that I have made upon you, then report them to the Federal President, Miklas, and within three days from now Austria must fulfill the Agreement, otherwise things will take their natural course'. I then agreed to sign the demands and, while waiting in Hitler's private room, he, Hitler, in an entirely changed mood, said to Franz von Papen, who was also present, 'Herr von Papen, through your assistance I was appointed Chancellor of Germany and thus the Reich was saved from the abyss of communism. I will never forget that'. Papen replied: 'Ja, wohl, Mein Fuehrer'. "I furthermore say and affirm that I, in the presence of Ribbentrop, Guido Schmidt, von Papen, and Hitler, signed the demands, and retained a copy for the Austrian Government. "I further state and affirm that, on the way back to Vienna from Berchtesgaden, Franz von Papen accompanied me and my party. Between the Berghof and Berchtesgaden, von Papen informed me as follows: 'Now, you have your own impression of how excited the Fuehrer can get, but that happens very seldom, and I am convinced that the next time you meet him, you will have an amicable conversation with him.'" (2995-PS) The pressure put on Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden is also disclosed in von Papen's notes on his last meeting with Schuschnigg, on 26 February 1938, the last two paragraphs of which read: "I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion that he had acted under 'brutal pressure' in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been able to state that he had always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied he had actually been under considerable moral pressure, he could not deny that. he had made notes on the talk which bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered: 'To be honest, no!' It appears to me of importance to record this statement." (1544-PS) For diplomatic purposes von Papen, who had been at Berchtesgaden, kept up the pretense that there had
without the pressure he would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered: 'To be honest, no!' It appears to me of importance to record this statement." (1544-PS) For diplomatic purposes von Papen, who had been at Berchtesgaden, kept up the pretense that there had been no pressure. But General Jodl, writing the account of current events for his diary, was more candid. This hand-written diary discloses not only the pressure at Berchtesgaden but also the fact that for some days thereafter, General Keitel and Admiral Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure, in order to coerce President Miklas into ratifying the agreement. And so the Nazi conspirators kept up the military pressure, with threats of invasion, for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference, in order to produce the desired effect on Miklas. (1780-PS) The following entries, for Feb. 11-Feb. 14 were made in Jodl's diary: "11 February: "In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol. "13 February: "In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval. "14 February: "At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates the different measures. "The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations." (1780-PS) The proposals for deceptive maneuvers mentioned by Jodl were signed by Keitel. Underneath his signature appeared a pencilled note that the Fuehrer approved the proposals. Among the rumors which Keitel proposed for the intimidation of Austria were the following: "1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments. "2. Spread false, but quite credible
signature appeared a pencilled note that the Fuehrer approved the proposals. Among the rumors which Keitel proposed for the intimidation of Austria were the following: "1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments. "2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria. "a. Through V-men (V-Maenner) in Austria, "b. through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier, "c. through travelling agents. "3. Such news could be: "a. Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the Sector of the VII A.K. "b. (Rolling Stock) is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and Regensburg. "c. Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna has been called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter of fact, this is the case). "d. The Police Stations located at the frontier of Austria, have called up reinforcements. "e. Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade (Gebirgsbrigade) in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and Berchtesgaden." (1775-PS) The pattern of intimidation and rumor was effective, for in due course, as is shown in the communiqués already referred to, President Miklas ratified the Berchtesgaden agreement, which foreshadowed a National Socialist Austria. E. Events Culminating in the German Invasion on 12 March 1938. (1) The Plebiscite. The day after his appointment as Minister of the Interior, Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. (2484-PS) On 9 March 1938, three weeks after Seyss-Inquart had been put in charge of the police, Schuschnigg announced that he would hold a plebiscite throughout Austria on the following Sunday, 13 March 1938. The question was: "Are you for an independent and social, a Christian, German and united Austria?" A "yes" answer to this question was clearly compatible with the agreement made by the German Government on 11 July 1936, and carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Moreover, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a plebiscite on the question of Anschluss. But the Nazis apparently appreciated the likelihood of a strong "yes" vote on the question put by Schuschnigg, and they could not
July 1936, and carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Moreover, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a plebiscite on the question of Anschluss. But the Nazis apparently appreciated the likelihood of a strong "yes" vote on the question put by Schuschnigg, and they could not tolerate the possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg Government. They took this occasion to overturn the Austrian Government. Although the Plebiscite was not announced until the evening of 9 March, the Nazi Organization received word about it earlier in the day. It was determined by the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler what to do about the situation, and that they would prepare a letter of protest against the Plebiscite from Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg, and that pending Hitler's approval, Seyss-Inquart would pretend to negotiate with Schuschnigg about details of the plebiscite. In the words of Gauleiter Rainer's report to Reichscommissioner Buerckel: "The Landesleitung received word about the planned plebiscite through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a. m. At the session which was called immediately after wards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the Landesleitung from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a. m. There it was decided that first, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938." (812-PS) (2)
negotiate with the government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938." (812-PS) (2) Germany's Preparation for the Use of Force. When news of the Plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous amount of activity. Hitler was determined not to tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers and ordered preparation for the march into Austria. He made diplomatic preparations by explaining in a letter to Mussolini the reasons why he was going to march into Austria. In the absence of von Ribbentrop, who was temporarily detained in London, von Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again. The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl's diary give a vivid account of the activity in Berlin. The entry for the 10th of March 1938 reads: "By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13, March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation. "Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, march 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District leader (Gauleiter) Buerckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft. "Prepare case Otto. "1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office. "Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which force the Fuehrer to take action. "1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3) 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army." (1780-PS) In a directive of the Supreme High
the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which force the Fuehrer to take action. "1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3) 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army." (1780-PS) In a directive of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, dated 11 March 1938 and initialed by Jodl and Keitel, Hitler stated his mixed political and military intentions: "1. If these measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population. "4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on the 12th of March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. "I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier, and to decide the actual moment for invasion. "5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms." (C-102) An implementing directive of 11 March 1938 issued by Jodl provided further: "If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in Austria, they are to be regarded as hostile. "The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends especially as Mussolini has declared himself uninterested in the solution of the Austrian Question". (C-103) The military preparations for invasion were complete. (3) The Events of 11 March in Austria. The events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available in three separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in some minor details, they afford each other almost complete corroboration with regard to the way in which the German Government deprived Austria of its sovereignty. The first account is contained in a third affidavit executed by Schuschnigg (2996-PS). Schuschnigg first states that he had been discussing the plebiscite with Seyss-Inquart, and that
each other almost complete corroboration with regard to the way in which the German Government deprived Austria of its sovereignty. The first account is contained in a third affidavit executed by Schuschnigg (2996-PS). Schuschnigg first states that he had been discussing the plebiscite with Seyss-Inquart, and that Seyss-Inquart had made some procedural objections but in general indicated his general willingness to support the plebiscite. Schuschnigg went to bed on March 10 thinking the plebiscite would be a success. But on the morning of March 11 he was told that traffic from Germany had stopped, and that German Army forces were moving to the border. After 10 a. m. Seyss-Inquart came to Schuschnigg's office with Glaise-Horstenau. Glaise-horstenau had just come from Berlin and reported that Hitler was in a rage. (2996-PS) Schuschnigg's affidavit then relates the three ultimatums presented by the German Government: "Seyss-Inquart was then and there called to the telephone and, upon his return, read to me from a scrap of paper which he held in his hand, the contents of a telephone call which he alleged was just then received by him from Goering in Berlin. The contents as he read it to me was as follows: 'The Chancellor must revoke the proposed plebiscite within the time of one hour, and after three or four weeks, Austria must oblige herself to carry out a plebiscite concerning the Anschluss according to the SAAR status, otherwise the German Army is ordered to pass the Austrian frontier'. "I further state and say that after informing the Federal President of this demand made on Austria by Germany, we decided to recall the Plebiscite, and thereupon I informed Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau of our intentions. "Seyss-Inquart said that he would go to the telephone and inform Goering in Berlin concerning the decision of the Austrian Government, at that time made. In a few minutes, he, Seyss-Inquart, returned to my office, and informed me further, as follows: 'I have had a telephone conversation with Goering, and Goering has ordered me to inform the Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, as follows: '"The situation can only be saved for Austria when Schuschnigg resigns as the Chancellor of Austria
returned to my office, and informed me further, as follows: 'I have had a telephone conversation with Goering, and Goering has ordered me to inform the Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, as follows: '"The situation can only be saved for Austria when Schuschnigg resigns as the Chancellor of Austria within two hours and Seyss-Inquart is appointed as the new Chief of the Austrian Government; if Seyss-Inquart does not inform me, Goering, within two hours, I, Goering, will suppose that you are hindered from doing so'". "I then reported to the Federal President the new developments, and, after some conversation with him and other members of the Government, I decided to resign. The Federal President reluctantly accepted my resignation at 3:30 p. m. on the afternoon of the 11th of March 1938. He expressed himself unwilling to appoint Seyss-Inquart as the Federal Chancellor - he therefore asked me to continue my duties as caretaker Chancellor until he had decided who would succeed me as Federal Chancellor. I accepted and remained as 'caretaker Chancellor' from 3:30 p. m., 11 March 1938 until about 11:30 p. m. the same night, when Seyss-Inquart was appointed to the position of Federal Chancellor. "I further state and say that at about 3:30 p. m. on the afternoon of 11 March 1938, the Foreign Office of the Austrian Government contacted the Embassy of Germany in Vienna, to ascertain if the demands that had been then and there made by Goering on Austria were the official demands of the German Government. The Military Attaché of Germany in Vienna, one Lieutenant General Muff, came before the Austrian Federal President, and repeated the contents of the German ultimatums that had previously been delivered to us by Seyss-Inquart. "I furthermore state and say, that the Federal President, at about 7:30 or 8:00 o'clock p. m. on the night of 11 March 1938 ordered me, as caretaker Chancellor, to broadcast the events of the day and to protest against the demands made on Austria during that day by Germany. Furthermore, to inform the world that Austria had been forced to give in to those demands of Germany through superior force * * *." (2996-PS) The report from Gauleiter Rainer to
as caretaker Chancellor, to broadcast the events of the day and to protest against the demands made on Austria during that day by Germany. Furthermore, to inform the world that Austria had been forced to give in to those demands of Germany through superior force * * *." (2996-PS) The report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reichscommissioner Buerckel also discusses the events of March 11. In general, Rainer's report corroborates Schuschnigg's affidavit. (812-PS) Another document recalls vividly the events of 11 March 1938. This document, which was found in a building of the courtyard of the German Air Ministry, is a binder containing typed transcripts of some 27 telephone conversations, held in Goering's office in the Air Ministry on 11 March 1938 and up to 14 March 1938. Most of the conversations were conducted by Goering, although at least one was held by Hitler (2949-PS). (For purposes of convenience these telephone calls are marked with an identifying letter, running from A through Z and then beginning again with AA). The first group of conversations took place between Field Marshal Goering, who was identified as F., and Seyss-Inquart, who was identified as S. The transcript is in part in the language of these two persons and is in part a summary of the actual conversations. At 2:45 p. m. the following conversation occurred: "F: How do you do, doctor. My brother-in-law, is he with you? "S: No. "Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn: "F: How are things with you? Have you resigned, or do you have any news? "S. The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for Sunday, and therefore he has put S. and the other gentleman in a difficult situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being ordered, among others curfew at 8 p. m. "F: Replied that in his opinion the measures taken by chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment he could not commit himself officially. F. will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections, he could see a postponement only, not a change for the present situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.
this moment he could not commit himself officially. F. will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections, he could see a postponement only, not a change for the present situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement. "Thereupon a conversation took place between F. and the Fuehrer. Afterwards F. phoned again S. This conversation was held at 15:05. "F: Told S. that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy any more the confidence of our government because he had broken the Berchtesgaden agreement, and therefore further confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently, the National Minister, S. and the others, are being requested to immediately hand in their resignation to the Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. F. added that if after a period of one hour no report had come through the assumption would be made that S. would no more be in the position to phone. That would mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. S. was then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon. As a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal President for S. to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnigg's resignation." (2949-PS, Part A) Thus Goering told Seyss-Inquart that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the election. And twenty minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state that Schuschnigg must resign. When informed at about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned, he pointed out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head of the Cabinet. An hour later Goering phoned Dombrowski at the German Embassy in Vienna. He was concerned that the Nazi Party and all its formations should be legalized promptly: "Goering: Now to go on. The Party has definitely been legalized? "Dombrowski: But that is * * * it isn't necessary to even discuss that. "Goering: With all of its organizations. "Dombrowski: With all of its organizations within this country. "Goering: In uniform? "Dombrowski: In uniform. "Goering: Good. "Dombrowski: calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have already