dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, there are a few interrogatories missing, some of which have already arrived and are being translated. I request that at a later occasion, perhaps after the case against Defendant Schirach, I be permitted to read these interrogatories. And then, Mr. President, I should like to say something of a general nature. I have already read extracts from various documents and requested that all of them be admitted as evidence and I should like to repeat this request for all these documents. With that I shall have finished my case for Funk. Mr. President, may I make another request of you at this moment, namely, that during the next few days the Defendant Von Schirach be excused from being present at the sessions in Court so that he can prepare his case. In his absence I shall look after his interests or else, when I am not here, my colleague Dr. Nelte will. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Who is appearing for the Defendant Schirach?
DR. SAUTER: I am; and when I cannot be present, then Dr. Belle will. One of us will always be in Court and look after his interests.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well, Dr. Sauter. Now the Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes. [A recess was taken.7
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, there was a document which you didn't refer to. I think it was an affidavit of a witness called Kallus. Were you offering that in evidence? It was an interrogatory of Heinz Karl Kallus.
DR. SAUTER: The Kallus interrogatory, Mr. President, has already arrived and at the moment it is in the process of translation' I shall submit it as soon as the translation has been received by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have got a translation into English.
DR. SAUTER: I believe, Mr. President, that what you have is an affidavit by Kallus, and in addition there is a Kallus interrogatory, which is in process of translation and which I shall submit later.
THE PRESIDENT: This takes the form of an interrogatory, questions and answers, what I have in my hand. I am only asking whether you want to offer that.
DR. SAUTER: Yes, I offer that in evidence. I request that judicial notice be taken of it. The; PRESIDENT: Very well; you gave it a number then, did you? What number will it be?
DR.SAUTER: Exhibit Number 5, if you please.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR.SAUTER: Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Kranzbuehler.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for Defendant Doenitz): Mr. President, first I should like to ask the permission to have a secretary, in addition to my assistant, in the courtroom, in order to facilitate the submission of documents. With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall first submit a number of documents; and I shall use the document book of the Prosecution and the document books which I have submitted. These document books consist of four volumes. The table of contents is in Volume I and in Volume III. In the first document of the document book of the Prosecution, Exhibit USA-12 (Document Number 2887-PS), I should like to correct an error in translation which may be of significance. It says there, in the German text, under "1939," "Konteradmiral, Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote," and that in the English text has been translated by "Commander-in-Chief." The correct translation should be "Flag Officer of Submarines." That point is of importance in regard to the fact that Admiral Doenitz, until his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in 1943, was not a member of the group which the Prosecution terms criminal. I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal back to Exhibit GB-190 (Document Number D-652 (a-b) ). That is a sea chart which the Prosecution has submitter This chart shows the position of the German submarines to the west of England on 3 September 1939, and the Prosecution uses that chart as evidence for the question of aggressive war. The Prosecution says, rightly, that these U-boats must have left their home bases at an earlier date. The first document, which I offer as Doenitz-1, is to prove, first, that this belongs in the category of measures resorted to in times of crisis such as were taken by every nation in Europe at this time, and that they were in no way preparatory measures for an aggressive war against England, because such a war was not planned. I shall read from this document-document book, Page 1.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for Defendant Doenitz): It is an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff of September 1939, and I read the entry of 15 August: "Prepared (for Case White) the following measures:"
THE PRESIDENT: What page?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Page 1 of the document book, Volume I.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: "15. 8. Prepared (for Case White) the following measures: "On 15. 8. Spee and all Atlantic submarines ready to sail. "On 22. 8. Transport Westerwald ready to sail. "On 25. 8. Deutschland ready to sail." And then we find the list of these ships: "21. 8. Report B-service about emergency measures of French fleet. "23. 8. Report B-service: Continuation of French emergency measures of fleet to 3rd grade. English and French blockade measures off ports. "25. 8. B-service reports: German and Italian steamers are being watched and reported by France." And then the instructions: "31. 8. Arrival Order I of OKW for conduct of war: Forcible solution in the East, attack against Poland 1 September, 0445 hours. In the West responsibility for starting hostilities unequivocally to be left to England and France. Strictly respect neutrality of Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland. The western border not to be crossed. At sea no hostile actions or such that could be interpreted as hostile. Air Force only in defense. "In case of opening of hostilities by Western Popovers: Defense only, economical use of forces. Reserve start of aggressive operations. The army to hold the 'Westwall.' Naval economic war concentrated against England. To augment effect probable declaration of zones of danger. Prepare these and submit them. The Baltic to be safeguarded against enemy invasion." So far this document. With the next document, Doenitz-2, I should like to prove that the British submarines, too, were active before the start of the war and appeared in the Bay of Helgoland at the very beginning of the war. It is on Page 2 of the document book. I probably need only point out that as early as 1 September electric motor noises were heard in the Bay of Helgoland and that on 4 September several reports arrived concerning English submarines sighted in the Bay of Helgoland. I come now to the document with reference to which Admiral Doenitz is accused of participating in the planning of the attack against Norway. That is Exhibit GB-83 (Document Number C-5).
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The Prosecution has submitted it as proof of the fact that Admiral Doenitz played a decisive part in the occupation of Norway. I shall refer to this document in more detail when examining the witness. I merely want to establish certain dates now. On the document -and I am about to submit the original to the Tribunal-there is a stamp which establishes when the document was received at the High Command. This stamp shows the date 11 October 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking of GB-837
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. And I refer now to Exhibit GB-81 (Document Number C-66), Page 6 of my document book. According to this the decisive report by Grossadmiral Raeder to the Fuehrer had already been made on 10 October 1939, that is, a day before GB-83 was received at the High Command. With the next document I should like to prove that considerations as to bases had nothing to do with the question of an aggressive war, as far as the Flag Officer of Submarines, Admiral Doenitz, was concerned. I am submitting Documents Doenitz-3 and Doenitz-4. They are on Page 3 and 5 of the Document Book. Doenitz-3 is a war diary of the Flag Officer of Submarines of 3 November 1939, and I read from the second paragraph, the 10th line from the top: "At the same time Naval Operations Staff reports that there are possibilities for the establishment of a 'Base North' which seem to be very promising. In my opinion the immediate introduction of all possible steps in order to arrive at a clear judgment of the existing possibilities is of the greatest importance." And then there follows a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of such a base, which is absolutely identical with the considerations mentioned in GB-83. It is a question of Murmansk in connection with Base North, as can be seen from Document Doenitz-4; and it is known that these considerations were in full accord with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, I should like to show that the question of bases continuously comes up in enemy navies without reference to...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, you are going a little bit fast over these documents and I am not quite sure that I am quite following what use you are making of them. This base mentioned in the report is Murmansk?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: Yes; Murmansk. And I want to use it as proof, Mr. President, that the question of bases has nothing to do with the-question of whether one wants to wage aggressive war with the country in which these bases are situated. The considerations as to Murmansk were taken in full accord with the Soviet Union, and in the same manner Admiral Doenitz took the question of Norwegian bases into consideration. That is the subject of my proof.
THE PRESIDENT: But the fact that Murmansk was suggested as a base, to be taken with the consent of the Soviet Union-if it was the case-doesn't have any relevance, does it, to taking a base in Norway without the consent of Norway.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, the relevancy seems to me to exist in the fact that Admiral Doenitz, as Commander of U-boats, in both cases received merely the order to state his opinion about bases in a certain country but that in the last analysis he had as little to say in the case of Narvik and Trondheim as in the case of Murmansk.
COLONELY.V.POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U. S. S. R.): In Document Number 3, the one just being referred to by the defense counsel for the Defendant Doenitz, mention is definitely made of the northern bases; but nothing is said in this document of any plans of the Soviet Union. And to discuss, here and now, some plan or other of the Soviet Union is in my opinion quite out of order, since there are no plans of the Soviet Union in connection with the northern bases, and there never have been.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: If the representative of the Soviet Union has any doubts that these bases were considered in full accord with the Soviet Union, then I shall prove that by calling a witness. THE PRESIDENT. Anyhow, the document doesn't say anything about it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: The document says nothing about it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal doesn't think you ought to make statements of that sort without any evidence; and at the moment you are dealing with a document which doesn't contain any evidence of the fact.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBOHLER: May I perhaps read Document Number D5nitz - ?
THE PRESIDENT: It is Doenitz-3, isn't it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBOHLER: I have already come to Doenitz-4. I had read from Doenitz-3. I shall now read from Doenitz-4 the entries for 17 April 1939: "Commander of U-boats receives instructions from Naval Operations Staff to try out Base North. Naval Operations Staff considers the trying out of the base by U-36 due to sail within the next days, highly desirable. Supply goods for tanker Phoenizia in Murmansk going with fishing steamer to Murmansk on 22 November." It seems to me that this entry very clearly shows that that could have happened only in accord with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, I want to show that considerations as to bases...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal thinks you oughtn't to make these observations on these documents which really don't support what you are saying. Document Number 3, for instance, doesn't bear any such interpretation, because it refers to attacks which it was suggested should be made against ships coming from Russian ports, in Paragraph 2. And equally the other document you referred to, Doenitz-4, on Page 5, doesn't bear the interpretation which you are putting upon it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I am afraid that the contents of both documents have been presented too quickly by me. For anyone who is familiar with such war diaries, many things are self-evident which otherwise are not so easy to understand. Document Doenitz-3 states in that part which I have read that possibilities for the establishment of a Base North exist. These possibilities can be only political possibilities, because one can establish a base in a foreign country only if that country agrees. Document Doenitz-4 shows that the base in question is Murmansk and that this base is being tried out with a supply ship, a fishing steamer, and a U-boat. That convincingly shows in my opinion...
THE PRESIDENT: The objection the Tribunal was raising was to the statement by you that the Soviet Union had agreed, and these documents do not bear out any such statement.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I am of the opinion that in Document Doenitz-4 that can clearly be seen. It is not possible. . .
COL. POKROVSKY: I definitely protest against the fact that, apart from what has been stated in the documents, certain unfounded conjectures or assertions have been made with a view to interpreting the documents in the manner in which Dr. Kranzbuehler has endeavored to interpret them from the initial stages of his defense. I do not belong to the category of fortune tellers and palmists. I cannot conjecture what hypothetical conclusions may be drawn from one or another of the documents. I am a lawyer and I am accustomed to operate with documents such as they appear, and I am accustomed to operate with the contents of a document such as they are expressed. I consider that the Tribunal has quite correctly expressed to the defense counsel the absolute impossibility of drawing the conclusions he is attempting to reach, and I would ask that counsel for the defense be reminded of his duty to limit himself exclusively to such interpretations as may be deduced from the document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): Your Honor, I would be grateful if the Tribunal would consider a general point of procedure. We have a number of objections to a considerable number of Dr. Kranzbuehler's documents. I have got out a short list grouping, as far as is possible, our objections, which I can hand to the Tribunal and, of course, to Dr. Kranzbuehler, now. It is a matter for consideration by the Tribunal whether it would be useful to see that list before the Tribunal adjourns tonight, and maybe here tender certain observations of Dr. Kranzbuehler upon them. Then the Tribunal might be able to give a decision with regard to certain of the documents before sitting again tomorrow and thereby save some time. I suggest that to the Tribunal for their consideration as perhaps the most profitable procedure under the circumstances.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you suggesting that at a certain point of time we should adjourn for the consideration of your list and then hear Dr. Kranzbuehler on it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what you suggest?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, Sir. I was going to explain my list, put my list to the Tribunal, and explain it; and then the Tribunal could hear Dr. Kranzbuehler upon it and adjourn at whatever time it is suitable.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: May I make a statement in that regard, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBOHLER: I do not agree with such a proceeding, Mr. President. Before this Tribunal I have said very little as defense counsel so far; but I am of the opinion that it is my turn now and that I have to be granted permission to submit my documents in that order in which I plan to and which I consider correct for my defense. I ask the Tribunal just to imagine what would have happened if, before the presentation of their case by the Prosecution, I had said that I should like to speak about the relevancy of the documents of the Prosecution. I believe that this comparison shows that I should not have thought of proceeding in this way. I shall try, before submitting my documents, to explain their relevancy to a greater extent than I have thought necessary until now. But I ask the Tribunal to grant that I present my case now and to limit the Prosecution to making their suggestions when I submit my documents individually.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The inconvenience of that course, My Lord, is that I shall then be interrupting Dr. Kranzbuehler every two or three documents and making a specific objection to an individual document, which will take a great deal of time. I thought it would be more convenient if I indicated to the Tribunal my objections to the documents in the usual way by classes rather than individually. I put it to the Tribunal to rule on whatever method they think would be most convenient for them. The last thing I want is to interfere with Dr. Kranzbuehler's presentation; but, on the other hand, the method that he suggests will mean individual objections, because, of course, an objection is useless if it is put in after Dr. Kranzbuehler has developed the document. Or, if it is not useless, it is at any rate of very much less weight.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, supposing that Sir David presents his objections to the documents now, whether in groups or in whatever way he likes, and you then answer him individually upon each document, pointing out the relevance in your view of each document; how does it harm you? The Tribunal will then consider your arguments and will rule upon them, and then you will know what documents the Tribunal has ruled out, and you can then refer to any of the other documents in any way you please. The only object of it and the only effect of it is to prevent the Prosecution's having to get up and interrupt, put on the earphones, and take the time for an individual objection to each document to which they wish to object as it turns up. I cannot see that it can interfere with you in the least. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBt1HLER: Mr. President, I have no objection to the Prosecution's stating their objections now. I merely wish to avoid my having to reply to each individual objection. If I am permitted to state my views when each individual document comes up, then I have no objection to the Prosecution's stating their objections now to individual documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal would like you to state now your objections to these documents. They will then allow Dr. Kranzbuehler to proceed with his discussion of the documents, answering your argument as to the admissibility of each document that you object to when he comes to it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please. Will Your Lordship just allow me a moment to get my papers? I am afraid I have only the Prosecution's objections in English, but it may help those of the Tribunal who do not understand English to have the numbers, at any rate, in front of them. My Lord, the first group are documents which the Prosecution submits have no probative value. These are D-53. My Lord, the 'ID" in this case stands for Doenitz Document Book 53, Page 99; and D-49, Pages 130 and 131; D-51 and D-69. My Lord, the first of these, D-53, is a letter from a prisoner-of war camp, purporting to be signed by 67 U-boat commanders and in purely general terms. The Prosecution submits that that is not helpful, either from its form or from its material. My Lord, D-49, which is at Pages 130 to 131, is again in entirely general terms and contains no indication of the moral or legal basis for the opinion expressed. D-51 and D-69 are both newspaper reports.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Sir David. 130? I have not got a Page 131. Is it an affidavit, or was it called an affidavit?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: "On the basis of the documents of the Navy Court archives at..." Oh yes, I think the Document Book has got a bit out of order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, maybe so.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a sworn affidavit by somebody or other? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE;: Yes, My Lord. 130 comes immediately before.
THE PRESIDENT: I have got it now, yes. 131 comes somewhere before 130.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is it, My Lord. It is an affidavit by a former fleet judge, and Your Lordship sees that the description which the Prosecution gives of it as being in entirely general terms is, I submit, justified by the wording of the document, and it is difficult to see the basis which the learned opponent seems to profess for his statements. My Lord, D-51, Page 134, is an extract from the Volkischer Beobachter of March 1945, and the Prosecution submits that the topic on which it is is irrelevant to the matters developed against the Defendant Doenitz. Number 69 is another newspaper report from the same paper of 14 November 1939, giving a list of armed British and French passenger ships. Now, My Lord, the second group which we developed are those irrelevant documents, D-5, D-9, D-10, D-12, D-13, D-29, D-48, D-60, D-74. Now, My Lord, the first of these, D-5, on the subject of Norway, seeks to introduce by way of a footnote a summary of the documents which the Tribunal dealt with when considering the documents in the case of the Defendant Raeder, with regard to which the Tribunal expressed its doubts, although it allowed them to be translated. The Tribunal will remember that with regard to the Doenitz documents it was thought convenient to have them translated without a preliminary argument. Now, My Lord, the same argument applies to a footnote, to a speech of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, a summary of documents which came into German possession long after the speech of the Defendant Ribbentrop was made. The Prosecution submits it is irrelevant. And the documents 9, 10, 12, and 13 deal with the rescue of Allied survivors in the years 1939 to 1941 inclusive.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that last statement, "and all apparently unsworn," is an error. It ought to be that D-13 is apparently unsworn. Now, My Lord, with regard to that the position is that whereas it is quite true that a non-rescue order was issued by the defendant before 27 May 1940, the really important period is round about 17 September 1942. It seemed to the Prosecution unnecessary to go into these details for the earlier period. There is no real doubt that there were some rescues. The only point which the Prosecution is putting against the defendant is that he did issue an order, which the Prosecution has proved, forbidding rescue when there was any danger.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date you gave us, 17 November 1942?