dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Counsel for the Defense wish to cross- examine this witness? [Referring to Peter Josef Heisig, interrogated the previous day.] [There was no response.] Then, Colonel Phillimore, do you wish to re-examine?
COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord; I have no further questions. THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can go. The witness left the stand.]
COL. PHILLIMORE: Before I call my second witness, Karl Heinz Moehle, an affidavit by him is the next document in the document book. [Karl Heinz Moehle took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
KARL HEINZ MOEHLE (Witness): Karl Heinz Moehle.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath: "I swear by God - the Almighty and Omniscient - that I will speak the pure truth - and will withhold and add nothing." [The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You can sit down, if you wish.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Karl Heinz Moehle, you held the rank of Korvettenkapitan in the German Navy?
MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You served in the German Navy since 1930? MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you tell the Tribunal what decorations you hold?
MOEHLE: I received the Submarine War Medal; the Iron Cross, Second Class; the Iron Cross, First Class; the Knight's Cross; the War Service Cross, First and Second Class; and the German Cross in Silver.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you swear to an affidavit covering a statement you have made on the 21st of July 1945?
MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; I made such a statement.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I show you that document and ask you to say whether that is your affidavit. [Document 382-PS was submitted to the witness.!
MOEHLE: Yes, this is my affidavit.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I put that document in, which is 382-PS, and it becomes Exhibit GB-202. [Turning to the witness.] In the autumn of 1942 were you head of the 5th U- boat Flotilla?
MOEHLE: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Were you stationed at Kiel?
MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.
COL. PHILLIMORE: How long did you hold that appointment altogether?
MOEHLE: For 4 years.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Was that from June 1941 until the capitulation?
MOEHLE: That is correct.
COL. PHILLIMORE: What were your duties as commander of that flotilla?
MOEHLE: My main duties as Flotilla Commander consisted of the fitting out of U-boats which were to be sent to the front from home bases, and giving them the orders of the U-boat command.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Had you any special responsibility to U-boat commanders in respect of the orders? MOEHLE? Yes, Sir; it was my responsibility to see that outgoing U-boats were provided with the new orders of the U-boat command.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Had you any responsibility in explaining the orders?
MOEHLE: The orders of the U-boat command were always very clear and unambiguous. If there were any ambiguities I used to have these ambiguities cleared up myself at the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of U-boats.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you personally see commanders before they went out on patrol?
MOEHLE: Yes, each commander before leaving for an operational cruise went through a so-called commander's briefing.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will go back, if I may, for two or three questions. Did you personally see commanders before they went out on patrol?
MOEHLE: Yes, each commander before sailing on a mission went through a briefing session at my office.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And what did that briefing session consist of? Were there any questions on the orders?
MOEHLE: Yes, Sir, all experiences of previous patrols and any questions of the ship's equipment were discussed with the commander at that session. Also, the commanders had an opportunity at the briefing to clarify any uncertainties, which might have existed in their minds, by asking questions.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Apart from your briefing sessions, did commanders also go to Admiral Doenitz' headquarters for briefing?
MOEHLE: As far as that was possible it was done, especially from the moment when the Commander-in-Chief of U-boats had transferred his office from Paris to Berlin.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember an order in the autumn of 1942 dealing with lifeboats?
MOEHLE: Yes. In September 1942 I received a wireless message addressed to all commanders at sea, and it dealt with that question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I show you this document. My Lord, that is the exhibit I have already put in as GB-199
THE PRESIDENT: What other number has it?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is Document D-630. [Turning to the witness.] Is that the order you are referring to?
MOEHLE: Yes, that is the order.
COL. PHILLIMORE: From the time when you were captured until last Friday had you seen that order?
MOEHLE: No, Sir.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It follows, I think, that the account of the order in your statement was given from recollection?
MOEHLE: Yes, only from recollection.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, after you got that order did you go to Admiral Doenitz' headquarters?
MOEHLE: Yes, at my first visit to headquarters after receipt of the order, I personally discussed it with Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch who was a specialist on the staff of the U-boat command.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you tell the Tribunal what was said at that meeting?
MOEHLE: At that meeting I asked Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch how the ambiguity contained in that order - or I might say, lack of clarity - should be understood. He explained the order by two illustrations. The first example was that of a U-boat in the outer Bay of Biscay. It was sailing on patrol when it sighted a rubber dinghy carrying survivors of a British plane. The fact that it was on an outgoing mission, that is, being fully equipped, made it impossible to take the crew of the plane on board, although, especially at that time, it appeared especially desirable to bring back specialists in navigation from shotdown aircraft crews to get useful information from them. The commander of the U-boat made a wide circle around this rubber boat and continued on his mission. When he returned from his mission he reported this case to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of U-boats. The staff officers reproached him, saying that, if he were unable to bring these navigation specialists back with him, the right thing to do would have been to attack that crew, for it was to be expected that, in less than 24 hours at the latest, the dinghy would be rescued by British reconnaissance forces, and they...
COL. PHILLIMORE: I don't quite get what you said would have been the correct action to take. You were saying the correct thing to do would have been...
MOEHLE: The right thing to do would have been to attack the air crew as it was not possible to bring back the crew or these specialists, for it could be expected that that crew would be found and rescued within a short time by British reconnaissance forces, and in given circumstances might again destroy one or two German U-boats. The second example...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did he give you any second example?
MOEHLE: Yes, the second example I am going to recount now. Example 2. During the first month of the U-boat warfare against the United States a great quantity of tonnage - I do not recollect the exact figure - had been sunk in the shallow waters off the American coast. In these sinkings the greater part of the crews were rescued, because of the close proximity of land. That was exceedingly regrettable, as to merchant shipping not only tonnage but also crews belong, and in the meantime these crews were again able to man newly-built ships.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You have told us about the ambiguity of the order. Are you familiar with the way Admiral Doenitz worded his orders?
MOEHLE: I do not quite understand the question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you familiar with the way Admiral Doenitz normally worded his orders?
MOEHLE: Yes. In my opinion, the order need only have read like this: It is pointed out anew that rescue measures have to be discontinued for reasons of safety for the submarines. This is how, I think, the order should have been worded - if only rescue measures had been forbidden. All...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you saying that if it had been intended only to prohibit rescue measures it would have been sufficient to refer to the previous order?
MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; that would have been enough.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Was that previous order also marked "top secret"?
MOEHLE: I do not remember that exactly.
COL. PHILLIMORE: What was the propaganda at the time with regard to crews?
MOEHLE: The propaganda at that time was to the effect that the enemy was having great difficulty in finding sufficient crews for his merchant marine and...
THE PRESIDENT: The question as to the propaganda at that time is too general a question for him to answer.
COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Honor pleases, I don't press it. [Turning to the witness.] From your knowledge of the way orders were worded, can you tell the Tribunal what you understood this order to mean?
MOEHLE: The order meant, in my own opinion, that although rescue measures remained prohibited, on the other hand it was desirable in the case of sinkings of merchantmen that there should be no survivors.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And was it because you understood this to be the meaning that you went to Admiral Doenitz' headquarters?
MOEHLE: I did not go to the headquarters of the U-boat command on account of this order alone; these visits took place at frequent intervals in order to discuss other questions also and to have the opportunity of keeping constantly in touch with the views and opinions of the U-boat command, as I had to transmit them to the commanders.
COL. PHILLIMORE: How did you brief commanders on this order?
MOEHLE: At these briefing sessions I read the wording of the wireless message to the commanders without making any comment. In a very few instances some commanders asked me about the meaning of the order. In such cases I gave them the two examples that headquarters had given to me. However, I added, '`U-boat command cannot give you such an order officially; everybody has to handle this according to his own conscience."
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember an order about rescue ships?
MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Can you say what the date of that order was?
MOEHLE: I do not remember the exact date, but I think it must have been about the same as the order of September 1942.
COL. PHILLIMORE: May the witness see the Document D-663 which I put in yesterday?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is the German copy of the document that I am showing him; the original is being held. [Document D-663 was submitted to the witness.]
MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; I recognize that order.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You will note that the date on that document is the 7th of October 1943.
MOEHLE: Yes, this order is laid down there in the general Operational Order Atlantic Number 56. According to my recollection, this order was already contained in the previous effective Operational Order Number 54, that is in a wireless message containing practical experiences and instructions. I cannot remember exactly. The date is October 1943.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, is that order in the index here?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord, that is the Document D-663, which I put in yesterday as Exhibit GB-200. If it is omitted from the index, Your Lordship will remember it is the document which, as I explained yesterday, we just received.
THE PRESIDENT: Where does it come in?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It comes in after D-630.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes. Thank you.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Your Lordship will remember the order; it deals with rescue ships attached to convoys, and it was on the last sentence that I relied.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I only wanted to get the words of it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, Sir. My Lord, also I have the original here now and if it is thought necessary the witness can see it, but he has seen a copy. [Turning to the witness.] Do you remember an order about entries in logs?
MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. At the time, the exact date I do not remember, it had been ordered that sinkings and other acts which were in contradiction to international conventions should not be entered in the log but should be reported orally after return to the home port.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you care to say why it is that you are giving evidence in this case?
MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; because when I was taken prisoner it was claimed that I was the author of these orders, and I do not want to have this charge connected with my name.
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the witness is available for examination by my colleagues and for cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any counsel for any defendant wish to ask the witness any questions?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Lieutenant Commander Moehle, since when have you been in the U-boat arm?
MOEHLE: Since the end of 1936. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER Do you know Grossadmiral Doenitz personally? MOEHLE; Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Since when?
MOEHLE: Since October 1937.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you see him here in this room?
MOEHLE: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Where?
MOEHLE: To the left in the rear.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you know Grossadmiral Doenitz as an admiral to whom none of his flotilla chiefs and commanders could speak?
MOEHLE: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Or was the opposite the case?
MOEHLE: He could be approached by everybody at any time.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Have you yourself been a commander of a U-boat?
MOEHLE: Yes, on nine operations.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: For how long?
MOEHLE: From the beginning of the war until April 1941.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: How many ships did you sink?
MOEHLE: Twenty ships.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: After sinking ships, did you destroy the rescue equipment or fire at the survivors?
MOEHLE: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did you have an order to do that?
MOEHLE: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Had the danger passed for a U-boat after the attack on a merchantman?
MOEHLE: No; the danger to the U-boat does not end when the attack is over.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Why not?
MOEHLE: Because in most instances when a ship is sunk, the ship is in a position to send SOS messages and give its position, and thus bring striking forces to attack the U-boat at the last minute. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER Is there a maxim in the U-boat arm that fighting comes before rescuing?
MOEHLE: I never heard of that rule put in that way. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER Prior to the order of September 1942 did you know of any other orders by which rescue work was prohibited if it entailed danger to the U-boat?
MOEHLE: Yes, but I do not know when and where this order was laid down. It had been ordered that, as a matter of principle, the safety of one's own boat takes precedence.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Was this ordered only once, or in several instances?
MOEHLE: That I cannot say.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you know that the order of September 1942 was given in consequence of an incident in which German U- boats, contrary to orders, had undertaken rescue measures?
MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: And the U-boats were then attacked by Allied aircraft?
MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: A minute ago you classified the order of September 1942 as ambiguous, did you not?
MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: You interpreted it to the commanders in the sense that the order should include the destruction of rescue facilities and of the shipwrecked crew?
MOEHLE: No, not quite; I gave the two examples to the commanders only if they made an inquiry and I passed them on in the same way as I had received them from the Commander-in-Chief Submarine Fleet and they themselves could draw that conclusion from these two examples.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: In which sentence of the order do you see a hidden invitation to kill survivors or to destroy the rescue facilities?
MOEHLE: In the sentence...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Just a second, I shall read to you each sentence of the order separately.
MOEHLE: Very well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I read from the Document D-630: "1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and handing over food and water. These are absolutely forbidden." Do you see it in this sentence?
MOEHLE: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: "Rescue measures contradict the most primitive demands of warfare that crews and ships should be destroyed." Do you see that in this sentence?
MOEHLE: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Does that sentence contain anything as to the destruction of shipwrecked persons?
MOEHLE: No, of crews.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: At the end of the order is the phrase "Be harsh." Did you hear that phrase there for the first time?
MOEHLE: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Was this phrase used by Commander-in-Chief of U-boats to get the commanders to be severe themselves and to their crews?
MOEHLE: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did you discuss the order with Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch?
MOEHLE: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you remember that exactly?
MOEHLE: As far as I can rely upon my recollection after such a long time.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Where did that conversation take place?
MOEHLE: At the staff headquarters of the U-boat command, probably in Paris. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER What position did Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch occupy at the time?
MOEHLE: As far as I can remember, he was the man in charge of the Enemy Convoys Department, but I could not say that with any certainty.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Was the superior officer of Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch, Commander Hessler?
MOEHLE: Superior officer? I would not say so, because Commander Hessler was on the same level as Kuppisch, a departmental chief.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Was Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch's superior Admiral Goth?
MOEHLE: Yes, in his capacity of Chief of Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did you speak to Commander Hessler or Admiral Goth or with the Grossadmiral himself with regard to the interpretation to be given to the order of September?
MOEHLE: Whether I spoke to Commander Hessler, I do not remember, but in any case not to Admiral Goth or the Grossadmiral himself.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: You said Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch had told you about the opinion which was prevalent in the staff of the U-boat command.
MOEHLE: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: With regard to the attitude towards the aviators in the Bay of Biscay, did he tell you that it was the opinion of the Grossadmiral himself?
MOEHLE: I do not remember that. It is too far back. When explanations were given at staff meetings of the U-boat command and an opinion was expressed by a responsible departmental chief, we flotilla leaders naturally took this to be the official opinion of the Commander-in-Chief of the U-boat arm. Admiral Goth personally or the Commander-in-Chief of the U-boat arm was only approached in cases where the departmental chiefs refused to commit themselves definitely or to assume the responsibility for an answer.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did you not get to know that the story of the airmen who had been shot down in the Bay of Biscay was in actual fact just the opposite...
MOEHLE: I do not understand.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I continue: That the commander was reprimanded because he did not bring home these flyers even if it meant breaking off his operation.
MOEHLE: No, I do not know that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch tell you in connection with that second example you mentioned, that the shipwrecked or their rescue equipment off the American coast should have been destroyed?
MOEHLE: No; he only said it was regrettable that the crews had been rescued.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: And you concluded from that that it was desired to have the shipwrecked killed?
MOEHLE: I did not draw any conclusions at all from that for I passed on these examples without any commentary.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you know the standing orders of the U-boat command?
MOEHLE: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do they contain the guiding principles of U-boat warfare?
MOEHLE: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Is there any order in the standing orders directing or advising the killing of shipwrecked persons or the destruction of rescue facilities?
MOEHLE: As far as I know, no.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: What grade of secrecy was attached to these standing orders?
MOEHLE: As far as I remember, top secret.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you remember that in Standing Order 511 the following was ordered... Mr. President, I read from an order which I shall submit in evidence later on. I cannot do it now because I have not yet the original. "Standing Order of the U-boat Command Number 511; 20 May 1943; taking on board of officers of sunken ships. "1. As far as accommodation facilities on board permit, captains and chief engineers of sunken ships are to be brought in. The enemy tries to thwart this intention and has issued the following order: (a) masters are not allowed to identify themselves when questioned, but should if possible use sailors selected especially for this purpose; (b) crew has to state that masters and chief engineers remained on board. "If in spite of energetic questioning it is not possible to find the masters or the chief engineers, then other ships' officers should be taken aboard. "2. Masters and officers of neutral ships, which, according to Standing Order Number 101, can be sunk (for instance, Swedish ships outside Goteborg traffic), are not to be brought in because internment of these officers would violate international law. "3. In case ship officers cannot be taken prisoner, other white members of the crew should be taken along as far as accommodation facilities and further operations of the craft permit, for the purpose of interrogation for military and propaganda purposes. "4. In case of the sinking of a single cruising destroyer, corvette, or escort vessel, try at all costs to take prisoners, if that can be done without endangering the boat. Interrogation of the prisoners at transit camps . . . can produce valuable hints as to antisubmarine tactics, devices, and weapons used by the enemy; the same applies to air crews of shot-down planes." [Turning to the witness.] Do you know that order? MOEHLE: Yes. The order seems familiar to me.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you know the order 513? "Standing Order of U-boat Command; 1 June 1944; taking along of prisoners. "1. Statements of prisoners are the safest and best source of information regarding enemy tactics, weapons, location appliances and methods. Prisoners from planes and destroyers may be of the greatest importance to us; therefore, as far as possible and without endangering the boat, the utmost is to be done to take such prisoners. "2. As prisoners are extremely willing to talk when captured, interrogate them at once on board. It is of special interest to know the manner of locating U-boats by aircraft, whether by radar or by passive location methods; for instance, by ascertaining, through electricity or heat, the location of the boat. Report prisoners taken as soon as possible in order to hand them over to returning boats." Do you know that order?
MOEHLE: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did you not notice and try to clarify a contradiction between these orders concerning the rescue of air crews in every case and the story you passed on about the destruction of air crews?
MOEHLE: No; because in the order of September 1942 it also says that the order about the bringing in of ships' captains and chief engineers remains in force.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did you hear of any instance where a U-boat brought in captains and chief engineers but shot the rest of the crew?
MOEHLE: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you consider it at all possible that such an order can be given - that is, that part of the crew should be rescued and the rest of the crew should be killed?