dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. STEINBAUER: We are now in the year. . .
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to add that, with regard to domestic policy, the events on 25 July were the worst that could possibly have happened to the prospect of the Anschluss. We reflected on what might be done and came to the conclusion that the Party in the Reich should cease its interference in the Austrian National Socialist Party, the existence of white anticipated the Anschluss; but in return the National Socialists in Austria should once more receive permission to be active, and especially, there should be elections to ascertain the proportional strength of the parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: What I am interested in is the question whether you had any connections with authorities in the Reich at that time, that is, in 1936?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had no connections with authorities in the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. Did you . . .
SEYSS-INQUART: Only, as Reich Marshal Goering has already testified, when I became a State Councillor, did I, for the first time, meet a leading German politician.
DR. STEINBAUER: When was that?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was in June or July 1937.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was your attitude toward the NSDAP in Austria at that time, when you were State Councillor?
SEYSS-INQUART: When the agreement of 11 July 1936 was reached-without my having taken any part in it-Dr. Schuschnigg through Minister Klees asked me for my political co-operation. At that time I had particularly close connections with Zernatto, the General Secretary of the Fatherland Front. At the suggestion of Zernatto and his friends I became an Austrian State Councillor and Dr. Schuschnigg gave me the task, in writing, of examining the conditions under which the national opposition could be enlisted to collaborate politically. In order to fulfill that task I did, of course, have to contact the National Socialists, because the national opposition consisted only of National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was the head of the NSDAP in Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Party in Austria had reorganized illegally; Captain Leopold was the head.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you on friendly terms with him?
SEYSS-INQUART: I could not come to an agreement with Captain Leopold; he did not understand my policy, but thought that on the basis of the agreement of 11 July Dr. Schuschnigg had to allow the NSDAP again in its earlier form. I think I talked to Leopold only twice, or at most three times, throughout that time. He demanded that I be subordinate to him; that I refused.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I in this connection draw attention to the following documents without reading from them? Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-44, on Page 103 of the document book, an excerpt from the Document Number 3471-PS, Exhibit Number USA-583, already submitted to the Court. Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-45, on Page 105, Document Number 3473-PS, Exhibit Number USA-581. And Document Number Seyss-Inquart-97, on Page 109, in which Zenatto expressly states that Seyss-Inquart did not fall in with Leopold's aims and efforts. My client has been accused by the Prosecution of having played a double game. As counter-evidence, I applied for permission to hear the former Gauleiter Siegfried Uiberreither. He was interrogated here, and I want to quote from the interrogatory, which is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-59, from the counterquestions put by the Prosecution on Page 140: "Question: 'Was not the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, before the time when the Nazi Party was legalized, that is, before it was declared legal in February 1938, was he not in constant contact with the illegal Nazi Party of Austria?' "Answer: 'No. I personally did not know Seyss-Inquart until his visit to Graz. In Nazi circles he was considered a non-Party member. I think-I do not know with certainty-that he joined the NSDAP only when it was legalized. For this reason, he personally encountered a strong opposition in illegal Nazi circles."' On Page 6 of the same document it says: "Question: 'Did not the Defendant Seyss-Inquart play a double game: On one side his legal position in Schuschnigg's Cabinet and on the other side his co-operation with the formerly illegal Nazi Party, whose activity was then legalized to a certain extent through the efforts of the defendant at Berchtesgaden in February 1938?' "Answer: 'I do not know to what extent he was in touch with the illegal Nazi circles before 12 February. I do not know about it, because I was not in Vienna. But from 18 February his contact with the Nazi Party was not duplicity but his duty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Schuschnigg himself had discussions with Leopold, the leader of the Nazis at that time-before Klausner it was Leopold."' [Turning to the defendant.] This brings us to 1938. At the beginning of that year you were State Councillor in the Austrian Government. What did you think of the political situation at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: In many conversations with Dr. Schuschnigg but most of all in continual discussions with Zernatto, I suggested, in line with the conclusions I had drawn from the events of 25 July 1934, that the Reich, and particularly Hitler, be asked to refrain from any interference in Austrian politics through the medium of the Austrian National Socialist Party. I proposed that instead the Austrian National Socialists should receive permission to resume activities. That did not mean at all that I would give up the Anschluss, but I was completely convinced that a lawful and responsible policy of the Austrian National Socialists in Austria would in the course of time win for them the support of a clear majority of the Austrian nation-I mean of the Germans in Austria; and that the demonstration of such a clear majority would no longer be challenged by the powers of the League of Nations. One had to attempt to make Adolf Hitler agree to such a policy by enlisting the support of the autonomous and independent state of Austria for the Fuehrer's policy and the demand for equal rights of the German people. It was in the interests of these ideas that I talked to Field Marshal Goering and Herr Hess. I reported the outcome of these conversations to Dr. Schuschnigg and to Zernatto and I recommended the formation of a coalition government by taking National Socialist ministers into the cabinet, on condition that Adolf Hitler offer adequate guarantees. My suggestions made no headway with either of the two parties, but were not directly turned down. Meanwhile, the Austrian National Socialists continued to be active illegally; the police intervened and made arrests; three Austrian concentration camps were set up; in short, the events of that time foreshadowed today's denazification system.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you at the Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. But I want to describe how that meeting came about. First of all, a renewed Party radicalism set in. At the beginning of 1938, legitimist tendencies were being promoted in Austria, the laws regarding the return of the Hapsburg property were discussed in the State Council. For the moment my own position, therefore, became untenable; I retired and informed Zernatto and State Secretary Keppler who had been officially nominated by the Reich Government to conduct the political affairs relating to Austria. I felt that in view of my task it was my duty to inform Keppler also. I myself accepted an invitation from the Reich Sports Leader Tschammer-Osten and went to Garmisch-Partenkirchen. There, without previous appointment, I met Herr Von Papen. Each of us poured out his troubles to the other, and came to the conclusion that both parties, that is to say, Hitler as well as the Austrian Government-that is, Dr. Schuschnigg-should be made aware of the fact that a clear decision on the lines of my proposal was necessary. At that time, participation of the National Socialists in the government was certainly discussed. Perhaps the Ministry of the Interior was also a subject of discussion, but my name was definitely not mentioned though it was the obvious one. I received no report on the discussions which Herr Von Papen had with Hitler, but I informed Zernatto of my conversation with Herr Von Papen. Zernatto at that time met me half-way on some questions, in particular with regard to the expansion of those sections dealing with national policy which were concerned with the National Socialists; and for this purpose he also placed means at my disposal. It was on 10 February, I think, when I heard through the group of my colleagues that Hitler had invited Dr. Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden. Among the members of my circle were Dr. Reiner, Dr. Jury, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, Langot, and several others.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you informed of the outcome of the discussions at the Obersalzberg?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was informed of the outcome of this conference only by Zernatto. On the evening of the 11th, before Dr. Schuschnigg left for Berchtesgaden, I had a detailed discussion with him and Zernatto. We agreed to a large extent regarding the appointment of National Socialists for instance, Jury, Reinthaller, and Fischbock-to certain public functions but not to ministerial positions. I did not broach the subject of a ministerial post, because I did not know how Adolf Hitler reacted to the suggestion which I made to Herr Von Papen. On 13 February Zernatto asked me to see him, and he then told me of the results and contents of the Berchtesgaden conference, which were known to him.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection, I want to refer to Document Number Seyss-Inquart-48, Page 111, in which Zernatto states, "I had the definite impression that he"-Seyss-Inquart-"did not until then know anything about the result of the discussion and the contents of the agreement"-of 12 February. Witness, on the basis of that agreement, you became Minister of the Interior and Police, did you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, on 17 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: On 17 February 1938, with the assignment of establishing connections between Austria and the Reich, or rather of improving them. Did you also have a discussion with Hitler himself?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. The agreement at Berchtesgaden on 12 February contained a definite stipulation to the effect that I was to be liaison man between the Austrian Government and the Austrian National Socialists on one side, and the German Reich on the other. The contents of the protocol appeared to me unsatisfactory and even dangerous. There was no doubt at all that my appointment to the Ministry of the Interior and Security served as a notification, if not a signal, for the Austrian National Socialists that they might expect an early realization of their political objectives. In addition they received permission to profess their beliefs; they could wear the swastika and salute with the raised hand. What was not permitted, however, was their organization; that means, my National Socialist friends in Austria had no possibility of getting in touch with the National Socialists in a legal way. This agreement opened the gates without providing for a regular procedure thereafter. Hence, I myself resolved to see Adolf Hitler in order to make sure whether my plan had his approval I went with Dr. Schuschnigg's assent and with an Austrian diplomatic passport.
DR. STEINBAUER: And when did you talk then to Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: I mentioned an incorrect date just now; it was on 16 February that I became Minister and I went to Berlin on the 17th. I talked with Adolf Hitler alone for more than 2 hours. It was pointed out here by the Prosecution that I saluted Adolf Hitler with the raised-hand greeting. That was permissible under the agreement. But I would ask the Prosecution to admit that during every one of my interrogations I stated that I had emphasized to Adolf Hitler at once that I was an Austrian Minister and as such responsible to Austria. I made some shorthand notes on this discussion on the back of a letter, and a few weeks later I dictated those notes to my secretary. I now want to relate the contents of my talk with Hitler on the basis of those notes. My statements . . .
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, will you kindly be as brief as possible; can you do it in headings, perhaps?
SEYSS-INQUART: But this is the most important point with regard to my whole responsibility. "A condition of Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg is that I adhere to an autonomous and independent Austria, that I support the Constitution, that is, further development, including the Anschluss, must be based on this. The formation of public opinion in Austria must proceed independently and in accordance with present constitutional possibilities. I must be an active guarantor for Dr. Schuschnigg of the revolutionary way, in the meaning of these statements (Yes), no Trojan horse. The Party and Movement must not adopt a militant attitude against prevailing cultural conceptions. (Yes). No totalitarianism of the Party and Movement; that is, National Socialist ideology to be realized with due appreciation and regard for conditions in Austria; not to be imposed on others by force. The Party as such is not simply to disappear, but to exist as an organization of individuals; no illegal activity, no efforts inimical to the State, everything to be done in a legal fashion, anyone failing to do this, to be locked up." In the main, Adolf Hitler agreed, and he told me: "It is not a question of the 25 points. One cannot proclaim a dogma; one must arrive from the pan-German and the national German conception to a National Socialist one." That was the gist of my conference with Adolf Hitler on 17 February, from 12 to 2:10 o'clock.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you . . .
MR. DODD: Mr. President' I understood the witness to say that he made his notes on the meeting with Hitler and later dictated them to his secretary. It is not clear to me whether he was reading from those notes. Furthermore, we have never seen such notes and I think it should be made clear on the record.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, has the defendant got the notes?
DR. STEINBAUER: The original was taken from him when he was arrested.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you heard the question I asked; have you got the notes?
SEYSS-INQUART: The original of these notes was among my files in Vienna. I made an application to have these files of mine, which were found, searched for the notes. I handed a copy of the notes to the Prosecution during one of my first interrogations; it is in the files of the Prosecution. I have only copies here; I do not have the original.
THE PRESIDENT: The copy would be just as good for the purposes. . SEYSS-INQUART: I have placed a copy at the disposal of the Defense.
DR. STEINBAUER: But I gave it back to you.
SEYSS-INQUART: Then you can submit this one.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, would you hand it over? [The document was submitted to the Tribunal.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give it an exhibit number, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: Number Seyss-Inquart-61, otherwise it would be confused with the others.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am confused about this; I still do not understand, and I am sure that my colleagues do not. We have never received any copy of any notes that this defendant has claimed he made soon after, or at the time of, his conference with Hitler. We have no such copy in our files. And I would like to have understood myself whether or not he is now claiming that this copy which is offered to the Tribunal is a copy of this original that he claims he gave to us.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that what you say, Defendant, that the document which you have just handed to your counsel is a copy of the document which you say you produced during your interrogations, which was from the shorthand notes you made at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. President, the original notes I made on the afternoon of 17 February. A few weeks later I dictated these notes, which I made in shorthand, to my secretary, who took them down on a typewriter. I had several copies, one of which I presented to the Prosecution during one of my interrogations last summer. I have now given a second copy to my defense counsel. These are copies made from the original notes a few weeks after the conference. The original was in my secret files in Vienna.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: I wonder if we could learn just who it was to whom this defendant gave these notes? Mr. President, I would like to have some search made for them, and some effort made to find them.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know who was the interrogating counsel?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Dodd himself.
MR. DODD: We do not have it.
SEYSS-INQUART: I think I am right in saying that it was handed over.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the main points of the contents coincide with the voluntary statement, which the defendant. . .
MR. DODD: I think this is important enough at this point, Mr. President, to clear up. I have the interrogation that I first conducted on this defendant, and it clearly shows that he referred to the notes; but he clearly said at the time that he did not have them, that he left them in a black leather case with other documents in Mondorf, and he asked me if I would make an effort to get them; and I said that I would, and we never have been able to find them, and that is the transcript of the interrogation.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I say that I received them. The black leather case was brought to me here in Court and the notes were in it. I submitted the copy at one of the subsequent interrogations. [There was a short pause.]
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Steinbauer.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I say that Document Number SeyssInquart-49, Page 113, is substantially of the same content. The defendant the present witness, informed Schuschnigg of the substance of that talk; that is evident from Document Number 3271-PS, Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-65, on Page 158. Witness, I want to ask you now whether Hitler approved of your proposals?
SEYSS-INQUART: He clearly said "yes" to a number of things, but on other points he expressed doubts as to whether the Austrian Government would agree; the principal impression was, however, that this policy seemed feasible.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection it has also been alleged that as Minister of the Interior and Police you brought executive power under the control of the Nazis.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to leave the main explanation of this matter to my witness, Dr. Skubl. After Dollfuss' death Dr. Skubl was a special confidant of the Austrian Government and was placed at my side as State Secretary and Inspector General for Security Matters clearly also to act as a kind of check. I had no objection at all to that and was very pleased to have such an expert at my disposal. I should just like to mention briefly that all orders of the entire executive came from Skubl. I myself never gave a direct order to the Austrian police. Skubl was given instructions by Dr. Schuschnigg, particularly on 10 and 11 March. I myself did not bring a single National Socialist into the Austrian police.
DR. STEINBAUER: All right, that is sufficient.
SEYSS-INQUART: Perhaps I might refer briefly to the public appeal . . .
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I want to refer to two documents, Numbers Seyss-Inquart-51 and 52, on Pages 117 and 119 respectively. We have now reached Document Book Number 2. The first is a speech by the defendant as Minister, addressed to his police officials, and the second speech is a radio talk which he gave at Linz. We now come to the critical days in March. Were you informed of the plebiscite plan of Schuschnigg, and by whom?
SEYSS-INQUART: The day before Dr. Schuschnigg announced in Innsbruck the plan for the plebiscite he called me in and informed me of his plan. I asked him at that time whether the decision was unalterable, and he affirmed that. I expressed my concern that this might lead to difficulties; but I promised him that I would help him wherever I could, either to make the best of this plebiscite or to bring about a suitable outcome-suitable, that is to say, even for the National Socialists. Of course, I had continual contact with the Austrian National Socialists, since I was the liaison man. I spoke at several meetings-Zernatto and Dr. Schuschnigg were informed of that-and recounted what I had discussed with Adolf Hitler or what I had proposed to him. I avoided all possibilities of demonstrations, and as Minister of the Interior also banned such demonstrations. In that connection may I refer to the general ban on public meetings, imposed by me among others, and to the specific prohibition of a demonstration at Graz, evident from the interrogatory of the witness Uiberreither.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Schuschnigg give you any promises?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. I want to say that on the same evening I was also approached by Dr. Jury who in some way had already . heard of the plan for the plebiscite. I did not tell him that I had given my assent to Dr. Schuschnigg, though on account of my function as liaison man as laid down in the agreement of 12 February, I should not have allowed silence to be imposed on me; yet, I did keep silent.
DR. STEINBAUER: I think, Mr. President, this might be a suitable moment for the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will break off now. [A recess was taken.]
DR. STEINBAUER: We got as far as the plebiscite which Schuschnigg had planned and which then became known. We come now to 11 March. What did you do in the forenoon on that day?
SEYSS-INQUART: I must say first that a day or two before, after consultation with Austrian National Socialists, I wrote a letter to Dr. Schuschnigg in which I commented on the plebiscite in an unfavorable way. The reasons were primarily that a real plebiscite result was not guaranteed, because it was not a proper plebiscite within the meaning of the national laws. For example, the plebiscite was not decided on by the Council of Ministers but by the Fatherland Front, that is) by the party; and it was to have been carried out by that party. It was suggested that the plebiscite be postponed and a proper election with all its legal requisites be held. On the evening of 10 March, in the presence of Foreign Minister Schmidt, I had another detailed conversation with Dr. Schuschnigg; and we agreed that the Government-as well as the provincial governments, and so forth-should include National Socialists, that, in effect, a coalition government should be formed; and in that case the National Socialists would also vote "yes." Only with reference to the license of the Party, the activities of the Party, were there still differences of opinion. I reported this to the Austrian National Socialists but they were not much interested, because news had come from Berlin that Hitler had rejected the plebiscite. I was told that on the next day I would receive a letter from Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive a letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I received a letter from Hitler by courier. I am almost certain that the letter also contained the draft of a telegram for a march into Austria, but I cannot recall whether the draft of a radio speech was also included in it.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did you do in the morning, after receiving this letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: After receiving this letter I went with Minister Glaise to Dr. Schuschnigg. We were at the Federal Chancellor's office at 10 o'clock, and I informed Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg of the entire contents of this letter without reservation. In particular, I pointed out that in case of a refusal Adolf Hitler expected unrest among the Austrian National Socialists and that he was ready, if disturbances occurred, to answer an appeal for help by marching in. In other words, I expressly called Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg's attention to the possibility of this development.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you ask for an answer from him?
SEYSS-INQUART: The letter set a deadline, 12 o'clock. As our talk lasted until about 11:30, I asked Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg to give me an answer by 2 o'clock. I know that in the meantime, and also on the previous day, he had taken security measures through Dr. Skubl, of which I had approved. A number of age groups of the Austrian Federal Army were called up, the police everywhere received instructions, and a curfew was imposed in the evening.
DR. STEINBAUER: What happened in the afternoon of 11 March?