dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
COL. PHILLIMORE: In the event, however, it is only too clear that almost from the beginning of the war the Germans abandoned their own principles and waged war with steadily increasing disregard for international law, and for what is, after all, the ultimate sanction of all law, the protection of human life and property from arbitrary and ruthless attacks." I pass to the third paragraph on the next page which sets out two instances: "On the 30th of September 1939 came the first sinking of a neutral ship by a submarine without warning and with loss of life. This was the Danish ship Vendia bound for the Clyde in ballast. The submarine fired two shots and shortly after torpedoed the ship. The torpedo was fired when the master had already signaled that he would submit to the submarine's orders and before there had been an opportunity to abandon ship. By November submarines were beginning to sink neutral vessels without warning as a regular thing. On the 12th November the Norwegian Arne Kjode was torpedoed in the North Sea without any warning at all. This was a tanker bound from one neutral port to another. The master and four of the crew lost their lives and the remainder were picked up after many hours in open boats. Henceforward, in addition to the failure to establish the nature of the cargo, another element is noticeable, namely an increasing recklessness as to the fate of the crew." And then dealing with attacks on Allied merchant vessels, certain figures are given: Ships sunk 241, recorded attacks 221, illegal attacks 112. At least 79 of these 112 ships were torpedoed without warning.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then they were not illegally sunk, however?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, Sir.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): According to this document, the Germans have been given the benefit of the doubt.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Oh, yes, I should have read that sentence; I am obliged to Your Honor. I pass to the second report, Document D-641(b). It is part of the same document and is put in as Exhibit GB-191. It is a report covering the next 6 months from September 1, 1940. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Are you not reading Page 3?
COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases, I have read a great deal of the report and there are passages that I had not considered important.
THE PRESIDENT: I haven't myself read it, but I think...
COL. PHILLIMORE: If I might read the first two paragraphs on Page 3: "By the middle of October submarines were sinking merchant vessels without any regard to the safety of the crews. Yet 4 months later the Germans were still officially claiming that they were acting in accordance with their prize ordinance. Their own semi-official commentators, however, had made the position clear. As regards neutrals, Berlin officials had early in February stated that any neutral ship that is either voluntarily or under compulsion bound for an enemy port including contraband control harbors - thereby loses its neutrality and must be considered hostile. At the end of February the cat was let out of the bag by a statement that a neutral ship which obtained a navicert from a British consul in order to avoid putting into a British contraband control base was liable to be sunk by German submarines, even if it was bound from one neutral port to another. As regards Allied ships, in the middle of November 1939 a Berlin warning was issued against the arming of British vessels. By that date a score of British merchantmen had been illegally attacked by gunfire or torpedo from submarines, and after the date some 15 more unarmed Allied vessels were torpedoed without warning. It is clear therefore that not only was the arming fully justified as a defensive measure but also that neither before nor after this German threat did the German submarines discriminate between armed and unarmed vessels." The last paragraph is merely a summing up; it does not add. Turning to D-641(b), which is a similar report covering the next 6 months, if I might read the first five paragraphs of Page 1: "On the 30th January 1941 Hitler proclaimed: 'Every ship, with or without convoy, which appears before our torpedo tubes is going to be torpedoed. On the face of it, this announcement appears to be uncompromising; and the only qualification provided by the context is that the threats immediately preceding it are specifically addressed to the peoples of the American Continent.
COL. PHILLIMORE: German commentators, however, subsequently tried to water it down by contending that Hitler was referring only to ships which attempted to enter the area within which the German 'total blockade' is alleged to be in force. "From one point of view it probably matters little what exactly was Hitler's meaning, since the only conclusion that can be reached after a study of the facts of enemy warfare on merchant shipping is that enemy action in this field is never limited by the principles which are proclaimed by enemy spokesmen, but solely by the opportunities or lack of them which exist at any given time."
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, isn't this document you are now reading really legal argument?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, some of it is. The difficulty is to leave those parts and take in the facts.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The third paragraph, if I might leave the rest of the second, is as follows: "The effect of the German 'total blockade' is to prohibit neutral ships from entering an enormous stretch of sea round Britain (the area extends to about 500 miles west of Ireland, and from the latitude of Bordeaux to that of the Faroe Islands), upon pain of having their ships sunk without warning and their crews killed. As a matter of fact, at least 32 neutral ships, exclusive of those sailing in British convoys, have been sunk by enemy action since the declaration of the 'total blockade."' The last sentence in the following paragraph about the sinking of ships without warning: "Yet though information is lacking in very many cases, details are available to prove that, during the period under review, at least 38 Allied merchant ships exclusive of those in convoys have been torpedoed without warning in or near the 'total blockade' area. "That the Germans themselves have no exaggerated regard for the area is proved by the fact that of the 38 ships referred to at least 16 were torpedoed outside the limits of the war zone." My Lord, the next page deals with a specific case illustrating the matter set out above. It is in the first paragraph of that page, the third sentence: "The sinking of the City of Benares on the 17th September 1940 is a good example of this. The City of Benares was an 11,000-ton liner with 191 passengers on board, including nearly 100 children. She was torpedoed without warning just outside the 'war zone,' with the loss of 258 lives, including 77 children. It was blowing a gale, with hail and rain squalls and a very rough sea when the torpedo struck her at about 10 p. m. In the darkness and owing to the prevailing weather conditions, at least four of the 12 boats lowered were capsized. Others were swamped and many people were washed right off. In one boat alone 16 people, including 11 children, died from exposure; in another 22 died, including 15 children; in a third 21 died.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The point to be emphasized is not the unusual brutality of this attack but rather that such results are inevitable when a belligerent disregards the rules of sea warfare as the Germans have done and are doing." I think the rest of that paragraph is not important. I turn to the next document, 641(c), which is part of Exhibit GB-191.
THE PRESIDENT: It is clear, I suppose, from that statement of facts that there was no warning whatever given?
COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: We think that you should read the next paragraph too.
COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases. "There are hundreds of similar stories, stories of voyages for days in open boats in Atlantic gales, of men in the water clinging for hours to a raft and gradually dropping off one by one, of crews being machine-gunned as they tried to lower their boats or as they drifted away in them, of seamen being blown to pieces by shells and torpedoes and bombs. The enemy must know that such things are the inevitable result of the type of warfare he has chosen to employ." My Lord, the rest is very much to the same general effect. The document, 641(c), is merely a certificate giving the total sinkings by U- boats during the war (1939 to 1945) as 2,775 British, Allied, and neutral ships totalling 14,572,435 gross registered tons. My Lord, it is perhaps worth considering one example not quoted in the above reports of the ruthless nature of the actions conducted by the defendant's U-boat commanders, particularly as both British and German versions of the sinkings are available. I turn to the next document, "The sinking of S.S. Sheaf Mead." That is Document D-644, which I put in as Exhibit GB-192. If I might read the opening paragraph: "The British S. S. Sheaf Mead was torpedoed without warning on 27 May 1940..."
THE PRESIDENT: This is the German account, is it not?
COL. PHILLIMORE: This is actually in the form of a British report. It includes the German account in the shape of a complete extract from the log.
THE PRESIDENT: It bears the words, "top secret"?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord, this was at the time a top-secret document. That was some while ago. "The British S. S. Sheaf Mead was torpedoed without warning on 27 May 1940, with the loss of 31 of the crew. The commander of the U-boat responsible is reported to have behaved in an exceptionally callous manner towards the men clinging to upturned boats and pieces of wood. It was thought that this man was Kapitanleutnant Ohrn of U-37: The following extract from his log for 27 May 1940 leaves no doubt on the matter and speaks for itself as to his behaviour." Again turning to the relevant extract from the log, on the second page, the time is marked on the document as 1554. "Surface. Stern is underwater." - referring to the ship which has been torpedoed "Stern is underwater. Bows rise higher. The boats are now on the water. Lucky for them. A picture of complete order. They lie at some distance. The bows rear up quite high. Two men appear from somewhere in the forward part of the ship. They leap and rush with great bounds along the deck down the stern. The stern disappears. A boat capsizes. Then a boiler explosion. Two men fly through the air, limbs outstretched. Bursting and crushing. Then all is over. A large heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to identify the name. The crew have saved themselves on wreckage and capsized boats. We fish out a buoy. No name on it. I ask a man on the raft. He says, hardly turning his head, 'Nix Name.' A young boy in the water calls, 'Help, help, please!' The others are very composed. They look damp and somewhat tired. An expression of cold hatred is on their faces. On to the old course. After washing the paint off the buoy, the name comes to light: Greatafield, Glasgow, 5,006 gross registered tons." "On to the old course" means merely that the U-boat makes off. Then the next page of that document contains an extract from the report of the chief engineer of the Sheaf Mead. The relevant paragraphs are the first and the last: "When I came to the surface I found myself on the port side, that is, nearest to the submarine, which was only about 5 yards away.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The submarine captain asked the steward the name of the ship, which he told him, and the enemy picked up one of our lifebuoys, but this had the name Greatafield on it, as this was the name of our ship before it was changed to Sheaf Mead last January." In the last paragraph: "She had cut-away bows, but I did notice a net-cutter. Two men stood at the side with boat-hooks to keep us off. "They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us in the water. Otherwise they just watched us, but said nothing. Then she submerged and went off, without offering us any assistance whatever."
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any suggestion in the German report that any warning was given?
COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord. It is quite clear, indeed, that it was not. Under the time 1414 there is a description of the sighting of the ship and the difficulty in identifying; and then at the top of the page: "The distance apart is narrowing. The steamship draws in quickly, but the position is still 40-50. I cannot see the stern yet. Tube ready. Shall I or not? The gunnery crews are also prepared. On the ship's side a yellow cross in a small, square, dark blue ground. Swedish? Presumably not. I raise the periscope a little. Hurrah, a gun at the stern. an A/A gun or something similar. Fire! It cannot miss..." and then the sinking. Now that it is possible to examine some of the actual documents by which the defendant and his fellow conspirators issued their orders in disregard of international law, you may think the compilers of the above reports understated the case. These orders cover not only the period referred to in the reports, but also the subsequent course of the war. It is interesting to note in them the steps by which the defendants progressed. At first they were content with breaching the rules of international law to the extent of sinking merchant ships, including neutral ships, without warning where there was a reasonable prospect of being able to do so without discovery. The facts already quoted show that the question of whether ships were defensively armed or outside the declared operational areas was in practice immaterial. I go to the next document in the document book, C-191, which I put in as Exhibit GB-193. That is a memorandum by the German naval war staff, dated 22 September 1939. It sets out: "Flag Officer U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights." 14 Jan. 46 Reading from the third sentence: "In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as the U-boat cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way that entirely obviates mistakes being made.
COL. PHILLIMORE: If the political situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters where French and English naval forces or merchant ships may be situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English units are to be expected, the measures desired by Flag Officer U-boats can be carried out; permission to take this step is not to be given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken approval of the Naval Operations Staff. "U-boat commanders should be informed by word of mouth, and the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser. In the meanwhile, U-boats in the English Channel have received instructions to attack all vessels sailing without lights." Now I go to the next document, C-21, which I put in as Exhibit GB-194. My Lord, this document consists of a series of extracts from the War Diary of the German naval war staff of the German Admiralty. The second extract, at Page 5, relates a conference with the head of the naval war staff, report of the 2 January 1940, and then reading: "1) Report by Ia" - that is the Staff Officer Operations on the naval war staff . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Shouldn't you reed above that, Paragraph 1/b? COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, if Your Lordship pleases. It is important. The others are much to the same effect. If I might read it: "Report by Ia." - This is one report by Ia on the directive of Armed Forces High Command of 30 December. "According to this, the Fuehrer, on report of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, has decided: (a) Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy vessels in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and Britain; (b) in the Bristol Channel all ships may be attacked without warning. For external consumption these attacks should be given out as hits by mines. Both measures may be taken with immediate effect." The next extract, a report by Ia, that is, the Staff Officer Operations on the naval war staff on the directive "of Armed Forces High Command, dated 30 December: "Referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in connection with 'Fall Gelb'. "In consequence of this directive, the Navy is authorized, simultaneously with the general intensification of the war; to sink by U-boats, without any warning, all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for external consumption, presence should be made that mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of weapons by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose." And then the third extract, dated 6 January 1940: " . . . pursuant to the Fuehrer's consent on principle (see minutes of report of Commander-in-Chief Navy of 30 December) to authorize firing without warning while maintaining the presence of mine hits in certain parts of the American blockade zone...." Well, then the order is given to Flag Officer U-boats carrying out that decision. The next extract, dated the 18th of January 1940, adds to some extent, and if I may read it: "The High Command of the Armed Forces has issued the following directive dated 17th of January, cancelling the previous order concerning intensified measures of warfare against merchantmen.
THE PRESIDENT: "The Navy is authorized, with immediate effect, to sink by U-boats without warning all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which the use of mines is possible." My Lord, that is an extension of the area. - "U-boats must adapt their behavior and employment of weapons to the presence, which is to be maintained in these cases, that the hits were caused by mines. Ships of the United States, Italy, Japan, and Russia are exempted from these attacks." Well, then there is a note emphasizing the point about maintaining the pretense of mine hits and the last extract is, I think, purely cumulative. The next document, C-118, I put in as Exhibit GB-195. This is an extract from the B.d.U. War Diary, that is to say the defendant's war diary. It is dated the 18th of July 1941, and it consists of a further extension of that order by the cutting down of the protected categories. "Supplementary to the order forbidding, for the time being, attacks on U.S. warships and merchant vessels in the operational area of the North Atlantic, the Fuehrer has ordered the following: "1. Attacks on U.S. merchant vessels sailing in British or U.S. convoys, or independently are authorized in the original operational area which corresponds in its dimensions to the U.S. blockade zone and which does not include the sea-route U.S. to Iceland." As the members of the Tribunal will have seen from these orders, at one date the ships of a particular neutral under certain conditions could be sunk while those of another could not. It would be easy to put before the Tribunal a mass of orders and instances to show that the attitude to be adopted toward ships of particular neutrals changed at various times. The point is that the defendant conducted the U-boat war against neutrals with complete cynicism and opportunism. It all depended on the political relationship of Germany toward a particular country at a particular time whether her ships were sunk or not. My Lord, I turn to the next document in the document book, D-642, which I put in as Exhibit GB-196.
THE PRESIDENT: My Lord, this is a series of orders; the first, I should say, of a series of orders leading up to the issue of an order which enjoined the U-boat commanders not merely to abstain from rescuing crews, which is the purpose of this order, not merely to give them no assistance but deliberately to annihilate them. My Lord, in the course of my proof of this matter, I shall call two witnesses. The first witness will give the Court an account of a speech made by the defendant at the time that he issued the order describing the policy, or his policy toward the recovery of Allied troops: that it must be stopped at all costs. The second witness is the officer who actually briefed crews on the order. My Lord, this document is an extract from the standing orders of the U-boat command, an extract from Standing Order Number 154, and it is signed by the defendant: "Paragraph e) Do pot pick up men or take them with you. Do not worry about the merchant ship's boats. Weather conditions and distance from land play no part. Have a care only for your own ship and strive only to attain your next success as soon as possible. We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began the war in order to destroy us, so nothing else matters."
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, that order, the copy we have, is not dated, but a later order, Number 173, which was issued concurrently with an operational order, is dated the 2d of May 1940. The Tribunal may take it, it is earlier than the 2d of May 1940. My Lord, that is a secret order.
THE PRESIDENT: Earlier than May 1940?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Earlier than May 1940. It was, however, in 1942, when the United States entered the war with its enormous ship-building capacity, that the change thus brought about necessitated a further adjustment in the methods adopted by the U-boats and of the defendant; and the defendant was guilty of an order which intended not merely the sinking of merchant ships, not merely the abstention from rescue of the crews, but their deliberate extermination. My Lord, the next document in the document book shows the course of events, Document D-423, and I put it in as Exhibit GB-197. It is a record of a conversation between Hitler and the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop, on the 3 of January 1942. "The Fuehrer, using a map, explains to the Japanese Ambassador the present position of marine warfare in the Atlantic, emphasizing that what he considers his most important task is to get the U-boat warfare going in full swing. The U-boats are being re-organized. Firstly, he had recalled all U-boats operating in the Atlantic. As mentioned before, they would now be posted outside United States ports. Later, they would be off Freetown and the larger boats even as far down as Capetown." And then, after further details: "After having given further explanations on the map, the Fuehrer pointed out that, however many ships the United States built, one of their main problems would be the lack of personnel. For that reason even merchant ships would be sunk without warning with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people. The training of sea-going personnel takes a very long time. We are fighting for our existence and our attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings. For this reason he must give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be taken prisoner, which is in most cases not possible on the sea, U- boats were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the lifeboats.