dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put a few more questions to you which more or less concern his relations with Hitler. According to your knowledge of the circumstances, as his collaborator, can it be said that he had the confidence of Adolf Hitler at all times when he was Foreign Minister, and also that Hitler let himself be advised and led by him altogether?
VON WEIZSACKER: As far as I am in a position to judge, he was the adviser but not the confidant of Hitler.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: But there was a certain contact between those gentlemen; is that not right?
VON WEIZSACKER: I was hardly ever a witness of such contacts.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you observe, when Von Neurath and Hitler met, whether they frequently discussed the political situation, what had to be done, and what should be done?
VON WEIZSACKER: I can only say that we of the Foreign Of lice regretted that the contact was not closer; all the more so as Hitler was frequently absent from Berlin. We considered the contact too loose.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Then, one cannot speak of close relations or of very close collaboration with Hitler in the case of Von Neurath?
VON WEIZSACKER: In my opinion, no.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And, in your opinion and according to your observation, how did the activity of Von Neurath affect foreign policy? Was he the leading man, or was he not perhaps a retarding element, that is a brake, so to speak, where matters contrary to his convictions were concerned?
VON WEIZSACKER: I have no actual proof that important foreign political actions of this period were influenced by Von Neurath. But I can well imagine that certain actions in the sphere of foreign politics were prevented...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think we can have the witness imagine. We cannot have the witness telling us what he can imagine. I think the question is too vague, and not a proper question to ask.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: During the time when Herr Von Neurath was Foreign Minister, did any authority in the Party also have an influence on the foreign policy which in effect was contrary to the tendencies of Von Neurath or at least was not shared by him?
VON WEIZSACKER: I believe there was not only one but many who acted in that way and had connection and influence with Hitler of course. That could not be verified, but it could be concluded from the results.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Do you know why, for what reason, the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in November 1935 was not signed by Von Neurath but by the then Ambassador Von Ribbentrop in London?
VON WEIZSACKER: Was not that in 1936?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: 1936; yes that is right.
VON WEIZSACKER: I assume for the reason that Hitler always liked to put several persons on to certain work, and he would then select from among them the one he considered best suited to carry the work through
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Was Von Neurath at all in agreement with this Anti-Comintern Pact?
VON WEIZSACKER: That I do not know.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was Von Neurath's policy regarding personnel? Did he try to keep old officials in office, or did he bring in National Socialist officials?
VON WEIZSACKER: Herr Von Neurath was very anxious to retain the old and familiar Foreign Of lice staff, in the Foreign Of lice, as well as in positions abroad.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: But that changed the moment he resigned?
VON WEIZSACKER: Not immediately, but later on to an increasing extent.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now, just two more questions. What was the attitude of Herr Von Neurath when he was no longer Foreign Minister and the Sudeten questions became acute, in the autumn of 1938; and what part did he play at the Munich Conference?
VON WEIZSACKER: I recall a scene in the Reich Chancellery, a day before the Munich Agreement, when Herr Von Neurath very strongly recommended pursuing a policy of appeasement and following the suggestion of Mussolini to hold a four-power conference.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that after Von Neurath had left the Foreign Office that office was forbidden to give him any information about foreign politics?
VON WEIZSACKER: I think I remember that the successor of Herr Von Neurath kept to himself information his predecessor received about foreign political matters.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Herr Von Weizsacker, you were German Ambassador to the Holy See in Rome from the summer of 1943?
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: At the same time the commander-in-chief in the Italian theater of war was Field Marshal Kesselring?
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes; that is, he was the commander-in-chief in that theater from 25 September 1943. Before that time an Italian general held the post.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you frequently called upon by Kesselring to settle differences between the German Army on one hand and the civil authorities on the other?
VON WEIZSACKER: There was constant communication between Weld Marshal Kesselring and my own office, not only in order to straighten out differences, but above all to prevent differences.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you, through your frequent contacts with Field Marshal Kesselring, gain a personal impression with regard to the attitude of the military...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we are not trying Kesselring. What relevance has this question got?
DR. LATERNSER: This question is relevant because in the crossexamination of Field Marshal Kesselring the Prosecution produced incriminating material to the effect that the military leadership in Italy did not observe the usages of war and the laws of humanity. I distinctly remember that you, Mr. President-and this may be seen on Pages 5803 and 5805 (Volume IX, Pages 234, 235)-said in reply to an objection by Dr. Stahmer that it was material incriminating the General Staff. I should like to ask the witness now present a few questions about this incriminating material.
THE PRESIDENT: If you wish to ask him anything that he knows about accusations which have been made by the Prosecution against Kesselring as a member of the General Staff, then you may do that.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. I started and that was to be a preparatory question. Herr Von Weizsacker, were the objects of art of Italy in the Italian theater of war spared and put in safekeeping?
VON WEIZSACKER: The German Wehrmacht, under the leadership of Field Marshal Kesselring, made the greatest efforts to spare and protect edifices, property, and objects of art belonging to the Church. This was a large chapter in the activities of the staff of Field Marshal Kesselring, and success was not wanting.
DR. LATERNSER: Can you give us one or two especially significant examples on this point?
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes, there are a lot of examples. I would like to mention that 6 months or a year ago an exhibition of manuscripts, incunabula, and similar things, was held in the Vatican. The German Wehrmacht is to be thanked for having saved a large part, if not the greater part of these objects.
DR. LATERNSER: That is sufficient, Herr Von Weizsacker. The high military command in Italy is accused of having treated the Italian population with especial harshness and cruelty. Can you tell us anything about the fact that precisely on the part of the high military command in Italy special measures were taken for the feeding of the population at a period when the food problem was difficult?
VON WEIZSACKER: Does this question refer especially to the food problem?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, the food problem in Rome.
VON WEIZSACKER: Well, my field of observation was only Rome. But there I can say that Field Marshal Kesselring told me one day that half his time was taken up with the question of feeding Rome. And I knew one of the higher military officials I believe his name was Seifert or something like that-who with great devotion concerned himself with this task and carried it through with success.
DR. LATERNSER: Now my last question, Herr Von Weizsacker: Through your observations of the activities of the high military leaders in Italy you must have gained a personal impression of these people. Did you get the impression that there was a sincere effort on the past of these military leaders to observe the laws of war and the laws of humanity?
VON WEIZSACKER: That is a matter of course, for otherwise certain results could not have come about. Perhaps it is not known here that in the autumn of 1943 the Holy See published a communiqué, an official communiqué, which especially praised the behavior of the German soldiers in Rome. Besides that, the sparing of the Eternal City could not have been realized if the German Wehrmacht had not behaved as it did.
DR. LATERNSER: And that was a special merit of Field Marshal Kesselring in particular?
VON WEIZSACKER: I would say that when the history of this time comes to be written first in the list of merit will be Pope Pius XII. Then praise will be accorded, in the second place to the German Wehrmacht under the leadership of Kesselring.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It has been asserted once that the Defendant Von Papen, who in the summer of 1934 had been appointed ambassador to Vienna, directed from that office a policy of aggressive expansion taking in the entire southeast up to Turkey; and that he, among other things, had offered neighboring states like Hungary and Poland territory to be gained from the intended partitioning of Czechoslovakia. Did this policy actually exist?
VON WEIZSACKER: I am sorry. I did not quite understand your question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy, which I just outlined, actually exist?
VON WEIZSACKER: My observation dates only from the late summer of 1936, as before that time I was abroad. I did not notice later that Herr Von Papen had carried on a southeastern policy for Vienna, or that he was commissioned to do so. The Foreign Office could not entrust him with such a mission, for he did not come under the Foreign Office.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: And this policy, as just outlined, did that exist at all when you entered the Foreign Office?
VON WEIZSACKER: Please repeat the question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy of expansion on the part of Germany . . .
VON WEIZSACKER: Which policy?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The aggressive policy of expansion on the part of Germany to the southeast as far as Turkey, the partitioning of Czechoslovakia, and the cession of parts of Czechoslovakia to Poland and Hungary.
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes. In 1939, no doubt?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: 1936-in 1936.
VON WEIZSACKER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution?
MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you one or two questions about the Athenia matter. You have told the Tribunal that you, yourself, saw the American charge d'Affaires and informed him, about the middle of September, that the Athenia could not have been sunk by a German U-boat. That is so, is it not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I did not see the American charge d'Affaires in the middle of September, but on the day on which I heard of the sinking, and that must have been, perhaps, 3, 4, or 5 of September.
MAJOR JONES: Were you already assuring the American representatives as early as that that a U-boat could not have been responsible?
VON WEIZSACKER: That is correct.
MAJOR JONES: And did you recommend, or rather, did the German Foreign Office recommend that the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy should receive the American naval attaché and tell him the same thing, namely, that a U-boat could not have sunk the Athenia ?
VON WEIZSACKER: That I do not know. I only dealt with the charge d'Affaires.
MAJOR JONES: I would like you to look at a new document, Document Number D-804, which will be Exhibit GB-477, which is an extract from the SKL on the Athenia case. You will see that that is a report from Neubauer to the naval attaché and it reads as follows: "The Foreign Of lice has had a report of the meeting between the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and the American naval attaché, on 13 September 1939, passed on to it by telephone. It is worded as follows: " 'On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the Commander-in-Chief of..."'
VON WEIZSACKER: I am sorry; I have not found the place as yet.
MAJOR JONES: Perhaps you would like to follow the English copy, Witness, if you would like. I read the second paragraph: " 'On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy received the American naval attaché on the advice of the Reich Foreign Minister and told him more or less the following: He had intended for some days already-as he knew-to write him that he should visit him in order to tell him his opinion about the sinking of the Athenia , in view of the continued agitation about it. However, he had waited for the return of those of the submarines that had been employed in waging war against merchant ships at the time in question and which might possibly be concerned, in order to receive reports about their activity personally. He repeated most emphatically that the sinking of the Athenia was not caused by a German submarine. The ship nearest to the place of the incident was at the time actually situated about 170 sea miles away from the place of the sinking. Besides this, the instructions as to how the commanders were to wage war against merchant shipping, had after all been published. Up to date, in no case had these instructions been even slightly disregarded. On the contrary, an American captain reported a short time before about the particularly courteous and chivalrous behavior of the submarine commanders.' " Well, now, it is clear from that, is it not, that the German Foreign Office was most anxious to cover up this matter of the Athenia as best it could; was it not?
VON WEIZSACKER: No; there was nothing to be covered up.
MAJOR JONES: When you discovered at the end of September that in fact it was the U-30 that had sunk the Athenia , there was then a good deal to be covered, was there not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I believe that I stated already yesterday that I had heard nothing to that effect.
MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you did not know at the end of September, on the return of the U-30, that the U-30 had in fact sunk the Athenia ?
VON WEIZSACKER: I do not remember that in any way at all.
MAJOR JONES: When did you first discover that the U-30 had sunk the Athenia ?
VON WEIZSACKER: As far as I remember, not at all during the war.
MAJOR JONES: But I understood you to say yesterday that you thought that the publication in the Volkischer Beobachter , accusing Mr. Winston Churchill of sinking the Athenia , was a piece of perverse imagination; is that right?
VON WEIZSACKER: Completely.
MAJOR JONES: Are you really saying to the Tribunal that -though you were in a responsible job-are you saying to the Tribunal that you did not discover the true facts about the Athenia until the end of the war, when you were directly concerned in the Foreign Office with this matter?
VON WEIZSACKER: I told you already yesterday what I know about this. It seems, does it not, that it was realized later by the Navy that the sinking of the Athenia was due to the action of a German submarine, but I cannot at all remember that I or the Foreign Office were informed of this fact.
MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder took no steps to correct the information that had been passed to the American diplomatic representatives, did he?
VON WEIZSACKER: I do not recall at all that Admiral Raeder advised me or the Foreign Office of the fact.
MAJOR JONES: Now, with regard to the Defendant Von Neurath. If it please the Tribunal, I am not proposing to question the witness as to the earlier diplomatic history, as this Tribunal has indicated that it is desirable to reserve the matter for the defendants as they go into the witness box later. [Turning to the witness.] But I want to ask you a general question. What was the earliest date at which responsible officials of the Foreign Office, like yourself, first realized that Hitler intended to wage aggressive war?
VON WEIZSACKER: That the foreign policy of Hitler's Government was a dangerous one I realized clearly for the first time in May 1933; the fact that an aggressive war was planned, perhaps, in the summer of 1938, or at least that the course pursued in foreign policy might very easily lead to war.
MAJOR JONES: Already in April 1938, the foreign political situation was so tense that you sent a special memorandum to all German diplomatic representatives dealing with the situation-the critical situation of Germany.
VON WEIZSACKER: That may be. May I be permitted to read the document?
MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at Document Number 3572-PS, which is a memorandum of the 25th of April 1938, signed by yourself, and a copy of which was sent to all the German diplomatic representatives. It will be Exhibit GB-478. That document reads: "Since the work in the field of preparation for the mobilization has made further progress within Germany in the Armed Forces and in all civil administrations including the Foreign Of lice, it is necessary now that in the case of government offices abroad corresponding measures also be taken in their area of jurisdiction without delay." And then there follows a series of instructions as to the actions that are to be taken on the commencement of the period of crisis, or of actual mobilization, and there is an insistence in the last paragraph but one: "I request the heads of offices, without waiting for further instructions, to start considering now the measures to be taken in their sphere of activity in the case of an emergency. In the interest of absolute secrecy it must be observed strictly that the number of people informed remains as restricted as possible." That suggests, does it not, that as early as April 1938 you were conscious of the imminent approach of actual mobilization; is that so?
VON WEIZSACKER: May I ask, is this document really dated the year 1938, or is it 1939? I cannot quite distinguish the date.
MAJOR JONES: It is dated the 25th of April 1938.
VON WEIZSACKER: Well, that may be.
MAJOR- JONES: Now, you yourself were opposed to Hitler's aggressive foreign policy, were you not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I did not quite understand your question.
MAJOR JONES: You yourself were opposed to Hitler's aggressive foreign policy, were you not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I personally, completely.
MAJOR JONES: Did you endeavor to persuade the Defendant Von Neurath also to oppose Hitler's aggressive foreign policy? 2Z May 46
VON WEIZSACKER: Herr Von Neurath was not Foreign Minister at that time.
MAJOR JONES: But he continued to be a very important functionary of the Nazi State, did he not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I believe that his influence in that period was even smaller than before; but I kept in touch with him, and I think I agreed with his opinion and he with mine.
MAJOR JONES: And yet he continued to serve the Nazi State, in particular, in a territory which was acquired as a result of this policy of aggression; is that not so?
YON WEIZSACKER: I should be grateful if this question would be put to Herr Von Neurath rather than to me.
MAJOR JONES: If you please. Now, you were in Italy and in Rome, were you not, in March of 1944?
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: You have given me some evidence as to the behavior of the German forces in Italy. Were you in Rome at the time of the massacres in the Hadrian Cave? You remember the incident, Witness, do you not?
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: When 325 Italians were murdered and 57 Jews were thrown in as a bit of makeweight. You were there when that happened, were you not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I believe it was 320 prisoners who were murdered in this cave which you just mentioned.
MAJOR JONES: Yes. Were you consulted about that matter?
VON WEIZSACKER: No.
MAJOR JONES: That was an action by German forces, was it not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I believe by the German Police, and not by the German Armed Forces.
MAJOR JONES: And you know, Witness, that there were many murders of that kind carried out by the SS during the period of German activity in Italy, do you not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I do not know about many murders having taken place, but I believe that the German Police were quite capable of such things.
MAJOR JONES: You know that they left a record of terror and brutality wherever they left their mark upon Italy; is that not so?
VON WEIZSACKER: The German Police, yes.
MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?
DR. SIEMERS: I have no more questions, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I now call the witness Vice Admiral Schulte-Monting.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go ahead. [The witness Schulte-Monting took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
ERICH SCHULTE-MONTING (Witness): Erich Schulte-Monting.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, please tell us briefly what positions you held from 1925 to 1945, particularly in what positions you served immediately under Admiral Raeder.
SCHULTE-MONTING: From 1925 to 1928 I was naval adjutant to Reichsprasident Hindenburg and, as such, simultaneously second adjutant to the Chief of the Naval Command Staff. Consequently my first collaboration with Raeder dates back to 1928. From 1929 until 1933 I had several front commands. From 1933 to 1937 I was first adjutant to Raeder. From 1937 to 1939 I had several front commands. From 1939 to 1943 I was Admiral Raeder's Chief of Staff; and up to 1944 I remained Admiral Doenitz' Chief of Staff. In January 1944 I was naval commander in southern France until the invasion; subsequently commanding general in North Trondheim. After the collapse I was employed for some months with the British Navy in winding up activities. Then in the autumn I was interned in a camp for generals in England.
DR. SIEMERS: Please tell me, if you can remember, in which month of 1939 you started to work with Raeder.
SCHULTE-MONTING: The first of January 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us briefly anything about Raeder's prestige as a navy expert, especially abroad? I mean only with regard to technical naval questions.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. I believe that through the many years of service I had with Raeder, and the many conversations I had with foreigners, I have been able to form some idea. After all, Raeder was head of the Navy for 15 years. He was known, or rather had a name, as a naval officer and as Chief of Staff of the last Commander-in-Chief of the German Imperial Navy, Admiral Hipper, the opponent of the famous British Admiral Beatty in the Skagerrak battle. He was known...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you kindly observe that light. When the yellow light goes on, you are talking too fast. When the red light goes on, you must stop.
SCHULTE-MONTING: He was known through his literary activity at the time of the "Tirpitz Era," when he edited the Nautikus , and later, after the first World War, through his two works on cruiser warfare in the last World War, for which he received an honorary doctor's degree and which, I should say, gained him a reputation among experts.
DR. SIEMERS: The defendant is accused of building up the Navy with the intention of carrying on an aggressive war, and this even after the Treaty of Versailles was already in force.
SCHULTE-MONTING: That is not correct. Never in all my conversations which I had with Raeder was the thought-much less the word-of an aggressive war mentioned. I believe that all his actions and his directives contradict this.
DR. SIEMERS: Were there possibly any ideas of a strategic nature under consideration, while the Versailles Treaty was in force, with a view to an aggressive war?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Never.
DR. SIEMERS: What was the basic reason for the maneuvers held by the Navy from the years 1932 until 1939? SCHULTE-MONTING They were held exclusively with a view to the security, protection, and defense of the coastal waters and the coast itself.