dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
* * * it isn't necessary to even discuss that. "Goering: With all of its organizations. "Dombrowski: With all of its organizations within this country. "Goering: In uniform? "Dombrowski: In uniform. "Goering: Good. "Dombrowski: calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have already been on duty for one-half hour which means everything is all right." (2949-PS, Part C) In addition Goering stated that the Cabinet must be formed by 7:30 p. m., and he transmitted instructions, to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart, as to who should be appointed to the cabinet: "Goering: Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Fuehrer and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One thing I have forgotten, fishbeck must have the Department of Economy and Commerce. "Dombrowski: That's understood. "Goering: Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security and Bahr is to have the armed forces. The Austrian Army is to be taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the Justice Department. "Dombrowski: Yes, yes. "Goering: Give me the name. "Dombrowski: Well, your brother-in-law. Isn't that right? "Goering: Yes? "Dombrowski: Yes. "Goering: That's right and then also Fishbeck." (2949-PS, Part C) About twenty minutes later, at 5:26 p. m., Goering received the news that Miklas was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. He issued instructions for an ultimatum to be delivered to Miklas. The telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart went as follows: "G: Now remember the following: You go immediately together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lt. General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please, do inform us immediately about Miklas' position. Tell him, there is no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we received before action was delayed, but now the situation is that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The Invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the
us immediately about Miklas' position. Tell him, there is no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we received before action was delayed, but now the situation is that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The Invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship. (There follows a sentence which is broken up) M. does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party with all its organizations (again interruption) and then call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They should now be in the streets. So remember, report must be given till 7:30. Lt. General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4 minutes." (2949-PS, Part E) An hour later, at 6:28 p. m. Goering had an extensively interrupted telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When told that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Goering replied: "Goering: Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him; just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that SI shall call on the national Socialists guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order". (2949-PS, Part H) After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed Goering that Miklas was still sticking to his old viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to him and there might be definite word in about ten minutes. The conversation proceeded as follows: "G: Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes beck, then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich Chancellery-as usually, but it has to be done fast. I hardly can justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power; all right? "S. But if he threatens? "G. Yes. "S. Well, I see, then we shall be ready (antreten). "G. Call me via Blitz." (2949-PS, Part h) It is plain that Goering and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The
to take over the power; all right? "S. But if he threatens? "G. Yes. "S. Well, I see, then we shall be ready (antreten). "G. Call me via Blitz." (2949-PS, Part h) It is plain that Goering and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The plan involved both the use of the National Socialist forces in Austria and invasion by German troops. Later that night, at about 8:00 o'clock, Goering and Seyss-Inquart had another conversation. This was after the ultimatum had expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Goering that Miklas was still refusing to name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as follows: "G: O.K. I shall give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I shall tell you now! Everyone who offers resistance or organizes resistance, will immediately be subjected to our court-martial, the court-martial of our invading troops. Is that clear? "S: Yes. "G: Including leading personalities, it doesn't make any difference. "S: Yes, they have given the order, not to offer any resistance. "G: Yes, it does not matter: The Federal President did not authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance. "S: Yes. "G: Well, now you are officially authorized. "S: Yes. "G: Well, good luck, Heil Hitler." (2949-PS, Part 1) Another historical event-the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart sent to the German Government requesting it to send troops into Austria to help put down disorder-was discussed over the telephone. A conversation held at 8:48 between Goering and Keppler proceeded as follows: "G: Well, I do not know yet. Listen: The main thing is, that Inquart takes over all powers of the Government, that he keeps the radio stations occupied. "K: Well, we represent the Government now. "G: Yes, that's it. You are the Government. Listen carefully: The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes: 'The provisional Austrian Government which after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, consider it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request, to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose
Take the notes: 'The provisional Austrian Government which after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, consider it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request, to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German Government to send German Troops as soon as possible'. "K: Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the professional groups (?)" (2949-PS, Part L) And a few minutes later the conversation continued as follows: "G: Then our troops will cross the border today. "K: Yes. "G: Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible. "K: Will send the telegram to SI in the office of the Federal Chancery. "G: Please, show him the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are asking him-well, he does not even have to send the telegram-all he needs to do is to say: agreed. "K: Yes. "G: Either call me at the Fuehrer's or at my place. Well, good luck. Heil Hitler!" (2949-PS, Part L) It will be recalled that in the first conversation (Part A), held at 3:05 p. m., Goering had requested Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon. But now the matter was so urgent that Goering dictated the exact wording of the telegram over the telephone. And an hour later, at 9:54 p.m., a conversation between Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went as follows: "D: I need the telegram urgently. "K: Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees. "D: This is marvelous. Thank you. "K: Listen to the radio. News will be given. "D: Where? "K: From Vienna. "D: So Seyss-Inquart agrees? "K: Jawohl!" (2949-PS, Part m) (4) The Order to Invade Austria. Communications with Austria were now suspended. But the German military machine had been set in motion. A Directive, dated 11 March 1938 at 2045 hours, from Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, initialed by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, ordered the invasion of Austria because of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The directive reads: "Re: Operation Otto "Directive No. 2 "1. The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian government have not been fulfilled. "2. The Austrian Armed Forces have been
by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, ordered the invasion of Austria because of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The directive reads: "Re: Operation Otto "Directive No. 2 "1. The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian government have not been fulfilled. "2. The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting. "The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord. "3. To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3. "I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all forces to the full, as quickly as possible. (signed) ADOLF HITLER" (C-182) (5) Communications with Rome-Avoidance of Disaster. But at the very time that Hitler and Goering had embarked on this military undertaking, they still had a question mark in their minds-Italy. Italy had massed forces on the Italian-Austrian border on the occasion of the 25 July 1934 putsch. Italy had traditionally been the political protector of Austria. At 10:25 p.m. that evening, however, Hitler heard from Prince Philip of Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just returned from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole affair in a very friendly manner. The telephone conversation went thus: "H: I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. The (Hessen) Duce accepted the whole thing in a very-friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had been informed from Austria, Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had then said it would be a complete impossibility. It would be a bluff, such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that Austria would be immaterial to him. "F: Then, please, tell Mussolini, I will never forget him for (Fuehrer) this. "H: Yes. "F: Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a quite different agreement with him. "H: Yes, I told him that, too. "F: As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin, nothing matters. "H: Yes, my Fuehrer. "F: Listen, I shall make any
never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a quite different agreement with him. "H: Yes, I told him that, too. "F: As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin, nothing matters. "H: Yes, my Fuehrer. "F: Listen, I shall make any agreement-I am no longer in fear of the terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I forget that. "H: Yes, my Fuehrer. "F: I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even if the whole world were against him. "H: Yes, my Fuehrer." (2949-PS, Part N) It will be recalled that Jodl referred in his diary (1780-PS) to the letter which Hitler sent to Mussolini. In this letter, dated 11 March 1938, after stating that Austria had been declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote: "I have decided to reestablish order in my Fatherland, order and tranquility, and to give to the popular will the possibility of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and by its own decision." He stated that this was only an act of self-defense, that he had no hostile intentions toward Italy. (2510-PS) After the invasion, when in Linz, Austria, Hitler communicated his gratitude to Mussolini once more, this time by telegraph: "Mussolini, I will never forget you for this." (2467-PS) (6) The Appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. Late in the evening of March 11, President Miklas appointed Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart's appointment was made at 11:15 p.m. (2465-PS) (7) Later Communications with London-Misleading Explanations. On Sunday, 13 March 1938, the day after the invasion, Goering, who had been left in charge of the Reich by Hitler, telephoned Ribbentrop in London. Their conversation disclosed the way in which the Nazis soothed and misled other nations: "G: As you know the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the administration of the current government procedures (Fuehrung der Regierungsgeschaft). And therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can
disclosed the way in which the Nazis soothed and misled other nations: "G: As you know the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the administration of the current government procedures (Fuehrung der Regierungsgeschaft). And therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the radio. "R: Yes, it is fantastic, isn't it? "G: Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely overshadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again. now, I mainly want to talk about political things. Well, this story we had given an ultimatum, that is just foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist ministers and the representatives of the people (Volksreferenten) have presented the ultimatum. Later on, more and more prominent people of the Movement Party participated, and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist ministers asked us to back them up, so they would not be completely beaten up against and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told them we would not allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, under no circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg's direct order, or with consent the Communists and the Reds had been armed, and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed with "Heil Moskau" and so on; naturally, all these facts caused some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Fatherland Front (Vaterlandische Front) would fight to its last man; one could not know that they would capitulate like that and therefore Seyss-Inquart who already had taken over the government asked us to march in immediately. Before we had already marched up to the frontier since we could not know whether there would be a civil war or not. These are the actual facts which can be proved by documents.* * *" "G: No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you spoke already to these people. I want that you once more, - but no - not at all once more, - but generally speaking - tell the following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the ultimatum
not know if you spoke already to these people. I want that you once more, - but no - not at all once more, - but generally speaking - tell the following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the ultimatum was presented to him by S-I, Glaise-Horstenau and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but it also was given by the others and as far as I know just a military attaché came along, asked by S-I, because of a technical question; he was supposed to ask whether in case S-I would ask for the support of German troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore, I want to state that S-I asked us expressly by phone as by telegram to send troops because he did not know about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; because arms had been distributed there. And then he could not know how the Fatherland Front might react since they always had had such a big mouth. "R: Mr. Goering, tell me, how is the situation in Vienna, is everything settled yet? "G: Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with some companies, in order to secure the airfield and they were received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17 division marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also I want to point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw but that they got together and fraternized immediately with the German troops, wherever they were stationed." (2949-PS, Part W) In view of the previous conversations, these are interesting explanations-that the ultimatum was made by Seyss-Inquart alone and not by Goering; that Lt. Gen. Muff, the military attaché, came along merely to answer a technical question; and that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone and by telegram for troops. But perhaps this conversation can best be understood in light of the actual physical scene of time and place: "G: Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you. "R: I shall see you this afternoon. "G: The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am sitting here on my balcony-all covered with blankets-in the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in, I have to
scene of time and place: "G: Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you. "R: I shall see you this afternoon. "G: The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am sitting here on my balcony-all covered with blankets-in the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in, I have to make the speech, and the birds are twittering, and here and there I can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful over there. "R: That is marvelous." (2949-PS, Part W) The British Foreign Office had protested the tactics employed by the German Government. In a letter dated 12 March 1938 Ambassador Neville Henderson, at the British Embassy, Berlin, wrote to Lord Halifax, Foreign Minister, as follows: "My Lord, "With reference to your telegram No. 79 of March 11th, I have the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter which I addressed to Baron von Neurath in accordance with the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on the same evening. "The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron von Neurath at the same time." (3045-PS) The enclosure was the note of March 11th from the British Embassy to Von Neurath and it reads as follows: "Dear Reich Minister, "My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding inter alia, the resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be National Socialists, and the readmission of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping order in Vienna. "I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to the German Government that if this report is correct, H.M.G. in the U.K. feel bound to register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of coercion backed by force against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence. "As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues." (3045-PS) Von Neurath wrote a letter of response dated 12 March 1938. He first objected to the fact that
independence. "As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues." (3045-PS) Von Neurath wrote a letter of response dated 12 March 1938. He first objected to the fact that the British Government was undertaking the role of protector of Austria's independence: "In the name of the German Government I must point out here that the Royal British Government has no right to assume the role of a protector of Austria's independence. In the course of diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German Government never left any doubt with the Royal British Government that the formation of relations between Germany and Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern of the German people and that it did not affect third Power." (3287-PS) Then, in response to the assertions regarding Germany's ultimatum, Von Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version of events: "* * * Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced, on the evening of the 9th of March, the surprising and arbitrary resolution, decided on by himself, to hold an election within a few days which, under the prevailing circumstances, and especially according to the details provided for the execution of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of oppressing politically the predominant majority of the population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria's internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore, a crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and in the formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring about this development. Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former Chancellor, that the German Government had presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention; according to the