dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It offered a favorable opportunity to get rid of troublesome opponents: The examples of Schleicher, of Klausner and others have sufficiently shown that. There was no way of knowing beforehand when and in what manner the measures taken against the persons already involved in these matters would end. The heated imagination saw in every man with opposing ideas a conspirator with these SA groups who sooner or later had really intended to revolt against Hitler. How far indeed persons of the right, because of their opposing attitude, had joined hands with the SA, which was a powerful factor at that time, has not been established with certainty up to now. However, it could not be judged at that time whether or not Hitler's statements in regard to persons not belonging to the SA were correct. For Papen the situation at that time was as follows: He knew of Bose's assassination but was as yet unaware of Jung's fate. He hoped that the latter had escaped. Three of his co-workers were in a concentration camp. These had first to be released. And also in view of the future the suspicion had to be dispelled that any one of them, as well as Papen himself, had been in contact with the SA circles in revolt. If Papen ever wished to make any representations with Hitler, the first requirements for any possible success would be to show that he was far removed from such SA circles. Papen therefore felt obliged to assure Hitler of his loyalty and faith. Besides, Papen had been convinced for years that Himmler and Goebbels were behind the attack on him and the Vice Chancellery and that Himmler in particular wanted to eliminate him, having been prevented from doing so only by Goering and that therefore in order to protect himself against these two it was necessary to assure Hitler of his irreproachable attitude.. In judging these letters it is not their form but their contents which is essential. The whole gist of the letters is the demand of rehabilitation for his own person and his associates. He demands court action.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He advises Hitler to strike out from his intended Justification Law all actions directed against persons outside the SA circle. But what is the meaning of these demands of Papen? Their real significance is his adherence to legality with regard to the illegal actions of 30 June. He demands an objective and judicial clarification of all that is to be condemned in the events of 30 June. When we consider these events of 30 June, we must always bear in mind that they fall into two parts. The first were measures against the SA leaders, whose radicalism had always been known and who were always connected with acts of violence and independent activities which in the past had had to be condemned. Intervention against such people could be explained as an act of state defense against dangerous forces which were ever ready for revolt. The other part consisted of measures against individuals outside the SA circle. A court investigation would have resulted in the clearing up of these events and in condemning the persons responsible. I believe that an objective study of the events at that time leads one to the conviction that Papen's letters really had no other purpose than to achieve what he had proposed to Hitler, namely, rehabilitation by means of a court action of those persons who had been unjustly persecuted and the insistence on a decree to establish the illegality of the measures in question. If we come now to the heart of the matter and to what was actually desired we can by no means give to the form of these letters the meaning which is ascribed to them by the Prosecution. That this form in particular did not represent an approval of the measures of 30 June but was merely used for the above-mentioned purpose is best shown by the examination of the letter of 17 July. Though at that time Papen had succeeded in having his co-workers released from the concentration camp, his other demands were not fulfilled by Hitler.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: So we now see a piece of writing which is entirely lacking even in the most elementary forms of politeness, merely objective statements and objective requests, a piece of writing signed only with the name of Papen, without even a closing courtesy formula. With regard to the subject Papen does not retreat from his line of conduct for a single moment. He insists upon his resignation and demands immediate action on it, as the letter of 10 July 1934 shows; he refuses to play any part in future government activities. He leaves Hitler immediately after having had him called out of the Cabinet session on 3 July. He keeps aloof from the Reichstag session at which the Justification Law is passed. He rudely declines the offer to accept the comfortable post of Ambassador at the Vatican. Such was his negative attitude. As to the positive one, he strives to bring about the intervention of the Armed Forces. He turns to his friend Generaloberst Von Fritsch. Blomberg, because of his attitude, is out of the question. Fritsch will not act without an express order from the Reich President. So now Papen endeavors, to get in touch with Hindenburg. But Hindenburg's entourage keeps him off.
THE PRESIDENT: You might stop there. [The Tribunal adjourned until 23 July 1946 at 1000 hours.]
DR KUBUSCHOK: Yesterday I stopped at the point where I was describing what Papen did in the course of the measures of 30 June. I mentioned his resignation, his refusal to co-operate in any way. I shall continue at the bottom of Page 46, the last paragraph. On the positive side he strives to have the Armed Forces intervene. He applies to his friend General Von Fritsch. Blomberg, because of his attitude, is out of the question. Fritsch will not act except on the express orders of the Reich President. Papen then endeavors to contact Hindenburg. But Hindenburg's entourage keeps him off. All access to his estate, Neudeck, is blocked by SS guards. Papen sends his secretary Ketteler to Hindenburg's neighbor and old friend Herr Von Oldenburg in order to obtain access to Hindenburg by this means, but that attempt also fails. He is left to witness how far Hindenburg has obviously been influenced when he publicly approves of Hitler's conduct in an official telegram on 30 June. What steps were left for Papen to take with the prospect of even moderate success? In his negotiations with Hitler he had tried to put matters on a legal basis. His attempts to mobilize the only factor of power, the Armed Forces, had failed. Hindenburg was unapproachable; his advisers had evidently influenced him in the opposite direction. The Prosecution hold that this was the time for Papen to refer openly to the criminal events of June 1930: by so doing he could have brought about the collapse of the entire Nazi system. mat assertion is untenable. Apart from the fact that, as we have demonstrated, Papen could no longer make an official statement of this nature, subsequent developments in Germany have made it plain that no individual protest of the kind would have had any effect on Hitler's power either at home or abroad. Hitler's prestige in Germany was already so great-and it increased as time went on-that such a protest, assuming that it reached the public at all, would certainly have found no echo in the masses of the population.
DR KUBUSCHOK: The great masses saw only the economic improvement and the strengthening of Germany's position abroad, and only a comparatively small number of them realized the true danger of this development. Foreign countries were, for the most part, better informed of the events of 30 June than were the Germans themselves. A statement by Papen would not have made matters clearer to the German people. No conclusions were drawn from the available knowledge by foreign countries either at that time or later. The Prosecution even believe that such a step might have led to the reoccupation of the Rhineland by the French. I cannot imagine on what the Prosecution base this assertion. It is contradicted by the fact that later events, not connected with internal politics, but vitally affecting other countries-for instance, the introduction of compulsory military service and the occupation of the Rhineland- called forth no military reaction. By his resignation and his open refusal to attend cabinet and Reichstag sessions, Papen made it clear to the public that he was opposed to the state of affairs. His conduct was a public protest against the measures of 30 June and their perpetrator. The Prosecution cannot deny these outward signs, which are historical facts. They attempt, however, to construct an antithesis between his outward behavior and his inner convictions. The only evidence at their disposal for that purpose are the letters addressed by Papen to Hitler in July. Even if the real nature and purpose of these letters were not clearly discernible from their contents, as in fact is the case, such an attempt would fail in any case in face of the facts just stated-since the means at hand were, from their very nature, inadequate. In this connection, I would like, in general, to make the following observations: What reason could Papen have for assuming in public a hostile attitude toward Hitler during his vice-chancellorship, and during the events of 30 June, if he had been, in fact, his loyal follower?
DR KUBUSCHOK: What reason could Hitler who, according to the Prosecution, conspired with Papen, have had for desiring this, and this, after all, would only be a result of the conspiracy? Could Hitler have wished Papen to disclose in his Marburg speech all the weaknesses and abuses of the Nazi system? What reason could Hitler have had for wishing Papen to remain so obviously aloof from the lawless proceedings of 30 June? It could only have been in line with his policy to show the unity between Vice Chancellor and Reich Chancellor to the public. If these points are taken into consideration, there is only one possible conclusion: There is no logical basis for the Prosecutions interpretation of Papen's inner conviction. This thesis of unconditional obedience to Hitler, despite certain facts apparently indicating the contrary-but actually for purposes of camouflage-is again applied by the Prosecution to Papen's acceptance of the Vienna post. Before discussing this problem, let 23 July 4s me briefly state the following. In my opinion the final development in the Austrian question-which occurred after Papen's recall, and undoubtedly without his co-operation-namely the marching-in on 12 March 1938-does not represent a crime in the sense of the Charter either. The Charter considers as punishable the preparation and waging of a war of aggression, or a war by violation of international treaties. In the three counts of the Indictment, the Charter confines itself to the arraignment of what appears to be crime at its gravest, with terrible and all-embracing consequences. The forbidden war of aggression itself, the crimes against the laws regulating the conduct of warfare, the crimes against humanity in their most brutal form, the immeasurable consequences of these grave actions-all these things have justified this unusual trial. The Charter does not charge the Tribunal with the punishment of all the injustices which have occurred in the course of the development of National Socialism.
DR KUBUSCHOK: In particular it does not charge the Tribunal with the task of investigating every political measure in order to determine whether it was necessary or permissible. Such a task is no part of the functions of this Tribunal, if only for technical reasons and for lack of the necessary time. It is not the task of the Tribunal to examine whether or not international treaties were observed. This question is only of importance if wars were caused, or if the crimes of violence which are to be described in detail have to be accounted for. The march into Austria is not a war, however far one stretches the meaning of the term, from the standpoint of international law. Here the sole decisive factor is that no force was employed, and not the slightest resistance offered; but that, on the contrary, the troops were received with jubilation. Furthermore, the march into Austria cannot be considered in connection with the later acts of aggression. It was a special case, based on an obvious predicament, which found its expression since 1918, in the fact that efforts had been made by both the Austrians and the Germans to effect some kind of constitutional union between the barely viable Austrian State and Germany. Therefore, the actual events must be considered apart from Hitler's war plans, and even from his purely military plans of preparation-with which I shall deal later-and must be regarded as the solution of a state political problem which had become acute, and the result of which had always been desired by both sides, independently of Hitler. Papen's activity in Vienna is clearly characterized by three episodes: The circumstance of his appointment on 26 July 1934; his letter to Hitler dated 16 July 1936-Defense Exhibit Papen-71, Document 2247-PS-after the conclusion of the July agreement; and his recall on 4 February 1938. The following circumstances led to his appointment. A crucial event had occurred: Dollfuss had been murdered. Not only were Austro-German relations strained, but they had reached an extremely dangerous stage of development.
DR KUBUSCHOK: The international situation was acute. Italy was mobilizing at the Brenner. It was to be feared that Austria would now turn finally to one of the groups of powers interested. A situation which would definitely and finally render impossible the maintenance of even tolerable relations between Germany and Austria seemed to be impending. In this difficult situation, Hitler obviously thought it necessary to discard his objections to Papen's person and to entrust him with the mission in Vienna. Papen was particularly fitted to initiate a policy designed to overcome the deadlock caused by the assassination of Dollfuss. In the Cabinet, Papen had always been in favor of developing friendly relations with Austria. Papen had an international reputation as being the representative of a reasonable policy of mutual understanding. He naturally had strong misgivings in taking over this post, however. His recent experience in home politics, his personal attitude to his own and his colleagues' treatment on 30 June, his attitude to the murder of Dollfuss, with whom he had remained on the most friendly terms since his previous office, were against his accepting the post. It was, therefore. a very difficult decision for Papen to make; but the consideration that he alone was in a position to fulfill this task in the spirit of genuine appeasement was bound to outweigh everything else. Could he assume that any other man had the necessary strength of will, as well as the power, to insure that the way of appeasement now begun would be followed to the end? The personal independence which he himself enjoyed could not be expected of a German Foreign Office official, much less of a Party man. Papen brought to this his experience as Vice-chancellor. He knew the difficulties of convincing Hitler by arguments of fact alone. He alone had any prospect of insuring a consistent peace policy in the future, in spite of the opposition of Hitler extremist advisers. On the other hand, he had learned caution from his experiences.
DR KUBUSCHOK: He stated conditions and demanded the establishment of a clear policy based on facts. He demanded that no further influence be exerted on the Austrian Nazi movement, and that this be insured, in the first place, by the dismissal of the man who had played a direct or indirect part in the criminal act-Landesinspektor Habicht. He asked that he himself be subordinated to Hitler personally in order to assure compliance with the conditions as he had proposed them, and to avoid their being weakened by administrative channels. He succeeded in doing something ordinarily impossible in his relations with the head of the State: The conditions under which he accepted the post of Ambassador were laid down in writing. They were signed by Hitler. He wanted always to be in a position to force Hitler to keep to his written word. We obtain a clear picture of these events through the testimonies given by witnesses, particularly by the statement made by Von Tschirschky, a man who, as the Prosecution have stated, is certainly not suspected of viewing the defendant in a favorable light. The Prosecution assert that Papen, as a faithful follower of Hitler's already known plans of aggression, had, from motives of sheer opportunism, eagerly and willingly accepted the new post. On the other hand, can the form of the appointment and the extreme precautions taken by the defendant really harmonize with such an attitude? These secret conferences, this unpublished document signed by Hitler, which was in Papen's possession, cannot really be regarded as a pretense made in order to create a false impression, as the charge made by the Prosecution would infer. These things were not intended to be publicized and were, in fact, never made public. The circumstances connected with his acceptance of the Vienna post can only lead us to conclude that Papen was sincerely eager to maintain the appeasement policy agreed upon. It is absurd to speak of opportunism in this connection. Papen had declined the position of Ambassador to the Vatican.
DR KUBUSCHOK: The position of Ambassador in Vienna was hardly an enticing post of honor for a former Reich Chancellor and recent Vice Chancellor. The soundness of Papen's own financial situation excluded all thought of material motives. Papen's letter of 16 July 1936 to Hitler is a report on the success of his many years of work in the interests of settled peaceful relations between both countries. The treaty of 11 July 1936 put the seal upon this. There can be no question as to the value of this document as evidence. It gives a clear account of Papen's assignment and the way in which he carried it out. Papen points out that the task for which he was called to Vienna on 26 July 1934 is now concluded. He considers his work as finished with the conclusion of the treaty. There can be no clearer proof of the truth of Papen's statement, in regard to his task and the way in which it was carried out, than that furnished by this letter. And yet, what farfetched and dubious motives have been imputed to him in connection with this mission! He is said to have acted as Hitler willing tool in accepting the task of preparing and carrying out the forcible annexation of Austria. He is said to have keen instructed to undermine the Schuschnigg Government and to co-operate for this purpose with the illegal Nazi movement in Austria. Everything he did with a view to mutual appeasement is described as camouflage to help him to carry out his underground plans. And here is a report of his work which is addressed to his employer and is above suspicion. Is it camouflage, intended to create an impression entirely incompatible with the facts-this letter, found by the Allied troops in the secret archive of the Reich Chancellery, and now obligingly placed at the disposal of the Defense Counsel by the Prosecution? The third episode which clearly indicates the nature of Papen's activity in Vienna is his recall on 4 February 1938. The numerous recalls and appointments made on that date clearly showed reorganization of the most important military and political posts.
DR KUBUSCHOK: The identity of the military men and diplomats recalled makes clear what the sole reason was for the unusual and extensive changes made at that time. If Hitler at such a time recalled Papen from his post, without any other definite cause for doing so, entirely unexpectedly and without giving reason, this clearly proves that Hitler, embarking upon a foreign policy of extremism, no longer considered Papen the right man for Vienna. These three points are in themselves sufficient and unequivocal proof of the peaceful nature of Papen's activities throughout the entire duration of his Austrian mission. As the Prosecution, however, tries in this case to interpret isolated incidents in a manner unfavorable to Papen, I shall briefly consider this period also. We see Papen engaged in a steady struggle against the illegal movement. The charge that he had conspired with it is best refuted ad absurdum by the fact that plans made by the illegal movement, and stated by Foreign Minister Schmidt to be genuine, reveal that members of this same illegal movement had planned to murder Papen. The documentary evidence from the available reports sent by Papen to Hitler also leads in one direction only. This, too' is absolutely clear proof, since the routine reports regularly made to Hitler certainly exclude any possibility of deliberate deception of the public. It is regrettable that the reports could not be found in their entirety so as to furnish us with a clear and complete historical picture of Papen's activities. Only a fraction of the reports are in our hands. But if Papen sent carbon copies of all his reports abroad at the end of his period of activity, as the evidence has shown, he surely could only have done it in order to justify his policy of appeasement in the eyes of history. This constitutes absolutely clear proof that his policy, as shown in the complete series of reports, must have been a policy contrary to the development affected by other quarters in March 1938.
DR KUBUSCHOK: All the witnesses who have appeared in court, and who could give information on conditions in Austria, have stated under oath that Papen's policy was a policy of appeasement, and that he opposed any attempts made by the illegal movement to interfere in politics. In view of these facts, what can be concluded from the presentation of the Prosecution? That Papen, by reason of his position as German Ambassador, and in accordance with the state treaty concluded with Austria, had to maintain a certain external connection with members of the Austrian Nazi movement-a connection which was in no way secret, which was purely for purposes of observation, and which was necessary to enable him to fulfill his obligations to report to Berlin on actual conditions in Austria? If he had actually collaborated with the illegal movement in the way the Prosecution state he did, this would most certainly have been mentioned in his reports to Berlin. He does not work out any secret plans with the illegal movement. On the contrary, we see him openly negotiating with the Austrian Government over the part to be played by the National Opposition in the work of the Government, as agreed upon in the July treaty. Finally, since we have before us in Rainer's report the' written history of the illegal movement, we see their activities proceeding during those years without the slightest co-operation or support from Papen. What conclusions can be drawn to the disadvantage of the defendant from the fact that he was interested in the activities of the Austrian Freiheitsbund, when this organization is described as representing a non-Nazi trade union, an Austrian organization which was thought to be willing to follow Schuschnigg and in support of his Cabinet? What conclusions can be drawn to the disadvantage of the defendant from the fact that he also watched the situation of the Government in Austria and reported on it to Berlin? Or when, in this connection, he expresses a wish that this or that combination may favor the development of friendly relations with Austria?