dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
for the time being, to carry on the German policy, under the well known and proved slogans of 'the right to autonomy' and 'Racial unity'. Anything else might be interpreted as pure imperialism on our part and create the resistance to our plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically, than our forces could stand up to." (TC-76) That was on 26 August 1938, just as the Czech crisis was leading up to the Munich settlement. While at Munich, a day or two before the Munich agreement was signed, Herr Hitler made a speech. On 26 September he said: "I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe." (TC-29) A letter from Admiral Carl, dated some time in September, with no precise date, and entitled "Opinion on the 'Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England'," stated as follows: "There is full agreement with the main theme of the study." "If according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power who needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean." (C-23) That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich agreement in September 1938. The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the Nazi Government had hoped and intended. As a result, the conspirators were not prepared straight away to start any further aggressive action against Poland or elsewhere. But with the advantages that were gained by the seizure of Czechoslovakia, it is obvious now that they intended and had taken the decision to proceed against Poland so soon as Czechoslovakia had been entirely occupied. As Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent occasions, Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for the attack on Poland. It is known now form what Hitler said in talking to his military commanders at a later date, that, in his own words, from the first he never intended to abide by the Munich agreement, but that he had to have the whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed in full force against Poland, after September 1938 they did at once begin to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig until the whole of Czechoslovakia had been
intended to abide by the Munich agreement, but that he had to have the whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed in full force against Poland, after September 1938 they did at once begin to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig until the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken in March. Immediately after the Sudetenland had been occupied, preliminary steps were taken to stir up trouble with Poland, which would and was to eventually lead to the Nazi excuse or justification for their attack on that country. The earlier discussions between the German and Polish governments on the question of Danzig, which commenced almost immediately after the Munich crisis in September 1938, began as cautious and friendly discussions, until the remainder of Czechoslovakia had finally been seized in March of the following year. A document taken from the Official Polish White Book, gives an account of a luncheon which took place at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on 25 October, where Ribbentrop had discussions with M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador to Germany. The report states: "In a conversation on 24 October, over a luncheon at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present, M. von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement of issues (Gesamtloesung) between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze. In exchange M. von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an extension of the Polish-German Agreement by twenty-five years and a guarantee of Polish-German frontiers." "Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von Ribbentrop that I could see no possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the substance of this conversation to you." (TC-73 No. 44) It seems clear that the whole question of Danzig, as indeed Hitler himself said, was no question at all. Danzig was raised simply as an excuse, a justification, not for the seizure of Danzig but for the invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland.
the substance of this conversation to you." (TC-73 No. 44) It seems clear that the whole question of Danzig, as indeed Hitler himself said, was no question at all. Danzig was raised simply as an excuse, a justification, not for the seizure of Danzig but for the invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland. As the story unfolds it will become ever more apparent that that is what the Nazi conspirators were really aiming at, only providing themselves with some kind of crisis which would afford some kind of justification for attacking Poland. Another document taken from the Polish White Book (TC-73 No. 45) sets out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, gave to Mr. Lipski to hand to the German government in reply to the suggestions put forward by Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on 24 October. The first part reviews the history of Polish-German relationship and emphasizes the needs of Poland in respect to Danzig. Paragraph 6 of the document states: "In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish government, the Danzig question is governed by two factors: the right of the German population of the city and the surrounding villages to freedom of life and development; and the fact that in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely bound up with Poland." (TC-73 No. 45) The document then sets out the guarantees to Poland under the statute, and continues as follows: "Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a friendly understanding with the government of the German Reich, the Polish government proposes the replacement of the League of Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bi-lateral Polish-German Agreement. This agreement should guarantee the existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of national and cultural life to its German majority, and also should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the complications involved in such a system, the Polish government must state that any other solution, and in particular any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must
as to assure freedom of national and cultural life to its German majority, and also should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the complications involved in such a system, the Polish government must state that any other solution, and in particular any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of Polish-German understanding in all its aspects. "In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am ready to have final conversations personally with the governing circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would be dangerous for the future." (TC-73 No. 45) The first stage in those negotiations had been entirely successful from the German point of view. The Nazis had put forward a proposal, the return of the City of Danzig to the Reich, which they might well have known would have been unacceptable. It was unacceptable and the Polish government had warned the Nazi government that it would be. The Poles had offered to enter into negotiations, but they had not agreed, which is exactly what the German government had hoped for. They had not agreed to the return of Danzig to the Reich. The first stage in producing the crisis had been accomplished. Shortly afterwards, within a week or so, and after the Polish government had offered to enter into discussions with the German government, another top secret order was issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed by Keitel (C-137). Copies went to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. The order is headed "First Supplement to Instruction dated 21 October 1938," and reads: "The Fuehrer has ordered: Apart from the three contingencies mentioned in the instructions of 21 October 1938, preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise. "The preparations will be made on the following basis: Condition is quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland." (C-137) The remainder of Czechoslovakia had not yet been seized, and
of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise. "The preparations will be made on the following basis: Condition is quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland." (C-137) The remainder of Czechoslovakia had not yet been seized, and therefore the Nazis were not yet ready to go to war with Poland. But Keitel's order shows how the German government answered the Polish proposal to enter into discussions. On 5 January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler. (TC-73 No. 48). Ribbentrop was also present. In the first part of that conversation, of which that document is an account, Hitler offered to answer any questions. He said he had always followed the policy laid down by the 1934 agreement. He discussed the question of Danzig and emphasized that in the German view it must sooner or later return to Germany. The conversation continued: "Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult problem. He added that in the Chancellor's suggestion he did not see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this matter. "In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite new, some new form, for which he used the term "Korperschaft,' which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be quite at ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the Polish Government." (TC-73 No. 48) It will be recalled that in the previous document discussed (C-137) orders had already been issued for preparations to be made for the occupation of Danzig by surprise. Yet some six weeks later Hitler assured the Polish Foreign Minister that there would be no fait accompli and that he should be quite at his ease. On the day after the conversation between Beck and Hitler, Beck and Ribbentrop conferred, as follows: "Mr. Beck asked M. Von Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that whereas previously, after all his conversations
Polish Foreign Minister that there would be no fait accompli and that he should be quite at his ease. On the day after the conversation between Beck and Hitler, Beck and Ribbentrop conferred, as follows: "Mr. Beck asked M. Von Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that whereas previously, after all his conversations and contacts with German statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today for the first time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement." "In answer M. Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy towards Poland was still a desire for the further building up of friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and interests of the two parties concerned." (TC-73 No. 49) Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with that one expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same month, January 1939, he was in Warsaw and made another speech, of which the following is a pertinent extract: "In accordance with the resolute will of the German National Leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German foreign policy. The political foresight, and the principles worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take the momentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that all other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of both sides. Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual relations." (2530-PS) Hitler spoke in the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, and gave further assurances of the good faith of the German Government. (TC-73 No. 57) In March 1939 the remainder of Czechoslovakia was seized and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up. That seizure, as was recognized by Hitler and Jodl, had immensely strengthened the German position
January 1939, and gave further assurances of the good faith of the German Government. (TC-73 No. 57) In March 1939 the remainder of Czechoslovakia was seized and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up. That seizure, as was recognized by Hitler and Jodl, had immensely strengthened the German position against Poland. Within a week of the completion of the occupation of Czechoslovakia heat was beginning to be applied on Poland. On 21 March M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador, saw Ribbentrop. The nature of the conversation was generally very much sharper than that of the discussion between Ribbentrop and Beck a little time back at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden: "I saw M. Von Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked me to call on him in order to discuss Polish-German relations in their entirety. "He complained about our Press, and the Warsaw students' demonstrations during Count Ciano's visit." "Further, M. von Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Hitler put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland's frontiers in exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich. He said that there had been further conversations between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had pointed out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an unfavorable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his suggestions. M. von Ribbentrop had had a talk with the Chancellor only yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in favor of good relations with Poland, and had expressed a desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the subject of our mutual relations. M. von Ribbentrop indicated that he was under the impression that difficulties arising between us were also due to some misunderstanding of the Reich's real aims. The problem needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his opinion our two States were dependent on each other." "I [Lipski] stated that now, during the settlement of the Czechoslovakian question, there was no understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was
some misunderstanding of the Reich's real aims. The problem needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his opinion our two States were dependent on each other." "I [Lipski] stated that now, during the settlement of the Czechoslovakian question, there was no understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was already hard enough for the polish public to swallow, for, despite our disputes with the Czechs they were after all a Slav people. But in regard to Slovakia the position was far worse. I emphasized our community of race, language and religion, and mentioned the help we had given in their achievement of independence. I pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that the polish man in the street could not understand why the Reich had assumed the protection of Slovakia, that protection being directed against Poland. I said emphatically that this question was a serious blow to our relations. "Ribbentrop reflected a moment, and then answered that this could be discussed. "I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that I might go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk over this matter. He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his offers. "Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania. "Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys on the latter's return from Rome, and they had discussed the Memel question, which called for a solution." (TC-73 No. 61) That conversation took place on 21 March. The world soon learned what the solution to Memel was. On the next day German armed forces marched in. As a result of these events, considerable anxiety was growing both in the government of Great Britain and the Polish government, and the two governments therefore had been undertaking conversations between each other. On 31 March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the House of Commons. He explained the results of the conversations that had been taking place between the British and Polish Governments: "As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other
undertaking conversations between each other. On 31 March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the House of Commons. He explained the results of the conversations that had been taking place between the British and Polish Governments: "As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish government all support in their power. They have given the Polish government an assurance to this effect. "I may add that the French government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government." (TC-72 No. 17) On 6 April, a week later, a formal communiqué was issued by the Anglo-Polish governments, which repeated the assurance the Prime Minister had given a week before, and in which Poland assured Great Britain of her support should Great Britain be attacked. (TC-72 No. 18) The anxiety and concern that the governments of Poland and Great Britain were feeling at that time appears to have been justified. During the same week, on 3 April, an order, signed by Keitel, emanated from the High Command of the Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3 April 1939. The subject is "Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40." The order reads: "Directive for the uniform preparation of war by the Armed Forces for 1939/40 is being reissued. "Part I (Frontier Defense) and Part III (Danzig) will be issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged. "Part II 'Fall Weiss' [the code name for the operation against Poland] is attached herewith. The signature of the Fuehrer will be appended later. "The Fuehrer has added the following Directives to 'Fall Weiss': "1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operations can be carried out at any time from 1st September 1939 onwards. "2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up
of the Fuehrer will be appended later. "The Fuehrer has added the following Directives to 'Fall Weiss': "1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operations can be carried out at any time from 1st September 1939 onwards. "2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise time-table for 'Fall Weiss' and to arrange by conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches of the armed forces. "3. The plan of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details for the time-table must be submitted to the OKW by the 1st of may, 1939." (C-120) This order was distributed to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. Another document, dated 11 April, and signed by Hitler, is annexed. It reads: "I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of the war. "Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following eventualities: "I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and protection against surprise air attacks. "II. 'Fall Weiss'. "III. The annexation of Danzig. "Annex IV contains regulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike development." (C-120) Again, copies of that document went to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. Annex I to this order, which concerns the safeguarding of the frontiers of the German Reich, declares: "* * * Legal Basis: It should be anticipated that a state of Defense or State of War, as defined in the Reichdefense law of the 4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures and demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are to be based on the laws valid in peacetime." (C-120) The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, followed by the Anglo-Polish communiqué of 6 April, was seized upon by the Nazi Government to urge on the crisis which they were developing in Danzig between themselves and Poland. On 28 April the German government issued a memorandum in which they alleged that the Anglo-Polish declaration was incompatible with the 1934 Agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of entering into or by reason of entering into that agreement, Poland had