dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. SIEMERS: I do not wish to quote it, since it repeats the facts we have already heard. I believe that Figure 4 of Document 117 which I have just read clarifies the matter completely and refutes every accusation against the Navy. [Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, do you have anything to add to these extracts from the War Diary?
RAEDER: No, I have nothing to add. It is entirely clear.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I ask you now to describe to the High Tribunal-and with this I am coming to the conclusion of my examination-how it came about that you resigned in January 1943? Your Honors, shall we have a recess first?
THE PRESIDENT: It depends on whether you hope to finish in a few minutes. If you hope to finish in a few minutes we will sit on so that you may finish your examination.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe it will take perhaps 10 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.
DR. SIEMERS: [Turning to the defendant.] Please describe how it came about that you resigned in January of 1943; but first I should like to ask you one more question: Did you, even before this, have the idea of resigning?
RAEDER: I should like to say briefly that on several occasions before the war I asked the Fuehrer to relieve me of my post, or I presented him with an ultimatum. I should like briefly to cite two cases as examples. In November 1938 in the presence of General Keitel I made a report to the Fuehrer about the type of ships and our plans as to how the ships should be developed further. On this occasion the Fuehrer, in a manner defying explanation, began to attack everything that we had built and were building, including the plans for the Bismarck , and to declare them wrong. Later I found out that things like that happened whenever some persons of his entourage, who knew very little about such things, gave him their opinion, that he always followed it up, probably wanting--as I told myself later-to check whether the things he had been told were actually correct. This case, however, was so extreme that I could not do anything else but simply pick up my plans, put them in my brief case, and leave the room. General Keitel was present. The Fuehrer followed me to the door, asked me to come in again, softened his accusations, and asked me not to resign now under any circumstances. The second case was a purely personal one, but it is rather typical. His naval adjutant, who had just been appointed, wanted to marry a young girl who had a very unsavory reputation at the University of Kiel. I told him I would never consent to the marriage. The Fuehrer had the girl introduced to him and decided he had nothing against the marriage; I left the Berghof and sent the Fuehrer a letter via a staff: officer in which I told him that I would refuse my consent, that the officer would not remain in the Navy should he marry, or else I would not remain. I asked the officer who acted as my courier to bring back the answer since I wanted to reach a decision at once.
RAEDER: The Fuehrer had the officer wait 2 days at the Berghof and then sent him back to me with a letter saying: "Very well, the officer cannot marry and remain in the Navy and he will not be used further as a naval adjutant; someone else will be put in his place. He will become some sort of leader in my National Socialist Motor Corps and will then serve as one of my Party adjutants." It was also typical of the Fuehrer that, to a certain degree, he wanted to see his will carried through; but this man was out of the Navy, and I could make my conviction felt in this case. Under these circumstances I declared myself ready to continue in office. That was at the beginning of 1939; in the course of the spring, however, I asked again whether I could not be relieved of my position now, since I had served for many years in the Navy and I did not believe I would be able to maintain the dignity of the office much longer. I suggested to him that perhaps in October 1939 I should leave my post. The Fuehrer refused at the time, and on 1 October we were at war, and in time of war I did not believe that I could leave the Navy under any circumstances unless it was very urgent, especially since I considered myself totally responsible for all preparations and for the training of the Navy. In the course of the war our co-operating which up until then, aside from such incidents, had been quite congenial, since the Fuehrer had always made an effort to show me respect, our connection gradually became very strained during the war. The Fuehrer became more nervous when I made reports, flared up in rage when there were divergences of opinion or if there had been any incidents, as, for instance, a technical defect or poor performance by a ship. It happened again and again that his entourage influenced him before I could actually explain matters to him, and I was called in subsequently to set him straight on these matters. In that way unpleasant scenes ensued which wore me out. One point about which the Fuehrer was especially sensitive was the large ships.
RAEDER: He was always uneasy when our large ships were out on the high seas and were carrying on raids against shipping. The loss of a ship, such as the Gray Spee or later the Bismarck , he considered a tremendous loss of prestige; and matters like that, therefore, excited him tremendously. That went on until the end of 1942. Then there came-and this particularly impressed me-my defeat in the consultation with the Fuehrer on questions dealing with Norway, France, and above all, Russia. In the final analysis he always listened more to the Party people as, for example, Terboven, than to an old officer. That led to a situation which could not be tolerated for any length of time. One of the basic characteristics of the Fuehrer was a tremendous suspicion toward anyone and everyone, but especially directed against old officers who had come from the old Wehrmacht and of whom he always assumed-despite all well-intentioned treatment-that in their hearts they did not share these feelings which he had to demand of them. Especially the case of Russia had led me to so many conflicts with him that our relations were strongly influenced thereby. Indeed, the man who compiled all these war diaries and minutes, Admiral Assmann, summed it up on one occasion at the conclusion of such a discussion with the words; "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, therefore, is in complete opposition to the Fuehrer in this matter." At the end of 1942, just after I had had to put an end to the entire Norwegian question, an incident occurred which led to the end. There was to have been an attack on a convoy which was going to Murmansk or Archangel from England. It was in December at a time when in those northern regions there are just 1 or 2 hours of light and hence no favorable weather for fighting by large ships when up against large numbers of destroyers. The ships, together with the destroyers, had started on their journey and had reached the convoy while it was still light.
RAEDER: But since daylight soon disappeared and darkness fell and since the convoy was guarded by many destroyers, the admiral considered it expedient to withdraw the big ships from the battle. That was the only correct decision for he might have lost them ad by torpedo attack. This fact, and secondly the fact that unfortunately the radio connection between this admiral and the Naval Operations Staff was made difficult and at times completely broken off by static, caused the Fuehrer to become extremely excited in his headquarters where I reported to him everything I found out myself. The whole day was spent with questions back and forth, and even in the evening I could not give him a clear picture. This excited him extremely. Through Admiral Krancke he had all sorts of insults transmitted to me and demanded that I report to him immediately; and I could see that very strong friction would result. I arranged it so that I did not need to report to him until 6 days later on 6 January so that the atmosphere could first cool off a little. On 6 January I could go to him with a complete report; and in the evening, at a discussion at which Field Marshal Keitel was also present, he made a speech of about an hour's duration in which he made derogatory remarks about everything that the Navy had done so far, in direct contrast to every judgment passed on the Navy up until this time. From this I saw that he was anxious to bring about a break. I personally was firmly prepared to seize this opportunity to resign, especially as it became ever clearer that the war was becoming a pure U-boat war, and I could therefore feel that I could leave at this moment with a clear conscience. After the Fuehrer had concluded his speech I asked to be permitted to speak with him alone. Field Marshal Keitel and the stenographers left and I told him that I was asking for my resignation as I could see from his words that he was entirely dissatisfied with me and therefore this was the proper moment for me to leave.
RAEDER: As always, he tried at first to dissuade me but I remained adamant and told him that a new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy who would have complete responsibility would definitely have to be appointed. He said that it would be a great burden for him if I were to leave now since for one thing the situation was very critical-Stalingrad was impending-and secondly, since he had already been accused of dismissing so many generals. In the eyes of the outside world it would incriminate him if I were to leave at this point. I told him that I would do everything I could to prevent that happening. If he wanted to give the appearance as far as the outside world was concerned that I had not resigned because of a clash, then he could make me a general inspector with some sort of nominal title, which would create the impression that I was still with the Navy and that my name was still connected with the Navy. This appealed to him at once and I told him on 6 January that I wanted to be dismissed on 30 January. At this point I had concluded 10 years of service as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy under him. He agreed to this proposal and asked me to suggest two successors so that he could make a choice. On 30 January he then personally dismissed me by appointing me Admiral Inspector of the Navy. He said that he would still on occasion ask me for advice; but that never happened. I was merely sent out twice, once to Bulgaria when the King of Bulgaria was buried and once to Hungary, to the Hungarian Regent Horthy to bring him a gift from the Fuehrer.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you otherwise performed no tasks as Admiral Inspector?
RAEDER: I had no functions and received no orders.
DR. SIEMERS: Then my last question: Did you have the impression, on the occasion of your conversation of 6 January 1943 with Hitler, that he in a way was glad to get rid of you in view of the many differences of opinion and the fact that you contradicted him frequently on technical naval and political matters concerning Norway, France, Russia?
RAEDER: I do believe that he wanted to get rid of me at this time, for I was in a certain way an inconvenience for him. This one case which I described, where I had my way in the end, he had never forgotten.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. This concludes my examination of Admiral Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit today until half past one. It will adjourn now for 10 minutes. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' counsel want to ask questions?
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for Defendant Doenitz): Admiral, you recall the memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff of 15 October concerning possibilities for an intensification of the economic war. That is in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10, on Pages 96 and 97 of the English text. Admiral Wagner has already testified about it here. Can you add anything to that statement concerning the purpose and the meaning of that memorandum?
RAEDER: Since the war against England came as a complete surprise to us, we had up until then dealt very little with detailed questions of submarine warfare. Among other things we had not yet discussed the question of so-called unrestricted submarine warfare which had played such a very important part in the previous war. And from that fact it developed that on 3 September that officer who was recently mentioned here was sent to the Foreign Office with some points for discussion on the question of unrestricted submarine warfare, so that we could clarify with the Foreign Office the question as to just how far we could go. And that is the document which recently played a role here, D-851, GB-451, of 3 November.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: 3 September, you mean.
RAEDER: Yes, 3 September. This touches upon all these questions. Then discussions with the Foreign Office took place and this U-boat memorandum mentioned by you was worked out in the High Command of the Navy on the basis of these discussions and released on 15 October. I believe that on 15 October I presented it to the Fuehrer who in principle agreed to the contents. But the very fact that a memorandum about submarine warfare concerning possibilities for an intensification of submarine warfare was issued only on 15 October shows how little we were prepared for that eventuality. That memorandum contains near the beginning that sentence which has been quoted by the Prosecution concerning our position with respect to international law, where reference is made to highest ethics of warfare, adherence to international law, and the desire to base all military measures on existing laws wherever possible. But if this is not possible or when by deviation it is possible to achieve decisive military results, and we could take the responsibility for this deviation, then in case of necessity we must depart from existing international law. That means that also a new international law may have to be developed. However, this entire memorandum represents merely a constant search for possibilities for conducting submarine warfare with the least damage to neutrals and the greatest possible adherence to international law and in such a way that it would become a decisive factor in the outcome of the war. Various cases are discussed as to how an intensification can be reached, but it always was a question of finding countermeasures against enemy measures. Such possibilities as blockade or the new concept to lay siege to England by submarine warfare are examined in all directions; but the draft always states the conclusion that in view of the number of submarines and other misgivings it is not yet possible to conduct such operations. And the final result of that entire memorandum, as set down in that document, can be found in the two last pages.
RAEDER: Unfortunately I have only the German copy in front of me where under the last Paragraph D the final opinion, the following sentences which I should like to quote, are worthy of notice...
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the extract?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: On Pages 99 and 100 in the Document Book 10, GB-224. Mr. President, another excerpt from the same document has already been mentioned and that is in the Document Book Doenitz 3, on Pages 199 to 203; but I do not believe that it is necessary to refer to it because the witness will only read one or two sentences.
RAEDER: [Continuing.] Now, the last paragraph "Conclusions" reads: "1.) The manner in which economic warfare has been conducted until now, in accordance with Prize Regulations, does not meet with military demands for ruthless severity. "A large part of enemy mercantile trade including all exports in neutral ships is not covered. "The requirements of naval law that neutral merchantmen be stopped and searched can no longer be fulfilled, in view of the strength of aerial reconnaissance and U-boat countermeasures in the enemy's coastal approaches. Economic warfare according to Prize Regulations has therefore to be limited and in the North Sea and the Baltic must be left to surface craft only. In the Atlantic the U-boats in enemy coastal waters will limit their activities to attacks without warning on convoys, troop transports, and once it has been approved, armed and all enemy merchantmen, and will conduct economic warfare according to the law governing prizes only in exceptional cases. The use of the Operational Air Force for economic warfare is not possible. Economic warfare is conducted within the framework of international law. A possibility of controversy with neutral states is ruled out." Then one more sentence: "If the Supreme War Command for political reasons should not be able at present to decide to wage the economic war in the most vigorous form possible by having recourse to a siege, it will be possible to increase the effectiveness of the policy of stopping enemy trade by a ruthless increase in the use of mines and by air attacks on enemy port installations. One cannot, however, expect a decisive result from the economic war in its present form." (Document C-157, Exhibit GB-224)
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The immediate result of that memorandum and of your report to the Fuehrer was the order of 17 October?
RAEDER: Yes, and that provided: Firstly, that all enemy merchantmen could be torpedoed; and secondly, as a severer measure, that passenger ships in convoys could be torpedoed a short time after an announcement to that effect had been made. That was all done in connection with the intensification, measure for measure, which we had brought about in answer to individual acts of the enemy.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, that long passage that the defendant has just read, if it has not been put in evidence yet, must be offered in evidence by you. I understand it is not in evidence at present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I can help. I shall be using this document and I shall put it in.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it been offered in evidence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Only part of it, not the part that the defendant has referred to. But, in view of that I shall refer to it later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral, you mentioned that before 1935 certain preparations were made for the construction of a German submarine weapon. Did Admiral Doenitz participate in any way in these preparations?
RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. As was said before, he was abroad during the last year; but even before that he had nothing to do with it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You have reported about your dismissal as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Would you please tell me how it came about that Admiral Doenitz became your successor?
RAEDER: The Fuehrer had ordered that I propose two admirals as successors. I suggested in writing first, as the elder...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, how does this arise? I mean, what relevancy has it to anything we have to decide as to how Admiral Doenitz became head of the Navy?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That has significance, Mr. President, in view of the Prosecution's assertion that Admiral Doenitz became the successor of Admiral Raeder on the basis of political relations or services rendered.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Please continue, Admiral.
RAEDER: I'll be very brief. I suggested, first, Admiral Carls, who was the senior and has vast knowledge of the entire conduct of naval policy. In the event that the Fuehrer should want to manifest that he now was placing U-boat warfare in the foreground I suggested Admiral Doenitz, who was the greatest authority in that field. Political considerations of any kind were not mentioned at all; it was purely an official, technical appointment.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I have no more questions.
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, the Tribunal, through its letter of 26 March, has consented that an affidavit be submitted by the Codefendant Raeder for the Defendant Keitel, provided the Prosecution has an opportunity to question Admiral Raeder on his statements in cross-examination. I have sent the affidavit to the Prosecution, and the Prosecution has raised no objection. I ask to be permitted to submit this affidavit which is concerned with the functions and position of the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, as Exhibit Number Keitel-l9, after Admiral Raeder has confirmed that he signed this affidavit and that he agrees to its being submitted. [Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, you are acquainted with the questions which I put to you and which, after a conference with your counsel, you answered and signed on 19 March?
RAEDER: That is about the position of Field Marshal Keitel in the OKW?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
RAEDER: I am quite familiar with that.
DR. NELTE: Then, may I submit this affidavit? The Prosecution has a copy of it. I have a few more questions for Admiral Raeder, the answers to which can be greatly simplified with the permission of the Court. These are the same questions which on 9 May, a week ago, I put to Admiral Doenitz and which refer to the assertion made by the witness Dr. Gisevius about Keitel's tremendous influence and the circle of silence which Keitel is said to have drawn around Hitler. I merely want to ask the witness Admiral Raeder, with the permission of the Tribunal, whether he can confirm as correct for the period before 1943 as well-that is, for the period during which Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy-the answers to my questions given by Admiral Doenitz in Raeder's presence. I ask for the decision of the Tribunal whether I may put this general question in order to save time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. NELTE: You heard what I said, and I ask you, can you confirm the answers given by Admiral Doenitz to my questions on 9 May for the period before 1943 as well?
RAEDER: Yes, that I can do.
DR. NELTE: Now, I have one final question. During your testimony Document L-79, the "Little Schmundt" file, was treated. You objected to this document as inaccurate and not of probative value?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Dr. Siemers then quoted a part of that document which the Prosecution, at the time when it submitted the document, had not read. In that part of the document there is mention of a research staff in the OKW.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. NELTE: I ask you now to tell me whether such a research staff in the OKW was ever actually created.
RAEDER: Not to my knowledge. The work was done by the Armed Forces Operations Staff in which there were officers representing all three branches of the Armed Forces.
DR. NELTE: So there was no change in the scope of tasks and in the division of jurisdiction?
RAEDER: No, definitely not.
DR. NELTE: That also concerns the question of working out strategic and operational matters between the OKW and the Armed Forces Operations Staff on one hand and the general staffs of the Armed Forces branches, including the Naval Operations Staff, on the other?
RAEDER: As far as the Naval Operations Staff is concerned, yes, there was no change.
DR. NELTE: And as far as the other branches of the Armed Forces are concerned do you know of no change or...?
RAEDER: That I cannot say. I do not know about that.
DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and Halder have testified about that. Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, is the affidavit that you referred to contained in your document book?
DR. NELTE: No, not yet. It will be Number Keitel-19.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Will you have translations supplied to the Tribunal?
DR. NELTE: Yes. DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): Admiral, you are the senior member of the group of the General Staff of the OKW, and you belonged to this so-called group for the longest time?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: In what manner did you become a member of this so-called group?