dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON MANSTEIN: It was in 1943. Rosenberg and Koch came to visit me. It must have been, I should think, in September or October, but try as I may I cannot give the exact date. It may have been earlier.
DR.LATERNSER: Field Marshal, why did you, as a high military leader, tolerate all these violations of international law and laws of humanity?
VON MANSTEIN: In my province, in my military province, I did not tolerate such things, and whatever happened in the ideological struggle outside of my sphere, we did not get to know about. It was taking place outside our sphere of influence and knowledge, and we had neither the power nor the right to prevent it, apart from the fact that we never knew of all the abominations which have since been disclosed.
DR.LATERNSER: Were you of the opinion that for reasons of military obedience you had to tolerate everything, or rather co-operate in everything?
VON MANSTEIN: The military duty to obey is without doubt binding and indivisible. The right or the duty to disobey I would say does not exist for the soldier. There may be a moral duty which would apply, for instance, in such cases as the execution of Jews. But we knew nothing about that.
DR.LATERNSER: In the case of the Commissar Order, if all the commanders-in-chief had refused, would it not have caused Hitler to amend it?
VON MANSTEIN: He would certainly not have done that. On the contrary, it would perhaps have been a desirable opportunity for him and some others to remove us. Apart from that, a flat refusal to obey in order to coerce a dictator, is an entirely useless method. Under a dictatorship, a dictator cannot permit himself to be forced, because the moment he gives way, his dictatorship ends.
DR. LATERNSER: Was it not possible to make him go back on his decisions by counterpropositions?
VON MANSTEIN: Here one must differentiate between two things; with regard to basic political decisions, the decisions for war, et cetera, we certainly had no possibility whatsoever. He announced his decision in the speeches or by means of orders, and no protest was possible.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has been over this subject already.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you have any military influence on Hitler?
VON MANSTEIN: In questions of purely military leadership, he listened to me in certain respects. Indeed, on this question I had constant arguments with him. My written suggestions to him, or to the chief of General Staff for submission to Hitler, would fill a large volume. In decisive points of purely operational leadership I probably succeeded, generally speaking, in carrying my point. In other cases, as soon as we left the subject of military command, he cut short any discussion. On three occasions, however, I tried, in personal talks with him, to get him to alter the supreme military command, that is, in plain language, to surrender the supreme command, if not in name, at least in fact.
THE PRESIDENT: What have we got to do with this? What have we got to do with these matters which are matters of strategy? The High Command is not being accused of anything in connection with strategy.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know, Field Marshal, whether other military leaders, too, had differences with Hitler?
VON MANSTEIN: These differences were, no doubt, very numerous. That becomes apparent from the following facts alone: Of 17 Field Marshals who were members of the Army, 10 were sent home during the war and 3 lost their lives as a result of 20 July. Only one Field Marshal managed to get through the war and keep his position as Field Marshal. Of 36 Generalobersten, 18 were sent home and 5 died as a result of 20 July or were dishonorably discharged. Only 3 Generalobersten survived the war in their positions.
DR. LATERNSER: Out of 36?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes, out of 36. 1 believe there is no profession which can show so many who suffered for their convictions, for all these leaders were highly qualified officers, militarily speaking. They could not have been sent away because they were incapable. They were sent away because Hitler distrusted them, and also because he did not think they were severe enough in operational strategy.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the circle of men concerned with, the 20 July incident get in touch with you? The witness Gisevius has said something about that.
VON MANSTEIN: I did not realize that at the time. I once received a letter from Generaloberst Beck. It was in the winter of 1942, and he discussed the strategical situation on the basis of the experience at Stalingrad. He said that it was hardly likely that the war would come to a good end. I replied to him that I could not contradict his statement, but that one defeat was no reason to consider the war lost, and that a war was only lost if you yourself .considered it lost. I went on to say that I had so many worries on my front that I could not begin a lengthy discussion about these matters. Now, afterwards, it has become clear to me that several other attempts to contact me were made, apparently in order to sound me out. On one occasion, General Von Gersdorff visited me and, as he told me afterwards, he had letters on him from Goerdeler, I believe, and Popitz, which he was supposed to show to me if he got the impression that I could be enlisted for a coup d'6tat. As it was always my point of view, however, that the removal or the assassination of Hitler during the war would lead to chaos, he never showed me these letters. That these were supposed to be feelers is something which became clear to me only afterwards. I had never, therefore, made a promise to anyone to participate in such affairs.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you receive any personal gifts?
VON MANSTEIN: No, I did not.
DR. LATERNSER: When and for what reason were you relieved of your post?
VON MANSTEIN: I was relieved of my post at the end of March 1944. The reason given to me by Hitler was that large-scale operations for which he needed me could no longer be carried out and that it was merely a question now of holding out stubbornly and for that a new man would have to be put in my position. I never believed that this was the true reason. The true reason was without doubt that he mistrusted me too. After all, he was the revolutionary and I was the old Prussian officer. Then too, as the chief of the General Staff, General Zeitzler, told me at the time, there was a continuous campaign of hatred against me on the part of Himmler, and all manner of statements were made, namely, that a Christian like myself could not be loyal; and it is certain, too, that other elements joined in this campaign.
DR. LATERNSER: I shall now come to my last question, Field Marshal. What can you say to the accusation by the Prosecution that the military leadership should be declared criminal?
VON MANSTEIN: I have been a soldier for 40 years. I come from a family of soldiers and I have grown up with military conceptions. The example from among my nearest relatives which I had before me was Hindenburg. We young officers naturally considered the glory of war as something great, and I do not wish to deny that I was proud when during this war an army was entrusted to me. But our ideal, and that applies to my comrades too, did not lie in the conduct of war, but in the education of our youth to be honorable men and decent soldiers. Under our orders these youths went to their death by the million. And if I may say something personal: My eldest son died as a lieutenant in the infantry, when he was 19; two of my brothers-in-law, who grew up in my house, died as young officers; my best comrades in this war, my young adjutant and my young chauffeur, were killed. Nearly all the sons of my brothers and sisters were killed. That we, the old soldiers, should have led into war for a criminal purpose that youth of ours which was so dear to us, would far exceed any wickedness of which man could be thought capable. It is possible that a man without a family and without tradition, who is obsessed with fanatical belief in a higher mission, may go beyond the limits of human law, but we, the old soldiers, purely from a human point of view, would not have been able to do so. We could not lead our youth into crime.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions, Mr. President. [A recess was taken.]
DR. GAWLIK (Counsel for the SD): Witness, you have repeatedly mentioned the SD. What is your conception of the SD?
VON MANSTEIN: What I understand by the SD is an institution within ' the framework of the SS, which came under Himmler and had special Police tasks.
DR. GAWLIK: Then if I now tell you that here the Departments III and IV of the Reich Security Main Office are being indicted under SD, then, I ask you, did you understand that those organizations came under SD?
VON MANSTEIN: The conception of the SD is only known to me as it was probably known to most Germans, that is to say, as some sort of special Police. I do not know what departments in the Reich Security Main Office belonged to it, because the organization and tasks of the Reich Security Main Office are unknown to me.
DR. GAWLIK: Then as a former commander-in-chief you do not know either which departments in the Reich Security Main Office dealt with Police tasks?
VON MANSTEIN: No, I have no idea of that, nor did it ever interest me.
DR. GAWLIK: Can you answer the question with "yes" or "no," whether by SD you meant Departments III and IV?
VON MANSTEIN: No.
DR. GAWLIK: Your defense counsel and you yourself have talked here about the Einsatzgruppen of the SD. Was that designation correct, or what were these Einsatzgruppen called?
VON MANSTEIN: The name Einsatzgruppen was made clear t me only here. Previously, during the time I was a commander-in-chief, I only knew that Higher SS and Police Leaders existed, an that sections of the SD had been given the special task of screening the population. Let me say, therefore, that the conception of the term Einsatzgruppen as it presents itself now, only became perfectly clear to me here.
DR. GAWLIK: But as a former commander-in-chief you must have known the correct designation of these Einsatzgruppen.
VON MANSTEIN: It may be that I already knew the name Einsatzgruppe. But I never thought of it as anything special. I merely, considered it to be a part of the SD, which was under Himmler and which had been given special tasks.
DR. GAWLIK: Did you not know that these Einsatzgruppen were called Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D?
VON MANSTEIN: No. I had never heard of Einsatzgruppen A, B, or C, and whether the Einsatzgruppe which worked in my territory was called "D" or not, I cannot say today. It may be or it may not be. I just do not know.
DR. GAWLIK: You did not know either what title Ohlendorf had?
VON MANSTEIN: Ohlendorf? I cannot tell you whether he was an SS Gruppenfuehrer or SS Oberfuehrer.
DR. GAWLIK: No, I do not mean that. I mean what title he had as the leader of Einsatzgruppe D.
VON MANSTEIN: No, I do not know that even today.
DR. GAWLIK: Did you not know that his title was Deputy to the Chief of the Security Police and of the SD with Army Group D?
VON MANSTEIN: No, I did not know that, because an Army Group D did not exist at the time, as far as I know.
DR. GAWLIK: Or that this was his title in the armies?
VON MANSTEIN: No, I did not know that.
DR. GAWLIK: Thank you.
COL. TAYLOR: Witness, did you leave the General Staff of the OKH in February of 1938?
VON MANSTEIN: May I ask you to repeat the question? I am afraid I did not understand.
COL. TAYLOR: Did you leave the General Staff of the OKH in February 1938?
VON MANSTEIN: Whether I was a member of the OKH? Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: What was your rank when you left the OKH General Staff in 1938?
VON MANSTEIN: I was a major general.
COL. TAYLOR: That is the lowest grade of general in the German Army, is it not?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: And after you left the General Staff of the OKH, you became a divisional commander?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: And you were a divisional commander at the time of the occupation of the Sudetenland, were you not?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes. My position in the service at that time was divisional commander, but when the Sudetenland was occupied, I was temporarily chief of the General Staff of that army which marched in from Bavaria.
COL. TAYLOR: And you were still a divisional commander when the rest of Czechoslovakia was occupied, were you not?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes, indeed.
COL. TAYLOR: And you were still a divisional commander while the attack upon Poland was being planned?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: Where was your division situated?
VON MANSTEIN: My division was in Lower Silesia and the division headquarters was in Liegnitz.
COL. TAYLOR: So that you personally were not very close to the OKH planning from February 1938 until the outbreak of the war?
VON MANSTEIN: No; I was in the High Command 6f the Army only up to the Anschluss in Austria, because I had to remain in the High Command of the Army for a time in order to hand over the affairs to my successor, General Halder.
COL. TAYLOR: Now, you were engaged in the war against the Soviet Union from the very beginning, were you not, beginning in June 1941?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL.TAYLOR: And did you take command of the German 11th Army after the death of General Von Schobert?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL.TAYLOR: And that was about the middle of September of 1941?
VON MANSTEIN: I believe I took over the command on 21 or 22 September.
COL.TAYLOR: And during 1941 and the first part of 1942 the 11th Army which you commanded was fighting at the extreme southern end of the front, was it not?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL.TAYLOR: That is in the region north of the Black Sea?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL.TAYLOR: And the 11th Army had captured Nikolaievsk just before you took command?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL.TAYLOR: And your headquarters, when you took command, were at Nikolaievsk?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: Now, is it true that you have just been testifying that Hitler had some very particular ideas concerning the methods by which warfare on the Eastern Front should be carried out?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: Hitler thought that the occupied Russian territories could best be subdued and pacified by the widespread use of terror, did he not?
VON MANSTEIN: At the time  that was by no means clear to me. It was only during the Trial that I learned that.
COL. TAYLOR: Did you not receive an order from the OKW that terroristic means were to be used to keep order in the occupied territories?
VON MANSTEIN: No, I could not, in my opinion, receive any order from the OKW for my army. And I have no recollection of an order to. use terroristic methods, either.
COL. TAYLOR: An order issued by the OKW could reach you through proper channels through the OKH, could it not?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: Will you please look at the document which is being handed to you? Your Lordship, that will be 459-PS, and the exhibit number will be USA-926. [Turning to the witness.7 You will see from the heading on the document that it was issued by the OKW on 23 July 1941.
VON MANSTEIN: Yes. But that, in my opinion, is a decision of the OKW, because the heading says, "The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces." That is the OKW.
COL. TAYLOR: Yes, I stated that. This is a document issued by the OKW.
DR. LATERNSER: I beg to apologize, but I shall have to interrupt here. I ask that a German copy be submitted to the witness. I gathered from his reply that he is quoting the English text.
COL. TAYLOR: The witness has a German copy, I am told.
PRESIDENT: Have you got a German copy?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes. A German copy is underneath.
COL. TAYLOR: I would like to read this document to you and ask you a question about it. "On 22 July, the Fi1hrer, after receiving the C.-in-C. of the Army, issued the following orders with a view to supplementing and enlarging Directive Number 33. And now, Witness, will you turn to Paragraph 6, please, the last paragraph, Paragraph 6? Do you find it?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: "In view of the vast size of the conquered territories in the East, the forces available for establishing security in these areas will be sufficient only if instead of punishing resistance by sentencing the guilty in a court of law, the occupying forces spread such terror as is likely, by its mere existence, to crush every will to resist amongst the population. "The commanders concerned, together with all available troops, should be made responsible for maintaining peace within their areas. The commanders must find the means of keeping order within their areas, not by demanding more security forces, but by applying suitable drastic measures." Signed by the Defendant Keitel. Did such an order never reach you, Witness?
VON MANSTEIN: I cannot remember the order. After all, it was issued long before I became commander-in-chief and naturally not every order that was issued before I became commander was submitted to me. At any rate, I cannot recollect it.
COL. TAYLOR: At the time this order was issued, you were a corps commander, weren't you?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: Isn't it plain on the face of this order that it could only be carried out by wide distribution to troops and the leaders of all the formations?
VON MANSTEIN: No, not necessarily. After all, the order contains directives for the Southeastern Front, the Central Eastern Front, the Northeastern Front, the Navy, and the Air Force, and also for security in the rear areas of the conquered territory. At that time I was a long way from the front with my armored corps; actually, in July I was west of lake Ilmen, where I was cut off and surrounded for a time. It is quite impossible that an order would be sent to me concerning the entire front; if it was done at all then I would have received only an extract referring to my area. But here the orders under Figure 6 are concerned with the security of the rear areas, and the armored corps which was far ahead of the front line of the infantry army had nothing to do with these matters.
COL. TAYLOR: The order plainly is meant to apply generally over the entire front, isn't it?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes, Number 6 naturally applies to the entire front. But an armored corps which is ahead of the front and which is continuously engaged in battle with enemy forces has nothing to do with these measures; and even if the order had been dispatched to me, it does not by any means signify that it would have reached me. As a matter of fact I just remember that in July when I was cut off, a very considerable portion of our baggage-train from headquarters, including very important documents, fell into enemy hands. Therefore, try as I may, I cannot remember having received this order. In fact, I do not believe it was dispatched to the corps at all.
COL. TAYLOR: If an army commander received this order, he could only carry it 6ut by distributing it down to his lower formations; isn't that right? That's the only way he could carry it out?
VON MANSTEIN: He did not necessarily have to distribute it, because Figure 6 mentioned conquered territories, that is to say, rear areas; and the armored group which I came under, which had only two armored corps in the foremost front line, would not necessarily need to transmit this order to the corps because the group itself had to secure its small rear area without the two corps, and in fact it did so.
COL. TAYLOR: So assuming you were cut off at the time and never got this order at the time it was issued, didn't any of your fellow generals in the other areas in the Prussian military tradition ever speak to you about this order and indicate they had received it?
VON MANSTEIN: Not one of them discussed the order with me. Only very rarely can a commander-in-chief talk to other commanders-in-chief. Whether they received the order, that I really could not tell you.
COL. TAYLOR: We'll pass from that document. Now, Hitler regarded the war on the Eastern Front as ideological war and race conquest, didn't he?
VON AIANSTEIN: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: And he wanted not only to conquer the Soviet Army but also to wipe out the Soviet political system, isn't that true?
VON MANSTEIN: No doubt he wanted the production system of the Soviet Union in the occupied territories to be used for the conduct of our war.
COL. TAYLOR: And he wanted to set up a new political system in the areas which the Army had captured?
VON MANSTEIN: I do not understand what you mean by "a new system." What are you referring to?
COL. TAYLOR: A political system of political administration.
VON MANSTEIN: Naturally, the occupied territories must have some sort of an administration.
COL. TAYLOR: He wanted an administration which would be very different from the type of administration under the Soviet Government, didn't he?
VON MANSTEIN: Yes, since the National Socialist system was different from the Soviet system in certain respects, it was necessary for him to attempt to establish the administration accordingly.
COL. TAYLOR: Now, in order to set up a new political administration, an administration that would operate peaceably so that the territory could be exploited, Hitler was very anxious to stamp out those parts of the population-those elements in the population-who would oppose his aims, wasn't he?
VON MANSTEIN: I do not know whether that was clear from the start. At any rate, he never told the military leaders of the plan.
COL. TAYLOR: In order to help in carrying out these plans didn't the OKW issue several orders to the commanding generals that were quite extraordinary? I refer among other things to the Commissar Order that you have mentioned.
VON MANSTEIN: The Commissar Order, after all, only affected the removal of those Soviet elements who, shall we say, were supposed to carry the war beyond the military into the ideological sphere and to urge their troops to fight to the death. That has nothing to do with the extermination of portions of the population at the most, it was the removal of a certain class of followers of the enemy forces who were considered to be more politicians than soldiers.
COL. TAYLOR: I refer also to Hitler's well-known order of 13 May 1941, which restricted the use of courts-martial in cases where German soldiers had committed crimes against the civilian population. Wasn't that part of this same plan?
VON MANSTEIN: Certainly if such a plan did exist, then it was part of this plan. But we did not follow that plan. As I said, by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army we employed our legal system in order to punish the excesses in the interest of discipline. I have already mentioned to you the example of the two death sentences in my corps.
COL. TAYLOR: Well, in fact, Witness, were not these views of Hitler and the purpose of these orders very well known to you and the other commanding generals on the Eastern Front?
VON MANSTEIN: No, we did not know that this order had a further purpose, for instance, the purpose of exterminating people. In fact, that thought never struck us at the time.
COL. TAYLOR: Well, now, what elements in the Russian population did the Germans think would be most likely to oppose their economic and political aims in occupied territory?