dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: That is Number 12. Number 32, minutes on the withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Military Commission. Number 50, a speech of Prime Minister MacDonald of 16 March 1933. Number 51, an article of Von Neurath on the League of Nations, in the periodical Der Volkerbund of 11 May 1933. Number 52, Hitler's speech of 17 May 1933, the so-called "Peace Speech." Number 53, a statement of the German Ambassador Nadolny, in Geneva, of 19 May 1933. Number 54, a statement of the American representative, Norman Davies, at the Disarmament Conference, of 22 May 1933. Number 55, a statement of the German Ambassador Nadolny, at the Disarmament Conference of 27 May 1935. Number 81, a speech by the then Minister Benes of 2 July 1934. Number 82, an excerpt from the speech of Marshal Petain of 22 July 1934. Number 83, the communiqué of the Reich Government of 26 July 1934. Number 85, the communiqué of the Reich Government of 10 September 1934. Number 86, a speech of Herr Von Neurath of 17 September 1934. Number 88, excerpts from the speech of Marshal Smuts of 12 November 1934. Number 119, a statement of the British Minister in the House of Commons of 20 July 1936. 'Those are the documents which I had not yet named, but which are already contained in my document books. Mr. President, may I take this opportunity to submit the following application, namely: The Court...
THE PRESIDENT: Those documents have all been translated, have they not, Dr. Ludinghausen?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, they are all included, in translation, in the document books which have been submitted. Mr. President, may I now make an application to the Court? It is to the effect that the Court should permit me to call again the Defendant Von Neurath to the witness stand, for the following reason. As may be recalled, in the course of cross-examination Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe presented Document 3859-PS to the defendant, which document was a photostatic copy of a letter from the defendant, dated 31 August 1940, to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, with two enclosures. In this letter the defendant asked Lammers to submit the two enclosures to Hitler and to arrange, if possible, a personal conference or an interview on the question of alleged Gernianization mentioned therein. The two enclosures of this letter to Lammers are reports and suggestions on the future form of the Protectorate and concern the assimilation or possible Germanization of the Czech people. The Court will recall that the presentation of this rather extensive document-it has 30 or 40 pages in this photostatic form if not more-surprised the defendant, and at that moment he could not recall the matter clearly enough to give positive and exhaustive information about these documents immediately. Nevertheless, in cross-examination, after a very brief look at these reports, he expressed doubts as to whether these reports, as presented here in photostatic form, were actually identical with the reports which were enclosed, according to his instructions, in the letter to Lammers to be submitted to Hitler. A careful examination of these photostatic copies was not possible in the course of cross-examination; and, of course, I myself, since I did not know the documents, was not able to comment upon them. Since Herr Von Neurath was obviously overtired and exhausted after the cross-examination it was not possible for me to examine the question and discuss it with him on the same day; that was possible only on the following day.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Von Ludinghausen, the defendant may be recalled for the purpose of being questioned about these two documents; but, of course, it is an exceptional license which is allowed on this occasion, because the object of re-examination is to enable counsel to elucidate such matters as this.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You may call him. [The Defendant Von Neurath resumed the stand.] You are still under oath, of course.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath, do you recall the reason for your letter to Dr. Lammers of 31 August 1940 and your request for him to arrange a conference, an interview with Hitler?
VON NEURATH: Yes. As I said during my examination, in the course of the summer of 1940 I learned that various Reich and Party agencies, among others particularly the Gauleiter of the neighboring Gaue and Himmler, had sent more or less radical reports and suggestions to Hitler. I knew that Himmler, particularly, made quite extreme suggestions regarding a partition of the Protectorate area and complete annihilation of the Czech folkdom and people. These agencies were urging Hitler to put these plans into effect as quickly as possible. Since, as I have already emphasized, I was opposed to such plans and, on the contrary, wanted to preserve the Czech people and folkdom and protect them against the intentions of Himmler and his companions to destroy them, I decided to make an attempt to induce Hitler not to carry out any Germanization plans but to forbid them and to send a categorical order to this effect to the Party and its agencies.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Do you recall how these two reports came about, which were to be included in your letter to Lammers?
VON NEURATH: As far as I can recall, things developed as follows: Either I myself dictated a report or one of my officials drew it up according to my instructions; I believe the latter was the case. But I recall definitely that this report was much briefer than the one submitted here in photostatic copy. I remember, furthermore, that the conclusions drawn in it were similar but much sharper and that the whole problem had to be considered very carefully.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now, tell us how and why the second report of Frank came to be made.
VON NEURATH: From the various discussions which I had with Frank, I knew that he, too, was opposed to this partition of the Protectorate territory and the evacuation of the Czech population as proposed by Himmler and that he shared my opinions, at least to that extent. Therefore I considered it expedient, since Hitler had assigned Frank to me as State Secretary because he knew the Czech country and people very well, to point out to Hitler that this man, too, was opposed to Himmler's plans and advised Hitler against accepting them.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: But for what reason did you especially emphasize in your letter to Lammers that you shared the opinions expressed in Frank's report?
VON NEURATH: I considered it right to do this because Frank was a member of the SS and a subordinate and confidant of Himmler. On the other hand, I knew already at that time that Hitler was prejudiced against me, because of my attitude toward the Czech people, which he considered much too mild and lenient; and I was, therefore, convinced that together with Frank I would be more likely to be successful in influencing Hitler to my way of thinking than if I went to him alone. That was the reason why I suggested that Frank should participate in the report. For the same reason I did not write directly to Hitler, as I did usually, but to Lammers. According to previous experience, I had to assume that if I had written directly to Hitler, who on top of it was not in Berlin at the time, he would either not read the report at all or would refer it to Himmler.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: How was this letter to Lammers and its enclosures handled in your office?
VON NEURATH: I had the draft of the report of Frank submitted to me. Then I dictated my letter to Lammers, and I sent it with my report and Frank's draft back to Frank's office for a final review of the Frank report and for the dispatch of the letter to Lammers together with both versions. I did not see the letter to Lammers and the two reports again before they were sent out nor did I see them, by the way, in Berlin at the conference with Hitler.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The last question. How did you reach the conviction that the photostatic copies, submitted here, of the two reports could not be identical with the reports which were enclosed in the letter to Lammers, according to your instructions'{
VON NEURATH: As for the first report which I prepared, I have already stated that according to my recollection it was much shorter than the one submitted here in photostatic copy. Furthermore, this photostatic copy does not bear my signature, not even my initials. But it is out of the question that the final copy of this report, which was enclosed at my office in the letter to Lammers, would not have been signed or at least initialed by me; and the certificate of correctness, which, remarkably enough, is contained in this report and which was prepared by an SS Obersturmbannfuehrer, is not signed. The photostatic copy which is said to have been enclosed in the letter to Lammers does not even bear my initials. The most noticeable thing, however, is the certificate of correctness on the photostatic copy. This can have a meaning only if the document enclosed in the letter to Lammers, in spite of not bearing my signature, was enclosed in the letter nevertheless. But since the final copy which my office sent to State Secretary Frank's office with the letter to Lammers was certainly signed by me, this certificate proves that it was not the report signed by me which was enclosed in the letter sent to Lammers but another one drafted by Frank or by officials in his office. As for Frank's own report, the text of the photostatic copy here, to my recollection, is not identical with the text of the report which I approved and which I then sent on together with my report to Lammers...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, we have heard the explanation more than once, I think, that the enclosure which was in the letter was not the same as the one which he drew up. It does not get any more convincing by getting told over again.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I only wanted to express it again. But if the Tribunal believes that that explanation has been made previously, I may dispense with it.
VON NEURATH: Mr. President, may I be permitted to make another statement as to how I imagine-of course, I can only imagine-these things took place? I am firmly convinced that if the two photostatic copies submitted here were actually enclosed in the letter to Lammer's, they were prepared in Frank's office, and enclosed without my knowledge. Another possibility would be, of course, that Czech...
THE PRESIDENT: We are quite as able to imagine possibilities as you are. The fact is that the letter was signed in his name, was it not? The letter itself was signed?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And he refers expressly to the enclosure?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; we understand it.
DR. VOW LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I wanted it to be made clear to the Court. For, as I have said, I could not thoroughly examine the remarkable characteristics of these two reports, the outer form and the text at the moment of cross-examination. I have no further questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to the dock. Do you want to ask any questions, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I do not think so. If the Court would just allow me, I should like to look at the document while the Court is recessed and see whether there is any point that might like to question on.
THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now. [A recess was taken.]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have considered the matter; and I think it is really in the stage of argument and not crossexamination; but, My Lord, I should like Your Lordship just to observe, as the matter has been raised, that there is a certificate, given by Captain Hochwald on behalf of General Ecer, which states that the exhibit which was put in is a photostat taken from the original of a document found in the archives of the Reich Protector's of lice in Prague, so that that theory appears, from the certificate and the exhibit, that the copy-letter to Dr. Lammers and the two memoranda were preserved and found in the of lice of the Reich Protector. I do not want to say anything further in the matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Let the defendant come back to the witness box. Oh-no he need not come back. Dr. Bergold. Dr. Bergold?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President, since Dr. Bergold is absent at present, I should like to ask whether I may submit the three documents in my case which are still outstanding.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Kranzbuhler.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I am offering as Exhibit Doenitz-100, the affidavit subscribed by the chief of the American Navy, Admiral Nimitz, as to American U-boat war against the Japanese Navy. The Tribunal already knows what I wish to prove with this. I need not read anything now because in the final presentation of my argument I shall have to come back to this point.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to have the document read, Dr. Kranzbuhler.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I have the original text in English, Mr. President, and I shall therefore have to read in English: "At the request of the International Military Tribunal, the following interrogatories were on this date, 11 May 1940, put to Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz..."
THE PRESIDENT: You must have given the wrong date-1946, is it not?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: 11 May 1946. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: ". . . put to Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy, by Lieutenant Commander Joseph L. Broderick, United States Naval Reserve, of the International Law Section, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., who recorded verbatim the testimony of the witness. Admiral Nimitz was duly sworn by Lieutenant Commander Broderick and interrogated as follows: "Q: 'What is your name, rank, and present station?' "A: 'Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, United States Navy, Chief of Naval Operations of the United States Navy.' "1. Q: 'What positions in the U.S. Navy did you hold from December 1941 until May 1945?' "A: 'Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.' "2. Q: 'Did the U.S.A. in her sea warfare against Japan announce certain waters to be areas of operation, blockade, danger, restriction, warning, or the like?' "A: 'Yes. For the purpose of command of operations against Japan the Pacific Ocean areas were declared a theater of operations.' "3. Q: 'If yes, was it customary in such areas for submarines to attack merchantmen without warning, with the exception of her own and those of her Allies?' "A: 'Yes, with the exception of hospital ships and other vessels under "safe conduct" voyages for humanitarian purposes.' "4. Q: 'Were you under orders to do so?' "A: 'The Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 ordered unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan.' "5. Q: 'Was it customary for the submarines to attack Japanese merchantmen without warning-outside of announced operation or similar areas since the outbreak of the war?' "A: 'The reply to this interrogatory involves matters outside the limits of my command during the war; therefore I make no reply thereto.' "6. Q: 'Were you under orders to do so?' "A: 'The reply to this interrogatory involves matters outside the limits of my command during the war; therefore I make no reply thereto.' "7. Q: 'If the practice of attacking without warning did not exist since the outbreak of the war, did it exist from a later date on?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: From what date on?' "A: 'The practice existed from 7 December 1941 in the declared zone of operations.' "8. Q: 'Did this practice correspond to issued orders?' "A: 'Yes.' "9. Q: 'Did it become known to the U.S. naval authorities that Japanese merchantmen were under orders to report any sighted U.S. submarine to the Japanese Armed Forces by radio? If yes, when did it become known?' "A: 'During the course of the war, it became known to the U.S. naval authorities that Japanese merchantmen in fact reported by radio to Japanese Armed Forces any information regarding sighting of U.S. submarines.' "10. Q: 'Did the U.S. submarines thereupon receive the order to attack without warning Japanese merchantmen, if this order did not exist already before? If yes, when?' "A: 'The order existed from 7 December 1941.' "11. Q: 'Did it become known to the U.S. naval authorities that the Japanese merchantmen were under orders to attack any U.S. submarine in any way suitable according to the situation; for instance, by ramming, gunfire, or by depth charges? If yes, when did it become known?' "A: 'Japanese merchantmen were usually armed and always attacked by any available means when feasible.' "12. Q: 'Did the U.S. submarines thereupon receive the order of attacking without warning Japanese merchantmen, if this order did not already exist before. If yes, when?' "A: 'The order existed from 7 December 1941.' "13. Q: 'Were, by order or on general principles, the U.S. submarines prohibited from carrying out rescue measures toward passengers and crews of ships sunk without warning in those cases where by doing so the safety of their own boat was endangered?' "A: 'On general principles, the U.S. submarines did not rescue enemy survivors if undue additional hazard to the submarine resulted or the submarine would thereby be prevented from accomplishing its further mission. U.S. submarines were limited in rescue measures by small passenger carrying facilities combined with the known desperate and suicidal character of the enemy. Therefore, it was unsafe to pick up many survivors.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Frequently survivors were given rubber boats and/or provisions. Almost invariably survivors did not come aboard the submarine voluntarily, and it was necessary to take them prisoner by force.' "14. Q: 'If such an order or principle did not exist, did the U.S. submarine actually carry out rescue measures in the above-mentioned cases?' "A: 'In numerous cases enemy survivors were rescued by U.S. submarines.' "15. Q: 'In answering the above question, does the expression "merchantmen" mean any other kind of ships than those which were not warships?' "A: 'No. By "merchantmen" I mean all types of ships which were not combatant ships. Used in this sense, it includes fishing boats, et cetera.' "16. Q: 'If yes, what kind of ships?' "A: 'The last answer covers this question.' "17. Q: 'Has any order of the U.S. naval authorities mentioned in the above questionnaire concerning the tactics of U.S. submarines toward Japanese merchantmen been based on the grounds of reprisal? If yes, what orders?' "A: 'The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered on 7 December 1941 resulted from the recognition of Japanese tactics revealed on that date. No further orders to U.S. submarines concerning tactics toward Japanese merchantmen throughout the war were based on reprisal, although specific instances of Japanese submarines committing atrocities toward U.S. merchant marine survivors became known and would have justified such a course.' "18. Q: 'Has this order or have these orders of the Japanese Government been announced as reprisals?' "A: 'The question is not clear. Therefore I make no reply thereto.' "19. Q: 'On the basis of what Japanese tactics was reprisal considered justified?' "A: 'The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 was justified by the Japanese attacks on that date on U.S. bases and on both armed and unarmed ships and nationals without warning or declaration of war.' "The above record of testimony has been examined by me on this date and is in all respects accurate and true."- signed-"Chester W.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy." This document bears the number Doenitz-100. As my next document I submit an expert opinion given by the former naval judge, Jackel, on the jurisdiction of the naval courts for the protection of the native population against encroachments by marines. This document has been admitted by the Tribunal and is available in translation and therefore I do not need to read it.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the number?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Doenitz-49, Mr. President. Then, Mr. President, some weeks back I made application to admit extracts from the records of a war crimes court at Oslo. These had been used by the Prosecution on the occasion of the cross-examination of Grossadmiral Doenitz. At that time they were not numbered. From these records I selected some extracts which prove that torpedo boat Number 345, whose crew were shot by reason of the Commando Order, was a boat which was charged with sabotage acts. Due to this fact the High Command of the Navy and also Admiral Doenitz were not informed about the treatment meted out to these prisoners, and this question was settled directly by means of discussions between Gauleiter Terboven and the Fuehrer's headquarters. I ask that the High Tribunal admit this document as evidence, since this document was used by the Prosecution. It would receive the Number Doenitz-107.
COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): My Lord, I do not know if the Tribunal has before it the answer which the Prosecution have put into this application.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we have just looked at it now.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Broadly speaking, it comes to this, that we are quite prepared to put in the whole proceedings, but we should object to' extracts being put in; that is, amongst the affidavits and the evidence of some of the witnesses, material to support the points for which counsel for Defendant Doenitz contends. There is, on the other hand, a body of evidence the other way on all those points. That is why, My Lord...
THE PRESIDENT: Would it not save translation if you put in the passages in the document upon which you rely?
COL. PHILLIMORE: If that would be more convenient, My Lord, we can do that.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know how long the document is. It may be very long indeed.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The whole proceedings are very long. The trial lasted for 4 days.
THE PRESIDENT: Then it would be appropriate that you should pick out the parts on which you rely and Dr. Kranzbuhler can put in...
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is put in the answer that the document against this defendant, which was proved in the defendant's case, was an affidavit by the Judge Advocate, who set out the effect of the evidence accepted by the court.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal follows that, but it thinks that it is desirable that you should put in the passages upon which you as well as the defense counsel rely.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: May I submit this document, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number again, please?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Number Doenitz-107, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: And it contains extracts from these proceedings, does it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Yes, extracts.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will put in their extracts and we will consider them both.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President, then I have another question dealing with the documents of the case which we have just dealt with, the case of Katyn. The witness, Professor Markov, mentioned the expert opinion given by the Italian expert, Professor Palmieri, which is in the German White Book . I should also like to submit this opinion as evidence, for the reason that there is no mention of insects being found on the corpses as Professor Markov asserted, but rather, "larvae." To me the difference appears to be that insects fly about during the summer whereas larvae conceal themselves during the winter months. Mr. President, may I submit this document?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I should like to make just one factual remark. In Professor Palmieri's report it was indicated that the "larvae" were discovered in the throats of of the corpses. I cannot imagine that "insects" were ever found in the throat of a corpse. That is why I do not think that the presentation of the document by defendant's counsel serves a purpose.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, you are specifying a particular document referred to in the White Book , is that right?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: And you mean the whole of the document?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: That document is about one page, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you may put it in, subject to its being translated.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Very well, Mr. President.