dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: He maintains that it was due to the fact that Korvettenkapitan Kuppisch from the staff of the Commander of U-boats had told him the story of U-386, a boat whose commander had been reprimanded for not having shot Allied airmen drifting in a rubber dinghy. This explanation of Mohle's cannot be correct. It is proven beyond any doubt by the War Diary and by witnesses that the commander of U-386 had been reprimanded because he did not take on board the airmen concerned and bring them back. The whole affair concerning U-386, furthermore, took place a year after the Laconia incident in September 1943 and Korvettenkapitan Kuppisch, who was supposed to have told it, had already been killed in action as a U-boat commander in August 1943. It is not my task to try to explain how Mohle actually acquired his knowledge about the Laconia order. One thing at any rate has been proven, namely, that Admiral Doenitz and his staff had not caused this briefing to be given, nor did they know anything about it. Considering the frequent personal contacts between the U-boat commanders and the staff of the Commander of U-boats this can only be explained by the fact that the few commanders whom Mohle thus briefed did not take his words seriously. Is Admiral Doenitz thus responsible for the interpretation of the Laconia order as given by Mohle? Criminal responsibility in the first place presupposes guilt, that is to say, possibility of foreseeing the result. Considering the close contact with his flotilla chiefs and commanders, for whom alone the Laconia order was intended, Admiral Doenitz could not foresee that a flotilla chief might give such an interpretation to that order without taking any steps to be enlightened by the Commander of U-boats. Such conduct is beyond anything that could reasonably be expected. Therefore all guilt is excluded. Criminal responsibility requires another criterion, namely, that results shall be proven. This also is entirely lacking.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The Prosecution have not even made a serious attempt to prove that any one of the commanders briefed by Mohle in that sense ever actually fired on shipwrecked crews. As far as we are informed, such a thing occurred only once in this war on the German side in the case of Kapitanleutnant Eck. It is significant that this case was presented not by the Prosecution, but by the Defense. For the conduct of Eck has nothing whatsoever to do with the Laconia order as the Prosecution desires to construe it. He was not concerned with the destruction of human lives but with the removal of wreckage and floats from which the Allied airplanes could deduce the presence of a German U-boat in the area. For this conduct he and two of his officers were sentenced to death, and thereby punished with a severity which less agitated times will no longer comprehend. The two cases presented by the Prosecution, where shipwrecked crews allegedly were shot at, are so obviously unsuited to prove this accusation that I need not deal with them any further. The testimony about the sinking of the Noreen Mary bears the stamp of phantasy in various points, and in the case of the attack on the Antonica the intention to destroy shipwrecked people is out of the question because everything was over in 20 minutes and the night was dark. I was in the fortunate position to be able to present to the Tribunal a compilation of the Naval Operations Staff concerning a dozen cases in which Allied forces had allegedly shot at German shipwrecked crews. It seems to me that every one of these instances is better than that of the Prosecution, and some appear rather convincing. I therefore attach all the more value to the sober attitude assumed by the Naval Operations Staff when transmitting their opinion on these cases to the Fuehrer's headquarters.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: They point out that: (1) Part of the incidents occurred during combat operations; (2) shipwrecked men swimming in the water might easily be led to believe that a miss on other targets was aimed at them; (3) so far no written or verbal order for the use of arms against shipwrecked crews had been traced. I can only request that these principles be equally applied to the incidents presented by the Prosecution. In the same written opinion to the Fuehrer's headquarters the Naval Operations Staff reject reprisals by destroying enemy shipwrecked; that was on 14 September 1942, 3 days before the Laconia order. Since the latter, as a radio order, came to the knowledge of the Naval Operations Staff, it would doubtlessly have been canceled in accordance with the opposite viewpoint just expressed to the Fuehrer's headquarters if it had been understood to be an order for the shooting of shipwrecked crews. And now I am coming to the positive counterevidence against the opinion of the Prosecution. It consists in the first place of the number of rescued Allied sailors. This amounted, according to a survey by the British Minister of Transport in 1943, to 87 percent of the crews. Such a result is simply not compatible with an order for destruction. Furthermore, it has been established that Grossadmiral Doenitz in 1943, that is, after the Laconia order, rejected all consideration of action against shipwrecked crews. In a written opinion given to the Foreign Of lice on 4 April 1943, a directive to the U-boats to take action against lifeboats or shipwrecked crews was considered impossible by the Naval Operations Staff, since that would go against the grain of every sailor. In June 1943 Grossadmiral Doenitz, on receiving reports from Korvettenkapitan Witt about British aviators having fired on shipwrecked crews of German submarines, most decidedly rejected the idea of attacking a foe rendered defenseless in combat, stating that this was incompatible with our principles of warfare.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Summing up, I am convinced that the assertion of the Prosecution that German submarines had received an order to murder shipwrecked men has been strikingly disproved. Grossadmiral Doenitz stated here that he would never have allowed the spirit of his submarine men to be endangered by mean acts. With losses ranging from 70 to 80 percent, he could only replenish his troops with volunteers if he kept the fight clean, in spite of its being tough. And if the Tribunal will recall the declaration of the 67 commanders in British captivity, it will have to admit that he created an attitude and morale which survived defeat. I have endeavored to present to the Tribunal the most important facts supplemented by a number of legal considerations regarding naval warfare in order to clarify the most important problems to be discussed here from the point of view of the Defense. We arc concerned with the examination of the behavior of admirals in naval warfare, and the question of what is permissible according to international law is intimately connected with what is necessary according to the military standpoint. Therefore, in examining this particular point of the Indictment, I deeply regret that the Charter of this Tribunal deprives the accused officers of a privilege guaranteed to them as prisoners of war by the Geneva Convention namely, the passing of judgment by a military tribunal applying the laws and regulations binding on its own officers. According to Article 3 of the Charter, I am not allowed to question the competency of this Tribunal. I can therefore only request the Tribunal to make up for the unfairness that I see in the aforementioned article of the Charter by applying the same standards, where the military appreciation and moral justification of the actions of tines' German admirals is concerned, as the Tribunal would apply to admirals of their own countries.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: A soldier, out of practical known edge of the procedure in warfare as applied not only by his owe country but also by the adversary, is keenly sensitive to the dividing line between combat and war crimes. He knows that the interpretation of international law concerning what is allowed of forbidden in naval warfare is in the last resort governed by the interests of his country. An insular power like Great Britain having long and vulnerable sea lanes, has always looked upon these questions from a different angle than the continental powers. The attitude of the United States from the renunciation of submarine warfare by the Root Resolution of 1922 to unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan in 1941, reveals how a change in strategic position can entail a change in legal evaluation. No one can tell to what extent a changed strategic' position at sea will cause c modification of legal conception. No one can know to what degree the development of air forces and the efficacy of bombs will increasingly force navies under water and render obsolete al previous conceptions of submarine warfare.* For-a naval office: these are obvious reflections, and they should prevent a man o law from settling controversial questions of law and police pertaining to naval war at the expense of those whose professions duty it is to direct navies. * Compare for instance "Submarines in the Atomic Era" in the New York Herald Tribune, European Edition, of 27 April 1946, Page 2. In the first World War German submarine warfare was accompanied by a storm of indignation. It seems significant to me today that the British historian, Bell, in a paper intended only for official use of the Foreign Of lice, judges the right to such indignation as follows: "It is an old rule of military honor never to belittle the deeds of an enemy who has put up a stiff and brave fight. If this rule had been followed in England, the public would better appreciate the place which the war between submarines and commerce will occupy in the history of strategy and of war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: It is unfortunate that the cries of terror as well as the unseemly insults of journalists were repeated by responsible people, with the result that the slogans 'piracy' and 'murder' entered the vocabulary and have engendered the corresponding feelings in the hearts of the people."* I must now treat the other points of the Indictment against Grossadmiral Doenitz which are not concerned with naval war. To begin with, there is the charge of preparation of aggressive wars. It is known how much contradiction this very accusation has aroused on the part of professional officers of probably all Allied countries. In answer to such attacks in public, Justice Jackson formulated for the press (The Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 5 December i945) the ideas of the Prosecution regarding this subject as follows: "I have made it clear that we do not prosecute these militarists because they served their country, but because they dominated it and led it into war. Not because they conducted the war; but because they have been driving to war." If this standard is used, then for the defense of Admiral Doenitz against the charge of preparing aggressive wars I need only point to the result of the evidence. At the beginning of the war he was a relatively young commander; his only task eras the training and commanding of submarine crews; he did not belong to the General Staff in the meaning of the Indictment and did not participate in any of the addresses which were presented here as proof of war intentions. The charge that he had advocated the occupation of submarine bases in Norway is likewise disproved. The same applies to the allegation that in 1943 he had proposed an attack upon Spain in order to capture Gibraltar. The conquest of Gibraltar * A. C.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Bell, Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defense, A History of the Blockade of Germany and of the Countries Associated with Her in the Great War 1914-1918 - The introduction contains the remark "This history is confidential and for official use only." (Quoted from the German edition by Bohmert, Die englische Hunger-blockade im Welthrieg, Essen, 1943). against the Drill of Spain was absolutely impossible and out of the question during the entire war, and especially so in 1943. For Germany the war had already reached a stage of defense, even of dangerous setbacks, on all fronts at the time when Admiral Doenitz was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on 1 February 1943. This fact may be significant for his participation in the so-called conspiracy. The Prosecution is not very clear about the precise moment at which they want to fix the beginning of such participation. In the individual Indictment intimate connection with Hitler since 1932 is mentioned. This, however, is obviously an error. Admiral Doenitz did not become acquainted with Hitler until the autumn of 1934, on the occasion of the submission of a military report, and in the following years talked to him briefly and always only about military problems, altogether eight times, and never alone. Since, aside from this fact, the defendant never belonged to any organization which is accused of conspiracy by the Prosecution, I see no connection of any kind with this conspiracy prior to 1 February 1943. All the more important is the question of the retroactive effects of joining the conspiracy, as has been illustrated by the British Prosecutor by the example of the perpetrators of railway sabotage. This idea of guilt, retroactive on past events, is very difficult for the German jurist to understand. The continental concept of law is reflected by the formulation of Hugo Grotius: "To participate in a crime a person must not only have knowledge of it but also the ability to prevent it."* While the entire legal.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: concept of the conspiracy in itself represents a special creation of Anglo-Saxon justice in our eyes, this applies even more to the retroaction of the so-called conspiracy. A judgment laying claim to international validity, one which should be understood by the peoples of Europe and especially by the Germans, must be based upon generally recognized principles of law. This, however, is not the case regarding a retroactive guilt. Though such a legal construction may seem fitting in dealing with certain typical crimes, it seems to me entirely inapplicable in judging events such as are being discussed here. Admiral Doenitz became the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in the course of a normal military career entirely free of politics. The appointment was based upon the proposal of his predecessor, Grossadmiral Raeder, for whom his proven abilities in the guidance of U-boat warfare alone were the determining factor. Specific acceptance of the appointment was no more required than in the case of an appointment to any other military position. Admiral Doenitz * Hugo Grotius, De jure pacis ac belli, Book II, Chapter XXI. entertained the sole thought, as any officer might well have done in a similar position, whether he would be equal to the task and whether he could accomplish it in the best interest of the Navy and of his people. All other considerations which the Prosecution apparently expected of him during this period, namely, as to the legitimacy of the Party Program and of the policy of the Party from 1922 on, as well as German internal and foreign policy since 1933, can be but fictitious; they have nothing to do with the facts. Fictions of such nature are not limited by time nor by reality. Is the responsibility for past measures on taking over a high position to extend only to acts of the present cabinet, or is it to extend to acts of former cabinets, and over what period? Is it to comprise only one's own internal and foreign policy or is it to include one's allies?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Such considerations cannot be, refuted logically; however, they lead to unacceptable results and show the impracticability of the idea of retroaction regarding the so-called conspiracy. To measure by exact standards the participation in such a conspiracy is difficult enough, if events not of a criminal but of a military and political nature are involved. Of what meaning are such concepts as "voluntary accession" and "knowledge of the criminal plan" when in times of greatest danger an officer assumes the task to prevent the collapse of his nation's maritime warfare? Even the Prosecution seems to realize this. For, corresponding to their general idea, they attempt to link Admiral Doenitz with the conspiracy in a political way. This is accomplished by the assertion that he became a member of the Reich Cabinet by virtue of his appointment to the High Command of the Navy. This allegation is based upon the decree whereby the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and of the Navy were invested with the rank of Reich Minister and upon the order of Hitler were to participate in Cabinet meetings. It is evident that one is not actually a Reich minister merely by being invested with the rank of Reich minister. Also one is not a member of the Cabinet if one is only permitted to participate in it upon special orders. This obviously indicates that he was only to be consulted on technical matters, but never had authority to gain information about other departments, much less to give advice. One cannot, however, speak of a political task and a political responsibility without the existence of such an authority. For an activity as a minister all legal basis is lacking. According to the Reich Defense Law there existed for the entire Armed Forces but one minister, the Reich War Minister. This post remained unoccupied after the resignation of Field Marshal Von Blomberg. The business of the ministry was conducted by the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. A new ministry was not created either for the Army or for the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and of the Navy therefore would have had to be ministers without. Since, however, they each headed a department, namely, the Army and the Navy, such an appointment would have constituted a contradiction to all legal customs of the State. The countersigning of all laws in which the minister participates according to his jurisdiction must be considered the basic criterion of all ministerial activity. There exists not a single law which was countersigned by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. I have demonstrated this to the Tribunal by the example of the Prize Ordinance. That is to say that, even applying the legal standards of a democratic system, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy cannot be designated as a member of the Reich Cabinet, because he lacked all authority of participation in legislative acts and every collective responsibility for policies assumed. His task was, and remained, a military one even though for reasons of etiquette he was put on an equal basis in rank with other Reich ministers. The Prosecution themselves realized that a Reich Government in the constitutional sense no longer existed during the war, and consequently stated that the actual governing was carried out by those who participated in the situation conferences at the Fuehrer's headquarters. As all witnesses examined here stated, we are concerned here with events of a purely military nature, where incoming reports were presented, military measures discussed, and military orders issued. Questions of foreign policy were only very rarely touched upon if they had any connection with military problems; they were, however, never discussed and no decision was rendered on them in these Fuehrer conferences on the situation. Internal policy and the security system were never on the agenda. Insofar as nonmilitary persons participated, they were attendants or listeners who gathered information for their respective departments. The Reichsfuehrer SS or his deputy were present for.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: the command of the Waffen-SS, and during the last year of war also for the Reserve Army. Admiral Doenitz always participated in these Fuehrer conferences when he was at the Fuehrer's headquarters. Notes taken down by whoever accompanied him on all these meetings and discussions of the Commander-in-Chief are all in the possession of the Prosecution. As the Prosecution has not presented a single one of these notes from which it would appear that the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy participated in reporting on or in discussing and deciding affairs of a political nature, one can assume that such notes do not exist. Thus the testimony of witnesses has been confirmed according to which the Fuehrer conferences had nothing whatever to do with governing in a political sense, but were exclusively an instrument of the military leadership. Therefore, an overall responsibility of Grossadmiral Doenitz for all events that occurred since 1943, which in the course of this Trial have been designated as criminal, certainly does not exist. Consequently, I shall deal only with those individual allegations by which the Prosecution tries directly to connect Admiral Doenitz with the conspiracy. I believe I am all the more justified to proceed in that manner, as a short time ago the Tribunal refused the cross-examination of witnesses in the Katyn case with the argument that no one was accusing Admiral Doenitz in connection with this case. I conclude, therefore, that at any rate in the eyes of the Tribunal he is only accused of such cases wherein he allegedly directly participated. To begin with, this does not apply to the Fuehrer's order for the extermination of sabotage Commandos, dated 18 October 1942. The Prosecution has tried to establish that this order had been presented to Admiral Doenitz in detail, together with all possible objections, shortly after his assumption of the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. It has failed to establish this assertion.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In fact Doenitz, as he himself admits, did read or have presented to him the order in question in the autumn of 1942 in his capacity of Commander of U-boats, and in the same form in which the frontline commanders received it. I do not wish to speak here of the circumstances which led to objections against this order on the part of the High Command of the Armed Forces. Indeed, all these circumstances could not be discernible to one who received this order at the front. For such a man it was a matter of reprisal against saboteurs who seemed to be soldiers, but did not fight according to the regulations which are binding upon soldiers. Whether such reprisals were admissible at all according to the Geneva Convention, and to what extent, could not be judged by, nor did that come within the competence of, the recipient of the order. Every superior officer, at any rate, probably recognized that the order not to grant any pardon, and to hand over such persons in certain cases to the SD, was in itself an infringement of the rules of war. However, since the essence of any reprisal is to avenge a wrong on the part of the enemy with a wrong on one's own part, this does not prove anything concerning the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the reprisal order. If no one but the leadership of the State is competent to order reprisals, then hundreds or thousands of German officers cannot be required today to have considered themselves also competent, and to have been presumptuous enough to verify orders whose actual and legal basis was entirely unknown to them. In this case the principle prevails, at least for the frontline commanders, that the subordinate may, when in doubt, rely on the order as given.* * Hugo Grotius, De jure pacis ac bell, Book II, Chapter XXVI.