dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. HORN: The guiding principles as to foreign policy which Hitler laid down for him at that time covered merely the reincorporation of Danzig and the establishment of an extraterritorial road through the Corridor, in order to open a direct land route to East Prussia. As the Tribunal will remember, Hitler had told Herr Von Ribbentrop already at the time of his appointment as Foreign Minister that it was desirable to achieve these aims. This demand was just as much historically justified as some solution in the case of earlier incorporations of areas inhabited by Germans, which had become inevitable. The statute of the purely German city of Danzig, which was created' by the Treaty of Versailles in the course of the establishment of a Polish state, had always been the cause of friction between Germany and Poland. Poland had achieved this solution at Versailles through the argument that it needed an outlet to the sea. For the same reason the Corridor was established against all ethnological needs. Clemenceau in his memorandum already referred to this artificial creation as a source of danger, especially due to the fact that the peoples living in this area had been separated through long years of bitter enmity. It was not difficult to foresee that as a result of this fact the League of Nations and the International Court at The Hague were constantly going to be occupied with complaints about Polish violations of the agreement on minorities. The same cause gave rise to the large-scale confiscation of up to a million hectares of German estates and the expulsion of far more than a million Germans in the course of 20 years.
DR. HORN: Not without reason did Lord d'Abernon speak of the Danzig-Corridor problem as the "powder magazine of Europe." When finally a solution of this question was sought under recognition of the Polish claim to the preservation of an outlet to the sea, such an endeavor appeared both sensible and historically justified: The evidence has produced nothing to support the claim that this question served merely as a pretext, which Herr Von Ribbentrop could not but have known. It has produced no proof that Herr Von Ribbentrop was acquainted with those of Hitler's aims which went far beyond these demands. Nor has it been proved that Herr Von Ribbentrop, as has been asserted by the Prosecution, before 1 September 1939, did all he possibly could to prevent peace with Poland, although he knew that a war with Poland would draw Great Britain and France into the conflict. The Prosecution base this statement on Document TC-73. This is a report by the Polish Ambassador to Berlin, Lipski, to his Foreign Minister. The document contains nothing whatsoever to substantiate this assertion. Moreover, I do not believe that, according to the result of the evidence, Lipski can be valued as a particularly reliable witness. May I recall that it was Lipski who, during the decisive stage of the negotiations before the outbreak of the war, remarked that he had not the least cause to be interested in notes or propositions from the German side and that he knew the situation in Germany quite well after a period of 51/2 years as Ambassador. He was convinced that in case of war riots would break out in Germany and that the Polish Army would march victoriously into Berlin. According to the testimony of the witness Dahlerus it was none other than Lipski who, during the decisive discussion at the Polish Embassy, created the impression among the Swedes that Poland was sabotaging every possibility for negotiations.
DR. HORN: Further results of the evidence also speak against the above allegations presented by the Prosecution; as for instance the fact that Herr Von Ribbentrop, after he had learned that the Polish-English guarantee pact had been signed, intervened with Hitler to cancel the order for the Armed Forces to march because a conflict with Poland would also, in his opinion, have drawn in the Western Powers. This opinion coincides with the conclusions to which Herr Von Ribbentrop had come in his review of the European situation and laid down in Document TC-75, which has already been mentioned. Minister Schmidt has testified here that it was Herr Von Ribbentrop who, on 25 August 1939, after the Hitler-Henderson meeting, sent him to Sir Nevile Henderson with the verbal communiqué, presented as TC-72/69, in which the contents of Hitler's proposals were summarized. At the same time Herr Von Ribbentrop adjured Henderson to submit Hitler's proposals personally to the British Government for favorable consideration. According to the British Blue Book, Sir Nevile Henderson could not refrain from calling these and subsequent proposals exceptionally reasonable and sincere. They were not the customary Hitler proposals, but pure "League of Nations" proposals. No one studying the negotiations of the subsequent fateful days can deny that everything was done on the German side at least to get negotiations under way on a workable basis. The opposite side did not let it come to that, because they were determined to take action this time. The good services of England ended with the breaking-off of all mediation without having been able to bring Poland to the conference table. Herr Von Ribbentrop has been blamed for having practically defeated the purpose of the last decisive discussion with the British Ambassador, Henderson, by having read the German proposals to Poland so fast, contrary to all diplomatic custom and international courtesy, that Sir Nevile Henderson could not understand them and, hence, could not pass them on.
DR. HORN: The interpreter, Minister Schmidt, was present at this decisive discussion. He has testified here under oath that this statement is not true. One may consider Hitler's order to acquaint Sir Nevile Henderson only with the sum stance of the memorandum as unwise. The fact is that not only did Herr Von Ribbentrop read the entire contents at a normal speed to the British Ambassador; but he also, by having the interpreter present, . made it possible for Sir Nevile Henderson to become familiar with the entire contents and, moreover, to have explanations given on it. Besides, upon the initiative of Reich Marshal Goering, it was transmitted to the British Embassy during the same night by telephone to the Counsellor of the Embassy, Mr. Forbes. Thus the British Government should have been able to render the good services offered for opening negotiations based on positive proposals. By reason of these facts here deposed, one must rightly doubt the truth of the allegation that the defendant had done everything to prevent peace with Poland. At the beginning of my defense speech I stressed that legal considerations concerning aggressive war are not possible without knowledge of the circumstances leading to an armed conflict. Before I proceed to the legal aspects of the conflict with Poland, may I make some additional statements concerning the causes that led to the war. The period between two World Wars is characterized by the conflicting reactions of those powers which were satisfied and those which were dissatisfied. It seems to be an inevitable law that after great war repercussions, the victorious states tend as far as possible toward the re-establishment of the prewar status and prewar mentality, whereas the vanquished are forced to find a way out of the consequences of their defeat by new means and methods. Thus after the Napoleonic wars there came about the Holy Alliance which under Metternich's leadership, using legitimacy as an authorization, tried to ignore the effects of the French Revolution.
DR. HORN: What the Holy Alliance did not achieve, the League of Nations equally failed to achieve. t Created in an atmosphere of fervent belief in human progress, it was quickly transformed into a tool of the satisfied states. Every effort to strengthen the League of Nations meant a new bulwark for the maintenance of the status quo. Under cover of the elegant diction of juridical formalities power politics continued. Besides, the obsession by the idea of securite soon deprived the newly-created body of any breath of freshness and life. In this fashion, naturally, a solution of the problems created by the end of the first World War could never be found. In international relations a coalition of interests of the conservative powers content with the status quo and of the revolutionary powers trying to do away with it, became increasingly apparent. It could only be a question of time until under those circumstances the political initiative would pass to the dissatisfied powers. The formation of this front depended exclusively on the force of the revolutionary spirit which was crystallizing in opposition to the political self-complacency and hankering after the past. In this fertile soil grew the doctrines of National Socialism, Fascism, and Bolshevism, obscure in many parts of their programs, elastic and incoherent in others. Their power of attraction was based not so much on their programs but on the fact that they admittedly offered something new and that they did not exhort their followers to worship a political ideal that had failed in the past. The economic crisis of the postwar period, the controversies about reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr, the inability of democratic governments to obtain anything for their distressed peoples from the other democracies, unavoidably led to a test of the doctrines which had not yet been tried out.
DR. HORN: The practical results of this revolution, as we experienced them in Germany after 1933, could, aside from the social program, consist only in abolishing the peace settlement of 1919, which constitutes a classical example of failure to understand the revolutionary character of a world crisis. For this revolution these tasks were not legal questions but doctrines, exactly as it had long become a doctrine of the satisfied states to maintain the status quo at all costs, even at the price of a new world war. Only he who does not shut his eyes before these facts can judge the political crisis of the past decade. Every revolution has but two possibilities; either it meets so little resistance that eventually conservative tendencies develop and an amalgamation with the old order is formed, or the antagonistic forces are so strong that finally the revolution breaks up through overstraining its own means and methods. National Socialism went the second way, which began without bloodshed and partly with a remarkable leaning upon tradition. But this method, too, could not escape the inherent laws of history. The aims were too high for one generation, the revolutionary essence too strong. The initial successes were startling, but they also resulted in lack of criticism as to the methods and aims. The process of uniting all larger German groups in the Central European space would most probably have succeeded, if at the end-I am referring to the setting up of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the pursuit of the Danzig-Corridor question-the revolutionary tempo and methods had not been overstrained by reason of previous successes. No person capable of sober judgment will dispute the need for a solution of the Danzig-Corridor question, delicate as it was. The Prosecution may assert that in reality Danzig was but a pretext, but seen from the state of affairs in 1939 this can hardly be proved. But it is certain that the opposite side was concerned about other things than the maintenance of the status quo in the East.
DR. HORN: National Socialism, and with it, in its newly gained strength, the German Reich, had become such a danger in the eyes of the others that after Prague it was determined to make any further German advance a "test case," wherever it should happen. I have already said that the revolutionary protest in Central Europe was chiefly due to economic causes brought about by Versailles where a peace treaty was imposed on Germany of which it was well-known that its economic provisions could not be carried out by the vanquished.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that sentence, at any rate, is objectionable on the ground that I have already stated.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I did not mean to emphasize how the Versailles Treaty came about; I only wanted to stress certain necessary consequences which are generally known facts, But I have completed this part and have nothing further to say with reference to it.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: Much has been said here about the slogan Lebensraum. I am convinced that this word would never have become a political program, if after the first World War Germany had been given the possibility of linking up with the world markets, instead of being strangled economically. By systematically cutting her off from all raw material bases of the world-all this for reasons of secrete-the tendency towards autarchy, the inevitable way out from the barring from the world markets was fostered; and, at the same time, with the progressively deteriorating economic situation, the cry for Lebensraum could find receptive ears. Thus, Stalin is right when he says: "It would be erroneous to believe that the second World War came about accidentally or as a result from mistakes of one or the other of the statesmen, even though such mistakes were made without doubt. Actually the war came about as an inevitable result of the development of international economic and political forces based on modern monopolistic capitalism."* Professor Jahrreiss has already fully explained, in his basic arguments concerning the legal and the actual significance of the Kellogg Pact, that the meaning given to this project for the * Speech by Stalin on the eve of the Soviet elections in February 1946. prevention of war by the Prosecution cannot be recognized by the Defense.* Even though war has been previously declared an international crime, especially at the 8th League of Nations Assembly of 1927, it became quite clear in preliminary conversations, as has been proved by documents already submitted to the Tribunal, that this declaration was not meant to make war a crime in the legal sense but that it was an expression of the wish to prevent future international catastrophes of the scale of the first World War. Moreover, neither the United States nor Russia participated in the League of Nations resolution of 1927.
DR. HORN: All further plans for outlawing war during the period between the first and second World Wars remained mere drafts, as the British Prosecutor had to acknowledge in his significant argumentation, because practical politics could not follow these moral postulates. All these experiments-and they are by no means few-clearly show that the problem of finding a definition lies in the difficulty of condensing a political process, dependent upon a host of components, into a legal concept which will cover all the varying cases occurring in practice. The failure to formulate a definition which could be used in international law has led to the fact that, instead of working out general standards and measures applicable in each case, the designation of the aggressor was left to the decision of an organ dominating all the contending parties. In such a way, the question of defining the aggressor became the question: "Quis judicavit?" that is, "Who shall designate the aggressor?" From this decision follows a new difficulty, namely, what is to be done against the aggressor? Previous to the attempt of settling in a general way the concept of aggression and the sanctions against the aggressor, political alliances determined the obligations of the parties to wage war. In order to improve this unsatisfactory and anarchic situation, the United States, under Secretary of State Bryan.
THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing.] Isn't this really arguing the same questions that Dr. Jahrreiss has already argued? * Mr. Justice Jackson is trying in this connection to invoke Article 4 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919. According to this, the universally recognized rules of international law are regarded as binding components of German Reich law. Owing to the differing legal appreciation of the Kellogg Pact on the part of the Great Powers the interpretation advanced by the Prosecution cannot be looked upon as German Reich law. C£. Reich Supreme Court Decisions in Litigation Procedures, Vol. 103, Page 216. Anschiltz: The Constitution of the German Reich (Die Verfassung des Deutschen Retches); 10th ea., Page 58 et sequentes.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have tried to omit the matters set forth by Professor Jahrreiss. Professor Jahrreiss confined his arguments chiefly to the Kellogg Pact. I am only dealing with the questions pertaining to the legal aspect of wars of aggression.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the Tribunal only granted the right to have an additional counsel deal with the general questions of law on the understanding that the other counsel were not going to deal with the same questions of law. Of course, you are not using the words of Dr. Jahrreiss-I should not expect you to do that-but you are arguing the very same topics.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, it had been agreed originally, as the professor as an expert had stated, that every counsel is entitled to take a different attitude toward the problem argued by him. Professor Jahrreiss concentrated chiefly on the Kellogg Pact and its consequences. I personally am turning my attention to aggressive war, and, as you, Mr. President, emphasized...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. What is involved, then, is that the Tribunal is going to hear 20 arguments upon the general questions of law; and surely it can scarcely have been thought by defendants' counsel that the Tribunal proposed to hear 20 arguments on the general questions of law and also hear Dr. Jahrreiss on it. The only purpose of hearing one counsel was to have the general questions of law dealt with by one counsel alone, and that the others should not speak upon it.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, may I emphasize once more. ..
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. The Tribunal will adjourn. [A recess was taken.]
DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): My Lord, may I ask the Tribunal to accept a short explanation to the matter which has just taken up the attention of the Tribunal and which for most counsel is of general and fundamental importance. I should like to remind you of the fact that the suggestion and initiative to take up certain legal topics and have them dealt with by Professor Jahrreiss came from the Defense and that this suggestion was made for the sole reason of complying with the Tribunal's wish to expedite the proceedings. I must earnestly request the Tribunal to protect us from letting this suggestion, made to and granted by the Tribunal at the time, become our own pitfall in that a resolution which has been made is interpreted too strictly. I do not have the resolution before me and I do not intend to deal with it and discuss it, but I should like to say this: Professor Jahrreiss did speak and was to speak on but two topics which, it is true, were of a general nature; that is, (a) the punishment of individuals for a war of aggression, in other words, nulla poena sine loge, and (b) the legal nature of the Fuehrer decrees. Only these two problems were to be dealt with by Dr. Jahrreiss and these were the two topics that he actually did deal with. But besides that, these proceedings entail a series of legal problems which are of a general nature and more or less affect each of the defendants. I only recall to you the interpretation of the conspiracy charges, the various questions dealing with international law, the questions of hostages and forced labor, and the legal question concerning distress at sea through naval warfare, and other general questions. There are a host of general questions, and above all the matter on which my colleague, Dr. Horn, was stopped, concerning the question: "What is an aggressive war?" There exist fundamental differences between a military war of aggression, a political war of aggression, and a juridical war of aggression, et cetera, about which Dr. Jahrreiss did not say a single word, nor was he supposed to do so.
DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): And please-I trust you do not mind my saying so, but that is the way I understood Dr. Horn-that is really the basis of his argument. I do not propose to argue and to refer to a resolution; but I ask the Tribunal not to put us in a most delicate situation, namely, that we, in order to expedite the proceedings by having Professor Jahrreiss deal with a number of legal questions, be put in a position for which we cannot take responsibility, in that we are prevented from dealing with certain questions which in our opinion are of decisive legal importance to the defendants and about which Jahrreiss himself did not speak at all. Only a word or two more. I believe the Tribunal will agree with me that one can have an entirely different opinion on the subject with which Professor Jahrreiss has dealt. I do not have it; nor shall I contradict Dr. Jahrreiss. But from a purely theoretical point of view that might be possible. Should it happen, just because in such an important matter a speaker has dealt with this question, although in a sense which possibly one of the counsel considers entirely improper and harmful to his case, that that counsel is forced to keep silent on such a matter? That cannot have been the intention of the Tribunal. Well, all I wanted to say was this: This speech by Jahrreiss served the purpose of expediting the Trial. Well and good. But we ask-I think I may say "we"; I believe that none of my colleagues is of a different opinion-we ask that it should not be interpreted too formally, and if one of us for some good reason says, "I have to discuss this, it is important for this or that reason," to give us that possibility wherever Jahrreiss has dealt with the subject in a sense which we do not approve, and not to prevent the discussion of some general legal question if it should be raised by any of the counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has been considering this matter and they are fully aware, of course, of the difficulties which may possibly arise if there were differences of opinion among the defendants' counsel upon questions which had been dealt with by Dr. Jahrreiss. They did anticipate when they made the Order which specifies that Dr. Jahrreiss should speak on legal issues arising out of the Indictment and Charter which are common to all the defendants-those are the words of the order-that he would deal with all the issues which were common to all the defendants, and in the absence of some difference of opinion, that the other defendants would be prepared to adopt his argument; but the Tribunal think that the questions of law may be to some extent quite various and difficult and that the only rule which is possible for them to lay down at this stage is that there must be no real repetition by defendants' counsel. The Tribunal apprehends that defendants' counsel will see the necessity for such a rule as that. It cannot be m the interests of an expeditious trial that argument should be repeated over and over again, and this Tribunal desires to point out to the defendants' counsel that such repetition upon general matters only tends to distract the attention of the Tribunal from the real defenses of the clients whom they represent, and therefore the Tribunal hopes that the defendants' counsel will try to co-operate in this matter and confine such legal arguments as they think it right to present to the Tribunal to arguments which had not been addressed to the Tribunal by counsel who preceded them-either Dr. Jahrreiss or any other counsel. That is all that I need to say, I think, at this stage; and as it is now 5 o'clock the Tribunal will adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 8 July 1946 at 1000 hours.]
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, Defendant Fritzsche is reported absent.