dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ALDERMAN: "In the early morning hours of 15 March, after the announcement of the planned entry of German troops, German men had to act in some localities in order to assure a quiet course of events, either by assumption of the police authority, as for instance in Brunn, or by corresponding instructions of the police president. In some Czech offices men had likewise, in the early hours of the morning, begun to burn valuable archives and the material of political files. It was also necessary to take measures here in order to prevent foolish destruction .... How significant the many-sided and comprehensive measures were considered by the competent German agencies follows from the fact that many of the men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were . admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even through the Reich leader of the SS himself or through SS Group Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these men were thereby designated as accomplished in the interest of the SS .... "Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here placed themselves at once at their further disposition and became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators." I now ask the Court to take judicial notice under Article 21 of the Charter of three official documents. These are identified by us as Documents D-571, D-572, and 2943-PS. I offer them in evidence, respectively, D-571 as Exhibit USA-112; D-572, Exhibit USA-113; and 2943-PS, which is the French Official Yellow Book, at Pages 66 and 67, as Exhibit USA-114. The first two documents are British diplomatic dispatches, properly certified to by the British Government, which gave the background of intrigue in Slovakia-German intrigue in Slovakia. The third document, 2943-PS or Exhibit USA-114, consists of excerpts from the French Yellow Book, principally excerpts from dispatches signed by M.
MR. ALDERMAN: Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin, to the French Foreign Office between 13 and 18 March 1939. I expect to draw on these three dispatches rather freely in the further course of my presentation, since the Tribunal will take judicial notice of each of these documents, I think; and therefore, it may not be necessary to read them at length into the transcript. In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day the Czechoslovakian Government dismissed those members of the Slovak Cabinet who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them Foreign Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within 24 hours the Nazis seized upon this act of the Czechoslovak Government as an excuse for intervention. On the following day, March 11, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. I quote from Document D-571, which is USA-112. That is the report of the British Minister in Prague to the British Government. "Herr Burckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart, and five German generals came at about 10 o'clock in the evening of Saturday, the 11th of March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress in Bratislava and told the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor, the Prime Minister, showed hesitation, Herr Burckel took him on one side and explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czechoslovakia definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her independence, because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Burckel for this information, but said that he must discuss the situation with the Government at Prague." A very strange situation that he should have to discuss such a matter with his own Government, before obeying instructions of Herr Hitler delivered by five German generals and Herr Burckel and Herr Seyss-Inquart. Events went on moving rapidly, but Durcansky, one of the dismissed ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal.
MR. ALDERMAN: Arms and ammunition were brought from German offices in Engerau across the Danube into Slovakia, where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guards to create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as an excuse for military action. The German press and radio launched a violent campaign against the Czechoslovak Government; and, significantly, an invitation from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava. Tiso, the dismissed Prime Minister, was summoned by Hitler to an audience in the German capital. A plane was awaiting him in Vienna. At this point, in the second week of March 1939, preparations for what the Nazi leaders like to call the liquidation of Czechoslovakia were progressing with what to them must have been very satisfying smoothness. The military, diplomatic, and propaganda machinery of the Nazi conspirators was moving in close coordination. All during the process of the Fall Grun (or Case Green) of the preceding summer, the Nazi conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in this new attack. Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, was again greatly flattered by this invitation. I offer in evidence Document 2816-PS as Exhibit USA-115. This is a letter the distinguished Admiral of Hungary, a country which, incidentally, had no navy, wrote to Hitler on 13 March 1939, and which we captured in the German Foreign Office files. "Your Excellency, my sincere thanks. "I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this headwater region-I dislike using big words-is of vital importance to the life of Hungary." -I suppose he needed some headwaters for the non-existent navy of which he was admiral. "In spite of the fact that our recruits have been serving for only 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will take place which will be followed by the big blow on Saturday." -He doesn't like to use big words; "big blow" is sufficient.
MR. ALDERMAN: "I shall never forget this proof of friendship, and Your Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times. Your devoted friend, Horthy." From this cynical and callous letter from the distinguished Admiral . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Was that letter addressed to the Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin?
MR. ALDERMAN: I thought it was addressed to Hitler, if the President please.
THE PRESIDENT: There are some words at the top which look like a Hungarian name.
MR. ALDERMAN: That is the letter heading. As I understand it, the letter was addressed to Adolf Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
MR. ALDERMAN: And I should have said it was-it ended with the ...
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything on the letter which indicates that?
MR. ALDERMAN: Only the fact that it was found in the Berlin Foreign Office, and the wording of the letter and the address "Your Excellency." We may be drawing a conclusion as to whom it was addressed; but it was found in the Berlin Foreign Office. From that cynical and callous letter it may be inferred that the Nazi conspirators had already informed the Hungarian Government of their plans for further military action against Czechoslovakia. As it turned out the timetable was advanced somewhat. I would draw the inference that His Excellency, Adolf Hitler, informed his devoted friend Horthy of this change in good time. On the diplomatic level the Defendant Ribbentrop was quite active. On 13 March, the same day on which Horthy wrote his letter, Ribbentrop sent a cautionary telegram to the German Minister in Prague outlining the course of conduct he should pursue during the coming diplomatic pressure. I offer in evidence Document 2815-PS as Exhibit USA-116. This is the telegram sent by Ribbentrop to the German Legation in Prague on 13 March. "Berlin, 13 March 1939. "Prague. Telegram in secret code. "With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today. In case you should get any written communication from President Hacha, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take any other action on them, but pass them on here by cipher telegram. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the legation to make a point of not being available if the Czech Government wants to communicate ,with you during the next few days." -Signed- "Ribbentrop." On the afternoon of 13 March Monsignor Tiso, accompanied by Durcansky and Herr Meissner and the local Nazi leader, arrived in Berlin in response to the summons from Hitler to which I have heretofore referred. Late that afternoon Tiso was received by Hitler in his study in the Reich Chancellery and presented with an ultimatum. Two alternatives were given him: Either declare the independence of Slovakia, or be left without German assistance to what were referred to as the emergence of Poland and Hungary.
MR. ALDERMAN: This decision Hitler said was not a question of days, but of hours. I now offer in evidence Document 2802-PS as Exhibit USA-117- again a document captured in the German Foreign Office-German Foreign Office minutes of the meeting between Hitler and Tiso on 13 March. I read the bottom paragraph on Page 2 and the top paragraph on Page 3 of the English translation. The first paragraph I shall read is a summary of Hitler's remark. You will note that in the inducements he held out to the Slovaks Hitler displayed his customary disregard for the truth. I quote: "Now he had permitted Minister Tiso to come here in order to make this question clear in a very short time. Germany had no interest east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to him what happened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge his people, or even a single soldier, to something which was not in any way desired by the Slovak people. He would like to secure final confirmation as to what Slovakia really wished. He did not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preserving something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, but in this connection unrest was only an outward indication of interior instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not a question of days, but of hours. He had stated at that time that if Slovakia wished to make herself independent he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He would stand by his word so long as Slovakia would make it clear' that she wished for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer responsible. In that case he would only intercede for German interests, and those did not lie east of the Carpathians. Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia.
MR. ALDERMAN: She had never belonged to Germany. "The Fuehrer asked the Reich Foreign Minister" -the Defendant Ribbentrop- "if he had any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in this case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He showed the Fuehrer a message he had just received which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Fuehrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself." A most extraordinary interview. Germany had no interest in Slovakia; Slovakia had never belonged to Germany; Tiso was invited there. And this is what happened: Those present at that meeting included the Defendant Ribbentrop, the Defendant Keitel, State Secretary Dietrich, State Secretary Keppler, the German Minister of State Meissner. I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the presence of the Defendant Keitel on this occasion, as on so many other occasions, where purely political measures in furtherance of Nazi aggression were under discussion, and where apparently there was no need for technical military advice. While in Berlin the Slovaks also conferred separately with the Defendant Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials, Ribbentrop very solicitously handed Tiso a copy, already drafted in Slovak language, of the law proclaiming the independence of Slovakia. On the night of the 13th a German plane was conveniently placed at Tiso's disposal to carry him home. On 14 March, pursuant to the wishes of the Nazi conspirators, the Diet of Bratislava proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. With Slovak extremeness acting at the Nazi bidding in open revolt against the Czechoslovak Government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to move against Prague. On the evening of the 14th, at the suggestion of the German Legation in Prague, M. Hacha, the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, and M. Chvalkowsky, his Foreign Minister, arrived in Berlin. The atmosphere in which they found themselves might be described as somewhat hostile.
MR. ALDERMAN: Since the preceding weekend, the Nazi press had accused the Czechs of using violence against the Slovaks, and especially against the members of the German minority and citizens of the Reich. Both press and radio proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in danger. Such a situation was intolerable. It was necessary to smother as quickly as possible the focus of trouble, which Prague had become, in the heart of Europe. -These peacemakers! After midnight on the 15th, at 1:15 in the morning, Hacha and Chvalkowsky were ushered into the Reich Chancellery. They found there Adolf Hitler, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Goering, and Keitel, and other high Nazi officials. I now offer in evidence Document 2798-PS as Exhibit USA-118. This document is the captured German Foreign Office account of this infamous meeting. It is a long document. Parts of it are so revealing and give so clear a picture of Nazi behavior and tactics that I should like to read them in full. It must be remembered that this account of the fateful conference on the night of March 14-15 comes from German sources, and of course it must be read as an account biased by its source, or as counsel for the defendants said last week "a tendentious account". Nevertheless, even without too much discounting of the report on account of its source, it constitutes a complete condemnation of the Nazis, who by pure and simple international banditry forced the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. And I interpolate to suggest that international banditry has been a crime against international law for centuries. I will first read the headings to the minutes.
MR. ALDERMAN: In the English mimeographed version in the document books the time given is an incorrect translation of the original It should read 0115 to 0215: "Conversation between the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and the President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, and of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, Chvalkowsky, in the Reich Chancellery on 15 March 1939, 0115 to 0215 hours." Others present were General Field Marshal Goering, General Keitel, Secretary of the State Von Weizsacker, Minister of the State Meissner, Secretary of the State Dietrich, Counselor of the Legation Hewel. Hacha opened the conference. He was conciliatory-even humble, though the President of a sovereign state. He thanked Hitler for receiving him and he said he knew that the fate of Czechoslovakia rested in the Fuehrer's hands. Hitler replied that he regretted that he had been forced to ask Hacha to come to Berlin, particularly because of the great age of the President. Hacha was then, I believe, in his seventies. But this journey, Hitler told the President, could be of great advantage to his country because, and I quote, "It was only a matter of hours until Germany would intervene." I quote now from the top of Page 3 of the English translation. You will bear in mind that what I am reading are rough notes or minutes of what Adolf Hitler said: "Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him. If Slovakia had kept closer to Germany it would have been an obligation to Germany, but he was glad that he did not have this obligation now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the Little Carpathian Mountains. He did not want to draw the final consequences in the autumn..."
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, don't you think you ought to read the last sentence on Page 2?
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps so; yes. The last sentence from the preceding page was: "For the other countries Czechoslovakia was nothing but a means to an end. London and Paris were not in a position to really stand up for Czechoslovakia. "Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him." Then I had read down to: "But even at that time and also later in his conversations with Chvalkowsky he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this State if Benes' tendencies were not completely revised. Chvalkowsky understood this and asked the Fuehrer to have patience." -He often bragged of his patience.- "The Fuehrer saw this point of view, but the months went by without any change. The new regime did not succeed in eliminating the old one psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth-to-mouth propaganda, dismissals of Germans, and many other things which, to him, were a symbol of the total perspective. "At first he had not understood this but when it became clear to him he drew his consequences because, had the development continued in this way, the relations with Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become the same as 6 months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its Army to a reasonable size? Such an army was a tremendous burden for such a state, because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the state. Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political mission such an army is meaningless. He enumerated several examples which proved to him that the spirit in the Army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the Army also would be a source of a severe political burden in the future.
MR. ALDERMAN: Added to this were the inevitable development of economic necessities, and, further, the protests of national groups which could no longer endure life as it was." I now interpolate, if the Tribunal please, to note the significance of that language of Adolf Hitler to the President of a supposed sovereign state and its Prime Minister, having in his presence General Field Marshal Goering, the Commander of the Air Force and General Keitel. And continuing to quote: "Thus it is that the die was cast on the past Sunday." -This is still the language of Hitler.- "I sent for the Hungarian minister and told him that I am withdrawing my hands from this country. We were now confronted with this fact. He had given the order to the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into the German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she had ever enjoyed during Austrian rule. Germany's attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be determined tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, and depends on the attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian military towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the Government. He believes in the honesty and straightforwardness of Hacha and Chvalkowsky, but doubts that the Government will be able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army had already started out today, and at one barracks where resistance was offered, it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had given in at the deployment of heavy artillery. "At 6 o'clock in the morning the German Army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German Air Force would occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form.
MR. ALDERMAN: In that case, it would be easy for the Fuehrer to give Czechoslovakia in the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own, autonomy, and a certain national liberty. "We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He would not like to torture and denationalize the Czechs. He also did not do all that because of hatred, but in order to protect Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not have yielded" -I suppose that is a bad translation for "had not yielded" - "the Czech people would have been exterminated. Nobody could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will that the Czech people should live a full national life and he believed firmly that a way could be found which would make far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting should break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in counter pressure. One would annihilate another and it would then not be possible any more for him to give the promised alleviations. Within 2 days the Czech Army would not exist any more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would result in a hatred which would force him" -that is, Hitler- "because of his instinct of self-preservation, not to grant autonomy any more. The world would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the Czech people when he was reading the foreign press. It would leave the impression on him which could be summarized in a German proverb: 'The Moor has done his duty, the Moor may go.' "That was the state of affairs. There existed two trends in Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and wished, in memory to the past, that Czechoslovakia would be conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which corresponded with his just-mentioned suggestions. "That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the Czech people. If it should come to a fight, the bloodshed would also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps prevent the extreme.
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps it would contribute to finding a form of construction which would be so far-reaching for Czechoslovakia as she could never have hoped for in the old Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for the German people. "The hours went past. At 6 o'clock the troops would march in. He was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to each Czech battalion. The military action was no small one, but planned with all generosity. He would advise him" -that is, Adolf Hitler advised poor old Hacha- "now to retire with Chvalkowsky in order to discuss what should be done." In his reply to this long harangue, Hacha, according to the German minutes, said that he agreed that resistance would be useless. He expressed doubt that he would be able to issue the necessary orders to the Czech Army, in the 4 hours left to him, before the German Army crossed the Czech border. He asked if the object of the invasion was to disarm the Czech Army. If so, he indicated that might possibly be arranged. Hitler replied that his decision was final; that it was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant. He turned to the circle of Nazi conspirators surrounding him, for their support, and you will remember that the Defendants Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel were all present. The only possibility of disarming the Czech Army, Hitler said, was by the intervention of the German Army. I read now one paragraph from Page 4 of the English version of the German minutes of this infamous meeting. It is the next to the last paragraph on Page 4. "The Fuehrer states that his decision was irrevocable. It was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant. He did not see any other possibility for disarmament and asked the other gentlemen" -that is, including Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel- "whether they shared his opinion, which was answered in the affirmative. The only possibility to disarm the Czech Army was by the German Army." At this sad point, Hacha and Chvalkowsky retired from the room.