dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
PAULUS: From personal experience, I can state the following: On 3 September 1940 I took office with the High Command of the Army as Chief Quartermaster I of the General Staff. As such I was deputy to the Chief of the General Staff, and had in addition to carry out the instructions of a general operational nature which he delegated to me. When I took office I found in my sphere of work, among other things, a still incomplete operational plan dealing with an attack on the Soviet Union. This operational plan had been worked out by the then Major General Marx, Chief of the General Staff of the 18th Army, who for this purpose had been temporarily transferred to the High Command of the Army. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Oberst Halder, turned over to me the continuation of the work which was ordered by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, on the following basis: An investigation was to be made as to the possibilities of an attack against the Soviet Union, with regard to the terrain, the points of the attack, the manpower needed, and so forth. In addition it was stated that altogether about 130 to 140 German divisions would be available for this operation. It was furthermore to be taken into consideration that from the beginning Romanian territory was to be utilized for the deployment of the German southern army. On the northern flank the participation of Finland in the war was taken into account, but was ignored in this operational plan of the army. Then, in addition, as a basis for the plan which was to be worked out, the aims_the instructions of the OKW-were given: First, the destruction of those parts of the Russian Army stationed in the west of Russia, to prevent the units which were fit for fighting from escaping deep into Russia; second, the reaching of a line from which the Russian air force would be unable to attack German territory effectively, and the final aim was the reaching of the Volga-Archangel line.
PAULUS: The operational plan which I just outlined was completed at the beginning of November and was followed by two military exercises with the command of which the General Staff of the Army entrusted me. Senior officers of the General Staff of the Army were also assigned. The basic strength requirements assumed in these military exercises were: The launching of one army group south of the Pripet territory, specifically from southern Poland and from Romanian territory, with the aim of reaching the Dnieper-Kiev line and south of it; north of the Pripet territory another army group, the strongest, from the area around Warsaw and northward, with the general direction of attack being the Minsk-Smolensk line, the intention being to direct it against Moscow later; then a further army group, namely Army Group North, from the area of East Prussia, with the initial direction of attack being through the Baltic States toward Leningrad. The conclusion which was drawn from these military exercises was at that time that in case of actual hostilities provision should be made firstly for reaching the general line Dnieper-Smolensk-Leningrad, and then the operation was to be carried forward if the situation developed favorably, supply lines, e! cetera being adjusted accordingly. In connection with these military exercises and for the evaluation of the theoretical experience gained therefrom, there was a further conference of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the chiefs of the general staffs of the army groups which had been planned for the East. And further, in connection with this conference, there was a speech about Russia by the then chief of the section Foreign Armies East, Colonel Kinsel, describing Russia's geographic and economic conditions, the Red Army, et cetera. The most significant point here was that no preparations whatever for an attack by the Soviet had come to our attention. With these military exercises and conferences that I have just described the theoretical considerations and plans for this offensive were concluded.
PAULUS: Immediately thereafter, that is on 18 December 1940, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces issued Directive Number 21. This was the basis for all military and economic preparations which were to be carried out. In the Supreme Command of the Army this directive resulted in going ahead with the drafting and working out of directions for troop deployments for this operation. These first directions for troop deployment were authorized on 3 February 1941 by Hitler after a report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at the Obersalzberg; thereupon they were forwarded to the troops. Later on several supplements were issued. For the beginning of the attack the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces had calculated the time which would make it possible for large troop movements to be made on Russian territory. That was expected from about the middle of May on. Preparations were made in accordance with this. Then at the end of March this date underwent a change, when Hitler decided, due to the development of the situation in Yugoslavia, to attack this country. Consequently, in the orders issued at the beginning of April 1941 this tentative date for the start of the operation...
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid you are a little too fast. I think you had better begin again where you said that at the end of March Hitler made a change in the plan.
PAULUS: [Continuing] Because of his decision to attack Yugoslavia, the date foreseen for the beginning of the attack had to be postponed by about five weeks, that is to the last half of June. And, indeed, this attack then did take place on 22 June 1941. In conclusion, I confirm the fact that the preparation for this attack on the Soviet Union, which actually took place on 22 June 1941, dated back to the autumn of 1940.
GEN. RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances . . .
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Did the witness give the date? He said that preparations for this attack had been made, and what I want to know is, did he give the date from which it had been prepared? [To the witness] Did you give the date from which the preparations went forward?
PAULUS: I gave it at the beginning: From the time my personal observations began, when I entered office, on 3 September 1940.
GEN.RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances was the participation of the satellite states secured?
PAULUS: From personal observation, I can say the following regarding this: About September 1940, just at the time when I had received this operational study for the attack on the Soviet Union there was planned from the outset the use of Romanian territory for the deployment of the German right or, that is to say, south wing, and that was taken into consideration from the outset. A military mission headed by the then Lieutenant General of Cavalry, Hansen, was sent to Romania. A whole panzer division, the 13th, was transferred to Romania as a training unit. To those who knew about the plans for the future it was obvious that this step could only serve the purpose of preparing the future partner in the war for the task intended for him. Further, in regard to Hungary: In December 1940 Colonel Lazslo, the chief of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, came to the headquarters of the Army High Command at Zossen. He asked for a conference regarding questions of organization. The Hungarian Army at that time was concerned with the question of regrouping its units, which were organized in brigades, into divisions and also with the setting up of motorized troops and of panzer units. The chief of the Organization Division of the General Staff of the Army, then Major General Buhle, and myself advised Colonel Lazslo. At the same time, several Hungarian military commissions were in Berlin, and with them also the Hungarian Minister of War, General Von Bartha, and they discussed armament deliveries to Hungary with German authorities. It was clear to all of us who were informed as to future plans that all these measures, including the supplying of arms to other armies, were only conceivable at that time if these weapons were to be employed in future military projects. Regarding Hungary there is a further point: Due to the development of events in Yugoslavia, Hitler, at the end of March 1941, decided to attack Yugoslavia.
PAULUS: On 27 or 28 March I was called to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, where there had just been a conference between Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl, in which the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Army had participated, that is, had been ordered to be present. When I arrived I was advised by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Halder, that Hitler had decided to attack Yugoslavia in the first place to eliminate a threat to the flank of the intended operation against Greece, and get hold of the rail line going from Belgrade southward through Dish, and then also with an eye to the future-to Plan Barbarossa-to keep the right flank free from the outset. I was instructed to go to Vienna, taking with me a number of competent General Staff officers of the Army, to deliver and explain pertinent orders to German commanders, and then to travel on without fail to the Hungarian General Staff in Budapest. and to reach an understanding with it on the deployment of German troops on Hungarian territory and the participation of Hungarian troops in the attack on Yugoslavia. On 30 March, early in the morning, I arrived in Budapest and had a conference with the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General Werth, of the infantry and then with the chief of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Lazslo. These conferences went along in good order and ended very quickly, and the desired result was achieved. This result was then put down on maps. The map that I received from the Hungarian General Staff contained not only the deployment of the troops intended for the attack against Yugoslavia, but also forces on the Carpatho-Ukrainian border, which were to be placed there to protect our rear against the Soviet Union. The fact of the creation and existence of this force is a sign that even on the side of Hungary there was the realization that an attack by Germany against Yugoslavia would have to be considered as an aggressive action by the Soviet Union.
PAULUS: As regards the principle of calling upon Hungary in the preparation and later in the execution of the planned operations, I learned Hitler's view at that time. He was of the opinion that Hungary was anxious, through German help, to recapture and expand the areas lost in 1918; and in addition, that she was afraid of falling behind Romania which was allied with Germany. HiMer saw Hungary from this point of view also with regard to his policy. But he was, as I could observe in many instances myself, very reserved toward Hungary, and for two reasons. For one, he did not believe Hungary could guarantee secrecy with regard to future war plans, due to her close connections with foreign countries hostile to Germany, and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too many premature promises of territory. I can cite one example: The question of the Dragowitsch oil territory. Later, when the attack began against Soviet Russia, the 17th German Army which was fighting at that point had the explicit order from the Supreme Command to take the Dragowitsch oil fields at all costs before the arrival of the Hungarians. Regarding this future partner, according to my observation the procedure of Hitler was such that he counted on her certain participation and therefore delivered the armament to her and helped with the training, but that he kept to himself the time when he would initiate the ally into his plans. Thirdly, the Finnish question. In December 1940 the first visit of the Chief of the Finnish General Staff, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, was made to the headquarters of the High Command of the Army in Zossen. Lieutenant General Heinrichs had a conference with the Chief of the Army General Staff, the contents of which I no longer remember; but he made a speech about the Russo-Finnish war of 1939-1940 before the General Staff officers of the High Command of the Army, and the General Staff officers of the Army groups who happened to be present at the time in connection with the discussion of the military exercises.
PAULUS: This speech before these General Staff officers had its great significance at that time because of the fact that it was delivered at the same time that Directive Number 21 of 18 December was issued. This speech was significant, it dealt with experiences won in the war with the Red Army and in addition gave an insight into the value of the Finnish troops as possible future partners in the war. I took part in a second conference with the Chief of the Finnish General Staff at the headquarters of the High Command of the Army in Zossen, in the second half of May 1941. The Chief of the Finnish General Staff arrived. from Salzburg where he had had conferences with the High Command of the Army. The subject of the subsequent conferences in Zossen with the General Staff of the High Command of the Army was the co-operation of the Finnish forces in the south in Plan Barbarossa in co-operation with Army Group North-which was to proceed from the deployment area in East Prussia towards Leningrad. At that time the agreement was reached that the Finnish troops in the south were to synchronize their movements with the advance of German Army Group North and likewise that the joint advance later against Leningrad should be subject to consultations and agreements depending on the development of events. Those are the personal observations which I made regarding the first appearance and the enlistment of allies in preparations for the aggression.
GEN. RUDENKO: How, and under what circumstances, was the armed attack on the U.S.S.R. carried out-the attack which was prepared by the Hitlerite Government and the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces?
PAULUS: The attack on the Soviet Union took place as I have related, according to a plan prepared carefully and well in advance. The troops for this attack were at first assembled in the rear of the deployment area. By special orders they were then moved by groups into jumping-off positions, and then took up their position along the entire long front from Romania to East Prussia for a simultaneous attack. The Finnish theater of war was excluded from this operation. Just as the large-scale operational plan, as I described it at the beginning, was to a certain extent tried out theoretically, the detailed employment of troops was discussed during military exercises by the staffs of army groups, corps, and divisions and drawn up in orders down to the details long before the beginning of the war. A large-scale diversion, which was to be organized in Norway and along the coast of France was designed to simulate an invasion of Britain in June 1941 and thus divert Russia's attention. All measures were taken not only for operational but also for tactical surprise, as for instance, the prohibition of open reconnaissance on and across the boundary before the beginning of the war. That meant on the one hand, that possible losses which might be caused due to the lack of reconnaissance had to be taken into account for the sake of surprise, but on the other hand it meant that a surprise attack across the boundary by the enemy was not feared. All of these measures show that it was a question of a criminal attack.
GEN. RUDENKO: How would you define the aims pursued by Germany in attacking Soviet Russia?
PAULUS: The aim to reach the Volga-Archangel line, which was far beyond German strength, is in itself characteristic of Hitler's and the National Socialist leadership's boundless policy of conquest. From a strategic point of view, the achievement of these aims would have meant the destruction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. With the winning of the line I have mentioned the main areas of Soviet Russia with the capital, Moscow, would have been conquered and subjugated, together with the leading political and economic center of the Soviet Union. Economically, the winning of this line would have meant the possession of important agricultural areas, the most important natural resources, including the oil wells of the Caucasus and the main centers of production in Russia, and also the main network of communications in European Russia. How much Hitler was bent on taking economic objectives in this war can best be shown from an example out of my personal experience. On 1 June 1942, on the occasion of a conference of commanders-in-chief in the region of Army Group South in Poltava, Hitler declared, "If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grosny, then I must end this war." For the utilization and the administration of the territories to be conquered, economic and administrative organizations had already been formed and were kept in readiness long before the beginning of the war. To summarize I should like to state that the objectives given indicate the conquest of the Russian territories for the purpose of colonization with the utilization and spoliation of and with the resources of which the war in the West was to be brought to a conclusion, with the aim of finally establishing domination over Europe.
GEN. RUDENKO: And one last question: Whom do you consider as guilty of the criminal initiation of the war against Soviet Russia?
PAULUS: May I please have the question repeated?
GEN. RUDENKO: I repeat the question...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is about to address an observation to General Rudenko. The Tribunal thinks that a question such as you have lust put, as to who was guilty for the aggression upon Soviet territory, is one of the main questions which the Tribunal has to decide, and therefore is not a question upon which the witness ought to give his opinion. Is that what Counsel for the Defense wish to object to?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President, that is what I want to do.
GEN. RUDENKO: Then perhaps the Tribunal will permit me to put this question rather differently.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Who of the defendants was an active participant in the initiation of a war of aggression against the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: Of the defendants, as far as I observed them, the top military advisers to Hitler. They are the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; Chief of the Operations Branch, Jodl; and Goering, in his capacity as Reich Marshal, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces and as Plenipotentiary for Armament Economy.
GEN. RUDENKO: In concluding the interrogation I shad make a summary. Have I rightly concluded from your testimony, that long before 22 June the Hitlerite Government and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces were planning an aggressive war against the Soviet Union for the purpose of colonizing the territory of the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: That is beyond doubt according to all the developments as I described them, and also in connection with all the directives issued in the well-known Green File.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have no more questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the French Prosecution wish to ask any questions?
FRENCH PROSECUTOR: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The British?
BRITISH PROSECUTOR: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The United States?
UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Any member of the defendants' counsel?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, as Counsel for the General Staff,<. I ask you to afford me the opportunity to examine the witness tomorrow morning. The presentation of the witness by the Prosecution came as a surprise to the defendants' counsel, at any rate, and I think a consultation about the questions to be asked, especially in view of the importance of the testimony, is absolutely necessary. I therefore ask to be permitted to conduct the cross-examination at the beginning of tomorrow morning's session.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if the Prosecution has no objection, the Tribunal thinks that this application ought to be granted.
GEN. RUDENKO: If the Tribunal so wishes, the Prosecution will not object.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. I don't know whether any other member of the defendants' counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I assume that all defendants' counsel may conduct their cross-examination of the witness, General Paulus, tomorrow morning?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. I was only asking whether any other member of the defendants' counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.
DR. NELTE: I personally would be able to put my questions after the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the witness can retire and the case will go on. He will be recalled tomorrow morning and in the meantime you will go on with your case. [The witness left the stand, and Major General Zorya approached the lectern.]
THE PRESIDENT: General, you won't, I presume, think it necessary to read any more of Field Marshal Paulus' statement, will you?
GEN. ZORYA: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on, then.
GEN. ZORYA: Referring to the explanation concerning the beginning of the criminal attack of Fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, I should like to remind the Tribunal that in the morning session of the Tribunal on 30 November 1945, the witness, Lahousen, was interrogated and gave evidence of sufficient interest in our case. Among other things, this witness, when enumerating the more intimate members of the inner circle of Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the German Army, mentioned Pieckenbrock by name. I present to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-220, the testimony of the former chief of Section I of the German Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, Lieutenant General of the former German Army, Hans Pieckenbrock, former chief and colleague of Lahousen. Pieckenbrock gave this testimony in the order prescribed by the laws of the Soviet Union, in Moscow, on 12 December 1945. For the moment I should like to read a few lines only into the record from Pieckenbrock's testimony, relating to the matter which we are now investigating. These lines are on Page 1 of the Russian text of his testimony and they are marked with a red pencil. This Page 1 corresponds to Page 34 of the document book. "I must say"-said Pieckenbrock-"that already since August and September 1940 the Foreign Armies East of the General Staff of the Army began to increase considerably its intelligence assignments to the Abwehr concerning the U.S.S.R. These assignments were unquestionably connected with the preparation of war against Russia. "The more precise dates for Germany's attack on the Soviet Union I learned in January 1941 from Canaris.