dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON PAPEN: I had spoken about the propaganda about myself which was carried on in the United States at the time of the first World War. No effort was in fact ever made to investigate whether this opinion was true or false. What I was able to accomplish in those years, that is, the fact that I opposed sabotage and fought against submarine warfare, never became known. This propaganda was public defamation, and it reached its height in 1941 in a pamphlet published in New York, with the beautiful title "The Devil in Top Hat." It repeats all these fairy stories without criticism, and adds new ones. Thus a so-called public opinion was formed about me which, I believe, gives a completely distorted picture of my character, my opinions, and above all my motives during the period from 1932 to 1945. I ask the Tribunal to keep in mind these psychological associations as I attempt to give now a true picture of my thoughts and my acts. After returning to Germany in 1916 I did my duty as a soldier, as a battalion commander and as a General Staff officer in the war in France. In 1917 I became Chief of the Operational Section of Army Group Falkenhayn in Turkey. When Falkenhayn was recalled in 1918, I became Chief of the General Staff of the Fourth Turkish Army until the Armistice. Perhaps I may recall briefly-after so many bad things have been said about me by the world-an episode which shows that I was able to do something useful for the history of humanity. On 8 December 1918, after a hard struggle with the German and Turkish headquarters, I succeeded in getting Falkenhayn to evacuate Jerusalem. Because of this decision the city was not shelled or destroyed by the British Army.
THE PRESIDENT: The translation came through to me, I thought, the 8th of December 1918. That must have been 1917.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, My Lord, 1918.
VON PAPEN: 8 December 1918. When in November 1918 I was negotiating with Ataturk about the evacuation of the German troops, we received the news of the collapse of the German armies and the abdication of the German Kaiser. This fact meant for me not only the loss of the war, a whole world had collapsed for me. The German Reich had collapsed after a thousand years of development, and everything that we had believed in was shrouded in the mists of the future. At this juncture I decided to face the issue. After my return to Germany, I asked for and received my release from the Army. I went back to my home where I lived on a modest agricultural estate. There I was on traditional soil and devoted myself to home tasks. Before long my farmer friends entrusted me with the administration of their community affairs. They elected me honorary mayor and in 1923 they sent me to the Prussian Parliament. When I was requested to do this, I decided not to join the Right, the German National Party, but the Center Party. This decision was influenced by my conviction that in this party I would be able to do much more in making adjustments in the social sphere than among the Conservatives. At the same time this party represented the principles of a Christian concept of the State. The 8 years in which I belonged to Parliament were filled with struggles for the internal recovery and strengthening of the German Republic. In the Center Party I represented the conservative ideas of my agricultural electors. I endeavored to make this party, which in Prussia had formed a coalition with the Left, form a coalition with the Right also. Thus I wanted to help create an outlet for the tensions out of which National Socialism was really born. Also, -into the same period fall my efforts to remove the discriminations against Germany through the numerous terms of the Versailles Treaty, and that by way of reaching a better understanding with the French people.
VON PAPEN: I became a member of the German-French Study Committee, a committee founded by the Luxembourg industrialist Meirisch, comprising a large number of outstanding men of both countries. Close relations and conversations also united me with the veterans' organizations of both countries, on the French side with the well-known leader of the Gueules Cassees, Colonel Piccat. I took an active part in the congresses of German-Frendh Catholic circles which took place in Paris and Berlin. All these efforts had as their aim to place European peace on the basis of a deeper knowledge and closer co-operation of our two countries. This realization of mine was further strengthened when I moved to the Saar in 1929 which at that time was, as is well-known, under international control. When in 1929 the Young Plan was accepted by Germany I asked Herr Stresemann to arrange with M. Briand a settlement of the Saar question without plebiscite, because I was always of the opinion that a candid solution of this thorny question by both sides would leave less resentment and an increased sense of solidarity than a decision brought about by an election campaign carried on heatedly on both sides. Unfortunately, this did not come about. Then in 1930 the great economic world crisis set in embracing victors and vanquished alike. Germany's new democratic regime was not able to cope with such a burden, and under the everincreasing economic pressure and increasing internal tension, the Papen Cabinet was formed in the spring of 1932. Here starts the political development which I am pleased to be able to account for before the Tribunal. I should like to add a request to the Tribunal. The Tribunal has ruled that the defendants have to be brief because the Defendant Reich Marshal Goering has completely presented the history of National Socialism. I ask that it be taken into consideration that I am not speaking here for National Socialism. My defense will be that of the other Germany.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In questioning the witness it will be necessary to go into the details of the events and the activities of the witness as Reich Chancellor in the year 1932. The Indictment covers the time from 1 June 1932, the date of the appointment of Herr Von Papen as Reich Chancellor. The Indictment sees in the conduct of his official activity as Reich Chancellor the preparation for Hitler's Government. The defense will set forth that the Papen Government consistently fought for a new program, entirely independent of the ideas of National Socialism, a program representing Papen's own basic political ideas to which he remained loyal in the following period also. As the Indictment. . .
THE PRESIDENT: It is not proper for a counsel to make a statement of that sort. You must elicit the evidence from the witness by questions; and the questions ought to be questions which are not leading questions, which do not suggest the answers. You are now telling us what the witness is going to say. We want to hear it from the witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I wanted only to point out that this period of time before 1933 must also be discussed and I wish to ask for your indulgence. We shall...
THE PRESIDENT: We have not attempted to stop you from giving the evidence-from eliciting the evidence. Ask the witness. But you must not state the facts yourself.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, will you explain to the Court what the situation was in Germany when Hindenburg called upon you on 1 June 1932 to form a Cabinet?
VON PAPEN: Before I answer this question, will you please permit me, as one of the last Chancellors of the Reich, to make a brief statement on the Government directed by me? If and to what extent the Charter of the Tribunal, in our opinion, is compatible with the sovereignty of the Reich and its different governments, will later be expounded by one of the other counsels. When the Prosecution deals with my activity as Reich Chancellor in 1932, I assume that this is done in order to get a clear, historically accurate picture of the developments and to form a judgment on my character as a whole. For this reason I will comment on this part of the accusation. However, I must state here emphatically that this Cabinet of 1932 governed, to the best of its knowledge and ability under the Constitution and under the emergency powers of the President, at a time of the most severe internal economic depression. It is a historical fact that the activity of my Cabinet would not justify the slightest suspicion of a crime in the sense of the Charter. I believe I must make this statement, My Lord, to uphold the integrity of my ministerial colleagues, and above all, the integrity of the President, Field Marshal Von Hindenburg, the last great historical figure of Germany. As to your question: Dr. Bruning, my predecessor in office, was highly esteemed by all of us and had been welcomed with great expectations. During his period of office came the great economic crisis, the customs blockades by other countries, with production and trade almost completely at a standstill, with no foreign currency for the procurement of necessary raw materials, increasing unemployment, youth out on the streets, and the economic world depression leading to bankruptcy of the banks. Government was possible only through emergency decrees; that is, by one-sided legislative acts of the President. Support of the unemployed empties the Treasury, is unproductive, and is no solution. As a result of the wide-spread unemployment, the radical parties were increasing.
VON PAPEN: The political splitting up of the German people reached its height. In the last Reichstag election there were 32 parties. After the war we had all hoped that we might be able to build up an orderly democracy in Germany. The English democracy was our model, but the Weimar Constitution had given the German people a great number of rights which did not correspond to its political maturity. In 1932 it had long been clear that the Weimar Constitution made the mistake of giving the Government too little authority. I remind you that the forming of governments often took weeks because all parties wanted to participate. In Prussia, the Social Democrats had ruled since 1919. They shared with the "Zentrum" in filling political offices in Prussia. The dualism between Prussia, the greatest of the provinces, and the Reich was constantly increasing. My wish that Bruning should return to the old construction of Bismarck's, to be Reich Chancellor and at the same time Prime Minister of Prussia, in order to coordinate the policy of the greatest province with that of the Reich, was rejected by Bruning. In all these years, in the last years, nothing was done to restrain the ever-increasing National Socialist movement, that is to direct it into a politically responsible course. The entire political confusion and the realization that something had to be done in order to make it possible for the Reich Government to govern and to make it more independent, forced Hindenburg to the decision to appoint a Cabinet independent of the parties, directed by experts. The members of this Cabinet of mine were all experts in their fields. Von Neurath was an old diplomat; the Minister of the Interior, Gall, was an old administrative official; the Agricultural Minister was general director of great agricultural societies; the Finance Minister was formerly Ministerial Director in his Ministry; the Railroad Director, Eltz, had been president of the board of directors of a railroad, and so forth.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the intention to govern authoritatively bring about a struggle of the parties?
VON PAPEN: Field Marshal Hindenburg had great confidence in Bruning, but he did not forgive him for failing to succeed in winning over the rightist parties, which had elected Hindenburg for the first time in 1925, for his re-election as President in 1932. At that time Hindenburg had been elected over the determined opposition of the Left and the Center. Now, in 1932, he was to be elected precisely by these leftist parties who had opposed him, and against the Right. Beside the great old soldier of the World War, the opposing candidate was an unknown steel-helmeted soldier. This, of course, hurt the Field Marshal deeply. I wish to point out that in the presidential election in 1932 Hitler had already received over 11 million votes, which was more than 30 percent of the total in the presidential election. Why the President chose me as Chancellor, I do not know. I can only say that I myself did not lift a finger. The course of events was the following. I am telling this, My Lord, in order to answer the charge that this formation of a Cabinet was the beginning of an intrigue and a conspiracy. On 26 May 1932 I was on my estate in the Saar. Herr Von Schleicher, the Defense Minister, called me up there and asked me to come to Berlin. On the evening of the 27th I arrived in Berlin. On the Seth I went to see Herr Von Schleicher. Herr Von Schleicher said to me: "There is a Cabinet crisis; we are looking for a Chancellor." He discussed various personalities with me, and finally he said: "The President would like to have you." I was greatly surprised, and said as much. I then asked for time to think it over. On the next day I discussed the matter with my friends. On the 30th I went to see Herr Von Schleicher again. I said to him: "I have decided not to accept." Herr Von Schleicher said: "That won't do you any good, the President wants you under all circumstances." I answered Herr Von Schleicher: "The President probably has a wrong conception of the political forces which I would bring to him for this government; he probably thinks that the Center would support me politically.
VON PAPEN: But that is out of the question." On the afternoon of this day I went to see the head of the Center Party. I asked him and he said: "Herr Von Papen, do not accept the office; the party would immediately oppose you." I said: "Thank you, that is what I thought." I then went to see Hindenburg and presented the situation to him. Hindenburg stood up and said: "I did not call you because I wanted the support of any party through you; I called you because I want a cabinet of independent men." Then he reminded me of my duty toward the fatherland. When I continued to contradict him, he said: "You cannot leave me, an old soldier, in the lurch when I need you." I said: "No, under these circumstances I will not leave you in the lurch; I will accept."
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As proof for that discussion . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal think this might be dealt with in slightly less detail. The facts could be stated with less detail.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: We will act accordingly. As proof for the discussion with the Center Party I refer to Document Book 1, Document 1, Page 1. I submit Document Book 1 as Exhibit Number 1. Witness, you have been accused of having intrigued against Bruning in some way. Is that true?
VON PAPEN: In no way. I have already said that I had a very high opinion of Dr. Bruning personally, and that from the day when Herr Von Schleicher called me in-that is, 3 days before my appointment-I never had the slightest idea of being appointed Bruning's successor.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you previously talk to Hitler about the government to be formed by you?
VON PAPEN: No, that is a completely false imputation on the part of the Prosecution. The History of the NSDAP by Volz, in which that is stated-and that is Document 3463-PS-is a purely private work and was probably sponsored by Goebbels and his Ministry. I state that my government, according to the wish of the Reich President, was to be created by a fait accompli, without any negotiations with any party or the head of any party.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: You did not promise Hitler the dissolution of the Reichstag beforehand either?
VON PAPEN: This statement of the Prosecution is also untrue. I did not previously discuss the dissolution of the Reichstag with Hitler for the Reichstag was dissolved on 4 June, and I saw Hitler for the first time in my life 5 or 6 days later. The dissolution of the Reichstag, as such, was a matter of course, because the new Government wished to have the opinion of the electors on the new course and on the Government's program.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What were the political aims of your Cabinet? Please state this briefly.
VON PAPEN: The central problem which occupied us was the economic one: The big economic crisis, and the 1 1/2 million unemployed young people, the 6 to 7 million completely unemployed, and the 12 to 13 million in part-time employment. Attempts of my predecessors to help with purely State means proved inadequate. They were a burden on finances and had no result. The aim of my Government, therefore, was to employ private economy to solve this problem. We wanted to bring the whole production machinery into working order again. With the investment of 2,200 million marks we wanted to put this process into operation and expected to return into the production process I3/d million workers in the current year. Such a program could not have been agreed upon with the parties. The political aim was to achieve, simultaneously with the reorganization of the economy, the practical co-operation of the strongest of the opposition parties, the NSDAP. That was the central problem of German internal policy. It had been shown, through National Socialist Government in Thuringia, in Brunswick, and in Oldenburg, that this attempt could be made without becoming exposed to the danger of revolutionary movements. I could hope, therefore, through a national and social program to find the approval of the Reichstag.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: For the Government's statement, I refer to Document 1, Exhibit 1, Pages 2 and 3. You spoke of the solution of the social problem as the main task of your Government. Will you please explain briefly how you regarded the problem and how you attempted to solve it?
VON PAPEN: In no country in the world, I believe, was the problem of capital and labor as acute as it was in Germany, as a result of over industrialization and alienation of the soil. The reason is known; I need not speak of it. However, one of the reasons, which is generally overlooked, was the German inflation which had destroyed all mobile fortunes in Germany. This inflation had deprived the middle class and the workers, who form the backbone of the nation, of their savings and fortunes and it had proletarianized the workers, tradesmen, and the middle class. Simultaneously with the social processes in Germany, a new social order had arisen in our great neighboring country, the order of a classless society and the totalitarian state. The democratic powers of the world resisted the exportation of this system. They took protective measures in the economic field, but these protective measures, the "New Deal," and "Ottawa," weakened the German position all the more.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, I think the defendant must realize that this is all very familiar ground to the Tribunal, and it is not necessary to restate it in detail.
VON PAPEN: I only wanted to explain to the Tribunal that this social problem was the basis for the whole historical development.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The question of the social problem is at the same time a question of the development of the NSDAP, and the witness is going to comment later from this point of view. Witness, you said a little while ago that you had no contact with Hitler before the formation of the government. When did you see Hitler for the first time and what agreements did you reach?
VON PAPEN: I have already said that I saw Hitler for the first time on 9 or 10 June. The aim of the talk was to determine under what conditions Hitler would be willing to tolerate my Government. My program contained so many points in the social field that an approval of that program by the National Socialists was to be expected. Hitler's condition for such an approval of the Government program was the lifting of the ban on uniforms for the SS; that is, the political equalization of his party with the other parties. I agreed to that at that time; all the more so as the ban of the SS by the Bruning Government was an obvious injustice. The SS, or rather the SA, had been prohibited; but the uniformed formations of the Socialists and the Communists, that is, the "Rotiront" and the "Reichsbanner," had not been prohibited. The result of my promise to Hitler was that Hitler obligated himself to tolerate my Government.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to correct a mistake made by the witness. He spoke of the SS, meaning the SA. There was no SS at that time. I refer to Document 1, Page 3, which is a statement of the President concerning the lifting of the ban against the SA. The President points out that he decreed the lifting of this ban under the express condition that there would be no more acts of violence in the future. He says furthermore that he was determined-that he would use all constitutional means at his disposal to act against all violations of any kind if this expectation were not fulfilled. Will you, Witness, make a brief statement concerning your efforts, and the course of the Lausanne Conference in June 1932 which had such a great influence on the growth of the NSDAP?
VON PAPEN: I ask for permission to go somewhat more into detail about this conference, because the result was closely connected with the enormous increase of the NSDAP immediately thereafter. This conference had been prepared long beforehand, as is known. It was to abolish reparations. But I went to Lausanne with many other aims and hopes. The abolition of reparations was, so to speak, a cause jugee. But what was necessary was to remove Germany's moral discomfort, if Europe was to return peacefully to normalcy. This moral dissatisfaction had many causes. Germany had become a "second-rate nation." It had been deprived of important attributes of its sovereignty: No military sovereignty; the Rhineland unprotected; the Corridor, the Saar, and others. I have already described the economic conditions. These economic and political difficulties helped advance political radicalism, and the extremists increased in every election. If therefore help was to be forthcoming, then not merely the reparations question had to be solved-that was a negative help- but positive, moral aid was required. My program was the restoration of the sovereignty of the Reich. In the first place, the famous Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty was to be struck out. That was the article which stated Germany's sole responsibility for the war. Historians of all countries had long established that we were not the only ones responsible. In the second place, relations with France based on confidence were to be established.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal do not think that this really is very important for them.
VON PAPEN: I shall briefly...
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I explain quite generally that the events of 1932, the internal and foreign political events, formed the key for judging the growth of the NSDAP which, after all, led to the 30th of January 1933. If we discuss certain questions here, we will be able to refer to them when we discuss the events of 1933. I believe we will thus save time. Therefore, I ask that a discussion of this period be permitted in somewhat greater detail.
VON PAPEN: I will make it as brief as possible, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better go on, as you suggest, from 1933. Is that not what you were suggesting, that you should go on to 1933, and then possibly come back to 1932, if it is necessary?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, that is not what I suggested. I said that the discussion of conditions in 1932 provides the key for the growth of the NSDAP and the formation of the Hitler Government.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; but the defendant has been discussing the conditions of 1932 for a long time now. Surely we can get on to something which has something to do with the National Socialist Party, now.