dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
the new airdrome near 17 May: 18 May: Day of great tension. The commanders-in-chief of the Army has not carried out the intention of building up, as quickly as possible, a new flanking position to the South. Instead of turning march to the west. For this reason the 10th Armored Division and the 2nd and 29th Motorized Divisions are still entrenched in the defensive flanking positions. The commander-in-chief of the Army and General Holdes are called immediately and ordered to adopt the necessary measures immediately. (see note in the files) Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is flying immediately by plane to General Rundstedt at Bastogne. I further give an order supplementing the previous directive. It veers the 1st Mountain Division and the rear echelons of the 4th Army, to the South and South-west for an attack. 19 May: 20 May: Break-through becomes more and more clearly outlined. True, Army Group "B", respectively Chief are very vexed because their Armored Corps was taken away from them, but it was the right thing to do. On the 20th, we already have all armored and mechanized divisions, except the 9th one, in the middle of the break-through wedge. While we were still afraid on the 19th that the bulk of the French-English army might have escaped to the South, it becomes increasingly evident on the 20th that more than 20 divisions are still north of the Somme. Now everything depends on sealing off the Abbeville gap and the Army Corps Kleist reaches it in the evening of the 28th. In the forenoon of the 20th, at the Army High Commands conference, the Fuehrer declares the new directive for continuation of operations against the French Army. 1. Annihilation of the enemy north of the Somme and gaining of the sea coast. 2. Sudden thrust forward between Oise and sea, until Seine river is reached. 3. Principal Attack on both sides of Reims in south-westerly direction, accompained on the right flank east of Paris by heavy forces. 4. For secondary reasons penetration of the Maginot line by lighter forces between St. Avold and Sarreguemines in direction of Nancy-Luneville. General von Stuelpnagel is ordered, not to follow up any more former intention, to attack the Plateau of Langres with 20 Italian Divisions crossing the Upper Rhine. The
heavy forces. 4. For secondary reasons penetration of the Maginot line by lighter forces between St. Avold and Sarreguemines in direction of Nancy-Luneville. General von Stuelpnagel is ordered, not to follow up any more former intention, to attack the Plateau of Langres with 20 Italian Divisions crossing the Upper Rhine. The Italians rather should attack the French Alpine Front and pin down French forces on the Upper Rhine. This they can prepare already now, without having commenced hostilities. Fuehrer is beside himself with joy. Talks in words of highest appreciation of the German Army and its leadership. Is working on the peace treaty, which shall express the tenor only: Return of territory robbed over the past 400 years from the German people, and other values. First negotiations in the forest of Compiegne like in 1918. British can get a separate peace any time after restitution of the colonies. A special memorandum of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command containing the emotion-chocked words of the Fuehrer when receiving the telephone report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army about the capture of Abbeville, is in the files. 21 May: Commander in Chief of the Army together with Halder reports at 09.45 about situations and later intentions. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army wants to operate by-passing Paris on the West with the entire Armored and Mechanized units under Reichman's command, and in addition to this to attack with he wants to attack the Upper Rhine with 18 divisions. This would change the intentions of the fuehrer, expressed by him on the 20th. Fuehrer declares his agreement for the time being. In the afternoon the Fuehrer explains to Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and to me, that he had changed his mind. He believes, that it is wrong to employ all Armed and Mechanized Divisions West of Paris, that it would be better to direct the main thrust, also with the bulk of Armored Forces, to by-pass Paris in the east, (transmitted by me to Greifenberg in the evening). Report of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to Fuehrer at 1200 hours. In the afternoon Field Marshal and Jeschonnek. The Fuehrer is a little nervous in the evening about the fact, that infantry divisions are not pushed forward fast enough. Possibly they are being held
(transmitted by me to Greifenberg in the evening). Report of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to Fuehrer at 1200 hours. In the afternoon Field Marshal and Jeschonnek. The Fuehrer is a little nervous in the evening about the fact, that infantry divisions are not pushed forward fast enough. Possibly they are being held back in order to obtain improvements of position of the VIth and VIIth Corps. If possible, one must employ transport groups. Fuehrer stays in map room until 0130 hours. 22 May: Chief of the Armed Forces High Command decides after that to fly to Army Group A in Charleville early on the 22nd. Brings back a report much more pleasant than the situation map indicates. It becomes apparent that Headquarters of 4th Army has ordered General Kluge to commit the Ist Army Corps south of Sombre, so that it will be in front rather than in the rear of the French border fortifications. The Fuehrer approves at 1300 hours directive, submitted by me, concerning sparing of human lives of the 10th Army by disengagement from the Maginot line, cessation of unnecessary attacks, bringing up of all Divisions and mobile CHQ troops to the rear of 4th Army. Sharp pressure of Army Group B towards the West. The Fuehrer furthermore approves commitment of an airborne Battalion already in readiness and of 2 companies Mountain troops, with short training, in Narvik. Army High Command draws a very optimistic picture of the situation at 1700 hours and intends to continue at 1200 hours on left wing West of Arras towards North. But Jeschonnek reports at 1900 hours, that French tanks reached point 3 kilometer in front of Arras and were stopped only there by dive bombers, pursuit planes and Anti Aircraft Artillery. 24 May: The Fuehrer flies together with me and Schmundt to Army Group A to Charleville. He is very happy about the measures of the Army Group, which correspond entirely with his ideas. He learns to his surprise that the Army High Command, without informing the Fuehrer and the High Command of the Armed Forces, has subordinated the 4th Army and a number of Divisions to its rear, to Army Group B. Fuehrer is very much displeased and thinks this regulation is a mistake not only in military respect but also psychologically wrong.
the Army High Command, without informing the Fuehrer and the High Command of the Armed Forces, has subordinated the 4th Army and a number of Divisions to its rear, to Army Group B. Fuehrer is very much displeased and thinks this regulation is a mistake not only in military respect but also psychologically wrong. Commander-in-Chief of the Army is ordered to report, and shifting of dividing-line is rescinded. New crisis of confidence, especially since Field marshal reports earlier that an order of the Army High Command in no way pushes the Army Group B onward, but even invites it to make available reserves that can be spared. For that reason a new order is issued in the evening (a) not to advance beyond the line Sandez-St.Omer-Graveline towards the East. Besides that each change regarding the Chain of command among the Armies is subject to approval of the Fuehrer. The fuehrer signs Order # 13 regarding continuation of operations. He prohibits the proposed talk by General von Melsch in the Foreign Office to foreign journalists about the war situation, if necessary this shall be done by W PR [Armed Forces Propaganda?] Very favorable report of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force and the Commander in Chief of the Army about the situation. It becomes obvious, that the surrounded enemy is no longer capable of concerted action. Situation in the East becomes threatening because of Russian concentration of forces against Bessarabia. 25 May: In the morning the Commander-in-Chief of the Army arrived and asks permission armored mechanized division to push forward from the High terrain Vimy-St.Omer-Graveline towards in the West into the level terrain. Fuehrer is against it, leaves decision to Army Group A. They decline for the time being because tank, shall rest a while, to be ready for tasks in the South. At noon, Commander of 22 Divisions (Parachute Divisions) Count Sponek, reports about his experiences between the Hague and Rotterdam. He had heavy losses, but accomplished the incredible. Air Force reports great successes near Narvik. The unlimited expansion plan of the SS causes general apprehension. Lutz protests in a letter to the General [Generaloberst] against mentioning of the
Count Sponek, reports about his experiences between the Hague and Rotterdam. He had heavy losses, but accomplished the incredible. Air Force reports great successes near Narvik. The unlimited expansion plan of the SS causes general apprehension. Lutz protests in a letter to the General [Generaloberst] against mentioning of the Armed-SS [Waffen-SS] in Armed forces High Command communiques. But this came from the Fuehrer in a proclamation to the troops in the Dutch theater of operations. General Dietl has received parachuted mountain troops in Narvik after a course of training lasting only 10 days, no losses. 26 May: In the morning the Fuehrer sends for Commander-in-Chief of the Army and agrees because 18th and 6th army advance slowly and because, resistance in the South in front of the 2nd Army Corps has stiffened, that tank units and infantry divisions push forward in direction of Tournai, Cassel and Dunkerque from the West, especially because the enemy on their part do not advance against the mountain positions but dig themselves in defensive positions and improve them. In conjunction therewith the Commander-in-Chief of the Army reports about his intentions for further conduct of the operations (All sketch). Of the 12 Divisions, committed for the first push northwest of Paris, 6 shall join Army Group B (9th and 4th Army). First push possible around 31 May. 2nd push 6 to 8 days later (Main attack A and B), 3rd push at C will be in readiness starting 15 June. The problem Paris is to be considered, not only from a military, but also from a political point of view. If Paris is surrended or if revolutionary features come to the fore, then Paris must be occupied at once. If Paris is defended, we will strongly disengage ourselves for the time being. Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946 Previous Document Volume IV Menu
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Document No. 1814-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1814-PS
ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP
Editions of 1936, 1938 and 1940.
Editor, the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley). Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich. Pages 86-88.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NSDAP AND ITS AFFILIATED ASSOCIATIONS
The Party was created by the Fuehrer out of the realization that if our people were to live and advance towards an era of prosperity they had to be led according to an ideology suitable for our race. They must have as supporters men above average, that means, men who surpass others in self-control, discipline, efficiency, and greater judgment. The party will therefore always constitute a minority, the order of the National Socialist ideology which comprises the leading elements of our people.
Therefore the party comprises only fighters, at all times prepared to assume and to give everything for the furtherance of the National Socialist ideology. Men and women whose primary and most sacred duty is to serve the people.
The NSDAP as the leading element of the German people control the entire public life, from an organizational point of view, as well as from that of affiliates, the organizations of the State administration, and so forth.
In the long run it will be impossible to let leaders retain responsible offices if they have not been recognized by the Party.
Furthermore, the party shall create the prerequisites for a systematic selection of potential "Fuehrers".
The reconstruction of the National Socialist organizational structure itself is demonstrated by the observation of the following principles:
The Fuehrer Principle
The subordination and coordination within the structure of the entire organization.
The regional unity
The expression of the practical community thought.
I
of the National Socialist organizational structure itself is demonstrated by the observation of the following principles: The Fuehrer Principle The subordination and coordination within the structure of the entire organization. The regional unity The expression of the practical community thought. I. FUEHRER PRINCIPLE [Fuehrerprinzip]
The Fuehrer Principle requires a pyramidal organization structure in its details as well as in its entirety.
The Fuehrer is at the top.
He nominates the necessary leaders for the various spheres of work of the Reich's direction, the Party apparatus and the State administration.
Thus a clear picture of the tasks of the party is given.
The Party is the order of "Fuehrers". It is furthermore responsible for the spiritual-ideological National Socialist direction of the German people. The right to organize people for their own sake emanates from these reasons.
This also justifies the subordination to the party of the organizations concerned with the welfare of the people, besides the inclusion of people in the affiliates of the party, the SA, SS, NSKK, the Hitler Youth, the NS Womanhood, the NS German Student Association and the NS German "Dozentenbund" [University teachers association].
This is where the National Socialist Fuehrer structure becomes more strongly apparent.
Every single affiliate is cared for by an office of the NSDAP.
The leadership of the individual affiliates is appointed by the Party.
The Reich Organization Leader [Reichsorganisationsleiter] of the NSDAP is simultaneously leader of the DAF. The NSBO is the organization bearer of the DAF.
The Leader of the Head-Office for Public Welfare also handles within the "Personalunion" the National socialist Welfare and the Winter Relief.
The same applies to:
The Reich Justice Office [Reichsrechtsamt] for the NS "Rechtswahrerbund",
The head office for public health for the NS
NSBO is the organization bearer of the DAF. The Leader of the Head-Office for Public Welfare also handles within the "Personalunion" the National socialist Welfare and the Winter Relief. The same applies to: The Reich Justice Office [Reichsrechtsamt] for the NS "Rechtswahrerbund", The head office for public health for the NS. German Medical Association,
The head office for educators for the NS Teachers Association,
The head office for civil servants for the Reich Association of Civil Servants,
The head office for war victims for the NS. War Victim Relief,
The head office for technology for the NS. Association of German Technology.
The Racial Political Office handles the Reich Association of families with many children, the NS Womanhood [Frauenschaft] and the "Deutches Frauenwerk".
The Reich Office for agrarian politics of the NSDAP remains furthermore in closest touch with the "Reichnaehrstand" [Reich Nutrition Office] which is anchored in the State. Direct handling and personal contact of the leaders is also provided in this manner.
All attached affiliates, as well as the offices of the Party, have their foundation, in the same manner as in the Reich direction, in the sovereign territories, in the "Gaue" and furthermore in the districts (Kreise) and if required in the local groups of the NSDAP. This applies also to cells and blocks in the case of the NS Womanhood, the DAF, and the NSV. The members of the attached affiliates will be included in local administrations, respectively district sectors or district comradeships which correspond geographically to local groups of the Party.
II. FUEHRER PRINCIPLE
also to cells and blocks in the case of the NS Womanhood, the DAF, and the NSV. The members of the attached affiliates will be included in local administrations, respectively district sectors or district comradeships which correspond geographically to local groups of the Party. II. FUEHRER PRINCIPLE. SUBORDINATION AND COORDINATION WITHIN THE TOTAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.
The Fuehrer structure would be split, though, if all subdivisions, including attached affiliates were completely independent in their structure from the smallest unit up to the "Reichsfuehrung" and were they to come only at the top directly under the Fuehrer.
Like a four-story building, if we consider the four Sovereign territories [Reich, Gau, etc] whose pillars and walls go up to the roof without having supporting joists (wooden stays) or connections on the various floors. Furthermore, it would not be reconcilable with the Fuehrer principle, which assumes complete responsibility, to assume that the Leader of a sub-division, as well as of an affiliated organization, would be in the position to guarantee beyond a professional and factual responsibility the political and ideological attitude of all the sub-leaders down to the smallest unit on the basis of his Reich leadership. The total independence of individual organizations would necessitate furthermore, the creation of an organizational, personal and educational apparatus for each one of them. This, in turn, would create eventually, in spite of the best will of the responsible "Reichsleiters" [Reich Leaders], central offices and office leaders in the Reich Leadership [Reichsfuehrung] of the party, differences in the various organizations. Those differences would later on of necessity take the shape of completely different systems in regional, vertical, and personal respects, etc
of the responsible "Reichsleiters" [Reich Leaders], central offices and office leaders in the Reich Leadership [Reichsfuehrung] of the party, differences in the various organizations. Those differences would later on of necessity take the shape of completely different systems in regional, vertical, and personal respects, etc. within the National Socialist regime.
The Subdivisions NS German Student Association, NS Womanhood Association, NSD [Dozentenbund] and the affiliates and their leaders come therefore under the authority of the competent sovereign leaders of the NSDAP. At the same time their structure is professionally effectuated from the bottom up and they are subordinated to their immediately superior organization in the sovereign divisions of the Party, from a disciplinary point of view, that is to say insofar as organization, ideology, politics, supervision and personal questions are concerned.
Thus a solid anchorage for all the organizations within the party structure is provided and a firm connection with the sovereign leaders of the NSDAP is created in accordance with the Fuehrer Principle.
[In the 1943 edition the text remains the same, but the topical sentences "I. Fuehrer Principle" and "II. Fuehrer Principle. Subordination and Coordination within the Total Organizational Structure" are changed to "I. Construction of the Organization" and "II. Subordination and Coordination within the Total Organizational Structure".]
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Document No. 1815-PS Previous Document Volume IV Menu Next Document PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1815-PS Berlin 12 May 1941 R.S.H.A. IV B I To all Staatspolizei-leit-stellen For information: The SD-Leit-Abschnitten The Inspekteuren der Sipo/SD Concerning: The Study and Treatment of Church Politics The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has issued an order, which is to come into immediate operation, in which the Sipo and SD Study and Treatment of Church Politics, which has hitherto been divided between the SD-Abschnitte and Stapostellen, shall now be taken over entirely by the Stapostellen. (See the plan for the division of work issued by the R.S.H.A. on 1.3.41. In addition to combatting opposition, the Stapostellen thus take over the entire 'Gegnernachrichtendienst' in this sphere.) In order that the Stapostellen should be in a position to take over this work, the Chief of the Sipo/SD has ordered that 'Church Specialists' hitherto employed in the SD-Abschnitten, should be temporarily transferred to the same posts at Stapostellen, and operate the Nachrichtendienst (Intelligence Service in the Church Political Sphere) there. On the orders of the Chief of the R.S.H.A., and after reaching agreement with the heads of Amts III, II, and I, these 'Church Specialists' specified in the attached lists will thus be transferred from the SD-Abschnitten to the Stapostellen, quoted. Further instructions for transference or removal will be issued by Amt. I. Those Stapostellen which are unable to obtain any SD-'Specialists' must immediately train those of their specialists who appear most suitable for Nachrichtendienst work. The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has furthermore ordered that 'Nachrichtendienst' files concerning Church Political Opposition, hitherto the property of the SD-Abschnitte should be handed over to the Stapostellen. However, material concerning Confessional influence on the lives of the people is to remain with the SD-Abschnitten. In doubtful cases the Stapostellen are to be given an opportunity of making copies or photostats of these reports. Since it is essential that in this particular sphere the opposition should be kept under constant observation, with no possibility of loopholes, I am endeavoring to ensure