dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: All of these documents concern the development of German zones of operation and the recognition of the zones of operation which were declared by the opponents. These documents are relevant for the question of the treatment of neutrals. In Exhibit GB-191 the charge was made against the Naval Operations Staff that without any consideration it had given the order to torpedo neutral ships. My evidence shall prove that that happened only in those areas which the neutrals had been warned against using and that this is a permissible measure of warfare, as shown also by the practices of the enemy. I should like to refer individually to two documents which concern the practices of the opposing side. Doenitz-60, Page 208, concerns the statement by Mr. Churchill of 8 May 1940 regarding the torpedoing of ships in the Jutland area. This document and the next one, Doenitz-60, Page 009, I wanted to put to a witness. Doenitz-60, Page 209, concerns a French statement about a danger zone near Italy. I am using both documents as evidence for the practical state of naval warfare and should like to discuss them with a witness. It goes without saying that the methods of the enemy also had some influence on German practices. The next group contains documents Doenitz-60, Pages 219, 222, and 224. They deal with the British system of navicerts. The navicerts, as can be seen from these documents, were certificates which all neutral ships had to get from the British Consulate before they could put to sea. Ships which refused to use navicerts were confiscated. The navicert system is relevant in two respects. First, it is mentioned in the German statement concerning the total blockade against England on 17 August 1940 as one reason for that blockade. Secondly, from the German point of view it was a non-neutral act on the part of the neutrals if they submitted to that system. This question plays a considerable part in determining to what extent Germany herself from that time on took consideration of neutrals in the zones of operations.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Finally, the navicert system shows the development of an entirely new naval warfare law, and that is a very important subject for me. The next document is Doenitz-60, Page 256. It is a French decree of 11 November 1939 concerning the creation of insignia for the crews of merchant ships who could be mobilized. This document is relevant for the question of whether the crews of merchant ships at that stage of the war should be considered combatants or noncombatants. The details of the decree seem to me to show that they would have to be considered combatants. With the two following documents I should like to object to the probative value of the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-191. This concerns my Documents Doenitz-81, Page 233, and Doenitz-82, Page 234. I had said that these two documents would dispute the probative value of the Document GB-191. That is the report of the British Foreign Office about German naval warfare. On Page 1 this report attacks Article 72 of the German Prize Regulations in which it states that ships can be sunk if they cannot be brought into port. Document GB-191 says that this is contrary to the traditional British conception. My Document Doenitz-81 shows the sinking of the German Freighter Olinda by the British cruiser Ajax on the first day of the war. It is only one example to show that the statement made in the report of the British Foreign Office, according to which the British fleet had not sunk ships if they could not or would not bring them to port, is incorrect. In the same report of the British Foreign Office, German U-boats are accused of never differentiating between armed and unarmed merchant ships. Later I shall submit to the Court the orders concerning armed and unarmed merchant ships. By my next document I merely wish to defend the U-boats against having each mistake interpreted as bad intent.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Therefore, in Doenitz-82, I submit a statement by the British Foreign Office which confirms that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, in some cases to distinguish between armed merchant ships and unarmed merchant ships. The next document, Doenitz-85, Page 242, contains a statement by the American Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, concerning the question of keeping secret the sinking of German U-boats by American naval forces. For me it is essential in connection with the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-194. In this document the measures which the naval war staff took to keep secret the sinkings by U-boats, that is, using as a pretense the fiction of sinking through mines, are presented as fraudulent. I should like to give this as an example that during a war military measures can naturally be kept secret, but that that is no proof for or against their legality. The next document is Doenitz-89, on Page 246. It is a list drawn up by the Naval Operations Staff of violations of neutrality committed by the United States from September 1939 to 29 September 1941. The document is essential to counter the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-195, which contains an order from Adolf Hitler of July 1941 in which it is stated that in the future even the merchant ships of the United States must be treated within the German zone of blockade in the same manner as all other neutral ships, that is to say, they should be sunk. The Prosecution has interpreted this order as proof of a cynical and opportunistic conduct of U-boat warfare by Admiral Doenitz. I wish to show, by submitting this list, that from the German point of view it was completely understandable and is justifiable if in the summer of 1941 one did not grant the United States a better position than any other neutral. Now I come to the subject of the treatment of shipwrecked survivors. These documents are in Volume I of the document book.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: The first document, Doenitz-9, on Page 11, offers a description of over-scrupulous measures taken by German U-boats to save survivors in September and October 1939. This is essential for Admiral Doenitz . . .
THE PRESIDENT: There must surely be a group of these, is there not? Haven't you got a number of documents which deal with shipwrecks?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Yes, there are a number of documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you not deal with them all together?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Yes, Mr. President, I can assemble them. They are Documents Doenitz-9, Page 11, Doenitz-10, Page 12, Doenitz-12, Page 18, and Doenitz-13, Pages 19 to 26, and Page 49, and Doenitz-19 on Page 34. All these documents are related to Exhibit GB-196 of the Prosecution. That is an Order from the winter of 1939-1940 in which the rescue measures of U-boats are limited. Sir David objected to that group that it was not important if, after this order of the winter 1939-i940, rescues were still carried out. I cannot share this opinion. If the Prosecution accuses Admiral Doenitz of having given an order about the limitation of rescue measures in the winter of 1939-1940, then it is essential to point out for what reasons such an order was issued and what practical consequences it had in fact. It is my assertion that that order can be traced, first, to the fighting conditions of the U-boats along the British coasts, and second, to over-scrupulous rescue measures taken by the commanders. The order did not prohibit measures of rescue generally, and that will be shown by the statements made by the commanders, which I have submitted under Doenitz-13.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it possible for you to give us a page where we can find these GB documents? For instance, GB-196. ,
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Yes. It is in the British document book on Page 33. In the document book of the Prosecution, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: GB-195?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Page 32, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I should like to state my position on a formal objection. Some of these statements are not sworn statements. I refer to Article 19 of the Charter, according to which the Tribunal is to use all matters of evidence which have probative value. I believe that a written report by an officer about his activity as commanding officer has probative value, even if it is not sworn to. A report of this kind before a German naval court would be accepted in evidence without question. The last document in this group, Doenitz-19, Page 34, concerns the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-199. It is a radio message on Page 36 of the British document book of the Prosecution. It concerns a radio message which the U-boat commanded by Kapitanleutnant Schacht received from Admiral Doenitz, and deals with the rescue or nonrescue of Englishmen and Italians. Document Doenitz-19 is a log book of Schacht's U-boat and shows, first, the armament and crew of the Laconia , whose crew is the one in question, and second, it explains why comparatively few of the numerous Italians and comparatively many of the less numerous Englishmen were rescued. The events were known to Admiral Doenitz from radio messages. Document Doenitz-29...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, as I told you, the Tribunal has read all of these documents and examined them, and therefore it isn't necessary for you to go into them as a small group, and it isn't necessary for you to go into each document, if you will indicate the nature of the groups.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Then I should like to mention the Documents Doenitz-29 on Pages 54 to 59 of the document book; Doenitz-31, Page 64; Doenitz-32 on Page 65; Doenitz-33 on Page 66; Doenitz-37 on Page 78; Doenitz-38 on Page 80 and Doenitz-40 on Page 86; these documents are also concerned with the subject of survivors. Doenitz-29 is concerned with a statement of the witness Heisig. The Prosecution has declared that I could not question the character of the witness Heisig because I had not made that point during the cross-examination of Heisig. In this connection I wish to state that in my opinion I attacked the credibility of Heisig during the cross-examination as far as it was possible at the time. I knew of the existence of that witness only three days before he appeared here.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, you are now proceeding to deal with each document. You have given us quite a number of documents which all fall in this group, of the treatment of shipwrecks and we have already seen those documents and therefore, we can consider them as a group. We do not need to have these details about the question of the credibility of Heisig, which is already before us.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President, I believe it is very difficult to judge the relevancy of documents if I am not permitted to say what the connection is. For instance, the next three documents, Doenitz-31, 32 and 33, are related to GB-200. That is an order by the Flag Officer of the U-boats dealing with the treatment of so-called rescue ships. The Tribunal will recall that the Prosecution has stated it did not object to the order as such with reference to the sinking of rescue ships, but only to the tendency to kill the survivors also by sinking rescue ships. My documents pertaining to this issue are to show that thus they apply moral standards which do not exist in wartime. I wish to show this comparison with the sea rescue planes. The sea rescue planes were rightfully shot down by the British Air Force, because there was no agreement which prohibited that. The British Air Force was therefore naturally not kept from shooting down rescue planes by moral consideration, if international law permitted it; and we have exactly the same point of view concerning the rescue ships. In the case of the sinking of the steamer Steuben , I should like to correct an error. That is Document Doenitz-33. It does not deal, as Sir David mentioned yesterday, with the sinking of a hospital ship by a Russian U-boat, but it concerns the sinking of a German transport ship which carried wounded. This sinking was, therefore, completely justified and I would like to show with this document that the Naval Operations Staff did not for a moment consider it unjustified. I believe, Mr. President, that I shall have to speak in more detail about the Documents Doenitz-37, 38, and 40, for it is precisely these documents which have been objected to by the Prosecution, because they show the conduct of the Allies in certain war measures.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, as I have told you more than once, the Tribunal does not wish to hear you on each individual document. We have already considered the documents and we want you to deal with them in groups. You have already given us the documents in a group and have indicated to what subject they relate.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President, may I at least mention the documents of the Prosecution to which my documents refer?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Doenitz-37 refers to a document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-638. That is the statement by Admiral Doenitz concerning the case of the Athenia . At the end of that statement the question of the punishment of the U-boat commander is mentioned and the Prosecution apparently accuses Admiral Doenitz of not punishing the commander except in a disciplinary manner. I want to prove with this Document Doenitz-37 that a commanding officer will tolerate certain war measures once even if they were not correct or at least partly not correct. Doenitz-38 is in connection with Document Doenitz-39, which has not been objected to by the Prosecution. It brings out only one detail from the Document Doenitz-39. This document states the attitude of the Naval Operations Staff to alleged reports about the Allies' firing on survivors and similar incidents. By Doenitz-38 I only intend to show that the very careful attitude of the Naval Operations Staff was not based on lack of proof for they even had affidavits to prove it, and in spite of that rejected any possibility of reprisals. Doenitz-40 is in connection with Document Doenitz-42 which I submitted and against which no objection has been raised. In this document quite sober considerations are raised as to whether survivors could be fired on or not. I should like to show that such considerations perhaps appear inhumane and impossible after a war, but that during war such questions are examined and in certain cases are answered in the affirmative, according to military necessity. The next two documents, Goering-7, on Page 89, and C-21, on Page 91, deal with the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-205. That was a radio message concerning the sinking of an Allied sailing cutter. GB-205 is on Page 53 of the Prosecution's document book. The Prosecution in connection with this document has accused our naval warfare command of trying to terrorize the crews of neutral ships.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Both my documents, Goering-7 and C-21, give only a few examples to the effect that that terrorizing is nothing illegal but that naturally each belligerent in taking military measures considers the psychological effect of these measures on the enemy. The next group is Document Doenitz-43, on Page 95; Doenitz-90, on Page 258, and Doenitz-67, on Page 96. They all deal with the subject of whether a ship is obliged to carry out rescues if this would endanger the ship Itself, and relates to the document of the Prosecution, GB-196 on Page 33 of the document book of the Prosecution and GB-199 on Page 36 of the Prosecution's book. They show first the methods of the British navy...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, you have told us the subject they relate to. That is to say, they relate to the subject whether a ship is obliged to rescue if in danger, and that, you say, is an answer to GB-196 and 199. Why should you tell us anything more than that?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: If that is sufficient, then I shall proceed, Mr. President. The last document in this group is Doenitz-53, Page 99. It is a statement signed by some 60 U-boat commanders from an English prisoner-of-war camp, and it deals with the fact that they never received an order to kill survivors. The Prosecution objected to it because it was considered too general and was not sworn to. I believe that it contains a very concrete statement concerning the alleged order for destruction. Furthermore, it is an official report by the German commanders as prisoners of war to their superior, the English camp commandant; and I received it through the British War Office. I request the Tribunal particularly to approve this document, because it has a high probative and moral value for myself and for my client. The last group of the documents objected to comes under the heading "Conspiracy." It is in the document book, Volume II, Mr. President, Doenitz-47, and relates to Exhibit GB-212. Doenitz-47 is on Page 120. The document of the Prosecution is Exhibit GB-212. On Page 75 an incident is mentioned, namely, that Admiral Doenitz approved the fact that a traitor in a prisoner-of-war camp was done away with. Doenitz-47 will show that the removal of traitors is an emergency measure which is approved by all governments in time of war. Doenitz-48 deals with the subject of the treatment of prisoners of war. It is related to the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-209. Doenitz-48 is on Page 122 in my document book, and GB-209 is on Page 68 of the document book of the Prosecution. In connection with GB-209, which deals with the possibility of abandoning the Geneva Convention, the Prosecution accuses Doenitz of wanting to risk the lives of 150,000 American and over 50,000 British prisoners of war without scruple.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: In my opinion, it is not sufficient merely to dispute such a statement which is made by the Prosecution, but I must prove that those prisoners of war for whom Admiral Doenitz himself was responsible were not only treated according to international law but in an exemplary manner and as can be seen from a British statement, which is contained in evidence, "with fairness and consideration." The next document Doenitz-49 deals with the treatment of native populations. It is on Page 130. It is relevant to the documents of the Prosecution GB-210, Prosecution document book Page 69, and GB-211, Prosecution document book Page 72. According to these two documents of the Prosecution Admiral Doenitz is connected with the conspiracy for committing crimes against the native populations of occupied territories. Here again, I would like to show that in that sector for which he was personally responsible, he did everything necessary to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territories. Therefore I have submitted evidence concerning the sentences imposed by the naval courts for the protection of the inhabitants, which have been confirmed by Admiral Doenitz even in the case of death sentences against German soldiers. The Prosecution states that this document is also very general. The document has an appendix with about 80 individual examples of sentences. I have not included these examples, in order to save the translators this work; but if the Tribunal considers it necessary, I will certainly have that appendix translated. The last group contains Doenitz-51, on Page 134, and Doenitz-52, on Page 135. They are in connection with the Prosecution's Document GB-188, on Page 10 of the British document book. That is the speech made by Admiral Doenitz on the occasion of Adolf Hitler's death. In connection with that document and another, the Prosecution has accused him of being a fanatical Nazi and, as such, of prolonging the war at the expense of the men, women, and children of his country.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: The very documents of the Prosecution, however, show that he considered a delay of capitulation necessary in order to make it possible to get as many people as possible from the East to the West and thus bring them to safety. The Documents Doenitz-51 and Doenitz-52 will prove that in fact many hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of German people were brought to safety during these last weeks of the war.
THE PRESIDENT: We shall see that from the documents presumably. That is part of the details in the documents, isn't it, what you say?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I do not need to say anything further about it, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Are these all the documents? Dr. Kranzbuhler, the Tribunal is inclined to think that it would save time after the Tribunal has ruled upon these documents, if you called the Defendant Doenitz first. Would you be willing to do that?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President, I was not prepared for it, but I am in a position to do so.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the object of it of course is to try and save time, and the Tribunal thinks that in the course of the examination of the defendant a considerable number of these documents might possibly be dealt with in the course of direct and crossexamination.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Yes, Mr. President. The difficulty, however, is that during the examination of Admiral Doenitz I should like to count on the knowledge of the contents of the documents; and I should also like to discuss some documents with him. But I do not know whether the Tribunal will approve these documents now or not.
THE PRESIDENT: But what I am suggesting is that the Tribunal should consider now the relevance of these documents, the admissibility of these documents, and then tell you-make a rule- as to what documents are admitted. You will then know what documents are admitted. Then you can call Admiral Doenitz and of course examine him with reference to the documents which are admitted; and as I have told you, the Tribunal has already looked at these documents. They will now reconsider them, in order to see whether they are admissible, and the Tribunal will in that way, to a large extent, be fully acquainted with the documents.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Yes, I agree to that, Mr. President. I will call Admiral Doenitz if the Tribunal deems it proper.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, you have been dealing with a Document Doenitz-60, which contains a great number of pages to which you wish to refer. When we have ruled upon them you will have to give separate exhibit numbers to each one of the documents-to each one of the pages which we will rule are admissible and which you wish to offer in evidence.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President, may I point out that this is one book. Doenitz-60 is one book. That is why I have not given it an exhibit number, because I submit it as one.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but it contains so many pages that it will be more convenient, will it not, to give each separate page a separate exhibit number?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to relate to a great variety of subjects.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Yes, a collection of documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Now as you dealt with the various subjects in entirely different order than the way in which Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe dealt with them, I think it would be convenient if we heard anything he wants to say about it. Only if you do wish to say something, Sir David.