dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. HORN: So you did not have the impression, then, that these men expected a declaration of war?
SCHMIDT: No, I did not have that impression.
DR. HORN: Witness, were you in a position to observe how Ribbentrop reacted to the news of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor?
SCHMIDT: I had no direct opportunity, but in the Foreign Office it was generally known that the news of Pearl Harbor took the Foreign Minister, as indeed the whole Foreign Office, completely by surprise. This impression was confirmed by what a member of the Press Department told me. The Press Department had a listening station for radio news and the official on duty had instructions to inform the Foreign Minister personally of important news at once. When the first news of Pearl Harbor was received by the listening station of the Press Department, the official on duty considered it of sufficient importance to report it to his chief, that is to say, the head of the Press Department, who in turn was to pass it on to the Foreign Minister. He was, however -- so I was told -- rather harshly rebuffed by the Foreign Minister who said it must be an invention of the press or a canard, and he did not wish our Press Department to disturb him with such stories. After that, a second and third message about Pearl Harbor was received, I think a Reuters report had also been received by the listening station; and the head of the Press Department then again plucked up courage and, in spite of the order not to disturb the Foreign Minister, he once more gave him this news.
THE PRESIDENT: This evidence seems to be utterly uninteresting and irrelevant to the Tribunal.
DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop is accused also of having prepared aggressive war against the United States of America.
THE PRESIDENT: What you were telling was the reactions of the press. What have we got to do with the reactions of the press?
DR. HORN: The witness described Von Ribbentrop's reaction to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Von Ribbentrop did not know that the Japanese were about to attack Pearl Harbor or that they were about to attack America at all. Neither was there such an agreement between Japan and Germany. It is therefore not correct that Ribbentrop prepared an aggressive war against the United States of America. That is ...
THE PRESIDENT: You were talking about the press. I am not saying that you ought not to ask him whether the Foreign Minister knew nothing about the attack upon Pearl Harbor. That was not what I said. What I said was that the Tribunal was not interested and thought it was irrelevant for you to go into the reactions of the press.
DR. HORN: Witness, you were present at the negotiations regarding the Naval Agreement with England. Can you tell us how those negotiations proceeded, and whether Von Ribbentrop was sincere, and what aims he pursued?
SCHMIDT: These negotiations, at which I was also present as interpreter, went perfectly smoothly after some difficulties had been overcome. The aims which the Foreign Minister ...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as I understand it, this is the Naval Agreement of 1935. In my recollection -- I am just trying to check it -- that was one of the matters which we discussed on the application for witnesses, and the Tribunal ruled against going into the negotiations antecedent to the conclusion of that treaty. It came up on application for witnesses. One or two witnesses who were going to give the negotiations were asked for and, I think, to deal with this exact point which Dr. Horn put in his last question, namely, the state of mind of the Defendant Ribbentrop. I found one or two -- there is Lord Monsell, for example, who was on the list of witnesses -- who were denied by the Court, and a number of German ones were denied on the same point. My Lord, it is in the Tribunal's statement of the 26th of February; and Your Lordship will see, on Page 2, 1 think, certainly the witness Monsell, who happens to be the one most familiar to myself; but I am sure there were other witnesses, too. I know that we discussed this point quite fully on the application for witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: Who were the others, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have a list of witnesses who were refused. There is Admiral Schuster...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he is one.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ... who was relevant on this question as to who initiated the treaty. And then there is Sir Robert Craigie, Number 24. There is Lord Monsell...
THE PRESIDENT: He was refused.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These are on the same points, Number 25.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I think these are the three.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what do you say to this? Those three witnesses -- Schuster, Craigie, and Monsell -- who as alleged by you were to give evidence on this 1935 treaty, were all refused. As to the witness you are now examining, no such reference was contained regarding him in the application. He was asked for only as an interpreter in the Foreign Office.
DR. HORN: I was under the impression that these other three witnesses had been refused because they were cumulative and I was not going to question the witness on the Naval Agreement but I merely want to ask him about the attitude shown by Ribbentrop when the agreement was concluded and afterwards in order to prove to the Tribunal that Von Ribbentrop was not, in any case at that time, deliberately working towards an aggressive war, nor was he participating in a conspiracy to initiate a war of aggression, at least not at that time. And I wish to prove further that this agreement was not "eyewash" as the aforementioned British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, put it.
THE PRESIDENT: Your application with reference to Ambassador Craigie was this: The witness can give evidence that in 1935 Ribbentrop approached England with a proposal that the Naval Treaty should be signed and Ribbentrop's initiative brought about an agreement by France to this treaty which involved the Treaty of Versailles. Thus the treaty has come into effect. Is it not in connection with that, that you were going to ask this witness questions?
DR. HORN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: If you have nothing about the Naval treaty of 1935, then you can go on.
DR. HORN: Witness, in 1944, you were present at a conference between Horthy and Hitler at Klessheim, in which Von Ribbentrop also took part and during which the solution of the Jewish question in Hungary was discussed. What did Von Ribbentrop, say to you about this question?
SCHMIDT: During this conference there had been a certain difficulty, when Hitler insisted that Horthy should proceed more energetically in the Jewish question, and Horthy answered with some heat, "But what am I supposed to do? Shall I perhaps beat the Jews to death?" -- Whereupon there was rather a lull, and the Foreign Minister then turned to Horthy and said, "Yes, there are only two possibilities -- either that, or to intern the Jews." Afterwards he said to me -- and this was rather exceptional -- that Hitler's demands in this connection might have gone a bit too far.
DR. HORN: On 25 August 1939, you took part in a conference between Hitler, Henderson, and Ribbentrop, at which Ribbentrop and Hitler once more expressed their wish to come to an agreement with Poland, using Britain as intermediary. Is it correct that Ribbentrop then sent you with a draft note on this conference to Henderson at the Embassy to ask him to back this proposal as far as possible and to try to put it through? Is that correct?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is so.
DR. HORN: May I submit to the Tribunal a copy of this telegram from Sir Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax? (Document Number TC-72, Number 69.) [Turning to the witness.] Is it correct, Witness, that on 28 August 1939, Herr Von Ribbentrop in a further discussion with Sir Nevile Henderson again stressed that an agreement between Germany and Britain after a settlement of the Polish question was Chamberlain's greatest wish, as the British Prime Minister had stated to Ribbentrop and that Von Ribbentrop then repeated this to Henderson? Is that true?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is true.
DR. HORN: May I submit to the Tribunal the memorandum in question as an exhibit?
THE PRESIDENT: You offer a copy of that in evidence, do you?
DR. HORN: I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the document.
THE PRESIDENT: What number?
DR. HORN: The one number has already been submitted by the Prosecution. It bears the Document Number TC-72 and another number, and the second number has also been submitted by the Prosecution. I submit it again to the Tribunal because I have referred to it just now. (Document Number TC-72, Number 75). Witness, one last question: In your extensive experience as an interpreter, you had much opportunity to observe Hitler in contact with foreigners. What impression, according to your observations, did Hitler make on foreign statesmen?
SCHMIDT: Naturally, it is not quite so easy to answer this question, as one cannot look into the hearts and minds of other people. But as an observer one can naturally draw certain conclusions from the attitude ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal does not think really that this is a matter which is relevant, the effect that Hitler's demeanor had on foreign statesmen. It does not influence us in the least.
DR. HORN: Then I withdraw my question. I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other defendants' counsel who wish to ask questions?
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Goering): Witness, were you present at a conversation which, about one year before the outbreak of war, took place between Lord Londonderry and Field Marshal Goering at Karinhall?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I was present at this conversation.
DR. STAHMER: Describe briefly to the Tribunal the substance of this conversation.
SCHMIDT: After so long a time I cannot, of course, remember the details, but I recall merely that the subject of conversation was the Anglo-German rapprochement, or rather the elimination of any points of dispute between Germany and England, and that in addition, of course, quite a number of technical questions regarding aviation and the air force were dealt with. I have always remembered very clearly one particular remark made by Goering in the course of this conversation, when at the end of adiscussion which was to prove how desirable it was that Germany and England be friendly and avoid conflicts, he said the following:
DR. STAHMER: Did you take part in the negotiations in Munich in the autumn of 1938?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I did take part in these negotiations.
DR. STAHMER: Was the then Field Marshal Goering also present?
SCHMIDT: During the first part he was not present, but later when the circle of those present became larger he likewise took part.
DR. STAHMER: In what way did he participate in the negotiations?
SCHMIDT: He intervened only in individual questions of lesser importance. However, he did take part in a way which showed that through his intervention he wanted to remove insofar as possible, any difficulties arising from certain technical points which might hamper the progress of the negotiations. In other words, he was anxious that the Munich negotiations should not collapse over such technical points of procedure, which played an important role in the second part of the negotiations.
DR. STAHMER: Were you present at a conversation which took place in the autumn of 1937 between Lord Halifax and the then Field Marshal Goering and followed a conference between Lord Halifax and Hitler at the Berghof?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I was present.
DR. STAHMER: What course did this conversation take? Briefly, please.
SCHMIDT: First I must say that at the Obersalzberg the conversation with Lord Halifax had taken a very unsatisfactory turn. The two partners could in no way come to an understanding, but in the conversation with Goering the atmosphere improved. The same points were dealt with as at Obersalzberg, the subjects which were in the foreground at the time, namely, the Anschluss, the Sudeten question, and finally the questions of the Polish Corridor and Danzig. At Obersalzberg Hitler had treated these matters rather uncompromisingly, and he had demanded more or less that a solution as he conceived it be accepted by England, whereas Goering in his discussions always attached importance to the fact or always stressed that his idea was a peaceful solution, that is to say, a solution through negotiation, and that everything should be done in this direction, and that he also believed that such a solution could be reached for all three questions if the negotiations were properly conducted.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you were present at numerous political conferences of Hitler's. Did you notice on such occasions that high military leaders tried to influence him to enlarge German territory in a peaceful way or by war?
SCHMIDT: No, no such efforts on the part of the military came to my notice, because at political negotiations the military representatives were for the most part not present at the beginning when the large problems were dealt with and they were called in only when purely military problems were discussed; and then, of course, they stated their opinion only on purely military questions and did not speak on any political matters.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I have one more question: On the occasion of such discussions, did you find that high military leaders were anxious to exert political influence upon the Reich Government?
SCHMIDT: No, I did not find that, and you could not have found it, since they were hardly ever present.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I want you first of all to tell the Tribunal quite shortly the general background of your views. Do you remember on 28 November making an affidavit at Oberursel; do you remember?
SCHMIDT: I cannot remember the date clearly, but I do remember that I made an affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at it. [Handing the document to the witness.] Paragraph 1 sets out your experience, the number of conferences, et cetera . My Lord, I ought to have said that this document is Document Number 3308-PS and will be Exhibit GB-288. [Turning to the witness.] Then, in Paragraph 2 you give the basis of your experience. Would you follow it while I read: And then, if you will look at the third paragraph, which gives your impression from that basis of the objectives of the foreign policy: Is that right, Herr Schmidt? Does that express your views?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, before I go on to deal with particular matters, I want you to develop your impressions a little further. You have told us that you acted under or with every foreign minister since Herr Stresemann. Did you notice a considerable difference between the style of living of the Nazi ministers and those who had preceded them?
SCHMIDT: As far as the style of living is concerned, there were certain differences, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take the Defendant Ribbentrop. Before the Defendant Ribbentrop went into politics, had he one house in Berlin-Dahlem? I think Lenze-Allee 19. Was that his possession?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when he was Foreign Minister, had he six houses? Let me remind you and take them one by one. You can tell me if I am right. There was a house in Sonnenburg, somewhere near Berlin, with an estate of 750 hectares, and a private golf course. That was one, was it not?
SCHMIDT: I knew that there was a house at Sonnenburg, but I did not know how large it was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then there was one at Tanneck bei Duren, near Aachen, a house that he used for horse breeding?
SCHMIDT: I did not know about that house.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then there was one near Kitzbuhl, that he used for chamois hunting?
SCHMIDT: That is not known to me in detail.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not in detail, but its existence was known?
SCHMIDT: I consider that it is not at all improbable that the house existed, but I have not heard any details about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, of course, there was the Schloss Fuschl; that is in Austria, is it not?
SCHMIDT: Near Salzburg, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Near Salzburg, yes. That was taken over as a state residence. I will ask you about the circumstances a little later. Then there was a Slovakian hunting estate called "Pustepole," was there not?
SCHMIDT: The name is familiar to me, and I know that Herr Von Ribbentrop sometimes went hunting there, but I know nothing regarding the proprietorship.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then he also used a hunting lodge, near Podersan, that had been that of Count Czernin, near Podersan, in Bohemia, in the Sudetenland?
SCHMIDT: There was a hunting house or something similar, I do not know the name, where receptions took place, as for instance, that given for Count Ciano. But I think it had a different name. SIR DAVID M)AXWELL-FYFE: That is the one where Ciano visited. That is the one I was indicating to you. I think I am right that it previously belonged to Count Czernin. Tell me, was the salary fixed for Reich Ministers?
SCHMIDT: I did not understand the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me put it quite clearly. Was a salary -- that is, a fixed annual remuneration -- appointed for Reich Ministers?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How much was that?
SCHMIDT: That I cannot say.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was kept secret? SCIU/BDT: That is not the reason that I cannot give you any information. I was not at all interested in how large a salary the Reich Foreign Minister received.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You do not know?
SCHMIDT: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you say that you do not know, that is good enough for me. I think, perhaps, you can answer this question. Had any previous Reich Foreign Minister been able to run six country houses and estates of various sizes on his salary, anyone that you had worked with?
SCHMIDT: Whether he could have done it I cannot say, but he did not do it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did not. We will leave it there for a moment. Now, I want you to apply your mind to May 1939. That is about four months before the war, when the Polish question was just coming up. I mean, it was getting to be quite a serious question. Do you remember what I think they call in the German Foreign Office a conduite de langage that was issued by Ribbentrop about that time and put out by Baron Von Weizsacker?
SCHMIDT: No, I do not know that, or at any rate I should say that I cannot remember it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-YYFE: Let me try to remind you, to see if this draws it to your recollection: Do you remember a conduite de langage to that effect issued by the Foreign Minister?
SCHMIDT: I cannot remember a conduite de langage of that kind. It appears to me rather to resemble a conduite de langage for propaganda purposes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you not remember that Von Ribbentrop issued instructions that no official of the Foreign Office was to issue any different views?
SCHMIDT: That is right, that one was to adhere to those conduites de langage .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember what he told Baron Von Weizsacker to say would happen to anyone who expressed different views?
SCHMIDT: No, I do not recollect that, but I can imagine that severe penalties would have been threatened to such a person. But I do not remember the actual case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you not remember that he said they would be shot by him personally?
SCHMIDT: That such a statement may have been made by him on some occasion when he was angry, I consider perfectly possible, but I do not believe that it was meant seriously.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I thought you might remember -- I just suggest it to you -- was the distress and difficulty that Baron Von Weizsacker had in deciding how he was to say it to the official conference at the Foreign Office. Do you not remember that?
SCHMIDT: At that time I had not yet been admitted to the morning conferences. I was not present at that time so I cannot tell you anything about it, but I can imagine that the State Secretary may have had quite some trouble in translating that statement into official language.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-YYFE: Well, now, I want to deal quite shortly with the points that have been put to you about August 1939. I only want to get the facts quite clear. Do you remember that you were with Hitler at the time that he was expecting the reactions of the Western Powers to the Soviet treaty?
SCHMIDT: No, I was attached to the delegation in Moscow and therefore not with Hitler.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So did you come back with the Defendant Ribbentrop on the 24th?
SCHMIDT: Yes, but I remained in Berlin and did not go to Berchtesgaden.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now you remember that Hitler saw Sir Nevile Henderson at 1:30 on the 25th and gave him what has been called a note verbale ? Do you remember that?
SCHMIDT: I think that I was not present at that conference, because just at that time I was in Moscow. It must be possible to establish the date. I was not present at a conference between Hitler and the British Ambassador which took place on the Obersalzberg during the time of our Moscow journey. I think that is the conference to which you are referring.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is the day after the defendant came back from Moscow.
SCHMIDT: No, I remained in Berlin. I was not up there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to remind you of the day. If you were not present, I will pass from it; but were you present when Signor Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, produced a communication from Mussolini?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SER DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the day I am asking you about. Do you remember that a communication came from Signor Attolico that afternoon that the Italian Army and Air Force were not in a condition to go to war?
SCHMIDT: Yes, indeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to try to help me because it is rather important as to the time. Was that not about 3 o'clock in the afternoon?
SCHMIDT: That could be so; but with the many conferences which took place at the time, the question of hours and dates is naturally a bit confused.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember the news that the Anglo-Polish Treaty would be signed that evening coming through about 4 o'clock?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember about 4 o'clock M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador, having an interview with Hitler?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that.
SIR DAV1D MAXWELL-FTFE: Now, were you aware that on that day the orders for an attack on Poland the next morning were countermanded?
SCHMIDT: I remember that military orders had been withdrawn, but just what orders these were I naturally never learned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would not ask you about that, Herr Schmidt, but you knew that orders had been countermanded. I wondered if you could help me on this point: Was not the countermanding of the orders at 6:15 -- 1815 hours -- after the interview with the French Ambassador, M. Coulondre, was not that the time when they were countermanded?
SCHMIDT: I cannot recall whether that was the time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And equally could you help the Tribunal on this point: Were they not issued about 2 o'clock -- 1400 hours -- after the interview with Sir Nevile Henderson? Do you know that?
SCHMIDT: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You cannot help us on that point. Well, now. I am not going to take time about the interview on the night of the 30-31 August between Sir Nevile Henderson and the Defendant Ribbentrop, except to ask you this: You have told us that the Defendant Ribbentrop was very excited; when he read these terms over, did he raise his voice at times, shouting?
SCHMIDT: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How did he show his nervousness, then?
SCHMIDT: It manifested itself during some incidents which I mentioned before, which had occurred during the conversation; previously during those incidents the nervousness became apparent, but not during the reading of the document.