dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MAJOR JONES: That is all I am putting to you at the moment And do you know that on 3 October the Defendant Raeder was sending out a questionnaire upon the possibility of extending the operational base to the north, and upon the bases that it would be desirable for German power to acquire? I am referring to Document C-122, My Lord. The document C-122 is in Document Book 10a at Page 91. If you will look at that document, Witness, you will see in the second sentence: "It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway with the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic and operational position. The following questions are to be examined . . ." And then there follow these questions: "What places in Norway can be considered as bases? "Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to achieve this without fighting? "What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation? "Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases, or do they possibly have decisive advantages simply as supply centers? (The Commander of U-boats considers such harbors extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic U-boats on temporary stops.)" And then finally: "What decisive advantages would there be for the conduct of the war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, for instance, Skagen?" Now, I suggest to you that those documents are the clue to the German invasion of Norway. Do you not agree with that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I do not see any aggressive intentions in these purely operational plans and considerations when thinking of what bases might come into consideration for the conduct of the war. This morning I said that, to the best of my knowledge, Generaladmiral Carls as early as September sent a letter to this effect to Raeder in which he expressed his concern and stated his strategical ideas and plans in case of an Allied occupation of Norway.
MAJOR JONES: The source of the information which the Defendant Raeder was receiving you discussed this morning, but one source that you did not give was the Norwegian traitor Quisling. The relations between the Defendant Raeder and him were very close, were they not? SCHULTE-MONTING There was no contact at all between Raeder and Quisling until December 1939; then Raeder met Quisling for the first time in his life and never saw him again.
MAJOR JONES: But after December Quisling's agent Hagelin was a very frequent visitor of the Defendant Raeder, was he not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I do not believe that Hagelin ever went to Raeder before Quisling's visit, unless I am very mistaken. I think he visited Raeder for the first time when he accompanied Quisling.
MAJOR JONES: Yes, but thereafter Raeder was in very close touch with the Quisling movement, the Quisling treachery, was he not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No. Raeder had nothing at all to do with the Quisling movement. ~
MAJOR JONES: Do you know a man, Erich Giese, Walter Georg Erich Giese, who was an administrative employee of the adjutancy of the supreme commander of the Navy in Berlin?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I did not quite catch the name.
MAJOR JONES: Giese, G-i-e-s-e. He was a-part of his duties were to receive the visitors of the supreme commander. He was an assistant of the supreme commander's adjutant and he was dismissed from his post in April 1942. And no doubt you recollect the man.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Will you please tell me the name again? Although it was spelled to me I did not catch it. Is this a Norwegian?
MAJOR JONES: This is a German subject, an employee of the supreme command of the Navy. Part of his duties were to receive all the supreme commander's visitors, to accept applications for interviews, and draw up the list of callers for the supreme commander. Now you are looking at an affidavit from this man, Document D-722, to be Exhibit GB-479.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness answered the question yet?
MAJOR JONES: Not yet, My Lord.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Now I have the name. The man of whom you are talking was in the reception room of the adjutant's office. It was not up to this man, who was to be admitted to the Admiral; that was up to me. I asked the callers for what reason they had come. Mr. Hagelin did not visit Raeder before Quisling's visit, that is, not before December 1939.
MAJOR JONES: I am not suggesting that but what I am suggesting is that after December 1939 there was a very close link between Raeder and the' Quisling movement. I just read out to you this extract from the affidavit of this man. From Page 3, My Lord, of the English text: "I can state the following about the preparations which led up to the action against Denmark and Norway: An appointment with the Commander-in-Chief was frequently made for a Mr. Hagelin and another gentleman; whose name I cannot recall at present, by a party official of Rosenberg's Foreign Political Office; as a rule they were received immediately. I also had received instructions that if a Mr. Hagelin should announce himself personally, I should always take him to the Commander-in-Chief at once. Shortly afterwards I learned from the minute book and from conversations in my room that he was a Norwegian confidential agent. The gentleman from the Foreign Political Office who frequently accompanied him and whose name I do not remember at the moment also conversed with me and confided in me, so that I learned about the Raeder-Rosenberg discussions and about the preparations for the Norway campaign. According to all I heard I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler's heartiest approval. The whole enterprise was disguised by the pretense of an enterprise against Holland and England. One day Quisling, too, was announced at the Commander-in-Chief's by Hagelin and was received immediately. Korvettenkapitan Schreiber of the Naval Reserve, who was later naval attaché in Oslo and knew the conditions in Norway very well, also played a role in all these negotiations. He collaborated with the Quisling party and its agents in Oslo."
SCHULTE-MONTING: It is not true that Mr. Hagelin was received by Admiral Raeder. Herr Giese cannot possibly have any 2Z May 46 information about that because he was stationed two rooms away. If he had perhaps noted down that he was received by me, that would in a certain sense be correct. The fact is that at the time, after the Quisling-Hagelin visit, I had said that if he were to pass through Berlin again and he had any naval political information in this connection, I should like him to make this information available to me.
MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that Defendant Raeder never met Hagelin?
SCHULTE-MONTING: He did not meet him before Quisling's visit in December. Later he did not receive him any more.
MAJOR JONES: But he in fact received Hagelin and took him to Hitler on 14 December 1939, did he not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: He was accompanied by Quisling, that is correct. But he did not have any special discussion with Raeder alone.
MAJOR JONES: You said-you spoke this morning as to a conference between Quisling and Raeder on 12 December 1939 and suggested that politics were not discussed at that conference.
SCHULTE-MONTING: By the word "politics" I mean politics in the National Socialistic sense, that is, National Socialistic politics on the Norwegian side and on our side. The matters discussed were only naval political questions.
MAJOR JONES: But I will not go into a discussion of the question of politics with you. I will consider the familiar German definition that politics is a continuation of war by other means. But if you look at the Document C-64 you will see that political problems were discussed on 12 December. You see that is a report of Raeder to Hitler. It is found on Page 31 of the Document Book 10a, in which Raeder writes in Paragraph 2: "As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England's influence is very great, especially because of Hambro, the President of the Storting (a Jew and a friend of Hore-Belisha) who is all-powerful in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that there is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible occupation of Norway, in which case Sweden would also stand against Germany. Danger of Norway's occupation by England is very great-possibly very shortly. From 11 January 1940 on, the Storting and thereby the Norwegian Government is unconstitutional since the Storting, in defiance of the constitution, has prolonged its term for a year." Politics was very much under discussion at that conference, was it not? You have said that the Defendant Raeder was anxious for peace with Norway. Was it for peace with a Norway ruled by the traitor Quisling? SCHULTE-MONTING. In reply to your first question I should like to say that in the minutes it says: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points out that in connection with such offers we can never know to what extent the persons involved want to further their own party aims, and to what extent they are concerned about German interests. Hence caution is required." This entry in the document which you have just presented to me corroborates what I was trying to say, that is, that no party matters or matters depending on agreement along ideological lines were to be settled between Admiral Raeder and Quisling. For this reason I said that Raeder did not discuss politics with him, but merely factual matters.
MAJOR JONES: That Quisling, at the time of his introduction, should mention certain things as a sort of preamble is self-evident. But he points out the factor of caution and asks: "What does this man want? Does he want to work with the Party or does he really want to remain aloof?"
MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder was preferring the reports of Quisling to the reports of the German Ambassador in Oslo which were entirely different from the reports of the traitor Quisling. That is so, is it not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe that Raeder never saw the reports from the German Ambassador in Oslo. I at any rate do not know these reports.
MAJOR JONES: Now the Tribunal has the documents with regard to that matter. I will not pursue it. I want to ask you next about the relations with the United States of America. When did the German Admiralty first know of Japan's intention to attack the United States?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I can speak only for Raeder and myself. As far as I know, it was not until the moment of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
MAJOR JONES: But you had received a communication from your German naval attaché at Tokyo before the attack on Pearl Harbor, indicating that an attack against the United States was pending, had you not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Pearl Harbor? No.
MAJOR JONES: But against the United States forces. Just look at the Document D-872, which will be Exhibit GB-480. You see that those are extracts from the war diary of the German naval attaché in Tokyo. The first entry is dated 3 December 1941: "1800 hours. The naval attaché extended an invitation to several officers of the Japanese Naval Ministry. It transpires from the conversation that the negotiations in Washington must be regarded as having broken down completely and that, quite obviously, the beginning of actions to the south by the Japanese Armed Forces is to be expected in the near future." And then on 6 December 1941: "Conversation with Fregattenkapitan Shiba." The outcome of the conversation is reported to Berlin in the following telegram: "Naval Attaché, 1251. Military Secret: "1. Last week America offered a non-aggression pact between the United States, England, Russia and Japan. In view of the Tripartite Pact and the high counterdemands, Japan rejected this offer. Negotiations have therefore completely broken down. "2. The Armed Forces foresaw this development and consented to Kurusu's being sent only to impress the people with the fact that all means had been exhausted. "3. The Armed Forces have already decided 3 weeks ago that war is inevitable, even if the United States at the last minute should make substantial concessions. Appropriate measures are under way." And then-I will not read the whole document, and at the end it says: "A state of war with Britain and America would certainly exist by Christmas." Assuming that signal reached you before 8 December, you became familiar with the plans of the perfidious Japanese attack upon the United States, did you not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I do not quite grasp it. I have already said that we had no contact with the Japanese experts or attaches in Berlin. I asserted that we first learned of the Pearl Harbor incident by radio, and I cannot quite see what difference it makes whether on 6 December the attaché in Tokyo told us his predictions, or whether he was drawing conclusions about a future conflict from information sources which we could not control. That has nothing to do with our having advised the Japanese in Berlin to attack America.
MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you had no conversations in Berlin with the Japanese attaché?
SCHULTE-MONTING: To my knowledge there were no official conferences between the two admiralty staffs, that is, official operational conferences between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, before you part from that document, I think you ought to read Paragraph 5.
MAJOR JONES: Paragraph 5, My Lord, reads: "5. Addition-Naval Attaché. "No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the commencement of the southern offensive. All the evidence, however, indicates that it may be expected to start within 3 weeks, with simultaneous attacks on Siam, the Philippines and Borneo. "6. The Ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of the telegram, but is acquainted with its contents." Now I want to...
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to what the witness has just said, I do not know whether I understood him right before, but what I took down he said was that the German Admiralty first knew of Japan's intention to attack, after Pearl Harbor, not that it first knew of Pearl Harbor by radio. It was the first indication they had of an intention to attack.
MAJOR JONES: That is so, My Lord. [TURNING to the witness.] I am suggesting to you, Witness, that you knew perfectly well of the Japanese intention to attack the United States before the incident of Pearl Harbor.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I do not know whether you are stressing Pearl Harbor, or the fact that 2 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor we received a telegram from Tokyo to the effect that a conflict was to be counted on. I was asked whether we had known of the fact of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and to that I said: "No." I said that we had had no conferences in Berlin between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff. What you are presenting to me...
MAJOR JONES: I just want to deal with that, but I want to read out to you what your Commander-in-Chief said about that, because it is not what you are saying, you know. On the interrogation of Admiral Raeder on 10 November 1945 (Document D-880, GB-483) he was asked: "Question: Would such matters be accomplished by Foreign Office people alone, or would that be in collaboration with the High Command of the Navy and OKW?" And Defendant Raeder's answer was: "No, the negotiations were conducted by the Foreign Office and on the part of the Japanese diplomats there was this delegate, Oshima, who was an officer. He negotiated with the Foreign Office in his capacity as delegate, but apart from that he was enough of an expert to look at this thing from a military standpoint as well. Military authorities had long before that carried on negotiations with military and naval attaches about the needs and other things that the Japanese needed... This was all talked about and thrashed out with the military and naval attaches." That is a very different version of the fact from the version you have given, Witness, is it not? Now, there are two more matters which I want to deal with. I do not know whether it will be convenient, My Lord, to have a brief adjournment. [A recess was taken.]
MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, with regard to the extract from the interrogation of the Defendant Raeder which I read I wanted to be clear that the defendant was then dealing with the relationship generally between the German authorities in Berlin and the Japanese representatives. I do not want to have given the Court the impression it was a direct negotiation with regard to intervention against America itself. I do not want to mislead the Court in any way with regard to that matter. [Turning to the witness.] Did you know of the shooting in December 1942 by a naval unit belonging to the German naval officer in command at Bordeaux of two British Royal Marines who took part in a raid on shipping in the Gironde estuary?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I learned of that later.
MAJOR JONES: Did you see the entry with regard to that shooting in the SKL War Diary?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, here in Nuremberg the defendant's counsel showed me an entry, but I do not know whether it was the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.
MAJOR JONES: It has been suggested by both counsel for the Defendant Doenitz and counsel for the Defendant Raeder that the entry in D-658 which contained the sentence: "The measure would be in accordance with the Fuehrer's special order, but is nevertheless something new in international law since these soldiers were in uniform," that that entry was not from the SKL War Diary. Now, you are familiar with the initial of the Defendant Raeder, are you not? I want you now to look at the original of D-658, so that it may be established beyond peradventure that this matter was entered in the SKL War Diary. I will put in a photostatic copy of the original if the Tribunal will allow me, because the original is required for other purposes. D-658 was GB-229, and it may be convenient to call the photostats of the originals D-658(a) and GB-229(a). That is the War Diary of the SKL, is it not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, I recognize it as such.
MAJOR JONES: And the SKL was perfectly familiar with that dreadful murder of the men at Bordeaux, was it not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: From the War Diary I can see-such is my impression-that afterward on 9 December they were informed about the fact of the shooting.
MAJOR JONES: And their laconic comment was...
SCHULTE-MONTING: In the Armed Forces communiqué it says: "According to the Armed Forces communiqué, the two soldiers have been shot in the meantime." This can be seen in the War Diary of the SKL and I acknowledged it. -
MAJOR JONES: And the humane comment of the SKL is, "It is something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform." There is one final matter which I wish to ask you about: Is it your contention that the German Navy fought a clean war at sea?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I contend that the German Navy fought a very clean war and that has nothing to do with the fact that it is said here in the Diary of the SKL, as taken from the Armed Forces communiqué, that two soldiers were shot and that this was in accordance with the special order given by the Fuehrer which has been cited but, as the Naval Operations Staff adds, was something new in the history of naval warfare. This too...
MAJOR JONES: I am turning to another matter, but you say generally . . .
SCHULTE-MONTING: May I just say in conclusion that this postscript has been confirmed and that the Navy, in this case Raeder, had no influence on these matters. If you ask me whether I approved that order or something of the sort I would give you my personal opinion of the matters which Raeder and I discussed.
MAJOR JONES: But you know Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and who would have influence in Germany if the commanders-in-chief did not have influence? Here was a matter directly reflecting on the honor of German Armed Forces and despite that deliberate denial of the protection of the Geneva Convention for those British marines he continued in office, after they were deliberately murdered.
SCHULTE-MONTING: That is a matter of opinion. I may take the following stand: The fact is that in this war, for the first time, a form of sabotage was applied, whether behind the lines by means of air landings or otherwise.
MAJOR JONES: Just a moment. These were marines in uniform. Your own report in the SKL War Diary says so.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I have to comment on that order which was issued earlier. The preamble of that order said that, since there w as knowledge of orders to the Allied soldiers or-I do not remember the exact wording any more-since these soldiers were given orders not to bother taking German prisoners but rather to shoot them while carrying out their work in the so-called Commando raids, the following directives had to be issued. At that time I discussed this matter with Raeder, of course, and I can merely state my personal opinion. I felt that I could believe this preamble because I am of the opinion that if I resorted to, let us say, sabotage behind the lines then of course I could not be bothered with taking prisoners, because then the element of surprise would be excluded. If, therefore, a troop of three to five men, a so-called Commando undertaking, is sent behind the lines in order to destroy enemy installations, then of course they cannot burden themselves with prisoners without running the risk of being killed themselves or of being recognized before they can carry out their undertaking. Therefore I considered this preamble quite credible and I expressly said so at that time.
MAJOR JONES: And you think that that shooting of those two marines was therefore perfectly justified? That is your position on this matter, is it not? Just say "yes" or "no" on that; I will not argue with you.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I have not asserted that in any way. Rather I said, here is a fact of which we were informed only by the Armed Forces communiqué, and that Raeder and the High Command had not been heard on this point. That is what I stated.
MAJOR JONES: Now, the final matter I wanted to ask you about, you have indicated that in your opinion Germany fought a clean war at sea. I want you to look at the new Document D-873 which will be GB-481, which is the log book of U-boat U-71, under the date line 21 June 1941, when the Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. You see the entry reads: "Sighted lifeboat of the Norwegian motor tanker John P. Pederson drifting under sail. Three survivors were lying exhausted under a tarpaulin and only showed themselves as the U-boat was moving away again. They stated that their ship had been torpedoed 28 days before. I turned down their request to be taken aboard, provisioned the boat with food and water and gave them the course and distance to the Icelandic coast. Boat and crew were in a state that, in view of the prevailing weather, offered hardly any prospects of rescue."-Signed: "Flachsenberg." Is that your conception of a clean war at sea?