dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. STAHMER: I should like to call as the next witness General Field Marshal Milch. [The witness Milch took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
ERHARD MILCH (Witness): Erhard Milch.
THE PRESIDENT: Repeat this oath after me: I swear by God --  the Almighty and Omniscient -- that I will speak the pure truth --  and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.
DR. STAHMER: Witness, did you take part in the first World War?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: In what position?
MILCH: First I was an artillery officer and at the end a captain in the Air Corps.
DR. STAHMER: When did you leave the Army after the end of the first World War?
MILCH: In the spring of 1920.
DR. STAHMER: What were your activities after you left the Army?
MILCH: I went into civil aviation.
DR. STAHMER: When did you join the Wehrmacht again?
MILCH: 1933.
DR. STAHMER: Did you go straight into the Air Force?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: What position did you have when the second World War began?
MILCH: I was General and Inspector General of the Air Force.
DR. STAHMER: When did the military construction of the Luftwaffe start?
MILCH: 1935.
DR. STAHMER: To what extent?
MILCH: A defensive air force was built up.
DR. STAHMER: Can you give us more details about that?
MILCH: In the year 1933 Germany had left the League of Nations and consequently also the Disarmament Conference. Hitler attempted to discuss with the individual nations whether or not disarmament should continue. These attempts to disarm failed, and Germany began to rearm. It was questionable whether the other nations would approve of that. Consequently Germany considered that it was imperative to have military strength in the air also, and to achieve that, the Air Force was itself to create an air power which would be sufficient for the defense of Germany. This is shown by the fact that principally fighters and antiaircraft artillery were provided. Likewise, the organization of the German Air Force was constructed for defense. It consisted at that time of four "air districts" (Luftkreise), which one can picture as a kind of cross over Germany. There was a Northeast section, Southeast, Northwest, and Southwest. Moreover the strength of the Air Force, as it was organized, was not planned for an aggressive war or for a largescale war. Besides fighter planes there were also bombers, but we always called these bomber formations the Risiko Luftwaffe (Risk Air Force), that is to say, their function was to prevent, if possible, any of Germany's neighbors from entering a war against Germany.
DR. STAHMER: What were the relations of the German Air Force with the air forces of foreign countries during the period beginning with the year 1935?
MILCH: During the first years after 1935 Germany had no air force worth mentioning. There were only the first units and the first larger schools that were established. Also during these years, our industry was built up. Before the rearmament started, our industry had been on a very small scale. I happen to know that the number of workers in the entire German air force industry at the time of the seizure of power by the National Socialists was about 3,000 to 3,300 men -- constructors, business men, technicians, and workers. The first contacts with foreign countries in the field of aviation started in 1937. This was when, in January 1937, an English commission led by Air Vice Marshal Courtney and three other highranking officers -- Courtney was the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the British Air Force -- came to Germany. I myself accompanied this commission and acted as guide during the entire time. We complied with every request of these gentlemen as to what they wanted to see. Those were the first units which were established. We especially showed our training units, in which all new forms and models were first tried out, the industries, the schools, and anything else about which the gentlemen wanted to know. At the end of our conference the English vice marshal suggested that we should start a mutual German-English exchange of plans. I asked for the approval of my commander-in-chief and it was granted. At the time we forwarded to the British the plans of the German Air Force for 1937, 1938, and, I believe, 1939, and, on the other hand, we also received from the British the corresponding figures. We agreed that in the future also, should changes in plans occur or new units be established, an exchange of data should again take place. The visit was animated by a spirit of comradeship and was the beginning of further contacts. In May of the same year, 1937, I was invited to Belgium with some other gentlemen, as representative of my commander-in-chief, to visit the air force there. Then in July...
DR. STAHMER: What happened on this visit to Belgium? Can you give me more details about that?
MILCH: It was a very cordial reception. I made the acquaintance of the Minister of War, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister, and also of His Majesty the King, besides the officers of the air force, who, of course, were of main interest to me. The discussion was friendly on both sides, and the Belgians assured us of their personal feelings of friendship for Germany.
DR. STAHMER: Was there also an exchange of data?
MILCH: No. Not in the same way; but later in Germany we also showed the Belgians everything, when the Chief of the Air Force, General Duvier, returned our visit. Then there was a big international meeting in the summer, in July 1937, on the occasion of the aviation meeting in Zurich, which was held every five years. At this meeting we purposely showed our latest models of fighters, bombers, and Stukas, also our new engines which had just been produced, and anything else that would be of international interest. There were large French, Italian, Czech, and Belgian delegations present, besides the German one; and a commission of British officers also attended to see the material displayed by us, but did not take part in the contests as representatives of Great Britain. We showed our material to the French, the British, and to the other nations, in a spirit of comradeship. There was, for instance, the Messerschmitt Fighter 109 with the improvements of the time, more or less as it was flown until the end of the war; the newest Dornier bomber type; the newest Stuka by Junkers; also the Daimler-Benz 600 and 601 engines, and also of Junkers...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that this amount of detail is of any interest to the Tribunal.
DR. STAHMER: Witness, please, no details; make it short.
MILCH: Yes. Then in October 1937, there was an invitation to France frown the French Government to inspect their air force also. The inspection is said to have been made in a very friendly spirit. Shortly after that, about one week later, a visit at the invitation of England took place in return for Air Vice Marshal Courtney's visit. Here, also, factories, organizations, schools and the War Academy were shown; also, as regards industry, the "shadow factories" were shown, that is, industries which produce peacetime goods in time of peace, and switch over to building aircraft and aircraft engines in time of war. There were also reciprocal visits with Sweden. I think I can conclude with that.
DR. STAHMER: Did you take part in a discussion with the Fuehrer on 23 May 1939?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: In what way did that happen?
MILCH: I was suddenly ordered to come on the morning of that day, because the Reich Marshal was not there.
DR. STAHMER: Do you remember the course of this conversation?
MILCH: The Fuehrer made a long speech to the three commanders-in-chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and their chiefs of staff. Several other persons were also present. The gist of it was that Hitler declared he had decided to solve in one way or another the question of a corridor across the Corridor to East Prussia, and in connection with that he discussed the possibility of complications which, in consequence, might arise in the West. It was only a speech, not a discussion or a conversation.
DR. STAHMER: Was anything else discussed or presented by him, any further details?
MILCH: Yes, it was just the question whether the West --  probably he was thinking primarily of France -- would keep quiet or whether it would interfere.
DR. STAHMER: Was anything said of the possibility of an attack on Poland or, as I remember, was only the solution of this Corridor problem mentioned?
MILCH: Actually, I understood him to say that he would solve this problem in any case, so his first thought was probably of negotiations, but if these negotiations did not produce results, then a military solution would probably have to be considered.
DR. STAHMER: Were there any further discussions about that?
MILCH: No, it was expressly ordered that any discussion by the participants, even among themselves, was forbidden. I, for instance, was forbidden to inform the Reich Marshal, who was not there. Hitler declared that he himself would inform Goering. I remember that at that time there was also issued the famous order which has been mentioned previously, and which as Fuehrer Order Number 1 had to be displayed in every one of our offices, to the effect that nobody should tell anybody anything he need not know; that nothing should ever be told sooner than was necessary; and that only just as much should be told as was necessary for the other person to know.
DR. STAHMER: Then you did not about this conference?
MILCH: No; I was forbidden to do so.
DR. STAHMER: When did he find out about it?
MILCH: I do not know.
DR. STAHMER: What was the attitude of the then Field Marshal Goering towards war?
MILCH: I was always under the impression -- this already became apparent at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland --  that he was worried lest Hitler's policy might lead to war. In my opinion, he was against war.
DR. STAHMER: When did you find out for the first time that Hitler had planned some operation against Russia?
MILCH: As far as I remember, that was in the spring of 1941. May I correct myself once more? I want to look in my notebook. On 13 January the Reich Marshal told me that Hitler expected an attack against Germany on the part of Russia; then for some time I did not hear anything further and the Reich Marshal did not mention either what his opinion was. At any rate, during the weeks and months following I did not hear any more about it. It is true, however, that at that time I was very seldom in Berlin and not at all at headquarters, but on inspection tours, et cetera. When I returned -- and I do not remember whether it was in March or April -- one of my subordinates made a report to me on a question of clothing, and he put the question to me whether winter clothing had to be provided in case of war against Russia. I was very surprised at this question. I had not been previously informed. I could only tell him that if it came to war with Russia we should then need clothing for several winters, and I told him what kind of winter clothing I would suggest.
DR. STAHMER: Did you speak a second time to Field Marshal Goering about this war?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: When was that?
MILCH: On 22 May, on one of my tours, I again came into contact with the Commander-in-Chief for the first time after a long interval. It was in Veldenstein where Goering was at the time. There I discussed the question with him and I told him that, in my opinion, it would be a great historical task for him to prevent this war since it could only end with the annihilation of Germany. I reminded him that we should not voluntarily burden ourselves with a two-front war, et cetera. The Reich Marshal told me that he also had brought forward all these arguments, but that it was absolutely impossible to dissuade Hitler from this war. My offer to try to speak to Hitler once more was declared by the Reich Marshal to be absolutely hopeless. We had to resign ourselves; nothing could be done about it. From these words it was quite clear that he was against this war, and that under no circumstances did he want this war but that also for him, in his position, there was no possibility of dissuading Hitler from this project.
DR. STAHMER: Did it also appear from what he said that he had told Hitler of his misgivings?
MILCH: Yes, it was quite clear to me, that he had also spoken about the question of a two-front war, and he told me that he had also laid before Hitler the arguments I had brought forward; but he told me that it was hopeless. I would like to say something more about the 23rd of May. After this discussion, and owing to the fact that the German Air Force had hardly any reserves of bombs available, I proposed that bombs should be manufactured. Previously Hitler had considered this unnecessary and superfluous for the time being. The shortage of iron came into the question. After this conference, being under the impression that complications might arise, I pointed out that the Air Force with its bomber fleet was not ready for action. My proposal was again rejected by Hitler after 23 May. He would let me know in time if and when we needed bombs. When we pointed out that the manufacture of bombs would take several weeks, even months, he declared that there would be plenty of time for that later. From that I came to the conclusion and you know I was not allowed to discuss it with anybody -- that Hitler's words on 23 May were not meant as seriously as they had sounded to me.
DR. STAHMER: When was this last conversation concerning the refusal to manufacture bombs?
MILCH: That was about -- I spoke once in that connection, after May when the situation was known. But later, during the latter part of summer, I again brought it to his attention. Again it was rejected. The order to manufacture bombs was not given by Hitler until 12 October 1939, although we had pointed out that deficiency before. Hitler said, if I remember correctly, "My attempts to make peace with the West after the campaign against Poland have failed. The war continues. Now we can and must manufacture the bombs."
DR. STAHMER: Did Hitler ever tell you that it was his serious desire to live in peace with the West?
MILCH: Yes. I did not go into the details of my visits. When I came back from France, I was with Hitler for two hours on the Obersalzberg, to report to him about the visit to France. Likewise, after the visit in England about two weeks later, I had to make a report to Hitler which lasted several hours. He was very interested, and after the second report, that is to say, after the English visit, he declared, "I wish to carry on my policy in such and such a way, but you can all rest assured that I will always rely on England. I shall try to co-operate with England at all times." This conversation took place on 2 November.
DR. STAHMER: What year?
MILCH: The year 1937, the 2d of November.
DR. STAHMER: You mentioned two conversations?
MILCH: Yes, the first was the report about the visit to France and the second about the visit to England. Hitler, who did not know foreign countries at all, was extremely interested to hear from a soldier something about his reception, the country, armaments, and so forth.
DR. STAHMER: What were the relations between Reich Marshal Goering and Himmler?
MILCH: It was not always clear to me. I had the impression that there was always some rivalry on the part of Himmler. The mutual relationship, however, must always have been very correct and very courteous on the surface; how they really stood, I could not say.
DR. STAHMER: In May of 1942, there was an exchange of correspondence between you and the SS Obergruppenfahrer Wolff?
MILCH: Yes, Sir.
DR. STAHMER: In particular, about medical experiments on inmates of the Dachau Camp. Could you tell us anything about that?
MILCH: I was interrogated about that question here in Nuremberg; and what I no longer remembered of the matter was recalled by two letters -- a letter from Wolff, who was adjutant to Himmler at the time, and another letter from Himmler to me and the answer which I had given, were submitted to me. They concerned the experiments with air-pressure chambers and chilling. These letters were addressed to me only because Himmler did not know the official channels of the Luftwaffe. The letters were delivered to the Medical Inspection department, which was not subordinate to me. The Medical Inspection department also wrote the answer and submitted it to me. I modified the answer a little and had it mailed. I have not read a report sent by Himmler in this connection. He also offered a film. I did not see the film. The Medical Inspector, whom I asked what it was all about, told me that the Air Force was fully informed about both problems, and that the experiments with air-pressure chambers had been carried out by our young doctors who had volunteered for that purpose. Likewise, in the question of chilling there was nothing of interest to the Air Force. We both agreed to his suggestion that we did not want to have anything to do with the matter. I asked him what these experiments were made for. He told me that criminals were subjected to these experiments. I asked him in what way. He said, in the same way as our young doctors had subjected themselves to these experiments. Then we wrote him a letter which was quite polite -- one could not write differently to these people -- but completely repudiating the experiments. We would have nothing to do with them. In Himmler's letter I had been asked to make a report to the Reich Marshal also about that question. I had the impression that by these experiments the SS wanted to make themselves important in Hitler's eyes. These were the words also used by the chief of the medical department to me.
MILCH: During a long report on quite different questions I mentioned this matter briefly to the Reich Marshal, because I had to expect that one day he would be approached by Himmler, and perhaps would not know anything about the whole question. The Reich Marshal asked me, when I told him about such and such experiments, "What does this mean?" I gave him the reply which I had been given by the Medical Inspector. I told him that we did not want to have anything to do with them, and that we repudiated them. He said he was exactly of the same opinion, but I should be very careful not to provoke the SD or treat them badly. What the experiments were about I do not know, neither do I know what was done to the people; I do not know it even now.
DR. STAHMER: Did the Reich Marshal know?
MILCH: No, certainly not.
DR. STAHMER: Did Dr. Rascher leave you soon after that to join the SS?
MILCH: I could not say. I do not know Dr. Rascher, and had nothing to do with the question of transfer. Rascher was not subordinate to me any more than was the chief of the medical department or the personnel office.
DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether Reich Marshal Goering gave orders to the troops under his command, saying that sabotage troops should be annihilated, or that captured enemy terror-fliers should be turned over to the SD without judicial procedure?
MILCH: No, I did not know anything about that.
DR. STAHMER: Did you never hear anything of that kind?
MILCH: No.
DR. STAHMER: What was the attitude of the Reich Marshal towards captured airmen in general?
MILCH: I sometimes used to speak to the Reich Marshal about that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I wish to interpose an objection. I think we have been very liberal. I think we have been very liberal in allowing all kinds of statements, but it does seem to me that this passes anything that is suitable as evidence. This witness has indicated that he has no knowledge of the subject; he did not know the orders which are in evidence, and he assumes to state the attitude of the Reich Marshal. I have no objection to his making any statement of any facts from which this Tribunal may be informed of the attitude of the Reich Marshal, but I think that for one witness to state the state of mind of another person without any facts whatever passes the bounds of what we can possibly let go here into evidence. It does not help to solve the problem and I respectfully object to the question and answer as not constituting credible and relevant evidence on any subject before the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I think you should confine yourself to any facts and observations of the Defendant Goering. As the witness had just said that he never heard of any action against the terror-fliers at all. I do not see how he could give evidence as to the attitude of the Defendant Goering about it.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President; I should like to formulate my question as follows: Did Reich Marshal Goering discuss with the witness as to how enemy airmen who had been shot down, should be treated?
MILCH: No.
DR. STAHMER: That is, I suppose, a fact, is it not?
MILCH: This was not discussed with me.
DR. STAHMER: I have one more question. Did he speak to you about the fact that he was opposed to any cruelty in the treatment of the enemy?
MILCH: That was just what I wanted to say before. He said that to me before the war, remembering the first World War.
DR. STAHMER: And what did he say about it?
MILCH: That once they have been shot down, they are our comrades; that was the gist of it.
DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions to put to the witness. I place him at the disposal of the Defense or the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of you wish to ask this witness any questions?
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, as you know, the Prosecution have grouped together a certain circle of people consisting of the highest ranking military leaders in order to declare this circle criminal. You probably know this circle?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Was there such a grouping of equivalent offices within the German Armed Forces?
MILCH: I did not understand the question.
DR. LATERNSER: Was there ever a grouping of offices within the German Armed Forces like the one that has now been created in order to form that group?
MILCH: Yes. I believe that ever since an army existed there have also been high-ranking leaders who were grouped under their commander-in-chief.
DR. LATERNSER: Were the holders of these offices occupied with the elaboration of technical military problems on Hitler's orders, or did they work out subjects on their own initiative which were submitted to Hitler for execution?
MILCH: No. The military leaders acted only upon the orders of their superiors, that is, the generals of the Air Force on the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, who got his orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht -- that was Hitler, and before him, Hindenburg.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether this alleged group of the General Staff and the OKW, as they are now combined, ever met collectively?
MILCH: Before the attack on Poland only the Army and Navy commanders who were assigned for action there were called together by Hitler. Likewise, those who were to go into action in the West in the spring of 1940 were calied together by Hitler. The same thing happened again, as far as I know, before the attack on Russia.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you sometimes present at such conferences?
MILCH: At some of them, yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Could you describe the course of any such conference? Particularly I attach value to the point as to whether the higher military commanders had an opportunity to make counter-suggestions during these conferences?