dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
BUEHLER: Yes, I was sent to the conference and the subject of the conference was the Jewish problem. I might say in advance that from the beginning Jewish questions in the Government General were considered as coming under the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and Police Leader and handled accordingly. The handling of Jewish matters by the state administration was supervised and merely tolerated by the Police. During the years 1940 and 1941 incredible numbers of people, mostly Jews, were brought into the Government General in spite of the objections and protests of the Governor General and his administration. This completely unexpected, unprepared for, and undesired bringing in of the Jewish population from other territories put the administration of the Government General in an extremely difficult position. Accommodating these masses, feeding them, and caring for their health-combating epidemics for instance-almost, or rather, definitely overtaxed the capacity of the territory. Particularly threatening was the spread of typhus, not only in the ghettos but also among the Polish population and the Germans in the Government General. It appeared as if that epidemic would spread even to the Reich and to the Eastern Front. At that moment Heydrich's invitation to the Governor General was received. The conference was originally supposed to take place in November 1941, but it was frequently postponed and it may have taken place in February 1942. Because of the special problems of the Government General I had asked Heydrich for a personal interview and he received me. On that occasion, among many other things, I described in particular the catastrophic conditions which had resulted from the arbitrary bringing of Jews into the Government General. He replied that for this very reason he had invited the Governor General to the conference. The Reichsfuehrer SS, so he said, had received an order from the Fuehrer to round up all the Jews of Europe and to settle them in the Northeast of Europe, in Russia.
BUEHLER: I asked him whether this meant that the further arrival of Jews in the Government General would cease, and whether the hundreds of thousands of Jews who had been brought into the Government General without the permission of the Governor General would be moved out again. Heydrich promised me both these things. Heydrich said furthermore that the Fuehrer had given an order that Theresienstadt, a town in the Protectorate, would become a reservation in which old and sick Jews, and weak Jews who could not stand the strains of resettlement, were to be accommodated in the future. This information left me definitely convinced that the resettlement of the Jews, if not for the sake of the Jews, then for the sake of the reputation and prestige of the German people, would be carried out in a humane fashion. The removal of the Jews from the Government General was subsequently carried out exclusively by the Police. I might add that Heydrich demanded, particularly for himself, his office, and its branches, the exclusive and uninterrupted competence and control in this matter.
DR. SEIDL: What concentration camps in the Government General did you know about during your activity as State Secretary?
BUEHLER: The publications in the press during the summer of 1944 called my attention to the Maidanek camp for the first time. I did not know that this camp, not far from Lublin, was a concentration camp. It had been installed as an economic establishment of the Reichsfuehrer SS, in 1941 I think. Governor Corner came to visit me at that time and he told me that he had objected to the establishment of this camp when he talked to Globocznik, as it would endanger the power supply of the city of Lublin; and there were objections, too, on the part of the Police with regard to the danger of epidemics. I informed the Governor General of this and he in turn sent for Globocznik. Globocznik stated to the Governor General that certain workshops for the needs of the Waffen-SS at the front had been erected on that site by him. He mentioned workshops for dressing furs but he also mentioned a timber yard which was located there. In these workshops for dressing furs, as I heard, fur articles from the collection of furs were altered for use at the front. At any rate, Globocznik stated that he had installed these workshops in compliance with Himmler's command. The Governor General prohibited the erection of any further installations until all questions were settled with the police in charge of building and blueprints had been submitted to the state offices, in other words until all rules had been complied with, which apply to the construction of buildings. Globocznik never submitted these blueprints. With regard to the events inside the camp, no concrete information ever reached the outside. It surprised the Governor Gener al just as much as it surprised me when the world press released the news about Maidanek.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution has submitted a document, Number 437-PS, Exhibit USA-610, which is a memorandum from the Governor General to the Fuehrer, dated 19 June 1943. I think you yourself drafted that memorandum. On Page 35 a report of the commander of the Security Police is mentioned and quoted verbatim in part. This report of the Security Police mentions also the name of Maidanek. Did you at that time realize that this Maidanek was identical or probably identical with that camp near Lublin?
BUEHLER: No. I assumed that, like Auschwitz, it was a camp outside the territory of the Government General, because the Governor General had repeatedly told the Police and the Higher SS and Police Leader that he did not wish to have concentration camps in the Government General.
DR. SEIDL: Under whose jurisdiction was the administration of concentration camps in the Government General?
BUEHLER: I don't know because I did not know of the existence of the camps. In August, on the occasion of a visit to the reception camp at Pruszkow, I heard about the administration of concentration camps in general. At that time I brought instructions from Himmler to the camp commandant, according to which transport of the inhabitants of Warsaw who had been removed from the city to concentration camps was to cease forthwith.
DR.SEIDL: Was that after the uprising in Warsaw?
BUEHLER: It was during it; it must have been on or about 18 or 19 August 1944. The camp commandant, whose name I have forgotten, told me at the time that he did not know about that order, and that he could receive instructions only from the Chief of Concentration Camps.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know whether the Governor General himself ever sent a Pole, a Ukrainian, or a Jew to a concentration camp?
BUEHLER: Nothing like that ever happened when I was present.
DR. SEIDL: Is it true that a large number of Jewish workmen who were working in the castle at Krakow were taken away by the Security Police against the wishes of the Governor General and during his absence?
BUEHLER: This Jewish workers' colony is known to me because I lived in that came. I also know that the Governor General always took care of the maintenance of this colony. And the chief of the Chancellery of the Government General, Ministerial Counsellor Keit, once told me that this group of Jewish workers had been taken away by force by the Police during the absence of the Governor General.
DR. SEIDL: I now come to the so-called AB Action, this extraordinary pacification action. What were the circumstances which occasioned this action?
BUEHLER: It may have been about the middle of May 1940 when one morning I was called from the government building, where I performed my official work, to visit the Governor General in the castle. I think I remember that Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart had also been called. There we met the Governor General together with some officials of the Police. The Governor General stated that, in the opinion of the Police, an extreme act of pacification was necessary. The security situation at that time, as far as I remember, was this: Certain remnants of the Polish armed forces were still roaming about in deserted forest regions, causing unrest among the population, and probably giving military training to young Poles. At that time, that is May 1940, the Polish people had recovered from the shock which they had suffered at the sudden defeat in 1939; and they began openly, with little caution and without experience, to start a resistance movement everywhere. This picture I remember clearly because of the statement given by the Police on that or some other occasion.
DR. SEIDL: May I interrupt you and quote from Frank's diary, an entry of 16 May 1940. I quote: "The general war situation forces us to regard the security situation in the Government General very seriously. From a number of symptoms and actions one can draw the conclusion that a large organized wave of resistance among the Poles is present in the country awaiting the outbreak of greater and violent events. Thousands of Poles are reported to have been organized secretly and to have been armed, and are being incited to carry out acts of violence of all sorts." Then the Governor General quoted some recent examples, as, for instance, an uprising in certain villages under the leadership of Major Huballa in the district of Radom; the murder of families of German blood in Jozefow; the murder of the mayor of Grasienta, et cetera . "Illegal pamphlets, inciting to rebellion, are being distributed and even posted up everywhere; and there can therefore be no doubt that the security situation is extremely serious." Did the Governor General express himself in that manner at the time?
BUEHLER: When I took part in that meeting, the Governor General spoke about the situation for some time, but the details I cannot recollect.
DR. SEIDL: What happened after that?
BUEHLER: I had only one impression. In the previous months the Governor General had succeeded, by taking great pains, in imposing on the Police a procedure for courts-martial which had to be observed in making arrests and dealing with suspicious persons. Furthermore, the Police had to concede that the Governor General could refer the sentences of a summary court-martial to a reprieve commission and that the execution of sentences could take place only after the sentences had been confirmed by the Governor General. The statements of the Governor General during this conference in the middle of May 1940 made me fear that the Police might see in these statements the possibility for evading the court-martial and reprieve procedure imposed on them. For that reason I asked the Governor General for permission to speak after he had finished his statement. The Governor General cut me short at first and stated that he wanted to dictate something to the secretary in a hurry, which the latter was then to dictate to a stenotypist at once and then put it into its final version. Thereupon the Governor General dictated some authorization, or order, or some such document; and with absolute certainty I remember that after he had finished dictating, the secretary and I think, quite definitely, Brigadefuehrer Streckenbach, the Commander of the Regular Police, left the room. I am saying this in advance because it explains the fact that everything that happened afterwards has not been recorded in the minutes. The secretary was no longer present in the room. I expressed my fears, saying that these requirements laid down for court-martial procedure should be observed under all circumstances. I am not claiming any particular merit in this connection, because if I had not done it then this objection would have been raised, I am convinced, by Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart, or the Governor General himself would have realized the danger which his statements might have caused in this respect.
BUEHLER: At any rate, in reply to my objection, and without any debate, the Governor General stated at once that arrests and shootings could take place only in accordance with the court-martial procedure, and that sentences of the summary court-martial would have to be examined by the reprieve commission. In the ensuing period these instructions were followed. I assume that it is certain that the reprieve commission received all sentences pronounced by these courts-martial and dealt with them.
DR. SEIDL: Another entry in Frank's diary, 12 July 1940, leads one to the conclusion that at first these leaders of the resistance movement concerned were merely arrested. I quote a statement of the Governor General: "Regarding the question what is to be done with the political criminals caught in connection with the AB Action, a discussion is to take place in the near future with State Secretary Dr. Buehler, Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger, Brigadefuehrer Streckenbach, and Ministerial Counsellor Wille." Who was Ministerial Counsellor Wille, and what task did he have in that connection?
BUEHLER: I might say in advance that there is a gap in my memory which makes it impossible for me to say for certain when the Governor General told Brigadefuehrer Streckenbach that in all cases he would have to observe court-martial procedure and respect the reprieve commission. On the other hand, I think I can remember for certain that at the time this discussion took place between Krueger, Streckenbach, Wille, and me, arrests only had taken place and no executions. Ministerial Counsellor Wille was the head of the Department of Justice in the Government and was the competent official for all matters concerning reprieves. The Governor General wanted these matters dealt with by a legally trained, experienced man. During the conference with Krueger, Streckenbach, and Wille it had been ruled that the persons who had been arrested up to that time were to be subjected to court-martial procedure and that sentences had to be dealt with by the reprieve commission. The Police were not exactly enthusiastic about this. I remember that Krueger told me privately after the conference that the Governor General was a jack-in-the-box with whom one couldn't work, and that in the future he would go his own way.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that this has been gone into in too great detail.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, I am coming to the end of my questions. Witness, during a Police meeting in 1940 on 30 May, the Defendant Dr. Frank mentioned among other things the following: "The difficulties we had had with the Krakow professors were terrible. If we had handled the matter here, it would have taken a different course." Who arrested these professors, and to what extent was the Governor General concerned with this matter?
BUEHLER: On 7 or 8 November 1939, when the Governor General arrived in Krakow to begin his activities, all professors of the University of Krakow were arrested by the Security Police without his knowledge and taken away to concentration camps in the Reich. Among them were acquaintances of the Governor General, with whom shortly before he had had social and academic connections through the Academy for German Law. The Governor General used his influence on Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger persistently and uninterruptedly until he achieved the release of the majority of these professors from concentration camps. This statement of his, which contradicts this, was made, in my opinion, for the purpose of placating the Police, for the Police did not like releasing these professors.
DR.SEIDL: What basically was the attitude of the Governor General concerning mobilization of labor?
BUEHLER: The Governor General and the Government of the Government General were always attempting to get as many Polish workers for the Reich as possible. It was clear to us, however, that the employment of force in recruiting workers might bring about temporary advantages but that recruitment of workers in that way would not promise much success in the long run. The Governor General gave me instructions, therefore, to conduct extensive and intensive propaganda in favor of employment in the Reich and to oppose all use of force in the recruitment of workers. On the other hand the Governor General wanted to make his recruitment of workers for the Reich successful by demanding decent treatment for Polish workers in the Reich. He negotiated for many years with the Reich Commissioner for the Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, and improvements were in fact achieved. The Governor General was especially opposed to the identifying of Jews and Poles by distinguishing marks in the Reich. I remember a letter from Reich Commissioner Sauckel in which he informed the Governor General that he had made every effort to insure the same treatment for Polish workers as for other foreign workers, but that his efforts were no longer crowned by success whenever the influence of the Reichsfuehrer SS opposed them.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to another point. Under Number USA-275 the Prosecution has submitted Document 1061-PS, which is a report of Brigadefuehrer Stroop on the destruction of the ghetto in Warsaw. Were you, or the Governor General, informed beforehand about the measures planned by the Security Police?
BUEHLER: I certainly was not. As to the Governor General, I do not know that he was informed about any such plans.
DR. SEIDL: What did you learn afterwards about the events at the ghetto in Warsaw in 1943?
BUEHLER: I heard what practically everybody heard-that an uprising had broken out in the ghetto which had long been prepared; that the Jews had used the building materials given them for the purpose of air-raid protection to set up defense works; and that during the uprising violent resistance was encountered by the German troops.
DR. SEIDL: I now come to the Warsaw uprising of 1944. To what extent did the administration of the Government General participate in the quelling of that revolt?
BUEHLER: As our comrades in Warsaw were encircled by the insurrectionists, we asked the Governor General to apply to the Fuehrer for assistance to bring about a speedy quelling of the Warsaw revolt. Apart from that the adoration assisted in the welfare of the population in connection with the evacuation in the battle zone of the quarters that were to be destroyed. But the administration did not exercise any authority here.
DR. SEIDL: On 4 November 1945 you made an affidavit. The affidavit bears the number 2476-PS. I shall now read to you that affidavit, which is very brief, and I shall ask you to tell me whether the contents are correct. I quote: "In the course of the quelling of the Warsaw revolt in August 1944, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw (a Polish estimate) were taken away to German concentration camps. As a result of a demarche made by the Governor General, Dr. Frank, to the office of Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, the latter prohibited further deportations. The Governor General tried to secure the release of the 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw who had already been taken to concentration camps in the Reich. The Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner, refused this request, made in writing as well as orally on the occasion of a visit of mine to Berlin in September or October 1944, on the grounds that these Inhabitants of Warsaw were being used in the secret manufacture of armaments in the Reich and that therefore a general release was out of The question. However, he would be willing to consider individual applications favorably. Individual applications for release from concentration camps were granted by Kaltenbrunner during the subsequent months. "Contrary to the Polish estimate, the number of persons taken from Warsaw to concentration camps in the Reich was estimated to be small by Kaltenbrunner. I- myself reported to my office Kaltenbrunner's statement regarding the number of internees, and after a renewed investigation I found that the above-mentioned figure of 50,000 to 60,000 was correct. These were the people who had been taken to concentration camps in Germany." I now ask you, are the contents of this affidavit, made before an American officer, correct?
BUEHLER: I can supplement it.
THE PRESIDENT: Before he supplements it, is it in evidence? Has it yet been put in evidence?
DR. SEIDL: It has the number 2476-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: That doesn't prove it has been put in evidence. Has it been put in evidence? Dr. Seidl, you know quite well what "put in evidence" means. Has it been put in evidence? Has it got a USA exhibit number?
DR. SEIDL: No, it has not a USA exhibit number.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you are offering it in evidence, are you?
DR. SEIDL: I don't want to submit it formally in evidence; but I do want to ask the witness about the contents of this affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: But it is a document, and if you are putting it to the witness, you must put it in evidence and you must give it an exhibit number. You cannot put documents to the witness and not put them in evidence.
DR. SEIDL: In that case I submit this document as Document Number Frank-1. I now ask you, Witness, whether the contents of Ibis affidavit are correct, and, if so whether you can supplement this affidavit.
BUEHLER: Yes, I should like to supplement it briefly. It is possible that I went to see Kaltenbrunner twice about that question not only once-and after Kaltenbrunner had refused to release these people the second time, on the strength of my experiences with the camp commandant in Camp Pruszkow, I had the impression that it was not in Kaltenbrunner's power to order such a release. He didn't talk to me about that.
DR. SEIDL: But from his statements you had the impression that perhaps he too did not have the power to release those people?
BUEHLER: During those conferences I had brought up questions about the Polish policy, and from these conferences I had the impression that I might gain Kaltenbrunner's interest in a reasonable Polish policy and Irvin him over as an ally tin negotiations with Himmler. At any rate, talking to me, he condemned the methods of force used by Krueger. I gathered from these statements that Kaltenbrunner did not want to see methods of force employed against the Poles and that he would have helped me if he could.
DR. SEIDL: The Soviet Prosecution has submitted a document bearing the Exhibit Number USSR-128 (Document Number 3305-PS). It is a teleprinted message from the intelligence office of the Higher SS and Police Leader East addressed to the Governor General and signed by Dr. Fischer, then Governor of Warsaw. Under Figure 2 it reads as follows: "Obergruppenfuehrer Von dem Bach has been given the new task of pacifying Warsaw, that is to say, of laying Warsaw level with the ground daring the war, except where military considerations of its value as a fortress are involved. Before the destruction, all raw materials, all textiles, and all furniture Frill be removed from Warsaw. The main task will fall to the civil administration. "I herewith inform you that this new Fuehrer decree regarding the razing of Warsaw is of the greatest significance for the further new policy regarding the Poles." As far as you can recollect, how did the Governor General receive and view that telegram? And to what extent was his basic attitude altered on the strength of that message?
BUEHLER: This telegram referred to instructions which Obergruppenfuehrer Von dem Bach had received from the Reichsfuehrer SS. The administration in the Government General did not welcome the destruction of Warsaw. On the contrary, I remember that. together with the Governor General, ways which might be used to avoid the destruction of Warsaw were discussed. Just what was really tried I cannot recollect. It may be that further steps were not taken because of the impossibility of achieving anything.
DR. SEIDL: I now turn to another subject.
THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes. [A recess was taken.]
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, before I continue the interrogation of the witness Dr. Buehler, I should like to inform you that I forego the interrogation of the witness Helene Kraffczyk; so this witness will be the last one.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Defendant Dr. Frank has been accused by the Prosecution of not having done everything within his power to ensure the feeding of the population of the Government General. What can you say about that?