dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And let me remind you of the date, that on the evening of the 24th the Defendant Goering asked Herr Dahlerus to go to London the next morning to carry forward a preliminary outline of what the Fuehrer was going to say to Sir Nevile Henderson on the 25th. So you remember that was his evidence? And on the 25th, at 1:30 ...
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the dates exactly, but I suppose they are correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I know these dates pretty well, and the Tribunal will correct me if I am wrong, but I am giving them as I have looked them up. That was the night of the 24th; Dahlerus left on the morning of the 25th, and then at 1:30 on the 25th -- you said about noon, I am not quarreling with you for a matter of minutes -- midday on the 25th the Fuehrer saw Sir Nevile Henderson...
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And gave him what is called a note verbale , that is, an inquiry in general terms.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was given to him in the evening. At noon he had only talked to him and in the evening I had Minister Schmidt take the note verbale to him, I think that is the way it was, with a special message in which I asked him again to impress upon his Government how serious the Fuehrer was about this message or offer. I think that is contained in the British Blue Book .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Whenever you gave him the actual note, Herr Hitler told him the general view in the oral conversation which he had with Sir Nevile in the middle of the day?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the actual calling off of the attack on the morning of the 26th, as you have said, was not done until you had had the message from Signor Mussolini at about 3 o'clock, and the news that the Anglo-Polish formal agreement was going to be signed that evening about 4 o'clock. That is what you have said. Now, the first point that I am putting to you is this: That at the time that Herr Dahlerus was sent, and the time of this note, when the words were spoken by the Fuehrer to Sir Nevile Henderson, it was the German intention to attack on the morning of the 26th; and what I suggest is that both the message to Herr Dahlerus and the words which were spoken to Sir Nevile Henderson were simply designed in order to trouble the British Government, in the hop e that it might have some effect on them withdrawing from their aid to Poland; isn't that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: Do you want me to answer that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly; I am asking you.
VON RIBBENTROP: The situation is that I am not familiar with the message of Dahlerus, I cannot say anything about it. Regarding the meeting between Hitler and Sir Nevile Henderson, I can say that I read the correspondence between Mr. Chamberlain and Hitler in the morning, I think it was dated the 22d, and somehow had arrived at a sort of deadlock. I talked to the Fuehrer afterwards, about whether or not another attempt should be made in order to arrive at some kind of a solution with England. Subsequently, towards noon, I think it was 1 or 2 o'clock, the Fuehrer met Sir Nevile Henderson in my presence and told him he should take a plane and fly to London in order to talk to the British Government as soon as possible. After the solution of the Polish problem he intended to approach England again with a comprehensive offer. He gave, I believe, a rough outline of the offer already in the note verbale; but I do not recall that exactly. Then Sir Nevile Henderson flew to London. While the Fuehrer was having that conversation, military measures were under way. I learned of that during the day, because Mussolini's refusal had arrived, I believe, not at 3 o'clock, but earlier in the course of the morning or at noon. Then at 4 or 5 in the afternoon I heard about the ratification of the Polish-British agreement. I went to the Fuehrer immediately and suggested to him to withdraw the military measures; and he did so after short deliberatiom There is no doubt that in the meantime certain military measures had been taken. Just how far they went I regret not to be able to say. But when the Fuehrer sent that offer, that note verbale to England I was convinced and under the impression that if England would respond to it in some way, it would not come to an armed conflict, and that in this case the military measures which, I believe, were automatically put in effect, would somehow have been stopped later on. But I cannot say anything about that in detail.
VON RIBBENTROP: I recollect only one thing, and that is that when I received the note verbale from the Fuehrer, which I think was in the afternoon or in the evening, these measures had already either been stopped or were, at any rate, in the process of being stopped. I cannot give it to you in chronological order at the moment. For that I have to have the pertinent documents which, unfortunately, are not at my disposal here. But one thing is certain, the offer of the Fuehrer to England was made in order to try once again to come to a solution of the Polish problem. When I saw the note verbale I even asked him, "How about the Polish solution?" and I still recollect that he said, "We will now send that note to the British, and if they respond to it then we can still see what to do, there will still be time." At any rate, I believe, the military measures had either been stopped when the note was submitted, or they were stopped shortly after.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you were not present at the meeting of the Fuehrer and his generals on the 22d of August, but you must have heard many times the account of it read out since this Trial started. You remember the Fuehrer is reported, according to minutes, to have said: (Document Number 1014-PS). That is what was said at Obersalzberg. Has Hitler ever said anything like that to you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say the 27th?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On the 22d. What I am asking you is, has Hitler said anything similar to that to you?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, at the meeting on the 22d, I was not present; I think I was on my way to Moscow.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said you were not present. That is why I put it in that way. Has he ever said anything similar to you? You say "no." Well, now, I want you to come to the 29th.
VON RIBBENTROP: May I say something about that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No; if you say that he has not said it to you, I am not going to pursue it, because we must not waste too much time on each of these details. I want you to come to the 29th of August when you saw Sir Nevile Henderson, and while accepting, with some reservations, the idea of direct negotiation with Poland, you said that it must be a condition of that negotiation that the Poles should send a plenipotentiary by the next day, by the 30th. You remember that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, well, it was like this ...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I really do not want to stop you, but I do want to keep it short on this point.
VON RIBBENTROP: In that case I must say "no". May I make a statement?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, because this is only preliminary. I thought it was common ground that you saw Sir Nevile on the 29th, that you put a number of terms. One of the terms was that a Polish plenipotentiary should be present by the 30th. If you don't agree with that, please tell me if I am wrong, because it is my recollection of all documents.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, on the 30th you have told us that your reason for not giving a copy of the terms to Sir Nevile was, first, because Hitler had ordered you not to give a copy. And I think your reason given at the time was that the Polish plenipotentiary had not arrived, and therefore it was no good giving a copy of the terms. That's right, isn't it?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, these terms that were given, that were read out by you, were not ready on the 29th, because in your communication demanding a plenipotentiary you said if he came on the 30th you would have the terms ready by that time. So may I take it that these terms were drawn up by Hitler with the heip of the Foreign Office between the 29th and the 30th?
VON RIBBENTROP: He dictated them personally. I think there were 16 points, if I remember rightly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you really expect after the treatment of Von Schuschnigg, of Tiso, of Hacha, that the Poles would be willing to send a fly into the spider's parlor?
VON RIBBENTROP: We certainly counted on it and hoped for it. I think that a hint from the British Government would have sufficed to bring that envoy to Berlin.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE-: And what you hoped was to put the Poles in this dilemma, that either these terms would stand as a propagandistic cause for the war, to use Hitler's phrase -- or else you would be able, by putting pressure on the Polish plenipotentiary, to do exactly what you had done before with Schuschnigg and Tiso and Hacha, and get a surrender from the Poles. Wasn't that what was in your mind?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, the situation was different. I must say, that on the 29th the Fuehrer told the British Ambassador that he would draft these conditions or this agreement and by the time of the arrival of the Polish Plenipotentiary, would make them also available to the British Government -- or he hoped that this would be possible, I think that is what he said. Sir Nevile Henderson took note of that, and I must repeat that the Fuehrer, after the British reply had been received on the 28th, once more, and in spite of the extremely tense situation between Poland and Germany, agreed to that kind of negotiation. The decisive thing in these crucial days of the 30th and 31st is, therefore, the following: The Fuehrer had drafted these conditions, England knew that the possibility of arriving at a solution existed. All during the 30th of August we heard nothing from England, at least nothing definite. Only at midnight, I think, did the British Ambassador report for this discussion. In the meantime, I must mention that at 7 o'clock in the evening news of the general mobilization in Poland had been received, which excited the Fuehrer extremely. Through that, the situation had become extraordinarily acute. I still remember exactly the situation at the Chancellery where almost hourly reports were received about incidents, streams of refugees, and so forth. It was an atmosphere heavily charged with electricity. The Fuehrer waited all through the 30th; no definite answer arrived. Then, at midnight of the 30th, that conversation took place. The course of that conversation has already been described here by me and also by a witness, the interpreter Schmidt. I did more then than I was allowed to do, in that I had read the entire contents to Sir Nevile Henderson. I was hoping that England perhaps might do something yet. The Fuehrer had told Sir Nevile Henderson that a Polish plenipotentiary would be treated on equal terms.
VON RIBBENTROP: Therefore, there was the possibility of meeting, somewhere at an appointed place, or, that someone would come to Berlin, or that the Polish Ambassador Lipski would be given the necessary authority. Those were the possibilities. I would even like to go further. It was merely necessary, during the 30th or the 31st, until late that night, or the next morning when the march began, for the Polish Ambassador Lipski to have authority at least to receive in his hands the German proposals. Had this been done, the diplomatic negotiations would in any case have been under way and thus the crisis would have been averted, at least for the time being. I also believe, and I have said so before, that there would have been no objections. I believe the Fuehrer would have welcomed, if the British Ambassador had intervened. The basis for the negotiations, I have also mentioned this here before, was called reasonable by Sir Nevile Henderson personady. One hint from the British Government during the 30th or 31st, and negotiations would have been in course on the basis of these reasonable proposals of the Fuehrer, termed reasonable even by the British themselves. It would have caused no embarrassment to the Poles, and I believe that on the basis of these reasonable proposals, which were absolutely in accord with the Covenant of the League of Nations, which provided for a plebiscite in the Corridor area, a solution, perfectly acceptable for Poland, would have been possible.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now for 10 minutes. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal desire me to say that they think that your answers and your explanations are too long, too argumentative, and too repetitive, and they are upon matters which have been gone over and over again before the Tribunal, so they would therefore ask you to try to keep your answers as short as possible.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did I understand you correctly, Witness, on Friday, that you didn't know about the connection between Quisling and the Defendant Rosenberg in the spring and summer of 1939? It was well before the war, in the spring and summer, before June of 1939?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I knew that Rosenberg had friends in Norway and that the name of Quisling was mentioned, but this name meant nothing to me at that time. On the request of the Fuehrer, at that time I gave Rosenberg certain amountg of money for his friends in Norway, for newspapers, propaganda, and similar purposes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn't know, as I understand your testimony, that some of Quisling's men had been in a schooling camp in Germany in August of 1939, before the war?
VON RIBBENTROP: No I do not remember that. I learned of it here through a document. But I do not recall having known anything about it. At any rate, if I knew anything about it, I did not know any of the details.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that the Germans living in Norway had been used to enlarge and extend the staff of the various German official agencies, the legation and the consulates, soon after the beginning of the war?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that at the moment, at all. At that time I probably never did learn correctly about that, if that was the case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL- FYFE: It is the quotation from the Yearbook of the NSDAP . All I want to know at the moment is 	whether or not you knew about that. If you say you did not...
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know and cannot say a thing about it, I'm afraid...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know at the time, in December 1939, that Quisling had two interviews with Hitler on the 16th and 18th of December?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either. What was the date, may I ask?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 16th and 18th December 1939, through the Defendant Raeder.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I knew nothing of these interviews, according to my recollection.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that practically the first matter that you knew about in regard to Norway was, first, when you got the letter from Raeder, dated the 3rd of April?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I believe that was a letter from Keitel. I believe this is a misunderstanding.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is a mistake of mine. I am sorry. Do you remember a letter from Keitel, where he says: So really, Witness -- I may perhaps be able to shorten the matter -- you are really not a very good person to ask about the earlier preparations with regard to Norway, because you weren't in on these earlier discussions with Quisling and with Raeder and Hitler. Is that right? If so, I will leave the subject.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not in on these discussions. But I should like to clarify one thing briefly: that I received this letter -- why, I do not know -- only some days later. The first intimation of the intention to occupy Norway, due to the anticipated landing of the British, I received about 36 hours ahead of time from the Fuehrer. The letter was probably longer under way than it should have been. I saw it only afterwards,
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I shall not occupy time, because there is a good deal to cover, and I will take you straight to the question of the Low Countries. You have heard me read, and probably other people read, more than once, the statement of Hitler's on the 22d of August 1939: That is what Hitler said on the 22d of August. You weren't there, and I ask you again if he expressed the same opinion to you?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, he did not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that from a very early date, on the 7th of October 1939, an army group order was given that Army Group B is to make all preparations, according to special orders, for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory if the political situation so demands. Did you know of that order on the 7th of October?
VON RIBBENTROP: No; I believe I have seen it here; I did not know it before.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that on the 9th of October Hitler issued a directive: Did you know that Hitler issued that directive on the 9th of October?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that as far as you were concerned you are telling the Tribunal that Hitler gave his assurance, the many assurances, in August and October, without telling his Foreign Minister that on the 7th and 9th of October, he had given the directive for the attack on the Low Countries, that he did not tell you about his order or his directive for his attack on the Low Countries? Are you sure of that?
VONHIBBENTROP: I am pretty sure of that, otherwise I should recall it. I know one thing, that such ideas, as to whether or not an offensive should be assumed in the West, after the Polish Campaign, had occasionally been discussed, but I never heard about any orders.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. If you say that is the state of your knowledge, we will pass on to something about which you did know a little bit more. Do you remember the meeting of Hitler and yourself with Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of August 1939?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I saw the document, the minutes, about it, here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, I want you just to look at that document, and it is on Page 181. 1 want you to follow while I read one passage, which should be about 182. It is on my second page and it is a paragraph which begins, "As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude that in case of conflict..."
VON RIBBENTROP: I have not found it yet.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you look for that "As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude..."
VON RIBBENTROP: On Page 2?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It should be on Page 2, on my Page 2. It may be further on in yours.
VON RIBBENTROP: Is that the beginning of the paragraph?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. "As Poland makes it clear..." It is two paragraphs on from a single line that says at the point "Count Ciano, showed signs of..."
VON RI31BENTROP: I have found it, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at the next sentence: "Generally speaking..." This is the next sentence but one: Now, that was Hitler's formulation of his policy, and may I take it that that was the policy which you were assisting to carry out, to liquidate the pseudo-neutrals one after the other, and include among these pseudo-neutrals Yugoslavia?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not to be miderstood in that way. I must state the following in this connection. The situation was this at that time: Hitler wanted under all circumstances to keep Italy on our side. Italy was always a very unreliable partner. For that reason the Fuehrer spoke at that time in a way designed to tell Italy, so to speak, that, if it came to difficulties with Yugoslavia, he would support Italy. It can be understood only from the situation which was this: Germany, with Italy's assistance, had already peacefully carried out some of her revisions in Europe, except for Danzig and the Corridor, in which Mussolini supported Hitler. I remember the situation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is quite a long explanation. But it is not an explanation of the words I put to you which is the important thing. "It would be best to liquidate uncertain neutrals one after the other." Are you denying that that was your policy, to liquidate uncertain neutrals?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not that. That cannot be taken so literally, for in diplomatic discussions -- and I do not think it is different in other countries -- many things are said sometimes ...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to...
VON RIBBENTROP: This was the question of Yugoslavia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This had always been Mussolini's view, hadn't it, that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest possible opportunity?
VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, would you look at Document 2818-PS. My Lord, this will be Exhibit GB-292. Remember this is the secret additioilal protocol to the Friendship and Alliance Pact between Germany and Italy made on the 22d of May 1939, and appended to it there are some comments by Mussolini on the 30th of May 1939. Do you see?
VON RIBBENTROP: What page?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just wanted you to look at two passages. Do you see where the comments by Mussolini begin? Under the Pact itself, do you see the comment by Mussolini?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, here it is.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, Number I says: Now, if you will turn to Paragraph 7, you will see Mussolini is hoping that the war will be postponed, and he is saying what should happen if the war comes; he says that: Do you see that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dont you agree that it was Mussolini's view that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest possible moment?
VON RIBBENTROP: They are utterances of Mussolini which I see here for the first time. I did not know them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to the remarks of Hitler which you have seen considerably more than once. You remember, after the Simovic coup d'etat on the 26th of March, there was a meeting, a conference with Hitler, where he announced his policy: Do you remember Hitler's saying that on the 27th of March?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember that. Could I perhaps see the document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don't you remember it? It has been read many times in this court, Hitler's statement.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I remember it, not the individual words, but in general.
SIR DAVID MAXWELTFYFE: Do you remember that was the sense of it, and I read his words. Now, that was the policy...
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know what you mean by "the sense of it."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I'll put it to you now. What I mean is this, that it was your policy to attack Yugoslavia without asking them for assurances, without any diplomatic action of any kind. You decided to attack Yugoslavia and to bomb Belgrade. Isn't that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was entirely different; and I ask to be permitted to explain the actual state of the case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want your explanation of these points which I have specifically read and mentioned to you. "No diplomatic inquiries will be made." Why did you decide, or why did Hitler decide, and you help, to attack Yugoslavia without making any diplomatic inquiries, without giving the new government any chance to give you assurances? Why did you do it?