dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Hitler was about to engage in a war for which the Luftwaffe was unprepared, based on your information of the situation, would it or would it not have been possible for the Luftwaffe officers to have advised Hitler of that fact?
KESSELRING: We had complete confidence in our Reich Marshal, and we knew that he was the only person who had a decisive influence upon Adolf Hitler. In that way we knew, since we also knew his peaceful attitude, that we were perfectly secure, and we relied on it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There came a time when you went into the East, did you not, as a commander? You went into Poland and you went into Soviet Russia, did you not?
KESSELRING: Poland and Russia, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And was it not understood among the officers in those Polish and Russian campaigns that the Hague regulations would not be applied to Soviet Russia as to the treatment of prisoners of war?
KESSELRING: That was not known to me.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified that the Luftwaffe was purely a weapon of defense, is that your testimony?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the German strength at the beginning of the Polish campaign in various types of planes?
KESSELRING: As I was not a member of the central board I can give you only an approximation on my own responsibility, without guaranteeing the historical certainty of these figures. All told, I would say we must have had approximately three thousand aircraft. All in all, so far as I can remember now, there were between thirty and forty bomber groups, the same number of fighters, and there were ten groups of dive-bombers, fighters...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you give me the number of each group?
KESSELRING: About thirty aircraft, which would drop to seven, six or five aircraft during the course of the day. To continue, there were ten to twelve groups of dive-bombers, including ground "strafers" and twin-engine fighters. Also included in that figure were reconnaissance planes and a certain number of naval aircraft.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the proportion of bombers to fighters was approximately two to one, was it not?
KESSELRING: The proportion of bombers to fighters was about one to one or one point two, or one point three to one. I said thirty to forty and about thirty fighter groups. If I include the twin-engine fighters, then the figure would be about one to one.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the way you make up the total of about three thousand units?
KESSELRING: The reason why I can give you that figure is because during these months of quiet reflection I made an estimate, without thereby revealing the historical truth.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, do you count as a weapon of defense the bomber, or do you treat that as an offensive weapon?
KESSELRING: I must speak of the bomber in the same way as the dive-bomber and the fighter, equally as a defensive and as an offensive weapon. I explained yesterday that no matter whether defensive or offensive warfare is concerned, the task of the air force must be carried out on the offensive and the targets are far and wide. I also explained that an air force which has only light aircraft is doomed to be destroyed, since it cannot attack the phases of the enemy's aircraft production, his air assembly areas, nor his movements in various sectors.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, the Luftwaffe was a defensive weapon if you were on the defensive, and an offensive weapon if you were on attack?
KESSELRING: I did not understand the last half of the sentence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Luftwaffe would serve as a defensive weapon if you were on the defensive, and as an offensive weapon if you were on attack, is that not true?
KESSELRING: One could put it like that. I would express it differently. As I said, the air force is essentially an offensive weapon, no matter whether it is used for defense or for attack.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you have improved on my sentence. Now, in the Netherlands, in Poland ...
KESSELRING: May I just say something else on the subject?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, yes.
KESSELRING: Namely, what I said yesterday at the very end, that the essential of an offensive air force is the long-distance four-engine heavy bombers, and Germany had none of these.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did it come that Germany had none of those?
KESSELRING: Firstly, because being actually in a period of danger, we were confining ourselves to the absolute essentials of a defensive air force only. Secondly, we tried, in keeping with our characteristics, to achieve as much as possible by precision bombing, in other words, by divebombing, utilizing the minimum of war material, and I am here thinking of the Ju 88 as a typical example of that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were examined by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, were you not, on the 28th of June 1945? Do you recall that?
KESSELRING: Yes, of course.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it is quite certain, is it not?
KESSELRING: I have often been interrogated.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I ask you whether on the 28th of June 1945, you did not say to the officer examining you on behalf of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey this: "Everything had been done to make the German Air Force from the point of view of airmanship, aircraft, flak, air corps, signals, and so forth, the most formidable in the world. This effort led to the fact that at the beginning of the war, or in 1940 at the latest, from a fighter viewpoint, from a divebomber viewpoint, from a combat viewpoint, we had particularly good aircraft, even if the standard was not uniform entirely." Did you not state that?
KESSELRING: That is still my view today, that as far as material, pursuit planes, dive-bombers, and fighters were concerned, we did in fact have a certain advantage over the other powers.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as to the failure to have the number of four-engine bombers; that was because of your peaceful intentions, was it, or was it because of mistake in judgment as to what the requirements of war would be?
KESSELRING: To that I must say the following: It would have been insanity on the part of the Air Force leaders to consider producing a complete air force within 3 to 4 years. It was in 1940, at the earliest, that the possibility existed of building up an effective air force which would comply with all requirements. For that reason, in my view, it was an amazing achievement of organization to have attained such effectiveness under the existing limitations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understood you to give as one of the indications of your unaggressive intentions the fact that you had not an adequate number of four-engine bombers at the outset of the war. Did I misunderstand you?
KESSELRING: That is an excerpt from the whole story. The strength of the Air Force was, particularly in comparison with the small states, to be regarded as sufficient; certainly not, however, in comparison with powerful opponents who were fully equipped in the MR. I have an example in mind. In a heated discussion with the Reich Marshal, before the beginning of the Russian campaign, I asked for reinforcements for fighters and dive-bombers. For certain reasons that was refused. The certain reasons were, firstly, shortage of material, and secondly, which I could also gather from the conversation, that the Reich Marshal did not agree with this campaign.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not testify to the Bomber Investigating Commission of the United States that you intended to build a long-range heavy bomber but -- and I quote your words: "We had developed the He III and the Ju 88 and they were actually put into the fighting as long-range heavy bombers. The Ju 88 was then used in the French campaign and against England. "Question: The Ju 88 is not really a long-range bomber?" Your answer: "It was considered a long-range bomber at that time, but unfortunately we had a low opinion of the four-engine aircraft, and an erroneous belief which proved to be a mistake in the course of later years." Is that true?
KESSELRING: That was my opinion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the reason you did not build the four-engine aircraft was your low opinion of it?
KESSELRING: May I say the following: That was the conception of a service department; the decisions in all these questions were made in the highest service department.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The highest service department made a mistake about the utility of the four-engine bomber?
KESSELRING: Well, looking at the situation retrospectively, I must say that the absence of a four-engine bomber became extremely awkward.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that the highest authority in aircraft production was Hermann Goering. He was the head of the whole plan of aircraft production, was he not?
KESSELRING: Yes, that is correct but it did not exclude the fact that erroneous conceptions of certain measures for the conduct of war or organizational measures may exist temporarily.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in the Polish campaign you have said?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that the German Air Force made the decisive contribution to that campaign as regards the time taken to conquer Poland?
KESSELRING: From the point of view of the Air Force officers I must agree with that conception absolutely, but the army officers did not quite share it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you are testifying now as to your opinion. And in that campaign you developed the technique of low level attacks by fighters, light bombers, and dive-bombers against marching columns, and the dive-bomber, the light bomber, and the fighters all contributed to the success of that movement.
KESSELRING: I must admit that. The foundations of the shortrange bombing technique were certainly laid during the Polish campaign.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I turn now to the French campaign. You were in the air in the French campaign, were you not?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Air Force contributed decisively to the success of that campaign, did it not?
KESSELRING: From the point of view of an Air Force officer, I must consider that view as correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you testified, did you not, that Dunkirk would not have been such a catastrophe if the Luftwaffe had not been there? That is true, is it not?
KESSELRING: Dunkirk, did you say? I did not quite understand.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Dunkirk.
KESSELRING: Yes. In my opinion, that is certain, and it would have been even more so if bad weather had not considerably hindered our operations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, the catastrophe would have increased for the English except for bad weather. You had the air force to do a better job at Dunkirk than you did, from your point of view?
KESSELRING: We were grounded for about 2 days.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were one of the principal advocates of the plan to invade England, were you not?
KESSELRING: Personally I am of the opinion that, if the war against England was to be brought to a successful end, this end could only be achieved for certain by invasion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had an adequate Air Force after having defeated Poland, defeated Holland, defeated Belgium, and defeated France, so that you advocated proceeding with an invasion of England, did you not?
KESSELRING: I must give an explanation on that point.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First tell me if that is true.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you please understand that you must answer the question first, and give an explanation afterwards. Every question, or nearly every question, admits of either an affirmative or negative answer, and you will kindly give that answer and make your explanation afterwards.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not advocate the invasion of England, and was not the Air Force ready to invade England?
KESSELRING: Subject to certain conditions, considering the existing air situation at that time the Air Force was ready to fulfill that task.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you recommended very strongly to the Reich Marshal that the invasion take place immediately after Dunkirk, did you not?
KESSELRING: Yes, and I still advocated that view later on too.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the preparations of the Luftwaffe for this invasion were complete, and the invasion was called off only because the procurement of sea-going craft was not sufficient, is that not true?
KESSELRING: Yes. I have to supplement the previous statement by saying that, of course, a certain interval between the French campaign and the English campaign would have had to elapse in order to effect the material replenishment of the air force.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also told the Strategic Bombing Survey that Hitler had ordered not only the bombing of military targets, including industrial production, but also the bombing of political targets. Is that true?
KESSELRING: After a certain date, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, to paralyze the government of the enemy. That is what you meant by a political target, did you not?
KESSELRING: That is not what I mean by political targets. I answered the question differently; I understood it differently, namely, that this order became effective at a later date.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You attended the speech made by Hitler in August of 1939?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At that time you were informed that the attack on Poland would commence immediately or very soon?
KESSELRING: During that conference, the final decision to commence the Polish campaign had not yet been reached. Negotiations were still in progress and we were all still hoping that they would bring favorable results.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were ordered on the 15th of August to get the Luftwaffe in readiness for an attack on Poland?
KESSELRING: This order as such is not known to me in detail, but I must admit that for months before we had made air preparations and erected bases in a general defensive direction, always thinking of a defensive situation.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You expected Poland to attack Germany in the air? Is that your point?
KESSELRING: At any rate, we took this possibility into collsideration on our side. The whole political situation was too unknown for us to be able to form a pertinent, incontestable judgment on it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have said that you never held conferences with Party leaders or talked politics or had any contacts with politicians, in substance, have you not?
KESSELRING: Essentially, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was not your immediate superior the Number 2 politician of Germany? Did you not know that?
KESSELRING: I did, but I must emphasize that the conversations which I had with the Reich Marshal were 99 percent concerned with military and organizational problems.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you knew that he, at all times, was one of the leading men in Nazi politics?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified that you knew of the order to shoot Soviet Commissars?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that you did not approve it and did not carry it out.
KESSELRING: I did not answer to that effect yesterday.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did you answer?
KESSELRING: I answered as follows: That the Air Force, which was not fighting on the ground, was not concerned with this problem, and that an official notification of that order is no longer in my recollection.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who executed that order? Who was expected to execute it?
KESSELRING: I was in Russia only until November 1941 and I can give you no information on it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you ever hear of the SS?
KESSELRING: Yes, of course.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And is it not a fact that the execution of that order was committed to the SS?
KESSELRING: I knew nothing about that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did you think the SS existed for?
KESSELRING: In my opinion, the SS, as far as it was used in military operations, was a special section of the Army, indeed a sort of guard of the Army.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The SS was to guard the Army, or to guard whom?
KESSELRING: No, but the SS divisions were, purely from the point of view of men, numbers and material, well above the average Army division as far as equipment and readiness were concerned.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was commanding the SS?
KESSELRING: The SS was commanded by Himmler. As far as these divisions were used within the army, they were tactically. under the army commanders, commanders of the army groups, or the corps headquarters staffs to which they were attached.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So far as they had special missions, they were under the command of Himmler, is that right?
KESSELRING: Yes, certainly; a very clear distinction.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified yesterday that you did not consider Hitler's Commando Order binding on you, and that you did not carry out that order, is that right?
KESSELRING: In the Mediterranean theater, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was that because the order left discretion in your hands, or because you just took discretion into your hands?
KESSELRING: I made those reservations myself, firstly for ideological considerations, and secondly because in the Mediterranean I had, as I said yesterday, a twofold command, and the German orders could not be included in the general administration without modification.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well then, the extent to which an order of that kind was carried out depended somewhat on the character and courage of the officer who received it, did it not?
KESSELRING: I would like to express it somewhat differently. These orders could be interpreted in different ways -- that Commando Order, for instance -- insofar as it was certainly quite possible for the Commander-in-Chief to consider an operation either as a special task or as a tactical measure which was militarily justified.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in command of the forces in Italy at this time, were you not, at the time of the Commando Order?
KESSELRING: With a difference. I did not have full powers until September 1943.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask to have you shown Document Number 498-PS in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-501. I call your attention to Paragraph Number 6 of that order which reads as follows: "I will hold responsible, under military law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed." You see that paragraph in the order?
KESSELRING: Yes, I have just read it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you ever report that you were not carrying out this order or did you deceive your superior officers as to whether it was being carried out?
KESSELRING: In one special case that question was treated very decisively at headquarters. This concerned the Commando action "Pescara" where Adolf Hitler ordered the shooting of certain people in spite of the fact that we, my troops and I, wanted to spare them. I think particularly that the influence of Jodl here, as an intermediary, was decisive; namely, that this subject was forgotten and that consequently these people were kept alive, in hospitals and prisoner-of-war camps. But I should not like to call it deception, the word you used just now, for I wish to emphasize that, in my military sector, I considered actions of this kind as guiding orders, and this Commando Order certainly allowed for several interpretations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, the extent to which one of these orders was carried out depended on the commanders in charge, is that right, that Hitler could not depend on it that an order as emphatic as this would be carried out by his commanders? Was that the state of the German Army?
KESSELRING: No, not that, but the situation can be explained as follows: If, on the part of an army, such an operation is reported to a superior as a Commando operation in the sense of that order, then the necessary measures would have to be carried out. That depended, however, on the way of reporting by the units concerned, and I already explained in detail yesterday that a unified conception had gradually set in, that men in uniform, who carried out a tactical move, were not Commandos within the meaning of this order.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified today, and another witness has testified here, that if an order of Adolf Hitler was resisted, it meant death. You are also testifying that an absolute order to execute Commandos, under threat of punishment if you failed, left you discretion to do it or not, and I want you once and for all to tell the Tribunal which is the fact, and then we will leave that subject.
KESSELRING: I must repeat what I said before, namely, that the Italian theater of war was not to be compared with the other theaters of war. Through the co-operation of Hitler and Mussolini there was always a very obliging attitude, therefore, these orders made by OKW could not easily be applied to the Italian theater of war.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They were applied everywhere, so far as you know, except in the Italian theater, then?
KESSELRING: That I cannot say. I have repeatedly explained that I confined myself exclusively to my own sphere of operations, which was considerable.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified, as I understand you, that you punished looting on the part of your soldiers in Italy.
KESSELRING: As soon as I heard of these instances, I punished them, and I most strictly ordered the Army commanders and Air Force commanders to do the same.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the punishment was very mild that you ever inflicted for any looting, was it not?
KESSELRING: I even went so far as to have culprits shot on the spot, and in that manner I succeeded in remedying the disorder which had arisen.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So a German general, dealing with a German soldier, considers shooting the proper penalty for looting?
KESSELRING: These far-reaching conclusions are something I cannot admit. On that subject I wish to make the following remarks: If an army -- as was the case with the 14th Army at the time -- fell into a certain disorder, the most severe measures were justified in the interests of the reputation of that army, and in the interests of the population, in order to bring about orderly conditions among the civilian population. I had heated discussion at headquarters on that particular subject. Apart from that, I was of the opinion that all penalties eventually became useless, and therefore, for some time I considered penalties purely as an educational means and not really as punishment. Consequently for some time, penalties were rather mild.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified that you took vigorous steps to protect the art treasures of Italy.
KESSELRING: Insofar as I was informed of art treasures, yes.
MR.JUSTICEJACKSON: What steps did you take, and against whoin did you take them?
KESSELRING: Primarily they were preventive measures: First, by excluding places of art and culture from the field of battle; secondly, by having these places cleared if they were liable to air raids by the enemy; and thirdly, by co-operating with General Wolff and having these cultural and art treasures removed to secure places. I make mention of the art treasures of Cassino and Florence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you know that any art treasure was removed from Mount Cassino, for instance, and taken to Berlin?
KESSELRING: Much later, at Mondorf, I heard about that. At the time all I could recollect was that they were handed over to the Vatican in Rome.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh. Did you know that art treasures were taken and delivered to Goering from Mount Cassino? Did you ever hear that?
KESSELRING: I once heard something about some statue of a saint, but I cannot really give you any more details.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if Goering received such a thing from Mount Cassino, was it a violation of your orders?
KESSELRING: The Hermann Goering Division was stationed in that sector. It was commanded by the former adjutant of Hermann Goering, and it is clear that there was a certain connection here, but to what extent I cannot tell you.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have a few more questions concerning your interrogations.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better break off for 10 minutes. [A recess was taken.]