dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
At a meeting of the Central Planning Board held on February 19, 1943, attended by Speer, Sauckel, and Field Marshall Milch, the following conversation occurred: "Sauckel: If any prisoners are taken, there, they will be needed. "Milch: We have made a request for an order that a certain percentage of men in the antiaircraft artillery must be Russians. 50,000 will be taken altogether; 30,000 are already employed as gunners. This is an amusing thing that Russians must work the guns." (R-124) (At this point a series of official German Army photographs were offered in evidence. The first one shows Russian Prisoners of War acting as ammunition bearers during the attack upon Tschudowo. The second group consists of a series of official German Army photographs taken in July and August 1941 showing Russian prisoners of war in Latvia and the Ukraine being compelled to load and unload ammunition trains and trucks and being required to stack ammunition.) This use of prisoners of war was in flagrant disregard of the rules of international law, particularly Article 6 of the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention Number 4 of 1907, which provides that the tasks of prisoners of war shall have no connection with the operations of war. The Nazi conspirators made extensive use of prisoners of war not only in active operations of war but also in the German armament industry. A secret letter from the Reichminister of Labor to the Presidents of the Regional Labor Exchange Offices refers to an order of Goering to the effect that: "Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal, 100,000 men are to be taken from among the French PWs not yet employed in armament industry, and are to be assigned to the armament industry (airplanes industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting there from will be filled by Soviet PWs. The transfer of the above-named French PWs is to be accomplished by 1 October." (3005-PS) A similar policy was followed with respect to Russian prisoners of war. In a secret memorandum issued from Hitler's headquarters on 31 October 1942, Keitel directed the execution of Hitler's order to use such prisoners in the German war economy (EC-194): "The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous hindrance for the future German war and armament industry. The
In a secret memorandum issued from Hitler's headquarters on 31 October 1942, Keitel directed the execution of Hitler's order to use such prisoners in the German war economy (EC-194): "The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous hindrance for the future German war and armament industry. The expected relief through discharges from the armed forces is uncertain as to the extent and date; however, its possible extent will be no means correspond to expectations and requirements in view of the great demand. "The Fuehrer has now ordered that even the working power of the Russian prisoner of war should be utilized to a large extent by large scale assignment for the requirements of the war industry. The prerequisite for production is adequate nourishment. Also very small wages are to be planned for the most modest supply with a few consumers' goods (Genussmittel) for every day's life, eventual rewards for production." "II. Construction and Armament Industry. "a. Work units for constructions of all kind, particularly for the fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers, unloading units for essential war plants). "b. Suitable armament factories which have to be selected in such a way that their personnel should consist in the majority of prisoners of war under guidance and supervision (eventually after withdrawal and other employment of the German workers). "III. Other War Industries. "a. Mining as under II. b. "b. Railroad construction units for building tracks etc. "c. Agriculture and forestry in closed units. The utilization of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the basis of above examples by: "To I. The armed forces "To II. The Reich Minister for Arms and Ammunition and the Inspector General for the German road system in agreement with the Reich Minister for Labor and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Wi Rue Amt). Deputies of the Reich Minister for Arms and Ammunition are to be admitted to the prisoner of war camps to assist in the selection of skilled workers." (EC-194) Goering, at a conference at the Air Ministry on 7 November 1941, also discussed the use of prisoners of war in the armament industry. The Top Secret notes on Goering's instructions as to the employment and treatment of prisoners
assist in the selection of skilled workers." (EC-194) Goering, at a conference at the Air Ministry on 7 November 1941, also discussed the use of prisoners of war in the armament industry. The Top Secret notes on Goering's instructions as to the employment and treatment of prisoners of war in many phases of the German war industry read as follows (1206-PS): "The Fuehrer's point of view as to employment of prisoners of war in war industries has changed basically. So far a total of 5 million prisoners of war-employed so far 2 million." "For 4) In the Interior and the Protectorate, it would be ideal if entire factories could be manned by Russian PW's except the employees necessary for direction. For employment in the Interior and the Protectorate the following are to have priority: "a. At the top coal mining industry. "Order by the Fuehrer to investigate all mines as to suitability for employment of Russians. At times manning the entire plant with Russian laborers. "b. Transportation (construction of locomotives and cars, repair shops). "Railroad-repair and industry workers are to be sought out from the PW's. Railroad is most important means of transportation in the East. "c. Armament industries "Preferably factories of armor and guns. Possibly also construction of parts for airplane engines. Suitable complete sections of factories to be manned exclusively by Russians. For the remainder employment in columns. Use in factories of tool machinery, production of farm tractors, generators, etc. In emergency, erect in individual places barracks for occasional workers which are used as unloading details and similar purposes. (Reich Minister of the Interior through communal authorities.) "OKW/AWA is competent for transporting Russian PW's employment through "Planning Board for Employment of all PW's (Planstelle fuer den Einsatz fuer alle Kriegsgefangenen). If necessary, offices of Reich Commissariates. "No employment where danger to men or their supply exists, i.e. factories exposed to explosives, waterworks, powerworks, etc. No contact with German population, especially no 'solidarity.' German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians. "Food is a matter of the Four Years' Plan. Supply their own food (cats, horses, etc.) "Clothes, billeting,
employment where danger to men or their supply exists, i.e. factories exposed to explosives, waterworks, powerworks, etc. No contact with German population, especially no 'solidarity.' German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians. "Food is a matter of the Four Years' Plan. Supply their own food (cats, horses, etc.) "Clothes, billeting, messing somewhat better than at home where part of the people live in caverns. "Supply of shoes for Russians as a rule wooden shoes, if necessary install Russian shoe repair shops. "Examination of physical fitness, in order to avoid importation of diseases. "Clearing of mines as a rule by Russians if possible by selected Russian engineers." (1206-PS) Speer also sponsored and applied the policy of using prisoners of war in the armament industry. In a speech to the Nazi Gauleiters of 24 February 1942, Speer said: "I therefore proposed to the Fuehrer at the end of December that all my labor force, including specialists be released for mass employment in the East. Subsequently the remaining PW's, about 10,000 were put at disposal of the armaments industry by me." (1435-PS) Speer also reported at the 36th meeting of the Central Planning Board, held on 22 April 1943, that only 30% of the Russian prisoners of war were engaged in the armament industry. This he found unsatisfactory. Speer continued: "There is a specified statement showing in what sectors the Russian PW's have been distributed, and this statement is quite interesting. It shows that the armaments industry only received 30%. I always complained about this." "The 90,000 Russian PW's employed in the whole of the armaments industry are for the greatest part skilled men." (R-124) Sauckel, who was appointed Plenipotentiary General for the utilization of labor for the express purpose, among others, of integrating prisoners of war into the German war industry, made it plain that prisoners of war were to be compelled to serve the German armament industry. His labor mobilization program contains the following statement: "All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well as of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely incorporated into the German armament and nutrition industries. Their production must be brought
German armament industry. His labor mobilization program contains the following statement: "All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well as of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely incorporated into the German armament and nutrition industries. Their production must be brought to the highest possible level." (016-PS) 7. THE CONCENTRATION CAMP PROGRAM OF EXTERMINATION THROUGH WORK A special Nazi program combined the brutality and the purposes of the slave labor program with those of the concentration camp. The Nazis placed Allied nationals in concentration camps and forced them, along with the other inmates of the concentration camps, to work in the armaments industry under conditions designed to exterminate them. This was the Nazi program of extermination through work. The program was initiated in the spring of 1942. It was outlined as follows in a letter to Himmler, dated 30 April 1942, from his subordinate Pohl, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS: "Today I report about the present situation of the concentration camps and about measures I have taken to carry out your order of the 3rd March 1942." "1. The war has brought about a marked change in the structure of the concentration camps and has changed their duties with regard to the employment of the prisoners. The custody of prisoners for the sole reasons of security, education, or prevention is no longer the main consideration. The mobilization of all prisoners who are fit for work for purposes of the war now, and for purposes of construction in the forthcoming peace, come to the foreground more and more. "2. From this knowledge some necessary measures result with the aim to transform the concentration camps into organizations more suitable for the economic tasks, whilst they were formerly merely politically interested. "3. For this reason I have gathered together all the leaders of the former inspectorate of Concentration Camps, all Camp Commanders, and all managers and supervisors of work on the 23rd and 24th of April, 1942; I have explained personally to them this new development. I have compiled in the order attached the main essentials, which have to be brought into effect with the utmost urgency if the commencement of work for
Commanders, and all managers and supervisors of work on the 23rd and 24th of April, 1942; I have explained personally to them this new development. I have compiled in the order attached the main essentials, which have to be brought into effect with the utmost urgency if the commencement of work for purposes of the armament industry is not to be delayed." (R-129) The order referred to in paragraph 3 above set the framework for a program of relentless exploitation, providing in part as follows: "4. The camp commander alone is responsible for the employment of the labor available. This employment must be, in the true meaning of the word, exhaustive, in order to obtain the greatest measure of performance. Work is allotted by the Chief of the Department D centrally and alone. The camp-commanders themselves may not accept on their own initiative work offered by third parties and may not negotiate about it. "5. There is no limit to working hours. Their duration depends on the kind of working establishments in the camps and the kind of work to be done. They are fixed by the camp commanders alone. "6. Any circumstances which may result in a shortening of working hours (e.g. meals, roll-calls) have therefore to be restricted to the minimum which cannot be condensed any more. It is forbidden to allow long walks to the place of working and noon intervals only for eating purposes." (R-129) This armaments production program was not merely a scheme for mobilizing the manpower potential of the camps. It was directly integrated into the larger Nazi program of extermination. A memorandum of an agreement between Himmler and the Minister of Justice, Thierack sets for the Nazi objective of extermination through work: "* * * 2. The delivery of anti-social elements from the execution of their sentence to the Reich Fuehrer of SS to be worked to death. Persons under protective arrest, Jews, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences, Czechs and Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according to the decision of the Reich Minister for Justice. First of all the worst anti-social elements amongst those just mentioned are to be handed over. I shall inform the Fuehrer of this through Reichsleiter Bormann." "14. It
Poles with more than 3-year sentences, Czechs and Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according to the decision of the Reich Minister for Justice. First of all the worst anti-social elements amongst those just mentioned are to be handed over. I shall inform the Fuehrer of this through Reichsleiter Bormann." "14. It is agreed that, in consideration of the intended aims of the Government for the clearing up of the Eastern problems, in future Jews, Poles, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians are no longer to be judged by the ordinary courts, so far as punishable offenses are concerned, but are to be dealt with by the Reich Fuehrer of SS. This does not apply to civil lawsuits, nor to Poles whose names are announced or entered in the German Racial Lists." (654-PS) In September, 1942, Speer arranged to bring this new source of labor within his jurisdiction. Speer convinced Hitler that significant production could be obtained only if the concentration camp prisoners were employed in factories under the technical control of the Speer Ministry instead of in camps. In fact, without Speer's co-operation, it would have been difficult to utilize the prisoners on any large scale for war production since he would not allocate to Himmler the machine tools and other necessary equipment. Accordingly, it was agreed that the prisoners were to be exploited in factories under Speer's control. to compensate Himmler for surrendering this jurisdiction to Speer, Speer proposed, and Hitler agreed, that Himmler would receive a share of the armaments output, fixed in relation to the man hours contributed by his prisoners. The minutes of Speer's conference with Hitler on 20, 21, 22 September 1942, are as follows (R-124): "* * * I pointed out to the Fuehrer that, apart from an insignificant amount of work, no possibility exists of organizing armament production in the concentration camps, because: "1. the machine tools required are missing, "2. there are no suitable premises. "Both these assets would be available in the armaments industry, if use could be made of them by a second shift. "The Fuehrer agrees to my proposal, that the numerous factories set up outside towns for ARP reasons, should release their workers for supplementing the second shift in town factories
suitable premises. "Both these assets would be available in the armaments industry, if use could be made of them by a second shift. "The Fuehrer agrees to my proposal, that the numerous factories set up outside towns for ARP reasons, should release their workers for supplementing the second shift in town factories and should in return be supplied with labor from the concentration camps-also two shifts. "I pointed out to the Fuehrer the difficulties which I expect to encounter if Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler should be able, as he requests, to exercise authoritative influence over these factories. The Fuehrer, too, does not consider such an influence necessary. "The Fuehrer however agrees that Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler should draw advantages from making his prisoners available; he should get equipment for his division. "I suggest to give him a share in kind (war equipment) in ratio to the working hours done by his prisoners. A 3-5% share is discussed, the equipment also being calculated according to working hours. The Fuehrer would agree to such a solution. "The Fuehrer is prepared to order the additional delivery of this equipment and weapons to the SS, according to a list submitted to him.' (R-124) After a demand for concentration camp labor had been created, and a mechanism set up by Speer for exploiting this labor in armament factories, measures were evolved for increasing the supply to victims for extermination through work. A steady flow was assured by the agreement between Himmler and the Minister of Justice mentioned above. This was implemented by such programs as the following, expressed in Sauckel's letter of 26 November 1942 to Presidents of Landes Employment Offices regarding the program for the evacuation of Poles from the Lublin district: "The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this measure will be put into concentration camps and put to work where they are criminal or asocial elements." (L-61) General measures were supplemented by special drives for persons who would not otherwise have been sent to concentration camps. For example, for "reasons of war necessity" Himmler ordered on 17 December 1942 that at least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work should be transferred immediately to concentration camps, (1063-D-PS). The
were supplemented by special drives for persons who would not otherwise have been sent to concentration camps. For example, for "reasons of war necessity" Himmler ordered on 17 December 1942 that at least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work should be transferred immediately to concentration camps, (1063-D-PS). The order provided that: "For reasons of war necessity not to be discussed further here, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police on 14 December 1942 has ordered that until the end of January 1943, at least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work, are to be sent to the concentration camps. In order to reach this number, the following measures are required: "1. As of now (so far until 1 Feb. 1943) all eastern workers or such foreign workers who have been fugitives, or who have broken contracts, and who do not belong to allied, friendly or neutral States are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration camps * * *. "2. The commanders and the commandants of the security police and the security service, and the chiefs of the State Police Headquarters will check immediately on the basis of a close and strict ruling. a. the prisons b. the labor reformatory camps "All prisoners qualified for work, if it is essentially and humanly possible, will be committed at once to the nearest concentration camp, according to the following instructions, for instance also if penal procedures were to be established in the near future. Only such prisoners who in the interest of investigation procedures are to remain absolutely in solitary confinement can be left there. "Every single laborer counts!" (1063-D-PS) Measures were also adopted to insure that extermination through work was practiced with maximum efficiency. Subsidiary concentration camps were established near important war plants. Speer has admitted that he personally toured Upper Austria and selected sites for concentration camps near various munitions factories in the area. This admission appears in the transcript of an interrogation of Speer under oath on 18 October 1945, in which Speer stated: "The fact that we were anxious to use workers from concentration camps in factories and to establish small concentration camps near the factories
near various munitions factories in the area. This admission appears in the transcript of an interrogation of Speer under oath on 18 October 1945, in which Speer stated: "The fact that we were anxious to use workers from concentration camps in factories and to establish small concentration camps near the factories in order to use the manpower that was available there was a general fact. But it did not only come up on connection with this trip." [i.e. Speer's trip to Austria]. (3720-PS) Goering endorsed this use of concentration camp labor and asked for more. In a teletype which Goering sent to Himmler on 14 February 1944, he stated: "At the same time I ask you to put at my disposal as great a number of concentration camp (KZ-) convicts as possible for air armament, as this kind of manpower proved to be very useful according to previous experience. The situation of the air war makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work of this kind concentration camp (KZ-) convicts can be especially well concentrated at work and in the camp." (1584-I-PS) Speer subsequently assumed responsibility for this program, and Hitler promised Speer that if the necessary labor for the program could not be obtained, a hundred thousand Hungarian Jews would be brought in by the SS. Speer's record of conferences with Hitler on April 6 and 7, 1944, contain the following quotation: "* * * Suggested to the Fuehrer that, due to lack of builders and equipment, the second big building project should not be set up in German territory, but in close vicinity to the border on suitable soil (preferable on grave base and with transport facilities) on French, Belgian or Dutch territory. The Fuehrer agrees to this suggestion if the works could be set up behind a fortified zone. For the suggestion of setting this plant up in French territory speaks mainly the fact that it would be much easier to procure the necessary workers. Nevertheless, the Fuehrer asks an attempt be made to set up the second works in a safer area, namely in the Protectorate. If it should prove impossible there, too, to get hold of the necessary workers, the Fuehrer himself will contact the Reichsfuehrer SS and will give an order that the required 100,000 men