dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON NEURATH: When this student, Opletal, who was injured in the fracas, died of his wounds, the Police, in order to prevent new demonstrations, prohibited the participation of students at the funeral, which was to take place on 15 November. Despite this, crowds collected, and when the Police attempted to disperse them, renewed demonstrations and shootings resulted. When this was reported to Hitler by Frank, Hitler was greatly enraged and called me, Frank, and the Military Plenipotentiary, General Friderici, to a conference to be held in Berlin. Hitler had also asked the Czech Minister, Chvalkovsky, the former Foreign Minister, to be present at this conference. Hitler was in a rage. I tried to calm him, but despite that he made serious charges against the Czech Minister and gave him instructions to tell the Czech Government that if such events should recur he would take the most severe measures against the people who were disturbing the peace and, furthermore, that he would hold the entire Czech Government liable. The language used by Hitler was quite uncontrolled and the proceeding was extremely distressing to us who were listening. After the Czech Minister had left, we stayed with Hitler for a few minutes longer. He asked me how long I would remain in Berlin and I told him 1 to 2 days. Then we were asked to dinner, but there was no further discussion about these incidents. Hitler asked State Secretary Frank to come back later. Hitler said no word about the shooting of the leaders of the demonstration or taking the students to concentration camps; neither did he mention the closing of the universities. When, toward evening, I asked after the pilot of my airplane in order to give him instructions, I was told at the airport that he had flown back to Prague in my airplane together with Frank.
VON NEURATH: The following day I returned to Prague by train and only then did I learn that Hitler had decreed the closing of all Czech universities for 3 years, the arrest of some 1,200 students and their transfer to a concentration camp, as well as the shooting of the ringleaders of the demonstration. At the same time a proclamation, which was signed with my name, was submitted to me in which these orders were announced which had been published in the press and had been posted publicly. I had Frank summoned immediately and challenged him with these unheard-of things which had taken place without my knowledge. He referred to a specific decree of Hitler's. I had not even seen this proclamation. My name had been affixed to it illegally by Frank. Even as my deputy, he was not justified in doing this; but later, through an official in my office, I learned that Frank often misused my name in this way. If I had had any advance knowledge of these decrees of Hitler-and, of course, he had the opportunity to reach me by telephone in Berlin-I would naturally have objected to these decrees and at that time would have asked to resign. Immediately I tried to have these students released. I tried with Hitler personally and tried going to Himmler, and gradually most of them were released, I believe more than 800 in all, the last of their number being released in the summer of 1941. Shortly after this incident, when I was again present in Berlin, I complained bitterly to Hitler about his conduct toward me. He evaded an answer, as far as I recall, but he promised me that the students would be released very soon and that the Czech universities would be reopened after 1 year. Neither of these promises did he keep.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I should like to read to you the answer of Legation Counsellor Von Holleben, who at that time participated in the Protectorate Government, to Question 21 of his interrogatory of 18 May 1946. This interrogatory may be found under Number 158 in my Document Book 5. The answer of Herr Von Holleben reads as follows: "The student riots of October and November 1939 were a turning point in the history of the Protectorate. I cannot give you a chronological repetition of the events from memory. However, I can state the following: The manifestations which took place on 28 October 1939, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the constitution of the Czechoslovak State, in Prague and Brno, mainly by the academic youth, were to be expected. Therefore, Herr Von Neurath, previous to 28 October 1939, issued orders to ignore them quietly as far as possible and only to interfere when they assumed the character of a serious danger to public peace and safety. Because of noncompliance with this order the greater part, if not the whole of the disaster resulted. Immediately after the conference with Hitler Frank returned to Prague. The office of the Reich Protector, who himself was still in Berlin, had only received knowledge of the measures taken against the students on 15 and 16 November on the following morning, partly through the numerous appeals which the members of the families of the arrested students made at the office of Herr Von Neurath. In my opinion Herr Von Neurath did not learn of these sanctions against students until after they had taken place. I personally did not report this matter to him, and I cannot tell you just who did report to Von Neurath on this matter. It is my firm conviction that the proclamation in question, addressed to the Czech people, was given out without the knowledge of Herr Von Neurath, and through misuse of his name. I remember distinctly that because of this he had heated arguments with Frank. At that time he remained in office, for he believed that by remaining he could prevent much more disaster.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: He considered the closing of the universities an unwarranted) intervention in the life of the Czech people. He tried with all the means at his disposal to have the Czech university teachers and students, who had been taken to German concentration camps, liberated subsequently, and until such liberation, to have them accommodated in special sections." In this connection, I should also like to submit to the Tribunal an affidavit which I just received a few days ago from the secretary of Herr Von Neurath at that time, Fraulein Irene Friedrich. This is dated 6 June 1946, and from it we can see quite clearly that at the time this announcement was issued and published, Herr Von Neurath had not yet returned from Berlin, and therefore that it was quite impossible for Herr Von Neurath to have had knowledge of this proclamation. I should like to ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this affidavit. I should also like to refer. . .
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the affidavit?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Number 159, Mr. President. I should like to refer further to a document of the Czech Prosecution: Appendix 5 of Supplement Number 1, a memorandum of Herr Von Neurath dated 26 March 1940 which has been submitted. This deals with the discussion with President Hacha regarding the arrested students and also shows that Herr Von Neurath tried, and kept on trying, to have these students released.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give us the number for that? You said Document Book 5.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: No, that is attached to the Czech report, USSR-60, and is not in my document book. I was only referring to that. Apart from these two actions which were decreed by Hitler personally, did other arrests take place on a rather large scale during the time of your office?
VON NEURATH: No, but single instances of arrest did take place recurrently, and I continually intervened anew to have them investigated and perhaps rescinded, at the suggestion of the Czech Government and private people.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to read a few more sentences from the document of the Czech Prosecution, USSR-60, to be found on Page 59 of the English text. I quote: "Immediately after the occupation representatives of the 'Sokol' (Falcon) athletic association, which had 1 million members, joined a movement for the liberation of the country; this included the underground movement at home and the movement abroad. The idea of the 'Sokol' united the army members abroad and gave strength and enthusiasm even in the hardest time. This was true at home to an even larger extent. The Gestapo was aware of this danger, and therefore proceeded with the utmost severity. In the beginning, their measures were moderate, but when they realized the firm resolve of the 'Sokols,' they began to use force. The first arrests took place on the day of the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and a further large number of arrests on 1 September 1939. Then extensive arrests of single individuals and of organizations followed." Will you please comment on this.
VON NEURATH: The "Sokol" was the most dangerous organization hostile to the State in the Protectorate. The extent of its activity can be seen especially from the sentences of the Czech Indictment which have just been read. It was taken for granted that machinations of this kind could not be tolerated, especially in war, and the report itself characterizes the first police measures as "still moderate." I am convinced that in no other country would such intrigues (underground movements) have been treated any differently. In such cases of undoubted high treason or cases of sabotage, I could not possibly intervene for the people responsible, and moreover, the Czech Government quite understood this.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report further mentions shootings under martial law. Did such shootings occur during your period of office?
VON NEURATH: No, apart from the case of the nine students which has already been mentioned I know of no shootings under martial law during my time in office.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did Frank, aside from his disastrous activity as Higher SS and Police Leader, as your State Secretary try to use his influence in the policy and administration of the Protectorate, and did you work closely with him in that respect?
VON NEURATH: Frank represented one-sided, radical German interests. That was the old Sudeten-German hatred of the Czechs. I repeatedly curbed these tendencies, but as my representative he, in practice, took part in the general policy and in the administration.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was your personal relationship to Frank?
VON NEURATH: From the very beginning it was bad because of the fact that he was so radical, and beyond that, I quite soon realized that very frequently he did not tell me the truth.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was your personal and official relationship to President Hacha and to the Czech Government?
VON NEURATH: In general, good. The Czech Government at that time was convinced of the fact that my intentions for fair and lust treatment of the Czech population were quite sincere, and that I did everything within my power to realize my intentions. On the other hand, I fully understood and recognized in every respect the efforts of the Czech Government to represent primarily the interests of the people. As to my personal relationship to President Hacha, I might go so far as to say it was very good. I always tried to facilitate Mr. Hacha's difficult task as far as I could, for I knew that he, too, through his assumption of the post of President and through his remaining in office was making a great personal sacrifice. He and the members of the Government were always invited to all occasions which did not have a purely German character, and were treated with distinction in accordance with their rank.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was the manner of work of your office in Prague? Were you quite independent in your work or were you in your office bound by directives from Berlin?
VON NEURATH: My answer in this respect is a rather tedious matter. The fundamentals of policy and the administration of the departments were determined in Berlin as far as they applied to the Protectorate, that is, by Hitler himself or by department ministers. My field was the supervision of the execution and application of these principles as they applied to the Protectorate, always considering the special circumstances which arose from the ethical, cultural, and economic structure of the country. Obviously, above all in war, the Protectorate, which was situated in the center of the Reich, could not be treated as an independent unit but had to be incorporated into the general pattern. As I have already stated, the various branches of my authority had been established by the central offices in Berlin. The officials of these branches, therefore, from the beginning, had certain practical connections with their parent ministries, even though they were later subordinate to me. The individual heads of the branches received their directives in regard to specific problems direct from their department ministries in Berlin. Then those directives were submitted to Under State Secretary Von Burgsdorff, who was the head of the administration, or, if they were very fundamental matters, also to me. The carrying out of these measures in the Protectorate was in that way discussed, and subsequently settled with the Czech Minister. Thus were established the decrees and basic directives which were signed by me or by my deputy. Frequently these dealt with the introduction of legal or administrative measures which already existed in the Reich, or which were newly issued in the Reich. Apart from that, a series of directives applying to the Protectorate were issued directly by the competent Berlin ministries. The Reich Minister of the Interior had been designated as the so-called central agency for the release of these Reich directives.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to refer to the following documents to be found in my Document Book 5: Documents Number 145, a decree from the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor dealing with the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, supplementing the decree of 22 March 1939; Number 146, extracts from basic regulations applying to the Protectorate, dealing with commercial transactions with the Protectorate, dated 28 March 1939; Number 147, a directive as to the administration of criminal justice in the Protectorate, dated 14 April 1939; Number 148, a directive dealing with statutory law in the Protectorate, dated 7 June 1939; and I should like to refer to a document which has already been submitted, Number 149, the regulation dealing with the structure of the administration and the German Security Police. In this connection I should like to remark that all these directives were signed, not by the Reich Protector, but rather by the competent Reich department minister, and sometimes also by Reich Marshal Goering as Chairman of the Reich Defense Council. The legal basis for the authority of the Protector is the decree by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor in regard to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia dated 16 March 1939, signed by Hitler, Frick . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Will you ask the defendant to clear up what his concern was with these decrees of the Reichsfuehrer and of the Defendant Goering.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: No, Mr. President, I wanted to show that he had nothing to do with these matters but that he was obliged to carry them out. According to the decree which put him in office it was his duty to supervise these measures, which were issued by agencies in the Reich. That was what I wanted to prove, that all these directives did not originate with him, but rather with the Reichsfuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that right, Defendant?
VON NEURATH: Yes. I should like to remark that I was chiefly concerned with seeing that these matters were duly published in Z4 June 46 the Protectorate, and then having my agencies supervise their execution.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: How far did the autonomy of the Protectorate reach in all these decisions?
VON NEURATH: The extent of autonomy was not clearly defined. Basically the Protectorate was autonomous, and it was administered by its own Czech authorities and Czech of finials. But in the course of time considerable restrictions were placed on this state of autonomy, as was provided for in the decree which you have just read. The introduction of these restrictions was regarded as practical by the Reich Government and resulted, in part, from general tendencies toward centralization in Berlin, but it was also necessitated to a large extent by the general political development in view of the war and of the so-called totalization of the war effort. I constantly objected to these restrictions insofar as in my opinion they did not correspond with the vital needs of the Protectorate and of its people.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to refer to Article 3 of the order which has already been quoted, a decree issued by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor dealing with the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia; Number 144 of my Document Book 5. This reads: "1.) The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is autonomous and administers itself. "2.) Its sovereign rights as a Protectorate are exercised on the basis of the political, military, and economic interests of the Reich. "3.) These sovereign rights are upheld by its own organizations, its own authorities, and with its own officials." How about the Armed Forces offices in the Protectorate? Were you connected with them?
VON NEURATH: No, they were subordinate to a special Plenipotentiary of the Armed Forces who was to keep me advised about the basic military questions.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now, I should like to turn to specific points which are mentioned in the Czech report, USSR-60, and of which you are accused; To which extent were you competent for administering criminal justice in the Protectorate? Specifically, did you have to confirm death sentences against the Czechs?
VON NEURATH: The criminal justice of the German courts was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice in Berlin. The Czech courts were not under my jurisdiction at all. I was concerned only Z4 June 46 with decisions in cases of appeals for clemency against verdicts of German courts in the Protectorate, which were submitted to me by the President of the Provincial Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht). These, in special cases, might also apply to Czechs. However, they did not concern political crimes. Political proceedings against Czechs were, as far as I recall, handled by the Peoples' Court (Volksgerichtshof) in Berlin, insofar as they dealt with high treason. As far as I know, in these proceedings against Czechs the same basic principles were applied as against Germans.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you have the right to grant pardon when the Peoples' Court gave decisions against Czechs?
VON NEURATH: No, I had no possibility of influence, and I did not have the right to pardon.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In your time did you know anything about the activity of special courts in the Protectorate?
VON NEURATH: No, I cannot recall that special courts were active during the time I was there. In my opinion, this could apply only to German courts for the prosecution of specific offenses, for example, violations of radio regulations; such courts were established at the beginning of the war in the Reich. However, these courts were not under my jurisdiction, but directly subordinate to the Reich Minister of Justice. He appointed the judges, gave them their directives, and the judges reported directly to him. I had no opportunity of using influence in any way.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Regarding the activity of these special courts, I should like to quote one sentence from the Czech report, USSR-60. This may be found on Page 106 of the German text and Page 92 of the English text. It deals with orders and decrees that were to be applied by these special courts. I quote: "A large number of these orders and decrees violate principles that all civilized countries consider irrevocable." Is that report correct?
VON NEURATH: Yes, in this case I agree entirely with the Czech Prosecution report. But I should imagine that in the latest developments this principle has been considerably attenuated even among civilized peoples.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to know something about the alleged plans dealing with the Germanization of the areas in the Protectorate inhabited by Czechs. You said previously that, when you assumed office, you knew nothing about such plans. Who later revealed the pattern of these plans to you?
VON NEURATH: These plans in part originated with Sudeten-German circles, but in the main they could be traced back to the Z4 June 46 organizations of Himmler and also to suggestions on the part of the Gauleiter of Lower Danube.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In regard to this problem of alleged efforts at Germanization, I should like to read to you a report to the OKW dated 15 October 1940 by the Armed Forces Plenipotentiary General in the Protectorate, General Friderici. This is the document which has been submitted by the Prosecution under Document Number 862-PS, Exhibit Number USA-313; and it is concerned with statements about basic policy pursued in the Protectorate, which State Secretary Frank made in an official discussion with your office. In this document Frank mentions a memorandum in which, after careful investigation, the Reich Protector had defined his attitude toward the various plans of numerous offices. He mentions three possibilities of solution to the question of the possible Germanization of the Czech territory. You probably know this document and I do not believe that it is necessary for me to read it. What do you know about this memorandum? Did you compose it yourself? Tell us what you have to say about it.
VON NEURATH: The memorandum refers to the proposals which I just mentioned on the part of various Party offices for the possible resettlement of the Czechs. I objected to this plan from the very beginning as being quite absurd and incapable of execution. Frank, who agreed with me on this point, therefore at my direction drew up this memorandum which you have just mentioned, in which the radical measures of the SS and of the Party were rejected and in which the so-called gradual assimilation was considered as the only possible solution of this problem. In this way I wanted to postpone the matter and thwart the plans of the SS. Since these plans for resettlement had already been put by Himmler before the Fuehrer, I required a rather stringent directive from the latter in order to quash them. However, for tactical reasons I had to make some sort of proposal: Hence, that of the policy of assimilation, because with this suggestion the matter was in practice postponed. In order to forestall countermeasures by the SS and Himmler, I reported to the Fuehrer personally about the matter and asked him to issue a stringent directive, which he did. Thus the matter was buried and was not taken up again. The sentence found in this memorandum to the effect that ". . . Germanization would have to be carried out for a number of years by the office of the Reich Protector..." means specifically that the SS could no longer interfere in this matter. The Reich Protector alone was to be the competent authority, and the Reich Protector did nothing. Moreover, the statement of General Friderici, who was equally opposed to radical fantasy, to the effect that ". . .as far as the Armed Forces were concerned there would be no important consequences, since he had always adhered to this concept..." goes to show the same. If after this report Frank said that ". . . the elements which were working contrary to the intended Germanization would have to be handled roughly and would have to be eliminated..." these were merely his words and the type of language that was used in speeches of that kind.