dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. SIEMERS: I should be grateful to Sir David if he would read the entire sentence; that is, if he would also read Note 6, which appears after the Number 118 and after the word "ordered." Note 6 which, as I have just observed, is not included in the English translation is worded as follows: "Chief of the Naval Budget Department, B. Number E 311/42, Top Secret, of 19 November 1942." The figure, Mr. President, refers to a much later period, not 1938 at all. I should be extremely grateful if, after the experience we have just had, I could in future have not only the German document but also the English translation from Sir David. I should be very grateful to Sir David if he could have this done.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you not have the passage you want translated from the German into English by the time you want to re-examine? As I understand it, you are referring to some note which is an addition to what has been translated into English. Will you read it again, would you read the passage again?
DR. SIEMERS: Sir David has been reading the following: "In reality 118 were completed and under construction." That is as far as Sir David has read. After the word "ordered" there is the figure 6. This refers to Note 6. Note 6 is worded as follows: "Chief of the Naval Budget Department, B. Number E 311/42, Top Secret, of 19 November 1942. (Page 19)." In other words, this shows that the Number 118 must have been mentioned on Page 19 of this document of the Naval Budget Department in 1942. The figure therefore does not refer to the year 1938 but to a later date.
RAEDER: I can add another explanation to that which is quite possible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will look into that, but the text says-and there is no difference in the German text- exactly what I read-that "about 55 could have been provided up to 1938 and that in reality 118 were ready and ordered." That is Admiral Assmann's text.
DR. SIEMERS: But not 1938.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, My Lord, my friend, Dr. Siemers, will have ample opportunity-if there is any point, I shall consider it, but there is the text, and the text includes that. What the footnote says, Dr. Siemers, can be put in re-examination.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Sir David, will you look at the note and see if the report was made in 1942, rather than the construction? I, suggest that you ask him whether or not the note doesn't show that the report was made in 1942, rather than the construction-I suggest that you ask him whether or not the note doesn't show that the report was made in 1942, rather than the construction.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, my translation of this note is "Chief of the Naval Budget Department." Then it gives the reference to his note, dated 19 November 1942. It seems entirely to bear out the suggestion of the learned American Judge, that this is the reference to the report, nothing more. It is only suggesting that the date of construction was 1942, and I think it really would be a matter of convenience that, unless Dr. Siemers has got something to say on the text that I am putting, if he reserved these argumentative points to re-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you can raise it all in re-examination. You can have a translation of this note laid before us by that time.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I am perfectly agreeable. I have merely requested that one copy of the English translation of the newly submitted documents should be given to me. Mr. President, you will admit that it is a considerable handicap to me to ascertain during the cross-examination what passages are missing from the translation and translate them myself when the British Delegation have an English translation on hand. I think it might be easier if Sir David would be good enough to let me have an English translation for my own use.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you will be able to let him have an English translation of any new document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. The Tribunal has ordered that. That is prepared. Surely you got the English translation? Certainly, My Lord. As I put each document, a translation will be given to Dr. Siemers.
THE PRESIDENT: There may have been some mistake.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will certainly get it. [Turning to the defendants] Now, we will pass to another gentleman on your staff. You told us a good deal about the naval budgets. Do you remember a Flottenintendant in your department, Secretary Flottenintendant Thiele, of the OKM Department E, the Budget Department of the German Admiralty? Do you remember?
RAEDER: Yes. Mr. Prosecutor, may I just say one more thing about the question of 118? I have just remembered something in connection with this Number 6, Chief of the Naval Budget Department. It is perfectly possible that in this case Admiral Assmann has taken two things together. All U-boats and ships were, of course, included in the budget and in this way sanctioned. This budget was drafted at the end of the year and published before the year to which it applied. As this large figure suddenly appears in this document, it is perfectly possible that here the Figure 118 originates on the basis of the agreement with England made on 30 or 31 December. It is perfectly natural that we should include in the budget all the other U-boats which we were allowed to build to complete the 100 percent. This does not necessarily mean that we started to build the U-boats in 1938. Incidentally I think we might have perhaps begun, because one can only build so and so many U-boats in any one year. I think that this explanation, which occurred to me when I saw the words "Naval Budget Department," is a perfectly correct one.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Tribunal has the wording) that is, "up to 1938," and I am not going to argue the point with you. The words speak for themselves. I would like you to look at Document Number D-855, which becomes Exhibit Number GB-461, and it is an extract from a lecture by the gentleman I have just mentioned, Herr Thiele, which was given at the German Naval Training Center for Administrative Officers in Prague on 12 July 1944. The extract I want to put to you is on Page 22, and it is headed "Ship Construction Plan." Have you got that-Page 22, and the heading is "Ship Construction Plan"? You see the paragraph beginning: "The era of the very large development of the Navy had therefore come at the moment of the seizure of power. Already in the first year after this, in March 1935, the construction of battle cruisers with a displacement of 27,000 tons was undertaken. Such a vessel was ordered to be constructed. Thus one of the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which was the most important for us was at once violated in the naval sphere in a manner which in a short time could no longer be camouflaged." Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right when he says that in his lecture?
RAEDER: Of course it was a violation, but I have explained here at length that there was no question of building new battle cruisers but of utilizing the two armored ships which had already been granted us; and I said that in 1934 Hitler had only given me permission to enlarge somewhat the plans for these ships, so that the armor might be heavier. I see from this that it was not until March 1935, when it was certain that the treaty would be concluded and also that England would allow us to build such ships through this treaty in a few months' time that the Fuehrer sanctioned the plans projected for the 26,500 ton ships which were to be the first of the battleships in the new program; and they were then begun. So that the three 28 cm turrets-that is, the offensive weapons which he had not yet approved in 1934-were thrown in.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This gentleman seems to agree with you more than the other. Just look at what he says about U-boats two sentences further on. He says: "The U-boats were completed in separate parts, as their construction was under no circumstances to be apparent to the outside world. These parts were stored in sheds for the time being and needed only to be assembled after the declaration of freedom to rearm." Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that point?
RAEDER: Yes, he is right. We have admitted that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us look at his next point.
RAEDER: Perhaps I can complete my explanation? We...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do try to keep it as short as you can. I don't want to cut you out, but keep it as short as you can.
RAEDER: Of course, but I must complete my defense. We had U-boat parts manufactured abroad and only at the beginning of 1935 did we bring them in and assemble them, when the naval treaty was certain. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE I see. You say you were anticipating the treaty; well now, just look at what he says after that: "The third also of those clauses of the Treaty of Versailles that was most disadvantageous for us, the limitation of personnel to 15,000 men, was immediately ignored after the seizure of power. The total personnel of the Navy was already 25,000 in 1934, and in 1935, the year of the London Naval Agreement, 34,000 men." Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that? Is that right?
RAEDER: Yes, that is admitted. It was clear that we had to train personnel in good time so that crews might be available for our increased naval forces.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now I just want you to look for a moment at the document which is on Page 3 of Document Book 10, which you did refer to in your examination-in-chief. That is Document C-23, about the displacement of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau and the Tirpitz and the Bismarck and the other ships. Now, you are familiar with that document; we have discussed it.
RAEDER: Yes. I know the documents.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, that is dated the 18th of February, 1938. Germany didn't denounce the Anglo-German Naval Treaty until after the British guarantee to Poland in April 1939, which is 14 months later. Why didn't you simply send a notification to Great Britain that the displacements had come out 20 percent bigger because of defensive matters in construction? Why didn't you do it?
RAEDER: I cannot tell you that today. We explained recently how the displacements gradually increased through quite insignificant changes to our own detriment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Really, Defendant, I have got that well in mind. We have got the reason why the displacements came out bigger, and I don't think you are prejudicing yourself if you don't repeat it, but just look at the bottom of that page, because I think you will find the reason which you can't remember there; won't you? "In the opinion of A IV, it would be quite wrong to report a larger tonnage than that which will probably be published shortly, for instance, by England, Russia, or Japan, so as not to bring upon ourselves the odium of an armament race." Isn't that the reason?
RAEDER: Yes, that was intended for a future date. We wished in no circumstance to create the impression that we were increasing the offensive power of our ships
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I am going to pass to another subject, and I want to put quite shortly and bluntly, as you will appreciate, the point the Prosecution puts to you, that for 20 years, from 1918 to 1938, you and the German Navy had been involved in a course of complete, cold and deliberate deception of your treaty obligations. That is what I am putting to you. Do you understand? After these documents, do you deny that that is so?
RAEDER: Of course. It was not a cold-blooded affair. All our evasions of the Versailles Treaty were due to our desire to be able to defend our country more efficiently than we had been allowed to. I have proved here that in the Versailles regulations the only points restricted were those unfavorable to the defense of our country and favoring aggression from without. As regards the ships, I may add that we could never complete any very great number of ships, and consequently we were interested in increasing as far as possible the power of resistance, that is, their seagoing security, et cetera . At no time did we increase the offensive power above the strength which was permitted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I want you to understand what my next series of questions is directed to. I don't want there to be any misapprehension. I am now going to suggest to you that these breaches of treaty and your naval plans were directed toward the possibility, and then the probability of war. I would just like you to take the same document that I have been dealing with, C-23. We will use that to pass from one to the other. Would you turn to Page 5 of Document Book 10, and there you will see that there is a memorandum, I think of the Planning Committee to the Flottenchef, Admiral Carls. We have heard your view of Admiral Carls, that you thought he was a very good officer, and in fact he was your first choice for your successor. Now, that is in September 1938, and it is a top secret opinion on the strategic study of naval warfare against England, and you see "A" says: "There is full agreement with the main theme of the study." Now, look at Paragraph 1: "If, according to the Fuehrer's decision, Germany is to acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions, but also secure naval communications and secure access to the oceans." Do you agree with that, Defendant?
RAEDER: Yes, that is correct. I know the whole document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at 2: "Both these requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to Anglo-French interests, and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that this can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power, therefore, forces upon us the necessity of -making corresponding preparations for war." Do you agree with that?
RAEDER: Yes, that is all quite correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let's take 3: "War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well, and a large number of countries overseas-in fact, against half to two-thirds of the whole world." I needn't ask you about that, because the facts have shown it. Now, look at the next: "It can only be justified...."
RAEDER: Yes, but I must be allowed to comment on that document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh certainly, I'm sorry. We got on so quickly I thought we were not going to have any explanation.
RAEDER: In 1938, as has been stated here quite often, the Fuehrer's attitude towards Great Britain became more difficult in spite of all the efforts of General Von Blomberg and myself to tell him that it was not so on England's side, and that it was possible to live in peace with England. In spite of that the Fuehrer ordered us to prepare for possible opposition by England to his plans. He for his part never contemplated a war of aggression against Great Britain; and we in the Navy still much less; in fact, I have proved that I did nothing but try to dissuade him from that. In 1938 he ordered us to make a study similar to those we had already made in the case of other possibilities of war-which it was the duty of the Wehrmacht Command to do-but dealing with the course which a war against England might take and what we would require for it. This study was prepared, and I reported to the Fuehrer that we could never increase our fighting forces to such an extent that we could undertake a war against England with any prospect of success-- it would have been madness for me to say such a thing. I told him-that has repeatedly been mentioned- that by 1944 or 1945 we might build up a small naval force with which we could start an economic war against England or seize her commercial shipping routes, but that we would never really be in a position to defeat England with that force. I sent this study, which was compiled under my guidance in the Naval Operations Staff, to Generaladmiral Carls who was very clear-sighted in all such questions. He thought it his duty to explain in this introduction of his reply, which agreed with our opinion, the consequences which such a war against Great Britain would have for ourselves, namely, that it would bring about a new world war, which neither he nor we in the Navy nor anyone in the Armed Forces wanted- in my opinion, not even Hitler himself, as I proved the other day-hence this statement.
RAEDER: He said that if we must have war with England, it was essential that we should first of all have access to the ocean and, secondly, that we should attack English trade on the sea route of the Atlantic. Not that he proposed that we, on our part, should embark on such a venture. He was only thinking of the case of such a war breaking out very much against our will. It was our duty to go thoroughly into the matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He says that, "The war against it"-that is the war against England-"can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily." Then you go on to say "waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean." Now, I just want to see how you prepared.
RAEDER: Yes, that is quite clear and quite correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let's just look how you had begun to prepare economically. Let's take that first, as you put it first. Would you look at Document C-29, which is Page 8.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, hadn't we better break off now before going into this? [A recess was taken.]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I told you, Defendant, that I was next going to ask you a question about Document C-29, which is on Page 8 of the English Document Book 10 and on Pages 13 and 14 of the German document book. You will remember, this document gives general directions for export given by the German Navy to the German armament industry...
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: . . . and you told us when you were dealing with the document that you wanted your service not to be small-minded about matters of a not very high secrecy but, in addition to that, your general policy was that the German armament firms should develop a foreign trade so that they would have the capacity to deal with the increased demands of the German Navy as soon as possible. Is that right, is that a fair summary, or shall I repeat it?
RAEDER: Yes, but it must be added that I said in two places that we hoped at that time that the Treaty of Versailles would be relaxed, because it was a comparatively favorable period for negotiations for disarmament and we already had the governments headed by Von Papen and Von Schleicher, both of whom showed great understanding for the needs of the Armed Forces and therefore fought hard for that at the disarmament conference. So a definitely legal development might be hoped for in this direction; and on the other hand, our entire industry was unable to cope with armaments production except on an insignificant scale and had therefore to be increased. I again stress the fact that it had nothing to do with the Hitler regime. That decree just happened to come out on 31 January.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don't think you are really disagreeing with me that your policy, your broad economic policy for the German armament industry, was to develop its export trade so as to be able to deal with increased home requirements in future years; that is what you advocated, isn't it, that the German armament industry should at once increase its export trade so as to be able to deal with increased home requirements when these requirements arose? Isn't that right?
RAEDER: Yes, that is correct but I do not quite understand that expression. Did you say "Eigenhandel" or "Eisenhandel"-internal trade or iron trade? I did not quite hear the expression-"Eigenhandel" or "Eisenhandel"?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "Aussenhandel" (Foreign Trade).
RAEDER: "Aussenhandel"-yes, undoubtedly we wanted to be able to compete industrially with other nations, so that our industry would be in favorable position, and would gain strength.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I will ask you to turn to Document Number C-135, which is Page 21 of the-sorry My Lord, Page 20 of the English document book and Page 73 of the German document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Book 10.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Book 10, My Lord, yes. [Turning to the defendant.] Now, you remember that document, you dealt with it? You said...
RAEDER: Yes, it was dealt with in the Lohmann affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is a document of the- I think, in April 1933, judging by the dates which I put to you a moment ago, and you said to the Tribunal in giving your evidence that it was mere chance that the. year 1938 was mentioned; that that was the same period as has been dealt with.
RAEDER: It has already been stated several times that the year 1938 was mentioned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Has it been mentioned in some Weimar Republic document? Will you just look at the second last paragraph; that will be on your Page 74, Page 21 of the English document. It is in the middle paragraph of Paragraph 3: "Now Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler had made the clear political request to build up for him in 5 years, that is, by the first of April 1938, armed forces which he could place in the balance as an instrument of political power." Is that sure, that Hitler had made a clear political request?
RAEDER: Yes, as far as I remember, he demanded a sort of five year plan in 1933 the last year of which, 1938, happened to coincide with the 1938 mentioned in our substitute plan for subsurface construction, and that directive had obviously been given for the whole of the Armed Forces; since the naval agreement, which gave us the right to arm only in the proportion of 1:3 and not in accordance with any special plans, had become the basis for the Navy as early as 1935.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The point that I want to deal with is this: Did Hitler tell you that he wanted these forces to place in the balance as an instrument of political power, did he tell you that?
RAEDER: I can no longer tell you that; but I believe that it is a perfectly ordinary expression to say that one uses one's armed forces as an instrument which could also be thrown into the scales at political negotiations, so that we need no longer be kicked around by the different nations, as had so far been the case. In my opinion, no suspicion attaches to the expression.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To put it bluntly, Hitler was telling you, "by 1938 I want armed forces that I can use in war, if war should become necessary." That is what it means, isn't it? That is what you understood it to mean, isn't that right?
RAEDER: No. There was no word about a war, only about the fact that we had to keep our position among the other nations so that we could no longer be tossed aside, as had hitherto been the case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If anyone tried to push you over, you could fight; that is it, wasn't it?