dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. STEINBAUER: The Defendant Kaltenbrunner told me that he and you were at this time very closely shadowed by Heydrich. Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Heydrich in particular was among those who distrusted us, and "us" includes Kaltenbrunner. At the end of 1937 Heydrich wrote a secret report, which I later received. In this report he said that the solution of the Austrian question in favor of the Party was inescapable, that the policy of State Councillor Seyss-Inquart might, however, prove to be the only obstacle, for he would be in a position to produce something like Austrian National Socialism. After the Anschluss a so-called "escort" detail was attached to me with the sole task of sending to Heydrich constant reports on what I was doing. I had as little objection to this as to the fact that, as Austrian Minister of Security, my telephone conversations were intercepted.
DR. STEINBAUER: After you had allegedly played the main role in this affair, what reward did you receive for your activity? Were you given an estate or a gratuity of several hundred thousand marks? Did you ever receive anything like that?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, and there was no question of anything like that. My reward was the knowledge of having worked for the formation of Greater Germany.
DR. STEINBAUER: I would still like to ask you: Did you ever receive anything?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. On my fiftieth birthday...
DR. STEINBAUER: But you received a title, did you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Do you mean the title of Gruppenfuehrer of the SS? On 15 March I was named Gruppenfuehrer of the SS, as an honorary rank. I must add that I did not try to obtain it and that I went through no examinations or other such things. As a rule an honorary rank in the SS does not entail membership in the general SS; it does not bestow on the holder either command or disciplinary powers. I myself learned that when I complained to Himmler about Burckel and demanded proceedings-that letter has been submitted here. Himmler told me then that he had no disciplinary powers over Burckel, who held only an honorary rank. I myself, as regards the SS...
DR. STEINBAUER: I think that is sufficient.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, as I understood it, the defendant said that he received a secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich. What was that secondary post? Is that what you said?
SEYSS-INQUART: Heydrich wrote a secret report against me. No, I am sorry, Heydrich sent an "escort" detail...
THE PRESIDENT: You said in 1937 Heydrich issued a secret report about Austria, and then said that the solution was unavoidable except for the policy of Seyss-Inquart. That was the substance of it, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not quite understand that.
THE PRESIDENT: And after that, I understood you to say you received a secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, Heydrich sent four or five of his men to accompany me as a kind of guard escort, and these men had orders to report my movements to him.
THE PRESIDENT: I see; I must have misunderstood the translation.
DR. STEINBAUER: To sum up, I can say that apart from your appointment as SS Gruppenfuehrer you received no awards; with the exception of a promise that you would become Reich Minister within a year? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: This promise was given at the end of April 1938. I refer to a question in the cross-examination of the Reich Marshal. Before 13 March 1938 I did not receive the slightest promise from the Reich on anything and was not in any way under obligation to anyone or bound to obey anyone in the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: And with that I can close the chapter on Austria and briefly discuss the Czechoslovakian question. You are accused, on the basis of a congratulatory letter sent to the Fuehrer by Henlein, of having taken an active part in the annexation of Czechoslovakia.
SEYSS-INQUART: In the affairs of September 1938 I had no other part at all than that of receiving, as Reichsstatthalter in Austria, the refugees from the border areas, lodging, and caring for them in Austria. Henlein, and a few other leaders, I knew personally but did not interfere in their politics and was not well acquainted with their relations to the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: What can you say about Slovakia?
SEYSS-INQUART: The relations between Vienna and Bratislava were very good even at the time of the old Austrian Monarchy. I myself had relatives in Bratislava. Hence the Slovaks and the Germans knew each other well. We knew in particular the complaint of the Slovaks that the promise of Pittsburgh had not been kept, that they had not received full autonomy of Slovakia. Father Hlinka was in favor of complete autonomy; he was venerated in Slovakia as a saint, and at least three-quarters of the Slovakian people were behind him; he advocated independence from the Parliament in Prague and the adoption of Slovakian as the official language. After March 1938-to be exact, after September 1938- I met a few Slovakian politicians, Sidor, Dr. Tiso, Dr. Churchansky, and perhaps one or two others. The Fuehrer himself once asked me to inform him and to send him a report on Slovakian conditions; and I commissioned two of my colleagues, who had very good personal connections in Slovakia, to obtain the desired information. In March 1939 I talked to Sidor and Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to confer with me on possible Berlin-Prague developments and their consequences for Slovakia; at least, so I was told by my colleagues who had invited me. Mention was made in these discussions of the possibility of a Berlin-Prague clash and of the concern for the integrity of Slovakia, because there was the danger that the Hungarians, and the Poles too, might take advantage of the occasion by occupying Slovakian territory. The Slovakian gentlemen wanted assurances on what Berlin intended to do and what they could do to preserve the integrity of their country. I spoke very openly with these gentlemen; but I did not ask them to declare their independence, for they themselves had to make that decision. We discussed rather the question of whether differences between Slovakian and German interests existed, and we established that they did not exist.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to two documents. One is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-71, Page 181. This is the reference to the Pittsburgh Treaty. The second document is Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-72 (Document Number D-751), Page 183, submitted by the Prosecution as Exhibit Number USA-112, as proof that the defendant was in unlawful contact with the Slovakians. You are, of course, acquainted with this document, Witness. It is a report of Viscount Halifax, of 21 March 1939. Who was in Bratislava with you at that time? Or were you there at all?
SEYSS-INQUART: State Secretary Keppler was at that time sent from Berlin to Vienna with the task of putting certain questions to the Slovakian Government. Both Burckel and I had refused to take over such an assignment; that was one of the few instances in which I agreed with Burckel. As chief of territorial administration it fell to me to make preparations for the visit to Bratislava, and it was agreed that State Secretary Keppler would go to Bratislava in my car. Burckel and I accompanied Keppler. No generals or other representatives of the Wehrmacht were present. The record of the conversations may be considered accurate.
DR. STEINBAUER: It says in the document "and five German generals."
SEYSS-INQUART: That is wrong. I should like to call the Court's attention to the-fact that both the Slovakian Minister Sidor and Monsignor Tiso, who later became President, declare in this document that they negotiated only with Burckel; the name Seyss-Inquart does not appear at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then, to sum up, can I say that you did not engage in the activity with which the Prosecution charge you in connection with Czechoslovakia or Slovakia? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: At any rate, I do not think that, in pursuing the interests of the Reich, I overstepped those limits which in such negotiations must be conceded to someone charged with representing legitimate interests. I did not participate when on 12 March Dr. Tiso through Burckel-I did not overstep the limits justified in representing legitimate interests of the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is sufficient. Then in 1939, on 1 May 1939, you became Minister without Portfolio. Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you ever take part in a Cabinet session, or a session of the Secret Defense Council?
SEYSS-INQUART: It no longer existed.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have influence in any way on the decision to make war on Poland?
SEYSS-INQUART: In no way whatever.
DR. STEINBAUER: When the war with Poland had actually begun, did you express your opinion on it to Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the second week of September I wrote a letter to Hitler. I hope that this letter too is among my Vienna files. I read a copy of it about a year and a half ago, and I remember the contents well. I called Hitler's attention to the fact that among the German people there was no enthusiasm at all; but, on the contrary, the gravest concern that it would be a life-and-death struggle. I expressed my opinion that the war would not end by a military solution but would have to be solved politically and that the basis for such a political solution would be the alliance with the Soviets, which should perhaps be extended to a military alliance. Consideration should be given to the fact that the Soviets, like Czarist Russia, would never abandon their interests in the Balkans and that Pan-Slavism would also play a role; consequently, Russia would have to be reckoned with in the Czechoslovakian and Polish questions. I said that it was necessary at all costs to maintain the belt of neutral states. Then the war on the narrow Western Front would run its course. The Italian policy, however, should not become a burden for Germany; but an agreement should be reached with Greece and Turkey. England could not be defeated through the air or by U-boats; one had to attack her position in the Mediterranean to force her to make peace.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive an answer to this letter from the Fuehrer?
SEYSS-INQUART: I received no direct answer, but once in a conversation he made a remark which showed clearly that he had read the letter. He said to me, "I do not want to destroy the British Empire at all," whereby, however, he implied that he had miss understood my letter.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, if the Tribunal agree, I think this would be a suitable time to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
DR. STEINBAUER: We last spoke about your attitude with regard to the question of Czechoslovakia. You talked about your position as Reich Governor in Vienna, and described your intolerable relations with Burckel, which was the reason why you changed your work and went to Poland. What were your functions in Poland?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I was appointed administrative chief for Southern Poland, which position actually came within the organization of the Armed Forces. This administrative post, however, was never set up, since the Government General was created forthwith and I became the Deputy of the Governor General. My sphere of influence was legally defined but depended, of course, upon the different cases in which the Governor General needed me as his deputy. On 19 January 1940, he determined this at a conference.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to Document Seyss-Inquart-73, on Page 185, which is an extract from Dr. Frank's diary. On Page 14 of this diary he describes the functions of Seyss-Inquart, and then on Page 30 he says something which he repeated to main person, namely, that he bore the responsibility for what happened there. Now, you became the deputy of the Governor General-although by rank as a Reich Minister you were actually placed higher-and you exercised certain functions there which, as we have heard, consisted primarily of making out reports. Under Document Number 2278-PS is a report which you yourself wrote, in which there are certain things for which you are accused. Will you please tell us what you have to say about this report on your official travels.
SEYSS-INQUART: My secretary wrote that report. I have read it, of course.
DR. STEINBAUER: It is Exhibit USA-706.
SEYSS-INQUART: It is brought against me, among other things, that the Governor of Lublin had suggested that the Jews be transferred from Lublin to the district of Cycow and then decimated. The Prosecution itself has stated that this is an insertion made by the writer. In any case this was not an official report at a meeting. Cycow itself was a settlement occupied by a group of Germans, and by employing Jews in that area I could hardly be suspected of wanting to exterminate the Jews in that district because of the climatic conditions. I knew, however, that it was the Governor's wish to have the very large Jewish population of Lublin removed from the town. I remember nothing of any specific intention expressed by the word "decimating" in the sense of annihilating. The Governor of Radom reported to me that desperate criminals there had been shot. It is true, he did tell me that. I was under the impression that this had been done by the summary courts martial, which still functioned at the time. But there are several passages in this same report where I always point out that German courts must be introduced, and that no sentence must be carried out without proper court procedure. I think that quite probably I said the same thing at the time I was at Radom-only this is not mentioned in the report. I have been accused of wanting to monopolize certain vital products, such as salt, et cetera. That was quite natural, considering the economic chaos in which we found Poland. We had to arrive at a "natural" economic system, and supply the agricultural population with certain products so that they in turn could supply food to the Polish town populations. In this connection I wish to point out that I urged the reestablishment of the Polish National Relief Organization under the former Polish management, and that I asked for 9 million zloty to be placed at its disposal also for motor vehicles, et cetera. In addition to this I said that compulsory work must be replaced by normal employment as soon as possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, the so-called "AB Action" plays a considerable part in the Polish question. It is an abbreviation for "extraordinary pacification action." Since that might still have happened in your time, I should like to ask if you know anything about it.
SEYSS-INQUART: This affair took place during the very last period of my stay in Poland. With the beginning of the Norwegian campaign the resistance movement in Poland became extremely active, and grew as a result of the campaign in the West. The Security Police demanded the severest countermeasures. Buhler really made the objection which he stated here on this witness stand. I always understood the Governor General's words just as Bubler wanted them to be understood. But Bubler was quite right in making the objection, because the Police might have interpreted these words as giving them much greater powers than the Governor General intended to give them. Dr. Frank always opposed the sentences passed by these summary courts martial, and he set up his own investigation commission. I was the chairman of this commission as long as I was in Poland, and sometimes we canceled as many as 50 percent of the sentences imposed.
DR. STEINBAUER: How long were you actually Deputy during your period of office, when Dr. Frank was prevented from carrying out his duties?
SEYSS-INQUART: Ten days, I believe. 10 June
DR. STEINBAUER: Ten days. Well, then, I think I can rapidly wind up the Polish question by asking: Did you introduce any measures which could really be said to be in the interests of the Polish population?
SEYSS-INQUART: During the winter of 1939-40 there was a famine in Polish towns. I myself intervened with State Secretary Backe, and on one occasion, for instance, I obtained 6,000 tons of grain for the large cities. I approached Reich Marshal Goering and the Fuehrer too, and asked for the town of Lodz to be left under the administration of the Government General. I did the same for the coal district west of Krakow.
DR. STEINBAUER: I now come to the main part of the accusation held against you, and that is the question of your activities in the Netherlands. My first question is this: How did you become Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Fuehrer appointed me.
DR. STEINBAUER: And where were you at the time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was on a service mission in the Government General, and Dr. Lammers called me to headquarters.
DR. STEINBAUER: So you did not apply for this job?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that did not even enter my mind. At that time I had just asked the Fuehrer for permission to join the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: But did not your war injury prevent your joining the Armed Forces?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had hoped that I might be useful somehow or other.
DR STEINBAUER: And what were the instructions the Fuehrer gave you with regard to your new position?
SEYSS-INQUART: The instructions are described in Document 997-PS, which vitas submitted by the Prosecution. That gives a fair picture of them.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is Exhibit RF-122.
SEYSS-INQUART: I was responsible for the civil administration, and, within this administrative task, I had to look after the interests of the Reich. Apart from this I had a political task. I was to see to it that while Dutch independence was maintained, the Netherlands should be persuaded to change their pro-British attitude for a pro-German one and enter into a close economic collaboration. I wish to draw your attention to Paragraph 3 of this document, in which I pointed out the difficulties connected with these two tasks, and the difficulties in co-ordinating them. I showed that one cannot co-ordinate the two so easily. An occupational power, I said, demands the suppression of all official activities and an awakening of a common political will, but grants such freedom which in the end may lead the Dutch to feel dependent on their own decisions. It was not my intention, therefore, to force upon the Dutch people any definite political will.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was this order of the Fuehrer ever altered later on?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, this order was never altered.
DR. STEINBAUER: How did you carry out this task from the political point of view? Did you ask the existing parties in Holland to co-operate?
SEYSS-INQUART: With the exception of the Marxists I allowed all parties to remain, and I gave them as much freedom to continue their activities as was compatible with the interests of the occupying forces. I particularly helped the National Socialist parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution make the accusation against you that in your speeches you often describe things quite differently from the way in which you carry them out. In this regard I refer to Document 3430-PS, Exhibit USA-708. It is asserted there that you tried to force National Socialism upon the Dutch. That is Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-76, on Page 197 of my document book.
SEYSS-INQUART: It is certainly correct that the goal which 1 had set for myself, and which I proclaimed in my speeches, was not reached in practice, nor could it have been. However, it may be possible that it gave the Dutch the impression that I was trying to force National Socialism upon them because, after all, later on I could admit only National Socialist parties, whereas I had to dissolve the others. I never used state methods of coercion to force any Dutchman to become a National Socialist, nor did I make membership in the National Socialist Party a condition for exercising the general rights and privileges to which every Dutchman was entitled. Incidentally, I referred to this quite clearly in my speech. I said: "I shall always act as a National Socialist.... But that does not mean that I shall force National Socialism on one single person. National Socialism is a matter of inner conviction. "There are two groups of organizations. There is the political, in the case of which I attach importance to the demand that each and every member be led to National Socialism-but these are absolutely voluntary organizations.... Then there is the vocational... in which it is immaterial what political views the individual has, as long as he fulfills his duties in his particular profession."
DR. STEINBAUER: Why and when did you dissolve the political parties in Holland?
SEYSS-INQUART: That happened during the second half of 1941. With the beginning of the Eastern campaign all the political parties, with the exception of the National Socialists, adopted an actively hostile attitude toward the occupational forces. In the interests of the occupational forces that could no longer be tolerated. I think it remarkable, to say the least, that for 11/~ years I allowed those parties to continue their work since, after all, they were no less hostile to National Socialism than National Socialism is today with regard to the democratic parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: Tell me, is it true or not that you showed partiality, and gave preference to the NSB Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite true as far as the field of political propaganda was concerned; it is untrue as far as state matters were concerned. The creation of a so-called National Political Secretariat has keen held up as an accusation against me. That was a National Socialist advisory body for my administration, and it was not allowed to exercise any influence on the Dutch administration. Any such attempts were strictly prohibited by me.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you not, nevertheless, put individual members of the NSB into state positions?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true, and it seemed a matter of course to me, because I had to find colleagues on whom I could rely. They were not under Party orders, however; on the contrary, in most cases certain differences developed between these people and the heads of the Party. In the face of urgent remonstrances I did not create a National Socialist government in the Netherlands-as was the case in Norway -and chiefly because certain Dutch gentlemen like General Secretary Van Damm, President Van Lohn of the Supreme Court, and Professor Schneider who was President of the Cultural Committee, urged me to realize how wrong it would be to do so.
DR. STEINBAUER: President Vorrink, a witness who has been examined here, talked about a policy of exploitation which you carried on. Is that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: The use of the National Socialist parties for the benefit of German policy did actually occur. I observed it, and I stated the fact publicly. I regretted this occurrence, but I could not stop it. The German occupational forces had to introduce a number of measures which were oppressive for the Dutch people, and which discredited our Dutch friends.
DR. STEINBAUER: What do you have to say to the accusation brought against you that you had co-ordinated all the cultural institutions?