dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
themselves. Thereupon Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop's statement, and said: "Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well." (2796-PS) Von Weizsacker's memorandum reads as follows: "Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary's attitude would be if the Fuehrer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech provocation by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured if Hungary marches towards the North and perhaps the East. Moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and 1 or 2 more years' time for its development should be allowed. "Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were between the pincers of the Axis Powers. Rumania alone would therefore not move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England would not recklessly risk her Empire. She knew our newly acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted since it would depend on Czech provocation. Von Ribbentrop repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good opportunity and participate. "The Hungarian reply thus remained a conditional one. Upon the question of von Ribbentrop, what purpose the desired General Staff conferences were to have, not much more was brought forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory of military material and preparedness for the Czech conflict. The clear political basis for such a conference-the time of Hungarian intervention-was not obtained. "In the meantime, more positive language was used by von Horthy in his talk with the Fuehrer. He wished not to hide his doubts with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put Hungary's intention to participate on record. The Hungarian Ministers were and remained, even later, more skeptical since they feel more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary with its unprotected flanks. "When von Imredy had a discussion with the Fuehrer in the afternoon, he was very relieved when the Fuehrer explained to him, that, in regard to the situation in question, he demanded nothing of Hungary. He himself would not know the time. Whoever wanted to join the
danger for Hungary with its unprotected flanks. "When von Imredy had a discussion with the Fuehrer in the afternoon, he was very relieved when the Fuehrer explained to him, that, in regard to the situation in question, he demanded nothing of Hungary. He himself would not know the time. Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs, he would have no objections." (2796-PS) By the third day of the conference the Germans were able to note that in the event of a German-Czech conflict Hungary would be sufficiently armed for participation on 1 October. Another captured German Foreign Office Memorandum reports a conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 August 1938. The last paragraph of this memorandum states: "Concerning Hungary's military preparedness in case of a German-Czech conflict von Kanya mentioned several days ago that his country would need a period of one to two years in order to develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary. During today's conversation von Kanya corrected this remark and said that Hungary's military situation was much better. His country would be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to take part in the conflict by October 1st of this year." (2797-PS) The signature to this document is not clear, but it appears to be that of von Weizsacker. These accounts of the German-Hungarian conference are corroborated by General Jodl's diary. The entry for 21-26 August reads as follows: "21-26 August: "Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (Reichsverweser). Accompanied by the Prime minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honored Minister v. Raatz. "They arrive with the idea that in the course of a great war, after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them. "Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they
demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them. "Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude." (1780-PS) The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a staff conference on 6 September. Jodl's diary entry for that day states: "6 September: "Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer. "Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Fuehrer-especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel." (1780-PS) G. Final Preparations for the Attack. The setting in which these events took place was that of the Munich Pact and the international crisis which led to it. As this crisis was developing in August and September 1938, frantic efforts were being made by the statesmen of the world to preserve the peace of the world. These statesmen, unfortunately, were unaware of the plans and designs of the Nazi conspirators. The documents captured by Allied troops reveal the hitherto unknown story underlying the Pact of Munich. These papers reveal the fraud and deceit practiced by the Nazi conspirators in negotiating the Pact of Munich as a stepping-stone toward further aggression. The hope for peace which came with the Munich Pact, which later turned out to be a snare and a deceit, was a trap carefully set by the Nazi conspirators. The nature of the trap is indicated by the events of the weeks just preceding the Munich agreement. With a 1 October target date set for Case Green, there was a noticeable increase in the tempo of the military preparations in late August and September. Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators were devoted to technical details: the timing of X-day, questions of mobilization, questions of transport and supply. On 26 August Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled "Timing of the
and September. Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators were devoted to technical details: the timing of X-day, questions of mobilization, questions of transport and supply. On 26 August Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled "Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures" (388-PS, Item 17). This memorandum demonstrates clearly the complicity of the OKW and of Keitel and Jodl, in the fabrication of an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals the character of the attack that Germany was preparing to launch. The memorandum reads as follows: "TIMING OF THE X-ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES "The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day. "The army's efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKW also demands that the X order be given not later than 1400 on X minus 1. "To this the following must be said: "Operation (Aktion) Green will be set in motion by means of an 'incident' in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance. "It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1. "It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at 1400 on X minus 1. "On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning. "If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous. "For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall
X minus 1. "On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning. "If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous. "For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numerous maneuvers and exercises. "Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident. "Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e. g., death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.) "If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that. "In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall) "It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in good time-in so far as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident. "I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on these points. "J [Jodl] 26/8." (388-PS, Item 17) In handwriting at the bottom of the page are the notes of Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant. These reveal that the memorandum was submitted to Hitler on 30 August; that Hitler agreed to act along these lines; and that Jodl was so notified on 31 August. On 3 September Keitel and von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at the Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference (388-PS, Item 18). The first three paragraphs of these minutes state: "Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch: Reports on the exact time
to act along these lines; and that Jodl was so notified on 31 August. On 3 September Keitel and von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at the Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference (388-PS, Item 18). The first three paragraphs of these minutes state: "Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch: Reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to 'exercise areas' for 'Gruen'. Field units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From here will then be ready for action. When X Day becomes known, field units carry out exercises in opposite directions. "Fuehrer: Has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day march away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere. "?: OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27 September." (388-PS, Item 18) During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views on the strategy the German armies should employ and the strength of the Czech defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the possibility of "drawing in the Heinlein people." The situation in the West still troubled him. Schmundt noted: "The Fuehrer gives orders for the development of the Western fortifications; improvement of advance positions around Aachen and Saarbrucken. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces.)" (388-PS, Item 18) Five days later General Stulpnagel asked Jodl for written assurance that the OKH would be informed five days in advance about the pending action. In the evening Jodl conferred with Luftwaffe generals about the coordination of ground and air operations at the start of the attack. The 8 September entry in General Jodl's diary states: "8 September: "General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the overall meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this moment (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE). "General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be
mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is reserved. "I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last statements. "In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore. "1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself). "We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-Befehl), (X-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, X-1 day, 7 o'clock). The 'Y time' has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour." (1780-PS) Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September, Hitler met with Keitel and Generals von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nurnberg. Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later joined the conference, which lasted from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning. Schmundt's minutes are Item 19 in his file (388-PS). In this meeting General Halder reviewed the missions assigned to four of the German armies being committed to the attack: the 2d, 10th, 12th, and 14th. With his characteristic enthusiasm for military planning, Hitler then delivered a soliloquy on strategic considerations which should be taken into account as the attack developed. The discussions proceeded as follows: "General Oberst v. Brauchitsch: Employment of motorized divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other
then delivered a soliloquy on strategic considerations which should be taken into account as the attack developed. The discussions proceeded as follows: "General Oberst v. Brauchitsch: Employment of motorized divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other divisions (ready to march) into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of Sept. if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23d, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command 2. "The Fuehrer: Doesn't see why workers have to return home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on. "General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be assembled. "v. Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will be drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West." (388-PS, Item 19) From this date forward the Nazi conspirators were occupied with the intricate planning required before the attack. On 11 September Jodl conferred with a representative of the Propaganda Ministry about methods of refuting German violations of International Law and exploiting those of the Czechs. The 11 September entry in the Jodl diary reads as follows: "11 September: "In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks. "The joint preparations for refutation (Wiederlegung) of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important." (1780-PS) This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by Section L, Jodl's section of the OKW (C-2). Seven copies of this captured document were prepared and distributed on 1 October 1938 to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftwaffe, and the Foreign Office. In this study anticipated violations of International Law in the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed and counter-propaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda agencies. This document is presented in a tabular form,
on 1 October 1938 to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftwaffe, and the Foreign Office. In this study anticipated violations of International Law in the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed and counter-propaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda agencies. This document is presented in a tabular form, in which possible incidents are listed in the left-hand column. In the second column are given specific examples of the incidents; in the third and fourth columns the position to be taken toward these incidents under International Law and under the laws of warfare is set forth; the fifth column, which is blank, is reserved for the explanation to be offered by the Propaganda Minister. The first 10 hypothetical incidents, for which justification must be found, and which are listed in column b of the table are as follows: "1a. In an air-raid on Prague the British Embassy is destroyed. "2. Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed. "3. The hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague. "4. On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles in ordered. "5. Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of important bridges, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot. "6. Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to do road work or to load munitions. "7. For military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets, food stuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the latter suffer from want. "8. Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily evacuated to the rear area. "9. Churches are used for military accommodation. "10. In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft." (C-2) From Nurnberg, on 10 September, Hitler issued an order bringing the Reichsarbeitsdienst, the German labor service, under the OKW. This top secret order, of which 25 copies were made, provides as follows: "1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September. "2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs
under the OKW. This top secret order, of which 25 copies were made, provides as follows: "1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September. "2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions. "3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned. "(signed) ADOLF HITLER." (388-PS, Item 20) Four days later, on 14 September, Keitel issued detailed instructions for the employment of specific RAD units. This order is Item 21 in the Schmundt file. A further order issued by Jodl on 16 September specified RAD units which would receive military training. This is Item 24 in the Schmundt file. (388-PS) Two entries in Jodl's diary give further indications of the problems of the OKW in this period of mid-September, just two weeks before the anticipated X-day. The entries for 15 and 16 September read as follows: "15 September: "In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation. "16 September: "General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or 22nd in Godesberg. "With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the VGAD along the Czech border. "In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September." (1780-PS) The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available which General Jodl referred to