dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
COL. TAYLOR: Halder was Chief of the General Staff of OKH. That would be the box second from the bottom on the left-hand side. He was Chief of the General Staff of the OKH from September 1938 to September 1942. He is, accordingly, a member of the group and well qualified by his position to testify as to the organization. His statement is short, and I will read it in full: "Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the head of the State, who prior to the 2d of August 1934, was Field Marshal Von Hindenburg and Hereafter, until 1945, was Adolf Hitler. "Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time head of the State), that is to say, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers exercised such supervision on The basis of their official instructions and by virtue of their training, their positions, and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group, according to the instructions of the OKW, in the name of their respective commanding officers and were presented to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time the head of the State). "The members of this group were charged with the responsibility of preparing for military operations within their competent fields, and they actually did prepare for any such operations as were to be undertaken by troops in the field. "Prior to any operation, the respective members of this group were assembled occasionally and given appropriate directions by the head of the State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish campaign and the conference at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign.
COL. TAYLOR: "The composition of this group and the relationship of its members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. This was, in effect, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. Signed: Halder." The chart to which reference is made is the chart which is at the front of the room and which was attached to the affidavit. The two meetings referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavit are covered by documents which will be introduced subsequently. I next offer a substantially identical statement by Von Brauchitsch, which will be Exhibit Number USA-532 (Document 3703-PS). Von Brauchitsch held the rank of field marshal and was Commander-in-Chief of the Army from 1938 to 1941-therefore also a member of the group. I need not read his statement, since it is practically the same as that given by Halder; but I will ask that it be set forth in full in the transcript at this point. The only difference between the two statements is in the last sentence of each. Halder states that the group described in the Indictment "was, in effect, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces," whereas Von Brauchitsch puts it a little differently, saying, "In the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces." Otherwise, the two statements are identical. [The document referred to above is as follows] "Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the head of State who prior to 2 August 1934 was Field Marshal Von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945 was Adolf Hitler. "Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time head of State), that is to say, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. In practice supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high ranking officers.
COL. TAYLOR: These officers exercised such supervision on the basis of their official instructions and by virtue of their training, their positions, and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the instructions of the OKW and were presented to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time head of State). "The members of this group were charged with the responsibility of preparing for military operations within their competent fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as might possibly be undertaken by troops in the field. "Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled occasionally and given appropriate directions by the head of State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish campaign and the conference at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign. "The composition of this group and the relationship of its members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. In the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces."-Signed- "don Brauchitsch." Now, the Tribunal will see from these affidavits that the chart which is on display at the front of the Court and which is contained in the short expository statement has been laid before Von Brauchitsch and Halder and that these two officers have vouched for it under oath as an accurate picture of the top organization of the German Armed Forces. The statements by Von Brauchitsch and Halder also fully support the Prosecution's statement that the holders of the positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the major responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces matters. I would now like to offer another affidavit by Halder which sets forth some of the matters of detail to which I adverted in describing the group. It is quite short.
COL. TAYLOR: Affidavit Number 6, which becomes Exhibit USA-533 (Document 3704-PS)-and I shall read it in full into the transcript: "The most important department in the OKW was the Operations Staff, in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in status with Jodl but, in the planning and conduct of military affairs, they and their departments were less important and less influential than Jodl and Jodl's staff. "The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was chief. It was called the National Defense Section, and it was primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions. From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff. "There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as the Great General Staff which operated in World War I. "Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out by the group of high ranking officers described in my statement of 7 November (in the Army, the General Staff of the Army; and in the Air Force, the General Staff of the Air Force). "Operational matters of the Navy were, even in World War I, not worked out by the Great General Staff but by the Naval Staff. Signed: Halder." The Tribunal will note that this affidavit is primarily concerned with the functions of the General Staffs of the four commands of OKW, OKL, OKH, and OKM and fully supports the inclusion in the group of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy Chief of the OKW staff because of his strategic planning responsibilities. I have just one other very short affidavit covering a matter of detail. The Tribunal will remember that the highest fighting formation in the German Air Force was known as an air fleet or Luftflotte and that all commanders-in-chief of air fleets are included in this group.
COL. TAYLOR: That is the box in the lower right-hand corner. The commanders of air fleets always had the status of Oberbefehlshaber, but they were not formally so designated until 1944. These facts are set forth in an affidavit by the son of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. His son had the rank of Oberst, or colonel, in the German Air Force and was personal aide to the Defendant Goering as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. His affidavit is Number 9 and becomes Exhibit Number USA-534 (Document 3705-PS). It reads as follows: "Lutflottenchefs have the same status as the Oberbefehlshaber of an army. During the war they had no territorial authority and, accordingly, exercised no territorial jurisdiction. "They were the highest troop commanders of the Air Force units subordinate to them and were directly under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. "Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation Befehlshaber and from then on that of Oberbefehlshaber. This change of designation carried with it no change in the functions and responsibilities that they previously had." Your Honor, that concludes the description of the composition of the group and the personnel of it. The staff of the Tribunal have referred to me two inquiries which have been addressed to the Tribunal by counsel for the group and it seemed to me it might be appropriate if I disposed of those inquiries now as to the composition of the group. The letters were turned over to me 2 days ago. The first is from Hofrat Dullmann, and he has asked whether the group, as defined in the Indictment , is contingent upon rank, whether it includes officers holding a definite rank such as field marshal or "Generaloberst." The answer to that is clearly "no." As has been pointed out, the criterion of membership in the group is whether one held one of the positions on the chart up there; and one would be in the group if one held one of the positions, no matter what one's rank. Rank is no criterion.
COL. TAYLOR: In point of fact, I suppose everybody in the group held at least the rank of general in the German Army, which is the equivalent of lieutenant general in ours. He has also asked whether the group includes officers of the so-called General Staff Corps. The answer to that is "no." There was in the German Army a war academy, and graduates of the war academy were in the branch of service described as the General Staff Corps. They signed themselves, for example, "Colonel in Generalstab." They functioned largely as adjutants and assistants to the chief staff officers. I suppose there were some thousands of them-two or three thousand, but they are not included in the group. Many of them were officers of junior rank. They are not named in the Indictment, and there is no reason and no respect in which they are comprehended within the group as defined. The other letter of inquiry is from Dr. Exner, who states that he is in doubt as to the meaning of Oberbefehlshaber and goes on to state that he believes that Oberbefehlshaber includes commanders-in-chief in theaters of war, the commanders-in-chief of army groups, and the commanders-in-chief of armies. That is quite right. Those are the positions as shown on the chart. Let us now spend a few minutes examining the way this group worked. In many respects, of course, the German military leaders functioned in the same general manner as obtained in the military establishments of other large nations. General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants in collaboration with the field generals or admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision to wage a particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the highest level; and the making of such a decision would involve political and diplomatic questions, as well as purely military considerations. When, for example, the decision was made to attack Poland, the top staff officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military plans for the campaign.
COL. TAYLOR: These general plans would be transmitted to the commanders of the army groups and armies who would be in charge of the actual campaign; and then there would follow consultation between the top field commanders and the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, in order to revise and perfect and refine the plans. The manner in which this group worked, involving as it did the interchange of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, on the one hand, and the principal field commanders on the other hand, is graphically described in two statements by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. That is Affidavit Number 4, which will be Exhibit Number USA-535 (Document 3706-PS). I invite the Tribunal's attention to these and will read them into the transcript. The statement of 7 November 1945: "In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan. This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him, as amended by a change which he desired. After the operational and deployment orders had been given to the two commanders of the army groups and the five commanders of the armies, conferences took place with them about details, in order to hear their desires and recommendations. After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of keeping in close and constant touch with the commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies by personal visits to their headquarters, as well as by telephone, teletype, or wireless. In this way I was able to obtain their advice and their recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In fact, it was the accepted policy and common practice for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his subordinate commanders-in-chief and maintain a constant exchange of ideas with them.
COL. TAYLOR: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff communicated with army groups and through them, as well as directly, with the armies; through army groups on strategic and tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and administration of conquered territory occupied by the armies. An army group had no territorial executive power. It had a relatively small staff, which was concerned only with military operations. In all territorial matters it was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and not of the army group, who exercised executive power. Signed: Von Brauchitsch." There follows: "Supplement to the statement of 7 November 1945: "When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of his political objectives through military pressure or through the application of military force, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command. Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the OKH. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a written order from the OKW to the three branches of the Armed Forces. In the meanwhile the OKH began to transmit the operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies involved. "Details of the operational and deployment plans were discussed by the OKH with the commanders-in-chief of the army groups and armies and with the chiefs of staff of these commanders During the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio, and courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the commanders of army groups, armies, and lower echelons by means of personal visits to them. "In the war against Russia the commanders of army groups and armies were individually and repeatedly called in by Hitler for report.
COL. TAYLOR: Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to army groups, and for all matters concerning supply and territorial executive power from the OKH directly to the armies. Signed: Von Brauchitsch." The Oberbefehlshaber in the field, therefore-and in the case of the Army that means the commanders-in-chief of army groups and armies-participated in planning and directing the execution of the plans, as those affidavits show. The Oberbefehlshaber were also the repositories of general executive powers in the areas in which their army groups and armies were operating. In this connection I invite the Court's attention to Document 447-PS, which is already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-135, this being a directive of 13 March 1941 signed by Keitel and issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. This directive sets out various regulations for the operations against the Soviet Union which were actually begun a few months later on 22 June. The documents, Your Honor, are in numerical order in Document Books II and III. Document Book II contains C and L; Document Book III contains PS; and this, being 447-PS, will be in Document Book III in numerical order within the PS's. And within that Document, under Paragraph I, the paragraph entitled "Area of Operations and Executive Power" ("Vollziehende Gewalt"), the Tribunal will find Subparagraph 1, in which the following appears-that is Page 1 of the translation, Paragraph 2: "It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the Government General an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority to the commanders-in-chief"- that, in the original German, is Oberbefehlshaber-"of the army groups and armies.
COL. TAYLOR: Orders of that kind have priority over all other obligations and over orders issued by civilian agencies." Your Honors will see that this executive power, with priority over civilian agencies, was vested in the Commander-in-Chief of the Army with authority to transfer it to commanders-in-chief of army groups or armies-to the members of the group as defined in the Indictment. Further on in the document, under Subparagraph 2(a), the document states-that is the fourth paragraph, on Page 1 of the document: "The area of operations of the Army created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power"-vollziehende Gewalt-"in this area, and may transfer his authority to the commanders-in-chief"-Oberbefehlshaber-"of the army groups and armies."
THE PRESIDENT: This would be a convenient time to break off.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit tomorrow in closed session to consider matters of procedure, and there will therefore be no public session tomorrow.
COL. TAYLOR: Your Lordship, I have just one more document dealing with this subject of the structure of the group before passing on to the substantive charges of criminality. This document is C-78, which is already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-139. That will be found in Volume II of the document book. This document is the official command invitation to participate in the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941, 8 days prior to the attack on the Soviet Union. This is one of the meetings that was referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavits by Halder and Von Brauchitsch, which were read into the record this morning. It is signed by Colonel Schmundt, the chief Wehrmacht adjutant to Hitler, and is dated at Berchtesgaden, 9 June 1941. It begins: "In re: Conference Barbarossa"-that being the code for the attack on the Soviet Union-"the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered reports on Barbarossa by the commanders of army groups and armies and naval and air commanders of equal rank." That is, as the Tribunal will see once again, the very group specified in the bottom line of the chart on the wall, army groups, armies, naval, and air commanders of similar rank. This document likewise includes a list of the participants in this conference, and I would just dike in closing on this subject to run through that list to point out who the participants in this conference were and how closely they parallel the structure of the group as we find it in the Indictment . The Tribunal will see that the list of participants begins at the foot of Page 1 of the translation: General Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and a member of the group; General Halder, who was Chief of the Army Staff and a member of the group; then three subordinates, who were not members of the group: Paulus, Heusinger, and Gyldenfeldt. Navy: Captain Wagner, who was Chief of the Operations Staff, Operations Division of the naval war staff, not a member of the group.
COL. TAYLOR: On the air side: General Milch, State Secretary and General Inspector of the Air Force, again not a member of the group; Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force and a member of the group; and two of his assistants. Passing over the page to the OKW, High Command of the Armed Forces, we find Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, all members of the group, were present, with an assistant from the General Staff. Then four officers from the office of the adjutant, who were not members of the group. Then we pass to the officers from the field commands: General Von Falkenhorst, Army High Command, Norway, member of the group; General Stumpff, Air Fleet 5, member of the group; Rundstedt, Reichenau, Stulpnagel, Schober, Kleist, all from the Army, all members of the group. Air Force: General Lohr, Air Fleet 4, member of the group General Fromm and General Udet were not members. One was director of the home forces, commander of the home forces, and the other the Director General of Equipment and Supply, G.A.F. The Navy: Raeder, a member of the group; Fricke, chief of the naval war staff, and a member of the group; and a personal assistant who was not a member, Carls, Naval Group North, a member of the group, likewise Schmundt. . Then from the Army: Leeb, Busch, Kuchler, all members of the group as Oberbefehlshaber; Keller, a member of the group; Bock, Kluge, Strauss, Guderian, Hoth, Kesselring, all members of the group. And it will accordingly be seen that except for a few assisting officers of relatively junior rank, all the participants in these consultations were members of the group as defined in the Indictment and that in fact the participants included almost all the members of the group who were concerned in the impending operation against the Soviet Union. I have now concluded the first part of the presentation, to wit, the description of the General Staff and High Command group and its composition and structure and general manner of functioning. I turn now to the charges levelled against this group in the Indictment.