dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose Friday, I had just reached the point in my discussion of aggression against the U.S.S.R. where, with the campaign in the West at an end, the Nazi conspirators had begun the development of their plans to attack the Soviet Union. Preliminary high level planing and action was in progress. Hitler had indicated earlier in November that more detailed and definite instructions would be issued. These would be issued as soon as the general outline of the Army's operational plans had been submitted to him and approved by him. We had thus reached the point in the story indicated on the outline submitted last Friday as Part 3 of the Plan Barbarossa. By the 18th of December 1940, the general outline of the Army's operational plan having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical directive to the High Command of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force for Barbarossa-Directive Number 21-was issued. This directive, which for the first time marks the plan to invade the Soviet Union, was specifically referred to in an order although the order was classified top secret. It also marked the first use of the code word Barbarossa to denote this operation. The directive is Number 446-PS, and was offered in evidence in the course of my opening statement as Exhibit USA-31. Since it was fully discussed at that time, it is, I believe, sufficient now merely to recall to the Tribunal two or three of the most significant sentences in that document. Most of these sentences appear on Page 1 of the English translation. One of the most significant, I believe, is this sentence with which the order begins: "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign even before the end of the war with England." On the same page it is stated: "Preparations requiring firing more time to start are, if this has not yet been done, to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.
MR. ALDERMAN: Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of the attack mill not be recognized." The directive then outlines the broad strategy on which the intended invasion was to proceed and the parts that the various services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) were to play therein, and calls for oral reports to Hitler by the Commanders-in-chief, closing as follows: "V."-that is on Page 2-"I am expecting the reports of the commanders-in-chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions. "The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time." Signed by Hitler, and initialed by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont, and one illegible name. It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well as from its history, which I have outlined, that this directive was no mere planning exercise by the staff. It was an order to prepare for an act of aggression, which was intended to occur and which actually did occur. The various services which received the order certainly understood it as an order to prepare for action, and did not view it as a hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in this basic directive. So we come to the military planning and preparation for the implementation of Plan Barbarossa. The Naval war Diary for 13 January 1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive Number 21 which ordered progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary is Document C-35 in our numbered series, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-132. This document contains a substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy's part in the coming campaign and the manner in which it was preparing itself to play the part.
MR. ALDERMAN: I feel, however, that it will be sufficient for the establishment of our point that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early date, to read only a small portion of the entry into the record, beginning on Page 1 of the English translation, which is Page 401 of the Diary itself. The entry reads: "30 January 1941. "7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the Barbarossa Case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed Forces." ' I should note that "Ia" is in this case the abbreviation for a deputy chief of naval operations. Then follows a list of the Navy's objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter many tasks for the Navy are listed, but I think one is sufficiently typical to give the Tribunal an idea of all. I quote from the top of Page 2 of the English translation: "II. Objectives of War Against Russia .... "d) To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as: 1) Lightning-like actions at the outbreak of the war by air force units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Polar Sea." The purpose of the offer of this document is merely that it indicates the detailed thinking and planning which was being carried out to implement Barbarossa almost six months before the operation actually got under way. It is but another piece in the mosaic of evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of the Soviet Union was one of the most coldbloodedly premeditated attacks on a neighboring power in the history of the world. Similarly the Naval War Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to the planning and preparation for the coming campaign. Extracts of such references are contained in Document W33, which I am now offering in evidence as Exhibit USA-133. I think it will be sufficient to quote for the record as typical the entry for 19 February 1941, which appears at Page 3 of the English translation and at Page 248 of the Diary itself.
MR. ALDERMAN: "In regard to the impending operation Barbarossa for which all S-boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer -can only be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations." On the 3rd of February 1941 the Fuehrer held a conference to assess the progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa. The conference also discussed the plans for "Sonnenblume," which was the code name for. the North African operation-"Sunflower." Attending this conference were, in addition to Hitler: The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the Defendant Keitel; the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Defendant Jodl; the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder; as well as several others, including Colonel Schmundt, Hitler's Adjutant. A report of this conference is contained in our Document Number 872-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-134. During the course of this conference the Chief of the Army General Staff gave a long report about enemy strength as compared with their own strength and the general overall operational plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated at various intervals by comments from the Fuehrer. At Page 4 of the English translation of the conference plan, which is at Page 6 of the German original, there is an interesting extract, which, although written in a semi-shorthand, is at least sufficiently clear to inform us that elaborate timetables had already been set out for the deployment of troops as well as for industrial operations. I quote: "The proposed time schedule is charted on the map. First Deployment Echelon"-Aufmarschstaf1:el-"now being transferred, Front-Interior-East. Second Deployment Echelon from the middle of March gives 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West, but Army groups and Army High Commands are withdrawn from the West. In the East there are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area.
MR. ALDERMAN: From now on, 'Attila"'-I might state here parenthetically that this was the code word for the operation for the occupation of unoccupied France-"Attila can be carried out only with difficulty. Economic traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the beginning of April, Hungary will be approached about the march-through. Third Deployment Echelon, from the middle of April. 'Felix' is now no longer possible, as the main part of the artillery has been shipped."-Felix was the name for the proposed operation against Gibraltar.- "In industry the full capacity timetable is in force. No more camouflage. Fourth Deployment Echelon, from 25. IV to 15. V, withdraws considerable forces from the West ('Seelowe' can no longer be carried out)."-"Seelowe" (or Sea Lion) was a code word for the planned operation against England and "Marita," which we shall see a little later in the quotation, was the code word for the action against Greece.-"The concentration of troops in the East is clearly apparent. The full capacity timetable is maintained. The complete picture of the disposition of forces on the map shows 8 Marita divisions. "Commander-in-Chief, Army, requests that he no longer have to assign 5 control divisions for this; but might hold them ready as reserves for commander in the West. "Fuehrer: 'When Barbarossa commences the world will hold its breath and make no comment."' This much, I believe, when read with the conference conclusions, which I shall read in a moment, is sufficient to show that the Army as well as the Navy regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and were far along with their preparations even as early as February 1941-almost 5 months prior to 22 June, the date the attack was actually launched. The conference report summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar as they affected Barbarossa, as follows; I am now reading from Page 6 of the English translation, which is on Page 7 of the German: "Conclusions: "1. Barbarossa. "a. The Fuehrer on the whole is in agreement with the operational plan.
MR. ALDERMAN: When it is being carried out it must be remembered that the main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad. "b. The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the plan of the deployment of forces be sent to him as soon as possible. "c. Agreements with neighboring states who are taking part may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Romania with regard to reinforcing the Moldau. "d. It must, in any case, be possible to carry out Attila. (With the means available.) "e. The concentration for Barbarossa will be carried out as a feint for Sea Lion and the subsidiary measure Marita." On 13th March 1941 the Defendant Keitel signed an operational directive to Fuehrer Order Number 21, which was issued in the form of "Directives for Special Areas." This detailed operational order is Number 447-PS in our numbered series, and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-135. This order which was issued more than 3 months in advance of the attack indicates how complete were the plans on practically every phase of the operation. Section I of the directive is headed, "Area of Operations and Executive Power," and outlines who was to be in control of what and where. It states that while the campaign is in progress in territory through which the Army is advancing, the Supreme Commander of the Army has the executive power. During this period, however, the Reichsfuehrer SS is entrusted with "special tasks." This assignment is discussed in Paragraph 2b, which appears on Page 1 of the English translation and reads as follows: "b) In the area of operations of the Army the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration-tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility.
MR. ALDERMAN: The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS." The order then states that in time political administration will be set up under Commissioners of the Reich, and discusses the relationship of these officials to the Army. This is contained in Paragraph 2c and Paragraph 3, parts of which I should like to read: "c) As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present it is to be divided on the basis of nationality and according to the positions of the Army groups into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia), and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer. "3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command. "The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a territorial commander and the rights of a supreme Army commander or a commanding general.
MR. ALDERMAN: In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks: "a) Close co-operation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political tasks; b) exploitation of the Country and securing its economic values for use by German industry." The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administration of economy in the conquered territory, a subject I will develop more fully later in my presentation. This provision is also in Section I, Paragraph 4, which I shall read: "4) The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal, who has delegated the Chief of the 'Wi Ru Amt.' with the execution of the task. Special orders on that-will come from the OKW/Wi Mu Amt." The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you tell us at some time who these people are? Who is the Reich Marshal?
MR. ALDERMAN: The Reich Marshal is the Defendant Goering.
THE PRESIDENT: And who was the Reichsfuehrer of the SS at that time?
MR. ALDERMAN: Himmler.
THE PRESIDENT: Himmler?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and communication traffic, and I shad not read it here. Section III of the order deals with the relations with certain other countries, and states in part as follows-I am reading from Page 3 of the English translation: "III. Regulations regarding Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and Finland. "9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW together with the Foreign Office and according to the wish of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW." The document closes with a section regarding Sweden, which is also on Page 3 of the English Translation: "IV. Directives regarding Sweden. "12) Since Sweden can only become a transient area for troops, no special authority is to be granted to the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of railroad transports against sabotage and attacks. "The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, '- signed- "Keitel." As was hinted in the original Barbarossa order, Directive Number 21, which I discussed earlier, the plan originally contemplated that the attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941. In the meantime, however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign in the Balkans, and were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is found in a document, which bears our Number C-170. This document has been identified by the Defendant Raeder as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty files, and contains file references to the papers which were the basis for each entry. I offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-136.
MR. ALDERMAN: Although I shall refer to this document again later, I should like at present to read only an item which appears in the second paragraph of Item 142 on Page 19 of the English translation and which is in the text in a footnote on Page 26 in the German original. This item is dated 3 April 1941, and reads as follows: "Balkan operation delay; Barbarossa now in about 5 weeks. Ail measures which can be construed as offensive actions are to be stopped according to the Fuehrer's order." By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out to permit the Fuehrer to definitely set D-Day as the 22d of June-more than 7 weeks away. Document Number 873-PS in our series is a top-secret report of a conference with the Chief of the Section "Landesverteidigung" of the "Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab" on April 30, 1941. I now offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-137. I think it will be sufficient to read the first two paragraphs of this report: "1) Timetable Barbarossa. The Fuehrer has decided: "Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas. "2) Proportion of actual strength in the Plan Barbarossa: "Sector North, German and Russian forces approximately of the same strength; Sector Middle, great German superiority; Sector South, Russian superiority." Early in June, practically 3 weeks before D-Day, preparations for the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This timetable is Document Number C-39 in our series, and I offer it in evidence now as Exhibit USA-138. This document was prepared in 21 copies, and the one offered here was the third copy which was given to the High Command of the Navy; Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal, and reads as follows: "Top secret; Supreme Command of the Armed Forces; Or. 44842/41 top military secret WFSt/Abt.
MR. ALDERMAN: L (I Op.); Fuehrer's headquarters; for chiefs only, only through officer; 21 copies; I Op. 00845/41; received 6 June; no enclosures. "The Fuehrer has authorized the appended timetable as a foundation for further preparations for Plan Barbarossa. If alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be informed. "Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces"-signed- "Keitel." I shall not bother to read to you the distribution list which indicates Mere the 21 copies went.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal does not think it necessary that you should read all those preliminary matters at the head of these documents, "top secret," "only through officer," and then the various reference numbers and file information when you give identification of a document.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir. The next two pages of the document are in the form of a text outlining the state of preparations as of the 1st of June 1941. The outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that date under six headings: General, Negotiations with friendly states, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Camouflage. I think it unnecessary to read into the record any of this textual material. The remainder of the paper is in tabular form with seven columns headed from left to right at the top of each page: Date, Serial number, Army, Air Force, Navy, OKW, Remarks. Most interesting among the items appearing on this chart . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you read the first paragraph, for that seems to be important. There are two lines there.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The heading "General" on Page 2.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir. "1. General. The timetable for the maximum massing of troops in the East mill be put into operation on the 22d of May."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: Most interesting among the items appearing on this chart, in my opinion, are those appearing on Pages 9 and 10. These are at Page 8 of the German version. At the bottom of Page 9 it is provided in the columns for Army, Navy, and Air Force-and I quote: "Up to 1300 hours is latest time at which operation can be cancelled." Under the column headed OKW appears the note that-and again I quote: "Cancelled by code word 'Altona' or further confirmation of start of attack by code word 'Dortmund' " In the Remarks column appears the statement that: "Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of main effort, concentration of armor and artillery must be reckoned with." The second entry on Page 10 of the chart for the 22d of June, under Serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and OKW, and provides as follows, under the heading: "Invasion Day. X-Hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces: 0330 hours." In the Remarks column, it states that: "Amy assembly independent of any lateness in starting on the part of the Air Force owing to weather. The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted and give, as I have said, great detail concerning the disposition and missions of the various components of the Armed Forces. On 9 June 1941 the order of the Fuehrer went out for final reports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941, which was just 8 days before D-Day. This order is signed by Hitler's Adjutant, Schmundt, and is C-78 in our numbered series of documents. I offer it in evidence now as Exhibit USA-139. I read from Page 1 the matter under the heading "Conference Barbarossa": "1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered reports on Barbarossa by the commanders of Army groups, armies, and naval and air commanders of equal rank. "2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin. "3.