dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VOCKE: The reasons given were the following: In the event of a threat to attack Germany on two fronts, the Army Command had decided to evacuate the frontier areas and to confine itself to a central zone which could be defended under all circumstances. I still remember from the map which was attached to the letter that the line of defense in the East...
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to the Tribunal that this is very remote from any question we have to decide.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, that map which the witness wants to describe shows clearly and beyond doubt that the attitude of the German High Command in 1936 was a defensive attitude and one which accepted the greatest strategic disadvantages, and this was communicated to the Reichsbank under the presidency of Schacht. We can see from that communication that nobody at that time even thought of aggressive intentions of the Army Command.
THE PRESIDENT: At what time?
DR. DIX: 1936, I understood him to say that. Perhaps it is better that he should give you the date.
VOCKE: I cannot say exactly what the date was, but it must have been about 1936, in my estimation.
DR.DIX: I believe that it is rather relevant. May the witness continue?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
VOCKE: The line of defense in the East went from Hof straight up to Stettin; I cannot remember so well where the western line was drawn. but Baden and the Rhineland were outside of it. The Reichsbank was shocked to hear that and about the threat of a two-front attack on Germany and the tremendous sacrifice of German territory. It was also shocked at the idea that the Reichsbank, in the event of an occupation of these regions by the enemy, would have to leave these occupied territories without any financial support. Therefore we refused the last-mentioned request, but, as far as the gold was concerned, we placed it in Berlin, Munich, Nuremberg, and so on. We could no longer have any doubt, however, after this top secret document, about the defensive character of our armaments and preparations. I come to a third incident. That was in 1937. At that time, when the economy was already racing ahead and more and more money was being put up, Schacht asked for the support of the German professors of economy and called them together to persuade them to work along his lines, that is, to try to check this trend. At that meeting one of those present asked Schacht the question: "What will happen if war breaks out?" Schacht got up and said: "Gentlemen, then we are lost. Then everything is over with us. I ask you to drop this subject. We cannot worry about it now." Now I come to the fourth incident, which also leaves no doubt about Schacht's attitude or the completeness of his information. That was a conversation immediately after the outbreak of the war. In the first few days Schacht, Huelse, Dreyse, Schniewind and I met for a confidential talk. The first thing Schacht said was: 'Gentlemen, this is a fraud such as the world has never seen. The Poles have never received the German offer. The newspapers are lying in order to lull the German people to sleep. The Poles have been attacked. Henderson did not even receive the offer, but only a short excerpt from the note was given to him verbally. If at any time at the outbreak of a war, the question of guilt was clear, then it is so in this case.
VOCKE: That is a crime the like of which cannot be imagined." Then Schacht continued: "What madness to start a war with a military power like Poland, which is led by the best French general staff of ricers. Our armament is no good. It has been made by quacks. The money has been wasted without point or plan." To the retort: "But we have an air force which can make itself felt," Schacht said: "The air force does not decide the outcome of a war, the ground forces do. We have no heavy guns, no tanks; in three weeks the German armies in Poland will break down, and then think of the coalition which still faces us." Those were Schacht's words and they made a deep impression on me; for me they are a definite and clear answer to the question which Dr. Dix put to me.
DR. DIX: Now, in the course of those years from 1933 to 1939 did Schacht ever speak to you about alleged or surmised war plans of Hitler?
VOCKE: No, never.
DR. DIX: What was Schacht's basic attitude to the idea of a war; did he ever mention that to you?
VOCKE: Yes, of course, fairly often. Schacht always emphasized that war destroys and ruins both the victor and the vanquished, and, in his and our field, he pointed to the example of the victorious powers whose economy and currency had been devaluated and partly even crippled. England had to devaluate her currency; in France there was a complete breakdown of the financial system, not to speak of other powers such as Belgium, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia.
DR. DIX: Schacht made these statements?
VOCKE: Yes, he did, and quite frequently. Schacht went into detail and was very definite about the situation in neutral countries. Schacht said again and again: There will be conflicts and war again, but for Germany there is only one policy, absolute neutrality. And he quoted the examples of Switzerland, Sweden, and so on, who by their neutral attitude had grown rich and more powerful and become creditor nations. Schacht again and again emphasized that very strongly.
DR. DIX: In that connection you will understand my question. How can you explain then, or rather, how did Schacht explain to you the fact that he was financing armament at all?
VOCKE: Schacht believed at that time that a certain quantity of armaments, such as every country in the world possessed, was also necessary for Germany for political...
DR. DIX: May I interrupt you. I want you to state only the things which Schacht told you; not your opinions about what Schacht may have thought, but only what Schacht actually said to you.
VOCKE: Yes. Schacht said a foreign policy without armament was impossible in the long run. Schacht also said that neutrality, which he demanded for Germany in case of conflict between the big powers, must be an armed neutrality. Schacht considered armaments necessary, because otherwise Germany would always be defenseless in the midst of armed nations. He was not thinking of definite attack from any side, but he said that in every country there was a militarist party which might come to power today or tomorrow, and a completely helpless Germany, surrounded by other nations, was unthinkable. It was even a danger to peace because it was an incentive to attack her one day. Finally, however, and principally Schacht saw in armaments the only means of revitalizing and starting up German economy as a whole. Barracks would have to be built; the building industry, which is the backbone of economy, must be revitalized. Only in that way, he hoped, could unemployment be tackled.
DR. DIX: Now, events led to the militarization of the Rhineland, the reintroduction of compulsory military service. Did you have conversations with Schacht in which he said that if this policy of Hitler was pursued it might lead to a war, at least to an armed intervention by other nations which did not approve of such policies? Were there any such conversations between you and Schacht?
VOCKE: Not in the sense of your question. Schacht did speak to me about the incidents when the Rhineland was reoccupied, that is to say, he explained to me how at that time Hitler, as soon as France adopted a somewhat menacing attitude, was resolved to withdraw his occupation forces-Hitler had climbed down-and how he was only prevented in this by Herr Von Neurath, who said to him: "I was against that step, but new that you have done it, it will have to stand." What Schacht told me at that time about Hitler's attitude was that Hitler would do anything rather than have a war. Schacht also felt this, as he told me, when he mentioned He friendship with Poland, the renunciation of his claim to Alsace Lorraine, and, in particular, Hitler's policy during the first years, all of which was a peaceful policy. Only later did he begin to have misgivings as regards foreign policy.
DR. DIX: What were Schacht's principles and ideas in foreign policy and how did these line up with his attitude to Hitler's foreign policy?
VOCKE: He definitely disapproved, especially, of course, since Ribbentrop had gained influence in foreign politics; Schacht saw in him the most incapable and irresponsible of Hitler's advisers. But already before that there were serious differences of opinion between Schacht and Hitler on foreign policy. For instance, as regards Russia: Already from 1928-29 onwards Schacht had built up a large trade with Russia by long term credits which helped the economy of both countries. He has often been attacked on account of that, but he said: "I know what I am doing. I also know that the Russians will pay punctually and without bargaining. They have always done it." Schacht was very angry and unhappy when Hitler's tirades of abuse spoiled the relations with Russia and brought this extensive trade to an end. Also, with regard to China, Schacht was convinced of the importance of trade with China and was just about to develop it on a large scale, when Hitler, by showing preference to Japan and recalling the German advisers to Chiang Kai-Shek, again destroyed all Schacht's plans. Schacht saw that this was a fatal mistake and said that Japan would never be able nor willing to compensate us for the loss of trade with China. Also Schacht always advocated close co-operation with the United States, with England, and with France. Schacht admired Roosevelt and was proud of the fact that Roosevelt, through the diplomat Cockerill, kept in constant touch with him. Schacht was convinced of the necessity of remaining on the best terms with England and France and for that very reason he disapproved of Ribbentrop being sent to London and actively opposed this plan. Schacht was against Hitler's policy towards Italy. He knew that Mussolini did not want to have anything to do with us, and he considered him the most unreliable and the weakest partner. With regard to Austria, I know only that Schacht thought highly of Dollfuss and was horrified and shocked when he heard of his murder. Also after the occupation of Austria, he disapproved of much that happened there.
VOCKE: May I, in this connection, say a word about Schacht's colonial policy, which was a sort of hobby of Schacht's, and about which he once gave a lecture? I can best illustrate Schacht's views by telling you about the orders which he gave me. Schacht's idea was to make an arrangement with England, France, et cetera, whereby these powers should purchase part of the Portuguese colony of Angola and transfer it to Germany, who would not exercise any sovereign rights, but would exploit it economically; and he had experts' opinions...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal thinks that this is being given in far too great length.
DR. DIX: Well, we can leave out the individual examples. The late Field Marshal Von Blomberg made a statement to the effect that the Reichsbank received every year from the Reichswehr Ministry a written communication about the state of the armaments. Do you, who were a member of the Directorate, know anything about this communication?
VOCKE: No, I have never heard anything about it.
DR. DIX: From the whole of your experience in the Reichsbank and your experience with Schacht's attitude to his colleagues, do you consider it possible that Schacht personally received that information, but did not pass it on to any of his colleagues in the Reichsbank Directorate?
VOCKE: It may be, but I consider it highly improbable.
DR. DIX: Now, when did Schacht start to try to stop the financing of armaments and thereby cheek rearmament; and, if he did try, and if you can affirm it, what were his reasons?
VOCKE: Schacht made the first attempts to limit armaments, I believe, about 1936, when economy was running at top speed and further armament seemed an endless spiral. The Reichsbank was blocked and, I believe, in 1936, Schacht himself started making serious attempts to put an end to armaments.
DR. DIX: And do you know from your own experience what these attempts were?
VOCKE: These attempts continued throughout the following years: First, Schacht tried to influence Hitler and that proved to be in vain. His influence decreased as soon as he made any such attempt. He tried to find allies in the civic ministries, and also among the generals. He also tried to win over Goering, and he thought he had won him over, but it did not work. Schacht then put up a fight and at last he succeeded in stopping the Reichsbank credits for armaments. That was achieved at the beginning of March 1938. But that did not mean that he discontinued his efforts to stop rearmament itself, and he continued to use every means, even sabotage. In 1938 he issued a loan at a time when he knew that the previous loan had not yet been absorbed-when the banks were still full of it; and he made the amount of the new loan so big that it was doomed to failure. We waited eagerly to see whether our calculations were correct. We were happy when the failure became obvious, and Schacht informed Hitler. Another way in which he tried to sabotage armaments was when the industries which applied for loans to expand their factories were prohibited from doing so by Schacht, and thus were prevented from expanding. The termination of the Reichsbank credit did not only mean that the Reichsbank could no longer finance armaments, but it dealt a serious blow to armament itself. This was shown in 1938, when financing became extremely difficult in all fields and, upon Schacht's resignation, immediately reverted to the direct credits of the issuing bank, which was the only means of maintaining elastic credit, perpetual credit, so to speak, which Hitler needed and could never have received from Schacht. I know that from my personal recollection, because I protested against that law which was put to me and which Hitler issued after Schacht's dismissal. I said to the Vice President: I am not going to have anything to do with it. Thereupon, I was immediately dismissed ten days after the dismissal of Schacht.
DR. DIX: Well, Herr Vocke, for an outsider the motive for stopping the financing of armaments might have been purely economic. Hav e you any grounds, have you any experience which shows that Schacht was now also afraid of war, and wanted to prevent a war by this stoppage of credit?
VOCKE: Yes. At any rate, in 1938 the feeling that this tremendous armaments program which had no limits would lead to war became stronger and stronger, especially after the Munich Agreement. In the meantime Schacht had realized, and I think the Fritsch affair had made it very clear to him, that Hitler was the enemy, and that there was only one thing to do; that was to fight against Hitler's armament program and warmongering by every possible means. These means, of course, were only financial, such as the sabotage, et cetera, as I have already described. The final resort was the memorandum by which Schacht forced his resignation.
DR. DIX: We will speak later about that. May I ask you another question? The Tribunal know about the method of financing this credit, namely, by mefo bills, so you need not say anything about that. What I want to ask you is now, in your opinion as a lawyer, could the financing of armaments by these mefo bills be reconciled with banking law?
VOCKE: The mefo bills and the construction of that transaction had, of course, been legally examined beforehand; and the point of their legality had been raised with us, and the question as to whether these bills could be brought under banking law had been answered in the affirmative. The more serious question, however, was whether these bills fulfilled the normal requirements which an issuing bank should demand of its reserves. To that question, of course, the answer is definitely "no." / If one asks, why did not the bank buy good commercial bills instead of mefo bills, the answer is that at that time there had been no good commercial bills on the market for years-that is, since the collapse due to the economic crisis. Already under Bruening schemes for assisting and restoring economy and credit had been drawn up, all of which followed similar/, lines, that is, they were sanctioned according to their nature as normal credits along the lines of a semipublic loan; for the Bank was faced with the alternative of standing by helplessly and seeing what would happen to the economy or of helping the Government as best it could to restore and support the economy. All issuing banks in other countries were faced with the same alternative and reacted in the same manner. Thus the armaments bills, which, economically speaking, were nothing more than the former unemployment bills, had to serve the same purpose. From the point of view of currency policy the Reichsbank's reserves of old bills, which had been frozen by the depression, were again made good. All the regulations under banking law, the traditional regulations concerning banking and bills policy, had only one aim, namely, to avoid losses.
DR. DIX: I believe, Herr Vocke, it will be sufficient for the Tribunal if you could confirm that in the end the legal experts of the Reichsbank pronounced the mefo bills to be legal. The reasons for this, if Your Lordship agrees, we can omit. Now we come to the memorandum which you have already mentioned. I want you to describe to the Tribunal the reasons which caused the Reichsbank Directorate, with Schacht at the head, to submit that memorandum to Hitler, and what the tactical purposes were which the Directorate, and therefore Schacht, hoped to achieve by that memorandum.
VOCKE: If we had been able to speak frankly, of course, we would have said: You must stop armaments. But the Reichsbank itself could not do this. Instead, we had to limit ourselves to the question of our responsibility for the currency. Therefore, the Reichsbank memorandum dealt with the question of currency. It said: If the financing of armaments is continued, German currency will be ruined and there will be inflation in Germany. The memorandum also spoke of limitless credits, of unrestrained expansion of credits, and unrestrained expenditure. By expenditure we meant armaments. That was quite clear.
THE PRESIDENT: We have all seen the memorandum, have we not?
DR. DIX: Me is not speaking about the contents of the memorandum, but of the reasons, the tactical reasons. {Turning to the witness.]- You understand, Herr Vocke, the Tribunal knows the text of the memorandum, so please confine yourself to what I have asked you.
VOCKE: The memorandum had to deal with the question of currency, but at the same time, we made quite clear what we wanted: Limitation of foreign policy. That shows clearly what we wanted: Limitation of expenditure, limitation of foreign policy, of foreign policy aims. We pointed out that expenditure had reached a point beyond which we could not go, and that a stop must be put to it. In other words, the expenditure policy, that is the armaments program must be checked.
DR.DIX: Now tell us, did you anticipate the effect that that memorandum would have on Hitler? What did you expect, tactically?
VOCKE: Either the memorandum would result in a halt of this intolerable expenditure which had brought us to ruin-for at the end of 1938 there was no more money available, instead there was a cash deficit of nearly 1,000 million. That had to be faced, and the Minister of Finance was on our side. If this was not recognized, then the smash would come and we would have to be released. There was no other alternative. We took the unusual step of getting the whole Directorate to sign this document.
DR. DIX: That, in my experience, is quite unusual, because generally an official document of the Reichsbank is signed by the President or his deputy, is it not?
VOCKE: That is true. We wanted to stress that the entire Directorate unanimously approved this important document which was to put an end to armaments.
DR. DIX: That, Witness, is clear. Have you any reason for believing that Hitler recognized that fact?
VOCKE: Yes, Hitler said something to the effect that that would be "mutiny." I think that is the word they use in the Army. I have never been a soldier, but I think that when a complaint is signed by several soldiers, it is looked upon as mutiny. Hitler had the same ideas.
DR. DIX: Yes, something like that does exist. But you were not present there. Who told you about that expression "mutiny"?
VOCKE: I cannot remember that any more. I believe it was Herr Berger of the Finance Ministry. But I cannot say exactly.
DR. DIX: So there was talk about this expression in ministerial circles?
VOCKE: Yes.
DR. DIX: Now, that memorandum also contained a compliment to Hitler, a reference to his success in foreign policy. VOCKE Yes, Schacht had adopted the habit of using flattery in his dealings with Hitler. The greater an opponent of the Hitler regime Schacht became, the more he made use of this flattery. Therefore, in that memorandum, at any rate at the beginning where he spoke of Hitler's successes, he also used those tactics.
DR. DIX: And what Divas the consequence of that memorandum? Please tell us briefly.
VOCKE: The result was that first Schacht was dismissed, then Kreide and Huelse, then I, Erhard, and Lessing. The result, however, visas that they knew abroad what things had come to in Germany. My colleague Huelse had made unequivocal statements in Basel, and said that if we should be dismissed, then our friends would know to what pass things had come.
DR. DIX: Did Herr Huelse tell you that?
VOCKE: Yes, Huelse told me that.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, shall we make a short pause here? I have not much more, but I still have the documentary evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: How much longer do you think you will take before you finish?
DR. DIX: It is very short and then the documentary evidence is also very short. Shall I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [A recess was taken.]
DR. DIX: Now, Witness, you have described to the Tribunal how that dismissal of Schacht and yourself came about. Why did Schacht not take that step before? Did he talk to you about it?
VOCKE: No. Throughout the years 1936 and 1937 we could not make up our minds. At first there was still hope that Hitler would steer a reasonable course as a statesman. Finally, in 1938, we reached a crisis, particularly in connection with the Munich Agreement and then after the Munich Agreement. Then, indeed, there was real anxiety that things would lead to war, and we then saw that we had to force the decision. However, one has to consider the following: As a bank we could not bring up political or military arguments or demands which were not within our competence. The danger of inflation, which we had stressed in that memorandum, did not show until 1938, when the note circulation during the last ten months had increased enormously-more than throughout the five preceding years.
DR. DIX: So that it was not until that year that, let us say, a pretext, a means, was found to take that leap?
VOCKE: Yes.