dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. STEINBAUER: The Report of the Netherlands Government, which the Prosecution also mentioned, states in great detail that the defendant, as Reich Commissioner, is responsible for the famine which began in September of 1944 and lasted until the spring of 1945 and for the great mortality, especially of children-whole tables of statistics have been submitted-because, on the occasion of the shipping and railroad strike, he prohibited the importing of food. That is one of the most important and serious charges made against him. I have asked for witnesses on this subject, and perhaps I might cut it short now so that the witnesses may speak about it.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to be allowed to comment on this matter. This is the charge which seems the most serious to me, too.
DR. STEINBAUER: Perhaps we can have a brief recess now, if Your Honor agrees. 10E PRESIDENT: Very welt [A recess was taken.]
DR. STEINBAUER: In the Government Report it is asserted that at the time 50,000 Dutch people died of starvation; and, therefore, I should like to ask you what reason you had for establishing this traffic embargo at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe I have already explained that in the main. The traffic situation was such that the Wehrmacht had to make sure of its shipping space. As long as it did that there was no ship traffic as such possible. I wanted to limit this to as short a period of time as possible so that afterwards ship traffic could again be assured and Holland regularly supplied with food. Ship traffic was not interrupted primarily by my embargo, but rather-the witnesses will confirm this-by the fact that all ships that could be found were confiscated. Naturally, I asked myself whether the Dutch food supply would be endangered; and I said to myself that the Dutch people themselves were responsible for this state of emergency, and that the military interests of the Reich were, anyhow, equally important. I thought that if in the second half of October I could establish an orderly ship traffic, then, according to my experience, I would have 2 months' time in which to take care of the food supply for the Dutch people. Then I could bring in between 200,000 and 250,000 tons of food. And that would be sufficient to maintain rations of 1400 to 1800 calories. I believe I can recollect that between 15 and 20 October I gave the order to establish ship traffic again.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what did you do?
SEYSS-INQUART: Ship traffic was not established because the Dutch traffic authorities, for the most part, had disappeared, perhaps because they were afraid that they would be made responsible for the general railroad strike. For weeks on end our efforts were fruitless; and finally I talked with Secretary General Hirschfeld and gave him complete authority, particularly...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal does not think that this matter can be gone into extreme detail like this.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, perhaps you can be very brief about this and tell us what you did to alleviate conditions.
SEYSS-INQUART: I am practically finished. I gave Secretary General Hirschfeld full authority in the field of transportation. He then, although very hesitantly, re-established traffic. He will confirm that I supported him in every possible way. Food supplies were brought into Holland. But many weeks had passed in vain. Within my sector, I then provided additional aid, about which witness Van der Vense and, I believe, witness Schwebel can give you information in their interrogatories.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I should like to submit as the next document an affidavit deposed by the witness Van der Vense. It has just arrived, but the translations are already finished and will probably be given to the Tribunal this afternoon or tomorrow morning. I shall now submit the original I do not believe it necessary to read this document which has been translated into four languages. It describes exclusively the food situation in this critical period of time.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I also call your attention to the fact that the Dutch Government...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of it?
DR. STEINBAUER: Number 105.
SEYSS-INQUART: . . . that the Dutch Government changed the figure of 50,000 deaths to the correct one of 25,000.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I shall turn to the last period of your activity as Reich Commissioner. I should like to ask you, when did you realize that military resistance in the Netherlands was in vain?
SEYSS-INQUART: That we had to reckon with the possibility that Germany might not win the war will be seen in my letter to the Fuehrer in 1939. Actual fear that this might happen arose at the time of Stalingrad. Therefore one had to consider that possibility, and in due time I feared that things would take this turn; I definitely and reliably knew it through a statement which Reich Minister Speer made to me on 1 April 1945...
DR. STEINBAUER: 1945?
SEYSS-INQUART: April 1945. Up until that time I did not want to believe it; but faced with the prospect of an unconditional surrender and complete occupation, I naturally believed that in every respect I should have to prepare for the worst because the consequences were unpredictable. Speer at that time told me that the war, for Germany, would end in a relatively short period of time because armament production simply could not be kept up. He said 2 to 3 months.
DR. STEINBAUER: When you realized this fact, what did you do?
SEYSS-INQUART: I decided to end the defensive occupation of Holland without violating my duties to the Reich and to the Fuehrer. I went to The Hague and discussed the methods with Secretary General Hirschfeld. We agreed to get in touch at once with the confidential agents of the Government in The Hague-which was illegal for me-and to ask them to start negotiations on the basis that the Allied troops should not advance against Holland, in which case no further destruction would occur and the Allies could take over the feeding of the Dutch population through direct contact with the Dutch authorities for food supply. Then we would wait for the end of the war.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was this not an arbitrary act on your part as far as the German Government was concerned?
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of this?
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the date of this?
SEYSS-INQUART: This conversation with Secretary General Hirschield took place on 2 April 1945. Then the negotiations dragged on, and on 30 April I had the conversation with Lieutenant General Bedell Smith. I purposely did not ask for authorization from Berlin in order to avoid a refusal or be prohibited from carrying out my intention. I did this on my own. General Blaskowitz, the commander of the Netherlands, was very apprehensive. He called me during the night, because his superiors had asked him just what was going on. Nevertheless, I was determined to carry through this matter, for it seemed the only reasonable step I could take in this situation. I stated that I would assume all responsibility. On 30 April the conference took place and the result that I had desired in effect materialized-the giving up of the military defense of Holland.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then what did you personally do?
SEYSS-INQUART: Admiral Doenitz, as head of State, called me to Flensburg. I went by speedboat across the North Sea and reported to him, and the Admiral will confirm this as my witness; I succeeded in having the demolition decree rescinded and tried my very best to return to the Netherlands. Finally I plunged ahead and was arrested in Hamburg.
DR. STEINBAUER: Just why did you want to return to the Netherlands? ~
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I wanted to take care of my co-workers; in the second place, I always was of the opinion that I should answer for my administration there; and finally, I was of the opinion that since we had been out in front in the hour of triumph we could lay claim to being out in front in the hour of disaster as well.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have concluded my examination of the witness.
DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for SS): Did you belong to the SS?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had an honorary position in the General SS. As such I was not a regular member of the General SS, but I was very much interested in the SS as an ideological and a political formation.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you exercise any functions in the SS, or did you just have a title?
SEYSS-INQUART: De jure I had only a title. Politically I tried to exert a certain influence on the SS in the Netherlands, insofar as it was not the Waffen-SS, the Security Police, and so on; and in April of 1945 I believe I can say that de facto I was the foremost SS Fuehrer in the Netherlands.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you have the impression that the SS was a closed, unified organization, or were there great divergences within the organization itself?
SEYSS-INQUART: To outward appearances it was an extremely closed system. Internally there were two factions. One wanted the SS to be just a political training unit. Obergruppenfuehrer Heissmeyer belonged to this school. The other faction wanted to make a state executive organ out of the SS. Heydrich belonged to this group. At first Himmler vacillated, but later he went over completely to Heydrich's camp. The SS ideal disappeared, because Himmler misused it for executive powers.
DR. HAENSEL: Can you limit that as to time? When approximately, in what year, did this ideal die out?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe the first signs were evident in 1938. The process continued with giant strides at the time of the Eastern campaign.
DR. HAENSEL: Did not the General SS come a little to the fore ever since 1939, whereas only the executive office groups or the Waffen-SS were active?
SEYSS-INQUART: In any event from this time on Himmler transferred people from the General SS and put them into his various executive organizations. The General SS, for me anyway, did not come to the fore after that time.
DR. HAENSEL: Do you think that the SS man could know about the struggle for power in the leadership, that he had insight into this at all; or was he unconscious of this?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe that the ordinary SS man knew this, but there were many SS men who felt very uncomfortable and who remained with their organization only because they felt it was their duty.
DR. HAENSEL: You said in your interrogation that a decree of Heydrich's caused you to have Jews transported from Holland. Did you see Hitler's decree to Heydrich?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think so-a decree from Hitler to Heydrich alone would not have been for Heydrich.
DR. HAENSEL: You picture the situation as if Heydrich had told you that he had this decree.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, he told me that, and a few weeks later he sent me this decree.
DR. HAENSEL: Was it in writing?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, it was in writing.
DR. HAENSEL: And what did the decree say?
SEYSS-INQUART: That he had complete charge of the final solution of the Jewish question as well as other matters dealing therewith.
DR. HAENSEL: And when was this? 1941? 1940?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was at about the time when the evacuations started. That was in 1942.
DR. HAENSEL: That must be wrong. It was 1941, not later.
SEYSS-INQUART: Perhaps he showed me the decree later. I do not know the date of the decree.
DR. HAENSEL: That must be the case. But this decree, you said, was conceived in general terms?
SEYSS-INQUART: General terms.
DR. HAENSEL: It could be interpreted one way or another? I mean, you know...
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I had the impression that in the occupied territories Heydrich was to carry through the evacuation, and at that time I was not quite sure whether that was to be a final evacuation-which, however, was possible. The most extreme possibility was that the Jews would be collected in camps and after the end of the war settled somewhere.
DR. HAENSEL: I beg your pardon, Witness, the most extreme possibility would certainly be that the Jews would be destroyed, is that not so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I am speaking of the most extreme possibility which I thought of at the time.
DR. HAENSEL: And which you could imagine according to the words of the decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. HAENSEL: Now, the question is: Is there a possibility that Heydrich went beyond Hitler's decree, that Himmler himself did not want these acts which Heydrich committed?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot testify to that.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you talk with Hitler before 1943?
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think the witness can tell what the possibility was as to what Heydrich would do any better than we can. He cannot give evidence about that sort of thing. DR. HAENSEL. Yes [Turning to the defendant.] Before 1943 did you discuss these problems with Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was merely present when Hitler talked about these problems. It was always along this line, to eliminate the Jews from the German population and to send them somewhere abroad.
DR. HAENSEL: But there was no talk at all about destruction of the Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: Never.
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, did Sauckel cause raids in the Netherlands, and did he have churches and motion picture houses surrounded?
SEYSS-INQUART: He could not have done that. I would not have allowed that, and he did not ask to have that done.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have anything to do with the operations of the Army in 1944?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, he did not know anything about that. When he heard about it, one of his men arrived so that he could in any case recruit skilled workers on this occasion; but this actually did not take place, for the Armed Forces sent these men into the Reich right away.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the regular worker transports to Germany, in connection with the recruitment of workers by Sauckel, take place under normal transport conditions or under very bad conditions?
SEYSS-INQUART: Whether the recruitment was voluntary or compulsory, transport conditions were always normal. The same as for everybody else in the Netherlands. They were not accompanied by Police, but by officials of the Labor Employment Office, with the exception of the 2,600 whom the Police had arrested and who were sent to a camp of Sauckel's in the Reich.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have anything to do with the transporting of internees or Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not at all.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know what the working conditions were for the workers who came from Holland to Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: I knew about them in the main. They were the same conditions as applied to workers in the Reich. But difficulties arose. First of all, the employers in the Reich asserted that the Dutch people had in part given false information at the time of their recruitment and did not meet with requirements. Secondly, these labor contracts were for a certain duration and the employers wanted to have the Dutch people remain in the Reich for a longer period. I saw to it that nothing was written into these labor contracts which would not actually be observed in the Reich, no matter what one might find out in the Reich.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have no further questions to put to the witness. DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): Witness, I wanted to put one question to you regarding the floodings. What did you, your offices, or the Commander, West undertake in order to prevent the pump stations from being flooded and so avoid a great flooding of Holland?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not quite understand the question. The pump stations could not be flooded, only the polder area.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: There were two dangers. One was that of blowing up, and in that case the pump stations would not have been of any use; anyway it was not done, as is known, but was prevented. The second danger was lack of coal and oil. We tried, as long as possible, to supply the pump stations with coal. This coal was listed as a top priority need. It was thus placed in the same category as every other Armed Forces requirement. When we received less and less coal, we allowed certain very low-lying reclaimed areas to run full, so that others would not be flooded. There was completely frictionless co-operation with the Dutch offices; and a deputy of the Dutch Government in England, with whom I spoke later, to whom I sent my expert, said that from the technical point of view our flooding measures were not objectionable.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, a second point. In answer to a question from your counsel, you said that you intervened against the destruction in the harbor of Rotterdam. With whom did you intervene?
SEYSS-INQUART: With General Christians, who was then commander-in-chief and Wehrmacht commander, who took my side immediately.
DR. LATERNSER: Then you found him in agreement at once with regard to your intervention with this military office?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
DR. HANS FLACHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): Witness, you mentioned yesterday the protected industries (Sperrbetriebe). Can you tell me when these industries were established in Holland and how they aimed to affect the labor employment program, that is, the transportation of workers from Holland to Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe the protected industries were established during 1943, if I remember correctly in the second half of 1943. The workers in these industries were protected. Thus, the recruiting and transporting of Netherlands workers to the Reich was partly slowed down and partly prevented altogether.
DR. FLACHSNER: When the protected industries began to function and work was taken up, were raw materials brought from Germany to Holland, coal in particular, so that the orders could be fulfilled?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe all raw materials, with the exception of coal. Coal was brought in from Limburg.
DR. FLACHSNER: You mentioned yesterday the Organization Todt. Do you know to what extent this Organization Todt in Holland used Dutch construction firms for construction work there on the Atlantic Wall and to what extent this construction was carried out by Dutch construction firms?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that the bulk of construction work in Holland, Northern France, and Belgium was done by indigenous construction firms. This is definitely true of Holland; and Dutch construction firms also carried out work in Belgium and in Northern France. These firms brought their workers along with them. In this manner some 35,000 to 40,000 Dutch workers who were not drafted by compulsion were working in Belgium and Northern France in the middle of 1942.
DR. FLACHSNER: Can you tell us what results this procedure had generally on the recruitment of native labor?
SEYSS-INQUART: The indigenous workers naturally preferred to go into the protected industries or the firms of the Organization Todt, for there they were at least more certain of not being transported to the Reich. And in addition, while they were with the Organization Tort they received special food rations.
DR. FLACHSNER: Witness, when in August or September 1944, because of enemy bombings on the distribution system, production in Holland was hampered or even paralyzed, what measures were taken in order to protect the unemployed workers of the protected industries?
SEYSS-INQUART: Three courses were open to us: First of all, to bring the workers into the Reich; secondly, to dismiss these workers and give them unemployment relief; and, thirdly, to retain these workers and to pay them their wages even though they did little or no work. I believe it was because of a decree issued by Reich Minister Speer that the third course was chosen. The workers in those industries received their pay, and I took care that the factory owners received a certain compensation for wages which they paid those workers.
DR. FLACHSNER: Witness, you mentioned before a discussion which you had on 1 April 1945 with Codefendant Speer. Can you tell us what the purpose of this discussion was?
SEYSS-INQUART: I mentioned already that I, for my part, wanted to talk with Minister Speer about the unscorched earth" decree. But Minister Speer also had a purpose in mind. He wanted us to transport potatoes from north Holland into the Ruhr region and in exchange to bring coal from the Ruhr area into the Netherlands. In view of the potato supply in north Holland this could readily have been done, but we did not have enough transportation means at our command to carry out this plan.
DR. FLACHSNER: Did Speer tell you about precautionary measures for the securing of food supplies during the period after the occupation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Minister Speer told me that behind the Ruhr area he had stored trainloads of food and that he had appropriated the means of transportation from the armament program, so that if the Ruhr area were invaded there would be trains with food for this area available.
DR. FLACHSNER: Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Does Counsel for the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? I am sorry, Dr. Kubuschok, did you have something to say?
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): The Defendant Kaltenbrunner has asked me, as the defense counsel sitting nearest him, to state that he had discussed with his attorney a number of questions which he would like to put to Seyss-Inquart. I just tried to reach Dr. Kauffmann, Kaltenbrunner's defense counsel; at present and probably all this afternoon it will not be possible for us to reach him. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner asks for permission to have these questions asked of Seyss-Inquart tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will expect some explanation from Dr. Kauffmann as to why he is not here to cross-examine. He must have known that the time was about to arrive for him to cross-examine. But the Tribunal will assent to the suggestion that those questions may be put at a later date, tomorrow, if possible. Now, do Counsel for the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
M. DELPHIN DEBENEST (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): Defendant, you have studied law, and you have told us that you had even obtained the degree of Doctor of Law at the University of Vienna in 1917?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You were a lawyer from 1929 to 12 February 1938, at which date you became Minister for the Interior?
SEYSS-INQUART: From 1921.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. Now, was not your clientele mainly composed of Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, not mainly, but there were some among them.
M. DEBENEST: And yet you told us yesterday that you had been an anti-Semite ever since the first World War.
SEYSS-INQUART: My clients knew that. It was widely known.
M. DEBENEST: Yes. But it did not, at the same time, cause you to despise Jewish money.
SEYSS-INQUART: Neither did it prevent the Jews from coming to me.
M. DEBENEST: Were you a Catholic?
SEYSS-INQUART: What do you mean by that?
M. DEBENEST: I am asking you whether you were a Catholic.
SEYSS-INQUART: I am a member; that is, I belong to the Catholic Church.
M. DEBENEST: Were you not also a member of a Catholic fraternity when you were a student?
SEYSS-INQUART: I never belonged to any student organization, Catholic or national. ~ 24
M. DEBENEST: Very walk You were appointed Reich Commissioner for Holland by a decree of Hitler's dated 18 May 1940; is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Your orders, on reaching the Netherlands-as you told us yesterday-were: To maintain the independence of the Netherlands and to establish economic relations between that country and Germany. You added that these orders were never afterwards modified by the Fuehrer; is that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not quite understand one word, the reference to economic relations.
M. DEBENEST: I said that you had arrived in the Netherlands with the following orders: 1) to maintain the independence of the Netherlands and 2) to establish economic relations between that country and Germany. Is that so?