dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
JODL: That program was completely wrecked by Italy's arbitrary act, about which the Reich Marshal and the Grossadmiral have already made statements. I have only a brief addition to make. Italy was beaten, as usual, and sent the Chief of the Operational Staff of the Supreme Command to me crying for help. But in spite of this calamity the Fuehrer did not intervene in the war in Albania. He did not send a single German soldier there, although the matter had been under consideration. He ordered only an operation against Greece, starting from Bulgaria, to be prepared for the following spring. Even that was for the primary purpose of occupying the Salonika Basin, thereby giving direct relief to the Italians and only in the event, which to be sure was feared, of English divisions now landing in the Balkans as the result of Italy's madness. In that case it was decided to consider the whole of Greece as an operational area, since we could not possibly tolerate a Royal Air Force base in the immediate vicinity of the Romanian oil fields. And this contingency is shown very clearly in the order which has been submitted to the Tribunal as Document 1541-PS, Exhibit GB-117, Pages 63 and 64 of the document book. I should like to quote two passages, two very brief passages from it. In Paragraph 2, Subparagraph b of Page 63, it says: " 'Operation Marital' My plan therefore is"-I am quoting- ". . . to send these forces straight through Bulgaria, for the occupation of the north Aegean coast and, if necessary, the entire mainland of Greece." I then quote from Page 64, Paragraph 4, Subparagraph a: "The primary objective of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast and the Salonika Basin. The continuation of the attack by way of Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth may prove necessary." It is quite obvious from these conditional orders that the occupation of the whole of Greece was intended only if we should be forced to take this measure by the landing of English troops, which at that time was not yet the case.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. [A recess was taken.]
DR. EXNER: You said we had planned to leave Yugoslavia neutral. Now this plan was apparently changed by the Simovic Putsch. Why did this event alter our policy toward Yugoslavia?
JODL: This Putsch against a legal government, by officers meddling in politics, immediately after Yugoslavia had joined the Tripartite Pact had necessarily an anti-German tendency. We stood directly on the verge of the campaign against Greece, against the whole of Greece, for in the meantime English divisions had landed there, and this campaign could only be waged with a safely neutral Yugoslavia behind us.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, various other members of the defendants Defendants Goering and Keitel-have dealt with the political aspects of the entry of Germany into Yugoslavia. Unless there is anything new for this defendant to give evidence about it seems to be entirely cumulative.
DR. EXNER: Then kindly just tell us, if you have anything new to add-some documents, et cetera .
JODL: I have something to add which concerns myself personally.
THE PRESIDENT: Nothing is coming through-the English was not coming through. Please, try it again. Repeat what you said.
JODL: I have something else to add which concerns me personally with regard to the Yugoslav problem...
THE PRESIDENT: No. There is nothing coming through to us. Go on then, Defendant. You were asked if there is anything new to say.
JODL: Yes, I have something personal to add.
DR. EXNER: Yes, do so.
JODL: On this morning when the Fuehrer spontaneously ordered the immediate preparation of an attack on Yugoslavia, I proposed to him, or at least I mentioned to him, that after concentrating our troops we ought first to clarify the real situation, the political situation, by an ultimatum. He refused to do so. He said, "That will not be of any use." Field Marshal Keitel has already confirmed this.
DR. EXNER: Tell me, was that on 27 March?
JODL: Yes, that was on the 27th. May I give proof of this. On the evening of the 27th the order was issued...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary if the Defendant Keitel said it, and you say it, and there is no cross-examination about it.
DR. EXNER: But I feel that there is something important.
JODL: A document was submitted, Document 1746-PS, Exhibit GB-120, on Page 70 of the document book.
DR. EXNER: Page 71.
JODL: Yes, the text is on Page 71. If the Court will compare this sentence on Page 71, Paragraph 1, with the sentence on Page 69 of the document book a difference will be noticed. Page 69 contains the order signed by the Fuehrer, and it begins with this sentence which I shall quote: "The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Even if she makes a declaration of loyalty, Yugoslavia must be considered as an enemy and therefore beaten as quickly as possible." This, as appears from the date, was issued on 27 March. I worked that whole night at the Reich Chancellery, which is another proof of the sudden nature of the whole case. At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 28th, as stated on Page 71, I put the following aide-memoire , this operational aide-memoire , into the hand of General Von Rintelen, our liaison officer with the Italian High Command. In it I had written-I quote: "Should political developments call for armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention..." et cetera. I must admit that, in this instance, I ventured a little into the political field, but in so doing I thought that if Germany did not clarify the political situation beyond any doubt, Italy perhaps might do it.
DR. EXNER: The next document is also evidence of the suddenness of this decision, and I have had it printed on Page 73, Volume 1. That is the order issued by the High Command of the Army on the basis of these directives-the order for deployment of troops for the operation. That is Document R-95, Exhibit GB-127, Page 73, of Volume I, as I have already stated, and it says there: "As a result of the change in the political situation..." et cetera-and then-"there will be concentrated..."-and then the last paragraph states-"The operation will be given the code name 'Project 25."' I ask you, Generaloberst, can anything be gathered from this?
JODL: The order issued was not until 3 April...
DR. EXNER: No, 30 March.
JODL: . . .30 March.
DR. EXNER: Did the operation receive the code name "Project 25"?
JODL: A code name for this operation was ordered for the first time 3 days after the Putsch, which proves that it had not been planned in 1937 as was once stated here.
DR. EXNER: And now, just one last question on this Balkan matter. Was Greek neutrality still being maintained on 24 March 1941 when we gave permission for the Luftwaffe attack on her territory of Crete? In this connection I refer to Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13. It is an order of 24 March 1941 which, as I have just stated, sanctioned air attacks on Crete and also on Greek shipping. Now, what about Greek neutrality on 24 March 1941?
JODL: From the point of view of international law it no longer existed at that date. The English had in the meantime landed on Crete and at Piraeus, and we had already learned about this on 5 or 6 March. The order, therefore, was in accordance with all the principles of international law. But to conclude the Yugoslav problem I may add that the allegation made by the Prosecution, that the plan to attack Yugoslavia emanated from Jodl's office, is a statement which has not been and cannot be substantiated by anything.
THE PRESIDENT: What was that document that you were referring to? 24 March 1941? You said 360, which did not indicate anything to us.
DR. EXNER: 24 March, which is Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. What page?
DR. EXNER: Page 76, Volume I. [Turning to the defendant.] We now come to the question of the Soviet Union. Mow many troops did we have in the East during the Western campaign?
JODL: At first it was 10 divisions, which in the course of the Western campaign were reduced to 6 or 5 divisions.
DR. EXNER: What prompted us to send troops to the East after the Western campaign?
JODL: The notification from the commander in the East that with such weak forces he could neither keep Poland quiet nor guard the demarcation line.
DR. EXNER: In your diary-the so-called diary-Document 1809-PS, Volume I of my document book, Page 83, you write on 24 May: "Situation in the East becomes precarious due to the Russian menace against Bessarabia." That is on 24 May 1940. That is what you wrote in your diary. How did you come to this conclusion?
JODL: The reason was a dispatch from Canaris reporting the concentration of 30 Russian divisions against Bessarabia. Whether the note expressing anxiety originated with me, or whether it was an idea of the Fuehrer's which I jotted down, I can no longer say today.
DR. EXNER: Well, on 6 September 1940 you signed an order stating that the regrouping should not give the impression of an offensive preparation. How should that be understood?
JODL: This order signed by me was interpreted as the first attempt to conceal the impending attack on Russia.
DR. EXNER: One moment. I want to point out the order in question to the Tribunal. It is Page 78, Volume I, Document 1229-PS, Exhibit USA-130. It is an order by Jodl, addressed to the Foreign Intelligence Service, and it says there: "The Eastern area will be manned by stronger forces in the coming weeks. By the end of October, the status indicated on the enclosed map ought to have been reached." And now, Your Honors, I am sorry to have to point out an omission in the English and French translations. The next paragraph is missing, and this is very important for the understanding of the entire document. It says, namely, "For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as well as for answering questions asked by the Russian Intelligence Service..."
THE PRESIDENT: It does not appear to be in our document. What paragraph are you reading?
DR. EXNER: It is Paragraph 2 in my document book, Page 78.
THE PRESIDENT: It has not been translated.
DR. EXNER: That is just what I said. That is the error. Therefore I will dictate it now, or read it slowly.
THE PRESIDENT: You want it to be translated?
DR. EXNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Paragraph 2 is not translated at all. There is nothing here.
DR. EXNER: These three lines were not translated at all, but they are very important.
THE PRESIDENT: Just read it through the earphones, then. Read the passage.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the full document is in the British Document Book 7, Page 102.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Go on.
DR. EXNER: "For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as well as for answering questions asked by the Russian Intelligence Service, the following guiding principles apply..." And now explain the subject further.
JODL: Instructions such as these to Canaris' office were issued by me every 6 weeks. They formed the basis for the so-called counterespionage work, which I do not wish to discuss in detail here. In this case what matters to me was that the weak forces which we kept in the East at this time should be made to appear actually stronger. That, for instance, can be, clearly seen from Paragraph 3 which says, and I quote: "In statements on the equipment situation of the forces, especially of the armored divisions, it is advisable to exaggerate if necessary." I also pointed out in the next paragraph that antiaircraft defenses should be exaggerated. All this was done because at that time anxiety had already arisen that possibly a Russian operation against Romania might develop. The purpose of this order was to deter them from that, and it was intended for the intelligence only. If on 6 September, I had already known of any aggressive intention against Russia I would have said exactly the contrary; for with this order, as I had issued it, I would have been working in the interests of Gisevius and his friends-namely, I would have been informing the Russians that we were beginning to deploy our troops.
DR. EXNER: Now, when did you first hear of the Fuehrer's fears that Russia might prove hostile to us?
JODL: For the first time, on 29 July 1940, at the Berghof near Berchtesgaden.
DR. EXNER: In what connection?
JODL: The Fuehrer kept me back alone after a discussion on the situation and said to me, most unexpectedly, that he was worried that Russia might occupy still more territory in Romania before the winter and that the Romanian oil region, which was the conditio sine qua non for our war strategy, would thus be taken from us. He asked me whether we could not deploy our troops immediately, so that we would be ready by autumn to oppose with strong forces any such Russian intention. These are almost the exact words which he used, and all other versions are false.
DR. EXNER: You have just mentioned Hitler's concern about the seizure of the Romanian oil fields. Did the Fuehrer do anything on account of this apprehension?
JODL: It was precisely on the basis of this conversation-when I protested that it was quite impossible to carry out a troop deployment at that time for it would take 4 months-that the Fuehrer ordered that these deployment arrangements were to be improved. Two orders were then issued immediately. One, I believe, is of 9 August. It was called "Reconstruction East" and included all measures to improve the deployment arrangements in the eastern area. The second order was issued on 27 August. We do not have it here, but it has been recorded in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: Yes, that is Page 85, Volume I of my document book. There is an entry, right at the end of the page, in the Diary of the Naval Operations Staff: "Transfer of 10 divisions and 2 armored divisions to the Government General, in case prompt intervention should prove necessary for the protection of the Romanian oil fields." That is an excerpt from Document C-170, Exhibit USA-136. The; PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you seem to be reading from Page 85. Were you?
DR. EXNER: Yes, from Page 85. It is Page 85 of the German version. Perhaps the numbering of the pages does not quite tally with the numbering of the English version. It is the entry: "Transfer of 10 divisions and 2 armored divisions to the Government General."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
JODL: This entry is a proof of the Fuehrer's intentions at that time with regard to this reinforcement in the East.
DR. EXNER: Well, when was the Fuehrer's order issued to prepare for attack?
JODL: The first order for deliberation concerning an attack, or for the discussion of any aggressive operation at all, was issued in writing by the Armed Forces Operations Staff and submitted to the Fuehrer on 12 November. It is Document 444-PS...
DR. EXNER: It is on Page 66, Volume I of my document book.
JODL: . . . and it is already known to the Tribunal. But this first order, which is known to me, had to be preceded by oral instructions from the Fuehrer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
DR. EXNER: That can be gathered from the document itself, namely from Page 67 which reads: "Irrespective of the result of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered are to be carried out." This is proof, therefore, that oral orders and preparation had preceded.
JODL: I am not in a position to say, however, when these oral instructions had been given to the Army.
DR. EXNER: Tell me, in these statements, which Hitler made to you, was there ever any mention made of such things as the extension of the "Lebensraum," and of the food basis as a reason for a war of conquest, and so on?
JODL: In my presence the Fuehrer never even hinted at any other reason than a purely strategic and operational one. For months on end, one might say, he incessantly repeated: "No further doubt is possible. England is hoping for this final sword-thrust against us on the continent, else she would have stopped the war after Dunkirk. Private or secret agreements have certainly already been made. The Russian deployment is unmistakable. One day we shall suddenly become the victim of cold-blooded political extortion, or we shall be attacked." But otherwise, though one might talk about it for weeks on end, no word was mentioned to me of any other than purely strategical reasons of this kind.
DR. EXNER: According to the reports received, how did the military situation develop in the East after the Polish campaign?
JODL: When we first contacted the Russians in the Polish campaign, relations were rather cool. We were carefully prevented from gaining any information about their troops or equipment. There were constantly unpleasant incidents on the San. The Russians shot at everything, at fleeing Poles or at German soldiers, and there were wounded and dead; and the demarcation line was flown over in numerous cases. The unusually strong forces employed by Russia for the occupation of the Baltic states, of Poland and Bessarabia struck us from the very beginning.
DR. EXNER: Did the reports which you received contain indications of military reinforcements for the Red Army?
JODL: From maps which were submitted every few days, which were based on intelligence reports and information from the radio interception section, the following picture was formed: In the summer of 1940 there were about 100 Russian divisions along the border. In January 1941, there were already 150 divisions; and these were indicated by number, consequently the reports were reliable. In comparison with this strength, I may add that the English-American-French forces operating from France against Germany never, to my knowledge, amounted to 100 divisions.
DR. EXNER: Did Hitler attempt to clear up the political situation by diplomatic means?
JODL: He attempted to do so by the well-known conference with Molotov; and I must say that I placed great hopes on this conference, for the military situation for us soldiers was as follows: With a definitely neutral Russia in our rear-a Russia which in addition sent us supplies-we could not lose the war. An invasion, such as took place on 6 June 1944, would have been entirely out of the question if we had had at our disposal all the forces we had used and lost in this immense struggle in Russia. And it never for a single moment entered my mind that a statesman, who after all was also a strategist, would needlessly let such an opportunity go. And it is a fact that he struggled for months with himself about this decision, being certainly influenced by the many contrary ideas suggested to him by the Reich Marshal, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as well as the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
DR. EXNER: On the basis of the reports which you received, what did the further military situation on both sides look like?
JODL: The Intelligence Service was put to work as from January 1941. The divisions on our borders and also along the Romanian frontier grew rapidly. On 3 February 1941 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army informed the Fuehrer of the operations which he himself intended to carry out. At the same time he presented a map showing the Russian troop deployment. This map indicated-and this has been proved by documents-that there were 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry divisions...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, do we need all these strategic details of plans which were drawn up by the German General Staff?
DR. EXNER: It is of very great importance to establish the picture facing the General Staff at that time. If an overwhelming concentration of Russian troops had not...
THE PRESIDENT: But that is not what he tells about. He is telling us about February 1941. The OKW had produced plans to show the deployment of German troops.
DR. EXNER: That is a plan which was developed by . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary to go into such details as to tell us how many cavalry regiments they had there.
DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] Please tell us on general lines how Halder pictured the situation to you after the February 1941 reports. One figure only: how many divisions were deployed?
JODL: I have already said that 150 Russian divisions were deployed against us in February.
THE PRESIDENT: He said that already.
DR. EXNER: And how many were there on our side?
JODL: I should like to say in reply that at this same time our deployment, as reported by General Halder, had only just begun. And furthermore, I should like to point out that according to Document C-39, Exhibit USA-138, Page 92 of the first document book, it is clear from a study of this document book-it is the timetable for the deployment-that it was not until 1 June that the actual attack formations, consisting of 14 armored divisions and 12 motorized infantry divisions, were brought up. In fact they were not actually moved until 10 June. I mention this so that it cannot be said that the German intention to attack was already obvious in February 1941. Such was not the case.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has especially emphasized that this plan for the attack on Soviet Russia had been drawn up long before then. Can you perhaps say anything more about that?
JODL: I will explain the matter in a few words. We had to use 10,000 trains for this deployment. If one could have run 100 a day it would have taken 100 days; but we never reached that figure, So for purely technical reasons this deployment had already taken 4 months.
DR. EXNER: Did events in Yugoslavia have any influence on the Fuehrer's decision?
JODL: They gave it the final impetus. Until that time the Fuehrer still had doubts. On 1 April, not earlier, he decided to attack; and on 1 April he ordered the attack to be made ready for about 22 June. The order for the attack itself-that is, the real opening of the campaign-was issued only on 17 June, which is likewise proved by documents.
DR. EXNER: Then, in your opinion, the Fuehrer waged a preventive war. Did later experiences prove that this was a military necessity?
JODL: It was undeniably a purely preventive war. What we found out later on was the certainty of enormous Russian military preparations opposite our frontiers. I will dispense with details, but I can only say that although we succeeded in a tactical surprise as to the day and the hour, it was no strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war.
DR. EXNER: As an example, could you perhaps tell the Tribunal the number of new airfields which were discovered in the Russian-Polish area?
JODL: I recall approximately that there had been about 20 airfields in eastern Poland, and that in the meantime these had been increased to more than a hundred.
DR. EXNER: Quite briefly, under these conditions what would have been the result of Russia's having forestalled us?
JODL: I do not want to go into the strategic principles, into the operations behind the front; but I can state briefly that we were never strong enough to defend ourselves in the East, as has been proved by the events since 1942. That may sound grotesque, but in order to occupy this front of over 2,000 kilometers we needed 300 divisions at least; and we never had them. If we had waited until the invasion, and a Russian attack had caught us in a pincer movement, simultaneously, we certainly would have been lost. If, therefore, the political premise was correct, namely that we were threatened by this attack, then from a military point of view also the preventive attack was justified. The political situation was presented to us soldiers in this light, consequently we based our military work accordingly.
DR. EXNER: Now, a few questions concerning Japan. What significance did Directive 24 of 5 March 1941 have for co-operation with Japan? It has already been mentioned, but the matter is not quite clear. That is Page 94, Volume I of our document book, which is Document C-75, Exhibit USA-151. Grossadmiral Raeder, in the witness stand, has already said something about this directive. Can you tell me anything new?
JODL: The document is very important. First, I must make a confession. So far I have been accused of merely having received this document. But it emanated from me; I authorized it. It was worked out by my staff in the Navy group. Consequently, I knew this document better than anybody else. It is not an operational order, it is a guide for German officers.
DR. EXNER: What does that mean?