dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
and a half decades, and carried by the newly-awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the armed forces, and as part of it, the navy, can lead with full strength towards its completion the rearmament already under way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the World." (C-156) An interrogation of Raeder concerning this book went as follows: "Q. I have here a document, C-156, which is a photostatic copy of the work prepared by the High Command of the Navy, and covers the struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919 to 1935. I ask you initially whether you are familiar with the work? "A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited. "Q. Was that an official publication of the Germany navy? "A. This Captain Schuessler, indicated there, was Commander in the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, which was an idea of these officers to put all these things together. "Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the authorization to here in the foreword. "A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as he told us here in the foreword. "Q. In the preparation of this work he had access to the official naval files, and based his work on the items contained therein? "A. Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons, and he would have had the files, which were necessary. "Q. Do you know whether before the work was published, a draft of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for comment? "A. No, I don't think so. Not before it was published. I saw it only when it was published. "Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication? "A. It was a secret object. I think the upper commands in the Navy had knowledge of it. "Q. It was not circulated outside of the naval circles? "A.No.. "Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained in the work regarding the circumventing of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty? "A. I don't remember very exactly what is in here. I can only remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word of the Versailles Treaty, but wanted to have some advantages. But the flying men were exercised one year before they went into the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of Versailles
remember very exactly what is in here. I can only remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word of the Versailles Treaty, but wanted to have some advantages. But the flying men were exercised one year before they went into the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of Versailles was filled. They didn't belong to the Navy, as long as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were developed but not in Germany, and not in the Navy, but in Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an Industrialist; in Finland, too, and they were built much later when we began to act with the English government about the Treaty of thirty-five to one-hundred, because we could see that then the Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a treaty with England, and so in order to keep the word of Versailles, we tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but tried to have advantages. "Q. Would the fair statement be that the Navy High Command was interested in avoiding the limited provisions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding the personnel and limits of armaments, but would it attempt to fulfill the letter of the treaty, although actually avoiding it? "A. That was their endeavor". Raeder had his explanations: "Q. Why was such a policy adopted? "A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first war by danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia and so we tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in this way, and so all our efforts were directed to the aim to have a little more strength against the Poles, if they would attack us; it was nonsense to them of the attacking the Poles in this state, and for the Navy a second aim was to have some defense against the entering of French forces into the Ostsee, or East Sea, because we knew the French had intentions to sustain the Poles from ships that came into the Ostsee Goettinger, and so the Navy was a defense against the attack by the Poles, and against the entrance of French shipping into an Eastern Sea. quite defensive aims. "Q. When did the fear of attack from Poles first show itself in official circles in Germany would you say? "A. When the first years they took Wilma. In the same minute we thought that they would come to
defense against the attack by the Poles, and against the entrance of French shipping into an Eastern Sea. quite defensive aims. "Q. When did the fear of attack from Poles first show itself in official circles in Germany would you say? "A. When the first years they took Wilma. In the same minute we thought that they would come to East Prussia. I don't know exactly the year, because those judgments were the judgments of the German government ministers, of the Army and Navy Ministers, Groner and Noske. "Q. Then those views in your opinion were generally held existing perhaps as early as 1919 or 1920, after the end of the First World War? "A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and about those years in the beginning, I can not give you a very exact thing, because I was then two years in the Navy archives to write a book about the war, and how the cruisers fought in the first war. Two years, so I was not with these things." The same kind of aims and purposes are reflected in the table of contents of a history of the German Navy, 1919 to 1939, found in captured official files of the German Navy (C-17). Although a copy of the book itself has not been found, the project was written by Oberst Scherff, Hitler's special military historian. The table of contents however, is available. It refers by numbers to groups of documents and notes in the documents, which evidently were intended as working material for the basis of the chapters to be written in accordance with the table of contents. The title of its table of contents fairly establishes the navy planning and preparations that were to get the Versailles Treaty out of the way, and to rebuild the navy strength necessary for war. Some of the headings in the table of contents read: "Part A (1919-The year of Transition.) "Chapter VII. First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its effects. "Demilitarization of the administration, incorporation of naval offices in civil ministries, etc. Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime observation station and the sea-mark system in Heligoland and Kiel, of the Ems-Jade-Canal, etc. into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934; "Noskos' proposal of 11.8.1919 to incorporate the Naval Construction
of naval offices in civil ministries, etc. Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime observation station and the sea-mark system in Heligoland and Kiel, of the Ems-Jade-Canal, etc. into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934; "Noskos' proposal of 11.8.1919 to incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin; "Formation of the "Naval Arsenal Kiel". "(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and guns. "1. North Sea. Strengthening of fortifications with new batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control Commission-information, drawings, visits of inspection, result of efforts." "2. Baltic. Taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pilau and Swinemunde; "Salvage for the Army of one-hundred and eighty-five movable guns and mortars there. "3. The beginnings of coastal air defense. "Part B (1920-1924. The Organizational New Order) Chapter V. "The Navy "Fulfillment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty "Foreign Countries "(a) The inter-allied Control Commissions "(b) Defense measures against the fulfillment of the Versailles Treaty and independent arming behind the back of the Reich Government and the legislative bodies. "1. Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and automatic weapons. "2. Limitation of demolition work in Heligoland. "3. Attempt to strengthen personnel of the navy, from 1923. "4. The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous associations at home and abroad, participations, formation of "sports" unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in naval recruitment). "5. Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since 1920. (Projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey, Argentine and Finland. Torpedo testing.) "6. Participation in the preparation for building of the Luftwaffe (preservation of aerodromes, aircraft construction, teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti-air raid defense, training of pilots). "7. Attempt to strengthen the mining branch. Part C (1925-1932. Replacement of Tonnage) Chapter IV. "The Navy, The Versailles Treaty, Foreign Countries. "(a) The activities of the Inter-allied Control Commissions (up
teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti-air raid defense, training of pilots). "7. Attempt to strengthen the mining branch. Part C (1925-1932. Replacement of Tonnage) Chapter IV. "The Navy, The Versailles Treaty, Foreign Countries. "(a) The activities of the Inter-allied Control Commissions (up to 31.1.27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace Commission) "Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann case. "1. The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation), their significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work from 1935. "2. Preparation for the re-strengthening of the German U-boat arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925, relationship to Spain, Argentine, Turkey: the first post war U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since 1927; 250 to specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid assembly; electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in Spain and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an anti-U-boat school. "3. Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparations for a Naval Air Arm, Finance Aircraft Company Sevra, later Luftdienst CMRH; Naval Flying School Warnemunde; Air Station List, training of sea cadet candidates, Military tactical questions "Air Defense Journeys", technical development, experimental station planning, trials, flying boat development DOX etc., catapult aircraft, arming, engines ground organization, air-craft torpedoes, the Deutchland Flight 1925 and the Seaplane Race 1926. "4. Economic re-armament ("the Tebeg"- Technical Advice and Supply Company as a disguised Naval Office abroad for inv4estigating the position of raw materials for industrial capacity and other War economic questions.) "5. Various measures. (The NV Aerogeodetic Company-secret investigations.) "(c) Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the Reich government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies (1928 to the taking over of power.) "1. The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations; winding up of works which could not be advocated; re-sumption and carrying on of
"(c) Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the Reich government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies (1928 to the taking over of power.) "1. The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations; winding up of works which could not be advocated; re-sumption and carrying on of other work. "2. Finance question. ("Black Funds" and the Special Budget). "3. The Labor Committee and its objectives "(d) The Question of Marine Attaches (The continuation under disguise; open re-appointment 1939-1933) "(e)The question of Disarmament of the Fleet abroad and in Germany (The Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931. The League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932). "Part D (1933-1939. The Germany Navy during the Military Freedom Period) "I. National Socialism and the question of the Fleet and of prestige at sea. "II. Incorporation of the navy in the National Socialist State." "III. The Re-armament of the Navy under the Direction of the Reich Government in a Disguised Way." (C-17) The policy development of the navy is also reflected from the financial side. The planned organization of the navy budget for armament measures was based on a co-ordination of military developments and political objectives. Military political development was accelerated after the withdrawal from the League of Nations. (C-17) A captured document, entitled "Chef der Marineleitung, Berlin, 12 May 1934," and marked "Secret Commando Matter," discusses the "Armament Plan (A.P.) for the 3rd Armament Phase." (C-153). This document, which bears the facsimile signature of Raeder at the end, speaks of war tasks, war and operational plans, armament target, etc., and shows that it was distributed to many of the High Command of the Navy. Dated 12 May 1934, it shows that a primary objective was readiness for a war without any alert period. The following are pertinent extracts: * * * "The planned organization of armament measures is necessary for the realization of the target; this again requires a coordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This organization of financial measures over a number of years according to the military viewpoint is found in the armament program
* "The planned organization of armament measures is necessary for the realization of the target; this again requires a coordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This organization of financial measures over a number of years according to the military viewpoint is found in the armament program and provides "a. for the military leaders a sound basis for their operational considerations and "b. for the political leaders a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military means available at a given time." "All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert period." (C-153) The conspiratorial nature of these Nazi plans and preparations long before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other ways. Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the U-Boat construction program; also the actual displacement and speed of certain ships. Work on U-Boats had been going on, as already indicated, in Holland, Spain, and Finland. Secrecy was equally important then because of the pending naval negotiations with England. The subject was discussed in a conversation between Raeder and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. The record of that conversation (C-189) is not signed by Raeder, but in an interrogation on 8 November 1945, Raeder admitted that (C-189) was a record of this conversation, and that it was in his handwriting, though he did not sign his name at the end. The report is headed, "Conversation with the Fuehrer in June 1934 on the occasion of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the Karlsruhe." It reads: "1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning displacement of D. E. (defensive weapons). "Fuehrer's instructions: No mention must be made of a displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton (ships). Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may be stated. "2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on the Fleet must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35 c.m. guns (Like the King George Class). "3. The Fuehrer demands to keep the construction of the U-Boats completely secret. Plebiscite also in consideration of the Saar." (C-189) In
that later on the Fleet must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35 c.m. guns (Like the King George Class). "3. The Fuehrer demands to keep the construction of the U-Boats completely secret. Plebiscite also in consideration of the Saar." (C-189) In order to continue the increase in navy strength, as planned, more funds were needed than the navy had available. Hitler therefore proposed to put funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the navy. This appears from another Raeder memorandum of a conversation between Raeder with Hitler, on 2 November 1934 (C-190). this report, again, is not signed, but it was found in Raeder's personal file and seems clearly his memorandum. It is headed: "Conversation with the Fuehrer on 2.11.34 at the time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the "Emden". It reads: "1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available for the armed forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible that the navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He considered it necessary that the navy be speedily increased by 1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need, he will get Dr. Ley to put 120-150 million from the Labor Front at the disposal of the navy, as the money would still benefit the workers. Later in a conversation with Minister Goering and myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if the navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia. "2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have six U-Boats assembled at the time of the critical situation in the first quarter of 1935, he stated that he would keep this point in mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the assembling should commence." (C-190) Then there is an asterisk and a note at the bottom: "The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in the middle of June 35 according to plan." (C-190) The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign
me when the situation demanded that the assembling should commence." (C-190) Then there is an asterisk and a note at the bottom: "The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in the middle of June 35 according to plan." (C-190) The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign markets was a program encouraged by the navy, so that this industry would be able to supply the requirements of the navy in case of need. A directive of Raeder, dated 31 January 1933, and classified "Secret Commando Mater," requires German industry to support the armament of the navy (C-29). It provides: "TOP SECRET "General directions for support given by the German Navy to the German Armament Industry "The effects of the present economic depression have led here and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an active participation of the German Armament Industry abroad, even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting. Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing "self-sufficiency" would in any case make such participation superfluous. "However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced t make the following contradictory corrective points: "a. The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce be overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in war politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to a certain extent, "b. The consequent estimation of the duties of the German Armament Industry lies mainly in the Military-political sphere. It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting the deliveries to our own armed forces. Its capacity must therefore be increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries over and above our own requirements. "c. Almost every country is working to the same end today, even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy are making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament industries. The use of their
foreign countries over and above our own requirements. "c. Almost every country is working to the same end today, even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy are making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament industries. The use of their diplomatic representations, of the propaganda voyages of their most modern ships and vessels, of sending missions and also of the guaranteeing of loans and insurance against deficits are not merely to gain commercially advantageous order for their armament industries, but first and foremost to expand their output from the point of view of military policy. "d. It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy has an ever-increasing and really vital interest in furthering the German Armament Industry and preparing the way for it in every direction in the competitive battle against the rest of the world. "e. If, however the German Armament Industry is to be able to compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the confidence of its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for our own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to be kept secret under all circumstances in the interest of the defence of the country is comparatively small. I would like to issue a warning against the assumption that, at the present stage of technical development in foreign industrial states, a problem of vital military importance which we perhaps have solved, has not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, which may become known, if divulged to a third person by naturally always possible indiscretion, have often been already superseded by new and better solutions on our part, even at that time or at any rate after the copy has been made. It is of greater importance that we should be technically well to the fore in any really fundamental matters, than that less important points should be kept secret unnecessarily and excessively. "f. To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing the continuous support of the industry concerned by the navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the