dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
of the Reich should be reduced in proportion to the number of German troops in France. But it is clear that this number has diminished considerably since the daily payment was fixed. The French government is all the more justified in arguing from the above facts, as it is faced by an extremely serious economic problem, owing to a lack of raw materials and insufficient means of transport, which have led to considerable unemployment. The result is that, if the level of the costs of occupation fixed in August is persisted in, the burden will become more and more difficult to bear as time goes on. The French government therefore has to make a formal request for a revision of the present daily payment. This reduction is amply justified, both by the real needs of the occupation troops and by France's economic capacity. If it does not take place soon, the French government will inevitably be unable to continue its payments. The French government, anxious to carry out the Armistice Convention which it signed, wanted to give the government of the Reich this loyal explanation of the position it is forced to take up. It appeals to the feeling of great comprehension of the German government and hopes that this sincere explanation will induce the latter to grant the revision requested in this note. I am sir, /S/ Yves de Boisanger. [Rubber Stamp] THE PRESIDENT French Armistice Delegation For Economic Affairs. PART 8 French Delegation for Economic Affairs Wiesbaden, 18 March 1941 [Rubber Stamp] German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs 18 March 1941 No. 5409 Enclosures. No. 15447/DE The President of the French Delegation for Economic Affairs. to Monsieur Hemmen Minister Plenipotentiary President of the German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs. Sir: I have the honor to communicate the following to you on the orders of my government: Since the fixation of the daily indemnity by Germany, the French government has paid over 108 million as occupation costs. The burden of this payment, aggravated as it is to this degree, can no longer be borne by the economy of this country without serious danger. There is a risk of its causing a disorganization of its social and political structure from which German interests would be the first to suffer. The
million as occupation costs. The burden of this payment, aggravated as it is to this degree, can no longer be borne by the economy of this country without serious danger. There is a risk of its causing a disorganization of its social and political structure from which German interests would be the first to suffer. The representatives of the German government have several times manifested their intention of dealing considerately with France's domestic order and her attempts at recovery. It is the purpose of safeguarding the economic forces necessary for Franco-German collaboration that the government has the honor of setting forth the motives and objects of its request for the revision of the indemnity. I. MOTIVES 1. Monetary The total of the sums paid by France is so great that financing has to be covered by repeated appeals to the Bank of France. As a result, the monetary circulation is increasing at an exceptionally dangerous rate. In January 1939 it did not exceed 110 milliards. In January 1941 it had already been doubled. At the present rate it will soon reach three times its pre-war volume. 2. Economic This enormous mass of buying power weighs down an impoverished country, whose reserves have been exhausted by war and whose production is cramped by the lines of demarcation. It can not be reabsorbed by taxes, since budgetary recoveries, which already represent a very heavy burden on the taxpayer, do not exceed 60 milliard francs. It can not be absorbed by loans, since subscriptions to treasury bonds only just cover the expenses of the French state. The mass of currency thus exercises considerable pressure on prices, so that it is difficult to prevent them rising. 3. Psychological This is particularly the case owing to the fact that, all holders of francs are showing an increasing propensity to fly from money. The rise in the rate of interest on shares, hoarding by merchants and individuals and rise in real estate prices reveal the progressive depreciation of the national currency. The fall of the franc was considerably accelerated when, the State's Fourth Convention with the Bank of France (20 January 1941) became known. It is to be feared that the publication of the Fifth Convention, dated
and individuals and rise in real estate prices reveal the progressive depreciation of the national currency. The fall of the franc was considerably accelerated when, the State's Fourth Convention with the Bank of France (20 January 1941) became known. It is to be feared that the publication of the Fifth Convention, dated the 20th of February, will be still more disastrous, unless it is accompanied by the announcement of a revision of the indemnity. II. OBJECTS 1. Reduction of the indemnity The indemnity was fixed at 400 million francs per diem, as the result of a decision by the German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs on the 8th of August 1940, to meet the expenses of the occupation troops. But these troops have decreased in number since the armistice, and one must reintroduce the distinction between operational troops and occupation troops, the latter being the only ones who were to be supported by France, according to the Armistice Convention. Furthermore, the debits actually entered on the account of the Reich Credit Bank [Reichskreditkasse] with the Bank of France have been used to cover other needs than that of supporting German troops. Finally, in spite of these non-military uses to which the indemnity has been put, German expenses have not absorbed the credits which were opened. Thus it came about, that on the 12th of March 1941 the payments made by France amounted to 108 milliards, while the Germans had only drawn up to half this figure. It would therefore only be fair, to reduce the daily payment of 400 millions by a very considerable fraction. 2. Incorporation of all French obligations into the indemnity The present indemnity does not include all the obligations which France has to meet. The French State meets the expenses of lodging and billeting separately. The fiscal exonerations which Germany recently decided her purchases in France should enjoy, deprived the French Treasury of a considerable income. It would only be fair that the new payment should cover all the obligations falling on France as a result of the occupation. 3. Reduction of the rate of exchange of the mark The rate adopted for the mark, as a result of the decision of the 8th August, is 20 francs to the Reichsmark,
income. It would only be fair that the new payment should cover all the obligations falling on France as a result of the occupation. 3. Reduction of the rate of exchange of the mark The rate adopted for the mark, as a result of the decision of the 8th August, is 20 francs to the Reichsmark, whereas the official parity between the two currencies is 17 francs, and real parity, based on a comparison of their buying power, is still lower than this figure. This over-valuation of German currency does not have as its only effect a considerable aggravation of the burden of tribute. It also exerts an upward pressure on French prices which tend to adjust themselves to German prices, on the basis of the excessive rate of exchange of the mark. The parity between the two currencies should therefore be brought back to a level which stands in a closer relationship to economic realities. 4. Alteration of the method of payment The habit of making payments in currency in settlement of the requisitions supplied to the occupation authorities is the principal cause of the exaggerated monetary circulation. It is therefore essential that the needs of the German occupation troops be met, in principle, only by requisitions in kind; that the methods used in the Rhineland from 1919 onwards be taken as an example and the French authorities be made responsible for obtaining these requisitions and debiting the occupation account with the value of the products and services provided in France; that payments in currency be limited to a few purchases direct from commerce and industry made by soldiers of the German army out of their pay; that payment for purchases in Germany for the maintenance of the occupation troops in France be met by the Reichsmarks which the French Compensation Office holds in Berlin. The cost of these supplies would be debited to the account opened to follow the use of the daily indemnity. The French government strongly hopes, that the reasons for her preoccupations will be understood. It urgently requests, that talks be begun rapidly, so that the indemnity can be readjusted before the currency has lost its value completely. It counts on the German government agreeing to no new payments being made, until the necessary negotiations have been
for her preoccupations will be understood. It urgently requests, that talks be begun rapidly, so that the indemnity can be readjusted before the currency has lost its value completely. It counts on the German government agreeing to no new payments being made, until the necessary negotiations have been completed, as the needs of the occupation troops are covered for many months by the money at present credited to them in the Bank of France". I am, Sir, etc. /S/ Yves de Boisanger. [rubber stamp] The President French Armistic Delegation for Economic Affairs. PART 20 Paris 11 Sep 1941 C 3 Del. W. No. 9659 P 1. Foreign BERLIN Del W. No. 443 of 11 Sep 1941 Teletype Secret After extensive examination of the situation, I would like to suggest urgently, in reference to our dilatory treatment of the occupation costs, ordered by the telegram from there of 2 Aug 1941-No. 3863-and strictly complied with up to now, to make a new appeal to the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, to authorize me to sign the agreement over the reorganization reached with the French delegation, according to my telegram of 22 July 1941, Del. W. No. 372, and to put it into force. In fact, it absolutely complies with Ambassador Abetz's opinion, forwarded there in his telegram of 15 Aug 1941, paragraph 1, that our consent for a fundamental readiness to decrease the occupation costs has been given to Admiral Darlan on 7 May 1941 for the concessions, granted us in Syria. As it is reported to me, General Huntziger has represented the opinion to De Boisanger, that there may be a misapprehension or incomplete notification of German agencies, if now the settlement of the occupation costs are brought up in connection with the North African questions. I further point, out, that the present arbitrary de facto settlement of the payment of 15 instead of 20 million RM daily, already extends over 4 months, and that this represents for France the practically most favorable situation, and probably pleases more than the new regulation for 10 million RM credit plus 3 million RM transfer daily. It is still more important, that with a further delay of the settlement of occupation cost, a series of important questions, which are
that this represents for France the practically most favorable situation, and probably pleases more than the new regulation for 10 million RM credit plus 3 million RM transfer daily. It is still more important, that with a further delay of the settlement of occupation cost, a series of important questions, which are regulated with the reorganization simultaneously, remain further unsolved at the same time, and disadvantages for us come about from this: 1. The purchase of further French interests abroad is obligatory in most cases because of war-economical reasons. However, the reorganization, agreed to, cannot be taken up for that, as long as a total solution is still uncompleted The Reichsministry for Economy reports that the negotiations are practically at a standstill at present for this reason. Therefore, the disadvantage lies with us alone in these subjects, while 60 million RM for the purchase of interests with the coming into force of the reorganization. 2. The execution of armament deliveries from France always presents to our armed forces authorities difficulties, which result from the payment. An immediate coming into force of the transfer of goods would directly result in favor of our war potential. 3. I can secure the final appointment of the German foreign trade commissioner at the same time, for which especially the Four Years' Plan and the military commander show a lively interest. But the stoppage also has a disadvantageous effect on the other work of the delegation. I am forced to approach the French government every week with new demands, mostly war-economically important, among them the construction of a German-French clay factory in France for deliveries of additional 100,000 tons of clay per year, the renting of several thousand trucks with French drivers, and the purchase of 15,000 French trucks, converted to woodgas for transports to Russia. Everywhere the energetic cooperation of the French government and in part serious pressure by the government on its own economic circles are necessary for the execution of these problems. Because of the well-known tendency of the French government to hide themselves in case of such economic desires behind the general political situation, my efforts now ran against continually
and in part serious pressure by the government on its own economic circles are necessary for the execution of these problems. Because of the well-known tendency of the French government to hide themselves in case of such economic desires behind the general political situation, my efforts now ran against continually increasing difficulties. It is therefore desired to reinstitute the previous status as soon as possible, and to keep the field of endeavor of my delegation free and independent of the prevailing political constellations, as much as possible. For these reasons, I recommend, that the present uncertain situation of the occupation cost question, which can only have a disadvantageous effect on us ourselves, be ended soon, and that the new settlement be ordered by us now. [In ink] Ambassador Abetz has been informed of this telegram before it was forwarded. /s/ Hemmen 1735 No. 23 one received foreign office KR PART 22 FOREIGN OFFICE Ambassador Ritter C.3 "Westfalen", 14 October 1941 [STAMP] German Armistice Commission Wiesbaden 18 October 1941 Nr. 10628 Dear Mr. Hemmen, I have received your letter of 29 September 1941-Del. W. No. 10093 P. The Reich Foreign Minister does not consider it appropriate to approach the Fuehrer with the regulation of the occupation expenses at the present. With friendly greetings Heil Hitler Yours signed: Nitter To The Ambassador Hemmen German Embassy Paris PART 23 Paris, 4th November 1941 Place du Palais-Royal French Delegation to the German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs German Armistice Delegation f. Economic Affairs Wiesbaden 5 November 1941 No. 11116 Enclosures The President of the French delegation for Economic Affairs, To Monsieur Hemmen Minister Plenipotentiary President of the German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs Sir, In execution of the decisions taken by the German government with regard to the payment of the costs of occupation, the French government has, since August 1940 made periodic payments which, on the 31st October 1941, totalled 183,200,000 francs. It was also obliged to defray certain expenses (particularly the lodging of troops) directly-expenses which amounted at this same time, to nearly 8 milliards and to cover the deficit in the Franco-German clearing account, which is,
made periodic payments which, on the 31st October 1941, totalled 183,200,000 francs. It was also obliged to defray certain expenses (particularly the lodging of troops) directly-expenses which amounted at this same time, to nearly 8 milliards and to cover the deficit in the Franco-German clearing account, which is, at the moment, in the neighborhood of 11 milliard francs. The French government protested several times against the size of this imposition, drawing the attention of the German Government to the grave dangers it entails, both from the financial and from the economic point of view. Its fears on this point are unfortunately being shown to be better founded every day. The expenses resulting to the French Treasury from the occupation alone are as high as the expenses of the State itself. The sums paid towards the costs of occupation are also often used to a large extent to defray expenses which have nothing to do with the maintenance of troops. It is clear that such burdens are disappropriate to the present resources of France and that they can be covered only by treasury expedients. The national revenue is diminishing continually. If the efforts made in the field of agriculture result in an increase in the productivity of the soil, industrial activity slows down. An increase in taxation would produce a hardly noticeable result, and one must, on the contrary, expect the product of these taxes to diminish more or less rapidly. One is therefore forced to borrow at short call, either from the Bank of France or from individuals and credit establishments, up to 70% of the needs. In this way the public debt and the advances from the fiduciary swell at an alarming speed, whatever the effects may be of the measures taken to manipulate certain elements of this debt and to make it less onerous (conversion, consolidation, reduction of rates of interest). The mass of means of payment created to deal with the expenses resulting from the occupation, seriously imperils economic equilibrium. Inflation takes place in spite of the efforts of the government to limit its volume and its consequences. The prices of foodstuffs of daily use and of industrial products are maintained by rationing and taxation, but nevertheless
resulting from the occupation, seriously imperils economic equilibrium. Inflation takes place in spite of the efforts of the government to limit its volume and its consequences. The prices of foodstuffs of daily use and of industrial products are maintained by rationing and taxation, but nevertheless tend more and more irresistibly to rise, and each day it is harder to prevent too rapid a rise in the cost of goods and property. The increasing abundance of money available is shown both by the increased circulation of bank notes and by the increase in stocks held in private and public institutions. The monetary circulation, which was about 160 milliard francs in June 1940, has today reached the figure of 250 milliards, in other words, it has increased by over 56%. During the same period bank deposits increased by about 50%. The smallness of the quantity of goods offered is at the same time accentuated by supply difficulties and by the extent of the requisitions carried out in the occupied zone. This development is leading to a catastrophy like that suffered by Germany 20 years ago. When the French government signed the Armistice, it firmly intended re-establishing the economic situation. All its efforts since then have aimed particularly at keeping the monetary situation under control, in spite of difficulties of all kinds and, particularly, in spite of the enormous costs of occupation. The French government is resolved to persevere in this path, but it cannot do so usefully if the payments imposed by the German government continue to render all its efforts useless in advance. It wants to warn it once more. I am, Sir etc. sgd. Yves de Boisanger. [rubber stamp] The President French Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs PART 27 Telegram (Secret Ch V) Berlin, 19 February 1942, 1343 o'clock Wako Paris Nr. 50 of 19 Feb. Citissime. Matter to be kept under lock C Att: Mr. Hemmen German Armistice Delegation for Economics Wiesbaden 20 February 1942 No. 1309 Enclosures [Initials] In answer to report of 3 and 11 February No. 736 and No. 189 of 16 February and telegram of the 18th No. 43. 1. Reich Foreign Minister has ordered on 16 February that you orally transmit to the Governor de Boisanger that the German Government
February 1942 No. 1309 Enclosures [Initials] In answer to report of 3 and 11 February No. 736 and No. 189 of 16 February and telegram of the 18th No. 43. 1. Reich Foreign Minister has ordered on 16 February that you orally transmit to the Governor de Boisanger that the German Government considers the letter of Finance Minister Bouthillier to the Reich Minister of Finances only as a personal statement, not as an official communication of the French Government. In case the French government wishes to make a statement concerning the question of occupation costs this should be directed by the authorized French chief of negotiations to the authorized German chief of negotiations. In connection with this communication you are to warn Mr. de Boisanger regarding the end of Mr. Bouthillier's letter emphatically against an arbitrary discontinuation of the payments for occupation costs by the French Government and to point out to him that such a discontinuation would create a serious situation and result in corresponding German counter measures. 2. The Reich Minister of Finance has on 17 February declared that he approves these steps and that he is not going to answer the letter. However, he has suggested an internal discussion of the question of occupation costs to which the Reich Foreign Minister also agreed regarding the report of the OKW on the actual daily expenditures. The discussion will take place soon in agreement with the competent department and your reports mentioned in the beginning will also be discussed. 3. Reich Foreign Minister, by the way, has issued for all your negotiations the general directive, considered at an earlier date, that you are to break off negotiations and depart for Berlin in case the French assume an attitude which is not becoming to them as the conquered ones. Wiehl. PART 29 French delegation to the German armistice delegation for economic affairs Ref.: P 276/DE Paris, 4 March 1942 Place du Palais-Royal From: The president of the French delegation to the German armistice delegation for economic affairs. To: Monsieur Hemmen, Minister Plenipotentiary, president of the German armistice delegation for economic affairs. Sir, I have the honour to inform you of the following by order of my government. Ever since August 1940 the French government