dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. SIEMERS: Was a war with England taken as a basis for any of these maneuvers between 1932 and 1939? SCHULTE-MONTING No, that was never made a basis, and I believe that would have appeared impossible and unreasonable to every naval officer. I remember that even at the beginning of the year 1939 Raeder issued a directive to the front commanders to hold maneuvers, in which he excluded a maneuver directed against England as an impossibility. It was forbidden to carry out that maneuver at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, it is now confirmed, as you know, that the Navy in the twenties, with the knowledge of the then parliamentary government, violated the Treaty of Versailles. These questions have been discussed a great deal here, therefore, we can be brief. I should like to ask you generally: Is it possible from these violations, which are known to you, to deduce aggressive intentions?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I consider that is completely out of the question. The violations were so insignificant and were based so exclusively on protection and defense that I think it is impossible to construe them as aggressive intentions.
DR. SIEMERS: Can you give us briefly a few instances or name a few cases where violations took place?
SCHULTE-MONTING: First of all, they were limited to the installation of coastal batteries, antiaircraft batteries, the procuring of mines and similar things, all of which were exclusively for the purpose of defense or protection.
DR. SIEMERS: Did these violations of the Treaty of Versailles -or, shall we say, the slight deviations-become known to the Inter-Allied Commission in whole or in part, and did that commission partly overlook these things because they were really trifles?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. I would say it was an open secret.
DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you, Admiral, to pause between question and answer so that the interpreters can keep up. Just pause a moment after my questions before you reply. May I ask you to repeat the answer to my question with regard to the commission?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I would say that it was an open secret. It was just passed by.
DR. SIEMERS: As proof that these violations of the treaty were made with the intention of waging aggressive war the Prosecution has several times presented the book by Post Captain Schussler entitled The Navy's Fight against Versailles. It is Document C-156. I will have this document submitted to you in the original. In order to save time and not to burden the Tribunal again with details-I do not want to go into details-I shall just ask you: What do you know about this book, and what caused it to be written at all? When was it written and what is your general opinion about it?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I know this book. It came about as a result of the attacks of the National Socialist regime in the years 1934 and 1935, which blamed the preceding government and the Navy for not having done enough in the past to arm the nation and for not even having exhausted the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles. Consequently, the idea arose at that time of publishing a sort of justification. This brochure is to be considered in that light; a sort of justification for, I might say, sins of omission. This booklet was later never actually published, or rather it was withdrawn from circulation because it was, I might say, a rather poor attempt, for, after all, it contains no challenging points which might be classified as rearmament.
DR. SIEMERS: Was this booklet distributed within the Navy later on?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No. As I said, it was withdrawn from the circles which had already had it and it was also severely criticized.
DR. SIEMERS: Was the book withdrawn on Raeder's orders?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe so, yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Through this book and another document, by Assmann, a charge has been brought concerning the known endeavors made with a construction firm in Holland. And it was also said yesterday that, by order of Admiral Raeder, U-boats were built for Germany in Finland and in Spain. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MONTING: That is not correct. The U-boats which were designed by the Dutch firm, and which were built abroad, were not built for the German Navy, but for foreign countries.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know for whom they were built? Who received the boat which was built in Finland?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe Turkey received one, and one went to Finland.
DR. SIEMERS: Then the ships were constructed for foreign orders and for a foreign country?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: What advantages at all did the Navy have from their collaboration in the construction?
SCHULTE-MONTING: We were only interested in keeping alive the experiences gained in U-boat warfare during the last World War. Consequently the Navy was interested in seeing that constructors of U-boats continued along those lines.
DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, was that prohibited according to the Treaty of Versailles?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I know of no paragraph which prohibits our activity in foreign countries along those lines.
DR. SIEMERS: In the beginning of February 1933 Admiral Raeder made his first naval report to Hitler. Do you know what Hitler, on that occasion, gave Raeder as the basis for rebuilding the Navy?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, I remember it exactly, because it was the first report which the then Chief of the Naval Command Staff, Admiral Raeder, made to the Reich Chancellor Hitler. Hitler said to Raeder that the basis of his future policy was to live in peace with England and that he intended to demonstrate that by trying to conclude a naval agreement with England. In this he wanted the German Navy to be kept relatively small. He wished to recognize Britain's naval superiority because of her position as a world power. He would accordingly suggest an appropriate ratio of strength. He wanted an understanding with regard to the construction of our Navy; and we should take these, his political points of view, into consideration. Raeder was impressed with the statements, for they were completely in accordance with his own basic attitude.
DR. SIEMERS: Within the framework of this policy the German-British Naval Agreement was then concluded in 1935. Was the Navy as a whole and Raeder in particular pleased with this agreement, or did they see certain disadvantages in it?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder and the Navy were very pleased with this agreement, although we had to impose voluntarily upon ourselves severe limitations for a certain length of time. By this agreement, in comparison with the Washington conference, I should say we ranged among the smallest sea powers. In spite of that, this agreement was generally welcomed, because friendly relations with the British Navy were desired, and it was believed that if we followed a wise and moderate policy, England in return would show her appreciation.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know whether at that time Hitler as well approved of the agreement in that form and was pleased about it?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, I can affirm that. Raeder and I happened to be together with Hitler in Hamburg the day this agreement was concluded, and Hitler said to Raeder when this fact was reported to him: "This is the happiest day of my life. This morning I received word from my doctor that my throat trouble is insignificant, and now this afternoon I receive this very gratifying political news."
DR. SIEMERS: You have already stated, Admiral, that the naval agreement was welcomed by the Navy. You will recall that in the year 1937 a modified naval agreement was concluded with England. Was the attitude of the Navy to that question still the same at that time?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, absolutely. The Naval Agreement of 1937 brought merely one, I might say, additional clause. This was for an exchange of information; and we had also reached an agreement with the British Navy with regard to a fixed U-boat tonnage. We had no reason...
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, referring to the U-boat tonnage, I remember the 1935 agreement: 100 percent of the British U-boat tonnage; Germany limited herself to 45 percent, but reserved the right to increase the tonnage up to possibly 100 percent, in which case she must, however, notify England and discuss it with the British Admiralty. Was this notification about the increase to 100 percent given, and if so, when and in what way?
SCHULTE-MONTING: After we had reached 100 percent, Admiral Cunningham was in Berlin and on that occasion the fact was discussed once more. Whether a written confirmation was made in addition I no longer recall I take it for granted because that was the purpose of the agreement of 1937. On the occasion of his visit in December 1938, Admiral Cunningham explicitly gave Britain's agreement to the final 100 percent equality in U-boats. That is the way I, or rather all of us, interpreted his visit.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember whether there was a special conversation, or a conversation between Admiral Cunningham and Raeder, on the occasion of this visit, in which Admiral Cunningham discussed generally the relations between the German and the British Navy, and between Germany and England?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I had the personal impression that Cunningham and Raeder parted on very friendly terns. At Cunningham's departure there was a breakfast for a rather limited circle, and on that occasion Cunningham expressed his pleasure at the conclusion of the naval agreement, concluding his speech with a toast to the effect that now all these questions had been settled at last, and it was to be hoped that in the future there would be no war between our navies.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this incident?
DR. SIEMERS: December 1938. I believe that is correct, Admiral?
SCHULTE-MONTING: As far as I remember, December 1938.
DR. SIEMERS: I remember the date from the testimony given by Admiral Raeder. I myself knew only that it took place in 1938.
THE PRESIDENT: What Admiral Cunningham is it?
DR. SIEMERS: I do not know, I am not a naval expert. Perhaps Admiral Schulte-Monting can tell us.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I did not understand the question, Doctor.
DR. SIEMERS: Which Admiral Cunningham is that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: The present Lord Cunningham. The elder of the two.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that it must have been on 30 or 31 December 1938, as far as we, or rather as far as Raeder recalls. [Turning to the witness.] From 1933 until 1939 was Raeder confident that Hitler would not start a war?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. Raeder was completely confident of that. As proof of this I may say that actually nothing was changed in our building program within that period. That would have been necessary if one had had to prepare oneself, at least mentally, for an armed conflict.
DR. SIEMERS: In what respect would the building program have had to be changed if one had wanted to wage an aggressive war?
SCHULTE-MONTING: It would have been necessary to give priority at least to the U-boat building program.
DR. SIEMERS: Was it clear to you and to the leading naval officers that a real aggressive war started by Germany would perforce result in a war with England?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. The knowledge of this fact is proof in my opinion that a war of aggression was not planned.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, now in 1938 and 1939 incidents took place which perhaps justified a certain amount of skepticism. I should like to remind you of the crisis in the autumn of 1938 concerning the Sudetenland which almost led to war, which was then prevented only at the last moment through the Munich Agreement. I should like to call your attention specifically to the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, which was contradictory to the Munich Agreement. Now, what was the attitude of Raeder to this incident, which you must know as you spoke to him practically every day.
SCHULTE-MONTING: As Hitler had stated expressly at Munich that he was interested only in the German areas of Czechoslovakia; and, even though perhaps he seemed exceedingly determined to the outside world, was actually willing to negotiate, Raeder and the leading circles in the Navy believed that these things would be adjusted politically. With the occupation of Czechoslovakia a great disquiet certainly did arise among us. But we were firmly convinced that Hitler would not make any exaggerated demands, and that he would be prepared to settle these matters politically, because we could not imagine that he would expose the German people to the danger of a second world war.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you know that before the agreement with Hacha was made, under rather strange circumstances, a bombardment of Prague had allegedly been threatened; or did Raeder know anything about that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I do not believe that Raeder knew anything about this. I am hearing about it for the first time now.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the Document L-79. This is a speech delivered by Hitler on 23 May 1939; that is the socalled "Little Schmundt File." Mr. President, this is Exhibit USA-27, and is to be found in Document Book Number 10, Page 74, of the British Delegation. I am submitting this document to the witness. [Turning to the witness.] This speech delivered by Hitler on 23 May 1939 was recorded by the adjutant on duty, Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt. As far as I know, Raeder, on the same day, discussed this speech with you in detail. At that time you had been Chief of Staff for a period of about 6 months. From your later activity are you familiar with the type of recording which was customary for military speeches?
SCHULTE-MONTING: This record can really not be considered a true account. I have from this record...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, in the first place, your question was very much leading. You did not ask him a question. You put into his mouth what had happened. That is altogether wrong. You ought to have asked him, if you wanted to prove a conversation he had with Raeder, whether he did have a conversation with Raeder. You have told him that he had a conversation with Raeder. The purpose of examination is to ask questions, and then he could tell us if he had a conversation with Raeder. He cannot tell us whether this is a true account or a true form of the account when he was not at the meeting himself.
DR. SIEMERS: I wish to thank the High Tribunal, and I shall try to put the questions properly. The witness...
THE PRESIDENT: Not only that, but the Tribunal cannot listen to this witness' account, or his opinion as to whether this is a true account of a meeting at which he was not present.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, the witness, as Chief of Staff, has always seen the exact minutes on important meetings. They were delivered to him in accordance with the distribution list. Therefore, as this document is of a decisive nature, I should like to determine whether Schulte-Monting, as Chief of Staff, received the minutes or whether he just received knowledge of the contents through Admiral Raeder's immediate reporting. That was the purpose of my question.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, you mean you want to ask him whether he ever saw this document. Yes, you may certainly ask him that. Ask him if he saw the document.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Your Honor, but I believe the answer of the witness was lost in the interpretation, and if I am correct...
THE PRESIDENT: Never mind about his answer; the question is what question you are to put to him, and he can answer whether he ever saw the document.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I shall put that question. Admiral, did you get to see this document at the time?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I am just seeing it now for the first time, here in Nuremberg.
DR. SIEMERS: How did you hear about the contents of the speech of 23 May?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder informed me fully, as a matter of principle, after every speech or conference, confidential or otherwise. Immediately after the speech, Raeder gave me his impressions which are in contradiction to these so-called minutes. Raeder did not have this, I might say, exaggerated bellicose impression which is apparent in this document. But, on the other hand . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The witness must tell us what Raeder said to him. That is what I told you before. He may tell us what Raeder said to him.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I should like you to tell us just what Raeder said to you.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder told me that Hitler in his speech said there was a prospect of a future conflict with Poland, and that this was in contradiction to those things which he had discussed with him alone. That the speech in itself was contradictory, was the impression he expressed to me at that time. He also told me that after the speech he had had a conversation with Hitler alone during which he called his attention to the contradictions contained in the speech. At the same time he reminded Hitler of what he had told him previously, namely that he would settle the Polish case under all circumstances in a peaceful way; and now he was considering a warlike solution possible. Hitler, he said, had reassured him and had told him that politically he had things firmly in hand. Then when Raeder asked him, or rather called his attention to this contradiction and asked him just what he really intended to do, Hitler had answered, Raeder told me, the following: "I Hitler, have three ways of keeping secrets. The first, when we two speak alone; the second, when I, Hitler, keep them to myself; the third, for problems of the future, which I do not think out to an end." Raeder called his attention to the impossibility of a warlike conflict. To that, according to Raeder, Hitler replied: "It is as if you and I had agreed on a settlement of one mark. Now, I, Hitler, have already paid you 99 pfennig. Do you think that because of this last 1 pfennig you would take me to court?" And Raeder said "No." "You see"-Hitler said to Raeder-"I have got what I want by political means, and I do not believe that because of this last political question"-the solution of the Polish Corridor, as we called it-"we will have to anticipate a war with England."
DR. SIEMERS: And that was in a conversation between Hitler and Raeder after this speech had been made?
SCHULTE-MONTING: That took place after this speech.
THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now. [A recess was taken.]
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with regard to the minutes which I have shown you, I have one final question: Did you personally, as Chief of Staff, also receive and read all minutes which were sent to Raeder?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, as a rule I saw all minutes and reports before they were given to Raeder.
DR. SIEMERS: Was Admiral Reader of the opinion-excuse me, I should like to put the question differently. What was Raeder's point of view concerning the Navy and politics?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder's opinion was that we, the Navy, had nothing to do with politics. He adopted that attitude as an order and a trust received from the old Reich President, Von Hindenburg, who, when appointing Raeder to be head of the Navy, imposed that as a duty upon him.
DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Norway. What were the reasons which induced Raeder, in September and October 1939, to consider a possible occupation of Norway?
SCHULTE-MONTING: The reasons were the reports which came from various sources about alleged intentions of an occupation of Norway by the Allies. These reports came from the following sources: First, Admiral Canaris, who was the chief of our intelligence service. He reported to Raeder, in my presence, once a week, the information that had come in. Secondly, the reports that came from the naval attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitan Schreiber, which indicated that rumors were increasing that the Allies intended to drag Scandinavia into the war in order to prevent, if possible, the iron ore exports from Sweden to Germany. We did not consider these reports altogether impossible, because, as documentary evidence from the last World War proves, Churchill had seriously considered the occupation of Norway.
DR. SIEMERS: Was there a further source for reports of that kind?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Admiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of Group North, had received similar reports which he passed on orally and in writing.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember any details from these reports which you could give us quite briefly?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. There were reports concerning the presence of British air crews in Oslo, allegedly posing as civilians. There were reports about Allied officers making surveys of Norwegian bridges, viaducts, and tunnels all the way to the Swedish border, which was taken as an indication that the transportation of heavy material and equipment was planned. And last but not least there were reports about a secret mobilization of Swedish troops because of the alleged danger to the ore areas.
DR. SIEMERS: What danger arose for Germany on account of that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: If Norway were to have been actually occupied, the conduct of the war in the North Sea would have become almost impossible, and it would have been very difficult in the Baltic Sea. The ore imports most probably would have been stopped. The danger from the air would have become terrible for north Germany and the eastern territories. In the long run the North Sea and the Baltic would have been blocked completely, which eventually would have led to the total loss of the war.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Admiral Raeder do on the basis of these considerations?
SCHULTE-MONTING: He reported to Hitler about his misgivings and called his attention to the dangers.
DR. SIEMERS: When was that report made?
SCHULTE-MONTING: If I remember correctly, in the autumn of '39.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, until the adjournment, will you go very slowly because, owing to the power of the electrical recording being off, what is happening here in Court is impossible to take and therefore we have to rely solely upon the shorthand notes which cannot be checked back against the electrical recording. Do you understand? Therefore I want you to go rather more slowly than usual.
DR. SIEMERS: When was the conference between Hitler and Raeder in which Raeder for the first time pointed out these dangers?
SCHULTE-MONTING: In October 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: According to the War Diary that conference took place, which of course you cannot remember offhand, on 10 October. At any rate you probably mean that conference.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler then, as a result of that conference, make a final decision?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, in no way at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Did discussions about that subject then take place continually between Hitler and Raeder?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No. No further discussions along that line took place then until perhaps the end of the year. Only when the reports which I mentioned before were received in increasing numbers was that subject taken up again.
DR. SIEMERS: Is it known to you that in December 1939 Quisling came to Berlin and also talked with Raeder?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, that is known to me, and I took part in that meeting.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Quisling tell Raeder?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Quisling came on a recommendation from Rosenberg and said he had important news of a military and political nature. He confirmed, more or less, the things which we knew already.
DR. SIEMERS: Were only the military dangers discussed in this conference?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Only these things were discussed; the conference was very short.
DR. SIEMERS: No political questions were discussed?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, not at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Raeder met Quisling for the first time?
SCHULTE-MONTING: On the occasion of that visit.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have at that time any close connections with Rosenberg? SCHULTE-MONTING- No, he knew him casually, having just seen him a few times.
DR. SIEMERS: Had Rosenberg informed Raeder before about the relations between Rosenberg and Quisling?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, not to my knowledge.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Raeder do when Quisling confirmed the reports received from Canaris and other sources?