dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON NEURATH: I had misgivings about taking the of lice, which I also expressed to Hitler. I realized that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would, at the very least, strongly offend the signatory powers of the Munich Agreement, even if Hacha had asked for protection of his own accord; and it was also clear to me that any aggravation of the situation through bad treatment of the Czechs would bring about an immediate danger of war. The patience of England and France must surely be exhausted. I mentioned this to Hitler, too. Hitler's answer was that that was precisely the reason why he was asking me to take over the post-to show that he did not wish to carry on a policy hostile to Czechoslovakia. I was generally known abroad as a peaceful and moderate man, and he would give me the most extensive powers to oppose all excesses, especially by the Sudeten German element. When I still hesitated and said that I did not know conditions in Czechoslovakia and that I was not an administrator, Hitler said that I should try it, that it could be changed at any time. He gave me two experienced men who knew the conditions. I did not realize at the time that the fact that the Police and the SS were not subordinate to any higher authority, already a practice then, would make it impossible for me to prevent the rule by force of Himmler and his agencies. But I cannot refrain from pointing out that great responsibility for further developments lies with the other powers, especially the signatory powers of Munich. Instead of making protest on paper, I had expected that they would at least recall their ambassadors. Then, perhaps, the tension might have increased for the moment, but the German people would have realized how serious the situation was, and Hitler would have avoided taking further aggressive steps and the war could have been prevented.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The charge is made that you took this office so that by misuse of your humane and diplomatic reputation the impression could be given to the world that the Czechs were to be treated moderately, while the contrary was to be the case. Will you comment briefly on this point?
VON NEURATH: That is absolutely wrong. Hitler said that I was to attempt to reconcile the Czechs to the new conditions and to keep from excesses the German population which was filled with hatred by the years of struggle over nationality and measures of suppression.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What assurances did Hitler give you with regard to your office?
VON NEURATH: He assured me that he would support me in every way and at all times in my work of settling the national conflicts justly and winning over the Czechs by a conciliatory and moderate policy. In particular, he would protect my administration from all attacks by political radicals, above all by the SS and Police and Sudeten Germans; I had pointed out this danger particularly.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Were you convinced at that time that, in making these assurances of humane treatment for the Czechs, Hitler was serious and honest?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I definitely had that impression.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Then you believed that he would abide by the assurances he gave you?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: At that time did you know of any plans or even intention with regard to forcible Germanization of the Czechs?
VON NEURATH: No, that was completely unknown to me. I would have considered that such nonsense that I would not have believed that anyone could have such an idea.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Do you still believe that Hitler's assurances and expressed intentions at that time were meant honestly, and that they were only made illusory through further developments?
VON NEURATH: Yes, they were certainly meant honestly at that time.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to a document in my Document Book 5, under Number 142, which contains an excerpt from Henderson's Failure of a Mission . I should like to ask the Court to take judicial notice of that. [Turning to the defendant.] In connection with that period, the conclusion of the German-Slovakian Treaty of March 1939 concerning the independence of Slovakia is charged against you by the Prosecution. Did you have anything at all to do with drawing up this treaty or with declaring Slovakia autonomous?
VON NEURATH: No. I learned of the declaration of autonomy for Slovakia and of all these events only after they had been made public.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What were the principles of your program for your administration in Prague?
VON NEURATH: It was quite clear to me that reconciliation of the Czech people with the newly created conditions could be brought about only gradually, by sparing their national feelings as far as possible, and without radical measures. Under more favorable circumstances that would have taken several generations. I therefore attempted a gradual adjustment and a diminishing of the previously hostile policies.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to Document 143 in my Document Book 5. This is a reproduction of an article which Herr Von Neurath published about the aims of his administration in Prague in the Europaische Revue at the end of March 1939. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of this. This article shows quite clearly with what intentions and with what tendencies Herr Von Neurath took up his office at that time. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. What were the conditions which you found in Prague when you took over your office in April?
VON NEURATH: The Czechs were generally disillusioned by the conduct of their former allies in the autumn of 1938. To a large extent they seemed ready to be loyal and to co-operate. However, the influence of anti-Czech and Sudeten-German circles, supported by Himmler and the SS, was considerable. This influence was personified especially in the Sudeten leader Karl Hermann Frank, who had been appointed my State Secretary at Himmler's instigation. I had the greatest difficulty with him from the very beginning, because he favored a completely different policy toward the Czechs. The office of the Reich Protector was still being built up. The head of the administration was an experienced administration official, State Secretary Von Burgsdorff, who was examined here. Under him were the various departments, which were built up directly by the Berlin ministries. In the provincial administration German "Oberlandrate" were appointed as supervisory officers for each Czech district. They were appointed by the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: To whom were the Police subordinate?
VON NEURATH: The police force was completely independent of my office. It was directly under the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police; that is to say, Himmler. ' Himmler appointed my own State Secretary Frank as Higher SS and Police Chief, who thus had a double position. Under Frank, in turn, was the commander of the Security Police. All police measures were ordered by Frank or directly by Himmler and the Reich Security Main Office without a request for my approval, without my even having been informed previously. From this fact resulted most of the difficulties with which I constantly had to struggle in Prague.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The treatment of the position of the Police in a Czechoslovakian report under Number USSR-60, which was submitted by the Prosecution, presents the matter in a somewhat different light. Do you adhere to the description which you have just given?
VON NEURATH: Yes, absolutely.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: You were informed of police measures only afterward, but were not asked for your approval beforehand?
VON NEURATH: Yes, and I was informed afterward only sporadically. I frequently learned only from the Czech Government, or through private persons, of incidents which I was not informed about by the Police even afterward; then I had to inquire of Frank.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I refer in this connection to the decree of 1 September 1939, which I have submitted verbatim as Number 149 in my Document Book 5, and I should like to point out the following: This order is divided into two completely separate sections. Part I concerns the building up of the administration of the Reich Protector; and Part II, completely separated therefrom, deals with the establishment of the German Security Police, which is-directly under the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police. Already this external form of the order, this ostentatious separation of the two administrative branches, if I may express it in that way, proves that the Police and the police power were only under Himmler or under his Berlin authorities. This already emphasized the fact that the Reich Protector could exert no influence on them. This is the great tragedy of Herr Von Neurath's activities as Reich Protector. Matters are automatically charged against him for which he never can and never did take the responsibility. The Prosecution refers particularly to Paragraph 13 in this order, which mentions administrative measures according to which the Reich Protector, and the Reichsfuehrer SS in agreement with the former, can take administrative measures necessary for the maintenance of security and public order in the Protectorate even beyond the limits determined for this purpose. What does this mean?
VON NEURATH: I do not know what this order means by "administrative measures." It seems to me to be a very general order, presumably referring to the issuing of general instructions. At any rate, as long as I was in Prague, neither I nor the Reichsfuehrer SS made any use of this power. Arrests were all made without informing me previously, on the basis of Paragraph 11 of the order which has just been read, and which does not in any way subordinate the Police in the Protectorate to me.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did Hitler not assure you, in Vienna, that you were to have full executive powers in the Protectorate, and that that would include the Police?
VON NEURATH: No; I have already mentioned that.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you attempt to change this situation and to obtain from Hitler control over the Police, or at least exert influence over the Police?
VON NEURATH: Yes. I repeatedly made representations to Hitler in connection with the recurring violations and excesses of the Police. He promised me repeatedly that he would investigate these circumstances, but nothing was changed. The influence of Himmler, who considered the Police throughout the Reich to be his own domain, was too powerful.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Czechoslovakian report on which the Indictment is based, in addition to the Police Chief, also holds the Reich Protector until September 1941-that is you- responsible for the terror acts of the Gestapo. On the basis of the statements which you have just made, do you assume such responsibility to any extent?
VON NEURATH: No. I must deny it very emphatically. I have already explained what the real circumstances were, that I had no influence whatever.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I should like to quote two or three sentences in this connection from Document 153 in my Document Book 5, which consist of minutes from the examination of former State Secretary Frank by the Czechoslovakian delegation on 30 May 1945. These minutes from Frank's testimony say: "Neither the Reich Protector nor I myself was responsible for the actions of the Police. The highest responsibility was with Heinrich Himmler as Chief of the German Police. The Gestapo received its instructions directly from Berlin, either from Hitler himself or from the Reich Security Main Office." By your presence in Prague could you actually do anything in practice to modify at least the worst measures inflicted by the Police or the Gestapo, or to minimize the most severe effects afterward? Will you please describe how you intervened and how you attempted to influence Frank in these matters?
VON NEURATH: I received continual requests from President Hacha, the Czech Government, and private persons. My office was for the most part busy working on these cases. I had every request presented to me personally, and in all cases in which intervention was at all justified, I had Frank or the commander of the Security Police report to me and tried to influence them in favor of releasing the arrested person. It was, however, an incessant struggle with Frank and the Police, although it was successful in many cases. In the course of time many hundreds of persons who had been arrested were released at my instigation. In addition many sentences were mitigated with respect to postal communication, sending of food, and so forth.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Soon after you took of lice did you not prevent the arrest and subjection to so-called atonement measures of the members of the families remaining in Prague of the Ministers Netschas and Feierabend, who had fled abroad?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is right. Frank had ordered the arrest of the members of the families of these two ministers. When I learned about it I induced him to desist from taking this step.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I make a suggestion to break off now, because this section is finished and I come now to individual questions? [A recess was taken.] Z4 June 46
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now, first of all, I should like to refer to individual police measures for which you have been held responsible to a greater or lesser degree by the Prosecution. Were there many arrests of Czechoslovak nationals already in the summer of 1939?
VON NEURATH: No; the activity of the Police in the summer of 1939 was slight, and I hoped that it would be possible to restrict these police measures increasingly.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Czechoslovakian Indictment, under USSR-60, in Appendix Number 6, Supplement 1, submits a proclamation which you, as Reich Protector, issued in August 1939, that is, just prior to the outbreak of the war. This is a proclamation which was to serve as a warning to the people of the Protectorate against acts of sabotage. I shall have this proclamation submitted to you at this point. I should like you to comment on it. This appendix is attached to the Document USSR-60 as Appendix 1. The proclamation, which I have just had given to the defendant, reads as follows-if I may, with the permission of the Tribunal, read the most important part: "1.) Each act of sabotage against the interests of the Greater German Reich, against German administration in the Protectorate, and against the German Wehrmacht will be prosecuted with unrelenting harshness, and will be punished most severely. "2.) By sabotage as described in Paragraph 1, is meant all disturbances of the public and economic life, particularly the damaging of essential installations such as railroads, telephones, and so forth, lines of communication, waterworks, electrical works, gas works, and factories, as well as the hoarding of consumer goods, raising of prices, and the spreading of rumors by word or in writing. "3.) The population must observe all special directives of the organs of the Reich working in the Protectorate such as have been published or such as will be published in the future. Refusal to obey or acting against any organs of the Reich will be considered as sabotage and punished accordingly. Responsibility for all acts of sabotage will be placed not only on the person who is committing the act, but rather on the entire Czechoslovakian population. "I expect under all circumstances that the Czechoslovakian population, through a loyal, peaceful, and quiet demeanor, will prove themselves worthy of the autonomy which the Fuehrer has guaranteed to the countries of Bohemia and Moravia" Will you please comment on this?
VON NEURATH: I cannot imagine from what point of view the release of this public warning against sabotage can be used as the basis of an accusation against me. At this period of the greatest political tension, it was to be feared that radical elements would exploit the situation in order to commit acts of sabotage which could damage public services. In my opinion, this would not have been tolerated in any state at such a time without severe punishment. Through this warning we wanted to try to eliminate all incentives for committing acts of sabotage. Moreover, as far as I recall, this warning had the desired effect and practically no acts of sabotage actually took place. Besides, the threat of special punishment is not contained in this warning at all, but it refers only to provisions for severe punishment which already existed.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Shortly after the publication of this proclamation the war broke out. What was your attitude toward this war?
VON NEURATH: I considered this war the greatest piece of stupidity, for on the basis of my knowledge of British psychology and politics, I was convinced that England would keep her promise to Poland, and that therewith the war against England and France would also commence, in which the United States, with its tremendous production capacity, would stand behind these powers. That was clear to me from all the statements made by President Roosevelt before the beginning of the war. I also rejected and condemned the rather reckless beginning of this war because of my ethical convictions and my ideology.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: For what reasons did you remain in your office instead of resigning?
VON NEURATH: I told myself that during the war, on the one hand, the Czechs would try, if not to throw off German rule, at least to disturb, either openly or secretly, through uprisings, sabotage, et cetera , the military measures of the Armed Forces taken in the Protectorate and that on the other hand due to this the severest measures would be taken against the population on the part of Germany, which would cause the Police, above all the Gestapo, to proceed with all kinds of terrorist acts. Through my remaining in office I wanted to prevent both of these things, and I also wanted to prevent a harsher treatment of the Czech population by the policy of conciliation and compromise which I followed. To lay down my office at a moment like that would have been desertion. But, on the other hand, I believed that in a war in which the existence of the German people was at stake I could not, as a German-which I am, with full devotion-refuse my services and my knowledge. After all, it was not a question of Hitler or the Nazi regime, but rather of my people and their existence.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Therefore, by remaining in office you did not wish to indicate your approval of this war, which was brought about by Hitler?
VON NEURATH: Never. For it was an accomplished fact, to which I had not contributed; and I told Hitler my attitude and my opinion about the insanity of the war quite clearly. But I would have considered myself a traitor to the German and Czech peoples if, in this hour of need, I had abandoned the difficult task which I had undertaken for the benefit and welfare of both peoples, as long as I could even in a restricted measure live up to my task. I do not believe that any decent person would have acted differently, for, above all, and beyond personal wishes, there is one's duty to one's own people.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: On the day of the outbreak of the war, in the Protectorate as well as everywhere in the Reich, so-called preventive measures were taken in the form of numerous arrests, involving at any rate more than a thousand persons, especially representatives of the intelligentsia insofar as they were considered politically unreliable. Were you advised of these arrests in advance, as should have been done according to Paragraph 11 of the order of 1 September 1939, which has been quoted earlier?
VON NEURATH: No, not even afterward. I learned of these arrests through President Hacha.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What did you have done then?
VON NEURATH: First of all, I had Frank come to me and remonstrated with him. He said that he had not been informed either, and that this was a general police preventive measure.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Which came directly from Berlin?
VON NEURATH: Yes which Himmler had ordered the Gestapo and SD to take.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you now try to have the people liberated who had been arrested, and who had for the most part been taken into the Reich?
VON NEURATH: Yes. I constantly exerted pressure on Frank, and on Himmler and Heydrich in Berlin, to that end.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And how successful were your efforts?
VON NEURATH: Hundreds of these people who had been arrested-whose names I had to get from, the Czechs with great difficulty as the German Police refused to give me these names- were released in the course of time.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: On 28 October 1939 public demonstrations occurred in Prague for the first time on the occasion of the Czech Independence Day. On this occasion, some of the demonstrators and some policemen were either killed or injured, for the Police took rather strong measures against the people demonstrating. Regarding these police measures before, during, and after this demonstration, did you have knowledge of them and did you endorse them?
VON NEURATH: At that time I was not in Prague, and only on 29 October did Frank inform me over the telephone about the unrest. The details I did not learn until I returned on 30 or 31 October. I told Frank that through his personal interference on the streets and through the use of the SS he had intensified the tumult instead of leaving the restoration of order to the Czech police.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Frank sent a report dealing with these cases of unrest to Berlin, which he mentioned when he was interrogated by the Czech delegation on 5 May 1945. I have submitted an excerpt from the record of this interrogation which will be found in my Document Book 5 under Number 152. I should like to quote a few sentences from this report: "This was the first time that the population demonstrated publicly and that these slogans"-that were mentioned earlier-"were heard in the open. This matter was therefore taken seriously, and I personally reported to Berlin about all incidents. I should like to say that I was an eyewitness to these demonstrations and that I had the impression that they were of a dangerous nature. In the report which I sent to Berlin I stated specifically that these were the first demonstrations, and that, therefore, special importance was to be attached to them Since they took place in the open street. I asked for directives which I received immediately from the Fuehrer's headquarters. These directives were sent from Berlin direct to the Security Police and I received knowledge of their contents. The entire program was carried through directly by the Police." Did you have knowledge of this report of Frank's, and the measures which are mentioned therein, before it was sent off, or afterward?
VON NEURATH: No. This report was completely unknown to me until now in Nuremberg; but Frank always reported directly to Berlin. Apart from that, I was never of the opinion that this demonstration, which was carried on mostly by young people, should be considered especially important or that it should necessitate special police measures.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: At the funeral on 15 November of one of the students who was killed on 28 October there were fresh demonstrations in Prague, in the course of which numerous students were shot, others arrested, and the universities closed. What do you know about these incidents?