dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
the suppression of religious views. (5) Through their contacts with foreign countries they endeavored to maintain peaceful international relations and were ignorant of any plans for an aggressive war. 134 Col. Neave Rep. (6) Certain groups within the organization such as the Stahlhelm and the XS Reiterkorps were transferred. contrary to their wishes into the SA in 1933 and 1934. Civil servants and others were compelled to join the SA under pressure. (7) After the Roehm Putsch their political influence so far declined that they cannot be considered a "tool of the conspirators". The evidence for the SA may be considered as follows: I. Composition and organization of the SA- (1) Origins and Purposes of the SA. (2) Its composition and chain of command. (3) Recruiting and conditions of membership. (4) Training. (5) The Stahlhelm. (6) The Reiterkorps and subsidiary organizations. II. Defense of the SA Against the Crimes Alleged by the Prosecution. (1) Denial that the SA was used as a terror organization by the Party. (2) The dissemination of National Socialist propaganda. (3) The persecution of the Jews. (4) Aggressive war and the encouragement of militarism. (5) Persecution of the church and interference in the freedom of worship. (6) Concentration camps and other crimes. I. Composition and Organization of the SA (1) Origins and purposes of the SA Before 1933 Max JUETTNER had been a member of the SA since 1933 and was previously a member of the Stahlhelm. He gave a long and detailed account of the early history of the SA. In the early days the immediate reason for its formation lay in the necessity for the protection of National Socialist speakers at public meetings. These meetings of the Nazis were in constant danger of attack by political 135 Col. Neave Rep. opponents. The police at that time were too weak and were themselves opponents of the Nazis. JUETTNER affirmed that the SA were never aggressive during this period. They were not armed. Largely because of unemployment in Germany the SA grew in popularity and in 1933 numbered 300,000 men. After 1933 By 1934 as a result of the joining of the Stahlhelm, the Kyffhauserbund and other organizations, its membership-had risen to 4,500,000. After the death of
during this period. They were not armed. Largely because of unemployment in Germany the SA grew in popularity and in 1933 numbered 300,000 men. After 1933 By 1934 as a result of the joining of the Stahlhelm, the Kyffhauserbund and other organizations, its membership-had risen to 4,500,000. After the death of ROEHM, Victor LUTZE became its Chief of Staff and he immediately set about the reduction of its members. He began by removing people of an unsatisfactory character and released a number whose membership was only honorary. He dismissed the Kyffhauserbund and instituted an examination for all members. Those who did not have the necessary qualifications were then dismissed from the SA. As a result a these reductions the SA of 1939 numbered 1,500,000 men. (2) Its composition and chain of command JUETTNER drew a chart showing the organization of the SA submitted by the Defense as Exhibit 3B. This shows the higher SA Leadership at the top with staffs and adjutants attached. Below the leadership come five deputies south, west, middle, north and northeast. Deputies are responsible for the Gau organization and subordinate local units. These local units included Sturmbanne (Regiments), Sturme (Companies) and Truppen (platoons). Questioned by Defense Counsel as to whether division into such units did not imply a military character, JUETTNER answered that these units were merely local groups of no military significance. The strength of the units varied according to the locality. In his view any comparison with the Army was ridiculous. According to JUETTNER the supreme commander of the SA was HITLER, the highest SA leader. Reference was made to the organization book of the SA submitted by the Prosecution where it is stated that the "Chief of Staff represented the Fuehrer within the SA". Asked whether the Chief of Staff had any discretion, JUETTNER said he could protest against the orders which he received. The Chief of Staff issued the orders to lower formations who were also subject to the Political Leaders. As example, he gave the organization of mass meetings to help in emergencies. On 136 Col. Neave Rep. occasions SA units were used by the police, but the SA as a whole had no police responsibilities. (See Part II, paragraph 6,
formations who were also subject to the Political Leaders. As example, he gave the organization of mass meetings to help in emergencies. On 136 Col. Neave Rep. occasions SA units were used by the police, but the SA as a whole had no police responsibilities. (See Part II, paragraph 6, with reference to "Assistant policemen".) The contact between the SA and the Political Leaders was limited to their particular spheres of activity. The Chief of Staff could oppose orders of the Political Leaders if he disagreed with them. JUETTNER said that after the death of ROEHM the Chief of Staff of the SA had absolutely no influence on political decisions. (3) Recruiting and conditions of membership Dr. DAVID, Vicar of the Catholic Diocese of Cologne since 1931, confirmed that the rapid increase in the membership of the SA during the years 1932 to 1934 was caused by social and economic discontent in Germany. Another reason was the pressure exerted by Nazi propaganda against the republican type of government. After 1933 it was a definite, advantage in the economic sense to belong to some organization connected with the Party. The SA offered the average individual the best means of seeking this benefit without coming into too close a contact with the extreme National Socialists. JUETTNER said that the first SA men were veterans of the last war or young "idealists". They were not "terror gangsters" as the Prosecution alleged, but patriots. Among them were a number of clergymen who remained in the SA until the end. Two witnesses as to character and past record were required before acceptance. He admitted that after 1933 a large number of people of bad character joined the organization but these were removed as a result of the purge conducted by LUTZE. Disciplinary measures authorized included confinement to quarters, reduction in rank or imprisonment. BOCK said it was seldom necessary to have recourse to such measures. Excesses which occurred in Camp Hohenstein resulted in the punishment of the guilty SA leaders who were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment and dismissed from the organization. (See Part II, paragraph 6). In general discipline in the SA was good. The type of Pressure exerted on certain groups to join the SA Evidence as to the
resulted in the punishment of the guilty SA leaders who were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment and dismissed from the organization. (See Part II, paragraph 6). In general discipline in the SA was good. The type of Pressure exerted on certain groups to join the SA Evidence as to the pressure exerted on people to become members of the SA was given by a number of witnesses. The cases of the Stahlhelm and Reiterkorps organizations are dealt with 137 Col. Neave Rep. separately in paragraphs 5 and 6 below. Dr. DAVID was of the opinion that membership in general was always influenced by a certain pressure. This pressure was chiefly economic, consisting in any financial advantage which might be gained. This particularly influenced students in high schools and colleges. This witness stated that membership in the SA was otherwise generally voluntary. Civil Servants before 1933 Dr. Gottfried BOLEY, who was a personnel expert in the Reich Finance Ministry and Reich Chancellery, said that civil servants were legally compelled to join the SA. Before 1933 only a small proportion of civil servants belonged to the Party or the SA. From his observation the greater part of the civil servants rejected National Socialism. Those who voted for it prior to 1933 were probably subordinate officials. Civil Servants after 1934 At the beginning of the National Socialist regime laws were passed which placed civil servants and other officials in a position of great difficulty. According to the civil service code, the official owed the State absolute obedience. From 103 onwards the State identified itself with the Party and its organizations. The official, therefore, owed obedience to both. BOLEY described how after the 30th of January 1933 directives were issued to the effect that civil servants should take an active part in the Party, and by a law of 28 February 1939, candidates applying for State offices were obliged to belong to the Party or one of its organizations. Prior to this order there had been numerous directives and statements which urged officials to join in the most peremptory manner. BOLEY said that at the time of the entry of the Nazis into power he was a young man at the outset of his career. He did not have a single colleague who did not belong to the Party or one of its branches.
directives and statements which urged officials to join in the most peremptory manner. BOLEY said that at the time of the entry of the Nazis into power he was a young man at the outset of his career. He did not have a single colleague who did not belong to the Party or one of its branches. Consequences of refusal The act of refusing to join the SA, for example, would have resulted in the most severe difficulties and dangers to the official concerned. After 1939 it was legally impossible for a civil servant to resign from his department. There were numerous other ordinances demanding that civil servants should support the national 138 Col. Neave Rep. socialist State in every way. He characterized the situation of the civil servants by saying that they were "all together in one boat and no one could be permitted to leave". A similar situation applied to students. Regulations regarding University Students The Defense referred to regulations of the Universities of Munich and Marburg. According to these regulations all students before their third year had to serve in the SA "University Office" and were then assigned to an organization. BOLEY estimated that when he was at the University there were about 150,000 people studying in all the universities and colleges in Germany. If females and those who were physically unfit were not considered in this total, he estimated that at least 100,000 remained who were forced to join one organization or another. The period involved was 1933 to 1934. An attempt was made by the Prosecution to make the witness say whether any of these 100,000 people had joined "willingly", but no definite answer seems to have been obtained. Other regulations as of this description were submitted by Defense Counsel. He quoted from an affidavit by one Dr. WEBER dated May 18, 1946. This said that the Gaustudentfuehrer DOEFFIER had delivered a speech in 1936 at the Law School of the University of Munich. DOEFFIER declared that every student was attending college at the expense of the State, and therefore the State expected that the student should serve the Party or one of its organizations. In the case of any student who considered himself "too good" to do so, he (Dr. WEBER) would see to it that the
of Munich. DOEFFIER declared that every student was attending college at the expense of the State, and therefore the State expected that the student should serve the Party or one of its organizations. In the case of any student who considered himself "too good" to do so, he (Dr. WEBER) would see to it that the student should have to fulfil the functions of a "street-cleaner". He would also see to it that such a student would never be admitted to any examinations. At this time it was already known to wide circles of the public that refusal to comply with such orders or even the suggestion of doing so would result in "supervision by the SD". (4) Training The Defense contend that the SA was in no sense a military or para-military organization. Its training was not designed to encourage militarism or aggressive war. This latter aspect is dealt with in Part II, paragraph 4. It is the purpose of this section of the report to describe the evidence given as to the nature of the training within the SA. 139 Col. Neave Rep. Training was not Military A great deal of the hearing on Commission was taken up with a discussion on the interpretation of various pages from the publication, "The SA Mann". The Defense contend that phrases which the Prosecution describe as militaristic could equally wen be described as encouraging good physique and what is called "ideological composure". The SA training schools gave instruction in "political soldierdom". This was to be interpreted as encouragement of political sincerity and of voluntary readiness to serve the State. There was no emphasis placed on the military aspect. Stress was laid on the ability of the individual to defend himself in all situations. Certain superficial characteristics of the SA might suggest a military character such as the division into regiments, companies and platoons already described. There were also special units like the Marines, engineers, airmen and the SA Riding Corps. These units gave members an opportunity for technical training. Drill regulations were taught so as to present a good appearance on parades. Witnesses repeatedly denied that the training schools of the SA had any military character whatsoever. Their program included
the Marines, engineers, airmen and the SA Riding Corps. These units gave members an opportunity for technical training. Drill regulations were taught so as to present a good appearance on parades. Witnesses repeatedly denied that the training schools of the SA had any military character whatsoever. Their program included instruction in propaganda, geography and topics of the day. There were also schools for Sturm (company) Leaders. These schools were merely discussion groups. Articles mentioned in Document 3050-PS referring to shooting exercises, anti-aircraft gunnery, gas warfare, details of various weapons and battle order of the German Army were merely reprinted as "items of interest". Witness considered on the other hand that articles on map reading and open air exercise were within the framework of the SA training. BOCK explained an article in 1938 giving a picture of SA men marching in military formation carrying carbines as a portrait of members on their way to a rifle meeting. He said that HITLER had authorized certain pre-military exercises in 1939 which were scheduled to take effect in October of that year. They were, however, cancelled. In cross-examination he could not explain why the Reich Ministry of the Interior was unable to prevent unauthorized newspaper articles in 1934 describing military training for the SA. He was sure that if any military training was carried out between January 1939 and May 10, 1940, he would have known about it since he was inspector of training at that time. Further cross-examined on Article 2820-PS regarding the right of a superior to use a weapon in the event of "mutiny" he was asked whether it was probable that any civil organization would have such regulations. His reply was that any organization which wished to maintain discipline would do so. In re-examination he said that 140 Col. Neave Rep. he thought that these regulations might have been issued by ROEHM in anticipation of a successful revolt in 1934 when a so-called "people's militia" was to be formed. The Organization Book - Training JUETTNER was also strongly cross-examined by the Prosecution with regard to alleged military training of the SA. He was asked whether he considered the reference to the
of a successful revolt in 1934 when a so-called "people's militia" was to be formed. The Organization Book - Training JUETTNER was also strongly cross-examined by the Prosecution with regard to alleged military training of the SA. He was asked whether he considered the reference to the organization book for 1938, 2354-PS, USA-43, to the throwing of hand grenades could be considered sporting. He replied somewhat evasively that the organization book was not authentic and it was only a draft of a cc visionary dream". It was not, however, a "visionary dream" of the SA that they should practice throwing hand grenades. The discussion then became confused and it is not clear that this witness admitted that hand grenades were ever actually thrown or not, or whether regulations in the organization book were ever carried out. As to the so-called "ideological training" of the SA, see Part II, under Propaganda. (5) The Stahlhelm In 1933 the Stahlhelm organization had approximately 1,500,000 members together with a youth organization of about 500,000 young men under sixteen years of age. The membership was divided into four groups. The Scharnhorst for members up to 16 years of age, the Young Stahlhelm, who were from 16 to 22 years of age, the Wehrstahlhelm or sport formation, who were between 22 and 34, and the Kern Stahlhelm. was composed of members over 34 years old. Objectives of the Stahlhelm. The principles of the Stahlhelm were to build a strong Germany and encourage international relations. It was designed to increase comradeship among veterans of the first World War who as a result of their recollections of its horrors were determined not to participate in another. They considered that the Versailles Treaty and other problems could be solved by peaceful means. To this end they established contacts with French English and Russian Associations. The Stahlhelm had no military activities. Its members received training in athletics. Some of them were Jews. By a speech on 27 April 1933, on the radio, SELDTE, who had become dictator of the Stahlhelm. in violation of their constitution, 141 Col. Neave Rep. announced that the Stahlhelm was now part of the SA. He dismissed his second in command DUESTERBURG, who opposed this
athletics. Some of them were Jews. By a speech on 27 April 1933, on the radio, SELDTE, who had become dictator of the Stahlhelm. in violation of their constitution, 141 Col. Neave Rep. announced that the Stahlhelm was now part of the SA. He dismissed his second in command DUESTERBURG, who opposed this transfer. The transfer of the Scharnhorst was accomplished by decrees from HITLER. As a result the whole organization was put under the Command of the supreme SA leader, including the youth and sport formations. Half a million members of the Wehrstahlhelm were transferred into the SA and approximately 442,000 members of the Kernstahlhelm were transferred to the SA reserve. About one-half million Stahlhelm, who were 45 years of age, were not transferred. On 25 January 1935, the SA reserve was transferred into the General SA. The Scharnhorst organization was transferred into the HITLER Youth on 21 June 1933. The remnant of the Stahlhelm continued to exist until 1935 when they were dissolved by decree of HITLER. These were the members over 45 previously described and they were never transferred to the SA. In general the members did not keep their ranks but received lower grades than members of the SA. Members of the Stahlhelm claimed that they were strongly opposed to this move with very few exceptions. They were, however, powerless to do anything against this order. After their assimilation many of them remained in secret opposition to the Party. The Stahlhelm members did not want to be involved in politics. They merely desired to continue the comradeship built up during the first world war. (See evidence of Theo GRUSS.) GRUSS was the "liquidator" of the Stahlhelm, which process was finally completed in 1939. He said that the spirit of the old Stahlhelm, was kept alive by this winding up organization and antagonism to the SA survived up until the first days of the war. Conditions of Membership Von WALDENFELS claimed that some Stahlhelm units put themselves at the disposal of the Army at the time of the Roehm Putsch in order to carry out an attack against the SA. This proved to be unnecessary but resentment against the SA continued. There were many convictions of Stahlhelm members between 1933
of Membership Von WALDENFELS claimed that some Stahlhelm units put themselves at the disposal of the Army at the time of the Roehm Putsch in order to carry out an attack against the SA. This proved to be unnecessary but resentment against the SA continued. There were many convictions of Stahlhelm members between 1933 and 1935. Some of them were men of the Stahlhelm who attempted to resign from the SA. Evidence was given that it was impossible to resign from the SA unless a person suffered from some severe physical incapacity. Insistence on resignation in the absence of such conditions could have resulted in dishonorable discharge and observation by the police. In February 1935 von WALDENFELS stated that he tried to resign and was immediately put under observation. His telephone calls were checked and his mail opened, 142 Col. Neave Rep. to the alarm of his family and friends. It was admitted on cross-examination that there were a number of Stahlhelm members who joined the SA voluntarily. These were generally politically ambitious persons who constituted only a small minority of the organization. It was admitted that after the Roehm Putsch the SA still adhered to an anti-Semitic policy but it was pointed out that the SA organization gradually diminished in importance. In general old Stahlhelm members were opposed to a policy of persecution and to militarism. (6) The Reiterkorps and Subsidiary Organizations The NS Reiterkorps originated in the transfer of urban and rural riding associations into the SA. This occurred in 1933. It was the intention that all athletic associations should be attached to the Party. It was guaranteed that these associations should retain their autonomy, and according to the witnesses for this organization, this assurance was kept. Riding and other sport associations were threatened with confiscation of their property if they refused. The Reitersturms of the SA Reiterkorps were composed of from 20 to 100 members. In each district they were also formed into Standarten. The riding groups together with the National Socialist Motorists group and the National Socialist Air Corps made up the three large athletic associations of the Party. The Reiter Korps continually attempted to free itself from the SA but was