dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SCHMIDT: Yes; of course, I cannot remember individual statements, but the collapse of the Fatherland Front did naturally come about when the Chancellor resigned. The Fatherland Front was the gathering point of the resistance, and with 11 March the resistance collapsed.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions. The; PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution want to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: Dr. Schmidt, when, for the first time-if you know- did the Defendant Von Papen suggest to Chancellor Schuschnigg that he, Schuschnigg, have a meeting with Hitler?
SCHMIDT: Late in the autumn of 1937-it must have been November-Von Papen made the suggestion for such a meeting. These discussions did not, however, have any concrete results at the time. The official invitation was brought by Von Papen on or about 6 or 7 February, after he had returned from his visit to Hitler. I heard about the invitation on that day.
MR. DODD: Will you also tell us if you know whether or not Von Papen assured Schuschnigg that this meeting would be restricted to very well-defined points, and that it would concern itself only with matters that were agreed upon between Schuschnigg and Von Papen before the conference took place?
SCHMIDT: The Chancellor himself demanded exact wording for the agenda of the conference, that is, as a basic topic the 11th of July, the final removal of existing differences, and so on and so forth. That had been agreed between Von Papen and Schuschnigg.
MR. DODD: And did Von Papen assure Schuschnigg that the meeting would proceed favorably for Austria?
SCHMIDT: Assure him? No. But a declaration was given by Von Papen to the effect that the situation at the time was favorable. In this connection, Von Papen referred to the conditions such as had been created on 4 February: He believed then that Hitler would need a foreign political success, following these events, and so a certain success could be scored by the Chancellor for a low price.
MR. DODD: Of course, what I am trying to clear up here-and you can answer briefly, which, I think, will help us-is that: You and Schuschnigg had the impression that advantage would accrue to you and to Austria if you attended the meeting, is that not so?
SCHMIDT: I said earlier that the Chancellor was not optimistic. An improvement of the situation, therefore, was hardly expected, only a removal of the existing differences.
MR. DODD: Now, the night before you left for Berchtesgaden, you had a conversation with a man by the name of Hornbostel, is that so? The Minister.
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And had you already had a conversation with SeyssInquart that same evening, you and Schuschnigg?
SCHMIDT: It is possible. During those days, repeated discussions took place.
MR. DODD: Well, maybe I can help you a little. Do you not recall that Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart were drawing up a memorandum of some sort about domestic questions, while you and, I believe, Hornbostel, or someone else, were preparing a paper or papers on international matters or matters of foreign policy? Does that help you any?
SCHMIDT: I could not understand.
MR. DODD: Well, I am referring to the time when you and some of your associates were preparing a memorandum of some sort about the foreign questions, and Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart were preparing papers about domestic affairs. You remember that, do you not?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Now, you were alarmed that night about Says Inquart, were you not?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And why were you alarmed? What was the cause of your alarm? What did you fear at the hands of Seyss-Inquart?
SCHMIDT: The drafts which I saw before my departure and which had been worked out by Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart as a basis for a part of the political discussions appeared to me to be politically useless and impracticable. It was my impression that two men were at work here who perhaps enjoyed making up stories, but who did not do justice to the seriousness of the situation. There were expressions used, such as the difference between the Austrian National Socialist ideology and the National Socialist. But there is no difference. An Austrian National Socialist ideology can only be National Socialist. I criticized these matters in one of my talks.
MR. DODD: Will you agree that he was in some kind of combination with Hitler and that bad things would result from it for Austria? By "him" I mean Seyss-Inquart.
SCHMIDT: No, at that time I had no fear that there was a secret agreement between Hitler and Seyss-Inquart.
MR. DODD: Now, when you got to Berchtesgaden the next day, you found that much of the material that had been discussed between Zernatto and yourself and Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg was the basis for Hitler's demands on Schuschnigg, is that not so?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And were you not convinced, at least that day, that Seyss-Inquart had been in communication with Hitler some time before you got to Berchtesgaden and had communicated to him these basic demands?
SCHMIDT: We merely had the impression that the basis for this conference was a draft which had been prepared by men who knew the conditions. Therefore, this list of demands was based on a large portion of the Zernatto-Seyss-Inquart agreements. The entire program of demands had not been made known to us previously.
MR. DODD: You and Schuschnigg represented Austria that day at Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Hitler, Von Papen, Von Ribbentrop, Keitel, Sperrle, and Reichenau, is that not so, were there for Germany?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: You and Von Papen and Schuschnigg rode from the border together in the same railroad coach, did you, to Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And in the course of that...
SCHMIDT: Whether Papen was in the same coach I am not sure, but we were together on the way back.
MR. DODD: Well, he was on the train, was he not, whether he was in the same coach or not? Did he not get on the train at the border and ride on with you and Schuschnigg?
SCHMIDT: That I no longer know.
MR. DODD: Did he not meet you at the border?
SCHMIDT: He was waiting for us at the border.
MR. DODD: Perhaps I am confused, but what I am getting at is a particular conversation that you and Schuschnigg had with Von Papen, either right at the time you met him at the border, or in the course of your trip up to Berchtesgaden, when he told you that, "Oh, by the way, there are going to be a few generals up here. I hope you would not mind." Do you remember Von Papen saying that?
SCHMIDT: Well, generals were mentioned, yes. Schuschnigg had said-whether Keitel's name was mentioned, that I can no longer remember-that he would be there.
MR. DODD: Well, it was rather casually said, and you did not have any opportunity to object at all, did you? And up to that time you had not known there were to be military men there?
SCHMIDT: No, up to then we did not know.
MR. DODD: Now, you got to Berchtesgaden at what time of day? Early in the morning or midmorning? What time of the day?
SCHMIDT: In the course of the morning.
MR. DODD: Yes, and I wish you to tell the Tribunal, as well as you can, just what happened there that day. We have heard much testimony about this meeting at Berchtesgaden, and you are the first person on the stand who was actually there. I guess that is not so-Keitel was there also. Well, but at any rate, you participated in the discussion. How did the discussion start?
SCHMIDT: To begin with, the discussion started with a conversation between Hitler and Schuschnigg. That conversation took place privately, so that neither I nor the other gentlemen were present. Later, the gentlemen were called in individually, and then there were also conferences without Hitler with the then Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, during which the points of the program which had been submitted to us before were discussed. In the course of these conversations, individual demands were canceled.
MR. DODD: While Hitler and Schuschnigg were talking, who were you talking with, if you were talking with anybody, or what were you doing?
SCHMIDT: I was together with the other gentlemen whom you have already mentioned; some of us were in the large hall and some of us sat and waited in the anteroom right outside the room where the four-man conference was taking place.
MR. DODD: Did you talk to Von Ribbentrop, for example' while Schuschnigg was talking to Hitler? What was going on there? What were you talking about with Ribbentrop, if you were talking to him?
SCHMIDT: In the afternoon session we went through the list of demands with Ribbentrop-I did that partly on my own-and I succeeded in having certain points eliminated.
MR. DODD: Well, during the morning-I wish you would limit yourself to time here, so that we will know the exact sequence of events. During that morning session between Hitler and Schuschnigg were you just sitting around in an informal conversation or were you actually in conversation about Austria and Germany with Ribbentrop or with anybody else?
SCHMIDT: Not in the morning, no, because we, or at least I, had not yet seen the program, and the political talks could only take place on the basis of the demands presented by both sides.
MR. DODD: Well, there were recesses, were there not, so to speak, between the conferences, and during those recesses, did you not have a chance to talk to Schuschnigg? During those few intervals?
SCHMIDT: Yes, after about an hour Schuschnigg came out, gave me a summary of the situation, and discussed it with me.
MR. DODD: Tell us what he told you, right there at first hand.
SCHMIDT: He first of all described the atmosphere, the violence of the language used, and then said that the demands which had been presented had the character of an ultimatum.
MR. DODD: Try to tell us what he said if you remember. What did he say about the atmosphere, about the language used? That is what we want to know.
SCHMIDT: First of all, he began with the greeting he had received. He said that the Fuehrer had accused him of not being a German, or that Austria was not following a German policy. It had always been so, even during the time of the Hapsburgs. He also held the Catholic element in Austria responsible for this. Austria was always a stumbling-block in the way of every national movement, and the same was true today. Then Hitler also mentioned the fact that Austria had not left the League of Nations. Then there were very serious arguments between Hitler and Schuschnigg personally, during which the Federal Chancellor felt that even he personally was being attacked badly. The details of this conference I cannot now remember, but the atmosphere, according to the Federal Chancellor's description, was extremely rough.
MR. DODD: You had luncheon there, I assume, at midday or shortly after?
SCHMIDT: After the conference, at or about 12:00 or 12:30, there was a joint luncheon. Here there was a perfectly normal tone of conversation again. In the meantime the tense feeling had subsided once more.
MR. DODD: Now, was Schuschnigg quite a heavy smoker?
SCHMIDT: You mean then, or when?
MR. DODD: I mean at that time, of course.
SCHMIDT: Of course, Schuschnigg was a heavy smoker.
MR. DODD: Now, we have heard that during that day of conferences, he was not permitted to smoke, until you pleaded with Ribbentrop to let him have one cigarette. Now, what about that? Is that so, or is that a story?
SCHMIDT: We were told at the time that there could be no smoking in Hitler's presence. That is true. Then I tried to find a chance for the Chancellor to be allowed to smoke one cigarette. Whether I asked Ribbentrop about it I cannot remember exactly, because that detail was not of any importance.
MR. DODD: Well, all right. Anyhow, at this conference did Schuschnigg tell you that Hitler demanded that Seyss-Inquart should be made Minister of Security of the Government?
SCHMIDT: That was one of the demands on the program.
MR. DODD: Made by Hitler?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Did he also demand that Glaise-Horstenau be named Minister for the Army?
SCHMIDT: That was the second position which was demanded.
MR. DODD: Did he also demand that certain expelled students from the universities in Austria be reinstated?
SCHMIDT: Yes, the expelled students were to be pardoned and admitted to the universities.
MR. DODD: And certain discharged officials were to be reinstated in their offices?
SCHMIDT: That too.
MR. DODD: Second, certain discharged members of the police forces of Austria were to be restored to their places as well?
SCHMIDT: That was included in the chapter "Acts of Reprieve.'' Accordingly, officials who had been discharged from executive positions were to be returned to status again.
MR. DODD: Were there also demands made with regard to currency exchange and customs unions?
SCHMIDT: Yes, economic demands of this kind were discussed The expression customs union itself was not used. However, there were demands that came close to it.
MR. DODD: Now, as soon as Schuschnigg heard these demands of course, you knew that the conference was exceeding the limitations that had been placed upon it by the agreement between Von Papen and Schuschnigg, did you not? You knew that right away?
SCHMIDT: Yes, the program was more far-reaching than we expected, that is quite true, but I do not know whether Von Paper knew the program beforehand. I assume not.
MR. DODD: Well, I did not ask you that, but that is all right if you want to say something for Von Papen. My question it however: Did you not immediately go to Von Papen or did you not go to Schuschnigg and say: "There, this is not what you told us we came here to do"? Did you not have any such conversation with him during one of these recesses?
SCHMIDT: Of course, statements were made to the effect that this program was more far-reaching than we had expected.
MR. DODD: What did Von Papen say?
SCHMIDT: We had the impression that Von Papen himself was unpleasantly affected by certain points.
MR. DODD: Did he not suggest, however, that you agree to Hitler's terms?
SCHMIDT: Papen certainly recommended that the final conditions be accepted, that is, after we had already obtained some of the concessions because in his opinion an agreement ought to be reached. The Federal Chancellor, too, gave his personal word, because he did not want to go away without a result being reached, so as not to endanger Austria's position.
MR. DODD: Now, also, Hitler agreed that he would dissolve the new National Socialist Party in Austria, did he not? Did he not assure you that day that he would do so?
SCHMIDT: Yes, indeed.
MR. DODD: That he would recall Dr. Tafs and Dr. Leopold, the leaders of the Nazi Party in Austria?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And also, you agreed to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Minister for Security?
SCHMIDT: The Chancellor agreed with this decision.
MR. DODD: And you agreed to take men by the names of, or men like, Fischbock and Wolf, into the Austrian press service?
SCHMIDT: They were to be admitted. Fischbock was to be in the Ministry of Commerce, and Wolf in the press section. Nothing was said about the form in which that was to take place.
MR. DODD: And you agreed also to try to absorb some of the National Socialists into the Fatherland Front, to absorb them into your own political group?
SCHMIDT: The expression "some of the Nazis into the Fatherland Front" does not meet the situation. It was the question of incorporating the National Opposition-which at that time was described as the Austrian National Socialist ideology-into the Fatherland Front, and so insure the co-operation of this entire group in the political life of Austria.
MR. DODD: All right; now, Hitler told you that you had until 15 December to accept his terms, did he not? I mean, 15 February.
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And he told you that if you did not do so, he would use force?
SCHMIDT: The ultimatum was-yes, it was an ultimatum-to the effect that Hitler intended to march into Austria as early as February, and was still prepared to make one last attempt.
MR. DODD: And what about these generals, were they walking in and out while the conference was going on? Men like the Defendant Keitel?
SCHMIDT: The generals were called in several times.
MR. DODD: Were you and Schuschnigg frightened? Did you think at one time that you were to be taken either into custody or to be shot?
SCHMIDT: We were worried that possibly we might not be allowed to leave, yes; but that we might be shot, no.
MR. DODD: Well, do you remember Schuschnigg telling you, when on your way back to Vienna, that he was frightened when Keitel was called in, that Schuschnigg thought he was going to be shot, or something drastic was to be done to him, and you told Schuschnigg that you, too, were frightened at that time, that the end had come, or words to that effect?
SCHMIDT: No, I do not remember that conversation. There was never any talk about shooting, but as I have already said, we were just afraid. The Chancellor was also of that opinion that if the negotiations did not go well we might not get away.
MR. DODD: Very well. What was Von Papen doing while the generals were moving in and out? Did he see that as well as you?
SCHMIDT: After such a heated discussion it is quite difficult to say, after 8 years, what each individual was doing at the time.
MR. DODD: There were not too many of you there-six or eight. Were you pretty generally in a group?
SCHMIDT: There were continuous changes. We were not always in there together. Various combinations were certainly made.
MR. DODD: Let me put it to you this way: There was not any possibility of Von Papen failing to see the generals there that day, was there?
SCHMIDT: On that day he must have seen them when we were there.
MR. DODD: Von Ribbentrop told you that Hitler was in a very angry frame of mind, did he not?
SCHMIDT: Yes, we were all agreed on that.
MR. DODD: And he also urged that you, of course, accept the terms as the best thing for you and for Schuschnigg, did he not?
SCHMIDT: At any rate, Ribbentrop at the time did not take part in this pressure. He represented the German demands, too, yes, but not in an unpleasant or forceful way. I mentioned that to the Chancellor even at the time.
MR. DODD: Yes, this is what the situation was, was it not: Von Ribbentrop was playing the role of the nice man, while Hitler inside was playing the role of the horrid man, and you and Schuschnigg were being passed back and forth from one to another?
SCHMIDT: It was my impression, at the time, that Ribbentrop was not acquainted with the subject very well and that for that reason alone he had kept himself somewhat in the background.
MR. DODD: Yes, that is interesting, and it is not altogether news in this case; but in any event, is it not a fact that you were being played off, so to speak, as between the nice man Von Ribbentrop and the bad man Hitler?
SCHMIDT: It cannot be described like that. That was not the case. We had to negotiate the details with Ribbentrop. Hitler had stated that we should discuss the detail together with the experts.
MR. DODD: Well, could it be that you do not realize it yet? Are you sure that that was not the situation, or is it only that you have not realized it to this day?
SCHMIDT: About what?
MR. DODD: That situation that I suggested-that you were being maneuvered between the good man and the bad man.
SCHMIDT: No.
MR. DODD: Well, if you do not understand, I do not think we need to go on with it. Now, how late did you stay there that day, and what time did you leave Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: In the late hours of the evening. It must have been between 9 and 10, as far as I remember.
MR. DODD: And when you got back to Vienna, did you tell Seyss-Inquart about what had happened in Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: First of all there was a conference between Zernatto and Seyss Inquart in which Zernatto gave Seyss-Inquart an exact picture of the situation, since Zernatto had been informed by the Federal Chancellor as well as by myself. Later I joined in this conversation. However, I had the impression that most of the description was already over and only details were still being mentioned.
MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal this morning that SeyssInquart told you that he wanted to retain some independence for Austria-some semblance of independence, anyway. Now, you did not believe that, did you, when he told you?
SCHMIDT: I cannot say either "yes" or '`no'' to that. I turned him down, and therefore I did not bother my head any more about Seyss-Inquart's political ideas because I did not intend to enter the Government. The demand had to be regarded as being meant seriously.
MR. DODD: Well, you used some particular language you turned him down, did you not? What did you say about wanting to be truthful and decent?
SCHMIDT: I stated at that time that I belonged to Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, that The laws of decency and loyalty still applied for me, and that therefore I would resign with him.
MR. DODD: Then did you not use the language, "I still believe in the rules of truth and decency"?
SCHMIDT: No, the laws regarding loyalty and decency were still applicable to me. That is what I said. I had been with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg all the time, and I would also resign with him. In this connection you would have to know my relationship to the Chancellor; anyone who knows that knows what it means and that I could not have acted any differently.
MR. DODD: Now, I am not suggesting that. I am merely trying to show that you yourself used language in refusing Seyss-Inquart that indicated that you did not think he was truthful or faithful or decent. Is that not so?
SCHMIDT: I did not mean that by it. What I said then referred to myself, to my reason for refusing. There was indeed a difference, was there not, which arose from the fact that I was on terms of friendship with the Chancellor.
MR. DODD: Well, you know we have your testimony down there in Vienna where you testified under oath before the Court, and you remember telling the judge down there that Seyss-Inquart participated in the violent removal of Schuschnigg.
SCHMIDT: Yes, I stated that I could not belong to Seyss-Inquart's Government since it was, after all, partly responsible for the removal of Schuschnigg's Government. Since I was a friend of Schuschnigg, I could not participate in such a Government.
MR. DODD: Well, the point of it all is that, knowing SeyssInquart, and as he had been in the closest association with the Nazis, and having had your experience at Berchtesgaden, are you serious when you tell the Tribunal that you really thought-you really believed Seyss-Inquart when he said he wanted to maintain some independence for Austria?
SCHMIDT: I doubted that, too, at the time, just as I still doubt it today. What went on in his head I cannot say.
MR. DODD: I am not asking you for that. I am asking you what went on in your head. Now, you had a conversation with the Defendant Von Papen about Seyss-Inquart not too many years ago, did you not?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Now, tell the Tribunal when and where that conversation took place.
SCHMIDT: I met Von Papen in Turkey-it must have been in the late autumn of 1943. Our conversation turned on the events of 11 March 1938. At the time Von Papen expressed himself in a severely critical way about the procedure at that time, about SeyssInquart, for the reason, he thought, that he had done nothing for the independence of Austria, and also because the procedure had not served German interests either. He wanted to express his criticism by this, and I had the impression that he was indeed against a violent solution, that is, against a solution by violence such as had occurred.
MR. DODD: Well, I want you particularly to tell the Tribunal just what it was that Von Papen said about Seyss-Inquart-and this was 1943, was it not, not 1940? It was when you were in Turkey and so was Von Papen? Or was he not?
SCHMIDT: Yes, he was.