dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
Madeleine' the Second Engineer and I had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the Second Engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 2½ inches long embedded in his body. * * * I had 14 shrapnel wounds." "This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the whalers 'Sylvester' (mined) and 'New Seville' (torpedoed), and the Trawler 'Ocean Tide', which ran ashore. "As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were six killed, two missing, two injured." (D-645). The next case is that of the ship "Antonico", which was torpedoed, set afire, and sunk on 28 September 1942, off the coast of French Guiana. The date of the incident is some eleven days after the issue of the order (D-630). A statement given by the Second Officer describes the attack on the ship, which by then was on fire (D-647): "* * * That the witness saw the dead on the deck of the 'Antonico' as he and his crew tried to swing out their lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20 minutes; and that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to get away from the side of the 'Antonico' in order to avoid being dragged down by the same 'Antonico' and also because she was the aggressor's target; that the night was dark, and it was thus difficult to see the submarine, but that the fire aboard the 'Antonico' lit up the locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that the enemy ruthlessly machined-gunned the defenseless sailors in No. 2 lifeboat, in which the witness found himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the witness gave orders to his company to throw themselves overboard to save themselves from the bullets; in so doing, they were protected and out of sight behind the lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even so the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At that time the witness and his companions were about 20 meters in distance from the submarine." (D-647) The U-boat's log in that case is not available, but it may be surmised, in view of the order that nothing compromising should be included in entries in logs, that it would be no more helpful than in the case of the previous
companions were about 20 meters in distance from the submarine." (D-647) The U-boat's log in that case is not available, but it may be surmised, in view of the order that nothing compromising should be included in entries in logs, that it would be no more helpful than in the case of the previous incident. A broadcast by a German Naval War Reporter on the long wave propaganda service from Friesland, (D-646-A) in English, on 11 March 1943, stated: "Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these waters-dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the colored people who were at their beck and call. Recently a U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer. Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a decoy ship, the submarine steamed cautiously to within 20 yards, when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder of the Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank. There remained only wreckage. Lifeboats packed with men, and sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed for Britain and America." (D-646-A) This statement shows that it was the policy of the enemy to seek to terrorize crews. It is a part with the order with regard to rescue ships and with the order on the destruction of steamers. After Doenitz succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he presumably also succeeded to the equivalent rank of a Minister of the Reich, which Raeder had held (2098-PS). An official report certified by an official of the British Admiralty sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings, and those present, on the occasion of meetings between Doenitz or his representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder until the end (D-648). The certificate states: "* * * I have compiled from them [captured documents] the attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz attended conferences at Hitler's headquarters. The list of other senior officials who attended the same conferences is added when this information was contained in the captured documents concerned. I certify that the list
from them [captured documents] the attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz attended conferences at Hitler's headquarters. The list of other senior officials who attended the same conferences is added when this information was contained in the captured documents concerned. I certify that the list is a true extract from the collective documents which I have examined, and which are in the possession of the British Admiralty, London." Either Admiral Doenitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss, was present at each of the numerous meetings listed. Among those who were also constantly present were Speer, Keitel, Jodl, Ribbentrop, Goering, and Himmler or his lieutenants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. The inference is clear that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, Doenitz was one of the rulers of the Reich and was undoubtedly aware of all major decisions of policy. (3) The Order to Kill Commandos. An internal memorandum of the Naval War Staff, written by the division dealing with International Law to another division, discusses the order of 18 October 1942, with regard to the shooting of Commandos (C-178). Doubt appears to have arisen in some quarters with regard to the understanding of this order. Accordingly, in the last sentence of the memorandum it is suggested: "As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, that all departments concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of members of commando units." (C-178) Whether that conference took place or not is not known. The document is dated some 11 days after Doenitz had taken over command from Raeder. But in July 1943, the Navy handed over to the SD Norwegian and British Navy personnel, whom the Navy decided came under the terms of the order, for shooting. An affidavit by a British Barrister-at-Law who served as judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the order states (D-649): "The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July 1943, in violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the killing of * * *"
judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the order states (D-649): "The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July 1943, in violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the killing of * * *" [there follow the names of six personnel of the Norwegian Navy, including one officer, and one telegraphist of the British Navy, prisoners of war.]. "There was evidence before the Court, which was not challenged by the Defense, that Motor Torpedo Boat No. 345 set out from Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area. The persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the Torpedo Boat. "The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that they were wearing uniform at all times after their capture. "On 27th July, 1943, the Torpedo Boat reached the island of Aspo off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral von Schrader, the Admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to the Bergenhus, where they had arrived by 11 p.m. on 28th July. The crew were there interrogated by Leut. H. P. W. W. Fanger, a Naval Lieutenant of the Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitan Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon the orders of the staff of the Admiral of the west coast. Leut. Fanger reported to the Officer in Charge of the Intelligence Branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the west coast. "The interrogation by the Naval Intelligence Branch was concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the immediate
officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the west coast. "The interrogation by the Naval Intelligence Branch was concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the immediate orders of the Sea Commander, Bergen, to Obersturmbannfuehrer of the SD, Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was at that time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen. This followed a meeting between Blomberg and Admiral von Schrader, at which a copy of the Fuehrer order of the 18th October 1942 was shown to Blomberg. This order dealt with the classes of persons who were to be excluded from the protection of the Geneva Convention and were not to be treated as prisoners of war, but when captured were to be handed over to the SD. Admiral von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this Torpedo Boat were to be handed over in accordance with the Fuehrer order, to the SD." (D-649) The affidavit goes on to describe the interrogation by officials of the SD. These officials took the same view as the Naval Intelligence officers, that the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. Nevertheless, the crew were taken out and shot by an execution squad composed of members of the SD. The affidavit concludes as follows: "It appeared from the evidence that in March or April, 1945, an order from the Fuehrer Headquarters, signed by Keitel, was transmitted to the German authorities in Norway. The substance of the order was that members of the crew of commando raids who fell into German captivity were from that date to be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. This order referred specifically to the Fuehrer order referred to above." (D-649) The date mentioned is important; it was time "in March or April, 1945," for these men to put their affairs in order. (4) Reasons for Not Renouncing the Geneva Convention. The minutes of conferences on 19 and 20 February 1945 between Doenitz and Hitler read as follows: "The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention * * *" [the 1929 Prisoners of War Convention]. "The Fuehrer orders the
in order. (4) Reasons for Not Renouncing the Geneva Convention. The minutes of conferences on 19 and 20 February 1945 between Doenitz and Hitler read as follows: "The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention * * *" [the 1929 Prisoners of War Convention]. "The Fuehrer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to consider the pros and cons of their step and to state his opinion as soon as possible." (C-158) Doenitz then stated his opinion in the presence of Jodl and a representative of Ribbentrop: "* * * On the contrary, the disadvantages [of renouncing the convention] outweigh the advantages. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with the outer world." (C-158) An extract from the minutes of another meeting between Doenitz and Hitler, on 1 July 1944,-the extract is signed by Doenitz-states: "* * * Regarding the General Strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names of such men are on everybody's lips, whereas there is silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar circumstances without court martial proceedings." (C-171) (5) Use of Concentration Camp Labor in Shipyards. In a memorandum signed by Doenitz sometime late in 1944, which was distributed to Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Speer, and the Supreme Command of the Air Force, Doenitz reviews German shipping losses, and concludes: "Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working parties by prisoners from the concentration camps and as a special measure for relieving the present shortage of coppersmiths, especially in U-boat construction, I propose to divert coppersmiths from the construction of locomotives to shipbuilding." (C-195) In dealing with sabotage, Doenitz has this to say: "Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have proved successful, and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for the Scandinavian
(C-195) In dealing with sabotage, Doenitz has this to say: "Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have proved successful, and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration." (C-195) Item 2 of the summing-up reads: "12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as additional labor (security service [SD] agrees to this)" (C-195). It was not for nothing that at these meetings Himmler and his Lieutenants, Fegelein and Kaltenbrunner, were present. They were not there to discuss U-boats or the use of battleships. It is clear from this document that Doenitz knew all about concentration camps and concentration camp labor, and as one of the rulers of Germany he must bear his full share of that responsibility. (6) Doenitz's Incitement of Ruthless Conduct By His Men. The orders issued by Doenitz in April 1945 (D-650) show his fanatical adherence to the Nazi creed, and his preparedness even at that stage to continue a hopeless war at the expense of human life, and with the certainty of increased destruction and misery to his country: "I therefore demand of the commanding officers of the Navy: That they clearly and unambiguously follow the path of military duty, whatever may happen. I demand of them that they stamp out ruthlessly all signs and tendencies among the men which endanger the following of this path. "I demand from Senior Commanders that they should take just as ruthless action against any commander who does not do his military duty. If a commander does not think he has the moral strength to occupy his position as a leader in this sense, he must report this immediately. He will then be used as a soldier in this fateful struggle in some position in which he is not burdened with any tasks as a leader." (D-650) In the secret Battle order of the day of 19 April 1945, Doenitz gives an example of the type of under-officer who should be promoted: "An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser 'Cormorau', in Australia, a petty officer acting as camp senior officer, had all communists who made themselves
(D-650) In the secret Battle order of the day of 19 April 1945, Doenitz gives an example of the type of under-officer who should be promoted: "An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser 'Cormorau', in Australia, a petty officer acting as camp senior officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camp systematically done away with in such a way that the guards did not notice. This petty officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and his execution. After his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has shown that he is fitted to be a leader." (D-650) E. CONCLUSION. Doenitz was no plain sailor, playing the part of a service officer, loyally obedient to the orders of the government of the day. He was an extreme Nazi who did his utmost to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people with the Nazi creed. It is no coincidence that it was he-not Goering, not Ribbentrop, not Goebbels, not Himmler-who was chosen to succeed Hitler. He played a large part in fashioning the U-boat fleet, one of the most deadly weapons of aggressive war. He helped to plan and execute aggressive wars, which he knew well were in deliberate violation of treaties. He was ready to stoop to any ruse where he thought he would not be found out: breaches of the Geneva Convention or of neutrality, where it might be asserted that sinking was due to a mine. He was ready to order, and did order, the murder of helpless survivors of sunken ships, an action only paralleled by that of his Japanese ally. There can be few countries which do not mourn for men of the merchant navies whose destruction was due to the callow brutality with which, at the orders of this man, the German U-boats did their work. LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO KARL DOENITZ Document Description Vol. Page Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6 ......................... I 5 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H); Appendix A ......................... I 29,67 Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the
Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H); Appendix A ......................... I 29,67 Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court. *382-PS Affidavit of Korvettenkapitaen Moehle, England, 19 July 1945, concerning. the interpretation of Doenitz's order of September 1942. (GB 202) ......................... III 290 *498-PS Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA 501) ......................... III 416 *503-PS Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October 1942, concerning Hitler's explanation of his commando order of the day before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) ......................... III 426 *526-PS Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, concerning saboteurs captured and shot in Norway. (USA 502) ......................... III 434 *1463-PS Diary of the Navy, 1944, by Admiral Doenitz. (GB 184) ......................... IV 45 *2098-PS Decree relating to Status of Supreme Commanders of Army and Navy, 25 February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 215. (GB 206) ......................... IV 725 *2878-PS Extracts from The Archive. (GB 187) ......................... V 540 *2887-PS Certificate of positions held by Doenitz, 8 November 1945. (USA 12) ......................... V 552 2988-PS Affidavit of Gerhard Wagner, Nurnberg, 19 November 1945, who identified document C-158 as expressing opinion of Doenitz and initialed by him ......................... V 693 3150-PS Interrogation of Doenitz, 3 November 1945 ......................... V 911 3151-PS Interrogation of Falkenhorst, 24 October 1945 ......................... V 912 *3260-PS "Churchill Sank the Athenia", published in Voelkischer Beobachter, 23 October 1939. (GB 218) ......................... V 1008 *C-5 Memorandum to Supreme Command of the Navy by Doenitz,
V 911 3151-PS Interrogation of Falkenhorst, 24 October 1945 ......................... V 912 *3260-PS "Churchill Sank the Athenia", published in Voelkischer Beobachter, 23 October 1939. (GB 218) ......................... V 1008 *C-5 Memorandum to Supreme Command of the Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, concerning base in Norway. (GB 83) ......................... VI 815 *C-21 Extracts from file on Intensification of U-boat warfare. (GB 194) ......................... VI 825 *C-105 Extract from German Naval War Diary, 21 December 1940, p. 252. (GB 455) ......................... VI 913 *C-118 Extract from German Naval file, 18 July 1941, concerning authorization of attacks on U. S. Merchantmen. (GB 195) ......................... VI 916 *C-120 Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 for "Fall Weiss", operation against Poland. (GB 41) ......................... VI 916 *C-122 Extract from Naval War Diary. Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 October 1939. (GB 82) ......................... VI 928 *C-126 Preliminary Time Table for "Fall Weiss" and directions for secret mobilisation. (GB 45) ......................... VI 932 *C-151 Details for execution of operation "Weseruebung", 3 March 1940, signed by Doenitz. (GB 91) ......................... VI 965 *C-158 Minutes of conference of C-in-C of Navy with Hitler, 19 and 20 February 1945. (GB 209) ......................... VI 971 *C-171 Minutes of conference between Hitler and C-in-C of Navy regarding Copenhagen General Strike, 1 July 1944. (GB 210) ......................... VI 1002 *C-172 Order No. 1 for "Fall Weiss" signed by Doenitz. (GB 189) ......................... VI 1002 *C-178 Order of Navy concerning treatment of saboteurs, 11 February 1943. (USA 544) ......................... VI 1012 *C-179 Hitler's second decree, 18 October 1942, regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units. (USA 543) ......................... VI 1014 *C-191 Demands by defendant Doenitz on sinking of merchant ships, 22 September 1939. (GB 193) ......................... VI 1018 *C-195 Report signed by Doenitz, 1944, giving support to Navy and Merchant Marine. (GB 211) ......................... VI 1022 *D-423 Memorandum of conversation between Hitler and Oshima, 3 January 1942. (GB 197) ......................... VII 53 *D-436 Citation on promotion