dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
JODL: Yes. It is merely a note on a brief account given to me by General Keitel about that day, probably related a bit colorfully.
DR. EXNER: But then it says, evening of 11 February: "General Keitel with Generals Von Reichenau and Spercle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and G. Schmidt are being subjected to very great political and military pressure." In the English and French translations it says that Schuschnigg and Schmidt are "again subjected to very great political and military pressure." This word "again" does not appear in my German original. Now, did you suggest deceptive maneuvers against Austria? That is being held against you.
JODL: I did not suggest any deceptive maneuvers. The Fuehrer ordered them; and I do not think that they are illegal, because I believe that in the gambling of world history, in politics and in war, false cards have always been played. But the Fuehrer ordered it and that is stated in the entry in my diary. I supplied military information and documents to Canaris as to where our garrisons were situated, what maneuvers were taking place. Canaris elaborated them and then released them in Munich.
DR. EXNER: What did you think was the purpose of...
JODL: I had been told that the purpose was to exert a certain amount of pressure so that Schuschnigg, when he had returned home, would adhere to the agreement made at Obersalzberg.
DR. EXNER: How long before the actual entry into Austria did you know of such intentions?
JODL: On 10 March in the morning just before 11 o'clock I heard of it for the first time.
DR. EXNER: And the entry took place when?
JODL: On the 12th. It was when General Keitel and General Viebbahn, who was then temporarily Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, were suddenly ordered to the Reich Chancellery that I heard of the intention for the first time.
DR. EXNER: Then did you have a plan made, or what?
JODL: The Fuehrer surprised them by stating that the question involved was the Austrian problem; and then they remembered, that there was a General Staff plan called "Otto." They sent for me and for the directive, and learned from me that such a directive actually did exist, but that in practice nothing at all had been prepared. As it had only been a theoretical plan and drafted solely in the event of an Austrian restoration, and as such a restoration was not expected for the moment, the High Command of the Army had virtually done nothing about it.
DR. EXNER: How did you yourself understand the entire Austrian action?
JODL: It appeared to me to be a family squabble which Austria herself would solve through her domestic politics in a very short time.
DR. EXNER: And what made you think that?
JODL: My own extensive knowledge of Austria. Through relatives and acquaintances, through the German-Austrian Alpine Club to which I belonged, as one who knew the Austrian mountains, I had been in closer contact with Austria than with northern Germany, and I knew that in that country there had been a government against the will of the people for a long time. The peasant uprising in Styria was a characteristic example.
DR. EXNER: Was the march into Austria the carrying out of the suggestion, C-175?
JODL: No, it was completely improvised within a few hours with the corresponding result. Seventy percent of all the armored vehicles and lorries were stranded on the road from Salzburg and Passau to Vienna, because the drivers had been taken from their recruitment training to be given this task.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you said just now, didn't you, that the Fuehrer told them it was the problem of Austria? You said that, didn't you?
JODL: I said that the Fuehrer had informed General Keitel and General Viehbahn about that on 10 March, in the morning. He did not talk to me, and until that day I had not talked to the Fuehrer either.
THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to know the date. You said it was 10 March?
JODL: Yes, on 10 March, in the morning.
DR. EXNER: Is it correct that only peacetime formations marched into the frontier districts, into Austrian territory?
JODL: Yes; it is a fact that only peacetime units which were intended for the parade in Vienna actually marched in. All units which might have been necessary for a military conflict, say, with Czechoslovakia or Italy, were stopped at the last moment and did not cross the border.
DR. EXNER: Ammunition columns, for instance?
JODL: No, everything remained behind.
DR. EXNER: Was there any hesitation among the political leaders at the last moment?
JODL: On 11 March, in the afternoon, I had news from the Reich Chancellery that the Wehrmacht was not to move in, but that the Police would pass through the Wehrmacht and move in alone. In the evening, however, on 11 March, at 2030 hours, the final decision reached me, which was that the Wehrmacht was to move in after all. I was unable to find out the reason for that hesitation.
DR. EXNER: So that altogether there was not really an invasion by force?
JODL: No, it was a purely peaceful occupation. It was characterized by my suggestion to the chief of the operations department of the Army that he should have bands marching at the head of the columns and that all drivers should be sure to wear goggles, otherwise they might be blinded by the flowers thrown at them.
DR. EXNER: What was the significance of the order you signed regarding the march into Austria? It has been put before you under Document Number C-182, Exhibit USA-77. You remember it, do you not?
JODL: Yes, I remember. That is nothing other than the written record of something which had previously been ordered orally and which was already being carried out. That written order, you see, would have come much too late.
DR. EXNER: And what is the significance of Document C-103, Exhibit USA-75, referring to a possible clash with Czech troops or Italian troops on Austrian territory? How did you come to that?
JODL: That was based on an inquiry from the General Staff of the Army. They wanted to know, even in the case of the remotest eventuality, how the troops were to comport themselves. I clarified the matter over the telephone, through General Schmundt, with the Fuehrer, and I then put his decision down in writing, by his order.
DR. EXNER: And how did the operation come off?
JODL: It came off exactly as expected. There was jubilation and a triumphal march, such as the world probably has seldom seen-even though no one likes to acknowledge it today. The population came to meet us during the night already; the custom barriers were removed, and all the German troops called that march just a battle of flowers.
DR. EXNER: We now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia. Did you participate in the conferences on 21 April 1938, and 28 May 1938, which the Prosecution have described as conspirators' conferences?
JODL: I did not participate in any of these conferences.
DR. EXNER: What type of General Staff work were you carrying out for "Case Green"-which is, of course, the Czechoslovakia operation?
JODL: I must refer again to Document C-175, which is on Page 17 of the first volume of my document book. In that general directive for the unified preparation for war two important cases were dealt with, or were to be dealt with: A defensive deployment against France if she opened hostilities-"Case Red" and an offensive deployment-Case Green-against Czechoslovakia. That would have been worked out in just the same way, even if we had not had an acute conflict with Czechoslovakia, because a war on two front which was the problem we always faced-could never be conducted or won in any other way than by means of an attack against the weaker. This directive, as far as the Case Green is concerned, had to be drawn up afresh the very moment that Austria automatically became a new assembly zone. Thus, on 20 May 1938, a new draft was made by me for Case Green which began with the customary words: "I do not intend to attack Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without provocation..."
DR. EXNER: Just wait a minute. That quotation is Document 388-PS, Exhibit USA-26. It is the document dated 20 May 1938. "I do not intend to attack Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without provocation..." Now, please continue.
JODL: That was 20 May. On the 21st, the day after, a monstrous incident occurred. Czechoslovakia not only mobilized but even marched up to our borders. The Czechoslovakian Chief of General Staff explained this to Toussaint by saying that 12 German divisions had been assembled in Saxony. I can only state-and my diary entries prove it-that not a single German soldier had been moved. Nothing, absolutely nothing had happened.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I think I ought to draw the attention of the Tribunal to a questionnaire-Exhibit AJ-9 (Document Jodl-62). It is a questionnaire submitted to General Toussaint who at that time was the German military attaché in Prague. He confirms the mobilization of that time. Third volume, 199-Page 201 of the document, at the bottom, there is the following question: "What was the reason for the Czechoslovakian mobilization in May 1938?" And he answered: "It is my personal opinion that the Czechoslovakian Government wished to force her political allies to take up a definite position. Krejci, the Czechoslovak Chief of General Staff, informed me, as the reason for the mobilization, that he had exact information that 10 to 12 German divisions had assembled in the Dresden area, and that he could no longer bear the responsibility of not taking countermeasures." On the other hand a diary note from Jodl, Volume I, Page 26 should be mentioned: "The Fuehrer's intention not to Touch on the Czech problem yet is altered by the Czech deployment on 21 May, which took place without any German threat and without even any apparent cause. Germany's silence thereto would lead to a loss of prestige for the Fuehrer, to which he is not willing to submit again., Hence the issuing on 30 May of the new directive for Case Green." [Turning to the defendant.] That is from Jodl's diary, Page 26, first volume. Now continue, please.
JODL: That was the information which I received, partly through General Keitel and partly through the then Major Schmundt, regarding the impression made on the Fuehrer. The result was that he personally changed my draft of 20 May and put at the beginning the following words: "It is my unalterable decision that Czechoslovakia must be destroyed within a reasonable period of time by military action. To decide upon the militarily and politically opportune moment is a matter for the political leadership."
DR. EXNER: These words appear in the Document 388-PS, which I have already referred to, which is Exhibit USA-26. It is the order of 30 May 1939. [Turning to the defendant.] Please tell us briefly what the contents of these directives were.
JODL: In that order of 30 May three possibilities were mentioned by the Fuehrer as to how a conflict with Czechoslovakia might arise: 1) Without particular cause-politically impossible and out of the question; 2) after a prolonged period of tension-most undesirable, because of the lack of the element of surprise; 3) the best solution, after an incident, such as were happening nearly daily at that time, and which would justify us morally before the world if we decided to intervene. Furthermore, there was the command that on the first day the Army should break through the fortifications in order to clear the way for the free operation of the mobile forces, the armored divisions, so that after 4 days such a situation would be created that the military position of Czechoslovakia would become untenable.
DR. EXNER: Why was the entire directive redrafted in June?
JODL: The entire directive C-175 was thoroughly revised in June. This was done because on 1 October a new mobilization year began, and because this directive C-175 was in any case planned to be valid only until 30 September 1938. The old directive was, of course, still in force until 1 October, but became invalid on 1 October through that directive which had been drafted by me on 24 June, or 18 June. In that directive the Case Green was mentioned in the sense of the Fuehrer's intention-namely, that it was the immediate aim of his policy that from 1 October 1938-not on, but from 1 October 1938-every favorable opportunity was to be utilized to solve the problem of Czechoslovakia, but only if France did not interfere or march, or Great Britain either. I confirm that no date existed in any of the orders for the starting of a war against Czechoslovakia. In the directive of 30 May the date was left open altogether; and the new instructions, C-175, of 18 June stated only from 1 October, on the first favorable occasion:
DR. EXNER: That is on Page 29 of our document book, second paragraph: "I have decided, from 1 October..."
JODL: May I perhaps conclude this whole question by saying, in order to be explicit, that actually before 14 September, as far as the military forces were concerned, nothing happened.
DR. EXNER: I once again refer to an entry in Jodl's Diary Volume I, Page 32. It is an extract from Document 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72, and is the entry under 14 September 1938: "At noon it was announced that the general order for mobilization had been posted in Czechoslovakia.... This, however, did not take place, although approximately eight age groups were called up at short notice. As the Sudeten Germans are crossing the border en masse, we request at about 1730 hours, at the suggestion of the OKH, Department 2, the calling up of the strengthened frontier guard (GAD) along the Czech border in military districts VIII, IV, XIII, and XVII. The Fuehrer gives his authorization from Munich."
THE PRESIDENT: What was it that you were reading from then?
DR. EXNER: I have read from Page 32 of my document book; Volume I, Page 32, and it is an excerpt from Jodl's diary of 14 September, therefore an entry made in the midst of that critical period. [Turning to the defendant.] Just what were these military measures which were being introduced?
JODL: On 13 or 14 September the eight age groups were called up in Czechoslovakia. We used the strengthened frontier guard so that the many escaping Sudeten Germans could be taken over. On 17 September the Fuehrer formed the Freikorps Henlein, contrary to the previous agreement and without telling us beforehand. Previously it had been agreed that these Sudeten Germans of military age were to join the Reserve Army. Around that time the political discussions started. The first one at the Berghof had already taken place. Benes ordered mobilization in Czechoslovakia on 23 September and only now, and in accordance with the political discussions, did the military deployment against Czechoslovakia commence. I had no doubt that it was going to be used in the event of Czechoslovakia not submitting to any agreement we had made with the Western Powers; for the Fuehrer had clearly stated that he would negotiate only if France and England did not intervene politically or militarily.
DR. EXNER: You made two more entries in your diary, on 22 and 26 September, which prove that you were worried at the time. Statement made by Captain Burckner, in the first volume of my document book, on Page 34; again an excerpt from 1780-PS, dated 22 September: "Captain Burckner, chief of the foreign section, reports that according to an intercepted long-distance telephone conversation between Prague and the local Czech Legation Counsellor, the German Embassy in Prague has just been stormed. I am immediately having connection made by telephone and wireless with Prague through Colonel Juppe. "1050 hours: Burckner reports that the incident has not been confirmed The Foreign Office has spoken with our Embassy. "1055 hours: I establish liaison with Prague and with Toussaint. To my question as to how he is getting along, he replies, 'Thanks, excellently.' The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces, who had been informed of the first report with the suggestion that he should think over what measures would have to be taken if the Fuehrer should wish for an immediate bombardment of Prague, is informed through Ic about the false report which may have had the purpose of provoking us to a military action." Then, on 26 September, it says: "It is important that false reports do not induce us to military actions before Prague replies." The Prosecution have stated that 1 October had long before been decided on as the date for aggression. Will you tell me what significance that date, 1 October 1938, had for Case Green?
JODL: I have already said that, I believe. I explained that the new mobilization year had started, and that no order contained a fixed date for the beginning of the campaign against Czechoslovakia. DR. EXNER: Did you believe that the conflict might be localized?
JODL: I was certainly convinced of that, because I could not imagine that the Fuehrer, in the position we were in, would start a conflict with France and Britain which had to lead to our immediate collapse.
DR. EXNER: And the entries in your diary probably show your concern about incidents?
JODL: Yes. In my diary on 8 September there is reference to a conversation with General Stulpnagel. According to that, Stulpnagel was at the moment very worried lest the Fuehrer should depart from his oft-defined attitude and allow himself to be dragged into military action, in spite of the danger of France's intervention. According to the entry in my diary I replied that actually at the moment I shared his worries to some extent. 1)R. EXNER: This is an entry which the Tribunal will find on Page 26 of the first volume of my document book. Once again it is an extract from Document 1780-PS, and it is the entry of 8 September 1938. [Turning to the defendant.] You have already said, have you not, what your worries were? Our weakness?
JODL: It was out of the question with five fighting divisions and seven reserve divisions in the western fortifications, which were nothing but a large construction site, to hold out against 100 French divisions. That was militarily impossible.
DR. EXNER: On 24 August, in a letter addressed to Schmundt, you referred to the importance of an incident for the tasks of the Wehrmacht in this case. You have been gravely accused of that, and I want you to tell me what the significance of that statement is. Your Honor, it is 388-PS, and it is on Page 35 of the first volume. It is an extract from the often quoted Document 388-PS: It is a report made at the time of the "X" Order and the preliminary measures. [Turning to the defendant.] Please, will you state what you intended in this work of the General Staff?
JODL: The Fuehrer's order of 30 May which I have already explained, assuming that it ever came to this action, left no other choice than to attack on a previously decided date. This could only follow as the result of an incident, because without provocation the operation was out of the question; and it was not to be attempted if too long a time had passed. The Army, in order to be ready for such a surprise break-through of the Czech fortifications, required 4 days of preparation. If nothing happened after those 4 days, the military preparations could no longer be kept secret and the surprise element would disappear. Therefore, nothing else remained but either a spontaneous incident in Czechoslovakia, which would then 4 days later have resulted in military action, or a date which had to be decided on previously. In that case an incident had to happen during those 4 days which the Army required for deployment. The Fuehrer's demands could, in fact, not be solved in any other way from the point of view of the General Staff. My letter to Major Schmundt was meant to explain that difficult situation to the Fuehrer. At that time incidents occurred every day. May I remind you that since the first partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia the Sudeten Germans liable to be called for military service had mostly evaded the order. They escaped over the border into Germany, and the Czechoslovakian border police shot at them. Bullets were shot over daily into Germany. All together, more than 200,000 Sudeten Germans crossed the border in that manner. From that point of view the conception of an incident was not so mean and criminal as it might have been, for instance, if peaceful Switzerland had been involved. If I said, therefore, how keenly interested we would be in such an incident, that was meant to express that if one resorted to military action at all-all this is, of course, purely theoretical-one might use just such an incident as a cases bell).
DR. EXNER: And how do you explain this remark of yours: ". . . unless the intelligence department is ordered to organize this incident in any case"? That is at the end of Page 38 in the second paragraph. It is an extract from 388-PS.
JODL: Yes, I had too much knowledge of European military history not to know that the question of the first shot-the apparent cause of war, not the inner cause of war-has played an important part in each war and on each side. The responsibility for the outbreak of war is always attributed to the enemy; it is not characteristic of Germany alone, but of all European nations who have ever been at war with one another. In the case of Czechoslovakia the deeper cause of the war was quite apparent. I need not describe the condition in which 3 1/2 million Germans found themselves who were supposed to fight against their own people. I myself was able to watch that tragedy in my own house. In this case, the deeper cause of the war was firmly established, and Word Runciman, who came on that mission from London, left no doubt about it whatsoever. In such a situation I certainly had no moral scruples about exaggerating one of these incidents, and, by means of a counteraction in vigorous reply to the Czech doings and activities, extending and enlarging such an incident in order that if the political situation allowed it, and England and France did not interfere-as the Fuehrer believed-we might find a really obvious reason for taking action.
DR. EXNER: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, there is one point to which I wish to draw your attention. In my opinion it is once more a mistake in translation. I refer to the second paragraph from the bottom on Page 36. It is the report about the incident. The second but last paragraph on Page 36 states: ". .. that Case Green may be set in motion as a result of an incident in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation (Amass) for military intervention." The translation in English of these last words is a "provocation"; "Amass" is translated as "provocation."
THE PRESIDENT: What are you saying? What is the alteration?
DR. EXNER: I believe that the translation is not correct. I am not absolutely certain but I would like to call the Tribunal's attention to it. "Amass" means "pretexts" in French-which as far as we know is "pretext."
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, there is no difference in the meaning of the words, whether it is "provocation," or whether it is "cause."
DR. EXNER: "Provocation" sounds a bit more aggressive, does it not? I just want to call your attention to it. In the German it is "cause" and not "provocation." [Turning to the defendant.] Now the Prosecution calls these considerations, which we have just talked about, criminal ideas and connects them with the supposedly planned murder of the German Ambassador in Prague. We are said to have planned that murder so as to have a cause for marching into Czechoslovakia. What do you have to say to that?