dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
BEST: No. In frequent reports in the course of 1943, I strongly rejected these measures. On 29 August 1943, when a state of military emergency was proclaimed in Denmark against my will, the deportation of Jews was ordered apparently by Hitler himself and then, once more, I objected. But when the Foreign Office confirmed that the order had definitely gone out, then I demanded that the state of military emergency be maintained as long as the action was going on, for I expected trouble and riots, and this demand of mine that the action was to take place under the state of military emergency was misinterpreted to the effect that I had wanted it. The best proof that I actually sabotaged the action may be gathered from the fact that I informed certain Danish politicians of what was going to take place and when, so that the Jews could flee, and in reality 6,000 Jews were able to flee, while only 450 were arrested. The Security Police also helped me in this matter. The commander of the Security Police could have reported me because he knew about my actions, and this would have cost me my life.
DR. MERKEL: Did the Security Police in the occupied countries participate in the deportation of workers to the Reich?
BEST: Not a single worker left Denmark, or rather, was deported from Denmark to the Reich. As far as I knew, the Security Police did not assist in deportations from other areas either.
DR. MERKEL: Who was responsible for the shooting of hostages in France? Was that the Police, or who was it?
BEST: From my own experience I know that the orders for the shooting of hostages in France came regularly from the Fuehrer's headquarters. The military commander, who had to carry out these decrees until 1942, was himself strongly against these measures, and General Oito von Stuelpnagel, because of his conflicts with the Fuehrer's headquarters, had a nervous breakdown and had to leave the service. Also the new Higher SS and Police Leader, Oberg, when taking over office, assured me that he was against these measures, too.
DR. MERKEL: From your own experience and observations, can you tell me who ultimately decreed the harsh treatment in the occupied territories?
BEST: According to my experience, it was Hitler himself who in each case issued the decrees.
DR. MERKEL: And what was the characteristic point in Hitler's decrees?
BEST: I found this to be especially characteristic in Hitler's decrees that in the most astonishing way they dealt with details which normally would not occupy the head of a state and supreme commander of armed forces, and that these decrees, so far as they applied to occupied territories, were always intended to have a deterring effect, containing intimidations and threats for some purpose or another without taking into consideration that the opposite side also showed a fighting spirit which could not so easily be daunted.
DR. MERKEL: And how did he react to objections of his subordinates?
BEST: Mostly by outbursts of rage and by a 9tiffening of his attitude. On the other hand he retained those in office who had asked to resign. DR.MERKEL. Does your book, The German Police, have an official character?
BEST: No, it is a purely private piece of work.
DR. MERKEL: Does your book deal only with definite and actual facts?
BEST: No. In parts the tendencies which were prevalent at the time it was written were pictured as already having obtained their fulfillment.
DR. MERKEL: Why did you do that?
BEST: Partly because I anticipated the tendencies to be realized in a very short time and partly because the book would otherwise have met with difficulties at the time of its publication.
DR. MERKEL: Does not the following fact confirm that certain arbitrary action was taken by the Security Police, namely, that certain directives said that the Chief of the German Police could order measures beyond his ordinary authority?
BEST: If this was specified in two decrees dealing with the occupation of Austria and the Sudetenland, it meant that the Chief of the German Police would legally have the authority to issue Police decrees in these regions which might deviate from the laws already existing there. This was a transfer of legal authority but no single acts were to be taken either illegally or arbitrarily.
DR.MERKEL: What was the existing police law according to your theory?
BEST: In speaking about police law in my book, I started from the National Socialist conception of the State and from the development of State laws at that time in Germany. When after 1933 the legislative power was transferred to the Government, it gradually became customary law of the State that the will of the head of the State automatically established law. This principle was recognized as law, for one cannot characterize the rules and regulations governing a great power for years on end as anything else but customary law. On the same basis, the State's police law developed, too. An emergency law issued by the Reich President, on 28 February 1933 removed the barriers of the Weimar Constitution, and thus the Police was given much wider scope. The activities and the authority of the Police were regulated through numerous Fuehrer decrees, orders, directives, and so forth, which, since they were decreed by the highest legislative authority of the State, namely, the head of the State himself, had to be considered as valid police laws.
DR. MERKEL: What would be your judgment concerning the orders to the Gestapo or parts of it, to carry out actions, deportations, and executions?
BEST: I have already said that these were measures quite alien to the Police, as they had nothing to do with the ordinary activities of the Police and were not necessary from the Police point of view. But, if the Police received such orders from the head of the State or in the name of the head of the State, then, of course, according to the prevailing conception each individual official had to take it upon himself as an obligation to carry out the decree.
DR.MERKEL: Did you wish to justify this conception when you wrote in your book.
THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o'clock now. Can you tell the Tribunal how long you think you are going to be with this witness?
DR.MERKEL: I have just two more questions. Perhaps just a few more minutes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. MERKEL: Did you wish to justify this opinion and this attitude when you said in your book that it was not a question of law but a question of fate that the head of State was setting up the proper law?
BEST: No. In that passage of my book, I meant to give a political warning to the State leadership, that is, that this tremendous amount of power to set law arbitrarily at that time we could not foresee an International Military Tribunal-would be subject to the verdict of fate, and that anyone transgressing against the fundamental human rights of the individual and of nations would be punished by fate. I am sorry to say that I was quite right in my warning.
DR. MERKEL: But if the members of the Gestapo had recognized the orders which they received as criminal, how would you judge their actions then?
BEST: In that case I have to state that they have acted in an express state of emergency, for during the war the entire Police was subject to the military penal code and any official who refused to carry out a decree or order would have been sentenced to death in a court-martial for reason of military insubordination.
DR. MERKEL: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 1 August 1946 at 1000 hours.]
DR. HANS GAWLIK (Counsel for SD): Mr. President, may I be permitted to put three questions to the witness Best?
THE PRESIDENT: What special reason is there why you want to put questions to him?
DR. GAWLIK: I wanted to put these questions to Dr. Spengler, a witness who has been granted me but who has not arrived, and for that reason I would like to put the three questions to Dr. Best instead.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, for that special reason we will permit you to put the questions, but it is not to be regarded -as a general rule.
DR. GAWLIK: Turning to the witness.] I should like to show you a copy of the decree of 11 November 1938. I should like to refer to Page 4 of the German trial brief dealing with the Gestapo and SD. In this decree it says: "The Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD), as information service for Party and State has to fulfill important tasks, particularly for the support of the Security Police." Now, I should like to ask you, did you participate in the making of this decree?
BEST: Yes.
DR. GAWLIK: Does this decree correctly represent the actual relationship between the Security Police and the SD?
BEST: In those years there were experiments constantly going on with the SD so that the scope of the tasks set up for the SD changed frequently. At the time when the decree mentioned was issued the chief of both the Security Police and the SD, Heydrich, was interested in having the SD gain an insight into the activity of the offices and agencies of the State. The exact wording of this decree was chosen in order to justify that aim sufficiently. In truth the scope of tasks to be put to the SD, whose model was to be the great foreign intelligence service, especially the British Intelligence Service, developed in such a manner that the SD was not to be an auxiliary branch of the Police but rather a purely political information organ of the State leadership, for the latter's own control of its political activities.
DR. GAWLIK: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution want to cross-examine? LIEUTENANT COMMANDER WHITNEY R. HARRIS, U.S.N.R. (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): Dr. Best, you realize that you are one of two witnesses who have been called, out of possibly hundreds, to represent the Gestapo, before this Tribunal, do you not?
BEST: Yes.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: And you realize that your credibility is. very important, do you not?
BEST: Yes.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: You understand as a jurist of long standing the significance of the oath that you have taken?
BEST: Yes.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: You stated yesterday, I believe that your publication, The German Police, was a purely private book and had no official status? Is that correct?
BEST: I said that it was my purely private work which originated without any contact with my superiors and without their knowledge. My chiefs-at that time Heydrich and Himmler-only knew of this work when the completed book was put before them.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: The question is whether this book of yours was or was not an official publication in any respect. Was it or was it not?
BEST: No, it was not an official publication.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: I ask that the witness be shown the Ministerialblatt of 1941, Page 119. [The document was submitted to the witness.] Now, you will notice that published in the Ministerialblatt for 1941 is a circular of the Reich Ministry of the Interior referring to your book and you will note that it states that: the book is for offices and officials of Police, State, Party, and municipal administrations. This book represents a reference work which can also serve as an award for worthy officials. It is recommended that this book be acquired especially also by the libraries..." And then the distribution is to various supreme Reich authorities. You see that there, do you not, Dr. Best.
BEST: Yes, indeed, and I can say only that this recommendation was published some time after the appearance of the book, without moreover, my having prior knowledge of it; and this recommendation is not to be considered more valuable than any recommendation of other books which had already been published and which subsequently were recognized as good and usable. I should like t emphasize again that before the publication of this book, I had no talked in any way with my superiors, nor with the agency which later published this recommendation.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Now I want to invite your attention t your book, Dr. Best, and particularly Page 99 of it. You testified yesterday concerning the development of the Gestapo from the pre-existing political police. You say in your boo as follows; I am now quoting: "In order to build up an independent and- powerful political police force, the like of which had not hitherto existed in Germany, regular officials of the former police force, on the one hand, and members of the SS, on the other hand, were brought in. With the uncompromising fighting spirit of the SS the new organization took up the struggle against enemies of the State for the safeguarding of the National Socialist leadership and order." That is the correct statement of how the Gestapo came into being, is it not, Dr. Best?
BEST: To that I should like to say that that part of the me -which was newly taken into the SS-into the Political Police force was very small at first. I said yesterday that a certain number of employees were newly engaged. Then later, from among the candidates who applied for the regular career of the Secret State Police further members of the SS flocked in, so that the picture given in my book is absolutely correct, but the ratio in figures is not mentioned.  I can say again today that the number of the regular officials-those old officials previously taken over as well as the candidates from the protection police-was much higher than the number taken in from the SS.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: All right. You said yesterday that you opposed the use of torture by the Gestapo in connection with interrogations and that you called Heydrich to account about that matter, did you not?
BEST: Yes, indeed.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: And you called Heydrich to account, as your superior?
BEST: Yes.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: But you did not prohibit Heydrich from continuing his practice of using torture in interrogations, did you?
BEST: I was not in a position to prevent my superior from carrying out measures he had ordered or planned. In addition to that, I had nothing to do with the executive side in the Secret State Police, for I was. an administrative official and consequently was not competent if Heydrich decreed measures like that or approved of them. I can only say that in the small branch of the counterintelligence which I headed as a commissioner for some time, I prevented the use of this method.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: I want to pass briefly to your experiences in Denmark, Dr. Best, and by way of preliminary I wish to refresh your memory as to the testimony which you gave before the Commission on the 8th day of July 1946: "Question: Have you met Naujocks? "Answer: Naujocks was in Copenhagen once. "Question: And what was his task in Denmark? "Answer: He did not give me any details. I know only that he asked me to, provide a contact for him with the research office in Copenhagen. "Question: Anyway, you have no idea why Naujocks was in Copenhagen, do you? "Answer: I imagine that he was in Denmark on matters pertaining to intelligence duties. "Question: And if he were to state and even to testify that he discussed the matter with you, you would say it was only a lie? "Answer: I would say that I could not recall it and that in my memory he remains an intelligence service man." Now, you were asked those questions and you gave those answers before the Commission, did you not, Dr. Best?
BEST: Yes.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes. And when you gave those answers you knew that you were telling a deliberate falsehood under oath, did you not, Dr. Best? Now, you can answer that question "yes" or "no," and then explain it if you like.
BEST: In the meantime, a report from Danish officials.
THE PRESIDENT: One minute, Wait. Answer the question. Do you or do you not know whether you were telling the truth then?
BEST: My statement was not correct. In the meantime I have been shown Naujocks' report and thereupon I was able to recollect exactly that in a general way he had told me about his mission. Even today I do not recall details, however.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Well, now, just so that you will remember that interrogation that you had with Dr. Kalki of the Danish Delegation 2 days later, on 10 July 1946, 1 am going to ask that you be shown the written statement which you corrected in your own handwriting and signed with your own signature. [The document was submitted to the witness.] Now, I invite your attention to the first paragraph, Dr. Best, in which you state as follows: "Now that I know that Naujocks has testified as to his connection with the terrorist activities in Denmark, I am ready to testify further on this subject. If I did not testify about this earlier, it was because I did not know whether Naujocks had been captured and had confessed regarding these things. It was contrary to my feelings to drag him into this thing before the facts were known to me." You gave that statement, did you not, Dr. Best, and that is your signature on there?
BEST: Yes.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Now, Dr. Best, you know very well when Naujocks came to you in January of 1944 that there was planned to be carried out by the Gestapo terroristic measures against the people of Denmark, because you attended the conference at Hitler's headquarters on 30 December 19b at which that plan was worked out, didn't you?
BEST: Yes.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: At that conference there were present in addition to yourself, Pancke, the Higher SS and Police Leader for Denmark; General Von Hannecken, the Military Governor for Denmark; and Hitler, Himmler, the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, the Defendant Keitel, the Defendant Jodl, and Schmundt. You reported these names in your own diary, didn't you?
BEST: Yes.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: And you knew that at that meeting was agreed that in order to counteract murders and sabotage agains German interests in Denmark, that the Gestapo was to go up t Denmark and to carry out ruthless murders and to blow up home and buildings as a countermeasure, don't you?
BEST: It is not correct that an agreement was reached, but rather, that Hitler gave orders in spite of my opposition and also Pancke's to these plans.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes. Hitler gave the order to Himmler, who gave it to Kaltenbrunner, who gave it to Miller, who sent the Gestapo into action, and you know that those murders and that this willful destruction of property was carried out in Denmark as a result thereof, don't you?
BEST: This general fact is known to me, yes.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes, and you knew that these were carried out, because you protested about some of them. For example, you remember when these thugs blew up a streetcar in Odense, killing and injuring the passengers in it, don't you?
BEST: In the period following, again and again for various reasons I protested against the use of this method; reports or telegrams to this effect ...
THE PRESIDENT: You haven't answered the question. The question was, did you know that the streetcar had been blown up.
BEST: I do not accurately recall the individual cases, and therefore I do not recall for what special reason I made my protests. But I do know that I protested in very many cases.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Now, Dr. Best, I know that you have a very short memory, but I would have thought that you could have remembered the events that you recited on 10 July 1946. 'If you will look at your statement there that you gave to Dr. Kalki, you will find the following: "I used on such an occasion the blowing up of a streetcar in Odense, for instance." Don't you see that there, Dr. Best? The statement that you gave on the 10th...
BEST: Where do I find that, please?
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: You will find that on about the middle of the document.
BEST: Wait just a minute. That is a wrong translation. I said the blowing up of a "Strassenzug" in Odense. That meant that along this street several houses were blown up simultaneously. It was not a car, but a row of houses.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Now, Dr. Best, you also remember the murder of four doctors in Odense, against which you protested because these doctors had been pointed out to you by National Socialist circles as being German sympathizers, don't you?
BEST: Yes, and apart from that, that was not the only reason. I called attention to the growing senselessness of these measures, for I had found out that some of these physicians were friendly to Germany.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes, and that was a terrible thing for the Gestapo to murder German sympathizers in Denmark, wasn't it?  There were so few. Now, to whom did you make your protests against this murderous activity of the Gestapo?
BEST: My protest always went to the Foreign Office, which was the Ministry superior to me.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes, your protests went to the Defendant Ribbentrop, didn't they?
THE PRESIDENT: Commander Harris, have we got a reference to any document which records the meeting of 30 December 1943?
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes, Sir. This is in evidence through the official government report of the Danish Delegation, Exhibit RF-901.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Now yesterday, Dr. Best, you testified that you learned that the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and SD in Denmark was opposed to the Kugelerlass, didn't you? BEST: Yes.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Who-who in Denmark told you that this Einsatzkommando was opposed to the Kugelerlass?
BEST: I was told that by the head of the executive, Dr,. Hoffmann.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes, Dr. Hoffmann. He was the head of the Gestapo in Denmark, wasn't he?
BEST: Of the Gestapo branch with the commander of the Security Police.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes, and when did Dr. Hoffmann tell you that? Approximately?
BEST: I cannot remember exactly now whether through my being together with Dr. Hoffmann I was reminded of these facts or whether the individual measures which were turned down at that time were ever reported to me. It may be that this is a new piece of information for me, which confirms that this decree was never put into effect. No case of this kind ever occurred.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Now, Dr. Best, you just got through saying in your last answer that Dr. Hoffmann told you that the Gestapo was opposed to the Kugelerlass in Denmark and that he told you this in Denmark. Now, is that true or isn't it true?
BEST: I did not say when and where I learned of it. I said only that on the initiative of the Police the decree was not put into effect. I did not say when and where I was told this.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: What was the Kugelerlass?
BEST: Today I know, for I have read files and transcripts, that these were measures, I believe, dealing with prisoners of war who had escaped.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Now-when you were asked about your knowledge of the Kugelerlass before the Commission, you didn't say anything about having had a conversation with Dr. Hoffmann about it, did you?
BEST: According to my memory, I was asked only whether I had known the Kugelerlass already-t1uring my term of office. I did not see the decree at that time and I believe I have mentioned already that I read it only here.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: If the Tribunal please, I have two documents which I would like to offer into evidence at this time. These documents have come to our attention and have been made available only in the last 2 days. Consequently, it has been impossible for us to present them to anyone speaking for the Gestapo before the Commission, and I think that this witness can assist in identifying some of the names. And I would like to ask the permission of the T ribunal merely to show these documents to the witness. They are quite long, and I will then try to summarize them as briefly as possible and develop what can'be developed out of them in the shortest possible time, perhaps 15 minutes for both -documents, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on, Commander Harris.