dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think, Your Honors, that we will save some duplication -- perhaps save time -- if I now yield to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who is prepared on some of the subjects I was about to take up. I think he is in a better position to take up the examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Whatever you think, Mr. Justice Jackson.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): Witness, you have been told why Dr. Stahmer wanted you to give evidence? Have you been told by Dr. Stahmer what to do to give evidence?
KESSELRING: The individual points were communicated to me, without all questions being directly defined.
SIR DAVID MAXWELTFYFE: I want to read you one sentence, so that you will have it in mind, of Dr. Stahmer's statement: "When Rotterdam became a battle zone in May 1940, it became a military necessity to employ bombers, as the encircled fighting parachute troops, who had no support from the artillery, had urgently asked for help from bombers." Do you remember the incident? I wanted you to have it in your mind.
KESSELRING: Yes, certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember being asked about this incident in the interrogation on the 28th of June, by the United States bombing survey? Remember?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say there at the question, "What about Rotterdam?" "Answer: 'First, Rotterdam had been defended in the parts which were later on attacked. Secondly, in this case one could notice that a firm attitude had to be taken. This one attack brought immediate peace to Holland. It was asked for by Model and was approved by the OKW. It was a very small part in the heart of Rotterdam.'" Do you remember saying that?
KESSELRING: Approximately I did say that, yes, and I repeated those words yesterday.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to deal first with the strategic aspects. I will come to the tactical aspects later. Your strategic purpose and real object was to take a firm attitude and secure immediate peace, was that not right?
KESSELRING: That far-reaching task had not been given to me, but, as I said yesterday, General Wenninger reported the result of the attack to me in such a way that close on the attack the total surrender of Holland followed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But I want you to think of your own words. This was approved by the OKW; a firm attitude had to be taken. Was not your purpose in this attack to secure a strategic advantage by terrorization of the people of Rotterdam?
KESSELRING: That I can deny with the clearest conscience. Neither did I say, when I was at Mondorf, that I had to adopt a firm attitude. I merely said that the support which was demanded by Student would have to be carried out. We only had the one task, and that was to furnish artillery support for Student's troops.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What did you mean by saying that a firm attitude had to be taken, if you did not mean that the people of Holland had to be possibly terrorized into peace.
KESSELRING: May I repeat in that connection that the conception of the expression, "firm attitude," is not in keeping with my accustomed wording. I cannot admit that this word was in the minutes, and it was not read out to me, either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What do you think you said instead of firm attitude, if you did not say it?
KESSELRING: I remarked that severe measures would bring quick results.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly what I am putting to you, Witness, "severe measures"...
KESSELRING: But only for the purpose of tactical results. May I once more emphasize that I am a soldier and not a politician, and did not act as a politician. At that time I was merely and solely complying with Student's requirements.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just before I deal with the tactical position -- which I do with great pleasure -- have you had to work with the Defendant Raeder ? Have you had to work with the Defendant Raeder at all?
KESSELRING: Admiral Raeder? Only in a general way, insofar as naval questions were concerned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to listen to the views which the Defendant Raeder has expressed and tell the Tribunal whether you agree with them. This is United Kingdom Exhibit Number GB-224, Document Number C-157, and here is the transcript in Page 2735 (Volume V, Page 274). Now, just listen carefully, if you will be so kind: "It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing international law. However, measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing international law." Do you agree with that?
KESSELRING: I cannot completely agree with that concept. As far as Rotterdam is concerned, conditions were exactly the opposite.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just for the moment we will deal with the Defendant Raeder's words. Do you agree with them?
KESSELRING: No.
DR. LATERNSER: I have an objection. I object to the earlier and to this present question put to the witness, because they are irrelevant, and secondly because they do not refer to facts but opinions. The witness is here to testify to facts.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-YYFE: My Lord, the witness is here, as I pointed out carefully, to deal with what is military necessity.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks that the question in the form in which you put it may be objectionable, by the introduction of the views of the Defendant Raeder.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, I bow to the Tribunal, but this witness is called to say that the explanation for this is military necessity. I was asking whether he did not agree with the views of one of his colleagues on this point, what is military necessity. If the Tribunal has any doubt, I would rather pass it. But the question of military necessity is one which the Tribunal will have to consider in a number of fields, and I respectfully do not abandon that point, which will run through the questions I have to ask on other matters. [Turning to the witness.] Now, I will come to the tactical position at Rotterdam: Will you just tell the Tribunal who were the officers involved? There was a Lieutenant General Schmidt and with him was Major General Student, who were in charge of the troops that were attacking Rotterdam. Do you remember that?
KESSELRING: Only General Student. General Schmidt is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the evidence that is given in this case is that the negotiations, the terms of capitulation, were actually written out by Lieutenant General Schmidt in a creamery near Rotterdam. I suppose he would be General Student's superior officer, would he not?
KESSELRING: General Student was the senior German officer in the Rotterdam sector and the responsible commander. General Schmidt is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-YYFE: So that General Schmidt would be junior to General Student, would he?
KESSELRING: He may have been called in for the special purpose, but I do not know of him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to have the times in mind: Do you know what time in the day the bombing of Rotterdam started?
KESSELRING: As far as I know, in the early afternoon, about 1400 hours, I believe.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I was going to put to you 1330.
KESSELRING: Yes, that is quite possible.
SIR DAVID MAXVTELIYYFE: Do you know that negotiations for a capitulation had been in progress since 1030 in the morning?
KESSELRING: No; as I said yesterday, I have no knowledge of these facts.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that at 1215 a Dutch officer, Captain Backer, went to the German lines and saw General Schmidt and General Student, and that General Schmidt wrote out the suggested terms of capitulation at 1235?
KESSELRING: No, that is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELIYYFE: That had never been told to you?
KESSELRING: It was not communicated to me. At least, I cannot remember it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you see, Witness, it is 35 minutes before the bombing began and ...
KESSELRING: The important factor would have been for Student to call off the attack as such, but that did not happen. The cancellation never reached me, and did not reach my unit either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just want you to have the facts in mind, and then I will ask you some questions. The terms that were discussed at 1235 were to expire; the answer was called for at 1620. After Captain Backer left with the terms, at 1322 and 1325 two red flares were put up by the German ground troops under General Student. Did you hear of that?
KESSELRING: I did not hear of that either. Moreover, two red flares would naturally not have sufficed for the purpose.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, but in addition to that your ground troops were in excellent wireless communication with your planes, were they not? Will you answer the question?
KESSELRING: I already said yesterday...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please answer the question?
KESSELRING: Yes, and no. So far as I know, there was no immediate communication between the ground station and the aircraft, but, as I said yesterday, from the tactical force, through the ground station, to the aircraft formatiofi.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If it had been wanted to pass the communication to the aircraft and stop the bombing, it could quite easily have been done by wireless, apart from putting up these two red flares?
KESSELRING: In my opinion, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I am suggesting is, you see, that everyone saw these bombers coming over. You know that. Student saw the bombers coming over. You know that do you not?
KESSELRING: Yes. SIR DAVID MkXVTELL-FYFE: If that attack had any tactical significance about helping your troops, it could have been called off, could it not?
KESSELRING: I did not understand the final sentence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If the object of this attack was merely tactical, to help in the attack on Rotterdam, it could easily have been called off by a wireless message from General Student to the planes, could it not?
KESSELRING: Yes, if the tactical situation had been communicated, or if the situation had been reported to the bombing units immediately, then there could have been no doubt.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if in honest negotiations, Witness, terms of surrender have been given and are to expire 3 hours later, it is only demanded of a soldier that he win can off the attack, is it not?
KESSELRING: If no other conditions have been made, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if he can stop the attack, it would have been the easiest thing in the world to do so. I want to make my suggestion quite clear -- that this tactical matter had nothing to do with the attack on Rotterdam; that the purpose of the attack on Rotterdam was, in your own words, to show a firm attitude and to terrorize the Dutch into surrender.
KESSELRING: May I repeat again, that I have said explicitly that this attack was only serving the tactical requirements, and that I disassociate myself completely from these political considerations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you know that General Student apologized afterwards for the attack; you know that? Apologized to the Dutch commander for the attack?
KESSELRING: I do not know it and, as I explained yesterday, I saw General Student when he was seriously injured, and I could not even talk to him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELI-FYFE: I am not going to take more time. I have put my point, I hope, quite clearly. I want to ask you on one other point on which you spoke yesterday in regard to bombing. You said that the attack on Warsaw on 1 September 1939 was made because you considered Warsaw a defended fortress with air defense. Is that fair?
KESSELRING: Yes, certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you know that at the same time -- at 5 o'clock on the morning of Friday, 1 September - the German Air Force attacked Augostow, Nowy Dwor, Ostrow Mazowiecki, Tczew, Puck, Zambrow, Radomsko, Toron, Kutno, Krakow, Grodno, Trzebinia, and Gdynia, which is in rather a different position. Just answer my question. The German Air Force attacked these towns?
KESSELRING: With my comrades -- yes. Not the towns, I repeat, not the towns.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, all this attack was made at 5 o'clock on the morning of 1 September, was it not?
KESSELRING: The attack started in the morning, but not, as you put it, on the towns but on military targets; airfields, staff headquarters, and traffic centers were attacked. As I have already explained, very detailed instructions were published by the OKW that only these military targets should be bombed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are suggesting that, all these towns I had read out were military targets?
KESSELRING: Insofar as they were in my sector, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had not had time for a single reconnaisance plane to fly over Poland before that attack was made, had you?
KESSELRING: That is correct. On the other hand, agents and others furnished sufficient intelligence on the situation and, apart from that, this whole plan was absolutely controlled by operational considerations of air warfare.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, the whole plan had been worked out in April of 1939 under the Fall Weiss, had it not?
KESSELRING: At that time I did not even know that I was going to be concerned in it, or that war would be declared.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you not know, Witness, after you were appointed, that a Fall Weiss had been worked out in April 1939? You were never told that?
KESSELRING: That was not said, but, on the other hand, may I say, as a soldier, that a general plan made in April would undergo many alterations by September, and decisive alterations might still have to be made even at the very last minute.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just one other point I want you to have in mind. Do you remember that the German radio broadcast the last note to Poland at 9 o'clock the night before, on 31 August? Do you remember that?
KESSELRING: I believe I do.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was 8 hours before your attack, and you know, do you not, that the Defendant Goering had been at his secret headquarters for a week before that, considering this matter?
KESSELRING: That I can well imagine, if on the ...
SIR DAVTID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I am putting to you is that this general attack on Polish towns was again a well-planned scheme to try and break down natural resistance for your attack?
KESSELRING: May I say the following on that subject? If my statements as Field Marshal and witness under oath are considered as little as you are considering them, Mr. Prosecutor, then further statements of mine do not serve any purpose. I have emphasized that it was not an attack against towns, but an attack on military targets, and you must finally believe me when I say that as a soldier.
SIR DAVID MAXVTELIFYFE: The Tribunal will decide as to the value of the evidence. I am not going to discuss it. I am just going to ask you about one or two other matters, in order to get your view on it, what you consider to be of military necessity. You remember the orders with regard to partisans in Italy during the time of your command? The orders with regard to partisans?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I want to put it perfectly correctly, so tell me if I am wrong, but I understand this to be the position. The Defendant Keitel issued a general order as to partisans on 16 December 1942. A copy was found in your headquarters or your ex-headquarters, and your recollection is that it came to your attention later on, but you are not quite sure of the date. Is that right? You are not quite sure of the time?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like you to try, because you have had time to consider it; do you think that Keitel's order of December 1942 had come to your attention before you issued your own order of 17 June 1944? Perhaps you would like to see your own order, would you?
KESSELRING: It was read out to me; but in November, then again in December, and subsequently in January, I requested that I should be heard once more on these questions and these orders, as I had certain doubts about the issuing of these orders, the distribution, the persons to whom they were sent, and the date.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will pass you the orders, Witness, because you ought to see them and recall them to your recollection. I do not think they have been put in before. Let us take first Defendant Keitel's order of 16 December 1942. [The document was submitted to the witness.] I hope I have passed you the right document. Does it read -- I will read it very slowly. "The Fuehrer has therefore ordered that: "1. The enemy employs, in partisan warfare, communist-trained fanatics who do not hesitate to commit any atrocity. It is more than ever a question of life and death. This fight has nothing to do with soldierly gallantry or principles of the Geneva Convention. If the fight against the partisans in the East, as well as in the Balkans, is not waged with the most brutal means, we will shortly reach the point where the available forces are insufficient to control this area. "It is therefore not only justified, but it is the duty of the troops to use all means without restriction, even against women and children, as long as it insures success. Any consideration for the partisans is a crime against the German people." Do you remember that order?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you in turn issued an order on the 17th of June 1944 when you were commanding in Italy? Do you remember that? I will show you in one moment, if I can get the German copy out of the file. I will just read a short passage again so that the Tribunal will have it in mind; but Witness, please refer to any other passage because I want to give a fair effect of the order: "1. The partisan situation in the Italian theater, particularly central Italy, has recently deteriorated to such an extent that it constitutes a serious danger to the fighting troops and their supply lines, as well as to the war industry and economic potential. The fight against the partisans must be carried on with all means at our disposal and with the utmost severity. I will protect any commander who exceeds our usual restraint in the choice of severity of the methods he adopts against partisans. In this connection the old principle holds good, that a mistake in the choice of methods in executing one's orders is better than failure or neglect to act." Do you remember that, Witness?
KESSELRING: Yes, I remember that order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you remember 3 days later, so that there will be no mistake as to what you meant, you issued this further one, another top-secret order. Reading the third line after saying, "The announcement does not represent an empty threat," you say: "It is the duty of all troops and police in my command to adopt the severest measures. Every act of violence committed by partisans must be punished immediately. Reports submitted must also give details of countermeasures taken. Wherever there is evidence of considerable numbers of partisan groups, a proportion of the male population of the area will be arrested; and in the event of an act of violence being committed, these men will be shot." Now, I just want only to take two examples, Witness, of the way that that was carried out. You remember when one of your officers, Colonel Von Gablenz, was captured by partisans; do you remember?
KESSELRING: General Von Gablenz?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think he was a colonel at this stage, it was the 26th of June, just after your order. You remember Colonel Von Gablenz being captured, do you?
KESSELRING: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was a colonel of the lines of communication; not a very important officer, but still a colonel.
KESSELRING: Yes, I remember.
SIR DAVID MAXWELTFYFE: Now, just look at these two documents. Is this right? -- this is an extract from the daily situation report by the Commander-in-Chief of Southwest Italy for the 26th of June. "Partisan situation. North of Arezzo, Colonel Von Gablenz, a member of the staff of the officer commanding lines of communication, area 10th Army, was captured by bandits. The entire male population of the villages on the stretch of road concerned was taken into custody." It was further announced that all these hostages would be shot if the captured colonel were not set free within 48 hours. Remember that?
KESSELRING: Not in detail, but in general ...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no, but do you remember the incident?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look at the next bit which is the 2-day situation report, the report for 2 days later, the 28th of June, the second paragraph: "As reprisal for the capture of Colonel Freiherr Von Gablenz, so far 560 persons, including 250 men, have been taken into custody." Is that your conception of what is meant by "steps necessary to deal with partisan warfare" that 410 women and children should be taken into custody?
KESSELRING: That was not necessary, but in connection with this I may ...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take one other example. You remember Civitella? You remember what was done with Civitella by your forces, do you not?
KESSELRING: At the moment, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just let me remind you what was done at Civitella -- that was on the 18th of June, one day after your order. "Two German soldiers were killed and a third wounded in a fight with partisans in the village of Civitella. Fearing reprisals, the inhabitants evacuated the village, but when the Germans discovered this, punitive action was postponed. On June 29" -- that, you will remember, Witness, was 9 days after your proclamation to reinforce your order -- "when the local inhabitants were returned and when feeling secure once more, the Germans carried out a well-organized reprisal, combing the neighborhood. Innocent inhabitants were often shot on sight. During that day 212 men, women, and children in the immediate district were killed. Some of the dead women were found completely naked. In the course of investigations, a nominal roll of the dead has been compiled and is complete with the exception of a few names whose bodies could not be identified. Ages of the dead ranged from 1 year to 84 years. Approximately one hundred houses were destroyed by fire. Some of the victims were burned alive in their homes." That is the report of the United Nations War Crimes Commission on the incident. Now, Witness, do you really think that military necessity commands the killing of babies of 1 and people of 84?
KESSELRING: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I just want to acquaint you with one subject which you have dealt with yourself, that is the position of the Hermann Goering Division. You mentioned one of the persons I have in mind, but let me just, in order to make it clear to the Tribunal, get clear who your officers were at that time. Did General Vietinghoff -- sorry, I think it was Von Vietinghoff -- did he command the 10th Army?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In 1944?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was he directly under your orders?
KESSELRING: Yes, he was under my command.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I take it he is a fairly senior and responsible general. I do not know his rank -- full general or ...
KESSELRING: Full general.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And under him was the 76th Corps, was it not, commanded by General Herr; is that correct?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And under General Herr was a Hermann Goering Division, commanded by General Schmalz, whom you mentioned this morning; is that right?
KESSELRING: General Von Schmalz commanded, but previously I mentioned another name.