dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
JODL: Yes; but at that time it was not called Otto but "For the March into Austria."
MR. ROBERTS: Hitler, when he heard that Schuschnigg was going to obtain the opinion of the people by plebiscite, decided to invade at once, did he not?
JODL: Yes, I was told, when he heard that there was to be a grotesque violation of public opinion through the trick of a plebiscite, he said that he would certainly not tolerate this under any circumstances. This is what I was told.
MR. ROBERTS: He would not tolerate public opinion being ascertained?
JODL: No; he would not tolerate public opinion being abused through this trick. That is how it was told to me.
MR. ROBERTS: So the Armed Forces of Germany then marched into Austria? That is right?
JODL: That is right; the Wehrmacht marched in.
MR. ROBERTS: And Austria, from that day, received all the benefits of National Socialism, is that right?
JODL: That is a political question. At any rate it could perhaps have become the happiest country on earth.
MR. ROBERTS: I wasn't asking what it could have become, but what it received. It received the SS, the Gestapo, the concentration camps, the suppression of opponents, and the persecution of Jews, didn't it?
JODL: Those are questions with which I did not concern myself. Those questions you have to put to the competent authorities. In addition it received me as artillery commander; and they loved me; I only want to confirm that.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You say the people appeared pleased to see you?
JODL: The people who were under my jurisdiction were very happy about this officer; I can say that.
MR. ROBERTS: They had to appear to be, whether they were or not, didn't they?
JODL: No, they did not have to be. At any rate, after I had been away for a long time, they certainly did not have to write enthusiastic letters to me, letters which I received throughout the war from these Austrians to whom my heart belonged.
MR. ROBERTS: There was one man who was not pleased to see you, wasn't there?
JODL: I know no such person.
MR. ROBERTS: Don't you?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: What about Schuschnigg?
JODL: I never saw Schuschnigg. He doesn't know me and I do not know him. I don't know...
MR. ROBERTS: He wasn't pleased to see you come in, was he?
JODL: I cannot say that.
MR. ROBERTS: What happened to him?
THE PRESIDENT: We know that, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: I quite realize that. I can't imagine my question is not admissible, but if you don't want me to put it-it is one of a series of questions-I won't. Schuschnigg was put in a concentration camp, wasn't he?
JODL: I was told that the Fuehrer had decided: "I do not want a martyr, under any circumstances, but I cannot liberate him; I must put him in honorary custody." That was the impression I had during the entire war.
MR. ROBERTS: Honorary custody? JODL It was called honorary custody.
MR. ROBERTS: What? Was he an honorary member of Dachau?
JODL: That I do not know. Those are not questions that you can put to me, for I was a soldier and not the commandant of a concentration camp.
JODL: Yes, I therefore wrote: "In case the counterintelligence service is not charged with the organization of an incident aside from that"-"in case." These are all theoretical deliberations of the General Stay in a situation, which I depicted quite accurately yesterday, where such incidents already occurred every day.
MR. ROBERTS: I know. Then, if this had taken place, the world would have been told that because of that incident Germany had been compelled to go to war?
JODL: I do not believe that this would have been reported to the world. Rather, I believe the true reason would have been told the world, which, furthermore, was made known constantly through the press, that 31/z million Germans cannot be used as slaves by another people permanently. That was the issue.
MR. ROBERTS: If the world is going to be told the truth, what is the earthly good of manufacturing an incident?
JODL: I testified as to that yesterday-I can only repeat what I said yesterday at length: I knew the history of war too well not to know that in every war things like that happen-the question as to who fired the first shot. And Czechoslovakia at that time had already fired thousands of shots which had fallen on this territory.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I say, Witness, subject to correction, that you are not answering the question at all. The question was a very short one and you make a long speech about something quite different. The question is, if the truth was sufficient to justify your going to war, why should you want to manufacture an incident? If you can't answer it, say so. ~
JODL: Well, it isn't at all confirmed that I wanted to bring about an incident. I wrote, "in case . . .not." We never prepared one and that is surely the essential thing.
MR. ROBERTS: I won't argue any further with you. I have put my point and will leave it. But now I want, on quite another point, to refer to the last paragraph on Page 29, the same document: "Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequence could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack." Perhaps you would read this paragraph, known already to the Tribunal. ". . . death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers." That means an air raid before there has been any declaration of war or any warning to the civilian population, doesn't it?
JODL: That meant that I called the attention of the Fuehrer, through this document, to the fact that on the basis of his decree that result could or would come about.
MR. ROBERTS: Would you call that a terror attack? A terror attack?
JODL: It cannot be said under what conditions such an action would be launched. These are all theoretical tasks for our General Staff. How and if that was translated into practice, that no one can say, whether with justice or injustice; that depended on the political decision.
MR. ROBERTS: I will show you later how those thoughts were carried into practice in the case of other countries. So we will leave that document altogether now and I will leave the case of Czechoslovakia. Now you were recalled to the OKW on the 23d of August 1939, from your artillery employment. We know that, don't we?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: That was a great compliment to the opinion that the Fuehrer had of you, wasn't it?
JODL: The Fuehrer was not responsible for my being called back. I do not know whether he knew about it at all. I do not believe so.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. On a very small point, Witness, you told the Court yesterday or the day before that you never had a conference with the Fuehrer, I think, until September 1939; but you diary, on the 10th of August 1938-it is Page 136 of Book 7-your diary said you attended a conference at the Berghof with the Army chiefs and the Air Force groups. Didn't you meet the Fuehrer then?
JODL: That which you asserted in your first sentence, I did not say. What I said was, word for word: ."On 3 September I was introduced to the Fuehrer by Field Marshal Keitel, and on this occasion, at any rate, I spoke with him for the first time." That is what I testified to, word for word, yesterday. I had seen the Fuehrer a dozen times before then and I had heard him when hi delivered his big speeches, after he was Reich Chancellor and Supreme Commander.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I accept that. It is quite likely that I we: wrong. Now, with regard to the Polish campaign, did I hear you right when you said that Warsaw was only bombed after leaflet< had been dropped?
JODL: That applies to the period of the siege of Warsaw. Th' terror attack, I might say, which was to hit the entire city through artillery bombardment, that took place after two previous warnings
MR. ROBERTS: It is a matter of history, is it not, that Warsaw was bombed, with many other Polish towns, in the early hours of the 1st of September 1939 before any declaration of war? Isn't that a matter of history?
JODL: As far as this historical fact is concerned, Field Marshal Kesselring, who is very well informed about this, testified to that here in detail. He said-and also Reich Marshal Goering-that on this date the militarily important objectives throughout Poland were attacked but not the population of Warsaw.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You are quite right, now Kesselring-If the Tribunal wants the reference, he gave evidence as to the bombing of Warsaw, the English transcript, Page 5731 (Volume IX, Page 175). [Turning to the defendant.] Now, I suppose the result of the Polish campaign was naturally a source of satisfaction to all of you?
JODL: The military development of the Polish campaign, from the military point of view, was extremely satisfactory to us. Of course things happen in life that would give more satisfaction than a military action.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I want you to look at a letter. This is-My Lord, this is a new exhibit, D-885, and it is GB-484. That letter is in your writing, is it not? Is it in your writing?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, it is written to Police President Dr. Karl Schwabe, Brunn, Moravia, Police Presidency, dated October 28, 1939: "My dear Police President: For your enthusiastic letter of 22 September, I thank you heartily. I was quite particularly pleased about it. This wonderful campaign in Poland was a grand opening for this hard and decisive struggle and has brought about for us an unusually favorable point of departure politically as well as militarily. The difficult part for the people as well as the Armed Forces is still ahead."- I propose to read it without comments and comment afterward. "But the Fuehrer and his associates are full of the greatest confidence; for the sanctimonious British will not succeed in throttling our economy, and militarily we are without worry. Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the many strong-willed and devoted men who are today at the head of the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of. This time we will show that we have better nerves and greater unity. That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share to keeping the Czechs at it and not let them perk up, of this I am convinced." Then he is very pleased about the high recognition granted to the troops: "Thanking you heartily once more for your words of appreciation which exceed my modest contribution in the shadow of the powerful personality of our Fuehrer. I am with a Hell Hitler." Why did you call the British sanctimonious? Because they keep treaties and don't have concentration camps and don't persecute Jews? Is that why you thought we were sanctimonious, because we don't break treaties?
JODL: No, that was not the reason. The reason was that the political situation generally was represented that way, and that I was actually of that opinion at the time.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now you deal with: Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the many strong-willed and devoted men who are at the head of the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of." Who were these strong-willed and devoted men? Is that the SS and the Gestapo?
JODL: No, these are the Gauleiter.
MR. ROBERTS: The Gauleiter?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, but I mean we have one or two Gauleiter here, Gauleiter Sauckel, for instance; in a large area like Thuringia, he couldn't do much by himself, could he? He would have to have some SS or Gestapo, wouldn't he?
JODL: We are not at all concerned with that here. The fact is that these Gauleiter actually directed the organization of the State and the administration in this war in a noteworthy way. Despite the catastrophe the people were much better taken care of than in the years 1914-18. That is uncontested and it is to the credit of these people.
MR. ROBERTS: They were better taken care of?
JODL: Even in the most terrible conditions at the end every man in Berlin received his normal rations. It was a model of organization, I can only say that.
MR. ROBERTS: And a model of organization because no opposition to the government or the Party was allowed, was it?
JODL: Certainly, it made it easier on one hand, and on the other hand, led to terrible catastrophes about which, of course, I only heard here for the first time.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Well, the letter speaks for itself, and I will go along. May I just ask you about this last sentence: "That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share to keeping the Czechs at it and to not let them perk up . . ." What did you mean by that?
JODL: Since he was Police President in Brunn, it was his task to see that quiet and order were maintained in Brunn and not to tolerate a Czech uprising at our backs while we were at war. That is a matter of course. I did not say that he was to murder or germanize the Czechs at all, but he had to keep them in order.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I pass from that now and I want to go to the various campaigns in the West. Now, with regard to Norway, of course you knew that your country had given its solemn word repeatedly to respect the integrity of Norway and Denmark, did you not?
JODL: I said yesterday, with reference to the two declarations of . . .
MR. ROBERTS: Please answer my question, it is such a simple one.
JODL: Yes, I believe, I recalled that at the time. I am quite sure.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good; and we know there was an assurance at the beginning of the war to reassure all these western neutrals, and there was another assurance on the 6th of October; and you say that in November Hitler decided to invade Denmark and Norway?
JODL: Yes. I testified as to that at length yesterday.
MR. ROBERTS: I know you did. Please don't always say that. I have got to ask you to go over the same ground from the other angle, you see. "Norway," as your speech said-and I am quoting from Page 291 of Book 7-perhaps you had better give it to him- Page 11 of your notes . . . [Turning to the Tribunal.] It is in the middle, My Lord, under Paragraph 8: "In the meantime we were confronted by a new and urgent problem: The occupation of Norway and Denmark.... "In the first place there was danger that England would seize Scandinavia and thereby, besides effecting a strategic encirclement from the north, would stop the import of iron and nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes. Secondly, it was with the realization of our own maritime necessities"-"Notwendigkeiten"-that is the word, isn't it- "Notwendigkeiten" . . . My Lord, that ought to be "necessary" and not "imperative"- "erforderten." ": . . which made it necessary for us to secure free access to the Atlantic by a number of air and naval bases." [Turning to the defendants.] You wanted air bases and U-boat bases, didn't you?
JODL: Militarily they were tremendously important to us, there is no doubt about that; but the prerequisites to taking them, those were the reports which we had, the threat to Norway.
MR. ROBERTS: What I suggest to you, you see, is this: In this, like the case of the other three Low Countries-in this case, you simply made an excuse. You thought England might do something, although she had not done it for months, and you breached Norway's neutrality at your own chosen time. Is that right?
JODL: In order to answer that question "yes" or "no," one would have to undertake a very thorough study of all the historical documents on both our own and the other side. Then one can say if it is correct or not. Before that has been decided, only a subjective opinion exists. I have mine, and you have another.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And I point out to you that it was Germany on every occasion who violated the neutrality. The other countries, the Allies, did not
JODL: In the case of Norway, the English did that first in the case of the Altmark by laying mines and by firing upon German ships in Norwegian territorial waters. That has been proved indisputably. There is no doubt about that.
MR. ROBERTS: The Altmark , as you very well know, Witness, was not an occupation at all; it was merely the act of the British Navy in taking British prisoners from a German prison ship, and I imagine your Navy would have done the same if they had had the chance. What is the good of talking about the Altmark ? It was not an occupation at all.
JODL: But it was a violation of international law as far as Norwegian sovereignty was concerned. You could only request that Norway do that, but you yourselves could not carry out a combative action in Norwegian waters. I know the regulations in this connection exactly.
MR. ROBERTS: Why should you break your word to Norway and cause untold suffering and misery to the inhabitants of that country because the British went into the territorial waters and took out a few hundred prisoners? What is the logic of it? Why should the Norwegians suffer for it?
JODL: You are just quoting one small example from The tremendously real picture of England's occupation, but there are hundreds of them.
MR. ROBERIS: It is the example you quoted, Witness, not I. I did not quote it.
JODL: I can only say that we were under the definite subjective impression that we carried through an enterprise, in the last second, for which British troops were already embarked. If you can prove to me that is not true, I shall be extremely grateful to you.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now I am going to call your attention to the only outside evidence that you have produced about that, because it was read rather hurriedly-quite rightly, yesterday. [Turning to the Tribunal.] My Lord, it is in Jodl's Document Book 2, and it is Page 174. Well, My Lord, it begins at Page 174. My Lord, that is on the left-hand top corner. Page 174 says that Albrecht Soltmann was an expert specialist, that he evaluated files from the British landing brigade, and that he examined diaries. That is on the second page, and the bottom of Page 175: "The documents and statements by prisoners showed that a short time before our landing in Norway the British invasion troops had been embarked on destroyers. On the following day they were again disembarked and remained in the vicinity of the port of embarkation. They were then reembarked after the German invasion of Norway for the second time and transported to Norway. What intention the English pursued in the embarkation of their troops before our landings could not be determined from the documents and from the statements of prisoners. Whether they intended to occupy Norway before our invasion could at that time only be conjectured, because the prisoners did not make any exact statements in this respect. The conjectures are based on the special equipment of these British troops. Insofar as I could evaluate the documents and statements furnished by prisoners they did not contain proof of the English plans with regard to Norway." And this is the next question: '`Have not the results of all documents and statements furnished by prisoners been to the effect that in the invasion of Norway we arrived only just ahead of the English? "Answer: 'Yes, the information in the documents and the statements furnished by prisoners could be interpreted. to mean that in our invasion we were just ahead of the English. However, whether this was considered unmistakable evidence I cannot judge.'" And then they deal with French documents captured in a railway train. The witness does not know anything about them.
MR. ROBERTS: [Turning to the defendant.] That is pretty poor evidence, isn't it, on which Norway was to be invaded. contrary to all the treaties and all the assurances?
JODL: I quite agree with you on that; you are quite correct. But that is only because Soltmann was unfortunately not the expert in this field. He was not even an officer of the General Staff. I had forgotten that. We had further and quite different evidence which lay before me on my desk; namely, all the commands carried by the English landing brigade. They confirmed our assumptions absolutely and definitely.
MR. ROBERTS: An invasion without any warning or any declaration of war?
JODL: That is a political question.
MR. ROBERTS: You have told the Court yesterday what a stickler you were about international law, how keen you were to see that international law was observed. You knew that was against international law, didn't you?
JODL: These matters were not in our regulations, but only the provisions which applied to the Wehrmacht. The concept of an aggressive war was not found in any regulation. We went only by the Geneva Convention and the Hague Land Warfare Regulations.
MR. ROBERTS: I mean if an honorable German gives his word he keeps it, does he not? He does not break his word without saying that he is going to depart from it, does he, an honorable German?
JODL: That seems to be a practice which is generally observed all over the world when human beings work together, but not in the sphere of politics.
MR. ROBERTS: If that is your code of honor, why is it not grossly dishonorable for Germany to break her word over and over and ever again? Or would you rather not answer that question?
JODL: No, you would do better to put that question to the people who were responsible for German politics.
MR. ROBERTS: Very well, I will leave that. Now I want to come to the invasion of Holland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. I beg your pardon, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. You have no doubt at all, have you, on the documents that in the event of war in the West, it was always Hitler's intention to violate the neutrality of those three small countries?
JODL: From the beginning, in his orders for the attacks in the West, he had the intention to go through Belgium; but he had reservations with regard to Holland for a long time, which were only rescinded later-I believe in the middle of November. Regarding Holland his intentions were not specific. Regarding Belgium his intentions in that direction were known comparatively early, that is, about the middle or the early part of October.
MR. ROBERTS: You could not, of course-I mean Germany naturally wanted to wage an offensive war and an offensive war in somebody else's country. That is the ambition, naturally, isn't it?
JODL: The German objective in this war was to win, at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. You couldn't attack in the West unless you attacked through Belgium, could you?
JODL: In any event, any other attack was tremendously difficult and was highly doubtful. I have already said that.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. That is why, of course, France built the Maginot Line, so that you couldn't attack her frontally. ' Well, now, if you secured the coast of Belgium and Holland, you secured air bases from which you could annihilate England or Great Britain. That is what you hoped, wasn't it?
JODL: No doubt the strategic position of Germany in the battle against England improved through our having the coast; that is true.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. May I just remind you of a few documents which the Tribunal know already. I do not intend to read them, but the first document in order of date is 375-PS, USA-84, dated 25 August 1938. It is during the Fall Grun time. That was the Air Force appreciation which, in the last paragraph of the document, Page 11, I think, it says: "Belgium and the Netherlands in German hands would represent an extraordinary advantage in the air war against Great Britain...." And the Army is asked to say how long it would take. That was at the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis, wasn't it?
JODL: Yes, but this document, I believe, has already been characterized as a ridiculous piece of paper, being the work of an insignificant captain.