dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, certainly, Your Honor. I am referring to Document Number Raeder-2, which has been submitted to the Tribunal already. This is the affidavit by Lohmann, on Page 5. I quote from Document Book 1, Page 8: "Within the limits defined by the German-English Naval Agreement, the German Navy commissioned four battleships. I append the dates of laying down the keel, launching, and commissioning, as far as I can still determine them. Scharnhorst : laid down keel, exact date cannot be determined; launched, 3 October 1936; commissioned, 7 January 1939. Gneisenau : laid down keel, date cannot be determined; launched, 8 December 1936; commissioned, 31 May 1938. Bismarck : laid down keel, 1936; launched, 14 February 1939; commissioned, 2 August 1940. Tirpitz : laid down keel, 1936; launched, 1 April 1939; commissioned, 1941." Admiral Lohmann was unable to ascertain the exact date. The "H"-I may add that the other ships mentioned under Document C-23 were planned but were broken up later. They had already been broken up in the summer of 1939, and this applies only to the first "H." So far there is no question of final preparation or construction. Since an obvious violation of the treaty exists, we now have to consider in what light this violation should be regarded. The Prosecution have said that this violation of the treaty is criminal since it implies intended aggression. In order to save time, especially since technical problems are involved, I should like, before questioning the defendant further, to submit Document Number Raeder-15, within the scope of the documentary evidence which I have submitted with the Tribunal's permission. In my opinion, this document proves that there was no intention of aggression. Document Number Raeder-15 is an affidavit-I beg your pardon-it is in Document Book 1, Page 94. This document deals with an affidavit deposed before a notary at Hamburg by Dr. Ing. h.c.
DR. SIEMERS: Wilhelm Suechting and is important for the refutation of Document C-23, and for that purpose I should like to quote: "I am the former Director of the shipbuilding yard of Blohm & Voss in Hamburg. I was with this firm from 1937 to 1945"-pardon me-"from 1907 to 1945 and I am conversant with all questions concerning the construction of warships and merchant ships. In particular, as an engineer I had detailed information about the building of battleships for the German Navy. Dr. Walter Siemers, attorney at law of Hamburg, presented to me the Document C-23, dated 18 February 1938, and asked me to comment on it. This document shows that the Navy, contrary to the previous agreement, informed the British that the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau -as well as other intended constructions-had a displacement and draught of about 20 percent less than was actually the case. "I can give some details to explain why this information was given. I assume that the information given to the British- information which according to naval agreement 4 had to be supplied 4 months before the keel was laid down-was based on the fact that the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenan were originally intended to have a displacement of 26,000 tons and a draught of 7.50 meters and the battleship "F" ( Bismarck ) a displacement of 35,000 tons and a draught of 7.90 meters, as stated. "If these battleships were afterwards built with a greater displacement and a greater draught, the changes were the result of orders given or requests made by the Navy while the plans were being drafted and which the construction office had to carry out. The changes were based upon the viewpoint repeatedly expressed by the Navy-namely, to build the battleships in such a way that they would be as nearly unsinkable as possible. The increase of the tonnage was not meant to increase the offensive power of the ship"-I beg your pardon, Mr. President.
DR. SIEMERS: I shall be finished in a moment-"The increase of the tonnage was not meant to increase the offensive power of the ship but was done for defensive and protective purposes." I may perhaps point out that in the English text there is a mistake in translation. In this text the word "not" is missing. It should read, "was not meant," and not "meant." "As time went on, the Navy attached more and more importance to dividing the hull of the battleship into a greater number of compartments in order to make the ship as unsinkable as possible and to afford the maximum protection in case of leakage. The new battleships were therefore built broad in the beam with many bulkheads, only about ten meters apart, and many longitudinal and latitudinal bulkheads outside the torpedo bulkhead. At the same time, both the vertical and the horizontal armor-plating were, as far as my information goes, heavier and composed of larger plates than those used by other navies. In order..."
THE PRESIDENT: In other words, his explanation is that they were altered in the course of construction for technical reasons. It does not matter what the technical reasons are.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, but I do believe that when we are dealing with a clearly-established violation of a treaty, the manner of this violation is of some importance. I do not believe that each and every violation of a treaty can be described as a war crime. The point is whether this violation of the treaty was a war crime in the sense of the Charter-in other words, whether it was motivated by the intention of waging a war of aggression. An insignificant violation of a kind which, after all, is found in every commercial lawsuit cannot be a crime.
THE PRESIDENT: The affidavit is before us. We shall read it. In fact, you have already read the material parts of it. Now, I think we had better adjourn. How long do you expect to be?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is very difficult for me to judge that accurately, but I imagine I shall be able to conclude sometime tomorrow. I hope, Mr. President, that I shall be able to conclude at noon; but I am asking Your Honor to take into consideration the fact that I am incorporating my documentary proof in the interrogation and that this documentary proof, which in many other cases has taken hours to present, is thus dealt with simultaneously.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hope that you will make your presentation as short as you possibly can. We have already been so long a time over this defendant. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I must first make a formal request, namely, that in addition to my own secretary I may have another here in Court. She was here this morning but has just been told that she may not come into the courtroom, and she is now standing outside the door.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. [The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.]
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Grossadmiral, you just saw the affidavit of Dr. Suechting. I ask you: Is it true, or rather-not to confuse you I will ask-on what did the Navy base its ideas about enlarging the battleships by about 20 percent?
RAEDER: Originally there was no intention to enlarge the ships by 20 percent. But at the time when we resumed battleship construction, when we could see that we would have a very small number of battleships in any case, it occurred to us that the resistance to sinking of ships should be increased as much as possible to render the few we had as impregnable as possible. It had nothing to do with stronger armament or anything like that, but merely with increasing the resistance to sinking and to enemy guns. For this reason a new system was worked out at that time in order to increase and strengthen the subdivision of the space within the ship. This meant that a great deal of new iron had to be built into the ships. Thereby the draught and the displacement were enlarged. This was unfortunate from my point of view, for we had designed the ships with a comparatively shallow draught. The mouths of our rivers, the Elbe, Weser, Jade, are so shallow that ships with a deep draught cannot navigate all stages of the rivers. Therefore, we had these ships built broad, intending to give them a shallow draught; but by building in these many new latitudinal and longitudinal bulkheads, we increased the draught and also the displacement.
DR. SIEMERS: Were these disadvantageous changes, which took place during construction, due in part to a comparatively limited experience in battleship construction?
RAEDER: Yes. Since the designers in the High Command of the Navy and the designers and engineers in the big shipyards had not built any heavy warships for a very long time, they lacked experience. As a result, the High Command of the Navy had to issue supplementary orders to the shipyards. This in itself was a drawback which I tried hard to overcome.
DR. SIEMERS: Did the construction of these four battleships surpass the total tonnage accorded by the naval agreement?
RAEDER: No, the total tonnage was not overstepped until the beginning of the war.
DR. SIEMERS: Your Honors, in this connection I should like to refer to Document Raeder-8, which has already been submitted in Raeder Document Book 1, Page 40, under II. In this affidavit Lohmann gives comparative figures which show how much battleship tonnage Germany was allowed under the naval agreement. Please take notice of it without my reading ad the figures. What is important is that, according to comparison with the British figures, Germany was allowed to have 183,750 tons. At that time she had three completed armored cruisers with 30,000 tons-which is shown here-so that according to this affidavit 153,750 tons still remained. With reference to Document Raeder-127, I should like to submit a short correction, because Grossadmiral Raeder, in looking through the affidavit, observed that Vice Admiral Lohmann made a mistake in one figure. The mistake is unimportant in terms of the whole, but in order to be absolutely fair and correct I thought it necessary to point it out to Vice Admiral Lohmann. Instead of 30,000 it should actually read about 34,000 tons, so that there is a difference, not of 153,750 tons but of 149,750. According to the naval agreement, we were allowed to build 146,000, the final figure, so that the result is not changed. Admiral Lohmann's mistake-as the Tribunal know-can be attributed to the fact that we were very limited in our material resources.
RAEDER: May I add a remark to what I said before? The statement of these displacements deviated from the terms of the treaty insofar as only the original construction displacement or draught was reported and not the draught and displacement which gradually resulted through these changes in the course of the planning of the construction.
DR. SIEMERS: In addition, may I refer the honorable Court to the following: The Naval Agreement of 1937 was changed by the London Protocol of 30 June 1938. I refer to Exhibit Raeder-16. My secretary just tells me it is not here at the moment; I will bring it up later. It is the last document in Raeder Document Book 1, Page 97. May I remind the Court that Document C-23 is of February 1938. By this London Protocol, at the suggestion of the British Government, the limitation on battleship tonnage to 35,000 tons was changed because the British Government, as weR as the German Government, realized that 35,000 tons was too low. As the protocol shows, effective 30 June 1938, the battleship tonnage was raised to 45,000 tons. Thereby this difference in the battleships, referred to in Document C-23, was settled a few months later. Now, I shall take up a new subject, the question of your participation in the planning and conspiracy to wage wars of aggression. This is the question of the so-called key documents which the Prosecution presented. Since you, Admiral, were present during these speeches of Hitler's to the commanders-in-chief, I must ask you to comment on these documents. The first document is Document 386-PS, the so-called Hossbach Document, Exhibit USA-25, in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10, Page 81. It is Hitler's speech of 5 November 1937. Herr Grossadmiral, did you ever see this document of Hossbach before the Trial began?
RAEDER: No, I saw no document and no protocol of any speeches which Hitler made. No minutes were taken officially. Only in later years-I believe since 1941-were stenographers present who wrote down every word. These are really not minutes at all, since the document is written in indirect discourse. It was written down by the author 5 days after the speech itself, as we have heard.
DR. SIEMERS: Although it is a very important document, I have noted that in contrast to other documents it has no distribution list; it was written down 5 days after the speech and is not even marked "secret." Can you explain where these minutes were set down?
RAEDER: I cannot recollect in detail the conditions that prevailed. I can only imagine that the adjutant in question kept the minutes in his safe.
DR. SIEMERS: Then you have only an over-all impression of this speech, after 8 or 9 years?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: The document was read in full here by the Prosecution and, as cannot be denied at all, it contains serious references to a war of aggression. It mentions, for instance, something bequeathed by will, the problem of space, the hatred against England and France; it says that, armament now being completed, the first goal is the overthrow of Czechoslovakia and Austria. Please explain to the Court what effect the speech had on you at that time, and how it happened that you ascribed no such importance to the speech as did Herr Von Neurath, for example, who was also present? And in spite of the speech how did you retain your opinion that Hitler would hold the old line and not seek a solution by force?
RAEDER: By way of introduction I may say that the assertion contained in the trial brief, that an influential group of Nazis met in order to examine the situation, does not give a correct picture of the situation at all. Hitler called together the persons mentioned in the document to explain to them the possibilities for political development and in order to give them any instructions he might have. And here I should like to say something in general-since there are quite a number of Hitler's speeches coming-about the nature of his speeches. Hitler spoke at great length, going very far in retrospect. Above all, in every speech he had a special purpose depending on the audience. Just as he was a master of dialectics, so he was also a master of bluff. He used strong expressions again according to the objective he was pursuing. He afforded his imagination full play. He also contradicted himself frequently in successive speeches. One never knew what his final goads and intentions were. At the end of such a speech it was very difficult to determine them. As a rule, his speeches made a greater impression on people who heard him infrequently than on those already acquainted with his whole manner of speaking on such occasions. It was never a question of taking counsel but, as has been said, always of giving undisputed orders. The purpose of the speech on 5 November 1937 was, as Reich Marshal Goering said at the beginning...
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is at the beginning of this speech of 5 November?
RAEDER: Yes, at the beginning of the speech. He told me he had spoken with the Fuehrer beforehand. The Fuehrer wanted to spur on the Army to carry out its rearmament somewhat faster. It was going too slowly for the Fuehrer. The subject of the speech was Austria and Czechoslovakia, which he said in one place he wanted to overthrow. He said that the latest date would be 1943-1945, because after that our situation would become worse. But the case could come up earlier due to two conditions: In the first place, if internal unrest occurred in France; in the second place, in the event of the outbreak of a Mediterranean war in which England, France, Italy, and probably Spain, would participate, which in my opinion was fantastic. The assertion that the arming of the Army, Navy, and Air Force was as good as completed in November 1937, I could not understand. The Navy still had not a single battleship in service. The situation was similar in the Air Force and Army. In no way were we armed far war, and a war against England, for example, would have been sheer madness. For me, the decisive sentences in his speech were that first, England and France-I believe-had already written off Czechoslovakia, and secondly, that he was convinced that France and England would not interfere. In the third place was the fact that just a few months before, in July 1937, the second naval agreement had been signed. These three facts seemed to me to make it certain that Hitler would not seek a warlike solution to these problems of Austria and Czechoslovakia. At that time it was a question of the Sudetenland under any circumstances and it seemed he would strive for a peaceful solution. For that reason the speech did not impress me with the fact that Hitler at that time wanted to change his policy-that he wanted to turn from a policy of peace to one of war. I can imagine that Herr Von Neurath, not knowing the purpose of this speech, received a different impression.
RAEDER: But' as I now think back over the matter, I can imagine that the exaggerated character of the speech was specifically intended to force Von Neurath out of the Cabinet, because I have learned that at that time the Fuehrer was already inclined to replace Von Neurath by Von Ribbentrop. That was only an assumption which I made afterwards. For me the conclusions to be drawn from the speech were none other than these: The construction of the fleet in the ratio of one to three, relative to England, was to be continued, and a friendly relationship with England was still to be striven for. The ratio agreement which had just been reached was to be observed.
DR. SIEMERS: And, it is obvious at the end of the document- namely, in the fourth paragraph from the end-that Field Marshal Von Blomberg and Colonel General Von Fritsch, in giving their estimate of the situation, repeatedly pointed out the necessity of England and France not playing the role of our enemies. This is commented on further, and one sees that Blomberg and Fritsch were disturbed and for once opposed Hitler. After the speech you talked to Blomberg. Is it true that Blomberg, who can unfortunately not be examined and Fritsch, who is also dead, saw through this exaggeration of Hitler's and therefore pointed out their misgivings and in this way intended to intervene? About what did you talk to Blomberg after this speech?
RAEDER: In the first place, Blomberg and Fritsch...
THE PRESIDENT: You must try not to put leading questions, Dr. Siemers. You are putting into the witness' mouth what you want him to answer. If you want to. . .
DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry if I did so. It is a little difficult when the two men who were there, Blomberg and Fritsch, are dead. I can only point out that they are not alive now. My final question is...
THE PRESIDENT: That cannot be helped, the fact that they are dead. But, if you want to get anything in about that, you must get it from the witness, not from yourself.
DR. SIEMERS: What impression did Blomberg have after this speech? What did he say to you afterwards?
RAEDER: I believe Blomberg himself in a questionnaire stated to Field Marshal Keitel that when we military men left the room Blomberg, who was with the Fuehrer frequently, said that this again had not been meant so earnestly and was not to be judged so seriously. He believed that the Fuehrer would settle these questions peacefully, too. And as Dr. Siemers said, Blomberg and Fritsch had both already called the attention of the Fuehrer to the fact that under no circumstances should England and France be allowed to intervene, since the German Wehrmacht would not be able to cope with them. I may add that in this case I intentionally did not make any such objections because it was, after all, a daily occurrence that whenever I met the Fuehrer, I told him, " Ceterum censeo , we must stay on the course in order to avoid entanglements with England." And the Fuehrer repeatedly confirmed this intention of his. It is typical that as soon as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel General Von Fritsch, said that after these remarks he would not be able to take the vacation in Egypt in the winter of 1937-38 which he had planned for his health, the Fuehrer immediately retracted his statement and said that the affair was not so urgent, that he could go ahead on his vacation undisturbed, which he then did. This shows that it was again a question of exerting pressure. That was the speech of 5 November 1937. In fact he did not crush either Austria or Czechoslovakia at that time; but in 1938 the question was settled peacefully without bloodshed, and even with the agreement of the other powers.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection may I submit the document dating from the following year, Exhibit Raeder-23, Raeder Document Book 2, Page 127. On 30 September 1938-I need not say anything further about Munich, because the defendant was not directly participating-Hitler and Chamberlain jointly declared that the agreement signed the previous night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement were considered symbols of the desires of both nations never again to wage war against each other. The rest of the contents is well known. Then I come to the second key document which the Prosecution submitted-namely, Document L-79, the so-called "Little Schmundt." It is Exhibit USA-27, Number 10 in the document book of the British Delegation, Page 24. The document in spite of its astonishing length was also presented in full by the Prosecution, so that I shall not read from it. May I remind the Court that it states that further successes could not be achieved without bloodshed, and on 23 May 1939 with reference to Poland it states that not Danzig but the readjustment of Lebensraum was the issue at stake. It speaks of the readjustment of Lebensraum and of the fact that the Polish problem could not be separated from the conflict with the West. Thereupon Hitler said that the only way out was to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. Unfortunately, this is again a document which is undated. Do you know when Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt prepared this report?
RAEDER: No, unfortunately I cannot say that.
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say it is undated?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, there is no date stating when the document was prepared. There is only the date referring to the minutes of the conference of 23 May. In the case of the Hossbach Document the conference was on 5 November, but it was written down by Hossbach 5 days later from memory, on 10 November. In the case of Schmundt, we do not know whether it was written down after 1 day, 5 days, or 4 weeks.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it in evidence that the document of 5 November was written down 5 days later?
DR. SIEMERS: No. The document of 5 November shows that it was prepared 5 days later. The document is dated at the top, "Berlin, 10 November 1937; Notes of the Conference in the Reich Chancellery on 5 November 1937...."
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is right, then there is evidence.
DR. SIEMERS: [Turning to the defendant.] In the case of Schmundt, there is no indication?
RAEDER: No.
DR. SIEMERS: You do not know when it was written down?
RAEDER: No, I never heard when.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you ever see this document before this Trial?
RAEDER: No.
DR. SIEMERS: Does this document contain a correct reproduction in all points of Hitler's speech, or does what you said about the Hossbach Document apply here also?
RAEDER: It applies even more here. In my opinion it is the most abstruse document concerning a Hitler speech in existence, for a large part of the statements in my opinion makes no sense whatsoever, as I have tried to show. The adjutant stated that he was only paraphrasing.
DR. SIEMERS: This is on the first page in the center where it is written, "Reproduced in Substance." Please explain to the Court what impression this speech made on you at the time and why you believed, in spite of this speech, that Hitler was not planning any war of aggression.