dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GEN. RUDENKO: You did say that. This sentence is the natural logical conclusion of your directions "to plunder and do it thoroughly." Goering: No, it is not. Just after that I said that I had issued a decree authorizing the soldiers to buy up what they wanted, as much as they wanted, and as much as they could carry. Just buy up everything.
GEN. RUDENKO: You mention soldiers. I wanted to remind you of this too, and as you have quoted it, I will refer to that sentence again. You said, "Soldiers may purchase as much as they want, what they want, and what they can carry away." Goering: As much as they can carry away, yes, and that was necessary because the custom authorities had issued a restrictive order whereby a soldier could take only a small parcel. It seemed wrong to me, that a soldier, who had fought should benefit the least from victory.
GEN. RUDENKO: So that you do not deny that the extract which has just been read is what you really said in your speech of 6 August 1942. Goering: I do not deny that at all.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Let us go to the next question. Do you admit that as Delegate for the Four Year Plan you directed the deportation to forced labor of millions of citizens from the occupied territories, and that the Defendant Sauckel was your immediate subordinate in this activity? Do you admit that? Goering: On paper he was my subordinate, but he was actually directly subordinate to the Fuehrer. I have already emphasized that to the extent that I was informed, I will take my part of the responsibility; and of course I knew about these statements,
GEN. RUDENKO: I want to draw your attention to your other remarks at the same conference. You will find that on Pages 141 and 142. Goering: That has already been read to the Tribunal.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to ask you now if you have found the place? Goering: I have found it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You have found it. You said at this conference: Further, on Page 142, you say -- you were speaking of Koch: Did you find the place? Goering: Yes; it does not read quite like that here.
GEN. RUDENKO: It was not explicit. Make it more precise. Goering: Koch is trying to assert that he alone supplied all these people for Sauckel. Whereupon, I replied that for the whole Sauckel program 2,000,000 workers had been supplied and that he, Koch, could lay claim to have supplied only 500,000, at most. In other words, Koch was claiming that he himself had supplied the total number.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you think that 500,000 from the Ukraine was a small number? Goering: No, that is not the point. I have just explained. Of these 2,000,000 which represent the total supplied by Sauckel in the past, 500,000 came from the whole of the Ukraine, so that Koch did not produce the whole number as he was trying to assert. That is the meaning of the quotation.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do not deny the underlying meaning that you were speaking here of millions of people who were carried off forcibly to Germany for slave labor. Goering: I do not deny that I was speaking of 2,000,000 workers who had been called up, but whether they were all brought to Germany I cannot say at the moment. At any rate, they were used for the German economy.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that this was forced labor, slavery? Goering: Slavery, that I deny. Forced labor did of course partly come into it, and the reason for that I have already stated.
GEN. RUDENKO: But they were forcibly taken out of their countries and sent to Germany? Goering: To a certain extent deported forcibly, and I have already explained why.
GEN. RUDENKO: You heard, Defendant Goering, that a series of German documents have been read which make it clear that these people from the occupied territories were sent forcibly to Germany; that they were rounded up, taken in the street, and from the cinemas, loaded into trains and sent to Germany under military guard. If they refused to go to Germany, or tried to evade mobilization, the peaceful inhabitants were shot and submitted to tortures of various nature. You have heard of these documents which describe these methods. Goering: Yes, but may I ask you to look at those documents again. These show that recruitment was not ordered, but that registration even for forced labor was regulated by decrees and other orders. If I had been given an absolute guarantee, particularly in the East, that all these people would be peaceful and peace-loving people, that they would never take part in partisan, activities or carry out sabotage, then I probably would have put a larger number to work on the spot. But for security reasons, both in the East and West -- particularly in the West -- where young age groups were reaching the age of military service -- we were compelled to draft these men into labor and bring them to Germany.
GEN. RUDENKO: They were taken to Germany only in the interest of security and safety? Goering: There were two reasons. I have already explained them in detail. Firstly, for security reasons. Secondly, because it was necessary to find labor.
GEN. RUDENKO: And for that reason -- let us take the second, the necessity of finding labor -- people were forcibly taken from their country and sent to slavery in Germany. Is that correct? Goering: Not to slavery; they were sent to Germany to work, but I must repeat that not all of those who were taken away from the East and are missing there today, were brought in to work. For instance, in the case of Poland already 1,680,000 Poles and Ukrainians had been taken by the Soviet Union from the territory which the Russians occupied at that time, and transported to the East -- the Far East.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not think you had better touch on the question of the Soviet territories. Just answer the question which I am asking you, which concerns the deportation to Germany of the peaceful population from the occupied territories. I am asking you once more: You said in answer to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe's question that of the 5,000,000 persons who were sent to Germany, approximately 200,000 were volunteers, while the rest were taken to Germany forcibly. Is that not so? Goering: First of all, I must correct that. I did not say that to Sir David at all, but he asked me.
GEN. RUDENKO: And you admitted it? Goering: Just a moment. That is to say, he mentioned the figure 5,000,000 of which he said not more than 200,000 were volunteers. He questioned me on the strength of the minutes of the Central Planning Board, allegedly a statement by Sauckel. I did not agree and answered that the figure of volunteers was much higher, and that there must be a mistake in the figures.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. You affirm that the number of volunteers was considerably larger, but you do not deny the fact that millions were sent to Germany against their will. You do not deny that. Goering: Without wanting to tie myself down to a figure, the fact that workers were forcibly put to work is something I have never denied, and I answered accordingly.
GEN. RUDENKO: Let us go to another question: Tell me, what procedure was there for sending on the orders and directives of the OKW to various other government agencies and organs. Goering: I did not understand the meaning of that question as it came through in translation.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like you to describe the procedure which existed for sending the directives of the OKW to the various units and departments of the Air Force and other organs. How were they distributed? Goering: If I have understood the question correctly, the procedure was as follows: If an order came from the OKW, addressed to the Air Force, it went through the following channels: If it was a direct order from the Fuehrer and signed by the Fuehrer, the order had to be sent directly to me, the Commander-in-Chief. If it was an order -- not actually signed by the Fuehrer, but beginning with the words, "By order of the Fuehrer," or "On the instructions of the Fuehrer" -- such an order, according to its importance, would go to the Chief of the General Staff of my Air Force, who, according to the purport and whether it was important, would report it to me verbally. If, however, it dealt with current and departmental matters the order would go immediately and directly to the lower departments concerned without passing through the High Command. It would have been impossible to work otherwise, owing to the very large number of such orders.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand. In connection with this I would like to ask the following: In 1941 the OKW drew up a series of instructions and orders with regard to the conduct of the troops in the East and how they were to treat the Soviet population. These dealt specifically with military jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region -- Document C-50, which has already been submitted to the Tribunal. According to these instructions, the German officers had the right to shoot any person suspected of a hostile attitude towards the Germans, without bringing that person to court. This directive also stated that the German soldiers could not be punished for crimes which they committed against the local population. Directives of this nature must have been submitted to you? Goering: I would have to see that from the distribution chart. May I see the document please?
GEN. RUDENKO: You would like to see the exhibit? Goering: I want to see whether that document went straight to me, or only to my departments. GEN.R'UDENKO: Please look at the date, 13 May 1941. Goering: Actually it did not go straight to me. It says on the distribution chart, "Ob. d. L., Air Force Operations Staff, Senior General Staff officer." Actually as far as my troops were concerned, I issued very severe disciplinary orders. That is the reason why I have asked for the senior Judge of the Air Force to be called as a witness, and have now sent him an interrogatory which deals with, these very questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do know about this order, however? Goering: I have seen it here, and consequently asked for the witnesses, since this order did not go directly to the Commander-in-Chief, but to the department which I have just mentioned. Nevertheless, if this department acted on this order, then I do of course formally share the responsibility. But we are here concerned with an order from the Farer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, which could not be questioned by the troops.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do agree that you must have known about this document because of its importance? Goering: No, if so, it would have come directly to me, the Commander-in-Chief, and not be sent to the Air Force Operations Staff and the General Staff officers' department. It depended then on whether this department considered the importance of the document to be such as to require my personal orders and directives. But this was not the case here, since the document did not affect us as much as it did the Army.
GEN. RUDENKO: But the document was sent to your department and circulated there. Goering: I have just said it was sent to two offices.
GEN. RUDENKO: But this document should have been reported to you. Goering: No, it did not have to be reported to me. I explained a little earlier that if every order and every instruction which came through in the shape of an order, but which did not require my intervention, would have had to be reported to me, I should have been drowned in a sea of papers; and that is the reason why only the most important matters were brought to me and reported to me. I cannot swear upon my oath that this document was not reported to me verbally. It is possible. And I formally take responsibility also for my departments.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like you to be more precise about it. You say that the most important things were usually reported to you; correct? Goering: That is correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to draw your attention to the document before you, to the third and fourth paragraphs of the order. The third paragraph says: Goering: Just a moment.
GEN. RUDENKO: The fourth paragraph ... Goering: You have sent me three documents, and I am trying to find out which one; I am trying to sort them out.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, sort them out. Goering: I shall repeat Paragraph 3 because it has been transmitted quite erroneously in the German.
GEN. RUDENKO: And Paragraph 4? Goering: Then we come to Number 4, and it is, if I understand you correctly, the paragraph where it says: "Where. measures of this kind have been omitted or were not practicable at the moment, the suspected elements will be,taken at once to an officer who will decide whether they are to be shot." That is probably what you meant, is it not?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. That is what I had in mind. Could it be assumed that this document, from your point of view, was important enough to have been reported to you? Goering: Actually it was important, but it was not absolutely necessary for it to be reported, because the order of the Fuehrer bad made it so clear that a subordinate commander, and even a commander-in-chief of one of the services could not alter a clear and strict order of that kind.
GEN. RUDENKO: I draw your attention once more to the date in the right-hand corner. It states there, Fuehrer headquarters, 13 May 1941. Goering: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore, it means that this was a month before the German attack on the Soviet Union? Already, then, directives were formulated about military jurisdiction within the regions covered by Case Barbarossa, and you did not know about this document? Goering: When a plan for mobilization is laid, provision must be made for certain eventualities. From his experience, the Fuehrer believed that a serious threat would immediately arise in the East, and in this document measures are laid down for dealing with any action by the resistance, and fighting behind the lines. It was therefore a precautionary order in case of such happenings. Such measures have to be taken always and at all times.
GEN. RUDENKO: And the officers were given the right to shoot civilians without bringing them to trial? Goering: An officer could hold a court martial on the spot, but, according to this paragraph, he could also, if he thought fit and had evidence that the opponent was making attacks from the rear, have him shot on the spot. That has always been done.
GEN. RUDENKO: You think that the officer can hold a court martial on the spot? Goering: That is laid down in the articles of war. Every officer commanding an independent unit can hold a court martial at any time.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do agree that there is no question of any court here? It states that he alone can decide what to do with the civilian. Goering: He could act alone or through a court martial, which was on the spot. All he needed to do was to call just two more people, and he could reach a decision, in 2 or 5 minutes if evidence of the attack was given.
GEN. RUDENKO: In 5 minutes or 2 minutes, you say, and then he could shoot the person? Goering: If I catch a man in the act of shooting at my troops from a house in the rear, then the matter can be settled very swiftly by a court martial. But where there is no evidence at all, you cannot do that. Here, however, we are dealing with an immediate attack and with the means of putting an end to it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Goering, let us leave this question. I would only like to point out once more that this directive wag issued by the High Command of the Armed Forces on 13 May 1941, and that this order gives an officer the right to shoot a man without a trial. I suppose you will not deny this. Let us go on. Goering: Yes, but I deny that emphatically. There is nothing here which says that an officer has the right to shoot a man right away. Let us get this right. It says here -- and I repeat it -- "Attacks by hostile civilians against the Armed Forces," and then it says, "Where measures of this kind are not practicable at the moment, the suspected elements.. ." -- and here is meant "suspected elements" only -- are to be brought before the highest officer of the formation there present and he will decide the matter. In other words, it does not say that every officer can decide the fate of any civilian.
GEN. RUDENKO: But the resolution is to shoot. It is quite clear. The second document which I would like to submit now and question you about is that dated 16 September 1941. It has been submitted to the Court as Exhibit Number R-98. Goering: Just a moment. What was the date you mentioned?
GEN. RUDENKO: 16 September 1941 is the date of the document. Point B of the document. I will not quote it. I am merely calling it to your mind. It states that as a general rule the death of one German soldier must be paid for by the lives of 50 to 100 Communists. That means that this rule was to serve as a deterrent. I am not going to question you about the main purport of the document. That is quite clear and needs no clarification. What I am interested in is whether this document was likewise unknown to you. Goering: It was not directed to me. Here again it merely went to some office. The Air Force had very little to do with such matters.
GEN. RUDENKO: And these offices did not report to you about such documents? Goering: In a general way I knew about these reprisals, but not to this extent. I learned only later -- I mean during the war, not here -- that the order originally mentioned 5 to 10 and that the Fuehrer personally made it 50 to a 100. The question is whether you have any evidence that the Air Force really made use of the order anywhere, and they did not. That is all I can tell you.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do not put questions to me. I am asking you. Did your administrative office ever report to you about this document? Goering: No, but later on I heard about this document. At a later date.
GEN. RUDENKO: What do you mean by a "later date"? Please be more precise. Goering: I cannot tell you at the moment. It was sometime during the war that I heard that a figure which originally stood at from 5 to 10 had been altered by the Fuehrer personally to 50 to 100. That is what I heard.
GEN. RUDENKO: For one German? Goering: I have just explained to you. That is what I heard. The number was originally 5 to 10 and the Fuehrer personally added on a zero. It was through that fact being once discussed that I learned about the whole matter.
GEN. RUDENKO: You mean the Fuehrer added the zeros?
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, do you think it is really necessary to go through these documents in such detail? The documents, after all, speak for themselves, and they have already been presented to the Tribunal.
GEN. RUDENKO: I am finishing with this document, Mr. President. Do you know anything about the directives of the OKW with regard to the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war? Goering: I shall have to see them.
GEN. RUDENKO: If you please, Mr. Presidgnt, the document has already been submitted to the Tribunal as 33B-PS. Please look at Point A, Paragraph 3, which states that there is a broad directive concerning the use of arms against Soviet prisoners of war. The use of weapons must be considered permissible and in any incidents involved the guards are not bound to report on the matter. This document also speaks for itself. I do not want ... Goering: Just a moment, I must read it first; there is some ambiguity in here.
GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to refresh your memory with still another subject, that is, a short comment. It is taken from an order concerning the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. Here it is said that prisoners of war who are trying to escape should be shot without warning. The same subject is also mentioned in the memorandum concerning the treatment of the Russian prisoners of war. Goering: The trouble here was the language difficulty; hence the guards were instructed to use their arms immediately against persons attempting escape. That is more or less the meaning of it, and that errors might occur in this connection can be understood.
GEN. RUDENKO: I am not talking about the purport of the document which speaks for itself. I want to know whether you knew about this document. Goering: This is a document dealing with the treatment of prisoners of war, and it was passed directly to my department which was concerned with prisoners of war. I did not know of this document, neither did I know of the one which contains the opinion of the Foreign Intelligence Department on the matter.
GEN. RUDENKO: You did not know about this document? Very well. Now one other, Number 884-PS, already submitted. It deals with the extermination of political leaders and other political personalities. This is a document ... Goering: In explanation of this, I should like to point out that the Air Force did not have any camps for Soviet prisoners of war. The Air Force had only six camps in which the air force personnel of other powers were confined; but it had no camps under it with Soviet prisoners of war.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have asked you these questions and shown you these documents because as the second man in Germany, you could not possibly have been unaware of these things. Goering: I apologize if I contradict you. The higher the office I held, the less would I be concerned with orders dealing with prisoners of war. From their very nature, these were departmental orders and not orders of the highest political or military significance. If I had held a much lower rank, then I might have had more knowledge of these orders. I am now looking at the document which you submitted to me -- Department of Home Defense. It says on the left, "Reference: Treatment of Captured Political and Military Russian Functionaries." That is the document I am looking at.
GEN. RUDENKO: Please look at the date of the document -- 12 May 1941, Fuehrer's Headquarters. Goering: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Look at Paragraph 3 of the document. Did you know about this directive? Goering: May I point out that this is in no way a directive, but that it bears the heading, "Memorandum," and is signed Warlimont. Also the distribution chart does not show any other department than the Home Defense Department, which I have mentioned. In other words, this is a memorandum.
GEN. RUDENKO: You mean to say then that you did not know about this document? Goering: I say once more, this is a memorandum from the Operations Staff of the OKW; and it is not an order or a directive, but a memorandum.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. You are telling us what it was, not whether you knew of it. Goering: No; I did not. It had been put before me as an order, and I wanted to point out that it is not an order.
GEN. RUDENKO: Let us go on. The directives regarding the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war must have been executed also by the units of the Luftwaffe? Goering: If ordered by the Fuehrer, yes; or if ordered by me, also.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you remember your own directives with regard to the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war? Goering: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not remember them? Goering: The Air Force had no camps with Soviet prisoners of war.
GEN. RUDENKO: Tell me, the majority of these criminal orders and directives of the OKW, were they not issued even before the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union and as part of the preparations for that war? Does this not show that the German Government and the OKW already had a prepared plan for exterminating the Soviet population? Goering: No. It does not prove it at all. It only shows that we considered a struggle with the Soviet Union would be an extremely bitter one, and that it would be conducted according to other rules as there were no conventions.
GEN. RUDENKO: These rules of warfare are well known to us. Please tell me, do you know about Himmler's directives given in 1941 about the extermination of 30 million Slavs? You heard about it from the witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski here in court. Do you remember that? Goering: Yes. First of all it was not an order but a speech. Secondly, it was an assertion by Zelewski. And thirdly, in all speeches that Himmler made to subordinate leaders, he insisted on the strictest secrecy. In other words, this is a statement from a witness about what he had heard, and not an order. Consequently, I have no knowledge of this nonsense.