dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GEN. RUDENKO: The problem was not solved, because of circumstances over which you had no control. It depended on the advance of the Red and Allied Armies. Am I right?
KORNER: I did not understand the question clearly enough to answer it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You say that the question was not solved. I ask you, is it not a fact thatthe problem was not solved because of circumstances which did not depend on yourselves? You were prevented by the Red and Allied Armies?
KORNER: I believe that at the time this letter was sent no such influence could have been felt. The question of the comprehensive organization of economic matters in occupied territories did not, as a fact, materialize because it was opposed by other circumstances.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not mean to discuss these causes with you at the present moment, but you have not yet answered my last question. I asked: Do you confirm that Goering, as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, was at the head of both the civilian and the military German organizations dealing with the economic exploitation of all the occupied territories, and that you were his closest collaborator?
KORNER: As far as the exploitation of occupied countries is concerned, it cannot be dealt with in this manner. The Four Year Plan had the possibility of exerting influence in economic questions in the occupied countries, but it was done only if it was absolutely necessary. In general it did not concern itself with such problems. The authorities who took care of economic matters in the occupied countries were the military commanders or the heads of the civil administration. In the East was the Economic Staff East and Rosenberg's Ministry. Only if there was a matter between the military and the economic authorities or between German departments, 0here there was a dispute or a disagreement, could the Four Year Plan be drawn in. The Reich Marshal in those cases could make special decisions, but that was in very, very few cases as, for instance, in the case of this conference mentioned today, concerning the occupied countries having to help supply foodstuffs for Europe. We had the right, since in the occupied territories not only in the East but also in the West, we carried out many new developments in the sphere of agriculture. In the West I can point out.
GEN. RUDENKO: What right are you discussing?
KORNER: I speak of the right which Germany had to share in the agricultural production of these countries, because we introduced many new developments there. I would like to point out that in the East, the regions which had been completely devastated, which had no seed, no machines, and with greatest difficulty...
GEN. RUDENKO: Who gave that right to the Germans?
KORNER: The right? It is only natural that once we have occupied a country and built it up, we are entitled to share in the surplus. We had to take care of the whole of Europe and we knew what anxieties and problems we encountered in the occupied countries.
GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you, where did the Germans get the right?
KORNER: I am no jurist. Therefore I cannot answer the question.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you were talking about German rights.
KORNER: I am speaking only of the natural right that if we built up a country we should share in the results of that work of development.
GEN. RUDENKO: After you had devastated these areas?
KORNER: Germany did not devastate these areas, especially not in any agricultural respect. We, in fact, instituted great developments. I remember, in the West, that some parts of France were completely devastated and our organizations performed reconstrtiction work there. Thus we rebuilt the uncultivated land which we found in France, through a German organization which had reconstructed whole areas in Reich territory, and repatriated French people there, giving them the possibility of working again as peasants and sharing in the agricultural production of the country. In the East we found territories whose agriculture had been greatly damaged through the war. All the machines had disappeared. All the tractors had been taken away by the Russians, and all agricultural implements had been taken away or destroyed. There we had to start in the most elementary and primitive way to build up agriculture again. That it was possible for us in the years of our occupation in the Eastito restore agriculture, German initiative and German machinery alone are to be thanked.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did German, initiative also include, together with the restoration of agricultural measures and developments, a vast net of concentration camps which you established in the occupied countries? Was that also included in the extent of the German initiative?
KORNER: I had nothing to do with that problem, and can say nothing about it.
GEN. RUDENKO: But I am asking you this question ...
KORNER: And therefore I do not understand what you mean.
GEN. RUDENKO: You are not sufficiently informed on the question of concentration camps, but it would appear that you are quite well informed, or appear to be informed, on restoration work in the agricultural field?
KORNER: Natilrally, I know a great deal about the rehabilitation of agricultural areas.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you know nothing about concentration camps?
KORNER: I was not concerned with these matters.
GEN. RUDENKO: You knew nothing about the fact that millions were being annihilated by the German occupational authorities?
KORNER: No, I knew nothing about it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You really knew nothing about it?
KORNER: I have only just found out about it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Only now?
KORNER: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have no further question to ask.
HERR GEORG BOEHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, do you know that Heines was Chief of Police at Breslau?
THE PRESIDENT: I asked defendants' counsel at the end of the examination by Dr. Stahmer whether they wished to ask any questions, and they said they did not wish to ask any questions. Therefore it is not your turn now to ask any questions.
HERR BOEHM: Mr. President. In the interrogation by Mr. Justice Jackson a point arose which I did not know of before and which calls for comment. It concerns the Chief of Police, Heines. May I be allowed to put two or three questions to the witness so that the point in question may be clarified?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We hope you will not take too long.
HERR BOEHM: I will try to be brief, Mr. President. Thank you. [Turning to the witness.] Witness, do you know that Heines was Chief of Police at Breslau?
KORNER: Yes.
HERR BOEHM: Further, do you know that in that capacity he was in charge of the prisons in Breslau?
KORNER: Of course, the Police Chief is in charge of prisons.
HERR BOEHM: Do you know whether at the time in question when this camp was set up, the police prisons of Breslau were overcrowded?
KORNER: That I do not know. I mentioned the case of Heines only as one of the camps which at that time were set up without the permission of the Prime Minister or the Minister of the Interior.
HERR BOEHM: Then you also know that Heines could establish this camp merely in his capacity as Chief of Police?
KORNER: Yes, that may be.
HERR BOEHM: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, have you any questions to ask?
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire.
DR. STAHNER: With the permission of the Tribunal I call as next witness, Field Marshal Kesselring. [The witness Kesselring took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?
ALBERT KESSELRING (Witness): Albert Kesselring.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God -- the Almighty and Omniscient -- that I will speak the pure truth -- and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit if you wish.
DR. STAHMER: Witness, since when have you served with the Luftwaffe?
KESSELRING: Since 1 October 1933.
DR. STAHMER: What rank did you hold on your transfer to the Luftwaffe?
KESSELRING: Up to that time I was a colonel and officer commanding artillery in Dresden. Then I was retired as air commodore.
DR. STAHMER: You helped to build up the Luftwaffe?
KESSELRING: During the first 3 years I was Chief of the Administrative Office, subsequently Chief of the General Staff, and I then served in the Gruppenkommando.
DR. STAHMER: Was the Luftwaffe being built up for defensive or aggressive purposes?
KESSELRING: The German Luftwaffe was purely a weapon of defense. I must, however, add the comment that the single plane as well as the whole of an air force by its very nature is an aggressive weapon. Even in land fighting, mere defense unaccompanied by offensive movements is considered not to lead to any appreciable results or successes. This applies to a still greater degree to air warfare. The air force covers a wider range, both for defense and attack. This had been realized by the Reich Marshal and his generals. It is obvious that when an air force is being built up, only light machines are produced, or are the first types to reach the units. Thus, up to 1936-37 we had only light craft, fighters, Stukas, reconnaissance planes, and a few "old sledges" as we called them, such as Ju 52, Do 11 and D 13 -- all obsolete bomber types. One may hold the view that defense can be successfully conducted with these light craft. On the other hand, I should like to point to the end of the World War, when the German defensive air force was smashed by the offensive air force of the enemy.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks the witness is dealing with this matter in far too great detail.
KESSELRING: I will go on. Up to 1937-38 there was no offensive air force, especially no bombers, and the bombers which were built later had neither the range nor the load capacity necessary for an offensive weapon. There were no four-engine bombers.
DR. STAHNER: Did you play any part in the attack on Warsaw?
KESSELRING: As Chief of Air Fleet 1, I led this attack.
DR. STAHMER: Did the military situation at the time justify this attack, and how was it carried out?
KESSELRING: Several attacks were made on Warsaw. In the German view, Warsaw was a fortress, and, moreover, it had strong air defenses. Thus the stipulations of the Hague Convention for land warfare, which can analogously be applied to air warfare, were fulfilled. As to the first phase of the attack on Warsaw, according to the operational principle governing the employment of the Luftwaffe, the enemy air force and the aircraft factories in the immediate vicinity of the airfields were to be attacked. These attacks were in my opinion fully justified and they comply with the rules. The second phase concerns the combating of the operational movements of the Poles. I may add that Warsaw is a junction for northern and central Poland. When our long-range reconnaissance reported -- this was confirmed by the final phase -- that the railway stations were crammed with material and that reinforcements in increasing numbers were moving on Warsaw, the air attack on these movements was ordered and carried out. It was mainly directed against railway stations and sidings and the Vistula bridges. For the execution of these attacks I detailed Stukas and ground "strafer" aircraft, because the precision of these machines afforded the guarantee that mainly the military targets would be hit. The third phase was the shelling of Warsaw. I consider the shelling to be an army action in which, at the request of the army, small units of the Luftwaffe were employed against military targets. I myself was over Warsaw, and after practically every air attack I consulted the army commanders about the execution. From my own experiences and reports I can assert that everything that was humanly possible was done to hit military targets only and to spare civilian targets.
DR. STAHMER: Can you confirm conclusively that these attacks were kept throughout within the limits of military necessity?
KESSELRING: Absolutely.
DR. STAHNER: Did you play any part in the attack on Rotterdam?
KESSELRING: As Air Force Chief 2, to which rank I had been promoted, I led air attacks on Holland, Belgium, and France, and the airborne corps operated under my command also. The airborne corps was commanded by General Student, who asked for his paratroops to be supported by a bomber attack. General Student had such a comprehensive knowledge of the ground situation that he alone must be considered responsible for preparation and execution of the attack. The Fourth Air Corps was ordered to provide air support, and one group, the smallest unit necessary for this purpose, was employed. The attack was carried out solely in accordance with the tactical requirements and technical possibilities. The orders of General Student reached my command very early. Thus all preparations could be made leisurely according to plan. At the instance of the Reich Marshal the unit was informed of possible changes within Rotterdam and of the approach of Panzer divisions. The objective set by General Student was quite elear as to extent, central and key points, and occupation. It was not difficult for seasoned troops to grasp the objective. There was radio communication between General Student's command, my staff, and other staffs, including the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. Any interruption of this communication could only have been a very short one as radio orders were transmitted by me or the Reich Marshal. The technique at that time made it possible to maintain contact through this radio communication between the tactical ground station and the flying unit via its ground station. The ground communications usual at that time such as flags, flares, and signal code designations at the front were maintained according to plan. They functioned without a hitch. In accordance with its training and its orders the formation had sent out a reconnaissance aircraft which kept them informed of the situation and the objective. In addition, by order of the Reich Marshal, there followed a General Staff officer attached to my air fleet who had the same mission.
DR. STAHMER: Had the order been given that the situation and the objective should be...
KESSELRING: I myself never had any doubt that the attack had to be carried out; I was only not quite sure whether or not it should be repeated. And this was the question to which the signals referred. Judging from my knowledge of General Student and -- I stress this particularly -- his technique in leading an attack and his clearly stated requirements, I had to expect the attack to be carried out. The attack was carried out according to plan and time schedule. The report that the target had been accurately bombed came through very quickly together with the message that no further attacks were necessary. During the 3 days of fighting in Holland the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe was kept well informed. Particularly on the third day, that is, the day I am talking of, the Reich Marshal in his outspoken manner intervened more than usual in the direction of the air fleet and did, in my opinion, everything that could possibly be done from such a high position. I do not remember any message to the effect that the bomber attack was no longer warranted by the tactical situation.
DR. STAHMER: Bombs are said to have been dropped when negotiations about capitulation had already started.
KESSELRING: As I said, no message to this effect had been received by the command, neither had the formation operating over Rotterdam picked up a message from the ground. Probably some confusion occurred at the command In Rotterdam itself of which I know nothing. Neither do I know about the agreements reached between General Student and the officer commanding the Dutch troops in Rotterdam. I wanted later to have a talk with General Student on this question, but it was not possible because of his having received a serious head injury. If, contrary to my firm conviction, the attack had been no longer warranted by the situation, this would be most regrettable. As a soldier of 42 years' standing, as an artillery man, as an airman, as a General Staff officer, and as a leader for many years, I wish to make it clear that this case was one of those unforeseeable coincidences of war which, I am sorry to say, occur in the armed services of all countries more frequently than one might think; only the world does not know.
DR. STAHMER: How do you explain the big fires that still broke out in Rotterdam?
KESSELRING: When I received the report from the formation I was very pleasantly surprised to learn that the effect of the bombing was confined to the target area, but this war has shown that most of the destruction is not caused bythe bombs themselves, but by the spreading of fires. Unfortunately a bomb had hit a margarine or some other factory in Rotterdam, causing oil to run out and the fire to spread. As after the attack the capitulation was already effective, it should have been possible to prevent the fires from spreading by bringing in the fire services and the troops.
DR. STAHMER: What were the military consequences of this attack?
KESSELRING: The immediate consequence of the attack was the surrender of the Rotterdam troops. General Wenninger, who was air attache at the time and who later was attached to my air fleet, told me that in consequence of this attack the whole of the Dutch Army capitulated.
DR. STAHMER: Did you lead the attack on Coventry in November 1940?
KESSELRING: As Chief of Air Fleet 2 I took part in this attack, without any doubt. I cannot say now whether Air Fleet 3 took part in it as well, but I did.
DR. STAHMER: What was the object of the attack?
KESSELRING: According to the target index kept by the archives department of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Coventry was an English armament center; it was known as "Little Essen." This index was compiled with meticulous care by experts, engineers, and officers, and contained maps, charts, photographs, description of targets, key points, et cetera . I myself, as well as my men, was fully familiar with these details. Furthermore, I had the aforementioned General Wenninger and several engineers with the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe give lectures to the troops about targets, in order to make them acquainted with the nature of the targets, their vulnerability, and the effects of an air attack. Preparations for an attack were made most conscientiously. I was very often present and the Reich Marshal himself occasionally inspected them. The case of Coventry was extremely simple, as during those nights favorable weather conditions prevailed, so that Coventry could be reached without radio navigation. The distribution of the targets in Coventry was likewise very simple, so that bombs could be dropped without the help of flares, and it was hardly possible to miss the target. But bombs follow the same law as other projectiles; in other words, in land and air warfare dispersion covers a wide range. With an air force this is the further peculiarity that if strong formations are employed not the individual target but only the target area as a whole can be aimed at, which naturally causes a deviation from the target itself. By order of the Commander-inChief of the Luftwaffe and on the reconnaissance pilot's own initiative, all hits and attacks were checked the following day by air photographs. The ground visibility was good but, as I already said in the case of Rotterdam, the destruction of the objective was not caused so much by the bombs themselves as by the spreading of fire. I do not know whether I should add anything further. The Hague Convention on land warfare did not provide for the requirements of air warfare.
KESSELRING: In order to avoid an arbitrary selection of targets, the Supreme Command had to go into the question and issue general directives based on the preamble to the Hague Convention, the literature published in the meantime, and finally, the special conditions governing the Luftwaffe itself. Only those targets which we considered admissible according to international law were assigned to the air fleet or formation. This did not exclude the reconsideration and change of targets in individual cases, which were discussed with the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, and we took the responsibility ...
THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking too fast.
KESSELRING: By personal visits and other means we impressed upon our units the need to study preparation, the dropping of bombs, aiming, the meteorological conditions, so carefully that the highest degree of accuracy could be obtained and regrettable deviations into the perimeter of the objectives could be avoided. The case of Coventry was particularly fortunate as it presented an important military target, and no one could speak of it as an attack directed against the civilian population.
DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defense counsel wish to ask questions?
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, since when were you commander of an army group?
KESSELRING: I became commander of an army group in September 1943 after, as commander of the German troops in the Supreme Command, I had already served in a supervisory capacity as far as general strategic and tactical questions were concerned.
DR. LATERNSER: The army group which you led was in Italy?
KESSELRING: The army group was in the Mediterranean area.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know the composition of the General Staff and High Command group as presented by the Prosecution?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: First I have a preliminary question. What is, strictly speaking, understood by the German General Staff of the individual branches of the Wehrmacht?
KESSELRING: The General Staff of the individual branches of the Wehrmacht comprises all those officers who assist the commanders-in-chief of the services and share their responsibility.
DR. LATERNSER: Would you please state how this group was composed and organized in the Luftwaffe, for instance?
KESSELRING: The General Staff of the Luftwaffe was the equivalent of the General Staff of the Army and these organizations were as alike as two pins. The General Staff consisted of the central department, called the Operations Staff in the Luftwaffe, headed by the Chief of the General Staff, the operational departments, the organizational groups, the departmental chiefs of the Luftwaffe, the supply office, et cetera . The various commands, from the air fleet down to the division, the ground staff and the Luftgaue, had General Staff officers attached to them to assist in the command. A chief of general staff no longer bore co-responsibility, as was previously customary, since this was held to be inconsistent with the Leadership Principle. These chiefs of general staffs and the chief of the central department of the General Staff exercisedtheir influence regarding military and ideological training on all the General Staff officers within the Wehrmacht, without prejudice to the responsibility of the individual military commander.
DR. LATERNSER: If I summarize your reply that by General Staff of the Luftwaffe is meant the Chief of General Staff and the regimental staff officers, would I then be describing correctly the composition of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe?
KESSELRING: Most certainly.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you consider the term "General Staff" as has been employed in these proceedings to be in accordance with military usage?
KESSELRING: As I said before, the General Staff was composed of officers assisting in the command, which did not include the commanders and commanders-in-chief. According to German views they did not belong to that category, because not all the commanders and commanders-in-chief had had the same education and training as the General Staff officers. The cornmanders-in-chief were single individuals. They would be treated collectively only in connection with their rank as generals and for budget and pay purposes.
DR. LATERNSER: Would you consider it to be erroneous to apply the term "General Staff" to the high military conuxianders?
KESSELRING: According to the German conception it would be a misnomer.
DR. LATERNSER: Have at any time in the history of the Wehrmacht the high military commanders been subsumed under this group as is being done here?