dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. DIX: Your Honors, before a resolution is made to the matter under discussion, I should like to make just a few remarks, not referring to the case of Rosenberg but to the Defense in general. Very serious accusations against the entire Defense have been raised. The expression was used that the Prosecution was not the press agent of the Defense. The accusation was raised that the Defense were trying to make propaganda, and then these accusations reached their peak in the most serious charge which one can possibly make in reference to a participant in a trial, that of contempt of Court. In the name of all Defense Counsel I oppose these heavy accusations with the best and strongest argument possible, that of an absolutely clean and pure conscience in this respect. Anyone who has listened to the debate of the last 30 minutes must have recognized that the differences of opinion, which have cropped up here and on already been mentioned repeatedly and which was confiscated on Schacht's estate by the Red Army when the Red Army marched in.* Despite all efforts the Russian Delegation have not yet succeeded in getting this strong box. Although some rather good passages are contained therein, I am perfectly refilling to break off here and to put these questions to Herr Schacht if the Tribunal would prefer that. May I have the Tribunal's decision on this question; if necessary I can cease to discuss the memorandum any further.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal had no objection to your asking this witness about it, but they thought you ought not to put a leading question and that you ought to ask the witness if he remembers the document and what the contents of the document were; not to put to him that it was such and such in the document or some other passage in the document, but just to ask him what the contents of the document were.
DR. DIX: The dividing line between leading questions and putting the contents of a document to the witness, a document which the witness does not remember exactly, is rather fluid. Therefore, I should prefer to have Herr Schacht give the rest of the contents of the memorandum; then we would avoid these difficulties. I shall therefore leave this point and proceed to another field. Witness, you quite correctly stated yesterday in answer to a question in connection with the defense of Funk by my colleague, Dr. Sauter, how it was the practice in 1939, that Hitler simply decreed that the Reichsbank would have to give so much credit. I want to avoid a mistaken impression on the part of the Tribunal as to the former position of the Reichsbank in regard to this question. You know that by Hitler's decree, the Reichsbank in January 1939 lost its former independence. In this decree Hitler ordered that he would decide what credits the Reichsbank would have to give; and this restricted decree of Hitler's was announced and became effective as a law in June 1939. Therefore, in order that the Tribunal get a proper impression of the general and also of the former position of the Reichsbank, I am asking you how the situation was before January 1939, that is, during Schacht's term in office as Reichsbank President, which ended, as is known, in January 1939. Was it possible at that time for Hitler simply to decree that so much credit was to be given, or was the Reichsbank still independent and could it refuse such credit or cancel it?
LAMMERS: I do not remember the legal regulations which existed in this connection to such an extent that I can give a complete answer as to when and how they were altered. I can confirm one thing, however; that is that during the period when Herr Schacht was President of the Reichsbank he must have made certain difficulties for the Fuehrer with reference to the granting of these credits. I was not present at the discussions' between the Fuehrer and Schacht, but I know from statements made by the Fuehrer that regarding those credits he met with considerable difficulties and restraints on Schacht's part, restraints which finally brought about Schacht's resignation from his position as President of the Reichsbank. On the other hand, I know that at the moment when Funk became President of the Reichsbank, these difficulties ceased to exist. These were obviously removed by legal regulations and also by orders which the Fuehrer had given; for when Funk became President of the Reichsbank, these credits were simply handled in the way which I described yesterday, when I described the technical procedure; in the main orders for credits and Reich loans from the Reichsbank were merely a simple matter of signature for the Fuehrer. They were a matter...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think he is able to answer your question, really. I do not think he is able to answer the question which you put to him, which was as to the position before 1939, so I think you must rely upon the decrees and documents.
DR. DIX: One moment, Herr Lammers: I shall clarify that right away. You have just stated how things were handled in practice in 1939, in the books. Do you not remember that the Reichsbank had previously been independent as far as the Government was concerned?
LAMMERS: Yes, I do remember. I also recollect that certain legal alterations were made, but I cannot remember just when. Without seeing the law books I cannot tell you exactly the contents of these legal regulations, just what the limitations were in terms of figures. All I do know is that the position of the President of the Reichsbank was later reduced considerably according to orders coming from the Fuehrer.
DR. DIX: That is enough. Now, as to the same subject: It is very difficult even for a German who has lived here the whole time but particularly for a foreigner, to understand the powerful machinery of the Third Reich. I think that in spite of the statements that you made yesterday in answer to the questions which my colleague, Sauter, put to you, not everything has yet been said and that you can say still more to inform the Tribunal. If I did not know what you know, if I were an outsider, then your statements of yesterday would give me the impression: Well, it was like this-the Reich Minister of the Interior could not give orders to the Police; the Reich Minister of Economy did not direct economy independently; all Reich Ministers were without official authority and could not give instructions as far as the Reich commissioners for the occupied territories were concerned.
MR. DODD: If Your Honors please, I respectfully suggest that Dr. Dix is really testifying here. I think perhaps he could put his questions more simply and we can get along faster and get the answer better.
DR. DIX: I shall put my questions more precisely, but I cannot put that question precisely unless I first of all ascertain, by means of statements, what has not yet been said up to now. Otherwise the most precise and shortest question cannot be put, for the Tribunal would not understand what I am aiming at. I can assure Mr. Dodd, I shall not ask anything of an uncertain nature; rather I shall put a very precise question. Let us proceed at once. [Turning to the witness]
LAMMERS: The infringement on the authority Of the individual ministers arose because of the number of institutions which the Fuehrer had created obviously quite consciously as a counterpoise, I might say, to the various ministers. That is the one faction. Secondly, it was done through offices created on a higher level, which, in the interest of a certain uniformity in particular fields, were to have sole authority. In the last category the typical example is, in the first instance, the Four Year Plan. In this connection the Fuehrer desired a comprehensive unified direction which was not to depend on the wishes of the ministers of the departments, and consequently, he created the Four Year Plan. In other sectors, in some way or other, the minister was confronted with a counterpart; for instance, by the appointment of Herr Ley as Reich Commissioner for Housing the Minister for Labor lost his jurisdiction in the important field of housing. He was relieved of one of his main duties by the appointment of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, Herr Sauckel, in the field of labor employment. As far as economy was concerned, the Minister of Economy, as I have already mentioned, was considerably limited in his powers by the setting up of the Four Year Plan and the powers given to it and later, in addition to that, by the powers which were transferred to the Minister for Armament and War Production. In the Ministry of the Interior the actual authority of the Chief of the German Police...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal thinks that once the general aspect of the matter has been explained by the witness the matter can be explained by the defendants themselves from their particular point of view. I mean the witness is now explaining to us, and probably indicating he will do it at some length, that with reference to the Four Year Plan, for instance, there was to be a unified command which was not to be interfered with by individual ministers. That explains the general system and when it comes to the individual defendants they can explain how it applied to them, and, therefore, we do not want this dealt with at any great length or in any great detail
DR. DIX: I shall take that into consideration and ask merely a few more concrete questions. It is not merely a question, Your Lordship, of the ministers having had to hand over certain fields in their departments to third persons, but there is also the fact that third persons, because of their authority, actually interfered in a field which was really under the jurisdiction of the minister. And now I shall give the witness a lead: What was, for example, the position of Reichsleiter Bormann?
LAMMERS: The Reichsleiter Bormann was a successor to Reich Minister Hess.
DR  DIX: And as far as interference in the ministries is concerned?
LAMMERS: He was appointed secretary to the Fuehrer by the Fuehrer and was thereby directly included in the State sector. As Chief of the Party Chancellery he was merely the successor to Reich Minister Hess, who was supposed to represent the wishes and ideas of the Party. The fact that he was appointed secretary to the Fuehrer, which meant that in the State sector a considerable number of things would have to go through Bormann's hands gained him a strong position in the State affairs. I had to experience this personally to a large extent, since I, who originally had at least been able, on occasion, to report to the Fuehrer alone, could no longer do that and could get to the Fuehrer only by way of Bormann. Most of my reports were given in Bormann's presence and everything which I formerly had been able to dispatch to the Fuehrer directly, even pure and simple matters of State, had now to go through the Secretary of the Fuehrer, through Bormann.
DR. DIX: This resulted, of course, in Bormann's influence in the various ministries?
LAMMERS: Yes, he had that influence, for all departments matters which I could not settle by reporting them to the Fuehrer directly or by asking for his decision had to be made in writing and had to go through Bormann. I would then received word from Bormann saying this or that is the Fuehrer's decision. The possibility of a personal report, which would have enabled me to speak of behalf of the minister for whom I was reporting, was lacking. They were not my own affairs; they were always complaints or protest or differences of opinion among the members of the Cabinet whip I finally could no longer take to the Fuehrer personally.
DR. DIX: Thank you, that is enough. And what you say about Bormann, does that not apply to some extent to the Gauleiter, too, who also interfered in the ministries'
LAMMERS: Gauleiter as such, had, of course, to go through the Party Chancellery; that was the prescribed channel for them. Since. the Gauleiter as a rule, however, were at the same time heads o Prussian provinces or Reichsstatthalter these two positions were, o course, somewhat mixed up; and a number of matters, instead o going through the prescribed channels from the minister concerned and through me, went directly from the Gauleiter to Reichsleiter Bormann. There are, in fact, cases where this channel was chosen deliberately.
DR. DIX: Thank you. Regarding the position of Himmler in the same respect, that of the appointment of a third person with authority, you made statements yesterday in connection with the cases o Frank and Frick. Can your statement be extended, in fact, to a] leading ministries, with reference to the increased power given to Himmler and the SS and his Police?
LAMMERS: I did not quite understand the question.
DR. DIX: You did not hear the question?
LAMMERS: I did not understand the question completely.
DR. DIX: Well, under the heading "interference with other, departments" you have talked about Bormann and you have talker about Gauleiter; yesterday you talked about Himmler, his Police and his SS with reference to the cases of Frick and Frank. I err now asking you whether this increasing power of Himmler's ant the SS did not similarly affect the other ministries?
LAMMERS: To a considerable extent in the most varied fields
DR. DIX: That exhausts that question. I am now coming back to Schacht. We have talked about the applications for resignation. Now we come to the actual dismissal Ministers who were dismissed were usually given a letter of dismissal by Hitler?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. DIX: And this letter of dismissal, I assume, was drafted by you and discussed with Hitler?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. DIX: Was considerable attention paid by Hitler to the wording of this letter of thanks on the occasion of a dismissal?
LAMMERS: Hitler usually looked at it carefully and he frequently made his own improvements, a sharper or a milder wording.
DR. DIX: The two letters of dismissal, Your Honors, which concern Schacht's dismissal from his office as President of the Reichsbank and as Minister without Portfolio are included in my document book as evidence. Therefore I do not propose to put them to the witness to any extent. There are only two sentences I propose to quote in the letter of dismissal from Hitler to Schacht on The occasion of his dismissal from his position as President of the Reichsbank: "Your name particularly will always be connected with the first period of national rearmament." Schacht considered that this sentence was written deliberately and that it contained a slight reprimand, a limitation of the praise he was getting. What is your view to this question, as one concerned in the drafting of that letter of dismissal?
LAMMERS: As far as I can recollect, I drafted the letter in such a way that a general expression of thanks was made to Schacht. This additional sentence is due to a personal insertion by the Fuehrer, as far as I can recollect, because it was not like me to make such a subtle difference here.
DR. DIX: In a later letter of dismissal of 22 January 1943, not signed by Hitler, but by you by order of the Fuehrer it is said: "The Fuehrer, with regard to your general attitude in this present fateful struggle of the German people, has decided to relieve you temporarily of your office as Reich Minister." Herr Schacht's feeling regarding his personal safety could not have been exactly pleasant when he read that sentence. May I ask you, since you drafted this letter on Hitler's order, was Schacht's anxiety unjustified?
LAMMERS: As to the reasons which caused the Fuehrer to dismiss Schacht, I know merely that a letter from Schacht to Reich Marshal Goering caused the Fuehrer to dismiss Schacht from his position. The Fuehrer did not inform me of the actual reasons. He was very violent and ordered me to use this text, implying that he even wanted it to be somewhat sterner, but I put it in the rather acceptable form which you find in this letter. The Fuehrer did not tell me, of course, what further measures were intended against 9 April 4 Schacht. But he had expressly ordered me to use the word "temporarily."
DR. DIX: A last question: Originally I had intended to ask you in detail, as the person best informed on these points, about the slob development from the year 1933 until Hitler's complete autocracy The answers which you gave to my colleagues yesterday have, it the main, settled these questions. I do not want to repeat them But two questions I should dike to have clarified. The Enabling Ac of 1933-that is the law by which the Reichstag deprived itself of its powers-did this law empower Hitler, the Reich Cabinet, or the Reich Government?
LAMMERS: This Enabling Act gave legislative powers and the right to alter the Constitution to the Reich Government, and the Reich Government, in turn, used this power to alter the Constitution, both expressly as well as by implication, by creating pub])' law based on usage which...
DR. DIX: Yes, thank you. You explained that yesterday. You do not need to go into that again. Yesterday you pointed out that this Reich Government consisted not only of National Socialists but that the majority of their members belonged to other parties. You mentioned only members of the German National Party, such as Hugenberg, Dr. Dorpmuller, and Gurtner, and you mentioned the Stahlhelm, the head of which was Seldte; but you forgot-and that is why I am asking you-to mention the Center Party. Is it true that Herr Von Papen came from the Center Party?
LAMMERS: Yes, I admit that is correct; but I do not know whether Herr Von Papen was a member of the Center Party or not.
DR. DIX: In my opinion you talk in rather scholarly and euphemistic terms about public law based on usage. I am going to give it a different name, but let us not discuss that. All I want you to tell me is whether during that gradual development toward complete dictatorship by Hitler, there were some other laws which were important and, as such, significant? Do you not consider the law after Hindenburg's death which unified the offices of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President with the result that the incumbent of this office became simultaneously the supreme military commander to whom the Wehrmacht swore their oath-do you not consider that law a further milestone in that development?
LAMMERS: That law was one of the most important milestones in this development, particularly because, by decree of the Reich Government, it was confirmed by a plebiscite with nearly 100 percent votes.
DR. DIX: And no further laws were issued to support this development?
LAMMERS: No, I do not know of any.
DR. DIX: Nor do I. And the other question is whether a combination of terror and ruse can be called public law based on usage and whether one should want to call it that. That is a question I do not want to raise at the moment; I think we are of different opinions in that connection. Your Lordship, I have now finished my questions to the witness Lammers on behalf of my client. But my colleague Dr. Kubuschok is away on duty. I do not think the airplane took off yesterday and therefore I do not think that he can be back. He asked me to question the witness on behalf of Herr Von Papen, and I wanted to able the Tribunal whether I may ask the witness the question now-there is only one short question-or whether I should wait until Papen's defense comes up at the proper time.
THE PRESIDENT: No, now, because this witness will not be called again except for some very exceptional reason.
DR. DIX: No, I meant, did you want me to ask the question later today, when Von Papen's turn comes in the proper sequence of defendants?
THE PRESIDENT: You may go on now. I think you had better ask it now.
DR. DIX: [Turning to the witness.] Please call to mind the Rohm Putsch. Papen's experiences during that revolt will be discussed later. But do you remember that Von Papen, who was Vice Chancellor at the time, demanded his dismissal from Hitler on 3 July 1934, and received this dismissal?
LAMMERS: Yes, I cannot tell you whether the dates right, but it happened right about that time.
DR. DIX: Do you also remember whether a short time afterwards, probably only a few days afterwards, between ~ and 10 July, you went to see Herr Von Papen by order of Hitler and asked him whether he was prepared to accept the position of Ambassador to the Vatican?
LAMMERS: I can remember that I visited Von Papen and, acting on the Fuehrer's order, was to give him the prospect of another position and that this concerned a position with the Holy See. But whether I had been ordered to make him a direct offer, that I cannot recollect now.
DR. DIX: Do you remember what Papen replied to that?
LAMMERS: At that time he was not very much inclined to accept such a position.
DR. DIX: Thank you. I have no further questions.
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, on 21 March 1942 Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor. What were the reasons for Sauckel's being chosen for this position?
LAMMERS: The Fuehrer was of the opinion that the allocation of labor had not been pushed with the necessary intensity by the Reich Minister for Labor and that this task would, therefore, have to be transferred to a particularly energetic person.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Fuehrer demand the use of foreign workers with particular emphasis?
LAMMERS: He demanded that all laborers who could possibly be made available should be used.
DR. SERVATIUS: Particularly with reference to foreign laborers?
LAMMERS: Yes, foreign countries were also mentioned in that connection, because at home we had exhausted all possibilities.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive the assignment of informing the highest offices in the occupied territories of the demand that they do their best to support Sauckel's task?
LAMMERS: That happened very much later. First the appointment of the Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor took place and was announced to all important offices. I do not think I added any particular demand to that. But at the beginning of 1944 a conference took place at the Fuehrer's headquarters dealing with the program of labor allocation for the year of 1944. At the end of that conference, during which Sauckel had been given a number of injunctions expressed in definite figures, I had the task of writing to all offices concerned and telling them that they should support the task Sauckel had just been given, with all the powers at their disposal.
DR. SERVATIUS: You are talking about a meeting at the beginning of January 1944. An extensive report which you prepared on that is available. According to this report, Sauckel said during that meeting that with regard to the number of foreign laborers he would find it difficult or perhaps even impossible to fulfill the demands made by the program. What was the reason he gave for that?
LAMMERS: The statement is correct, and the reason he gave was that the executive power necessary for the carrying out of that task was lacking in the various sectors. He said that if he were to fulfill his task, then under all circumstances he should not have to rely on a foreign executive power, as, for instance, was the case in France, but that there must be a German executive power which supported his actions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did he not talk about the fact that fulfillment of the demand was impossible because of the danger of the partisans?
LAMMERS: He pointed out these difficulties repeatedly, namely, the partisan danger; and it was regarded as self-evident that no recruitment of labor could be carried out by him in territories where the partisans were still fighting.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did he demand the pacification of these agitated partisan territories and demand executive powers in that connection?
LAMMERS: Yes, that is correct.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did he wish to have the authorities protected against these resistance movements?
LAMMERS: Yes, he wanted the local of lice to take action, so that he would have a free hand to work.
DR. SERVATIUS: I am quoting one sentence from the report, and I want you to explain to me how that is to be understood. There it says: "The Reichsleiter of the SS explained that the forces at his disposal were extremely small but that he would try by increasing them and by using them more intensively to win success for Sauckel's actions." How is that to be understood?