dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SEYSS-INQUART: I would not put it that way exactly; rather, I was to try and bring about as close an economic relationship between Holland and Germany as possible. The economic stipulations, too, were, in the long run and apart from war necessities, not intended to be dictatorial
M. DEBENEST: But you did say that you had not come with the intention of giving a definite political outlook to the people of the Netherlands. Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, I would not put it that way. It was my intention to further National Socialist policy wherever possible in Holland; not to decree it, but to promote it as much as possible.
M. DEBENEST: Was it also your intention not to introduce but to impose it?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, for one cannot force a political ideology on anyone.
M. DEBENEST: Very wed. I am going to have a Document, Number 997-PS, handed to you. This document has already been submitted both by the Prosecution under Number RF-122, and yesterday by the Defense. Will you kindly turn to Pages 7 and 8 of the German text? It is Page 7 of the French text, at the paragraph "Measures." This document, as you will note, is a report which you yourself made.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You write: "In view of this state of affairs it was necessary first of all to eliminate Winkelmann's influence, which was done in the following manner: The secretaries general were expressly informed that from now on they would take orders only from the Reich Commissioner, which they expressly agreed to. The offices of secretaries general were retained and the same persons kept in office, since in the event of their resignation it would probably be impossible to find Dutch people who would be willing to take over the administration. In the rightist parties there were hardly any people qualified to do this; but it seemed necessary, from a political point of view, that a certain number of measures, above all economic measures, and indirectly, police measures as well, signed by the Dutch secretaries general, be made known to the Dutch nation." In short, according to this document, it appears that if you decided to retain the secretaries general, it was because you needed them for imposing certain measures on the Dutch people? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but what has that to do with politics? This is a matter of administration.
M. DEBENEST: As far as I know, this refers to political as well as to economic questions.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, in the German text it says "police question." Economic and police questions, not political; there is a difference.
M. DEBENEST: In that case, I will re-read the sentence, bearing your answer in mind. "But it seemed necessary, from a political point of view..." Now is that "political" or "police" which we see?
SEYSS-INQUART: Just a moment, please. Yes, that is correct. But that does not mean politics in the sense of party politics, but political in respect to the treatment of the Dutch people as such. Whether they thereby became National Socialists or not was quite immaterial to me.
M. DEBENEST: Was it in the interests of Dutch or of German policy?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, I admit without any hesitation at all that I followed a German policy. That was part of my task.
M. DEBENEST: But the German policy of that day was surely the policy of the National Socialist Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: The German policy was, at that time, the policy of a fight for existence on the part of the German people, and this struggle was led by the National Socialist Party. But the basic concern was not the carrying out of the 25 points of the Party program, but rather the carrying through of our fight for existence, and that is what I think this means.
M. DEBENEST: In your administration, in the Netherlands, you were helped by four Commissioners General: Wimmer in Administration and Justice, Fischbock in Finance and Economy, Rauter for Public Security, and Schmidt for Special Questions. The Commissioner General for Public Security, Rauter, was directly subordinate to you, was he not?
SEYSS-INQUART: The four Commissioners General were immediately subordinate to me; Rauter, insofar as he, as Commissioner General for Security, headed the Dutch police, and not insofar as he was chief of the German Police.
M. DEBENEST: You had decided to rule and administer the Netherlands alone; to accomplish this you dissolved the two Assemblies which then existed; and by the same decree, you restricted the powers of the State Council to the juridical field.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember this decree, but it may very well have been that way.
M. DEBENEST: You also seized control over the finances, and over the Treasury of the Netherlands. For this purpose you issued a decree on 24 August 1940 authorizing you to appoint the president of the Bank of Holland.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall the date exactly, but I did issue such a decree.
M. DEBENEST: When you arrived in the Netherlands, Mynheer Trip was president of the Netherlands Bank and Secretary General for the Treasury?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: For what reason did you have him replaced?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Trip was replaced because he objected to the lifting of the existing foreign currency and clearing limitations. I put it to him that he could resign if he did not want to carry out my measures.
M. DEBENEST: And by whom did you replace him?
SEYSS-INQUART: By Mynheer Rost van Tonningen.
M. DEBENEST: You had known Mynheer Rost van Tonningen for a very long time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe I knew him-only by name at the most. He obviously had been judged capable of holding the same office for Austria-in connection with the League of Nations in Vienna.
M. DEBENEST: Since when did you know his name?
SEYSS-INQUART: Most probably since the time when he assumed his office in Vienna. I do not know the date.
M. DEBENEST: You were not associated with him when he was in Vienna?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that I never saw him.
M. DEBENEST: Was Mynheer Rost van Tonningen not a member of the Dutch National Socialist Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Was that the reason why you appointed him?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was one of the reasons. Not so much the fact that he was a member but rather that he represented our views.
M. DEBENEST: Will you kindly look again at the document which I have just shown to you, 997-PS, Page 5 of the German text, and Page 5 of the French text. This is what you say about Mynheer Rost van Tonningen: "Ross van Tonningen: Meets perfectly ale the ideological requirements, is in line with the Germanic idea and National Socialism, speaks effectively and animatedly, has a strong desire to be active, does not find his strength in himself but seeks the support and backing of other people." As far as I can see, we do not find in what you write here about Rost van Tonningen that he was particularly competent in financial matters.
SEYSS-INQUART: In reference to the other gentlemen as well, I never described their technical qualifications but merely their political attitude. I did not say that Mr. Mussert was really a recognized engineer in the Netherlands and so forth. I described merely their political attitude..
M. DEBENEST: Thank you. Therefore, you set up in the Netherlands a civil government, a German civil government.
SEYSS-INQUART: My four Commissioners General could not be considered as having the same offices as ministers normally have. Certain functions, however, had been delegated to the secretaries general. But these secretaries general did not represent a government or a ministry. I mentioned yesterday that I took over the Government.
M. DEBENEST: But the secretaries general did represent the Government of the Netherlands, did they not?
SEYSS-INQUART: No; the secretaries general were the supreme heads, officials of certain ministries; but they were not what we call the bearers of sovereignty in the State. Those gentlemen were in England.
M. DEBENEST: But you knew, nevertheless, that they had been left in the Netherlands by the Government in order to carry on the duties of the Government in its place?
SEYSS-INQUART: What intentions the Government which had gone to England had in making this appointment, I do not know. I assumed that they remained there in order to direct the administration technically. It is within the jurisdiction of an occupying power, in the case of complete occupation of a country, to determine just how the government is to be carried on.
M. DEBENEST: But did you consider that the creation of a German civil government in an occupied country was in conformity with international conventions?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I object to this question. In my opinion, it is a question which should be solved by the High Tribunal
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question may be asked. The defendant has already given his views of international law in his examination-in-chief. We allow the question.
M. DEBENEST: Then answer me, please.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I please have the question repeated?
M. DEBENEST: Do you consider that the creation of a German civil government in an occupied country is in conformity with international convention?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the way in which it took place in Holland, certainly.
M. DEBENEST: And why?
SEYSS-INQUART: Because, as a result of the complete occupation, Germany had assumed responsibility for the administration of this country and, therefore, had to establish a responsible leadership in this country.
M. DEBENEST: You yourself created the secretariats general, particularly the Secretariat for Information and Fine Arts?
SEYSS-INQUART: We call it the Propaganda Ministry.
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I did that.
M. DEBENEST: And whom did you put at the head of this Secretariat?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe Professor Goedewaagen first. He, too, was a member of the Dutch National Socialist Party.
M. DEBENEST: That is true. Was not the staff of the General Secretariat mainly composed of members of the Dutch National Socialist Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: I am convinced of that, but I did not know them individually.
M. DEBENEST: Do you also know that in one of the offices a member of the SS even acted in an advisory capacity?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Dutch SS?
M. DEBENEST: No, the German SS.
SEYSS-INQUART: Then he was a consultant?
M. DEBENEST: He was a consultant for national education and national development.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not quite follow you-he was a consultant for...
M. DEBENEST: For national education.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; I did not know him. I consider it possible; but I do not believe that he was there as an SS man in particular, but rather for other reasons.
M. DEBENEST: You ordered the dissolution of the municipal and provincial assemblies; why?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot say the dissolution of the administration. I eliminated merely the elected representatives of the communities and the provinces. I not only kept the administration itself, but also strengthened it in its functions.
M. DEBENEST: You even turned out the mayors of the more important municipalities?
SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly; and I am convinced, with the full right of an occupying power. The burgomaster of Amsterdam did not prevent the general strike but rather promoted it.
M. DEBENEST: But was that the same reason that made you turn out all the mayors, or at least a certain number of them?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not remove any mayors from office until they became unbearable for me because of their actively hostile attitude. Otherwise their political attitude was of no significance to me. Up to 1945 I kept Herr Boraine's brother as mayor in a Dutch city, even though he was a very bitter enemy of National Socialism and of us Germans.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. And by whom did you replace all these mayors?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that until the year 1943, at least, the posts were filled in agreement with Mr. Fredericks, the Secretary General of the Interior, who was left behind for me by the Dutch Government to administer interior affairs. There were National Socialists; there were those who were not National Socialists. For instance, the son of the province commissioner of Holland was a firm enemy of National Socialism and of Germany, and yet I appointed him mayor of one of the largest Dutch cities, Zwolle.
M. DEBENEST: You are not exactly answering my question. I am asking you to tell me by whom you replaced all the mayors whom you had turned out? Were they members of the NSB?
SEYSS-INQUART: In part they were members of the Dutch National Socialist Party. In part they were nonpolitical men; and in part they were members of political trends which were absolutely against National Socialism and against Germany. In time there were more and more people of the Dutch National Socialist Party, for other people did not put themselves at our disposal any longer. That was the greatest success of the Dutch resistance movement that politically it resisted us so completely. That was Holland's significance in this war.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore assert that it was the Dutch resistance movement which led you to put a great number of NSB people in all the important positions?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that would be going a bit too far. The Dutch resistance movement merely induced the population not to co-operate with the occupying power at all, so that outside of the members of the Dutch National Socialist Party there was no one who wanted to work with us. '1~; PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
M. DEBENEST: Defendant, in the larger towns and in the provinces of the Low Countries, you installed agents who were directly subordinate to you and to whom you gave full powers. Were those agents not members of the NSDAP?
SEYSS-INQUART: Will you please tell me what you mean by "agents"? I had German representatives in the provinces and in the big cities. Do you mean the German or the Dutch ones?
M. DEBENEST: No; I meant to speak of the Beaufiragten (delegates).
SEYSS-INQUART: They were Germans, and I assume that all were Novembers of the NSDAP. I do not know for certain, but it is quite possible and I believe that was the case.
M. DEBENEST: Well, then, in order to refresh your memory, will you please take Document 997-PS, which I had handed to you this morning. I refer to Page 9, in the French and German texts. I would like to inform the Tribunal that I gave an incorrect reference this morning. The document was submitted under the Number USA-708, but it is RF-122. [Turning to the defendant.] At the top of Page 9 you write: "Delegates have been provided for the provinces which have a far-reaching independent administration. The creation of these posts was delayed due to the necessity of making a preliminary examination of the situation. It has now been shown that it must be less a question of administrative officers than of men who have had political experience. Therefore, through Reichsamtsleiter Schmidt, Reichsleiter Bormann (Hess' staff) was asked for men who, coming mostly from the Party, are now on their way and can be installed in their functions in the provinces in a few days" That was true, wasn't it?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, and I find my assertion confirmed that they were not all from the Party.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, but I also notice that these men were specially selected.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, they were politically experienced men for I did not want any administrative bureaucrats but men who were experienced and skillful in public political life, not Party political life.
M. DEBENEST: On what basis did you organize the municipal councils and the regional councils?
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, it seems to the Tribunal-I don't know whether we are right-that it would be better if you would pause after the sentence rather than after each word.
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: Will you please tell me what you mean by municipal and provincial councils? According to our concept, the word "council" means a corporate body, but I did not establish any such bodies, I appointed individual men to direct the administration.
M. DEBENEST: In the communes, in the Netherlands, there were municipal councils and in the provinces provincial councils, however differently you may have termed them.
SEYSS-INQUART: Thank you. I understand. In 1941 I dissolved the provincial and community assemblies which had previously existed. I provided for such councils in the community regulations which I issued then, but never actually appointed such councils because the Netherlands population did not co-operate and as a result these community councils would have been only artificial bodies. This provision of my community regulations did not go into effect.
M. DEBENEST: But on what basis did this regulation establish this organization?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot recall any certain basis. I assume that it was established by law, if it was provided for at all.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I will put the question in a different manner and perhaps you will be able to answer it. Did you introduce, by means of your regulations, the Fuehrer Principle?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I called it the "one-man responsibility," and I am of the opinion that in times of crisis a "one-man responsibility" is the correct thing.
M. DEBENEST: That was, in fact, the system which was also applied in Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true. Perhaps it was not exactly the same, but under the circumstances I considered it correct. I repeat what I said yesterday: We committed an error here. We committed the error of considering the order imposed by the occupational forces better than that already existing in the occupied territory.
M. DEBENEST: Well, the introduction of this principle had a particular importance, did it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I certainly thought it did; especially in these territorial districts I had to have a man who was responsible to me for the administration and not an anonymous majority of a representative body.
M. DEBENEST: I am having Document F-861 handed to you, which I submit under Number RF-1524. From the last paragraph you will see the importance which was attached to that in the Reich. It is a letter of the Minister of the Interior dated 6 September 1941. It reads as follows: "Particular importance must be accorded' to the decree because it contains detailed regulations concerning the introduction of the Fuehrer Principle in the municipal government of the Netherlands."
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. The Minister of the Interior was interested in this. I should only like to point out, to get things straight, that the Reich Minister of the Interior exerted no influence, and in the second place that these larger powers were given in 1941 to at least 80 percent of the mayors, who belonged to the democratic party and were therefore my political opponents.
MR. PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, haven't you established, by the questions that you have put to this defendant, that he did alter, to a considerable extent, the form of government in the Netherlands, and that he introduced a different form of government? Isn't that all that you really require for the argument which, no doubt, you intend to present? The details of it don't very much matter, do they?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I simply wish to demonstrate that, contrary to what the defendant said, he had sought to impose the National Socialist system upon the people of the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, to a large extent, I think he had admitted that. He said just now that he introduced what he called "oneman responsibility," which is another phrase for the Fuehrer Principle, and that he had dissolved various organizations of the Netherlands Government. All I am suggesting to you is that, having got those general admissions, it isn't necessary to go into details about the exact amount that the Government of the Netherlands was interfered with or the exact way in which it was replaced. Isn't it really all stated in a document drawn up by the defendant, namely, the document you have been putting, 997-PS?
M. DEBENEST: More or less, Mr. President, but not entirely.
THE PRESIDENT: Well the only question is whether the details are really very important for the Tribunal
M. DEBENEST: I thought that those details might have a certain importance, since the governors of the Reich itself attached a great deal of importance to it and, in fact, the whole was part of a plan which had been definitely laid down.
THE PRESIDENT: Welt, the Tribunal is inclined to think that you have got all that is necessary for the argument which you are indicating that you would present. If there are any particular details that you think important to us, no doubt you can bring them out.
M. DEBENEST: Quite so, Mr. President. [Turning to the defendant.] For what purpose had you centralized the police into a police directorate?
SEYSS-INQUART: I will repeat my testimony of yesterday. The Netherlands police was under three or four different agencies, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, I believe the Army Ministry, and so forth. For the sake of a clear police administration, I thought it necessary to combine these various police organizations in one and to place it under the Ministry of Justice.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not appoint as chief of this police a National Socialist?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: In short, the end that you had in view-was it not to place the Netherlands in the hands of the NSDAP and thus adapt the internal organization of the Netherlands to that of the Reich? In other words, to do something similar to what you had done in Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe that one can say that. In particular, the policy of the NSB was not that of the NSDAP. The NSB was different in many respects. In the second place, if I had wanted to do that, I would have been able to make Herr Mussert Prime Minister; that would have been less complicated. The simple explanation is that I used, possibly in a somewhat schematic way, the example of the Reich as a model in setting up an administration in the Netherlands, which, at least in part, made it possible for me to carry out my task of watching over safety and order. Yesterday I only asserted that I forced no Dutch citizen to become a National Socialist. I did not deny that a certain co-ordination was undertaken due to the mistakes which I have repeatedly admitted.
M. DEBENEST: But you placed members of the NSB in all the administrative bodies, the higher offices?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not exclusively, but I did it because in the last analysis I could rely only on them; all others sabotaged my orders.
M. DEBENEST: You told the Tribunal yesterday of the dismissal of the magistrates of the court of Leeuwarden. Would you tell us again the exact causes of this dismissal?
SEYSS-INQUART: They were not the magistrates but the administrators of the court. This court of Leeuwarden had said in a public judgment that those Dutch citizens who were condemned by Dutch courts and sent to a Dutch prison would be transferred to German concentration camps, maltreated, and executed. As a result, the court no longer felt in a position to sentence a Dutch citizen. This statement of the court was wrong in my opinion. In my opinion Dutch citizens have not been sent from Netherlands prisons to German concentration camps to be executed there. In the meantime I cleared up the situation at the suggestion of the Amsterdam judges, and through the Secretary General for Justice I had the court in Leeuwarden requested to continue passing sentence. The court in Leeuwarden did not do so. Thereupon, I dismissed this court.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I have here the document "Verdict of the Court of Appeal of Leeuwarden" and there is no question of Dutch prisoners being sent to concentration camps or being tortured or otherwise put to death. All that is mentioned is that the magistrates of that court do not wish that the detainees be sent to concentration camps after they have served their sentence. I shall hand you the original of this document so that you can check it. The document has already been submitted under Number RF-931.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not receive a German translation or the original German.