dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
in Berlin concerning foreign anti-aircraft guns ......................... VI 1072 D-191 Memorandum on reconstruction of Krupps after war 1914-1918 with special reference to armaments exports, 25 March 1941 ......................... VI 1076 D-196 Memoranda by Dr. Lehman concerning recruiting of French workers ......................... VI 1078 D-201 Telegram from Goering to Krupp ......................... VI 1080 *D-203 Speech of Hitler to leading members of industry before the election of March 1933. (USA 767) ......................... VI 1080 *D-204 Statement of Krupp concerning political organization of state and economy, 22 February 1933. (USA 768) ......................... VI 1085 *D-206 Memorandum, 12 October 1939, on distribution of propaganda abroad through foreign connections of Krupp firm. (USA 769) ......................... VI 1085 D-208 Letter from Krupp to Springorum, 26 April 1933 ......................... VI 1087 *D-230 Instruction for issuing steel switches to Krupp camps, 3 January 1945. (USA 898) ......................... VI 1094 D-233 Memorandum, 17 October 1944, concerning working hours for foreign workers ......................... VI 1095 D-238 Memorandum by Trockel, 28 July 1944, concerning assignation of detainees ......................... VI 1095 D-242 Letter from Springorum to Krupp concerning contribution of 20,000 marks to Rosenberg ......................... VI 1097 D-249 Von Bulow memorandum on notes of conference with Grassmann, Fuss and Kraft, held 9 December 1942, concerning History of War Economy ......................... VI 1098 D-253 Affidavit of Peter Gutersohn, 3 October 1945 ......................... VI 1105 D-256 Affidavit of Rene Koenigsberg and Agnes Koenigsberg, 20 September 1945 ......................... VI 1107 D-265 Affidavit of Heinrich Ruhnau, 3 October 1945 ......................... VI 1108 D-267 Affidavit of Heinrich Tiedtke, Karl Hanke, Johann Berek, 27 September 1945 ......................... VI 1109 D-270 Memorandum, 7 April 1942, concerning employment of foreign workers ......................... VI 1110 D-271 Memorandum from Wiele to Ihn, 20 October 1942 ......................... VI 1110 D-272 Affidavit of Elizabeth and Ernestin Roth, 21 September 1945 ......................... VI 1111 D-274
VI 1109 D-270 Memorandum, 7 April 1942, concerning employment of foreign workers ......................... VI 1110 D-271 Memorandum from Wiele to Ihn, 20 October 1942 ......................... VI 1110 D-272 Affidavit of Elizabeth and Ernestin Roth, 21 September 1945 ......................... VI 1111 D-274 Statement by Ihn, 1 October 1945 ......................... VI 1112 D-277 Affidavit of Rosa Katz, 21 September 1945 ......................... VI 1115 D-278 Memorandum from Works Catering Department to Dr. Lehmann, Employment Office, 19 March 1942 ......................... VI 1116 D-279 Affidavit of Alexander Haverkarte, 1 October 1945 ......................... VI 1116 D-280 Secret memorandum, 17 June 1942, concerning need for and obtaining of workers for cast steel works ......................... VI 1117 D-281 Memorandum by Winhold, 13 July 1942, concerning urgent production A.Z. 23 (Pr) ......................... VI 1119 *D-283 Report by Krupp hospitals, 7 May 1943, concerning deaths of Eastern Workers. (USA 899) ......................... VII 1 D-287 Letter from Krupp to Raeder, 30 October 1942 ......................... VII 1 *D-288 Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Jaeger, 15 October 1945. (USA 202) ......................... VII 2 D-291 Speech by Krupp, 1 May 1936 ......................... VII 7 D-297 Memorandum from Theile to Hupe, 26 March 1942, concerning employment of Russian PWs and civilians ......................... VII 9 D-298 Affidavit by Dr. Georg Wolff and chart, "Fried. Krupp Berthawerk, Markstaedt Breslau, Number of Occupied Foreigners, Prisoners of War and Concentration Camp Inmates" ......................... VII 10 D-304 Krupp speech, 13 October 1938 ......................... VII 12 D-305 Affidavit of Heinrich Buschhauer, 5 October 1945 ......................... VII 13 D-306 Affidavit of August Kleinschmidt, 11 October 1945 ......................... VII 14 D-310 Memorandum from Grollius to Kolsch, 18 March 1942 ......................... VII 15 D-312 Affidavit of Karl Sehnbruch, 11 October 1945 ......................... VII 16 *D-313 Affidavit by Dr. Apolinary Gotowicki, 13 October 1945. (USA 901) ......................... VII 18 *D-316 Memorandum to Mr. Hupe, 14 March 1942, concerning employment of Russians. (USA 201)
VII 15 D-312 Affidavit of Karl Sehnbruch, 11 October 1945 ......................... VII 16 *D-313 Affidavit by Dr. Apolinary Gotowicki, 13 October 1945. (USA 901) ......................... VII 18 *D-316 Memorandum to Mr. Hupe, 14 March 1942, concerning employment of Russians. (USA 201) ......................... VII 20 *D-317 Krupp speech, "Thoughts about the Industrial Enterpriser", January 1944. (USA 770) ......................... VII 21 D-318 Memorandum from Diwkelaker to Ihn, 20 March 1942 ......................... VII 24 *D-321 Affidavit of Adam Schmidt, 12 October 1945. (USA 895) ......................... VII 25 D-325 Affidavit of 17 October 1945 concerning payments of Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works to Party and Party Organizations ......................... VII 26 D-332 Letter from Janssen to NSDAP, 27 June 1935 ......................... VII 26 *D-335 Memorandum from Stinnesbeck to Jaeger, 12 June 1944. (USA 900) ......................... VII 27 D-338 Special medical report by Dr. Jaeger, 28 July 1944 ......................... VII 27 D-339 Special medical report by Dr. Jaeger, 2 September 1944 ......................... VII 28 D-341 Affidavit of Johannes Schroeder concerning Fried. Krupp Participations ......................... VII 29 D-345 Letter from Col. Zimmermann to Krupp firm, 27 August 1942 ......................... VII 30 D-348 Secret memo by Reiff concerning conference in Berlin, 14 August 1942 ......................... VII 31 D-353 Speech by Krupp, 18 October 1933, at first meeting of Committee for Industrial and Social Policy of Reich Association of German Industry ......................... VII 32 D-354 Affidavit of Paul Lenz, Wilhelm Sill, Hermann Rosskothen, Fritz Schink, Karl Fortkamp, Wilhelm Piegeler, 5 October 1945 ......................... VII 34 D-355 Affidavit of Walter Thoene, 8 October 1945 ......................... VII 36 D-363 Krupp speech, 4 September 1939 ......................... VII 37 D-366 Memorandum from Haller to Schuermeyer, 8 December 1942 ......................... VII 37 D-367 Affidavit of Heinrich Frauenrath, 12 October 1945 ......................... VII 38 D-368 Letter from Lutze, 15 August 1934, concerning use of Hitler Fund ......................... VII 39 D-373 Letter from Terboven to Krupp, 24 June 1935,
8 December 1942 ......................... VII 37 D-367 Affidavit of Heinrich Frauenrath, 12 October 1945 ......................... VII 38 D-368 Letter from Lutze, 15 August 1934, concerning use of Hitler Fund ......................... VII 39 D-373 Letter from Terboven to Krupp, 24 June 1935, thanking Krupp for contributions ......................... VII 40 D-375 Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 24 July 1942 ......................... VII 40 *D-382 Affidavit of Raimund Becker, Aloys Hoefer, Josef Dahm, 4 October 1945. (USA 897) ......................... VII 41 D-385 Speech by Krupp at first showing of Krupp film on 27 October 1935 ......................... VII 42 D-386 Speech by Krupp on election after death of Hindenburg, on 10 August 1934 ......................... VII 43 D-387 Speech by Krupp, 7 April 1938 ......................... VII 43 D-390 Krupp speech to jubilees of plant on 6 May 1941 ......................... VII 43 D-391 Speech by Krupp, 6 April 1938 ......................... VII 44 D-392 Speech by Krupp, 26 January 1934 ......................... VII 45 D-393 Speech by Krupp, "The Day of Fate of the German People" ......................... VII 47 D-526 File memorandum, 29 July 1942, concerning acquisition of Liancourt lease ......................... VII 71 Chapter XVI Part 12 Contents Chapter XVI Part 14
14. KARL DOENITZ A. NAVAL AND POLITICAL CAREER. After his appointment in 1935 as commander of the Weddigen U-boat flotilla-the first flotilla to be formed after the World War in 1918-Doenitz, who thus became in effect commander of U-boats, rose steadily in rank as the U-boat arm expanded until he became an admiral. On 30 January 1943 he was appointed Grand Admiral and succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, retaining his command of the U-boat arm. Then, on 1 May 1945, he succeeded Hitler as leader of Germany (2887-PS). Doenitz was awarded the following decorations: On 18 September 1939 he received the cluster of the Iron Cross, first class, for the U-boat successes in the Baltic during the Polish campaign. This award was followed on 21 April 1940 by the high award of the Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross, while on 7 April 1943 he received personally from Hitler the Oak Leaf to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, as the 223rd recipient. Doenitz's services in building up the German Navy, and in particular the offensive U-boat arm, for the coming war, were outstanding. An extract from the official publication "Das Archiv" on the occasion of Doenitz's promotion to vice-admiral, dated 27 September 1940, reads as follows: "* * * In four years of untiring and in the fullest sense of the work uninterrupted work of training, he [Doenitz] succeeds in developing the young U-boat arm, personnel, and material till it is a weapon of a striking power unexpected even by the experts. More than three million gross tons of sunken enemy shipping in only one year achieved with only few boats speak better than words of the services of this man." (D-436) An extract from the diary for the German Navy, 1944 edition (1463-PS) emphasizes Doenitz's contribution. It describes in detail Doenitz's work in building up the U-boat arm; his ceaseless work in training night and day to close the gap of seventeen years, during which no training had taken place; his responsibility for new improvements and for devising the "pack" tactics which were later to become famous. His position is summarized further as follows: "* * * In spite of the fact that his duties took on unmeasurable proportions since the beginning of the huge U-boat construction program, the chief was what he always was and always will be, leader and
the "pack" tactics which were later to become famous. His position is summarized further as follows: "* * * In spite of the fact that his duties took on unmeasurable proportions since the beginning of the huge U-boat construction program, the chief was what he always was and always will be, leader and inspiration to all the forces under him. * * * In spite of all his duties, he never lost touch with his men and he showed a masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war." (1463-PS) It was not only, however, his ability as a naval officer which won Doenitz these high honors: his promotion to succeed Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; the personal position he acquired as one of Hitler's principal advisers; and finally, earlier candidates such as Goering having betrayed Hitler's trust or finding the position less attractive than they had anticipated, the doubtful honour of becoming Hitler's successor. These he owed to his fanatical adherence to Hitler and to the Party, to his belief in the Nazi ideology with which he sought to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people, and to his "masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war" (1463-PS), which may be regarded as synonymous with a capacity for utter ruthlessness. B. INDOCTRINATION OF NAVAL PERSONNEL WITH NAZI POLITICAL IDEOLOGY. Doenitz's attitude to the Nazi Party and its creed is shown by his public utterances. in a speech-subsequently circulated by Doenitz as a Top Secret document for senior officers only and by the hand of officers only-at a meeting of commanders of the Navy in Weimar on 17 December 1943, Doenitz stated (D-443): "* * * I am a firm adherent of the idea of ideological education. For what is it in the main? Doing his duty is a matter of course for the soldier. But the whole importance, the whole weight of duty done, are only present when the heart and spiritual conviction have a voice in the matter. The result of duty done is then quite different to what it would be if I only carried out my task literally, obediently, and faithfully. It is therefore necessary for the soldier to support the execution of his duty with all his mental, all his
heart and spiritual conviction have a voice in the matter. The result of duty done is then quite different to what it would be if I only carried out my task literally, obediently, and faithfully. It is therefore necessary for the soldier to support the execution of his duty with all his mental, all his spiritual energy, and for this his conviction, his ideology are indispensable. It is therefore necessary for us to train the soldier uniformly, comprehensively, that he may be adjusted ideologically to our Germany. Every dualism, every dissension in this connection, or every divergence, or unpreparedness, imply a weakness in all circumstances. He in whom this grows and thrives in unison is superior to the other. Then indeed the whole importance, the whole weight of his conviction comes into play. It is also nonsense to say that the soldier or the officer must have no politics. The soldier embodies the state in which he lives; he is the representative, the articulate exponent of this state. He must therefore stand with his whole weight behind this state. "We must travel this road from our deepest conviction. The Russian travels along it. We can only maintain ourselves in this war if we take part in it with holy zeal, with all our fanaticism. "Not I alone can do this, but it can only be done with the aid of the man who holds the production of Europe in his hand, with Minister Speer. My ambition is to have as many warships for the Navy as possible so as to be able to fight and to strike. It does not matter to me who builds them." (D-443) In a speech on the same subject by Doenitz as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to the Commanders in Chief on 15 February 1944, he had this to say: "From the very start the whole of the officer corps must be so indoctrinated that it feels itself co-responsible for the National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the exponent of the state; the idle chatter that the officer is nonpolitical is sheer nonsense." (D-640) Doenitz's position was made unmistakably clear in a speech which he made to the German Navy and the German people on Heroes' Day, 12 March 1944: "German men and women! "* * * What would have become of our country today, if the Fuehrer had
the idle chatter that the officer is nonpolitical is sheer nonsense." (D-640) Doenitz's position was made unmistakably clear in a speech which he made to the German Navy and the German people on Heroes' Day, 12 March 1944: "German men and women! "* * * What would have become of our country today, if the Fuehrer had not united us under National-Socialism! Split into parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry and vulnerable to it, and lacking, as a defense, our present uncompromising world outlook, we would long since have succumbed to the burdens of this war and been subject to the merciless destruction of our adversaries. * * *" (2878-PS) A speech by Doenitz to the Navy on 21 July 1944 shows his fanaticism: "Men of the Navy! Holy wrath and unlimited anger fill our hearts because of the criminal attempt which was intended to have cost the life of our beloved fuehrer. Providence wished it otherwise-watched over and protected our Fuehrer, and did not abandon our German fatherland in the fight for its destiny." (2878-PS) And then he goes on to deal with the fate which should be meted out to the traitors. The abolition of the German military salute and the adoption of the Nazi salute in the German forces was due to Doenitz along with Goering and Keitel (2878-PS). When Adolf Hitler was reported dead, Doenitz spoke over the German radio announcing the Fuehrer's death and his own succession. The German announcer made this statement: "It has been reported from the Fuehrer's Headquarters that our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler has died this afternoon in his battle headquarters at the Reichschancellery fighting to the last breath for Germany against Bolshevism. "On the 30th April the Fuehrer nominated Grand Admiral Doenitz to be his successor. The Grand Admiral and Fuehrer's successor will speak to the German nation." (D-444) Whereupon Doenitz spoke as follows: "German men and women, soldiers of the German Armed Forces. Our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler is dead. The German people bow in deepest sorrow and respect. Early he had recognized the terrible danger of Bolshevism and had dedicated his life to the fight against it. His fight having ended, he died a hero's death in the capital of the German Reich, after having led an unmistakably straight and steady life." (D-444) Doenitz
dead. The German people bow in deepest sorrow and respect. Early he had recognized the terrible danger of Bolshevism and had dedicated his life to the fight against it. His fight having ended, he died a hero's death in the capital of the German Reich, after having led an unmistakably straight and steady life." (D-444) Doenitz Proceeded to issue an order of the day, to the same effect (D-444). C. PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AGGRESSIVE WARS. Apart from his services in building up the U-boat arm, there is ample evidence that Doenitz, as Officer Commanding U-boats, took part in the planning and execution of the aggressive wars against Poland, Norway, and Denmark. (1) Poland. The distribution list on a memorandum by Raeder, dated 16 May 1939, shows that the sixth copy went to the Fuehrer der Unterseeboote, who was Doenitz. This document was a directive for the invasion of Poland (Fall Weiss) (C-126). Another memorandum from Raeder's headquarters, dated 2 August 1939, is addressed to the fleet, and The Flag Officer, U-boats - this is, Doenitz (c-126). This was merely a covering letter on operational directions for the precautionary employment of U-boats in the Atlantic in the event that the intention to carry out Fall Weiss remained unchanged. The second sentence is significant: "Flag Officer, U-boats, is handing in his operational orders to SKL [Seekriegsleitung, the German Admiralty] by 12 August. A decision on the sailings of U-boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August." (C-126) Doenitz proceeded to give operational instructions to his U-boats for the operation Fall Weiss. These instructions, signed by him, are not dated, but it is clear from the subject matter that the date must have been before 16 July 1939 (C-172). These operational instructions gave effect to Raeder's directive (C-126). (2) Norway and Denmark. An extract from the War Diary of the Naval War Staff of the German Admiralty, dated 3 October 1939, records the fact that the Chief of the Naval War Staff has called for views on the possibility of taking operational bases in Norway (C-122). It states Doenitz's views as follows: "* * * Flag Officer U-boats already considers such harbors extremely useful as equipment-and
Staff of the German Admiralty, dated 3 October 1939, records the fact that the Chief of the Naval War Staff has called for views on the possibility of taking operational bases in Norway (C-122). It states Doenitz's views as follows: "* * * Flag Officer U-boats already considers such harbors extremely useful as equipment-and supply-bases for Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily." (C-122) A communication from Doenitz as Flag Officer U-boats, addressed to the Supreme Command of the Navy (the Naval War Staff) dated 9 October 1939, sets out Doenitz's views on the advantages of Trondheim and Narvik as bases. Doenitz proposes the establishment of a base at Trondheim with Narvik as an alternative (C-5). Doenitz then gave operation orders to his U-boats for the occupation of Denmark and Norway. This Top Secret order, dated 30 March 1940, under the code name "Hartmut," provided: "The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fly the British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvik." (C-151) (3) England. The preparations for war against England are perhaps best shown by the disposition of the U-boats under Doenitz's command on 3 September 1939, when war broke out between Germany and the Western Allies. The locations of the sinkings in the following week, including that of the Athenia, provide corroboration. These matters are contained in two charts prepared by the British Admiralty. The first chart sets out the disposition of German submarines on 3 September 1939. The certificate attached to this chart reads: "This chart has been constructed from a study of the orders issued by Doenitz between 21 August 1939 and 3 September 1939, and subsequently captured. The chart shows the approximate disposition of submarines ordered for the 3rd of September 1939, and cannot be guaranteed accurate in every detail, as the file of captured orders are clearly not complete and some of the submarines shown apparently had received orders at sea on or about September 3 to move to new operational areas. The documents from which this chart was constructed are held by the British Admiralty in London." It will be apparent that U-boats which were in the positions indicated on this chart on 3 September 1939 had left Kiel a
orders at sea on or about September 3 to move to new operational areas. The documents from which this chart was constructed are held by the British Admiralty in London." It will be apparent that U-boats which were in the positions indicated on this chart on 3 September 1939 had left Kiel a considerable time before. The location of the U-boat U-30 is particularly significant. The second chart sets out the sinkings during the first week of the war. The attached certificate reads: "This chart has been constructed from the official records of the British Admiralty in London. It shows the position and sinkings of the British merchant vessels lost by enemy action in the seven days subsequent to 3 September 1939." The location of the sinking of the Athenia is significant. D. PARTICIPATION IN CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF RULES OF WARFARE. The course of the war waged against neutral and allied merchant shipping by German U-boats followed, under Doenitz's direction, a course of consistently increasing ruthlessness. (1) Attacks on Merchant Shipping. Doenitz displayed "his masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war" (1463-PS). From the very early days, merchant ships, both allied and neutral, were sunk without warning, and when operational danger zones had been announced by the German Admiralty, these sinkings continued to take place both within and without those zones. With some exceptions in the early days of the war, no regard was taken for the safety of the crews or passengers of sunken merchant ships, and the announcement claiming a total blockade of the British Isles merely served to confirm the established situation under which U-boat warfare was being conducted without regard to the established rules of international warfare or the requirements of humanity. The course of the war at sea during the first eighteen months is summarized by two official British reports made at a time when those who compiled them were ignorant of some of the actual orders issued which have since come to hand. An official report of the British Foreign Office summarizes German attacks on merchant shipping during the period 3 September 1939 to September 1940, that is to say, the first year of the war (D-641-A). This report, made shortly after September 1940, states