dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND
The prosecution has also asked that the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces be declared a criminal organisation. The Tribunal believes that no declaration of criminality should be made with respect to the General Staff and High Command. The number of persons charged, while larger than that of the Reich Cabinet, is still so small that individual trials of these officers would accomplish the purpose here sought better than a declaration such as is requested. But a more compelling reason is that in the opinion of the Tribunal the General Staff and High Command is neither an " organisation " nor a " group " within the meaning of those terms as used in Article 9 of the Charter.
Some comment on the nature of this alleged group is requisite. According to the Indictment and evidence before the Tribunal, it consists of approximately 130 officers, living and dead, who at any time during the period from February, 1938, when Hitler reorganised the Armed Forces, and May, 1945, when Germany surrendered, held certain positions in the military hierarchy. These men were high-ranking officers in the three armed services: OKH-Army, OKM-Navy, and OKL-Air Force. Above them was the over-all armed forces authority, OKW-High Command of the German Armed Forces with Hitler as the Supreme Commander. The Officers in the OKW, including defendant Keitel as Chief of the High Command were in a sense Hitler's personal staff. In the larger sense they co-ordinated and directed the three services, with particular emphasis on the functions of planning and operations.
The individual officers in this alleged group were, at one time or another, in one of four categories: (1) Commanders-in-Chief of one of the three services; (2) Chief of Staff of one of the three services; (3) " Oberbefehlshabers", the field commanders-in-chief of one of the three services, which of course comprised ,by far the largest number of these persons; or (4) an OKW officer, of which there were three, defendants Keitel and Jodl, and the latter's Deputy Chief, Warlimont. This is the meaning of the Indictment in its use of the term " General Staff and High Command ".
GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND
of the three services, which of course comprised ,by far the largest number of these persons; or (4) an OKW officer, of which there were three, defendants Keitel and Jodl, and the latter's Deputy Chief, Warlimont. This is the meaning of the Indictment in its use of the term " General Staff and High Command ".
The Prosecution has here drawn the line. The Prosecution does not indict the next level of the military hierarchy consisting of commanders of army corps, and equivalent ranks in the Navy and Air Force, nor the level below, the division commanders or their equivalent in the other branches. And the staff officers of the four staff commands of OKW, OKH, OKM, and OKL are not included, nor are the trained specialists who were customarily called General Staff officers.
In effect, then, those indicted as members are military leaders of the Reich of the highest rank. No serious effort was made to assert that they composed an " organisation " in the sense of Article 9. The assertion is rather that they were a " group ", which is a wider and more embracing term than " organisation ".
The Tribunal does not so find. According to the evidence, their planning at staff level, the constant conferences between staff officers and field commanders, their operational technique in the field and at headquarters was much the same as that of the armies, navies and air forces of all other countries. The over-all effort of OKW at co-ordination and direction could be matched by a similar, though not identical form of organisation in other military forces, such as the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff.
To derive from this pattern of their activities the existence of an association or group does not, in the opinion of the Tribunal, logically follow. On such a theory the top commanders of every other nation are just such an association rather than what they actually are, an aggregation of military men, a number of individuals who happen at a given period of time to hold the high-ranking military positions.
GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND
the opinion of the Tribunal, logically follow. On such a theory the top commanders of every other nation are just such an association rather than what they actually are, an aggregation of military men, a number of individuals who happen at a given period of time to hold the high-ranking military positions.
Much of the evidence and the argument has centred around the question of whether membership in these organisations was or was not voluntary; in this case, it seems to the Tribunal to be quite beside the point. For this alleged criminal organisation has one characteristic, a controlling one, which sharply distinguishes it from the other five indicted. When an individual became a member of the SS for instance, he did so, voluntarily or otherwise, but certainly with the knowledge that he was joining something. In the case of the General Staff and High Command, however, he could not know he was joining a group or organisation, for such organisation did not exist except in the charge of the Indictment. He knew only that he had achieved a certain high rank in one of the three services, and could not be conscious of the fact that he was becoming a member of anything so tangible as a " group," as that word is commonly used. His relations with his brother officers in his own branch of the service and his association with those of the other two branches were, in general, like those of other services all over the world.
The Tribunal therefore does not declare the General Staff and High Command to be a criminal organisation.
Although the Tribunal is of the opinion that the term " group " in
Article 9
must mean something more than this collection of military officers, it has heard much evidence as to the participation of these officers in planning and waging aggressive war, and in committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. This evidence is, as to many of them, clear and convincing.
GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND
Article 9 must mean something more than this collection of military officers, it has heard much evidence as to the participation of these officers in planning and waging aggressive war, and in committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. This evidence is, as to many of them, clear and convincing.
They have been responsible in large measure for the miseries and suffering that have fallen on millions of men, women and children. They have been a disgrace to the honourable profession of arms. Without their military guidance the aggressive ambitions of Hitler and his fellow Nazis would have been academic and sterile. Although they were not a group falling within the words of the Charter they were certainly a ruthless military caste. The contemporary German militarism flourished briefly with its recent ally, National Socialism, as well as or better than it had in the generations of the past.
Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier's oath of obedience to military orders. When it suits their defence they say they had to obey; when confronted with Hitler's brutal crimes, which are shown to have been within their general knowledge, they say they disobeyed. The truth is they actively participated in all these crimes, or sat silent and acquiescent, witnessing the commission of crimes on a scale larger and more shocking than the world has ever had the misfortune to know. This must be said.
Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought to trial so that those among them who are guilty of these crimes should not escape punishment.
The Tribunal will sit to-morrow at 9.30 a.m., and the Tribunal will now adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 9.30 a.m., 1st October, 1946.)
The PRESIDENT: There is a correction which the Tribunal wishes to make in the judgment pronounced yesterday at page 159 with reference to the
SD
.
The Tribunal's attention has been drawn to the fact that the Prosecution expressly excluded honorary informers who were not members of the SS, and members of the Abwehr who were transferred to the SD. In view of that exclusion by the Prosecution, the Tribunal also excludes those persons from the SD which was declared criminal.
Article 26 of the Charter
provides that the Judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or innocence of any defendant shall give the reasons on which it is based.
GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND
SD. In view of that exclusion by the Prosecution, the Tribunal also excludes those persons from the SD which was declared criminal. Article 26 of the Charter provides that the Judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or innocence of any defendant shall give the reasons on which it is based.
The Tribunal will now state those reasons in declaring its Judgment on such guilt or innocence.
Judgement : von Papen
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THE PRESIDENT:
Von Papen is indicted under
Counts One
and
Two
. He was appointed Chancellor of the Reich on 1st June, 1932, and was succeeded by von Schleicher on 2nd December, 1932. He was made Vice Chancellor in the Hitler Cabinet on 30th January, 1933, and on 13th November, 1933, Plenipotentiary for the Saar. On 26th July, 1934, he was appointed Minister to Vienna, and was recalled on 4th February, 1938. On 29th April, 1939, he was appointed Ambassador to Turkey. He returned to Germany when Turkey broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in August, 1944.
Crimes against Peace
Von Papen was active in 1932 and 1933 in helping Hitler to form the Coalition Cabinet and aided in his appointment as Chancellor on 30th January, 1933. As Vice Chancellor in that Cabinet he participated in the Nazi consolidation of control in 1933. On 16th June, 1934, however, von Papen made a speech at Marburg which contained a denunciation of the Nazi attempts to suppress the free press and the church, of the existence of a reign of terror, and of " 150 per cent Nazis " who were mistaking " brutality for vitality ". On 30th June, 1934, in the wave of violence which accompanied the so-called Roehm Purge, von Papen was taken into custody by the SS, his office force was arrested, and two of his associates including the man who had helped him work on the Marburg speech, were murdered. Von Papen was released on 3rd July, 1934.
THE PRESIDENT:
On 30th June, 1934, in the wave of violence which accompanied the so-called Roehm Purge, von Papen was taken into custody by the SS, his office force was arrested, and two of his associates including the man who had helped him work on the Marburg speech, were murdered. Von Papen was released on 3rd July, 1934.
Notwithstanding the murder of his associates, von Papen accepted the position of Minister to Austria on 26th July, 1934, the day after Dollfuss had been assassinated. His appointment was announced in a letter from Hitler which instructed him to direct relations between the two countries " into normal and friendly channels " and assured him of Hitler's complete and unlimited confidence ". As Minister to Austria, von Papen was active in trying to strengthen the position of the Nazi Party in Austria for the purpose of bringing about Anschluss. In early 1935 he attended a meeting in Berlin at which the policy was laid down to avoid everything which would give the appearance of German intervention in the internal affairs of Austria. Yet he arranged for 200,000 marks a month to be transmitted to " the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria ". On 17th May, 1935, he reported to Hitler the results of a conference with Captain Leopold, the Leader of the Austrian Nazis, and urged Hitler to make a statement recognising the national independence of Austria, and predicting that the result might be to help the formation of a coalition between Schuschnigg's
Christian Socialists and the Austrian Nazis against Starhemberg. On 27th July, 1935, von Papen reported to Hitler that the union of Austria and Germany could not be brought about by external pressure but only by the strength of the National Socialist Movement. He urged that the Austrian Nazi Party change its character as a centralised Reich German Party and become a rallying point for all National Germans.
THE PRESIDENT:
to Hitler that the union of Austria and Germany could not be brought about by external pressure but only by the strength of the National Socialist Movement. He urged that the Austrian Nazi Party change its character as a centralised Reich German Party and become a rallying point for all National Germans.
Von Papen was involved in occasional Nazi political demonstrations, supported Nazi propaganda activities and submitted detailed reports on the activities of the Nazi Party, and routine reports relating to Austrian military defences. His Austrian policy resulted in the agreement of 11th July, 1936, which nominally restored relations between Germany and Austria to " normal and friendly form", but which had a secret supplement providing for an amnesty for Austrian Nazis, the lifting of censorship on Nazi papers, the resumption of political activities by Nazis and the appointment of men friendly to the Nazis in the Schuschnigg Cabinet.
After the signing of this agreement von Papen offered to resign but his resignation was not accepted. Thereafter he proceeded to bring continued pressure on the Austrian Government to bring Nazis into the Schuschnigg Cabinet and to get them important positions in the Fatherland Front, Austria's single legal party. On 1st September, 1936, von Papen wrote Hitler advising him that anti-Nazis in the Austrian Ministry of Security were holding up the infiltration of the Nazis into the Austrian Government and recommended bringing " slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime ".
THE PRESIDENT:
Austria's single legal party. On 1st September, 1936, von Papen wrote Hitler advising him that anti-Nazis in the Austrian Ministry of Security were holding up the infiltration of the Nazis into the Austrian Government and recommended bringing " slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime ".
On 4th February, 1938, von Papen was notified of his recall as Minister to Austria, at the same time that von Fritsch, von Blomberg and von Neurath were removed from their positions. He informed Hitler that he regretted his recall because he had been trying since November, 1937, to induce Schuschnigg to hold a conference with Hitler and Schuschnigg had indicated his willingness to do so. Acting under Hitler's instructions, von Papen then returned to Austria and arranged the conference which was held at Berchtesgaden on 12th February, 1938. Von Papen accompanied Schuschnigg to that conference and at its conclusion advised Schuschnigg to comply with Hitler's demands On 10th March, 1938, Hitler ordered von Papen to return to Berlin. Von Papen was in the Chancellery on 11th March when the occupation of Austria was ordered. No evidence has been offered showing that von Papen was in
favour of the decision to occupy Austria by force, and he has testified that he urged Hitler not to take this step.
After the annexation of Austria von Papen retired into private life and there is no evidence at he took any part in politics. He accepted the position of Ambassador to Turkey in April 1939 but no evidence had been offered concerning his activities in that position implicating him in crimes.
The evidence leaves no doubt that von Papen's primary purpose as Minister to Austria was to undermine the Schuschnigg regime and strengthen the Austrian Nazis for the purpose of bringing about Anschluss. To carry through this plan he engaged in both intrigue and bullying. But the
Charter
THE PRESIDENT:
position implicating him in crimes. The evidence leaves no doubt that von Papen's primary purpose as Minister to Austria was to undermine the Schuschnigg regime and strengthen the Austrian Nazis for the purpose of bringing about Anschluss. To carry through this plan he engaged in both intrigue and bullying. But the Charter
does not make criminal such offences against political morality, however bad these may be. Under the Charter von Papen can be held guilty only if he was a party to the planning of aggressive war. There is no showing that he was a party to the plans under which the occupation of Austria was a step in the direction of further aggressive action, or even that he participated in plans to occupy Austria by aggressive war if necessary. But it is not established beyond a reasonable doubt that this was the purpose of his activity, and therefore the Tribunal cannot hold that he was a party to the common plan charged in
Count One
or participated in the planning of the aggressive wars charged under
Count Two
.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that von Papen is not guilty under this
Indictment
, and directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshal, when the Tribunal presently adjourns.
Judgement : The Aggression Against Poland
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See also the
British War Bluebook
for additional documents on the Aggression Against Poland
By March, 1939, the plan to annex
Austria
and
Czechoslovakia
, which had been discussed by Hitler at the meeting of the
5th November, 1937
, had been accomplished. The time had now come for the German leaders to consider further acts of aggression, made more possible of attainment because of that accomplishment.
On the 23rd May, 1939, a meeting was held in Hitler's study in the new Reich Chancellery in Berlin. Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland and gave his reasons, and discussed the effect the decision might have on other countries. In point of time, this was the second of the important meetings ,to which reference has already been made, and in order to appreciate the full significance of what was said and done, it is necessary to state shortly some of the main events in the history of German-Polish relations.
As long ago as the year 1925 an Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland had been made at Locarno, providing for the settlement of all disputes between the two countries. On the 26th January, 1934, a German-Polish declaration of non-aggression was made. signed on behalf of the German Government by the defendant von Neurath. On the 30th January, 1934, and again on the 30th January, 1937, Hitler made speeches in the Reichstag in which he expressed his view that Poland and Germany could work together in harmony and peace. On the 2h February, 1938, Hitler made a third speech in the Reichstag in the course of which he said with regard to Poland:
" And so the way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with Danzig, has today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief makers succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly cooperation. Relying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of us peace."
makers succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly cooperation. Relying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of us peace."
On the 26th September, 1938, in the middle of the crisis over the Sudetenland, Hitler made the speech in Berlin which has already been quoted, and announced that he had informed the British Prime Minister that when the Czechoslovakian problem has been solved there would be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. Nevertheless, on the 24th November of the same year, an OKW directive was issued to the German armed forces to make preparations for an attack upon Danzig; it stated:
"The Feuhrer has ordered:
(1) Preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise."
In spite of having ordered military preparatians for the occupation of Danzig, Hitler, on the 30th January, 1939, said in a speech in the Reichstag:
"During the troubled months of the past year, the friendship between Germany and Poland has been one of the most reassuring factors in the political life of Europe."
Five days previously, on the 25th January, 1939, Ribbentrop said in the course of a speech in Warsaw:
"Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual relations."
Following the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Germany on the 15th March, 1939, which was a flagrant breach of the
Munich Agreement
, Great Britain gave an assurance to Poland on the 31st March, 1939, that in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, Great Britain would feel itself bound at once to lend Poland all the support in its power. The French Government took the same stand. It is interesting to note in this connection, that one of the arguments frequently presented by the defence in the present case is that the defendants were influenced to think that their conduct was not in breach of international law by the acquiescence of other Powers. The declarations of Great Britain and France showed, at least, that this view could be held no longer.
the arguments frequently presented by the defence in the present case is that the defendants were influenced to think that their conduct was not in breach of international law by the acquiescence of other Powers. The declarations of Great Britain and France showed, at least, that this view could be held no longer.
On the 3rd April, 1939, a revised OKW directive was issued to the armed forces, which after referring to the question of Danzig made reference to Fall Weiss (the military code name for the German invasion of Poland) and stated:
"The Fuehrer had added the following directions to Fall Weiss:
(1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time from the 1st September, 1939, onwards.
(2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise timetable for Fall Weiss and to arrange by conferences the synchronised timings between the three branches of the Armed Forces." On the 11th April, 1939, a further directive was signed by Hitler and issued to the armed forces, and in one of the annexes to that document the words occur:
" Quarrels with Poland should be avoided. Should Poland however adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, " a final settlement " will be necessary, notwithstanding the pact with Poland. The aim is then to destroy Polish military strength, and to create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of defence. The Free State of Danzig will be incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. Policy aims at limiting the war to Poland, and this is considered possible in view of the internal crisis in France, and British restraint as a result of this."
In spite of the contents of these two directives, Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag on the 28th April, 1939, in which, after describing the Polish Government's alleged rejection of an offer he had made with regard to Danzig and the Polish Corridor, he stated: