dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
JODL: Yes. The order offered two ways of avoiding the treatment of really decent soldiers like criminals. If a Commando troop, mostly encountered in fights at night, was not wiped out but captured, as was the rule in almost all cases, that was already certain proof that our troops did not consider these men as bandits. It was then the task of the commanders-in-chief to make an investigation. If it was purely a reconnaissance operation, the entire action did not fall within the sphere of the Commando Order at all and would not be reported as a Commando raid. However, if the operation was really carried out by a sabotage and demolition unit, its equipment had to be examined. It had to be investigated whether the men were wearing civilian clothing under their uniforms; whether they were carrying the famous armpit guns, which go off automatically when the arms are lifted in the act of surrender; or whether they used other despicable methods during the fighting. The commanders-in-chief could then act in accordance with the outcome of such an investigation. I believe that in that way it was quite possible and in fact it happened many times, I might almost say in the bulk of cases-that the shooting of brave, decent soldiers was avoided.
DR. EXNER: Could you yourself exert any influence on the practices followed by the troops?
JODL: I tried to exert my influence on various occasions. When it was reported to me that a Commando unit had been captured- which according to the Fuehrer decree was not allowed-then I raised no questions or objections. I made no report at all to the Fuehrer on Commando operations which met with only minor success. And finally, I often dissuaded him from taking too drastic views, as in the Pescara case, which Field Marshal Kesselring has already described here, when I succeeded in convincing the Fuehrer that only a reconnaissance unit was involved.
DR. EXNER: Were many units actually wiped out?
JODL: Commando operations decreased considerably as a result of the public announcements in the Wehrmacht communiqué. I believe that not more than 8 or 10 cases occurred in all. For a time, during the months of July and August 1944, increasingly large numbers of terrorists were reported killed in the Wehrmacht communiqué; these, however, were not Commando troops, but insurgents who were killed in the fighting in France. That may be proved if the Tribunal will read Document 551-PS, Figure 4. There the order is given-it is USA-551, on Page 117.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is Page 70 of Book 7.
JODL: Or Page 117 of our Volume II. There it is ordered...
DR. EXNER: What is ordered? I should like to deal now with another document, Document 532-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: It is time to break off. [A recess was taken.]
DR. EXNER: With reference to the Commando Order, I want to mention Document 532-PS, Exhibit Number RF-368, which is in our Document Book 2, Page 113. This document was offered on a previous occasion, and I objected to it because it was not signed, or rather because it was crossed out. Will you explain why you crossed out the draft order which is contained in this document?
JODL: Immediately before this draft order was written, the Commander, West requested that now, after the invasion, the Commando Order should be rescinded altogether. I approved that proposal. A draft was submitted to me here which rescinded the order only partially, namely in regard to the immediate area of the beachhead and that part of Brittany, a little further from the beachhead, where landings by parachutists were taking place daily at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: At the time of your objection was this document not rejected? You told us that you objected to the document. What I am asking you is, what did the Tribunal do upon your objection? Did they maintain it, or did they deny it?
DR. EXNER: The objection was allowed, and I think the document was struck off. I do not think that I am mistaken.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, why are you putting it in now?
DR. EXNER: I did not ask at the time to have the document struck off. I merely raised the objection that no mention was made of the facts that the draft order in the document was crossed out, and that it clearly bore a handwritten marginal note by Jodl rejecting it.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Either the document was offered in evidence or it was not; and either it has got an exhibit number or it has not; and, as I understand, your objection was rejected.
MR. ROBERTS: It was in fact objected to by Dr. Exner, after having been given the French Exhibit Number RF-368; and after discussing it, it was then stricken from the record, the English shorthand note reference being Page 3631 (Volume VI, Page 360). My Lord, I think in fact both the Prosecution and the Defense agreed it has Jodl's writing upon it; and, therefore, I feel certain that there can be no question as to its admissibility, either on behalf of the Prosecution or the Defense. My Lord, I certainly intend, with the permission of the Tribunal, to cross-examine him about it; and I have not the slightest objection to my friend Dr. Exner putting it in.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. It may, therefore, be left in as RF-368.
DR. EXNER: Will you continue?
JODL: At that tune it was my intention to get rid of the Commando Order entirely. For that reason I wrote, next to the sentence under Figure 4: "That is just what they should not"-the entire first page. That was of no use, however, because on that very day the Fuehrer made a different decision with regard to the request of the Commander, West, and his decision is contained in Document 551-PS.
DR. EXNER: 551-PS, Exhibit Number USA-551. That is contained in the second volume on Page 115; it is an order on the treatment of men belonging to Commandos. This order contains the following handwritten remark of yours: "Similar action should be taken in the Italian theater of war." This is on Page 117. Will you briefly explain the contents of that order and the reason for your remark.
JODL: That can be quickly explained. In that order territorial limits were set restricting the use of the Commando Order, which henceforth was to apply only to enemy operations behind the corps command posts but not to the battle area of the beachhead. These were territorial limitations which had not so far been fixed or ordered; and I immediately accepted this order for the Italian theater of war, because in Italy also there existed a fighting front on land. If this order were put into practice in Italy, it would mean that no Commando operation which began with a landing on the coast need be regarded as a Commando operation, because all these landings took place in front of the lines of the corps command posts. Therefore I was very anxious to have the same lighter conditions applied to the whole Italian theater of war.
DR. EXNER: I just want to read one paragraph on Page 116. It is the second paragraph under Number 1. In the first paragraph it says: "... the order remains in force...." But the second paragraph reads: "Excepted are enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate battle area of the beachhead-that is in the area of the divisions fighting in the front line-as well as reserve troops up to and including corps commands, in accordance with Figure 5 of the basic order...." The word "Generalkommando" means "corps command," and it has not been quite correctly translated into English and French. This limitation of the order to certain areas was, on the basis of Jodl's comment, also to apply to the Italian theater. Now finally-but before that I have another important question . . .
THE PRESIDENT: What is it you are saying about this translation?
DR. EXNER: Yes; the word "Generalkommando" has been translated into the French, Region Militaire . Region Militaire is not quite clear.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the English?
DR. EXNER: And in the English it says, "corps command." That is correct. The English is correct: "corps command." That is the same as "Generalkommando."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal would prefer that you should draw the attention of the Tribunal to anything which you say is a mistranslation, rather than stating that it is a mistranslation. I call it a question of opinion whether it is a mistranslation or not. It is not for you to tell us that it is a mistranslation. You may draw our attention to it and say that you submit it as a mistranslation. But now, will you tell us this also: In one copy of this Document 551-PS, it appears to be signed by, or initialed by Warlimont. In the other, in your version of the translation, it appears to be signed by the Defendant Keitel. What is the explanation of that?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, might I make a suggestion? I think the Court should get the original from the Exhibit Room. 551-PS in fact consists of three documents. The first is a draft altered in pencil; and the second is a draft initialed "W"-that is Warlimont, with Jodl's penciled note at the end extending it to Italy; and the third is the final order in which the penciled note of Jodl and the alteration of distribution to Italy is incorporated. So, there are really three documents, and the last is a mimeographed document with the mimeographed signature of Keitel. That appears from the original draft.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Exner.
DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution has been emphasizing that you gave strict instructions to have this order kept secret, and that you ordered its distribution only down to the level of commanding officers to avoid its falling into enemy hands at all costs. You gave these instructions for the second order, the explanatory order, 503-PS. Will you explain why you ordered such strict secrecy?
JODL: These instructions for secrecy refer actually only to Document 503-PS.
DR. EXNER: That, I may add, is in the second volume of my document book, on Page 102. That is the order for secrecy, signed by Jodl. [Turning to the defendant.] Will you continue?
JODL: Particular secrecy for this order was quite inevitable. First of all, it was directed only to the commanders. Secondly, the order contained in great detail information on the considerable damage which the German Wehrmacht had already suffered through these Commando operations, and the damage which might still be caused under certain circumstances. If the order were to fall into enemy hands, it would certainly be an incentive for the enemy to continue that particular type of warfare in increased measure. Thirdly, the order, 498-PS, could be considered as a reprisal. But the last sentence in Document 503-PS, a sentence which can easily be recognized as a later addition-as the order seems to end before it-that sentence, I must say, made me indignant and was one of the reasons why I insisted on such particularly strict secrecy for this order.
THE PRESIDENT: Which sentence are you referring to?
JODL: I refer to the last sentence of document 503-PS, which says: "If it should serve some useful purpose to save one or two men temporarily to interrogate them, they are to be shot immediately after interrogation." I cannot prove it...
THE PRESIDENT: That is not in 503, is it?
DR. EXNER: 503-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: You have not printed the whole of 503 in your document book. Is that it?
DR. EXNER: Unfortunately, 503-PS is not in it, but only the secrecy order, Page 102. I expressly requested, however, that it should be submitted to the Tribunal.
JODL: May I add that this sentence became the source of all trouble, The troops made use of that sentence and on principle, or as a rule, did not kill Commandos but took them prisoner.
DR. EXNER: You said this last sentence made you indignant. Were you also convinced that it was against international law?
JODL: One might have doubts in that respect too. But I found it distasteful from a human point of view, for if one does shoot a man, I think it is base to extort all information out of him first.
DR. EXNER: I want to ask one more question concerning what you mentioned before the recess. You said that you did not report everything to the Fuehrer; you did not report all Commando raids to him. That is quite clear. But you said you also did not report information which you obtained from the enemy-killings, and so on. What did you mean by that?
JODL: I reported the results of Dieppe and, should we say, the violations of international law which we considered had been committed there-the shackling of German prisoners, and so on. There was only one thing which I did not report, namely, the shackling of some men belonging to the Todt Organization in such a manner that they strangled themselves. I did not report that, and it did not appear in any order or Wehrmacht communiqué.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already told us about this, so why you should ask him again I don't know.
DR. EXNER: I thought it was not quite clear. [Turning to the defendant.] We now pass to another subject, the order regarding Leningrad and Moscow. How did Hitler's order about the fate of Leningrad and Moscow come into being? It is C-173, second volume, Page 145 of my document book; it was submitted under the number USSR-114. This is the order stating that surrender was not to be accepted. How did this order come into being?
JODL: At the beginning of the second paragraph appears the sentence: "The moral justification for this measure is clear to the whole world." I shall now explain that. The first reason was a report from Field Marshal Von Leeb, the Commander of Army Group North at Leningrad. He reported that the population of Leningrad had already begun to flock out toward his lines in the south and west. He pointed out that it would be absolutely impossible for him to keep these millions of Leningrad people fed and supplied if they were to fall into his hands, because the supply situation of the army group was deplorable at that time. That was the first reason. But shortly beforehand Kiev had been abandoned by the Russian armies, and hardly had we occupied the city when tremendous explosions occurred one after another. The major part of the inner city was destroyed by fire; 50,000 people were made homeless; German soldiers were used to fight the flames and suffered considerable losses, because further large masses of explosives went off during the fire. At first the local commander at Kiev thought that it was sabotage on the part of the population, until we found a demolition chart, listing 50 or 60 objectives in Kiev which had already been prepared for destruction some time before; and this chart was in fact correct, as investigation by engineers proved at once. At least 40 more objectives were ready to be blown up, and for most of them a remote-control was to set off the explosion by means of wireless waves. I myself had the original of this demolition chart in my hands. That proved...
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need go into the details of Kiev. This deals with Leningrad. The defendant might briefly state in substance what he says happened at Kiev; but we cannot investigate details of it.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, the defendant wanted to show that it was feared these happenings in Kiev might repeat themselves in Leningrad.
THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that; but if he said that he had plans of the blowing up of Leningrad, it would be a different matter, and he could give that in more detail. But what I am saying is we cannot go into the details about Kiev.
DR. EXNER: No. I only want to refer without quoting to my Exhibit AJ-15 (Document Jodl-50), on Page 149 of my second volume. That is a report on these explosions in Kiev. We will not delay over this matter any more now. I just wanted to bring it to the notice of the Tribunal. Turning to the defendant.] Please continue.
JODL: Then I only need to say in conclusion that the Fuehrer always expected that what had happened in Kiev, in Kharkov, and in Odessa would happen also in Leningrad, and possibly in Moscow. That was the decisive reason why this order, which already had been put into writing, was given by him orally to the High Command of the Army. And the order was given added weight because the Russian radio reported that Leningrad had been undermined and would be defended to the last man. The purpose of the order was exclusively that of protecting German troops against such catastrophes as had already occurred; for entire staffs had been blown into the air in Kharkov and Kiev. For this reason the Fuehrer issued this order, which I in turn, at his express request, put into writing. Therefore the order began with the words, "The Fuehrer has again decided"-that means "once more," "for the second time."
DR. EXNER: What was the reason for the order to leave openings to the east in the encirclement of Leningrad and Moscow?
JODL: We did not want these masses of the population. We had had our experiences in Paris. There it had even been necessary to use the transport space of four divisions and the whole relief train "Bavaria," which could supply tens of thousands of people, to save the population from starvation. In Leningrad that would have been quite impossible, because in the first place the railways had been destroyed; the raids had not yet been adjusted to our gauge, and the supply situation was very difficult. It would have been impossible to help these millions of people in any way; there would have been a real catastrophe. Hence the idea of pressing them back to the east, into the Russian areas; an idea, incidentally, not in conformity with the assertion which has been made here that we wanted to exterminate the Slavs.
DR. EXNER: I now come to another subject. The French prosecutor has accused you of ordering in Document UK-56-which is Exhibit RF-335 in my document book, the second volume, Page 153-of ordering the deportation of Jews, thereby giving, as chief of a military staff, a political order. Will you explain how this order came into being?
THE PRESIDENT: I think the translation must have come through wrong. You said-at least, I took it down-Page 153.
DR. EXNER: Page 155. I beg your pardon, it is on Page 155 of the second volume of my document book. The actual order is on Page 156. [Turning to the defendant.] Please reply.
JODL: I must explain in connection with this document that the deportation of Jews from Denmark was discussed during a conference at which I did not participate. Himmler suggested it to the Fuehrer; and the Fuehrer approved or ordered it. I was informed of it either through General Schmundt or Ambassador Hewel. Then on instructions conveyed to me by Schmundt, I transmitted to the military commander in Denmark the details of this order. The heading, or rather, the address of this teleprint message shows that it was directed to two offices, namely to the Foreign Office and to the commander of the German troops in Denmark. These are the two principal offices for which it was destined. The Reichsfuehrer SS received the letter only for information purposes, as is noted on it in accordance with our of lice practice. He did not have to act upon it; it was not an order for him, but it was merely for information. He already knew the Fuehrer's decision. I did not in any way order the deportation of the Jews, but I wrote, "The deportation of Jews will be carried out by the Reichsfuehrer SS..."
DR. EXNER: That is under Figure 2?
JODL: Figure 2. Had this been an order, it would have had to be addressed to the Reichsfuehrer SS; and it would have had to be worded like this: "Reichsfuehrer SS is to deport Jews from Denmark." But it is exactly the other way about. This Figure 2 informs General Von Hanneckeh in Denmark that he has nothing to do with this affair, but that it is being handled by the Reichsfuehrer SS. But General Von Hannecken had to be told of this, because at that time a state of military emergency existed. He had executive power in Denmark, and if anything like that had been done without his knowledge he might immediately have objected to it and forbidden it. The matter appeared to me so urgent that, in order to avoid incidents, I informed the military commander in Denmark about it over the telephone, quite openly and without regard to its secrecy. The French Prosecution mentioned an indiscretion which enabled most Jews to escape from Denmark into Sweden; presumably it was this telephone call which made that possible. Finally, therefore, I repeat that I was far from ordering the deportation of Jews; I merely informed the military commander in question that he was to have nothing to do with the matter. Besides, as I heard afterwards on making inquiries, these Jews were taken to Theresienstadt, where they were cared for and visited by the Red Cross; and even the Danish minister declared himself satisfied with their treatment.
DR. EXNER: May I draw the attention of the Tribunal to what I consider is an inadequate translation into English and French. Under Figure 1 on Page 156 of the second volume the word "volunteers,' does not appear in the translation. It says here, "The Reichsfuehrer SS has permission to recruit volunteers from the former members of the Danish forces who are to be released. . ." The word "volunteers" is missing in the English translation; the French merely says hommes-"men." [Turning to the defendant.] You actually had no dealings with matters in occupied territories; they were outside your jurisdiction. How then did you come to sign this order?
JODL: Actually this affair did not concern me at all. I signed the order because Field Marshal Keitel was away on that day.
DR. EXNER: As we are just talking of the Jews, will you tell the Court what you knew about the extermination of Jews? I remind you that you are under oath.
JODL: I know just how improbable these explanations sound, but very often the improbable is true and the probable untrue. I can only say, fully conscious of my responsibility, that I never heard, either by hint or by written or spoken word, of an extermination of Jews. On one single occasion I had doubts, and that was when Himmler spoke about the revolt in the Jewish Ghetto. I did not quite believe in this heroic fight; but Himmler immediately supplied photographs showing the concrete dugouts which had been built there, and he said, "Not only the Jews but also Polish Nationalists have taken refuge there and they are offering bitter resistance." And with that he removed my suspicions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Warsaw?
JODL: I am speaking of the uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto of which I heard through a personal report from Himmler given in our presence, in the- presence of soldiers at the Fuehrer's headquarters. Himmler spoke only of an uprising and of bitter fighting. As far as the activities of the Police are concerned, of the so-called action groups, Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos-a conception, incidentally, of which I first heard here in detail-there was never any explanation through the Fuehrer himself other than that these police units were necessary to quell uprisings, rebellions, and partisan actions before they grew into a menace. This was not a task for the Armed Forces, but for the Police, and for that reason the Police had to enter the operational areas of the Army. I have never had any private information on the extermination of the Jews; and on my word, as sure as I am sitting here, I heard all these things for the first time after the end of the war.
DR. EXNER: What did you know about concentration camps . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is necessary to point out to you that you cannot speak about there having been no explanation to the Fuehrer; you can only speak about there having been no explanation to yourself. The translation I heard was, as to these Einsatzgruppen, that there had been no explanation to the Fuehrer. All; INTERPRETER: From the Fuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: From the Fuehrer?
THE INTERPRETER: Yes, My Lord.
JODL: I said that the Fuehrer had never given us any other reason for the presence of police forces than his statement that police measures were necessary.