dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
authorities, transporting them to Germany that of the German railways, and taking care of them in Germany that of the Ministries of Labour and Agriculture, the German Labour Front and the various industries involved. He testifies that insofar as he had any authority he was constantly urging humane treatment.
There is no doubt, however, that Sauckel had over-all responsibility for the slave labour programme. At the time of the events in question he did not fail to assert control over the fields which he now claims were the sole responsibility of others. His regulations provided that his Commissioners should have authority for obtaining labour, and he was constantly in the field supervising the steps which were being taken. He was aware of ruthless methods being taken to obtain labourers, and vigorously supported them on the ground that they were necessary to fill the quotas.
Sauckel's regulations also provided that he had responsibility for transporting the labourers to Germany, allocating them to employers and taking care of them. and that the other agencies involved in these processes were subordinate to him. He was informed of the bad conditions which existed. It does not appear that he advocated brutality for its own sake, or was an advocate of any programme such as Himmler's plan for extermination through work His attitude was thus expressed in a regulation:
" All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure."
The evidence shows that Sauckel was in charge of a programme which involved deportation for slave labour of more than 5,000,000 human beings, many of them under terrible conditions of cruelty and suffering.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Sauckel is not guilty on
Counts One
and
Two
. He is guilty under
Counts Three
and
Four
.
Judgement : Schacht
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MR. BIDDLE :
Schacht is indicted under
Counts One
and
Two
of the Indictment. Schacht served as Commissioner of Currency land President of the Reichsbank from 1923 to 1930; was reappointed President of the bank on 17th March, 1933; Minister of Economics in August, 1934; and Plenipotentiary General for War Economy in May, 1935. He resigned from these two positions in November, 1937, and was appointed Minister without Portfolio. He was reappointed as President of the Reichsbank for a one-year term on 16th March, 1937, and for a fourth term on 9th March, 1938, but was dismissed on 20th January, 1939. He was dismissed as Minister without Portfolio on 22nd January, 1943.
Crimes against Peace
Schacht was an active supporter of the Nazi Party before its accession to power on 30th January, 1933, and supported the appointment of Hitler to the post of Chancellor. After that date he played an important role in the vigorous rearmament programme which was adopted, using the facilities of the Reichsbank to the fullest extent in the German rearmament effort. The Reichsbank, in its traditional capacity as financial agent for the German Government, floated long-term Government loans, the proceeds of which were fused for rearmament. He devised a system under which five-year notes, known as M.E.F.O. bills, guaranteed by the Reichsbank and backed, in effect, by nothing more than its position as a bank of issue, were used to obtain large sums for rearmament from the short-term money market. As Minister of Economics and as Plenipotentiary General for War Economy he was active in organising the German economy for war. He made detailed plans for industrial mobilisation and the coordination of the Army with industry in the event of war. He was particularly concerned with shortages of raw materials and started a scheme of stock-piling and a system of exchange control designed to prevent Germany's weak foreign exchange position from hindering the acquisition abroad of raw materials needed for rearmament. On 3rd May, 1935, he sent a memorandum to Hitler stating that " the accomplishment of the armament programme with speed and in quantity is the problem of German politics, that everything else therefore should be subordinated to this purpose."
the acquisition abroad of raw materials needed for rearmament. On 3rd May, 1935, he sent a memorandum to Hitler stating that " the accomplishment of the armament programme with speed and in quantity is the problem of German politics, that everything else therefore should be subordinated to this purpose."
Schacht, by April, 1936, began to lose his influence as the central figure in the German rearmament effort when Goering was appointed Coordinator for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange. Goering advocated a greatly expanded programme for the production of synthetic raw materials which was opposed by Schacht on the ground that the resulting financial strain might involve inflation. The influence of Schacht suffered further when on 16th October, 1936, Goering was appointed Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan with the task of putting " the entire economy in a state of readiness for war " within four years. Schacht had opposed the announcement of this plan and the appointment of Goering to head it, and it is clear that Hitler's action represented a decision that Schacht's economic policies were too conservative for the drastic rearmament policy which Hitler wanted to put into effect.
After Goering's appointment, Schacht and Goering promptly became embroiled in a series of disputes. Although there was an element of personal controversy running through these disputes, Schacht disagreed with Goering on certain basic policy issues. Schacht, on financial grounds, advocated a retrenchment in the rearmament programme, opposed as uneconomical much of the proposed expansion of production facilities, particularly for synthetics, urged a drastic tightening on government credit and a cautious policy in dealing with Germany's foreign exchange reserves. As a result of this dispute and of a bitter argument in which Hitler accused Schacht of upsetting his plans by his financial methods, Schacht went on leave of absence from the Ministry of Economics on 5th September, 1937, and resigned as Minister of Economics and as Plenipotentiary General for War Economy on 16th November, 1937.
dispute and of a bitter argument in which Hitler accused Schacht of upsetting his plans by his financial methods, Schacht went on leave of absence from the Ministry of Economics on 5th September, 1937, and resigned as Minister of Economics and as Plenipotentiary General for War Economy on 16th November, 1937.
As President of the Reichsbank, Schacht was still involved in disputes. Throughout 1938, the Reichsbank continued to function as the financial agent for the German Government in floating long-term loans to finance armaments. But on 31st March, 1938, Schacht discontinued the practice of floating shortterm notes guaranteed by the Reichsbank for armament expenditures. At the end of 1938, in an attempt to regain control of fiscal policy through the Reichsbank, Schacht refused an urgent request of the Reichsminister of Finance for a special credit to pay the salaries of civil servants which were not covered by existing funds. On 2nd January, 1939, Schacht held a conference with Hitler at which he urged him to reduce expenditures for armaments. On 7th January, 1939, Schacht submitted to Hitler a report signed by the Directors of the Reichsbank which urged a drastic curtailment of armament expenditures
and a balanced budget as the only method of preventing inflation. On 19th January, Hitler dismissed Schacht as President of the Reichsbank. On 22nd January, 1943, Hitler dismissed Schacht as Reich Minister without Portfolio because of his " whole attitude during the present fateful fight of the German nation." On 23rd July, 1944, Schacht was arrested by the Gestapo and confined in a concentration camp until the end of the war.
It is clear that Schacht was a central figure in Germany's rearmament programme, and the steps which he took, particularly in the early days of the Nazi regime, were responsible for Nazi Germany's rapid rise as a military power, But rearmament of itself is not criminal under the Charter. To be a crime against peace under Article 6 of the Charter it must be shown that Schacht carried out this rearmament as part of the Nazi plans to wage aggressive wars.
the Nazi regime, were responsible for Nazi Germany's rapid rise as a military power, But rearmament of itself is not criminal under the Charter. To be a crime against peace under Article 6 of the Charter it must be shown that Schacht carried out this rearmament as part of the Nazi plans to wage aggressive wars.
Schacht has contended that he participated in the rearmament programme only because he wanted to build up a strong and independent Germany which would carry out a foreign policy which would command respect on an equal basis with other European countries; that when he discovered that the Nazis were rearming for aggressive purposes he attempted to slow down the speed of rearmament, and that after the dismissal of von Fritsch and von Blomberg he participated in plans to get rid of Hitler, first by deposing him and later by assassination
Schacht, as early as 1936, began to advocate a limitation of the rearmament programme for financial reasons. Had the policies advocated by him been put into effect, Germany would not have been prepared for a general European war. Insistence on his policies led to his eventual dismissal from all positions of economic significance in Germany. On the other hand, Schacht, with his intimate knowledge of German finance, was in a peculiarly good position to understand the true significance of Hitler's frantic rearmament, and to realise that the economic policy adopted was consistent only with war as its object.
economic significance in Germany. On the other hand, Schacht, with his intimate knowledge of German finance, was in a peculiarly good position to understand the true significance of Hitler's frantic rearmament, and to realise that the economic policy adopted was consistent only with war as its object.
Moreover Schacht continued to participate in German economic life and even, in a minor way, in some of the early Nazi aggressions. Prior to the occupation of Austria he set a rate of exchange between the mark and the schilling. After the occupation of Austria he arranged for the incorporation of the Austrian National Bank into the Reichsbank and made a violently pro-Nazi speech in which he stated that the Reichsbank would always be Nazi as long as he was connected with it, praised Hitler, defended the occupation of Austria, scoffed at objections to the way it was carried out, and ended with " to our Fuehrer a triple ' Sieg Heil '." He has not contended that this speech did not represent his state of mind at the time. After the occupation of the Sudetenland, he arranged for currency conversion and for the incorporation into the Reichsbank of local Czech banks of issue. On 29th November 1938, he made a speech in which he pointed with pride to his economic policy which had created the high degree of German armament, and added that this armament had made Germany's foreign policy possible.
Schacht was not involved in the planning of any of the specific wars of aggression charged in Count Two. His participation in the occupation of Austria and the Sudetenland (neither of which are charged as aggressive wars) was on such a limited basis that it does not amount to participation in the common plan charged in Count One. He was clearly not one of the inner circle around Hitler which was most closely involved with this common plan. He was regarded by this group with undisguised hostility. The testimony of Speer shows that Schacht's arrest on 23rd July, 1944, was based as much on Hitler's enmity towards Schacht growing out of his attitude before the war as it was on suspicion of his complicity in the bomb plot. The case against Schacht therefore depends on the inference that Schacht did in fact know of the Nazi aggressive plans.
that Schacht's arrest on 23rd July, 1944, was based as much on Hitler's enmity towards Schacht growing out of his attitude before the war as it was on suspicion of his complicity in the bomb plot. The case against Schacht therefore depends on the inference that Schacht did in fact know of the Nazi aggressive plans.
On this all important question evidence has been given for the prosecution, and a considerable volume of evidence for the defence. The Tribunal has considered the whole of this evidence with great care, and comes to the conclusion that this necessary inference has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Schacht is not guilty on this
Indictment
, and directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshal, when the Tribunal presently adjourns.
Judgement : von Schirach
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General NIKITCHENKO:
Von Schirach is indicted under
Counts One
and
Four
. He joined the Nazi Party and the SA in 1925. In 1929 he became the Leader of the National Socialist Students Union. In 1931 he was made Reichs Youth Leader of the Nazi Party with control over all Nazi youth organisations including the Hitler Jugend. In 1933, after the Nazis had obtained control of the Government, von Schirach was made Leader of Youth in the German Reich, originally a position within the Ministry of the Interior, but, after 1st December, 1936, an office in the Reich Cabinet. In 1940, von Schirach resigned as head of the Hitler Jugend and Leader of Youth in the German Reich, but retained his position as Reichsleiter with control over Youth Education. In 1940 he was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna, Reichs Governor of Vienna, and Reichs Defence Commissioner for that territory.
Crimes against Peace
After the Nazis had come to power von Schirach, utilising both physical violence and official pressure, either drove out of existence or took over all youth groups which competed with the Hitler Jugend. A Hitler decree of 1st December, 1936, incorporated all German youth within the Hitler Jugend. By the time formal conscription was introduced in 1940. 97 per cent. of those eligible were already members.
Von Schirach used the Hitler Jugend to educate German Youth " in the spirit of National Socialism " and subjected them to an intensive programme of Nazi propaganda. He established the Hitler Jugend as a source of replacements for the Nazi Party formations. In October, 1938. he entered into an agreement with Himmler under which members of the Hitler Jugend who met SS standards would be considered as the primary source of replacements for the SS.
programme of Nazi propaganda. He established the Hitler Jugend as a source of replacements for the Nazi Party formations. In October, 1938. he entered into an agreement with Himmler under which members of the Hitler Jugend who met SS standards would be considered as the primary source of replacements for the SS.
Von Schirach also used the Hitler Jugend for pre-military training. Special units were set up whose primary purpose was training specialists for the various branches of the service. On 11th August, 1939, he entered into an agreement with Keitel under which the Hitler Jugend agreed to carry out its pre-military activities under standards laid down by the Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht agreed to train 30,000 Hitler Jugend instructors each year. The Hitler Jugend placed particular emphasis on the military spirit and its training programme stressed the importance of return of the colonies, the necessity for Lebensraum and the noble destiny of German youth to die for Hitler.
Despite the warlike nature of the activities of the Hitler Jugend, however, it does not appear that von Schirach was involved in the development of Hitler's plan for territorial expansion by means of aggressive war, or that he participated in the planning or preparation of any of the wars of aggression.
Crimes against Humanity
In July, 1940, von Schirach was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna. At the same time he was appointed Reichs Governor for Vienna and Reichs Defence Commissioner originally for Military District 17, including the Gaus of Vienna, Upper Danube and Lower Danube and, after 17th November, 1942, for the Gau of Vienna alone. As Reichs Defence Commissioner, he had control of the civilian war economy. As Reichs Governor he was head of the municipal administration of the city of Vienna, and, under the supervision of the Minister of the Interior in charge of the governmental administration of the Reich in Vienna.
Von Schirach is not charged with the commission of war crimes in Vienna, only with the commission of crimes against humanity. As has already been seen, Austria was occupied pursuant to a common plan of aggression. Its occupation is, therefore, a " crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal," as that term is used in
Article 6
charged with the commission of war crimes in Vienna, only with the commission of crimes against humanity. As has already been seen, Austria was occupied pursuant to a common plan of aggression. Its occupation is, therefore, a " crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal," as that term is used in Article 6
(c) of the Charter. As a result, " murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and ether inhumane acts " and " persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds " in connection with this occupation constitute a crime against humanity under that Article.
As Gauleiter of Vienna, von Schirach came under the Sauckel decree dated 6th April, 1942, making the Gauleiters Sauckel's plenipotentiaries for manpower with authority to supervise the utilisation and treatment of manpower within their Gaus. Sauckel's directives provided that the forced labourers were to be fed, sheltered and treated so as to exploit them to the highest possible degree at the lowest possible expense.
When von Schirach became Gauleiter of Vienna the deportation of the Jews had already been begun, and Only 60,000 out of Vienna's original 190,000 Jews remained. On 2nd October, 1940, he attended a conference at Hitler's office and told Frank that he had 50,000 Jews in Vienna which the General Government would have to take over from him. On 3rd December, 1940, von Schirach received a letter from Lammers stating that after the receipt of the reports made by von Schirach, Hitler had decided to deport the 60,000 Jews still remaining in Vienna to the General Government because of the housing shortage in Vienna. The deportation of the Jews from Vienna was then begun and continued until the early fall of 1942. On 15th September, 1942, von Schirach made a speech in which he defended his action in having driven " tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the Ghetto of the East " as " contributing to European culture."
from Vienna was then begun and continued until the early fall of 1942. On 15th September, 1942, von Schirach made a speech in which he defended his action in having driven " tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the Ghetto of the East " as " contributing to European culture."
While the Jews were being deported from Vienna reports, addressed to him in his official capacity, were received in von Schirach's office from the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD which contained a description of the activities of Einsatzgruppen in exterminating Jews. Many of these reports were initialled by one of von Schirach's principal deputies. On 30th June, 1944, von Schirach's office also received a letter from Kaltenbrunner informing him that a shipment of 12,000 Jews was on its way to Vienna for essential war work and that all those who were incapable of work would have to be kept in readiness for " special action."
The Tribunal finds that von Schirach, while he did not originate the policy of deporting Jews from Vienna, participated in this deportation after he had become Gauleiter of Vienna. He knew that the best the Jews could hope for was a miserable existence in the Ghettoes of the East. Bulletins describing the Jewish extermination were in his office.
While Gauleiter of Vienna, von Schirach continued to function as Reichsleiter for Youth Education and in this capacity he was informed of the Hitler Jugend's participation in the plan put into effect in the fall of 1944 under which 50,000 young people between the ages of 10 and 20 were evacuated into Germany from areas recaptured by the Soviet forces and used as apprentices in German industry and as auxiliaries in units of the German armed forces. In the summer of 1942, von Schirach telegraphed Bormann urging that a bombing attack on an English cultural town be carried out in retaliation for the assassination of Heydrich which, he claimed, had been Planned by the British.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that von Schirach is not guilty on
Count One
. He is guilty under
Count Four
.
Judgement : The Siezure of Czechoslovakia
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See also
The French Yellow Book
and
Documents on the Munich Agreement
for additional documents on the Siezure of Czechoslovakia
The conference of the
5th November, 1937
, made it quite plain that the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Germany had been definitely decided upon. The only question remaining was the selection of the suitable moment to do it. On the 4th March, 1938, the defendant Ribbentrop wrote to the defendant Keitel with regard to a suggestion made to Ribbentrop by the Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin, that possible war aims against Czechoslovakia should be discussed between the German and Hungarian armies. In the course of this letter Ribbentrop said:
" I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed about this."
On the 11th March, 1938, Goering made two separate statements to M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that the developments then taking place in Austria would in no way have any detrimental influence on the relations between the German Reich and Czechoslovakia, and emphasised the continued earnest endeavour on the part of the Germans to improve those mutual relations. On the 12th March, Goering asked M. Mastny to call on him, and repeated these assurances.
This design to keep Czechoslovakia quiet whilst Austria was absorbed was a typical manoeuvre on the part of the defendant Goering, which he was to repeat later in the case of Poland, when he made the most strenuous efforts to isolate Poland in the impending struggle. On the same day, the 12th March, the defendant von Neurath spoke with M. Mastny, and assured him on behalf of Hitler that Germany still considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in October, 1935.
The evidence shows that after the occupation of Austria by the German Army on the 12th March, and the annexation of Austria on the 13th March, Conrad Henlein, who was the leader of the Sudeten German party in Czechoslovakia, saw Hitler in Berlin on the 28th March