dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
4 December 1945. PART I On an occasion to which reference has already been made Hitler, the Leader of the Nazi Conspirators who are now on trial before you, said in reference to their warlike plans: "I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war, never mind whether it be true or not. The victor shall not be asked later on whether we tell the truth or not. In starting and making a war not the right is what matters but victory-the strongest has the right." (1014-PS) The British Empire has twice been victorious in wars which have been forced upon it within the space of one generation but it is precisely because we realize that victory is not enough; that might is not necessarily right; that lasting peace and the rule of International Law is not to be achieved by the strong arm alone, that the British Nation is taking part in this trial. There are those who would perhaps say that these wretched men should have been dealt with summarily without trial by "executive action"; that their personal power for evil broken, they should be swept aside into oblivion without this elaborate and careful investigation as to the part they played in plunging the world in war. Vae Victis. Let them pay the penalty of defeat. But that is not the view of the British Empire or of the British Government. Not so would the Rule of Law be raised and strengthened on the international as well as the municipal plane; not so would future generations realize that right is not always on the side of the big battalions; not so would the world be made aware that the waging of aggressive war is not only a dangerous venture but a criminal one. Human memory is short. Apologists for defeated nations are sometimes able to play upon the sympathy and magnanimity of their victors so that the true facts, never authoritatively recorded, become obscured and forgotten. One has only to recall the circumstances following the last world war to see the dangers to which, in the absence of any authoritative judicial pronouncement a tolerant or a credulous people is exposed. With the passage of time the former tend to discount, perhaps because of their very horror, the stories of aggression and atrocity which may be handed down; the latter, misled by fanatical and
dangers to which, in the absence of any authoritative judicial pronouncement a tolerant or a credulous people is exposed. With the passage of time the former tend to discount, perhaps because of their very horror, the stories of aggression and atrocity which may be handed down; the latter, misled by fanatical and dishonest propagandists, come to believe that it was not they but their opponents who were guilty of what they would themselves condemn. And so we believe that this Tribunal, acting, as we know it will act notwithstanding its appointment by the victorious powers, with complete and judicial objectivity, will provide a contemporary touchstone and an authoritative and impartial record to which future historians may turn for truth and future politicians for warning. From this record all generations shall know not only what our generation suffered but also that our suffering was the result of crimes against the laws of peoples which the peoples of the world enforced and will continue in the future to uphold by international cooperation, not based merely on military alliances but firmly grounded in the rule of law. Nor, though this procedure and this Indictment of individuals may be novel, is there anything new in the principles which by this prosecution we seek to enforce. Ineffective though, alas, the sanctions proved themselves to be, the Nations of the world had, as it will be my purpose to show, sought to make aggressive war an international crime, and although previous tradition has sought to punish States rather than individuals, it is both logical and right that if the act of waging war is itself an offense against International Law those individuals who shared personal responsibility for bringing such wars about should answer personally for the course into which they lead their states. Again, individual war crimes have long been regarded by International Law as triable by the Courts of those States whose nationals have been outraged at least so long as a state of war persists. It would indeed be illogical in the extreme if those who, although they may not with their own hands have committed individual crimes, were responsible for systematic breaches of the laws of war affecting the nationals of many States should escape. So also in regard to crimes
long as a state of war persists. It would indeed be illogical in the extreme if those who, although they may not with their own hands have committed individual crimes, were responsible for systematic breaches of the laws of war affecting the nationals of many States should escape. So also in regard to crimes against humanity. The right of humanitarian intervention on behalf of the rights of man trampled upon by the State in a manner shocking the sense of mankind has long been considered to form part of the law of Nations. Here, too, the Charter merely develops a pre-existing principle. If murder, raping and robbery are indictable under the ordinary municipal laws of our countries shall those who differ only from the common criminal by the extent and systematic nature of their offenses escape accusation? It is, as I shall show, the view of the British Government that in these matters the Tribunal will apply to individuals not the law of the victor but the accepted principles of international usage in a way which will, if anything can, promote and fortify the rule of International Law and safeguard the future peace and security of this war-stricken world. By agreement between the Chief Prosecutors it is my task on behalf of the British Government and of the other States associated on this Prosecution to present the case on Count 2 of the Indictment and to show how these Defendants in conspiracy with each other and with persons not now before this Tribunal planned and waged a war of aggression in breach of the Treaty obligations by which, under International Law Germany, as other States, had sought to make such wars impossible. That task falls into two parts. The first is to demonstrate the nature and the basis of the Crime against peace which, under the Charter of this Tribunal, is constituted by waging wars of aggression and in violation of Treaties. The second is to establish beyond doubt that such wars were waged by these Defendants. As to the first, it would no doubt be sufficient to say this. It is not incumbent upon the Prosecution to prove that wars of aggression and wars in violation of International Treaties are, or ought to be, International Crimes. The Charter of this Tribunal has prescribed that they are crimes and that
to the first, it would no doubt be sufficient to say this. It is not incumbent upon the Prosecution to prove that wars of aggression and wars in violation of International Treaties are, or ought to be, International Crimes. The Charter of this Tribunal has prescribed that they are crimes and that the Charter is the statute and the law of this Court. Yet, though that is the clear and mandatory law governing the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, we feel that we should not be fully discharging our task in the abiding interest alike of international justice and morality unless we showed the position of that provision of the Charter against the whole perspective of International Law. For just as some old English Statutes were substantially declaratory of the Common Law, so this Charter substantially declares and creates a jurisdiction in respect of what was already the Laws of Nations. Nor is it unimportant to emphasize that aspect of the matter lest there be some, now or hereafter, who might allow their judgment to be warped by plausible catchwords or by an uninformed and distorted sense of justice towards these Defendants. It is not difficult to be misled by such phrases as that resort to war in the past has not been a crime; that the power to resort to war is one of the prerogatives of the sovereign State; that the Charter in constituting wars of aggression a crime has imitated one of the most obnoxious doctrines of National Socialist jurisprudence, namely post factum legislation; that the Charter is in this respect reminiscent of Bills of Attainder-and that these proceedings are no more than a measure of vengeance, subtly concealed in the garb of judicial proceedings which the Victor wreaks upon the Vanquished. These things may sound plausible-yet they are not true. It is, indeed, not necessary to doubt that some aspects of the Charter bear upon them the imprint of significant and salutary novelty. But it is our submission and conviction, which we affirm before this Tribunal and the world that fundamentally the provision of the Charter which constitutes such wars as these Defendants joined in waging and in planning a crime is not in any way an innovation. That provision does no more than
novelty. But it is our submission and conviction, which we affirm before this Tribunal and the world that fundamentally the provision of the Charter which constitutes such wars as these Defendants joined in waging and in planning a crime is not in any way an innovation. That provision does no more than constitute a competent jurisdiction for the punishment of what not only the enlightened conscience of mankind but the Law of Nations itself constituted an International Crime before this Tribunal was established and this Charter became part of the public law of the world. So first let this be said. Whilst it may be true that there is no body of international rules amounting to law in the Justinian sense of a rule imposed by a sovereign upon a subject obliged to obey it under some definite sanction, yet for fifty years or more the people of the world, striving perhaps after that ideal of which the poet speaks: When the War Drums throb no longer And the Battle Flags are furled, In the Parliament of Man, The federation of the World have sought to create an operative system of rules based on the consent of nations to stabilize international relations, to avoid war taking place at all and to mitigate the results of such wars as took place. The first such treaty was of course the Hague Convention of 1899 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. This was, indeed, of little more than precatory effect and we attach no weight to it for the purpose of this case, but it did establish agreement that in the event of serious disputes arising between the signatory powers, they would so far as possible submit to mediation. That Convention was followed in 1907 by another Convention reaffirming and slightly strengthening what had previously been agreed. These early conventions fell indeed very far short of outlawing war or of creating any binding obligation to arbitrate. I shall certainly not ask you to say any crime was committed by disregarding them. But at least they established that the contracting powers accepted the general principle that if at all possible war should be resorted to only if mediation failed. Although these Conventions are mentioned in the Indictment I do not rely on them save to show the historical
by disregarding them. But at least they established that the contracting powers accepted the general principle that if at all possible war should be resorted to only if mediation failed. Although these Conventions are mentioned in the Indictment I do not rely on them save to show the historical development of the law. It is unnecessary, therefore, to argue about their effect, for their place has been taken by more effective instruments. They were the first steps. There were, of course, other individual agreements between particular States which sought to preserve the neutrality of individual countries as, for instance, that of Belgium, but those agreements were, in the absence of any real will to comply with them, entirely inadequate to prevent the first World War in 1914. Shocked by the occurrence of that catastrophe the Nations of Europe, not excluding Germany, and of other parts of the World came to the conclusion that in the interests of all alike a permanent organization of the Nations should be established to maintain the peace. And so the Treaty of Versailles was prefaced by the Covenant of the League of Nations. I say nothing at this moment of the general merits of the various provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. They have been criticized, some of them perhaps justly, and they were made the subject of much warlike propaganda in Germany. But it is unnecessary to enquire into the merits of the matter, for however unjust one might for this purpose assume the Treaty to be, it contained no kind of excuse for the waging of war to secure an alteration in its terms. For not only was it a settlement by agreement of all the difficult territorial questions which had been left outstanding by the war itself but it established the League of Nations which, if it had been loyally supported, could so well have resolved those international differences which might otherwise have led, as they did lead, to war. It set up in the Council of the League, in the Assembly and in the Permanent Court of International Justice, a machine not only for the peaceful settlement of international disputes but also for the ventilation of all international questions by frank and open discussion. At the time the hopes of the world
the Council of the League, in the Assembly and in the Permanent Court of International Justice, a machine not only for the peaceful settlement of international disputes but also for the ventilation of all international questions by frank and open discussion. At the time the hopes of the world stood high. Millions of men in all countries-perhaps even in Germany-had laid down their lives in what they believed and hoped to be a war to end war. Germany herself entered the League and was given a permanent seat on the Council, on which, as in the Assembly, German Governments which preceded that of the Defendant Von Papen in 1932 played their full part. In the years from 1919 to 1932 despite some minor incidents in the heated atmosphere which followed the end of the war, the peaceful operation of the League continued. Nor was it only the operation of the League which gave good ground for hope that at long last the rule of law would replace that of anarchy in the international field. The Statesmen of the world deliberately set out to make wars of aggression an international Crime. These are no new terms, invented by the Victors to embody in this Charter. They have figured prominently in numerous treaties, in governmental pronouncements and in declarations of Statesmen in the period preceding the Second World War. In treaties concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other States-such as Persia (1 October 1927), France (2 May 1935), China (21 August 1937)-the Contracting Parties undertook to refrain from any act of aggression whatsoever against the other Party. In 1933 the Soviet Union became a party to a large number of treaties containing a detailed definition of aggression. The same definition appeared in the same year in the authoritative Report of the Committee on Questions of Security set up in connection with the Conference for the Reduction and the Limitation of Armaments. But States went beyond commitments to refrain from wars of aggression and to assist States victims of aggression. They condemned wars of aggression. Thus in the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and conciliation of 10 October 1933, a number of American States-subsequently joined by practically all the States of the American Continent and a number of
from wars of aggression and to assist States victims of aggression. They condemned wars of aggression. Thus in the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and conciliation of 10 October 1933, a number of American States-subsequently joined by practically all the States of the American Continent and a number of European countries-the Contracting Parties solemnly declared that "they condemned wars of aggression in their mutual relations or in those of other States." That Treaty was fully incorporated into the Buenos Aires Convention of December 1936 signed and ratified by a large number of American countries, including the United States of America. Previously, in February 1928, the Sixth Pan-American conference adopted a Resolution declaring that as "war of aggression constitutes a crime against the human species * * * all aggression is illicit and as such is declared prohibited." In September 1927 the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a resolution affirming the conviction that "a war of aggression can never serve as a means of settling international disputes and is, in consequence, an international crime" and declaring that "all wars of aggression are, and shall always be, prohibited." The first Article of the Draft Treaty for Mutual Assistance of 1923 reads: "The High Contracting Parties, affirming that aggressive war is an international crime, undertake the solemn engagement not to make themselves guilty of this crime against any other nation." In the Preamble to the Geneva Protocol of 1924 it was stated that "offensive warfare constitutes an infraction of solidarity and an international crime." These instruments remained unratified, for various reasons, but they are not without significance or instruction. These repeated condemnations of wars of aggression testified to the fact that, with the establishment of the League of Nations and with the legal developments which followed it, the place of war in International Law had undergone a profound change. War was ceasing to be the unrestricted prerogative of sovereign States. The Covenant of the League did not totally abolish the right of war. It left certain gaps which probably were larger in theory than in practice. In effect it surrounded the right of war by procedural and
had undergone a profound change. War was ceasing to be the unrestricted prerogative of sovereign States. The Covenant of the League did not totally abolish the right of war. It left certain gaps which probably were larger in theory than in practice. In effect it surrounded the right of war by procedural and substantive checks and delays which, if the Covenant had been observed, would have amounted to an elimination of war not only between Members of the League, but also, by virtue of certain provisions of the Covenant, in the relations of non-Members. Thus the Covenant restored the position as it existed at the dawn of International Law, at the time when Grotius was laying the foundations of the modern law of nations and established the distinction, accompanied by profound legal consequences in the sphere of neutrality, between just and unjust wars. Neither was that development arrested with the adoption of the covenant. The right of war was further circumscribed by a series of treaties-numbering nearly one thousand-of arbitration and conciliation embracing practically all the nations of the world. The so-called Optional Clause of Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice which conferred upon the Court compulsory jurisdiction with regard to most comprehensive categories of disputes and which constituted in effect the most important compulsory treaty of arbitration in the postwar period, was widely signed and ratified. Germany herself signed it in 1927; her signature was renewed and renewed, for a period of five years, by the National-Socialist Government in July 1933. (Significantly, that ratification was not renewed on the expiration of its validity in March 1938.) Since 1928 a considerable number of States signed and ratified the General Act for the pacific Settlement of International Disputes which was designed to fill the gaps left by the Optional Clause and the existing treaties of arbitration and conciliation. All this vast network of instruments of pacific settlement testified to the growing conviction that war was ceasing to be the normal and legitimate means of settling international disputes. The express condemnation of wars of aggression, which
Clause and the existing treaties of arbitration and conciliation. All this vast network of instruments of pacific settlement testified to the growing conviction that war was ceasing to be the normal and legitimate means of settling international disputes. The express condemnation of wars of aggression, which has already been mentioned, supplied the same testimony. But there was more direct evidence pointing in that direction. The Treaty of Locarno of 16th October 1925, to which I will refer later and to which Germany was a party, was more than a treaty of arbitration and conciliation in which the parties undertook definite obligations with regard to the pacific settlement of disputes that might arise between them. It was, subject to clearly specified exceptions of self-defense in certain contingencies, a more general undertaking in which the parties agreed that "they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other". This constituted a general renunciation of war and was so considered to be in the eyes of jurists and of the public opinion of the world. For the Locarno Treaty was not just one of the great number of arbitration treaties concluded at that time. It was regarded as the corner stone of the European settlement and of the new legal order in Europe in partial, voluntary and generous substitution for the just rigours of the Treaty of Versailles. With it the term "outlawry of war" left the province of mere pacifist propaganda. It became current in the writings on international law and in official pronouncements of governments. No jurist of authority and no statesman of responsibility would have associated himself, subsequent to the Locarno Treaty, with the plausible assertion that, at least as between the parties, war had remained an unrestricted right of sovereign States. But although the effect of the Locarno Treaty was limited to the parties to it, it had a wider influence in paving the way towards that most fundamental and truly revolutionary enactment in modern international law, namely, the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 27 August 1928, known also as the pact of Paris, or the Kellogg-Briand pact, or the Kellogg Pact. That Treaty-a most