dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
the amount in kind to be produced and the persons to whom distribution must be made (ECH-4; ECH-2). During this period the Military Commander issued instructions to the Goods Offices through "command channels," that is, through the Belgian Minister of Economics. (ECH-3) On 6 August, 1942, the Military Commander, however, published a decree reaffirming explicitly the power to compel production of designated articles (3612-PS), a signal for the introduction of "positive" controls. In 1943, on instructions from the Reich Ministry of Economics, German representatives selected from the Reichsstellen were attached directly to the Belgian Goods Offices (ECH-3). At the end of 1943, the office of the "Ruestungsobmann" of the Speer Ministry for Armaments and War Production began issuing "positive orders" for production to individual concerns directly, without clearing with the Goods Offices, pursuant to decree of the Minister for Armaments and War Production (Speer). (ECH-3) Production facilities in Belgium which were not deemed to serve the German interest were shut down. By order of 30 March 1942, the Military Commander prohibited the enlargement of existing plants and the construction of new ones without German authorization, and provided for the closing down of factories at his discretion (3616-PS). In the iron and metal industry alone at least 400 plants "not important for the war effort" had been closed down by 15 April 1943 (EC-335). By the end of the occupation, 1960 out of a total of 2164 plants in the textile industry had been closed down. (ECH-19) France and Holland Substantially the same system was put into effect in France and Holland. German Goods Offices were established in Occupied France at the same time as in Belgium (3604-PS). These were subsequently abolished in November, 1940, however, when the Vichy Government, at the "suggestion" of the Nazis, created raw material rationing boards, on which delegates of the German Military Administration served as technical advisers (EC-613; EC-616). In the Netherlands, controls were exercised by the local German Armament Inspectorate (EC-471; EC-472-A), who, it is believed, made use of the rationing boards set up in Holland before the outbreak of war. C. The Nazi Conspirators Acquired Ownership of
technical advisers (EC-613; EC-616). In the Netherlands, controls were exercised by the local German Armament Inspectorate (EC-471; EC-472-A), who, it is believed, made use of the rationing boards set up in Holland before the outbreak of war. C. The Nazi Conspirators Acquired Ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and French Participations in European Industries By Means of Governmental Pressure and Through the Use of Funds Unlawfully Exacted from the Occupied Countries and Their National. The Nazi conspirators were not content with securing for Germany the supplies necessary for the period of the war. They aimed at obtaining permanent ownership and domination of European industry to the fullest extent possible, and embarked on program to that end even during the progress of the war. (1) The Nazi conspirators established a program to acquire for German interests ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and French participations during the war. On 23 May 1940, recommendation was made that it would be opportune to secure all Dutch and Belgian stocks "in order, especially in the case of holding companies, to win influence over the controlled companies' (EC-41). The memorandum recommended the taking possession of stocks of the dominated companies located in foreign countries and influencing the decisions of members of holding companies located in Holland and Belgium or of other owners of such stock. Because of the provisions of private property, it was deemed more advisable to influence members of holding companies through careful guiding than through plain force. (EC-41) At a meeting held in the Reich Ministry of Economics on 3 June 1940 on the subject of "Belgian and Dutch capital shares in southeastern European countries," it was decided that regulations should be issued immediately by the Military Commander for Belgium prohibiting the destruction, transfer, or disposition of any bonds or stocks of these countries, and that registration should be required of owners and trustees. (1445-PS) In a memorandum of 2 August 1940 Goering declared that the goal of the Germans' economic policy was the "increase of German influence with foreign enterprises," that it was "necessary already now that any opportunity is used ot make it possible for
should be required of owners and trustees. (1445-PS) In a memorandum of 2 August 1940 Goering declared that the goal of the Germans' economic policy was the "increase of German influence with foreign enterprises," that it was "necessary already now that any opportunity is used ot make it possible for the German economy to start the penetration even during the war of the interesting objects of the economy of the occupied countries," and directed that the transfer of capital from Germany to the occupied countries be facilitated to make possible the immediate purchase of enterprises in the occupied countries. (EC-137) At a meeting at the Reich Ministry of Economics on 8 August 1940 on the subject of "Acquisition of shares of important foreign enterprises in southeastern Europe," Dr. Schlotterer of the Reich Ministry of Economics commented that "private economical penetration of the Southeast area by German influence is desirable, likewise the supplanting of British and French interests in that territory" (EC-43). The group present, including representatives of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Reichsbank, agreed that "attempts should be made immediately to acquire shares" and that "in doing so the tendency should be preserved to present a bill for the shares at the peace conference." It was further agreed that "it should be attempted if possible to transfer the shares into private hands" but that "in order to make the right selection it appears necessary to introduce an intermediary stage" in which "first of all, enterprises should be taken over through banks, thereupon the plants should be managed as a matter of trusteeship for the Reich with the aim that the Reich (Reich Marshal Goering)" undertake handing them over to private industry. (EC-43) (2) The Nazi conspirators carried out this program by compulsory sale where necessary and by purchases financed out of occupation charges and under clearing agreements with the occupied countries. Belgium Immediate steps were taken to implement these measures in Belgium. The annual report of the Commissar at the National Bank from May 1940-41 states: "According to the directions of the Reichsmarshal Goering as early as September 1940 the first measures for
clearing agreements with the occupied countries. Belgium Immediate steps were taken to implement these measures in Belgium. The annual report of the Commissar at the National Bank from May 1940-41 states: "According to the directions of the Reichsmarshal Goering as early as September 1940 the first measures for a closer formation of capital ties between the Belgian and German economy were taken. Two different procedures were concerned here: "1. Direct negotiations between German industrialists and Belgian industrialists, for the purpose of obtaining constructive participations in important Belgian enterprises which offer the basis for collaboration between the two economies even after the war. Furthermore, it is desired to transfer to German hands important Belgian participations in foreign enterprises whose administration is located in Belgium, particularly so far as enterprises are concerned which are located in the Balkans and in which a general German interest exists. "2. Ties which result from purchases of stock by German parties on the Belgian stock markets. For this purpose the Reich Economic Minister has given general permission to 32 German banks ot obtain participation rights, particularly stocks, in a limited quantity in Belgium. Till now use has been made of this permission in the amount of about 25 million RM, to which can be added an additional 10 million RM for the procurement of Belgian participations in Rumania, Bulgaria, and the former Poland." (ECR-24) In this report for November 1940 the Military Commander for Belgium stated: "A certain readiness exists on the part of the Belgians to give up investments in stocks in such countries which, at the present time, are being ruled militarily or economically by Germany. Among the important business deals of this kind which have been concluded should be mentioned the taking over by the Kreditanstalt, Wien (Credit Institute, Vienna) of an essential interest in the Allgemeiner Jugoslawischer Bankverein (General Yugoslav Bank Association) from the Societe Generale (capital approximately 1 million RM) and the taking over by the Deutsche Bank of the overwhelming majority [translator's note: of shares] of the Banca Commerciala Romana from the Societe
interest in the Allgemeiner Jugoslawischer Bankverein (General Yugoslav Bank Association) from the Societe Generale (capital approximately 1 million RM) and the taking over by the Deutsche Bank of the overwhelming majority [translator's note: of shares] of the Banca Commerciala Romana from the Societe Generale (capital approximately 2 million RM). The Deutsche Bank also succeeded in acquiring shares of the Kreditanstalt, Wien, of approximately 800,000 RM nominally from the Societe Generale and from one of its subsidiaries. Negotiations between the Deutscfhe Bank and the Societe Generale on the transfer of approximately 25% of the capital of the Banque Generale du Luxmbourg are about to be concluded. Through this deal the Deutsche Bank together with the other German groups obtains the absolute majority of the Luxembourger Bank (approximately 70% of the shares). The Deutsche Bank gets the right to acquire another 25% of the shares which for the time being, remained with the Societe Generale." (EC-34) While the Military Commander of Belgium may have given some assurance that the owners would not be compelled to sell (ECH-22), in at least one instance, purchase could be effected only by military order (EC-335). In this instance the procurement for the Main Branch of Trustees East of shares of the Belgian "Trust Metallurgique" in electricity and road enterprises of East Silesia and the General Government, as well as purchase of shares in the iron works Ostrovica for the Reichswerk Hermann Goering had "to be done, at the request of the Reich Ministry for Economics, forcibly, as an agreement on a financial basis could not be obtained." (EC-335) The German acquisition of Belgian stock participations was financed through the Belgium-German clearing. The Belgian clearing balances of 20 March 1940 included an item of 296 millions bfrs., which 'is explained by out-payment of large clearing transfers to purchase Belgian capital participations in Balkan enterprises" (ECR-14). Increasing transfers resulting from the German capital penetration program precipitated a controversy with the Emission Bank, which was resolved by the Commissar's issuance of an order requiring the bank to make payment (ECR-24). As a sequel,
to purchase Belgian capital participations in Balkan enterprises" (ECR-14). Increasing transfers resulting from the German capital penetration program precipitated a controversy with the Emission Bank, which was resolved by the Commissar's issuance of an order requiring the bank to make payment (ECR-24). As a sequel, "capital" payments were separated from those for "goods and services" and financed by a separate "capital" clearing agreement covering purchases of securities and other "capital" transactions (ECR-24). The Belgian clearing "credit" under the capital clearing, as of 31 July 1943, amounted to 1,071,000,000 bfrs (ECR-173). As shown below, (see infra, D, 2) the Belgian credit under the capital clearing traffic represents a forced loan, exacted for a purpose not even remotely related to the needs of the occupation army. France and Holland The limited evidence in the presently available German documents indicates that similar methods were employed in French and Dutch participations. The procedure followed in the Netherlands is indicated below in the discussion of the removal of restrictions on the free transfer of Reichsmarks in that country. (See infra, D, 5.) In France, participations of a value of 121,000,000 RM were purchased for German interests, paid for in part out of occupation funds and in part through the clearing. (1991-PS) D. The Nazi Conspirators Compelled the Occupied Countries and Their Nationals to Furnish the Monetary Requirements for the German Exploitation, by Means of Occupation Levies, Forced Loans, and the Requisition of Gold and Foreign Exchange in Amounts Far in Excess of the Needs of the Occupation Armies. Except for the early period of the occupation, during which Reichskreditkassen certificates were issued to finance the needs of the occupation troops (Lemkin, Axis Rule In Occupied Europe, p. 329), the Nazis obtained the necessary local currency through the levy of excessive occupation charges, the imposition of clearing engagements under which the local central banks were compelled to finance exports to the Reich, and by requisition of gold and foreign exchange. (1) The Nazi conspirators exacted excessive occupation charges from the conquered countries. Belgium The Nazi conspirators demanded
occupation charges, the imposition of clearing engagements under which the local central banks were compelled to finance exports to the Reich, and by requisition of gold and foreign exchange. (1) The Nazi conspirators exacted excessive occupation charges from the conquered countries. Belgium The Nazi conspirators demanded from Belgium both "internal occupation costs" and "external occupation costs" (ECR-32). The former was defined as "those sums which are gotten out of the country to finance the needs of the German military formations located in the country" (ECR-32). The term "external occupation costs" was used interchangeably with the title "antibolshevistic contribution" (EC-401). Under whatever theory, the exaction of occupation charges was made "to the limit of capacity". (ECR-59) Throughout the period of German occupation, a substantial part of the contribution charges obtained from Belgium was used as a matter of regular practice "not for occupation cost purposes" (ECR-166; ECR-155-A; ECR-35), including: (a) Exports to Germany, Holland, and France (ECR-89; ECR-104). (b) Exchange for Belgian francs of RKK certificates, a "not inconsiderable part" of which did "not have the least thing to do with occupation costs" (ECR-39; ECR-142). (c) "Political purposes (that is, SS, Propaganda, Hitler Youth)" (ECR-106). (d) Purchases in the "black market" (ECR-106), many of them destined for export. (See supra, B, (2).) (e) General war expenses, including the supply of troops based in Belgium for military operations against England (ECH-5); the Commander-in-Chief of the Army rejected a recommendation of the Military Commander that a distinction be drawn between occupation troops and those for military operations (ECH-5). Notwithstanding the extensive use of occupation levies for non-occupation purposes, the contributions exacted from Belgium "were not only sufficient to cover the needs of the Wehrmacht but also made it possible to found a cash reserve which reached at certain times about 2,500,000,000 bfrs". (ECH-5) France The occupation cost accounts of the Reichskreditkasse in Paris disclose on their face that a large part of the occupation funds was obtained and used for nonoccupational purposes. Two sets of occupation cost accounts were maintained: Account A, into
reached at certain times about 2,500,000,000 bfrs". (ECH-5) France The occupation cost accounts of the Reichskreditkasse in Paris disclose on their face that a large part of the occupation funds was obtained and used for nonoccupational purposes. Two sets of occupation cost accounts were maintained: Account A, into which payments were made on behalf of various Reichs ministries and agencies, and for specified purposes; and Account B, into which payments were made for disposal for the Wehrmacht (3615-PS). The funds in Account A were used for obviously nonoccupational purposes, as follows: June 1940 to end 1943 A I. Reich Minister for Economic Affairs (primarily for the buying agency, "Roges," also for the purchase of securities and devisen)....RM 1,518,000,000 A II. Foreign Office (for propaganda purposes in France)....27,000,000 A III. Payment of support to dependents of laborers recruited in Frances for work in Germany....1,500,000 A IV. Reich Minister for Transportation (purchase of securities)....2,500,000 A V. Paris Agency of the Reichstierstelle (Reich Agency for Animals)-imports of meat and meat products....19,000,000 A VI. Exchange by the Bank of France of RM notes for persons evacuated from Alsace-Lorraine....900,000 A VII. Financing purchases of raw sugar in North France by sugar refinery in South Germany....1,285,000 A VIII. Compensation for war damage to Reichsdeutsche and Volkdeutsche in France.....8,500,000 A IX. Sale of French francs to the Reich (Commodity imports into Alsace-Lorraine).....66,000,000 A X. Reich Minister of Education (Purchases for libraries in the Reich of books destroyed in air raids)....1,000,000 (3615-PS) The available records to not disclose the full extent to which the Wehrmacht used the funds at its disposal in Account B for nonoccupational purposes. It is certain, however, that large sums were expended for such purposes. Thus, a communication of the OKW to the Foreign Office of 6 November 1942, explaining the decrease in reserve for Account B, states: "In addition, payments to a considerable extent had to be made from the occupation cost funds which were not allotted to meet the demands of those units of the German Wehrmacht stationed in France.
the OKW to the Foreign Office of 6 November 1942, explaining the decrease in reserve for Account B, states: "In addition, payments to a considerable extent had to be made from the occupation cost funds which were not allotted to meet the demands of those units of the German Wehrmacht stationed in France. On 15 January the B account of occupation costs was approximately 3 bill. RM. The reason for the decrease appears from the following compilation: Million RM. a. For procurement of goods exported from France during the period of 1 Jan.-31 Oct. 1942 an estimated 10X90 mill. RM .......................... 900 b. To Roges Raw Material Trading Company Ltd. for purchases on black market .......................... 700 c. For procurement of foreign bills by the Navy (the purchase of foreign bills with French francs was necessary to buy and repair merchant ships in Spanish harbors. These merchant ships are to serve for supplying Rommel's Panzer army in Africa) .......................... 40 d. Reimbursement to Foreign Office (account Syria) .......................... 4 e. Allotments in favor of families of French workers working in Germany .......................... 1.5 f. Special commissioner Rumania .......................... 1.3 g. Costs of building completions for directors of French powder factories .......................... 0.2 1,647 Therefrom it appears that the decrease of reserves of occupation cost funds amounting to 3,000 mill. RM on 15 January 1942 is primarily due to expenditures for purposes unrelated to the occupation." (1741-PS) Holland Occupation charges were fixed at about 100,000,000 gulden a month (ECR-174; EC-86). (100 RM=75 gulden, approximately (EC-468)). Expenditures were divided between "occupation" purposes and "nonoccupation" purposes, according to whether "the products purchased or produced on orders of the armed forces of the Netherlands (nonoccupation cost)" (ECR-174). During the 20-month period from March 1941 to October 1942, inclusive (the only period for which figures are available), out of the total occupation charges of 1,545,500,000 gulden, 433,800,000 gulden were expended for "nonoccupation" purposes (ECR-175-193). A large part of the "pure" occupation expenditure, moreover, was for general
the 20-month period from March 1941 to October 1942, inclusive (the only period for which figures are available), out of the total occupation charges of 1,545,500,000 gulden, 433,800,000 gulden were expended for "nonoccupation" purposes (ECR-175-193). A large part of the "pure" occupation expenditure, moreover, was for general war expenses, including the construction of fortifications and airfields, and the letting of shipbuilding contracts. (ECR-180, 181, 183, 187, 191) In theory, only the "occupation" costs were supposed to be charged to the Netherlands (ECR-174); until April 1941, the 'nonoccupation" expenditures were returned to the Military Commander in the Netherlands (ECR-175). The claim of the Netherlands to the sums "returned,' however, was rejected. Moreover, as appears from the above cited reports (ECR-175-193), nonoccupation expenditure continued even after April 1941, when reimbursements ceased. (ECR-176) During the first year of the occupation Germany exacted an additional levy from the Netherlands under the heading of "external occupation costs,' amounting to 500,000,000 RM (ECR-194). Of this sum, 100,000,000 RM was paid in gold; the remainder was paid by a transfer of the clearing balance of the Netherlands Bank at the Verrechnungskasse to the German Ministry of Finance, that is, was used to reduce a credit which arose by reason of exports to the Reich. (ECR-194) In April 1942, "at the instigation of the Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart," the Netherlands began to pay a "voluntary contribution to the war against Bolshevism" of 50,000,000 guilders per month, retroactive to 1 July 1941, of which 10,000,000 per month was paid in gold (ECR-195). By 31 March 1944, this "contribution" amounted to 2,150,000,000 RM. (EC-86) It is immaterial whether this "contribution" was made at the direction of Seyss-Inquart or was in fact the "voluntary" act of the then President of the Netherlands Bank and Treasurer in the Ministry of Finance, Van Tonningen. Van Tonningen was appointed by Seyss-Inquart and acted in the German interest. His acts, like that of civilian administrators in occupied territories generally, must be charged to the occupant. (See infra, Conclusion.) The spirit in which he