dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SEYSS-INQUART: I discussed this case yesterday. That was a measure at the direct order of Himmler, which only came to my knowledge after it had been carried out and against which I protested. To my knowledge, mass deportations to Mauthausen did not occur again after that.
THE PRESIDENT: Then what I understand the defendant to say is that that document is accurate except where you referred to under the Numbers 3 and 4, on the last page. Is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: In my testimony yesterday I confirmed the orders contained in this document, but not all the details of the actual events.
DR. STEINBAUER: The presentation on Page 6 of the individual agencies is correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: The actual presentation, too, is basically correct. Yesterday I spoke also of the burning of synagogues and of the prevention of the destruction of synagogues in The Hague and Amsterdam.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Steinbauer. Go on.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I should like to refer to Document 79, Page 203, from Exhibit Number USA-708. That is a speech which Seyss-Inquart made on the Jewish question. The Prosecution submitted this document. Since it needs a little explaining I shall begin by reading the last sentence: "The only thing we can discuss is the creation of a tolerable transitional state while maintaining our point of view that the Jews are enemies, and thus applying every precaution customarily observed against enemies. As regards the time when Germany will not be here as an occupational force to maintain order in public life, the Dutch people will have to decide for themselves whether they want to endanger the comradely union with the German people for the sake of the Jews." Witness, I should like to ask you about this speech. Were you thinking of the complete elimination and destruction of the Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: I never thought of that at all, and in this speech I was not even thinking of evacuation. At that time I held s the point of view that the Jews should be confined in the Netherlands, as is done with enemy aliens, for the reasons which are given in the preceding part of this speech, which the American Prosecution has submitted. The idea still prevailed of treating them as enemy aliens, even though Englishmen, for example, were also transported to the Reich. I have already pointed out that that viewpoint later changed to conform to the measures against Jews, which were customary in the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: We now come to . . .
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the speech?
SEYSS-INQUART: This speech is of March 1941. Only once again did I express my point of view, and that was on 20 April 1943, when I made the somewhat, I admit, fantastic suggestion that all belligerent powers should pool 1 percent of their war costs in order to solve the Jewish problem from the economic standpoint. I we: thus of the opinion that the Jews still existed; incidentally, I never called the Jews inferior.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe I can conclude this topic and go on to another charge which is made against you-violations of international law, the subject of spoliation. Who confiscated raw materials and machinery in the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: The initiative for this, and the extent to which it was to be done, originated with the Reich offices. The operations were carried out either by my offices, by the Wehrmacht, by the armament inspection offices, or even by the Police and the Waffen-SS; but from the middle of 1944 on they were carried out in the main by the of lice of the Armament Minister, which was also my office, and by the field economic commands of the High Command of the Army. At that time control was extremely difficult.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was your own attitude toward this problem?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was of the opinion that the provisions of the Hague Convention for Land Warfare applying to this were obsolete and could not be applied to a modern war because the labor potential of the civilian population is at least as important as the war potential of the soldiers at the front. How much could be demanded seemed to me to depend on the conditions prevailing in one's own country. These doubtlessly varied in each country. I therefore endeavored to obtain a statement from Reich Marshal Goering to the effect that the Dutch were to live under the same conditions as the German people. This promise, to be sure, was not kept completely in the ensuing period.
DR. STEINBAUER: How was the confiscation carried out? By what authorities?
SEYSS-INQUART: Until 1943, the Dutch offices carried out our assignments. The technical experts had to provide me with factual justification for confiscations, since I was not familiar with such matters. I took steps when complaints reached me. For example, I prevented the removal of margarine works in Dordrecht and of a brand new electrical works in Leeuwarden. Reich Minister Speer issued an important order that only the machines from factories which delivered more than one-half of their total production to the Reich, for example, Phillips in Eindhoven, could be transferred to the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: The French Prosecution charges that you favored the black market. What do you have to say about this?
SEYSS-INQUART: We combated the black market from the beginning. It was therefore always a so-called "gray market" with us. I had prohibited the purchase of food from the current production and likewise of other important consumer articles on the black market. Every case was investigated by the competent offices in conjunction with the Dutch offices. If it was a business which had been forbidden by me, the goods were confiscated and turned over to the Dutch offices. These measures were 100 percent for the benefit of the Dutch, for what the German Reich wanted officially it got anyhow. I see from the document that the turnover in the Netherlands was the lowest anywhere. The figures are deceptive, though, since prices on the black market were several times higher than those on the normal market, so that the actual amount of goods was much lower.
DR. STEINBAUER: In Document 1321-PS the charge is made that you turned medical instruments over to the SS.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true. Please judge that in connection with my general statements. The SS needed microscopes for its hospitals at the front, for all its hospitals which had been destroyed by bombings. In the laboratories of the University of Utrecht there were microscopes which were not being used. I had the case investigated by my office and what seemed dispensable confiscated. In this connection I refer to a case which was much more important for the Dutch. The Reich wanted to tear down the Kammerlingh Institute at Leyden, which is one of the most famous low temperature research institutes in the world. I believe only the Soviets and the Americans have one as well, especially suitable for atomic research. I prevented the tearing down of this institute which would have meant an irreparable loss for the Netherlands. Experiments which seemed necessary were carried out by Professor Heisenberg himself in Leyden. DR. STEINBAUER Document 1988-PS, RF-130, charges that you had the rolling mill in Ymuiden removed.
SEYSS-INQUART: This rolling mill in Ymuiden was built up after May 1941 by a German firm, which in exchange was given a partnership in the blast furnace joint stock company. The electrical installations of these works were repeatedly destroyed by the English, not without the aid of the intelligence service of the Dutch resistance movement. In my opinion the Reich Marshal was right in ordering that they be moved to the Reich. This was done. Why no indemnity was paid I do not understand, for I had issued an order that all such demands had to receive full indemnification, but perhaps the German concern relinquished its partnership.
DR. STEINBAUER: The charge is further made that you turned over the essential transportation means of the Netherlands to the Reich.
SEYSS-INQUART: I could not in substance dispose of the means of transportation; that was the concern of the transport command of the Armed Forces. Once I merely took part in demanding 50,000 bicycles-there were 4,000,000 bicycles in the Netherlands-for the mobilization of troops in the Netherlands themselves.
DR. STEINBAUER: Another charge is that you had art objects removed from public museums and collections.
SEYSS-INQUART: I most painstakingly took care that famous art objects, especially pictures, in the Dutch public museums of Amsterdam, Mauritshuis, and so forth were especially protected. But it is possible that loans to these museums which belonged to Jewish persons were claimed in connection with the liquidation of Jewish property. There was just one case. A Kruller Foundation existed in the Netherlands which was willed to the Netherlands State. Without my permission three pictures from this foundation were taken to the Reich, for which I later concluded a contract for sale with the museum authorities. I endeavored to replace these pieces for the museum. They procured some beautiful Van Goghs and a Corre from the German treasure list, and the head of the museum once told me that the new pictures fitted better into the museum than the old ones. The famous paintings were in a bombproof shelter on the Dutch coast. When the coast was declared a fortified area, I induced the Dutch authorities to have a new shelter built near Maastricht. The pictures were taken there, always under Dutch care. No German had anything to do with it. In the fall of 1944 Dr. Goebbels demanded that the pictures be taken to the Reich. I definitely refused this and had reliable guards placed at the shelter, and also sent an official from the Dutch Ministry who was authorized to hand over the pictures to the approaching enemy troops. I was convinced that the Dutch Government in England would see to it that these pictures remained in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you yourself acquire any pictures?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not buy any pictures for myself in the Netherlands, except for two or three small etchings by a contemporary artist. As Reich Commissioner I bought pictures by contemporary artists at exhibitions when I liked them and when they seemed worth the price and were offered for sale. I also bought old pictures and gave them to public institutions in the Reich, especially to the Museum of Art History in Vienna and the Reich Governor's office in Vienna. They were all purchases on the open market, as far as I am informed. Among them was a picture attributed to Vermeer, although it was contested. On the other hand I acquired an authentic Vermeer for the Dutch State by preventing its sale to the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, there is no specific charge against this defendant of having bought pictures.
DR. STEINBAUER: It was mentioned in the trial brief. May I continue? Let us conclude this question.
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want details about it. It is sufficient if he told us that he paid for the pictures. He need not give us details about the pictures.
DR. STEINBAUER: I will go on to the next question. I submit to you Document RF-136. It describes the confiscation of the property of Her Majesty, the Queen of the Netherlands.
SEYSS-INQUART: To tell the full truth, I must add something to the previous question. Pictures and art objects from Jewish fortunes or from enemy fortunes, when there was a reason for it, were liquidated and sold in the Reich. In this connection a very lively free trade developed with the participation of the Dutch art dealers, doubtless favored by the free transfer of foreign currency.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I should like to go on to the question of the royal property, RF-136. What do you know about the order for the liquidation of this property?
SEYSS-INQUART: I myself ordered this liquidation. In the Netherlands we, of course, had an order to confiscate enemy property, as in all occupied territories. When we came to the Netherlands, the royal property was merely placed under trusteeship, without any steps being taken to seize it. Right after the outbreak of the campaign in the East, the Queen of the Netherlands spoke personally on the radio in a very antagonistic manner, severely accusing the Fuehrer and making an express appeal for active resistance. In view of this state of affairs the property of any Dutch citizen might have been confiscated. I therefore decided to proceed in this case in the same way in order to prevent an excessive extension of this measure as had been demanded of me, while having the conviction that I could not make any exceptions. I myself, as I said, signed the order for confiscation, in order not to implicate anybody else.
DR. STEINBAUER: What instructions did you give in the course of the liquidation?
SEYSS-INQUART: I immediately issued liquidation orders which in practice prevented the liquidation being carried out. I ordered estates or castles to be turned over to the Netherlands State-with the exception of one apartment house, I believe-and likewise bonds and securities and archives, and that all historic or artistic or otherwise valuable furniture be selected by a Dutch commission so that the Netherlands State could take it over. The commission included almost everything at all possible in its list. I realized that and did not strike out one piece. In particular, I had the historical installations at Soestdyk and Huis ten Bosch turned over in full, although Berlin wanted the Huis ten Bosch installation as a memorial to the people of Brandenburg. Finally, even the personal things...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that the defendant need make this quite so detailed, Dr. Steinbauer. He has made the point that some of the things were turned over to the Netherlands State.
DRY STEINBAUER: Then I should like very briefly to ask in this connection: Do you know to what extent the property was actually liquidated?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had a survey given to me. It was reported to me that 3, or at the most, 5 percent of the property was actually liquidated.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is enough.
SEYSS-INQUART: The proceeds were turned over to a fund for the repairing of war damages.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I shall proceed to the question of the confiscation of factories and raw materials. Who undertook this confiscation?
SEYSS-INQUART: I may refer to my previous statements. From the late summer of 1944 on, this was done primarily by the economic field commands. There are individual documents available with notations referring to me. There were many unauthorized confiscations. People came from the Reich with trucks and began to take away machinery. Together with the Armed Forces commander and the Higher SS and Police Leader I ordered that the strictest measures be taken against these methods.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to two documents which I submitted but which I shall not read in order to save time. These are Documents Number Wand 81, Pages 205 and 208. It can be seen from these that this was a task of the Armed Forces; that these confiscations were all carried out by the occupation forces. In Document RF-137, Witness, the charge is made that the removal of furniture and clothing from Arnhem was sanctioned by you.
SEYSS-INQUART: The charge is correct. The situation was as follows: The front was directly south of Arnhem. There were three or four resistance lines built in Arnhem proper. The city had been completely evacuated. It was being shelled and installations and goods in Arnhem were gradually being ruined in the course of the winter. The Fuehrer ordered at that time through Bormann that textiles, particularly, be brought from the Netherlands for German families who had suffered bomb damage. Without any doubt the furniture and the textiles in Arnhem would probably either have been looted or would have been ruined by the weather or would have been burned in a battle at Arnhem. Although it was not in my territory but at the front and the executive power thus lay with the Armed Forces, I gave my approval that under the circumstances furniture and textiles be brought to the Ruhr area. I ordered at the same time that the items be listed for indemnification claims. I believe that Dr. Wimmer can confirm this as a witness.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe we can conclude that.
SEYSS-INQUART: The charge is also raised against me that I blew up safes. I opposed this most strongly. When such a case was reported to me, I had my prosecuting authority issue the indictment and the order for arrest.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I shall go on to the next question. How about the blowing up and destruction of ports, docks, locks, and mines in the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: Blastings were undertaken at the moment when the Netherlands again became a theater of war. As for port and dock installations and shipyards, the following is important: The port of Antwerp fell almost undamaged into the hands of the enemy. I believe that that was of decisive importance for the further development of the offensive. Thereupon the competent military authorities in the Netherlands began to blow up such installations as a precautionary measure. I am only acquainted with the fact, not with the details; and I refused to watch the explosions. But my commissioner and I intervened with the Armed Forces offices, and I believe that in Rotterdam half of the installations were not blown up. This is shown by the Dutch reports. I had nothing whatever to do with the matter, aside from this intervention. When the English reached Limburg, an order was issued to blow up the mines as being vital for war. I inquired with Reich Minister Speer about this, and he issued an order not to blow them up but only to put them out of commission for 3 or 4 months. The orders were issued to this effect. I hope that they were not violated.
DR. STEINBAUER: We have heard in this Trial of "scorched earth" policy. Did that apply to the Netherlands also?
SEYSS-INQUART: I received a "scorched earth" order from Bormann. Without there being a military necessity for it, all technical installations were to be blown up. That meant, in effect, the destruction of Holland, that is, the western Netherlands. If explosions are carried out in 14 or 16 different places in Holland the country will be entirely flooded in 3 or 4 weeks. I did not carry out the order at first; instead I established contact with Reich Minister Speer. I had a personal meeting with him on 1 April in Oldenburg. Speer told me that the same order had been given in the Reich; but that he was frustrating it, that he now had full authority in this matter, and that he agreed that the order should not be carried out in the Netherlands. It was not carried out.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, to another chapter. Floods did occur. Did you have anything to do with them?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know about this, and in a certain connection I did have something to do with it. There were previously prepared floodings by the Armed Forces for defense purposes and there were so-called "battle" floorings, which suddenly became necessary in the course of battle. The prepared ones were carried out in closest contact with my office and the Dutch offices. Through their intervention, about half of the area demanded was spared and saved. The flooding was done mostly with fresh water so that less damage would occur, and the outer dikes were spared. There were two battle floorings in Holland, at the order of the commander of Holland. The Wieringer Polder was mentioned in particular. At that time there was great danger of a troop landing from the air which would outflank the Dutch defense front. I was not actually informed of the execution of the battle floorings. The commander had decided on it overnight. When, on 30 April, I talked to Lieutenant General Bedell Smith, General Eisenhower's Chief of the General Staff, he told us: "What has been flooded so far can be justified from the military point of view; if you flood any more now, it is no longer justifiable." After 30 April there were no more floorings.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to Document 86, Page 221, without reading it. It shows that these floodings were of a purely military character. Another charge which was made against you, Witness, is the question of the food supply for the Netherlands population. What measures did you take to maintain the food supply of the Dutch people?
SEYSS-INQUART: The food question in the Netherlands was doubtless the most difficult question of the whole administration; and I believe, because of the special aspects of the case, it was one of the most difficult in all the occupied territories. In the Netherlands there is a density of population of 270 people per square kilometer, in Holland specifically there are more than 600 per square kilometer to be fed. The food economy is highly cultivated as a processing economy dependent upon the importation of hundreds of thousands of tons of food. With the occupation and the blockade all that had disappeared. The whole food economy had to be put on a new basis, as well as the production of food for immediate human consumption. It was certainly a great achievement of Dutch agriculture and its leadership that this was successful. However, I may say that my experts aided very effectively, and we got a great deal of support from the Reich. Food distribution in the Netherlands was also very carefully regulated, more so almost than in any other occupied territory. The most important thing for me was to maintain this food system, although its leader, Generaldirektor Louwes, and his entire staff of helpers were definitely hostile to the Germans. Against the will of the Reich Central Office, I nevertheless retained him, because otherwise I would not have been able to bear the responsibility for the nourishment of the people.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you also deliver food to the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, the troops, above all, claimed the right to live off the land, I believe, but grain was supplied from the Reich to an extent of 36,000 tons, vegetables being demanded in exchange. The Reich demanded in addition more vegetables and also the delivery of cattle, canned meat, seeds, and some other products. Vegetables and meat would not have made so much difference, but the seeds caused trouble. I am convinced that the Dutch food system did its utmost to prevent deliveries.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe that that is enough on this theme, and I should like to ask how the general food situation was in the fall of 1944?
SEYSS-INQUART: During most of the occupation period we had a caloric value at first of 3,000, and then of about 2,500 calories; and in 1944 about 1,800 calories. Experience today will show what that meant. In September of 1944 the Netherlands became a theater of war again. At about the time that the first British airborne divisions landed at Arnhem, a general strike of the Dutch railroads began on order of the Dutch Government in England; and it was carried out almost completely. At the same time ships vanished from the internal waterways. It was not a formal strike, but it amounted to the same thing. Through this situation the defense possibilities for the German Armed Forces were most severely endangered. The German Armed Forces then began to confiscate ships and, in effect, interrupted all traffic. I got in touch with the Armed Forces and was told that if the railroad strike stopped they would not have to proceed so rigorously. I reported this to Secretary General Hirschield and Generaldirektor Louwes. No result was achieved, and I had to consider how I could restore shipping. I discussed it with the Armed Forces, and I suggested that I would give them 3 or 4 weeks' time in which they could secure their necessary shipping space. Out of about 2 million tons available, they needed 450,000 tons. During this time I forbade all ship traffic, because the Armed Forces was confiscating all ships anyhow. I permitted traffic of small ships in Holland.
THE PRESIDENT: How is all this relevant to the charges made against the defendant?