dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON NEURATH: At first the occupation of the Rhineland had naturally created unrest in the cabinets and public opinion and among the signatory powers of the Treaty of Versailles. This applied especially to France and Czechoslovakia. Therefore it was natural, if a reasonable German foreign policy was to be conducted, to allow this unrest to die down, so as to convince the world that Germany was not pursuing aggressive plans, but only wanted to restore full sovereignty in the Reich. The erection of fortifications was to serve only to decrease the temptation to our highly armed neighbors to march at any time they saw fit into German territory, lying there unprotected. Despite all the negotiations and efforts, it had not been possible to get them to observe the disarmament clause in the Treaty of Versailles. As I have already said, France and Czechoslovakia especially, instead of disarming, continued to arm, and by concluding agreements with Soviet Russia increased their military superiority. In my discussion with Mr. Bullitt I attempted to bring all this out when I said that we would not start any further diplomatic actions for the time being. By making any military attack more difficult I hoped to get France and Czechoslovakia to change their policy, which was hostile to Germany, and to create better relations with both these countries in the interests of peace. These hopes and views which I held can be seen clearly in the last part of Mr. Bullitt's report-and with this Mr. Bullitt was in full agreement. As to the remark about British policy on Page 2, Paragraph 2 of this report, at that time Great Britain was trying to prevent a rapprochement between Germany and Italy, with whom her relations were strained to a breaking-point because of the Abyssinian question. The Foreign Of lice thought the rapprochement could be prevented by making it known that it would no longer oppose the Anschluss between Germany and Austria. At that time Mussolini was still entirely opposed to the Anschluss.
VON NEURATH: The realization of this specious intention on the part of Britain was one of the motives for the conclusion of the German-Austrian Agreement of 11 July 1936. The British statement which I had hinted at and expected was forthcoming in November 1937 on the occasion of the visit of Lord Halifax to Berlin. Lord Halifax told me at that time-and I took care to make a note of his statement, which I quote in English word for word: "People in England would never understand why they should go to war only because two German countries wish to unite." But at the same time, the Foreign Office, in a directive to the British Minister in Vienna, the wording of which is now well known, called upon the Austrian Government to offer stubborn resistance to the Anschluss, and promised every support. The Bullitt report also shows that I said that Hitler's greatest wish was a real understanding with France. Apart from that I also told Mr. Bullitt-and he himself states that right from the beginning-that the German Government would do everything to prevent an uprising of the National Socialists in Austria. Z4 June 46
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I ask the Tribunal to take special notice of these notes of Mr. Bullitt, so that we can save time by not quoting this paragraph. This is Document Book 1, Neurath Document Number 15, Page 60, last paragraph. What was your own personal attitude and opinion. about the policy to be pursued by Germany with reference to Czechoslovakia?
VON NEURATH: Czech policy towards us was always characterized by a profound mistrust. This was to be explained partly by the geographical position of the country between Germany and Austria, and partly by the diversity of nationalities within the country. These were swayed by strong feelings. The country's being drawn into the Franco-Russian military and friendship pact did not contribute to the establishment of closer relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. As Reich Foreign Minister I always worked to improve political relations. I also tried to strengthen our economic connections, which were of manifest importance. In so doing I no more thought of using force, or of military occupation, than I did in our relations with all the other neighboring states.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was your attitude to the Sudeten-German question?
VON NEURATH: I have to be a little more explicit in this case. The Germans living in the Sudetenland as a compact group had been given the assurance, at the peace negotiations in 1919 when they were attached to the Czechoslovak State, that they would be given autonomy on the model of the Swiss Confederation, as expressly stated by Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons in 1940. The Sudeten-German delegation at that time, as well as Austria, had demanded an Anschluss with the Reich. The promise of autonomy was not kept by the Czech Government. Instead of autonomy, there was a vehement policy of "Czechification." The Germans were forbidden to use their own German language in the courts, as well as in their dealings with administrative authorities, et cetera, under threat of punishment.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, can not the defendant go on to the time with which we have to deal, namely, 1938, and tell us what his policy was then, without telling us all these facts beforehand about 1919?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I just wanted to show the background for his later policy. However, if the Tribunal thinks that this is unnecessary, because it is well known, then I shall be satisfied with the testimony which has already been given. Herr Von Neurath, what were your official and personal relations with Hitler during your time as Foreign Minister?
VON NEURATH: From the personal point of view I had no close connection of any kind with Hitler. I did not belong to his close circle either. In the beginning I had frequent discussions with him concerning foreign policy and on the whole found him open to my arguments. However, in the course of time this changed when other organizations, especially the Party, began to concern themselves with foreign policy and came to Hitler with their plans and their ideas. This applied especially to the so-called Ribbentrop Bureau. Ribbentrop became more and more a personal adviser of Hitler in matters of foreign policy, and gained more and more influence. It was often difficult to dissuade Hitler from proposals which had been submitted to him through these channels. German foreign policy was to a certain extent going two different ways. Not only in Berlin but also in its offices abroad the Foreign Office had constantly to contend with difficulties caused by the working methods and the sources of information of this Ribbentrop Bureau. I personally was always opposed to the Party exercising any influence on foreign policy. I was especially opposed to Ribbentrop's direct handling of important questions and his official interference in matters of foreign policy in cases where they had not been removed from my control. For that reason I handed in my resignation several times, and for a time I succeeded in getting Hitler to dispense with Ribbentrop's meddlesome methods which he had hitherto supported.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to submit, and have the Tribunal take judicial notice of, an extract from an article in the American periodical Time dated 10 April 1933, Number 9 of my Document Book 1, Page 44. I should also like to refer . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that mere newspaper reports or comments are in the nature of evidence.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In addition, I have submitted in my Document Book 1, under Number 17, an extract from the well-known book by Henderson, the former British Ambassador in Berlin, Failure of a Mission, and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it so that I shall not have to read it, paying special attention to Paragraph 2, Page 69.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that this document-the article from Time-may be admitted, but it is not necessary to refer to it.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Thank you. This is Document Number 9, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is Document Number 9. I say it may be admitted.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Thank you. Finally, I should like to submit and call the attention of the Tribunal to Document Number 16 which is a communication addressed by Defendant Von Neurath to Hitler, dated 27 July 1936, requesting to be relieved of his post because of the intended appointment of Herr Von Ribbentrop as State Secretary. It is not necessary to read this document, but I should like to call the Tribunal's attention not only to the contents, but also to the mode of address and the ending. Hitler is addressed only as "Esteemed Reich Chancellor,'' and the ending is "Yours very respectfully." I mention this because the Prosecution has often made the accusation that flowery phrases were used in addressing letters to Hitler which exceeded ordinary courtesy. Herr Von Neurath has never done so. I also call your attention to Document 14, which will be found in my Document Book 1. That is also an offer to resign, dated 25 October 1935, and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document as well. Herr Von Neurath, apart from your official policy, were there not other offices which took independent action, which signed treaties, in which you had no part?
VON NEURATH: Yes. That was the case, for instance, in the so called Berlin-Rome-Tokyo policy. Hitler pursued this plan stubbornly, and Ribbentrop supported him in this. I rejected this policy, as I considered it detrimental and in some ways fantastic, and I refused to allow my staff to carry this through. Ribbentrop therefore, in his capacity as Ambassador with a special mission, carried on these negotiations independently, and on Hitler's instructions concluded the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact. Hence this pact bore Ribbentrop's signature and not my own, even though I was still Foreign Minister at that time and in the ordinary way would have had to sign the pact.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: We now come to the change in policy. Herr Von Neurath, when did you realize that Hitler's foreign policy plans, above all the achieving of equal rights for Germany, went beyond peaceful means, and that the waging of wars and the use of violence began to be considered as a possibility?
VON NEURATH: I realized it for the first time when I heard Hitler's speech to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on 5 November 1937, which has been mentioned here frequently, and at which I was present. It is true that the notes on the contents of this speech, as we have seen from the Hossbach minutes, were made from memory 5 days later as an excerpt from a speech which lasted 2 or 3 hours. Although the plans set forth by Hitler in that long speech had no concrete form, and various possibilities were envisaged, it was quite obvious to me that the whole tendency of his plans was of an aggressive nature. I was extremely upset at Hitler's speech, because it knocked the bottom out of the whole foreign policy which I had consistently pursued-the policy of employing only peaceful means. It was evident that I could not assume responsibility for such a policy.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In connection with this I should like to refer to the affidavit of Baroness Hitter already mentioned by me as Number 3 in Document Book 1. From this affidavit I should like to quote a paragraph under Figure 17 of my document book, a paragraph which seems to me to be so important that I should like to ask the Tribunal to grant me permission to quote this paragraph. I quote: "When for the first time Herr Von Neurath recognized from Hitler's statement on 5 November 1937 that the latter wanted to achieve his political aims by the use of force toward the neighboring states, he was so severely shaken that he suffered several heart attacks. "He discussed this with us in detail on the occasion of his visit on New Year's Day 1938, and we saw that this had affected him both physically and spiritually. Above all, he was very upset because meanwhile Hitler had refused to receive him and in these circumstances he could not see how Hitler was to be dissuaded from his plans, which he severely condemned. He often said 'It is horrible to play the part of Cassandra.' He categorically declared that on no account could he support this policy, and that he would face the issue. He did not falter in this decision when on 2 February 1938, on the occasion of his sixty-fifth birthday, Hitler told him that he could not do without him as Foreign Minister. He told us about this the same evening in a telephone conversation when we sent him birthday greetings." What did you do when this speech forced you to realize these things?
VON NEURATH: About 2 days after this speech I went to see General Von Fritsch, who had also been present on the occasion of this speech; and together with him and the Chief of the General Staff, Beck, I discussed what could be done to get Hitler to change his ideas. We agreed that first of all General Von Fritsch, who was due to report to Hitler during the next few days, should explain to him all the military considerations which made this policy inadvisable. Then I intended to explain the political reasons to him. Unfortunately Hitler left for the Obersalzberg soon afterward and could not or did not wish to receive me before his departure. I could not see Hitler until 14 or 15 January. On that occasion I tried to show him that his policy would lead to a world war, and that I would have no part in it. Many of his plans could be realized by peaceful means, even if the process was slower. He answered that he could not wait any longer. I called his attention to the danger of war and to the serious warnings of the generals. I reminded him of his speech to the Reichstag in 1933 in which he himself had declared every new war to be sheer madness, and so forth. When despite all my arguments he still held to his opinions, I told him that he would have to find another Foreign Minister, and that I would not be an accessory to such a policy. At first Hitler refused to accept my resignation, but I insisted, and on 4 February he granted my release without further comment.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you have the impression, Herr Von Neurath, that Hitler decided to grant your release with reluctance, or that by your request to be allowed to resign you met his wishes halfway?
VON NEURATH: I believe the latter was the case. I believe Hitler had been wanting this for some time...
THE PRESIDENT: That is not evidence. You cannot say what you think another man thought.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Then, simultaneously with your resignation as Foreign Minister, you were made president of the newly instituted Secret Cabinet Council. What did that appointment mean?
VON NEURATH: As the witness Goering has already stated here, the Secret Cabinet Council was set up for the sole purpose of masking the reorientation in foreign policy and the changes on the military side. Several witnesses have testified to the fact that the Secret Cabinet Council never convened. I might add that in actual practice it would not have been able to function, for after my resignation on 4 February I was cut off from all access to news concerning foreign policy.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now, after your resignation as Foreign Minister you kept your title as Reich Minister. But were you still a member of the Reich Cabinet or not?
VON NEURATH: No. Apart from the fact that as far as I know the Reich Cabinet no longer functioned, because there were no longer any sessions of the Reich Cabinet, the title "Reich Minister" was just a title of form, which was not connected with any activity or with any Government department. Unlike the members of the Reich Government, I did not receive any legislative bills for signature.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution states that in March of 1938 you represented Ribbentrop as Foreign Minister during his absence and they adduce this from an entry in the diary of General Jodl which says, "Neurath in the meantime is taking over the Foreign Office." Will you please comment on this?
VON NEURATH: After my resignation on 4 February I was quite out of touch with my former colleagues and I withdrew completely. However, I still remained in Berlin. On 11 March 1938, late in the afternoon, Hitler suddenly rang me up in my apartment and asked me to come and see him. In the anteroom' I met, besides Herr Von Papen, General Von Brauchitsch and a number of other high officials and officers of his immediate entourage. Goering was also in the room with Hitler when I came in. Hitler told me that the Anschluss with Austria was a fact, and that German troops would cross the border during the night of the 11th and 12th. When I raised the question whether that had to be, Hitler told me the reason why he did not wish to wait any longer. He asked me what the Foreign Office should do, as the Foreign Minister was absent and in London at the time. I told him quite clearly that we would probably receive protests to which a reply would have to be sent. Apart from that we on our part should make a statement to the powers. There should be no formal negotiations. I also told him that the Foreign Minister should be immediately recalled from London. Goering opposed this. Finally Hitler asked me to tell the State Secretary of the Foreign Office what he had just told me, so that the Foreign Office would know what was happening. On 12 March, in the morning, I did as Hitler had instructed me, and passed on his description of events to the State Secretary, who was the official representative of Ribbentrop. Goering was appointed by Hitler to be his deputy during the time he was absent. On 12 March I personally told the former about the letter addressed to me by the British Ambassador containing the British protest against the occupation of Austria. I told him that the Foreign Office would submit a note of reply. When the draft of this note had been prepared I told Goering about the contents of the note over the telephone. Goering as Hitler's deputy asked me to sign the reply in his stead, since the British Ambassador's letter had been addressed to me.
VON NEURATH: Goering has already stated this as a witness here in this courtroom; hence the phrase in this letter which says "in the name of the Reich Government." I repeatedly asked Goering to have Ribbentrop recalled from London and to keep him informed. From the telephone conversation between Goering and Ribbentrop, which has already been mentioned here, it appears that Goering did this. The explanation why the British note was addressed to me I learned only here through the testimony of Goering, when he said that on the evening of the 11th he himself had told the British Ambassador that he, Goering, was representing Hitler during his absence and that Hitler had asked me to advise him, if need be, on matters of foreign policy. The entry ire Jodl's diary, about which I heard only here in this Court, and which, strangely enough, is dated 10 March-a time when I had not even put in an appearance-can probably be attributed to the fact that somebody had seen me on 11 March in the Reich Chancellery. In any case, I was not active in any other way as Ribbentrop's deputy.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Also you did not use stationery with the heading "Foreign Office," or the signature of the Foreign Of lice.
VON NEURATH: The fact that I used stationery with the heading "President of the Secret Cabinet Council," which I found in a room of the Chancellery, and which was the only indication that this legendary institution actually existed, also proves that I did not represent the Foreign Office or the Foreign Minister, otherwise I would have used Foreign Office stationery.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: You answered the note of the British Ambassador on 12 March by the letter just described. The Prosecution reproaches you, asserting that the reasons given by you in this letter and the description of events in Austria which preceded the entry into the country, are not correct. As I assume the Tribunal is familiar with the passages which form the subject of this accusation, I think it is not necessary to quote them. You also know these passages and I should like to have your opinion.
VON NEURATH: The accusation that the contents of this reply are parry incorrect is quite true. This is explained by the fact that I had no other information except Hitler's communications and the note is based on these communications. This is the information which I had transmitted to the Foreign Office, which was completely ignorant of the events. That was the basis of the draft. I should like to add that the incidents which led to the Austrian Anschluss were never planned during my period of office, and nothing of the kind was ever mentioned. Hitler never had any definite foreign policy plans at all, rather did he take decisions very suddenly and immediately translated them into action, so that even his closest associate had knowledge of them only a few days in advance. The expression "Austrian Anschluss," as it is used here and generally, does not express that which actually happened later, which was in fact the incorporation of Austria. It is this incorporation of Austria that we are now concerned with. This incorporation of Austria was conceived by Hitler at the very last moment, in Linz, as the troops were marching in. A further proof that the plan for invasion had not been made in advance is the fact that Hitler a few days earlier had sent his Foreign Minister to London to clear up some diplomatic formalities.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to refer to an excerpt from the book by Sir Revile Henderson, Failure of a Mission , which has already been mentioned. This excerpt is Number 129 in my Document Book 4. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. During the Austrian crisis, on 12 March, the day after the marching-in, you made a statement to the Czechoslovakian Minister in Berlin regarding the measures taken in respect to Austria, and their effects on Czechoslovakia. According to a report made by Dr. Mastny, the Czechoslovakian Minister in Berlin, about this discussion, you declared that the German Government did not intend to take any steps against Czechoslovakia, but to uphold the arbitration treaty concluded in the twenties with Czechoslovakia. Will you please comment on this report, which is known to you and which is to be found under Number 141 in my Document Book 5.
VON NEURATH: It is quite correct that on 12 March I made the said statement to M. Mastny. Only the reason for the conversation and its gist were somewhat different from the way he has described it. On 12 March Ministerial Director Von Weizsacker telephoned me at my home, telling me that the Czechoslovakian Minister Mastny was with him and wanted to know whether he could see me sometime during the course of the day. I asked M. Mastny to come to my apartment during the afternoon. M. Mastny asked me whether I believed that Hitler, after the Austrian Anschluss, would now undertake something against Czechoslovakia as well. I replied that he could set his mind at rest, that Hitler had told me on the previous evening, in reply to my suggestion that the Austrian Anschluss might create unrest in Czechoslovakia, that he had no thoughts of undertaking anything against Czechoslovakia. Mastny then asked me whether Germany still considered herself bound by the agreement concluded in 1925. On the strength of the answer given to me by Hitler I was able to confirm this with a clear conscience. Hitler had added in this connection that he believed the relations with Czechoslovakia would even improve considerably. The settlement of the Austrian Anschluss was after all a domestic affair. M. Mastny's report states that I spoke on Hitler's instructions. However, that is not true. I merely referred to my discussion with Hitler which was fresh in my mind. When M. Mastny in this report stresses the fact that I spoke as the president of the Secret Cabinet Council, he may have been using a manner of speech in order to give more weight to his report.