dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I quote two lines from the argument at the top of Page 5 of the exhibit: "For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful intentions of Italy and Germany." Then we get the Fuehrer's answer to those arguments, half-way down Page 5: "The Fuehrer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn, the more difficult would military operations in eastern Europe become. From the middle of September weather conditions made air operations hardly possible in these areas, while the conditions of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for motorized forces. From September to May, Poland was a great marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations. Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in October . . . and Germany would not be able to do anything about it since they obviously could not bombard or destroy the place." They couldn't possibly bombard or destroy any place where there happened to be Germans living. Warsaw, Rotterdam, England, London--I wonder whether any sentiments of that kind were held in consideration in regard to those places. "Ciano asked how soon, according to the Fuehrer's view, the Danzig question must be settled. The Fuehrer answered that this settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August. To the question of Ciano as to what solution the Fuehrer proposed, Hitler answered that Poland must give up political control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would obviously be reserved and that Polish general behavior must contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since, up to the present, the German proposals had been refused. The Fuehrer had made this proposal personally to Beck, at his visit to Obersalzberg. They were extremely favorable to Poland.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In return for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete guarantee of Polish interests, and the establishment of a connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would have given a frontier guarantee, a 25-year pact of friendship, and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck had received the proposal with the remark that he was willing to examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia, and even proposed .to advance to Berlin ...."--That was something quite different. The meeting was held over that night, and it continued on the following day. On Page 7, in the middle of the page, it will be seen: "The Fuehrer had therefore come to two definite conclusions: (1) in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately attack; (2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her political intention, she must be forced to do so." I go to the last line on that page: "As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist further in the world through the lack of space; not only was there no more space, but existing space was completely blockaded by its present possessors; they sat like misers with their heaps of gold and deluded themselves about their riches .... The Western Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the world and would not regard Germany and Italy as in their class. This psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst thing about the whole business. It could only be settled by a life death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet more easily because their interests did not clash on any point. "The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for which Italy had claim to predominance. The Duce himself . . . had summed up the position to him in the words that Italy, because of its geographic location, was already the dominant power in the Mediterranean.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On the other hand, the Fuehrer said that Germany must take the old German road eastwards and that this road was also desirable for economic reasons, and that Italy had geographical and historical claims to permanency in the Mediterranean. Bismarck . . . had recognized it and had said as much in his well-known letter to Mazzini. The interests of Germany and Italy went in quite different directions and there never could be a conflict between them. "The Minister of Foreign Affairs added that if the two problems mentioned in yesterday's conversations were settled, Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work against the West. The Fuehrer said that Poland must be struck down so that for 10 years"--there appears to have been a query raised in the translation--"for so many years long she would have been incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the west could be settled. "Ciano thanked the Fuehrer for his extremely clear explanation of the situation. He had, one his side, nothing to add and would give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite information on one point, in order that the Duce might have all the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no decision because the Fuehrer believed that the conflict with Poland could be localized. On the basis of lone experience decision of the Fuehrer, and German reaction would follow in a moment. The second condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano therefore asked what was the date by which Poland must have satisfied Germany about her political condition. He realized that this date depended upon climatic conditions. "The Fuehrer answered that the decision of Poland must be made clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the decisive part of military operations against Poland could be carried out within a period of 14 days, and the final liquidation would need another . . . 4 weeks, it could be finished at the end of September or the beginning of October. These could be regarded as the dates.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It followed, therefore, that the last date on which he could begin to take action was the end of August. "Finally, the Fuehrer reassured Ciano that since his youth he had favored German-Italian co-operation, and that To other view was expressed in his publications. He had always thought that Germany and Italy were naturally suited for collaboration, since there were no conflicts of interest between them. He was personally fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from himself, there was one other statesman who would stand out great and unique in history; that he could be this man's friend was for him a matter of great personal satisfaction, and if the hour of common battle struck, he would always be found on the side of the Duce for better or for worse."
THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes. A recess was taken.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If the Tribunal please, I never actually put that last document that I was referring to in as an exhibit. It is Document TC-77, which becomes GB-48. Having referred the Tribunal to those documents showing that the military preparations were throughout the whole period in hand and nearing their completion, I would refer to one letter from the defendant Funk, showing that at the same time the economists had not been idle. It is a letter dated the 26th of August 193g, in which Funk is writing to his F0hrer. He says: "My Fuehrer! I thank you sincerely and heartily for your most friendly and kind wishes on the occasion of my birthday. How happy and how grateful to you we ought to be for being granted the favor of experiencing these overwhelmingly great and world-changing times and taking part in the mighty events of these days. "The information given to me by Field Marshal Goering, that you, my Fuehrer, yesterday evening approved in principle the measures prepared by me for financing the war and for shaping the relationship between wages and prices and for carrying through emergency sacrifices, made me deeply happy. I hereby report to you, with all respect, that I have succeeded by means of precautions taken during the last few months, in making the Reich Bank internally so strong and externally so unassailable that even the most serious shocks in the international money and credit market cannot affect us in the least. In the meantime, I have quite inconspicuously changed into gold all the assets of the Reich Bank and of the whole of the German economy abroad on which it was possible to lay hands. Under the proposals I have prepared for a ruthless elimination of all consumption which is not of vital importance and of all public expenditure and public works which hare not of importance for the war effort, we will be in a position to cope with all demands on finance and economy without any serious shocks.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have considered it my duty as the general plenipotentiary for economy, appointed by you, to make this report and solemn promise to you, my Fuehrer. Heil my Fuehrer"--signed--"Walter Funk." That document is PS-699, and it goes in as GB-49. It is difficult in view of that letter to see how the Defendant Funk can say that he did not know of the preparations and of the intentions of the German Government to wage war. I come now to the speech which Hitler made on the 22d of August at Obersalzberg to his commanders-in-chief. By the end of the third week of August, preparations were complete. That speech has already been read to the Tribunal. I would, perhaps, ask the Tribunal's patience if I quoted literally half a dozen lines so as to carry the story on in sequence. On the first page of PS-1014, which is already USA-30, the fourth line: "Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers." The second paragraph: "Destruction of Poland is in the foreground. The aim is the elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective." Again, the famous sentence in the third paragraph: "I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the right is what matters but victory." We are going to see only too clearly how that propagandistic cause, which already had been put in hand, was brought to its climax. I turn to the next page (798-PS, USA-29), the third paragraph: " It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I had already made this decision in the spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East." I refer to these passages again particularly to emphasize the intention of the Nazi Government, not only to conquer Poland, but ultimately, in any event, to wage aggressive war against the Western Democracies. I refer lastly to the last page, a passage which becomes more and more significant as we continue the story of the last few days: I quote from the fourth paragraph: "We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a big aim, which demands great efforts. I am, only afraid that at the last minute some 'Schweinehund' will make a proposal for mediation. "The political aim is set farther. A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony. The way is open for the soldier, after I have made the political preparations." And, again, the very last line becomes significant later: "Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance that the Armed Forces will do their duty." We pass from the military-economic preparations and his exhortations to his generals to see how he was developing the position in the diplomatic and political field. On the 23rd of August 1939 the Danzig Senate passed a decree whereby Gauleiter Forster was appointed head of the State of the Free City of Danzig, a position which did not exist under the statute setting up the constitution of the Free City. I put in the next document, which is taken from the British Blue Book , only as evidence of that event, an event that was, of course, aimed at stirring up the feeling in the Free City at that time. That is TC-72, Number 62, which becomes GB-50. At the same time, frontier incidents were being manufactured by the Nazi Government with the aid of the SS.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The Tribunal has already heard the evidence of General Lahousen the other day in which he referred to the provision of Polish uniforms to the SS forces for these purposes, so that dead Poles could be found lying about the German side of the frontier. I refer the Tribunal now to three short reports which corroborate the evidence that that gentleman came and gave before you, and they are found in the British Blue Book . They are reports from the British Ambassador in Warsaw. The first of them, TC-72, Number 53, which becomes GB-51, is dated 26th of August. "A series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German frontier. "Polish patrol met a party of Germans one kilometer from the East Prussian frontier near Pelta. Germans opened fire. Polish patrol replied, killing leader, whose body is being returned. "German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo, twice near Bybnik, and twice elsewhere, firing shots and attacking blockhouses and customs posts with machine guns and hand grenades. Poles have protested vigorously to Berlin. "Gazeta Polska, in an inspired lead article today, says these are more than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts of aggression of pare-military disciplined detachments, supplied with regular army's arms, and in one case it was a regular army detachment. Attacks more or less continuous. "These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and strong attitude of defense. Facts spoke for themselves and acts of aggression came from German side. This was the best answer to the ravings of German press. "Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detachment has since shot a Pole across frontier and wounded another." I pass to the next report, TC-72, Number 54, which becomes GB-52. It is dated the same date, the 26th of August. "Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story recounted by Hitler to the French Ambassador that 24 Germans were recently killed at Lodz and eight at Bielsko.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The story is without any foundation whatever." And lastly, TC-72, Number 55, which becomes GB-53, the report of the next day, the 27th of August. "So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-treatment of German minority by Polish authorities are gross exaggeration, if not complete falsification. "2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation by Polish civil authorities. Warsaw, and so far as I can ascertain, the rest of Poland is still completely calm. "3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda methods regarding Czechoslovakia last year. "4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has since March"--since the date when the rest of Czechoslovakia was seized and they were ready to go against Poland--"that has since March exacerbated feeling between the two nationalities. I suppose this has been done with the object: "(a) Creating war spirit in Germany, (b) impressing public opinion abroad, (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent aggression in Poland. "5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two latter objects. "6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by Herr Hitler. "7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority is apparently negligible factor compared with alleged sufferings of Germans in Poland where, be it noted, they do not amount to more than 10 per cent of the population in any commune. "8. In the face of these facts it can hardly be doubted that, if Herr Hitler decided on war, it is for the sole purpose of destroying Polish independence. "9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister for Foreign Affairs necessity of doing everything possible to prove that Hitler's allegations regarding German minority are false." And yet, again, we have further corroboration of General Lahousen's evidence in a memorandum, which has been captured, of a conversation between the writer and Keitel. It is 795-PS, and it becomes GT-54.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That conversation with Keitel took place on the 17th of August, and from the memorandum I quote the first paragraph: "I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel He said that he would not pay any attention to this action, as the Fuehrer had not informed him, and had only let him know that we were to furnish Heydrich with Polish uniforms. He agrees that I instruct The General Staff. He says he does not think much of actions of this kind. However, there is nothing else to be done if they have been ordered by the Fuehrer; that he could not ask the Fuehrer how he had planned the execution of this special action. In regard to Dirsehau, he has decided that this action would be executed only by the Army." That then, My Lord, was the position at the end of the first week in August--I mean at the end of the third week in August. On the 22d of August the Russian-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Moscow, and we have heard in Hitler's speech of that date to his commanders-in-chief how it had gone down as a shock to the rest of the world. In fact, the orders to invade Poland were given immediately after the signing of that treaty, and the H-hour was actually to be in the early morning of the 25th of August. Orders were given to invade Poland in the early hours of the 25th of August, and that I shall prove in a moment. On the same day--the 23rd of August--that the German-Russian Agreement was signed in Moscow, news reached England that it was being signed. And of course the significance of it from a military point of view as to Germany, particularly in the present circumstances, was obvious; and the British Government immediately made their position clear in one last hope--and that one last hope was that if they did so the German Government might possibly think better of it. And I refer to Document TC-72, Number 56; it is the first document in the next to the last part of the Tribunal document book, in which the Prime Minister wrote to Hitler.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That document becomes GB-55: "Your Excellency: "Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures taken by His Majesty's Government, and announced in the press and on the wireless this evening. "These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, been rendered necessary by the military movements which have been reported from Germany and by the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland, which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and which they a redetermined to fulfill. "It has been alleged that, if His Majesty's Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty's Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding. "If the case should arise, they are resolved and prepared to employ without delay all the forces at their command; and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous delusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured." Thereafter the Prime Minister urged the German Government to try and resolve the difficulty without recourse to the use of force; and he suggested that a truce should be declared while direct discussions between the two Governments, the Polish and German Governments, might take place. I quote in Prime Minister Chamberlain's language: "At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe in war.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In view of the grave consequences to humanity which may follow from the action of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put before you " On the following day, the 23rd of August, Hitler replied to Prime Minister Chamberlain, and that document is TC-72, Number 60, and it becomes GB-56. He starts off by saying that Germany has always wanted England's friendship, and has always done everything to get it; on the other hand, she has some essential interests which it is impossible for Germany to renounce. I quote the third paragraph: "Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig and of the corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegation which is disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization against Poland"--we see here the complete dishonesty of the whole business--"the assertion of aggressive designs towards Ptomania, Hungary, and so forth as well as these-called guarantee declarations, which were subsequently given, had, however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate on a basis of this kind which would have been tolerable for Germany also. "The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland, that she would render assistance to that country in all circumstances regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring, could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement thenceforward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German inhabitants living in Poland." Again I cannot help remembering the report by the British Ambassador, to which I just referred: "The atrocities which since then have been taking place in that country are terrible for the victims but intolerable for a great power such as the German Reich, which is expected to remain a passive onlooker during these happenings.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Poland has been guilty of numerous breaches of her obligations towards the Free City of Danzig, has made demands in the character of ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic strangulation." It goes on to say that "Germany will not tolerate a continuance of the persecution" and the fact that there is a British guarantee to Poland makes no difference to her determination to end this state of affairs. from Paragraph 7: "The German Reich Government has received information to the effect that the British Government has the intention to carry out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures other than those of a defensive character against England or France and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended, and does not in the future intend, to attack England or France, it follows that this announcement as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a contemplated act of menace directed against the Reich. I, therefore, inform your Excellency that in the event of these military announcements being carried into effect, I shall order immediate mobilization of the German forces." If the intention of the German Government had been peaceful, if they really wanted peace and not war, what was the purpose of these lies; these lies saying that they had never intended to attack England or France, carried out no mobilization, statements which, in view of what we now have, we know to be lies?. What can have been their object if their intention had always been for a peaceful settlement of the Danzig question only?