dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
ROSENBERG: This document is correct. It was also submitted to me in the preliminary interrogation. It shows that, although I knew that the Fuehrer had not accepted my more far-reaching proposals, I continued to fight for these more far-reaching proposals. And it shows, further, that I saw the Fuehrer personally, so that a few crazy middle-class people in the East would not make derogatory remarks about other nations whose standard of living may to all appearances have been poor at the time. From the many thousands who came in there, I could not expect either sympathy or antipathy, but I could demand one thing of them if their attitude was contemptuous, and that was to keep it to themselves and to act decently. In conclusion I would like to add something which is extraordinarily decisive, namely, it says here in the last paragraph, "I ask that the Fuehrer rule on this record and the draft decree." This instruction is unfortunately not attached to the document; I believe that much would have been proved from it.
MR. DODD: All right. Now let's turn to Document R36, Exhibit USA-699. [The document was submitted to the defendant.] You have seen this document before, haven't you?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I have seen it.
MR. DODD: Now, this is a memorandum submitted to you by one of your subordinates, Dr. Markull, and directly submitted to you by Leibbrandt, also one of your subordinates, one of your top men, on the 19th of August 1942. I want you to follow along with me while I read you certain passages from it. The first few lines are dated the 5th of September 1942, and it says, "To the Reich Minister; on the premises." It states that there is enclosed a memorandum containing the opinion of Dr. Markull on the matter of the Bormann letter of the 23rd July. Before we go into this just for a minute-if you will just pay attention to this-you told us yesterday that you were in disagreement with Bormann about some matters. Is that so?
ROSENBERG: I said...
MR. DODD: Just answer the question. Did you tell us that yesterday?
ROSENBERG: On decisive points I did not agree with Bormann. I testified that in the course of years I was assailed in such a way that, on occasion, I had to give him an appeasing answer. My whole policy was to...
MR. DODD: All right. Let's look at this document, which is, as I say, a memorandum about a Bormann letter to you, dated the 23rd of July, I assume 1942: "On 23 July 1942, Reichsleiter Bormann sent the Minister a letter which enumerates in eight paragraphs the principles which the Minister is to follow in administering the Occupied Eastern Territories." It goes on to say that you, in a message to the Fuehrer dated the 11th of August 1942, explained in detail to what extent these principles are already being put into practice or used as a basis of policy. The next paragraph says: "Any person reading this correspondence is struck, first of all, by the complete agreement of concepts. The Minister"- that is you-"apparently was particularly concerned about two points. The first relates to the protection of German rule against the pressure of the Slav race; the second to the absolute necessity of simplifying the administration. These are indeed decisive problems, of which more will have to be said." Then there is this statement: "For the rest, the Minister"-referring to you-"not only raises no objections against Bormann's principles or even his phraseology; on the contrary, he uses them as a basis for his reply anti endeavors to show that they are already being put into practice. When, however, Bormann's letter was read out by Captain Zimmermann in a conference of the department chiefs, grave concern was shown at once, both on account of the phraseology of the letter and the future conduct of our Eastern policy." Then it goes on to say: "In order to find out whether this concern is justified, it is best to start from a supposition which clearly shows the prevailing situation." Then, under the Number I, Markull writes: "Let us suppose Bormann's letter were issued to the Reich commissioners as a ministerial decree. This supposition is by no means unrealistic since the Minister"-and that again refers to you-"appears to hold identical views.
MR. DODD: Since the Ostland presents a special case, and moreover the Ukraine is, or will become probably the most important region politically, the following discussion will mainly be based on that region." Then, going on: "The consequences of a decree of this kind will best be judged by its effect on those men whose duty it is to put it into practice." Moving down a little bit, he says: "Imagine the formulas of Bormann's letter translated into the language of a member of the German civilian administration, and you will get, roughly, the following views: "The Slavs are to work for us. Insofar as we do not need them, they may die. Therefore, compulsory vaccination and German health service are superfluous. The fertility of the Slavs is undesirable. They may use contraceptives or practice abortion, the more the better. Education is dangerous. It is enough if they can count up to 100. At best an education which produces useful coolies for us is admissible. Every educated person is a future enemy. Religion we leave to them as a means of diversion. As for food, they will not get any more than is necessary. We are the masters; we come first." Then it goes on to say: "These sentences are by no means overstatements. On the contrary they are covered, word by word, by the spirit and the text of Bormann's letter. Already at this point the question arises whether such a result is desirable in the interests of the Reich. It can hardly be doubted that these views would become known to the Ukrainian people. Similar opinions prevail already today." Moving on, the next paragraph, with the Number 2, says: "But there is no real need to assume a fictitious decree as was done in Paragraph 1. The above-mentioned concept of our role in the East already exists in practice. The Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine has expounded his views of the Ukrainian people governed by him in three successive speeches at the inauguration...."- et cetera . And he goes on to quote those speeches, which have been referred to before this Tribunal.
MR. DODD: Then, in the next paragraph, he says that every visitor and every member of the local civil administration can confirm this from his own observations, and they show particularly clearly how well the soil is prepared for the Bormann letter. Then he goes on to quote statements that have been made by saying, "To be exact, we are here among negroes; the population is just dirty and lazy," and so on. And then, passing on, he says: "I may add that Kreisleiter Knuth, whom the Gauleiter still retains in spite of the gravest accusations against his professional integrity, declared, in conversations on the Kiev question, that Kiev ought to be depopulated through epidemics. Altogether it would be best if the superfluous part of the population starved to death." Moving on further we come to the third paragraph down. It says: "Finally among the district commissioners 80 percent oppose the views described above. In many conferences with the general commissioners they emphasized that the population ought to be treated decently and with understanding." And, that statements opposing such policies as referred to above will result in a catastrophe. That is what the next paragraph says. And then Markull goes on to say: "For the rest the only effect of the false concepts of the 'master race' is to relax the discipline of our officials." I will not take the time to read all of it. I am sure you are reading it. Then we move on and we come to this very significant paragraph, with a Number 5: "However, it must be examined whether there is not in fact an agreement between the policy hitherto pursued and the Bormann letter in the sense that the decrees quoted above and the other instructions of the ministry are to be understood merely as tactical moves, whereas in fact there is no divergence of opinion.
MR. DODD: The Minister's reply"-I remind you each time the Minister refers to you-"of 11 August might be considered to point in this direction." Then he goes on to say: "In answer to this it should be pointed out that the Minister knows very well that it is not possible to reorganize a continent of the size of Russia by means of political tactics and by wearing the mask of a liberator, but only by applying a statesmanlike conception appropriate to the political conditions."-And so on. And finally he says: "Another reason why..." I want to be fair about this document with you. He indicates that perhaps it should not be interpreted merely as a tactical maneuver, because of the inconsistency which this would imply. For in that case the word "liberation" ought never to have been mentioned and no theater should be allowed to stay open, no trade school, no Ukrainian university should be allowed to function. And finally I would like to read you-not finally-but I would like to read you this significant paragraph. It states-and I think you will allow me to summarize it-that this letter of Bormann's, which originated from the field headquarters, simply cannot be issued as a ministerial decree, since it would disavow the entire policy hitherto announced by the Minister-yourself. And in this connection, a few sentences down, says Markull: "It is necessary to point once more to the obvious similarity between the opinions professed by Koch and the instructions given in the Bormann letter." Then, about halfway down the paragraph, it says only you can decide upon this question and he suggests certain considerations which might be useful, recounting some difficulties. And finally you come, under Number II to the second paragraph: "Without wishing to criticize in any way the statements of Reichsleiter Bormann it is yet necessary to point out that the wording of his letter does not always bring out clearly the importance of the issue at stake. A phrase like 'brisk trade in contraceptives' had better not be brought into connection with the name of the Fuehrer.
MR. DODD: In the same way abrupt phrases like 'vaccination of the non-German population is completely out of the question,' "-and so on-"would hardly seem to be entirely in keeping with the importance of the historical problems involved here." Finally, to go on, I want to read you this, under Number III, Markull states: "The statements set out above may appear very sharp. They are, however, dictated by concern and duty." And finally-well, I don't think there is any necessity to read the last paragraph. It merely talks about the political philosophy which is being raised in a grandiose manner by the Japanese ally in his new districts. Now, you remember this memorandum that you received through your assistant, Leibbrandt, from your subordinate, Markull? You can answer that "yes" or "no," by the way; that is all I want to know right now-whether or not you remember it. Will you wait just a minute?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I received this report from Dr. Leibbrandt, and I would like to make the following explanation.
MR. DODD: Just before you do that-you will have an opportunity; I won't shut you up on any explanations or even attempt to-I have one or two things I would like to ask you about it, and then if you feel the need to explain them or anything else I feel sure the Tribunal will permit you to do so. You had written a letter in answer to the Bormann letter, hadn't you?
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.
MR. DODD: And you had agreed with these-if I may use the term-shocking suggestions of Bormann? In your letter you had agreed with these shocking suggestions of Bormann? "Yes" or "no"?
ROSENBERG: I wrote an appeasing letter so that I could bring about a pause in the constant pressure under which I was kept, and I would dike to anticipate and say that my activity, and the decrees which I issued after this letter, did not change in any way; but, on the contrary, decrees were issued setting up a school system and for the further continuation of health control. I will discuss it further in my reply.
MR. DODD: You wrote this letter to the Fuehrer; you did not write it to Bormann, did you? Your answer went to Hitler?
ROSENBERG: I wrote my reply to the Fuehrer, yes.
MR. DODD: And you were appeasing the Fuehrer as well, were you, when you mouthed back the phrases such as are repeated in this letter about the use of contraceptives and abortion?
ROSENBERG: No; besides...
MR. DODD: Wait until I finish. I was saying, in your letter to the Fuehrer you wrote back those horrid suggestions of Bormann, didn't you-those nasty, horrid suggestions of Bormann, I might say? You wrote them to Hitler?
ROSENBERG: I wrote a letter to the Fuehrer, but did not use the wording of Bormann's letter. I wrote appealingly to the Fuehrer that I was not doing any more than could and had to be done. I wanted to ward off an attack from headquarters for I knew it would come because I did more for the Eastern peoples than for the German people-that I was demanding more doctors than the German people had for their sick, that I was doing more in my capacity as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories for the health problem and thereby for the Eastern people than German doctors could do for the German people. The attack had reached such proportions that Koch finally accused me of promoting a policy of immigration. That was the reason why the conflict arose shortly thereafter and was brought to the Fuehrer.
MR. DODD: Just so there will be no doubt about this-I don't want there to be any misunderstanding and nobody else does-are you telling us that you did not write back almost word for word what Bormann wrote to you?
ROSENBERG: I do not have the letter here verbatim.
MR. DODD: But you have the Markull memorandum here, which says that the Minister not only raises no objections against Bormann's principles or even his phraseology. Now surely one of your subordinates would not be impertinent enough to write you a memorandum like that unless it was perfectly true that you had done so?
ROSENBERG: I welcomed very much that my collaborators always had the courage to contradict me and give me their opinion, even concerning something I myself requested. Dr. Leibbrandt came and said to me, "Herr Reich Minister, that certainly is not in accord with what we are all doing here." I said, "Dr. Leibbrandt, please calm yourself. I have written an appeasing explanation. Nothing will be changed. Later I will also speak to the Fuehrer personally about these matters."
MR. DODD: Your subordinate was not afraid to tell you that you had written such a letter in which you agreed word for word with Bormann. I have no trouble with you on that score. That is all I am trying to get you to tell this Tribunal, because it is true that you did write back expressing these word-for-word sentences.
ROSENBERG: That is not correct. The author-I rather say Dr. Leibbrandt-when he gave me this memorandum, read it through in a hurry saying, "There seems to be a gentleman who believes that I cannot do anything else but what I consider right." But in this case I am facing a serious conflict, and I will maintain my position as I consider it right. That may be seen in the documents covering a period of 3 years which I read yesterday. May I give my opinion now on this document?
MR. DODD: Answer this question: Who were you appeasing, Hitler or Bormann? Or both of them?
ROSENBERG: First, I concurred with my collaborator, Dr. Leibbrandt, in the idea that ministerial decrees in that sense would never be released by me. Second, I regulated by a decree the school system in the Ukraine including a 4 year elementary school, trade school, and professional colleges.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. That is not an answer to the question. You said that you wrote an appeasing answer. The question is whom were you trying to appease. Was it Hitler or was it Bormann or was it both?
ROSENBERG: Yes, both of them; yes.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, would this be a convenient time to break off?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. [A recess was taken.]
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have stated yesterday that the document books for Frank have already been translated. However, it appears-I have just found this out-that the document books are not yet bound because the office authorized to do that has not yet received permission from another competent office. Perhaps the Tribunal could order the binding of the document books, or else the whole translation is useless.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: I did not know there was any delay, but I will see to it right away that they get it as far as we are able to do it.
ROSENBERG: May I say something about this document? This memorandum, as I stated in the beginning, is based on the supposition of a possible ministerial decree. It obviously uses phrases which Bormann had used in his letter, but my letter which I sent to the Fuehrer cannot possibly contain these phrases. It may have contained appeasing statements to the effect that I did nothing in the Occupied Eastern Territories for which I was reproached; that is to say, that I did nothing for the German population but that I established large health departments, school departments, education departments, et cetera; and that now I was absolutely compelled to simplify these administrative departments. But that Bormann made these statements, that he used these phrases! It is regrettable that he expressed himself in this way; and during the last few years we were compelled to observe an unnecessarily large number of similar instances. I may add briefly that he himself stated that the Minister apparently intervened to clarify these things there, but I want to indicate one decisive point, and that is that the opinions advanced by Bormann were also familiar to Koch's circle. During these tragic years my entire efforts were directed against Koch's personal circle, especially in the training of administrative leaders; and that can be seen from Paragraph 3, where it says, "Moreover, at least 80 percent of the district commissioners are opposed to the views described."
MR. DODD: I think we all know what is in it. If you have any explanation, I think you ought to make it.
ROSENBERG: Yes. On Page 4, it says the great majority of the administrative leadership corps set their hopes in the Minister- that is, myself-and I endeavored and tried to fulfill these hopes of the administrative leadership corps, which I attempted to educate by means of my decrees because these thousands of people could not know the vast Eastern territories, these thousands who, even in the fight against Bolshevism, sometimes had no very clear conception of the state of things in the East; and I must emphasize the fact that the author here says that the decree issued by the Minister on 17 March 1942 reemphasizes his former decrees in a more rigorous form. The decree of 13 May 1942 attacks the view that the Ukrainians were not a race at all and attacks the false conception of superiority. Thus, these are two decrees which I have not received and which are here; and furthermore, Mr. Prosecutor, I say that he points out quite correctly that of course the Minister- that is, myself-knows very well that such a continent has to be treated differently than in accordance with these suggestions which we have heard. As a consequence of these proceedings, however, I have positively established that after that correspondence between Koch and Bormann I introduced the orderly setup of a school administration in the Ukraine by issuing a detailed decree. Secondly, I requested the extension of the...
MR. DODD: I am not interested in that. Just a minute.
ROSENBERG: Well, I have to answer these accusations.
MR. DODD: That is no answer to this, if Your Honor pleases, and no explanation of this document. He is launching off on one of these long speeches again about what he did after the document was received or after he wrote the letter, and I ask that he be instructed to answer that question and not to go on into statements about what he did in the administration in the Ukraine. I don't think it is pertinent.
ROSENBERG: I spoke to the Fuehrer personally about this and told him-that decree of May 1943 is in my file-I told him that it was impossible to work in the East with this kind of talk from Koch and his following.
THE PRESIDENT: If there is a letter in your file or if there is not a letter in your file, your counsel can reexamine you upon crossexamination, but you cannot in crossexamination go into long explanations. You must answer the question "yes" or "no" and explain, if you must explain, shortly. You have been explaining this document for a long time.
MR. DODD: When did you first meet Erich Koch?
ROSENBERG: Erich Koch?
MR. DODD: Yes.
ROSENBERG: In the twenties. It may have been 1927 or 1928 . . .
MR. DODD: Apparently you have known him, then, a great many years?
ROSENBERG: I have not seen him often, but as Gauleiter I talked to him personally now and again.
MR. DODD: When did he become a Gauleiter?
ROSENBERG: I believe in the year 1928 he became Gauleiter in East Prussia, but I cannot give the exact date when he became Gauleiter.
MR. DODD: That is all right. I want an approximate date. Did you have much to do with him from the time that he was appointed Gauleiter, let us say, until 1940?
ROSENBERG: During the fighting years, I had practically nothing at all to do with him. Then later, after 1933, I talked to him several times.
MR. DODD: You had a pretty good knowledge, I assume, in any event, of his general reputation among his friends and acquaintances?
ROSENBERG: I knew Koch had a very excitable temperament' going from one extreme to the other and hard to keep steady, and therefore not reliable in carrying out a steady policy.
MR. DODD: I take it from your answer, that you were not aware, however, before he became the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, of his temperament in this way, that you did not know that he did these terrible things, which he did do while Reich Commissioner in the Ukraine, did you?
ROSENBERG: No, and...
MR. DODD: That is an answer and there is no need to explain that.
ROSENBERG: I even knew that Koch had expressed the opposite opinion previously, and that he had said that the youth of the East embraces also the German youth. He previously wrote that.
MR. DODD: So I take it you were surprised when this man turned out to be the kind of man that he did turn out to be. Is that a fair statement?
ROSENBERG: That only came to light gradually later on. Another person could not foresee that this temperament would involve such results and it would not have gone so far had he not been supported by somebody else.
MR. DODD: You don't think he was quite so good a man as appears from the record, but was rather encouraged by some others; is that what you are trying to tell us?
ROSENBERG: Yes, that, of course, contributed.
MR. DODD: I am going to ask that you be shown Document 1019-PS; it becomes Exhibit USA-823. By the way, before we look at that document, Koch is the man whom you blame to a very great extent for many of these terrible things that happened under your ministry in the Ukraine, isn't he? There isn't any doubt about that. You told us about that all day yesterday.
ROSENBERG: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, could you go just a little bit slower?
MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor, I will. [Turning to the defendant.] If you look at this document, you will see that it is a memorandum about your recommendations as to the personnel for the Reich commissions in the East and for the central political office in Berlin; and it was written on the 7th day of April 1941, and I take it that that was only a few days after Hitler talked to you about your new assignment in the East, 4 or 5 days at the most; isn't that so? Will you answer that question?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
MR. DODD: Now, in this memorandum you set out that you recommended Gauleiter Lohse and we know from the documents and the testimony that he was appointed; isn't that a fact?
ROSENBERG: Yes.