dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
BRIGADIER GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): This might later be relevant in the trial of these individuals, if they can show that they never really had the status and responsibility of a commander-in-chief, but is not important in contemplating the group as a whole. Several affidavits submitted by the Defense point out that a few generals were members of the group for less than 6 months; that a number of them died or were removed or retired from their positions before the end of the war, and that the younger ones were not generals when the war started. This is all quite natural. We are concerned here with a seven-year period, during most of which there was a war, which is a hazardous and wearing occupation. During these years some generals died, others failed, still others fell out of favor; new faces appeared as replacements; the great increase in the number of German army groups and armies brought still other officers into the status of commander-in-chief. To the extent that in war the hazards were sharper and the failures more costly in the Wehrmacht than in politics, this turnover may have been correspondingly greater in the Wehrmacht than in the Party. But again, these questions are relevant only on the degree of responsibility of individual members, and not on the responsibility of the group itself. A special point has been made of the fact that many members of the group did not become such until after 1942. The argument drawn from this circumstance is, I take it, that the generals who joined the group only after 1942 could not have taken part in the planning and launching of aggressive wars. It is true that by the end of 1942 the Wehrmacht, led by the accused group, had invaded or overrun all or a large part of every neighboring country except Switzerland and Sweden, so that further wars of aggression had become impracticable. I suppose that it might be urged with equal, if any, force that many Germans joined or rose to high rank, in the SS or the Party Leadership group after 1942.
BRIGADIER GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): Certainly the argument ignores that the military leadership group, long after 1942, was a group whose official orders were to murder commandos and commissars and to achieve "pacification" by spreading terror. Many of the atrocities committed by the German Armed Forces occurred late in the war. Once again, this point has substance only in that individual late-comers to the group may show in other proceedings that they never learned of, and did not join in, the criminal activities. The group itself cannot escape responsibility by pleading that it continued to grow after the Third Reich's capacity to initiate aggressive wars had been exhausted. The Defense tells us that the military leaders were not a "group," because they merely occupied official positions without any "unifying element." This is a factual question. Its solution is not advanced by nice linguistic points, such as whether the German word "Gruppe" means "group" or "number." I suppose that "group" means a number of persons chosen because of some likeness. Or, as Mr. Justice Jackson puts it, the members must have an "identifiable relationship" and a "collective general purpose." I suppose also that the "likeness" or "relationship" and the purpose must be meaningful under the London Agreement. The generals who held the positions listed in the Indictment constituted the military leadership of the Third Reich. That is their "likeness," their "identifiable relationship," or their "unifying element." Their "collective general purpose" was to build up and train the Wehrmacht, and to make its plans and direct its operations. The evidence to this effect is, I submit, conclusive and uncontradicted. Leading German generals--Brauchitsch and Halder--have said in sworn statements, that those who held the positions listed in the Indictment had the "actual direction of the Armed Forces" and "were in effect the General Staff and High Command." The technical objections made later by the Defense with respect to the chart are quite irrelevant to this essential point.
BRIGADIER GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): The testimony of numerous generals, assuming its credibility, that the military leaders did not have any formal organization or any secret advisory council, is quite wide of the mark. The Prosecution has not charged this; nor has it charged that the military leaders were a political party, or that they had a set or uniform view on internal political matters. Nor are we surprised to hear from some Defense witnesses that the Germans, like ourselves, found co-ordination within a single service easier to achieve than co-ordination between the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The mere existence of the OKW is sufficient proof of the importance which the Germans attached to inter-service collaboration, and numerous documents show that constant and detailed planning and discussion took place between the three services. In any event, it is quite unnecessary to look behind the actual course of events. Surely no one would have suggested in 1941, after witnessing the co-ordinated use of tanks and stukas in Africa, and the team-play of all three services during the Norwegian invasion, that the German war effort lacked co-ordination. From the standpoint of military planning, we are told by Halder that the most important part of the OKW was the Armed Forces Operations Staff, of which Jodl and Warlimont were the chief and deputy chief respectively. The field commanders, too, participated in planning. We know from Brauchitsch and Blaskowitz that the military plans for the- attacks on Poland and other countries were submitted in advance to the commanders-in-chief of army groups and armies, so that OKH would have the benefit of their recommendations. Brauchitsch and Blaskowitz have also told us that, during operations, the OKH and the commanders-in-chief of army groups and armies were in continual consultation, and that the commanders-in-chief were repeatedly consulted by Hitler himself. The testimony of General Reinhardt is to the same effect.
BRIGADIER GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): Contemporary documents clearly show the participation of the field commanders-in-chief in planning for the Polish campaign. The commanders-in-chief of army groups and armies in occupied territories had executive power (Vollziehende Gewalt) within the areas under their command. Within those areas they were supreme, and had the power of life and death over the inhabitants. They had the responsibility for determining such questions as whether the Commissar and Commando Orders should be distributed, and if so, how widely and with what instructions. To summarize, these generals were an aggregation of persons who directed the German Armed Forces, and whose collective purpose was to prepare it for and lead it in military operations. From time to time, when all the members met together, it was a congregation. The purpose and spirit of the London Agreement clearly bring such a body, of men within the scope of Article 9 thereof. The Agreement established this Tribunal to try such offenses in the planning and waging of aggressive wars, and violations of the laws and customs of war. The German military leaders are charged, among other things, with developing the plans under which aggressive and illegal wars were initiated, and with directing the Armed Forces in the launching and waging of these wars. They are charged with circulating throughout the Wehrmacht orders directing the murder of certain types of prisoners, and with aiding, abetting, and joining in the murder and ill-treatment of the civilian population, all in violation of the laws and customs of war. The argument of the Defense that the military leaders are not a "group" and are therefore immune to a declaration under Article 9 is, we submit, utterly unfounded, and flatly contrary to the plain purposes of the London Agreement. That agreement cannot be reasonably construed to exclude from the purview of Article 9 the leaders of one of the two chief instrumentalities of the Third Reich. The Defense appears to contend that membership in this group was not voluntary.
BRIGADIER GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): I say "appears to," because in one breath we are told that the generals could not withdraw from the positions they occupied, and in the next, that many of them resigned because of disagreements with Hitler. The question is, I think, a simple one. We are not concerned here with the ordinary German conscript who made up the bulk of the Wehrmacht. We are concerned entirely with professional soldiers, and with the most zealous, ambitious, and able German officers in the business. Most of them chose a military career because it was in their blood; as Manstein put it, "they considered the glory of war as something great." They slaved at it and were devoted to their profession, and if they reached the status of commander-in-chief, they were, like Manstein, proud that an army had been entrusted to them. No one became a German commander-in-chief unless he wanted to. It is true that in time of war a professional soldier cannot resign his commission or his post at his own free will. But this does not turn the professional officer into a conscript or make his status an involuntary one. No one becomes a professional officer without knowing in advance the obligations that will bind him in time of war. The fanatical Nazis who rushed to volunteer for the early Waffen-SS divisions or who voluntarily joined other para-military sections of, the Party could not thereafter resign at will, but I have not heard it urged that they were conscripts or involuntary members. The members of the General Staff and High Command Group were keen professional warriors, who competed with others like themselves for the responsibilities and honors of being commanders-in-chief. They rose within the Wehrmacht just as an ambitious Party member might rise to be a Kreisleiter or Gauleiter. In fact, retirement was easier for the commander-in-chief than anyone else in the Wehrmacht. The junior officer who protested against what was going on around him, might lose advancement or be moved to a less desirable assignment, or be court-martialed and disgraced.
BRIGADIER GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): He was not given the option of retiring, and he was usually too young to plead illness plausibly. The commanders-in-chief were in a far better position. No War Office or War Department wants a field commander-in-chief who is in constant and fundamental disagreement with his instructions. Such a commander-in-chief must be removed. Yet often he has sufficient seniority, prestige, and acknowledged ability so that his demotion or disgrace would be embarrassing, and retirement or acceptance of resignation is the best solution for all concerned. And this is just what happened with some of the commanders-in-chief. The record is replete with testimony by or about commanders-in-chief who openly, disagreed with Hitler on tactical matters and as a result of such disagreements were retired or allowed to resign. I note in passing that the record is notably barren of evidence that any commander-in-chief openly disagreed with Hitler-- decisively on the issuance of orders which violated the laws of war, or who forced his retirement on account of these orders. At all events, it is quite clear that a commander-in-chief who wanted to retire could contrive to do so; whether by pleading illness or by honest blunt behavior. If he had the will, there was a way out. And it is worth noting that the three Field Marshals who testified before this Tribunal had all found or fallen into the way out, and the record shows that many others were equally successful and that few of them thereafter suffered serious harm on this account. I pass now to the criminal activities. The Prosecution submits that the evidence before the Tribunal conclusively established the participation of the General Staff and High Command Group in accomplishing the criminal ends of the conspiracy, and in the commission of crimes under all parts of Article 6 of the Charter and under all Counts of the Indictment.
BRIGADIER GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): We also submit that the criminal aims, methods, and activities of the group were of such a nature that the members may properly be charged with knowledge of them, and that, for the most part, they had actual knowledge. I will speak first of the prewar period, or, more accurately, of the period ending in the spring of 1939, when detailed planning for the attack on Poland got under way. It is worth noting that during this early period the group defined in the Indictment never exceeded eight in number, and that four are defendants in this Trial. I do not want to spend time retreading much-travelled roads. We know that during these years the military leaders built up the Wehrmacht and made it into a formidable military machine which struck terror into neighboring countries and later succeeded in overrunning most of them. There is not a shred of evidence to contradict the charge that members of the General Staff and High Command Group directed the building and assembling of this machine. Some witnesses have testified that the rearmament was for defensive purposes only, but the Wehrmacht's new strength was promptly used to support Hitler's aggressive diplomatic policy. Austria and Czechoslovakia were conquered by the Wehrmacht, even though there was no war. The events of 1939 to 1942 and the terrible offensive power of the Wehrmacht are a further and sufficient answer, even without referring to Blomberg's official written statement in June 1937 that there was no need to fear an attack on Germany from any quarter. Witnesses for the Defense have made much of the fact that the generals had little or no foreknowledge of the absorption of Austria. Many of these witnesses were not at the time members of the group, but the point is in any event not helpful, since the Anschluss was not timed in advance by the Germans, but was precipitated by Schuschnigg's surprise order for a plebiscite. That is why, as Manstein testified, plans for the march into Austria had to be quickly improvised.
BRIGADIER GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): But the plans were drawn up by Manstein under the supervision of Beck (Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and a member of the group), and other members of the group were closely involved in the Anschluss, as were other generals who later became members. As to the participation of the generals in the Munich crisis and occupation of the Sudetenland, the Defense's main point seems to be that Brauchitsch, Beck, and other generals opposed risking a war at that time. The record makes it quite clear that the generals' attitude was not based on any disagreement with the objective of smashing Czechoslovakia, or on any opposition to a diplomatic policy supported by military threats. Rather was it their attitude that the Wehrmacht was not as yet (in 1938) strong enough to face a war with major powers. The Defendant Jodl expressed it very clearly in his diary in drawing a contrast between "the Fuehrer's intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion of- the Army that we cannot do it as yet, since most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them." The further contention of the Defense that there were no military preparations for the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army gave no instructions in this regard, is completely incredible when weighed against contemporary documents of unquestioned authenticity, which have long bee n in evidence before the Tribunal and which the Defense cannot and did not attempt to explain away. The military directives and planning memoranda contained in the so-called "Fall Gruen" file demolish any such contention, and fully reveal the extensive preparations being made by the Wehrmacht under the leadership of Keitel, Jodl, Brauchitsch, Halder, and others. Jodl's diary gives us further details about such matters as co-ordination of the air and ground offensives, timing of the D-day order, collaboration with the Hungarian Army, and order of battle.
BRIGADIER GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): It also shows the personal participation of other members of the group and of other generals who later became members. Military preparation for absorption of the remainder of Czechoslovakia is also adequately shown by documents in evidence before the Tribunal. One other point about this prewar period should be noted. The military leaders not only participated in the plans; they were delighted with the results. They were afraid of getting into a war before they were adequately prepared, but they wanted a big army, and they wanted the strategic and military advantages which Germany derived from Hitler's Austrian and Czechoslovakian successes. That is, in fact, why the Party leaders -and the military leaders worked together; that is why the generals supported Hitler; that is why the Third Reich, through the Party and the Wehrmacht, was able to achieve what it did achieve. Leading German generals have told the Tribunal this in so many words. Blomberg tells us that before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to Hitler. Blaskowitz says that all officers in the Army welcomed rearmament and therefore had no reason to oppose Hitler. Both of them tell us that Hitler produced the results that all the generals desired. The testimony of Blomberg and Blaskowitz is in no way weakened by the statements of various Defense witnesses that many army officers disliked some of Hitler's internal policies and distrusted some of the Nazi politicians. It is too much to ask that all partners in crime should like and trust each other. That, in spite of these differences, the Third Reich came so close to imposing its dominion and evil theories on the world merely emphasizes the deep agreement between the Party and the military leaders on the most essential objectives--national unity and armed might--in order to accomplish territorial aggrandizement.
BRIGADIER GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): This cannot be doubted, and for confirmation we need only look at the testimony of a witness called by the Defense (Colonel General Reinhardt, who was Chief (f the Army Training Section before the war and later commanded a Panzer army and army group on the Eastern Front). When asked what was the attitude of the officers' corps toward Hitler, he replied: "I do not believe there was a single officer who did not back up Hitler in his extraordinary successes. Hitler had led Germany out of its utmost misery, both politically and in its foreign politics, and economically." So we turn to the war itself. The group of military leaders specified in the Indictment becomes much larger; we are no longer concerned only with the generals in Berlin, but also with the war lords who commanded the Wehrmacht in the field-names far more familiar to and feared by the peoples of the territories overrun by the Germans. Names such as Blaskowitz, Von Bock, Von Kluge, Kesselring, Von Reichenau, Von Rundstedt, Sperrle, and Von Weichs. What do the generals say in defense of the attack on Poland? Some of their statements, like Manstein's explanation that the Poles might "carelessly" attack Germany, are merely laughable. About the best they can say is that they expected that Poland would give in without a struggle. Were this a defense, its credibility is dubious. Hitler himself had made it clear to the military leaders that it was not a question of Danzig and the Corridor, but of living space and increasing the food supply under German exploitation. The generals could have hardly expected the Poles to give themselves up entirely without a struggle, and Hitler had said that there would be war and no repetition of the Czech affair. But in any event it is not claimed by the Defense that the generals hoped for a "Blumenkrieg." The witnesses for the Defense have agreed that the Germain demands on Poland were to be enforced by military threats and armed might. There is no evidence that the generals opposed this policy of sheer hold-up.
BRIGADIER GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): In fact, it is clear that they heartily endorsed it, since the Polish Corridor was regarded by them as a "desecration" and the regaining from Poland of former German territory as a "point of honor." And it has never been a defense that a robber is surprised by the resistance of his victim, and has to commit murder in order to get the money. There is no controversy concerning the knowing participation of the members of the General Staff and High Command group in the planning and launching of the attack itself. Brauchitsch has described how the plans were evolved, and then passed to the field commanders-in-chief for their recommendations. We know, both from his own testimony and from contemporary documents, that Blaskowitz, one of the field commanders-in-chief, received the plans for the attack in June and thereafter perfected them in consultation with the army group and OKH. Rundstedt's chief of staff received the plans, and there can be no doubt that all the other commanders-in-chief did also. A week before the attack, all the members of the group met at the Obersalzberg for the final briefing. As the war spread to other countries, and eventually over the entire continent of Europe, the Wehrmacht grew and many more army groups, armies, air fleets, and naval commands were created and the membership in the group was correspondingly enlarged. All three branches of the Wehrmacht participated in the invasion of Norway and Denmark, which was an excellent demonstration of "combined operations," involving the closest joint planning and co-ordination between the three services. The documents before the Tribunal show that this operation was a brain-child of the German admirals; the proposal originated with Raeder and other naval members of the group and, after Hitler's approval had been obtained, the plans were developed at the OKW. Numerous members of the group participated in its planning and execution.