dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
never lapse when dealing with PWs. The use of arms against PWs is, as a rule, legal. Any contact between PWs and the civilian population must be prevented. This applies particularly to the occupied area. The segregation of higher-ranking PWs (Officers and NCOs), which has already been effected by the field forces, must be strictly maintained in the area of the Armed Forces Commanders and within the Reich. Any communication between higher-ranking personnel and the men, even by signs, must be rendered impossible. Camp-police must be formed from suitable Soviet PWs in the camp and in the larger fatigue details to be employed in carrying out the orders and upholding the discipline of the commandant. Within the wire fence, the camp police may be armed with sticks, whips or other similar weapons to enable them to carry out their duties effectively. The use of this kind of weapon by German soldiers is absolutely forbidden. With the offer of better food, treatment and accommodation, an executive body should be created in the camp; this would decrease the work of the German guard personnel. II. Treatment of members of recial groups. In accordance with orders issued to date, PWs have already been divided up, according to their race, in the "Home Organization" [heimatorganisation] (General Government and Service Command I) as well as in the camps within the Reich. The following racial groups are concerned: Racial Germans Ukrainians White Russians Poles Lithuanians Latvians Esthonians Rumanians Finns Georgians. In so far as it has been impossible for special reasons to carry out this separation, it must now be done at once. This applies, in particular, to PWs newly captured in the Area of the Armed Forces Commanders. Members of the following racial groups must be speedily sent home: Racial Germans Ukrainians, White Ruthenians Latvians Esthonians Rumanians Finns Lithuanians Special orders will be issued on the manner in which this release is to be effected. Should the attitude of individual members of these racial groups arouse the suspicion that they could be detrimental or dangerous to the German people or to National-Socialism, they are to be debarred from release and will be dealt with in accordance with section III. III. Segregation of civilians and politically undesirable PWs
attitude of individual members of these racial groups arouse the suspicion that they could be detrimental or dangerous to the German people or to National-Socialism, they are to be debarred from release and will be dealt with in accordance with section III. III. Segregation of civilians and politically undesirable PWs taken during the Eastern campaign. 1. Intentions. The Armed Forces must rid themselves of all those elements among the PWs which must be considered as the driving forces of bolshevism. The special conditions of the Eastern Campaign demand special measures which can be carried out on their own responsibility, free from bureaucratic and administrative influences. 2. The way to reach the appointed goal. A. Apart from directing PWs into camps according to their nationality (see section II) PWs (also members of racial groups) and any civilians in the camps are to be divided as follows: a. those politically undesirable b. those politically harmless c. those especially reliable in the political sense (who could be employed in the reconstruction work in the occupied areas). B. Whereas the work of separation according to nationality, rank, etc., is undertaken by the camp organization itself, the Reichsfuehrer-SS has assigned Special purpose units of the Security Police and the Security Service for the work of classifying PWs according to their political opinions. They are immediately subordinate to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, have received special training for their special duties and carry out the measures and inquiries, within the framework of the camp organization, according to regulations which they have already received from the Chief of Security Police and the SD. There must be the closest cooperation between the commandants, especially their defense officers, and the special purpose units. 3. Further treatment of groups segregated in accordance with No. 2. A. Military personnel. The special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD decides what persons are to be segregated as "politically undesirable elements". Should individuals, considered as suspicious, later prove themselves to be unsuspicious, they should be sent back to the camp with the other PWs. Requests made by the
personnel. The special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD decides what persons are to be segregated as "politically undesirable elements". Should individuals, considered as suspicious, later prove themselves to be unsuspicious, they should be sent back to the camp with the other PWs. Requests made by the special purpose units for other persons to be handed over, must be complied with. Officers will very often be liable for segregation as "political undesirables". Even soldiers captured in civilian clothes, count as military personnel. B. Civilians. If they are harmless, efforts must be made to send them back quickly to the occupied area. The competent Armed Forces Commander (and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) decides the time this is to be brought about, with the approval of the competent office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. The condition for this return is the assurance of employment in some work in their hometown or in specially created Labour-formations. The Armed Forces Commander (and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) is responsible for guarding them on the return journey. If possible, the camp will provide an escort unit. Politically undesirable civilians are to be treated as under A. C. Reliable persons are to be separated from politically undesirable persons and directed into some other work of camp administration. (Special attention must be paid to racial Germans: it is, however quite possible that, even among these, there may be elements that must be considered as "politically undesirable".) Should the reliable persons seem especially suited for employment in the reconstruction work in the occupied area, a request for release made by the special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD can be opposed only if there is an interest in any specific individual from the point of view of defense. IV. Employment of Soviet PWs. 1. General. Soviet PWs may be employed only in squads completely separate from civilians and PWs of other nationalities. (Employment in groups). The only places of work which can be considered are these where the PWs can work under the constant supervision of the guard personnel. The separation from civilians and PWs of other nationalities must be
in squads completely separate from civilians and PWs of other nationalities. (Employment in groups). The only places of work which can be considered are these where the PWs can work under the constant supervision of the guard personnel. The separation from civilians and PWs of other nationalities must be enforced, not only in the billets, but also at the place of work. It must be stressed, in this connection, that the guard personnel must not be prevented from immediate use of their weapons out of consideration for a third person. 2. Special regulations for employment within the Reich. The main principle for the employment of Soviet PWs within the Reich, is the assured security of German life and German property. The Armed Forces authorities in charge of employment have the sole responsibility for the orderly employment of Soviet PWs. Therefore, employment, first and foremost, must be taken up in work connected with the Armed Forces. In the case of employment in the civil sector, the local employment authorities can make suggestions, but the decision, contrary to the regulations on the employment of other PWs, rests with the Armed Forces authorities. In cases where all the conditions for constant supervision and complete separation from the civilian population cannot be complied with by a civilian place of work employment cannot be approved. Should one of these conditions lapse later on, the fatigue detail is to be withdrawn forthwith. In addition, the instructions OKW/PW (15) No. 5015/41, dated 2.8.41 is to be followed in detail. Anyone breaking it will be severely punished. 3. Guard duties. The best possible trained energetic and prudent guard personnel are to be chosen to guard the Soviet PWs and constantly instructed by the Training Officer of the Military base camp [A. O. des M. Stammlagers]. At least one guard must be assigned to each 10 PWs. There must, however, never be one guard alone on duty. Should a fatigue detail consist of no more than 10 men, 2 guards must be employed to guard them. Guards should be equipped with hand grenades if possible. Those guarding larger squads must also be issued with machine guns or sub-machine guns. Places of work must be frequently examined by officers or experienced NCOs. They are responsible for seeing that the order
10 men, 2 guards must be employed to guard them. Guards should be equipped with hand grenades if possible. Those guarding larger squads must also be issued with machine guns or sub-machine guns. Places of work must be frequently examined by officers or experienced NCOs. They are responsible for seeing that the order was given are carried out to the letter. The notes, attached as an appendix, are to be made available for thorough and detailed perusal. The billets of Soviet PWs on fatigue details are to be under constant guard, even at night, and are to be inspected from time to time by the supervising authorities. V. Final remarks. PW-commandants are to be made personally responsible that under all circumstances the above regulations are strictly observed by subordinate units. This duty may in no case cease or be influenced by a change in offices. Therefore all offices and units newly concerned and employed in this sphere must be made thoroughly acquainted with the content of the regulations. Appendix to the Order of OKW/Gen. Armed Forces Dept. PW section No. 3058/41 Secret dated 8.9.1941 (for free distribution!) Notes on the guarding of Soviet Prisoners of War. Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany For the first time in this war, the German soldier is encountering not only a military opponent, but one, at the same time, politically educated, who sees in communism his ideal and in National-Socialism, his most provocative enemy. In the fight against National-Socialism, every method is, to him, legal: sniping, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, incendiarism, seditious propaganda, murder. Even a Soviet soldier in captivity, however harmless he may appear on the surface, will snatch any opportunity to show his hatred of everything German. It is quite possible that the PWs received corresponding instructions on how to act in captivity. It is essential, therefore, to treat them with the utmost vigilance, the greatest caution and complete mistrust. The principles to be followed by guard personnel are: 1. Ruthless action at the slightest indication of insubordination or disobedience. Weapons are to be used unsparingly to put down resistance. PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on immediately (without
greatest caution and complete mistrust. The principles to be followed by guard personnel are: 1. Ruthless action at the slightest indication of insubordination or disobedience. Weapons are to be used unsparingly to put down resistance. PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on immediately (without a challenge) with the firm intention of hitting them. 2. Any conversation-even on the march to and from the place of work-unless it concerns absolutely necessary official instructions, is utterly forbidden. No smoking at all is allowed on the march to and from the places of work-as well as during work. In the same way, all conversation between PWs and civilians is to be prevented, if necessary by force of arms-even against the civilians. 3. At the place of work also, a constant and careful supervision by German guard personnel is required. Each guard must always keep a sufficient distance from the PWs to enable him, at any time, to use his weapons without delay. Never turn your back on a PW. 4. Slackness is out of place even with a PW who is obedient and willing to work. He interprets it as weakness and draws his own conclusions. 5. When German soldiers are ruthlessly carrying out given orders with all severity and harshness, any arbitrary action, maltreatment and, above all, the use of clubs and whips is forbidden. This would be out of keeping with the honour of German soldiers and armed men. 6. The appearance of seeming harmless on the part of bolshevist PWs must never lead to the slackening of the above instructions. Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946 Previous Document Volume IV Menu
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Document No. 1520-PS Previous Document Volume IV Menu Next Document TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1520-PS Notes about a discussion with the Fuehrer at the Fuehrer Headquarters on the 8th of May 1942. Present at first Reich Minister Dr. Lammers [also Bormann and Rosenberg, the author of the notes]. I began with reporting to the Fuehrer about the results of the 1941/42 collection of the NSDAP of books for the German Armed Forces resulting in more than 9 million books, from which 46,000 libraries were formed. Then I dealt with certain reproaches raised against the Ministry East. The article in the "information service" of the Ministry for Propaganda concerning construction and aims of the Ministry East appeared without any knowledge whatsoever on my part. I had, as a matter of principle, agreed with the Ministry for Propaganda that no publications whatsoever regarding the occupied Eastern Territories should be published without my express consent. This became essential because even ministers talked about the "Policy of Colonisation" in the East.-Then it was also said that I had declared 650 men as unfit for war service and thus deprived the armed forces of them, and that I also left 90 officers without work as an advance command in Taganrog. I want to state that, because of the newly reinforced decree, the Ministry East has handed over 650 men; however, up to a few weeks ago only 240 men have been called away. As concerns the 90 men in Taganrog, this is not a measure taken by me but by the Economic Staff East and the armed forces armament staff, resp. Therefore, this matter was none of my affair. Furthermore, this advance commando has been dissolved. As regards the re-settlement of the Germans from Lithuania, the Fuehrer said that he was under the impression that people who had already settled here would have to be re-settled again. I told the Fuehrer that it was not so, this was a matter concerning more than 30,000 settlers capable of resettlement who were still detained in camps and who were worn down by the prolonged camp life. At last I referred to the new Molotov memorandum regarding supposed horrors and our economic measures, which, as a matter of fact, refers to some statements in the so-called "Green Folder" of the
capable of resettlement who were still detained in camps and who were worn down by the prolonged camp life. At last I referred to the new Molotov memorandum regarding supposed horrors and our economic measures, which, as a matter of fact, refers to some statements in the so-called "Green Folder" of the economic staff East of the 4-year Plan. Presumably such statements had been discovered on the body of a shot agrarian leader; a year ago I had already expressed my concern about the too-clearly expressed tendencies of those statements. A number of agrarian leaders already had been killed, also three territorial commissioners already have been killed fighting the partisans. Thereafter I described to the Fuehrer the considerations which caused me to grant self-administration to the Baltic countries. First of all this was not proclaimed by Law, but it was only my decree to the Reich Commissioner with the corresponding directives. In practice it meant nothing beyond a confirmation of an already existing state of affairs and the abolition of a certain uncertainty. We were very short of officials and were thus forced to be most economical with human material. However, frequently efforts were noticeable to meddle with the trivialities of life which necessitates new demands and withdraws too many soldiers from the armed forces. It left the doors open for some people to escape army service. Furthermore, self-administration was connected with an increased willingness to work. After all there were enough safety clauses whereby the self-administration could not undertake anything without the sanction of the Commissioner General. In order to eliminate any possible political danger, and exception has been made with Riga. Riga has 1012,000 officials and was to receive a german mayor who is not subordinated to the Lithuanian self-Administration. Thereby a personal political policy of the Lithuanian Directorate would be avoided. By this measure Riga would be an experiment for annexed administration. We also created an historical alibi and had demonstrated that we were meeting the Baltic nations more than half way. If at a later date this would not be acknowledged, we had every justification to proceed more drastically. The
avoided. By this measure Riga would be an experiment for annexed administration. We also created an historical alibi and had demonstrated that we were meeting the Baltic nations more than half way. If at a later date this would not be acknowledged, we had every justification to proceed more drastically. The Fuehrer kept all decrees and regulations in order to examine them. Yet during the whole of the report he made no comments. Afterwards the Fuehrer asked how all those economical measures were looked upon by the part of the Germans, whereupon I replied that, of course, the entire economical management was in German hands, and that this fact had produced a deterioration of the morale. Generally speaking the monopolistic companies and the ZHO [Zentralhandelsges. Ost-Eastern Central Trade], are fundamentally necessary, only they have to be supervised. Dr. Lammers interjected that private profits had to be throttled in order to avoid too strong a group of profiteers. I once more referred to the question of monopolies and wihsed to ascertain whether the fuehrer intended an absolute tobacco monopoly for here, whereupon he declared that he was particularly interested in the retail monopoly. The question of arranging for the producers could still be settled at al latter date. i replied that the economic leaders have not yet agreed upon the question of the producers. The opinion is frequently prevalent, that the production itself need not necessarily be a direct state monopoly. I told the Fuehrer that I shall have the whole question examined once again. Then the problem of religious freedom for the occupied Eastern territories was discussed. The Fuehrer consulted Reichsleiter Bormann, who already had gathered much experience by the preparations for the Wartheland and for Austria. I explained the situations in the East was that various large ecclesiastical groups being formed, but that one should not allow such development to take place without supervision, but that one ought to direct same and that the intended decrees, respectively orders, were for the purpose of protecting us from unanticipated surprises. Bormann entirely agreed with this attitude, he merely questioned if the Reichminister East, who also had some standing
to take place without supervision, but that one ought to direct same and that the intended decrees, respectively orders, were for the purpose of protecting us from unanticipated surprises. Bormann entirely agreed with this attitude, he merely questioned if the Reichminister East, who also had some standing in Germany, would not produce too close a dependency by a law which might have repercussions inside the Reich. What was to be understood under "religious freedom" was to be interpreted by the Churches, and he could anticipate, that such a law would produce hundreds of new letters and complaints on the part of the churches within the Reich. The Fuehrer considered a number of twists and forms which would eliminate such a danger, and after discussing its suitability the Fuehrer read the decree and gave his consent. Finally it was agreed that the whole question was not to be settled by myself in the from of a law, but that the Reich Commissioners take the existing religious freedom so to speak for granted and would decree the necessary executive orders. I was then to watch the development continuously and retain the executive control. It is easily possible that the leaders of the churches in the Ukraine would combine in order to elect a patriarch. I pointed out that this was already the case for all practical purposes and that a steering of the matter is necessary. The Fuehrer asked me if I really thought that all the Ukrainians were faithful adherents of the church. i replied that with the older generation and the women it was certainly the case, the youth were already somewhat unaccustomed to church. Furthermore I had transported from Kiev to Berlin the "Atheist Museum". In this the writings of the national writer of the Ukraine, Schewischenko, are quoted and may be possible to publish them in the Ukrainian language in a sense which in truth was not for the church. Also such freedom of expression of opinion has also to be guaranteed. Moreover the Fuehrer emphasized that after the war he would proceed against the churches with the fitting measures; he believed that he was still able to do something because of his authority which at a later date would be difficult for anybody else.
such freedom of expression of opinion has also to be guaranteed. Moreover the Fuehrer emphasized that after the war he would proceed against the churches with the fitting measures; he believed that he was still able to do something because of his authority which at a later date would be difficult for anybody else. He would not forget the attitude of the church during the war. i told the Fuehrer that I carried out church political lectures in a small circle in my lecture house in Dahlem, in which the whole problem was thoroughly examined, so that in the future the necessary ideological fight would also be carried out with the necessary knowledge and on the necessary scale. Then the treatment of the countries which were Germany's wards was discussed. I pointed out that some representatives interpreted the point of view of the master race, by travelling up and down the country with the whip. It is true, formerly one used to say of the Slavs that they liked to be thrashed. But this had changed radically. Now the situation was that the public thrashing meant the same as for the Orientals "the losing of face." Even the Bolshevics mistreated the prisoners abominably behind the walls, but never in public view. A number of incidents had occurred caused by thoughtless talk. It is necessary that our foreign representatives also know how to keep silent. The Fuehrer read the draft of my decree for the Reich Commissioner Ukraine and gave his consent to it. I then described to the Fuehrer the reception of the three delegations of farmers in grateful acknowledgment of our agrarian legislation and produced all our propaganda, such as circulars, pamphlets, posters, translations of German writings, etc. The difficulty here, too, was that it had taken a long time until the 18 waggons could be transported. A part had remained in the Government General. The whole action was very successful. I then submitted to the Fuehrer photographs of Ukrainian men and women who were working in the Heinkel works. The Fuehrer expressed his surprise at the extraordinary good looks and even beauty of the people. I then dealt with the employment of foreign workers in the occupied Eastern territories. I had appointed a special delegate for this who