dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir. In actual fact, great pressure was put on Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. The fact that pressure was exerted, and pressure of a military nature involving the threat of the use of troops, can be sufficiently established from captured German documents. I have our Document 1544-PS, a captured German document, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-71 This document consists of the Defendant Von Papen's own notes on his last meeting with Schuschnigg, on February 26, 1938. I quote the last two paragraphs of these notes. This is Von Papen speaking, in his own notes: 'I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion that he"-that is, Schuschnigg-"had acted under 'brutal pressure' in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been able to state that he had always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied that he had actually been under considerable moral pressure; he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk which bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any. concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered: 'To be honest, no."' And then Von Papen says: "It appears to me of importance to record this statement. "In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that Austria could have maintained her status with the help of non-German, European combinations. This question could be decided only according to the interests of the German people. He asserted that he held the same conviction and would act accordingly." Thus we have, through the words of Von Papen, Schuschnigg's contemporary statement to Papen of the pressure which had been exerted upon him as recorded by Von Papen in an original, contemporaneous entry. For diplomatic purposes, Papen, who had been at Berchtesgaden, kept up the pretense that there had been no pressure applied.
MR. ALDERMAN: But the Defendant General Jodl, writing the account of current events in his diary, was much more candid. We are fortunate in having General Jodl's handwritten diary in German script which I can't read. It is our Document 1780-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-72. I may say that General Jodl, in interrogations, has admitted that this is his genuine diary in his handwriting. This diary discloses not only the pressure at Berchtesgaden, but also the fact that for some days thereafter Defendant Keitel and Admiral Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure in order, obviously, to coerce President Miklas of Austria into ratifying the agreement. It started from Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. It will be noted that the approval of President Miklas was needed to ratify the Berchtesgaden agreement; that is, with respect to naming Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and Security. And so the Nazi conspirators kept up the military pressure with threats of invasion for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference in order to produce the desired effect on President Miklas. I quote from General Jodl's diary, the entries for February 11, February 13, and February 14, 1938. The entry of 11 February: "In the evening and on 12 February General K."-Keitel- "with General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol. "13 February: In the afternoon General K."-Keitel-"asks Admiral C."-Canaris-"and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure, by shamming military action, should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval. "14 February: At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office VII and initiates the different measures. "The effect is quick and strong.
MR. ALDERMAN: In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations." The proposal for deceptive maneuvers reported on by Defendant Jodl are set forth in Document 1775-PS, a captured German document, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-73. The proposals are signed by the Defendant Keitel. Underneath his signature appears a note that the Fuehrer approved the proposal. In the original document that note is handwritten in pencil. The rumors which Keitel proposed for the intimidation of Austria make very interesting reading. I quote the first three paragraphs of the suggested order: "1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments. "2. Spread false but quite credible news which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria: "(a) Through V-men"-V-Männer-"in Austria. "(b) Through our customs personnel"-staff-"at the frontier. "(c) Through travelling agents. "3. Such news could be: "(a) Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the sector of the VII A.K. "(b) Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and Regensburg. "(c) Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna, has been called for a conference to Berlin. As a matter of fact, this is the case." -That reminds me of a lawyer from my own home town who used to argue a matter at great length, and then he would end up by saying. "and, incidentally, it is the truth." "(d) The police stations located at the frontier of Austria have called up reinforcements. "(e) Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade"-Gebirgsbrigade-"in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall, and Berchtesgaden." ' The total pattern of intimidation and rumor was effective, for in due course, as we have already seen from the communiqués referred to, President Miklas verified the Berchtesgaden Agreement which foreshadowed National Socialist Austria and then the events culminating in the actual German invasion on 12 March 1938. Mr. President, would this be a convenient moment for a recess?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes. [A recess was taken.]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had reached the subject of the events culminating in the German invasion of Austria on 12 March 1938, and first under that, the plebiscite and the preparations for both German and Austrian National Socialists. The day after his appointment as Minister of the Interior of Austria, Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. I invite the Court to take judicial notice of the official German communiqué covering that visit of Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, as it appears in the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik , Volume 6, I, Page 128, Number 21-c, a copy of which will be found in our Document 2484-PS. On March 9, 1938, 3 weeks after Seyss-Inquart had been put in charge of the police of Austria and was in a position to direct their handling of the National Socialists in Austria-3 weeks after the Nazis began to exploit their new prestige and position with their quota of further victories-Schuschnigg made an important announcement. On March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg announced that he would hold a plebiscite throughout Austria the following Sunday, March 13, 1938. The question to be submitted in the plebiscite was: "Are you for an independent and social, a Christian, German, and united Austria?" A "yes" answer to this question was certainly compatible with the agreement made by the German Government on 11 July 1936 and carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Moreover, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a plebiscite on the question of Anschluss, but the Nazis apparently appreciated the likelihood of a strong "yes" vote on the question put by Schuschnigg in the plebiscite, and they could not tolerate the possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg Government. In any case, as events showed, they took this occasion to overturn the Austrian Government. Although the plebiscite was not announced until the evening of 9 March, the Nazi organization received word about it earlier in that day.
MR. ALDERMAN: It was determined by the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler what to do about the situation (that is, the Austrian Nazis), and that they would prepare a letter of protest against the plebiscite from Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and that, pending Hitler's approval, Seyss-Inquart would pretend to negotiate with Schuschnigg about details of the plebiscite. This information is all contained in the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Buerckel, transmitted as I have already pointed out to Seyss-Inquart, and which has already been received in evidence-our Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61. I quote briefly from Page 7 of the English test, the paragraph beginning on Page 11 of the German original: "The Landesleitung received word about the planned plebiscite through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the Landesleitung from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik, and Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a.m. There it was decided that: "First, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the Government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Plainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938. "Negotiations with the Government were not successful.
MR. ALDERMAN: Therefore, they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with the instructions he received from the Fuehrer .... On 10 March all the preparations for future revolutionary actions already had been made ... and the necessary orders given to all unit leaders .... During the night of the 10 to 11, Globocnik returned from the Fuehrer with the announcement that the Fuehrer gave the Party freedom of action ... and that he would back it in everything it did." -That means the Austrian Nazi Party. Next, Germany's actual preparations for the invasion and the use of force. When news of the plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous amount of activity. Hitler, as history knows, was determined not to tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers and ordered the preparation of the march into Austria. On the diplomatic side he started a letter to Mussolini indicating why he was going to march into Austria, and in the absence of the Defendant Ribbentrop (who was temporarily detained in London), the Defendant Von Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again. The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl's diary give a vivid account of the activities in Berlin. I quote from the entry of 10 March: "By surprise and without consulting his Ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimicists in the absence of plan or preparation. The Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. "This same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General Von Reichenau is called back from the Cairo Olympic Committee. General Von Schobert is ordered to come as well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the district leader, Gauleiter Buerckel, in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 9:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General Von Viebahn, to give him all drafts.
MR. ALDERMAN: 'Prepare Case Otto.' "1300 hours, General K."-which I think plainly means Keitel-"informs Chief of Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris, Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office. Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which forced the Fuehrer to take action. "1830 hours, mobilization order is given to the Commander of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps, without Reserve Army." (Document Number 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72). Now, it is to be noted that Defendant Von Neurath was at this critical hour acting as Foreign Minister. The previous February the Defendant Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and Von Neurath had become President of the Secret Cabinet Council. But in this critical hour of foreign policy the Defendant Ribbentrop was in London handling the diplomatic consequences of the Austrian transaction. As Foreign Minister in this hour of aggression, involving mobilization and movement of troops, use of force and threats to eliminate the independence of a neighboring country, the Defendant Von Neurath resumed his former position in the Nazi conspiracy. I now offer in evidence our Document W102 as Exhibit USA-74, a captured German document, top secret, the directive of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, 11 March 1938. This directive by Hitler, initialed by the Defendants Jodl and Keitel, stated Hitler's mixed political and military intentions. I quote Paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 of the directive. First the caption, "The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces" with some initials; "referring to Operation Otto; 30 copies." This is the 11th copy; top secret: "1. If other measures prove unsuccessful I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population. "4.
MR. ALDERMAN: The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on 12 March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier and to decide the actual moment for invasion. "5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brother; it is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence, but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms." I also over in evidence captured German Document C-103 as Exhibit USA-75. This was an implementing directive issued by the Defendant Jodl, and it provided as follows: "Top secret; 11 March 1938; 40 copies, sixth copy. "Special Instruction Number 1 to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Number 427/38,"-with some symbols.- "Directive for policy toward Czechoslovakian and Italian troops or militia units on Austrian soil. "1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in Austria they are to be regarded as hostile. "2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends, especially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in the solution of the Austrian question. The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl." Next, the actual events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available to us in two separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in some minor details, such as precise words used and precise times when they were used, they afford each other almost complete corroboration. We think it appropriate for this Tribunal to have before it a relatively full account of the way in which the German Government on 11 March 1938 deprived Austria of her sovereignty. First I shall give the report of the day's events in Austria as given by the Austrian Nazis.
MR. ALDERMAN: I refer to Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, a report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Buerckel, and I shall read from Page 8 of the English version. For the benefit of the German interpreter I am starting following a tabulation: First case, second case, third case, and following the sentence, "Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiter." "On Friday, 11 March, the Minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived m Vienna after a visit with the Fuehrer. After talks with Seyss-Inquart he went to see the Chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the Landesleitung had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fischböck, and Muhlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the proposal of the two ministers. "In regard to Rainer's proposal, Von Klausner ordered that the Government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400 hours, signed by legal political 'front' men, including both Ministers and also State Councillors Fishböck and Jury, for the establishment of a voting date in 3 weeks and a free and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution. "On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, and a telegram to the Fuehrer calling for help were prepared. "Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a session of all ministers for 2 p.m. Rainer agreed with Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Fuehrer and the statement to the population at 3 p.m. and at the same time he would start all necessary actions to take over power unless he received news from the session of the Ministers' Council before that time. During this time all measures had been prepared.
MR. ALDERMAN: At 2:30 Seyss-Inquart telephoned Rainer and informed him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had recalled the plebiscite but that he refused to call a new plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two Ministers had resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered, 'No.' Rainer informed the Reichskanzlei through the German Embassy, and received an answer from Goering through the same channels, that the Fuehrer will not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign. Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and Muehlmann. Talks were held between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg. Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures the Party wished taken. Rainer's answer: Reestablishment of the Government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the Party, and calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force. Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but very soon the announcement followed that everything might be threatened by the resistance of Miklas, the President. Meanwhile word arrived from the German Embassy that the Fuehrer expected the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a national majority, the legalization of the Party, and permission for the Legion"-that is the Austrian Legion in Germany-"to return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p.m.; otherwise German troops would cross the border at 8 p.m. At 5 p.m. Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by Muhlmann, went to the Chancellor's office to carry out this errand. "Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a government whim included Blacks, Reds, and National Socialists, and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and therefore a weak and unfavorable political situation for the cause might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernatto.
MR. ALDERMAN: Director of the Cabinet Huber, Guido Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attaché General Muff, and the Gruppenfuehrer Keppler,"-whose name I told you would reappear significantly-"who had arrived in the meantime, were already negotiating. At 7 p.m. Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations again. Situation at 7:30 p.m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a German invasion. "Gruppenfuehrer Keppler explained that the Fuehrer did not yet have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any moment because Rainer ordered the entire Party to demonstrate at 3 o'clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the Chancellor's palace in order to force the reconstruction of the Government. The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8 p.m. the SA and the SS marched in and occupied the Government buildings and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p.m. Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiter of Austria to take over power in all eight gaue of Austria, with the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all Government representatives who try to resist, should be told that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart. "With this the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the complete occupation of Austria within 3 hours and the taking over of all important posts by the Party. "The seizure of power was the work of the Party supported by the Fuehrer's threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in the Government. The national result in the form of the taking over of the Government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of power by the Party on one hand, and the Political efficiency of Dr.
MR. ALDERMAN: Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other; but both factors may be considered only in relation to the Fuehrer's decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently issued by the Fuehrer." We have at hand another document which permits us virtually to live again through the events of March 11, 1938, and to live through them in most lively and interesting fashion. Thanks to the efficiency of the Defendant Goering and his Luftwaffe organization we have a highly interesting document, obviously an official document from the Luftwaffe headquarters headed as usual "Geheime Reichssache" (top secret). The letterhead is stamped "Reichsluftfahrtministerium Forschungsamt". If I can get the significance of the German, Forschungsamt means the Research Department of Goering's Air Ministry. The document is in a characteristic German folder and on the back it says, "Gespräche Fall Österreich" (Conversations about the Austria Case) and the paper cover on the inside has German script writing, which in time, I will ask the interpreter to read; but it looks to me as if it is "Privat, Geheime Archive," which is Secret Archive, Berlin, "Gespräche Fall Österreich" (Case Austria). I offer that set of documents in the original file as they were found in the Air Ministry, identified as our 2949-PS. I offer them as Exhibit USA-76, and, offering them, I am reminded of Job's outcry, "Oh, that mine enemy would write a book!" The covering letter in that file, signed by some member of this research organization within the Air Ministry, and addressed to the Defendant Goering, states in substance-well, I will read the English translation. It starts: "To the General Field Marshal. Enclosed I submit, as ordered, the copies of your telephone conversations." Evidently the defendant wanted to keep a record of important telephone conversations which he had with important persons regarding the Case Austria, and had the transcriptions provided by his Research Department.