dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON PAPEN: The details given by Mr. Messersmith show that this is obviously an agent's report received by the Austrian Foreign Minister on my trip to Berlin. The contents of that report are largely incorrect. The inaccuracy of the passage referring to Dr. Schacht has already been shown by Dr. Schacht's testimony. But in that report there is something which is true. At that time there was-a so-called relief fund in Austria, which was managed by a certain Herr Langot. It has already been testified here in the witness box that this relief measure, which was intended to benefit wives and children of Austrian National Socialists who had emigrated to Germany, existed with the knowledge of the Austrian Government and police. But I neither requested Herr Schacht to make available official funds for this relief fund, nor did I myself pay out such money. Obviously this money originated from Party sources in Germany.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection therewith, I refer to the testimony of Glaise-Horstenau, who stated here that the Austrian Government knew of the Langot relief fund. Mr. Messersmith believes that from information received from the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, he can reproduce the following statement made by you at the beginning of 1935: "Yes, now you have your French and English friends, and you can maintain your independence a littler longer." Did you make such a statement?
VON PAPEN: Such a statement would have been not only extremely foolish from a diplomatic point of view, but actually impossible, because it would certainly have put an end to all diplomatic activity. In no case could the co-operation, which Mr. Messersmith states was carried on successfully for years, or the political activity which he describes as also having been carried on for years, have been reconciled with an open admission of this kind to the effect that I wanted Austrian independence to be of short duration only.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. Messersmith goes on to say in this affidavit that you had publicly stated you wished to get rid of certain members of the Austrian Government, among them Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg. Is that true?
VON PAPEN: The contrary is true. I never aimed at the removal of Chancellor Schuschnigg; it was rather my aim to give him confidence in my policy, in the policy of reconciliation. I know Herr Von Schuschnigg as an upright Austrian patriot, but also as a man who was far from wishing to deny his German ties, and in spite of many differences in policy these German antecedents of his made an excellent basis for collaboration. I can only ask in addition whether a diplomat who desires a change to come about in the government to which he is accredited would proclaim it from the roof tops.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution have submitted a report which you made to Hitler, dated 17 May 1935, as proof of your desire to steer Schuschnigg into a government including the National Socialists. This is Exhibit USA-64, included again in my document book as Document Papen-66, on Pages 159 and 160. Witness, what were your intentions, actually?
VON PAPEN: I must be a lithe more explicit with reference to this document. This report was written 8 months after the Dollfuss murder, that is, within the first 2 years, during which period the Prosecution themselves admit that I had instructions to remain entirely passive. When this report was written we had news that Starhemberg, in conjunction with Mussolini, was pursuing a policy which would have put serious difficulties in the way of an understanding between Austria and Germany. For this reason I suggested to Hitler a drastic intervention: I proposed that Schuschnigg and the Christian Socialist elements, which were hostile to a Heimwohr dictatorship, should be played off against Starhemberg by the offer of a final agreement on German-Austrian interests. This report states that if Germany were to recognize the national independence of Austria and were to undertake to refrain from influencing the National Opposition in Austria, by which I meant the Nazis, a coalition between these factors would be bound to result. The consequence would be that Germany would participate in the Danube Agreement, which would be tantamount to a peaceful solution of the entire European situation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: You have just explained that you were pursuing an honest policy of balancing interests?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal would like to understand more clearly what the defendant means, by what he just said.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I have just been told that the translation came over very badly; the English translation is said to have come through very badly. Would you suggest, Mr. President, that the defendant repeat the entire answer?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, most certainly. That is the best way. I think it is very unlikely that the English translation came over badly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, will you please repeat your answer but rather more slowly so that the interpreters will have no difficulty?
VON PAPEN: When this report was written, we had news that Starhemberg-Starhemberg was the chief of the Heimwehr- wanted to link himself with Mussolini in a policy which would be hostile in future to any Germanophile tendencies in Austria. In order to counter Prince Starhemberg's maneuver, I advised Hitler to suggest to Schuschnigg that, instead of forming a coalition with the Heimwehr, he should do so with the Christian Socialist elements, who were not opposed to a reconciliation of Germany with Austria. In order to induce Schuschnigg to enter into such a coalition, Hitler was to offer him a final settlement of German and Austrian interests. In other words, Hitler was to tell him that Germany would recognize the national independence of Austria and would undertake not to interfere in future in the internal affairs of Austria. And I went on to say to Hitler that if we achieved this pacification and established good and friendly relations with Austria, we could even join in the Danube Pact. This was the combination of the French, the Italians, and the Czechoslovaks, who were always in favor of a pact of the Danube powers including Austria. We in Germany had opposed the policy of those powers at the time, because we feared that if Austria joined a Danube Pact, she would be estranged from Germany once and for all. If, on the other hand, we were on good terms with Austria and friendly relations were established again, we could, as I pointed out to Hitler, join in this Danube Pact and by this means achieve something extraordinarily constructive for the cause of European peace.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not forgetting your hopes that you expressed this morning?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: You have just said that you pursued an honest policy of the amicable settlement of interests. Is it true that you persuaded Hitler to make a statement in favor of Austria's independence in his Reichstag speech on 21 May 1936?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that is perfectly true, because that statement was the prerequisite for any normalcy and settlement of interests in a revolutionary way; for our joint policy could only be advanced by Austria. Austria had been ordered by the Peace Treaty of St. Germain and the Geneva Protocol to remain aloof from Germany. If Austria, therefore, were to take the initiative and improve her relations with Germany, it was essential that we should first recognize her sovereignty.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I draw your attention to a mistake in the translation. In the English translation, instead of the words spoken by the defendant, the words "revolutionary way" were said instead of "evolutionary way." Will you please comment on the pact of 11 July 1936?
VON PAPEN: The Agreement of 11 July has been described by Sir David as a deceptive maneuver and an attempt to get the Austrian Government into new difficulties, to undermine it by introducing men of pro-German sympathies, like Glaise-Horstenau or Foreign Minister Schmidt. This judgment passed upon the pact is entirely incorrect, and I think historically untenable; and I think that that has been demonstrated here by the hearings and testimony of the Austrian Foreign Minister. The pact was the result of my efforts over 2 years to reestablish normal relations between the sister nations. The agreement was desired by both Governments, not by the German Government only, and Chancellor Schuschnigg admitted that himself, as mentioned in a report of mine dated 1 September 1936 on a speech made by Schuschnigg to Austrian workers. Why should the Austrian Government have concluded this pact? They were not compelled to conclude it, unless they themselves wanted to bring about normal, friendly relations with the German Reich. For that very reason I had asked Hitler to proclaim Austrian sovereignty in his Reichstag speech. That agreement was certainly not intended to imply our willingness to give up the idea of union at a later date, which we wanted, but it acknowledged Austria's full independence of action. But the aim of union of the two States was now to be pursued in a regular and evolutionary manner. This corresponded with the agreement which I had made with Hitler on 26 July. There was a second part to that agreement which was not published. That second part contained all the elements necessary for pacification: an amnesty, the regulation of our press relations, and the lifting of the so-called "1,000 mark bar." This was a frontier bar imposed by Hitler's decree upon people traveling into Austria. Any German wishing to go to Austria at that time had to pay 1,000 marks. This bar was removed.
VON PAPEN: Herr Schuschnigg, for his part, promised in this unpublished part of the agreement that men in his confidence who were members of the National Opposition were to be drawn in to co-operate in Austria. It appeared to us that the inclusion of the Austrian Opposition in Austrian parliamentary procedure was an essential condition for any further peaceful solution. In other words, the Party was gradually to lose its illegal status and become a legal factor. Mr. Messersmith, if I may add, stated incorrectly in his affidavit: "Part II of this pact contained a clause that a number of persons who were in the Chancellor's confidence should be called to positions in the Cabinet." That, obviously, is a mistaken conclusion on Mr. Messersmith's part, because we were not concerned with people who had Hitler's confidence, but with those who had Schuschnigg's confidence. This was an agreement made by Schuschnigg. Apart from this, Mr. Messersmith says with reference to this agreement that: ". . . the first penetration of German nationals into the Austrian Government was achieved through the nomination of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs." This is entirely wrong. Dr. Schmidt was an Austrian and made Austrian policy; he represented Austrian interests, as was natural, and at no time did Germany exert any influence to make him, Dr. Schmidt, Foreign Minister. On the whole, world public opinion at that time regarded this agreement as an instrument of peace and a great step forward. It was left to the Prosecution to call it a deceptive maneuver.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Prince Erbach's affidavit, Document Number Papen-96 of the English book, Pages 233 and 234, Questions 4 to 7 and Questions 12 and 13, dealing with the subject which we have just discussed. Did you, after the conclusion of the July Agreement, regard your mission in Austria as terminated?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I regarded it as terminated. That is proved by the resignation which I tendered to Hitler on 16 July 1936.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Papen-71, Page 165 of the second document book. I quote the beginning: "On 26 July 1934, you proposed to the late Field Marshal that I should be sent to Vienna on a temporary mission to restore normal and friendly relations. "With the Agreement signed on 11 July, the decisive step has been taken in this direction." In a later part of the document, he asks to be recalled; I go on to quote the second paragraph from the end: "Even though the 'German question' will need very careful and considerate handling in the future too-especially after the incredible difficulties which have gone before-I would like now, at the end of the task you entrusted to me, to place my resignation in your hands." The Prosecution have used the report you made to Hitler on 1 September 1936; 2246-PS, and they accuse you of remaining in contact with the illegal leaders of the Austrian National Socialists, of attempting to bring that Opposition into the Fatherland Front, and of desiring to change the Schuschnigg regime.
VON PAPEN: In the report mentioned I wrote: "In the normalization of relations to Germany, progress has been hindered by the staying power of the Ministry of Security, where the old anti-National Socialist officials are located. Changes in personnel are, therefore, urgently required." The expression which I used in this report: "Changes in the regime," actually means "Changes in personnel"; in that connection I also go on to say, in the following sentence, that economic negotiations will follow in the near future. This shows quite clearly that these words do not refer to a removal of Schuschnigg's person. Apart from that, this report speaks of the gravity of the situation in the Danube area, and makes proposals for a peaceful solution. If I am accused by the Prosecution of having had contacts with the Nazi Opposition, although the July Agreement had excluded all intervention in Austrian affairs, I must point out that I was perfectly entitled to these contacts because I was interested in ascertaining whether and how far Herr Schuschnigg kept his promise to take in men from the nationalist Opposition in whom he had confidence for collaboration. Just how far the Nazi Opposition submitted to that Agreement of 11 July is shown by Leopold's statement in January 1937, which Mr. Messersmith has attached to his own affidavit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number Papen-75, Page 171, which contains this file note of Leopold's. The document is identical with the appendix, which has the number Exhibit USA-57. There is an error in the English translation. In the fifth line from the end, on Page 1, the word "Anschluss" has been translated by "annexation." Witness, what do you have to say about Leopold's proposals?
VON PAPEN: Leopold's proposals show the following. The leaders of the Austrian Nazis fully accepted the policy of the July Agreement. They recognized that in future the question of the Anschluss would be an internal Austrian affair to be settled by the Austrian Government. They proposed that this solution should be found in an evolutionary manner by the Austrian Government and the Party. In favor of this solution is the fact that by means of the declaration of the sovereignty of Austria these arguments could in the future no longer represent foreign political dangers for Austria, that is, that the Agreement of July was understood by the Austrian National Socialists and approved of, and that they were prepared to proceed in a legal way with the Austrian Government.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. [The Tribunal adjourned until 18 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The witness Guido Schmidt has referred to an incident involving a flag at Pinkafeld, in May 1937. Would you please describe your activities in settling that incident.
VON PAPEN: The flag incident at Pinkafeld is mentioned by myself, or rather by my defense counsel, because it is a typical example of Hitler's attempts to pass on to an aggressive policy in Austria, even in the days before 1938. On 1 May 1937 in the small hamlet of Pinkafeld a flag of the German Reich was hauled down by an Austrian official. There was great excitement in the press; I instantly tried to settle the matter amicably with the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thereupon I received a telegram to proceed to Berlin at once. I arrived in Berlin and reported to Hitler. Hitler did not receive me. I waited for 3 days. After 3 days, I wrote and told him, "It appears that you are trying to use the flag incident at Pinkafeld to introduce an aggressive policy against Austria. In that case there is nothing more for me to do, and I beg to hand in my resignation." A quarter of an hour later he called me to the Reich Chancellery. He gave me a lecture, which lasted half an hour, furious and beside himself with rage over the humiliations which the German Reich could no longer tolerate. After his rage had spent itself I told him that our agreement of 26 June ruled that the policy concerning Austria was to be conducted on evolutionary lines. The Agreement of 11 July emphasized that. "If you wish to pursue a different policy, then dismiss me," I said. As a result of this very serious conversation he said, "No, no. Go back and settle everything; we do not want to change our peaceful policy." I returned to Vienna, and the incident was settled satisfactorily with the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs within 24 hours.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you talk to representatives of other powers regarding the policy which you pursued in Austria?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I repeatedly discussed this policy with representatives of other powers. For instance, in the summer of 1937 I discussed it with the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson.
THE PRESIDENT: Has this letter which the witness speaks of been produced, or a copy of it? He has spoken of a letter to Hitler: "I wrote a letter."
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, we have not got that letter, neither have we a copy of it. The files of the witness were destroyed in Berlin by air attacks.
VON PAPEN: May I add, Mr. President, that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has confirmed the incident in Court and the course it took. Herr Von Neurath also knows this incident very well indeed.
THE PRESIDENT: Who was the Minister for Foreign Affairs who confirmed it?
VON PAPEN: The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Schmidt, who was here as a witness; the witness Guido Schmidt.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
VON PAPEN: With reference to that question, may I remark that I, of course, very often spoke to representatives of other powers about our Austrian policy. For instance, in June 1938 I discussed it with Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador to Berlin. In October 1937 I visited Paris, incognito, and there talked to many of the leading politicians about this problem, among them the President of France, M. Daladier, and M. Leon Blum. I assured these gentlemen that we would seek a solution of the Austrian problem exclusively on an evolutionary basis and that the hoped for union of the two States would never prove a threat to the interests of France, that on the contrary we were only looking for that solution within the European framework, that is, with the consent of France. At that time, I was under the impression that in England as well as in France it was being increasingly understood that a general settlement was necessary.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As proof that the defendant could actually have been convinced that the other powers-by virtue of an evolutionary development in Austria-might eventually be prepared to come to a peaceable agreement, I submitted Document Number 74, Page 169. It is a report from Von Papen to Hitler on the conversation just outlined with Sir Nevile Henderson on 1 June 1937. I draw your attention to this document and should like to point out that Henderson has stated that he was well disposed toward . . an amicable solution of the Austrian problem and trusted that he too could exercise a corresponding influence in Paris. I further draw your attention to Document Number 80, Page 177. It is a statement of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Spaak, after the Anschluss. I invite your attention to the last sentence: "I have believed, for a long time past, that the Anschluss complied with the logic of facts and had it been ratified in a normal manner, I should not have been surprised." Mr. Messersmith alleged that Nazi propaganda in Austria had been paid for out of German funds. Did you ever give or arrange for any funds for that purpose?
VON PAPEN: The Party never received a penny, either from me personally or through the German Embassy. It is, however, quite possible-and even probable-that German Party funds did pour into Austria. I was never informed of this, for it was a wellknown fact that I did not enjoy the confidence of the Party in either country. There is, however, one exception which I particularly wish to emphasize, namely, the donation-and it was known to me-of funds in support of the "Langot" subsidy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution has reproached you for your anti-Semitic attitude in connection with your report to Hitler of 12 May, in which you suggested giving financial aid to the Freedom League for the furtherance of their fight against Jewry. What was this Freedom League?
VON PAPEN: The Freedom League was a focal point, a union of the former Christian Trade Unions and the Christian Workers' Union, under the leadership of the president of the Trade Unions. Dollfuss took over the leadership in 1934. It would be utterly ridiculous to accuse this Freedom League, mainly composed of Catholic workers, of an anti-Semitic attitude in the National-Socialist sense. The Freedom League fought to purge the administration of Vienna of unsuitable Jewish elements. The problem of this undue alien penetration was absolutely similar to conditions then existing in Germany, conditions which I mentioned yesterday in detail. This fact is also proved by the report submitted yesterday to the Prosecution. I learned that the Czechs were endeavoring to establish close relations with the Freedom League and that for this purpose they desired to support the League with large sums of money. I thereupon suggested to Hitler that this possible influencing of the Freedom League by Czech politics should be eliminated by supporting it ourselves. But we could not of course tell the Freedom League: "We are now going to subsidize you so that you do not go over to the Czechs." So I proposed to Hitler that he should give these moneys in consideration of the League's continued fight against Jewry, which was pure camouflage. Had I wanted to give this money specifically for the fight against Jewry, I would not have written "in consideration of" but "for the furtherance of its fight."
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 32, Page 112 of the document book. It is an excerpt from the Austrian Yearbook of 1933-1934, which is an official publication. I draw your attention to the beginning of the second paragraph, where it is explained that the Freedom League originated in the Christian Workers' Unions and the Christian Trade Unions. I further draw your attention to the fifth line from the bottom, and I quote, "At the beginning of 1934 the late Federal Chancellor, Dr. Dollfuss, took over the supreme leadership of the Freedom League." I also draw your attention to Document Number 72, Page 166. It is a report of Von Papen to Hitler in which he quotes a report from the Prague Secret Service. Of interest, in this connection, is a reference to the fact that the Freedom League was striving for an understanding with Social Democracy. The next document, Number 70, has already been presented as GB-243. I draw your attention to the first paragraph which reflects the efforts of the Czech diplomats. Document Number 70, Page 164. This is the document mentioned by the Prosecution, part of whim has been submitted under GB-243. The first paragraph is important in that it deals with the activities of Czech diplomacy, mentioned a short time ago by the defendant. Furthermore, there is, with reference to this Freedom League, Von Papen's report, Document Number 73, Page 176, to which I wish to invite your attention. Another report of Von Papen's is interesting, Document Number 69, Page 163. It shows the efforts of the Freedom League to gain a foothold in the political constellation of that day. Witness, in the summer of 1937 Schuschnigg was making efforts to persuade the National Opposition to collaborate. What do you know about it and what were the subsequent developments?