dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
dive bombers. Bornholm occupied. 11 April: Luetzow on voyage home. Oslo hit by torpedo. Norwegians warships are put into service. Denmark does not belong any longer to jurisdiction of XXIst Corps. Railroads Oslo-Bergen and Oslo-Drontheim destroyed. 12 April: Still 6 destroyers left ready for use in Narvik, Freighter [Treckdampfer] Jon Wellom in N., otherwise no ship of the leading echelon. Bulk of the submarines ordered outside the ports occupied by us. Hundalen on the iron-ore railroad reached. Strong enemy air attack on Bergen. 13 April: Mountain battery flown to lake near Narvik with Ju 52 planes. Concentration of strong English naval forces near Harstadt in process. Much booty in Oslo. 1650 hours naval battle in Narvik. Battleships and Hipper arrived in home ports. 14 April: Dietl is not being attacked, but is separated from Northern group. Terrible excitement. All details are to be ordered from here. Steamship Baerenfelsis sunk in the course of attack on Bergen. Another 3 air-force antiaircraft batteries on board ship torpedoed by submarine. Fuehrer wants that Dietl tries to fight his way through to the South. I argue against this impossible idea. 15 April: 16 April: Reproaches against the navy, especially because the battle was not engaged by battleships and because she does not succeed in speeding up the transports (Unjustified-I strongly argue against it). 17 April: During the night from the 16th to 17th Staff Officer from Admiralty arrives in Narvik and delivers written report by Dietl with call for help from Stavanger, since English naval forces are firing there. Air-Force notified. The Fuehrer again states in a temperamental way that the Gr. Dietl will have to march South or will have to be picked up. I advocate again in a very strong way that a. a march South is impossible, b. even a transport can evacuate only very small units, leads to the loss of many planes and breaks the moral backbone of the Dietl group. They will continue to fight on the Swedish border for a long time. A thing should be considered lost only when it is actually lost. 1200 hours: Field Marshal with Jeschonnek. Has to be regrouped. Draws combat teams to Ralburg and transport groups back into Slesvig. 1530 hours: Admiral of the Fleet [Grossadmiral] with Admiralty Staff Officer from Narvik who
on the Swedish border for a long time. A thing should be considered lost only when it is actually lost. 1200 hours: Field Marshal with Jeschonnek. Has to be regrouped. Draws combat teams to Ralburg and transport groups back into Slesvig. 1530 hours: Admiral of the Fleet [Grossadmiral] with Admiralty Staff Officer from Narvik who reports verbally about his experiences in Narvik. Each piece of bad news leads to the worst fears. Chief of Air-Force and of L IH [Army Air-Forces?] presents an evaluation of the situation I fully agree to. I present to the Fuehrer this and the proof that we do not have enough long range planes to pick up troops from Narvik, anyhow. Furthermore, an order which is delivered by courier and composed in our sense. To fight and tie down forces and not to give up. Even a professor who knows Norway is fetched from Innsbruck and asked whether mountain troops can get from Narvik to Fauske is impossible judging from my mountain experience. In the evening, the Fuehrer signs the order to Dietl which I had prepared, to hold out as long as possible. 18 April: Fuehrer is again calm. He gives orders to Captain von Sternburg in a way conforming entirely with our point of view. It might even be possible to change last night's order even more towards a sense of holding out and tying down forces. The situation, too, looks better. The strong shipping losses of the English give them something to think about. Quiet day which does our somewhat strained nerves good. Sternburg leaves by plane with additional verbal orders. 1600 hours: General Jeschonnek shares the opinion we should to Bardufoss. I refuse that. The troops cannot hold out. Important is of the forces on hand, most important the thorough destruction of the railroad. 2. He expresses doubts whether the landing of the 22nd division which takes several days still runs satisfactorily in view of the preparations in Holland. I emphasize that we have to open for ourselves at least the entry into the Southern front of the fortress Holland and that we have to keep it open. 19 April: Renewed crisis. Political action has failed. Envoy Braner is recalled; since Norway is at war with us, the task of the Foreign Offices is finished. According to the Fuehrer's opinion, force has to be used.
least the entry into the Southern front of the fortress Holland and that we have to keep it open. 19 April: Renewed crisis. Political action has failed. Envoy Braner is recalled; since Norway is at war with us, the task of the Foreign Offices is finished. According to the Fuehrer's opinion, force has to be used. Gauleiter Terboven is supposed to be put in charge. Field Marshal works in the same direction; he criticizes that the behavior against the civilian population is not energetic enough, that it was possible to occupy the electrical plant, that not enough troops are brought up by the navy. The Air-Force cannot do everything. Chief of the Armed Forces High Command leaves room, leadership chaos is again threatening, because even details are being overruled from above, and all orderly work of the competent military leadership (Navy High Command and Gr. XXI) is in vain. In the evening, Terboven arrives; after supper, the Fuehrer instructs him alone. It is doubtful, if it will be possible to limit him to the activity of a Civilian Commissar [Zivilkommissar], as I suggest it; we will have to talk to him personally. 20 April: Fuehrer's birthday. Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and the Supreme Commanders congratulate. All the tempests has quieted down. The movements to Oslo and Narvik make progress. No English landings. Fuehrer has a discussion with the Field-Marshal, with Himmler, Terboven, Reichsleiter Bormann. Before that, the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command has told the Fuehrer about all possible points of friction between an independent head of the government and the Military Commander in Norway. It seems that reports of the Air Force have induced the Fuehrer to form the opinion that the Norwegians are already conducting guerilla warfare and sabotage on a large scale. Already on the 19th, I contradicted such an opinion. We must not lead the Norwegians to passive or even active resistance, because that is precisely the aim of the English, after all. 21 April: Reports about landings on a larger scale near Andalsnes and Namsos become more tangible. On the evening of April 20th, the General [Generaloberst] leads a long fight in order to word the text of the order to Terboven in such a way that the
that is precisely the aim of the English, after all. 21 April: Reports about landings on a larger scale near Andalsnes and Namsos become more tangible. On the evening of April 20th, the General [Generaloberst] leads a long fight in order to word the text of the order to Terboven in such a way that the military necessities are taken into account. Fuehrer would like to bring big vessel with personnel and materiel to Trondheim. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy considers that to be impossible, especially now. 22 April: Fuehrer is increasingly worried about the English landings and the consequent impossibility to set up ground communications with Trondheim. Without success, I compare the difficult situation of the English, who have no usable port and no airdrome at their disposal. The Field-Marshal somewhat quieter, in view of the good weather forecasts for the Air Force today. 23 April: The excitement grows, because the 163rd and 196th divisions are making small progress towards the North and New bridge demolitions are being reported. Fuehrer orders that no more motorized units [11th rifle brigade] are to be sent to Stavanger, but immediately 2 mountain divisions instead. 3rd is to be brought up to full strength again. 4 ships of the Iller class, in addition a 5000t steamer, later 2 larger East Asia boats are to be brought to Bergen convoyed by capital ships, in order to make the troops there mobile and ready for battle. Forces in Narvik to be reorganized right away, in order to make the 3d mountain division again steadfast for battle. No heavy artillery is to go to Norway for ground combat. The heavy battalion of the 2nd mountain division remains in the West, those of the 3d mountain and 69th division are at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Fuehrer talks to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. a. Anti-aircraft reinforcements for Stavanger. b. Bombers for ground fighting in Oslo, Fighters for ground fighting in Oslo. In the evening Lieutenant-Colonel von Lossberg returns from Oslo. He reports the favorable situation in a somewhat schoolmasterly way, but does not know any details. He brings along an English battalion order. 24 April: The situation looks much more favorable, a fast advance on the right flank is to be
Oslo. In the evening Lieutenant-Colonel von Lossberg returns from Oslo. He reports the favorable situation in a somewhat schoolmasterly way, but does not know any details. He brings along an English battalion order. 24 April: The situation looks much more favorable, a fast advance on the right flank is to be expected with mechanized Battalion Goering. Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme confirms that picture after his return from the front. He brings collected orders of the captured English brigade detachment along. Very great political success to be anticipated with that. 1130 hours: Field-Marshal reports, especially the situation in Trondheim. Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme, back from the battle field, reports favorably, rapid progress. Fuehrer regrets the halting of the 11th rifle brigade. I refuse to send them again now. 2300 hours: Schmundt back, even more favorable news. Boehme brings English orders for the entire project of Norway's occupation by the English. Complaint about lack of clear orders in the Air Force. 25 April: Optimistic mood continues. Fuehrer very happy about Schmundt's report and about exact orientation. Talks adversely about Lossberg to Bodenschatz; Lossberg's somewhat braggard report has created displeasure, although he did not know any details. Preparation of an action on the basis of the orders found on captured Englishmen. Order to Kraatzer W Pr and Counter Intelligence Bureau for foreign countries [Amt Abwehr/Ausland]. Report by Sternberg about his task in Narvik. Order by me to Chief L to give out a strong directive that nobody but Armed Forces High Command will give orders to Gr. Narvik. All men there are subordinated General Dietl exclusively. The Belgian government resigned. 26 April: Suggestion to the Fuehrer to omit naval transport to Bergen with battleships and to bring these mobile parts of the 69th Division back to Oslo. Italian ambassador Atolico is recalled, because he does not take a clear pro-German attitude. At 1500 hours the Commander-in-Chief of the navy reports. Fuehrer drops request for transporting troops to Bergen convoyed by heavy naval forces. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy reports that everything which could be possibly thought of has been done for the safeguarding of the Westwall will be extended Sp solidified. Major Soltman reports about the
of the navy reports. Fuehrer drops request for transporting troops to Bergen convoyed by heavy naval forces. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy reports that everything which could be possibly thought of has been done for the safeguarding of the Westwall will be extended Sp solidified. Major Soltman reports about the interrogation of the Englishmen, and delivers additional important documents, among them the secret chain of command [Rangliste]. At noon, the first prisoners arrived in Berlin. They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and confirm the authenticity of the orders. All material is handed over to the Foreign Office. Until 0330 in the Reich Chancellery, where Fuehrer formulates the government statement together with Foreign Minister. It will be published on the 27 April: Fuehrer voices intention to start with case "Yellow" between 1st and 7th May. I point out that the Air Force and the Transportation Chief have to be initially notified 3 days ahead of time. Motor column [Mot.Kol.] Fischer gets stuck 100 miles [Km?] south of Drontheim in front of many destroyed bridges. Group (Gr) XXI is crying for engineers and cross-Country motor vehicles. They will have to get along with their own engineers. After all, there are 19 engineer companies. Order to get all engineers up to the front. 28 April: Advance movement direction Drontheim is halting. Nevertheless the English are retiring fast according to their communiques. 29 April: Fuehrer decides: Air Force can commit another 2 groups (new) in Norway on Tuesday and Wednesday, but must be ready for Yellow on Sunday. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy commits heaviest flat * * * for the safeguarding of [?] Emden still to be left in Baltic (O), Employ 2 East Asia steamboats for Oslo-transport. Falkenhorst wants his motorized and mountain battalion with engineer platoon and battalion brought to Drontheim by air. Commander-in-Chief of the Army has to be compelled first to set up the missing regiment for the 3rd mountain division so rapidly than it can roll immediately behind the 2nd mountain division. Fuehrer is worried about Drontheim and is not quite to be dissuaded yet from readying heavy artillery and also the 1st mountain division for Norway. 30 April: At 13.35 hours I am
the missing regiment for the 3rd mountain division so rapidly than it can roll immediately behind the 2nd mountain division. Fuehrer is worried about Drontheim and is not quite to be dissuaded yet from readying heavy artillery and also the 1st mountain division for Norway. 30 April: At 13.35 hours I am able to report to the Fuehrer that line of communication on land between Oslo and Drontheim has been established. Fuehrer is happy with joy. At noon, I have to sit next to him. The special communique is released right away. It remains to be decided now, whether to keep in readiness the 1st mountain division (no) and heavy artillery (no). At 18.30 hours the report comes in that Dombaas has been reached, too, and that the enemy is retiring. Opdal on the railroad Drontheim-dombaas has also been occupied. Fuehrer releases order of the day to the soldiers in Norway. 1 May: More big successes in Norway on land and in the air. Fuehrer orders that starting Saturday, May 4th, everything must be in readiness to start operations for case Yellow the following day, when ordered. 2 May: Victory report from Norway. Pursuit direction Andalsnes. The English fleet to the boats. Norwegians give up the Commander of Moeren-Romsdal, Gen. Hang offers capitulation. Field Marshall with Kesselring, Joschonnek, Student, Sponek again report about case "Festung" [fortress]. It will be carried out. Landing on super-highway possible. Difficulty is the strong echelonment in depth [Tiefenstaffelung] of the bridge position near Moerdyk and north of it. Air Force is to get order on the 3rd at noon, whether to guide in [einweisen] or not to guide in, that whether means to use or not to use parachutists and airborne units. 3 May: After evaluation of weather, Fuehrer decides that X-day will not be before Monday, 6 May. Air Force notified by code word "Do not guide in." ["Nichteinweisen"] Field Marshal protests against draft of the comprehensive description of operations in Norway, where Armed Forces high Command is mentioned and where the name Pellengahr appears, but not Milch. Fuehrer rejects request of the Air Force to set up a listening post [Horchstelle] in the Caucasus. Prepared White Book concerning unneutral actions of Holland and Belgium does
comprehensive description of operations in Norway, where Armed Forces high Command is mentioned and where the name Pellengahr appears, but not Milch. Fuehrer rejects request of the Air Force to set up a listening post [Horchstelle] in the Caucasus. Prepared White Book concerning unneutral actions of Holland and Belgium does not seem to satisfy the Foreign Office completely. To my mind the material is more than sufficient. A new order goes out to group XXI, especially as several foreign news reports say that Namsos, too, will be evacuated. Dr. Todt transmits exact details. 4 May: Reports about evacuation of Namsos by the English. Great successess of the Air Force against the English fleet. Battleship, heavy cruiser and destroyer, in addition to 12000 ton transport sunk. Fuehrer himself wants to make comprehensive report about the campaign in Norway. He is furious about it that people other than himself meddle with this reporting. He stated that the Armed Forces High Command is his staff. Fuehrer designates Tuesday, May 7th as X-day. The flanks of Gr. Dietl are being pressed hard in Narvik. I am afraid he remains too long in front. 5 May: Field Marshal reports that an English 1500 ton submarine minelayer was sighted on the Swedish coast. He makes an onslaught aimed at subordinating all Naval Air units under the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. Fuehrer has finished justification [Begruendung] for case "Yellow". Wednesday, May 8th, is designated as A-day. 6 May: Detailed orders for May 8th for A-day are issued, and for transmission of the codewords Augsburg and Danzig. 7 May: Fuehrer railroad train was scheduled to leave Finkenkrug at 16.38 hours. But weather remains uncertain and therefore, the order valid up to this time is rescinded. Next decision May 8th until 1200 hours. 1100 hours: The Field Marshal with Bodenschatz and Jeschonnek at the Fuehrer's. 1500 hours: Admiral of the Fleet [Grossadmiral] Raeder. Mine damage of the Gneisenau only very insignificant. One destroyer may be recalled from Drontheim, as a second one is still ready for sailing. Fuehrer very much agitated about new postponement, as there is danger of treachery particularly in brown leaflets [in braunen Blaettern]. Talk of the Belgian Envoy to the Vatican to Brussels
only very insignificant. One destroyer may be recalled from Drontheim, as a second one is still ready for sailing. Fuehrer very much agitated about new postponement, as there is danger of treachery particularly in brown leaflets [in braunen Blaettern]. Talk of the Belgian Envoy to the Vatican to Brussels permits the deduction that treason has been committed by a German personality who left Berlin for Rome on April 29th. Fuehrer again emphasizes that the greatest achievement of endurance [Dauerleistung] is that of the foot-slogging combatsoldier. 8 May: Alarming news from Holland, canceling of furloughs, evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the counter-intelligence service the British have asked for permission to march in but the Dutch have refused. According to reports the measures of the Dutch are partly directed against the coast and partly against us. It is not possible to obtain a clear picture, whether the Dutch don't work hand in hand with the English or whether they actually want to defend their neutrality against the first attacker. Evaluation of the weather shows slow improvement of the whole situation, but development fog in the next days still have to be taken into consideration. Fuehrer does not want to wait any longer. Field Marshal wants postponement until the 10th, at least. Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presses for early action. Fuehrer is very agitated; then he consents to postponement until May 10th, which is against his intuition, as he says. But not one day longer. Departure of Envoy Kieritz, who was scheduled to leave at 12.57 hours is stopped at the last minute. Is not supposed to leave until May 9th. In the evening, I arrange the different telegrams with him. 9 May: Fuehrer decides to fall in on May 10th for sure. Departure with Fuehrer train at 17.00 hours from Finkenkrug. After report Jeschonnek that weather situation will be favourable on the 10th, the code word Danzig is given at 2100 hours. The same to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. 10 May: Morning arrival in Emskirchen still during darkness. At 0530 hours in the Eagle's nest. 11-13 May The operations take a course favorable beyond expectation. The Dutch offer desperate resistance. Bridges at
on the 10th, the code word Danzig is given at 2100 hours. The same to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. 10 May: Morning arrival in Emskirchen still during darkness. At 0530 hours in the Eagle's nest. 11-13 May The operations take a course favorable beyond expectation. The Dutch offer desperate resistance. Bridges at Maastricht, and all bridges north of it, are blown up. Only the railroad bridge at Gemrep falls into our hands undamaged. Fort Eben Emael is taken and the bridges in Mordeyk south of Dortrecht as well as the important ones over the Albert Canal west of Maastricht are taken over by parachutists and glider-borne personnel and are held by them. Airborne operation of the Sponek Division is met by heaviest resistance and is badly mauled. However, the different units hold out. On the R., the junction of the 9th armored division with them is effected. The citadel of Luettich is being broken into. 14 May: Order number 11 issued, which orders the concentration of all armored and mechanized units in front of the 4th army. Holland capitulates. 16 May: Fuehrer insists very much on transfer of all armored and mechanized units from Army Group B to A, and on speediest bringing up of strong reserves behind the 4th and 12th army. OKH gives orders to pull these units out from B and to add them via F ... to the fifteenth corps as new Armored Group Hoeppner. According to report Reichau, there are indications that the enemy is giving up the Dyle position or its Southern part, at least. Therefore, Army High Command receives the option to carry out the junction of Armored Group Hoeppner also in front, of Nanner, which the enemy seems to be evacuating. Engle reports after visit at 4th army that that army has reached the French-Belgian border near Beauchmont, after a heavy tank battle. 1600-1830 hours: Field Marshal Goering with the Fuehrer, talk with Jeschonnek about forthcoming tasks of the Air Force and intentions concerning Navik, utilizing the new airdrome near 17 May: 18 May: Day of great tension. The commanders-in-chief of the Army has not carried out the intention of building up, as quickly as possible, a new flanking position to the South. Instead of turning march to the west. For this reason the 10th Armored Division and the