dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON RIBBENTROP: Put this way, that is not correct. It was clear to me, when I became Foreign Minister, that the realization of the German desires in Europe was difficult and that it was principally England who opposed them. I had tried for years, by order of the Fuehrer, to achieve these things by means of a friendly understanding with England.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you now to answer my question: Did you advise the Fuehrer that the proper policy was pretended friendliness with England and in actuality the formation of a coalition against her? Did you or did you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not the right way of putting it to agree to these German aspirations. That without doubt, was the situation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to know, Witness, why you told the Tribunal 5 minutes ago that you had not advised Hitler in the sense in which I put to you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Which advice do you mean?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Outwardly an understanding with England and formation under great secrecy of a coalition against her. I put that to you twice and you denied it, I want to know why you did deny it.
VON RIBBENTROP: I said quite clearly that England was resisting the German requests and that therefore, if Germany wanted to realize these aspirations, she could do nothing but find friends and bring England with the help of those friends to the conference table so that England would yield to these aspirations by diplomatic means. That was my task at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to direct your attention to the relations with Poland. I will give you the opportunity of answering a question generally, and I hope in that way we may save time. Will you agree that up to the Munich Agreement, the speeches of all German statesmen were full of the most profound affection and respect for Poland? Do you agree with that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the purpose of what is shown in the Foreign Office memorandum of 26 August 1938? I will give you the page number, Page 107 of your document book. I want you to look at it. I think it is the fourth paragraph, beginning, "This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia..."; and you may take it from me that the method of approach was putting forward the idea that you and Hitler wanted the return of all Germans to the Reich. I put it quite fairly and objectively. That is what preceded it. I want you to look at that paragraph.
VON RIBBENTROP: Which paragraph do you mean? I did not hear.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The fourth, "This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia..." it begins. The fourth on my copy.
VON RIBBENTROP: I have not found it yet. Paragraph 5, yes, I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Does that correctly set out the endeavors of German foreign policy at that time?
VON RIBBENTROP: Undoubtedly no, for, first of all, I do not know what kind of a document it is. It has apparently been prepared by some official in the Foreign Office where sometimes such theoretical treatises were prepared and may have come to me through the State Secretary. However, I do not remember having read it. Whether it reached me, I cannot tell you at the moment; but it is possible that such thoughts prevailed among some of our officials. That is quite possible.
SIR DAVID ALAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Now, if you do not agree, would you look at Page 110, on which you will find extracts from Hitler's Reichstag speech on 26 September 1938. 1 am sorry. I said Reichstag; I meant Sportpalast.
VON RIBBENTROP: Sportpalast, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the end of this extract the Fuehrer is quoted as saying with regard to Poland, after a tribute to Marshal Pilsudski: Do you think that is an honest statement of opinion?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I believe that that was definitely the Fuehrer's view at the time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And so at that time all the questions of the treatment of minorities in Poland were very unimportant; is that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, they were not unimportant. They were a latent and even difficult point between Poland and ourselves, and the purpose of that particular kind of statement by the Fuehrer was to overcome it. I am so familiar with the problem of the minorities in Poland because I watched it for personal reasons for many years. From the time I took over the Foreign Ministry, there were again and again the greatest difficulties which, however, were always settled on our part in the most generous way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate you have agreed with me that the speeches at that time -- and you say quite honestly -- were full of praise and affection for the Poles; is that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, we were hoping that thereby we could bring the German minority problem, in particular, to a satisfactory and sensible solution. That had been our policy since 1934.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, immediately after Munich you first raised the question of Danzig with M. Lipski, I think, in October, around 21 October.
VON RIBBENTROP: Right, 28 October.
SIR DAVID MAXVTELL-FYFE: 28 October. And the Poles had replied on the 31st; it may have reached you a day later through M. Lipski, suggesting the making of a bilateral agreement between Germany and Poland, but saying the return of Danzig to the Reich would lead to a conflict. I put it quite generally. I just wanted to remind you of the tenor of the reply. Do you remember?
VON RIBBENTROP: According to my recollection it was not quite like that. The Fuehrer had charged me -- it was on 28 October, to be exact -- to request Ambassador Lipski to come to Berchtesgaden. His order was given because the Fuehrer in particular, perhaps as a sequel to the speech in the Sportpalast, but that I do not remember, wanted to bring about a clarification of the relations with all his neighbors. He wanted that now particularly with respect to Poland. He instructed me, therefore, to discuss with Ambassador Lipski the question of Danzig and the question of a connection between the Reich and East Prussia. I asked Ambassador Lipski to come and see me, and stated these wishes in a very friendly atmosphere. Ambassador Lipski was very reserved; he stated that after all Danzig was not a simple problem but that he would discuss the question with his government. I asked him to do so soon and inform me of the outcome. That was the beginning of the negotiations with Poland.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, if you will turn -- I do not want to stop you, but I want to get on quickly over this matter -- if you will turn to Page 114, you will find the minutes of M. Beck's conversation with Hitler on 5 January. I just want to draw your attention to the last paragraph, where, after M. Beck had said that the Danzig question was a very difficult problem: Do you see that, before I ask you the question?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have read that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the summary of your own conversation with M. Beck on the next day. It is Page 115, at the beginning of the paragraph, the second paragraph. You will see that, after M. Beck had mentioned the Danzig question, you said, "In answer, Herr Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking any violent solution." (Document TC-73, Number 49). That was almost word for word what Hitler had said the day before; do you see that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, turn back to Page 113. (Document Number C-137, Exhibit GB-33) These are the Defendant Keitel's orders to -- or rather, to put it exactly -- the Defendant Keitel's transmission of the Fuehrer's order with regard to Danzig. It is dated 24 November. That was some 6 weeks before, and it is supplementary to an order of 21 October, and you see what it says: Did you know of these instructions?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. This is the first time that I have seen that order or whatever it may be. May I add something?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not for the moment. Hitler must have known of the order, mustn't he? It is an order of the Fuehrer?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, of course, and therefore I assume -- that is what I wanted to add -- that the British Prosecution are aware that political matters and military matters are in this case two completely different conceptions. There is no doubt that the Fuehrer, in view of the permanent difficulties in Danzig and the Corridor; had given military orders of some kind -- just in case -- and I can well imagine that it is one of these orders. I see it today for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Supposing that you had known of the orders, Witness, would you still have said on the 5th of January that Germany was not seeking a fait accompli or a violent solution? If you had known of that order would you still have said it?
VON RIBBENTROP: If I had known this order and considering it an order of the General Staff for possible cases, as I am compelled to do, then I would still continue to have the same opinion. I think it is part of the General Staff's duty to take into consideration all possible eventualities and prepare for them in principle. In the final analysis that has nothing to do with politics.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Nothing to do with politics to. have a cut-and-dried plan how the Free State of Danzig is to be occupied by German troops by surprise when you are telling the Poles that you won't have a fait accompli? That is your idea of how matters should be carried on? If it is I will leave it.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must rather add that I know that the Fuehrer was alarmed for a long time, particularly during 1939, lest a sudden Polish attack take place against Danzig; so that to me, I am not a military man, it appears quite natural to make some preparations for all such problems and possibilities. But, of course, I cannot judge the details of these orders.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when did you learn that Hitler was determined to attack Poland?
VON RIBBENTROP: That Hitler contemplated a military action against Poland, I learned for the first time, as I remember, in August 1939. That, of course, he had made certain military preparations in advance to meet any eventuality becomes clear from this order regarding Danzig. But I definitely did not learn about this order, and I do not recollect now in detail whether I received at that time any military communication. I do remember that I knew virtually nothing about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you tell the Tribunal that you did not know in May that Hitler's real view was that Danzig was not the subject of the dispute at all, but that his real object was the acquisition of Lebensraum in the East?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know it in that sense. The Fuehrer talked sometimes about living space, that is right, but I did not know that he had the intention to attack Poland.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at Page 117, or it may be 118, of your document. On Page 117 you will find the minutes of the conference on the 23rd day of May 1939 at the new Reich Chancellery.
VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say 117?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 117. 1 want you to look af it. It may be on Page 118, and it begins with the following words: Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never explained that view to you?
VON RIBBENTROP: It may be strange to say so, but I should like to say first that it looks as though I was not present during this conference. That was a military conference, and the Fuehrer used to hold these military conferences quite separately from the political conferences. The Fuehrer did now and then mention that we had to have Lebensraum; but I knew nothing, and he never told me anything at that time, that is in May 1939, of an intention to attack Poland. Yes, I think this was kept back deliberately, as had been done in other cases, because he always wanted his diplomats to stand wholeheartedly for a diplomatic solution and to bring it about.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean to say that Hitler was deliberately keeping you in the dark as to his real aims; that Danzig was not the subject of dispute and what he really wanted was Lebensraum; is that your story?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I assume that he did that deliberately because ...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at the very short paragraph a little further on where he says: Do you tell the Tribunal that he never said that to his Foreign Minister?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand that question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a perfectly simple one. Do you tell the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned what I have just read from his speech, that there is to be no question of sparing Poland, that you had to attack Poland at the first opportunity, and your task was to isolate Poland? Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned that to his Foreign Minister, who would have the practical conduct of foreign policy?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, he did not do that at that time; but, according to my recollection, only much later, in the summer of 1939. At that time he did say that he was resolved -- and he said literally -- to solve the problem one way or another.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you say that you didn't know in May that Hitler wanted war?
VON RIBBENTROP: That he wanted what?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn't know in May that Hitler wanted war?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not convinced of that at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear from the document that he did want war, isn't it?
VON RIBBENTROP: This document, no doubt, shows the intention of an action against Poland, but I know that Hitler often used strong language to his military men, that is, he spoke as though he had the firm intention of attacking a certain country in some way, but whether he actually would have carried it out later politically is an entirely different question. I know that he repeatedly told me that one had to talk with military men as if war was about to break out here or there on the next day.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about another point. You said on Friday that you had never expressed the view that Great Britain would stay out of war and would fail to honor her guarantee to Poland. Do you remember saying that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I would just like you to look at one or two other documents. Do you remember on the 29th of April 1939 receiving the Hungarian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister at 3:30 in the afternoon?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we have the minutes of your meeting signed by Von Erdmannsdorff, I think. Did you say this to the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister: Did you say that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not think I ever said that. I consider that impossible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYPE: Well, if you got a copy ...
VON RIBBENTROP: May I perhaps have a look at the document?
SIR DAVED MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, certainly, with pleasure. This will become Exhibit GB-289, Document D-737.
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot, of course, tell you now in detail that I said at that time, but it may be possible that there was an effort at that time to reassure the Hungarians who were probably concerned about the Polish problem; that is absolutely possible. But I hardly believe that I said anything like this. However, it is certain that the Fuehrer knew, and I had told the Fuehrer that England would inarch to the aid of Poland.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you are a little doubtful would you look at Document Number D-738, which will be Exhibit GB-290. Apparently you saw these gentlemen again 2 days later. Just look at the last sentence of that: That is quite straight speaking, isn't it, "The British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch"?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know on just what page that is.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Paragraph 7, and it is the report of the Ist of May, the last sentence of my quotation. It is signed by a gentlemen called Von Erdmannsdorff; it appears above his signature. The words I am asking you about are, "In case of a military clash the British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch."
VON RIBBENTROP: Is that on Page 8 or where? On what page, if I may ask?
SIR DAVID MAXWELTFYFE: My heading is Paragraph 7. It begins:
VON RIBBENTROP: It is perfectly conceivable that I said sbmething like that, and if it has been said it was done in order not to alarm the Hungarians and to keep them on our side. It is quite clear that that is nothing but diplomatic talk.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don't you think there is any requirement to tell the truth in a political conversation?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was not the point; the point was to bring about a situation which made it possible to solve this and the Polish question in a diplomatic way. If I were to tell the Hungarians today, and this applies to the Italians also, that England would assist Poland and that a great war would result, then this would create a diplomatic situation which would make it impossible to solve the problem at all. There is no doubt that during the entire time I had to use very strong language, just as the Fuehrer had always ordered, for if his own Foreign Minister had hinted at other possibilities, it would naturally have been very difficult, and I venture to say, it would have meant that this would, in any case, have led to war. But we wanted to create a strong German position so that we could solve this problem peacefully. I may add that the Hungarians were somewhat worried with regard to the German policy, and that the Fuehrer had told me from the start to use particularly clear and strong language on these subjects. I used that kind of language also quite frequently to my own diplomats for the same reasons.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You want us to assume that you were telling lies to the Hungarians but you are telling the truth to this Tribunal. That is what it comes to shortly, isn't it? That is what you want us to understand -- that you were telling lies to the Hungarians but you are telling the truth to this Tribunal. That is what you want us to understand isn't it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether one can talk of lies in this case, Mr. Prosecutor. This is a question of diplomacy; and if we wanted to create a strong position, then of course we could not go beating about the bush. Consider what the impression would have been if the German Foreign Minister had spoken as if at the slightest German step the whole world would attack Germany! The Fuehrer used frequently such strong language and expected me to do the same. I want to emphasize again that often I had to use such language, even to my own Foreign Office, so that there was no misunderstanding. If the Fuehrer was determined on the solution of a problem, no matter what the circumstances, even at the risk of war if it had to be, our only chance to succeed was to adopt a firm stand, for had we failed to do that, war would have been inevitable.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you to have in mind what Count Ciano says that you said to him on, I think the 11th or 12th of August, just before your meeting at, I think it was at Salzburg, with you and Hitler. You remember that according to Count Ciano's diary he said that he asked you, "What do you want, the Corridor or Danzig?" and that you looked at him and said, "Not any more; we want war." Do you remember that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is absolutely untrue. I told Count Ciano at that time, this is on the same line, "the Fuehrer is determined to solve the Polish problem one way or another." This was what the Fuehrer had instructed me to say. That I am supposed to have said "we want war" is absurd for the simple reason that, it is clear to every diplomat, those things are just not said, not even to the very best and most trusted ally, but most certainly not to Count Ciano.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I should just like you to look at a report of the subsequent conversation that you had with Mussolini and Count Ciano not very long after, on the 10th of March 1940, that is, about 9 months later. If you look at Document Number 2835-PS, which will become Exhibit GB-291, and if you will turn to, I think it is Page 18 or 19 ...
VON RIBBENTROP: You mean Page 18?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I remind you again, a conversation between you and Mussolini and Ciano on the 10th of March 1940. It begins by saying: And then you go on to say that it would be a good thing to finish the conflict in the lifetime of the Fuehrer.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that was after the outbreak of war; is that it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. What I am putting to you are these words: And if you will look at where it says "secondly"...
VON RIBBENTROP: May I reply to that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; but what I am suggesting to you is that that shows perfectly clearly that Count Ciano is right, and that you were very glad that the war had come, because you thought this was an appropriate time for it to happen.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not agree. On the contrary, it says here also "that at all times he had reckoned with the possibility of intervention by the Western Powers." It says so here quite clearly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is the second part that I am putting to you. I pass from that point about British intervention. I say, "he was glad now about the course of events," and if you will look down at the paragraph where it says "secondly," so that you will have it in mind, the third line says:
VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask where it says that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A few lines further down. The word "secondly" is underlined, isn't it?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it is not here. Yes, I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "Secondly, at the moment when England introduced general conscription... " It is about 10 lines further on.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, what does the British Prosecutor try to prove with that; I do not quite understand?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look at the next sentence before you answer my question. What I am saying...
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that appears correct to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was your view at the time and the view that you declared afterwards as being your view, that you were determined that you would solve the Polish question even if it meant war? Count Ciano was perfectly right in saying that you wanted war. That is what I am putting to you.
VON RIBBENTROP: No; that is not correct. I told Count Ciano at the time at Berchtesgaden that the Fuehrer was determined to solve the problem one way or another. It was necessary to put it in that way because the Fuehrer was convinced that whatever became known to Rome would go to London and Paris at once. He wanted therefore to have clear language used so that Italy would be on our side diplomatically. If the Fuehrer or myself had said that the Fuehrer was not so determined to solve that problem, then it would have been without doubt passed on immediately. But since the Fuehrer was determined to solve the problem, if necessary by war if it could not be solved any other way, this would have meant war, which explains the clear and firm diplomatic attitude which I had to adopt at that time in Salzburg. But I do not know in what way this is contradictory to what is being said here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to pass on to the last week in August and take that again very shortly, because there is a lot of ground to cover. You agreed in your evidence that on the 25th of August the Fuehrer called off the attack which was designed for the morning of the 26th. You remember that? I just want you to have the dates in mind.
VON RIBBENTROP: I know that date very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were here in court the day Dahlerus gave his evidence, were you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was here.