dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
leave no doubt that not only was the proposed requisition far beyond the resources of the country, but its impact was to be distributed on a discriminatory basis. Frank's opening remarks at this meeting defined the scope of the problem and its solution: "Before the German people are to experience starvation, the occupied territories and their people shall be exposed to starvation. In this moment therefore we here in the General Government must also have the iron determination to help the Great German people, our Fatherland..... The General Government therefore must do the following: The General Government has taken on the obligation to send 500,000 tons bread grains to the Fatherland in addition to the foodstuffs already being delivered for the relief of Germany or consumed here by troops of the Armed Forces, Police or SS. If you compare this with our contributions of last year you can see that this means a six fold increase over that of last year's contribution of the General Government. The new demand will be fulfilled exclusively at the expense of the foreign population. It must be done cold-bloodedly and without pity; * * *" (2233-E-PS). President of the Main Department for Food and Agriculture Naumann (apparently an official of the General Government) then described how the reduced quantity of food available for feeding the population of the General Government should be distributed: "The feeding of a Jewish population, estimated heretofore at 1.5 million, drops off to an estimated total of 300,000 Jews, who still work for German interests as craftsmen or otherwise. For these the Jewish rations, including certain special allotments which have proved necessary for the maintenance of working capacity, will be retained. The other Jews, a total of 1.2 million, will no longer be provided with foodstuffs. "Non-German normal consumers will receive, from 1 January 1943 to 1 March 1943, instead of 4.2 kg. Bread per month, 2.8 kg; from 1 March 1943 to 30 July 1943 the total bread ration for these non-German normal consumers will be cancelled. "Those entitled to be supplied [Versorgungsberechtigten] are composed as follows. We estimate that 3 million persons come into consideration as war workers, the A-and B-card
month, 2.8 kg; from 1 March 1943 to 30 July 1943 the total bread ration for these non-German normal consumers will be cancelled. "Those entitled to be supplied [Versorgungsberechtigten] are composed as follows. We estimate that 3 million persons come into consideration as war workers, the A-and B-card holders and their kin, and that somewhat more than 3 million persons are non-German normal consumers, who do not work directly or indirectly in the interests of Germany. The war workers, A-and B-card holders and their families, about 3 million persons, will however continue to be supplied, up to the harvest of 1943, at the prevailing rates." (2233-E-PS) Naumann goes on to discuss the difficulties that may be encountered in the process of requisition: "The securing of all depots and food processing plants, as well as their transport facilities must be assured, as otherwise irreplaceable losses result which mean a further burdening of the food budget. I have had maps made of all districts [Kreise] on which the depots have all been drawn in. I request that the necessary measures be taken on the part of the police and these depots, which are in the eye of the hungering masses, above all at times when the restrictions are carried out, should be strictly guarded, so that the meager supplies which we have until the new harvest should not be destroyed by sabotage or arson...... Finally it must be determined at the beginning of November whether the martial law for the harvest period, which has been proclaimed up to 30 November, must be extended to 30 December. Martial law for the harvest period has been extended to all products which are to be seized. The planned quota increase and reduction of ration quantities must be kept secret under all circumstances and may be published only at that time which the Main Department for Food and Agriculture considers proper. Should the reduction of ration quantities and the increase of quotas become known earlier, extremely noticeable disturbances in the seizure would take place. The mass of the Polish population would then go to the land and would become a supplementary competitor of our requisitioning agencies." (2233-E-PS) Frank's concluding remarks summarized the position as follows:
increase of quotas become known earlier, extremely noticeable disturbances in the seizure would take place. The mass of the Polish population would then go to the land and would become a supplementary competitor of our requisitioning agencies." (2233-E-PS) Frank's concluding remarks summarized the position as follows: "I must point out that some sectors of the administration will feel this very keenly. In the first place the police will feel this, for it will have to deal, if I may say so, with an increased activity of the black market and a neglect of food customs. I will gladly give the police extraordinary powers so that they can overcome these difficulties. "The economy will feel it. The decrease of work rendered will become felt in all sectors, branches and regions. I also assume that our transport system will feel it too. In view of the worsening living conditions an extraordinary hardship will set in for railroad workers and other categories; as the previous quantities of food were already not enough. The monopolies will feel it through a decrease of their incomes, as the amounts of potatoes available for the production of vodka will be less. "The Germans in this area shall not feel it. We wish in spite of this new plan to see to it that the supplies for Germans will be maintained. Also the Wehrmacht and other encamped units in this area shall not feel it. We hope that it will be possible for us to keep up the whole quotas here. "To help in this necessity there is a corresponding measure, namely that the supervision of persons traveling from the General Government to the Reich, above all of military personnel, in order to see whether they are taking food out of the General Government, should be suspended. This means that in addition to all that which we must now extract from the land economically, there must take place a complete removal of control over that which is dragged out of the land by thousands upon thousands-doubtless illegally and against our government measures." (2233-E-PS) The extent of the General Government's food contribution to the Reich, and its significance in terms of rations within Germany were described by Frank at a meeting of political leaders of the NSDAP in December
land by thousands upon thousands-doubtless illegally and against our government measures." (2233-E-PS) The extent of the General Government's food contribution to the Reich, and its significance in terms of rations within Germany were described by Frank at a meeting of political leaders of the NSDAP in December 1942 at Cracow: "I will endeavor to get out of the reservoir of this territory everything that is yet to be got out of it. When you consider that it was possible for me to deliver to the Reich 600,000 tons of bread grain, and in addition 180,000 tons to the Armed Forces stationed here; further an abundance amounting to many thousands of tons of other commodities such as seed, fats, vegetables, besides the delivery to the Reich of 300 million eggs, etc.-you can estimate the significance of the consignment from the General Government of 600,000 tons of bread grain; you are referred to the fact that the General Government by this achievement alone covers the raising of the bread ration in the Greater German Reich by two-thirds during the present rationing period. This enormous achievement can rightfully be claimed by us." (2233-Z-PS) (2) Resettlement projects. Although Himmler was given general authority in connection with the conspirators' program to resettle various districts in the conquered Eastern territories with racial Germans, projects relating to resettling districts in the General Government were submitted to and approved by Frank. On 4 August 1942, for example, the plan to resettle Zamosc and Lublin was reported to him by State Secretary Krueger: "State Secretary Krueger then continues, saying that the Reichsfuehrer's next immediate plan until the end of the following year would be to settle the following German racial groups in the two districts (Zamosc and Lublin): 1000 peasant settlements (1 settlement per family of about 6) for Bosnian Germans; 1200 other kinds of settlements; 1000 settlements for Bessarabian Germans; 200 for Serbian Germans; 2000 for Leningrad Germans; 4000 for Baltic Germans; 500 for Wolhynia Germans; and 200 settlements for Flemish, Danish and Dutch Germans: in all 10,000 settlements for 50,000 persons" (2233-T-PS). Frank directed that: "* * * the resettlement plan is
for Bessarabian Germans; 200 for Serbian Germans; 2000 for Leningrad Germans; 4000 for Baltic Germans; 500 for Wolhynia Germans; and 200 settlements for Flemish, Danish and Dutch Germans: in all 10,000 settlements for 50,000 persons" (2233-T-PS). Frank directed that: "* * * the resettlement plan is to be discussed cooperatively by the competent authorities and declared his willingness to approve the final plan by the end of September after satisfactory arrangements had been made concerning all the questions appertaining thereto (in particular the guaranteeing of peace and order) so that by the middle of November, as the most favorable time, the resettlement can begin." (2233-T-PS) The way in which the resettlement at Zamosc was carried out was described to Frank at a meeting at Warsaw on 25 January 1943 by State Secretary Krueger: "When we settled about the first 4000 in Kreis Zamosc shortly before Christmas I had an opportunity to speak to these people. * * * It is understandable that in resettling this area.... we did not make friends of the Poles. * * * In colonizing this territory with racial Germans, we are forced to chase out the Poles. * * * We are removing those who constitute a burden in this new colonization territory. Actually, they are the asocial and inferior elements. They are being deported, first brought to a concentration camp, and then sent as labor to the Reich. From a Polish propaganda standpoint this entire first action has had an unfavorable effect. For the Poles say: after the Jews have been destroyed then they will employ the same methods to get the Poles out of this territory and liquidate them just like the Jews." (2233-AA-PS) Although the illegality of this dispossession of Poles to make room for German settlers was clear, and although the fact that the Poles were not only being dispossessed but taken off to concentration camps was drawn to Frank's attention at this time, he merely directed that individual cases of resettlement should in future be discussed in the same manner as in the case of Zamosc. (2233-AA-PS) (3) Encroachments and confiscations in the industries and in the field of private property. Frank explained his policy in respect to Polish property to his Department Heads in the
individual cases of resettlement should in future be discussed in the same manner as in the case of Zamosc. (2233-AA-PS) (3) Encroachments and confiscations in the industries and in the field of private property. Frank explained his policy in respect to Polish property to his Department Heads in the following terms in December 1939: "Principally it can be said regarding the administration of the General Government: This territory in its entirety is booty of the German Reich, and it thus cannot be permitted that this territory shall be exploited in its individual parts but that the territory in its entirety shall be economically used and its entire economic worth redound to the benefit of the German people." (2233-K-PS) Whatever encroachments there were on private property rights in the General Government fell squarely within the policy which Frank in an interview on 3 October 1939 stated he intended to administer as General Governor: "Poland can only be administered by utilizing the country through means of ruthless exploitation, deportation of all supplies, raw materials, machines, factory installations etc. which are important for the German war economy. * * * [it was Frank's opinion] that the war would be a short one and that it was most important now to make available as soon as possible raw materials, machines and workers to the German industry, which was short in all of these. Most important, however, in Frank's opinion, was the fact that by destroying Polish industry, its subsequent reconstruction after the war would become more difficult, if not impossible, so that Poland would be reduced to its proper position as an agrarian country which would have to depend upon Germany for importation of industrial products." (EC-344-16 & 17) The basic decree under which property in the General Government was sequestered was promulgated by Frank on 24 January 1940. This decree authorized sequestration in connection with the "performance of tasks serving the public interest," the seizure of "abandoned property," and the liquidation of "antisocial or financially unremunerative property." It permitted the Higher S.S. and Police Chief to order sequestrations "with the object of increasing the striking power of the units of the uniformed police and armed
of tasks serving the public interest," the seizure of "abandoned property," and the liquidation of "antisocial or financially unremunerative property." It permitted the Higher S.S. and Police Chief to order sequestrations "with the object of increasing the striking power of the units of the uniformed police and armed S.S." No legal recourse was granted for losses arising from the enforcement of the decree, compensation being solely in the discretion of an official of the General Government. It is clear that the undefined criteria of this decree empowered Nazi officials in the General Government to engage in wholesale seizure of property. (2540-PS) (4) Principle of collective responsibility. It was no part of Frank's policy in administering the General Government that reprisals should be commensurate with the gravity of the offense. Frank was, on the contrary, an advocate of drastic measures in dealing with the Polish people. At a conference of Department Heads of the General Government on 19 January 1940, he explained: "My relationship with the Poles is like the relationship between ant and plant louse. When I treat the Poles in a helpful way, so to speak tickle them in a friendly manner, then I do it in the expectation that their work performance redounds to my benefit. This is not a political but a purely tactical-technical problem. * * * In cases where in spite of all these measures the performance does not increase, or where the slightest act gives me occasion to step in, I would not even hesitate to take the most draconic action." (2233-L-PS) At a subsequent meeting of Department Heads on 8 March 1940 Frank became even more explicit: "Whenever there is the least attempt by the Poles to start anything, an enormous campaign of destruction will follow. Then I would not mind starting a regime of terror, or fear its consequences." (2233-M-PS) At a conference of District Standartenfuehrer at Cracow on 18 March 1942 Frank reiterated his policy: "Incidentally, the struggle for the achievement of our aims will be pursued cold bloodedly. You see how the state agencies work. You see that we do not hesitate before anything, and stand whole dozens of people up against the wall.
Standartenfuehrer at Cracow on 18 March 1942 Frank reiterated his policy: "Incidentally, the struggle for the achievement of our aims will be pursued cold bloodedly. You see how the state agencies work. You see that we do not hesitate before anything, and stand whole dozens of people up against the wall. This is necessary because here simple consideration says that it cannot be our task at this period when the best German blood is being sacrificed, to show regard for the blood of another race. For out of this one of the greatest dangers may arise. One already hears today in Germany that prisoners-of-war, for instance with us in Bavaria or in Thuringia, are administering large estates entirely independently, while all the men in a village fit for service are at the front. If this state of affairs continues then a gradual retrogression of Germanism will show itself. One should not underestimate this danger. Therefore, everything revealing itself as a Polish power of leadership must be destroyed again and again with ruthless energy. This does not have to be shouted abroad, it will happen silently." (2233-R-PS) And on 15 January 1944 Frank assured the political leaders of the NSDAP at Cracow: "I have not been hesitant in declaring that when a German is shot, up to 100 Poles shall be shot too." (2233-BB-PS) (5) Rigorous methods of recruiting workers. Force, violence, and economic duress were all advocated by Frank as means for recruiting laborers for deportation to slave labor in Germany. Deportation of Polish laborers to Germany was an integral part of the program announced by Frank for his administration of the General Government (See EC-344-16 & 17), and as Governor General he authorized whatever degree of force was required for the execution of his program. Voluntary methods of recruitment soon proved inadequate. In the spring of 1940 the question of utilizing force came up, and the following discussion took place in the presence of Seyss-Inquart: "The Governor-General stated that the fact that all means in form of proclamations etc. did not bring success, leads to the conclusion that the Poles out of malevolence, and guided by the intention of harming Germany by not putting themselves at its disposal, refuse to enlist
presence of Seyss-Inquart: "The Governor-General stated that the fact that all means in form of proclamations etc. did not bring success, leads to the conclusion that the Poles out of malevolence, and guided by the intention of harming Germany by not putting themselves at its disposal, refuse to enlist for working duty. Therefore, he asks Dr. Frauendorfer, if there are any other measures, not as yet employed, to win the Poles on a voluntary basis. "Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer answered this question negatively. "The General Governor emphasized the fact that he now will be asked to take a definite attitude toward this question. Therefore the question will arise whether any form of coercive measures should now be employed. "The question put by the General Governor to SS Lieutenant General [Obergruppenfuehrer] Krueger: does he see possibilities of calling Polish workers by coercive means, is answered in the affirmative by SS Lieutenant General Krueger." (2233-N-PS) At the same conference Frank declared that he was willing to agree to any practical measures, and decreed that unemployment compensation should be discontinued on 1 May 1940 as a means of recruiting labor for Germany. "The General Governor is willing to agree to any practical measure; however, he wishes to be informed personally about the measures to be taken. One measure, which no doubt would be successful, would be the discontinuance of unemployment compensation for unemployed workers and their transfer to public welfare. Therefore, he decrees that, beginning 1 May, claim for unemployment compensation will cease to exist and only public welfare may be granted. For the time being only men are to report and above those men living in cities. There might be a possibility of combining the moving of the 120,000 Poles from the warthe district with this measure." (2233-N-PS) In March 1940 Frank assured the authorities in Berlin that he was prepared to have villages surrounded and the people dragged forcibly out. He reported that, in the course of his negotiations in Berlin regarding the urgent demand for larger numbers of Polish farm workers, he had stated: "* * * if it is demanded from him, [he] could naturally exercise force in such a manner,
to have villages surrounded and the people dragged forcibly out. He reported that, in the course of his negotiations in Berlin regarding the urgent demand for larger numbers of Polish farm workers, he had stated: "* * * if it is demanded from him, [he] could naturally exercise force in such a manner, that he has the police surround a village and get the men and women in question out by force, and then send them to Germany. But one can also work differently, besides these police measures, by retaining the unemployment compensation of these workers in question." (2233-B-PS) At a conference of Department Heads of the General Government on 10 May 1940 Frank laid down the following principles for dealing with the problem of conscription labor: "Upon the demands from the Reich it has now been decreed that compulsion may be exercised in view of the fact that sufficient manpower was not voluntarily available for service inside the German Reich. This compulsion means the possibility of arrest of male and female Poles..... The arrest of young Poles when leaving church services or the cinema would bring about an ever-increasing nervousness of the Poles. Generally speaking, he had no objection at all if the rubbish, capable of work yet often loitering about, would be snatched from the streets. The best method for this, however, would be the organization of a raid, and it would be absolutely justifiable to stop a Pole in the street and to question him what he was doing, where he was working, etc." (2233-A-PS) Frank utilized starvation as a method of recruitment. At a conference on 20 November 1942 the following plan was agreed: "Starting 1 February 1942 the food ration cards should not be issued to the individual Pole or Ukrainian by the Nutrition Office [Ernaehrungsamt], but to the establishments working for the German interest. 2,000,000 people would thus be eliminated from the non-German, normal rationconsuming contingent. Now, if those ration cards are only distributed by the factories, part of those people will naturally rush into the factories. Labor could then be either procured for Germany from them or they could be used for the most important work in the factories of the General Government." (2233-Y-PS) On 18 August 1942 Frank informed Sauckel that