dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Even Huber's book Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches, quoted by the Prosecution under Document 1744-PS in their attempt to prove the contrary, shows that the Secret Cabinet Council and its President had nothing whatsoever to do with the Reich Cabinet, and was not a branch or an organ of it, but only one of several of the Fuhrer's personal offices. As had been shown by the testimony of Goring, Lammers, and other witnesses, the Secret Cabinet Council never really functioned, and was never meant to function. In point of fact, all that was intended was to bestow a personal honor on the defendant, and thus efface the impression that differences had arisen between him and Hitler. That he himself did not look upon his appointment in any other way is proved by the fact that after 4 February 1938 the defendant lived a life of leisure on his own estate in Wurttemberg as a private citizen, and went only very rarely to Berlin where, however, he was not and could not have been active in any official capacity, since all information as to what was happening in the Foreign Ministry was deliberately kept from him. If the Prosecution believe that they are able to conclude, from the documents submitted under Number 3945-PS, that the defendant received sums of money from the Reich, or the Reich Chancellery, for obtaining diplomatic information, then-apart from the defendant's own testimony under oath-this is refuted by a letter among these documents, dated 31 May 1939, from Amtsrat Koeppen, the head of the office of the Secret Cabinet Council, which was kept going merely for the sake of appearances-a letter which proves conclusively that these not very large payments at long intervals were for covering the cost of maintaining this office, and were not intended for purposes of secret information.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And if the defendant made no use of his position as President of this Secret Cabinet Council-except for this one occasion in September 1938 he made just as little use of his position as a member of the Reich Defense Council, to which he was appointed by the Reich Defense Laws. Here, too, the Prosecution err when they make use of this membership to accuse the defendant of warlike intentions or of promoting such intentions. Since this Reich Defense Council has already been discussed so much during the hearing of the evidence, I believe there is no need for me to examine more closely this assertion of the Prosecution, and that I can limit myself to pointing out that no aggressive. tendencies of any kind were embodied in these Reich Defense Laws; but that, on the contrary, as their contents state, they merely contain-as is the custom in any country which has to reckon with the possibility of a war-the necessary provisions in the event of the Reich's being attacked, or being drawn into a war in some other manner. How one can deduce from them that the defendant had warlike intentions, or planned for war, is utterly incomprehensible. Moreover, the defendant did not take part in a single one of the meetings of this Council, and no reports about the decisions of this Council were ever forwarded to him. The Document 2194-PS, submitted by the Prosecution as alleged counterevidence, was not sent to the defendant at all, but to a department of the Reich Ministry of Transportation attached to the Government of the Protectorate-namely, the transport department-and was intended for the latter. Also the sender of the document was not the Reich Defense Council, but the Ministry for Economy and Labor of Saxony. All these and similar efforts will never enable the Prosecution to prove that the defendant, by his policies, was at any time directly or indirectly guilty of a crime of planning or preparing an aggressive war, or even of approving or supporting such a war. Quite the contrary.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: All his efforts were directed to one end, and one end only: to attain by peaceful means and in a peaceful way only those aims which had been sought by all former democratic Governments after 1919-namely, the removal of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty which discriminated against Germany and stamped the German Reich as a second-rate power, and the bringing about of a general pacification of Europe. Not one of his diplomatic actions served any other purpose, or was performed with any intention which would imply a crime in the sense of the Charter. It is not surprising, therefore, that his resignation as Reich Foreign Minister was received by the whole world with anxiety and dismay, both outside Germany-I refer ,to the statement of the witness Dieckhoff-as well as inside Germany, and especially in conservative circles. This alone serves to prove that the assertion of the Prosecution, that he was active in these circles as a fifth columnist, is untrue. All the Prosecution's references to Hitler's speech to his generals in November 1939, and still less to the speeches by the defendant himself of 29 August and 31 October 1937, will alter none of those facts. Hitler's speech was made at the time of the first military successes and was calculated to vindicate Hitler's state leadership, and should be taken at its face value. The speeches made by the defendant, however, say just the opposite of what the Prosecution see fit to put into them. For both speeches, Numbers 126 and 128 in my Document Book 4, stress quite clearly the success of the peaceful intentions of the German foreign policy conducted by the defendant, and lay particular emphasis on the fact that the results were obtained entirely by peaceful means, and not by means of force. In particular, the speech of 31 October 1937, the last public speech of the defendant as Foreign Minister, is actually a resume of his peace policy.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: That this was and still is a correct resume, the Prosecution themselves have had to admit in this Court-that Hitler's speech of 5 November 1937, which was used by my client as an excuse for his resignation, was, as described by a member of the Prosecution, the turning point in German foreign policy. Thus the Prosecution acknowledged unequivocally that up to that day German foreign policy had not been an aggressive policy of force, or pursued any warlike plans or schemes, but had been peaceful throughout. Indeed it could not have been otherwise, in view of the defendant's political and humane creed; and this has been unanimously confirmed by all witnesses examined here and in all of the questionnaires and affidavits in my document books. This creed was built on three main pillars: love of men, love of the fatherland, and love of peace-all three springing from and sustained by a deep sense of responsibility toward himself, toward his God, and toward his people. When, a few days after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Hitler called the defendant to Vienna from his well-deserved otium cum dignitate on his estate, and told him that he had been selected as Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia, it was this same sense of responsibility which made him feel it his duty to accept this post. At first he was opposed to the idea and struggled long with himself, for he had always been an inveterate opponent of any interference in the affairs of other nations, let alone the more or less forcible annexation of a country to the German Reich. It was for this reason that he had also condemned the annexation of Czechoslovakia and the so-called protection pact concluded with President Hacha, although at this time he had not the slightest idea of how this really came about. He got to know the true facts of this incident for the first time here in Nuremberg.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In spite of his reluctance to accept a public office once more, especially at his age, and to serve again under Hitler and his regime of which he heartily disapproved, his sense of responsibility toward his people and his humane principles persuaded him that it would be wrong to refuse this mission. When Hitler explained to him that he had chosen him as being the only man possessing the necessary qualities to reconcile the Czechoslovakian people with the new conditions and with the German people- which Hitler said was his desire-he could not fail to recognize that the task given him was one which, in the interests of the German people, of humanity, and of international understanding, he ought not to refuse. And was it not indeed a task worthy of the utmost effort, to appease by just government and humane treatment a people who would regard every restriction and encroachment on their liberty and independence as the worst injustice that could be done them, and who would be filled with mortal hatred and resentment toward a people they felt to be an intolerable oppressor, and to reconcile them with these very people and the conditions for which they were directly responsible? But was not this aim in line with the endeavor to insure and preserve peace, which clearly and unequivocally pervaded his whole foreign policy? And he had every justification for telling himself that if he refused this task, then another man from Hitler's entourage would in all probability be nominated Reich Protector, who would be neither able nor willing to conciliate the Czech people by humane and just treatment, but who, on the contrary, would be more inclined to hold them down by force and terror, as indeed happened 21/2, years later.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Such were the only thoughts and considerations which led him to accept the appointment offered him, setting aside all personal interests and willing to face the risk that this might be interpreted and held against him in some quarters as denoting approval and support of Hitler and his regime-for Hitler had made him the definite and firm promise that he would at all times be willing to support the defendant's intended policy of appeasement and reconciliation for the Czech people through humane and just treatment and through safeguarding the interests of the Czech people to the greatest extent. He was fully aware that the task which he had accepted was a difficult one. I do not hesitate to admit that it was here a question of a decision, the justification of which could-if one admits the point of view put forward here by the British prosecutor that it was immoral to remain in a government which should be repudiated because of its amorality-cause embarrassment in the judgment of a man whose thoughts arid dealings were different from those of the Defendant Von Neurath. But having in mind the character of Herr Von Neurath, which I hope has been described to you clearly enough, and his deep sense of responsibility, this decision was the only possible and logical one. It is a veritable tragedy, resembling those of the ancient Greeks, that the failure of this mission, which had been undertaken with only the highest ethical motives, should have brought the Defendant Von Neurath into this dock.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: But at this point now, I should like to make the following comments on the Prosecution's attempt by means of the photostatic documents which they submitted under Document 3859-PS-consisting of a letter from the defendant to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery Lammers, dated 31 August 1940, and its alleged enclosures-to discredit the defendant's assertion that in assuming his office as Reich Protector his sole aim was to appease and reconcile the Czech people by safeguarding to the utmost their interests and their national traditions, and thus work for the well-being of this people and their prosperity as a nation. I believe that the second examination of the defendant, which the Tribunal, in their readiness to help, granted to me, has proved that those documents, particularly the two reports attached to the letter to Lammers-which indeed, with regard to the question of the Germanization of the l Czech people, cannot be reconciled with the intentions and tendencies of the defendant as mentioned above-have no evidentiary value. Not only do those photostatic copies in no way tally-and the defendant has made a definite statement to this effect-with the contents and the form-that is, the length of the originals attached to the letter to Lammers, and which had been submitted to the defendant for signature and approved by him-but the photostatic copies also give rise in several places to well-founded doubts as to whether they are really identical with the enclosures to the letter addressed to Lammers, and this owing to the following facts. Contrary to the practice adopted by all administration offices, neither of the photostatic copies bears the reference number of the letter to Lammers, or even a note that they are enclosures to a third document, let alone to the Lammers letter.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Neither does the photostatic copy of the first report bear the defendant's signature which, according to his definite statement, when he signed the letter to Lammers, he added to the report enclosed with it, which report had been drawn up by himself or by his office according to his instructions, and submitted to him in a fair copy. Another thing which strikes one is that it only bears a correction note of the copy which should have been, but actually was not, signed by an SS Obersturmfuehrer working in the office of State Secretary Frank. These facts support the defendant's assertion that, if the reports from which the photostatic copies have been made were in fact annexed to the Lammers letter, they have been substituted for the original report of the defendant and for Frank's report-the draft of which was approved by the defendant in the office of State Secretary Frank which was entrusted with the dispatch-either by the latter or by his orders. Furthermore, the defendant's statement, made by him in order to explain the purpose of this Lammers letter and its enclosures, is quite worthy of belief: namely, in the same way as was intended by the plan contained in General Friderici's report-dated 15 October 1940, submitted under Exhibit USA-65, Document L-150-to induce Hitler by reporting verbally to him, and on the basis of the two reports sent, to abstain from dividing the Protectorate territory and from germanizing the Czech people in any way whatever, and to prohibit any such plans, a course which the defendant repudiated for many reasons, but chiefly because he had at heart the interests of the Czech nation, which had been entrusted to him, and its national character and unity. These assertions of the defendant are confirmed by the statements of the witness Von Holleben in the questionnaire answered by him,-Document Book 5, Document Neurath-156-of the witness Dr. Von Burgsdorff, as well as by the defendant's letter to Baroness Ritter-quoted in her affidavit, Document Book 1, Document Neurath-3.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And the defendant has actually succeeded in carrying his point, as shown by Ziemke's report on his conversation with Hitler, submitted by the Prosecution. As long as he was in Prague, no measures were taken to germanize the Czech people; the defendant even prohibited the discussion of this entire question, as shown by Document 3862-PS submitted by the Prosecution. Especially by preventing any division of the Protectorate territory and any more or less forcible Germanization of the Czech nation according to plan, the defendant has proved, in the most striking manner, the sincerity of his aims and endeavors to protect and preserve the Czech people, their national traits, and their national unity and character, in conformity with his principles and intentions as stated publicly in his article on the New Order in Central Europe, reproduced by the Frankfurter Zeitung of 30 March 1939-Document Book 5, Neurath-143-which set forth his line of conduct for the accomplishment of his task. In this article he himself describes his task as a fine one, but at the same time a difficult one. How difficult it really was-how nearly impossible-was to become obvious, unfortunately, only too soon. Chief among the reasons for this was that from the beginning not only were the full powers in the Protectorate not transferred to the Reich Protector, not only was he not given the sole executive and controlling position-quite apart from his subordination to Hitler-but also his competency and powers were not sufficiently clearly defined. It is true that Hitler's decree of 16 March 1939, establishing the Protectorate, and the supplementary decree of 22 March 1939-Document Book 5, Documents Neurath-144 and 145- had specified that the Reich Protector was subordinate to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor, that he was to be the sole representative of the Fuhrer and the Reich Government, and was to receive his directives from the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor..
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: But, at the same time, not only were certain administrative branches, such as the Armed Forces, communications, the postal, telegraphic and telephone services, removed from his control at the very beginning, but the Reich Government-that is, the Reich-had also been given the right to take under its own so-called "reichseigene" jurisdiction, in the administration of the Reich proper and independent of the Reich Protector, those administrative branches which actually were Reich Protector offices, and to establish, if necessary, Reich offices which did not fall within the Reich Protector's competence. The Reich was also given the right to take measures necessary for security and order in the Protectorate over the head of the Reich Protector himself. Furthermore-and this is the most important point of all-every one of the many supreme Reich authorities- that is, not only the Reich Ministries but, for instance, the Reichsbank, the Four Year Plan, the Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich, and others-was given the right to decree laws and organizational measures on its own authority, quite independently of the Reich Protector and, therefore, could interfere in these administrative branches which actually were to come within the jurisdiction of the Reich Protector without the Reich Protector having either the right or the possibility to protest against or prevent such decrees or measures should they be in opposition to his own decrees, measures, and policy. On the contrary, he was bound not only to publish them in the Protectorate if asked to do so but also to supervise their execution. Therefore, the position of the Reich Protector was, to use an example by way of explanation, by no means the same as that of the British Viceroy in India; it was more like the position-though to outward appearances on a somewhat higher level-of a Reichsstatthalter or the Oberprasident.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Therefore, it was different from what had hitherto been understood constitutionally by a protectorate; nor could it be otherwise, because this so-called Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia belonged, according to Article 1 of the abovementioned decree of 16 March 1939,-and to this I wish to draw particular attention here-to the territory of the German Reich- that is to say, it was a part of the German Reich. And it only had a certain amount of independent authority, a limited autonomy within the Reich, so that the laws and regulations valid in the rest of the Reich territory were introduced into the Protectorate as a matter of course. It was quite obvious that this vague and loosely defined limitation of the powers and competence of the Reich Protector was bound to lead very soon to the greatest difficulties, difficulties not only in the way of a uniform policy, uniformly conceived and directed, but difficulties which prevented the defendant himself, as Reich Protector, from governing in the way he wished and from keeping to the course already taken, difficulties and reverses which became more and more acute in the course of time. In view of all this, it follows that the responsibility of the defendant can only be judged against this background-that is, only by taking into account the power exerted by these many other authorities. He can never be held responsible for decrees, measures, and actions which he did not decree or order himself, but which were decreed without his co-operation, without his knowledge, even against his will, by authorities or other offices outside his sphere of power and influence-decrees, measures, and actions which he had neither the right nor the power to prevent, and for which he was at most an intermediary, a link in the chain. This is especially relevant for the accusation of joint responsibility brought against him by the Czech Prosecution-Document USSR-60(a)-for all the actions of Hitler and of the Reich Government before and after the setting up of the Protectorate.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution take as basis for their assertion the fact that Herr Von Neurath, after having given up his post as Reich Foreign Minister, remained a member of the Reich Cabinet-whereas in fact this is incorrect. I have already proved elsewhere beyond all doubt that he was not a member of the Reich Cabinet, either as a Minister without Portfolio or as President of the Secret Cabinet Council; nor was he a member of the Reich Cabinet as Reich Protector. That, too, is certain, and has never been maintained by the Prosecution before this Court. Therewith, any joint responsibility of the defendant for any actions or measures which preceded or prepared the way for the setting up of the Protectorate is disproved. Also I have already proved elsewhere that his statement to the Czechoslovak Ambassador on 12 March 1938, which has been used by the Prosecution in support of their allegation that this prepared the way, was not false, not deceitful, and therefore was not an action which prepared the way for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. If the Czech Prosecution further deduce from Article 5 of the above-mentioned decree of 16 March 1939 that, as Reich Protector, he was wholly responsible for everything that occurred in the Protectorate during the time he was in office-that is, from 17 March 1939 to 27 September 1941-then this conclusion also is wrong and factually incorrect, in view of the actual position with regard to the division of powers in the Protectorate, as explained above. There is no system of law in the world according to which one can charge a person with criminal responsibility for occurrences and acts by third persons, acts in which he did not participate or co-operate, or which even occurred against his will.