dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
midst of a conference at general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them. "It goes without saying that this is only for your secret information." (D-657) Thus, Hitler ordered attacks on American ships before the German declaration of war. Then on 11 December 1941 Ribbentrop, in the name of the German Government, announced a state of war between Germany and the United States. Ribbentrop also made attempts to get Japan to attack the Soviet Union. In his conversations with Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, in July 1942 and in March and April 1943, Ribbentrop continued to urge Japanese participation and aggression against the Soviet Union (2911-PS; 2954-PS). The report of a discussion between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima reads: "Ambassador Oshima declared that he has received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report, by order of his Government to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: "The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the object of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the danger which threatens from Russia and completely understands the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question." (2954-PS) Whereupon Ribbentrop returned to the attack: "However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia, together. It is not good when one
the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question." (2954-PS) Whereupon Ribbentrop returned to the attack: "However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia, together. It is not good when one part must fight alone." (2954-PS) Ribbentrop's pressure on Japan to attack Russia is shown in another report of Japanese-German discussions on 18 April 1943 (2929-PS): "The Reichsminister for Foreign affairs then stressed again that without any doubt this year presented the most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the moment * * *." (2929-PS) C. RIBBENTROP'S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY. (The following discussion concerns only the planning of these crimes. The execution of the crimes was left to the French and Soviet prosecuting staffs for proof.) (1) The Killing of Allied Aviators. With the increasing air raids on German cities in 1944 by the Allied Air Forces, the German Government proposed to undertake a plan to deter Anglo-American fliers from further raids on Reich cities. In a report of a meeting at which a definite policy was to be established, there is stated the point of view that Ribbentrop had been urging (735-PS). The meeting took place at the Fuehrer's headquarters on 6 June 1944, and proceeded in part as follows: "Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner informed the Deputy Chief of WFST in Klessheim, on the afternoon of the 6th of June, that a conference on this question had been held shortly before between the Reich Marshal [Goering], the Reich foreign Minister [Ribbentrop], and the Reichsfuehrer SS [Himmler]. Contrary to the original suggestion made by the Reich Foreign Minister, who wished to include every type of terror attack on the German civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed in the above conference that merely those attacks carried out with aircraft armament, aimed directly at the civilian population and their property, should be taken as the standard for the evidence of a criminal
of terror attack on the German civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed in the above conference that merely those attacks carried out with aircraft armament, aimed directly at the civilian population and their property, should be taken as the standard for the evidence of a criminal action in this sense. Lynch law would have to be the rule. On the contrary, there has been no question of court martial sentence or handing over to the police." (735-PS) That is, Ribbentrop was pressing that even where there was an attack on a German city, the airmen who crash-landed should be handed over to be lynched by the crowd. The minutes of the conference report further as follows: "Deputy Chief of the WFST mentioned that apart from lynch law, a procedure must be worked out for segregating those enemy aviators who are suspected of criminal action of this kind until they are received into the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel; if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD for special treatment." (735-PS) The sense of this seems to be that if they were not lynched under the first scheme, by the crowd, then they were to be kept from prisoners of war, where they would be subject to the protecting power's intervention. And if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD to be killed. The conference reached a decision on what would be regarded as justifying lynch law: "At a conference with colonel von Brauchitsch, representing the C-in-C, Air Force, on the 6th of June, it was settled that the following actions were to be regarded as terror actions justifying lynch law: "Low-level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian population, single persons as well as crowds. "Shooting our own men in the air who had bailed out. "Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains in the public service. "Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals, hospitals, and hospital trains, which are clearly marked with the Red Cross." (735-PS) These were to be the subject of lynching and not, as Ribbentrop had suggested, the case of the bombing of a city. In the latter part of this report there occurs a somewhat curious comment from Keitel: "If one allows the people
hospitals, hospitals, and hospital trains, which are clearly marked with the Red Cross." (735-PS) These were to be the subject of lynching and not, as Ribbentrop had suggested, the case of the bombing of a city. In the latter part of this report there occurs a somewhat curious comment from Keitel: "If one allows the people to carry out lynch law, it is difficult to enforce rules! "Minister Director Berndt got out and shot the enemy aviator on the road. I am against legal procedure. It doesn't work out.' (735-PS). That is signed by Keitel. The remarks of Jodl then appear: "This conference is insufficient. The following points must be decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office: "1. What do we consider as murder? "Is RR in agreement with point 3b? "2. How should the procedure be carried out? "a. By the people? "b. By the authorities? "3. How can we guarantee that the procedure be not also carried out against other enemy aviators? "4. Should some legal procedure be arranged or not? "(Signed) Jodl" (735-PS). It is important to note that Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office were fully involved in these breaches of the laws and usages of war. The clarity with which the Foreign Office perceived that there were such violations is indicated by a document from the Foreign Office, approved of by Ribbentrop and transmitted by one of his officials, Ritter (728-PS). The approval of Ribbentrop is specifically stated in a memorandum of 30 June 1944 (740-PS). The Foreign Office document reads: "In spite of the obvious objections, founded on international law and foreign politics, the Foreign Office is basically in agreement with the proposed measures. "In the examination of the individual cases, a distinction must be made between the cases of lynching and the cases of special treatment by the Security Service, SD. "1. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the circumstances deserving punishment, according to points 1-4 of the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the German authorities are not directly responsible, since death had occurred before a German official became concerned with the case. Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will be such that it will not be
according to points 1-4 of the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the German authorities are not directly responsible, since death had occurred before a German official became concerned with the case. Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will be such that it will not be difficult to depict the case in an appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of lynching, it will be of primary importance correctly to handle the individual case upon publication. "2. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the S.D., including subsequent publication, would be tenable only if Germany, on this occasion, simultaneously would openly repudiate the commitment of International Law, presently in force, and still recognized by Germany. When an enemy aviator is seized by the Army or by the Police, and is delivered to the Air Forces (P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel, he has received, by this very fact, the legal status of a prisoner of war. "The Prisoner of War Treaty of 27 July 1929 establishes definite rules on the prosecution and sentencing of the Prisoner of War, and the execution of the death penalty, as for example in Article 66: Death sentences may be carried out only three months after the protective power has been notified of the sentence; in Article 63: a prisoner of war will be tried only by the same courts and under the same procedure as members of the German Armed Forces. These rules are so specific, that it would be futile to try to cover up any violation of them by clever wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the other hand the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion a formal repudiation of the Prisoner of War Treaty. "An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected fliers from ever attaining a legal Prisoner of War status, that is, that immediately upon seizure they be told that they are not considered Prisoners of War but criminals; that they would not be turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over Prisoners of War; hence not go to a Prisoner of War Camp; but that they would be delivered to the authorities in charge of the prosecution of criminal acts and that they would be tried in a summary proceeding. If the evidence at the trial
turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over Prisoners of War; hence not go to a Prisoner of War Camp; but that they would be delivered to the authorities in charge of the prosecution of criminal acts and that they would be tried in a summary proceeding. If the evidence at the trial should reveal that the special procedure is not applicable to a particular case, the fliers concerned may subsequently be given the status of Prisoner of War by transfer to the Air Forces (P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel. "Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the possibility that Germany will be accused of the violation of existing treaties, and maybe not even the adoption of reprisals upon German prisoners of war. At any rate this solution would enable us clearly to define our attitude, thus relieving us of the necessity of openly having to renounce the present agreements or of the need of having to use excuses, which no one would believe, upon the publication of each individual case." "It follows from the above, that the main weight of the action will have to be placed on lynchings. Should the campaign be carried out to such an extent that the purpose, to wit 'the deterrence of enemy aviators', is actually achieved, which goal is favored by the Foreign Office, then the strafing attacks by enemy fliers upon the civilian populations must be stressed in a completely different propagandist manner than heretofore." (728-PS). Those words show clearly Ribbentrop's point of view: "Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone on 29 June that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft." (740-PS) Thus, on the treatment of aviators, Ribbentrop furthered the deliberate adoption of a procedure evading International Law. (2) The Destruction of the Peoples in Europe. With regard to Poland, the affidavit of Lahousen reports Ribbentrop participation in a discussion on 12 September 1939 on the Fuehrer's train concerning the extermination of Poles and Jews (Affidavit A). With regard to Bohemia and Moravia, on 16 March 1939 there was promulgated the decree of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, signed by Ribbentrop, establishing the protectorate (TC-51). The effect of that decree was to place the Reich Protector in a position of
of Poles and Jews (Affidavit A). With regard to Bohemia and Moravia, on 16 March 1939 there was promulgated the decree of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, signed by Ribbentrop, establishing the protectorate (TC-51). The effect of that decree was to place the Reich Protector in a position of supreme power over Bohemia and Moravia, subordinate only to the Fuehrer. Article 5 of that decree provides: "* * * 2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich, and as commissioner of the Reich Government, is charged with the duty of seeing to the observance of the political principles laid down by the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich. "3. The members of the government of the Protectorate shall be confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be withdrawn. "4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all measures taken by the government of the Protectorate and to give advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich, and, in case of danger, issue ordinances required for the common interest." (TC-51) It is further provided that the promulgation of laws and the execution of certain judgments shall be annulled if the Reich Protector enters an objection (TC-51). In part as a result of the sweeping terms of this law, the two Reich Protectors of Bohemia and Moravia and their various deputies were able to commit numerous violations of the laws of war, and crimes against humanity. (Discussion of these matters was assumed as the responsibility of the Soviet prosecuting staff.) Similarly, with regard to the Netherlands, on 18 May 1940 a decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands was signed by Ribbentrop. Section 1 of that decree provided (D-639): "The occupied Netherlands territories shall be administered by the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands territories * * * the Reich Commissioner is guardian of the interests of the Reich and vested with supreme civil authority. "Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart is hereby appointed Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories." (D-639) On the basis of this decree, the Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, promulgated such
* * the Reich Commissioner is guardian of the interests of the Reich and vested with supreme civil authority. "Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart is hereby appointed Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories." (D-639) On the basis of this decree, the Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, promulgated such orders as that of 4 July 1940, confiscating the property of those who had, or might have, furthered activities hostile to the German Reich (2921-PS). Tentative arrangements were also made for the resettlement of the Dutch population (1520-PS). (This part of the proof was assumed as the responsibility of the French prosecuting staff.) With regard to Bohemia and the Netherlands, the charge against Ribbentrop is laying the basis and erecting the governmental structure under which the war crimes and crimes against humanity were directed and facilitated. (3) Persecution of the Jews. In December 1938 Ribbentrop, in a conversation with M. Bonnet, who was then Foreign Minister of France, expressed his opinion of the Jews. That was reported by the United States Ambassador, Mr. Kennedy, to the State Department as follows (L-205): "During the day we had a telephone call from Berenger's office in Paris. We were told that the matter of refugees had been raised by Bonnet in his conversation with von Ribbentrop. The result was very bad. Ribbentrop, when pressed, had said to Bonnet that the Jews in Germany without exception were pickpockets, murderers and thieves. The property they possessed had been acquired illegally. The German government had therefore decided to assimilate them with the criminal elements of the population. The property which they had acquired illegally would be taken from them. They would be forced to live in districts frequented by the criminal classes. They would be under police observation like other criminals. They would be forced to report to the police as other criminals were obliged to do. The German Government could not help it if some of these criminals escaped to other countries which seemed so anxious to have them. It was not, however, willing for them to take the property which had resulted from their illegal operations with them. There was in fact nothing that it could or would do." (L-205) That succinct statement of Ribbentrop's
it if some of these criminals escaped to other countries which seemed so anxious to have them. It was not, however, willing for them to take the property which had resulted from their illegal operations with them. There was in fact nothing that it could or would do." (L-205) That succinct statement of Ribbentrop's views on Jews is elaborated in a long document which he had sent out by the Foreign Office (3358-PS). This document, entitled "The Jewish Question As A Factor In German Foreign Policy in the year 1938" contains the following: "It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question simultaneously with the realization of the 'idea of Greater Germany', since the Jewish policy was both the basis and consequence of the events of the year 1938." "The final goal of German Jewish policy is the emigration of all Jews living in Reich territory." "These examples from reports from authorities abroad can, if desired, be amplified. They confirm the correctness of the expectation that criticism of the measures for excluding Jews from German lebensraum, which were misunderstood in many countries for lack of evidence, would only be temporary and would swing in the other direction the moment the population saw with its own eyes and thus learned what the Jewish danger was to them. The poorer and therefore the more burdensome the immigrant Jew to the country absorbing him, the stronger this country will react and the more desirable is this effect in the interest of German propaganda. The object of this German action is to be the future international solution of the Jewish question, dictated not by false compassion for the 'United Religious Jewish minority' but by the full consciousness of all peoples of the danger which it represents to the racial composition of the nations." (3358-PS) This document was widely circulated by Ribbentrop's ministry, to all senior Reich authorities and to numerous other people on 25 January 1939, just after the statement to M. Bonnet. Apparently Ribbentrop's anti-Semitic incitements grew stronger, for in June 1944 Rosenberg made arrangements for an international anti-Jewish Congress to be held in Krakow on 11 July 1944. The honorary members were to be Ribbentrop, Himmler,
on 25 January 1939, just after the statement to M. Bonnet. Apparently Ribbentrop's anti-Semitic incitements grew stronger, for in June 1944 Rosenberg made arrangements for an international anti-Jewish Congress to be held in Krakow on 11 July 1944. The honorary members were to be Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goebbels, and Frank. The Foreign Office was to take over the mission of inviting prominent foreigners from Italy, France, Hungary, Holland, Arabia, Iraq, Norway etc. in order to give an international aspect to the Congress. However, the military events of June 1944 prompted Hitler to call off the Congress, which had lost its significance by virtue of the Allied landing in Normandy (1752-PS). It is clear that Ribbentrop supported and encouraged the Nazi program against the Jews, which resulted in their transportation to concentration camps, where things went on which he, as a minister in special touch with the head of the government must have known about. As one who preached this doctrine and was in a position of authority, Ribbentrop cannot suggest that he was ignorant of how the policy was carried out.' D. CONCLUSION Hitler summed up Ribbentrop's contribution to the Nazi conspiracy for aggression, as follows: "In the historic year of 1938 the Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, was of great help to me, in view of his accurate and audacious judgment and the exceptionally clever treatment of all problems of foreign policy." During the course of the war, Ribbentrop was in close liaison with the other Nazi conspirators. He advised them and made available to them, through his foreign embassies and legations abroad, information which was required. He at times participated in the planning of war crimes and crimes against humanity. His guilt is clear. LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP Document Description Vol. Page Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6....I 5 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H); Appendix A.....I 29,57 Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally