dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
staff whose job was to report bad conditions. VII. ATTITUDE OF POLITICAL LEADERS TOWARDS THE PARTY PROGRAM HIRT, a Blockleiter of Nurnberg, was questioned at some length regarding the Nazi party program . He said that no right-thinking German could have any idea that Point 1 , the union of the 35 Col. Neave Rep. German people into one nation, would be obtained by criminal means., With regard to Point 2 , the Versailles Treaty , he said that the Blockleiters believed it was natural for a vanquished people to try to ease the harshness of a peace treaty. Point 3 of the program relating to Lebensraum. he interpreted as a demand for colonies which had belonged to Germany prior to the First World War. He thought there was nothing aggressive about this claim. He was also asked for the view of the Blockleiters of HITLER's action with regard to Poland and his declared intention (Document 221-L USA-317) to incorporate into the Reich the Crimea, the Baltic States and other eastern territory. He remarked that the Block and Zellen Leiters had been informed that the struggle of the German people was for their very existence. They had no thought of conquest or settlement in foreign territories. Block and Zellen Leiters had no idea of any plan for aggression or conquest and the war was represented to them as being defensive. PART III KNOWLEDGE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES Various witnesses stated that they were acquainted with HITLER's order that each individual should only learn as much information as was necessary for the fulfilment of his particular function. The Kreisleiters, for instance, testified that on the basis of this order a Political Leader on the Kreis level could not possibly have had any knowledge of preparation for the war. None of them entered concentration camps and the subject was never discussed at their meetings. The Army was directly responsible for prisoners of war questions and did not involve the Political Leaders. The witnesses admitted that they knew of the existence of Document 884-D referred to, concerning the abortions practised on foreign female laborers. KUEHL, however, said that such abortions were permitted only if the woman herself signed an application for one. It was agreed that party officials received information copies of
admitted that they knew of the existence of Document 884-D referred to, concerning the abortions practised on foreign female laborers. KUEHL, however, said that such abortions were permitted only if the woman herself signed an application for one. It was agreed that party officials received information copies of this directive. Far from persecuting or illtreating foreign workers, the witness as Kreisleiter and Ortsgruppenleiter received. directives from SAUCKEL which requested decent treatment and rations for foreign labor and he was active 36 Col. Neave Rep. in enforcing such regulations. KUEHL said that he knew of cases where policemen and other persons were punished for cruelties towards foreign workers. (See paragraph on foreign workers above) Witnesses for the Political Leaders denied any knowledge of euthanasia or "mercy killings". They had not heard of the order given by HITLER to Reichsleiter Buehler and Dr. Brandt which allowed a certain group of doctors to carry out "mercy killings". PART IV EVIDENCE OF VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP AMONG THE POLITICAL LEADERS Witness WAHL said there was a decree of 1941 or 1942 which provided that party members who refused to take over a party office were to be subject to trial by a party tribunal This witness testified that he thoroughly disapproved of the party leadership's attitude and was often on the verge of resigning his office. He felt, however, compelled to retain his office for fear of the consequences. SCHNEIDER said that he was appointed to the position of Zellenleiter by his Ortsgruppenleiter without having been given any previous notice and without consultation as to whether he wanted the position. Every party member was obliged to cooperate in this manner. If a man, for instance, who had a good job in the civil service or in private employment refused to serve in the party, his action would have been considered sabotage against the State. WOLF said that it was permissible for civil servants in certain cases to resign from the Party but this would of course have meant that a civil servant would lose his job. With regard to the DAF, HUPFAUER said that membership in the Political Leaders Corps on the part of DAF officers was contingent on an application made to the party
permissible for civil servants in certain cases to resign from the Party but this would of course have meant that a civil servant would lose his job. With regard to the DAF, HUPFAUER said that membership in the Political Leaders Corps on the part of DAF officers was contingent on an application made to the party chancellery on their behalf. This was usually made by the higher DAF officers. Members did not join the party of their own free will. The same rules applied to the Foreign Organization and to other affiliated organizations. In contrast to what has been stated above, MEYER-WENDEBORN said that most Political Leaders occupied their offices voluntarily, particularly the Blockleiters and Zellenleiters. These 37 Col. Neave Rep. were appointed by the Ortsgruppenleiter after discussion with his staff. If, however, a person considered himself unable to perform the duties he could decline. Thus there was no question as to whether acceptance of office by Zellenleiters and Blockleiters was compulsory or not. In complete contradiction to what had been said by other witnesses, MEYER-WENDEBORN went on to say that if a man could say he was unable to take care of his profession or his family as a result of the cares of office, he could request release from his Party duties. This was usually granted. The question of resignation was really one of the sense of responsibility of the official concerned. THE GESTAPO The Defense called 12 witnesses who may be divided into four groups. The first group gave evidence regarding the structure and activities of the GESTAPO in Germany itself and in occupied territory. They also described the alleged legal basis of the GESTAPO. The evidence of the witness KNOCHEN for the SD should also be studied in regard to GESTAPO activities in occupied territory. These witnesses were: DR. WERNER BEST, who was from 1936 to 1940 Ministerial Director of the Security Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior and later Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark. He was the author of the book "The German Police", frequently referred to by the Prosecution. KARL HEINZ HOFFMANN, who was in charge of the division of the GESTAPO concerned with Western European questions and after 1943 Chief of Amt IV of the Security
and later Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark. He was the author of the book "The German Police", frequently referred to by the Prosecution. KARL HEINZ HOFFMANN, who was in charge of the division of the GESTAPO concerned with Western European questions and after 1943 Chief of Amt IV of the Security Police in Denmark. FRANZ STRAUB, who was commander of the Security Police in Belgium from 1940 to 1943 and afterwards criminal director there until the German retreat in September, 1944. The next group of witnesses gave evidence as to the activities of GESTAPO branch offices in different districts of Germany: WALTER ALBATH, Chief of the GESTAPO in Konigsberg from 1941 to 1943 and later Inspector of the Security Police and SD in Wehrkreis (Dusseldorf) until the end of the war. LUDWIG OLDACH, Chief of the GESTAPO in the Mecklenburg District from 1933 to 1945. 38 Col. Neave Rep. The third group gave evidence on the closing by the GESTAPO of unauthorized concentration camps belonging to the SS and the SA and other disciplinary matters. They also described the connection of the GESTAPO with the events of November, 1938 and the so-called "Action Zeppelin"' (segregation of Russian PW's). GUENTHER JOEL of the Reich Ministry of Justice from 1933 to 1943 and later attorney general of Westphalia. HEINRICH VITZDMANN, Chief of Police and GESTAPO in Konigsberg from 1936 to 1939 and later Police President. WILHELM GRUENWALD, who was from 1943 personal representative of the Inspector of Security Police and SD in Braunschweig. The fourth group gave evidence concerning the transfer of subsidiary organization into the GESTAPO, the compulsory character of membership in the GESTAPO and the status of administrative personnel within the organization. JOHANN HEDEL of the Technical Information Bureau of the GESTAPO in Munich. OTTO SOMANN, Chief of the Security Police in Wiesbaden, 1943 to 1945. WILHELM JOHANN KIRCHBAUM, Chief of the Military Police in Obersalzberg, 1940 to 1945. HANS TESMER, Attorney of the Gestapo in Berlin from 1936 to 1945. From statements made by Counsel it would appear that in calling these 12 witnesses, the Defense seek to prove: 1. The GESTAPO was a State police organization similar to the police systems to be found in other countries. 2. Its activities
1940 to 1945. HANS TESMER, Attorney of the Gestapo in Berlin from 1936 to 1945. From statements made by Counsel it would appear that in calling these 12 witnesses, the Defense seek to prove: 1. The GESTAPO was a State police organization similar to the police systems to be found in other countries. 2. Its activities were based on legal decree. It acted within the German penal code to prevent political crimes and to maintain the security of the State. 3. The GESTAPO had disciplinary authority over the Party. It suppressed illegal concentration camps and other abuses. It endeavored to maintain order during the events of November, 1938. 4. The Border Police and the Security Meld Police and other subsidiary groups were compulsorily transferred to the GESTAPO together with a number of civil servants and administrative officials. Administrative personnel had no executive powers and none of these groups could have protested against their transfer without fear of disciplinary action. 39 Col. Neave Rep. 5. Knowledge of the activities of the EINSATZGRUPPEN, conditions in concentration camps and other alleged atrocities was limited to a very small circle of GESTAPO officials. The following is a summary of the evidence taken on behalf of the GESTAPO. It may be convenient to consider it under the following heads: A. Activities Relating to Article 6 of the Charter. I. Origin and Development of the GESTAPO from 1933. II. Its Activities and Organization in Germany. III. Its Activities and Organization in Occupied Territory. IV. Its Connection with Concentration Camps. V. Its Defense against the Charge of Third Degree Interrogations and Brutality. VI. Its Connection with the Deportations and Liquidation of Jews. VII. Its Defense Against the Charge of Persecuting the Church. B. Evidence of Voluntary or Compulsory Membership. I. Transfer of Civil Servants and Administrative Officials to the GESTAPO. II. Compulsory transfer of the Field Police to the GESTAPO. III. Compulsory transfer of the Border Police to the GESTAPO. IV. Other Organizations Affiliated to the GESTAPO. C. Knowledge of Criminal Activities. 1. Knowledge of the work of the EINSATZGRUPPEN and of Conditions in Concentration Camps. 1. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GESTAPO Most of the evidence
Compulsory transfer of the Border Police to the GESTAPO. IV. Other Organizations Affiliated to the GESTAPO. C. Knowledge of Criminal Activities. 1. Knowledge of the work of the EINSATZGRUPPEN and of Conditions in Concentration Camps. 1. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GESTAPO Most of the evidence on this subject was given by DR. WERNER BEST, until the end of the war German Plenipotentiary in Denmark. He published in 1940 a book called "The German Police" which described the organization of the Security Police. BEST, who was a lawyer and professional civil servant, held various positions 40 Col. Neave Rep. in the Reich Ministry of Justice and the GESTAPO office in Berlin. He claims to, be an authority on the subject of the position of the GESTAPO within the German police system, though his accuracy on some points is disputed by witnesses for both the GESTAPO and SD. Creation of a Political Police Force Examined by Defense Counsel on the subject of his book, he said that in 1933 it became necessary to organize a political police force. Prior to 1933 there had been political departments attached to each police headquarters but no unified police authority. Before the Party came into power, the uniformed police had frequently been employed against the Nazis, and to protect them from reprisals witness organized in his district of Hesse a combined state and political police. This procedure was followed elsewhere. These new police departments were declared to be part of the National Socialist system. They were given authority with respect to members of the Party. This permitted employment of many professional policemen who would otherwise have been disqualified from belonging to the Party. The legal basis of the police system of the National Socialist State was laid down by a decree of the Reich President dated 26 February 1933. The witness emphasized that the National Socialist idea of the State was purely authoritarian. This can be gathered from the laws of the 24th of March 1934 which gave the Reich Government power to issue laws. The morality of prosecuting political enemies must be considered in this light. The Political Police: Prosecution of Party Officials The political police of the newly formed GESTAPO were employed to prosecute party members, and to avoid
laws of the 24th of March 1934 which gave the Reich Government power to issue laws. The morality of prosecuting political enemies must be considered in this light. The Political Police: Prosecution of Party Officials The political police of the newly formed GESTAPO were employed to prosecute party members, and to avoid criticism were equipped with SS uniforms. From 1933 onwards they were used to discipline the Party. According to the witness JOEL members of the party were pardoned by GOERING only for offenses committed in connection with the seizure of power by the Nazis. A special department was set up in the Ministry of Justice to deal with crimes committed by party members. These were mainly offenses of a purely criminal nature. The GESTAPO, however, were used for political crimes such as the case which led to the removal of Gauleiter and GESTAPO Chief STREICHER in Nurnberg. 41 Col. Neave Rep. Formation of the RSHA The reason for the formation of the RSHA or Reich Security Main Office was that HEYDRICH, the Chief of the Security Police, desired that different organizations attached to him should be amalgamated. After this amalgamation took place, the different departments, according to witness, remained the same and carried out the same functions. II. FUNCTIONS OF THE GESTAPO IN GERMANY General 1. According to DR. BEST the functions of the GESTAPO can be defined as (a) administrative, and (b) executive. The executive part included what might be called a "political" executive. This did counter-intelligence work as carried out by the Reich Security Police. The administrative officials belonged to a category separate from the executive officials. They were engaged only in office work and dealt with expenditure, accounting and other forms of administration. Further reference to their position is made by the witness TESMER in Paragraph B III of this report. (i) COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE The description of the counter-intelligence section of the GESTAPO by DR. BEST is somewhat confused. It appears that originally the ordinary uniformed police had a counter-intelligence division attached to them. This work was carried out by specially assigned officials in the different provinces. After 1933 these officials
counter-intelligence section of the GESTAPO by DR. BEST is somewhat confused. It appears that originally the ordinary uniformed police had a counter-intelligence division attached to them. This work was carried out by specially assigned officials in the different provinces. After 1933 these officials were taken over by the GESTAPO. There was also a military counter-intelligence organization (Abwehr) which was independent. The GESTAPO organization dealt with individual cases of espionage while the military counter-intelligence ascertained the purposes of the enemy. These institutions kept each other informed of current developments. BEST estimated there were about 2,000 to 3,000 people in the original counter-intelligence police. He stated that up till 1940 every charge of treason against the State was transferred to the courts for trial. (ii) PROTECTIVE CUSTODY The witness ALBATH said that protective custody measures were employed under authority given in an order of the 28th of 42 Col. Neave Rep. February 1933. In the beginning the GESTAPO did not carry out protective custody on its own initiative but only after complaint from the population, from the police, from state and Party officials or from the SD. After 1941 orders were issued allowing the GESTAPO to employ protective custody measures on its own initiative. The GESTAPO was instructed to take care of families of people Who were taken into custody. BEST also discussed the question of protective custody at some length. He said that there was an appeal against protective custody orders to superior authority such as the Fuehrer or the Minister President of Prussia. At the beginning of the war the GESTAPO had plans for a full examination of the question but this was never carried out. Both he and the witness JOEL confirmed that protective custody was based on decree. In principle the GESTAPO acted for the Ministry of Justice within the penal code and its actions were thus not arbitrary. BEST summed up the position of the GESTAPO with regard to protective custody by saying that it was the duty of the GESTAPO to act as assistants to the state prosecutors to prevent political crimes. Protective custody was not the only police measure, nor was it the one most frequently applied.
thus not arbitrary. BEST summed up the position of the GESTAPO with regard to protective custody by saying that it was the duty of the GESTAPO to act as assistants to the state prosecutors to prevent political crimes. Protective custody was not the only police measure, nor was it the one most frequently applied. Its Legal Basis Both BEST and JOEL were cross-examined on their claims as to the legality of protective custody. BEST in an article dated 1937 had stated that all attempts dangerous to the State were the responsibility of the political police. The expression "dangerous to the State" included situations which were considered a menace to the State, even though no overt act had been carried out. He was asked whether he would consider it criminal to put 20,000 people into concentration camps just because they were Jews. He evaded the question first by answering that this was a "non-police matter". He then stated that in a moral sense it was a crime but its criminality would depend on whether the orders of the Government that they should be arrested could be said to have the force of law or not. He insisted that so far as the executive departments of the GESTAPO were concerned, members of the Organization had no opportunity to avoid the execution of such orders. JOEL admitted that there were cases in which the GESTAPO exceeded their functions in a manner that was not within the scope of the penal code. The offenders, however, were punished (see Document 3751-PS). 43 Col. Neave Rep. (iii) ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE SPHERE OF POLICE WORK BEST stated that as time went on, the GESTAPO or individual members of it were ordered to take certain executive measure outside of their police duties. Such measures were for purely political purposes. As an example he quoted the employment of the GESTAPO to arrest the 20,000 Jews (previously referred to) in 1938. There were many similar orders given to the GESTAPO later on. In cross-examination on this point, BEST was asked whether it was true that the basis of the GESTAPO's authority was the throwing of people into, concentration camps without judicial proceedings and the use of third degree interrogation. He repeated that actions like the arrests of Jews were not police functions at all. He admitted in reference to
was asked whether it was true that the basis of the GESTAPO's authority was the throwing of people into, concentration camps without judicial proceedings and the use of third degree interrogation. He repeated that actions like the arrests of Jews were not police functions at all. He admitted in reference to an article that he wrote in 193 that as long as the activities of the GESTAPO were consistent with maintaining HITLER in power, the GESTAPO had a free hand in matters of political security. He insisted, however, that all such actions were based on orders and directives from the Government He was also reminded of a statement in his book that as Ion as the police carried out the will of the Government, it was actin legally. He replied that an order that did not come within the sphere of police work would not be included in this statement. (iv) TRAINING OF GESTAPO MEMBERS The attention of the witness BEST was called to a quotation on Page 109 of his book which states that members of the GESTAPO were trained in National Socialism and SS ideology. He replied that this was done to the same extent as in other state and civic service schools in Germany. He denied that training of the police was handled by the SS. He said that fully one half of the GESTAPO organization was composed of older officers who never receive such ideological training although it had been HIMMLER's wish that the GESTAPO should receive instruction from the SS. 2. ACTIVITIES OF LOCAL OFFICES (i) WESTERN GERMANY (DUSSELDORF) The activities of local GESTAPO offices were described by the witnesses ALBATH and OLDACH. ALBATH said that in 1934 h became inspector of the Security Police and SD of Wehrkreis 44 Col. Neave Rep. which comprised six districts: Aachen, Cologne, Dusseldorf, Arnsberg, Munster and Minden. These districts were later reduced to four. The tasks of witness as Inspector of the Security Police and SD comprised inspection of the offices of the GESTAPO, Criminal Police, Security Police and SD. In general the witness was charged with seeing that the decrees of the Reich Security Main Office were carried out and he also investigated alleged illegal activities among members of the GESTAPO. He tried to coordinate the work