dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SCHACHT: They are all well-known statements made by statesmen and ministers, ambassadors, and such, all of which have the same tenor, namely, that it was absolutely essential that the promise made by the Allies should be kept; in other words, that disarmament should be carried out.
DR. DIX: Excuse me if I interrupt you, but we can do it more quickly and more simply by asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of Exhibit Number Schacht-12, which I have been granted, without my reading it, Page 31 of the English translation of my document book. These are pertinent remarks and speeches made by Lord Cecil and others, by the Belgian Foreign Minister, et cetera . There is no need to read them; they can be presented. I just hear that they have been presented, and I can refer to them. Pardon me, please. Continue.
SCHACHT: Well, in that case I am finished with my statement. Hitler made still further offers but the other countries did not take up a single one of these offers, and thus, unfortunately, only one alternative remained, and that was rearmament. That rearmament carried out by Hitler was financed with my assistance, and I assume responsibility for everything I have done in that connection.
DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly? Can one draw the conclusion from your statement that there were other reasons for your assistance in the rearmament program, that you had the tactical consideration that, by putting German rearmament up for discussion, the debate on disarmament amongst the other governments might be started again? This debate, so to say, had died down?
SCHACHT: If I may, I will illustrate it briefly by means of an example: Two parties have a contract with each other. One party does not live up to that contract, and the other party has no way of making him fulfill his obligations. Thus the other party can do nothing except, in turn, not adhere to the contract. That is what Germany did. That is what I supported. Now, of course, I must say that I had expected a type of reaction which in such a case must always be expected from the partner to a contract, namely, that he would say, "Well, if you do not keep up the contract either, then we shall have to discuss this contract again." I must say-and I can quite safely use the word-it was a disappointment to me that Germany's rearmament was not in any way replied to by any actions from the Allies. This so-called breach of contract on Germany's part against the Versailles Treaty was taken quite calmly. A note of protest was all; nothing in the least was done, apart from that, to bring up again the question of disarmament in which I was interested. Not only was Germany allowed to go on rearming but the Naval Agreement with Great Britain did, in fact, give Germany the legal right to rearm contrary to the Versailles Treaty. Military missions were sent to Germany to look at this rearmament, and German military displays were visited and everything else was done, but nothing at all was done to stop Germany's rearmament.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, I cannot see the point of all this detail. We have conceded that rearmament here, except as it was involved with aggressive purposes, is immaterial. As I said in the opening, the United States does not care to try here the issues of European politics, nor are they submitted to this Tribunal for decision. The sole question here is the Indictment, charging arming with the purpose of aggression. I do not want to interfere with the defendant giving any facts that bear on his aggressive intentions, but the details of negotiations, of European politics and charges and countercharges between governments, it seems to me, lies way back of any inquiry that we could possibly make, and the details of this matter seem to me not helpful to the solution of the issues here, and I think was ruled out by the Tribunal in the case of Goering, if I am not mistaken.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Dix, it all seems to be a matter of argument, and argument isn't really the subject of evidence.
DR. DIX: I do not believe so, Your Lordship. What Mr. Justice Jackson said is quite correct. Schacht is accused of having assisted in bringing about an aggressive war, but this assistance of his is supposed to have consisted in the financing which he carried out.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Dix, and do try to make it as short as possible.
DR. DIX: I think you had come to the end of that question anyway. May I refer in this connection to one of the motives for Dr. Schacht's assistance in rearmament. It was his hope to renew the debate on disarmament. May I draw your attention to Exhibit Number Schacht-36, Page 141 of the German text, and Page 149 of the English text? It is an affidavit from Dr. Schacht's son-in-law, Dr. Von Scherpenberg. On Page 2 of that affidavit you will find the following brief paragraph which I propose to read; in fact, I can confine myself to one sentence: "He"-that is to say, Schacht-"considered rearmament within certain limits to be the only means for the re-establishing of the disturbed equilibrium and the only means of inducing the other European powers to participate in a limitation of armaments which, in opposition to the Versailles Treaty, they had sought to avoid." That is a statement of Scherpenberg regarding conversations which Schacht had had at that time. It is, therefore, not an ex post facto opinion; it is the report of a conversation which he, Scherpenberg, had with his father-in-law Schacht at that time. That is just an additional remark I wanted to make. [Turning to the defendant.] You have spoken about the rearmament on the part of the other states, particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland, but can you tell us whether at the time you knew of or heard any exact details regarding the state of armament of those two states?
SCHACHT: I know only that it was known about Russia that in 1935 she announced that her peacetime army should be increased to 960,000 men. Then I knew that in Czechoslovakia, for instance, the installation of airdromes was one of the leading tasks of rearmament. We knew that Great Britain's Navy was to be stepped up.
DR. DIX: Did you later on completely abandon your idea of general disarmament?
SCHACHT: To the contrary, I used every opportunity, in particular during conversations with men from abroad, to say that the aim should always be disarmament, that, of course, rearmament would always mean an economic burden for us, which we considered a most unpleasant state of affairs. I remember a conversation which I had with the American Ambassador Davies. His report of this conversation is incorporated in an exhibit that has been submitted to the Tribunal. It is an entry in a diary which is repeated in his book, Mission to Moscow , and it is dated as early as 20 June 1937, Berlin. He is writing about the fact that among other things he and I had talked about disarmament problems, and I need only quote one sentence. I do not have the number of the document, Your Lordship, but it has been submitted to the Tribunal.
DR. DIX: It is Exhibit Schacht-18, German Page 43, English Page 49.
SCHACHT: Since I have only the English text, I shall read from it. Davies writes: "When I outlined the President's (Roosevelt) suggestion of limitation of armament to defensive weapons only, such as a man could carry on his shoulder, he (means Schacht) almost jumped out of his seat with enthusiasm." It becomes clear, therefore, from Ambassador Davies' remark that I was most enthusiastic about this renewed attempt and the possibility of an imminent step towards disarmament as proposed by President Roosevelt. In this same book, Davies reports a few days later on 26 June 1937 about the conversation he had with me, in a letter addressed to the President of the United States. I quote only one very brief paragraph-in English again: "I then stated to him (that is, Schacht) that the President in conversation with me had analyzed the European situation and had considered that a solution might be found in an agreement among the European nations to a reduction of armaments to a purely defensive military basis and this through the elimination of aircraft, tanks, and heavy equipment, and the limitation of armaments to such weapons only as a man could carry on his back, with an agreement among the nations for adequate policing of the plan by a neutral state. Schacht literally jumped at the idea. He said: 'That's absolutely the solution.' He said that in its simplicity it had the earmarks of great genius. His enthusiasm was extraordinary."
DR. DIX: To what extent did you want rearmament?
SCHACHT: Not beyond equality with every single one of our neighbor states.
DR. DIX: And did Hitler talk to you of far-reaching intentions, or did you hear of any?
SCHACHT: At no time did he tell them to me, nor did I hear from anyone else, whether he had made remarks about further intentions.
DR. DIX: Were you informed about the extent, the type and speed of rearmament?
SCHACHT: No, I was never told about that.
DR. DIX: Had you set yourself a limit regarding this financing or were you prepared to advance any amount of money?
SCHACHT: I was certainly, by no means, ready to advance any unlimited amount of money, particularly as these were not contributions; they were credits which had to be repaid. The limits for these credits were twofold. One was that the Reichsbank was independent of the State finance administration, and the supreme authority of the State as far as the granting of the credits was concerned. The Board of Directors of the Reichsbank could pass a resolution that credits were to be given, or were not to be given, or that credits were to be stopped, if they considered it right, and as I was perfectly certain of the policy of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank-all of these gentlemen agreed with me perfectly on financial and banking policy-this was the first possibility of applying a brake, if I considered it necessary. The second safeguard-limit was contained in the agreement which the Minister of Finance, the Government, and of course Hitler had made-the mefo bills, of which these credits consisted, were to be paid back when they expired. They were repayable after 5 years, and I have already said that if the repayments had been made, funds for rearmament would naturally have had to decrease. Therein lay the second possibility of limiting the rearmament.
DR. DIX: Will you please give now to the Tribunal the figures which you were dealing with at the time?
SCHACHT: We went up to...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We have no desire to enter into controversy about the figures of financing rearmament. It seems that the detail of dollars and cents or Reichsmarks is unimportant to this, and terribly involved. We aren't trying whether it cost too much or too little; the purpose of this rearmament is the only question we have in mind. I don't see that the statistics of cost have anything to do with it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we would like to know what figures the accused and you are talking about.
DR. DIX: The amounts that Schacht as President of the Reich bank was ready to grant for the rearmament program; that, no doubt, is relevant, because if those amounts remained within such limits as might possibly be considered adequate for defensive rearmaments in case of emergency, then, of course, the extent of that financial assistance is a very important piece of evidence regarding the intentions which Schacht was pursuing at the time. That is the very thing that, in the case of Schacht, Mr. Justice Jackson considers relevant, namely, whether he helped prepare for an aggressive war. If he were considering only the possibility of a defensive war in his financing and placed only sums at the disposal of the rearmament program which would never have allowed an aggressive war, then that would refute the accusation raised by the Prosecution against the defendant, and I think that the relevance of that question cannot be doubted.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that if the Defendant Schacht placed at the disposal of the Reich, say, 100 millions, or whatever the figure is, it would be defensive, and if he placed 150 millions, it would be not defensive, or what? Is it simply the amount?
DR. DIX: No, I want to say that if, as will be proved, he only wanted to give 9 and later on gave hesitatingly and unwillingly 12 millions for the purpose, then that contribution can never have been aimed at an aggressive war.
THE PRESIDENT: It is simply the amount?
DR. DIX: Yes, only the size of the amount.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that can be stated very shortly, but as for details of finance...
DR. DIX: I am also of the opinion that we have talked about it too long. I was only going to ask, "What amount did you give?" and then the objection was raised, and thus the discussion was drawn out. May I put the question?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. DIX: [Turning to the defendant.] Well, then, what amount did you intend to grant?
SCHACHT: Naturally as little as possible; however, what I contributed is what is decisive. I placed at their disposal-to give one figure and to be very brief-until 31 March 1938, credits amounting to a total of 12,000,000,000 Reichsmark. I have discussed that with one of the interrogators of the British Prosecution, who asked me about the subject, and I replied that that was about one third of the amount which was spent on rearmament. After that, without the Reichsbank, beginning with 1 April 1938, the figure stated in that budget year for rearmament was 11,000,000,000, and in the subsequent year, 20,500,000,000, and of that not a pfennig came from the Reichsbank.
DR. DIX: That was after your resignation, was it not?
SCHACHT: That was after I had stopped credits. For the record I should like to say that I think I made a mistake before. I said millions instead of milliards, but I think it is obvious what I meant. I wanted only to correct it.
DR. DIX: Now, then, Dr. Schacht, the Prosecution have stated that on 19 February 1935 the Ministry of Finance received authority to borrow unlimited amounts of money if Hitler ordered them to do so.
SCHACHT: Here, again, the prosecutor did not see things in the proper light. The President of the Reichsbank is not responsible for the actions of the Reich Minister of Finance. I think the President of the Federal Reserve Bank in New York can hardly be held responsible for the things done by the Secretary of the Treasury in Washington.
DR. DIX: You have also been accused that the debt of the Reich increased three times during the time while you were President of the Reichsbank.
SCHACHT: I might just as well be accused of being responsible for the fact that the birth rate in Germany rose sharply during the time I was President of the Reichsbank. I want to emphasize the fact that I had nothing to do with either.
DR. DIX: You were not responsible for the same reason.
SCHACHT: No, of course I am not responsible for that.
DR. DIX: And presumably the same applies to the point made by the Prosecution that you allegedly drafted a new finance program in 1938?
SCHACHT: On the contrary, I refused to do anything else for the financing of rearmament; the finance program was drafted by a state secretary in the Reich Finance Ministry, and it looked like it.
DR. DIX: One of your economic policies, during the time you were Minister of Economy, and which you have been accused of as being a preparation for war, was the so-called "New Plan" (Neue Plan). What was that?
SCHACHT: May I first of all say that the New Plan had nothing at all to do with rearmament. Germany, after the Treaty of Versailles, had fallen into a state of distress, economically speaking and especially export ..
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the New Plan has nothing to do with the rearmament and preparations for war-I think the Prosecution are of the opposite opinion- then, of course, the question is irrelevant, and I will drop it. I am only putting it because the New Plan has been used in the argumentation of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: If you say, and the defendant has just said that the New Plan had nothing to do with rearmament, I think you might leave it for cross-examination and you can raise it again in re-examination if it is cross-examined. DR. DIX [Turning to the defendant] : In that case I shall not ask you about the barter agreements, either. I shall leave it to the Prosecution to bring it out during the cross-examination. I cannot see what it has to do with the preparation for war. Now, you have already stated that you strove to remove the Versailles Treaty by means of peaceful negotiations, or at least, to modify it. In the opinion which you held at that time did any such means for a peaceful modification of the Versailles Treaty still exist?
SCHACHT: In my opinion, there were no means other than peaceful ones. The desire to modify the Versailles Treaty by means of a new war was a crime.
DR. DIX: Well. But now you are being accused that the alleged preparations for war, which really were a countermeasure to the general rearmament although not a preparation for an aggressive war, were nevertheless a rearmament, and as such, were an infringement of the Treaty of Versailles. I assume that you, at the time, decided to help finance that rearmament only after giving the problem due legal and moral considerations. What, exactly, were these considerations?
SCHACHT: I think I have already answered that question in detail. I need add nothing else.
DR. DIX: Very well. Insofar as you know, was this attitude of yours, the attitude of a pacifist and of someone who was definitely opposed to the extension of living space in Europe, known abroad?
SCHACHT: As long as I have been President of the Reichsbank, that is to say from March 1933-and I am, of course, only talking about the Hitler regime-my friends and acquaintances abroad were fully informed about my attitude and views. I had a great many friends and acquaintances abroad, not only because of my profession but also outside of that and particularly in Basel, Switzerland, where we had our monthly meeting at the International Bank, with all the presidents of the issuing banks of all the great and certain neutral countries, and I always took occasion at all these meetings to describe quite clearly the situation in Germany to these gentlemen. Perhaps I may at this point refer to the so-called conducting of foreign conferences or conversations. If one is not allowed to talk to foreigners any more, then one cannot, of course, reach an understanding with them. Those silly admonitions, that one had to avoid contact with foreigners, seem entirely uncalled for to me, and if the witness Gisevius deemed it necessary the other day to protect his dead comrades, who were my comrades too, from being accused of committing high treason, then I should like to say that I consider it quite unnecessary. Never at any time did any member of our group betray any German interests. To the contrary, he fought for the interests of Germany, and to prove that, I should like to give you a good example: After we had occupied Paris, the files of the Quai d'Orsay were confiscated and were carefully screened by officials from the German Foreign Office. I need not assure you that they were primarily looking for proof whether there were not any so-called defeatists circles in Germany which had unmasked themselves somewhere abroad. All the files of the Quai d'Orsay referring to my person and, of course, there were records of many discussions which I had had with Frenchmen, were examined by the Foreign Office officials at that time, without my knowing it.
SCHACHT: One day-I think it probably happened in the course of 1941-I received a letter from a German professor who had participated in this search carried out by the Foreign Office. I shall mention the name so that, if necessary, he can testify. He is a Professor of Finance and National Economy, Professor Stueckenbeck of Erlangen, and he wrote me that at this investigation...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal cannot see any point in this, so far as this Trial is concerned. In any event, if the defendant says that he did not, in any way, give away the interests of Germany, surely that is sufficient. We do not need all the details about it. What it has got to do with this Trial, I do not know.
DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, that that was not the point of the statement. What he wants to say is that reliable men abroad knew him and were acquainted with the fact that he was certainly a man of peace and not a man who prepared aggressive wars, and that applies even to the period of rearmament.
THE PRESIDENT: But he said that 5 minutes ago.
DR. DIX: I do not think the question of Professor Stueckenbeck is so important, but it certainly seems pertinent to me what Ambassador Davies said about his conversation with the then Foreign Commissar of the Soviet Republic, Litvinov. This is contained in Exhibit Schacht-18 of my document book. It is Page 43 of the German text, and Page 49 of the English text. May I read one paragraph, and then ask Dr. Schacht briefly whether that statement of Ambassador Davies corresponds to his recollection? It is Davies' report, an extract from his book Mission to Moscow . A report is there to the Secretary of State in the United States. The passage is on Pages 108 and 109. "Pursuant to an appointment made, I called upon Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov to present my respects before departure for the United States. "I then stated that the European situation in its elementals looked simple and that it was difficult to understand why the statesmanship of Europe could not provide that England, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia should agree to preserve the territorial integrity of Europe and through trade agreements provide Germany with raw materials, thereby giving the assurance that she could live, which would relieve the peoples of Europe and the world of these terrific burdens of armament and of the fear of catastrophic war. The prompt rejoinder was: 'Do you think Hitler would ever agree to anything like that?' I said that I did not know, but that it was my opinion that there was a very substantial body of influential and responsible men in Germany that such an idea would appeal to. Litvinov replied that he thought that might be so; that Schacht was of that type; he did not think they could prevail against Hitler and the political and military forces dominant in Germany." And now I ask you, do you remember that conversation with Davies?
SCHACHT: I think there must be a mistake. I did not speak to Davies about this, I spoke to Litvinov. This is a report of Davies to the Secretary of State, about which I did not know.
DR. DIX: Yes, you are perfectly right. It has been repeatedly emphasized by the Prosecution that your knowledge of Hitler's intentions of war resulted also from your being Plenipotentiary for War Economy and a member of the Reich Defense Counsel. Goering has made a detailed statement on it. Have you anything new to add to Goering's statement?
SCHACHT: I think the witness Lammers has also talked about it. I should like merely to confirm that the first Reich Defense Counsel of 1935 was nothing other than the legalization of a committee which existed before 1933, made up of ministerial officials who were supposed to deal with economic measures as well as administrative measures, which might have to be taken in the event of a threat of war against Germany.
DR. DIX: How often did you have a meeting especially with the Minister of War and the Plenipotentiary for Administration?
SCHACHT: This famous triumvirate, this Three Man College described by one of the prosecutors as the cornerstone of war policy, never met at all, and it is no wonder that we lost the war, if that was the cornerstone.
DR. DIX: The Prosecution have also referred to the report of the Ministry of War regarding the task of the Reich Defense Counsel of 1934. It is Document Number EC-128, Exhibit Number USA-623. Have you anything in particular to add to that?