dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore, Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joint action, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.
Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them, because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.
As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argument went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.
to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.
The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to reply instantly to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.
Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last maneuver towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignments of rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argument naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.
The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.
of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.
The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that, on the other hand, it is proved by this attitude to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.
Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter has spread these things and thus brought about all, sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.
and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.
Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.
On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.
Besides this, Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that, by cabling, something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.
The Fuehrer agreed and assured him, after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.
Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.
The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.
Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.
Signed: SCHMIDT
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Document No. 1882-PS
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1882-PS
Aufz RAM 21/41
Notes on the talk between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 5 April 1941.
[Pages 2 to 3]
Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works. He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not as yet advanced as far as in Germany and that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which has realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, most of whom are parasites, anyway. A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must give them up. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had already started their pernicious activities when National Socialism put a stop to these doings; they will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected with certainty.
In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now awakening and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as the Fuehrer had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament, and with the designation from the League of Nations. * * *
[Pages 9 to 11]
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only dominant power on the European Continent.
In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trip:
be built up on the basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only dominant power on the European Continent. In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trip:
1. Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede it, if it had not collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign herself to this fact.
2. There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.
3. Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in East Asia.
Matsuoka replied that he himself could only repeat that he had long been of the opinion that every nation would be offered an opportunity only once in a thousand years. Japan was confronting such an opportunity, and she would have to assume the risk connected with it. She would have to act decisively at the right moment in order to take advantage of this unique opportunity.
Berlin, the 7th of April 1941
Sig. Schmidt
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Document No. 1889-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1889-PS
Account concerning the conference of the Fuehrer with the Italian Ambassador Attolico on August 31, 1939 at 1900 hours.
The Fuehrer handed the Italian Ambassador a copy of the German proposals and a press notice, pointing out that because of the Polish Government the proposals are now void. The mediation attempt of England must, therefore, be considered as having failed.
Ambassador Attolico recalled that the Fuehrer on the occasion of a mediation offer made a few days ago by Mussolini had declared that England had just made a proposal and that one would wait for its result. Since the Fuehrer had stated himself now, that the English proposal must be considered as having failed, the question arises now if the Duce on his part could not take over a mediation. He asks, therefore, the Fuehrer if it were all right if the Duce would mediate from now on.
The Fuehrer replied, one had to wait first of all for future developments. He is not in the mood to be slapped in the face time and again by Poland, and does not want to bring the Duce into an uncomfortable position through acceptance of his mediation. He is certain that because of the spiritual conception of the Poles, they wouldn't listen to the Duce either.
To the question of Attolico whether herewith everything is at an end, the Fuehrer answered yes.
Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister as per instructions.
Berlin, 1 September 1939
(signed) Dr. Schmidt
Ambassador
Source:
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Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Document No. 1893-PS Previous Document Volume IV Menu Next Document PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1893-PS Organization Book of the NSDAP 1943 edition, Editor the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley), Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich. [Page 6 e.] 3. Resignations. Authorized to decree dismissal on the basis of a lawful decision of a party court are: (a) The Local Chapter Directors [Ortsgruppenleiter]. (b) The County Directors [Kreisleiter]. (c) The District Directors [Gauleiter]. (d) The Fuehrer. [Page 7] 6. Duties of the Party Members. The commandments of the National Socialists: The Fuehrer is always right. The program be your dogma: It demands your utter devotion to the movement: Right is, what serves the movement and thus Germany which means the Nation. [Page 13] The aims of the Party are Only Ideological Ones. It must be attempted to transfer all professional duties which, during the reconstruction in connection with the rebuilding of the Reich, are still being executed by the Party, to the affiliated organizations or, if possible, to the State administration in due time. If necessary, and if possible, directives to this effect will be issued by the competent officers of the Reich Directorate [Reichsleitung]. The party as an instrument of ideological education, must grow to be the Leader Corps [Fuehrerkorps] of the German nation. This Leader Corps is responsible for the complete penetration of the German Nation with the National Socialist spirit and to overcome the dependence on the international influences in which the nation is still partly rooted. It will further be the duty of this Fuehrerkorps to see that the professional and general duties within the affiliated organizations and within the State administration will be handled according to National Socialist directives. [Page 14] The Political Director [Der Politische Leiter]. The basis of the Party organization is the Fuehrer thought. The public is unable to rule itself either directly or indirectly. The man best suited for the job will be a Fuehrer. He will be carried by the confidence of the people. All Political Directors stand as appointed by the Fuehrer and are responsible to him. They possess full authority towards
the Fuehrer thought. The public is unable to rule itself either directly or indirectly. The man best suited for the job will be a Fuehrer. He will be carried by the confidence of the people. All Political Directors stand as appointed by the Fuehrer and are responsible to him. They possess full authority towards the lower echelons. In choosing the Political Director the main consideration will be to put the right man in the right place. In principle this is to be noted: Only a man who has absorbed the school of subordinate functions within the Party has a claim to the higher Fuehrer offices if he should be otherwise suited. We can only use Fuehrers who have served from the ground up. Any Political Director who does not conform to these principles is to be dismissed or to be sent back to the lower offices, as Blockleiter, Zellenleiter, for further training. Each Political Director must be conscious always, as a Political Fuehrer, that leadership does not only confer greater powers, but first and foremost higher duties. [Page 15] The Type of the Political Director. All this shows the character of the Political Director. The Political Director is not an office worker but the Political Deputy of the Fuehrer. With the Political Director we are building the political leadership of the State. The type of the Political Director is not characterized by the office which he represents. There is no such thing as a Political Director of the NSBO, etc., but there is only the Political Director of the NSDAP. [Page 16] The Oath of the Political Director. The Political Director is sworn in yearly. The oath is worded as follows: "I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge unconditioned obedience to him and the Fuehrers appointed by him." The Political Director is inseparably tied to the ideology and the organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with his death or with his expulsion from the National Socialist community. [Page 17] The Protection of the Honor of the Political Director. The leading personalities of State and Party are protected against vicious attacks upon State and Party. (See Section 6). This law primarily protects leading Party members from District Directors on up. Should, however, a situation exist which is
community. [Page 17] The Protection of the Honor of the Political Director. The leading personalities of State and Party are protected against vicious attacks upon State and Party. (See Section 6). This law primarily protects leading Party members from District Directors on up. Should, however, a situation exist which is liable to degrade the Party and its institutions (for instance an allegation of embezzlement by a Kreisleiter in which matter nothing was being done which would mean, in other words, that bad conditions were tolerated) the prosecution may be directed by authority of paragraph 1 of the law. In case of attacks which are liable to degrade the Party and its officers prosecution may be requested through the competent State prosecutor after consulation with the proper law office of the Party. [Page 19] The Appointment of Political Directors. 1. The Fuehrer appoints the following Political Directors: (a) Reichsleiter and all political Directors to include the Directors of the Women's Leagues within the Reich Directorate [Reichsleitung]. (b) Gauleiters to include the Directors of an office of the Gau Directorate, as well as the Directors of the Women's League's of the Gau. (c) Kreisleiters. Their appointment will be published in the official paper [Verordnungsblatt]. 2. The Gauleiter appoints: (a) The Political Directors and the Directors of the Women's Leagues within the Gau Directorate, and the Directors of the Main Offices up to Associate Directors [Mitarbeiter]. (a) The Political Directors and the Directors of the Women's Leagues in the Kreis Directorate. (c) The Local Chapter Directors [Ortsgruppenleiter]. 3. The Kreisleiter appoints: The Political Directors and the Directors of the Women's Leagues of the Local Chapter [Ortsgruppen] to include Block and Cell DIrectors and Block Helpers, as well as the Political Directors in the factories (inasmuch as they are Party members). All Political Directors and Directors of the Women's Leagues will be issued an identity card. [Page 24.] All political directors irrespective of the local chapter, the county, or the district in which they may be in office will wear a uniform office suit. All political directors irrespective in what party
All Political Directors and Directors of the Women's Leagues will be issued an identity card. [Page 24.] All political directors irrespective of the local chapter, the county, or the district in which they may be in office will wear a uniform office suit. All political directors irrespective in what party offices they execute their duties, be it in the political directorate, the administration, the party courts, the affiliated associations or in the factories, will wear a uniform office suit. [Page 49]. MEETINGS OF MEMBERS AND PUBLIC MEETINGS The bearers of sovereignty of the party are responsible for the membership meetings planned by all party offices and affiliated associations. They will be approved: 1. By the local chapter director if they do not go beyond the local chapter in their importance. 2. By the county directors if they do not go beyond the county in their importance. 3. The district directors if they have a general political significance for the district. The meetings will be conducted along the lines laid down by the local organization and propaganda offices. [Page 50]. CELL EVENINGS OF THE NSDAP 1. Time of meetings: Cell evenings of the NSDAP will be held once a month. 2. Conduct of the Cell Evenings: The cell evenings of the Party will be conducted by the cell director of the NSDAP. If no suitable cell director is on hand-either because of his short time in office or insufficient indoctrination-the meeting will be in the hands of the local Chapter Director of the NSDAP. 3. Participants: (a) Participation at a cell evening is compulsory for: All political directors of the cell: Block leaders and block helpers, cell foremen and block foremen living within the cell zone. Factory cell and factory block foremen of the German Labor Front [DAF] and their co-workers. NSV cell and block managers: Cell and block leaders of the Women's League and the co-workers of the NSV and NSF whose domicile is within the Cell Zone. All Party members within the cell; All members of organizations of the NSDAP. 5. Program of the Cell Evenings. (During War Time): Following are the rules for the program of a cell evening: (b) Lecture (not over 30 minutes) based on the directives issued by the Reich Directorate
whose domicile is within the Cell Zone. All Party members within the cell; All members of organizations of the NSDAP. 5. Program of the Cell Evenings. (During War Time): Following are the rules for the program of a cell evening: (b) Lecture (not over 30 minutes) based on the directives issued by the Reich Directorate for Propaganda of the NSDAP. [Page 50a-51]. LEADER CONFERENCES-TIME OF MEETINGS 1. Leader conferences in the local chapter zone. (a) Local chapter directors and office chiefs, cell directors and block directors possibly in the presence of cell and block foremen, as well as cell and block managers and cell and block directors of the Women's League, as well as the local leaders of the organizations and possibly the deputies of the Kreis offices (health, education, civil servants, county policy, etc.). Once a month. (b) Cell directors with block directors and cell foremen, cell managers and cell directors of the Women's League. Once a month. (c) Block directors with block foremen, block managers, block leaders of the Women's League and block helpers. Once a month. (d) All officers of the local chapter are also to participate in: 1. The official formation within the region of the local chapter (may be combined with leader conference (a) ). 2. Official formations of the county. Every three months. 3. The District Day. [Gautag]. One every three years. 4. The County Day. [Kreistag]. If coinciding with District Day, County Day will be cancelled. Once a year. (e) Participation in schooling: 1. Participants: The political directors, foremen, managers, advisers, directors of the Women's League, etc. Once a month. (f) Participation in education. The political directors of the local chapter; in the evenings or Sunday mornings, sport to be conducted concurrently. (For further details see AVM). Twice a month. 2. Leader conferences in the county [Kreis]: (a) County director and his staff every 8 to 14 days. (b) If possible the county director is to arrange for a week end course of 11/2 to 2 days duration. (Possibly at a county school [Kreisschule], with the participation of the directors of the county offices and local chapter directors.) One every 3 months. Purpose: To hear fundamental lectures, to gather socially in the presence of the bearer