dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
LT. COL.BROOKHART: During the period in which Hungarian Jews were being collected, what, if any, contact was made by the Joint Distribution Committee for Jewish Affairs with Eichmann's representative?
WISLICENY: The Joint Distribution Committee made efforts to contact Eichmann and to try to ward off the fate of the Hungarian Jews. I myself established this contact with Eichmann, since I wanted to discover some means of protecting the half million Jews in Hungary from the measures already in force. The Joint Distribution Committee made certain offers to Eichmann and in return requested that the Jews should remain in Hungary. These offers were mainly of a financial nature. Eichmann felt himself, much against his Will, obliged to forward these proposals to Himmler. Himmler thereupon entrusted a certain Standartenfuehrer Becher with further negotiations. Standartenfuehrer Becher then continued the negotiations with Dr. Kastner, delegate of the J.D.C. But Eichmann, from the very first, endeavored to wreck the negotiations. Before any concrete results were obtained he attempted to present us with a fait accompli; in other words, he tried to transport as many Jews as possible to Auschwitz.
THE PRESIDENT: Need we go into all these conferences? Can't you take us on to the conclusion of the matter?
LT. COL. BROOKHART: The witness is inclined to be lengthy in his answers. That has been true in his pre-trial examination. I will try...
THE PRESIDENT: You are examining him.
LT.COL.BROOKHART: Yes, Sir. Was there any money involved in the meeting between Dr. Kastner and Eichmann?
WISLICENY: Yes.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: How much?
WISLICENY: In the first conversation Dr. Kastner gave Eichmann about 3 million pengoes. What the sums mentioned in further conversations amounted to, I do, not know exactly.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: To whom did Dr. Kastner give this money and what became of it?
WISLICENY: It was given to Eichmann, who then turned it over to his financial agent; the sum was in turn handed to the commander of the Security Police and the SD in Hungary.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: These actions that you have described, involving approximately 450,000 Jews being moved from Hungary- were there any official communications sent to Berlin concerning these movements?
WISLICENY: Yes, as each transport left, Berlin was informed by teletype. From time to time Eichmann also dispatched a comprehensive report to the RSHA and to the Chief of the Security Police.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Now with reference to the Jews that remained in Budapest, what, if any, action was taken against them?
WISLICENY: After Szalasi had taken over the Government of Hungary . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Brookhart, we have not yet heard, have we, what happened to these Jews from Hungary? If we have, I have missed it.
LT. COL.BROOKHART: I will ask that question now, Sir. [Turning to the witness.] What became of the Jews to whom you have already referred-approximately 450,000?
WISLICENY: They were, without exception, taken to Auschwitz and brought to the final solution.
LT. COL.BROOKHART: Do you mean they were killed?
WISLICENY: Yes, with the exception of perhaps 25 to 30 percent who were used for labor purposes. I here refer to a previously mentioned conversation on this matter between Hoess and Eichmann in Budapest.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Turning now to the Jews remaining in Budapest, what happened to them?
WISLICENY: In October-November 1944 about 30,000 of these Jews, perhaps a few thousand more, were removed from Budapest and sent to Germany. They were to be used to work on the construction of the so-called Southeast Wall, a fortification near Vienna. They were mostly women. They had to walk from Budapest to the German border-almost 200 kilometers. They were assembled in marching formations and followed a route specially designated for them. Their shelter and nutrition on this march was extremely bad. Most of them fell ill and lost strength. I had been ordered by Eichmann to take over these groups at the German border and direct them further to the Lower Danube Gauleitung for labor purposes. In many cases I refused to take over these so-called workers, because they were completely exhausted and emaciated by disease. Eichmann, however, forced me to take them over and in this case even threatened to turn me over to Himmler to be put into a concentration camp if I caused him further political difficulties. For this same reason I was later removed from Eichmann's department. A large proportion of these people then died in the so-called Lower Danube work camps from exhaustion and epidemics. A small percentage, perhaps 12,000, was taken to Vienna and the surrounding area, and a group of about 3,000 was taken to Bergen-Belsen, and from there to Switzerland. Those were Jews who had been released from Germany as a result of the negotiations with the J.D.C.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Summarizing for the countries of Greece, Hungary, and Slovakia-approximately how many Jews were affected by measures of the Secret Police and SD in those countries about which you have personal knowledge?
WISLICENY: In Slovakia there- were about 66,000, in Greece about 64,000, and in Hungary more than half a million.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: In the countries Croatia and Bulgaria, about which you have some knowledge, how many Jews were thus affected?
WISLICENY: In Bulgaria, to my understanding about 8,000; in Croatia I know of only 3,000 Jews who were brought to Auschwitz from Agram in the summer of 1942.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were meetings held of the specialists on the Jewish problem from Amt IVA, whose names appear on this sheet to which we made reference earlier?
WISLICENY: Yes. Eichmann was accustomed to calling a large annual meeting of all his experts in Berlin. This meeting was usually in November. At these meetings all the men who were working for him in foreign countries had to report on their activities. In 1944, so far as I know, such a meeting did not take place, because in November 1944 Eichmann was still in Hungary.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: In connection with the Jews about whom you have personal knowledge, how many were subjected to the final solution, that is, to being killed?
WISLICENY: The exact number is extremely hard for me to determine. I have only one basis for a possible estimate, that is a conversation between Eichmann and Hoess in Vienna, in which he said that only a very few of those sent from Greece to Auschwitz had been fit for work. Of the Slovakian and Hungarian Jews about 20 to 30 percent had been able to work. It is therefore very hard for me to give a reliable total.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: In your meetings with the other specialists on the Jewish problem and Eichmann did you gain any knowledge or information as to the total number of Jews killed under this program?
WISLICENY: Eichmann personally always talked about at least 4 million Jews. Sometimes he even mentioned 5 million. According to my own estimate I should say that at least 4 million must have been destined for the so-called final solution. How many of those actually survived, I am not in a position to say.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: When did you last see Eichmann?
WISLICENY: I last saw Eichmann towards the end of February 1945 in Berlin. At that time he said that if the war were lost he would commit suicide.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did he say anything at that time as to the number of Jews that had been killed?
WISLICENY: Yes, he expressed this in a particularly cynical manner. He said he would leap laughing into the grave because the feeling that he had 5 million people on his conscience would be for him a source of extraordinary satisfaction.
LT.COL.BROOKHART: The witness is available for other counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other prosecuting counsel wish to examine the witness?
MR. G.D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): My Lord, I have no desire to ask any questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Soviet prosecutor wish to ask any questions?
COL. POKROVSKY: At this stage the Soviet Union does not wish to ask any questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the French prosecutor? [There was no response.]
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you mentioned the impressment of the Jews for labor and named two cases, one of Jews from Slovakia who were brought to Auschwitz and put to work if they were fit for it; then later you spoke of those Jews who were brought from Hungary to the Southeast Wall. Do you know whether the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor Sauckel had any connection with these actions, whether this happened on his orders, and whether he otherwise had anything to do with these matters?
WISLICENY: As far as the Jews from Slovakia were concerned, the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor had nothing to do with these matters. It was a purely internal affair for the Inspector of Concentration Camps who employed these Jews for his own purposes. Concerning the impressment of Jews for the construction of the Southeast Wall, I cannot definitely answer this question. I do not know to what extent the construction of the Southeast Wall was directed by the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. The Jews who came up from Hungary for this construction work were turned over to the Lower Danube Gauleitung.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to ask the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other?
HERR BABEL: Witness, you mentioned measures taken by the Security Police and the SD; and you spoke about these organizations several times in your testimony. Is this merely an official designation or are we to conclude from your statement that the Security Service (the SD) as such, participated in some way?
WISLICENY: The actions mentioned were executed by Amt IV, that is, the Gestapo. If I mentioned the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, I did so because it was the correct designation of this office and not because I wished to mention the SD as such.
HERR BABEL: Did the SD then participate, in any way, in the measures against the Jews mentioned by you: 1) to what extent, and 2) in what manner?
WISLICENY: The SD as an organization was not involved. Some of the leaders, including me, who worked with Eichmann, came from the SD; but they had been detailed to Amt IV-to the Gestapo.
HERR BABEL: Did former members of the SS and SD who later became active in the Gestapo still remain members of their original organization, or were they now members of the Gestapo?
WISLICENY: No, they still remained with the, SD.
HERR BABEL: And were they acting as members of the SD or were they carrying out orders of the Gestapo?
WISLICENY: We belonged to the Gestapo for the duration of our assignment. We merely remained on the SD payroll and were taken care of as members of their personnel. Orders were received exclusively from the Gestapo-from Amt IV. 3 Jan.46
HERR BABEL: In this connection I should like to ask one more question. Could an outsider ever know his way about in this maze of offices?
WISLICENY: No; that was practically impossible.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other of the defendants' counsel who wishes to cross-examine this witness? Colonel Amen, do you wish, or Colonel Brookhart, does he wish to re-examine the witness?
COL. AMEN: No further questions, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That will do. [The witness left the stand.]
COL. AMEN: It will take about 10 minutes, Sir, to get the next witness up. I had not anticipated we would finish quite so quickly. Do you still want me to get him up this afternoon?
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any other witnesses on these subjects?
COL. AMEN: Not on this subject, Sir. I have two very brief witnesses: one on the written agreement, concerning which testimony was given this morning, between the OKW and OKH and the RSHA-a witness who can answer the questions which the members of the Tribunal asked this morning, very briefly; and one other witness who is on a totally different subject.
THE PRESIDENT: On what subject is the other witness?
COL. AMEN: Well, he is on the subject of identifying two of the defendants at one of the concentration camps. I don't like to mention these names to the Defense unless you wish me to.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then you will call those two witnesses tomorrow?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Lordship. I don't think either of them will take more than 20 minutes apiece.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well then you will go on with the evidence against the High Command?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. [The Tribunal adjourned until 4 January 1946 at 1000 hours.]
COL. AMEN: I would like to call as a witness for the Prosecution Walter Schellenberg. [The witness, Schellenberg, took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Is your name Walter Schellenberg?
WALTER SCHELLENBERG (Witness): My name is Walter Schellenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you take this oath: "I swear by God- the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing." [The witness repeated the oath.]
COL. AMEN: Speak slowly and pause between the questions and the answers. Where were you born?
SCHELLENBERG: In Saarbrucken.
COL. AMEN: How old are you?
SCHELLENBERG: Thirty-five years.
COL. AMEN: You were a member of the NSDAP?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And of the SS?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes; the SS also.
COL. AMEN: And of the Waffen-SS?
SCHELLENBERG: And the Waffen-SS.
COL. AMEN: And the SD?
SCHELLENBERG: And the SD.
COL. AMEN: What was the highest office you held?
SCHELLENBERG: The highest rank I held was that of SS Brigadefuehrer in the SS, and of major general in the Waffen-SS.
COL. AMEN: You were Chief of Amt VI?
SCHELLENBERG: I was Chief of Amt VI and Military.
COL. AMEN: During what period of time?
SCHELLENBERG: I was made Deputy Chief of Amt VI in July 1941, and the final confirmation of my appointment as Chief was in June of 1942.
COL. AMEN: State briefly the functions of Amt VI of the RSHA.
SCHELLENBERG: Amt VI was the political secret service of the Reich and worked principally in foreign countries.
COL. AMEN: Do you know of an agreement between OKW, OKH, and the RSHA concerning the use of Einsatz groups and Einsatzkommandos in the Russian campaign?
SCHELLENBERG: At the end of May 1941 conferences took place between the then head of the Security Police and the Quartermaster General, General Wagner.
COL. AMEN: And who?
SCHELLENBERG: The Quartermaster General of the Army, General Wagner.
COL. AMEN: Did you personally attend those conferences?
SCHELLENBERG: I kept the minutes of the final conferences.
COL. AMEN: Have you given us the names of all persons present during those negotiations?
SCHELLENBERG: The negotiations took place principally between Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich, who was then the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, and the Quartermaster General of the Army.
COL. AMEN: Was anyone else present during any of the negotiations?
SCHELLENBERG: Not during the negotiations themselves, but at a later meeting other persons took part.
COL. AMEN: And did those negotiations result in the signing of an agreement?
SCHELLENBERG: A written agreement was concluded.
COL. AMEN: Were you there when the written agreement was signed?
SCHELLENBERG: I kept the minutes and I saw both gentlemen sign.
COL. AMEN: By whom was this agreement signed?
SCHELLENBERG: It was signed by the then Chief of the Security Police, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich, and the Quartermaster General of the Army, General Wagner.
COL. AMEN: Do you know where the original agreement, or any copy thereof, is located today?
SCHELLENBERG: No, that I cannot say. I know nothing about that.
COL. AMEN: But you are familiar with the contents of that written agreement?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes; for the most part I recall that.
COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, please tell the Tribunal exactly what was contained in that written agreement.
SCHELLENBERG: The first part of this agreement began with the quotation of a basic decree by the Fuehrer. It read in the introductory clause somewhat as follows: For the safety of the fighting troops in the Russian campaign that is now expected to start, all means are to be used to keep the rear safe and protected. On the basis of this consideration every means is to be used to break any resistance. In order to support the fighting units of the Army, the Security Police and the Security Service are also to be called in for this task. If I remember correctly, as a special example of something to be protected, the safeguarding of the so-called great routes of supply, also caned "Rollbahnen," was mentioned.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall anything else contained in that agreement?
SCHELLENBERG: In the second part of this agreement the organization of the army groups was mentioned.
COL. AMEN: And what was said about that?
SCHELLENBERG: And the corresponding organization of the Einsatz groups and the Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police and the SD. Four different sectors were mentioned. I remember the following: First, the front area; second, the operational zone-it was also -divided into an army group area and a rear army group area; third, the rear army area; and fourth, the area where the civil administration (Reichskommissariat) was to be set up. In these different areas, the division of subordination and command was clearly defined. In the front areas or fighting areas, the Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police and the SD were tactically and operationally under the command of the Army; that is, they were completely under the command of the Army. In the operational zones only operational subordination should apply and this same rule should apply in the rear army area. In the zone intended for the civil administration (Reichskommissariat) the same conditions of subordination and command were to apply as in Reich territory. In a third part it was explained what was meant by tactical-and operational, or rather only the concept "operational" was explained in detail By "operational" was meant the subordination to the branches of the Army in respect to discipline and supplies. Special mention was made of the fact that the operational subordination also included all supplies especially supplies of gasoline, food, and the making available of technical routes for the transmission of intelligence.
COL. AMEN: Have you now told us everything which you recall about that agreement?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes; I cannot remember anything else contained in the agreement.
COL. AMEN: If Your Honor pleases, that is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the English Prosecution have any questions to ask?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): No.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Russian Prosecution have any questions to ask?
COL.POKROVSKY: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the French Prosecution have any questions to ask? [There was no response.]
THE PRESIDENT: Do the defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions?
DR.KAUFFMANN: Is it correct that Dr. Kaltenbrunner was your superior?
SCHELLENBERG: Dr. Kaltenbrunner was my immediate superior.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Until what time?
SCHELLENBERG: From the 30th of January of 1943 until the end.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know his attitude towards the main themes of National Socialism, for instance, the treatment of the Jews or the treatment of the Church?
SCHELLENBERG: I personally did not have a chance to converse with him on these problems. What I know about him is the result of my own few personal observations.
DR.KAUFFMANN: Did you see original orders from Kaltenbrunner dealing with the execution of saboteurs, the confinement of people in concentration camps, and the like?
SCHELLENBERG: No. I heard him give only oral orders in respect to this-commands which he gave to the Chief of the State Police, the Chief of Amt IV of the RSHA.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did Kaltenbrunner ever indicate to you that he had agreed with Himmler that everything concerning concentration camps and the entire executive power was to be taken away from him and that only the SD, as an intelligence service, was to be entrusted to him and that he wanted to expand this intelligence service in order to supply the criticism that was otherwise lacking?
SCHELLENBERG: I never heard of any such agreement, and what I found out later to be the facts is to the contrary.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, since you have given a negative answer, I must ask you the following question, in order to make this one point clear: Which facts do you mean?
SCHELLENBERG: I mean, for instance, the fact that after the Reichsfuehrer SS very reluctantly agreed, through my persuasion, not to evacuate the concentration camps, Kaltenbrunner-by getting into direct contact with Hitler-circumvented this order of Himmler's and broke his word in respect to international promises.
DR.KAUFFMANN: Were there any international decisions in respect to this-decisions which referred to existing laws or decisions which referred to international agreements?
SCHELLENBERG: I would like to explain that, if through the intermediary of internationally known persons, the then Reichsfuehrer SS promised the official Allied authorities not to evacuate the concentration camps, owing to the general distress, this promise was binding according to human rights.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What do you mean by evacuate?
SCHELLENBERG: Arbitrarily to evacuate the camps before the approaching enemy troops and to scatter them to other parts of Germany still unoccupied by the enemy troops.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was your opinion?
SCHELLENBERG: That no further evacuation should take place, because human rights simply did not allow it.
DR.KAUFFMANN: That the camps should therefore be surrendered to the approaching enemy?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know that your activity, too, could bring suffering to many people, to people who were per se innocent?
SCHELLENBERG: I did not understand the question. Will you please repeat it?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you ever think that your motive, too, and the activity of your fellow-workers was a cause for the great suffering of many people-let us say Jews-even though these people were innocent?
SCHELLENBERG: I cannot imagine that the activity of my office could cause any such thing. I was merely in an information service.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then your information service had no connection at all with such crimes.
SCHELLENBERG: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then Kaltenbrunner, too, would not be guilty in regard to this point?
SCHELLENBERG: Certainly; because he was, at the same time, the Chief of Amt IV of the State Police.
DR.KAUFFMANN: I asked "in regard to this point," and by that I meant your sector.
SCHELLENBERG: I only represented the Sector Amt VI and Amt Military.
DR.KAUFFMANN: But Kaltenbrunner, at the same time, was Chief of Amt VI?
SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the RSHA. Eight departments, as you probably know, were under him. I was at the head of one or two of them, namely, Amt VI and Amt Military. These two offices had nothing to do with the executive power of the State Police.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then, if your department. ..
THE PRESIDENT: What I understood you to say was that you were only in a branch which was an information center; is that right?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And that Kaltenbrunner was your immediate chief; is that right?
SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the RSHA.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he was the Chief not only of your branch but of the whole organization.
SCHELLENBERG: Yes, that is correct.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I should like to question this witness later on, after I have talked with Kaltenbrunner.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the summer of 1943 were you in Ankara? And did you, on this occasion pay a visit to the German Embassy?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you during this visit criticize German foreign policy in various respects, and did you mention that it was absolutely advisable to establish better relations with the Holy See Did Herr Von Papen then answer, "That would be possible only if in accordance with the demands that I have made repeatedly, the Church policy is revised completely and the persecution of the Church ceases"?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes, the gist of the conversation is correct; and I spoke with the then Ambassador Von Papen to this effect.