dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
in any really fundamental matters, than that less important points should be kept secret unnecessarily and excessively. "f. To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing the continuous support of the industry concerned by the navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the purchasers are not made confident that something special is being offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the competitive battle and therefore will not be able to supply to requirements of the German Navy in case of need." (C-29) This surreptitious rearmament, in violation of treaty obligations, starting even before the Nazi came into power, is illustrated by a 1932 order of Raeder, chief of the naval command, addressed to the main naval command, regarding the concealed construction of torpedo tubes in E-Boats (C-141). He ordered that torpedo tubes be removed and stored in the naval arsenal but be kept ready for immediate refitting. By using only the number permitted under the Treaty, at a given time, and by storing them after satisfactory testing, the actual number of operationally effective E-Boats was constantly increased. This German order for the concealed armament of E-Boats, issued by Raeder on 10 February 1932, provides: "In view of our treaty obligations and the Disarmament Conference steps must be taken to prevent the 1st E-Boat-Half-Flotilla, which in a few months will consist of exactly similar newly built (E)-Boats, from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats as it is not intended to count these E-Boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed us. "I therefore order: "1. S2-S5, will be commissioned in the shipyard Luerssen, Vegesack without armament, and will be fitted with easily removable cover-sheet-metal on the spaces necessary for torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I. [Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining] in agreement with the naval arsenal, for the Boat 'S1' which will dismantle its torpedo-tubes, on completion of the practice shooting, for fitting on another boat. "2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-Boats will be stored in the naval arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a short
'S1' which will dismantle its torpedo-tubes, on completion of the practice shooting, for fitting on another boat. "2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-Boats will be stored in the naval arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a short time to be fitted and for practice shooting so that only one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public consumption its boat will be in service for the purpose of temporary trials by the T.V.A. [Technical Research Establishment]. "It should not anchor together with the other, unarmed boats of the Half-Flotilla because of the obvious similarity of type. The duration of firing, and consequently the lengthy of time the torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible. "3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all E-Boats is intended as soon as the situation of the political control allows it." (C-141) Along similar lines the navy was also carrying on the concealed preparation of auxiliary cruisers, under the disguised designation of Transport Ships O. The preparations under this order were to be completed by 1 April 1935. At the very time of construction of these ships as commercial sips, plans were made for their conversion. This was the result of a Top Secret order from the command office of the navy, dated 12 March 1934, and signed in draft by Groos. This order bears the seal of the Reichministerium, Marineleitung, over the draft signature. It provides: "Subject: Preparation of Auxiliary Cruisers. "It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35 (AG-Aufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary cruisers which are intended for use in operations on the high seas. "In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations the ships will be referred to as "Transport Ships O". It is requested that in future this designation only will be uses. "The preparations are to be arranged so that they can be completed by 1.4.35." (C-166) In the official navy files, notes were kept year by year, from 1927 to 1940, on the reconstruction of the German Navy. One of these notes discloses that the displacement of the battleship "Scharnhorst-Gneisenau" was actually greater than the
arranged so that they can be completed by 1.4.35." (C-166) In the official navy files, notes were kept year by year, from 1927 to 1940, on the reconstruction of the German Navy. One of these notes discloses that the displacement of the battleship "Scharnhorst-Gneisenau" was actually greater than the tonnage which had been notified to the British under the treaty obligations: "The true displacement of the battleship "Scharnhorst-Gneisenau' and 'F/G' exceeds by 20 percent in both cases the displacement reported to the British." (C-23) There is annexed to this document a table with reference to different ships, and two columns, headed "Displacement by Type"; one column reads "Actual Displacement," and the other, "Notified Displacement." The actual displacement of the "Scharnhorst" is thus shown to be 31,300 tons, although the notified displacement was only 26,000 tons. On the "F/G" actual was 41,700, wile notified was 46,850. And so on down the list. (C-23). In these notes there also occurs the statements, In a clear cut program for the construction, the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has set the navy the task of carrying out the aims of his foreign police." (C-23) The German Navy constantly planned and committed violations of armament limitation, and with characteristic German thoroughness had prepared superficial pretexts to explain away these violations. Following a conference with the Chief of "A" section [the military department of the Navy], an elaborate survey list was prepared and compiled, giving a careful list of the quantity and type of German naval armament and ammunition on hand under manufacture or construction (C-32). A statement of the justification or defense that might be used was included in those instances where the Versailles Treaty was violated or its allotment has been exceeded. The list contained 30 items under "Material Measures" and 14 items under "Measures of Organization." The variety of details covered necessarily involved several sources within the navy, which must have realized their significance. This Top Secret document, which is headed "A Survey Report of German Naval Armament after Conferences with Chief of "A" Section, dated 9 September 1933," contains three columns, one header "Measure," one headed "Material Measures, Details," and the
several sources within the navy, which must have realized their significance. This Top Secret document, which is headed "A Survey Report of German Naval Armament after Conferences with Chief of "A" Section, dated 9 September 1933," contains three columns, one header "Measure," one headed "Material Measures, Details," and the third headed "Remarks." The "Remarks" contain the pretext or justification for explaining away the violations of the treaty. The following are examples: "1. Exceeding the permitted number of mines." Then figures are given. "Remarks: Further mines are in part ordered, in part being delivered." (C-32) "Number 2. Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea are for Baltic artillery batteries." The remarks column reads, "Justification: Necessity for over-hauling. Cheaper repairs." (C-32) "Number 6. Laying gun-platforms in the Keil area." Remarks: "The offense over and above that in serial number 3 lies in the fact that all fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This justification will make it less severe; pure defense measures." (C-32) "Number 7. Exceeding the calibre permitted for coastal batteries." Remarks: "possible justification is that, though the calibre is larger, the number of guns is less." (C-32) "Number 8. Arming of mine-sweepers." Remarks: "The guns are taken from the fleet reserve stores, have been temporarily installed only for training purposes. All nations arm their mine-sweeping forces (equality of rights)." (C-32) "Number 13. Exceeding the number of machine guns, et cetera, permitted." Remarks: "Can be made light of." (C-32) "Number 18. Construction of U-boat parts." Remarks: "Difficult to detect. If necessary can be denied." (C-32) "Number 20. Arming of fishing vessels." Remarks: "For warning shots. Make little of it." And so on throughout the list (C-32). This document must have been used as a guide for negotiators who were attending the Disarmament Conference, as to the position that they might take. E. Withdrawal From the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations: Building of the Air Force. At this point, on 14th October 1933, Germany withdrew from the International Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. The Nazis took this opportunity to break away from the international
they might take. E. Withdrawal From the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations: Building of the Air Force. At this point, on 14th October 1933, Germany withdrew from the International Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. The Nazis took this opportunity to break away from the international negotiations and to take an aggressive position on an issue which would not be serious enough to provoke reprisal from other countries. At the same time, Germany attached so much importance to this action that it considered the possibility of the application of sanctions by other countries. In anticipation of the probable nature of such sanctions and the countries which might apply them, plans wee made for armed resistance on land, at sea, and in the air. Military preparations were ordered in a directive from the Reichsminister for Defense (von Blomberg) to the head of the Army High Command (Fritsch), the head of the Navy High Command, (Raeder), and the Reichsminister for Air, (Goering) (C-140). This directive, dated 25 October 1933, 11 days after the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, provides: "1. The enclosed directive gives the basis for preparation of the armed forces in the case of sanctions being applied against Germany. "2. I request the chiefs of the Army and Navy High Command and the Reichsminister for Air to carry out the preparations in accordance with the following points: "(a) Strictest secrecy. It is of the utmost importance that no facts become known to the outside world from which preparation for resistance against sanctions can be inferred or which is incompatible with Germany's existing obligations in the sphere of foreign policy regarding the demilitarized zone. If necessary, the preparations must take second place to this necessity." (C-140) One of the immediate consequences of this action was that following the withdrawal from the League of Nations, Germany's armament program was still further increased. As it was ordered on 12 May, 1934: "5. Owing to the speed of military political development since Germany quitted Geneva and based on the progress of the army, the new A-Plan will only be drawn up for a period of two years. The third A phase lasts accordingly from 1.4.34
armament program was still further increased. As it was ordered on 12 May, 1934: "5. Owing to the speed of military political development since Germany quitted Geneva and based on the progress of the army, the new A-Plan will only be drawn up for a period of two years. The third A phase lasts accordingly from 1.4.34 to 31.3.36." (C-153) On 10 Marcy 1935, Goering announced that Germany was building a military air force. At page 1830 of Das Archiv it is stated: "The Reich Minister for Aviation, General of the Airmen, Goering, in his talk with the special correspondent of the Daily Mail, Ward Price, expressed himself on the subject of the German Air Force. "General Goering said: "In the extension of our national defense [Sicherheit], it was necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take care of defense in the air. As far as that is concerned, I restricted myself to those measures absolutely necessary. The guiding line of my actions was, not the creation of an aggressive force which would threaten other nations, but merely the completion of a military aviation which would be strong enough to repel, at any time, attacks on Germany." "In conclusion, the correspondent asked whether the German Air Force will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany. General Goering replied to that exactly as follows: "The German Air Force is just as passionately permeated with the will to defend the Fatherland to the last as it is convinced, on the other hand, that it will never be employed to threaten the peace of other nations." (2292-PS) Since they had gone as far as they could on rearmament and the secret training of personnel, the next step necessary to the conspirators' program for aggressive war was a large-scale increase in military strength. This could no longer be done under disguise and camouflage, and would have to be known to the world. Accordingly, on 16 March 1935, there was promulgated a law for universal military service, in violation of Article 173 of the Versailles Treaty. That law appeared in the Reichsgesetzblatt, Title I, Vol. I, 1935, page 369. The text of the law itself provides: "In this sprit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the following law: "Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16,
in violation of Article 173 of the Versailles Treaty. That law appeared in the Reichsgesetzblatt, Title I, Vol. I, 1935, page 369. The text of the law itself provides: "In this sprit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the following law: "Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, 1935. "The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is herewith promulgated: "Section 1. "Service in the Armed Forces is based upon compulsory military duty. "Section 2. "In peace time, the German Army, including the police troops transferred to it, is organized into: 12 Corps and 36 Divisions. "Section 3. "The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty of submitting immediately to the Reich Ministry detailed laws on compulsory military duty." (1654-PS) The law is signed first by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, and then by many other officials, including von Neurath, Frick, Schacht, Goering, Hess, and Frank. (1654-PS) F. Assurances. As a part of their program to weaken resistance in other states, the Nazis followed a policy of making false assurances, thereby tending to create confusion and a false sense of security. Thus, on 21 May 1935, the same date on which Germany renounced the armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty, Hitler announced the intent of the German Government to respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties. In his speech in the Reichstag on that date Hitler stated: "Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely respect all other articles pertaining to the cooperation [zasammenleben] of the various nations including territorial agreements; revisions which will be unavoidable as time goes by it will carry out by way of a friendly understanding only. "The Government of the German Reich has the intention not to sign any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfill. However, it will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily even if it was composed before this government took over. Therefore, it will in particular adhere to all the allegations under the Locarno Pact as long as the other partners of the pact also adhere to it." (2288-PS) For convenient reference, the territorial limitations in the Locarno and Versailles Treaties, include the following:
was composed before this government took over. Therefore, it will in particular adhere to all the allegations under the Locarno Pact as long as the other partners of the pact also adhere to it." (2288-PS) For convenient reference, the territorial limitations in the Locarno and Versailles Treaties, include the following: Article 1 of the Rhine Pact of Locarno, 16 October 1925, provides: "The High Contracting parties, collectively and severally, guarantee, in the manner provided in the following Articles: the maintenance of the territorial status quo, resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France and the inviolability of the said frontiers, as fixed by, or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Versailles, on June 28, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulation of Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty, concerning the demilitarized zone." That has reference, of course, to the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Article 42 of the Versailles Treaty, 28 June 1919, provides: "Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either no the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank, to the west of the line drawn 50 kilometers to the east of the Rhine." Article 43 provides: "In the area defined above, the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily and military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden." G. Reoccupation of the Rhineland. The demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was a sore spot with the Nazis ever since its establishment after World War I. Not only was this a blow to their increasing pride, but it was a bar to any effective strong position which Germany might want to take on any vital issues. In the event of any sanctions against Germany, in the form of military action, the French and other powers would get well into Germany east of the Rhine, before any German resistance could even be put up. Therefore, any German plans to threaten or breach international obligations, or for any kind of aggression, required the preliminary reoccupation and refortification of this open Rhineland territory. Plans and preparations
well into Germany east of the Rhine, before any German resistance could even be put up. Therefore, any German plans to threaten or breach international obligations, or for any kind of aggression, required the preliminary reoccupation and refortification of this open Rhineland territory. Plans and preparations for the reoccupation of the Rhineland started very early. A Document apparently signed in the handwriting of von Blomberg, deals with what is called "Operation Schulung", meaning schooling or training (C-139). It is dated 2 May 1935 and refers to prior staff discussions on the subject. It is addressed to the Chief of the Army Command, who at that time was Fritsch; the Chief of the Navy High Command (Raeder); and the Reich Minister for Air (Goering). The document does not use the name "Rhineland" and does not, in terms, refer to it. It seems clear, however, that it was a plan for the military reoccupation of the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of Locarno. The first part, headed "Secret Document," provides: "For the operation, suggested in the last staff talks of the Armed Forces, I lay down the Code name Schulung [training]. "The supreme direction of the operation 'Schulung' rests with the Reich Minister of Defense as this is a joint undertaking of the three services. "Preparations for the operation will begin forthwith according to the following directives: "1. General "1. The operation must, on issue of the code word 'Carry out Schulung,' be executed by a surprise blow at lightning speed. Strictest secrecy is necessary in the preparations and only the very smallest number of officers should be informed and employed in the drafting of reports, drawing, etc., and these officers only in person. "2. There is no time for mobilization of the forces taking part. These will be employed in their peace-time strength and with their peace-time equipment. "3. The preparation for the operation will be made without regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible a greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better prospects of success." (C-139) The rest of the order deals with military details. There are certain points
operation will be made without regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible a greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better prospects of success." (C-139) The rest of the order deals with military details. There are certain points in this order which are inconsistent with any theory that it was merely a training order, or that it might have been defensive in nature. The operation was to be carried out as a surprise blow at lightning speed. The air forces were to provide support for the attack. There was to be reinforcement by the East Prussian division. Furthermore, since this order is dated 2 May 1935, which is about 6 weeks after the promulgation of the Conscription Law of 16 March 1935, it could hardly have been planned as a defensive measure against any expected sanctions which might have been applied by reason of the passage of the Conscription Law. The actual reoccupation of the Rhineland did not take place until 7 March, 1936, and this early plan (C-139) necessarily underwent revision to suit changed conditions and specific objectives. That the details of this particular plan were not ultimately the ones that were carried out in reoccupying the Rhineland does not detract from the fact that as early as 2 May 1935, the Germans had already planned that operation, not merely as a staff plan but as a definite operation. It was evidently not on their timetable to carry out the operation so soon, if it could be avoided. But they were prepared to do so if necessary. It is significant to note the date of this order is the same as the date of the signing of the Franco-Russian Pact, which the Nazis later asserted as their excuse for the Rhineland reoccupation. The military orders on the basis of which the Rhineland reoccupation was actually carried into execution on 7 March 1936, were issued on 2 March 1936 by the War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, von Blomberg. They were addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (Raeder), and the Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force (Gering) (C-159). That order, classified "Top Secret", in the original bears Raeder's initial in green pencil, with a