dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GODT: There were certain orders which had to be kept in collective files and which one therefore saw very frequently. This order was not one of them, but was filed separately after being dealt with. After it had been issued I never saw it again until the end of the war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What did an order intended for inclusion in such a collection look like on the outside?
GODT: It had to be a "Current Order" or an "Admonition Message."
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did that occur in the text of the order concerned?
GODT: It would be in the heading of the order concerned. That is not the case here.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: So we may conclude from the fact that this wireless message is not headed either "Admonition Message" or "Current Order" that it did not belong to a collection of orders?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: But then how is it possible that Korvettenkapitan Mohle gave lectures on this order apparently until the end of the war?
GODT: Korvettenkapitan Mohle had access to all wireless messages issued by Commander, U-boats. He was entitled to select from these signals anything he thought necessary for the instruction of commanders about to go to sea. It made no difference whether the order was marked "Admonition" or "Current Order." He had obviously taken out this message and had had it among the material to be used for these instructions to the commanders.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did Mohle ever ask you about the interpretation of that order?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: Did you ever hear of any other source interpreting this order to mean that survivors were to be shot?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Can you judge from your own experience whether this order had, or could have had, any effect practically on Allied naval losses?
GODT: That is very difficult to judge. At that time something like 80 per cent of all U-boat attacks were probably carried out under conditions which made any attempt at rescue impossible. That is to say, these attacks were made on convoys or on vessels in close proximity to the coast. The fact that some 12 captains and engineers were brought back as prisoners by U-boats is an indication of what happened in the other cases. It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty whether it was possible to take rescue measures in all cases. The situation was probably such that the Allied sailors felt safer in the lifeboats than they did, for instance, aboard the U-boat and probably were glad to see the U-boat vanish after the attack. The fact that the presence of the U-boat involved danger to itself is proved by this same case of the Laconia, where two U-boats were attacked from the air while engaged in rescuing the survivors. I do not think it is at all certain that this order had any effect one way or the other.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What do you mean "one way or the other"?
GODT: I mean whether it meant an increase or a decrease in the number of losses among enemy seamen.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: There is one argument I did not quite understand. You pointed to the fact that approximately 12 captains and chief engineers were made prisoner after this order was issued. Do you mean by that that only in these few cases was it possible, without endangering the submarine, to carry out the order to transfer such officers from the lifeboats?
GODT: It is too much to say that it was only possible in these few cases, but it does afford some indication of the number of cases in which it was possible.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I shall now show you the wireless message which went to Kapitanleutnant Schacht. It is on Page 36 of the Prosecution's document book. This message, too, was sent as "top secret." What was the reason for that?
GODT: It is a definite and severe reprimand for the commander.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: How far was that reprimand justified? Schacht had not received previous instruction to rescue Italians only?
GODT: No, but it had been assumed that U-boats would realize that it was of primary importance that allies should be rescued, that is, that they should not become prisoners of war. Apart from that, several reminders had been issued in the course of operations warning commanders to be particularly careful. After that came Schacht's report, which appeared at the time to indicate that he had disobeyed orders. Viewed retrospectively, Schacht's action must have taken place before Commander, U-boats, issued the order in question, so that in part at least, the accusation was unjustified.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were any further rescue measures carried out by U-boats after this order was issued in September 1942?
GODT: In isolated cases, yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did Commander, U-boats, object to these rescues?
GODT: I have no recollection of that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: To your knowledge, did German U-boats deliberately kill survivors?
GODT: The only case I know of-and I heard of it after the capitulation-is that of Kapitanleutnant Eck. We heard an enemy broadcast which hinted at these happenings, but we were unable to draw any conclusions from that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I now hand to you the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-203, which is regarded by the Prosecution as proof of the shooting of survivors. This is the war log of U-247 from which I mimeographed an extract on Page 74 of Volume II of my document book. This extract describes an attack made by the U-boat on a British trawler. You have already seen this war log. After his return, did the commander make a report on this action?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did he report anything about the shooting of survivors on that occasion?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: According to a statement made by a survivor named McAllister this trawler, the Noreen Mary, had a gun aboard. Do you know whether trawlers had guns mounted fore or aft?
GODT: They were almost always in the bows.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Can you remember, with the help of this extract from the war log and on the strength of your own recollection of the commander's report, the exact details of this incident?
GODT: Originally the U-boat when submerged encountered a number of vessels escorting trawlers close to Cape Wrath. It tried to torpedo one of the trawlers.
THE PRESIDENT: Is the witness trying to reconstruct this from the document, reconstruct the incident?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I am asking him to tell us what he remembers of the event, basing his account on his own recollection of the commander's report supplemented by the entry in the war log.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, he hasn't said whether he ever saw the commander.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Oh yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, all he can tell us is what the commander told him.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, have him do that then.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Will you please tell us what you remember after reading the log.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. If he remembers anything about what the commander told him he can tell us that, but the log speaks for itself and he can't reconstruct it out of that. He must tell us what he remembers of what the officer said.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Very well, Sir. [Turning to the witness.] Will you please speak from memory.
GODT: The commander reported that he had encountered a number of trawlers extraordinarily close to the coast, considering conditions at the time. Failing in his attempt to torpedo one of them, he sank it with gunfire. That was all the more remarkable because, in the first place, the incident occurred quite unusually near the coast and, in the second place, the commander risked this artillery fight regardless of the presence of other vessels nearby.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were these other ships also armed trawlers?
GODT: It was to be assumed at the time that every trawler was armed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The witness McAllister thought that the submarine surfaced 50 yards away from the trawler. In the light of your own recollections and experiences, do you think this is possible?
GODT: I do not remember the details; but it would be an unusual thing for a U-boat commander to do.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: McAllister also stated the U-boat used shells filled with wire.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal thinks that the witness oughtn't to express opinions of this sort. He ought to give us the evidence of any facts which he has. He is telling us in his opinion it is impossible that a naval commander would ever bring his submarine up within 50 yards of another vessel. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBt1HLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not a matter for him to say.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I was going to ask the witness next whether German U-boats used shells filled with wire as stated by the witness McAllister. Is that question admissible?
THE PRESIDENT: Shells filled with wire?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, that is the question I want to put. Will you answer that question, Witness.
GODT: There were no such shells.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was this attack by the submarine on the Noreen Mary reported by wireless immediately? Do you know anything about it?
GODT: Do you mean the U-boat commanders report?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: No, by the British.
GODT: As far as I remember, a wireless message sent by a British vessel was intercepted, reporting a U-boat attack in the area.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: A signal is entered in the war log under 0127 hours. It is intended for Matschulat, which means that it was sent by you to the commander, and it reads, "English steamer reports attack by German U-boat west of Cape Wrath."
GODT: That is the message intended to inform the U-boat that a wireless signal sent by a British steamer concerning a submarine attack in that area had been intercepted.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I should now like to ask you something about Standing War Order Number 511. This is in Volume I of my document book, Page 46. When I presented this order, the Tribunal was not sure of the significance of Paragraph 2, which I am going to read: "Captains and officers of neutral ships which may be sunk according to Standing Order Number 101, (such as Swedish except Goteborg traffic), must not be taken on board, since internment of these officers is not permitted by international law." Can you tell me first the experiences or calculations which led to the inclusion of Paragraph 2 in the order?
GODT: On one occasion a U-boat brought a Uruguayan officer -a captain whose ship had been sunk-to Germany. We were afraid that if we released this captain he might report some of the things he had seen while he was interned aboard the U-boat. The reason for this order was to avoid difficulties of that kind in the future; for the Uruguayan captain had to be released and was, in fact, released.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What is the meaning of the reference to neutral ships which might be sunk according to Standing War Order Number 101?
GODT: May I please see the order for a minute? [The document was submitted to the witness.] The Standing War Order Number 101 contains the following directives in connection with the sinking of neutral ships: Once inside the blockade zone, all neutral ships can be sunk as a matter of principle, with two main exceptions, or shall we say, two general exceptions. To begin with, ships belonging to certain neutral countries, with whom agreements had been made regarding definite shipping channels, must not be sunk; further, ships belonging to certain neutral states which might be assumed not to be working exclusively in the enemy's service. Outside the blockade zone neutral ships might be sunk; first, if they were not recognizable as neutrals and therefore must be regarded as enemy vessels by the submarine in question and, second, if they were not acting as neutrals. · °
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: As, for instance, those traveling in enemy convoy?
GODT: Yes, those traveling in convoys, or if they reported the presence of U-boats, et cetera, by wireless.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did Paragraph 2 mean that the captains of neutral ships would in the future be in a worse position than captains of enemy ships, or would they be in a better position?
GODT: This is not a question of better or worse, it is a question of taking prisoners. They were not to be taken prisoners because they could not be detained as such: Whether this meant that their positions would be better or worse is at least open to doubt. Captains of enemy ships usually tried to avoid being taken aboard the U-boat probably because they felt safer in their lifeboats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What do you know about orders to respect hospital ships at the beginning of the invasion?
GODT: At the beginning of the invasion the rule in this area, as in any other area, was that hospital ships were not to be attacked. Commanders operating in the invasion zone then reported that there was a very large number of hospital ships sailing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: From where to where?
GODT: Between the Normandy invasion area and the British Isles. Commander, U-boats, then had investigations made by the competent department as to whether hospital traffic was really as heavy as alleged in these reports. That was found to be the case.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What do you mean by that?
GODT: It means that the number of hospital ships reported corresponded to the estimated number of wounded. After that it was expressly announced that hospital ships were not to be attacked in the future.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was the strict respect paid to hospital ships at that stage of the war in our own interests?
GODT: At that time we only had hospital ships in the Baltic where the Geneva Convention was not recognized by the other side; so eve had no particular interest in respecting hospital ships.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Do you know of any case of an enemy hospital ship being sunk by a German U-boat during this war?
O GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did it happen the other way round?
GODT: The German hospital ship Tubingen was, I think, sunk by British aircraft in the Mediterranean.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Presumably because of mistaken identity?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the question on German hospital ships which were sunk isn't relevant, is it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I was going to show by it, Mr. President, that the possibility of mistaken identity does exist and that a hospital ship was in fact sunk in consequence of such a mistake. My evidence therefore goes to show that from the sinking of a ship it must not be concluded that the sinking was ordered.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite realize that mistakes may be made in sea warfare. It is a matter of common knowledge. Should re-adjourn now?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President. [A recess was taken.]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral Godt, you have known Admiral Doenitz very well since 1934; and you have had a good deal to do with him during that time. Did he have anything to do with politics during that time?
GODT: Nothing at all, to my knowledge, before he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. As Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he made occasional speeches outside the Navy; for instance, he addressed dock workers, made a speech to the Hitler Youth at Stettin, and gave a talk over the air on "Heroes' Day" and on 20 July; I remember no other occasions.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were these speeches not always directly connected with the tasks of the Navy-for instance, the address to the dock laborers-ship-building?
GODT: Yes, when he spoke to the dock laborers.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And to the Hitler Youth?
GODT: The Hitler Youth, too.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And what was the connection there?
GODT: As far as I remember, the speech was concerned with recruiting for the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did he select his staff officers for their ideological or military qualifications?
GODT: Their military and personal qualities were all that mattered. Their political views had nothing to do with it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The question of whether Admiral Doenitz knew, or must have known, of certain happenings outside the Navy is a very important one from the Tribunal's point of view. Can you tell me who his associates were?
GODT: His own officers and officers of his own ages almost exclusively. As far as I know, he had very few contacts beyond those.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did matters change much in this respect after he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
GODT: No. He probably had a few more contacts with people from other branches, but on the whole his circle remained the same.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Where did he actually live at that time, that is, after his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
GODT: After his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, he was mainly at the headquarters of the Naval Operations Staff near Berlin.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did he live with his family or with his staff?
GODT: He made his home with his family; but the main part of his life was spent with his staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And where did he live when his staff was transferred to the so-called "Koralle" quarters in the neighborhood of Berlin in the autumn of 1943?
GODT: He lived at his headquarters, where his family also lived-at least for some time. His official discussions, however, usually lasted till late in the evening.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In, other words, from that time on he lived constantly in the naval officers' quarters?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You were in a better position than almost any of the other officers to observe the Admiral's career at close quarters. Can you tell me what you think were the motives behind the military orders he issued?
THE PRESIDENT: You can't speak about the motives of people. You can't give evidence about other people's minds. You can only give evidence of what they said and what they did.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I still think that an officer who lived with another officer for years must have a certain knowledge of his motives, based on the actions of the officer in question and on what that officer told him. However, perhaps I may put my question rather differently.
THE PRESIDENT: He can give evidence about his character, but he can't give evidence about his motives.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Then I shall question him on his character, Your Honor. Witness, can you tell me whether Admiral Doenitz ever expressed selfish motives to you in connection with any other orders he gave or any of his actions?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, that is the same thing, the same question again, really.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I meant it to be a different question.
THE PRESIDENT: Nobody is charging him with being egotistical or anything of that sort. He is charged with the various crimes that are charged against him in the Indictment.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Then I shall ask a direct question based on the Prosecution's opinion. The Prosecution judged Admiral Doenitz to be cynical and opportunistic. Does that agree with your own judgment?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: How would you judge him?
GODT: As a man whose mind was fixed entirely on duty, on his work, his naval problems, and the men in his service.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the defendants' counsel want to ask any questions? there was no response.]
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, might I first mention the documents that I put in in cross-examination this morning, or rather it was a document which had been in before. It was D-658, GB-229. That is the document dealing with Bordeaux, and there was a dispute as to whether it was from the Bordeaux Commando Raid. The dispute was as to whether it was from the SKL, that is the Naval War Staff Diary, or from the war diary of some lower formation. My Lord, I have had the matter confirmed with the Admiralty, and I will produce the original for defense counsel; it comes from the SKL War Diary, Tagebuch der Seekriegsleitung, and it is from Number 1 Abteilung, Tell A-that is part A-for December 1942. So it is from the War Diary of the Defendant Raeder and the witness. You have said, Witness, that you don't recollect protesting against this order of 17 September 1942.
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will try and refresh your memory. Would you look at a document, D-865? That's GB-458, My Lord; that is an extract from an interrogation of Admiral Doenitz on 6 October. I should say that the record was kept in English and therefore the translation into German does not represent necessarily the Admiral's actual words. [Turning to the witness.] Would you look at the second page of that document at the end of the first paragraph. It is the end of the first paragraph on Page 207 in the English text. The Admiral is dealing with the order of 17 September 1942, and in that last sentence in that paragraph he says: "I remember that Captain Goat and Captain Hessler were opposed to this telegram. They said so expressly because, as they said, 'it might be misunderstood.' But I said, 'I must pass it on now to these boats to prevent this 1 percent of losses. I must give them a reason, so that they do not feel themselves obliged to do that." Do you remember protesting now, saying "That can be misunderstood"?
GODT: No, I do not recall that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And a further extract on Page 3 of the English translation, the bottom of Page 2 of the German: "So I sent a second telegram to prevent further losses. The second telegram was sent at my suggestion. I am completely and personally responsible for it, because both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler expressly stated they thought the telegram ambiguous or liable to misinterpretation." Do you remember that now?
GODT: No, I do not recall that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you look at a further statement to the same effect, on Page 5 of the English, first paragraph; Page 4 of the German text, third paragraph. He has been asked the question: "Why was it necessary to use a phrase like the one that I read to you before: Efforts to rescue members of the crew were counter to the most elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews?" It is the last clause of the first sentence, and he answered: "These words do not correspond to the telegram. They do not in any way correspond to our actions in the years of 1939, 1940, 1941 and 1942, as I have plainly shown you through the Laconia incident. I would like to emphasize once more that both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler were violently opposed to the dispatch of this telegram." Do you still say that you don't remember protesting against the sending of that telegram? GODT; I have stated repeatedly that I do not remember it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you one more extract, Document D-866, which will become GB-459. That is a further interrogation on 22 October. The first question on the document is: "Do you believe that this order is contrary to the Prize Regulations issued by the German Navy at the beginning of the war?" And the last sentence of the first paragraph of the answer is: "Godt and Hessler said to me, 'Don't send this message. You see, it might look odd some day. It might be misinterpreted.' " You don't remember using those words?
GODT: No.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were an experienced staff officer, were you not?
GODT: Yes.