dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
needs of the population "from the point of view of the party". The SD did not involve itself in the exploitation of church property or persecute the National Czech Church. It did not persecute Polish priests. He said that while the SD accepted the principles of National Socialism, they rejected the attitude of BORMANN toward the Church. BORMANN'S policy of hostility towards the Church was not successful and in 1942 ninety percent of the members of the party belonged to the church, including eighty percent of the SS. 8. The SD and Crimes Against Peace The evidence of NAUJOCKS refers to the alleged organization by the SD of the simulated frontier incident at Gleiwitz on the Polish border, in August 1939. Witness NAUJOCKS stated that he was personally employed by HEYDRICH to carry out the task and that the SD offices, Amts III, VI and VII were not employed in this instance, nor were they informed by him. The witness denied that he was given this task because of his membership in any of these offices (he was a member of Amt VI) but because HEYDRICH knew him personally. He received his orders direct from him. The reference to "SD men" as taking part in the Gleiwitz incident is based on a misunderstanding of the meaning of this term as described above. As already remarked there is little evidence regarding the knowledge of criminal activities by members of the SD. The witness EHLICH said that the reports made by his section on the Einsatzgruppen were only sent to a very small number of people. In witness' group of ninety persons he estimated that only three or four could have known or seen reports on the shooting of Jews. With regard to the evidence of voluntary or compulsory membership in the SD, little was said by the witnesses. It appears that the V-men were mainly volunteers although about fifty percent of them were regularly employed and paid. They could not, however, resign. THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND The Defense called: GENERALFELDMARSCHALL GERD VON RUNDSTEDT, Commander-in-Chief West until March 1945. 108 Col. Neave Rep GENERALFELDMARSCHALL WILHELM LIST, who Commanded an Army in France, Poland and Greece until 1942. GENERALFELDMARSCHALL ERIC VON MANSTEIN, who Commanded the 11th Army in 1942. GENERAL DER
HIGH COMMAND The Defense called: GENERALFELDMARSCHALL GERD VON RUNDSTEDT, Commander-in-Chief West until March 1945. 108 Col. Neave Rep GENERALFELDMARSCHALL WILHELM LIST, who Commanded an Army in France, Poland and Greece until 1942. GENERALFELDMARSCHALL ERIC VON MANSTEIN, who Commanded the 11th Army in 1942. GENERAL DER INFANTERIE THEODORE BUSSE, who Commanded a Corps in July 1944 and was later appointed to Command the 9th Army. GENERALOBERST HANS REINHARDT, who Commanded the Third Panzer Army and Army Group Center until January 1945. GENERALFELDMARSCHALL RITTER VON LEEB, Commander-in-Chief Army Group North on the Russian Front in 1941. GENERAL DER KAVALLERIE SIEGFRIED WESTPHAL, Chief of Staff in Italy from 1943 to 1944. GENERALFELDMARSCHALL ALBERT KESSELRING, Commander-in-Chief West at the end of the War. The following witnesses were cross-examined by the Defense on Affidavits submitted by the Prosecution. Their evidence is referred to in this report. GENERALFELDMARSCHALL WALTER VON BRAUCHITSCH, Commander-in-Chief of the Army until 1941. MAJOR GENERAL ADOLF HEUSINGER, Chief of the Operations Section of the High Command of the Army from 1940 to 1944. GENERAL WALTER SCHELLENBERG, in middle of May 1943 was Chief of Section E of Amt IV of the RSHA. GENERAL FRANZ HALDER, Chief of the General Staff of the Army. GENERAL HANS ROETTINGER, Chief of the 4th Army of the Central Army Group. It appears that the Counsel for the Defense wishes to establish the following: 1. The officers belonging to the General Staff and. High Command did not form a defined group in the sense alleged by the Prosecution. 2. They did not conspire with HITLER to plan an aggressive war. The re-building and training of the German Army from the coming of the Nazis until 1939 was based on a theory of defense. 3. They were not in a position to influence the decision of the higher political leaders. The majority of military commanders 109 Col. Neave Rep. kept clear of politics and did not subscribe to Nazi principles. They were, however, true to the oath that they swore to the Fuehrer and carried out orders according to their traditions. 4. They did not conspire with other organizations, in particular the SS, SD, and GESTAPO to commit war crimes or crimes against
kept clear of politics and did not subscribe to Nazi principles. They were, however, true to the oath that they swore to the Fuehrer and carried out orders according to their traditions. 4. They did not conspire with other organizations, in particular the SS, SD, and GESTAPO to commit war crimes or crimes against humanity. They sabotaged the execution of the Commissar Order, the Commando Order, and repressive measures against the civilian population of occupied territories. 5. They were not in a position to resign their commands or staff appointments, particularly after 1941, without fear of serious consequences to themselves and their families. The evidence for the High Command may be considered under the following headings: I. Denial that the High Command was a group in the sense used by the Prosecution. II. Composition of the General Staff and denial of the correctness of charts submitted by the Prosecution. III. Expansion and training of the German Army from 1933 t9 1939; its unpreparedness for war. IV. Denial that the High Command conspired with HITLER to promote an aggressive War or that they were informed of his plans in this connection. The attitude of the General Staff towards National Socialism and its ideals. Their Oath of allegiance to HITLER. VI. Denial of the charge of violation of the rules of war: (1) Anti-partisan measures in Russia, Italy and the Balkans. (2) Destructions of monuments and the scorched earth policy. (3) The order regarding political Commissars in the Russian Army. (4) The policy of the Army towards civilians in occupied territory in the East-Attachment of Einsatzgruppen and SD Units to the Army -Deportation and Extermination of Jews. (5) The revolt of the Polish resistance in Warsaw in 1944. (6) The treatment of prisoners of war in the East. (7) The treatment of prisoners of war in the West. 110 Col. Neave Rep. (8) Operations against the French Resistance and underground movements in western Europe -The Oradour Incident. (9) The Commando Order. (10) Treatment of the civilian population in occupied territory in the West. (11) The charge of bombing open cities. VII Knowledge of specific crimes. VIII. Whether membership was compulsory and whether the relinquishing of commands and staff
movements in western Europe -The Oradour Incident. (9) The Commando Order. (10) Treatment of the civilian population in occupied territory in the West. (11) The charge of bombing open cities. VII Knowledge of specific crimes. VIII. Whether membership was compulsory and whether the relinquishing of commands and staff appointments was possible. I. Denial that the High Command was a Group in the Sense Alleged by the Prosecution One of the main points which the Defense have tried to establish in calling von RUNDSTEDT, von BRAUCHITSCH and other witnesses is that the General Staff and High Command did not form a defined group. Von BRAUCHITSCH, who was cross-examined by the Defense on 25 July 1946 on an Affidavit submitted on behalf of the Prosecution, was asked to explain the use of the word "gruppe" in his Affidavit No. 2. The Defense interpreted use of this to mean that the Prosecution regarded the High Command as a unified organization, and von BRAUCHITSCH was asked whether this was what he had meant. His answer was somewhat confused. He said that he had used the word "gruppe" in the sense of "a number of people standing together who had no mutual contacts". There was never any specially defined group in the German armed forces and there was practically no contact between the several parts of the supreme command. He denied, for instance, that he had ever had any conversation with the supreme commanders of the Air Force or the Navy at the same time. He thought that the number of conversations he had had with either one of them would not be more than five. In answer to further cross-examination by Dr. Laternser, he said that he interpreted the word "gruppe" as meaning a certain number of military leaders and not a combination of persons for a specific purpose. That it is the object of the Defense to show that the so-called group was a mere loose association of officers holding staff appointments and commands can be seen in the evidence of von RUNDSTEDT. Von RUNDSTEDT appeared to be thinking in the terms Col. Neave Rep. of a military clique such as existed in Japan. He said that he did not know of any other nation where such a clique existed, at any rate not
staff appointments and commands can be seen in the evidence of von RUNDSTEDT. Von RUNDSTEDT appeared to be thinking in the terms Col. Neave Rep. of a military clique such as existed in Japan. He said that he did not know of any other nation where such a clique existed, at any rate not in Germany. The position of the German Generals was that they individually received orders and obeyed them. LIST on the same subject says that there was no political union among the Generals, and that officers were appointed solely on the basis of their military qualifications. The same evidence was given by other witnesses. Claim that Commanders-in-Chief not finally appointed should be excluded With respect to Document 3739-PS, USA-778 which enumerated by name those persons who are considered as belonging to the General Staff and High Command, the witness BUSSE gave a list of Generals who he alleged had not been appointed to the positions which they are stated to have held. (This evidence was objected to by the Prosecution on the grounds that the witness could not possibly know as a mere Army Commander what the exact positions of the other persons were). He said that he himself was ordered to take over the 9th Army on January 21, 1945 but his appointment was never confirmed. It would appear that it was customary for commanders of formations of the status of an Army and higher to be on six months probation before their final appointments as Commanders-in-Chief. On this basis the Defense submit that a number of Generals should be excluded from the indictment. II Composition of the General Staff and Denial of the Correctness of Charts Submitted by the Prosecution Witnesses for the Defense criticized the chart contained in Affidavit No. 1 (Document 3702-PS, USA-531) sworn to by General HALDER, which purported to show the composition of the OKW. The chart was incorrect insofar as it showed KEITEL as having jurisdiction over the three branches of the Armed Forces. In reality these three branches were under the immediate command. of the Fuehrer. REINHARDT disagreed with the final sentence of HALDER to the effect that the military leaders described in the chart represented the actual General Staff and Supreme Command 112 Col. Neave Rep. of the German Army.
branches of the Armed Forces. In reality these three branches were under the immediate command. of the Fuehrer. REINHARDT disagreed with the final sentence of HALDER to the effect that the military leaders described in the chart represented the actual General Staff and Supreme Command 112 Col. Neave Rep. of the German Army. He said that the General Staff consisted of the higher staff officers (the actual translation was "leadership assistants") and the respective commanders-in-chief. The chart contained in Affidavit No. 2, 3703-PS , USA-532, sworn to by von BRAUCHITSCH contains the same mistake. HALDER cross-examined by Dr. Laternser was asked regarding the manner in which his affidavit had been made. The Defense was understood to imply that some misunderstanding with the Prosecution had taken place as to the meaning of the chart. HALDER appeared to admit that the sketch he had made could be misunderstood. The reason for this was that connecting lines had been drawn between HITLER and KEITEL and between KEITEL RAEDER, GOERING and BRAUCHITSCH. Then again a connecting line had been drawn between BRAUCHITSCH as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, between HALDER himself as Chief of Staff and from him to the various commanders-in-chief of the Army groups. He agreed with the Defense Counsel that this might be liable to misinterpretation because in reality BRAUCHITSCH, RAEDER and GOERING were never under KEITEL but HITLER, just as the Commanders-in-Chief of Army groups were never under HALDER himself as Chief of Staff. Commanders-in-Chief of Army groups were under the Commander-in-Chief of the Army von BRAUCHITSCH. HALDER was asked whether it was correct that orders went from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to the Chief of Staff and that the latter passed on the orders independently to Army groups. He replied that the Department of the Chief of Staff was not independent although he transmitted the orders that came from the Commander-in-Chief. (The object of this cross-examination as far as the Defense of the General Staff is concerned was presumably to show that the Prosecution had presented an incorrect picture of the chain of command). HALDER admitted that the sketch he had made could be misunderstood and that it required verbal
(The object of this cross-examination as far as the Defense of the General Staff is concerned was presumably to show that the Prosecution had presented an incorrect picture of the chain of command). HALDER admitted that the sketch he had made could be misunderstood and that it required verbal explanation. Von BRAUCHITSCH cross-examined on his version of the chain of command, denied the existence of anything resembling a council of war. As Commander-in-Chief, he said that the commanders of Army groups had conferences with him and received and gave their advice and recommendations. Orders were given by HITLER in his capacity as supreme commander of the Wehrmacht to the three armed forces. He agreed with HALDER that the Chiefs of Staff themselves did not issue orders on their own initiative. 113 Col. Neave Rep. III. Expansion and Training of the German Army from 1933 to 1939; Its Unpreparedness for War According to von MANSTEIN, on April 1st, 1930, the German Army had seven Infantry Divisions, three Cavalry Divisions, no heavy artillery, tanks or air force. There were no fortifications or armament industry and no reserves of munitions. At this date preparations were made for mobilization of the Army and its raising to 21 divisions, even though one-half or one-third of the men could not be supplied with arms. The first concentration plans known as "Plan Red" were drawn up in August 1935. They consisted of maneuvers and training on a basis of three Army groups in the West in case of attack by France; two or three in the East in the case of attack by Poland, and frontier protection against attack by Czechoslovakia. The "Plan Green" was drawn up in 1936-1937 on the basis of a war on two fronts. The object of this mobilization and maneuvers was purely defensive. Von RUNDSTEDT, who was Commander-in-Chief in Berlin during the early growth of the Reichswehr, said that in 1938 HITLER was extremely indignant with von FRITSCH, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, who had opposed his plan to increase the Army to 36 divisions. As a result von FRITSCH was dismissed and von BRAUCHITSCH appointed. Even in 1939 the German Army was ill prepared for war. It could not be compared with the same force in 1914. Rearmament had taken place at too great a speed contrary to the advice
his plan to increase the Army to 36 divisions. As a result von FRITSCH was dismissed and von BRAUCHITSCH appointed. Even in 1939 the German Army was ill prepared for war. It could not be compared with the same force in 1914. Rearmament had taken place at too great a speed contrary to the advice of the high command. New divisions were formed from ill-trained troops and there was a serious lack of trained reserves and qualified tank personnel. Defensive Nature of Training REINHARDT, who was director of training from 1933 to 1937, said that no change took place in the methods of training after the conference with HITLER in 1937, as a result of which it was decided to increase the Army. Training was purely defensive and he believed that the object of creating a powerful Army was for the protection of German territory. This was the view of most officers. 114 Col. Neave Rep. Officers of the High Command did not think that it was necessary to go to war in order to remove the burden of Versailles or to settle the problem of the Polish Corridor. There was no special emphasis placed on aggressive tactics in the training program of the Army. In fact, the enemy forces with which it was supposed to be dealing in carrying out maneuvers were always considered to be superior in numbers. REINHARDT observed somewhat naively that any over-emphasis on training in offensive tactics would have been unwise because the Army training school was attended by many foreign officers. He said that in 1938 he commanded a tank division which was ill equipped and ill trained and it was extremely fortunate that it did not have to go into action during the Czech occupation. The order for participation in the Polish campaign came as a surprise, and even then the division was not at its full strength. Von LEEB, who with von RUNDSTEDT, was in 1935 one of the only two Commanders-in-Chief in the Army, considered that the re-armament was necessary because Germany was isolated in the middle of Europe and surrounded by countries who had already re-armed. He also thought that the German Army re-armed at too great a rate and was badly trained. IV. Denial that the High Command Conspired with HITLER to Promote an Aggressive War or that they were Informed of his Plans in
was isolated in the middle of Europe and surrounded by countries who had already re-armed. He also thought that the German Army re-armed at too great a rate and was badly trained. IV. Denial that the High Command Conspired with HITLER to Promote an Aggressive War or that they were Informed of his Plans in this Connection. All the Generals gave evidence that they never attended conferences prior to August 1939 which gave any indication that HITLER was planning an aggressive war and, as before stated, that the training and apparent purposes of the army were defensive. The chief points made by von RUNDSTEDT were as follows: HITLER did not inform the General Staff of his Plans Staff officers drew up plans on the orders of the Government. The individual Commanders-in-Chief were only informed of those plans as far as their sectors or commands were involved. They could not question them. HITLER never consulted the higher commanders concerning his decisions. He did not tell RUNDSTEDT, although he was Commander-in-Chief in Berlin, of his decision to 115 Col. Neave Rep. increase the Army in 1935. In 1938 when he was still holding the same appointment, RUNDSTEDT was not informed of the occupation of the Rhineland until he heard it on the wireless. He was an intimate friend of von FRITSCH, but von FRITSCH never told him of any aggressive plans discussed in the conference of 5 November 1937 . Von FRITSCH was removed because of his opposition to various plans, particularly the occupation of the Rhineland. In general, HITLER held conferences merely to inform his Generals of his intentions. The same applied to the occupation of Austria. BRAUCHITSCH, RUNDSTEDT, REICHENAU and BECK were all informed of the move into the Sudetenland and all opposed it. The Polish Corridor They had faith in HITLER'S promises after the Munich agreement and with respect to the Polish Corridor. The first time RUNDSTEDT became aware of the danger of war was in May 1939, when he was ordered to command an Army group in case war should break out. Blaskowitz's statement (Affidavit No. 5, 3706-PS, USA Exhibit 537) that general officers believed that the question of the Polish Corridor might one day lead to war, brought a firm denial from von RUNDSTEDT who said that the military leaders
he was ordered to command an Army group in case war should break out. Blaskowitz's statement (Affidavit No. 5, 3706-PS, USA Exhibit 537) that general officers believed that the question of the Polish Corridor might one day lead to war, brought a firm denial from von RUNDSTEDT who said that the military leaders believed that the Polish Corridor question could be solved peacefully. He admitted, however, in cross-examination that the regaining of former German territory had become a question of honor for many members of the German Army. Asked how he could have persisted in the belief that the Polish question could be settled peacefully in view of the increase in the Wehrmacht and of hostile propaganda towards the Poles, he replied that he believed that sufficient pressure would be exerted on Poland to induce her to part with the Corridor as a result of the Russian-German pact . Even after HITLER'S address to the military leaders on 22 August 1939 at Berghof, the witness did not think that war was unavoidable. The Generals thought that the treaty with the Russians would act as an insurance against an attack by Poland on Germany. They left this conference under the impression that they would have another "Rower war" like the entry into the Sudetenland. The military leaders, including probably von BRAUCHITSCH opposed the idea of an offensive war in the West and believed that they should wait until the enemy attacked. They did not recommend the violation of Belgian and Dutch neutrality. RUNDSTEDT said he learned of HITLER'S decision to invade Yugoslavia and Greece after the invasion had been accomplished. 116 Col. Neave Rep. The Attack on Russia In March 1941, HITLER informed the military leaders of his intention to attack Russia. This decision was contrary to the advice of the General Staff. HITLER said he had information of hostile movements on the part of the Russians through the Japanese. There were some indications that this was in fact correct when the German Army advanced into Russia, and there found new airfields and troop concentrations. Russian military maps which were captured marked out territory far into Silesia. Reactions of the General Staff to HITLER'S statements - Their views on events and major political problems When cross-examined,