dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
and the Declaration of Non-Aggression which was entered into between Germany and Poland on 26 January 1934. The German-Polish Arbitration Treaty (TC-15) declares in the preamble and Articles 1 and 2: "The president of the German Empire and the President of the Polish Republic: "Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Poland by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries; "Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for international tribunals; "Agreeing to recognize that the rights of a State cannot be modified save with its consent; "And considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause of division between States; "Have decided. . ." "Article 1: All disputes of every kind between Germany and Poland with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, as laid down hereafter." "Article 2: Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute may, by agreement between the Parties, be submitted, with a view to amicable settlement, to a permanent international commission, styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission, constituted in accordance with the present Treaty." (TC-15) Thereafter the treaty goes on to lay down the procedure for arbitration and for conciliation. Germany, however, in September 1939 attacked and invaded Poland without having first attempted to settle its disputes with Poland by peaceful means. The second specific treaty, the German-Polish Declaration of 26 January 1934, reads in part: "The German Government and the Polish Government consider that the time has come to introduce a new era in the political relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding between the States. They have therefore decided to establish by the present declaration a
Declaration of 26 January 1934, reads in part: "The German Government and the Polish Government consider that the time has come to introduce a new era in the political relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding between the States. They have therefore decided to establish by the present declaration a basis for the future shaping of those relations. "The two Governments assume that the maintenance and assurance of a permanent peace between their countries is an essential condition for general peace in Europe." "The declaration shall remain in effect for a period of ten years counting from the day of exchange of instruments of ratification. In case it is not denounced by one of the two governments six months before the expiration of that period of time, it shall continue in effect but can then be denounced by either government at a time of six months and at any time in advance." (TC-21) B. German Intentions Before March 1939. It has been previously shown that the actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia were in themselves part of the preparation for further aggression. Even at that time, before the Germans had seized the whole of Czechoslovakia, they were perfectly prepared to fight England, Poland, and France, if necessary, to achieve those aims. They appreciated the whole time that they might well have to do so. Furthermore, although not until after March 1939, did they commence upon their immediate and specific preparations for a specific war against Poland, nevertheless, they had for a considerable time before had it in mind specifically to attack Poland once Czechoslovakia was completely theirs. During this period also-and this happens throughout the whole story of the Nazi regime in Germany-as afterwards, while they were making their preparations and carrying out their plans, they were giving to the outside world assurance after assurance so as to lull them out of any suspicion of their real object. When the agreement with Poland was signed in January 1934, Hitler had this to say: "When I took over the Government on the 30th of January, the relations between the two countries seemed to me more than unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing differences which were due to the Territorial Clauses of the Treaty of
with Poland was signed in January 1934, Hitler had this to say: "When I took over the Government on the 30th of January, the relations between the two countries seemed to me more than unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing differences which were due to the Territorial Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the mutual tension resulting therefrom would gradually crystallize into a state of hostility which, if persisted, might too easily acquire the character of a dangerous traditional enmity." "In the spirit of this Treaty the German Government is willing and prepared to cultivate economic relations with Poland in such a way that here, too, the state of unprofitable suspicion can be succeeded by a period of useful cooperation. It is a matter of particular satisfaction to us that in this same year the National Socialist Government of Danzig has been enabled to effect a similar clarification of its relations with its Polish neighbor." (TC-70) That was in 1934. Three years later, again on 30 January, speaking in the Reichstag, Hitler said: "By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tension and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the European atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland which has worked out to the advantage of both sides. True statesmanship will not overlook reality but consider them. The Italian nation and the new Italian state are realities. The German nation and the German Reich are equally realities, and to my own fellow citizens I would say that the Polish nation and the Polish state have also become a reality." (2368-PS) That was on 30 January 1937. On 24 June 1937, a "Top Secret Order (C-175) was issued by the Reich Minister for War and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, signed "Von Blomberg". There is the notation at the top, "Written by an Officer. Outgoing documents in connection with this matter and dealing with it in principle are to be written by an officer." With it is enclosed a Directive for the Unified Preparation for War of the Armed Forces, to come into force on 1 August 1937. The enclosed directive is divided into Part 1, "General Guiding Principle"; Part 2, "Likely Warlike Eventualities"; Part 3, "Special Preparations". The substance of the
an officer." With it is enclosed a Directive for the Unified Preparation for War of the Armed Forces, to come into force on 1 August 1937. The enclosed directive is divided into Part 1, "General Guiding Principle"; Part 2, "Likely Warlike Eventualities"; Part 3, "Special Preparations". The substance of the document justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side. The second paragraph states: "* * * The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces. "To counter attacks at any time, and to enable the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they occur." (C-175) The preparations which are to be made are then set forth: "* * * The further working on mobilization without public announcement in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and time." "Special preparations are to be made for the following eventualities: Armed intervention against Austria; warlike entanglement with Red Spain." (C-175) Another passage shows clearly how they appreciated at that time that their actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia might well involve them in war. "* * * England, Poland, Lithuania take part in a war against us." (C-175) Part 2 of this directive, dealing with "Probable warlike eventualities-Concentrations," states: "1. War on two fronts with focal point in the West. "Suppositions. In the West France is the opponent. Belgium may side with France, either at once or later or not at all. It is also possible that France may violate Belgium's neutrality if the latter is neutral. She will certainly violate that of Luxembourg." (C-175) Part 3, which deals in part with "Special Case-Extension Red-Green," declares: "The military political starting point used as a basis for concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either England, Poland or Lithuania join on the side of our opponents. Thereupon our military position would be worsened to an unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The
Red-Green," declares: "The military political starting point used as a basis for concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either England, Poland or Lithuania join on the side of our opponents. Thereupon our military position would be worsened to an unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The political leaders will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above all England and Poland." (C-175) The date of this order is June 1937, and it seems clear that at that date, anyway, the Nazi Government appreciated the likelihood, if not the probability, of fighting England and Poland and France, and were prepared to do so. On 5 November 1937, Hitler held his conference in the Reichschancellery, the minutes of which, referred to as the Hossbach notes, contain the remarks made by Hitler in respect of England, Poland, and France: "The Fuehrer then stated: 'The aim of German policy is the security and preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space'" (386-PS) Hitler then went on to discuss what he described as "participation in world economy", and declared: "The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and movements of nations." (386-PS) "The history of all times, Roman Empire, British Empire, has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable. Neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the proprietor." (386-PS) On the same day as this Hossbach meeting in the Reichschancellery was taking place, a communiqué was being issued as a result of the Polish ambassador's audience with Hitler (TC-73 No. 33). In the course of this conversation, the communiqué stated: "It was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet with difficulty because of the Danzig question." (TC-73 No. 33) On 2 January 1938, some unknown person wrote a memorandum for the Fuehrer. This document is headed, "Very Confidential-Personal Only", and is entitled "Deduction on the report, German Embassy, London, regarding the future form of Anglo-German
should not meet with difficulty because of the Danzig question." (TC-73 No. 33) On 2 January 1938, some unknown person wrote a memorandum for the Fuehrer. This document is headed, "Very Confidential-Personal Only", and is entitled "Deduction on the report, German Embassy, London, regarding the future form of Anglo-German relations." It states in part: "With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a status quo in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an agreement will slowly disappear among Germanophile British politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arises: Will Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate camps and will they march against each other one day? To answer this question, one must realize the following: "Change of the status quo in the east in the German sense can only be carried out by force. So long as France knows that England, which so to speak has taken on a guarantee to aid France against Germany, is on her side, France's fighting for her eastern allies is probable in any case, always possible, and thus with it war between Germany and England. This applies then even if England does not want war. England, believing she must attend her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in automatically by France. In other words, peace or war between England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who could bring about such a war between Germany and England by way of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows therefore that war between Germany and England on account of France can be prevented only if France knows from the start that England's forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby France, to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-France coalition would never tolerate. "This position would arise for instance if England, through insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by a superior coalition of powers, e. g., Germany, Italy, Japan, thereby tying down her military forces in other places, would not be able to assure France of sufficient
would never tolerate. "This position would arise for instance if England, through insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by a superior coalition of powers, e. g., Germany, Italy, Japan, thereby tying down her military forces in other places, would not be able to assure France of sufficient support in Europe." The writer goes on to discuss the possibility of a strong partnership between Italy and Japan, and then reaches a summary: "Paragraph five: Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us. "1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard to the protection of the interests of our friends. "2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say, a tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan; also the winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours directly or indirectly. "Close and confidential cooperation of the diplomats of the three great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way can we confront England be it in a settlement or in war. England is going to be a hard, astute opponent in this game of diplomacy. "The particular question whether in the event of a war by Germany in central Europe France and thereby England would interfere, depends on the circumstances and the time at which such a war commences and ceases, and on military considerations which cannot be gone into here." (TC-75) Whoever it was who wrote that document, appears to have been on a fairly high level, because he concludes by saying, "I should like to give the Fuehrer some of these viewpoints verbally." (TC-75) On 20 February 1938, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag. In that speech he said: "In the fifth year following the first great foreign political agreement with the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to state that in our relations with the state with which we had had perhaps the greatest difference, not only has there been a 'detente,' but in the course of the years there has been a constant improvement in relations. This good work, which was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that since the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to
only has there been a 'detente,' but in the course of the years there has been a constant improvement in relations. This good work, which was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that since the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new commissioner, this most dangerous spot from the point of view of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State respects the national conditions in this state, and both the city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to an understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which beginning with Danzig has today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly cooperation. "To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of us-peace." (2357-PS) A memorandum dated 2 May 1938, and entitled, "Organizational Study 1950," originated in the office of the Chief of the Organizational Staff of the General Staff of the Air Force. Its purpose was said to be: "The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly-conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization of the Air Force." (L-43). The result gained is termed, "Distant Objective." From this is deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the process, which is called, "Final Objective 1942." This in turn yields what is considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of the staffs of the Air Force Group Commands, Air Gaus, Air Divisions, etc. (L-43) The Table of Contents is divided into various sections. Section I is entitled, "Assumptions." In connection with the heading "Assumption I, frontier of Germany", a map is enclosed (Chart No. 10). The map shows that on 2 May 1938 the Air Force was in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, all of which are shown as within the boundaries of the Reich. The following is a pertinent extract from the
I, frontier of Germany", a map is enclosed (Chart No. 10). The map shows that on 2 May 1938 the Air Force was in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, all of which are shown as within the boundaries of the Reich. The following is a pertinent extract from the memorandum: "Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in Section 1: "1. Attack Forces: Principal adversaries: England, France, and Russia." (L-43) The study then goes on to show all the one hundred forty-four Geschwader employed against England, very much concentrated in the Western half of the Reich; that is to say, they must be deployed in such a way that by making full use of their range, they can reach all English territory down to the last corner. Under the paragraph "Assumption" double heading 2, the "Organization of Air Force in peacetime" is shown and seven group commands are indicated: (1) Berlin; (2) Brunswick; (3) Munich; (4) Vienna; (5) Budapest; (6) Warsaw; and (7) Koenigsberg. (L-43) Finally, the study declares: "The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air Force grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have locally bound commands * * *" (L-43) The original of this document is signed by an officer who is not at the top rank in the German Air Force, and the inferences that can be drawn from it should therefore not be over-emphasized. At least, however, it shows the lines upon which the General Staff of the Air Force were thinking at that time. On the 26 August 1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister succeeding von Neurath, a document was addressed to him as "The Reich Minister, via the State Secretary." The document reads as follows: "The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem, might easily, but must not lead to a conflict with the Entente. Neither France nor England are looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she should, without direct foreign interference and through internal signs of disintegration, due to her own faults, suffer the fate she deserves. This process, however, would have to take place step by step and would have to lead to
trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she should, without direct foreign interference and through internal signs of disintegration, due to her own faults, suffer the fate she deserves. This process, however, would have to take place step by step and would have to lead to a loss of power in the remaining territory by means of a plebiscite and an annexation of territory. "The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly. Germany cannot fix any definite time and this fruit could be plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the desired developments. "For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at present of the right for autonomy of the Sudeten-Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to now, is to be taken up gradually. The international conviction that the choice of nationality was being withheld from these Germans will do useful spadework, notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may not be finally speeded up by the mechanical means as well. The fate of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet be clearly decided by this, but would nevertheless be definitely sealed. "This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of boundaries in the southeast and their transfer to the east and northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact [is] that after the liquidation of the Czech question, it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in turn. "But the later this assumption sinks in in international politics as a firm factor the better. In this sense, however, it is important for the time being, to carry on the German policy, under the well known and proved slogans of 'the right to autonomy' and 'Racial unity'. Anything else might be interpreted as pure imperialism on our part and create the resistance to our plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically, than our forces