dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON NEURATH: Mr. President, I shall try to be very brief in coming to this period of time, the withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference. The negotiations, as I said, dragged on the whole year, into the summer of 1933. In the fall there was again a Disarmament Conference session in which the same subject was more or less debated over again. Well, the result of this conference was that disarmament was definitely refused by the Western Powers and that was the reason why we then first of all withdrew from the Disarmament Conference, since we considered useful work there no longer possible. Following this, we also withdrew from the League of Nations, since we had witnessed its failure in the most widely different fields. And so, quite briefly, that brings us up to the point which caused us to withdraw from the League of Nations. The reasons which caused us to do so at that time I have discussed explicitly in a speech which my defense counsel can perhaps submit.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What date do you mean, Herr Von Neurath?
VON NEURATH: October 1933-16 October, a speech to the foreign press. In this speech I said that the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations by no means meant that Germany refused to take part in any negotiations or discussions, especially with the Western Powers.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, this speech is the excerpt on Page 59 in my document book. Since it is essentially the same thing that Herr Von Neurath has just stated, except that it is in more detail, I am prepared to forego reading the actual excerpt, as I had intended to do. In this connection I must call attention to the documents which I have submitted for this entire period of time which we have rather skipped over, so that they will at least provide a picture of how things had gradually come to a head by the middle of October. In this connection I should like to refer to Document Neurath-56, a speech by Herr Von Neurath to the foreign press; then Hitler's appeal to the German people, Number Neurath-58; to the document just quoted, Number Neurath-59; to the German memorandum on the question of armament and equal rights of 18 December 1933, Document Neurath-61; Number Neurath-62, an interview with Herr Von Neurath by the Berlin representative of The New York Times on 29 December 1933; the German answer to the French memorandum of 1 January 1934, Number Neurath-64 in my Document Book 3; the German memorandum of 13 March 1934, Number Neurath-67; the speech of the President of the Disarmament Conference, Sir Nevile Henderson, of 10 April 1934, Number Neurath-68; and finally, the aide-memoire of the Reich Government to the British Disarmament memorandum of 16 April, Number Neurath-69. I have just been informed that I gave the wrong first name. That was Arthur Henderson. [Turning to the defendant.] In the middle of April 1934 a very important event occurred. Will you comment on this; for this declaration, this note, caused a complete volte-face , a change in European politics.
VON NEURATH: This was a French note which was addressed to the British Government as an answer to a British inquiry and to a German memorandum of 13 March 1934, which had dealt with the continuation of the negotiations. The details are contained in this speech to the Berlin press which has just been cited. With this French note, however, the efforts to come to a settlement in the disarmament question again failed because of the French Government's "no."
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I should like to refer to various documents on this, which I have submitted in my Document Book 3; Number Neurath-66, an excerpt from a speech by the Belgian Premier, Count Broqueville, of March 1934; an excerpt from the diary of Ambassador Dodd, Number Neurath-63; then Number Neurath-70, an excerpt from the note of the French Government, which was just mentioned, to the British Government on 17 April 1934; the speech of Foreign Minister Von Neurath, the defendant, to representatives of the Berlin press, in which he commented on this French note, Number Neurath-74 in my document book; finally, an excerpt from the speech of the American delegate at the Disarmament Conference, Norman Davis, of 29 May 1934. In these the sudden change in European politics which I have just alluded to...
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give the number of that?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The last one, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Number Neurath-76.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; go on.
VON NEURATH: I think that before I answer this question, I might perhaps comment on something else. The Prosecution showed me a speech by Hitler on 23 September 1939 to the commanders of the Army, in which he speaks of the political and organizational measures which preceded the war.
THE PRESIDENT: You say that was on 23 September?
VON NEURATH: 23 September 1939. The Prosecution sees in the mention of the withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference a sign of aggressive intentions which were already in existence at that time, and reproaches me with this. As I have repeatedly emphasized, up to 1937 there had never been any talk at any time of any aggressive intentions or preparations for a war of aggression. The speech mentioned by the Prosecution was made by Hitler 6 years after these events and 18 months after my resignation as Foreign Minister. It is clear that to a man like Hitler these events, at such a moment, after the victorious termination of the Polish war, appeared different from what they had actually been. These events, however, cannot be judged afterwards, that is, before the date of the speech, any more than German foreign policy can be judged today, but they must be regarded from the point of view prevailing at the time at which they took place. And now in answer to your question: In my opinion the reasons lie, first of all, more or less in the fact that the course of the preceding diplomatic negotiations had shown that England and Italy no longer stood unconditionally behind France and were no longer willing to support France's strictly antagonistic attitude toward the question of equal rights for Germany. The same point of view was held by the neutral states-Denmark, Spain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland-in a note addressed to the Disarmament Conference on 14 April 1934. Therefore, at the time France apparently feared being isolated and thus falling into the danger of not being able to maintain her refusal to undergo any form of disarmament. I myself commented in detail on this attitude on the part of France, from the German point of view, in my aforementioned speech to the German press on 27 April 1934, I believe.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What were the further consequences of this French note of 17 April, as far as the attitude of French foreign policy was concerned?
VON NEURATH: Just a few days after this note the French Foreign Minister, M. Louis Barthou, undertook a trip to the East, to Warsaw and Prague. As was soon apparent, the purpose of this trip to Poland and Czechoslovakia was to prepare the ground for a resumption of diplomatic relations between these countries, and the other countries of the so-called "Little Entente," and, the Soviet Union and thus to smooth the way for the inclusion of Russia as a participant in European politics. Barthou's efforts were successful. Poland as well as Czechoslovakia and Romania resumed diplomatic relations with Russia. On a second trip Barthou was able to get the agreement of all the states of the Little Entente to the Eastern pact proposed by France and Russia.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Were not negotiations undertaken at the same time for an Eastern pact which later also proved to be an instrument directed against Germany?
VON NEURATH: Yes. I just mentioned it. An Eastern pact was worked out and presented which we would have accepted, as far as the basic principle was concerned, but which then came to naught because we were supposed to undertake obligations which we could not keep, namely an obligation to give aid in all cases of conflict which might arise among the Eastern nations. We were in no position to do this, and thus the Eastern pact came to naught.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: May I, in connection with the statements just made, refer to three documents in my Document Book 3; Number Neurath-72, an official communiqué on- 24 April 1934 about the Warsaw discussions of the French Foreign Minister; Number Neurath-73, an official communiqué about the Prague discussions of the French Foreign Minister on 27 April 1934; and an excerpt from a speech of the French Foreign Minister of 30 May 1934, Number Neurath-77. What was your further policy after the rather abrupt breaking off of negotiations caused by this French note?
VON NEURATH: We tried first of all by means of negotiations with the individual powers to bring about permanent and real peace on the basis of the practical recognition of our equal rights and general understanding with all peoples. I had given the German missions abroad the task of carrying on talks to this effect with the respective governments. In order to get negotiations going again, Hitler had decided to accept an invitation from Mussolini for a friendly talk in Venice. The purpose of this meeting, as Mussolini later said, was to attempt to disperse the clouds which were darkening the political horizon of Europe. A few days after his return from Venice Hitler made an important speech in which he reaffirmed Germany's desire for peace.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like in this connection to refer to my Document Number Neurath-80 in Document Book 3, which is an excerpt from this Hitler speech in Gera on 17 June 1934-only the part of interest from the foreign political point of view, of course. Would you like to break off now, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, the Tribunal hopes that on Monday, when you continue, you will be able to deal in less detail with this political history, which, of course, is very well known to everyone who has lived through it, and particularly to the Tribunal who have heard it all gone into before here.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I shall endeavor to do so, Mr. President. [The Tribunal adjourned until 24 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath, I have been told, and I also heard it on the radio, that yesterday apparently a mistake arose, possibly due to poor translation, regarding your activity from 1903 to 1914. Perhaps you can repeat it, for I believe that the Court also misunderstood your statement.
VON NEURATH: It probably concerns my stay in London. From 1903 to 1907 I was in London, and after that I was in the Foreign Office in Berlin.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Then we will continue the presentation of your policy as Foreign Minister. I should like to ask the following questions: In the fact that during your period of office as Foreign Minister, in the spring of 1935, general rearmament was begun, compulsory military service was reintroduced, and the Luftwaffe was created, the Prosecution sees proof of your guilt in the alleged conspiracy against peace. Will you comment on this?
VON NEURATH: First, I should like to emphasize that there was no question of war plans in Germany in this year and in the following years. I am also perfectly convinced that at that time neither Hitler nor his entourage had any aggressive plans, or even considered any aggressive plans, for that would not have been possible without my knowing about it. Rearmament as such involves no threat to peace unless it is decided to use the newly made weapons for purposes other than defense. There was no such decision and no such preparation at that time. The same charge of preparations for aggressive war could be held against all the neighboring states of Germany, who were rearming in precisely...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Dr. Von Ludinghausen, this is argument, not evidence.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must hear how things appeared to him. Decisions for action can only be excused if I explain... z4 June 46
THE PRESIDENT: No, we are not prepared to hear argument in the course of evidence. It is evidence for him to say that there were no plans made at that time for offensive action, but it is argument to say that rearmament does not necessarily involve offensive action. We do not desire to hear argument at this stage.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes. Then please answer the question once more, whether there were in fact no plans to use the weapons created by rearmament for any aggressive purposes or for other violent action?
VON NEURATH: That is what I just said. I do not believe I need repeat it.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What reasons were there, what facts, which made the situation of Germany appear particularly perilous?
VON NEURATH: At that time Germany could not help feeling she was encircled by her highly armed neighbors. Russia and France had concluded a mutual assistance pact which could only be called a military alliance. It was immediately followed by a similar treaty between Russia and Czechoslovakia. According to her own statements, Russia had increased the peacetime strength of her army by more than half. How strong it actually was could not be ascertained. In France, under the leadership of Petain, efforts were being made to strengthen the Army considerably. Already in 1934 Czechoslovakia had introduced 2-year military service. On 1 March 1935 France issued a new defense law, which also increased the period of military service. This whole development, which had come about in a few months, could only be considered as an immediate threat. Germany could no longer be a defenseless and inactive spectator. In view of these facts the decision which Hitler then made to reintroduce compulsory military service and gradually to build up an army of 36 divisions was not an act which seriously threatened the neighboring countries bound together by alliances.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to ask you to take judicial notice of the following documents in my document book: Number 87, a document on the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations of 18 September 1934, in Document Book 3. Number 89, also in Document Book 3, is a statement of the reporter of the Army Committee of the French Chamber, of 23 November 1931, on the entente with Russia. Number 91, in Document Book 3, is the Russian-French Protocol to the Eastern Pact negotiations of 5 December 1934.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I should like to say that Document 89 has not been submitted to us as yet. Therefore, it has not been possible to examine this document and to say whether or not this document is relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: When you get the book you will have the right to object to the document, if necessary. Dr. Von Ludinghausen is only telling us what documents he contends support the evidence which has just been given, that is all. He is offering these documents in evidence, and as soon as you get the book and can scrutinize the document, you will have the opportunity of making an objection to its admissibility.
M. DEBENEST: That is exactly the point, Mr. President. I wished to reserve for myself the right to do that.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we agree with you.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Then comes Document 92, in Document Book 3, the call to the Army made by the President of the Czechoslovakian Republic on 28 December 1934. In Document Book 3, Number 96 is the French Government declaration of 15 March 1935. In Document Book 3, Number 79 is a report of the Czech Minister in Paris, Osusky, of 15 June 1934. Document 101 is the Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact of 2 May 1935. Document 94 is an excerpt from the speech of the French President, Flandin, to the French Chamber on 5 February 1935. I ask you to take judicial notice of these documents. [Turning to the defendant.] Was Germany's decision to rearm intended to mean that she would discontinue all further co-operation in international efforts to limit general rearmament?
VON NEURATH: No, by no means. An English inquiry as to whether Germany would be ready to continue to participate in general disarmament negotiations in the same manner and to the same extent as laid down in the so-called London Communiqué of February 1935 was immediately answered in the affirmative. On 18 March-that is, 2 days after the introduction of military service-the Embassy in London was instructed to resume negotiations and, in particular, to suggest an agreement to limit the strength of the Navy. In May 1935 Hitler made a speech to the Reichstag, in which he expounded a concrete German plan for peace. He emphasized particularly the German will for peace, and again declared himself willing to co-operate in any system of international agreements for the maintenance of peace, even collective agreements. The only condition he made, and this he had always done, was the recognition of Germany's equal rights. He also declared himself willing to Z4 June 46 rejoin the League of Nations. By so doing he wanted to prove that Germany, in spite of the conclusion of military alliances which she felt to be a threat, and our own rearmament, continued to desire peace.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I wish to ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the following documents in my Document Book 3: Number 95, answer of the Reich Government of 15 February 1935, to the so-called London Communiqué. Number 97, an excerpt from the appeal of the Reich Government of 16 March 1935, for the reintroduction of the German military service. Number 98 is the communiqué of 26 March 1935 on the talks of the British Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, and the Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Eden, with the Reich Government. Number 102 is the communiqué of 15 May 1935 on the speech of Foreign Minister Laval in Moscow. Number 104, Hitler's speech of 21 May 1935 on the Russian-French Pact. Number 105, the note of the Reich Government of 25 May 1935 to the signatory powers of the Locarno Treaty. [Turning to the defendant.] Did the German efforts and willingness to negotiate have any success?
VON NEURATH: Yes; they led to the conclusion Of the first and only agreement to limit armaments which was actually put into effect on the basis of the German proposals by the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June 1935. Of course, I would have preferred it if the negotiations with all countries concerning proposals for armament limitation had been successful. Nevertheless, this agreement between only two states was warmly welcomed by us as the first step in this direction. We know that at least England held aloof from the decision of the League of Nations stating that Germany had broken the Versailles Treaty by rearming. The German step was thus recognized as justified.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to ask the Court to take judicial notice of two documents from my Document Book 3: Document Number 106 is a statement by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, over the British radio on 19 June 1935. The second is Document Number 119, an excerpt from the statement of the Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty, Mr. Shakespeare, in the House of Commons on the occasion of the ratification of the London Naval Agreement on 20 July 1936. [Turning to the defendant.] Was German activity in the direction of disarmament limited to the German-English Naval Agreement?
VON NEURATH: No; our willingness to co-operate in a positive way for the limitation of armaments, which had been declared by us on many occasions, also found expression in the negotiations for disarmament in the air. Right from the outset, as early as 1933, Hitler had stressed the importance of this point for the maintenance of peace. Germany was ready to accept any limitation, and even the complete abolition of air armament, if it was done on a reciprocal basis. But only England reacted to such suggestions. The difficulty was to persuade France to participate in the negotiations. She did this only after 3 months through the efforts of England. But France stipulated conditions which made it practically impossible for these negotiations to succeed. Apart from a general agreement embracing all European states, special bilateral agreements were to be permitted. In addition, the continuation of negotiations on air armament was to be made dependent on negotiations concerning the Eastern Pact. Germany could not participate in this Eastern Pact, since she would have had to assume military obligations whose consequences could not be foreseen. Owing to this and the outbreak of the Italian-Abyssinian war, which brought the differences among the Western Powers into the open, the negotiations came to a standstill.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: One year later, in March 1936, the Rhineland was reoccupied by German troops. The Prosecution see in this a breach of the Locarno Treaty and further proof of your coresponsibility in the alleged conspiracy against peace. Will you please comment on this?
VON NEURATH: This assertion is completely untrue. There was no decision or plan to wage aggressive war any more than there had been the year before. The restoration of full sovereignty in all parts of the Reich had no military, but only political significance. The occupation of the Rhineland was carried out with only one division and this fact alone shows that it had only a purely symbolic character. It was clear that a great and industrious people would not tolerate forever such a drastic limitation of its sovereignty as had been imposed by the Versailles Treaty. It was simply a dynamic development which the leaders of German foreign policy could not oppose.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did the reoccupation of the Rhineland take place according to a plan which had been made some time beforehand, or was the decision spontaneous?
VON NEURATH: It was one of those sudden decisions of Hitler which was to be carried out within a few days.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What were the events which led to this immediate decision?
VON NEURATH: On 16 January 1936, the French Foreign Minister, M. Laval, announced that after his return from Geneva he would present the Russian-French Pact to the French Chamber for ratification. The fact that Hitler, in an interview with M. de Jouvenel, the correspondent of the reputable French paper Paris Midi , while pointing out the dangers of this pact, once again held out his hand to France in an attempt to bring about an honorable and permanent understanding between the two peoples, was of no avail. I had previously discussed this interview in detail with Hitler, and I received the definite impression that he was absolutely serious in his desire for a permanent reconciliation of the two peoples. But this attempt also was in vain. The strong opposition to the pact from large portions of the French people, under the leadership of the Union Nationale des Combattants , and in Parliament itself could not prevent the French Government from ratifying the pact. The voting took place on 27 February 1936 in the French Chamber.