dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
WAGNER: Yes. I have said already that we had decided, after consulting with the Foreign Office, to adhere strictly to the London Agreement until we had proof that English merchant shipping was navigated militarily and was being used for military purposes. Here we are apparently concerned solely with information, with an exchange of opinions with the Foreign Office...
COL. PHILLIMORE: I did not ask for your general view on the document. We can read that for ourselves. Your object was to terrorize the small neutrals and frighten them from sailing on their ordinary lawful occasions. Is that not right?
WAGNER: No.
COL.PHILLIMORE: And is that not why in the orders you issued in January of 1940 you excepted the larger countries from this "sink at sight" risk? Would you look at Document C-21. That is GB-194, at Page 30 of the Prosecution document book in English; Pages 59 and 60 in the German. Now, just look at the second entry on Page 5, 2 January 1940: "Report by IA." That is you, is it not? That was you, was it not?
WAGNER: Yes, but I cannot find the point which you are quoting.
COL.PHILLIMORE: Page 5 of the original, under the date of 2 January 1940. Report by IA on directive of Armed Forces High Command, dated 30 December, referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in connection with Case Yellow: "Through this directive the Navy will authorize, simultaneously with the beginning of the general intensification of the war, the sinking by U-boats without any warning of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for external consumption, the use of mines should be simulated. The behavior of, and use of weapons by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose." That has nothing to do with the arming of British merchant ships. That is not the reason that is given, is it? The reason is because it fitted in with your operations for Case Yellow.
WAGNER: I did not understand the last sentence.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You do not give as your reason that the British were arming their merchant ships. The reason you give is that it was necessary in connection with intensified measures for Case Yellow. Why is that?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The German translation is so inadequate that it is almost impossible to understand the question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will put the question to you again. The excuse for this directive is to be the intensification of measures in connection with Case Yellow. You notice, do you not, that nothing is said about the arming of British merchant ships as justifying this step? That is correct, is it not?
WAGNER: May I have time, please, to peruse these papers first?
COL.PHILLIMORE: Certainly. This was written by yourself, you know.
WAGNER: No, that was not written by me. This measure really came within the warning which was given to the neutrals on 24 November 1939.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Nothing is said about the warning of 24 November. If you were entitled, as you have told us, under that to sink neutral ships, there would not be any need for this special directive, would there?
WAGNER: No.
COL.PHILLIMORE: No. Now, let us just...
WAGNER: For military and political reasons we ordered that a hit by a mine was to be simulated, and that is a special point of this order.
COL.PHILLIMORE: And just before we leave that document, have a look at the entry on 18 January, will you? Have you got it? 18 January.
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: That is the actual order for sinking without warning. You notice the last sentence: "Ships of the United States, Italy, Japan, and Russia are exempted from these attacks." And then Spain is added in pencil Is it not right that you were out to terrorize the small neutrals and to bully them, but you were not running any risks with the big ones?
WAGNER: No, that is not correct. The explanation is, of course, that one must take military disadvantages into the bargain if one can obtain political advantages for them.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Oh, yes, it was just entirely a question of how it paid you politically. That is ail it was, was it not?
WAGNER: Of course, all military actions were strongly influenced by the political interests of one's own country.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And because the Danes and the Swedes were not in any position to make any serious protest, it did not matter sinking their ships at sight. That is right, is it not?
WAGNER: The motivation you give to this conduct is entirely incorrect.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, but what is the difference?
WAGNER: We sank the ships of all neutrals in these areas with the exception of those countries where we had a special political interest.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, you had no special political interest at this time for Norway and Sweden and Denmark, so you sank their ships at sight. That is right, is it not?
WAGNER: We sank them because they entered this area despite warning.
COL.PHILLIMORE: Yes, but if a Russian ship or a Japanese ship did that, you would not sink it.
WAGNER: No, not at that period of time.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I just want to show you what you actually did. Would you look at Documents D-846 and 847? My Lord, they are two new documents. They will be GB-452 and 453. [Turning to the witness.] Will you look at the first of these, that is D-846? That is a telegram from your Minister at Copenhagen, dated 26 September 1939. That is before your first warning and before any of these zones had been declared. The second sentence: "Sinking of Swedish and Finnish ships by our submarines has caused great anxiety here about Danish food transports to England." You see, you had started sinking ships of the small neutrals right away in the first three weeks of the war, had you not?
WAGNER: In single cases, yes; but there was always a very special reason in those cases. I know that several incidents occurred with Danish and Swedish ships in which ships had turned against the U-boat and the U-boat in turn because of this resistance was forced to attack the ship.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You do not think it was because the blame could be put upon mines?
WAGNER: At this period not at all.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at the second telegram, if you would; 26 March 1940, again from the German Minister at Copenhagen. It is the first paragraph: "The King of Denmark today summoned me to his presence in order to tell me what a deep impression the sinking of six Danish ships last week, apparently without warning, had made on him and on the whole country." And then, passing on two sentences: "I replied that the reason why the ships sank had not yet been clarified. In any case, our naval units always kept strictly to the Prize Regulations; but vessels sailing in enemy convoy or in the vicinity of the convoy took upon themselves all the risks of war. If there were any cases of sinking without warning, it seemed that they could be traced back to the German notifications made to date. "At the same time I stressed the danger of the waters around the British coast, where neutral shipping would inevitably be involved in compromising situations on account of measures taken by the British. The King assured me emphatically that none of the Danish ships had sailed in convoy, but it would probably never be possible subsequently to clear up without possibility of doubt the incidents which had led to the sinking." Have you any doubt that those six ships were sunk deliberately under your sink-at-sight policy?
WAGNER: Without checking the individual cases, I cannot answer this question; but I am of the opinion that possibly these ships were sunk in that area off the English coast where, because of heavy military defenses, there would no longer be any question of open sea.
COL.PHILLIMORE: Very well. We will come to an incident where I think I can supply you with the details. Would you look at Document D-807? My Lord, that is a new document, it becomes GB-454. [Turning to the witness.] You seal this document is dated 31 January 1940; and it refers to the sinking of three neutral ships, the Deptford, the Thomas Walton, and the Garoufalia. The document is in three parts. It first sets out the facts as they were known to you. The second part is a note to the Foreign Office, and the third is a draft reply for your Foreign Office to send to the neutral governments; and if you look at the end of the document you will see "IA"; it emanates from your department. "It is proposed in replying to Norwegian notes to admit only the sinking by a German U-boat of the steamship Deptford, but to deny the sinking of the two other steamers." Would you follow it. "According to the data attached to the notes presented by the Norwegian Government, the grounds for suspecting a torpedo to have been the cause of the sinkings do in fact appear to be equally strong in all these cases. According to the Norwegian Foreign Minister's speech of 19 January, the suspicion in Norway of torpedoing by a German U-boat appears, however, to be strongest in the case of the steamship Deptford, whereas in the other two cases it is at least assumed that the possibility of striking mines can be taken into account; this is considered improbable in the case of the steamship Deptford, because other vessels had passed the same spot. "The possibility that the steamship Thomas Walton struck a mine can be supported, since the torpedoing occurred towards evening and nothing was observed, and also because several explosions took place in the same area owing to misses by torpedoes. "In the case of the steamship Garoufalia, a denial appears expedient, if only because a neutral steamer is concerned, which was attacked without warning. Since it was attacked by means of an electric torpedo, no torpedo wake could be observed." Do you say in the face of that that you did not deceive the neutrals?
COL.PHILLIMORE: That is the advice you were giving to the Defendant Raeder as his staff officer, is it not?
WAGNER: This memorandum did not emanate from me; it emanated from "Iia."
COL. PHILLIMORE: Where does it originated
WAGNER: That is the assistant of the expert on international law.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You would not have seen it?
WAGNER: I do not recall this document.
COL.PHILLIMORE: Why do you say it emanated from "Iia?" It has "Ia" at the end of it.
WAGNER: If this memorandum was dispatched then I also saw it...
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will just read the next part of the note to remind you. "The following facts have thus been ascertained:"-this is what you are writing to the Foreign Office- "The steamer Deptford was sunk by a German U-boat on 13 December..." I am sorry. I should have started earlier. "It is suggested that Norwegian notes regarding the sinking of the steamships Deptford, Thomas Walton, and Garoufalia be answered somewhat in the following manner: "As a result of the communication from the Norwegian Government, the matter of the sinking of the steamships Deptford, Thomas Walton, and Garoufalia has been thoroughly investigated. The following facts have thus been ascertained: "The steamer Deptford was sunk by a German U-boat on 13 December, as it was recognized as an armed enemy ship. According to the report of the U-boat commander, the sinking did not take place within territorial waters but immediately outside. The German Naval Forces have strict instructions not to undertake any war operations within neutral territorial waters. Should the U-boat commander have miscalculated his position, as appears to be borne out by the findings of the Norwegian authorities, and should Norwegian territorial waters have been violated in consequence, the German Government regret this most sincerely. As a result of this incident, the German Naval Forces have once again been instructed unconditionally to respect neutral territorial waters. If a violation of Norwegian territorial waters has indeed occurred, there will be no repetition of it. "As far as the sinking of the steamships Thomas Walton and Garoufalia is concerned, this cannot be traced to operations by German U-boats, as at the time of the sinking none of them were in the naval area indicated." And then there is a draft reply put forward which is on very much the same lines. And you say in the face of that document that the German Navy never misled the neutrals?
WAGNER: The neutrals had been advised that in these areas dangers of war might be encountered. We were of the opinion that we were not obliged to tell them through which war measures these areas were dangerous, or through which war measures their ships were lost.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Is that really your answer to this document? This is a complete lie, is it not? You admit the one sinking that you cannot get away from. And you deny the others. You deny that there was a German U-boat anywhere near, and you are telling this Tribunal that you were justified in order to conceal the weapons you were using. Is that the best answer you can give?
WAGNER: Yes, certainly. We had no interest at all in letting the enemy know what methods we were using in this area.
COL.PHILLIMORE: You are admitting that one of them was sunk by a U-boat. Why not admit the other two as well? Why not say it was the same U-boat?
WAGNER: I assume that we were concerned with another area in which the situation was different.
COL. PHILLIMORE: What was the difference? Why did you not say, "One of our U-boats has made a mistake or disobeyed orders, and is responsible for all these three sinkings?" Or, alternatively, why did you not say, "We have given you fair warning, we are going to sink at sight anyone in this area. And what is your complaint?"
WAGNER: Obviously I did not consider it expedient.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It was considered expedient to deceive the neutrals. And you, an Admiral in the German Navy, told me you did not do that ten minutes ago. As a matter of fact, these three boats were all sunk by the same U-boat, were they not?
WAGNER: I cannot tell you that at the moment.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I say they were all sunk by U-38, and the dates of sinking were: the Depiford on 13 December, the Garoufalia on the 11th, and the Thomas Walton on the 7th. Do you dispute that?
WAGNER: I did not understand the last sentence.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you dispute those details, or do you not remember?
WAGNER: I cannot recall; but I actually believe it is impossible.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you another instance of deceiving the neutrals, and this time it was your friends, the Spanish. Would you look at C-105? My Lord, that is a new document; it becomes GB-455. It is an extract from the SKL War Diary for 19 December 1940. [Turning to the witness.] You kept the SKL War Diary yourself at that time, did you not?
WAGNER: No, I did not keep it, but I signed it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You signed it. Did you read it before you signed it?
WAGNER: The essential parts, yes.
COL.PHILLIMORE: You see, it reads: "News from the Neutrals," and it is headed "Spain": "According to a report from the naval attache, Spanish fishing vessel was sunk by a submarine of unknown nationality between Las Palmas and Cape Juby. In the rescue boats the crew was subjected to machine gun fire. Three men badly wounded. Landed at Las Palmas on 18 December. Italians suspected. (Possibility it might have been U-37)." Then on 20 December, the next day: "Commander, Submarine Fleet, will be informed of Spanish report regarding sinking of Spanish fishing vessel by submarine of unknown nationality on 16 December between Las Palmas and Cape Juby, and requested to conduct an investigation. On the responsibility of the Naval Operations Staff it is confirmed to our naval attache in Madrid that, regarding the sinking, there is no question of a German submarine." When you reported that, you thought it possible, did you not, that it might have been U-37; is that not so?
WAGNER: It seems to me that in the meantime it became known that it was not U-37.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will read on. This is under date of 21 December: "U-37 reports: a torpedo fired at a tanker of the Kopbard type (7329) ran off in a circle and probably hit an Amphitrite submarine in the tanker's convoy. Tanker burned out. Spanish steamer St. Carlos (300) without distinguishing marks, through concentrated gunfire. Nine torpedoes left. "Then U-37 torpedoed French tanker Rhone and the sub marine Sfax and sank the Spanish fishing vessel." And then, if you will read the next entry. "We shall continue to maintain to the outside world that there is no question of a German or Italian submarine in the sea area in question being responsible for the sinkings." Do you still say that you did not deceive the neutrals?
WAGNER: This case is doubtless a deception, but I do not remember for what particular reason this deception was carried through.
COL. PHILLIMORE: But it is pretty discreditable, is it not? Do you regard that as creditable to the German Navy, that conduct?
WAGNER: No, this...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did the Defendant Raeder sign the War Diary?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL.PHILLIMORE: Did you tell the Defendant Doenitz what answer you were giving to the Spaniards and the Norwegians?
WAGNER: That I do not recall.
COL.PHILLIMORE: He would get a copy, would he not?
WAGNER: I did not understand you.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You would send him a copy, would you not, of your note to the Foreign Office?
WAGNER: That is possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, does the signature of the Defendant Raeder appear at the end of this document, C-105?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I regret to say I have not checked that. But as the witness has said, the practice was that he was to sign the War Diary, and that the Commander-in-Chief was to sign it periodically. Is that right, Witness?
WAGNER: Yes. On the next page, on 21 December my signature appears as well as those of Admiral Fricke, Admiral Schniewind, and Admiral Raeder.
DR.SIEMERS: Mr. President, I would be very grateful to the Prosecution if the documents which concern the Defendant Raeder would also be given to me, for it is relatively difficult for me to follow the situation otherwise. I have received none of these documents.
COL.PHILLIMORE: I am extremely sorry, My Lord. That is my fault, and I will see that Dr. Siemers has the copies tonight.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now at this point until tomorrow morning. [The Tribunal adjourned until 14 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember the sinking of the Monte Corbea in September 1942?
WAGNER: I have some recollection of it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: That was the ship in respect to which the Defendant Doenitz sent a telegram to the U-boat commander, threatening him. with court-martial on his return because he had sunk the ship after recognizing it as a neutral. Now, in 1942 the friendship of Spain was very important to Germany, was it not?
WAGNER: I assume so.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You told us yesterday that Admiral Raeder vitas considering Mediterranean policy-recommending it. Now that was the reason, was it not, why the U-boat commander was threatened with court-martial, that it mattered in 1942 if you sank a Spanish ship?
WAGNER: No, that was not the reason. The reason was that the commander of the U-boat in question had obviously not acted according to the directives of the Commander of U-boats.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It did not matter in 1940 when you thought you were winning the war, but in September 1942 I suggest to you it became politically inexpedient to sink a Spanish ship; is that not right?
WAGNER: You will have to ask the political departments of the German Reich about that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: If that is the answer, do you think it is unfair to describe your attitude to the sinking of neutral ships as cynical and opportunist?
WAGNER: No, I reject that absolutely.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I want to ask you one or two questions about the witness Heisig. You spoke yesterday of a conversation in the jail here in the first week of December 1945.
WAGNER: In December 1945?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. You knew at the time you spoke to Heisig that he was going to be called as a witness, did you not?
WAGNER: That could be assumed from his presence here at Nuremberg.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And you knew you revere going to be called as a witness, did you not?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not tell the defense lawyers about this conversation until quite recently?
WAGNER: I did not understand the sense of your question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not report this conversation with Heisig to the defense lawyers until quite recently?
WAGNER: I think it was in February or March when I told the Defense Counsel about this conversation.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now I just want to put the dates to you. The U-boat Commander Eck was sentenced to death on 20 October. Do you know that?
WAGNER: I did not know the date.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Death sentence was passed by the Commission on 21 November and he was executed on 30 November. That is to say he was executed before you had this conversation. Did you know that?
WAGNER: No. I just discovered that now.
COL. PHILLIMORE: At any rate, the witness Heisig knew it before he gave his evidence, did he not?
WAGNER: Obviously not. Otherwise, he would most likely have told me about it. Previously, he had for 10 days...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you just listen to a question and answer from his cross-examination. It is Page 2676 of the transcript (Volume V, Page 227). This is a question by Dr. Kranzbuehler: "In your hearing on 27 November were you not told that the death sentence against Eck and Hoffmann had already been set?" Answer: "I do not know whether it was on 27 November. I know only that here I was told of the fact that the death sentence had been carried out. The date I cannot remember. I was in several hearings." Now if that is right...
THE PRESIDENT: What date was that evidence given?
COL. PHILLIMORE: That was given on 14 January, My Lord; Page 2676 of the transcript (Volume V, Page 227).
WAGNER: I did not understand who gave this testimony.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The witness Heisig, when he gave evidence here in Court. So that whether or not he was deceived, as you suggest, before he gave his affidavit, he at least knew the true facts before he gave evidence here to the Tribunal?
WAGNER: Then he told an untruth to me.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to ask you one question on the order of 17 September 1942. That is the order that you say you monitored in the naval war staff and saw nothing wrong with it. Did the Defendant Raeder see that order?
WAGNER: That I cannot say with certainty.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were Chief of Staff Operations at that time?
WAGNER: Yes, but one cannot expect me to remember every incident in 6 years of war.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Oh, no, but this was an important order, was it not?
WAGNER: Certainly, but there were many important orders in the course of 6 years.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you normally show an important operational order to the Commander-in-Chief?
WAGNER: It was my task to submit all important matters to the Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff, and he decided which matters were to be submitted to the Grossadmiral.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you saying that you would not have shown this to the Chief of Staff?
WAGNER: No. I am sure he had knowledge of it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Have you any doubt that this order would have been shown to Admiral Raeder?
WAGNER: That I cannot say; I do not recall whether he received it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now I want to ask one or two questions about your tasks as Admiral, Special Duties. You became Admiral, Special Duties, in June 1944, is that right?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And from then on you attended the important conferences with Admiral Doenitz and in his absence represented him, did you not?
WAGNER: I never participated in any discussions as his representative. Doenitz was represented by the Chief of the SKL.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now at that stage of the war all questions were important insofar as they affected military operations in one way or another, were they not?
WAGNER: At every stage of the war all military questions are of importance.
COL. PHILLIMORE: What I am putting to you is that at that stage of the war the importance of all questions chiefly depended on how they affected the military situation.
WAGNER: Yes, that, I imagine, one has to admit.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And during that period Germany was virtually governed by the decisions taken at the Fuehrer's headquarters, was it not?
WAGNER: Yes.