dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
KALTENBRUNNER: A conference between Buhler and myself took place. The subject was something quite different and I am asking you to let me state it clearly. The so-called uprising of Warsaw was quelled in a purely military action. I think that this fight took place under the command of the chief of the anti-partisan units, Von dem Bach-Zelewski. I do not know which fighting units he was commanding, but I must assume that there were mixed troop units of the Armed Forces and the Police. Any participation of my office in this purely military action is out of question from the start. What Himmler and the troop units did with the prisoners was naturally not reported to me. The reason why Buhler came to see me was quite a different one. Frank, I think, for 1 1/2 years or even longer, had been trying to get Hitler to employ a different policy in the Government General. Frank was in favor of increased autonomy for the Polish people. In October 1944, I think on the occasion of a Polish National holiday, Frank had been planning to announce the increase of their autonomy. Hitler's refusal, in which he was encouraged by Himmler, and also other factors, was apparent. Therefore he sent Buhler to me with the proposal that I should make suggestions through the information service to the same end, that is, the participation of the Poles in the district administration and in the high positions of the Government. I promised Buhler both these things. He went on to say, "On this occasion Frank wants a generous amnesty to be pronounced in Poland and that includes the release of the prisoners from the Warsaw uprising. Can't you help us with that?" I asked him, "Where are those prisoners?" He replied, "Himmler has, at all events, sent them to prisoner-of-war concentration camps." My answer could only have been, "Then he must have employed them in any case in the armament Industry and it will be hard to get them out from there, but I shall favor an amnesty." According to my knowledge that was the state of the case.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Would it have been possible for you to bring about a release by asserting your full influence?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, during the time I was in office, as I have repeatedly stated during interrogations before the Trial, I have received at least 1,000 individual applications for release and every single case was put before Himmler or sent to him-put before him mostly, since I put them in my report file and discussed them with Himmler during my periodical reports to him. In perhaps two thirds of all the cases I was successful to the extent that he arranged a release. But to such an extent as Frank wanted to achieve from Himmler with the help of Bubler, I never had the possibility of making a decision or of bringing about a decision; that was entirely in Himmler's hands and was determined by the policy which he and Hitler agreed upon regarding Poland.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now put before you a statement from the witness Schellenberg. On 3 January this witness stated before this Tribunal that the evacuation of the Buchenwald concentration camp had been ordered by Kaltenbrunner. "Kaltenbrunner," he said, "had stated yes, this is correct; this evacuation is due to a Fuehrer order which had been confirmed to him, Kaltenbrunner, by the Fuehrer." Can you give an explanation of this?
KALTENBRUNNER: The statement is quite definitely incorrect. It is incorrect by the mere fact that Hitler quite definitely never ordered an evacuation or a non-evacuation of concentration camps. Such an order could only originate from Himmler.
THE PRESIDENT: Was there an affidavit or did he give the evidence-Schellenberg?
DR. KAUFFMANN: It was a statement of a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: It was given in evidence, was it?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, it is a statement of a witness on 3 January.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But, then, who did actually give such an order?
KALTENBRUNNER: It could certainly have been an order only from Himmler himself. The channel of command is quite clear: Himmler, Pohl, Clucks, and the camp commandant. It is not impossible that Himmler may have given the order direct to the commandant of the camp. That I do not know.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I want to interpose a question. Did you gain knowledge of this order?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I neither heard of it nor could these orders be in any way connected with me, since I had ordered exactly the contrary regarding Mauthausen. I shall explain later why, in the case of Mauthausen, I was able to give an order for the first and only time. It has to do with the powers given to me on 19 April 1945. Until then, I never had any possibility at all of giving any such order in the name of Himmler.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In the same connection I am mentioning the statement made 3 January by the witness Berger. I read one or two sentences: "The commandant of Dachau"-says Berger-"or his deputy, telephoned about 12 o'clock and stated to me that he had received this order, that is, the order for the evacuation from Kaltenbrunner after he had been summoned by the Gauleiter of Munich, the Reich Commissioner." I ask you: Do you know anything about the evacuation of Dachau?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. This statement of Berger must be doubted quite definitely because he was the man who had been given full authority by Himmler, concerning Bavaria and all the territory west of it. That was given to him the same day I received full power regarding Austria. Therefore it would be for me. . .
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did the concentration camp at Dachau come under Berger's sphere of power just mentioned by you, or did it come under your sphere of command?
KALTENBRUNNER: Since Dachau is near Munich in Bavaria, of course it was only Berger's sphere of command.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was Dachau evacuated at all?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know; I have never been to Bavaria after 19 April.,
DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness refers to the date 23 April 1945, or a little later, he says.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I forgot about that.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Where were you at that time?
KALTENBRUNNER: On 19 April, at 3 o'clock in the morning, I left Berlin and went via Prague to Linz, my goal being Innsbruck where I wanted to meet Burckhardt's representative again. From that moment onwards, I no longer had any connection with Berlin nor did I ever set foot on Bavarian soil or give orders there. My sphere of duty stopped at the Austrian border.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How can you explain such a statement?
KALTENBRUNNER: The only way I can explain it is that this must be a mistake and if I am put face to face with Berger, I am completely convinced that it can be cleared up.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Could it have been an evacuation order bearing the signature of Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: Certainly; perfectly possible.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Among other things you have been accused by the Prosecution of having committed a crime against peace. Will you tell the Tribunal whether you did anything, and if so, what during your time of office, to bring the war to an end?
KALTENBRUNNER: I started my duty on 1 February 1943. The situation which I found in the Reich was such that on this day-to be more exact, 2 February 1943, with the case of Stalingrad-it was my conviction that the war was to be regarded as absolutely lost for Germany. The conditions which I found, coming from a completely different atmosphere, from Austria, only confirmed this point of view. I recall that I paid my inaugural visit to Under Secretary of State Luther in the Foreign Of lice-I think it was on 2 or 3 February. I talked to him from half past 11 in the morning until 2 o'clock in the afternoon, suspecting nothing. We were talking about foreign political intelligence tasks which we would have to carry out together. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon the same Under Secretary of State Luther was arrested by the Gestapo and taken to a concentration camp. I do not think I can explain with a more drastic example the situation in which I was put and how such events...
THE PRESIDENT: What is this in answer to? What is the question it is in answer to?
DR. KAUFFMANN: You ought to come to the point a little more quickly. The question was what you did to bring the war to the quickest possible end? ~
KALTENBRUNNER: I could quote a lot of factors in this connection. My first effort was in the spring of 1943; I think it was even in February 1943, when I favored a considerable alteration of the church politics in order to win the Vatican for the first peace mediations. That was my first effort in that direction.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now mention the name Dulles. Did you have direct or indirect contact with him and what was the purpose of your taking up those connections?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I was in contact with him, namely, through Hottl. Since May 1943, I won over step by step, Hottl and other Austrians who were politically in the opposition, and learned of their peace feelers directed to foreign countries. Through these channels I heard of Roosevelt's representative for central Europe. I think he was his economics expert, a Mr. Dulles, who was reported as being in Switzerland.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I want to interpose a question in that connection. What would have happened if Hitler or Himmler had heard of that attitude of yours?
KALTENBRUNNER: My order to Hottl and my knowledge of his activity was, if you interpret it strictly, high treason since the Fuehrer's views were known to me at the time. They were that there should be no contact regarding peace and no discussions about peace. Hitler changed his opinion only on 15 April 1945 in a discussion with me in the presence of a certain Wolf.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In the course of this so-called peace policy which you have described, did a representative make journeys to Switzerland so as to make contact with the so-called Mr. Dulles?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, there was a large number of journeys, and indeed not only by Hottl but by several other persons. For instance, I point out a discussion which I had with a Count Potocki, whom I asked to get in touch with such circles and forward the same information to Anglo-American circles in Switzerland.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I think we can leave this subject. In my opinion you have related the essential parts.
KALTENBRUNNER: These were not the only attempts, there were numerous others.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to your relations with the President of the Red Cross, Professor Burckhardt, and I ask you: Is it true that you had a conference with Professor Burckhardt in 1945 with the aim that camps-prisoner-of-war camps and concentration camps-should be opened to the Red Cross so that medical supplies could be taken into these camps? ~
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I tried for a long time to achieve this with Burckhardt. I was helped by the fact that he himself had asked for a meeting with Himmler. Himmler, however, did not get Hitler's permission for such a meeting because he was, at the time, the COMMANDER-in-Chief on the northern front of the Vistula River. A meeting with Burckhardt could have taken place only there at the front. I tried, therefore, to take it upon myself to arrange a meeting between Burckhardt and a responsible personality in the Reich. After a lot of ado and in spite of many difficulties I succeeded. A private meeting Burckhardt was held on 12 March.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you come to an agreement, and within this agreement was any help really given and in what manner?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, considerable help was given. An agreement was reached, according to which all foreign civilian internees, with the help of the Red Cross, were to be taken from all camps in the Reich and released to their home countries. But in the first place, by granting Burckhardt's request during these discussions I achieved the aim that the leading departments of the Reich were involved to such an extent that they could no longer detach themselves from this agreement, and I think that was my greatest success with Burckhardt.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that to get about 3,000 French and Belgian civilian internees through the front line at that time, you got in touch with General Kesselring's headquarters?
KALTENBRUNNER: I sent a wireless message to the headquarters asking that as soon as the Americans and British would agree to this, it should also be allowed by the Germans that such internees go through the fighting lines.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, he said 12 March but he did not give the year.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not understand-Yes, 12 March.
THE PRESIDENT: What year?
DR. KAUFFMANN: 1945. [Turning to the defendant.] What is the total number of people who, due to your intervention reached their homeland?
KALTENBRUNNER: You must differentiate here between two different periods: the first period before the private meeting on 12 March and the period after that.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In my opinion you can give me a brief answer to that question. The periods of time do not matter.
KALTENBRUNNER: At least 6,000 civilian internees coming from France and Belgium and all the Eastern European States including the Balkan States were included in these talks. At least 14,000 Jewish internees were handed over to the Red Cross in the town of Gunskirchen for their immediate care. This applies to the whole camp of Theresienstadt.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And finally is it correct-please answer very briefly either in the affirmative or in the negative-that because of your intervention, a special liaison department with the Red Cross was installed at Konstanz for the purpose of facilitating and carrying out this program further.
KALTENBRUNNER: A liaison department with the Red Cross was established in Lindau and at Konstanz.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough The Prosecution hold you responsible for a wireless message you are alleged to have sent to Fegelein in which it says: "Please report to the Reichsfuehrer SS and inform the Fuehrer, that all measures regarding Jews, political and concentration camp prisoners in the Protectorate, have been carried out by me personally today." I ask you: Did you send such a wireless?
KALTENBRUNNER: It did not get sent because the technical connection was not reestablished.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I did not mention a number. It was not presented in court but it is contained in the trial brief on Page 14.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it is Document 2519-PS. It was presented to the Court.
KALTENBRUNNER: The wireless message was planned-the text probably was written by the adjutant who was accompanying me. I did not write it personally and as I say, it could not be sent. On 19 April 1945 I had been given authority to act independently in accordance with the discussions with Burckhardt with reference to foreign civilian internees and regarding the entering of all camps by the Red Cross. On that occasion I stated in Hitler's and Himmler's presence that my route would be via Prague and Linz to Innsbruck and that I would pass by Theresienstadt. I said that there were not only Jewish prisoners there who were to be looked after by the Red Cross but also Czechoslovak political prisoners. I suggested that their release should also be carried out. That is the explanation for that wireless message. But not until 19 April at 6 o'clock in the evening was I given full power in this connection.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But the Prosecution might assume from that statement, and at first, rightly so, that you might also have had jurisdiction over concentration camp questions. I ask you-and please answer this question with "yes" or "no." Is it true that the powers you have mentioned as given to you on 19 April 1945 were the first powers in that sphere altogether?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I would not have needed a renewed authority at all if I had had it up to that time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In a speech Himmler made on 3 October 1943 at Posen before the Higher SS and Police Leaders, you are called Heydrich's successor. The Prosecution consider that this is a confirmation of the entire executive power and your extraordinary powers in this sphere. Does this formal expression, which was certainly used in this connection, do justice to the situation or not?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I protest strongly-I have done so during all the interrogations-against being called Heydrich's successor. If in my absence Himmler referred to me as such, or if earlier such a notice or announcement coming from him was once published in the press then this was done without my knowledge and without my wish. The first time, in connection with that press notice, there was a violent reaction to Himmler on my part. The day which you mentioned here I was ill in Berlin with an inflammation of the veins and in plaster, and therefore I did not join this discussion. Neither the extent of my power nor outward appearance permitted the slightest possibility of comparison with Heydrich. I want to say quite briefly now that to the very last day of my activity I was paid 1,820 Reichsmark, which is the salary of a general of the police, and that Heydrich's income from his office was more than 30,000 Reichsmark, not because he was. paid for a higher rank but in recognition of his completely different position. Any comparison is completely unjust.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, my next question: Is it correct that Himmler feared Heydrich and this was because Heydrich had been given too much authority from his point of view, and that for that reason he thought that by appointing you he had found the very man who would be completely safe for him, Himmler? In this connection the Prosecution have drawn a parallel between you and Heydrich, and, as I have already just said, they have described you as the second Heydrich.
KALTENBRUNNER: The relationship between Himmler and Heydrich can be characterized shortly as follows: Heydrich was by far the more intelligent of the two. He was at first an unusually docile and obedient...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, we do not want to know anything about Heydrich's intelligence. The witness has said over and over again that he was not his successor. 12 April 46.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In that case I will repeat the question which I put earlier, and which is the following: Did Himmler, by calling on you, want a man who was completely safe for him, Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: He never again wanted to give away such executive power out of his own hands to the extent that Heydrich had it. The moment Heydrich was dead, Himmler took over the entire department and after that never let the executive powers out of his hands. He had once had the experience, in the person of Heydrich, of how dangerous a Chief of the Security Police could become to him. He did not want to run that risk a second time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, what you want to say, finally, is that after Heydrich died, Himmler wanted to and did retain the whole executive power in his hands?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, another question. You stated yesterday that you learned of the conception of the so-called "final solution" only later on. In effect, such instructions went from Himmler to Heydrich and to Eichmann as early as 1941 or 1942. Is it true that you frequently met Himmler? Were you a friend of Himmler's?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is utterly wrong to call the relation between Himmler and myself friendly. Just like every other official, I was treated by him in an extremely cool and reserved manner. He was not a man who could enter into personal relationship with anyone.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It is natural to assume, if I place myself in the position of the Prosecution, that you must have had knowledge of the "final solution" and of that idea, if you met Himmler frequently. I therefore ask you again: Did not Himmler at some time put to you clearly what this "final solution" was?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, not in this form. I said yesterday that on the basis of all information which accumulated during the summer and autumn of 1943, including reports from enemy broadcasts and foreign news, I came to the conviction that the statement regarding the destruction of Jews was true, and that, thus convinced, I immediately went to see Hitler, and the next day Himmler, and complained to both of them saying that I could not for one single minute support any such action. Beginning with that moment . . .
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, well, you said so yesterday. You need not repeat it again.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, he told us that before and you told us that you would finish in an hour; you have now been nearly an hour and a half.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have only two or three questions. [Turning to the defendant] The trial brief of the Prosecution contains a statement of Schellenberg, and it runs as follows: "What am I going to do with Kaltenbrunner? He would have me completely under his thumb in that case." This is stated by Schellenberg in an affidavit, and it is supposed to have been said by Himmler. Please, will you give a very brief statement regarding the fact whether you would consider such a statement by Himmler at all probable?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not consider such a statement probable. If he did say it, then it can have been only in connection with...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that is a possible question to put to the witness.
DR. KAUFFMANN: [To the defendant.] In the trial brief a document of this kind has been presented and charged against you but, if the President does not wish that question, I shall be glad to withdraw it.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to be merely a matter of argument, and you cannot criticize this affidavit, if the affidavit Is in evidence.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the last question. I ask you whether the possibility existed that you, after you gradually became aware of conditions within the Gestapo and concentration camps, et cetera, could have brought about a change? If that possibility did exist, can you say that by staying on in your position you achieved any alleviation in this sphere and an improvement of conditions?
KALTENBRUNNER: I repeatedly asked to join troops at the front, but the most burning question which I personally had to decide was: Will conditions be thus improved, alleviated? Or will anything be changed? Or is it my personal duty in this position to do everything necessary to change all these sharply criticized conditions? Upon repeated refusals to my request to be detailed to the front, I had no other alternative than to try myself to alter a system, the ideological and legal basis of which could not be altered by me, as had been proved by all the orders issued before my time and offered in evidence here. All that I could do was to try to modify these methods while striving to have them abolished altogether.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did your conscience permit you to remain in office in spite of it?
KALTENBRUNNER: When I considered the possibility of exerting again and again influence on Hitler and Himmler and other persons, my conscience would not allow me to leave my position. I thought it my duty to take, personally, a stand against wrong.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have no further question.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [A recess was taken.]