dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I wish to make the following statement: With regard to what was mentioned. here by Defense Counsel Seidl, about the agreement allegedly seized by Soviet troops in connection with the capture of the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs -- that is, the agreement concluded in Moscow in August 1939 -- I would draw the attention of the Defense Counsel, to the newspaper in which this agreement, the German Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939, was published. That is a known fact. Insofar as other agreements are concerned, the Soviet Prosecution considers that Dr. Seidl's application for the incorporation into the record of affidavits by Friedrich Gaus should be denied, and for the following reasons: Gaus' testimony on this pact and on the history immediately preceding the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact is irrelevant. The presentation of such affidavits, which, moreover, do not shed a true light on events, can be looked upon only as an act of provocation. This is clearly borne out by the fact that Ribbentrop, himself repudiated this witness even though his affidavits describe Ribbentrop's activities, even though Defense Counsel for Hess has accepted testimonies from this witness and applied for their incorporation into the record, despite the fact that they contain no reference to Hess. On the strength of these considerations, of these circumstances, I request the Tribunal to reject the request made by Defense Counsel Seidl and to consider the question submitted by Defense Counsel Horn as being irrelevant to the matter under our consideration.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl? Do you want to say something?
DR. SEIDL: May I add something? The translation of what the Soviet Prosecutor has just said has come through incompletely. I could not make out whether General Rudenko wanted to deny altogether that such an agreement was concluded or whether he wanted only to state that the contents of this secret agreement are not relevant. In the first case, I repeat my application that the Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov be called and interrogated before this Tribunal; in the latter case, I ask to be given the opportunity here and now to submit to the Tribunal my points regarding the relevance of this secret agreement.
THE PRESIDENT: At the moment we are considering an objection to the evidence of this witness, so we won't trouble with that. The Tribunal will adjourn for a few moments. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal desires to point out to Counsel for the Defense, that there was no mention of this alleged treaty in his application for evidence to be given by the witness now in the witness box, but as the matter has now been raised the Tribunal rules that the witness may be questioned upon the matter.
DR. HORN: [To the witness.] You were speaking about the secret agreement. How did you come to know about the conclusion of this agreement?
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that what I said was wrongly translated into the Russian language. At any rate, I don't know whether it was rightly translated into the German language; but what I said was that the witness may be questioned, not that the witness may not be questioned. Is that clear to you?
DR. HORN: Thank you. I understood the question correctly. [Turning to the witness.] Taking up your previous statement about the secret agreement I should like to ask you how you came to know about the conclusion of this agreement?
FRAULEIN BLANK: Owing to illness, I could not accompany Von Ribbentrop on his two trips to Russia. I was also absent when the preparatory work for the agreements was being done. I learned of the existence of this secret agreement through a special sealed envelope which, according to instructions, was filed separately and bore an inscription something like "German-Russian secret or additional agreement."
DR. HORN: You were also responsible for filing separately these secret matters? Is this correct?
FRAULEIN BLANK: Yes.
DR. HORN: I should like to turn now to another group of questions. Did Von Ribbentrop endeavor to keep the pact with Russia in any case?
FRAULEIN BLANK: Having signed the Gernian-Russian pacts, Von Ribbentrop was, of course, interested in their being kept. Moreover, he realized fully the great danger a German-Russian war would mean for Germany; accordingly he informed and warned the Fuehrer. For this very purpose, as far as I recall, Embassy Counsellor Hilger from Moscow and Ambassador Schnurre were called to Berchtesgaden to report. Also, in the spring of 1941 Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg was again ordered to report, to back up and to corroborate and reinforce Herr Von Ribbentrop's -warnings to the Fuehrer.
DR. HORN: Do you know whether Von Ribbentrop was informed beforehand of Hitler's intent to attach Austria to the Reich?
FRAULEIN BLANK: At the time of the German march into Austria, Ambassador Von Ribbentrop, who in February had been appointed Foreign Minister, was in London on his farewell visit. There he heard to his surprise of the Anschluss of Austria. He himself had had a different idea of a solution of the Austria question, namely an economic union.
DR. HORN: Do you know whether Von Ribbentrop made repeated efforts to end the war by diplomatic methods?
FRAULEIN BLANK: Yes. One of his moves was to send Minister Professor Berber to Switzerland in the winter of 1943-1944. Later on these moves were intensified by sending Herr Von Schmieden to Bern and Dr. Hesse to Stockholm. As the Fuehrer had not given official authority to initiate negotiations, it was possible only to try to find out on what conditions discussions might be opened between Germany and the Allies. Similar missions were entrusted to the German Charge d'Affaires in Madrid, Minister Von Bibra, Consul General Mollhausen in Lisbon, and the Ambassador to the Vatican, Von Weizsacker. A former member of the Office Ribbentrop living in Madrid was instructed to make a similar attempt with the British Government. On 20 April Von Ribbentrop dictated to me a detailed memorandum for the Fuehrer in which he asked for official authorization to initiate negotiations. I do not know the outcome of this request because I left Berlin.
DR. HORN: In the course of your duties did you get to know what Hitler's basic attitude to this question was?
FRAULEIN BLANK: From what I heard from men of his entourage I know that the Fuehrer did not expect much of it, or that he would have been in favor of initiating negotiations only at a time of military successes. If and when, however, there were military successes, he was likewise against diplomatic initiative. As to the mission of Dr. Hesse -- after its failure, he, it was disclosed by an indiscretion, remarked that he had not expected much of it anyway.
DR. HORN: Just one more question: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop, was notified of the impending invasion of Norway and Denmark only a very short time before this action?
FRAULEIN BLANK: Yes, just a few days previously.
DR. HORN: Have you heard anything to the effect that Von Ribbentrop was of the opinion England would fight for Poland?
FRAULEIN BLANK: Yes. In line with his view that England would adhere to the old balance of power policy, he was of the opinion that England would honor her guarantee to Poland.
DR.HORN: I have no further questions to put to this witness.
TEE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions of this witness? [There was no response.] Do the Prosecution?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution have very carefully considered this matter. They hope that the Tribunal will not hold it against them that they accept everything that this witness says, but they feel that all the matters could be more conveniently put to the defendant, himself, and therefore they do not intend to cross-examine.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire. [The witness left the stand.]
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the Tribunal has permitted the question concerning the secret agreement to be put to the witness. The witness knew only of the existence of this agreement, not its contents. May I please be told whether the admission of this question to the witness is to be considered as implying the decision by the Tribunal on the admissibility of Ambassador Gaus' affidavit, and whether I might now be given the opportunity of reading an excerpt from this affidavit?
THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been submitted to the Prosecution?
DR. SEIDL: Last Monday -- that is, 3 days ago -- I submitted six copies of the affidavit to the Translation Division or to Lieutenant Schrader of the Defendants' Information Center. I assume that in the meantime, since 3 days have elapsed, the Prosecution have received a copy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution have not received the copies. I have not seen the affidavit yet. Neither has my friend Mr. Dodd, nor have my other colleagues, General Rudenko, or M. Champetier de Ribes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then I think we had better wait until the document is in the hands of the Prosecution, then it can be considered.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I believe that I did everything in my power to furnish the Prosecution with the affidavit. I have no influence on the General Secretary's business, and I should be obliged if the Tribunal would assist in this matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Nobody has said that you have done anything wrong about it, Dr. Seidl. Yes, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: As my next witness I should like to call Minister Paul Schmidt. [The witness Schmidt took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?
DR. PAUL OTTO SCHMIDT (Witness): Schmidt is my name.
THE PRESIDENT: Your full name?
SCHMIDT: Dr. Paul Otto Schmidt.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God -- the Almighty and Omniscient -- that I will speak the pure truth -- and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath in German.]
DR. HORN: Witness, you took part in some of the decisive discussions between the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, and members of the Reich Government before the outbreak of war. Is it correct that you were present at the conference on 30 August 1939 between the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the British Ambassador? [There was a pause in proceedings.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until a quarter to 2. [The Tribunal recessed until 1345 hours.]
DR. HORN: Witness, is it correct that you were present at the conference on 30 August 1939 between the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.
DR. HORN: Where did that conference take place?
SCHMIDT: It took place in the office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Foreign Office in Berlin.
DR. HORN: In what capacity did you take part in that conference?
SCHMIDT: I took part in that conference as interpreter and recorder.
DR. HORN: Since when had you been employed in this capacity in the Foreign Office and for whom did you work?
SCHMIDT: I had been working in the Foreign Office as interpreter for conferences since 1923, and in this capacity I interpreted for all foreign ministers, from Stresemann to Von Ribbentrop, as well as for a number of German Reich Chancellors such as Hermann Muller, Marx, Bruning, Hitler, and for other cabinet members and delegates who represented Germany at international conferences. In other words, I participated as interpreter in all international conferences at which Germany was represented since 1923.
DR. HORN: Did you have the opportunity to act as interpreter during the discussion between Ribbentrop and Sir Nevile Henderson?
SCHMIDT: No, I did not have that opportunity as the discussion was conducted in German.
DR. HORN: Was Ambassador Henderson able to speak German fluently?
SCHMIDT: Ambassador Henderson's knowledge of German was rather good, but not perfect. Hence it could happen that in moments of excitement he did not quite understand certain points, as is proved by an incident which occurred during the conference just mentioned; and it was not always easy for him to express himself in German; but when speaking to Germans he usually preferred to conduct these discussions in German.
DR. HORN: In the course of the conference Herr Von Ribbentrop read out to Henderson a memorandum containing the German proposals for a settlement of the questions pending between Germany and Poland. And now I am asking you, Witness, did Henderson ask you during that discussion to translate to him the contents of the memorandum Ribbentrop, had read out?
SCHMIDT: No, he did not do that.
DR. HORN: Did you get the impression from his attitude that Sir Nevile Henderson had fully understood the contents of the memorandum?
SCHMIDT: That is, of course, very hard to say. You cannot tell what goes on inside a person's mind, but I doubt whether he understood the document in all its details.
DR. HORN: Did Ribbentrop, when he read out the document to Sir Nevile Henderson, give him any explanations?
SCHMIDT: Yes, while reading out the document the Foreign Minister now and then commented to Henderson about some points which might not have been quite clear.
DR. HORN: Did Sir Nevile Henderson himself ask for such explanations?
SCHMIDT: No, Sir Nevile Henderson sat and listened to the document being read out and the comments which were made.
DR. HORN: What atmosphere prevailed during that conference?
SCHMIDT: The atmosphere during that conference was, I think I can say, somewhat charged with electricity. Both participants were extremely nervous. Henderson was very uneasy; and never before, and perhaps only once afterwards, have I seen the Foreign Minister so nervous as he was during that conference. An incident which occurred during the first part of the discussion can perhaps serve to illustrate the atmosphere. The matter under discussion was the specifying of all the points Germany had against Poland and her government, and the Foreign Minister had done that in all details and concluded with the words: "So you see, Sir Nevile Henderson, the situation is damned serious." When Sir Nevile Henderson heard those words, "damned serious" he started up, half raised himself and pointing a warning finger at the Foreign Minister said: "You have just said 'damned.' That is not the language of a statesman in so serious a situation."
THE PRESIDENT: To what charge in the Indictment is this relevant?
DR. HORN: To the point in the Indictment that on 30 August 1939, Von Ribbentrop read out the memorandum, the decisive memorandum, so quickly that Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson was not able to grasp its contents and transmit it to his government and have it forwarded to the Polish Government in order to continue negotiations between Germany and Poland. England at that time had offered her good offices as intermediary between both governments. Germany on the basis ...
THE PRESIDENT: Which passage of the Indictment are you referring to? You may be right, I do not know. I only want to know which passage in the Indictment you are referring to.
DR. HORN: I am referring to the preparation of, that is, to the failure to prevent aggressive war for which Ribbentrop is indicted as a co-conspirator.
THE PRESIDENT: That is on Page 9, is it not, from (F) 4? There is nothing about the way in which this document was handed over to Sir Nevile Henderson. Presumably you have got the Indictment. Where is it in the Indictment?
DR. HORN: It has been presented by the Prosecution and it has also been presented in the House of Commons where Chamberlain insisted that Ribbentrop had read it out so rapidly that it was impossible to grasp the contents and transmit them through diplomatic channels, which England had expressly offered to do. Thus the Defendant Von Ribbentrop is directly indicted for having prevented this last chance of further negotiations with Poland. The statement of the witness will prove that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop cannot be charged with this.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Horn, you made the point that it was read in that way. There is no charge about it in the Indictment at all. It may be that the Prosecution referred to it in the course of the history. You have made the point, surely it is not necessary to go on at length about it.
DR. HORN: In that case may I proceed? [Turning to the witness.] Then you had the impression that both these statesmen were extremely agitated?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I did have that impression.
DR. HORN: To what causes do you attribute this agitation?
SCHMIDT: To the tension which prevailed during the negotiations, to the numerous conferences which had taken place almost without interruption during the preceding days and which had made considerable demands upon the nerves of all participants.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop, as Sir Nevile Henderson maintains in his book, said in the worst possible language that he would never ask the Polish Ambassador to call on him?
SCHMIDT: That I cannot remember. The Foreign Minister merely said that he could receive the Polish Ambassador for negotiations or discussions only if he came to him with the necessary authority to negotiate.
DR. HORN: Ambassador Lipski did not have that authority?
SCHMIDT: He answered a question respecting this, put to him by the Foreign Minister when Ambassador Lipski was with him with an emphatic "no." He said he had no authority.
DR. HORN: Thereupon, Ribbentrop declared to Sir Nevile Henderson that he could not receive the ambassador, is that right?
SCHMIDT: No. I was speaking about a conference which the Foreign Minister had with the Polish Ambassador in the course of which the latter was asked whether he had authority to negotiate. To this he replied "no," whereupon the Foreign Minister said that in this case naturally no conversation could take place.
DR. HORN: Then Von Ribbentrop did not hand the memorandum which we mentioned previously to Sir Nevile Henderson. Did you have the impression that Ribbentrop did not submit the text of the ultimatum to Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson because he did not wish to or because he was not allowed to do so?
SCHMIDT: It is difficult for me to give a clear-cut answer to this question as I was not present at the preliminary discussions which Hitler doubtless had with the Foreign Minister regarding that point before the conference with the British Ambassador. I, therefore, have to rely on the impressions I got during the conference with the British Ambassador; and from these I can draw my conclusions as to the instructions Hitler may have given the Foreign Minister for this conference. In this connection I can say the following: When Henderson requested that the document containing the German proposals be submitted to him, the Foreign Minister said: "No, I cannot give you the document." These are the words he used. This of course was a somewhat unusual procedure because normally Sir Nevile Henderson had the right to expect that a document which had just been read out would be handed to him. I myself was rather surprised at the Foreign Minister's answer and looked up because I thought I had misunderstood. I looked at the Foreign Minister and heard him say for the second time: "I cannot give you the document." But I saw that this matter caused him some discomfort and that he must have been aware of the rather difficult position in which he found himself by this answer, because an uneasy smile played on his lips when he said in a quiet voice to Sir Nevile Henderson these words, "I cannot give you the document." Then I looked at Sir Nevile Henderson as I of course expected him to ask me to translate the document, but this request was not forthcoming. I looked at Henderson rather invitingly, since I wanted to translate the document, knowing how extraordinarily important a quick and complete transmission of its contents to the British Government was. If I had been asked to translate I would have done so quite slowly, almost at dictation speed, in order to enable the British Ambassador in this roundabout way to take down not merely the general outline of the German proposal but all its details and transmit them to his Government.
SCHMIDT: But Sir Nevile Henderson did not react even to my glance so that the discussion soon came to an end and events took their course.
DR. HORN: Did you, on the morning of 3 September 1939, receive the British ultimatum to the German Government?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.
DR. HORN: To whom did you submit this ultimatum?
SCHMIDT: On the morning of the 3rd, at about 2 or 3 o'clock, the British Embassy telephoned the Reich Chancellery, where I was still present with the Foreign Minister in order to be available for possible conferences, to give the information that the British Ambassador had received instructions from his government, according to which, at exactly 9 o'clock, he was to make an important announcement on behalf of the British Government to the Foreign Minister. He therefore asked to be received by Herr Von Ribbentrop at that time. He was given the reply that Ribbentrop himself would not be available but that a member of the Foreign Office, namely I, would be authorized to receive the British Government's announcement from the British Ambassador on his behalf. Thus it happened that at 9 o'clock in the morning I received the British Ambassador in Ribbentrop's office. When I asked him to be seated Henderson refused and while still standing he read to me the well-known ultimatum of the British Government to the German Government, according to which, unless certain conditions were fulfilled by Germany, the British Government would consider themselves at war with Germany at 11 o'clock that morning. After we had exchanged a few words of farewell, I took the document to the Reich Chancellery.
DR. HORN: To whom did you submit this document there?
SCHMIDT: In the Reich Chancellery I gave it to Hitler, that is to say, I found Hitler in his office in conference with the Foreign Minister and I translated the document into German for him. When I had completed my translation, there was at first silence.
DR. HORN: Was Hitler alone in the room?
SCHMIDT: No as I said before, he was in his office with the Foreign Minister. And when I had completed my translation, both gentlemen were absolutely silent for about a minute. I could clearly see that this development did not suit them at all. For a while Hitler sat in his chair deep in thought and stared somewhat worriedly into space. Then he broke the silence with a rather abrupt question to the Foreign Minister, saying, "What shall we do now?" Thereupon they began to discuss the next diplomatic steps to be taken, whether this or that ambassador should be called, et cetera . I, of course, left the room since I had nothing more to do. When I entered the anteroom, I found assembled there -- or rather I had already seen on my way in -- some Cabinet members and higher officials, to whose questioning looks -- they knew I had seen the British Ambassador -- I had said only that there would be no second Munich. When I came out again, I saw by their anxious faces that my remark had been correctly interpreted. When I then told them that I had just handed a British ultimatum to Hitler, a heavy silence fell on the room. The faces suddenly grew rather serious. I still remember that Goering, for instance, who was standing in front of me, turned round to me and said, "If we lose this war, then God help us." Goebbels was standing in a comer by himself and had a very serious, not to say depressed, expression. This depressing atmosphere prevailed over all those present, and it naturally lives in my memory as something most remarkable for the frame of mind prevailing in the anteroom of the Reich Chancellery on the first day of the war.