dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
RAEDER: That is obvious. That would be the case, of course, if we were attacked. We wanted to be in a position to defend ourselves if we were attacked. Up till that point we were unable to do this. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Now, just let us take the first example, when you contemplated fighting. If you look at Document Book 10a, Document Number C-140, Page 104 of the English translation and Page 157 of the German version, you remember that is the directive of Field Marshal Von Blomberg on Germany leaving the disarmament conference and League of Nations. And there, there is a pretty full general directive as to what military measures you would take if the members of the League of Nations applied sanctions against you; in other words you were quite prepared...
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: . . . for a war happening on that peace policy; that is so, isn't it, and that is what it says, it gives all preparations ready for fighting?
RAEDER: These preparations were made, if I remember correctly, 11 days after we had left the League of Nations, and it was quite natural that, if the Fuehrer believed that in consequence of our leaving the League of Nations, which was quite a peaceful action in itself, warlike measures or sanctions would be applied against us, we would have to defend ourselves; and if such an attack was probable we had to take these preparatory steps.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you realized, Defendant, that as early as October 1933 the course of Hitler's foreign policy might have brought about an immediate war, did you not?
RAEDER: No, I did not expect at all that such a measure as the secession from the League of Nations, where we had always been treated unjustly because we had no power behind us, would result in a war with any other power. Nevertheless, it was right to take such eventualities into consideration.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is good enough for me. Now, just let us look at the same document book, Document Number C-153, on Page 107 of the English version and Page 164 to 167 of the German version. That is, you will remember, your armament plan for the third armament phase, and I would just like you first of all to look at Paragraph 3. In (a) and (b) of Paragraph 3 you give the general basis for your arrangements: "(a) For the military leaders a sound basis for their strategic considerations, and "(b) For the political leaders a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military means available at a given time."
RAEDER: Yes, it is quite obvious that such a plan would have this purpose.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that your political leaders were to make their plans on what armed forces you had available for war, if necessary. That was what you were contemplating then, was it not?
RAEDER: Yes, that is a matter of course; I reported to the Fuehrer that I could put a certain military strength at his disposal during that year. The Chief of State must know that in order to know what he can count on. But that has nothing to do with plans for war. That is the case in every state. On the other hand, I cannot influence the political leader as to what he wants. I can only report what I could have. Therefore, I had nothing to do with political matters. I only did what is necessary and what is done in every state.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And just look at Paragraph 7. I am not going to argue with you as to whether states base their foreign politics on things other than war as a matter of argument, but look at Paragraph 7: "All theoretical and practical R-preparations (armament) are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a sudden war." That is that you, as far as the Navy was concerned, you had to be ready then for an immediate war footing, have the Navy on an immediate war footing, isn't that right?
RAEDER: No, no. This concerns the sequence of the things to be taken for granted. The armament plan listed the most important immediate requirements of the Navy and at that point I say here that this applied to weapons to be used in a war where there was no time to prepare and that is, in plain language, the mobile fleet, which must be in a state of constant readiness. It had to be kept ready for action at a moment's notice and it had to receive priority. All other matters, such as quarters, and things that had nothing to do with direct combat; were attended to afterwards.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought that is what I put to you, that the fleet had to be ready and ready for war. However, you have given your account of it. Just turn over, if you will be so good, to Page 66 of Document Book 10, Page 285 of the German document book, Document Number C-189, My Lord. [Turning to the defendant.] Now, I want to raise just this one point on which you made a point in your examination and which I must challenge. You say in Paragraph 2: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy expresses the opinion that later on"-and I ask you to note the words "later on"- "the fleet must anyhow be developed against England and that therefore from 1936 onwards the large ships must be armed with 35 centimeter guns." Now, are you telling the Tribunal, that "gegen England" does not mean "against" in the sense of in antagonism to, directed against, in opposition to-that it merely means in comparison to? Are you seriously saying that, are you?
RAEDER: I explained the other day that we are dealing here with the question of keeping up with other navies. Up to that time we were keeping up with the French Navy which had 33 cm guns. Then England went beyond that in mounting 35.6 cm guns on her ships and then, as I said before, France went beyond England in using 38 cm guns. Thus I said to the Fuehrer that our 28 cm guns which we believed we could use against the French Dunkerque class would not be heavy enough, and that we would have to take the next bigger caliber, that is 35.6 like those of the English ships That was never done because the French began to use 38 cm guns and our Bismarck class followed the French lines. That comparison of calibers and classes of vessels was at that time quite customary and was also...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told us all that before and my question is a perfectly simple one; that this document in the original German, when you say "gegen England" is exactly the same as in your song Wir fahren gegen England . It means against, in antagonism and directed against, and not in comparison. That is what I am putting to you and it is a perfectly short point. Are you telling this Tribunal that "gegen England" means in comparison with England?
RAEDER: That is what I want to say; because it says "develop gegen England" and at that time we had not even signed the Naval Agreement. It is hardly likely that I would consider following an anti-British policy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look to the next page, Document Number C-190, Page 67 of the English document book, Page 284 of the German document book. That is your conversation with Hitler on the 2nd November 1934, when you are discussing bigger naval estimates and the availability of more money. I want you to look at the end of the first paragraph which gives Hitler's reasons. "He considers it vital that the Navy be increased as planned"- now look-"as no war could be carried on if the Navy were not able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia." Are you still telling the Tribunal you were not from 1934 onwards contemplating war? Well, if so, why does Hitler say that? That is one of the most vital points of German naval strategy. "No war could be carried on if the Navy were not able to safeguard the ore imports from Sweden." Were you not contemplating war in November? Were you not?
RAEDER: Hitler said that a navy is built so that, if war becomes necessary, the navy can use its weapons to defend the country. A navy is established for no other purpose, and that was definitely one of the general reasons for the existence of a German Navy. There were many people who thought a navy was unnecessary.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, what I am putting to you is this. You have told the Tribunal that the Navy was purely defensive, all your preparations were purely defensive. I am suggesting to you that Hitler there is contemplating a war and contemplating the task of a navy during a war, a few months before he intended to denounce the military clauses of Versailles. You were all set for a war if it should become necessary, and you knew that. Was that not the position?
RAEDER: That is a complete misrepresentation of the facts, Mr. Prosecutor. Of course it is necessary during peacetime to contemplate the circumstances which might arise to make it necessary to call on the Armed Forces for defense. At that time nobody thought of a war of aggression, and the individual tasks must be understood. One of the Navy's tasks was undoubtedly to secure the Swedish and Norwegian ore exports in case of war; and it had to be developed with a view to that end.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you just look at the next sentence in Paragraph 2: "When I pointed out that in the critical political situation in the first quarter of 1935, it would be desirable to have six U-boats already assembled...." You were preparing for the critical political situation.
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let's look at what you were doing in 1936. Would you give the defendant and Dr. Siemers Document Number D-806. That is a report of yours dated the 11th of November 1936, dealing with the U-boat construction program, and after the first paragraph you say this in the second paragraph: "The military and political situation urgently demands that the extension of our U-boat fleet should be taken in hand immediately and completed with the greatest energy and dispatch, as it is a particularly valuable part of our armament at sea and possesses special striking power." Are you saying that what you were urging there was purely defensive and that you had no idea of the special striking powers that would be needed in a war?
RAEDER: The entire political situation, or so I seem to remember, made me consider it necessary to put the construction of submarines in the foreground. But I never expected that we would start a war on our own account. Hitler himself had told me that again and again, but he had made his political moves which could undoubtedly lead us into war if the other powers intervened against such a political move. The charge made against me was that I did not push the construction of U-boats sufficiently far ahead.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are stressing it sufficiently there, aren't you? "On the military and political situation"-you were kept fully informed of the political situation and were adjusting your naval armament accordingly; isn't that so?
RAEDER: At that time I not only knew nothing about what was going to happen, but I knew that we had occupied the Rhineland during that year, and that in consequence of the clouds which appeared on the horizon as a result of the occupation of the Rhineland Hitler maintained an attitude of greatest caution and said that we must be prepared for further complications. For that reason a special directive was issued in 1936, and I took precautions along the lines suggested by these considerations. My main duty was to watch; and on the basis of my observations and the conclusions which I drew from them, I had to strengthen myself as much as possible. This document, about which you did not question me, had the same connotation. I asked whether-should political tension develop at the beginning of 1935, before the signing of the Naval Agreement, and that would not be done till June-we should perhaps assemble six U-boats. That was also in the case of tension arising; and I knew at that time that the declaration of freedom of territorial defense was intended to be made in 1935.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, you have told us what you knew in 1936. Now, just let's pass on to 1937. I want to know exactly what you say. That of course, as you remember, turns on the Hossbach Document, 386-PS, which is at Page 81 of Document Book 10, Page 314 of the German document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, did you give the number of that last document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful, My Lord. It is Exhibit GB-462. [Turning to the defendant.] Now, I want you just-have you got that, Page 314 of the German document book?
RAEDER: Can you tell me the paragraph? I have...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, the first thing I want to ask you about is the third paragraph, the last sentence, where Hitler is reported as saying: "The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space." And then I wanted you, if you would be so good, to turn over two pages to 316. My Lord, it is Page 83 of the English document book. That is repeated. My Lord, it is about seven lines down. Where Hitler says: "The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space." And then he says that: "The history of all times has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance." And then in a separate paragraph he says: "The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at the lowest cost." Do you see that, on Page 316?
RAEDER: May I begin with the last one? It is wrongly translated.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that's what I'm really going to ask you. I want you to just tell us, did you hear Hitler say that that was the general problem, "the greatest possible conquest to be made at the lowest cost."
RAEDER: No. The English document has the word "conquest" (Eroberung), but that is not in the German document. The German text reads: "the highest possible gain (Gewinn) with the smallest risk." That is a phrase borrowed from sport. There is no mention of conquest.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I'm quite prepared to accept that it comes after the passage which I have referred to you in quite some detail, because I don't want to select anything out of the context. Did you appreciate that Hitler there was saying, "The only possibility for Germany is to get extra living space," and that had to be got at the expense of other nations? He said that, didn't he?
RAEDER: He did say that; and I explained recently how that is to be understood. He was speaking of Austria and Czechoslovakia, of the Sudetenland. We were of the opinion that no change was intended in that policy; nor did one take place later. War was not waged against Austria or Czechoslovakia. We were all convinced that he would solve that question peacefully, like all other political questions. I explained that in great detail.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wed now, that is what I was going to ask you about. You have taken my second point yourself. The rest of the document deals with action against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Would you look at Page 86? I think you will agree with me that Field Marshal Von Blomberg and General Von Fritsch rather poured cold water on Hitler's ideas. Isn't that a fair way of putting it?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They rather thus showed a certain antipathy?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was in November 1937.
RAEDER: We all of us told him constantly that in no circumstances might he start a war with England and France, and he always agreed. But I explained that this entire speech had a definite purpose; and that for this purpose he exaggerated a great deal and at once withdrew that exaggeration when a hint was given to him about the danger of a war with France and England.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was what I was going to ask you. That was in November. By January, Field Marshal Von Blomberg had made his unfortunate marriage, hadn't he?
RAEDER: I believe it was in January. I do not know exactly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took the view, didn't you, that he had been encouraged to do that by the Defendant Goering?
RAEDER: I never said that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, didn't you?
RAEDER: No, not that I know of. I never thought that at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember making a statement in Moscow on this point? Let me read it to you.
RAEDER: To whom, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In Moscow to the Russians. "At the beginning of the year 1938 I had experiences of a personal nature, which although they did not concern the Navy directly caused me to lose confidence, not only in Goering but also in the sincerity of the Fuehrer. The situation in which Field Marshal Von Blomberg found himself as a result of his unfortunate marriage made his position as a Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces impossible. I came to the belated conclusion that Goering was making every effort to obtain the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht in place of Blomberg. "He favored the marriage because it made Blomberg ineligible for this post, while Blomberg believed-and even stated repeatedly-that such a marriage was possible under the present system. Goering had already had him shadowed in the past, as I learned from later remarks." Didn't you say that?
RAEDER: In Moscow, immediately after the collapse, I made a note of the causes of the collapse as seen in the light of my own experience. I wrote this document under the conditions there- where I was treated very chivalrously-and I had no hesitation in informing the highest general of the Commissariat of the Interior of this when I was asked what I was doing there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All I want to know is, is that true, what you said?
RAEDER: Yes. I wrote these notes, and it is also true that it occurred to me afterwards that Goering might have favored the marriage. I believe that he himself told me that here. He had assisted Blomberg in such a way that, I think, he did not know what the true state of affairs was or how serious the matter was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you see, your view at that time was that Goering was encouraging the marriage because he knew that it would put Blomberg off the map as Commander-inChief because he, Goering, wanted the position. Was that the view that you held last summer?
RAEDER: I believed that last summer, yes. And it is also true that Goering certainly wanted to become Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, but the Fuehrer himself thwarted him in that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was Von Blomberg. We know what happened to him. Your second choice, after Von Blomberg, was Von Fritsch, was it not? You thought that Von Fritsch would have been the best Commander-in-Chief if Von Blomberg went, did you not?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mentioned that to Hitler? And . . .
RAEDER: He asked me, and I said that if I were consulted, I would suggest Baron van Fritsch. But the Fuehrer said that that was out of the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. But there were some of them bringing a charge of homosexuality against Von Fritsch; isn't that right? That was why it could not be done?
RAEDER: Yes. He said, in general terms, that some kind of moral crime existed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were one of the court who inquired into that charge, were you not? Goering, as president, you and General Von Brauchitsch?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you came to the conclusion that the charge of homosexuality against Von Fritsch was a frame-up by the Gestapo, did you not? Do you know what I mean? I am afraid "frame-up" is rather difficult to translate.
RAEDER: The whole thing gave me that impression. Yes. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE That is because the denunciation had been by some shady character who you thought was a "hang-around" of the Gestapo; and at the trial, the co-operation of the Gestapo with the accuser was brought to light; that is right, is it not? You were satisfied, from sitting at the trial?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you agree that there had been-not a confusion-but that the guilty party was a cavalry captain, Rittmeister Von Fritsch, and not this general at all; isn't that right?
RAEDER: I agree absolutely. We acquitted Baron von Fritsch because his innocence was proved. There was no suspicion of any kind remaining against him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You acquitted him, but his reinstatement did not follow? His reinstatement in command did not follow?
RAEDER: No. I went to him, as I knew him very well, and asked him if he would agree to my going to Hitler and suggesting that he, Baron van Fritsch, be reinstated. But Fritsch replied that he considered that quite impossible. He thought that his authority was so much impaired that he would no longer care to resume his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. After that, unfortunately, I could do no more about it. I reported this to the Fuehrer, but there were no further developments. All that happened was that the Fuehrer confirmed the absolute innocence of Baron von Fritsch in a large assembly of generals and admirals.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you say this with regard to the Von Fritsch incident: "I was convinced that Goering had a hand in this well prepared situation, since in order to attain his goal it was necessary to eliminate every possible successor to Von Blomberg"? Do you remember saying that?
RAEDER: I do not remember that now; but I believe that I held that opinion. To be quite just, I must say that Baron von Fritsch's acquittal was due principally to the way in which Goering conducted the proceedings. The witness who was brought up told so many lies and made so many contradictory statements every few minutes, that only Goering could cope with him. After seeing that, I was very thankful that I had not been appointed president, as suggested by the Minister of Justice. I could not have coped with those people. It was entirely due to Goering's intervention that he was acquitted without any difficulties.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But of course, I think you have said, Witness, that whether he was acquitted or not, the authority of Van Fritsch in the German Army was in his own view destroyed by the fact that this charge had been brought against him. That was the result of it, was it not?
RAEDER: Herr Von Fritsch thought so. I would have insisted on being reinstated after I had been acquitted in that manner.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did it not strike you as curious that the two people who on the 5th of November had tried to head Hitler off? from a course that might have meant war were both disgraced in 2 months? Didn't it strike you as curious?
RAEDER: That did not strike me as curious at all; and there is certainly no connection. If Hitler had thought it necessary to remove the men in high positions who opposed him in such matters, he would have had to remove me long ago. But he never said anything about it to me, and I have never noticed that he said anything like that because I contradicted him. I have frequently pointed out, with regard to that very question of England and France, that no war should be caused there; and I never had the impression that he ever took it amiss.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just let us take it very shortly. Within 6 weeks of the disgrace of Blomberg and the removal of Von Fritsch, the Anschluss with Austria took place. Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not know that there were pretended military preparations for the Anschluss with Austria, the ones described by General Jodl in his diary and also described by Field Marshal Keitel? Did you know that these threats of military action would have been made?
RAEDER: I do not believe that I ever took part in a military discussion concerning the Austrian Anschluss, because actually I had nothing to do with it. But I should like to emphasize here, once and for all, that I learned of such enterprises as, for instance, the annexation of Austria through a directive issued by the Fuehrer, and not before, because one copy of these directives, regardless of whether or not they concerned the Navy, was always sent to me as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. So, of course, I must have received a directive in this case, too. Unfortunately, I cannot tell you the date of it; but I confirm that a directive came to my knowledge.