dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
RAEDER: I must give an explanation on that matter, and I was just about to do that. Sharp attacks on the British blockade, in violation of international law-these attacks were made by M.  Molotov. Here too, protests were made which were turned down. But I wanted to prevent protests and the entire document shows that our deliberations always aimed at taking measures in such a way that they could not be objected to, but were always legally justified.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you tell me, Defendant, how it was going to prevent protests if you suggest in this paragraph to use the most ruthless measures and disregard every protest that neutrals made? How is that going to prevent protests?
RAEDER: These measures were to be taken in such a way that no objection was possible. If I tell the neutrals: "This is a dangerous area in every way," and nevertheless they go there because they want to make money or because they are being forced by the British, then I need not accept any protest. They are acting for egotistical reasons, and they must pay the bill if they die. I must also add...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is true. They must pay the bill if they die. That was what it came to, was it not?
RAEDER: They received large premiums for exposing themselves to that risk, and it was their business to decide about it.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we might break off now for 10 minutes. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to be much longer, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought about half an hour, My Lord. [Turning to the defendant.] Defendant, in this document the Naval Command suggests that it calls for a siege of England, that is, the sinking without warning of all ships that come into a big area around England. Didn't you hear? Sorry. In this document the Naval Command suggests what is called the siege of England, on Pages 10 to 13. And that is, the sinking of all merchant ships, including neutrals and tankers, which come into an area around England. Isn't that so?
RAEDER: No, that is not true. The Navy Command does not suggest that, but discusses the idea of a siege after the blockade had been discussed and rejected. It likewise comes to a conclusion why the siege, which until that time had not been accepted as a recognized idea by international law, should not be undertaken; and it draws the inference from all these discussions by setting out on the last page, the last page but one, what shall now be considered the final conclusion. These are only those measures which can be justified by the actions already taken by the British. And during the entire discussion about blockading, the consideration was always in the foreground as to whether the neutrals would not suffer too much damage by that. And the whole idea of a siege is based on the fact that Prime Minister Chamberlain had already said-on 26 September-that there would not be any difference between a blockade on the seas and a siege on land, and the commander of a land siege would try to prevent with all means the entry of anything into the fortress. Also, the French press had mentioned that Germany was in the same situation as a fortress under siege.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am suggesting is that you come down in favor of a siege, but you do not want any siege area declared. Will you look at Paragraph 2 of the conclusions, and then I will leave the document to the Tribunal. That is the point I suggest. In paragraph 2 of the conclusions you say: "For the future conduct of economic war, the basic military requirements demand the utmost ruthlessness. The employment of the siege by sea as the most intensified form of economic warfare meets this demand. Even without the public announcement of a state of siege, after it has been clearly defined as a concept, a declaration which would have drawbacks militarily and from the point of view of international law, and even without the declaration of a prohibited zone, it seems perfectly possible at the moment, as has been explained in this memorandum, to take military measures to introduce the most intensive form of economic warfare, and to achieve what are at present the greatest possible results in the interruption of enemy trade"-now the last words- "without the Naval Operations Staff being tied in all cases to special forms and areas." That is your final conclusion, that you should have as effective a siege as possible without proclaiming any area. Isn't that so?
RAEDER: No, that is not the conclusion. The conclusion is that we cannot carry out a siege, and that it would be a matter for the political leadership of the State to decide. The political leadership of the State has never suggested to decree a siege, and it can be seen here quite clearly what, on the basis of the memorandum, is suggested for the time being, and then how the intensification gradually took place.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We must not take time arguing about it, I want you to make clear...
RAEDER: But..
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me finish. My suggestion to you is-and there I leave it-that you rejected a formal siege, but you claimed the right to sink at sight, without warning, all neutral vessels in an area which the High Command may choose. Now, I want to pass on to another subject, because I am afraid time is getting on.
RAEDER: That is no siege, however. That was a directive issued after neutral ships did not heed our warning and continued to enter the sea around Britain in order to support Britain in the economic warfare which she, with the greatest ruthlessness and severity, was conducting against us. It was a measure of self-defense.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it that the document speaks for itself, now that the attention of the Tribunal has been drawn to it. I want to come to another point. You have mentioned certain matters, in answer to Dr. Morn this morning, with regard to the treatment of American ships in the summer of 1941. In April 1941 you were pressing for German naval forces to operate freely up to three miles of the American coast instead of the 300-mile safety limit which the Americans were suggesting, were you not? Well to save time I will give the witness Document Number D-849, Exhibit Number GB-472. [The document was handed to the defendant.] That says you couldn't get in touch with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and therefore you asked Baron Von Weizsaecker to get a decision on these points: "1) Authorization for the German naval forces in the western part of the Atlantic Ocean to operate freely as far as the international customary 3-mile boundary. "2) The cancellation of the preferential treatment which American merchant vessels have been enjoying so far in our warfare at sea." Now, I hand you Document Number 850, that will be Exhibit Number GB-473. Your suggestion, which had been made in April, was turned down by Hitler in June. It is a memorandum from Ritter in the Foreign Office and it reads: "General Jodl informs me that at the recent report of Grossadmiral Raeder to the Fuehrer, the more far-reaching orders to the naval forces, as they were discussed in connection with the Raeder interview, have been postponed until further notice. "In the same way, permission to attack United States' merchant vessels within the framework of the prize law has not been granted." Your suggestion was to abandon the policy then existing and attack up to the 3-mile limit. Now, I want you to come to another point . . .
RAEDER: No, please may I make a statement concerning that? I should like to say something, even if you do not put a question to me. It is not right. At that time, in March 1941, and on the 1st of April and the following dates in 1941, a whole number of intensifications were introduced by the United States, which I mentioned this morning, from the document which I had before me. Therefore, it was clear that I, on behalf of the Naval Operations Staff, which was supposed to conduct the most effective naval war, urged that also with respect to the United States those steps should be taken which were permissible according to international law, and that we should start slowly. Those steps included: First: that we should no longer respect that 300-mile limit, but go as far as the 3-mile limit, where according to existing international law, it was possible to attack. That is to say, not against international law, but it was just discontinuing certain favorable conditions which we had granted the United States. And Point 2: The cancellation of the preferential treatment...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That's exactly what I suggest to you. There is no dispute between us. I was just establishing that point.
RAEDER: Yes-no...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want you to come. . .
RAEDER: I only wanted to say that during the hearing of Grossadmiral Doenitz the Prosecution demanded of us that we should not treat certain neutrals better than others, but we should treat them all alike; that is to say in plain language, we must sink them all, no matter whether we wanted to do so or not, and of course we were not bound to do that. The second thing: it was a matter of course that a thoroughly justified suggestion on my part from the point of view of the Naval Operations Staff had been rejected by the Fuehrer if, with regard to the political situation, he decided that at that time he did not desire to adopt a more severe attitude towards the United States.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Now, I want you to come to quite a different point. Do you say that you did not know anything about the extermination of Jews in the Eastern Territories? [There was no response.] Do you say that you did not know about the extermination of Jews in the Eastern Territories?
RAEDER: I say clearly under oath that I had not the slightest inkling about it. I might add in explanation that on no account would Hitler have spoken about such things to a man like myself, whose opinion he knew, especially because he was afraid that on my part there would be very serious objections. I explained the other day why I used the word "Jews" in my memorial speech. In my opinion, I was obliged to do so. But that had nothing at al, to do with an extermination of Jews. About the Jewish matter I have only learned...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well...
RAEDER: Excuse me, please, one moment. I only learned something about the Jewish matter when Jews who were known to me, mostly friends of my old parents, approached me and told me that they were about to be evacuated from Berlin. And then I intervened for them. That was the only thing I knew. On occasions I was told in answer to my questions that they were to be evacuated to cities where ghettos had been established. I always understood that a ghetto was a district in a city where all the Jews lived together, so that they would not have to mingle with the rest of the population.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Welt you know, my question was only: Did you know or did you not, and you could have answered that yes or no. I want you now to answer about that point . . .
RAEDER: Yes, but I must-so many questions have been asked about this very point and as every man in my position who held the same views says the same, that he does not know anything about it, I should like to explain once for all that one did not hear about these things, because civilians certainly did not talk to us about that, because they were always afraid that they would get into difficulties. The Fuehrer did not speak about it. I had no connection with Himmler nor with other agents of the Gestapo. I did not know anything about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you just to tell the Tribunal your chain of command for the Baltic coast. Is this right that you had the naval chief command, and then the Flag Officer of the East Baltic coast Tallinn and, under him, you had a command at Libau; is that right? Was that your chain of command?
RAEDER: I did not understand that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was your chain of command for the East Baltic coast, Kiel, Flag Officer Tallinn, and a detachment under him at Libau? You had...
RAEDER: I assume so-that depends on various things. If they were operational matters, then it had to do with the Naval Group Commander East or North; and as far as matters of organization were concerned, then it might have gone through the Station Chief of the Baltic Sea. SIR DAVID MAXWELL- Yew: Well, then, at any rate, you had got in 1941 a naval command at Libau, had you not?
RAEDER: Yes, of course.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I would like you just to look at Document Number D-841, which is a deposition on oath by one of the naval employees at Libau. My Lord, that will be Exhibit Number GB-474. This witness says: "Deposition on oath of Walter Kurt Dittmann." And then it says: "I was Naval Administration Inspector and officer in charge of the Naval Clothing Depot at Libau in Latvia. "I held this position from the beginning of August 1941 to the end of March 1942. "The Jewish population of Libau at that time was supposed to be about 7,000 people. "Up to the end of March 1942 many thousands of them had already been 'evacuated' by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police. " 'Evacuated' was the local expression for the annihilation of these people. "All Jews were registered. When a new lot was to be evacuated it happened in the following way: "The Latvian Police fetched the Jews out of their houses, put them on lorries and drove them to the Naval Port about six to seven kilometers outside the town. Later on these people had to march and were not taken there in lorries. "In the Naval Port these people were then shot with machine guns. This was done by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police. The police, of course, got their orders from the German Gestapo. "I personally did not witness these incidents, but comrades told me all about them. "Some of the Jews before they were shot worked for the Navy. "About 80-100 people worked in the Clothing Depot every day. "About 100-150 people worked in the Garrison Administration every day. "About 50 people worked in the Garrison Building Office (Navy) every day. "Through these contacts and through personal visits to the houses of Jews I heard a lot regarding the terrible happenings in Libau during these months. "I personally went to my superior, Festungs-Intendant Dr. Lancelle, and before that I also went to another superior, the officer in charge of the Hospital Administration, named Mueller, both were Naval Administration Officials. I pointed out to them these abuses which have already been described.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The answer I got was that they could not do anything and that things like that were best overlooked. "The Marineverwaltungsassistent Kurt Traunecker accompanied a consignment of clothing from Kiel to Libau. He stayed a few weeks in Libau and he expressed his displeasure at the conditions there regarding the annihilation of the Jews. "He then went back to Kiel to the local clothing office. There again he expressed his displeasure and was ordered to appear at the Naval Administration Headquarters (Marine-Intendantur). Whom he saw there, I do not know, but it was made clear to him that these occurrences were not true, and therefore he should not talk about them any more, otherwise he would get into most serious trouble. "My personal opinion is that the higher offices of the Navy in Kiel and in other places in Germany must have had knowledge of these terrible conditions." Are you saying, Defendant, that with your naval detachments on the East coast of the Baltic and with these things happening, that nobody reported to you that the Jews were being slaughtered by the thousands in the Eastern Territories, you are still saying it?
RAEDER: Yes, I knew nothing about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was your staff doing, if they were not telling you about this? Had you an efficient staff? Do you say you had an efficient staff?
RAEDER: That is a question which is not relevant here. Of course I had only efficient officers around me. But here we are dealing with things which were not done at all by the Navy. It says here in all places that it was the police and so on. I even was in Libau once and I was told-and this is the only thing in connection with this matter-that the peculiar thing was that the Jews in  Libau, contrary to their custom, were craftsmen and therefore they were doing useful work there. That was the only thing I heard about it. As regards any extermination...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When were you in Libau?
RAEDER: I cannot say that now. It was after it was occupied' probably immediately afterwards.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were you there in 1941 or 1942?
RAEDER: I said just now that I do not know exactly when; I have to look it up somewhere. It does not say here that anything was reported, only that it was apparently discussed in the Navy Headquarters and with the Navy Quartermaster (Marine-Intendantur), who does not report to me. Of course I would have intervened if I had heard about such happenings.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You think you would? Well, I'll leave that. Now, tell me about the Commando Order of the 18th of October 1942. You received Hitler's Commando Order and passed it on to your various divisions of the Navy, did you not?
RAEDER: Yes, I passed it on through the Naval Operations Staff.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you approve of it?
RAEDER: I did not recommend it, but I passed it on. I have to make a statement if you want to know what I thought about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that's not what I'm asking you. I'm asking you-first answer my question-did you approve of an order to shoot Commandos or to hand them over to the SD to be shot, did you?
RAEDER: I did not recommend the order, but I received it as drafted by the Fuehrer, and as it came into my hands, T passed it on as ordered with the same remark as to how far it has to be passed on and how it has to be returned. It was all ordered by Hitler in detail. It was decisive for me that in one of the first paragraphs the reason for this order was given, and the reasons why Hitler considered a deviation from international law justified. Moreover, a short time before I had been in Dieppe in France, and there I was informed that on the occasion of the Commando action of the British in France, the prisoners, I believe they were from the Labor Service, who were working along the coast, had been shackled with a noose around their neck and the other end of the noose around the bent-back lower leg, so that when the leg weakened, the noose tightened and the man choked.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, will you answer my question: Did you approve of the order or not? You haven't answered it yet. Did you approve of the order?
RAEDER: I always said-yes, I did-no, I do not want to say- I said that twice already. I passed it on because it was an order from my Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, in one of the last paragraphs it said that that order should not be applied for the treatment of prisoners taken after a naval action or after large scale landing operations and I, as well as many others in the Navy, concentrated our attention on this point because that was our main activity. But I saw no reason to raise objections to the Fuehrer on account of this order which I thought justified in this way. And I would like to state very clearly that I, as a soldier, was not in a position to go to my Supreme Commander and Chief of State to tell him, "Show me your reasons for this order," that would have been mutiny and could not have been done under any circumstances.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, do you remember that one example which we have discussed a great deal in this Trial, which you must have listened to, was the case of naval men coming in with a two-man torpedo, trying to sink the Tirpitz . Do you remember that case? Surely you can answer that "yes" or "no," because either you remember or you do not. We have discussed it about six times.
RAEDER: Yes, I remember. If I remember I will say "yes." The contrary does not have to be assumed at ale
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that during the time that you were Inspector General, or Admiral Inspector of the German Navy, that there was started a "Kommando der Kleinkampfverbaende," under Vice Admiral Helmut Heye, which included in its command one-man torpedoes, one-man U-boats, explosive motor boats, and had personnel, starting at about 5,000 and rising, I think, as far as 16,000? Did you know that there was that Kommando in the Navy, "Kommando der Kleinkampfverbaende"? Did you know that?
RAEDER: Yes, I knew that of course and that it operated quite openly on the French coast and later on, I believe, also on the North coast.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you have approved if the Allies had shot any one of your thousands of personnel in that Kommando that was dealing with one-man and two-man torpedoes and explosive motor boats? Would you have approved if we had shot them out of hand?
RAEDER: First, I cannot give any information about what I would have done in a particular case with which I had nothing to do any more. Secondly, here it is...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, if you don't want to answer, it is good enough for me. I will point it out in due course to the Tribunal with...
RAEDER: But you interrupted me again. I should like to make a second point after what I said first. Secondly, these units fought quite openly, just below the coast, and had no civilians on board and also no murderous instruments or instruments for sabotage with them, so they were fighters just like the fighters in a submarine. I know...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly the point that I have put with our Commandos, so I will not argue. I want to pass to one other point. Was it under your orders that the log on the Athenia was falsified? Was it by your direct order?
RAEDER: No, not at all. I have explained the other day here that my order was, "First: absolute secrecy upon the order of the Fuehrer. Secondly: politically it will be dealt with by the High Command of the Navy. Thirdly"-there was a third point-I will find it in a second-"I do not intend to punish the commander because he acted in good faith and committed an error." That is what I ordered. I did not order anything further concerning that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you know under whose orders the log was falsified? I am very anxious to know. The log was falsified. I have asked the Defendant Doenitz. He cannot tell me. He has put in an affidavit that the matter was to be left to you, and now I am asking you whether you can tell me. I think the commander is dead, as far as I remember, so he cannot tell me. Do you say that you cannot tell me under whose orders the log of the Submarine U-30, that sank the Athenia , was falsified?
RAEDER: I have already said that I had nothing to do with it, because in fact I did not have anything to do with such details. I did not order such details. The other day-I do not know whether Admiral Wagner said it-it was discussed who did it. I assumed that it was within the flotilla.