dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE PRESIDENT: Again in your application you say that three interrogatories were used by the Prosecution on the understanding that the deponents would be subject to cross-interrogation. That means, I suppose, cross-interrogatories. It does not say crossexamination; it says cross-interrogation. Do you want to have them brought here for cross-examination?
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is what I had intended, unless my first suggestion is accepted. My first suggestion is simpler, in my opinion, and it would save time. It proposes that I be allowed to be present at the questioning of the witnesses outside this courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we understand your point of view, Dr. Kauffmann, and we will consider it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.
DR. OTTO STAMMER (Counsel for Defendant Goering): May I make a brief statement with reference to General Rudenko's motion? General Rudenko wishes to reject my application for evidence, referring to Article 21, I believe, of the Charter. I do not believe that this regulation opposes my application. It is true of course, that government reports are evidence...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I think the Tribunal has already ruled that that article does not prevent the calling of witnesses; but General Rudenko, in addition to an argument based upon Article 21, also gave particular reasons why he said that these particular witnesses were not witnesses who ought to be called. He said that one of them was a psychiatrist, and the other one could not give any evidence of any value. We should like to hear you upon that.
DR. STAHMER: In the report submitted by the Soviet Union, the charge is made that members of the engineer staff which was stationed near Katyn carried out the execution of these Polish officers. They are mentioned by name, and I am bringing counter-evidence-namely members of the same staff-to prove that during the whole time that this staff was stationed there no killings of Polish officers occurred. I consider this is a pertinent assertion and a presentation of relevant evidence. One cannot eliminate a witness by saying that he was involved in the act. With reference to these people, that is not yet settled, and it is not mentioned at all in the record. Neither are these people, whom I have now named, listed in the Russian record as having taken part in the deed. Apart from that, I consider it out of the question to eliminate a witness by saying that he committed the deed. That is what has to be proved by hearing him.
THE PRESIDENT: About the psychiatrist, was he a member of the German commission?
DR. STAMMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: He was a member of it?
DR. STAMMER: Yes. He was present at the unloading, and he ascertained from the condition of the corpses that the executions must have been carried out at some time before the occupation by the German Army.
THE PRESIDENT: But he does not actually say in the application that he was a member. He said he was present during the visit of the military commission; he knows how the resolution of the commission was produced.
DR. STAMMER: I do not think he was an appointed member, but he took part in this inspection and in the duties connected with it. As far as I know, he was a regimental doctor in some regiment near-he was a regimental doctor of a regimental staff in the vicinity.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will consider your argument. Then, is the counsel for Von Neurath agreeable that that matter should stand over? Is counsel for Von Neurath here? He is not here? Very well then, we will consider that. Then, Counsel for the Defendant Schirach, do you wish to say anything in answer to what Sir David said?
DR. NELTE: My colleague Dr. Sauter asked me, if necessary, to represent the interests of the Defendant Von Schirach. As to the statement of Sir David, I have only to say that, according to the opinion of the Defendant Von Schirach, the witness Von Vacano, who made and signed this affidavit, makes statements on a number of points on which Herr Von Schirach did not speak when he was examined as a witness. I therefore ask the Court to examine this affidavit to determine whether it does not contain individual points which would be important in connection with the charges against Von Schirach, and then to decide whether to admit it.
THE PRESIDENT: Then does counsel for the Defendants Hess and Frank want to say anything about the application for an interrogatory to General Donovan? Dr. Seidl, we have already heard the argument about it.
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Hess and Frank): I have nothing to add to the arguments which I have already offered on the application to obtain official information from the War Department. I have also withdrawn my request for a decision on my first application, which was to obtain information from the War Department. It has not yet been decided, however, whether a questionnaire is to be submitted to Secretary of War Patterson.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the matter will be considered. There was no objection to the other three applications, so it is unnecessary to hear argument. Then the Tribunal will consider all these matters. Now, Dr. Exner. Dr. Exner, if it is convenient to you personally, the Tribunal thinks that you might go a little bit faster in your speech through the earphones.
DR. EXNER: Before the recess, we heard what you told your officers when Adolf Hitler entered the government. Now I should like to hear what you felt about the appointment of Hitler as head of the State in 1934.
JODL: The union of the two of flees in one person gave me much concern. When we lost Hindenburg, we lost the Field Marshal loved by the Wehrmacht and by the whole German people. What we should get with Hitler, we did not know. It is true, the result of the plebiscite was so overwhelming that one could say that a higher law than this popular will could not possibly exist. Thus we soldiers were quite justified in taking the oath to Adolf Hitler.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution speak of your close relationship with Hitler. When did you learn to know Adolf Hitler personally?
JODL: I was presented to the Fuehrer by Field Marshal Keitel in the command train on 3 September 1939 when we were going to the Polish Eastern Front. At any rate that was the day I first exchanged words with him.
DR. EXNER: Two days after the outbreak of war?
JODL: Two days after the beginning of the war.
DR. EXNER: Did the Fuehrer have confidence in you?
JODL: That came about very gradually. The Fuehrer had a certain distrust of all General Staff officers, especially of the Army, as at that time he was still very skeptical toward the Wehrmacht as a whole. I may, perhaps, quote a statement of his which was often heard: "I have a reactionary Army, a Christian"-sometimes he said too- "an imperial Navy, and a National Socialist Air Force." The relations between us varied a great deal. At first, until about the end of the campaign in the West, there was considerable reserve. Then his confidence in me increased more and more until August 1942. Then the great crisis arose, and his attitude to me was severely caustic and unfriendly. That lasted until 30 January 1943. Then relations improved and were particularly good, sincere, after the Italian betrayal in 1943 had been warded off. The last year was characterized by numerous sharp altercations.
DR. EXNER: To what extent did the Fuehrer confide in you regarding his political intentions?
JODL: Only as far as we needed to know them for our military work. Of course, for the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff political plans are somewhat more necessary than for a battalion commander, for politics is part of strategy.
DR. EXNER: Did he permit discussions of political questions between himself and you?
JODL: Discussion of political questions was generally not admissible for us soldiers. One example is especially characteristic. When I reported to the Fuehrer in September 1943 that Fascism was dead in Italy, for party emblems were scattered all over, this is what he said: "Such nonsense could only be reported by an officer. Once again it is obvious that generals do not understand politics." It can be easily understood that after such remarks the desire for any political discussions was slight.
DR. EXNER: Were political and military questions therefore kept strictly separate?
JODL: Yes, they were strictly separated.
DR. EXNER: Was it possible for you to consult him on military matters or not?
JODL: Consultation on military questions depended entirely on the circumstances of the moment. At a time when he himself was filled with doubts, he often discussed military problems for weeks or months, but if things were clear in his own mind, or if he had formed a spontaneous decision, all discussion came to an end.
DR. EXNER: The system of maintaining secrecy has often been discussed here. Were you also subject to this secrecy?
JODL: Yes, and to an extent which I really first realized during this Trial. The Fuehrer informed us of events and occurrences at the beginning of the war-that is, the efforts of other countries to prevent this war, and even to put an end to it after it had already begun-only to the extent that these events were published in the press. He spoke to the politicians and to the Party quite otherwise than to the Wehrmacht; and to the SS differently again. The secrecy concerning the annihilation of the Jews, and the events in the concentration camps, was a masterpiece of secrecy. It was also a masterpiece of deception by Himmler, who showed us soldiers faked photographs about these things in particular, and told us stories about the gardens and plantations in Dachau, about the ghettos in Warsaw and Theresienstadt, which gave us the impression that they were highly humane establishments.
DR. EXNER: Did not news reach the Fuehrer's headquarters from the outside?
JODL: The Fuehrer's headquarters was a cross between a cloister and a concentration camp. There were numerous wire fences and much barbed wire surrounding it. There were outposts on the roads leading to it to safeguard it. In the middle was the so-called Security Ring Number 1. Permanent passes to enter this security ring were not given even to my staff, only to General Warlimont. Every guard had to check on each officer whom he did not know. Apart from reports on the situation, only very little news from the outer world penetrated into this holy of holiest
DR. EXNER: But what about foreign papers and radio reports'
JODL: Among foreign papers we studied very carefully the illustrated American and English papers, for they gave us verb good information on new weapons The foreign news itself was received and censored by the headquarters civilian press section I was given only what was of military interest. Reports concerning internal politics, police, or the present situation were forbidden.
DR. EXNER: How did your collaboration with the Fuehrer take place?
JODL: It took place as follows: Every day I made at least two reports on the situation. Some time ago it was asserted, rather indignantly, that I took part in 119 conferences. I took part in far more than 5,000 conferences. This discussion of the situation and reporting on the military position was at the same time an issuing of orders On the basis of the reports on events, the Fuehrer decided immediately what orders were to be given for the next few days. I worked in this way: When my report was finished, I went into an adjoining room. There I immediately drew up the teletype messages and orders for the next few days, and while the report. on the situation were still going on, I read these drafts to the Fuehrer for his approval. Warlimont then took them along to my staff where they were sent off.
DR. EXNER: Were you also present at political talks?
JODL: May I add-to complete the picture it should be said the I did not hear many things which were discussed during tines' reports on the situation. The same is true of Field Marshal Keitel who worked in a similar manner.
DR. EXNER: Were political matters also brought up at the discussions of the situation, and to what extent were you present a discussions of a political nature?
JODL: As I have already said at the beginning, political problem were discussed only to the extent that was necessary for our, military measures. Also on occasions when political and military leaders came together, when the Reich Foreign Minister was present problems were discussed which lay on the borderline between politics and He conduct of the war. I did not take part in the exclusively political talks with foreign politicians, neutral or allied or with the Reich Foreign Minister. I did not even take part in the discussions on the organization, armament, and administration o the occupied territories, for the purely military discussions of the situation in which I had to take part often lasted or required as much as 6 or 8 hours a day. I really needed the time I then hat left for my own work.
DR. EXNER: It has often been stated here that it was impossible to contradict the Fuehrer. Did you have any success with remonstrances?
JODL: One cannot say it was really impossible to contradict the Fuehrer. Very many times I contradicted him most emphatically, but there were moments when one actually could not answer a word. Also by my objections I induced the Fuehrer to desist from many things.
DR. EXNER: Can you give an example?
JODL: There were a great number of operational question which do not interest the Court; but in the sphere of interest to the Court, there was, for example, Hitler's intention to renounce the Geneva Convention. I prevented that because I objected.
DR. EXNER: Were there other possibilities of influencing Hitler?
JODL: If it was not possible by open contradiction to prevent something which according to my innermost convictions I should prevent, there was still the means I often employed of using delaying tactics, a kind of passive resistance. I delayed work on the matter and waited for a psychologically favorable moment to bring the question up again. This procedure, too, was occasionally successful, for example, in the case of the intention to turn certain low-level fliers over to lynch justice. It had no success in the case of the Commando Order.
DR. EXNER: We will speak about that later. The Fuehrer therefore ordered that himself. ~ The witness Gisevius in answer to questions by the Prosecution, said that "Jodl had a key position with Hitler." Did you know this witness by sight, or by hearing about him, or in any other way?
JODL: I did not have that honor. I heard the name of this witness for the first time here, and I saw him for the first time here in Court.
DR. EXNER: What, if anything, could you influence Hitler not to do?
JODL: Obviously, I could give the Fuehrer only an extract of events. In view of his inclination to make emotional decisions I naturally was particularly cautious in presenting unverified reports made by agents. If the witness meant this by his general term of "key position," he was not wrong. But if he intended it to mean that I kept from the Fuehrer atrocities committed by our own Wehrmacht, or atrocities committed by the SS, then that is absolutely untrue. Besides, how was that witness to know about it? On the contrary, I immediately reported any news of that kind to the Fuehrer, and no one could have stopped me from doing so. I will give examples: An affidavit by Rittmeister Scheidt was read here. He testified that Obergruppenfuehrer Fegelein told the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Guderian, and Generaloberst Jodl of atrocities committed by the SS Brigade Keminski in Warsaw. That is absolutely true. Ten minutes later I reported this fact to the Fuehrer and he immediately ordered the dissolution of this brigade. When I heard through the American radio, through my press chief, of the shooting of 120 American prisoners near Malmedy, I immediately, on my own initiative, had an investigation started through the Commander, West so as to report the result to the Fuehrer. When unimaginable horrors committed by an Ustashi company in Croatia came to my knowledge, I reported this to the Fuehrer immediately.
DR. EXNER: I should like to interrupt you a moment. In your diary Document Number 1807-PS, you write, on 12 June 1942- Page 119, second document book: "The German field police disarmed and arrested a Ustashi company because of atrocities committed against the civilian population in Eastern Bosnia." I should like to add here that this is noteworthy because this Ustashi company was something like an SS troop in Croatia and was fighting on the German side. Because of the atrocities, the German field police arrested this Ustashi company. "The Fuehrer did not approve of this measure, which was carried out by order of the commander of the 708th Division, as it undermined the authority of the Ustashi on which the whole Croatian State rests. This is bound to have a more harmful effect on peace and order in Croatia than the unrest of the population caused by the atrocities." Was this the incident of which you were thinking just now?
JODL: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Have you another example?
JODL: After the issuing of the Commando Order, I reported enemy violations of international law to the Fuehrer only when he would be certain to have heard of them through other channels. I reported cases of Commando undertakings and capture of Commandos only when I could be quite sure that he would hear of them through other channels. In this respect I did try to hold back any new spontaneous emotional decisions.
DR. EXNER: Was it possible to hold Hitler back?
JODL: Unfortunately not. He did not greet me any more, or rarely. This situation lasted until 30 January 1943. He told me, through Field Marshal Keitel, that he could no longer work with me and that I would be replaced by General Paulus as soon as Pails had taken Stalingrad.
DR. EXNER: Did you yourself not try during this time to be released from the OKW?
JODL: During all this time, every other day I asked General Schmundt to see to it that I should be sent at last to a position at the front with the mountain troops in Finland. I wanted to go there. But nothing happened.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has asserted that you enjoyed the good graces of the Fuehrer and that the Fuehrer lavished his favor on you. How much of that is true?
JODL: I need not waste many words on that. What I said is the actual truth. I am afraid that what the Prosecution said is imagination.
DR. EXNER: It was also said that you were ambitious in your military career. How about that?
JODL: If the Prosecution mean that as a so-called political soldier I was promoted especially quickly, they are mistaken. I became a general in my fiftieth year. That is quite normal. In July 1940, when I was appointed general of Artillery it is true I skipped the grade of lieutenant general, but that was only an accident. A much younger general in the Air Force, Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, was to be promoted to Air Chief Marshal. Then Schmundt said to the Fuehrer: "Jodl could perhaps do that too." Thereupon, shortly before the Reichstag session, the Fuehrer decided to promote me also-to general of Artillery. This Jeschonnek, who is much younger than I am, became Generaloberst much sooner than I. Zeitzler, who was formerly my subordinate, became Generaloberst at the same time as I did.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will break off. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30.
DR. EXNER: We were discussing to what extent you enjoyed the favor of the Fuehrer, that is with regard to- Did you not receive exceptional decorations from Hitler?
JODL: To my surprise, when the Vinnitza crisis was over, on 30 January 1943, I received from the Fuehrer the Golden Party Badge. That was the only decoration I received from the Fuehrer.
DR. EXNER: In the entire 5'/e years of war?
JODL: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Did you receive a gift or donation from Hitler, or from the Party?
JODL: Not a single cent. If I am to conceal nothing I must mention the fact that at headquarters we received a package of coffee from the Fuehrer each Christmas.
DR. EXNER: Did you acquire any property in the territories occupied by us, or receive any as a gift or as a token of remembrance?
JODL: Nothing at ail. When in The Indictment the sentence is found to the effect that the defendants enriched themselves from the occupied territories, as far as I am concerned I have only one word for that, and I must be frank-it is a libel against a decent German officer.
DR. EXNER: During the war you saved some of your pay as a Generaloberst. How did you invest this money?
JODL: My entire savings of this war are at the moment in Reich bonds . . .
THE PRESIDENT: He said that he could not save a penny. He has not yet been cross-examined about it.
DR. EXNER: During the entire period of the war you were with Hitler and therefore you must really know him best. So I should like to ask you in detail about the personality of the Fuehrer, but the Court is not very fond of repetition. Therefore tell us quite briefly what particularly influenced you in Hitler's behavior, what impressed you particularly? What were the things you disliked?
JODL: Hitler was a leader to an exceptional degree. His knowledge and his intellect, his rhetoric, and his will power triumphed in the end in every spiritual conflict over everyone. He combined to an unusual extent logic and clarity of thought, skepticism and excess of imagination, which very frequently foresaw what would happen, but also very often went astray. I really marveled at him when in the winter of 1941-42, by his faith and his energy, he established the wavering Eastern Front; for at that time, as in 1812, a catastrophe was imminent. His life in the Fuehrer headquarters was nothing but duty and work. The modesty in his mode of life was impressive. There was not one day during This war...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. As you said, Dr. Exner, the Tribunal has had to listen to This sort of thing over and over again already. We are not interested in that.
DR. EXNER: Perhaps you can tell the Tribunal something which they have heard less frequently, namely what you disliked in the personality of Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that, put in that general way, it is of any interest to the Tribunal, what he disliked in Hitler. I mean, can he not get on with his own case?
DR. EXNER: Did you feel that you were close to the Fuehrer personally?
JODL: No; in no way at all.
DR. EXNER: All your relations were essentially official?
JODL: Yes, purely official. I did not belong to his private circle, and he did not know any more about me than that my name was Jodl, and that therefore, presumably, I came from Bavaria.
DR. EXNER: Who belonged to the private circle?
JODL: Chiefly all the old guard from the time when the Party was in its developing stage: Bormann first of all, the original women secretaries, his personal physician, and the political or SS adjutants.
DR. EXNER: Your Gauleiter speech was used by the Prosecution to prove that you were an unconditional follower of the Fuehrer and his enthusiastic adherent. Tell us, how did you come to make that speech?
JODL: Bormann proposed this speech to the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer ordered it, though I undertook this speech very reluctantly, chiefly because of lack of time. But it was generally the wish in this period of crisis...
DR. EXNER: When was this speech?
JODL: In November 1943. The Italian defection had preceded it. It was the time of the heavy air attacks. At that moment it was naturally necessary to give the political leaders at home a completely unembroidered picture of the whole military situation, but at the same time to fill them with a certain amount of confidence in the supreme leadership. This speech, which had the title, "The strategic situation of Germany at the beginning of the fifth year of the war," could obviously not be made by a Blockleiter, it could only be made by an officer of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and so I came to deliver this speech.
DR. EXNER: What were the contents of this speech?