dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ALDERMAN: On 17 July 1936 all illegal Gauleiter met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. At this same conference the Gauleiter received organizational instructions from Globocnik and Hiedler." Then skipping a paragraph I quote further from this report- in the English that paragraph which I am skipping is omitted, so I am skipping a paragraph in the German version: "Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Fuehrer named Lieutenant General"-Gruppenfuehrer-"Keppler as chief of the mixed commission which was appointed, in accordance with the State Treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct execution of the agreement. At the same time Keppler was given full authority by the Fuehrer for the Party in Austria. After Keppler was unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked together with Doctor Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaler as leader of the peasants, Kaltenbrunner"-that is the Defendant Kaltenbrunner in this case -"as leader of the SS, and Doctor Jury as deputy leader of the Austrian Party, as well as with Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart." A new strategy was developed for the Austrian Nazis. Mr. Messersmith describes it briefly, and I quote from Page 13 of his affidavit, 1760-PS: "The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold who, as was known definitely, was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program was now to form an organization through which the Nazis could carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations which had a legal basis, but which were simply a device by which the Nazis in Austria could organize and later seek inclusion as a unit in the Patriotic Front.
MR. ALDERMAN: The most important of these was the Union of the East Mark,"-Ostmarkische Verein-"the sponsor of which was the Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this organization was declared legal by the courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because it shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi activities directed from Germany." At this point I offer in evidence Document 2246-PS as Exhibit USA-67, a captured German document which is a report from Von Papen to Hitler dated September 1, 1936. This document is most interesting because it indicates Von Papen's strategy after July ll, 1936 for destroying Austria's independence. Von Papen had taken a substantial step forward with the agreement of July 11. It should be noted incidentally, that after that agreement he was promoted from Minister to Ambassador. Now his tactics were developed in the following terms-I quote the last three paragraphs of his letter of September 1, 1936 to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. Those three paragraphs are all joined as one paragraph in the English text: "The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti National Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected prior to the conference on the abolishing of the control of nuances at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed Minister Von Glaise-Horstenau of his intention to offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior. As a guiding principle"-Marschroute (a German word meaning the route of march)-'I recommend on the tactical side, continued, patient, psychological treatment, with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime.
MR. ALDERMAN: The proposed conference on economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be a very useful tool for the realization of some of our projects. In discussion with Government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal Party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform completely with the agreement of 11 July I am trying to direct the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative representation of the movement in the Fatherland Front, but nevertheless refraining from putting National Socialists in important positions for the time being. However, such positions are to be occupied only by personalities having the support and the confidence of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau." Signature-"Papen." To recapitulate, this report by Von Papen to Hitler discloses the following plan: (a) Obtaining a change in personnel in the Austrian Ministry of Security in due course; (b) Obtaining corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the Fatherland Front; (c) Not putting avowed National Socialists in important positions yet, but using nationalist personalities; (d) Using economic pressure and patient psychological treatment with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime. My next subject is Germany's diplomatic preparations for the conquest of Austria. The program of the Nazi conspiracy with respect to Austria consisted of weakening that country externally and internally by removing its support from without, as well as by penetrating within. This program was of the utmost significance, especially since, as the Court will remember, the events of 25 July 1934 inside Austria were overshadowed in the news of the day by the fact that Mussolini had brought his troops to the Brenner Pass and posed there as a strong protector of his northern neighbor, Austria.
MR. ALDERMAN: Accordingly, interference in the affairs of Austria and steady increase in the pressure needed to acquire control over that country, required removal of the possibility that Italy or any other country would come to its aid. But the foreign policy program of the conspiracy for the weakening and isolation of Austria was integrated with their foreign policy program in Europe generally. I should like, therefore, at this juncture, to digress for a moment from the presentation of evidence bearing on Austria alone and to consider with the Tribunal the general foreign policy program of the Nazis. It is not my intention to examine this subject in any detail. Historians and scholars exhausting the archives will have many years of probing all the details and ramifications of European diplomacy during this fateful decade. It is instead my purpose to mention very briefly the highlights of the Nazis' diplomatic preparation for war. In this connection I should like to offer to the Tribunal Document Number 2385-PS, a second affidavit of George S. Messer- smith executed on 30 August 1945 at Mexico City. This has been made available to the defendants in German, as well as in English. This is a different affidavit from Document Number 1760-PS which was executed August 28. This second affidavit, which I offer as Exhibit USA-68, consists of a presentation of the diplomatic portion of the program of the Nazi Party. To a considerable extent it merely states facts of common knowledge, facts that many people who are generally well informed already know. It also gives us facts which are common knowledge in the circle of diplomats or of students of foreign affairs. It consists of some 11 mimeographed pages, single-spaced. I read first from the third paragraph in the affidavit: "As early as 1933, while I served in Germany, the German and Nazi contacts which I had in the highest and secondary categories openly acknowledged Germany's ambitions to dominate southeastern Europe from Czechoslovakia down to Turkey.
MR. ALDERMAN: As they freely stated, the objective was territorial expansion in the case of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The professed objectives in the earlier stages of the Nazi regime, in the remainder of southeastern Europe, were political and economic control and they did not, at that time, speak so definitely of actual absorption and destruction of sovereignty. Their ambitions, however, were not limited to southeastern Europe. From the very beginnings of 1933, and even before the Nazis came into power, important Nazis speaking of the Ukraine freely said that 'it must be our granary' and that 'even with southeastern Europe under our control, Germany needs and must have the greater part of the Ukraine in order to be able to feed the people of greater Germany.' After I left Germany in the middle of 1934 for my post in Austria, I continued to receive information as to the German designs in southeastern Europe. In a conversation with Von Papen shortly after his appointment as German Minister to Austria in 1934, Von Papen frankly stated to me that 'southeastern Europe to Turkey is Germany's hinterland and I have been designated to carry through the task of bringing it within the fold. Austria is first on the program.' "As I learned through my diplomatic colleagues, Von Papen in Vienna and his colleague Von Mackensen in Budapest were openly propagating the idea of the dismemberment and final absorption of Czechoslovakia as early as 1935." Then, skipping a short paragraph, I resume: "Immediately after the Nazis came into power, they started a vast rearmament program. This was one of the primary immediate objectives of the Nazi regime.
MR. ALDERMAN: As a matter or fact the two immediate objectives of the Nazi regime when it came into power, had to be and were, according to their own statements frequently made to me: First, to bring about the complete and absolute establishment of their power over Germany and the German people, so that they would become in every respect willing and capable instruments of the regime to carry through its ends; Second, the establishment of a tremendous armed power within Germany in order that the political and economic program in southeastern Europe and in Europe could be carried through by force if necessary, but probably by a threat of force. It was characteristic that in carrying through this second aim, they emphasized from the very outset the building of an overpowering air force. Goering and Milch often said to me or in my presence that the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in the shortest time." Skipping to the end of that paragraph, and resuming at the next: "At the same time that this rearmament was in progress, the Nazi regime took all possible measures to prepare the German people for war in the psychological sense. Throughout Germany, for example, one saw everywhere German youth of all ages engaged in military exercises, drilling, field maneuvers, practicing the throwing of hand grenades, et cetera . In this connection I wrote in an official communication in November 1933, from Berlin as follows: "'...Everything that is being done in the country today has for its object to make the people believe that Germany is being threatened vitally in every aspect of its life by outside influences and by other countries. Everything is being done to use this feeling to stimulate military training and exercises, and innumerable measures are being taken to develop the German people into a hardy, sturdy race which will be able to meet all comers. The military spirit is constantly growing.
MR. ALDERMAN: It cannot be otherwise. The leaders of Germany today have no desire for peace unless it is a peace which the world makes at the expense of complete compliance with German desires and ambitions. Hitler and his associates really and sincerely want peace for the moment, but only to have a chance to get ready to use force if it is found finally essential. They are preparing their way so carefully that there is not in my mind any question but that the German people will be with them when they want to use force and when they feel that they have the necessary means to carry through their objects...."' One further sentence following that I quote: 'military preparation and psychological preparation. were coupled with diplomatic preparation designed so to disunite and isolate their intended victims as to render them defenseless against German aggression." In 1933 the difficulties facing Germany in the political and diplomatic field loomed large. France was the dominant military power on the continent. She had a system of mutual assistance in the West and in the East. "The Locarno Pact of 1928, supplemented by the Franco-Belgian Alliance, guaranteed the territorial status quo in the West. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were allied in the Little Entente and each, in turn, was united with France by mutual assistance pacts. Since 1922 France and Poland had likewise been allied against external aggression. Italy had made plain her special interest in Austrian independence." Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to break up the existing alliances and understandings, to create divisions among the members of the Little Entente and the other eastern European powers. Specifically, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with promises of economic gain for cooperating with Germany. To some of these countries she offered extravagant promises of territorial and economic rewards. She offered Carinthia in Austria to Yugoslavia. She offered part of Czechoslovakia to Hungary and part to Poland.
MR. ALDERMAN: She offered Yugoslav territory to Hungary at the same time that she was offering land in Hungary to Yugoslavia. As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit-that is 2385-PS, on Page 5: "Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German program of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors of these countries with the promises of a share in the loot. To Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. Concerning the Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time: " 'The major factor in the internal situation in the last week has been the increase in tension with respect to the Austrian Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia... There is very little doubt but that Goering, when he made his trip to various capitals in southeastern Europe about 6 months ago, told the Yugoslavs that they would get a part of Carinthia when a National Socialist Government came into power in Austria .... The Nazi seed sown in Yugoslavia had been sufficient to cause trouble and there are undoubtedly a good many people there who look with a great deal of benevolence on those Nazi refugees who went to Yugoslavia in the days following July 25.' "Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, Von Papen and Von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935 were spreading the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all. "The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objective. I recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or 1935 that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions of Hungarian territory.
MR. ALDERMAN: The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later gave me the same information. "I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made these promises were not only the 'dyed in the wool' Nazis but more conservative Germans who already had begun willingly to lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an official dispatch to the Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I wrote as follows: " 'Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen, and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are "diplomats of the old school." They are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just because the outside world looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime.' " I find that last paragraph very important and worthy of emphasis. In other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these divisions and increase its own aggressive strength by using as its agents in making these promises men who on outward appearances were merely conservative diplomats. It is true that the Nazis openly scoffed at any notion of international obligations, as I shall show in a moment. It is true that the real trump in Germany's hand was its rearmament and more than that, its willingness to go to war. And yet the attitude of the various countries was not influenced by those considerations alone. With all those countries, and I suppose with all persons, we are not always completely rational, we tend to believe what we want to believe, and if an apparently substantial and conservative person like the Defendant Von Neurath, for example, is saying these things, one might be apt to believe them, or at least to act upon that hypothesis. And it would be the more impressive if one were also under the impression that the person involved was not a Nazi and would not stoop to go along with the designs of the Nazis. Germany's approach toward Great Britain and France was in terms of limited expansion as the price of peace.
MR. ALDERMAN: They signed a naval limitations treaty with England and discussed a Locarno air pact. In the case of both France and England, they limited their statement of intentions and harped on fears of communism and war. In making these various promises, Germany was untroubled by notions of the sanctity of international obligations. High ranking Nazis, including Goering, Frick, and Frank, openly stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany's interest to do so. I quote from the affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Page 4, beginning on the 10th line: "High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official contact, particularly men such as Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frisk, Frank, Darre, and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany's interest to do so. Although these statements were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made to others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing any secret, for on many occasions they expressed the same idea publicly." France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to counter Germany's moves.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. [The Tribunal adjourned until 29 November 1945 at 1000 hours. ]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal. Before I resume the consideration of Mr. Messersmith's second affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, I should like to consider briefly the status of the proof before this Tribunal of the matter stated in the first Messersmith affidavit, introduced by the United States, Document 1760-PS, Exhibit USA-57. You will recall that Mr. Messersmith in that affidavit made the following general statements: First, that although Nazi Germany stated that she would respect the independence of Austria, in fact she intended from the very beginning to conclude an Anschluss, and that Defendant Von Papen was working toward that end. Second, that although Nazi Germany pretended, on the sur- face, to have nothing to do with the Austrian Nazis, in fact she kept up contact with them and gave them support and instruction. Third, that while they were getting ready for their eventual use of force in Austria, if necessary, the Nazis were using quiet infiltrating tactics to weaken Austria internally, through the use of Christian-front personalities who were not flagrantly Nazi and could be called what they referred to as Nationalist Opposition, and through the device of developing new names for Nazi organizations, so that they could be brought into the Fatherland Front of Austria corporatively, that is as an entire group. Now let us see briefly what some of our German documents proved, in support of these general statements in the Messersmith affidavit. The excerpts I have already read out of the report from Gainer to Burckel, enclosed in the letter to Seyss-Inquart, Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, showed: First, that the Austrian Nazi groups kept up contacts with the Reich although they did it secretly in accordance with instructions from the Fuehrer. Second, that they continued their organization on a secret basis so as to be ready in what they referred to as an emergency.
MR. ALDERMAN: Third, that they used persons like Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau, who had what they called good legal positions, but who could be trusted by the Nazis; and that 5 days after the Pact of July 11, 1936 between Germany and Austria, a pact which specifically pledged the German Government not to interfere either directly or indirectly in the internal affairs of Austria, including the question of Austrian National Socialism, the Austrian Nazis met with Hitler at Obersalzberg and received new instructions; and finally, that Hitler then used Keppler, whose name we shall again meet in a short while in a significant manner as his "contact man" with the Austrian Nazis, with full authority to act for the Fuehrer in Austria and to work with the leaders of the Austrian Nazis. Then we offered Document 2247-PS, Exhibit USA-64, Von Papen's letter to Hitler of May 17, 1935 that showed that Von Papen had been in contact with Captain Leopold and it showed how Von Papen got Hitler to make a solemn promise of Austria's independence in order to further Papen's internal political gain in Austria. Then we offered Document 2248-PS, Exhibit USA-63, Von Papen's letter of July 27, 1935, which reviewed the situation 1 year after Dollfuss' death, and pointed out how National Socialism could be made the link for the Anschluss and how National Socialism could overcome the Austrian ideologies, and in which he identified himself completely with the National Socialist goat We offered Document 2246-PS, Exhibit USA-67, Von Papen's letter to Hitler of September 1, 1936, which Showed how Von Papen advised using both economic and continuing psychological pressure; that he had conferences with the leaders of the illegal Austrian Party; that he was trying to direct the next developments in such a way as to get corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the Fatherland Front, and that meanwhile he was not ready to urge that avowed National Socialists be put in prominent positions, but was quite satisfied with collaborators like Glaise-Horstenau.