dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
COL. PHILLIMORE: FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Is that your opinion or is that the opinion which Admiral Doenitz expressed to you?' HESSLER: He told me, "We have a clear conscience." FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Immediately after the capitulation you were repeatedly interrogated on questions of U-boat warfare and you asked the senior officer present whether the German U-boat command would be accused by the British Navy of criminal acts. Is that right? HESSLER: Yes. 555 14 May 46 FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And what answer did you receive? HESSLER: An unhesitating "No." FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: I have no further questions, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Does any defendant's counsel wish to ask any questions? [There was no response.] The Prosecution? COL. PHILLIMORE: With the Tribunal's permission I would not propose to cross-examine and ask leave to adapt my cross-examination of the last witness because it is the same ground substantially. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Does any other Prosecutor wish to cross-examine? Yes, Dr. Kranzbuehler? FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I have no further questions to ask the witness, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: In the interrogation of the Defendant Doenitz he said that Godt and Hessler-that is you, is it not. . . ? HESSLER: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: . . . told him, "Don't send that signal. You see, one day it might appear in the wrong; it might be misinterpreted." Did you say that? HESSLER: I do not remember. As consulting officers, we often had to oppose orders which were being drafted, and we were entitled to do so; but I do not remember whether Admiral Godt and I did so in this case. THE PRESIDENT: Then later in this interrogation the Defendant Doenitz said: "I am completely and personally responsible for it"-that is that order-"because Captains Godt and Hessler both expressly stated that they considered the telegram as ambiguous or liable to be misinterpreted." Did you say that this telegram was ambiguous or liable to be misinterpreted? HESSLER: I do not remember that point. I do not think I thought the telegram was ambiguous.
COL. PHILLIMORE: THE PRESIDENT: And lastly the Defendant Doenitz said this: 556 14 May 46 "I would like to emphasize once more that both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler were violently opposed to the sending of the telegram." Do you say that you were not violently opposed to the sending of the telegram? HESSLER: It is possible that we opposed the dispatch of the telegram because we did not consider it necessary to refer to the matter again. THE PRESIDENT: Did you say anything to the Defendant Doenitz about this telegram at all? HESSLER: At the drafting of the telegram we talked it over, just as we discussed every wireless message drafted by us. As time went on, we drafted many hundreds of wireless messages so that it is impossible to remember just what was said in each case. THE PRESIDENT: You began your answer to that question: "At the drafting of this telegram..." Do you remember what happened at the drafting of this telegram? HESSLER: I can remember only that in the course of the socalled Laconic incident a great many wireless messages were sent and received; that many wireless messages were drafted; and that, in addition, U-boat operations were going on in the Atlantic, so that I cannot recall details of what happened when the message was drafted. THE PRESIDENT: You said now that it was possible that you and Admiral Godt were opposed to the sending of this telegram. Is that your answer? HESSLER: It is possible, but I cannot say. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Dr. Kranzbuehler, the witness can retire. 1The witness left the stand.] FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, this morning I had already advised the Prosecution that I shall not call the fourth witness scheduled-that is Admiral Eckardt. Therefore, my examination of witnesses has been concluded. THE PRESIDENT: And that concludes your case for the present? FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That concludes my case, but with the permission of the Tribunal I would like to clarify one more question which deals with documents.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The Tribunal has refused all documents which refer to contraband, control ports, and the "Navicert" system. These questions are of some importance if I am to give a correct exposition later on. 557 14 May 46 May I interpret the Tribunal's decision as saying that these documents are not to be used now as evidence but that I may have permission to use them later on in my legal exposition? THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal thinks that is a question which may be reserved until the time comes for you to make your speech. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Thank you, Mr. President. Then I have concluded my case. THE PRESIDENT: We win adjourn now. [The Tribunal adjourned until 15 May 1946 at 1000 hours.] 558
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: These orders you were issuing were going to young commanders between 20 and 30 years of age' were they not?
GODT: Certainly not as young as 20. They would be in their late twenties, most probably.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Do you say that this order is not ambiguous?
GODT: Yes. Perhaps if you take one sentence out of the context you might have some doubt, but not if you read the entire order.
COL. PHILLIMORE: What was the point of the words: "Rescue runs counter to the most elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews"? [There was no response.] Show it to him, will you? [The document was submitted to the witness.] What was the point of those words, if this was merely a nonrescue order?
GODT: It was served to motivate the remainder of the order and to put on an equal level all the ships and crews which were fighting against our U-boats.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You see, all your orders were so clear, were they not? Have you got the Defense documents there in the witness box?
GODT: I think so-no.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at the Defense Document Number D5nitz-8, Page 10. It is on Page 10 of that book. Let me just read you the second paragraph: "U-boats may instantly attack, with all the weapons at their command, enemy merchant vessels recognized with certainty as armed, or announced as such, on the basis of unimpeachable evidence in the possession of the Naval Operations Staff." The next sentence: "As far as circumstances permit, measures shall be taken for the rescue of the crew, after the possibility of endangering the U-boat is excluded." Now, no commander could go wrong with that order, could he? It is perfectly clear. Look at another one, D-642, at Page 13. It is the last paragraph of the order, on Page 15. Now, this is a nonrescue order. Have you got it? Paragraph E, Standing Order 154: "Do not rescue crew members or take them aboard and do not take care of the ship's boats. Weather conditions and distance from land are of no consequence. Think only of the safety of your own boat and try to achieve additional success as soon as possible. "We must be harsh in this war. The enemy started it in order to destroy us; and we have to act accordingly." Now, that was perfectly clear, was it not? That was a "nonrescue" order?
GODT: It was just as clear as the order we are talking about
COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at one or two more and then let me come back to that order; Page 45, another order: "Order from Flag Officer, U-boats"-reading the third line- "to take on board as prisoners captains of sunk ships with their papers, if it is possible to do so without endangering the boat or impairing its fighting capacity." It is perfectly clear to anybody exactly what was intended, is it not?
GODT: That is not an order at all; it only reproduces an extract from the War Diary.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, reciting the words of the order; and Then, on the next page in Paragraph 4: "Try under all circumstances to take prisoners if that can be done without endangering the boat"-Again, perfectly clear. Look at the next page, Page 47, Paragraph 1 of your order of the 1 June 1944, the last sentence: "Therefore every effort must be made to bring in such prisoners, as far as possible, without endangering the boat." Now, you have told us that this order of 17 September 1942 was intended to be a nonrescue order; that is right, is it not?
GODT: Yes, certainly.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I ask you again, what was meant by the sentence: "Rescue runs counter to the most elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews"?
GODT: That is the motivation of the rest of the order, which states that ships with crews armed and equipped to fight U-boats were to be put on the same level.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Why do you speak about the destruction of crews if you do not mean the destruction of crews?
GODT: The question is whether the ships and their crews were to be destroyed; and that is something entirely different from destroying the crews after they had left the ship.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And that is something entirely different from merely not rescuing the crews; isn't that a fact?
GODT: I do not quite understand that question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Destruction of crews is quite different from nonrescue of crews?
GODT: Destruction-as long as the ship and crew are together.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question, are you? But if you want it again: Destruction of crews is quite different from nonrescue of crews?
GODT: The destruction of the crew is different from the nonrescue of survivors, yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Were those words merely put in to give this order what you described as a "lively character," which an order should have?
GODT: I cannot give you the details; I have already said that I do not remember in detail the events leading up to this order.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the tribunal has already said to the witness that the document speaks for itself.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. [Turning to the Witness.] Would you just look at the next document in the Prosecution book, that is D-663, at the last sentence of that document? In view of the desired destruction of ships' crews, are you saying that it was not your intention at this time to destroy the crews if you could?
GODT: I thought we were talking about survivors.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, it is the same thing, to some extent, is it not; ships' crews, once they are torpedoed, become survivors?
GODT: Then they would be survivors; yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you now answer the question? Was it not your intention at this time to destroy the crews, or survivors if you like, if you could?
GODT: If you mean survivors; the question can refer to two things. As regards survivors-no.
COL. PHILLIMORE: If you are not prepared to answer the question, I will pass on. Do you remember the case of Kapitanleutnant Eck?
GODT: I only heard of the case of Kapitanleutnant Eck from American and British officers, and only after I came to Germany.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you know that he was on his first voyage when his U-boat sank the Peleus and then machine-gunned the survivors? -Do you know that?
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: He had set out from the 5th U-boat flotilla at Kiel where Mohle was briefing the commanders, had he not?
GODT: He must have.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Now, if-instead of taking the whole blame upon himself for the action which he took-if he had defended his action under this order of 17 September 1942, are you saying that you could have court-martialed him for disobedience?
GODT: It might have been possible.
COL. PHILLIMORE: In view of the wording of your order; do you say that?
GODT: That would have been a question for the court-martial to decide. Moreover, Eck, as far as I heard, did not refer to this order.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Can you explain to the Tribunal how the witness Mohle was allowed to go on briefing that this was an annihilation order, from September 1942 to the end of the war?
GODT: I do not know how Mohle came to interpret this order in such a way. In any case he did not ask me about it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You realize that he is putting his own life in great jeopardy by admitting that he briefed as he did, don't you.
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You also know, don't you, that another commander he briefed was subsequently seen either by yourself or by Admiral Doenitz before he went out?
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Again when he came back?
GODT: In general, yes, almost always.
COL. PHILLIMORE: In general. Are you seriously telling the Tribunal that none of these officers who were briefed that this was an annihilation order, that none of them raised the question either with you or with Admiral Doenitz?
GODT: In no circumstances was this order discussed.
COL. PHILLIMORE: But I suggest to you now that this order was very carefully drafted to be ambiguous; deliberately, so that any U-boat commander who was prepared to behave as he did was entitled to do so under the order. Isn't that right?
GODT: That is an assertion.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And that you and Hessler, you tried to stop this order being issued?
GODT: I have already said that I do not remember this.
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross-examination? Do you wish to re-examine, Dr. Kranzbuehler?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Do you know that Korvettenkapitan Mohle has testified before this Tribunal that he told only a very few officers about his interpretation of the Laconia order?
GOUT: I-read that in the affidavit which Mohle made before British officers last year.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Do you know that Mohle testified here personally that he did not speak to Admiral Doenitz, yourself, or Captain Hessler about his interpretation of the Laconia order, although he repeatedly visited your staff?
GODT: I know that. I cannot tell you at the moment whether I know it from the affidavit which Mohle made last year or from another source.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You have been confronted with Admiral Doenitz' testimony that you and Captain Hessler opposed the Laconia order. You stated that admiral Doenitz gave an exaggerated account of your objection to this order, so as to take the whole responsibility upon himself?
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think you can ask him that question, Dr. Kranzbuehler, whether it is possible that the Admiral was over-emphasizing what he said.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Then I will not put this question. Your Honor, I have no further question to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: Then with the permission of the Tribunal I would like to call Captain Hessler as my next witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. [The witness Hessler took the stand.] Ion; PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
GUNTHER HESSLER (Witness): Gunther Hessler.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and will add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Captain Hessler, when did you enter the Navy?
HESSLER: In April 1927.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What was your last grade?
HESSLER: Fregattenkapitan.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You are related to Admiral Doenitz. Is that correct?
HESSLER: Yes. I married his only daughter in November 1937.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: When did you enter the U-boat service?
HESSLER: I started my U-boat training in April 1940.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were- you given any information during your period of training on economic warfare according to the Prize Ordinance?
HESSLER: Yes. I was informed of it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was the so-called "prize disc" used which has just been submitted to you?
HESSLER: Yes, I was instructed about it.
FLOTTENRICHTERUEHLER: Will you tell the Tribunal briefly just what the purpose of this "prize disc" is?
HESSLER: It was a system of discs by means of which, through a simple mechanical process in a very short time one could ascertain how to deal with neutral and enemy merchant ships-whether, for instance, a neutral vessel carrying contraband could be sunk or captured, or whether it must be allowed to pass. This disc has another great advantage in that it indicates at the same time the particular paragraph of the Prize Ordinance in which the case in question may be found. This made it possible to cut down the time required for the investigation of a merchant ship to a minimum.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That means that the disc was in the nature of a legal adviser to the commander?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I now submit this disc to the Tribunal as Exhibit Doenitz-95. In your training were you told what attitude you were required to adopt toward shipwrecked survivors? If so, what was it?
HESSLER: Yes. The rescuing of survivors is a matter of course in naval warfare and must be carried out as far as military measures permit. In U-boat warfare it is utterly impossible to rescue survivors, that is, to take the entire crew on board, for space conditions in the U-boat do not permit of any such action. The carrying out of other measures, such as, approaching the lifeboats, picking up swimmers and transferring them to the lifeboats, handing over provisions and water, is, as a rule, impossible, for the danger incurred by the U-boat is so great throughout the operational zone that none of these measures can be carried out without endangering the boat too much
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You yourself went out on cruises as commander soon after receiving these instructions?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: From when to when?
HESSLER: From October 1940 till November 1941.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In what areas did you operate?
HESSLER: South of Iceland, west of the North Channel, in the waters between Cape Verde and the Azores, and in the area west of Freetown.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What success did you have against merchant shipping?
HESSLER: I sank 21 ships, totaling more than 130,000 tons. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBt1HLER: You received the Knight's Cross?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: How did you act toward the survivors of the crews of the ships you sank?
HESSLER: In most cases the situation was such that I was compelled to leave the scene of the wreck without delay on account of danger from enemy naval or air forces. In two cases the danger was not quite so great. I was able to approach the lifeboats and help them.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What were the ships concerned?
HESSLER: Two Greek ships: the Papalemos and Pandias.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: How did you help the lifeboats?
HESSLER: First of all I gave the survivors their exact position and told them what course to set in order to reach land in their lifeboats. In the second place, I gave them water, which is of vital importance for survivors in tropical regions. In one case I also furnished medical aid for several wounded men.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did your personal experience with torpedoed ships dispose you to caution with regard to rescue measures?
HESSLER: Yes. The experienced U-boat commander was justifiably suspicious of every merchantman and its crew, no matter how innocent they might appear. In two cases this attitude of suspicion saved me from destruction. This happened in the case of the steamer Kalchas, a British 10,000 ton ship which I torpedoed north of Cape Verde. The ship had stopped after being hit by the torpedo. The crew had left the ship and were in the lifeboats, and the vessel seemed to be sinking. I was wondering whether to surface in order at least to give the crew their position and ask if they needed water. A feeling which I could not explain kept me from doing so, I raised my periscope to the fullest extent and just as the periscope rose almost entirely out of the water, sailors who had been hiding under the guns and behind the bulwark, jumped up, manned the guns of the vessel -which so far had appeared to be entirely abandoned-and opened fire on my periscope at very close range, compelling me to submerge at full speed. The shells fell close to the periscope but were not dangerous to me. In the second case, the steamer Alfred Jones, which I torpedoed off Freetown, also seemed to be sinking. I wondered whether to surface, when I saw in one of the lifeboats two sailors of the British Navy in full uniform. That aroused my suspicions. I inspected the ship at close range-I would say from a distance of 50 to 100 meters-and established the fact that it had not been abandoned, but that soldiers were still concealed aboard her in every possible hiding-place and behind boarding. When I torpedoed the ship this boarding was smashed. I saw that the shin had at least four to six guns of 10 and 15 centimeter caliber and a large number of depth-charge chutes and antiaircraft guns behind the bulwarks. Only a pure accident, the fact that the depth charges had not been timed, saved me from destruction. It was clear to me, naturally, after such an experience, that I could no longer concern myself with crews or survivors without endangering my own ship.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: When did you enter the staff of the Commander, U-boats.
HESSLER: In November 1941.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You were First Naval Staff Officer?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was it your task to instruct the commanders on orders issued before they left port?
HESSLER: Yes, I did that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And what was the connection between the instructions given by you and those to be given by the flotilla chiefs-Korvettenkapitan Mohle, for instance?
HESSLER: The commanders whom I had to instruct received a complete summary of all questions concerning procedure at sea. The flotilla chiefs were charged with ascertaining that all commanders should receive a copy of the most recent orders issued by Commander, U-boats. I might say that these were limited instructions, compared with the full instructions they received from me.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did these full instructions include the instructions to the commanders regarding the treatment of survivors?
HESSLER: Yes, in much the same style as the instructions I received during my training in the U-boat school.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was any change made in the manner of instruction after the Laconia order of September 1942?
HESSLER: Yes. I related the incident briefly to the commanders and told them: '`Now the decision as to whether the situation at sea permits of rescue attempts no longer rests with you. Rescue measures are prohibited from now on."
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Do you mean to say that during the whole of the rest of the war-that is, for 21/z years-the commanders continued to be told about the Laconia incident, or was that only done immediately after this incident in the autumn of 1942?
HESSLER: I would say up to January 1943 at the latest. After that, no further mention was made of it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You mean, no further mention of the incident?
HESSLER: No further mention of the Laconia incident.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: But the orders issued as a result of it were mentioned?
HESSLER: Yes, that a specific order not to take any more rescue measures had been issued.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did the commanders at any time receive orders or suggestions from you or from one of your staff to shoot at survivors?
HESSLER: Never.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were the commanders told by you about the order to take captains and chief engineers on board, if possible?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was it emphasized in those instructions that this was only to take place when it could be done without endangering the U-boat?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Do you know of the incident of U-boat U-386 which passed some airmen shot down in the Bay of Biscay?
HESSLER: I remember this incident very distinctly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Then you also remember that this incident took place in the autumn of 1943?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did Commander, U-boats, think, with regard to this incident, that the U-boat commander should have shot at the airmen in the rubber dinghy?