dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. STAHMER: Why did Hitler decide to rearm and reintroduce compulsory service? Goering: When Germany left the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, she simultaneously announced to the leading powers concerned her definite decision to aim at universal disarmament. The Fuehrer then made various proposals which, it can be assumed, are historically known: restriction of active armed forces to a certain number of men; restriction of weapons to be used; abolishing of certain weapons as, for example, bombers; and various other points. Each one of these proposals was rejected, however, and did not reach a general realization, nor were even discussed. When we and the Fuehrer recognized clearly that the other parties did not think of disarming and that, on the contrary, that mighty power to the east of us in particular, Russia, was carrying out an armament program as never before, it became necessary for us, in order to safeguard the most vital interests of the German people, their life and their security, to free ourselves from all ties and to rearm to such an extent as was now necessary for the interests and security of the Reich. That was the first reason for the necessity of reintroducing compulsory service.
DR. STAHMER: To what extent did the Luftwaffe participate in this rearmament? Goering: In 1933, when I founded the Air Ministry, we had not yet gone into the question of rearmament. In spite of that I did arrange for certain basic conditions. I immediately extended manufacture and increased air traffic beyond the extent of necessary traffic, so as to be able to train a larger number of pilots. At that time I took over a number of young people, lieutenants, cadets, who then had to leave the Wehrmacht in order to take up commercial flying and there to learn to fly. I was aware from the beginning that protection in the air was necessary as one of the most essential conditions for the security of my nation. Originally it was my belief that a defensive air force, that is, a fighter force, might suffice; but upon reflection I realized -- and I want to underline what witness Field Marshal Kesselring said on that subject -- that one would be lost with merely a fighter force for defense purposes and that even a defensive force must contain bombers in order that it can be used offensively against the enemy air force on enemy territory. Therefore I had bomber aircraft developed from commercial airplanes. In the beginning rearmament proceeded slowly. Everything had to be created anew since nothing existed in the way of air armament. In 1935 I told the Fuehrer that I now considered it proper, since we had repeatedly received refusals in answer to our proposals, to declare to the world openly that we were creating an air force, and that I had already established a certain basis for that. This took place in the form of an interview which I had with a British correspondent. Now I could proceed to rearm on a larger scale; but in spite of that we confined ourselves at first to what we called a "Risk Air Force," that is a risk insofar as an enemy coming to attack Germany should know that he could expect to meet with an air force. But it was by no means strong enough to be of any real importance.
DR. STAHMER: In 1936 followed the famous report, which was presented to the witness Bodenschatz, in which I said that we must from this moment on work on the basis of mobilization, that money mattered nothing, and that, in short, I should take the responsibility for overdrawing the budget. Since nothing had existed before, I should be able to catch up quickly only if aircraft production on one hand were made to work with as many shifts and as much speed as possible, that is with maximum effort and on a mobilization basis, and if, on the other hand, extension of the ground forces and similar matters was carried out at once with the greatest possible speed. The situation in 1936 is defined by me, in that report to my co-workers, as serious. Other states had, to be sure, not disarmed, but here and there they had perhaps neglected their air force and they were catching up on lost ground. Violent debates were taking place in England with regard to modernizing and building up the air force; feverish activities were taking place in Russia, concerning which we had reliable reports -- I shall refer to the question of Russian reannament later. When the Civil War broke out in Spain, Franco sent a call for help to Germany and asked for support, particularly in the air. One should not forget that Franco with his troops was stationed in Africa and that he could not get the troops across, as the fleet was in the hands of the Communists, or, as they called themselves at the time, the competent Revolutionary Government in Spain. The decisive factor was, first of all, to get his troops over to Spain. The Fuehrer thought the matter over. I urged him to give support under all circumstances, firstly, in order to prevent the further- spread of communism in that theater and, secondly, to test my young Luftwaffe at this opportunity in this or that technical respect.
DR. STAHMER: With the permission of the Fuehrer, I sent a large part of my transport fleet and a number of experimental fighter units, bombers, and antiaircraft guns; and in that way I had an opportunity to ascertain, under combat conditions, whether the material was equal to the task. In order that the personnel, too, might gather a certain amount of experience, I saw to it that there was a continuous flow, that is, that new people were constantly being sent and others recalled. The rearming of the Air Force required, as a basic condition, the creation of a large number of new industries. It was no help to me to build a strong Air Force and not to have any gasoline for it. Here, too, therefore, I had to speed up the development of the refineries to the utmost. There were other auxiliary industries, above all, aluminum. Since I considered the Luftwaffe the most important part of the Wehrmacht, as far as the security of the Reich was concerned, and, in view of the modernization of technical science, it was my duty as Commander-in-Chief to do everything to develop it to the highest peak; and, too, as nothing was there to begin with, a supreme effort and a maximum amount of work had to be achieved. That I did. Much has been said here in a cross-examination about four-engine bombers, two-engine bombers, et cetera . The witnesses made statements to the best of their knowledge and ability, but they were familiar only with small sections and they gave their opinions from that point of view. I alone was responsible and am responsible, for I was Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and Minister for Air. I was responsible for the rearmament, the training and the morale of the Luftwaffe. If at the beginning I did not build any four-engine bombers, it was not because I had qualms that they might be construed as an aggressive force. That would not have disturbed me for one minute. My only reason was that the necessary technical and production conditions did not exist. That kind of bomber simply had not yet been developed by my industry, at any rate not so that I could use it.
DR. STAHMER: Secondly, I was still short of aluminum, and anyone only half an expert knows how much aluminum a four-engine bomber swallows up and how many fighters, that is, two-engine bombers, one can build with the same amount. To start with, I had to ascertain who were likely to be Germany's opponents in a war. Were the technical conditions adequate for meeting an attack against Germany by such an enemy? Of all possible opponents I considered Russia the main opponent, but of course England, France, and Italy also had to be considered. It was my duty to consider all possibilities. As far as the European theater of war was concerned, I could, for the time being, be satisfied with bombers which could operate against the impoftant centers of enemy armament industry. Thus, for the time being, I did not need anything more than aircraft which would enable me to do that, but it was important to have more of that kind. But in a speech to the aircraft industrialists I let it be clearly known that I desired most urgently to have a bomber which, loaded with the necessary bombs, could fly to America and back. I asked them to work on that diligently so that, if America should enter into war against Germany, I could also reach the American armament industry. It was not a question, therefore, of not wanting them. I even, as far as I remember, inaugurated a prize competition for bombers capable of flying at great heights and at great speeds over large distances. Even before the beginning of the war we had begun to develop propellerless aircraft. Summing up, I should like to say that I did everything possible under the technical and production conditions then prevalent, to rebuild and rearm a strong Air Force. The technical knowledge of that time led us to believe that, after 5 years of war, new technical and practical advances would be made. That is a principle based on experience. I wanted to be prepared to have an Air Force which, however the political situation might develop, would be strong enough to protect the nation and to deal blows to Germany's enemy.
DR. STAHMER: It is perfectly correct for Mr. Justice Jackson to ask whether the speedy elimination of Poland and France was due to the fact that the German Air Force, acting according to modern principles, contributed so much. It was the decisive factor. On the other hand, though this does not concern me, the use of the American air force was also a decisive factor for the Allied victory.
DR. STAHMER: Has the fact that you were given control of raw materials already in April 1936 anything to do with this rebuilding of the Air Force? Goering: I need not repeat what the witness Korner elaborated yesterday, or the day before yesterday, with regard to my gradual rise in economic leadership. The starting point was the agricultural crisis in the year of 1935. In the summer of 1936 the then Minister of War, Von Blomberg, the Minister of Economy and President of the Reichsbank, Schacht , and Minister Kerrl came to me and asked me whether I was prepared to back a suggestion of theirs which they wanted to submit to the Fuehrer, namely, that I be appointed Commissioner for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange. It was agreed that I should not function as an economics expert, which I was not; but some one was needed to take care of the difficulties due to shortage of foreign currency, which continuously arose because of our heavy demands, and at the same time to make available and accumulate raw materials -- someone who was capable of taking measures which would perhaps not be understood by many people, but would have the weight of his authority. Secondly, it was decided that in this sphere, though not as an expert, I should be the driving power and use my energy. Minister Schacht, who was the expert, had difficulties with the Party. He was not a member of the Party. He was at that time on excellent terms with the Fuehrer and me, but not so much with the members of the Party. The danger arose that the appropriate measures might not be understood by the latter, and in this connection I would be the right man to make these things known to the people and the Party. That is how that came about. But since I, as Minister of Air was, as I have explained, interested in raw materials, I played an ever increasingly important role. Then the differences between agriculture and economy in regard to foreign currency came more to the fore, so that I had to make decisions, decisions which became more drastic. Thus I entered the field of economic leadership.
DR. STAHMER: I devoted a great deal of time and work to this task, particularly to procuring the raw materials necessary for economy and for rearmament. Out of this the Four Year Plan arose which gave me far-reaching plenary powers.
DR. STAHMER: What was the aim of the Four Year Plan? Goering: The Four Year Plan had two aims: First, that German economy as far as possible and particularly in the agricultural sector, should be made secure against any crisis; secondly, in the event of war, Germany should be able to withstand a blockade to the greatest extent possible. Therefore it was necessary, first, to increase agriculture to the utmost, to control and direct it, to control consumption, and to store up supplies by means of negotiations with foreign countries; secondly, to ascertain which raw materials, imported until then, could be found, produced, and procured in Germany itself, and which raw materials that were difficult to import could be replaced by others more easily obtainable. Briefly, as far as the agricultural sphere was concerned: utilization of every available space; regulation of cultivation according to the crops needed; control of animal breeding; building up of reserves for times of need or crop failures; as far as the industrial sector was concerned, the creation of industries supplying raw materials: First, coal -- although there was sufficient coal, its production would have to be increased considerably, since coal is the basic raw material on which so many other things are dependent; iron-our mining industry had made itself so dependent on foreign countries that, in the event of a crisis, a most disastrous situation might arise here. I can quite understand that from the purely financial and business point of view that was all right but, nevertheless, we should have to mine and make available the German iron ores which were at our disposal, even though they were inferior to the Swedish ores; we should have to compel industry to make alloys and manage with German ores. I recklessly allowed industry a year's time. As industry by then had still not begun to exploit these ores, I founded the Reich works which were given my name. They were primarily for opening up iron-ore reserves in German soil and using them in the mining industry.
DR. STAHMER: It was necessary to set up oil refineries, aluminum works and various other works, and then to promote the development of the so-called synthetic material industry in order to replace necessary raw materials which could be obtained only from abroad and under difficult circumstances. In the field of textiles this involved the conversion of the textile industry and of I. G. Farben. That, roughly, was the task of the Four Year Plan. Naturally a third question is of importance in this connection: the question of labor. Co-ordination was necessary here too. The most important industries had to have workers; less important industries had to dispense with them. The control of this allocation of labor, which before the war functioned only within Germany, was another task of the Four Year Plan and the Department for the Allocation of Labor. The Four Year Plan as such very quickly assumed too large proportions as an official organization. Then, after Schacht had left, I took over the Ministry of Economy for 2 months and fitted the Four Year Plan into it. I retained only a very small staff of collaborators and carried out the tasks with the assistance of the ministries competent to deal with these things.
DR. STAHMER: Was the purpose of carrying out these plans that of preparing for aggressive war? Goering: No, the aim of the plans was, as I said, to make Germany secure against economic crises, and to make her secure against a blockade in the event of war, and, of course, within the Four Year Plan to provide the necessary conditions for rearmament. That was one of its important tasks.
DR. STAHMER: How did the occupation of the Rhineland come about? Goering: The occupation of the Rhineland was not, as has been asserted here, a long-prepared affair. What had been discussed previously did not deal with the occupation of the Rhineland, but with the question of mobilization measures in the Rhineland in case of an attack on Germany. The Rhineland occupation came about for two reasons. The balance which was created through the Locarno Pact had been disturbed in western Europe, because a new factor had arisen in France's system of allies, namely Russia, who even at that time had an extraordinarily large armed force. In addition, there was the Russian-Czechoslovakian mutual assistance pact. Thus, the conditions upon which the Locarno Pact had been based no longer existed, according to our way of thinking. So, there was now such a threat to Germany, or the possibility of such a threat, that it would have been a neglect of duty and honor on the part of the Government if it had not done everything to ensure, here also, the security of the Reich. The Government therefore -- as a sovereign state -- made use of its sovereign right and freed itself from the dishonorable obligation not to place a part of the Reich under its protection, and it did place this important part of the Reich under its protection by building strong fortifications. The construction of such strong fortifications, such expensive fortifications and such extensive fortifications, is justified only if that frontier is regarded as final and definitive. If I had intended to extend the frontier in the near future, it would never have been possible to go through with an undertaking so expensive and such a burden to the whole nation as was the construction of the West Wall. This was done -- and I want to emphasize this particularly -- from the very beginning only in the interest of defense and as a defensive measure.
DR. STAHMER: It made the western border of the Reich secure against that threat which, because of the recent shift of power, and the new combination of powers such as the Franco-Russian mutual assistance pact, had become a threat to Germany. The actual occupation, the decision to occupy the Rhineland, was made at very short notice. The troops which marched into the Rhineland were of such small numbers -- and that is an historical fact -- that they provided merely a token occupation. The Luftwaffe itself could not, for the time being, enter the Rhine territory on the left at all, since there was no adequate ground organization. It entered the so-called demilitarized territory on the right of the Rhine, Dusseldorf and other cities. In other words, it was not as if the Rhineland were suddenly occupied with a great wave of troops; but, as I said before, it was merely that a few battalions and a few batteries marched in as a symbol that the Rhineland was now again under the full sovereignty of the sovereign German Reich and would in the future be protected accordingly.
DR. STAHMER: What were Hitler's aims when he created the Reich Defense Council and when he issued the Reich Defense Law? Goering: The Reich Defense Council, during the last months, played a very important role here. I hope I shall not be misunderstood; I believe that during these months more has been said about it than was ever said since the moment of its creation. In the first place it is called Reich Defense Council and not Reich Council for the Offensive. Its existence is taken for granted. It exists in every other country in some form or other, even if it has another name. First of all, there was a Reich Defense Committee already, before our seizure of power. In this committee there were official experts from all the ministries for the purpose of carrying out mobilization preparations or, better said, mobilization measures, which automatically come into consideration in any kind of development -- war, the possibility of war, the facts of war involving bordering states and the subsequent need to guard one's neutrality. These are the usual measures to be taken -- to ascertain how inany horses have to be levied in case of mobilization, what factories have to be converted, whether bread ration cards and fat ration cards have to be introduced, regulation of traffic, et cetera -- all these things need not be dealt with in detail, because they are so obvious. All such discussions took place in the Reich Defense Committee discussions by the official experts presided over by the then chief of the ministerial office in the Reich Ministry of War, Keitel. The Reich Defense Council was created, for the time being, as a precautionary measure, when the armed forces were re-established, but it existed only on paper. I was, I think, Deputy Chairman or Chairman -- I do not know which -- I heard it mentioned here. I assure you under oath that at no time and at no date did I participate in a meeting at which the Reich Defense Council as such was called together.
DR. STAHMER: These discussions, which were necessary for the defense of the Reich, were held in a completely different connection, in a different form and depended on immediate needs. Naturally, there were discussions about the defense of the Reich, but not in connection with the Reich Defense Council. This existed on paper, but it never met. But even if it had met, that would have been quite logical, since this concerns defense and not attack. The Reich Defense Law, or rather the Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense, which is probably what you mean, was created only one day before the outbreak of the war, since the Reich Defense Council actually did not exist. This Ministerial Council for Reich Defense is not to be considered the same as, for instance, the so-called War Cabinet that was formed in England when the war broke out, and perhaps in other countries. On the contrary, this Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense was -- by using abbreviated procedure -- to issue only the regulations necessary for wartime, laws dealing with daily issues, explanations to the people, and it was to relieve the Fuehrer to a considerable extent, since he had reserved for himself the leadership in military operations. The Ministerial Council therefore issued, first of all, all those laws which, as I should like to mention, are to be expected in any country at the beginning of a war. In the early period it met three or four times, and after that not at all. I, too, had no time after that. To abbreviate the procedure, these laws were circulated and then issued. One, or one and a half years afterwards -- I cannot remember the exact time -- the Fuehrer took the direct issuance of laws more into his own hands. I was the co-signer of many laws in my capacity as Chairman of this Ministerial Council. But that, too, was practically discontinued in the latter years. The Ministerial Council did not meet again at all after 1940, I think.
DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution has presented a document, Number 2261-PS. In this document a Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 is mentioned, which for the time being was kept in abeyance by order of the Fuehrer. I shall have that document shown to you and I ask you to give your views on it? Goering: I am familiar with it.