dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. DIX: GISEVIUS: On that Sunday, the 1st of July, Frick said to me "If Hitler does not very soon do to the SS and Himmler what he has done to the SA today, he will experience far worse things with the SS than he has experienced now with the SA." I was greatly struck by that prediction at the time, and by the fact that Frick should speak so openly to me. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But notwithstanding the estimate he made of those men as dangerous persons, did he not thereafter appoint them both in his Ministry of Interior? GISEVIUS: Well, of course, they were actually appointed by Hitler. However, I can only say that when I took leave of Frick, at the time I left the Ministry of the Interior in May 1935, Frick told me literally that the constant difficulties he had had because of me had taught him from now on to take Party members only in his Ministry, and as far as possible those who had the Golden Party Emblem. He said that it was possible that in the course of events he might even be forced to allow Himmler into his Ministry, but in no case would he accept the murderer Heydrich. Those were the last words I exchanged with Frick. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Both were put in charge of matters that were under his legal control, were they not? GISEVIUS: Yes, they became members of the Reich Ministry of the Interior and Frick remained their superior. THE PRESIDENT: Did you say that those were the last words which you exchanged with the Defendant Frick? GISEVIUS: Yes. That was in 1935 and I have not met him or talked to him since. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after 1934 Frick was the Minister in charge of the running and controlling of concentration camps, was he not, Dr. Gisevius? GISEVIUS: In my opinion the Reich Minister of the Interior was responsible from the beginning for all police matters in the Reich and therefore also for the concentration camps, and I do not believe that one can say he had that responsibility only since 1934. 255 25 April 46 MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am willing to accept your amendment to my question.
DR. DIX: I ask that you be shown Document Number 3751-PS of the United States, which has not yet been offered in evidence. [The document was submitted to the witness.] Now, this purports to be a communication from Dr. Guertner, the Minister of Justice, to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior. That would be from your friend Dr. Guertner to Frick, would it not? GISEVIUS: I believe I heard you say "friend." During the time he acted as Minister, Guertner did not conduct himself in such a way that I could consider him my friend. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well then, tell us about Guertner. Tell us about Guertner's position in this situation because we have a communication here apparently from him. GISEVIUS: Guertner? MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. GISEVIUS: At that time Guertner without doubt made many attempts to expose the cruelty in the camps and to initiate criminal proceedings. In individual cases Guertner did make many attempts; but after the 30th of June he signed that law which legalized all those dreadful things, and also in other respects Guertner never acted consistently with his views. But this document which you submit to me was just such an attempt by Guertner and the many decent officials in the Ministry of Justice to bring the question of the Gestapo terror to discussion. As far as I recollect this is one of those letters which we discussed unofficially beforehand in order to provoke an answer, so to say. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I now desire to read some parts of this into the record. It becomes Exhibit USA-828. I will offer it as such. Will you kindly follow the German text and see if I correctly quote: "My dear Reich Minister! "Enclosed you will find a copy of a report of the Inspector of the Secret State Police, dated 28 March 1935. "This report gives me an occasion to state my fundamental attitude towards the question of corporal punishment for internees. The numerous instances of ill-treatment which have come to the knowledge of the authorities of justice point to three different reasons for such ill-treatment of prisoners: 256 25 April 46 "1.
DR. DIX: Beating as a disciplinary punishment in concentration camps. "2. Ill-treatment, mostly of political internees, in order to make them talk. "3. Ill-treatment of internees arising out of sheer wantonness or for sadistic motives." I think I will not take the Tribunal's time to read his comment on Number 1 or Number 2. About Number 3, you will find in the German text: "The experience of the first revolutionary years has shown that the persons who are charged to administer the beatings generally lose all sense of the purpose and meaning of their action after a short time, and permit themselves to be governed by personal feelings of revenge, or sadistic tendencies. Thus members of the guard detail of the former concentration camp at Bredow, near Stettin, completely stripped a prostitute who had an argument with one of them and beat her with whips and cowhides in such a fashion that the woman 2 months later still showed two open and infected wounds." I shall not go into the dimensions; they are not important. "In the concentration camp at Kemna near Wuppertal, prisoners were locked up in a narrow clothing locker and were then tortured by blowing in cigarette smoke, upsetting the locker, et cetera . In some cases the prisoners were first given salt herring to eat, in order to produce an especially strong and torturing thirst. "In the Hohnstein Concentration Camp in Saxony, prisoners had to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for this purpose, until the drops of water, which fell down at even intervals, caused seriously infected wounds on their scalps. "In a concentration camp in Hamburg four prisoners were lashed in the form of a cross to a grating for days, once without interruption for 3 days and nights, once for 5 days and nights and fed so meagerly with dry bread that they almost died of hunger. "These few examples show a degree of cruelty which is such an insult to every German feeling, that it is impossible to consider any extenuating circumstances.
DR. DIX: "In conclusion, I should like to present my opinion about these three points to you, my dear Herr Reich Minister, in your capacity as departmental minister competent for the 257 25 April 46 establishment of protective custody, and the camps for protective custody." And he goes on to make certain recommendations for action by the Minister. I do not know whether the Tribunal cares to have more of this read. Was any improvement in conditions noted after the receipt of that communication by Frick? GISEVIUS: The letter was received just at the time I left the Ministry of the Interior. I should like to say only one thing concerning this letter: What is described therein is really only a fraction of what we knew. I helped prepare this letter in that I spoke to the officials concerned in the Ministry of Justice. The Minister of Justice could bring up only those matters which had by chance become known legally through some criminal record. But there can be no doubt that this communication was merely a motive, and the cause of a very bold letter from Heydrich to Goering, dated 28 March 1935, in which he disputed the right of the Minister of Justice to prosecute cases of ill-treatment. The letter, therefore does not add anything new to my descriptions, and no doubt all have been convinced that these conditions, which started at that time, never ceased but became worse as time went on. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when Heydrich was assassinated in Prague, was there not? GISEVIUS: Yes, some very brave Czechs were able to do what we unfortunately could not achieve. That will always be to their glory. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I suppose the Czechs expected, and did you expect that the assassination of Heydrich would result in some improvement in this condition?
DR. DIX: GISEVIUS: We doubted-we, Canaris, Oster, Nebe, and the others of the group-whether it was possible at all for an even worse man to be found to succeed such a monster as Heydrich, and to that extent we really did think that the Gestapo terror would now subside, and that perhaps we would return to a certain amount of honesty and integrity, or that at least the cruelties might be lessened. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then came Kaltenbrunner. Did you notice any improvement after the appointment of Kaltenbrunner? Tell us about that. GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner came and things became worse from day to day. More and more we learned that perhaps the impulsive actions of a murderer like Heydrich were not so bad as the cold, legal logic of a lawyer who took over the administration of such a dangerous instrument as the Gestapo. 258 25 April 46 MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you tell us whether Kaltenbrunner took an even more sadistic attitude than Himmler and Schellenberg had done? Were you informed about that? GISEVIUS: Yes. I know that Heydrich, in a certain sense, really had something akin to a bad conscience when he committed his crimes. At any rate, he did not like it when those things were discussed openly in Gestapo circles. Nebe, who as Chief of the Criminal Police had the same rank as the Chief of the Gestapo, Mueller, always told me that Heydrich took care to conceal his crimes. With the entry of Kaltenbrunner into that organization, this practice ceased. All those things were now openly discussed among the department chiefs of the Gestapo. By now the war had started, of course. These gentlemen lunched together, and Nebe often came to me from such luncheons so completely exhausted that he had a nervous breakdown. On two occasions Nebe had to be sent on long sick leave because he simply could not stand the open cynicism with which mass murder, and the technique of mass murder, were discussed.
DR. DIX: I remind you only of the gruesome chapter of the installation of the first gas chambers, which was discussed in detail in this circle, as were the experiments as to how one could remove the Jews most quickly and most thoroughly. These were the most horrible descriptions I have ever heard in my life. It is, of course, so much worse when you hear them first-hand from someone who is still under the direct impression of such discussions-and who because of this is almost at the point of physical and mental collapse, than when you hear of them now from documents. Nebe became so ill that actually as early as 20 July he suffered from a persecution mania and was a mere human wreck after everything he had gone through. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it the custom to have daily dinner conferences of the chiefs of the Main Security Office, those who happened to be in town? GISEVIUS: Daily conferences; everything was discussed at luncheon. This was of particular importance to us, because we heard details of the methods used by the Gestapo in the fight against our group. To prove what I say, I can state here that, for instance, the order issued for the arrest of Goerdeler on 17 July was decided upon during such a luncheon conference, and Nebe warned us at once. That is the reason why Goerdeler was able to escape, at least for some time, and why we were able to know to what extent the Gestapo were aware of our plot. 259 25 April 46 MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who were the regular attendants at those luncheon conferences? GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner presided. Then there were Gestapo Mueller, Schellenberg, Ohlendorf, and Nebe. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you know whether, at those meetings, the new kinds of torture and the technique of killing by gas, and other measures in the concentration camps, were discussed? GISEVIUS: Yes. That was discussed in great detail, and sometimes I received the description only a few minutes later. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what is the situation with reference to the information of the Foreign Office about the conduct of the Gestapo?
DR. DIX: Will you tell us what was done to inform the Foreign Office from time to time of the crimes that the Gestapo were committing? GISEVIUS: The Foreign Office, particularly during the earlier years, was continually kept informed, as nearly every day some foreigner was half beaten to death or robbed, and then the diplomatic missions would come with their complaints, and these complaints were sent to the Ministry of the Interior by the Foreign Office. These went through my office and sometimes I had four or five such notes a day from the Foreign Office regarding excesses by the Gestapo; and I can testify that in the course of years there were no crimes by the Gestapo which were not set forth in these notes. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make certain reports to the Foreign Office which were so dispatched that you are reasonably certain they would reach Neurath? GISEVIUS: Ribbentrop was not yet the Foreign Minister at that time... MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, Neurath. GISEVIUS: I very often discussed these matters personally with the officials of the Foreign Office, because they were of a particularly difficult nature, and because the officials of the Foreign Office were very indignant, I asked them repeatedly to put these matters before the Minister through the official channels. In addition, I gave as much material as I could to one of the closest collaborators of the Foreign Minister at that time, the Chief of Protocol, "Minister" Von Buelow-Schwante; and according to the information I received from Buelow-Schwante, he very often submitted that material to Neurath. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, were certain of the collaborators close collaborators of Von Papen? Was Von Papen subject to action by the Gestapo? 260 25 April 46 GISEVIUS: To start with, the entire group around Von Papen was continuously under surveillance by the Gestapo because in the earlier years there was an impression among great masses of people that Von Papen was a special advocate for decency and right.
DR. DIX: A large group collected around Von Papen and that, of course, was most carefully watched by the Gestapo. As the complaints, which Von Papen received by the score, were carefully compiled in his office, and as no doubt Von Papen quite often took these papers either to Goering or to the Hindenburg palace, the closest collaborators of Von Papen were especially suspected by the Gestapo. So it was that on 30 June 1934 Oberregierungsrat Von Bose, the closest collaborator of Von Papen, was shot dead in the doorway of Von Papen's office. The two other colleagues of Von Papen were imprisoned, and the man who wrote Von Papen's radio speeches, Edgar Jung, was arrested weeks before the 30th of June; and on the morning of 1 July, he was found murdered in a ditch along the highway near Oranienburg. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did Von Papen continue in office after that? GISEVIUS: I have never heard that he resigned; and I know that very soon after the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered, he was sent to Vienna as Hitler's ambassador. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he ever make any protests that you know of? GISEVIUS: I personally heard of none at the time, although, we were naturally extremely eager to hear which minister would protest. However, no letter from Papen arrived at the Ministry of the Interior. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were some of his collaborators murdered after the Anschluss in Austria? GISEVIUS: On the day of the Anschluss, when the SS entered Austria, Von Papen's closest collaborator, Legation Counsellor Freiherr von Ketteler, was kidnapped by the Gestapo. We searched for him for weeks, until 3 or 4 weeks later his body was washed up on the banks of the Danube. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After that did Papen continue to serve as a part of the Hitler Government and accept further offices from Hitler's hands? GISEVIUS: He was no longer a member of the Government at the time. Immediately after the march into Austria Von Papen was disposed of by being made envoy. However, it was not long before he continued his activities as Ambassador at Ankara. 261 25 April 46 MR.
DR. DIX: JUSTICE JACKSON: Does the Tribunal desire to rise at this point? THE PRESIDENT: You would like a little more time, wouldn't you, with this witness? MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It will take a little more time, Your Honor. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now. [The Tribunal adjourned until 26 April 1946 at 1000 hours.] 262
DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, before the noon recess we had just come to the outbreak of the war, and so that your subsequent testimony may be understood, I must ask you first in what capacity you served during the war.
GISEVIUS: On the day of the outbreak of war I was called to Security Intelligence by General Oster by means of a forged order. However, as it was a regulation that all officers or other members of the intelligence service had to be examined by the Gestapo, and as I would never have received permission to be a member of the intelligence, they simply gave me a forged mobilization order. Then I was at the disposal of Oster and Canaris without doing any direct service.
DR. DIX: And after the outbreak of war what were the activities of your group of conspirators, the members of which you have already mentioned? Who took over the leadership, who participated, and what was done?
GISEVIUS: Immediately after the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck was at the head of all oppositional movements which could exist in Germany at all, with the exception of the Communists with whom we had no contact at that time. We were of the opinion that only a general could be the leader during war, and Beck stood so far above purely military matters that he was the suitable man to unify all groups from the left to the right. Beck chose Dr. Goerdeler as his closest collaborator.
DR. DIX: Consequently the only civilians who worked with this group of conspirators were Schacht and Goerdeler as before?
GISEVIUS: No, on the contrary; all the opposition groups, who had so far had merely loose connections with each other, were now drawn together under the pressure of war. This was especially so with the left opposition movements, which had been greatly reduced in the early years as all their leaders had been interned. These left groups especially now came in with us. In this connection I shall merely mention Leuschner and Dr. Karl Muehlendorf. However, I must also mention the Christian Trade Unions, and Dr. Habermann, and Dr. Jacob Kaiser. Further I must mention the Catholic circles, the leaders of the Confessional Church, and individual political men such as Ambassador Von Hassell, State Secretary Planck, Minister Popitz, and many, many others.
DR. DIX: What was the attitude of these left circles, especially concerning the question of a revolt, the forceful removal of Hitler or even an attempt on his life? Did they also consider the possibility of an attempt at assassination, which later was actually suggested in your group?
GISEVIUS: No, the left circles were very much under the impression that the "stab in the back" legend had done much harm in Germany; and the left circles thought that they ought not to expose themselves again to the danger of having it said later that Hitler or the German Army had not been defeated on the battlefield. The left wing had long been of the opinion that no matter how bitter an experience it might be for them, it must now be proved absolutely to the German people that militarism was committing suicide in Germany.
DR. DIX: I have already submitted to the Tribunal, a letter which you, Doctor, smuggled to Switzerland for Schacht at about this time-the end of 1939. It is a letter to the former president of the International Bank at Basel, later president of the First National Bank of New York; a man of influence, who probably had access to President Roosevelt. In anticipation of the documentary evidence pertaining hereto I had originally intended to read this letter to the Tribunal now. However, in discussing the admissibility of evidence I informed the Tribunal of most of the essential points, and as Mr. Justice Jackson could not yet have the Schacht Document Book in hand, and as he remarked previously that he did not like me to produce documentary evidence at this point, I will not carry out my original intention to read this letter in its entirety. I shall come back to it when I present my documentary evidence. Just to refresh the witness' memory about this letter, I will give the underlying reasons for it. Schacht suggested to President Fraser that now the moment. ..
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I make no objection to the use of the letter from Schacht to Leon Fraser as one banker writing to another. If you want to claim that Mr. Fraser was influential with President Roosevelt, I should want you to prove it; but I have no objection to the letter.
DR. DIX: The letter is dated 14 January 1946. I will not read it in its entirety, for there are six long pages. Its contents are. . .
THE PRESIDENT: What date was it?
DR. DIX: I had the wrong letter. The 16 October 1939. It will be Exhibit Number 31 in my document book. He writes that now would be an excellent time to give peace to the world with President Roosevelt-that would be a victory, also a German victory . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is the letter from Schacht?
DR. DIX: From Schacht to Fraser.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have proof for the letter?
DR. DIX: If the Tribunal prefers, Schacht can also deal with the letter. In that case I will only ask the witness whether it is true that he smuggled this letter into Switzerland. [Turning to the witness.] Please answer the question, Witness.
GISEVIUS: Yes. I took this letter to Switzerland and mailed it there.
DR. DIX: Very well. What did your group do to bring about peace, or prevent the war from spreading? Did you undertake further activities in foreign politics in that direction in your opposition group, that is, your group of conspirators?
GISEVIUS: The main thing for us was with all possible means to prevent the war from spreading. It could only spread toward Holland and Belgium or Norway. We recognized clearly that if a step was taken in this direction, the consequences, not only for Germany, but for the whole of Europe would be tremendous. Therefore, we wanted to prevent war in the West by all means. Immediately after the Polish Campaign Hitler decided to move his troops from the East to the West, and to launch the attack by violating the neutrality of Holland and Belgium. We believed that if we could succeed in preventing this attack in November we would in the coming winter months gain enough time to convince the individual generals, above all Brauchitsch and Halder and the leaders of the army groups, that they must at least oppose the expansion of the war. Brauchitsch and Halder evaded the question and said it was now too late, that the enemy would fight Germany to the end and destroy her. We did not share this opinion. We believed a peace with honor was still possible, and by honor I mean that we would of course eliminate the Nazi hierarchy to the last man. In order to prove to the generals that the foreign powers did not wish to destroy the German people, but wanted only to protect themselves against the Nazi terror, we took all possible steps abroad. The first attempt in that direction, or a small part of that attempt, was the letter written by Schacht to Fraser, the object of which was to point out that certain domestic political developments were imminent and that if we could gain time, that is, if we could come through the winter, we could perhaps persuade the generals to undertake a revolt.