dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE PRESIDENT: That is the very thing which we have already ruled cannot be put. You are not suggesting that these actions were taken by way of reprisal for the way in which German sabotage units were treated? We are not trying whether any other powers have committed breaches of international law, or crimes against humanity, or war crimes; we are trying whether these defendants have. The Tribunal has ruled that such questions cannot be put.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do not know what answer the witness is going to give. I merely wanted, in case, which I do not know...
THE PRESIDENT: We wanted to know why you were putting the question. You said you were putting the question in order to ascertain whether German sabotage units had been treated in a way which was contrary to international law, or words to that effect, and that is a matter which is irrelevant.
DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, it would show at least that doubt existed about the interpretation of international law with regard to such operations and that would be of importance for the application of the law.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the question is inadmissible.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you also stated during your crossexamination that until 1944 you were chief of the Operational Department of the Naval Operations Staff. Can you give information on whether there were strong German naval forces or naval transport ships in the Black Sea?
WAGNER: The strength of naval forces and transport ships in the Black Sea was very slight.
DR. LATERNSER: For what were they mostly needed?
WAGNER: For our own replacements and their protection.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, how does this arise out of the cross-examination? You are re-examining now, and you are only entitled to ask questions which arise out of the cross-examination. There have been no questions put with reference to the Black Sea.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I learned during the examination that for a long time the witness was chief of the Operational Department; and I concluded that he was one of the few witnesses who could give me information regarding the facts of a very serious accusation raised by the Russian Prosecution, namely, the accusation that 144,000 people had been loaded on to German ships, that at Sebastopol those ships had gone to sea and had then been blown up, and that the prisoners of war on the ships were drowned. The witness could clarify this matter to some extent.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you knew, directly this witness began his evidence, what his position was; and you, therefore, could have cross-examined him yourself at the proper time. You are now re-examining; you are only entitled-because we cannot have the time of the Court wasted-you are only entitled to ask him questions which arise out of the cross-examination. In the opinion of the Tribunal this question does not arise out of the cross-examination.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, please, would you, as an exception, admit this question? low PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal has given you a great latitude and we cannot continue to do so. The Tribunal will now adjourn. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: You have finished, have you not, Dr. Kranzbuehler, with this witness?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. [The witness left the stand.]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And now I should like to call my next witness, Admiral Godt. The witness Godt took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
EBERHARD GODT (Witness): My name is Eberhard Godt.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath.] You may sit down.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral Goat, when did you enter the Navy as an officer cadet?
GODT: On 1 July 1918.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: How long have you been working with Admiral Doenitz, and in what position?
GODT: Since January 1938; first of all as First Naval Staff Officer attached to the Commander, U-boats, and immediately after the beginning of the war as Chief of the Operations Department.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Chief of the Operations Department with the Chief of Submarines?
GODT: Yes, attached to the Chief of Submarines, later Flag Officer, U-boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: Did you collaborate since 1938 in the drafting of all operational orders worked out by the staff of the Flag Officer, U-boats?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: How many officers were on this staff at the beginning of the war?
GODT: At the beginning of the war there were four officers, one chief engineer, and two administrative officers on that staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I shall now show you Document GB-83 of the Prosecution's document book Page 16, which is a letter from Commander, U-boats, dated 9 October 1939. It refers to bases in Norway. How did this letter originate?
GODT: At that time I was visiting the Naval Operations Staff in Berlin on other business. On the occasion of that visit I was asked whether Commander, U-boats, was interested in bases in Norway and what demands should be made in that connection.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were you informed how those bases in Norway were to be secured for the use of the German Navy?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: The Prosecution has quoted an extract from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff dating from the same period. Mr. President, I am thinking of the extract reproduced on Page 15 of the document book. [Turning to the witness.] That extract contains four questions. Questions (a) and (d) deal with technical details regarding bases in Norway, whereas (b) and (c) deal with the possibility of obtaining such bases against the will of the Norwegians, and the question of defending them. Which of these questions was put to you?
GODT: May I ask you to repeat the questions in detail first of an.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The first question is: Which places in Norway can be considered for bases?
GODT: That question was put.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Will you show me from the letter from Commander, U-boats, whether the question was answered and where it is answered? .
GODT: The question was answered under Number 1 (c) at the end of Number 1.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: There it says, "Trondheim or Narvik are possible places."
GODT: Yes, that is right.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Question Number 2 is: "If it is impossible to obtain bases without fighting, can it be done against the will of the Norwegians by the use of military force?" Was that question put?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Can you tell me if the question was answered in the letter from Commander, U-boats?
GODT: This question was not answered.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The third question is: "What are the possibilities of defense after occupation?" Was that question put to you?
GODT: No, that question was not put. FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBt1HLER: Is it replied to in the letter?
GODT: III-d refers to the necessity of adopting defense measures.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Is that reference connected with the fourth question I put to you now: "Will the harbors have to be developed to the fullest extent as bases, or do they already offer decisive advantages as possible supply points?"
GODT: These two questions are not connected.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was that fourth question put to you?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was it answered?
GODT: Not in this letter.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What is the significance of the figures II and III? Do they not answer the question of whether these ports must be developed as bases or whether they can be used just as supply points?
GODT: They indicate what was thought necessary in order to develop them to the fullest extent as bases.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Will you please read the last sentence of the document? There it says, "Establishment of a fuel supply point in Narvik as an alternative supply point." Is that not a reply to the question asking whether a supply point is enough?
GODT: Yes; I had overlooked that sentence.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Can I sum up, therefore, by saying that the first and fourth questions were put to you and answered by you, whereas questions 2 and 3 were not put to you and not answered by you?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff there is a note which says, "Commander, U-boats, considers such ports extremely valuable even as temporary supply and equipment bases for Atlantic U-boats." Does that note mean that Admiral Doenitz was working on this question before your visit to Berlin? Or what was the reason for the note?
GODT: That was my own opinion, which I was entitled to give in my capacity as Chief of the Operations Department.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was that the first time that plans for bases were brought to your notice?
GODT: No. We had been considering the question of whether the supply position for U-boats could be improved by using ships- in Iceland, for instance.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: Were these considerations in any way connected with the question whether one ought to start a war against the country concerned?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: I shall now show you Document GB-91. This appears on Page 18 of the Prosecution's document book. It is an operational order issued by Commander, U-boats, on 30 March 1940 and dealing with the Norwegian enterprise. Is it true, that this is your operational order?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: How many days before the beginning of the Norwegian action was that order released?
GODT: Approximately ten days.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: Paragraph II, Section 5, contains the following sentence: "While entering the harbor and until the troops have been landed, the naval forces will probably fly the British naval ensign, except in Narvik." Is that an order given by Commander, U-boats, to the submarines under his command?
GODT: No. That passage appears under the heading: "Information on our own combat forces."
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: And what is the meaning of this allusion?
GODT: It means that U-boats were informed that in certain circumstances our own naval units might fly other flags.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: Why was that necessary?
GODT: It was necessary so as to prevent possible mistakes in identity.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Are there any other references to mistakes in identity in this order?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Where?
GODT: In Paragraph IV, Section 5.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Will you please read it?
GODT: There it says, "Beware of confusing our own units with enemy forces." FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBt3HLER: Only that sentence. Did this order instruct U-boats to attack Norwegian forces?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Will you please indicate what the order says about that?
GODT: IV, as states, "Only enemy naval forces and troop transports are to be attacked."
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What was meant by "enemy" forces?
GODT: "Enemy" forces were British, French, and Russian-no, not Russian. It goes on: "No action is to be taken against Norwegian and Danish forces unless they attack our own forces." FLOi7li;NRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Will you please look at Paragraph VI-c?
GODT: Paragraph VI says: "Steamers may only be attacked when they have been identified beyond doubt as enemy steamers and as troop transports."
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was Commander, U-boats, informed of the political action taken with regard to incidents caused by submarines?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In what way?
GODT: U-boats had orders to report immediately by wireless in the case of incidents, and to supplement the report later.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I do not think you quite understood my question. I asked you, was Commander, U-boats, informed as to how an incident caused by a submarine would later on be settled with a neutral government?
GODT: No, not as a rule.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Can you remember any individual case where he was informed?
GODT: I remember the case of the Spanish steamer Montse Corbea. Later on I learned that Spain had been promised reparations. I cannot remember now whether I received the information through official channels or whether I just heard it accidentally.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I should now like to establish the dates of certain orders which I have already presented to the Tribunal. I shall show you Standing Order Number 171, which is on Page 159 of Volume III of the document book. What is the date on which that order was issued?
GODT: I shall have to look at it first.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Please do.
GODT: That order must have originated in the winter of 1939-1940. Probably 1939.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: On what do you base that conclusion?
GODT: I base it on the reference made in 4a to equipment for depth charges. This was taken for granted at a later stage. I also gather it from the reference made in 5b to the shifting of masts and colored lights, something which was formulated then for the first time.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Can you tell us the exact month in 1939?
GODT: I assume that it was November.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I am now going to show you another order, Standing War Order Number 122. It appears on Page 226 in Volume IV of my document book. Up to now all we know is that this order was issued before May 1940. Can-you give us a more exact date?
GODT: This order must have been issued about the same time as the first, that is to say, about November 1939.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Thank you. How was the conduct of U-boat warfare by Commander, U-boats, organized in practice? Will you explain that to us?
GODT: All orders based on questions of international law, et cetera, originated with the Naval Operations Staff. The Naval Operations Staff also reserved for itself the right to determine the locality of the center of operations-for instance, the distribution of U-boats in the Atlantic Theater, the Mediterranean Theater, and the North Sea Theater. Within these various areas U-boat operations were, generally speaking, entirely at the discretion of Commander, U-boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were the standing orders for U-boats given verbally or in writing?
GODT: In writing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were there not verbal orders as well?
GODT: Verbal instructions personally issued by Commander, U-boats, played a special part and amounted to personal influence on commanders, as well as to explanations of the contents of written orders.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: On what occasions was · that personal influence exerted?
GODT: Particularly when reports were being made by the commanders after each action. There must have been very few commanders who did not make a personal and detailed report to Commander, U-boats, after an action.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was it possible for written orders to be changed in the course of verbal transmission, or even twisted to mean the opposite?
GODT: Such a possibility might have existed, but it never actually happened.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: When they made these verbal reports, could the commanders risk expressing opinions which were not those of Commander, U-boats?
GODT: Absolutely. Commander, U-boats, even asked his commanders in so many words to give him their personal opinions in every case, so that he could maintain direct personal contact with them and thus remain in close touch with events on the front, so that he could put matters right, where necessary.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was this personal contact used for the verbal transmission of shady orders?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The Prosecution holds that an order-apparently a verbal order-existed, prohibiting the entry in the log of measures considered dubious or unjustifiable from the point of view of international law. Did such a general order exist?
GODT: No; there was no general order. In certain individual cases-can remember two-an order was given to omit certain matters from the log.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Which cases do you remember?
GODT: The first was the case of the Athenia; and the second was the sinking of a German boat, which was coming from Japan through the blockade, by a German submarine.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Before I ask you to give me details of that, I should like to know the reason for omitting such matters from the log.
GODT: It was done for reasons of secrecy. U-boat logs were seen by a great many people: First, in the training stations of the U-boat service itself; and, secondly, in numerous offices of the High Command. Special attention had therefore to be paid to secrecy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: How many copies of each U-boat war log were made?
GODT: I should say six to eight copies.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did the omission of such an item from the log mean that all documentary evidence was destroyed in every of lice; or did certain of flees keep these documents?
GODT: These records were received by Commander, U-boats, and probably by the Naval Operations Staff as well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was there a standing war order prescribing treatment of incidents?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: What were the contents?
GODT: It stated that incidents must be reported immediately by wireless and that a supplementary report must be made later, either in writing or by word of mouth.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Does this standing order contain any allusion to the omission of such incidents from the log?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Will you please tell me now how this alteration was made in the log in the case of the Athenia?
GODT: In the case of the Athenia Oberleutnant Lemp reported on returning that he had torpedoed this ship, assuming it to be an auxiliary cruiser. I cannot now tell you exactly whether this was the first time I realized that such a possibility existed or whether the idea that this might possibly have been torpedoed by a German submarine had already been taken into consideration. Lemp was sent to Berlin to make a report and absolute secrecy was ordered with regard to the case.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: By whom?
GODT: By the Naval Operations Staff, after a temporary order had been issued in our department. I ordered the fact to be erased from the war log of the U-boat.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And that, of course, was on the orders of Admiral Doenitz?
GODT: Yes, or I ordered it on his instructions.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did you participate in the further handling of this incident?
GODT: Only with regard to the question of whether Lemp should be punished. As far as I remember, Commander, U-boats, took only disciplinary action against him because it was in his favor that the incident occurred during the first few hours of the war, and it was held that in his excitement he had not investigated the character of the ship as carefully as he might have done.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did I understand you correctly as saying that the detailed documentary evidence in connection with the sinking of the Athenia was retained by both Commander, U-boats, and, you believe, the Naval Operations Staff?
GODT: I can say that with certainty only as far as Commander, U-boats, is concerned. That is what happened in this case.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You mentioned a second case just now where a log book had been altered. Which case was that?
GODT: That incident was as follows: A German blockade breaker, that is to say, a merchant vessel on its way back from Japan, was accidentally torpedoed by a German submarine and sunk in the North Atlantic. This fact was omitted from the log.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: So it was only a question of keeping matters secret from German offices?
GODT: Yes. The British learned the facts from lifeboats as far as I know; and these facts were to be concealed from the crews of other blockade-breaking vessels.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Documents submitted to the Tribunal by the Defense show that until the autumn of 1942, German U-boats took steps to rescue crews as far as was possible without prejudicing the U-boat's safety and without interfering with their own assignment. Does this agree with your own experiences?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I should now like to put a few questions to you regarding the so-called Laconia order which still require clarification. I refer to Document GB-199. As you know, the Prosecution calls this order an order to kill survivors. Who formulated this order?
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: It is the document book of the Prosecution on Page 36, Mr. President.
GODT: I cannot now tell you that for certain. Generally speaking, such an order was discussed by Commander, U-boats, the First Naval Staff Officer, and myself; Commander, U-boats, decided on the general terms of the order and then it was formulated by one of us. It is quite possible that I myself worded the order.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: But, at any rate, Admiral Doenitz signed it, did he not?
GODT: He must have; yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral Doenitz thought that he remembered that you and Captain Hessler were opposed to this order. Can you remember this, too; and if so, why were you against it?
GODT: I do not remember that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What was the meaning of the order?
GODT: The meaning of the order is plain. It prohibited attempts at rescue.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Why was that not forbidden by a reference to Standing War Order Number 154, which was issued in the winter of 1939-40?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, surely a written order must speak for itself. Unless there is some colloquial meaning in a particular word used in the order, the order must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the words.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I was not proposing to go into the question any further, Mr. President. [Turning to the witness.]   I should like to repeat my last question. Why, instead of issuing a new order, did they not simply refer commanders to Standing War Order Number 154, which was issued in the winter of 1939-40? I refer, Mr. President, to Document GB-196, on Page 33 of the Prosecution's document book. You remember that order, don't you. I have shown it to you.
GODT: Yes, I do. That order had already been canceled when the so-called Laconia order was issued. Apart from that, a mere reference to an order already issued would have lacked the character of actuality which orders should have.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Do you mean by that that your staff, as a matter of principle, did not issue orders by references to earlier orders?
GODT: That was avoided whenever possible; that is to say, almost always.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Will you explain to me why that order was issued as "top secret"?
GODT: The order appeared after an operation An which we nearly lost two boats, and contained a severe reprimand for the commanders concerned. It was not customary for us to put such a reprimand in a form accessible to any one except the commanders and all the officers.
THE PRESIDENT: Which is the severe reprimand?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Will you please explain of what this severe reprimand for the commander consisted?
GODT: It is understandable in the light of previous events- namely, those very things which it forbids. It is largely contained in the sentence beginning: "Rescue is against the most elementary demands" and it is also implied by the harshness, whereby the commander is reproached with being softhearted.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Does this mean that the commanders were accused of having endangered their boats too much in connection with the rescue action of the Laconia and of acting in a manner which was not in accordance with the dictates of war?
GODT: Yes, and that after having been repeatedly reminded during the action of the necessity for acting in a manner in accordance with the dictates of war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: You were interrogated on this order after the capitulation, as you told me; but you could not at the moment remember its exact wording. How was it possible for you not to remember this order?