dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. SIEMERS: That the withdrawal from the League of Nations occurred 14 October 1933, 11 days before the document was written, is a well-known fact and has been mentioned by the Prosecution on Page 257 of the record (Volume II, Page 304). Now we come to Document C-166. This is Exhibit USA-48. Mr. President, this is in Document Book 10, on Page 36. It is a document dated 12 March 1934. It emanates from the Command Office of the Navy and refers to the preparation of auxiliary cruisers for action. The Prosecution have quoted only the first two paragraphs of this document and have pointed out that it shows that auxiliary cruisers were to be built and describes transport ships "O" for camouflage purposes. The two paragraphs sound incriminating, but they can very easily be explained. May I refer to Lohmann's affidavit, Document Number Raeder-2, my Document Book 1, Page 5. I refer to Paragraph II. I quote: "The Document C-166, submitted to me, a communication from the Office of the Naval Command of 12 March 1934, deals with the 'availability of auxiliary cruisers' which, as stated in the document, were marked as 'Transport Ships O.' These ships were not to be newly constructed but were to be selected from the stock of the German merchant marine in accordance with the demands enumerated in the document and were to be examined as to their suitability for the tasks to be assigned them. Then plans were made for reconstruction in case of necessity, but the boats remained in the merchant marine." May I state at this point that in the English translation the word "Umbau" has been translated by the word "reconstruction." I have my doubts as to whether this is quite correct. I presume that the interpreter has now translated it as "Umbau" accordingly.
DR. SIEMERS: As far as I know, the German word "Umbau" only means much the same thing as the English word "changes"-that is, "Veranderung." I continue to quote: "The order to select such boats from German shipyards was received, among others, by the Hamburg Office of the Naval Command where I was serving at the time." Thus far Admiral Lohmann. Witness, is Lohmann's statement correct? Have you anything to add?
RAEDER: No. I can only emphasize again that there was no question of immediate construction but only of selecting suitable ships and examining them with a view to ascertaining the alterations necessary to enable them to function as auxiliary cruisers in the case of a general mobilization. The preparation of the plans and the plans themselves were to be ready by 1 April 1935, as laid down in Number 12. They were to be submitted to the naval administration so that in the case of mobilization the ship concerned could be taken from the stock of the merchant marine and converted. All these proposals for mobilization were, of course, kept secret.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, that the whole misunderstanding would not have arisen if the Prosecution had translated two further sentences. The English version is very short. and Point 11 is missing. I quote the text of Point 11: " 'B' is requested in co-operation with 'K,' first of all, to select suitable vessels and to ascertain how many 15-centimeter guns have to be mounted to achieve the required broadside..." The word "selected" is used here so that the intention is not-as the Prosecution assert-the building of auxiliary cruisers but the making of a selection from merchant vessels.
RAEDER: Yes; and the ships continued to sail in the service of the merchant marine.
DR. SIEMERS: The second sentence, which I find has been unfortunately omitted from the English translation of the Prosecution, reads as follows: "As long as only a restricted number of guns-at present 24- can be placed at our disposal for this purpose, preparations are to be made for only four transport ships (O). An increase of this number, presumably to six, will be postponed to a date when more guns are available. Until then we must await the results of the preparations for the first auxiliary cruisers." The fact that only four, or at the most six, merchant navy vessels were involved shows the insignificance of the whole matter. I now come to Document C-189, USA-44. It is in Document Book Number 10 of the British Delegation, Page 66. I should like your comments-I beg your pardon. I should remind you that this concerns the conversation between Grossadmiral Raeder and the Fuehrer aboard the Karlsruhe in June 1934. Grossadmiral, will you please state your views on the three points mentioned in this brief document and which you discussed with Hitler in June 1934. First question: Why was Hitler unwilling to reveal the increase in displacement of D and E-that is, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau -when, according to this document, these were defensive weapons and every expert would notice the increased tonnage of these ships and, as far as I know, did notice it?
RAEDER: At that time we were considering what we could do with the two armored ships D and E, after the signing of the impending naval pact with England-that is, the two ships which Hitler had granted me for the Navy in the 1934 budget. We had definitely decided not to continue building these armored ships as such, since we could make better use of the material at our disposal.
DR. SIEMERS: But surely you realized that every expert in the British or American or any other Admiralty would see on a voyage, as soon as he had sighted the ship, that the 10,000 tons had now become 26,000?
RAEDER: Yes, of course.
DR. SIEMERS: So that there was merely the intention...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, when you are examining a witness directly, you are not to ask leading questions which put into his mouth the very answer that you desire. You are stating all sorts of things to this witness and then asking him "isn't that so?"
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. I shall make every effort to put my questions differently.
RAEDER: My answer is different anyway.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes?
RAEDER: We are dealing here, in the first place, with plans. I asked permission to revise the plans for these two armored ships; first, by strengthening their defensive weapons-that is, the armor-plating and underwater compartments-and then by increasing their offensive armaments-namely, by adding a third 28-centimeter instead of 26-centimeter tower. The Fuehrer was not yet willing to sanction a new 28-centimeter tower because, as I said before, he did not in any circumstances want to prejudice the negotiations going on with Great Britain. To begin with, therefore, he sanctioned only a medium displacement of 18,000 to 19,000 tons; and we knew that when matters reached the stage where a third 28-centimeter tower could be mounted, the displacement would be about 25,000 to 26,000 tons. We saw no cause to announce it at this stage, however, because it is customary in the Navy that new construction plans and especially new types of ships should be announced at the latest possible moment. That was the principal reason; and apart from that, Hitler did not want to draw the attention of other countries to these constructions by giving the figures mentioned or stating the very high speed. There was no other reason for not announcing these things.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like your comments on Number 2 of the document. That has been specially held against you by the Prosecution, because there you state the view that the fleet must be developed to oppose England later on.
RAEDER: At first-as I intended to explain later-we had taken the new French ships as our model. The French Navy was developing at that time the Dunkerque class with eight 33-centimeter guns and a high speed, and we took that for our model, especially since, in Hitler's opinion-as you will hear later-there was no question of arming against England. We intended to reconstruct these two armored ships on this pattern as battleships with nine 28-centimeter guns and capable of a high speed. But then we heard that the King George class was being designed in England with 35.6-centimeter guns and, therefore, stronger than the French type; and so I said that we would in any case have to depart from the French type eventually and follow the English model which is now being built with 35-centimeter guns. There is an error in the translation-namely, "oppose England." It says in my text that developments should follow the lines of British developments-in other words, that we should design vessels similar in type to the English ships. But they were out of date, too, shortly afterwards, because France was then building ships of the Richelieu class with 38-centimeter guns. Therefore, we decided that we too would build ships with 38-centimeter guns. That was how the Bismarck came to be built. The word "oppose" would have been quite senseless at a time when we intended to come to an agreement with Britain on terms under which we could in no way vie with her.
DR. SIEMERS: Now we come to Point 3 of this document, which the Prosecution regard as equally important. I quote: "The Fuehrer demands complete secrecy with regard to the construction of U-boats-in consideration, also, of the Saar plebiscite."
RAEDER: I have already referred to the Fuehrer's wish for secrecy in connection with both the construction of submarines and the preparations for that construction. This is one of the points on which he was most sensitive, because in no circumstances did he wish to prejudice the negotiations. He himself was generally extremely cautious during this period and would not in any circumstances do anything which might sabotage the naval pact which he was so eager to conclude.
DR. SIEMERS: I do not quite understand the reference to secrecy in connection with the construction of submarines. These were as yet not under construction, were they?
RAEDER: No. I said secrecy in connection with the preparations for the construction of submarines; that is just a short way of expressing it.
DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Document C-190, Exhibit USA-45. It is in Document Book Number 10 of the British Delegation, Page 67. This is a conversation which took place between Hitler and Raeder on 2 November 1934 aboard the Emden . In the document before you Hitler informs you that he considers it necessary to enlarge and improve the Navy by 1938 and that, if necessary, he would instruct Dr. Ley to place at the disposal of the Navy 120 to 150 million marks from the Labor Front. Did you have anything at all to do with raising funds for rearmament?
RAEDER: No, not actually with the raising of funds. I applied for funds to the Reich Defense Minister, who allocated them to me for the purpose of this rearmament. I presume that this statement was made because the allocation sanctioned for the Navy appeared too small to me, and for this reason the Fuehrer said that if necessary he would get Ley to act. This did not actually happen. I received my funds only through the Reich Defense Minister.
DR. SIEMERS: Although the charge made by the Prosecution is not quite clear to me, since it is based on Hitler's views-which have nothing to do with you-I want to come back to this sum once more. I may remind you that an armored cruiser of the old 10,000-ton class, which after all was small, cost 75 to 80 million. Could this figure of 120 to 150 million be large enough to put the Navy in a position to carry out rearmament on a large scale?
RAEDER: No, certainly not. Two battleships were also under construction, apart from those two armored cruisers. You can imagine that the costs continually increased.
DR. SIEMERS: So that this sum was not final?
RAEDER: No, it was not final.
DR. SIEMERS: Will you please go on, then, to Point 2. According to Point 2 of the document, you pointed out to Hitler during this conference that it might be necessary to assemble six submarines during the first quarter of 1935.
RAEDER: I said this because I knew that at the beginning of 1935 we were going to aim at the re-establishment of the Armed Forces; and I thought that this might create a critical situation in respect to sanctions, which Hitler always expected, too. I assume that we were talking about this and that is why I suggested that if the necessity for any special preparations should arise out of the re-establishment of the Armed Forces then six submarines should be assembled, at a date previous to their proper date of assemblage, from those parts which were obtained from abroad.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler actually give the order?
RAEDER: No, the order was not given.
THE PRESIDENT: We might break off now. [A recess was taken.]
DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-159, Exhibit USA-54. This document may be found in the British Delegation's Document Book 10a, Page 110. This document is a letter written by Von Blomberg on 2 March 1936, dealing with the demilitarized zone. Did you, Witness, make lengthy military preparations for the action which took place on 7 March 1936?
RAEDER: No, I made no lengthy preparations; I heard of the plan only through this document of 2 March. I may refer you to Point 6 which says, "To preserve the peaceful character of the operation, no military security or advance measures are to be taken without my express orders." It was made clear, therefore, that the entire action was to have a peaceful character.
DR. SIEMERS: You knew nothing at all about this entire action until the beginning of March?
RAEDER: No, I believe that this action was kept especially secret.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I will turn to Document C-194, Exhibit USA-55, in the British Delegation's Document Book 10a, Page 128. This document is a communication from the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy dating from 1936-the wording seems to indicate 6 March 1936. It deals, therefore, with the same subject as the last document. May I have your comments.
RAEDER: The Reich Defense Minister had sanctioned a certain air reconnaissance to take place over the North Sea on 6 March- that is to say, the day before the occupation of the Rhineland. He intended to withhold his decision as to whether U-boats were also to be sent out on reconnaissance assignments in the West as far as the Texel until the next day. I thereupon issued an order on 6 March 1936 and gave special instructions...
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. [Turning to the Tribunal.] I would like to point out that Raeder's order of 6 March 1936 is appended to the same document and that the text is therefore before the Tribunal. [Turning to the Defendant.] Please go on.
RAEDER: I prepared this decree of 6 March concerning the planning of the U-boat line and the reconnaissance to take place in the German bay on 7 March. I pointed out especially that everything must be avoided which might create a false impression of the Fuehrer's intentions and thus put difficulties in the way of this peaceful action.
DR. SIEMERS: I would like to add to your statement that these words taken from the decree of 6 March 1936 are to be found under Point 5. They are in the last two lines.
RAEDER: Those were all precautionary measures in case of a hostile counteraction.
DR. SIEMERS: Were there any preparations on a large scale?
RAEDER: No, no.
DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the two last documents dealing with the topic of the Versailles Treaty and rearmament, Document C-135, Exhibit GB-213, Document Book 10, Page 20-that is the British Delegation's Document Book 10-which is headed, "History of the War Organization"-that is, the "War Organization and Mobilization Scheme." This dates from 1938. This document was read in its entirety by the Prosecution and a very grave charge was based upon it, because the document contains a statement to the effect that Hitler had demanded that in 5 years-that is, by 1 April 1938-a Wehrrnacht should be created which he could employ as a political instrument of power and also because the document mentions the Establishment Organization Plan 1938 and the Combat Organization Plan. Considering the significance of this point, I asked Vice Admiral Lohmann for his comments on this rather technical question. We are dealing with Exhibit Number Raeder-2, in my Document Book 2, under part III, on Page 5. I think the Prosecution have misunderstood the meaning of certain terms. The terms "Kriegsgliederung" (Combat Organization Plan) and "Aufstellungsgliederung" (Establishment Organization Plan) have been misunderstood. I ask permission, therefore, to read this affidavit in conjunction with the documents I have submitted in evidence. I quote: "III. Referring to Documents C-135 and C-153, Armament Plan, Mobilization Plan, Establishment Organization Plan -Aufstellungsgliederung, A.G.-and Combat Organization Plan-Kriegsgliederung, K.G...." I would like to add that C-153 and C-135 are connected. I have taken them together for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, I would like to state for the record that 153 is Exhibit USA-43 and may be found in British Document Book 10 a, Page 107. It is headed, "Armament Plan (A.P.) for the Third Armament Period." It is a rather long document and is dated 12 May 1934.
DR. SIEMERS: I quote Lohmann's affidavit on these two documents: "The above-named documents submitted to me deal with the Establishment Organization Plan, the Combat Organization Plan, the Mobilization Plan, and the Armament Plan. The first three plans, or orders of distribution, deal with the same matters and differ only in manner of composition. The Armament Plan differs from the other plans inasmuch as it deals with new construction and the required new materials and is hence less extensive. "The German Navy, like the Armed Forces as a whole-and, no doubt, the Armed Forces of every nation-made such plans in order to be able, in the case of a conflict or of military complications, to prepare in time and use efficiently the means of combat available. Owing to changing conditions, military developments, changes in personnel, and advances in technique, such plans were revised every year. An essential part of these preparations, self-evident in the case of any Armed Forces, consisted of the establishment, mobilization, or combat organization, which provided a survey of all naval installations on land and sea, their local defenses, and tactical subordination-as well as of all combat material on hand or to be secured, increased, or reorganized by a specified date. All operations envisaged by the military command were based on this Combat Organization Plan, and it also served the political leaders as an indication of the possibilities according to the strength and number of the military resources available. "The Combat Organization Plan always had to be prepared with great foresight and was issued by the High Command of the Navy generally 1 1/2 years before it was to go into effect, in order to enable the responsible offices to attend in time to such necessary preliminaries, such as applying to the Navy Budget Office for funds and materials-such as iron, steel, et cetera -and for the preparation of accommodation insofar as all this was not already covered by the peacetime development of the Navy.
DR. SIEMERS: "In 1933, when Hitler in his Five Year Plan demanded that by 1 April 1938 an armed force should be created which he could throw into the balance as an instrument of political power, the Combat Organization Plan for 1938 was worked out independently of the scheduled yearly Combat Organization Plan, and up to 1935 it dealt mostly with the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles which had not yet been exhausted and with the question of supplementing the naval strength with craft not subject to limitation in type or number. After the Naval Pact of 1935, the Combat Organization Plan 1938 was replaced by a "Combat Organization Plan Ultimate Goal" (K.G. Endziel), which regulated the number of warships of all types existing or to be built in the proportion of 35:100 measured by the tonnage actually existing in the English Fleet. In consideration of monetary and material resources, the capacity of the shipyards, and the length of time required to build large warships, this ultimate goal was in the meanwhile fixed for the year 1944-45. "There remained always the possibility of postponing it further, in accordance with the building program of the English Fleet. "The various terminologies have only a naval technical significance and do not permit conclusions as to political plans." I would like to indicate a slight error in translation in the English text. The translation of the word "Terminierungen" by "terminology" is, in my opinion, not correct. It should probably be "dates" or "deadlines." Witness, are Vice Admiral Lohmann's statements correct? Can you add anything to this basic point of view?
RAEDER: These statements contain everything which can be said on this matter. All these arrangements are, in my opinion, preparations which must be made by every navy if it is to be systematically equipped and made ready for operation. It says somewhere-in Document Number C-135, Page 1, under Point 2-that, "The growing tension between Germany and Poland forced us to make practical instead of theoretical preparations for a purely German-Polish conflict." That was interpreted to mean that at some time-I believe in 1930-we planned a war of aggression against Poland. I testified yesterday that our main object was and had to be, nor could it have gone any further than, to oppose with force any aggression committed by Poland against East Prussia. That was the object of our work-to protect Germany from an invasion by the Poles. At that time, it would have been madness for German forces, which were still very inadequately armed, to invade Poland or any other country. Then too, since the dates 1938 and 1944-45 constantly recur, I would like to point out again that the year 1938 first came into question as the final date for the first phase of the Shipping Replacement Plan. The last ship of this Shipping Replacement Plan was to be built from 1936 to 1938.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. [Turning to the Tribunal.] I would like to call your attention to the fact that this is Document Number Raeder-7.
RAEDER: [Continuing.] Then Hitler decreed a Five Year Plan, which happened also to cover the years 1933 to 1938 and in accordance with which the Combat Organization Plan was to be fixed for the year 1938. The Combat Organization Plan Ultimate Goal was fixed for 1944-45; and the reason for fixing this date, as stated in the document which you have just read, was the fact that in fixing our program we had to take into consideration the funds and material at our disposal, the capacity of our shipbuilding yards, and the length of time needed to build big warships. A reasonably strong fighting force could not be created before that date. Later on the Combat Organization Plan appears again in several of my letters. But there was no date given which, on our part, was intended as the appointed time of attack.
DR. SIEMERS: The statements in Document C-135 are in accordance with the German-English Naval Agreement. Is that correct? Perhaps I did not formulate my question clearly. The statement that a new program was set up implies then that it was done in accordance with the German-English Naval Agreement?
RAEDER: Yes, of course.
DR. SIEMERS: In any case, the reference to Document C-135, Point 8, is probably to be interpreted in that way since it says, ". . . A modern fleet, bound only by the clauses of the German-British Naval Agreement."
RAEDER: Of course.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I turn to another topic and go back to the year 1933. Grossadmiral, when did you meet Hitler, and did you have any connection with National Socialism before 1933?