dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DOENITZ: I gave them quite a number of orders, as I have already said, according to the weather, according to what part of the sea they were in, and whether it was day or night. The orders were different according to these factors, because the danger depended on these elements and varied accordingly. There were changes too; if we had bad experiences, if we found that night was more dangerous than day, then we surfaced during the day. We had the impression that in the end it was better to surface during the day, because then one could at least locate beforehand the aircraft attacking by direction-finding, so we changed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is a fact that quite soon after this order the Allied air cover became so heavy that-I quote your own words; you say, "Two months later submarines were no longer in a position to surface." That is, as I understood it, surfacing became very difficult in view of the heavy nature of Allied air attacks, is that right?
DOENITZ: Yes, they did not have a chance to come to the surface in certain waters without being attacked immediately. That is just the point. The submarines were however in readiness, in the highest degree of readiness-and that is the big difference, for in rescue work readiness is disrupted; yet these heavy losses and difficulties occurred at the height of readiness.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to look at Page 93. It is the page after the one I referred you to in Volume II of your document book; do you see Paragraph 1?
DOENITZ: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "The percentage of merchant vessels sunk out of convoys in 1941 amounted to 40 percent; in the entire year of 1942 to barely 30 percent; in the last quarter of 1942 to 57 percent; in January 1943, to about 65 percent; in February to about 70 percent; and in March to 80 percent." Your worst period was the first three quarters of 1942, is that not so? That appears from your own figures.
DOENITZ: Which "worst period"? What do you mean? I do not understand. SIR DAVID MAXW1;LL-FYFE: Well, it is Page 93, Paragraph 1.
DOENITZ: Yes, but how do you mean, "worst period"? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Well, the percentage of sunk merchant vessels in convoys in 1941 amounted to 40 percent.
DOENITZ: You mean merchant ships?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I am reading your own war diary, or rather the naval war staff War Diary. "In the entire year of 1942 to barely 30 percent..."
DOENITZ: From convoys?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Convoys, yes. So that the worst period that you had was the first three quarters of 1942?
DOENITZ: No. In 1942, as I have already said in my description of the entire situation, a large number of submarines were just outside the ports, they were off New York, off Trinidad, et cetera, so that they are not mentioned here. In this list only the sinkings carried out by those packs which were attacking the convoys in the North Atlantic are mentioned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But is it not right that these figures mean that your worst period was the first three quarters of 1942? It must have been around 30 percent.
DOENITZ: No, my most successful period was the year 1942.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, how can you call it the most successful period if for the entire year of 1942 your percentage of sunk merchant vessels in convoys is only 30 percent, whereas in January and February and March 1943, it got up to 65, 70, and 80 percent?
DOENITZ: Quite right, that is so. Of the merchant ships sunk in 1942, 30 percent were sunk in the Atlantic, but the total figure was much larger than, for instance, in 1943, when 65 and 70 percent were sunk; and that is simply because at that time in 1943 we could no longer remain outside a port like New York. This indicates percentages of sinkings in the Atlantic from convoys only.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see what I am putting to you is this, that in 1942, when your percentage from convoys was low, when you had had that pressure that I have gone into with you before, there was every reason for you to issue an unequivocal order which would have the effect of getting submarine commanders to destroy the crews of the ships. In 1943 your U-boats were not surfacing, your convoy proportions had gone up, and there was not any reason to make your order more explicit. That is what I am suggesting to you, Defendant.
D0NITZ: I consider that that is quite wrong.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want to...
DOENITZ: It was like this. As I already said, from the summer of 1942 onwards we found that the danger from the air suddenly increased. This danger from the air was making itself felt in all waters, also in those waters where submarines were not fighting convoys or were not fighting just outside the ports.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want you to help me on one other point. Dr. Kranzbuehler put to you yesterday that Kapitanleutnant Eck said that if he had come back he would not have expected you to have objected or been angry with him for shooting up the crew of the Peleus. You said you knew that Eck was carrying this order of yours in his locker when he did shoot up the crew of the Peleub?
DOENITZ: Yes, but I also know that this order did not have the slightest effect on his decision but that, as Eck has expressly said, his decision was to shoot up the wreckage; and he had quite a different aim, namely, to remove the wreckage because he was afraid for his boat which would have been smashed to pieces just like other boats in those wakes. He stated clearly that there was no connection whatsoever in his mind between the order with reference to the Laconia, which he had on board quite accidentally, and his decision.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now you know there are two other cases before the Tribunal, the Noreen Mary and the Antonico, which are on Pages 47 and 52 of the Prosecution's document book, where witnesses give specific evidence of the U-boat carrying out attacks on them when they are in one case on wreckage and in the other case in the lifeboat. Will you look at the Noreen Mary on Page 47 of the document book? The testament of the survivor is on Pages 49 and 50. He deals with this point; he says in the fourth paragraph-Page 85 of the German book...
DOENITZ: I have the English document book.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Page 50 of the English one; I have got the English document: "I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge but deliberately steamed in my direction and when only about 60 to 70 yards away fired directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As their intention was quite obvious I fell into the water and remained there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat." The statement by the Brazilian gentleman you will find on Page 52. Have you got it?
DOENITZ: Yes, I have got it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Fifteen lines from the foot, he says, ". . . the enemy ruthlessly machine-gunned the defenseless sailors in Number 2 lifeboat..." Assuming-of course one has to assume-that Mr. McAllister and Senhor de Oliveira Silva are speaking the truth, are you saying that these U-boat officers were acting on their own?
DOENITZ: It is possible that the men might have imagined these happenings. I want to point out, however, that in a night fight-let us take the case of the Antonico first-which lasted 20 minutes, it could very easily have been imagined that these were shots, or that shots directed against the ship hit a lifeboat. At any rate, if someone makes a report on a night attack lasting 20 minutes, then it is a subjective report and everyone who knows how these reports vary, knows how easily a seaman can make a mistake. If, during such a night fight, the U-boat had wanted to destroy these people, then it would not have left after 20 minutes, particularly as the person states that he could not see the submarine in the darkness. These are certainly all very vague statements. The case of the Noreen Mary is quite similar. A large number of statements are made in this deposition which certainly are not true; for instance, that the submarine bore a swastika. Not a single submarine went to sea painted in any way. If someone is on some wreckage or in a lifeboat and there are shots nearby. then he very easily feels that he is being shot at. It was for this very reason that quite a number of cases of the Anglo-American side have been mentioned by us; not because we wanted to make an accusation, but because we wanted to show how very skeptical one has to be regarding these individual reports. And the only cases in 5.5 years of war, during several thousand attacks, are the ones brought up here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, and of course for the 2.5 of these years that the submarine commanders have been shooting up survivors, you are not likely to get many cases, are you? I just want to ask you one other point...
DOENITZ: Submarine commanders with the exception of the case of Eck have never shot up shipwrecked persons. There is not a single instance. That is not true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what you say.
DOENITZ: In no case is that proved. On the contrary, they made the utmost efforts to rescue. No order to proceed against shipwrecked people has ever been given the U-boat force, with the exception of the case of Eck, and for that there was a definite reason. That is a fact.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, tell me this: Did you know that the log of the Athenia was faked, after she came in?
DOENITZ: No, it was not faked, but there was a clear order that the case of the Athenia should be kept secret for political reasons and, as a result, the log had to be changed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You do not like the word "faked." Well, I will use the word "changed"; that a page was cut out of the log and a false page had been put in. Did you know about that?
DONLTZ: I cannot tell you that today. It is possible. Probably Captain Lemp received the order either from me or my staff: "The case is to be kept secret." And following that, he or the flotilla took the log, which went to ten different departments of the Navy, and altered it. What else could he do? He could not do otherwise.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to know, was it your order and with your knowledge that that log was altered from, I suppose, the truth into the falsity in which it exists today? That is a simple question. Can you answer it?
DOENITZ: Yes. Either it was done by my order or, if it had not been done, then I would have ordered it, because the political instructions existed that "it must be kept secret." The fighting men had no other choice, therefore, but to alter the log. The U-boat commanders never received the order to make a false entry, but in the particular case of the Athenia, where it was ordered afterwards that it must be kept secret, it was not noted in the log.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now I have only one other point to deal with you, and I can deal with it quite shortly. You were q firm adherent of ideological education for service personnel, were you not?
DOENITZ: Yes, I have explained my reasons. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Well, I just want to get thus, and then you can explain your reasons afterwards. You thought it nonsense that a soldier should have no politics, did you not? If you want to...
DOENITZ: Of course. The soldier had nothing to do with politics; but, on the other hand, he naturally had to stand by his country during the war.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you wanted your come` menders to indoctrinate the Navy with Nazi ideology, did you not?
DOENITZ: I wanted the troops' commanders to tell them that the unity of the German people as it existed then was a source of strength for our conduct of the war and that consequently, since we enjoyed the advantages of this unity, we also should see to it that the unity should continue, because during the World War we had had very bad experiences precisely because of that. Any lack of unity among the people would have necessarily affected the conduct of the war.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look at Page 7 in the English document book (Document Number D-640, Exhibit Number GB-186). I think it puts it almost exactly as in my question. The last sentence: "From the very start the whole of the officers' corps must be so indoctrinated that it feels itself coresponsible for the National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the exponent of the State. The idle chatter that the officer is nonpolitical is sheer nonsense." That is your view, is it not?
SPRITZ: I said that. But you have also got to read from the beginning, where it says that our discipline and our fighting strength is miles above that of 1918 and the reason is because the people as a whole are behind us, and if that had not been the case then our troops would have become disintegrated long ago; that is the reason why I said that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me, how many men were you attempting to apply this to, or how many men had you got in the Navy on the 15th of February 1944? I want to see what body you were trying to affect. How many? A quarter of a million?
DOENITZ: 600,000 or 700,000.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like you to turn to the next page, Page 8 in the British document book, which gives your speech on Heroes' Day, 12 March 1944. You say this: "What would have become of our country today if the Fuehrer had not united Us under National Socialism? Split parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry, and vulnerable to it because we lacked the defense of our present uncompromising ideology, we would long since have succumbed under the burden of this war and delivered ourselves up to the enemy who would have mercilessly destroyed us." (Document Number 2878-PS) What did you mean by the "spreading poison of Jewry"?
DOENITZ: I meant that we were living in a state of unity and that this unity represented strength and that all elements and all forces...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is not what I asked. I am asking you, what did you mean by the "spreading poison of Jewry"? It is your phrase, and you tell us whet you meant by it.
DOENITZ: I could imagine that it would be very difficult for the population in the towns to hold out under the stress of heavy bombing attacks if such an influence was allowed to work, that is what I meant.. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE; Well, now, can you tell me again; what do you mean by the "spreading poison of Jewry?"
DOENITZ: It means that it might have had a disintegrating effect on the people's power of endurance, and in this life-and-death struggle of our country I, as a soldier, was especially anxious about this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what I want to know. You were the Supreme Commander and indoctrinated 600,000 or 700,000 men. Why were you conveying to them that Jews were a spreading poison in party politics? Why was that? What was it that you objected to in Jews that made you think that they had a bad effect on Germany?
DOENITZ: That statement was made during my memorial speech on Heroes' Day. It shows that I was of the opinion that the endurance, the power to endure, of the people, as it was composed, could be better preserved than if there were Jewish elements in the nation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This sort of talk, "spreading poison of Jewry," produced the attitude in the mind which caused the death of five or six million Jews in these last few years. Do you say that you knew nothing about the action and the intention to do away with and exterminate the Jews?
DOENITZ: Yes, of course I say that. I did not know anything at all about it and if such a statement was made, then that does not furnish evidence that I had any idea of any murders of Jews. That was in the year 1943.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, what I am putting to you is that you are joining in the hunt against this unfortunate section of your community and leading six or seven hundred thousand of the Navy on the same hunt. Now, just look at Page 76 of the document book in this last reference to you...
DOENITZ: Nobody among my men thought of using violence against Jews, not one of them, and nobody can draw that conclusion from that sentence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just look at Page 76. This is where you are dealing with the promotion of under officers and men who have shown themselves to be personalities in warfare. You first of all say: "I want the leaders of units responsible for ratings and the flotilla commanders and other commanders superior to them to interest themselves more in the promotion of those petty officers and men who have shown in special situations in the war that, thanks to their inner attitude and firmness, their energetic and inner drive, in short, owing to their personal qualities, they are capable of taking the right decisions independently and of carrying them out without wavering in their aim and with willing acceptance of responsibility. "One example: On the auxiliary cruiser Cormoran, which was used as a place of detention in Australia, a warrant officer, acting as senior camp officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camps systematically and unobtrusively done away with. This petty officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and its execution; and after his return I shall do everything I can to promote him, as he has shown he is fitted to be a leader." Was that your idea of leadership in this National Socialist indoctrinated Navy; that he should murder political opponents in a way that would not be found out by the guards?
DOENITZ: No, it was not so. It has been reported to me that there was an informer there who, when new crews were brought in, was smuggled into the camp and, after listening around, passed information on to the enemy. The result was that on the strength of that information U-boats were lost. And it was then that the senior man in the camp, a petty officer, decided to remove that man as a traitor. That is what was reported to me and what I shall prove by a witness. In my opinion, and every nation will recognize that, the man acted like anyone else who finds himself in an extremely difficult situation and he had to...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you not say that, Defendant? If you had stated that this man had killed a spy, who by the spreading of information was dangerous, I would not have put this to you. But what you say is that it was communists who made themselves noticeable, and this man had killed them without knowledge of the guard. Why do you put communists in your order if you mean a spy?
DOENITZ: I think this is an order from a Baltic station. I had been told that it concerned a spy, and it is something that a witness will prove. If there were reasons-perhaps intelligence reasons- for not divulging that...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you putting the responsibility for this order on one of your junior officers? Are you saying it was one of your junior officers who put the order out like this? It was not what you meant at all? Is that what you are saying?
DOENITZ: I have merely said how the order came about; up to now, I have not once shirked the responsibility.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross-examination?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: My Lord, the Soviet Prosecution has several questions to ask the Defendant DOENITZ. [Turning to the defendant.] Defendant DOENITZ, your address to the German people and your order to the Armed Forces in connection with Hitler's death were drafted by you on 30 April 1945, is that not so?
DOENITZ: Yes. .
COL. POKROVSKY: In these documents you informed the people that Hitler's successor, appointed by Hitler himself, was you. That is correct, is it not?
DOENITZ: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you ask yourself then for what particular reason Hitler selected you?
DOENITZ: Yes, I put that question to myself when I received that telegram, and came to the conclusion that after the Reich Marshal had been removed, I was the senior officer of an independent branch of the Armed Forces, and that that was the reason.
COL. POKROVSKY: In your address to the Army and to the people, you demanded the continuation of military operations, and all those who were opposed to resistance were called traitors and cowards, is that not so?
DOENITZ: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: A few days afterwards, you gave an order to Keitel to capitulate unconditionally, is that not right?
DOENITZ: Yes. I said quite clearly in the first order that I would fight in the East until troops and refugees could be rescued from the East and brought to the West and that I would not fight one moment longer. That was my intention, and that is also clearly expressed in that order.
COL. POKROVSKY: By the way, there was not a word about it in this order, but that is not so important. Do you agree that on 30 April...
DOENITZ: I...
COL. POKROVSKY: First listen to my question and then answer. Do you agree with the fact that on 30 April also, right on the day when you published the two documents that we are talking about now, it was absolutely clear that further resistance of Hitlerite Germany was absolutely aimless and useless? Do you understand my question? Do you agree with that?
DOENITZ: Yes, I understood the question. May I say the following: I had to continue fighting in the East in order to rescue the refugees who were moving to the West. That is certainly very clearly stated. I said that we would continue to fight in the East only until the hundreds and thousands of families from the German eastern area could be safely transferred to the West.
COL. POKROVSKY: Still you did not answer my question, DOENITZ, did you, even though it was very clearly put. I repeat it once again so that you can manage to understand it. Do you agree with the fact that already on 30 April it was fully clear that further resistance of Hitlerite Germany was absolutely aimless and useless? Answer me "yes" or "no."
DOENITZ: No, that was not clear. From the military point of view the war was absolutely lost, and there was then only the problem of saving as many human beings as possible, and therefore we had to continue resistance in the East. Therefore that resistance in the East had a purpose.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, I understand you, but will you deny that your order, which called for a continuation of the war, led to further bloodshed?
DOENITZ: That is extremely small, compared to the one or two millions which otherwise would have been lost.
COL. POKROVSKY: One moment, please; will you wait. Do not try and make any comparisons. First answer and then explain. That is the order that we have to follow here all the time. First "yes,' or "no," and then an explanation, please.
DOENITZ: Of course, in the fighting in the East during those few days there might be further losses, but they were necessary in order to save hundreds of thousands of refugees.
COL.POKROVSKY: You did not answer my question. I shall repeat it for the third time.
THE PRESIDENT: He did answer; he said "yes," that bloodshed would be caused. That is an answer to your question.
COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you. [Turning to the defendant.] I would like you to explain exactly the question of whether you look upon yourself, first and foremost, as a politician, or do you look upon yourself as a soldier who obeyed direct orders of his own superiors without any analysis of the political meaning and content of such orders?
DOENITZ: I do not understand that question completely. As head of State, from 1 May on, I was a political man.
COL. POKROVSKY: And before that time?
DOENITZ: Purely a soldier.