dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: From all these three things I had gained the absolute impression that if Schuschnigg were to cancel the Sunday plebiscite, then a peaceful solution would still be possible.
MR. DODD: And what do you suppose you were going to do with that telegram, that false telegram that asked Hitler for help because of disorders? This was days before it actually took place. You knew that this was a complete fraud, an obvious fraud. Why did you even consent to carry that back to Austria?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I did not take it along. There was even a sharp difference of opinion between myself and Field Marshal Goering. I did not take it along. It was given to a courier.
MR. DODD: You told us; you know we have your notes here, in which you said that you did carry it along.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No, never did I say that. That was contrary to the truth. I never put down or said that I took any of these three things along personally, but I emphasized that the courier did that. I should like to call your attention to the fact that, according to the agreement of 12 February, Seyss-Inquart had the right to deal with Reich and Party agencies in the Reich.
MR. DODD: Well, in any event, you knew that the telegram was a falsehood, did you not? Whether you carried it or Globocznik did, it was not true, was it?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I beg your pardon, I had nothing whatever to do with this telegram afterwards. Months later I asked Seyss-Inquart whether this telegram had ever been sent off and he said "no," it had never been sent. I have already said that all three documents were not used.
MR. DODD: Certainly they were not given to you by Hitler to be thrown away, and when you consented to carry them, you did not know that they were not going to be utilized, did you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Anything further was the task of SeyssInquart who, according to the Berchtesgaden agreement, had contact with the Reich and Party offices...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you try to answer the question instead of answering something else?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Very well...
MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to press it any further. You seem to think that you had some other reasons, but I do not want to press it any further.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No, I would be very grateful if I could follow, but I do not understand this question.
MR. DODD: Well, if you do not understand it, I do not think there is any point in pressing it.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I should be very grateful if you would repeat it.
MR. DODD: What I suggested in my question was what you, at least, knew about this false telegram which was handed to you, a draft of it, I think you said either by Hitler or by Goering. You were then a Minister without Portfolio of the Austrian Government. You certainly knew it was a complete falsehood and yet you were willing to go back to Austria and deal with Seyss-Inquart, knowing that such a telegram had been arranged, and that it had been sent by courier.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The telegram had lost all significance through the fact that Schuschnigg canceled the plebiscite, and I told Schuschnigg explicitly-leaving it to Seyss-Inquart, who sat beside me, to say anything more specific-that Hitler would march in if we did not call off the plebiscite. That is exactly what I said to Schuschnigg.
MR. DODD: All right. That is not what I am talking about, but I am not going on with it. Do you remember telling us that at the time that Goering was talking to Seyss-Inquart at the telephone, you found out that the Defendant Von Papen and Fritz Wiedemann were sitting beside Goering in Berlin?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I am sorry. I only heard about that after the collapse in 1945, from Wiedemann.
MR. DODD: What I want to know is, how did you find that out?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I found out from Captain Wiedemann, whom I just happened to be with.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, you know Defendant Von Papen once wrote a letter to Hitler and he said that you were a willing collaborator with him with respect to the possibility of union or Anschluss with Germany, and that was way back in 1936. Do you know about that? It is in evidence in this case, USA-67, Document 2246-PS. Were you a willing collaborator with Von Papen?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was a willing collaborator for the normalization of the relations between the two countries; but I am not familiar with this document.
MR. DODD: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. We will adjourn now. [A recess was taken.] [The witness Rainer took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
FRIEDRICH RAINER (Witness): Friedrich Rainer.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: What functions, and for how long, did you have in the NSDAP?
RAINER: I have been a member of the NSDAP since 10 October 1930. Until 1934 I had no functions. Afterwards Gauleiter Klausner of Carinthia called me to the Gauleiter's office. Beginning in 1936 I worked in the Landesleitung. Landesleiter Leopold, in the autumn of 1936, relieved me of my position because there were differences of opinion between us. In February of 1938 Klausner again appointed me his political adviser and co-worker in the Landesleitung. In May 1938 the Fuehrer appointed me Gauleiter of Salzburg. On 1 December 1941 I was transferred to Carinthia. Those were my political functions.
DR. STEINBAUER: You were therefore Gauleiter of Carinthia at the end?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: And through years of work in the NSDAP you had a chance to get to know it well?
RAINER: Yes, I know the conditions well since the Anschluss.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did you get to know Seyss-Inquart?
RAINER: The first time that I met Seyss-Inquart was in August 1935. We had a conversation which lasted a few minutes. A few days later I was arrested, and for 6~/~' months I was in the custody of the Austrian police. After my release in approximately April or May 1936 I met Seyss-Inquart again in Vienna and remained in contact with him after that. 12 June 4G
DR. STEINBAUER: Was he a member of the Party?
RAINER: During the time that the Party was prohibited SeyssInquart was not a member of the NSDAP, but he was a member of the Styrian Home Guard. That organization was, I think in 1933 by agreement between its leaders and Habicht, taken over entirely as part of the Austrian NSDAP. After the Anschluss that transfer was not recognized by the Reich Treasurer, Schwarz, and the members of the Styrian Home Guard, among them, I believe, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, had to apply again for membership.
DR. STEINBAUER: So your statement in the famous "Rainer letter"-I shall call it the Rainer letter henceforth for short-is incorrect?
RAINER: At that time I did not know that the transfer in its original form had not been recognized by the Reich Treasurer.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that we can say you knew Seyss-Inquart, you had talked to him quite frequently, and surely he would have told you his ideas regarding the Anschluss?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What were these ideas? Please be very brief.
RAINER: The Anschluss, at that time, was not the subject matter of our discussion. The idea of the Anschluss was a point in the program of all Austrian parties; it remained the ideal goal for all of us. In this case, however, what we were concerned with was that the Austrian State should once again steer a course toward Germany and that internal conditions should be peaceful. The difficulty in this connection was that the State founded by Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, by disregarding the democratic constitution, was going to permit only a one-party system. It was particularly difficult, therefore, to draw into participation and to legalize the great mass of the opposition of the National wing. That task, according to Seyss-Inquart's conception and my own, was to be carried out without further bloodshed by peaceful means. With good will on both sides and a postponement of radical means such a way seemed possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then came the Agreement of 11 July 1936?
PAINTER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you, at that time, went to see Adolf Hitler to clarify his attitude toward the party. What did Adolf Hitler say to you at the time?
RAINER: A few days after 11 July 1936 I was called to Berchtesgaden, and on 16 or 17 July I visited Adolf Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you can go a little quicker than you are going, Witness. 12 June 9B
RAINER: The Fuehrer made very serious and thorough observations, and he demanded in very severe words that the Austrian National Socialists should respect the Agreement of 11 July under all circumstances. He criticized the previous methods, and he used the expression that they had been heroic, but stupid. He pointed out that the continuation of such methods would lead to continuous difficulties in foreign politics. He demanded that the National Socialists in Austria should use the existing political possibilities. Upon my specific question whether this included the Fatherland Front, he said "yes." He assured us that in the near future the general tension would be relieved by an improvement in the relationship between these two German states.
DR. STEINBAUER: In its essentials, therefore, he approved of Seyss-Inquart's policy?
RAINER: The Fuehrer's statement, to me, meant a confirmation of the correctness of the way in which we had decided to go.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was Seyss-Inquart also the leader of the Party?
RAINER: No, Seyss-Inquart was never the Party leader.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he subordinate himself to the leadership of the Austrian NSDAP as you state in your letter?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart was a member of the National Opposition group, and in that capacity he recognized the existing leadership. I want to draw your attention to the fact that he recognized Klausner in that letter because Klausner, according to the Berchtesgaden agreement, had replaced Leopold by request of the Fuehrer, since he promised to steer a quiet, clear, and open course. Cooperation with him appeared to assure adherence to the Berchtesgaden agreement. Seyss-Inquart, however, had explicitly stated that in his capacity as trustee for the Berchtesgaden agreement and Minister in Schuschnigg's Government he was independent of Klausner.
DR. STEINBAUER: Tell me, Witness, after the understanding of 12 February 1938 did you, during a railway journey, meet SeyssInquart who was coming back from his visit to the Fuehrer?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did he tell you about his conference with the Fuehrer?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart returned in a sleeper, and we sat together in his compartment. He had a piece of paper-I think it was an envelope-and on that there were notes. I remember that , , . he described the formalities which had taken place at the beginning by saying that he had come in his capacity as an Austrian Minister, bound by oath to the Constitution, and responsible to the President and the Chancellor of Austria. He said that he was greeting, in Adolf Hitler, the leader of all Germans. Afterwards he told me in detail about points of that conference, not all of which I can remember now. My whole impression was that the discussion had passed satisfactorily, and I recognized that the conference had been conducted in a spirit of full loyalty to Chancellor Schuschnigg. As far as I can remember, the Anschluss as such had not been dealt with at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you remember his telling you that he had stated to Hitler that he would be Schuschnigg's living guarantor, and not a Trojan Horse?
RAINER: I do not wish to confirm those exact words. The expression which Dr Seyss-Inquart repeatedly used was that he was not a Trojan Horse leader. Furthermore, I remember that he had used the expression frequently that he was the living guarantor for mutual adherence to the agreement of Berchtesgaden.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he also say that he refused to have a cultural fight?
RAINER: I do not believe that I can remember that. At any rate, that was his point of view, and I certainly assume that he spoke to the Fuehrer about that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Fuehrer agree to these proposals?
RAINER: I had the impression that Adolf Hitler was in full agreement with the suggestions of Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart tell Schuschnigg that?
RAINER: That I must assume. At any rate, he did state that that was his intention.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he tell the Austrian National Socialists the same thing?
RAINER: Yes, because that was particularly necessary. SeyssInquart made a speech at a conference of leaders at the beginning of March and pointed out that an evolutionary course and measures which were to a certain extent disappointing to the radical followers-namely, the dissolution of the illegal organization-were specifically desired by Adolf Hitler. I think I can also remember that during the large demonstration at Linz, and on the occasion of the demonstrations at Graz, he referred to that specifically; for the visit to Adolf Hitler in Berlin gave him the necessary legitimate foundation in the eyes of the National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this Rainer letter of yours you wrote that Seyss-Inquart had been informed of preparation for revolutionary steps.
RAINER: May I ask you, Dr. Steinbauer, which revolutionary steps you mean?
DR. STEINBAUER: Those of 10 March.
RAINER: May I have permission to go into some detail in this connection? The expression "revolutionary steps" is too far-reaching. The measures which were introduced were mainly these: After Chancellor Schuschnigg's speech at Innsbruck, Major Klausner was convinced that thereby every. basis for an inner political understanding had been destroyed and that this speech would be like a spark in a powder barrel. Whereas previously we had had consultations under what circumstances the vote might be "yes," it had now, in view of the attitude of the broad masses, become impossible. A clear-cut indication of attitude by the National Socialist leaders had to be brought about. During the night, the new Gauleiter were still being given their first piece of information about the Party not being agreeable to the proposed plebiscite, and that therefore the slogan would be, for the time being, to refrain from voting. The strictest discipline was demanded, because we feared that feeling would soon run very high. On 10 March the long-prepared propaganda of Zernatto began, and clashes occurred. We also had reports to the effect that large groups of the Protective Legion, forbidden in February 1934, were being armed. Strictest alert was ordered for the formations, therefore, and the formations received orders to provide protection for the Nationals. Essentially, these were the steps ordered on the 10th; I think I informed Dry Seyss generally, in the afternoon, regarding the atmosphere in the provinces. I probably did not inform him about individual organizational measures. ~
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he promote that atmosphere?
RAINER: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he demand demonstrations, or did he prevent them?
RAINER: He neither promoted them, nor did he urge them. Prevention at that stage was no longer possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then what happened on the morning of the 11th?
RAINER: On 11 March in the forenoon I was working at the office of State Councillor Jury at 1 Seitzergasse. I no longer know at exactly what task. We met Dr. Seyss, Glaise-Horstenau, and several others about noon in the office of Dr. Fischbock, and Dr. Seyss-Inquart told us of the outcome of the conferences with Dr. Schuschnigg. The result of our consultation was the letter which the Ministers and State Councillors wrote to Dr. Schuschnigg, which set a time limit for 2 o'clock in the afternoon, demanded the cancellation of this unconstitutional plebiscite and the fixing of a new plebiscite a few weeks later in accordance with the regulation of the Constitution, or we would resign.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then what happened? Schuschnigg postponed the plebiscite. How did you hear about that?
RAINER: Yes. Schuschnigg postponed the plebiscite, but he refused to give a date for a new plebiscite and gave orders to Dr. Seyss, the Security Minister, to adopt severe measures. That solution was reported to the Chancellery in Berlin by telephone in the afternoon, and it produced the statement from the Reich that this solution, as a half-solution, was not acceptable any more. As far as I know, that started the intervention by the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: But was not intervention already brought about through the fact that Glaise-Horstenau, as has been stated, or a courier, took a letter from Adolf Hitler to Henna?
RAINER: It was my view that certain drafts which Globocznik showed me at midday, and which had been addressed to the Landesleitung offices, had been brought along by Glaise-Horstenau who came back from Berlin that morning. As I heard later, that was reportedly done by a courier. In my opinion this was not an intervention on the part of the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was there collaboration between the Party and the- Reich on one hand, and Seyss-Inquart on the other?
RAINER: If you mean "conspiracy" by "collaboration," then I must say definitely, "no." But the collaboration which was agreed upon at Berchtesgaden was carried out.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Klausner give the order that the Party was free to act and that it was to seize power?
RAINER: Through a specific order from Adolf Hitler, the Party was bound not to undertake any revolutionary steps. That order had been retransmitted by Keppler during the early days of March, and Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop had called Keppler, who was already in the plane, back in order to impress upon him...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, surely, the question was what Klausner did, and the witness is now telling us what a lot of other people did.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. I asked you, when did Klausner give the order to the Gauleiter to seize power?
RAINER: That order was given by Klausner on the evening of 11 March.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart approve?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart was not informed of that until some time later.
DR. STEINBAUER: NO I must put to you the fact that Gauleiter Eigruber, of Upper Austria, has stated in an affidavit that he received a telegram in which he was addressed as Landeshauptmann. Do you know anything about that?
RAINER: I know nothing whatever about telegrams, or a telegram. I know that Klausner's order was telephoned from 1 Seitzergasse. That evening Globocznik was also putting through calls from the Chancellery. I assume that Eigruber is referring to one of these telephone calls.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you that Globocznik, who was Gauleiter of Vienna before this illegal period, told you that he misused the name of Seyss-Inquart for the seizure of power?
RAINER: Globocznik told me that several inquiries had been directed to the Chancellor's office which were passed on to him over the telephone, and that he did not always state his name in that connection. One special case relative to Salzburg is known to me very well.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this Rainer letter you also made a statement which mentions some assistance rendered on 25 July 1934. The Prosecution considers that this has some connection with the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss.
RAINER: That remark goes back to a conversation during which Seyss-Inquart told me that after 25 July he had been afraid for a few days that his name might be connected with those events. But after a few days it turned out that there was no such connection. Subsequently he tried to exert his personal influence toward reconciliation and he took over some defense cases. That is what I meant.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that is your explanation for the expression "rendering assistance"?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that pressure was exercised on President Dr. Miklas by the Austrian National Socialists, so that he would appoint Seyss-Inquart?
RAINER: The negotiations, which occupied the entire late afternoon and evening, were under a certain amount of pressure; for practically in the whole of Austria the change had already been carried out. The overthrow of Schuschnigg's Cabinet loosed a tremendous avalanche. During the negotiations that fact made itself felt.
DR. STEINBAUER: In other words, you mean that clearly there was pressure, but not physical, directly upon the person of the President?
RAINER: There can be no question of that.
DR. STEINBAUER: But then, how do you explain that at that time 40 SS men marched into the Chancellery building and occupied it?
RAINER: An occupation by the SS is hardly the right expression. When, toward 8 o'clock in the evening, Miklas had again refused to nominate a National Socialist as Chancellor, Doppler stated that at 8 o'clock-not as originally declared-they would march in and he stated his fear for the safety of the negotiators. In fact, as was said in Austria, things were generally in commotion and the situation appeared very unsafe. The Chancellery building was occupied by the police and by the guards and was put in a state of defense. I informed the Landesleitung of this situation and asked them to take protective measures so that willful acts would not cause unnecessary misfortune. In consequence of the measures which were then 'introduced, I estimate that no earlier than 10 o'clock in the evening an SS leader reported in civilian clothes, stating that he and his men had been assigned to protect the negotiators. Seyss-Inquart considered that step excessive but I asked him to take the measure into consideration, and he then allowed these men to pass through the police and guards, and they, were admitted to the courtyard of the Chancellery building. There was never any pressure nor were there acts of force; it was merely a precautionary measure.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you were Gauleiter of Carinthia. Did you also have administrative powers during the war in the neighboring area of Italian sovereignty?
RAINER: Yes. In September 1943, I was appointed Supreme Commissioner in the operational zone "Adriatic Coastland," with my seat in Trieste, and I had six provinces under my authority.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you recruit foreign workers there for employment in Germany?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: In what manner was this done?
RAINER: It was done through recruiting, that is to say, without employing coercion, since for many decades these workers were accustomed to go north to work.
DR. SERVATIUS: These workers were put to work in your Gau, were they?
RAINER: The majority were put to work in my Gau, but also in other parts of the Alpine regions.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the living conditions of these people in your Gau?
RAINER: Their living conditions were the general and normal ones.
DR. SERVATIUS: Where were they accommodated? In camps? Did you see any such camps?
RAINER: They were housed by their employers. Where larger numbers of them existed they lived in camps which were looked after by the Italian consulate and the German Labor Front.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Labor Front supervise matters in practice?
RAINER: Yes, it was bound by an agreement to that effect, of which I was informed, and it took great pains to carry out that task.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you yourself inspect any camps?
RAINER: Yes. I inspected camps repeatedly and I found conditions to be in good order. In the case of certain industries, for instance the water works, I found that conditions were exceptionally good.
DR. SERVATIUS: Can you give us the names of these camps?