dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
RAEDER: Well, I consider the first point right because it is always important to get in before one's opponent, and this was happening under certain definite conditions. The second point was ordered by the Fuehrer. Neither of the two points was ever carried out, and therefore it is useless, in my opinion, to discuss this matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is something for the Tribunal, and I will decide what is useful to discuss. Do I take it, then, that you entirely approve of attacking Soviet submarines and ruthlessly destroying them 6 days before you start the war? That is what the Tribunal is to understand, is it?
RAEDER: Yes, if they appeared in our waters to reconnoiter or to carry out some other war action, then I considered it right. I considered that better than that our ships should run into Russian mines.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, let us just come, for a short time, to your views on U-boat warfare. Do you remember the document which I put to the Defendant Doenitz about the memorandum of the Foreign Office, Document Number D-851, which became Exhibit Number GB-451?
RAEDER: I have it before me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Right. Well, I will ask about that in a moment. This is what you said about it when you were answering Dr. Kranzbuehler, I think on Saturday. You said: "Since the war against England came as a complete surprise to us, we had up until then dealt very little with detailed questions of submarine warfare. Among other things, we had not yet discussed the question of so-called unrestricted submarine warfare which had played such a very important part in the previous war. And from that fact it developed that on 3 September, that officer who was recently mentioned here was sent to the Foreign Office with some points for discussion on the question of unrestricted submarine warfare, so that we could clarify with the Foreign Office the question as to how far we could go." Now, do you think that is. . .
RAEDER: So far as I can recollect, that is the way it happened. Unrestricted warfare had not been considered.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got the document in front of you?
RAEDER: You mean the one regarding the Foreign Office, Document Number D-851?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Doenitz 851, yes.
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don't think this is in any copy, My Lord. Has Your Lordship a copy?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did put it in when I was cross-examining the Defendant Doenitz.
THE PRESIDENT: It is very likely with our Doenitz papers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps Your Lordship will allow me to just read it slowly, for the moment. The document says this: "The question of an unrestricted U-boat warfare against England is discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the High Command of the Navy. "The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage to England which can be achieved with the forces available can only be attained if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping in the prohibited area indicated on the enclosed map. The Navy does not fail to realize that: "(a) Germany would thereby publicly disregard the agreement of 1936 regarding the conduct of economic war. "(b) Conduct of the war on these lines could not be justified on the basis of the hitherto generally accepted principles of international law." Then, I ought to read this, or point it out. I have dealt with it before, it is the second last paragraph: "Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using the method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England gives us a justification by her method of waging war to order this form of warfare as a reprisal." [Turning to the defendant.] Now, I want you to take it by stages. You see the paragraph that says: "The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage to England which can be achieved with the forces available can only be attained if U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without warning in the area...." Is that your view? Was that your view on the 3d of September?
RAEDER: No, it is not my view; it is a conditional view. We had given submarines the order to wage economic war according to the Prize Ordinance, and we had provided in our War Diary that if the British were to arm merchant ships or something like that, then certain intensifications...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please give me an answer to the question I asked you? It is a perfectly easy question.
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, isn't it your view?
RAEDER: In theory, of course, considering the small resources that we had, the greatest possible damage to England could only be achieved through-we had to discuss with the Foreign Office just how far we could go with this intensification. For this reason, this officer was sent there. The discussions with the Foreign Office resulted in the submarine memorandum which shows, from beginning to end, that we were trying to adhere to the existing law as far as possible: The whole memorandum is nothing more than just that sort of discussion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you answer my question? When this document says "the Navy has arrived at the conclusion," is it true that the Navy had arrived at that conclusion?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true or not?
RAEDER: But of course, everybody would arrive at that conclusion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is much easier to say "yes" than to give a long explanation. Now, let us come to another point. Is it true that you had arrived at that conclusion without consulting the Flag Officer, U-boats, as the Defendant Doenitz said when he gave evidence?
RAEDER: Regarding these matters? We only agreed before the submarines put to sea that they should wage war according to the Prize Ordinance. I did not ask him whether he wanted to carry out unrestricted U-boat warfare, because I did not want that. First of all I had to discuss it with the Foreign Office to find out how far we could go. That was the purpose of this affair, which was to give individual orders, such orders which we were entitled to give, step by step, in accordance with the behavior of the British. This was a question of international law, which I had to discuss with the expert on international law in the Foreign Office.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Isn't it correct that you continued to press this point of view, the conclusion of which you had arrived at, with the Foreign Office for the next 3 months? Isn't it correct that you continued to press for an unrestricted U-boat warfare within the area for the next 3 months?
RAEDER: I hardly think so; otherwise I would not have issued the memorandum of 3 September. Maybe we did go to the Foreign Office and put on pressure, but what we did is contained in the memorandum and our measures were intensified step by step, following steps taken by the British.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the next step with the Foreign Office was a conference with Baron Von Weizsaecker, on the 25th of September, which you will see in Document Number D-852, Exhibit Number GB-469. You see Paragraph 3 of that document: "The High Command of the Navy will submit to the Foreign Office a proposal, as a basis for a communication to the neutral powers, in which those intensifications of naval warfare will be communicated, the ordering of which has already ' taken place or is impending in the near future. This includes, particularly, a warning not to use wireless on being stopped, not to sail in convoy, and not to black-out." That was your first step, was it not? That was put up to the Foreign Office, with a number of other proposals?
RAEDER: Of course! The first measure was that armed merchant ships could be attacked because as early as G or 8 September, a submarine had stopped a merchant ship, the Manar , had fired a warning shot, and had at once been fired on by the British steamer. Thereupon the submarine started firing at the merchant ship. Such cases were known. And since one cannot recognize in every case whether the ship is armed or not, we assumed that it would lead to all ships being fired at. However, at that time it was ordered that only armed British merchant ships should be fired at. Secondly, that ships which sent a wireless message when stopped could also be shot at, because this use of wireless which was done by order of the Admiralty would immediately bring to the spot both naval and air forces, especially the latter which would shoot at the U-boat. The first step, therefore, was firing on armed merchant ships-the passenger steamers were still excepted-and secondly, firing on blacked-out vessels and firing on those who made use of wireless. Blacked-out vessels are...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you look at Document Number D-853. I only want you to look at the next document, which will be Exhibit Number GB-470. I want you to come as soon as possible to this memorandum of which you talked. D-853, if you will look at Section II, is a report by the Under Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, dated the 27th of September, which goes through these matters which you talked about just now, the sinking at sight of French and British ships, under the assumption that they are armed. In Paragraph II it is said: "The Naval Operations Staff indicated anew that the Fuehrer will probably order ruthless U-boat warfare in the restricted area in the very near future. The previous participation of the Foreign Office remains guaranteed." Were you still pressing for absolutely unrestricted warfare within a large area to the west of Britain and around Britain?
RAEDER: Yes. Insofar as we took intensification actions step by step on the basis of our observations regarding the attitude of enemy forces, and that is in those cases where intensification was perfectly justified and was legally proved.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Baron Weizsaecker's minutes of the 14th of October which is Document Number D-857, which will be Exhibit Number GB-471. Now, you see, this is after these measures have been taken, which you have just explained to the Tribunal. Baron von Weizsaecker reports to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop: "According to my information, the decision on unrestricted U-boat warfare against England is imminent. This is at least as much a political decision as it is a technicality of war. "A short while ago I submitted my personal view in writing, that unrestricted U-boat warfare would bring new enemies upon us at a time when we still lack the necessary U-boats to defeat England. On the other hand, the Navy's attitude of insisting on the opening of unrestricted U-boat warfare is backed by every convincing reason." Then he says that it is necessary to ask for certain information. On that you put in-on that point you put in your memorandum of the 15th of October, which, My Lord, is Document Number C-157, and Exhibit Number GB-224.
RAEDER: First of all, may I say something about the previous document? This expression "unrestricted U-boat warfare . . ."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can do it later on, because we have got a lot of ground to cover here.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks he ought to be allowed to say what he wants to say on that document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, if Your Lordship pleases. Please go on, Defendant, my fault.
RAEDER: Now the two documents are gone. What I wanted to say was that the expression "unrestricted submarine warfare" on the part of the Foreign Office originated from the previous World War. In reality, and during the entire war, we did not wage unrestricted U-boat war in the sense of the unrestricted submarine warfare of the first World War. Even there, where he says "unrestricted submarine warfare might be imminent"-are only ordered very restricted measures, which always were based an the fact that the British had ordered something on their part. The chief action on the part of the British was that of militarizing the entire merchant fleet to a certain extent. That is to say, the merchant fleet was being armed, and they received the order to use these arms.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don't see how that arises out of the last document at all. Unless the Tribunal wants to go into it, I think we might pass on. Doesn't Your Lordship think so?
RAEDER: Out of both documents. Not out of one only...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have put that point, I should think, at least seven times this afternoon. I am going to suggest to you that your real object of the submarine war was set out in the first paragraph of the memorandum. Would you just look at it? You see "Berlin, 15 October..."
RAEDER: No, I must still say that there was not any unrestricted U-boat warfare but merely an intensification of measures, step by step, as I have repeatedly said, and these were always taken only after the British took some measure. The British. . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest that that is an entire untruth, and that I will show you out of this document. Look at your own document, this memorandum. In the first paragraph: "The Fuehrer's proposal for the restoration..."
RAEDER: I am not telling untruths, I would not think of doing it. I do not do that sort of thing.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is what I am suggesting to you, and I will show it out of this document. "The Fuehrer's proposal for the restoration of a just, honorable peace and the new adjustment of the political order in Central Europe had been turned down. The enemy powers want the war, with the aim of destroying Germany. In this fight, in which Germany is now forced to defend her existence and her rights, she must use her weapons with the utmost ruthlessness, at the same time fully respecting the laws of military ethics." Now, let's see what you were suggesting. "Germany's principal enemy in this war is Britain. Her most vulnerable spot is her maritime trade. The war at sea against Britain must therefore be conducted as an economic war, with the aim of destroying Britain's fighting spirit within the shortest possible time and forcing her to accept peace." Now, miss one paragraph and look at the next. "The principal target of our naval strategy is the merchant ship"-now, let's look-"not only the enemy's, but in general every merchant ship sails the seas in order to supply the enemy's war industry, both by way of imports and exports. Side by side with this the enemy warship also remains an objective." Now, wasn't that the object which you in the Naval Command were putting up to Hitler and to the Foreign Office, to use utmost ruthlessness to destroy Britain's fighting spirit, and to attack every merchant ship coming in or going out of Britain? Wasn't that your object?
RAEDER: Of course, but attacks on neutrals only insofar as they were warned and advised not to enter certain zones. Throughout the centuries in economic warfare the enemy merchant ship as well as the neutral merchant ship has been the object of attack.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are not telling the Tribunal that you were suggesting use of warnings. Are you seriously suggesting to the Tribunal that what you meant by that paragraph was that neutral ships were only to be attacked with warning?
RAEDER: Of course, and that happened. Afterwards we issued the warning to neutral ships, after our blockade zone was established in accordance with the American blockade zone. We warned them that they should not enter this zone because they would run into most serious danger. That I am saying, and I can prove it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest to you that that is untrue, and I will show it out of the document. Now, just turn to page...
RAEDER: On 24 November that warning was issued.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you will turn to Section C of the document, "Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain." "Our naval strategy will have to employ tq the utmost advantage every weapon at our disposal. Military success can be most confidently expected if we attack British sea communications where they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the interest of neutrals, insofar as this is possible without detriment to military requirements. It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing international law; however, measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing international law." Wasn't that the view you were putting up to the Foreign Office and the Fuehrer, "Use international law as long as you can, but if international law conflicts with what is necessary for military success, throw international law overboard." Wasn't that your view?
RAEDER: No, that is quite incorrectly expressed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then explain these words. Explain these words: "We should try to consider the interest of neutrals insofar as this is possible without detriment to military requirements. However, measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out even if they are not covered by international law." What did you mean by that if you didn't mean to throw international law overboard?
RAEDER: It says "If the existing rules of land warfare cannot be applied to them." It is generally known that international law had not yet been co-ordinated with submarine warfare, just as the use of aircraft at that time. It says: "In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare"-that is, a new code of naval warfare on the basis of actual developments. Throughout the war a new code of naval warfare was developing, starting with the neutrals themselves. For instance, the Pan-American Security Conference defined a safety zone 300 miles around the American coast, thereby barring a tremendous sea area for overseas trade. Likewise, the United States fixed a fighting zone around the British Isles which was not at all to our liking, and on 4 November 1939, the United States themselves maintained that it would be extremely dangerous for neutral ships to enter it, and they prohibited their own ships and their own citizens to enter this area. We followed that up by asking the neutrals that they too should proceed in the same way as the United States, and then they would not be harmed. Then only those neutrals sailed to Great Britain which had contraband on board and made a lot of money out of it, or which were forced by the British through their ports of control to enter that area and nevertheless submit themselves to those dangers. Of course, they were quite free to discontinue doing that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now tell me, what changes had taken place in the development of either airplanes or submarines from the time that Germany signed the Submarine Protocol of 1936 to the beginning of the war? You say that international law had to adapt itself to changes in weapons of war. What changes had taken place between 1936 and 1939?
RAEDER: The following changes took place: The Submarine Protocol of 1936 was signed by us because we assumed that it concerned peaceful actions...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not an answer to my question. My question is quite clear. It is: What changes in weapons of war, either in the air or in the submarines, had taken place between 1936 and 1939? Now, there is a question. You are a naval officer of 50 years' experience. Tell me, what were the changes?
RAEDER: It turned out that because of the airplane the submarine was no longer in a position to surface and to investigate enemy ships or any other merchant ships, particularly near the enemy coast where the U-boats carried on their activities at first. There was no regulation at all issued about airplanes.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is not an answer to the question. The question you were asked was, what changes had taken place in the weapons of war, either airplanes or submarines.
RAEDER: But Mr. President, the changes took place in the airplane. The ever increasing efficiency of the airplanes and the extension of their activities also over the seas led to the situation where it became impossible to examine any merchant vessel without aircraft being called to threaten the submarine. That got worse and worse, so that later on even rescuing had to be restricted because of enemy aircraft, and the entire submarine warfare was completely turned upside down in that manner.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the only change that you can say in order to justify your statement that international law was to be thrown overboard where it didn't fit in with military necessities? Is that the only change, the increase in the power of aircraft between 1936 and 1939?
RAEDER: I have already said once it was not thrown overboard. It was to be limited and changed and that was done by others too.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you just look at the next paragraph. You talked about your consideration for neutrals. At the top of Page 5 in the English text; it is the paragraph that follows the one that I have just read. You say: "In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare. "The Supreme War Command, after considering the political, military and economic consequences within the framework of the general conduct of the war, will have to decide what measures of a military nature are to be taken, and what our attitude to the usage of war is to be. Once it has been decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in fulfillment of military requirements, this decision is definitely to be adhered to under all circumstances. On no account may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or subsequently relaxed under political pressure from neutral powers, as took place in the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be turned down. Even threats from other countries, especially the United States, to come into the war, which can be expected with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end."
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now agree with that suggestion and that point of view expressed in the paragraph which I have just read to you?
RAEDER: It has to be understood quite differently from the way you are trying to present it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite differently from what it says . . .
RAEDER: No, not what it says. This is the point. We had the experience during the first World War that, as soon as the order for intensification had been given and communicated, as soon as the first neutral had raised a finger to object, these measures were immediately cancelled, particularly when the United States had a hand in it. And here I am saying that under all circumstances it must be avoided that we always withdraw our measures at once; and I give a warning to the effect that we should consider our measures as carefully as possible. That is the reason for the discussion with the Foreign Office and others, namely, to avoid the situation where later on they might be withdrawn, which would mean a considerable loss of prestige and the results would not be achieved. That is the reason. Numerous protests were received by Britain too, and in most cases they were unanswered. I can quote from the Document Number C-170, Exhibit Number USA-136, where there are a lot of figures, Number 14, where it says: "Sharp Russian note against the British blockade warfare on 20 October 1939;" and Number 17, on 31 October, where it states: "Political Speech of Molotov."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All that I ask is, was that a proper procedure?