dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, I believe we should also discuss the fact that opposition was partly due to the contradiction provoked by certain National Socialist newspaper articles.
ROSENBERG: The statements of the opposite side, as they appeared constantly during these 14 years, had in part already appeared prior to the rise of the National Socialist movement. After all, the incidents of the Rate Republic in Munich and in Hungary took place long before the National Socialist movement was in a position to gain influence.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, what did you have to say to the fact that in the first World War 12,000 Jewish soldiers died at the front?
ROSENBERG: Of course, I have always been conscious of the fact that many Jewish-German citizens were assimilated into the German environment, and that in the course of this development many tragic individual cases appeared, and that these, of course, deserved consideration. On the whole, however, this did not involve the entire social and political movement, especially since the leading papers of the so-called democratic parties recognized the increase of unemployment in Germany and suggested that Germans should emigrate to the French colonies, to the Argentine, and to China. Prominent Jewish people and the chairman of the Democratic Party suggested three times quite openly that, in view of the increase of unemployment, Germans should be deported to Africa and Asia. After all, during those 14 years just as many Germans were expelled from Poland as there were Jews in Germany, and the League of Nations took no effective steps against this violation of the pact in favor of the minorities.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you were the leader of the foreign policy of lice of the Party. What was your function?
ROSENBERG: The Foreign Policy Office was founded in April 1933. After its accession to power, many foreigners came to Germany in order to obtain information about the origin and nature of the National Socialist Party. In order to create an information center for the Party, the Fuehrer assigned me to direct this office. As I said, it was the task of this office to receive foreigners who were interested in these problems, to give them information, to refer them to the proper organizations of the Party and the State, if they were interested in the labor front, the youth problem, the winter aid work, and so forth We were also interested in working provisionally on certain initial suggestions made to us in the field of foreign trade and, if they deserved support, in transmitting them to those departments of the government particularly concerned. Furthermore, we studied the foreign press in order to have good archives for future research work and to inform the Party leadership politically by short excerpts from the foreign press. Among other things, I am accused here of having written articles for the Hearst press. On invitation by the Hearst combine, I wrote five or six articles in 1933 or 1934; but, after I had met Hearst once for about 20 minutes at Nauheim, I did not see him or speak to him again. I heard only that the Hearst combine did get into extraordinary difficulties because of the favor shown me by publishing my impartial statements.
DR. THOMA: As the chief of the Foreign Policy Of lice did you at times take official political steps? '
ROSENBERG: In the documents presented here, Document Number 003-PS, 004-PS, and 007-PS, the activity of the Foreign Policy Office had been discussed and submitted; and in regard to this activity I could give a brief luminary to the Tribunal and read from the documents.
DR. THOMA: But I would like you to tell us what steps you took as the chief of the Foreign Policy Of lice to reach a positive agreement among the European nations.
ROSENBERG: Adolf Hitler called a meeting at Bamberg, I believe in 1927, at which he stated his foreign political conviction that at least some nations could have no direct interest in the total extinction of central Europe. By "some nations" he meant particularly England and Italy. After that in wholehearted agreement with him, I tried to find a way to an understanding by personal contacts I had made. Frequently, I had conversations with British Air Force officers of the British Air Forces General Staff. On their invitation I visited London in 1931, and at that time had purely informal conversations with a number of British personalities. And when, in 1932, at a meeting of the Royal Academy of Rome, the topic "Europe" was discussed, I was offered an opportunity to speak, and I made a speech about this problem in which I explained that the development of the last centuries had been determined mainly by four nations and states-namely, England, France, Germany, and Italy. I pointed out that, first of all, these four should define their vital interests so that shoulder to shoulder they would defend the ancient and venerable continent of Europe and its traditions. I believed that these fourfold national roots of the rich European culture represented a historical and political legacy. Excerpts of my speech were published, and parts of it with approval have been translated for the Tribunal. On the last day of the conference, the former British Ambassador to Italy, Sir Rennell Rodd, came to me and told me that he had just left Mussolini who had told him that I, Rosenberg, had spoken the most important words of the conference.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, may I ask you, please, to be a lime more brief.
ROSENBERG: In May 1933 I was again in London, this time by Hitler's personal order; and I visited a number of British ministers, whose names are not relevant here, and tried again to promote understanding for the sudden and strange development in Germany. My reception was rather reserved, and a number of incidents occurred which showed that the sentiment was very repellent. But that did not prevent me from keeping up these personal contacts and from inviting a great number of British personalities to come to Germany later. It was not within the scope of my assignment to do that.
THE PRESIDENT: Why don't you ask the defendant what the agreement (*) was to be about? Why doesn't he tell us what the agreement was to be about instead of going on talking about an agreement in the abstract?
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I asked the defendant that question because he took steps to come to a positive understanding with England and worked toward that goal. The defendant is accused. . .
THE PRESIDENT: But what was the understanding about?
DR. THOMA: We were concerned with the fact that the defendant went to London in order to . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I want you to ask the defendant. I don't want you to tell me.
DR. THOMA: I have just asked him, Mr. President. The defendant is accused of having participated the Norwegian action, in that he advocated the violation of Norwegian neutrality. [Turning to the witness.] Please answer the question. How did you meet Quisling?
ROSENBERG: I met Quisling in the year 1933, when he visited me, and I had a discussion of 20 minutes' duration with him. Subsequently, an assistant of mine, who was interested in Scandinavian culture and had written books about it, corresponded with Quisling. It was all of 6 years before I saw Quisling again, and I did not intervene either In the Norwegian political situation or in the Quisling movement until he visited me in June of 1939, when the tension in Europe had increased, and expressed his apprehensions about the situation in Norway in the event of a conflict. He said it was to be feared that Norway would not be able to remain neutral in such a case, and that his home country might be occupied in the North by Soviet troops and in the South by the troops of the Western powers, and that he viewed things with great concern. My staff leader made a note of his apprehensions and then reported them to Dr. Lammers, as it was his duty to do.
DR. THOMA: When was that?
ROSENBERG: That must have been in June 1939. Thereupon Quisling asked one of my assistants to help to maintain German-Norwegian understanding and especially to Acquaint his Party with the organization and propaganda of our Party movement. Thereupon, in the beginning of August there were, I believe, 25 Norwegians in our training school in order to train for this propaganda work and then to return home.
DR. THOMA: What were they trained in, and how?
ROSENBERG: I did not see them, nor did I speak to them individually. They were taught how to carry on more effective propaganda, and how the organization of the Party in this field had been built up in Germany. We promised to assist them in this field. Suddenly, after the outbreak of the war, or shortly before-I do not remember exactly-Hagelin, an acquaintance of Quisling's, came to me with apprehensions similar to those expressed by Quisling. After the outbreak of the war, this assistant of Quisling's deported various details about the activity of the Western Powers in Norway. Finally, in December of 1939, Quisling came to Berlin with the declaration that, on the basis of exact information, he knew that the Norwegian Government was only seemingly neutral now, and that in reality it was practically agreed that Norway should give up her neutrality. Quisling himself had formerly been a Minister of War in Norway, and therefore, he should have had exact knowledge of these things. In accordance with my duty as a German citizen, I recommended that the Fuehrer should hear Quisling. The Fuehrer thereupon received Quisling twice, and at the same time Quisling, with his assistant, Hagelin, visited Navy headquarters and gave them identical information. I spoke once to Raeder after that, and he also recommended to the Fuehrer that he listen to Quisling's report.
DR. THOMA: Then you personally transmitted only those reports which Quisling had given you?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I would like to emphasize that although Quisling visited me, I had not been engaged on this question-I had not been involved in these political affairs for 6 years. Naturally, I had to consider it my duty to forward to the Fuehrer reports which, if correct, were a tremendous military threat to Germany, and also to make notes of, and report to the Fuehrer, those things which Quisling told me orally-namely, his plan to bring about a political change in Norway and then to ask Germany for support. At this time-I do not know, this development has been described in those documents produced by the Prosecution in words which express it much more precisely than I could summarize it here. In Document Number 004-PS, my staff leader made a short summary of it about 1'/z or 2 months after the Norwegian operation.
DR. THOMA: This document-I would like to call the attention of the Tribunal particularly to this document-was compiled immediately after the Norwegian operation while the impression of its success was still fresh, and it describes the measures which were taken quite unequivocally. It states clearly that Quisling was the instigator, that he suddenly turned up at Lubeck and made reports, that he begged that his people be trained further, and that he came back again and again and always informed Rosenberg about the new developments in Norway.
THE PRESIDENT: What document are you referring to?
DR. THOMA: Document Number 004-PS, Exhibit GB-140. That is in Document Book 2, Page 113.
THE PRESIDENT: The document book is not numbered or paged?
DR. THOMA: I believe the number is at the bottom, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Which book is it you are referring to?
DR. THOMA: My Document Book Number 2, Page 113. Document Book Alfred Rosenberg, Page 113, Volume II. It is on Page 72 of the English translation.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, then, what is your question?
DR. THOMA: I would like to point out that on Page 1 it states, "Before the meeting of the Nordic Society in Lubeck, Quisling was in Berlin, where he was received by Rosenberg." That was in June 1939, as is shown by the Document Number 007-PS. Then. on the next page, it says that in August a course was given in Berlin-Dahlem. It says further that in December of 1939 Quisling reappeared in Berlin on his own initiative and made his reports-that was on the 14th and 15th of December-and Rosenberg, in line with his duty, transmitted to the Fuehrer these reports which Quisling made to him. He did nothing beyond that in this matter, however. Parallel to this, and entirely independently of each other, the same reports were received by Raeder. [Turning to the defendant.] Do you have anything to add to Document Number 004-PS?
ROSENBERG: Yes. Please let me have the document. [The document was submitted to the defendant] On Page 5 of this Document Number 004-PS, it is stated that Hagelin, Quisling's assistant who moved in Norwegian governmental circles and who had received orders from the Norwegian Government for the purchase of arms from Germany, after the Altmark incident, for instance-that is the incident where a German vessel was fired upon in Norwegian territorial waters-had heard Norwegian deputies of the Storting say that Norway's reserved attitude was clearly a prearranged matter. Further, in the middle of Page 7: "On 20 March on the occasion of his participation in negotiations regarding German deliveries of antiaircraft artillery, he made a detailed report on the unceasing activity of the Allies in Norway with the acquiescence of the Nygardsvold Government. According to his report, the Allies were already inspecting the Norwegian harbor towns for landing and transport facilities. The French Commander, Kermarrec who had orders to that effect"-incidently I also remember this name spelled Karramac, or something similar-"in a confidential conversation with Colonel Sundlo, the Commander of Narvik, who was also a follower of Quisling, had informed the Colonel about the intention of the Allies to land mechanized troops at Stavanger, Trondheim, and perhaps also at Kirkenes, and to occupy Sola airport near Stavanger." A little further down it says, and I quote: "In his report of 26 March he"-that is, Hagelin-"pointed out once more that the speech of the Norwegian Foreign Minister Koht, dealing with Norwegian neutrality and his protests, was not taken seriously either in London by the English or in Norway by the Norwegians, since it was well known that the Government had no intention of taking a serious stand against England."
DR. THOMA: That is what Quisling reported to you?
ROSENBERG: Yes, these were the reports which Quisling had instructed Hagelin to make. I would like to add further that, some time after the Fuehrer had received Quisling he told me that he had instructed the OKW to consider this case from the military viewpoint, and he asked me not to talk about this subject to anybody else. In this connection, I would like to point out also that- as can be seen from the report Document Number 004-PS-the Fuehrer had emphasized that he wanted the entire Scandinavian North to maintain neutrality at all costs, and would change his attitude only if the neutrality was threatened by other powers. Later, an assistant of mine was ordered by the Fuehrer to keep up connections with Quisling at Oslo, and he received a certain sum from the Foreign Of lice to support; propaganda friendly to Germany to counteract other propaganda. He also returned to Germany with reports about the opinions of Quisling. Later I heard -and this was entirely understandable-that this assistant, who was a soldier at that time, had also received military intelligence reports which he disclosed after the Norwegian operation.
DR. THOMA: Please be more brief, Mr. Rosenberg.
ROSENBERG: The Fuehrer did not inform me of his final decision, or whether he had actually decided to carry through the operation. I learned of the entire operation of 9 November through the new paper and thereupon paid a visit to the Fuehrer on that day. Several weeks later, the Fuehrer summoned me and said that he had been forced to make this decision on the basis of concrete warnings which he had received, and documents which have been found gave proof that these warnings had been correct. He said it had been true to the letter that when the last German ships arrived in the fjord of Trondheim, I believe, they had already been engaged by the first of the approaching British vessels.
DR. THOMA: In this connection I have just one more question: Did Hitler ever call on you to attend a foreign political or military conference in your capacity as chief of the foreign policy office?
ROSENBERG: The Fuehrer differentiated strictly between the official foreign policy and the policy followed on account of an initiative or suggestion which was urged upon me from outside. I believe all the documents show that he never asked me to participate in any conference concerning foreign policy or military preparations.
DR. THOMA: That is, you were never called upon to participate in the operations against Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, et cetera? I believe, Mr. President, that this is a suitable time to adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 16 April 1946 at 1000 hours] * The President's question is in response to the foregoing answer of the Defendant Rosenberg in which the interpreter said "to bring about an agreement" instead of "to promote understanding". Back .
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you were the official appointed by the Fuehrer for the supervision of the entire intellectual and ideological training of the NSDAP and all its affiliated organizations. Did you exert any influence on national lawmaking in that capacity?
ROSENBERG: The Fuehrer once spoke to me in this connection and explained to me that in the leadership of a large movement and of a state three factors had to be considered. There are, for instance, men who by their natures feel they must deal with any rising problems fundamentally through contemplation and then in lectures; then there is the directorate-that is to say, he, himself- who must select that which shows possibilities of realization; and finally, there are those people who have the task of putting the selected problems into practice in the social, political, and economic fields by dint of painstaking labor. So it was that he originally conceived of my task, and he entrusted me with the supervision of training with the intention of expecting me to adopt a constructive attitude, by reason of my knowledge of the movement. The executive and legislative powers were in the hands of the respective ministries-that is, the Ministry for Education and the Reich Propaganda Ministry-and the general representation of the Party was in the hands of the Party Chancellery. The Party Chancellery occasionally asked me to define my position with regard to this or that question but was not obliged to consider my views.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, did you have any influence on National Socialist school policies?
ROSENBERG: I did not have any direct influence on school policies. The school systems were an affair of the Reich Ministry for Education-the actual internal organization of the schools is not to be confused with the Party training-and the organization of the universities, the task of the ministry concerned with this problem.
DR. THOMA: There were National Socialist educational institutions. Can you tell me what kind of institutions these were and what your function was in that connection?
ROSENBERG: The so-called National Socialist educational institutions were special foundations under the leadership and direction of the Ministry for Education and the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, for the purpose of training a distinct disciplined class; and the inspection of these educational institutions was in the hands of a special SS leader detailed to the Ministry for Education.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you are also accused of religious persecution, especially as it finds expression in your Myth of the 20th Century. Do you admit that occasionally you. were a little too severe toward the church?
ROSENBERG: Of course I will allow that as far as historically founded creeds were concerned I pronounced severe personal judgment. I would like to emphasize, in this connection, that in the introduction to my book I described it as a work dealing with personal opinions; secondly, that this book was not directed against the religious elements in the public, as is shown in the quotation on Page 125 of the document book, Part I; and thirdly, that I rejected a policy of withdrawal from the church, as can be seen in the document book, Part I, Page 122, and also rejected political interference by the state in purely religious confessions which is also expressed clearly in this book. I further rejected many proposals to have my book translated into foreign languages. Only once a Japanese translation was submitted to me, although I was not able to recall having given my approval for the translation.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you were not trained in theological matters. Don't you believe that in some judgments on theological questions you were wrong?
ROSENBERG: I naturally never assumed that this book, which deals with many problems, does not contain errors. I was, to an extent, grateful to receive criticism, and I made certain corrections; but some attacks I could not consider justified, and I thought that later I would certainly thoroughly revise this work-which, of course, also contained political comments.
DR. THOMA: Did you at any time use State Police measures against your opponents in theology and science?
ROSENBERG: No. I would like to state here that this work was published 2 1/2 years before the assumption of power, and that it was naturally open to criticism from all sides, but that the main criticism arose after the assumption of power. I answered these attacks in two pamphlets, but I never made use of the Police to suppress these attacks or persecute the authors of these attacks.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, in the RSHA there was an of lice for the persecution of "political" churches. Did you have any connection with this department?
ROSENBERG: I know only that a coworker of mine was in contact with many Party offices as a matter of policy and, of course, was also in touch with the SS. Through him I received many circular letters from the church authorities: pastoral letters, the circular letters of the Fulda Conference of Bishops, and many others. No arrests of individual church leaders came to my attention-although, of course, later on I did find out that during the war many monasteries had been confiscated, ostensibly for state political reasons-and so I never was able to find out in detail the political motives involved. I must mention that in the year 1935 a bishop sent an official letter to the administrative head of his province, asking him to prohibit me from delivering speeches in that city. That, to be sure, was of no avail; this church dignitary was not harmed either by me or by anybody else, however.
DR. THOMA: What was your attitude toward the churches coming within the range of the Ministry for Eastern Territories?
ROSENBERG: After the entry of German troops in the eastern territories, the Wehrmacht of its own accord granted the practice of religious worship; and when I was made Minister for the East, I legally sanctioned this practice by issuing a special "church tolerance" edict at the end of December 1941.
DR. THOMA: The Prosecution have presented a number of documents-almost all of them letters by the Leader of the Party Chancellery-to support their contention of religious persecution. I would like to have you state your attitude toward these documents, which have been submitted under Numbers 107, 116, 122, 129, 101; USA-107, USA-351; 116, USA-685...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, you are going too fast for us to get these numbers down. 107-PS, do you mean?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly say PS if you mean PS? 107-PS, 116-PS.
DR. THOMA: Yes, I will add the USA exhibit numbers. 107-PS, 351-USA .
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would rather have the PS number. If you will give me the PS numbers, or whatever the numbers are, as part of the exhibit number: 107-PS, 116-PS...
DR. THOMA: Yes, Documents 116-PS, 122-PS, 129-PS, 101-PS, l00-PS, 089-PS, 064-PS, 098-PS, 072-PS, 070-PS.