dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: "At the same time the Polish Government accepted, with regard to another state, political obligations which are not compatible either with the spirit, the meaning, or the text of the German-Polish declaration of the 26th of January 1934. 219 Thereby, the Polish Government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this declaration null and void." In the last paragraph the German Government says that, nevertheless, they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland. On the same day as that memorandum was issued Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag, 28 April, in which he repeated, in effect, the terms of the memorandum. This is Document T - 72, Number 13, which becomes GB-43. I would only refer the Tribunal to the latter part of the second page of the translation. He has again repeated the demands and offers that Germany made in March, and he goes on to say that the Polish Government have rejected his offer and lastly: "I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish Government. But that alone is not the decisive fact. The worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia a year ago, believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up troops although Germany, other part, has not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in any way against Poland. As I have said, this is, in itself, very regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was really right to refuse the suggestion made this once by me. This, as I have said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a question which intimately affects the German people by a truly unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both countries. According to my conviction, Poland was not a giving party in this solution at all, but only a receiving party, because it should be beyond all doubt that Danzig will never become Polish.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The intention to attack, ton the part of Germany, which was merely invented by the international press, led, as you know, to the so-called guarantee offer and to an obligation on the part of the Polish Government for mutual assistance...." It is unnecessary, My Lord, to read more of that. It shows us, as I say, how completely dishonest was everything that the German Government was saying at that time. There was Hitler, probably with a copy of the orders for Fall Weiss in his pocket as he spoke, saying that the intention to attack, by Germany, was an invention of the international press. In answer to that memorandum and that speech the Polish Government issued a memorandum on the 28th of April. It is set out in the next exhibit, TC-72, Number 16, which becomes GB-44.It is unnecessary to read more than . . .
THE PRESIDENT: It is stated as the 8th of May, not the28th of April.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, yes, on the 5th of May. It is unnecessary to read more than two short paragraphs from that reply. I can summarize the document in a word. It sets out the objects of the 1934 agreement: to renounce the use of force and to carry on friendly relationship between the two countries, to solve difficulties by arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish Government appreciate that there are difficulties about Danzig and have long been ready to carry out discussions. They set out again their part in the recent discussions, and I turn to the second page of the document, the one but last paragraph or, perhaps, I should go back a little to the top of that page, the first half of that page. The Polish Government allege that they wrote, as indeed they did, to the German Government on the 26th of March giving their point of view, that they then proposed joint guarantees by the Polish and German Governments of the City of Danzig based on the principles of freedom for the local population in internal affairs. They said they were prepared to examine the possibilities of a motor road and railway facilities and that they received no reply to these proposals: "It is clear that negotiations in which one state formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands unaltered, are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and dignity of Poland." Which, of course, in a word summarizes the whole position of the Polish point of view. And thereafter they reject the German accusation that the Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the1934 German-Polish agreement. They state that Germany herself has entered into similar agreements with other nations and lastly, on the next page, they too say that they are still willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should Germany wish to do so. If the Tribunal would turn back to the Document C-120, to the first two letters, to which I referred only a few minutes ago, it becoming GB-41.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On the bottom of the page there is a figure 614, on the first page of that exhibit, "Directives from Hitler and Keitel Preparing for War and the Invasion of Poland". I would refer to page 6 of that particular exhibit. The page number will be found at the bottom of the page, in the center. It is a letter from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, signed by Hitler and dated the 10th of May. It goes to OKW, OKH, OKM, various branches of the OKW and with it apparently were enclosed ''instructions for the Economic War and the Protection of Our Own economy." I only mention it now to show better that throughout this time preparations for the immediate aggression were continuing. That document will still be part of the same exhibit. Again on the next page, which is headed Number C-120(1), I am afraid this is a precis only, not a full translation and therefore, perhaps, I will not read it. But it is the annex, showing the "Directives for the War against the Enemy Economy and Measures of Protection for Our Own Economy." As we will see later, not only were the military preparations being carried out throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every other kind of preparation was being made for war at the earliest moment. I think this period of preparation, translated up to May 1939, finishes really with that famous meeting or conference in the Reich Chancellery on the 23rd of May about which the Tribunal has already heard. It was L-79 and is now Exhibit USA-27; and it was referred to, I think, and has been known as the "Schmundt minutes." It is the last document which is in the Tribunal's document book of this part and I do not propose to read anything of it. It has been read already and the Tribunal will remember that it was the speech in which Hitler was crying out for Lebensraum and said that Danzig was not the dispute at all. It was a question of expanding their living space in the East, where he said that the decision had been taken to attack Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you remind me of the date of it?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The 23rd of May 1939. Your Lordship will remember that Goering, Raeder, and Keitel, among many others, were present. It has three particular lines of which I want to remind the Tribunal, where he said: "If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia against Germany, Italy, and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England." So that, not only haste decision been taken definitely to attack Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack England and France, also. I pass to the next period, which I have described as the final preparations taken from June up to the beginning of the war, at the beginning of September--Part V of the Tribunal's document book. If the Tribunal Will glance at the index to the document book, they will find I have, for convenience, divided the evidence up under four subheadings: Final preparations of the Armed Forces; economic preparation; the famous Obersalzberg speeches; and the political or diplomatic preparations urging on the crisis and the justification for the invasion of Poland. I refer the Tribunal to the first document in that book, dealing with the final preparations of the Armed Forces. It again is an exhibit containing various documents, and I refer particularly to the second document, dated the 22d of June 1939. This is Document C-126, which will become GB-45. It will be remembered that a precise timetable had been called for. Now, here it is: "The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, a 'preliminary timetable' for Case White based on the particulars so far available from the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not included in this timetable. "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army, and Air Force and made the following comments on individual points: "1.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In order not to disquiet the population by calling up reserves on a larger scale than usual for the maneuvers scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, employers or other private persons who make inquiries should be told that men are being called up for the autumn maneuvers and for the exercise units it is intended to form for these maneuvers. "It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to subordinate establishments." All this became relevant, particularly relevant, later when we find the German Government making allegations of mobilization on the part of the Poles. Here we have it in May, or rather June--they are mobilizing, only doing so secretly: "2. For reasons of security, the clearing of hospitals in the area of the frontier must not be carried out." If the Tribunal will turn to the top of the following page, it will be seen that that order is signed by the Defendant Keitel. I think it is unnecessary to read any further from that document. There is--which perhaps will save turning back, if I might take it rather out of date now--the first document on that front page of that exhibit, a short letter dated the 2d of August. It is only an extract, I am afraid, as it appears in the translation: "Attached are operational directions for the employment of U-boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out Case White remaining unchanged. Commander, U-boats is handing in his operation orders by the 12th of August to the operations staff of the Navy." One must assume that the Defendant Doenitz knew that his U-boats were to go out into the Atlantic "by way of precaution in the event of the intention to carry out Case White remaining unchanged." I turn to the next document in the Tribunal's book, C-30, which becomes GB-46. That is a letter dated the 27th of July.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It contains orders for the air and sea forces for the occupation of the German Free City of Danzig: "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with the Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy Danzig Free State immediately in order to protect the German population. There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms." It then sets out how the occupation is to be effected. All this again becomes more relevant when we discuss the diplomatic action of the last few days before the war, when Germany was purporting to make specious offers for the settlement of the question by peaceful means. I would like to offer this as evidence that the decision had been taken and nothing was going to move him from that decision. That document, as set out, says that, "There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms." Nevertheless, that was not the only condition upon which the occupation was to take place and we find that during July, right up to the time of the war, steps were being taken to arm the population of Danzig and to prepare them to take part in the coming occupation. I refer the Tribunal to the next Document, TC-71, which becomes GB-47, where there are set out a few only of the reports which were coming back almost daily during this period from Mr. Shepherd, the Consul-General in Danzig, to the British Foreign Minister. The sum total of those reports can be found in the British Blue Book . I now would refer to only two of them as examples of the kind of thing that was happening. I refer to the first that appears on that exhibit, dated the 1st of July 1939. "Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti arrived here by night express from Berlin to organize Danzig Heimwehr.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: All approaches to hills and dismantled forts, which constitute a popular public promenade on the western fringe of the city, have been closed with barbed wire and 'verboten' notices. The walls surrounding the shipyards bear placards: 'Comrades keep your mouths shut lest you regret consequences.' "Master of British steamer High Commissioner Wood, while he was roving Konigsberg from the 28th of June to 30th of June, observed considerable military activity, including extensive shipment of camouflaged covered lorries and similar material, by small coasting vessels. On the 28th of June four medium-sized steamers, loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens, and so forth, left Konigsberg ostensibly returning to Hamburg after maneuvers, but actually proceeding to Stettin. Names of steamers...." And again, as another example, the report Number 11, on the next page of the exhibit, dated the 10th of July, states: "The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises me that on the 8th of July, he personally saw about 30 military lorries with East Prussian license numbers on the Bischofsberg, where numerous field kitchens had been placed along the hedges. There were also eight large antiaircraft guns in position, which he estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber, and three six-barreled light antiaircraft machine guns. There were about 500 men, drilling with rifles, and the whole place is extensively fortified with barbed wire." I do not think it is necessary to occupy the Tribunal's time in reading more. Those, as I say, are two reports only, of a number of others that can be found in the British Blue Book , which sets out the arming and preparation of the Free City of Danzig. On the 12th of August and the 13th of August, when preparations were practically complete--and it will be remembered that they had to be complete for an invasion of Poland on the 1st of September--we find Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop at last disclosing their intentions to their allies, the Italians.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: One of the passages in Hitler's speech of the 23rd of May, it will be remembered--I will not quote it now because the document has been read before. However, in a passage in that speech Hitler, in regard to his proposed attack on Poland, had said, "Our object must be kept secret even from the Italians and the Japanese." Now, when his preparations are complete, he discloses his intentions to his Italian comrades, and does so in hope that they will join him. The minutes of that meeting are long, and it is not proposed to read more than a few passages. The meeting can be summarized generally by saying, as I have, that Hitler is trying to persuade the Italians to come into the war with him. The Italians, or Ciano, rather, is most surprised. He had no idea, as he says, of the urgency of the matter; and they are not prepared. He, therefore, is trying to dissuade Hitler from starting off so soon until the Duce can have had a little more time to prepare himself. The value--perhaps the greatest value--of the minutes of that meeting is that they show quite clearly the German intention to attack England and France ultimately, anyway, if not at the same time as Poland. I refer the Tribunal to the second page of the exhibit. Hitler is trying to show the strength of Germany, the certainty of winning the war; and, therefore, he hopes to persuade the Italians to come in: " At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements in prospect."--I quote from the top of the second page.--"Some time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction could be taken into service. As far as the land army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had been called to the colors." I quote this passage particularly to show the intention to attack England. We have been concentrating rather on Poland, but here his thoughts are turned entirely towards England: "If England kept the necessary troops in her own country- she could send to France, at the most, two infantry divisions anyone armored division.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: For the rest she could supply a few bomber squadrons, but hardly any fighters, since, at the outbreak of war, the German Air Force would at once attack England and the English fighters would be urgently needed for the defense of their own country. "With regard to the position of France, the Fuehrer said that in the event of a general war, after the destruction of Poland--which would not take long--Germany would be in a position to assemble a hundred divisions along the West Wall and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available forces from the colonies, from the Italian frontier and elsewhere, on her own Maginot Line for the life and death struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also thought that the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt."--Doubts which, perhaps, in view of the subsequent performances, were well justified. "The Polish Agony was most uneven in quality. Together with a few parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak in antitank and antiaircraft defense and at the moment neither France nor England could help her in this respect." What this Tribunal will appreciate, of course, is that Poland formed such a threat to Germany on Germany's eastern frontier. "If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western Powers over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to the fanatics of Warsaw and Krakow, the population of their areas is indifferent. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the position of the Polish State. Out of34 million inhabitants, one and one-half million were German, about four million were Jews, and approximately nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much less in number than the total population and, as already said, their striking power was to be valued variably. In these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in the shortest time.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: "Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it clear that in any case, in the event of a conflict, they would stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a hostile Poland remained on Germany's eastern frontier, not only would the 11 East Prussian divisions be tied down; but also further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation.'' The argument goes on on those lines. I pass on to the next page, at the top of the page: "Coming back to the Danzig question, the Fuehrer said to Count Ciano that it was impossible for him to go back now. He had made an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly and northeasterly direction of a German policy. The east and northeast, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been Germany's undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial, as the Mediterranean had been the appropriate sphere for Italy. For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and timber from these eastern regions." Now we get the truth of this matter. It is not the persecution of German minorities on the Polish frontiers, but the economic reasons, the need for foodstuffs and timber from Poland: "In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material, although the city had the greatest harbor in the Baltic--the transshipment by tonnage was 40 percent of that of Hamburg--but Danzig was a Nuremberg of the north, an ancient German city awaking sentimental feelings for every German, and the Fuehrer was bound to take account of this psychological element in public opinion.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over anything of this kind. "Count Ciano, in replying to the Fuehrer's statement, first expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during his Berlin visit had there been any sign, from the German side, that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the contrary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had said that in his opinion the Danzig question would be settled in the course of time. On these grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that a conflict with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed that he should make his preparations for this event; he had made plans for a period of 2 or 3 years. If immediate conflict was unavoidable, the Duce, as he had told Ciano, would certainly stand on the German side; but for various reasons he would welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later time." No question of welcoming the cancellation of a general conflict; the only concern of anybody is as to time. "Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a convict with Poland would not be limited to that country but would develop into a general European war." Thereafter, during the meeting, Ciano goes on to try to dissuade Hitler from any immediate action.