dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
serious cases, there is no objection to the increasing of the deterrent effect by the spreading of a cleverly carried out rumor propaganda, more or less to the effect that, according to hearsay, in view of the seriousness of his case, the arrested man will not be released for 2 or 3 years.
4. In certain cases, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a concentration camp. Orders of this kind will, in future, also be transmitted to the State Police district Office concerned. In this case too, there is no objection to spreading the rumour of this increased punishment as laid down in Section 3, paragraph 3, in so far as this appears suitable, to add to the deterrent effect.
5. Natuarally, particularly suitable and reliable people are to be chosen for the spreading of such news.
By Order
(signed) Mueller
Authenticated: (signed) Bleeck
Chancellery employee
II
Chief of the Security police and the SD
Bk. No. IV-226/42 Top Secret
Berlin, 12th June 1942
120 Copies 110th Copy
TOP SECRET
As Top Secret
to all Chiefs of the Security Police and the SD
to all Directors of Groups IV A, IV B, IV C, and IV E of the reich Security Head Office
to all Commanding Officers of the Security Police and the SD
to all Heads of the State Police District Offices
For Information
to the Inspectors of the Security Police and the SD
Subject: Third degree
Enclosure: 1 receipt
In order to simplify things the Decree of the Chief of the Security police and the SD of 1.7.37 Bk. No. 28 (II) 301/37 Secret (to be destroyed according to sealed orders) will be superseded by the following new ruling, with immediate effect:
1. Third degree may only be applied if it is clear from preliminary investigation that the prisoner can give information on important facts, as social or subversive to the State and to the Reich, but will not disclose what he knows, and the information cannot be obtained by investigation.
immediate effect: 1. Third degree may only be applied if it is clear from preliminary investigation that the prisoner can give information on important facts, as social or subversive to the State and to the Reich, but will not disclose what he knows, and the information cannot be obtained by investigation.
2. Third degree may, under this supposition, only be employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah's Witnesses, saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements, parachute agents, anti-social elements, Polish or Soviet-Russian loafers or tramps. In all other cases, my permission must first be obtained.
3. Third degree may not be used to extort confessions of a prisoner's own crimes. Also this method may not be employed against persons who are temporarily detained by law for further investigations.
My previous permission is also necessary in exceptional cases.
4. Third degree can, according to the circumstances, consist, among other methods, of very simple diet (water and bread), hard bunk, dark cell, deprivation of sleep, exhaustion drill, but also in the administration of flogging (for more than 20 strokes a doctor must be consulted).
I. V.
(signed) Mueller
Authenticated: (signed) Nellmuth
Registered Secretary (Female)
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Document No. 1534-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1534-PS
Berlin, W.8., Wilhelm Street 79, 30 January 37
My Fuehrer:
I thank you for the confidence which you have placed into me during the four years of your leadership and for the honour you do me in offering to admit me to the party. My conscience forbids me however to accept this offer. I believe in the principles of positive christianity and must remain faithful to my Lord and to myself. Party membership however would mean that i should have to face without contradiction the steadily aggravating attacks by party offices on the Christian confessions and those who want to remain faithful to their religious convictions.
This decision has been infinitely difficult for me. For never in my life i have performed my duty with greater joy and satisfaction than under your wise state leadership.
I ask to be permitted to resign.
With German Greetings!
Your very obedient,
(signed) Baron v. Eltz.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Document No. 1536-PS Previous Document Volume IV Menu Next Document TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1536-PS TOP SECRET Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force [initials written in ink] 12 August 1938 Draft General Officers only 2 copies 2nd Copy Access only through officer General Staff 5.Division No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only (Ic) Re: Freudenthal Affair Ref: Abwehr II No. 42/38. Top Secret General Officers only. A. As Appendix 1 please find enclosed a translation by Major d.G. Moericke on which the following comment is made: 1. The report from the Abwehrstelle Breslau still does not prove that the real circumstances are known to the two Sudeten Germans or even widely in Sudeten German circles. Nevertheless, there is still no need for Czech authorities to have any knowledge of them. If the worst comes to the worst it is a question, in eventual remarks made by Macholdt to Pilz, of Suppositions which are never theless very near to the truth of the matter. 2. For the time being there is no reason for stopping preparations for the Fr. operation. 3. Punishable behaviour on the part of Major Moericke cannot be deduced purely from the Abwehrstelle report. rather, as far as can be seen from here, has Major Moericke carried out the task allotted to him skilfully and provided good evidence. B. In the course of further preparations, the following measures are recommended: 1. Not a single word on the matter will be mentioned to informers [V-Leute]. 2. The fields will not be purchased through middlemen. Neither will any influence be brought to bear on the owners in order to effect any change in the cultivation of the land according to local custom and the time of the year. 3. In the event of the suspected endangering of our plans, as a result of treachery, then it will be a question of sham reconnoitring of landing grounds in other areas and spreading of rumors as a camouflage. 4. It is worth considering whether Macholdt and Pilz cannot be called back to Germany on some pretext and retained here temporarily. C. Further to the preparations which have already been carried out, the following proposals have been made by the Luftwaffe: 1. Continual supervision of the state of the agricultural
It is worth considering whether Macholdt and Pilz cannot be called back to Germany on some pretext and retained here temporarily. C. Further to the preparations which have already been carried out, the following proposals have been made by the Luftwaffe: 1. Continual supervision of the state of the agricultural cultivation of the landing grounds in question, in accordance with Appendices 2, 3, 4. 2. Continual supervision of the area around Freudenthal with regard to whether Czech defence measures against their intended employment are being undertaken. Reconnoitering of further landing grounds, if possible by 10 September, in the following areas: a. Freudenthal - Spachendorf - Hof - Braunseifen - Freudenthal. b. Around Sternberg (up to a radius of 5 km). c. Around Olmuetz (up to a radius of 10 km). As landing grounds are considered flat open stretches, above all dry meadows and clay strips with a surface area of approximately 500 x 500 m. and larger. If possible it is requested that photographs similar to Appendices 3 and 4 are brought along. By order of Schmidt Distribution: Abwehr II, 1st Copy received with 4 appendices General Staff 5th Division (IC), 2nd Copy 13/8 [signature illegible] Appendix 1 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force. General Staff 5th Division. No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only dated 12.8.38. TOP SECRET Berlin 4.8.1938 General Officers only Access through Officer only Transaction Major of the General Staff Moericke, Air Attache at the German Legation, Prague, states: I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to reconnoitre the land in the region Freudenthal/Freihermersdorf for landing possibilities. For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in Prague. I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me to M, particularly about my official position. I used my official car [Dienst Pkw] for the journey to Fr. taking precautions against being observed. The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten German Glider pilots in Fr. and Said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted man. My personal impression fully
to M, particularly about my official position. I used my official car [Dienst Pkw] for the journey to Fr. taking precautions against being observed. The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten German Glider pilots in Fr. and Said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted man. My personal impression fully confirmed this judgment. no hint of my identity was made to him, although I had the impression that M. knew who I was. At my request, with which he complied without any question, M. travelled with me over the country in question. We used M's private car for the trip. As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently well, he took with him the local leader of the F.S., a Czech reservist of the Sudeten German racial Group, at the time on leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage I was entirely in agreement with this-without actually saying so. As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said "Aha, so you're looking for airfields!" I answered that we supposed that, in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications. i had the intention of looking over the country from that point of view. To my question as to when the farmers in this part were generally in the habit of ploughing up the fields he answered: "Always immediately after the harvest." I thought that in this way he wanted to express the fact that the Czechs would no longer be able to use the fields as airfields even shortly after harvest. Before leaving Fr. I bound M. to absolute secrecy as regards what he had seen. From the conversation between M. and the Leader of the F.S. in Beneschau, whose name i do not know, I noticed that they knew several of the Abwehr informers [V-Leute] in Freudenthal and Beneschau. Both M. and the 2nd companion are minor informers [V-Leute]. As I have at the moment no incentive to believe that m. has not kept his promise, I can only presume that Pilz is the same person as the leader of the F. S. In Beneschau, who, accompanied us at the time, and a subordinate informer [V-Mann] to the informer [V-Mann] in the Security Office [Abwehrstelle]
the moment no incentive to believe that m. has not kept his promise, I can only presume that Pilz is the same person as the leader of the F. S. In Beneschau, who, accompanied us at the time, and a subordinate informer [V-Mann] to the informer [V-Mann] in the Security Office [Abwehrstelle] at Breslau. I believe it to be out of the question that the real purpose of my reconnaissance be known. Should measures be invoked against Macholdt or Pilz on the grounds of the report from the Security Office at Breslau, I urgently request a hearing beforehand. Moericke, Major d. G.H. g. w. o. Schmidt, Maj. d. G. Appendix 2 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force, General Staff 5th Division. No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only dated 12.8.38. [Section of map] General Officers only Access through Officer only Appendix 3 to Reich Minister for Air, etc. [photograph] Landing-ground south of Freudenthal; taken from southern edge of Freudenthal looking west. Appendix 4, Sectional picture of airfields a and b [4 photographs]. Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946 Previous Document Volume IV Menu
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Document No. 1538-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1538-PS
SECRET
Office Foreign Intelligence Dept Foreign Affairs Nr 173/41 (g.K.Chefs III org)
May 24, 1941
[Stamp] Air-Corps-Operational, 7 copies
Staff I a, 2 copies
May 24, 41
No. 279.
[Stamp] TOP SECRET
(to be forwarded) By Officer only
To be presented to the Chief of the Armed Forces high Command.
[Marginal note:]
The Military Attache Tokio reports with No. T 47 signed May 23.
In interview with Akita on handling of relations between Japan and USA in the press, desire was expressed to hear Okamoto on the form in which Japan would start hostilities in case of a war between USA and Germany. instead of a reception by Okamoto visit with Akita who explained:
[Marginal note:]
To be presented to the Chief of the Office Foreign intelligence (simultaneously for ZL).
1. In case USA enters war, Japan acknowledges treaty obligations at once. However, would not open hostilities immediately. Preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.
2. Possible war Russia-Germany causes USA entry into war. Japanese action as mentioned under 1 plus preparation of possible attacks (on) Vladivostok and Blagowesqensk.
[Marginal note:]
(To be presented to the) Operational Staff of the Air-Forces I. C.
3. Conclusion of conflict with China important before new tasks for Japanese Armed Forces. I am stressing first that Japanese recognition of obligations under treaty needs confirmation by immediate opening of hostilities.
Signature: Bueckner
U R Ia
Schmid [in crayon]
May 24
Copy to:
L.
3 Skl
Sonderstb H.H.K.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Document No. 1541-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1541-PS
TOP MILITARY SECRET
The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces High Command/armed forces.
Command Staff/armed forces, Section L Nr. 33 406/40
TOP SECRET
Matter of Chief					Fuehrer #9
Only through Officer				13 December 1940
[illegible notations]				12 Copies, 9th Copy
Direction Number 20
Operation Marita
1. The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the British endeavor be foiled to create airbases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.
2. My plan therefore is (a) to from a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next months.
(b) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.
3. For the concentration of the task force in Rumania are necessary:
(a) The 16th Panzer Division which arrives in December on an army mission, and whose task remains unchanged.
(b) Following will be a task force of about seven divisions (final wave) to be dispatched to Southern Rumania. Engineers in the required strength for the preparation of the Danube crossing can conveniently be attached for transport to the 16th Panzer Division (as instructional troops). The field commander of the army will await my decision for the proper moment for them to be employed on the Danube.
(c) Preparations are to be made for further transport to take in the calculated maximum for the operation Marita (total of 24 divisions).
(d) It is the mission of the Air Force to give air protection to the concentration, as well as preparing the necessary primary and reserve installations on Rumanian soil.
are to be made for further transport to take in the calculated maximum for the operation Marita (total of 24 divisions). (d) It is the mission of the Air Force to give air protection to the concentration, as well as preparing the necessary primary and reserve installations on Rumanian soil.
4. The Operation Marita itself is to be prepared on the following basis:
(a) The primary mission of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast, and the Bay of Saloniki. It may be necessary to continue the attack across Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth.
(b) Flank protection against Turkey will be the task of the Bulgarian forces, although it is to be secured and strengthened through the alerting of German Forces.
(c) It is not certain whether the Bulgarian forces will take part in the attack. Likewise the Yugoslavs position cannot yet be clearly determined.
(d) It will be the mission of the Air Force to support the drive of the army in all phases, to liquidate the opposing air force, and, as far as possible, to occupy British strongpoints on the Greek Islands through airborne landings.
(e) The question in which fashion the Operation Marita is to be supported by the Italian forces, and how coordination of the operations is to take place, awaits a later decision.
5. The military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demands the exact control of all the necessary measures by the General Staff.
The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported step by step by the General Staff of the armed forces and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the Germany Army mission in Rumania.
Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent; also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties.
6. After the completion of the Operation Marita it is contemplated to use the access of the forces used therein for a new undertaking.
to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent; also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties. 6. After the completion of the Operation Marita it is contemplated to use the access of the forces used therein for a new undertaking.
7. I anticipate reports from the Chiefs concerning their plans, which has already taken place as regards the Army. I want to be presented with exact timetables for the planned preparations, as well as for the necessary recallings from the armament industry (reconstruction of Furlough Divisions).
Signed: Adolf Hitler
Witnessed: [signature illegible] Captain in the General Staff
Distribution:
Commander of the Armies (Operational Section), 1st Copy
Commander of the Navy (Sea War Direction), 2nd Copy
Commander of the Air Force (Air Force General Staff), 3rd Copy
Chief of the German Army Mission to Rumania, 4th Copy
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces:
Command Staff, 5th Copy
Section L, 6-9 Copies
UNV, 10th Copy
Chief of Army Transport Forces, 11the Copy
Foreign Counter Intelligence Office, 12th Copy
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Document No. 1544-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1544-PS
File Memorandum
on my parting visit with the Chancellor
After an exchange of irrelevant courtesies, the conversation turned to the speech of the Chancellor [Bundeskanzler]. i said to him that though he had used very cordial expressions on the German mission of Austria his dramatic advocacy of her independence which he apparently considered threatened had drowned out this testimony to a large extent, to say nothing about some unnecessary pinpricks against Germany. To his assertion that he had reestablished his authority in the country by this speech I added that this speech also had provoked a debate yesterday in the French chamber. in my opinion it was greatly to be regretted that the Austrian question had again become the center of European discussions. For Germany an Austrian independence supported by French and Czech crutches was intolerable, for it would lead to arguments which might easily endanger the peace concluded recently.
The Chancellor admitted this without qualifications and requested me to inform the Reich Foreign Minister as soon as possible that neither he nor any other political agency in Austria had instigated this debate in the French Chamber, and that he shared my opinion on its extraordinarily disrupting effects. On my request he stated his willingness to publish Sunday morning an article in the official paper "Wiener Zeitung" (Viennese newspaper) in which he would clearly detach the problem of Austrian independence from French interests. And he had instructed the Austrian press to carry only meagre excerpts of the debate in the Chamber.
request he stated his willingness to publish Sunday morning an article in the official paper "Wiener Zeitung" (Viennese newspaper) in which he would clearly detach the problem of Austrian independence from French interests. And he had instructed the Austrian press to carry only meagre excerpts of the debate in the Chamber.
I then introduced into the conversation the wide-spread opinion that he had acted under "brutal pressure" in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been able to state that he had always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied he had actually been under considerable moral pressure, he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk which bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. he answered: "To be honest, no!" It appears to me of importance to record this statement.
In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that Austria could ever maintain her status with the help of Non-German, European combinations. This question would be decided only according to the interests of the German people. he asserted that he held the same conviction and would act accordingly.
Vienna, 26 Feb 1938
/s/ Papen
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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