dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
of whether or not his Government had any hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the Greeks, Yugoslavia must be liquidated. It was not worth while to the Nazis to take any steps to ascertain Yugoslavia's intentions, for it would be so little trouble, now that the German troops were deployed, to destroy her militarily and as a national unit. Accordingly, in the early hours of Sunday morning, 6 April 1941, German troops marched into Yugoslavia without warning and into Greece simultaneously. The formality was observed of handing a note to the Greek Minister in Berlin, informing him that the German forces were entering Greece to drive out the British. M. Koryzis, the Greek Minister, in replying to information of the invasion from the German Embassy, replied that history was repeating itself and that Greece was being attacked by Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned, he said, the same reply as it had given to the Italians in the preceding October. G. The Pattern of Aggression. There is one common factor which runs through the whole of the Nazi aggressions. It is an element in the Diplomatic technique of aggression, which was used with singular consistency, not only by the Nazis themselves, but also by their Italian friends. Their technique was essentially based upon securing the maximum advantage from surprise, even though only a few hours of unopposed military advance into the country of the unsuspecting victim could thus be secured. Thus, there was, of course, no declaration of war in the case of Poland. The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small hours of the night of April 8-9 1940, and was well under way as a military operation, before the Diplomatic explanations and excuses were presented to the Danish Foreign Minister, at 4:20 a. m. on the morning of the 9th, and to the Norwegian Minister, between half past four and five on that morning. The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland began not later than five o'clock, in the small hours of 10 of May, 1940, while the formal ultimatum, delivered in each case with the Diplomatic excuses and explanations, was not presented until afterwards. In the case of Holland the invasion began between three and four in the
of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland began not later than five o'clock, in the small hours of 10 of May, 1940, while the formal ultimatum, delivered in each case with the Diplomatic excuses and explanations, was not presented until afterwards. In the case of Holland the invasion began between three and four in the morning. It was not until about six, when the Hague had already been bombed, that the German Minister asked to see M. van Kleffens. In the case of Belgium, where the bombing began at five, the German Minister did not see M. Spaak until eight. The invasion of Luxembourg began at four and it was at seven when the German Minister asked to see M. Beck. Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o'clock on the morning of 28 October 1940 when his Minister in Athens presented a three hours ultimatum to General Metaxas. The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, also, both began in the small hours of 6 April 1941. in the case of Yugoslavia no diplomatic exchange took place even after the event, but a proclamation was issued by Hitler at five o'clock that Sunday morning, some two hours before Belgrade was bombed. In the case of Greece, it was at twenty minutes past five that M. Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering Greek territory. The manner in which this long series of aggressions was carried out is, in itself, further evidence of the essentially aggressive and treacherous character of the Nazi regime: to attack without warning at night to secure an initial advantage, and to proffer excuses or reasons afterwards. This is clearly the method of the State which has no respect for its own pledged word, nor for the rights of any people but its own. It is impossible not to speculate whether this technique was evolved by the "honest broker" himself or by his honest clerk, Ribbentrop. LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST of DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA Document Description Vol. Page Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6(a)....... I 5 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 5; V...... I 27,29 Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)
the International Military Tribunal, Article 6(a)....... I 5 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 5; V...... I 27,29 Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court. *444-PS Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer's Headquarters signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl, 12 November 1940, concerning plans for prosecution of war in Mediterranean Area and occupation of Greece. (GB 116)........ III 403 *448-PS Hitler Order No. 22, initialed by Keitel and Jodl, 11 January 1941, concerning participation of German Forces in the Fighting in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. (GB 118).......... III 413 *1195-PS Keitel Order, 12 April 1941, for provisional directions for partition of Yugoslavia. (GB 144)......... III 838 *1541-PS Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13 December 1940. (GB 117)........ IV 101 *1746-PS Conference between German and Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; speech by Hitler to German High Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27 March 1941; plan for invasion of Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120)........ IV 272 *1834-PS Report on conference between Ribbentrop and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129)........ IV 469 *1835-PS Letter from Hitler to Mussolini, 28 March 1941. (GB 126)........ IV 475 *1842-PS Meeting of Mussolini and Ribbentrop in Rome, 19 September 1940. (GB 143)....... IV 477 *1871-PS Report on Hitler and Ciano meeting, 12 August 1939. (GB 142)....... IV 508 *2450-PS Two letters from Ribbentrop to Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, as published in Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, 26 March 1941. (GB 123)....... V 186 2719-PS German assurance to Yugoslavia; official announcement by German Foreign Office, 28 April 1938, to German Diplomatic Representatives, published in Documents of the Origin of War, 1939, No. 2, p.324........ V
as published in Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, 26 March 1941. (GB 123)....... V 186 2719-PS German assurance to Yugoslavia; official announcement by German Foreign Office, 28 April 1938, to German Diplomatic Representatives, published in Documents of the Origin of War, 1939, No. 2, p.324........ V 378 *2762-PS Letter from Hitler to Mussolini (probably early November 1940). (GB 115)...... V 410 *2765-PS Extract from notes of conference between Hitler and Ciano in Vienna, 25 March 1941. (GB 124)....... V 411 *2987-PS Entries in diary of Count Ciano. (USA 166)....... V 689 *3054-PS "The Nazi Plan", script of a motion picture composed of captured German film. (USA 167)......... V 801 *C-59 Order signed by Warlimont for execution of operation "Marita", 19 February 1941. (GB 121)........ VI 879 *C-127 Extract from Directive No. 25 by Hitler, 27 March 1941. (GB 125)...... VI 938 *C-134 Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum on conference between German and Italian Generals on 19 January and subsequent speech by Hitler, 20 January 1941. (GB 119)....... VI 939 C-147 Extracts from Directive No. 18, signed by Hitler, 12 November 1940........... VI 957 *C-167 Report of meeting between Raeder and Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122)........ VI 977 *L-79 Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, "Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims". (USA 27)........ VII 847 *R-95 Army Order signed by von Brauchitsch, 30 March 1941, concerning deployment instructions for "Action 25" and supplementary instruction for action "Marita". (GB 127)...... VIII 70 TC-43 German assurance to Yugoslavia, 6 October 1939, from Documents of German Politics, Vol. VII, p.352......... VIII 386 *TC-77 Memorandum of conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano, 12 August 1939. (GB 48)......... VIII 516 *TC-92 Hitler's address at dinner for Prince Regent of Yugoslavia, 1 June 1939. (GB 114)........ VIII 536 *TC-93 Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the German people, 6 April 1941, from Documents Concerning the Conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece. (GB 114)...... VIII 537 12. AGGRESSION AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. A. Inception of the Plan. The point of departure for the story of the aggression against the Soviet Union is the date, 23 August 1939. on that day-just a week before the invasion of Poland-the Nazi
Concerning the Conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece. (GB 114)...... VIII 537 12. AGGRESSION AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. A. Inception of the Plan. The point of departure for the story of the aggression against the Soviet Union is the date, 23 August 1939. on that day-just a week before the invasion of Poland-the Nazi conspirators caused Germany to enter into the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. This Treaty (TC-25) contained two significant articles: "Article 1: The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack against one another, whether individually or jointly with other powers." "Article 5: Should disputes or conflicts arise between the contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, the two partners would clear away these disputes or conflicts solely by friendly exchanges of views or if necessary by arbitration commission." (TC-25) The Treaty was signed for the U.S.S.R. by the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, and for the German Government by Ribbentrop. Its announcement came as somewhat of a surprise to the world, since it appeared to constitute a reversal of the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy. The explanation for this about face was provided, however, by Ribbentrop himself, in a discussion which he had with the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, at Fuchel on 23 February 1941. A report of that conference was forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain German diplomats in the field for their strictly confidential and purely personal information (1834-PS). Ribbentrop told Oshima the reason for the Pact with the U.S.S.R. in the following words: "Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with Russia-a necessity for avoiding a two-front war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan For the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia." (1834-PS) In view of this spirit of opportunism which motivated the Nazi Conspirators in entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and nonaggression, it is not surprising to find that they regarded it, as they did all Treaties and Pledges, as binding on them only so long
treaty with Russia." (1834-PS) In view of this spirit of opportunism which motivated the Nazi Conspirators in entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and nonaggression, it is not surprising to find that they regarded it, as they did all Treaties and Pledges, as binding on them only so long as it was expedient for them to do so. That they did so regard it is evident from the fact that, even while the campaign in the West was still in progress, they began to consider the possibility of launching a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R. In a speech to the Reichsleiters and Gauleiters at Munich in November 1943, Jodl admitted that: "Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East-that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the Fuehrer himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the western campaign had informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the moment our military position made it at all possible." (L-172) At the time this statement was made, however, the Western Campaign was still in progress and so any action in the East necessarily had to be postponed for the time being. On 22 June 1940, however, the Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiegne and the campaign in the West, with the exception of the war against Britain, came to an end. The view that Germany's key to political and economic dominance lay in the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor, and in the acquisition of lebensraum at her expense, had long been basic in Nazi ideology. This idea had never been completely forgotten, even while the war in the West was in progress. Now, flushed with the recent success of their arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the Nazi conspirators began serious consideration of the means for achieving their traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union. The situation in which Germany now found herself made such action appear both desirable and practicable. As early as
defeat Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the Nazi conspirators began serious consideration of the means for achieving their traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union. The situation in which Germany now found herself made such action appear both desirable and practicable. As early as August of 1940, General Thomas received a hint from Goering that planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union was already under way. Thomas at that time was the Chief of the Wirtschaft Rustung Amt, or Office for Economy and Armaments, of the OKW (Wi Rue Amt). General Thomas tells about receiving this information from Goering in his draft of a work entitled "Basic Facts For a History of German War and Armaments Economy," which he prepared during the Summer of 1944 (2353-PS). On pages 313 to 315 of this work, Thomas discusses the Russo-German trade agreement of 1939 and relates that, since the Soviets were delivering quickly and well under this agreement and were requesting war materials in return, there was much pressure in Germany until early 1940 for increased delivery on the part of the Germans. However, at page 315 he has the following to say about the change of heart expressed by the German leaders in August of 1940: "On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference with Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the Fuehrer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands. This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rue to give priority to matters concerning Russian War Economy." (2353-PS) This statement will be referred to again later in the discussion of preparations for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory. At that time too, evidence will be presented that in November of 1940 Goering categorically informed Thomas that a campaign was planned against the U.S.S.R. Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of the Soviet union necessarily entailed, even this many months in advance of the date of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet
large an undertaking as an invasion of the Soviet union necessarily entailed, even this many months in advance of the date of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet intelligence service. Counterintelligence measures were obviously called for. In an OKW directive signed by Jodl and issued to the counter-Intelligence Service Abroad on 6 September 1940, such measures were ordered (1229-PS). this directive pointed out that the activity in the line for the counterintelligence people to take to disguise this fact. The text of the directive indicates, by necessary implication, the extent of the preparations already underway. It provides: "The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to come. By the end of October the status shown on the enclosed map is supposed to be reached. "These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand, Russia will realize that strong and highly trained German troops are stationed in the Government, in the Eastern provinces, and in the Protekterat; she should draw the conclusion that we can at any time protect our interests-especially on the Balkan-with strong forces against Russian seizure. "For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the answer to questions of the Russian intelligence service, the following directives apply: "1. The respective total strength of the German troops in the East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be explained by movements into training camps, regroupings. "2. The impression is to be created that the center of the massing of troops is in the Southern part of the Government, in the Protekterat and in Austria, and that the massing in the North is relatively unimportant. "3. When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, especially of the armored divisions, things are to be exaggerated, if necessary. "4. By suitable news the impression to be created that the antiaircraft protection in the East has been increased considerably after the end of
"3. When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, especially of the armored divisions, things are to be exaggerated, if necessary. "4. By suitable news the impression to be created that the antiaircraft protection in the East has been increased considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that it continues to be increased with captured French material on all important targets. "5. Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes, etc., it is to be stated that the work is kept within normal limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly won Eastern territories, and serves primarily economical traffic. "The supreme command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent correct details, I. e., numbers of regiments, manning of garrisons, etc., will be made available to the defense for purposes of counter espionage. "The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order of /signed/Jodl." (1229-PS) Early in November 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders and called for a continuation of preparations, promising further and more definite instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced a general outline of the army's operational plans. This order was contained in a Top Secret directive from the Fuehrer's Headquarters No. 18, dated 12 November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl (444-PS). The directive begins by saying that: "The preparatory measures of Supreme Headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines." (444-PS) It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy regarding relations with other countries and says regarding the U.S.S.R.: "* * * 5. Russia "Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued. "Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the Army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by me." (444-PS) On 5 December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, at that time General Halder, reported to the Fuehrer concerning the progress of the plans for
"Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the Army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by me." (444-PS) On 5 December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, at that time General Halder, reported to the Fuehrer concerning the progress of the plans for the coming operation against the U.S.S.R. A report of this conference with Hitler is set forth in a folder containing many documents, all labelled annexes and all bearing on Fall Barbarossa (1799-PS). This folder was discovered with the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab and was apparently an inclosure to that Diary. Annex No. 1, dated 5 December 1940, indicates the state which planning for this aggression had reached six and a half months before it occurred: "Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940. "The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad." "The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed operational plans and adds the following: The most important goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian air force will be unable to attack the territory of the German Reich and, on the other hand, the German air force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its regeneration. "The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible." "It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned for the entire operation is sufficient." (1799-PS) B. Plan Barbarossa. By 18 December 1940 the general outline of the army's operational plans having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical directive to the High Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air forces for Barbarossa-Directive No. 21-was issued (446-PS). This directive marks the first time the plan to invade the U.S.S.R. was specifically referred to in an order,