dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SCHULTE-MONTING: I observe that the commanding officer did what he could, in view of the weather which he described when he said that in view of the bad weather he could not rescue them. He threw provisions to them in a sack and gave them the course to the coast. I do not know what there is about that that is inhumane. If he had left without giving them food and the Course, then you might make that accusation.
MAJOR JONES: But he could have taken them aboard, you know. These were three men who did...
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I believe you cannot judge that. Only the commanding officer himself can judge that, the man in charge of the U-boat. I would have to look at the weather, because it says here "Medium swell.'' That could also...
MAJOR JONES: But you see here the U-boat commander must have spoken to these people and physically it must have been possible to take them aboard, but he left them to their fate, you know, knowing quite well he was leaving them to die.
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, not at all. Then he would not have needed to give them any food and to give them the course to the coast. What makes you think that they had to die? By the way...
MAJOR JONES: The last sentence is a clear indication that the U-boat captain knew he was leaving them to die. I am suggesting to you that he could have taken them aboard and should have done so if he had the elements of humanity in him.
SCHULTE-MONTING: No; I do not know the condition of the U-boat, whether the boat was in a position to take prisoners on board. I believe that you have never seen conditions on a U-boat; otherwise you would not judge it like that. Considering that the crew of a U-boat is under water for weeks and uses every last bit of space and is exposed to the greatest dangers day and night, one cannot simply say that it would have been a humane act to take these additional men aboard. Besides, the commander himself says there was hardly a chance of rescue in view of the prevailing weather.
MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions, My Lord.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I have some questions concerning a few points which Mr. Elwyn Jones put to you. An entry was shown to you from the document by Assmann of 10 October 1939 with the assertion that from this it can be seen that Raeder wanted to occupy Norway only in order to have Norwegian bases. I should like to read to you the full entry and I should like you then to take position to the entire document: "The Fuehrer agrees that full use of the only two battleships which we have at the time should not be made for the time being. Russia offered bases near Murmansk... "Question of siege of England: Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of Navy agree that all objections by neutrals have to be rejected, even in view of the danger of entry of U.S.A. into the war which seems certain if the war keeps on. "The more brutally the war is conducted the sooner the effect, the shorter the war. "Capacity for large U-boat production program. Fuehrer rejects suggestion to have submarines built by or bought from Russia for political reasons. Commander-in-Chief of Navy states no advantages to be won for the U-boat war by conquest of Belgian coast; refers to the value of winning Norwegian bases-Trondheim-with the help of Russian pressure. Fuehrer will consider the question." (Document D-879, Exhibit GB-482) Admiral, according to the entire contents, is this a complete clarification of the Norwegian problem?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, not at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Am I right in concluding that here a great number of questions are treated and only one strategic question with reference to Norway...
MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship pleases, the translation came through as, "no advantage of occupation of Norwegian bases" and the translation which is in the document is "Raeder stresses importance of obtaining Norwegian bases." Perhaps if there might be a careful-I am not saying this in any critical sense-a very careful translation of the entry, it might be important.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the-did you give that an exhibit. number?
MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord. That is the entry from Assmann's headline diary.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is. But I want to know the exhibit number.
MAJOR JONES: I will have an extract made and the exhibit number given this evening, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: It would be GB-482, would it not?
MAJOR JONES: Yes, My Lord, that is it; GB-482.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is the same date; I beg your pardon if it does not agree; but the document from which I read I received through the courtesy of Mr. Elwyn Jones.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better go into the question of translation and get that settled.
MAJOR JONES: Yes, Your Lordship.
DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, Admiral, both entries are 10 October, that is, of the same conference. Am I right in saying that consequently there were many strategic questions, not one of which can be said to have been treated completely and conclusively?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I believe that this complex of questions has nothing to do with the comprehensive discussion between Hitler and Raeder concerning the occupation of Norway. The Norwegian question was touched upon, the occupation of Norway, and then a few points brought up for discussion which Raeder usually jotted down in his notebook. Apart from the question whether an occupation of Norway was necessary or not, the possibility of conquering bases outside German territory was accidentally touched on the same day.
DR. SIEMERS: Therefore, Murmansk which had been offered by Russia was discussed.
SCHULTE-MONTING: From Russia to Belgium-all along the coast, wherever there were possibilities and advantages for our submarine strategy.
DR. SIEMERS: If in the War Diary a sentence in connection with a conference between Raeder and Hitler is in quotation marks, does that mean that these words were used by Hitler? Can one assume that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: If it says...
MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship please, the translation has now been checked, and the original reading of "Raeder stresses the importance of obtaining Norwegian bases" appears to be a perfectly correct translation.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Siemers.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I understood, Dr. Siemers; shall I speak about that?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, did you want to add something to that point?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. I understand that the other gentleman just pointed out that Raeder allegedly called Hitler's attention to the necessity of acquiring submarine bases and in that connection once spoke about Russian assistance and also about the possibility of acquiring bases from Norway. But that does not reveal any aggressive intentions.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to save time, I also asked Dr. Kranzbuhler to check the translation. The German text as I should like to point out right now says: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points out the value of winning Norwegian bases." That is something different from the English translation. But I should like to come back to this later. [Turning to the witness.] Admiral, Mr. Elwyn Jones then submitted the affidavit of Walter Giese. I should be grateful if you would look at it again. It is D-722. The first line reads: "I was born at Steffln on 24 November 1900, the son of a bricklayer's foreman, Ernst Giese." Then it says: "I sat in the reception room of the Commander-in-Chief as assistant to the adjutant." Then it says, in the same paragraph: "I received the minute book from the adjutant at midday after the conferences had ended and locked it up in the general safe." Then it says on the second page: "I did not have much contact with the Commander-in-Chief personally. This consisted merely in my submitting to him or fetching from him top-secret correspondence." Admiral, am I right in assuming, therefore, that Giese was a sort of messenger?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. In order to save officers we fired a large number of unimportant positions with civilians, people who we thought were worthy of our confidence. The care of a safe or guarding the key was really the task of the second adjutant, who later had to be used elsewhere. Giese had been a sergeant in the Navy for many years and for 12 years had been a clerk in the Navy, and therefore had had a certain amount of practice in keeping files.
THE PRESIDENT: All this is stated in the document. If there is anything inaccurate in the document, you can put it to him. But it all is set out in the document, exactly as the Admiral said. You are wasting the time of the Tribunal by repeating it.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe what Mr. Elwyn Jones presented was also in the document. What matters is the question of interpretation and the witness has been referred to very definite points. If I should be mistaken, I beg your pardon. I believed that I also had the right in re-examination to refer to certain points in the document.
THE PRESIDENT: If you want to, you can draw our attention to the paragraphs.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I can be very brief. Giese had no inside information about the facts, and even if he had, without permission, looked into the minutes of the adjutant, which were not a shorthand record but merely notes to aid the memory of the adjutant, he could never have received the right impression without having taken part in the conference. And it was not up to him in the reception room to decide who should be admitted to the Commander-in-Chief, but rather up to the adjutant or to me. He did not even know who was to be admitted. And it is a bold statement or assumption when he says that a man like Hagelin saw Raeder each time instead of seeing me first. By the way, Hagelin came to me perhaps four or five times.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe Giese was present when Raeder talked to Hitler?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Giese? No, never. Giese sat in the reception room and took care of Raeder's telephone calls.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, nobody here suggests that he was. Mr. Elwyn Jones was not putting it that this man Giese was present at talks between Raeder and the Fuehrer or Raeder and Hagelin.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is his affidavit, and in the affidavit, it says, as I should like to point out now, on Page 5, "According to all I heard, I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler's joyous agreement." How could he know that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I might stress that even I as chief of staff was not present at these private conferences, and Herr Giese had to stay with the telephone and had no other way of gaining an insight than by giving his imagination free rein.
DR. SIEMERS: That is enough, thank you. I come now to Document D-872. That is the war diary of the naval attaché in Japan, in connection with which you were told that you must have known that Japan would attack America on 7 December. The telegram which is mentioned here is of 6 December. When could that telegram have arrived in your office?
SCHULTE-MONTING: You mean, when could I have received it personally?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes; or Raeder.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Not before the next morning.
DR. SIEMERS: That would be 7 December.
SCHULTE-MONTING: At the earliest. In this case, the Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff would decide whether for operational reasons that telegram should be presented at once, or not.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you remember that document?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Is Pearl Harbor mentioned in the document?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No. I tried to explain that Pearl Harbor had no connection with that telegram from Admiral Wennecker at all and that Wennecker depended on sources of information and on his assumptions or formulated his assumptions in a telegram on the basis of his information without having any definite facts. Such telegrams were received continuously. Sometimes these assumptions were correct; sometimes they were incorrect.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution has submitted it to prove that military negotiations had taken place with Japan. Am I correct in saying that that was only a message concerning possible developments?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, of course. I have tried before to explain that there were no military negotiations between the admiralty staffs. Rather the naval attaché was charged with examining and transmitting all information of value which came to him.
DR. SIEMERS: Then a document was shown you which was not submitted, an interrogation of Raeder of 10 November 1945. May I ask to look at the bottom of Page 5 of this document which I am handing to you and the passage which was read on Page 6?
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, that ought to have a number, ought it not?
MAJOR JONES: That will be GB-483, My Lord.
DR. SIEMERS: On that document, Page 5 at the bottom, is Document C-75 mentioned?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe you are mistaken, Admiral, or else I have made a mistake.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I have an English copy-do you mean the English one?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the English copy because it does not exist in German.
SCHULTE-MONTING: You mean the last paragraph?
DR. SIEMERS: I believe the last line or the line before the last. The page numbers are very hard to read. Maybe you have the wrong page. This interrogation, Mr. President, concerns Document C-75. I believe the witness will find it soon. Mention has been made of this document recently and in accordance with the wish recently expressed by the Tribunal, I am submitting C-75; that is Directive Number 24 about the co-operation with Japan, and the full text is Document Number Raeder-128. The Tribunal will recall that the British Delegation...
THE PRESIDENT: Has it already been put in, C-75, has it already been put in?
DR. SIEMERS: I submit it now, C-75.
THE PRESIDENT: No, has it already been put in? Has it already been offered in evidence?
DR. SIEMERS: You may recall that the Prosecution has submitted Document C-75 as USA-151 ...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is all I wanted to know. If it has already been put in, it does not need a new number, is that not the position?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. PRESIDENT, may I remind you that it needs a new number because only the first part was submitted by the Prosecution.
MAJOR JONES: It has already been exhibited as USA-151, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we are not giving fresh numbers, Dr. Siemers, to parts of documents which had already been put in. If the document has been put in, then where you want to use a fresh part of the document it has the same number as the old number; that is all.
DR. SIEMERS: But, Mr. PRESIDENT, if the Prosecution in their document put in only the first three paragraphs then I cannot...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; I know that perfectly well, but you are perfectly entitled to put in any part of the document. It is only a question of what number is to be given to it and I think- I may be wrong-that up to the present we have not given new numbers to documents once that they have been put in, although fresh parts of the documents are put in.
MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the position with regard to C-75 is that the whole of the original has been put in as USA-151, but only an extract from the original was included in the English document which was put before the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. All I was concerned with was the number of the thing. It has got the number USA-151 and I thought our practice had been that it should continue to have that number. You can put in any part of it you like, and if it is a question of translation, no doubt the Prosecution will hand it to the translation department and have it translated for you; but you are attempting to give it a new number, that is all.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, once more, but I was asked recently to submit the document anew and that is where the misunderstanding arose. Under these circumstances, now that I hear that it. has been submitted in its entirety, I can withdraw it; I should be grateful if the Tribunal were also to receive the complete translation of the document in English and not only the first two paragraphs. [TURNING to the witness.] Admiral, have you found it in the meantime?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, it is on Page 7 as you thought and not on Page 5. The document refers...
DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It is right then that the interrogation refers to Document C-75?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Document C-75, Admiral, is Directive Number 24 concerning collaboration with Japan, and it says: "The following rules apply: Our common war aim is to defeat England quickly and thereby keep the U.S.A. out of the war." Besides that the document also mentions the fact I referred to recently, that Singapore should be occupied by Japan. Now Raeder, on 10 November '45 stated his position in respect to this and, according to the next page of the document, he said that which Mr. Elwyn Jones has just put to you. May I ask you to look at it again? It says there, on Page-I thought it was at the top of Page 6, maybe it is at the top of Page 8...
SCHULTE-MONTING: The top of Page 8. I do not know English as well as German, but I would translate it: "If that which Japan needs . . ."
DR. SIEMERS: If I remember correctly, the word is "need."
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, he uses the word "need"-"and other things, things that the Japanese need."
DR. SIEMERS: That is to say, Japan's needs and other things which Japan requires. Therefore, the conversations mentioned by Raeder were not concerned with strategic points?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, these are two entirely different things.
DR. SIEMERS: So that Raeder's answer is concerned purely with questions of supplies and material.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, purely questions of supplies and material . . .
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.
SCHULTE-MONTING: . . . which we had with all the navies, not only with the Japanese.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I come to the Commando Order about which you testified already I want to put to you the following: You have been shown Document D-658, which says that according to the Armed Forces communiqué the soldiers were executed, that the soldiers wore uniforms and that the Fuehrer's Order was something new in international law. I believe that the naval commander in western France reported this and that this was contained in the Armed Forces communiqué. The man who compiled the War Diary wrote: "A new thing in international law." I am not a military man, but I should like to ask you, would you consider such a reference a criticism of the order?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe that I have to answer the question in the following manner: Normally, the fact of an execution is not entered in a war diary on operational matters.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that is really a matter which we can go into, whether he thinks this is an entry which is a criticism of the order.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe he wanted to establish that it was something new.
DR. SIEMERS: Never mind, Admiral. A factual question. The Prosecution asserts again that it concerns soldiers in uniform. The Wehrmacht communiqué announced the execution on 9 December. The execution, as I have already shown in another connection, did not take place until 11 December. I am presenting to you now Document UK-57, and ask you to look at the second paragraph under Figure 4. The heading Figure 4 reads: "Sabotage against German ships near Bordeaux"; then it says: "December 12, 1942"; and further on we read: "From the submarine the participants went two by two in paddle boats up the Gironde estuary. They wore special olive gray uniforms. After carrying out the blastings they sank their boats and tried, with the aid of French civilians, to escape to Spain in civilian clothes." Did these soldiers behave correctly according to the provisions of international law?
SCHULTE-MONTING: In my opinion, no.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I have no more questions.
SCHULTE-MONTING: If they had had a clear conscience, they would not have needed to wear civilian clothes.
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, just this final question: Did you personally in the High Command receive an inquiry or any information before this execution which was carried out at the direct order of the Fuehrer?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, neither an inquiry nor any information.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President, the question as to whether a document concerning Norway had been translated correctly was just discussed. I shall find out what number it is. The English translation which I have before me is not identical with the German original. It deviates considerably. It is Document GB-482. I shall read the German text which in-my opinion differs from the English translation. "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states: Conquest of Belgian coast provides no advantage for our submarine warfare; points out value of winning Norwegian bases (Trondheim) with the help of Russian pressure. The Fuehrer will consider the question."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, would it not save time, really, if we have the sentence which is said to have been wrongly translated referred to a committee of experts in the translating division?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President . . .
THE PRESIDENT: It really is not a matter which it is worth while wasting time over.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I beg your pardon, I did not know that it was to be examined again.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better have it examined and then the translation certified to.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I, myself, have a question to put to the witness. Admiral, Document D-873 has been put to you before. That was a war diary of U-71 and concerned the supplying of three Norwegians in a lifeboat. The entry was on 21 June. I have already submitted it to the Tribunal under Doenitz Number 13, on Page 23 of my document book, a statement by the above-mentioned commanding officer Flachsenberg. According to that statement this submarine put to sea on 14 June. It was west of Norway. Can you tell me if that U-boat, therefore, on 21 June, was putting out for operations or returning from operations?
SCHULTE-MONTING: You mean from memory?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: No, considering the dates, put out to sea on 14 June, this entry on 21 June.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Putting out.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Putting out. As you know, this submarine was a 500-ton vessel. Is a boat of that size in a position to carry out an operation over several weeks with three additional people on board?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe not. I am not enough of an expert to be able to judge definitely what the extra weight of additional persons on board might mean as far as trimming experiments and such things are concerned; but aside from that, I do not believe that such a small boat, which is putting out to sea for an operation, can load itself on the way with prisoners. I do not consider that possible.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.