dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON NEURATH: Yes. During the whole period when I was Reich Foreign Minister no means were used which were not internationally customary and permissible.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: On the 16th the negotiations in the Disarmament Conference were to begin again. What was the result of this meeting of the Disarmament Conference?
VON NEURATH: England finally suggested a-at first the Disarmament Conference accomplished nothing; but later there resulted the so-called Five-Power Declaration in December 1932, which had been suggested by England. This declaration recognized Germany's claim to equal rights and to the elimination of those provisions of the Versailles Treaty which discriminated against Germany. After this declaration, which was made by the war powers and later by the Disarmament Conference or the Council of the League of Nations itself, Germany's equal rights were recognized for all time. Therefore, Germany could assert her right to renounce Part V of the Versailles Treaty by referring to the obligation of general disarmament undertaken by the signatory powers. This Five-Power Declaration provided the necessary condition for Germany's taking part in the deliberations of the Disarmament Conference once more.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to refer to the text of the Five-Power Declaration of 11 December 1932. It is Number Neurath-47a in my Document Book 2. I should also like to refer to an article by the defendant in the Heimatdienst on this recognition of equal rights for Germany. The text is in Number Neurath-48 of my Document Book 2. That was prior to the seizure of power. [Turning to the defendant.] Now, in January 1933 Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor; and thus there came about the so-called seizure of power by the NSDAP. Did you participate in any form whatsoever in this seizure of power and in Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor?
VON NEURATH: No, I had no part in any stage of the negotiations regarding the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor. No one, not even the Reich President, and certainly no party leader, asked me for my opinion. I had no close relations with any of the party leaders, especially not with the leaders of the National Socialist Party. With regard to this Goering and Papen have testified with absolute correctness.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What feelings did you yourself have on this question of Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor, in other words, on the question of the seizure of power by the Party?
VON NEURATH: I had serious misgivings, but, as I said at the beginning, in view of the party situation and the impossibility of forming a government against the National Socialists I saw no other possibility unless one wanted to start a civil war, about the outcome of which there could be no doubt in view of the overwhelming number of Hitler's followers.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In view of your attitude as you have just expressed it, for what reason did you remain Reich Foreign Minister in the newly-formed Hitler Government?
VON NEURATH: At the urgent desire of Hindenburg.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I should like- in this connection to refer to the affidavit of Baroness Hitter, Number Neurath-3 in my Document Book 1, which has already been mentioned, and with the permission of the Court I should like to read a short passage from it: "When in 1933 a new Government was formed, with Hitler as Reich Chancellor, Hindenburg required from Hitler the condition that Neurath should remain as Foreign Minister. Accordingly Hindenburg asked Neurath to stay, and Neurath complied with Hindenburg's wish in accordance with his previous promise. I know that in the course of time Neurath frequently had serious misgivings, but that he was of the opinion that it was his patriotic duty to remain. "In this connection I recall the especially fitting comparison of a large rock which by its position right in the middle of the river can decrease the force of the raging current, while on the shore it would remain without influence. He frequently declared, 'When the Germans often wonder why I am co-operating with this Government, they are always thinking only of the prevailing deficiencies, without appreciating how much additional disaster I am still able to prevent. They forget what strength it takes to advance alone through the wall of "Myrmidons".. .' " By that Baroness van Ritter means the close circle surrounding Hitler-to advance through this to Hitler. [Turning to the defendant.] Do you know for what reasons Hindenburg wanted you to remain, that is, to enter Hitler's Cabinet as Foreign Minister?
VON NEURATH: To secure the continuation of a peaceful foreign policy, and to prevent Hitler from taking the rash steps which were so possible in view of his impulsive nature; in one word, to act as a brake.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did not Hindenburg make it an actual condition for Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor that you should ~ remain as Foreign Minister, that is, enter Hitler's Cabinet?
VON NEURATH: Yes, he told me so later.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to refer to the affidavit of former Ambassador Curt Prufer, Number Neurath-4 in my document book, and I should like to read a short excerpt from it: "Since Hindenburg was a conservative, his basic political attitude..."
THE PRESIDENT: What page is that?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Page 27, Exhibit Number 4. "Since Hindenburg was a conservative, his political attitude was probably about the same as that of Baron Neurath. There was no doubt in the mind of anybody who was even slightly aware of the conditions that Hindenburg himself, in vesting power in Hitler, did this reluctantly and only under the heavy pressure of domestic political developments. If under such circumstances he insisted, and actually made it a condition, that Baron Neurath, his former foreign political adviser, should remain in office, this undoubtedly was due to the fact that he wanted to assure himself of at least one steady pillar for foreign policy, that is, for peace, in the midst of the seething new forces which certainly appeared sinister and displeasing to him personally." Did you talk to Hindenburg about this, and did you tell him of your reluctance, your misgivings, about joining the Hitler Cabinet?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I did not leave him in any doubt about that.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What did Hindenburg answer?
VON NEURATH: He told me that I would have to make this sacrifice, else he would no longer have a single quiet hour; that Hitler had not yet had any experience whatsoever in matters of foreign policy.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Was it only then and for this reason that you decided to join Hitler's Cabinet?
VON NEURATH: Yes. The British prosecutor, Sir David, in the session of 1 March of this year, declared that by joining Hitler's Cabinet I had sold my honor and reputation. I refrain from commenting further on this most serious insult.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like in this connection to quote a sentence from the Diary of Ambassador Dodd 1933-37 which is Number Neurath-13 in my document book. I should like to quote the entry under 6 April 1934, on Page 100; that is Page 55 of the German text, which reads as follows. It is a remark of Dodd's which refers to Herr Von Neurath: "I am sorry for these clear-headed Germans who know world affairs very well and who must work for their country and yet submit to the ignorance and autocracy of Hitler and his followers." In these talks with Hindenburg did you promise him that you would remain in the Cabinet as long as it would be at all possible for you to guide the foreign political course in a peaceful direction and avoid warlike developments, even if at some future time Hindenburg should die?
VON NEURATH: Yes. He repeatedly expressed that wish to me.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: This was, no doubt, the reason why you remained in office after the death of Hindenburg?
VON NEURATH: Yes. But also because in the meantime I had discovered that Hitler, because of his excitable temperament, often let himself be carried away to take rash steps and in this way could endanger peace. On many occasions, however, I had also learned by experience that in such cases he would listen to my objections.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution, as you are aware, has particularly charged you with entering and remaining in Hitler's Cabinet as Foreign Minister, above all, with remaining in the Cabinet after Hindenburg's death.
VON NEURATH: How they can reproach me for that is completely inexplicable to me. I never belonged to a party; I never swore allegiance to party programs, and I never swore any allegiance to party leaders either. I served under the Imperial Government, was asked to re-enter the diplomatic service by the Socialist Government under Ebert, and was appointed Minister and Ambassador by it. I have served under Democratic, Liberal, and Conservative governments. Without identifying myself with their various programs, and often in opposition to the party government of the time, I have pursued only the interests of my fatherland in co-operation with the other powers. There was no reason for me not to attempt to do the same under Hitler and the National Socialist Party. One could put opposition opinions into effect with any prospect of success only from the inside as a member of the Government. Freedom of speech and the use of the press were forbidden in Germany, or at least made difficult. Personal freedom was endangered. Moreover, it is not greatly different in other countries; I mean by that participation in the governments of various parties, and I might cite the example of Reynaud, or of Lord Vansittart, whom I know well and who was in the English Foreign Office as an influential State Secretary under conservative as well as labor governments.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: But, after 30 June 1934 and the bloody events of that time, why did you still remain in the Government? Why did you not resign at that time? You know that the Prosecution has reproached other defendants with remaining in the Government under these circumstances.
VON NEURATH: Aside from the fact that from the description which Hitler gave of the events of the Rohm Putsch at that time I had to conclude that it had been a serious revolt, I have known a number of revolutions from my own experience, for example, the Russian revolution and, as I already said, the Fascist revolution in Rome, and I have seen that in such revolutions innocent people very often have to suffer. In addition I adapted myself entirely to Hindenburg's attitude; even if I had wanted to resign he would never have let me do so. As an illustration that I had to acknowledge the seriousness of this revolt and the truth of Hitler's description of it, I should like to mention briefly that on this day, 30 June, a brother of the Emperor of Japan was in Berlin and I had to invite him to dinner. Generaloberst Von Fritsch was also present at this dinner and a number of other high officers and officials of the Foreign Office. The Prince did not make his appearance at the dinner; that is, he came an hour late. When I asked for the reason I learned that my house had also been surrounded by the SA and the Prince had been prevented by them from entering my house. A few days later Generaloberst Von Fritsch, after he had described the events on the military side, asked me whether I knew that he himself, and I as well, had been on Herr Rohm's list. Thus this revolt was not quite as harmless as was described here, I believe, by the witness Gisevius.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Before you decided to enter the Hitler Cabinet, did you talk to Hitler himself about the principles and the line of foreign policy which you intended to pursue?
VON NEURATH: Yes, in detail. I explained to him that only by way of negotiation and by a policy conforming to the international situation could we achieve our ends. This would demand patience. Hitler seemed to understand this at the time, and I had the same impression during the following years, too. I am convinced that he at that time entirely approved the continuation of this policy and honestly meant it. He repeatedly emphasized that he knew what war was like and did not want to experience another one.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I should like once more to refer to the affidavit of Ambassador Prufer, Number Neurath-4 in my Document Book 1, and, with the permission of the Court I should like to quote the following: "Neurath's policy was one of international understanding and peace..."-That is Page 29-"This policy was not consistent with the fact that Herr Von Neurath also strove for a revision of the severe provisions of the Versailles Treaty. However, he wanted to bring this about exclusively by negotiation, in no case by force." Then on the same page...
THE PRESIDENT: Have you not read this already?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I want now to read a passage following this: "I am certain that Freiherr von Neurath, as well as other career officials in the Foreign Office, had no concrete knowledge of any possible plans for violence on Hitler's part. On the contrary, during the first years after the change of government one generally lent credence to the oft-repeated declaration of peaceful intentions by the National Socialist leaders. I am even of the opinion that the latter themselves, during the first years, did not want to bring about a war. Rather was it believed and hoped in the highest circles of the Party, to which Neurath did not belong at all, that it would be possible to continue winning cheap laurels without war through the hitherto successfully practiced tactics of bluff and sudden surprise. It was not until later that the megalomania arising from the belief in their own luck and their own infallibility and invincibility, which had assumed mystic proportions caused by unrestrained sycophancy, led Hitler and his immediate entourage to include war among their instruments of political power. We, the officials of the foreign service, and with us Baron von Neurath, our chief, became aware of this development only gradually and as outsiders. Until about the beginning of 1936 only a very few officials had been admitted into the Party which, for its part, treated the staff of the Foreign Office, including the recently admitted members, with suspicion and distrust."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, is this not really all argument? You are reading at great length.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I have already finished, Mr. President. [Turning to the defendant.] Did you yourself see in the Party program of the National Socialists any intention or desire to break with other powers?
VON NEURATH: No. Contrary to the allegations of the Prosecution, which do not gain in accuracy by repetition, I cannot possibly detect any intention to resort to armed hostilities in the event of failure to reach these aims, and from Hitler's various statements I know that he himself at that time, that is, at the beginning of his term of Government, had no such intentions. He wanted as close an understanding as possible with England, and a stable, peaceful relationship with France, which would remove the ancient enmity of the two peoples. The latter, he told me, was the special reason for his publicly declaring after the Saar plebiscite that he was renouncing once and for all any attempts to regain Alsace.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution charges in particular that from the following sentences of the Party program you must have known that the Nazis were pursuing aggressive foreign political ends and that they thus were aiming at war from the very beginning. It reads: "We demand the union of all Germans in a Greater Germany on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination. We demand equal rights for the German people in respect to other nations, the repeal of the Treaty of Versailles, and the Treaty of St. Germain." Will you please comment on this?
VON NEURATH: Even today I fail to detect any aggressive spirit in these sentences which have just been quoted. The right of self-determination is a basic condition in the modern state, recognized by international law. It was also the basis, theoretically at least, of the Treaty of Versailles, and on the same basis the plebiscites were carried out in the border areas. The union of all Germans on the basis of this recognized principle was therefore an absolutely permissible political postulate, as far as international law and foreign policy are concerned. The removal of the discriminatory terms of the Treaty of Versailles by changing the terms of the Treaty was the essential aim of German foreign policy, as also of all bourgeois and Social Democrat governments which preceded the National Socialists. I cannot see how one can deduce any aggressive intention if a people strives to free itself from the burdens of a treaty which it feels to be unjust, provided that this is done by peaceful means. And I should like to add that this was the foreign policy which I represented until the moment, at the end of 1937, when I had to realize that Hitler was also considering war a means in his policy. Before, as stated above, there had never been any mention of that.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was the effect of Hitler's seizure of power in Germany on foreign countries?
VON NEURATH: A perceptible tension and distrust of the new Government was the immediate result. The antagonism was unmistakable. It was especially clear to me at the World Economic Conference in 1933 in London, where I had an opportunity to talk to many old friends and members of other delegations and to inform myself definitely of this change of feeling. The practical effect of this feeling was greater caution in all negotiations, including the session of the Disarmament Conference which was just reopening.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to refer in this connection to a letter which is Number Neurath-11 in my document book. It is a report by Herr Von Neurath to Reich President Von Hindenburg from the London Conference. It is dated 19 June 1933. I shall quote only a very short passage: "Unfortunately I have to state that the impressions I received here are most alarming."
THE PRESIDENT: What page is that?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Page 47.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: "In view of the reports of the chiefs of our foreign missions I was prepared for many bad manifestations, many gloomy events, and disturbing opinions on the part of foreign countries. Nevertheless, despite all my apprehensions, I had hopes that much of this would perhaps be only transitory, that much could straighten itself out. However, my apprehensions proved more justified than my hopes. I hardly recognized London again. I found a mood there, first in the English world and then in international circles, which showed a retrogression in the political and psychological attitude toward Germany which cannot be taken seriously enough." Now further negotiations were held in the main committee of the Disarmament Conference in the winter of 1933-34. Can you briefly describe the course of these negotiations? It is important in view of later events.
VON NEURATH: A French plan of 14 November 1932 was the basis of the negotiations at that time. This plan' surprisingly enough, provided for the transformation of professional armies into armies with a short period of service, for according to the opinion presented by the French representative at that time only armies with a short period of service could be considered defensive armies, while standing armies consisting of professional soldiers would have an offensive character. This point of view on the part of France was completely new and was not only exactly the opposite of France's previous point of view, but it was also a change from the provisions laid down in the Versailles Treaty for the disarmament of Germany. This meant for Germany-at whom it was obviously aimed-the elimination of its standing army of 100,000 men. In addition, by this new plan France let it be seen that she herself did not want to disarm. A statement by the French representative, Paul-Boncour, in the session of 8 February 1933 confirmed this. France also maintained the same point of view in the subsequent discussions about the so-called working program presented by England on 30 January 1933 by means of which England wanted to speed up the negotiations of the conference. This attempt to expedite the negotiations, which aimed at adjusting the diverging tendencies of the various powers, failed because of the stubborn attitude of France. A change in the program was then made in an attempt to get over these difficulties, whereby the question of army strength was first discussed.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to submit, and ask the Court to take judicial notice of, Document Number 49 in my Document Book 2. It contains excerpts from the English working program of 30 January 1933, and also from my Documents Numbers 46 and 47, which are likewise in Document Book 2. They contain excerpts from the French plan for the unification of continental European army systems. Finally, Number 47 of my Document Book 2 contains excerpts from the speech by Herr Von Neurath at the session of the League of Nations Assembly on 7 December 1932, which describes the negotiations up to that time. What was the attitude of the Disarmament Conference on the question of the treatment of disarmament as such, that is, the reduction of army strength?
VON NEURATH: To discuss this I must refer to notes to a great extent, because it is not possible to keep all these details, motions, and formulations in one's head. The subject matter goes into detail so much that I can only do it by means of notes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, we have been the whole morning at this, and we haven't yet really got up to 1933. The Tribunal thinks this is being done in far too great detail. As I have already pointed out, a great deal of it is an attempt to show that the Treaty of Versailles was unjust, which is irrelevant.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, if I may say the following, I do not wish to show the injustice of the Versailles Treaty; but I must...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Von Ludinghausen, will you kindly get on? As I say, we think you are going into it in far too great detail.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Very well. What happened now, Herr Von Neurath, in order to get the negotiations going again? On 16 March the British Prime Minister submitted a new plan...
THE PRESIDENT: We have nothing to do with the disarmament program.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must nevertheless show what the entire background and mood were, in order to explain more exactly the motives for our withdrawal from the League of Nations, with which we have been reproached; for Germany's withdrawal followed in the fall of 1933...
THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing against Von Neurath in having influenced Germany to resign from the League of Nations, is there?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, there is. I can explain the withdrawal from the League of Nations only on the basis of the preceding events. I cannot say in three words that this and that was the reason; rather must I explain how gradually a certain atmosphere came about, and what the circumstances were which left no other choice to the German Government except to leave the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, for these factors explain the decision of the German Government to rearm. In history and in politics decisions and actions are always the consequence of what went before them. In the development of these political conditions we are indeed concerned with a period of development extending over several years, not with a spontaneous event or a spontaneous decision. In the case of a military order, to be sure, I cannot say that this order came about through orders of the other side; rather must I describe. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, we do not need all this argument. We only desire you to get on. I am pointing out to you that you have been nearly the whole of the morning, and we have not yet got up to 1933.