dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
in Danzig between themselves and Poland. On 28 April the German government issued a memorandum in which they alleged that the Anglo-Polish declaration was incompatible with the 1934 Agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of entering into or by reason of entering into that agreement, Poland had unilaterally renounced the 1934 agreement. The following are pertinent passages from that memorandum: "The German government have taken note of the Polish-British declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According to this declaration there had been concluded between the Polish government and the British government a temporary understanding to be released shortly by a permanent agreement which will provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two states being directly or indirectly threatened." (TC-72 No. 14) The memorandum goes on to set out in the next three paragraphs the history of German friendship towards Poland. It continues: "* * * The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish government with the British government is in such obvious contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago that the German government can take note only with surprise and astonishment of such a violent reversal of Polish policy. "Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British agreement is intended as a regular Pact of Alliance, which, by reason of its general sense and of the present state of political relations, is directed exclusively against Germany. "From the obligation now accepted by the Polish government, it appears that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to take an active part in any possible German-British conflict, in the event of aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934 declaration." "The Polish government, however, by their recent decision to accede to an alliance directed against Germany have given it to be understood that they prefer a
not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934 declaration." "The Polish government, however, by their recent decision to accede to an alliance directed against Germany have given it to be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German government. In view of this, the German government are obliged to conclude that the Polish government do not at present attach any importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by means of direct, friendly discussion with the German government. The Polish government have thus abandoned the path traced out in 1934 to the shaping of German-Polish relations." (TC-72 No. 14) All this would sound very well, if it had not been for the fact that orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued and the Armed Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable. The memorandum goes on to set out the history of the last negotiations and discussions. It sets out the demands of the 21st which the German government had made for the return of Danzig, the autobahn, and the railway. It mentions the promise by Germany of the twenty-five year guarantee, and continues: "The Polish government did not avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them by the German government for a just settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safeguarding of Poland's frontiers with the Reich and thereby for permanent strengthening of the friendly, neighbourly relations between the two countries. The Polish government even rejected German proposals made with this object. "At the same time the Polish government accepted, with regard to another state, political obligations which are not compatible either with the spirit, the meaning or the text of the German-Polish declaration of the 26 of January, 1934. Thereby, the Polish government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this declaration null and void." (TC-72 No. 14) In the last paragraph the German government says, that nevertheless, they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland. On the same day that memorandum was issued, 28 April, Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag, in which he repeated, in effect, the
this declaration null and void." (TC-72 No. 14) In the last paragraph the German government says, that nevertheless, they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland. On the same day that memorandum was issued, 28 April, Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag, in which he repeated, in effect, the terms of the memorandum. He repeated the demands and offers that Germany made in March, and went on to say that the Polish government have rejected his offer. He expressed his disappointment: "I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish government. But that alone is not the decisive fact. The worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia, a year ago, believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up troops although Germany, on her part, has not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in any way against Poland. As I have said, this is, in itself, very regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was really right to refuse the suggestion made this once by me. This, as I have said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a question which intimately affects the German people, by a truly unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both countries. According to my conviction, Poland was not a giving party in this solution at all, but only a receiving party, because it should be beyond all doubt, that Danzig will never become Polish. The intention to attack on the part of Germany, which was merely invented by the International press, led, as you know, to the so-called guarantee offer, and to an obligation on the part of the Polish government for mutual assistance. * * *" (TC-72 No. 13) The speech demonstrates how completely dishonest was everything that the German government was saying at that time. Hitler, who may very well have had a copy of the orders for "Fall Weiss" in his pocket as he spoke, announced publicly, that the intention to attack by Germany was an invention of "the International Press." In answer to that memorandum and that speech, the Polish government issued a memorandum on 5 May. It sets out the objectives of the 1934 agreement to renounce the use of force and to carry on friendly relationship between the two countries;
by Germany was an invention of "the International Press." In answer to that memorandum and that speech, the Polish government issued a memorandum on 5 May. It sets out the objectives of the 1934 agreement to renounce the use of force and to carry on friendly relationship between the two countries; to solve difficulties by arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish government states its awareness of the difficulties about Danzig and declares that it has long been ready to carry out discussions. The Polish government sets out again its part of the recent discussions. The Polish government states that it communicated its views to the German government on 26 March, and that it then proposed joint guarantees by the Polish and German governments of the City of Danzig, based on the principles of freedom for the local population in internal affairs. The Poles stated their preparedness to examine the possibilities of a motor road and railway facilities. They received no reply to those proposals. The Polish position is summarized in one sentence: "It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and dignity of Poland" (TC-72 No. 16). The Polish government proceeds to reject the German accusation that the Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the 1934 German-Polish agreement. It states that Germany herself has entered into similar agreements with other nations, and lastly it announces that it is still willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should Germany wish to do so. (TC-72 No. 16) The German answer was contained in a letter from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, is signed by Hitler, and dated 10 May (C-120). Copies went to the various branches of the OKW, and with them apparently were enclosed "Instructions for the economic war and the protection of our own economy." Not only were military preparations being carried out throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every other kind of preparation was being made for war at the earliest moment. This period of preparation, up to May 1939, concluded with the conference in the Reichschancellery on
our own economy." Not only were military preparations being carried out throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every other kind of preparation was being made for war at the earliest moment. This period of preparation, up to May 1939, concluded with the conference in the Reichschancellery on 23 May. The report of this meeting is known as the Schmundt Minutes (L-79). In his address to the conference Hitler cried out for lebensraum and said that Danzig was not the dispute at all. It was a question of expanding their living room in the east, and he said that the decision had been taken to attack Poland. Goering, Raeder and Keitel, among many others, were present. The following is a significant paragraph: "If there ware an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England." (L-79) So that, not only has the decision been taken definitely to attack Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack England and France. C. Final Preparations: June-September 1939 (1) Final Preparations of the Armed Forces. A precise timetable for the attack had been called for. On 22 June 1939 it was ready. It provided as follows: "The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander a 'preliminary timetable' for 'Fall Weiss' based on the particulars so far available from the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not included in this timetable. "The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force and made the following comments on individual points:- "1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up reserves on a larger scale than usual for the maneuvers scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be told that men are being called up for the autumn maneuvers and for the exercise units it is intended to form for these maneuvers. "It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to subordinate establishments."
civilian establishments, employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be told that men are being called up for the autumn maneuvers and for the exercise units it is intended to form for these maneuvers. "It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to subordinate establishments." (C-126) All this became relevant later, when the German government made allegations of mobilization on the part of the Poles. This order shows that in June the Germans were mobilizing, only doing so secretly. The order continues: "For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in the area of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried out." (C-126) The order is signed by Keitel. A short letter, dated 2 August, which is attached to that order, reads in part: "Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out 'Fall Weiss' remaining unchanged. F.O. U-Boats [Doenitz] is handing in his Operation Orders by 12 August." (C-126) Another letter, dated 27 July, contains orders for the Air and Sea Forces for the occupation of the German Free City of Danzig. It provides: "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with the Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy the Danzig Free State immediately in order to protect the German population. There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms." (C-30) The letter then sets out how the occupation is to be effected. All this again becomes more relevant in the subsequent discussion of the diplomatic action of the last few days before the war, when Germany was making specious offers for the settlement of the question by peaceful means. This letter is evidence that the decision had been taken, and that nothing would change that decision. During July, right up to the time of the war, steps were being taken to arm the population of Danzig and to prepare them to take part in the coming occupation. The reports which were coming back almost daily during this period from Mr. Shepherd, British
that the decision had been taken, and that nothing would change that decision. During July, right up to the time of the war, steps were being taken to arm the population of Danzig and to prepare them to take part in the coming occupation. The reports which were coming back almost daily during this period from Mr. Shepherd, British Consul-General in Danzig, to the British Foreign Minister, and published in the British Blue Book, show the kind of thing that was happening. The report dated 1 July 1939 reads as follows: "Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti arrived here by night express from Berlin to organize Danzig Heimwehr. "All approaches to hills and dismantled fort, which constitute a popular public promenade on western fringe of the city, have been closed with barbed wire and 'verboten' notices. "The walls surrounding the shipyards bear placards: 'Comrades keep your mouths shut lest you regret consequence.' "Master of British steamer 'High Commissioner Wood' whilst he was roving Koenigsberg from 28th June to 30th June, observed considerable military activity, including extensive shipment of camouflaged covered lorries and similar material by small coasting vessels. On 28th June four medium-sized steamers, loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens, etc., left Koenigsberg, ostensibly returning to Hamburg after maneuvers, but actually proceeding to Stettin." (TC-71) And again, as another example, the report dated 10 July states: "The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises me that on 8th July he personally saw about thirty military lorries with East Prussian license numbers on the Bischofsberg, where numerous field kitchens had been placed along the hedges. There were also eight large anti-aircraft guns in position, which he estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber, and three six-barreled light anti-aircraft machine guns. There were about 500 men drilling with rifles, and the whole place is extensively fortified with barbed wire." (TC-71). On 12 and 13 August, when preparations were practically complete, Hitler and Ribbentrop at last disclosed their intentions to their allies, the Italians. It will be recalled that one of the passages in Hitler's speech on 23 May, in regard to the proposed attack on Poland, had said, "Our object must be kept secret even
13 August, when preparations were practically complete, Hitler and Ribbentrop at last disclosed their intentions to their allies, the Italians. It will be recalled that one of the passages in Hitler's speech on 23 May, in regard to the proposed attack on Poland, had said, "Our object must be kept secret even from the Italians and the Japanese." (L-79). Now, when the preparations were complete, Hitler disclosed his intentions to his Italian comrades in the hope that they would join him. Ciano was surprised at Hitler's attempt to persuade the Italians to come into the war with him. He had no idea, as he said, of the urgency of the matter, and they are not prepared. He therefore tried to dissuade Hitler from starting off until the Duce could have a little more time to prepare himself. (TC-77) The minutes of that meeting show quite clearly the German intention to attack England and France ultimately, if not at the same time as Poland. In trying to show the strength of Germany and its certainty of winning the war as a means of persuading the Italians to come in, Hitler declared: "At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements in prospect. Some time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction could be taken into service. As far as the land army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had been called to the colors. If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she could send to France, at the most, two infantry divisions and one armored division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber squadrons but hardly any fighters since, at the outbreak of war, the German Air Force would at once attack England and the English fighters would be urgently needed for the defense of their own country. "With regard to the position of France, the Fuehrer said that in the event of a general war, after the destruction of Poland-which would not take long-Germany would be in a position to assemble hundreds of divisions along the West Wall and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available forces from the Colonies, from the Italian frontier and elsewhere on her own Maginot Line, for the life and death struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also thought that
in a position to assemble hundreds of divisions along the West Wall and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available forces from the Colonies, from the Italian frontier and elsewhere on her own Maginot Line, for the life and death struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also thought that the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt. The polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with a few parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak in anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense and at the moment neither France nor England could help her in this respect. "If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western powers, over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to the fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow, the population of their areas was different. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the position of the Polish State. Out of 34 million inhabitants, one and one-half million were German, about four million were Jews, and nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much less in number than the total population and, as already said, their striking power was not to be valued highly. In these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in the shortest time. "Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it clear that in any case in the event of a conflict they would stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. if a hostile Poland remained on Germany's eastern frontier, not only would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation." "Coming back to the Danzig question, the Fuehrer said that it was impossible for him now to go back. He had made an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression that this
a previous liquidation." "Coming back to the Danzig question, the Fuehrer said that it was impossible for him now to go back. He had made an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly and northeasterly direction of a German policy. The east and northeast, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been Germany's undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial, as the Mediterranean had been an appropriate sphere for Italy. For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and timber from these eastern regions." (TC-77) Now the truth of this matter appears. It is not the persecution of German minorities on the Polish frontiers, but economic reasons-the need for foodstuffs and timber from Poland. The minutes of the Italo-German meeting continue: "In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material, although the city had the greatest harbour in the Baltic. Danzig was a Nurnberg of the North, an ancient German city awakening sentimental feelings for every German, and the Fuehrer was bound to take account of this psychological element in public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over anything of this kind. "Count Ciano, in replying to the Fuehrer's statement, first expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during his Berlin visit had there been any sign from the German side that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the contrary, Ribbentrop had said that in his opinion the Danzig question would be settled in the course of time. On these grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that a conflict with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed that he should make his preparations for this event; he had made plans for a