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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Document No. 1786-PS
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1786-PS
WAR DIARY OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OPERATIONS STAFF
WF. St. KTB (1) 1943
14 Mar. 1943
The treatment of captured partisans has been laid down in the combat directive for the combatting of partisans in the East [Kampfanweisung fuer die Bandenbekaempfung] of 27.11.42 (cf. 27.11/11/1) and Hitler's order [Fuehrerbefehl] of 16.12 (cf.16.12/1). On the basis of the foregoing the Reichsfuehrer SS ordered on the 30.12 that persons suspected of being partisans or their assistants, who are not to be executed, are to be transferred to concentration camps in Germany.
This order, which corresponds to the terms of reference already decreed, differs from an order already given on the 30.10.42 by the Commander in Chief [Oberbefehlshaber] of the 18th Army, which calls for the shooting without discrimination of all members of partisan groups and which is covered by the subsequent orders of the 15.11 and 16.12 only on their strictest interpretation. The Reichsfuehrer SS therfore sent to the Armed Forces Operations Staff [Wehrmachtfuehrungstab] on the 21.1 a letter of the Chef der S.P. and S.D. in which it is requested that, in the area of the 18th Army also, partisan helpers and persons suspected of such activity, should be dealt with in accordance with the terms of reference of 30.12.
The Armed Forces Operations Staff handed the matter over on the 25.1 to the Army General Staff [Generalstab des Heeres] competent for the combatting of partisans, and thereby conforming with the ruling given by the Reichsfuehrer SS. This decision was confirmed by the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces [Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht].
the matter over on the 25.1 to the Army General Staff [Generalstab des Heeres] competent for the combatting of partisans, and thereby conforming with the ruling given by the Reichsfuehrer SS. This decision was confirmed by the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces [Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht].
Since the ruling of the combat directive, figs. 85, 86 & 104, provides for work in Germany as a punitive measure for partisan helpers and suspects and has proved to be disadvantageous for the enlistment of voluntary workers, the General Plenipotentiary for Labour [Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer den Arbeitseinsatz], has requested that no threat of forced labour in Germany as a punitive measure should be made, or that at least, suspects should be described as such to the labour authorities for the purpose of supervision.
The General Quartermaster together with the Economic Staff (East) [Wirtschaftsstab Ost] has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison camps or to "training centers in their own area", and that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees are on probation and in less serious cases.
In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff this proposal does not take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the "peaceful population" which has been called upon to work. He recommends therefore transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already been introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] in the case of an extension to the province of the latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader and orders that the difference between "punitive work" and "work in Germany" is to be made clear to the population.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader and orders that the difference between "punitive work" and "work in Germany" is to be made clear to the population. Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Document No. 1796-PS
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1796-PS
7 April 1941
W Kr Gesch.
Copy
3 Copies, 3rd Copy
Major of the General Staff Deyhle
Berlin, 18 October 1940
2 Copies, 2nd Copy
Notes to the War Diary
1st. End of March 1939:
The Fuehrer decides to make military preparations for the gradual, seemingly unavoidable conflict with Poland, in such manner that these can be executed in late summer 1939. Thereby the Fuehrer hopes only to have to wage war on one front ("Fall Weiss").
2nd. The following months: Minutes under the Fuehrer's influence:
a. Attack by the forces from East Prussia;-OKH will first of all deploy the forces from South West Part of East Prussia in order to eliminate the Corridor as soon as possible. The Fuehrer considers attack further East more suitable in order to reach a decisive solution at the very beginning (causing the Vistula line to fall, thereby preventing the Poles from making a new stand behind the Vistula).
b. Forming of 14 divisions. Fourth wave (Welle) to consist of E units.
c. All preparations to be camouflaged as defensive measures.
Basis for 1st and 2nd:
a. Directive for "Fall Weiss" OKW/L of April 1939.
b. "Chronological table" for Weiss OKW/L of July 1939.
c. Correspondence OKW/L with sections of the Armed Forces
d. Beginning of the War diary L
3rd. August 1939:
In spite of the English guarantee to Poland, and thereby a war on 2 fronts becoming almost unaviodable, the Fuehrer decides to settle the account with Poland after having prevented encirclement by means of an agreement with Russia.
4th. September 1939: Polish Campaign mainly under the Influence of the Fuehrer:
a. "Great Pincers" (strongly motorized forces to attack the Eastern part of East Prussia towards South behind Vistula, moreover motorized forces to push forward in plenty of time across lower Vistula towards East Prussia).
b. Capture of Warsaw. Must be carried out before the Russians reach the Vistula.
the Influence of the Fuehrer: a. "Great Pincers" (strongly motorized forces to attack the Eastern part of East Prussia towards South behind Vistula, moreover motorized forces to push forward in plenty of time across lower Vistula towards East Prussia). b. Capture of Warsaw. Must be carried out before the Russians reach the Vistula.
c. Reinforcement of the Western Front. Extension northwards to the Belgian/Dutch border, in order to incite the French/British Army to march into Holland and Belgium; in addition to this also hasten the construction of the Northern part of the West Wall.
5th. End of September 1939:
Decision of the Fuehrer, to attack in the West and this as soon as possible since the French/British Army is not yet ready. Intention of attacking through Belgium and Holland (at least southern part) is cartain from the start. From the very beginning it is the Fuehrer's idea not to repeat the Schlieffen-plan but to attack in approximately a west-north western direction through Belgium and Luxembourg under strong protection of the Southern flank, and to gain the Channel coast.
After conclusion of the Eastern Campaign the restrictions hitherto existing in regard to warfare in the West are progressively being lifted. They served the purpose, while the Eastern campaign was in Progress, of not inciting the enemy in the West to greater action, by German measures.
6th. October 1939:
Attack to begin at the earliest about 10 Nov. OKH is of the opinion that the preparations of the Army will not be absolutely complete by this time. Frequently the opinion is advocated-by no means shared by the Fuehrer-that an attack in the West is unnecessary, the war could perhaps be won for us satisfactorily if we were to wait a little.
Fuehrer is determined to attack in November only if the weather will permit operations by the mass of the Luftwaffe since only then can one of our most important trumps become effective.
attack in the West is unnecessary, the war could perhaps be won for us satisfactorily if we were to wait a little. Fuehrer is determined to attack in November only if the weather will permit operations by the mass of the Luftwaffe since only then can one of our most important trumps become effective.
How situation would turn out if France/England march into Belgium/Holland, is constantly the concern of the Fuehrer. Immediate attack of the German Western Army [Sofortfall] must be prepared for this event.
7th. End of October 1939: Influence of the Fuehrer:
a. Employment of motorized forces in direction Sedan is suggested by the Fuehrer. Preparations are under way for moving Army group B and concentrating them at A after, in accordance with previous deployment of troops, main concentration had been at Army Group B.
b. Re-occupation of Holland, it has been decided that Holland is not to be occupied for the time being, rapid occupation in case of English landing should however be possible at any time.
c. Question of using parachute and air-borne troops is being taken up by the Fuehrer.
8th. Beginning of November 1939: Mainly under Influence of the Fuehrer:
a. Permanent reinforcement of the southern mot. group, which is to advance against Sedan.
b. Reinforcement of the Western Army to the utmost capacity.
The weather conditions prevent the execution of the attack in the West.
9th. 23 November 1939: Speech by the Fuehrer to the Generals and Admirals.
10th. End of November 1939: Influence of the Fuehrer above all
a. Holland is to be occupied immediately.
b. Shifting of the main concentration of Army Group B to A appears to have even better prospects.
c. Deployment of 7th FL. Div. (Deliberation of further possibilities).
d. Important to maintain element of surprise, therefore motorized units which are still all located at home will be moved up to the Rhine in order not to betray to the enemy the imminent beginning of the attack, by the moving up to the front.
of 7th FL. Div. (Deliberation of further possibilities). d. Important to maintain element of surprise, therefore motorized units which are still all located at home will be moved up to the Rhine in order not to betray to the enemy the imminent beginning of the attack, by the moving up to the front.
e. Capture of the bridges at Maastricht and of the Fort Eben Emael, since destruction of the bridges would render impossible the fast advance of the sixth Army.
First directive for warfare against England (no. 9) is issued. Purpose: concentration of all combat weapons for important targets.
At a conference in the map-room of the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) in the Reich Chancellery, the Fuehrer expresses anew his opinion that the attack planned in the West will lead to the greatest victory in world history.
11th. December 1939:
In spite of the severe winter the Fuehrer as always still continues to consider it desirable to carry out the attack in the West as soon as possible and not to delay it until spring. Reasons:
a. England/France must not be allowed under any circumstances to steal a march on us by occupying Belgium and Holland since then-on account of the danger to the Ruhrbasin-the war could hardly be won.
b. Time is not on our side but on the enemy's (see notes of Major Deyhle).
The Fuehrer is carefully watching the Russo-Finnish war (on account of the possibility of the Western powers joining in to the advantage of Finland).
12th. Beginning of January 1940:
The introductory movements in preparation for the big attack are ordered anew by the Fuehrer, soon however checked again on account of the weather condition, although most important operational basis fall into Belgian hands and thereby there is a possibility of our intentions becoming known.
For the deployment of the 7th FL. Division a new possibility becomes more and more probable: Capture of the "Fortress Holland".
13th. Middle of January 1940:
account of the weather condition, although most important operational basis fall into Belgian hands and thereby there is a possibility of our intentions becoming known. For the deployment of the 7th FL. Division a new possibility becomes more and more probable: Capture of the "Fortress Holland". 13th. Middle of January 1940:
During the past weeks probable dates for our attack in the West have become known in Belgium and Holland. The reason can not be determined, the main fault lies possibly in the long waiting time just before the attack (issue of order 7 days beforehand).
In order better to maintain the surprise element beyond the time of attack, the Fuehrer orders therefore a change in the alert procedure.
The idea that the decisive point of the attack will have to be reached by breaking through Southern Belgium (thus the total attack to be concentrated on the left) is being worked out by the Fuehrer in even greater detail.
The occupation of the whole of Holland is ordered. For this also the 7th FL. Division is to be employed. Extensive deceptive measures are ordered. The "Sofortfall" remains in effect.
The Fuehrer makes up his mind to utilize the Danish and Norwegian space for the German warfare.
The Fuehrer considers what possibilities exist for forming new units. The setting up of the division's 7th and 8th wave is then ordered.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Document No. 1799-PS
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1799-PS
War Diary; Armed Forces Operations Staff (L/K.T.B. WFSt, Volume 6A, 1 Aug. 1940-26 Mar. 1941)
ANNEX 1
Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940
The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.
The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed operational plans and adds following: The most important goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian air force will be unable to attack the territory of the German Reich and, on the other hand, the German air force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its regeneration.
The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible.
It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned for the entire operation is sufficient.
1 August 1940-March 26, 1941
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Document No. 1800-PS
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PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 1800-PS
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON GERMANY'S CRIMES AGAINST NORWAY [Prepared by the Royal Norwegian Government.]
[Page 17]
Other Violations.
In different places in Norway the Germans appeared in Norwegian uniforms during battles. This was the case in the district of Bergen according to a Communique of the 14th of April, 1940, during the struggles in Valdres and in Narvik. Reports have been received that at one place the Germans even put on women's clothes, in order to reach a favourable position.
Where the Germans passed, the civilians found their homes in an indescribable condition after the battle, even if the Germans had not set fire to the houses. The so-called German "Informal requisitions" which actually meant plundering and destruction, were later compensated for to the extent of about 9 million kroner in all, partly by Norwegian authorities and partly by German authorities, that is, by money drawn out of the Bank of Norway [Norges Bank] by the Germans.
On 25th April, 1940, Ulvik in Hardanger was reduced to ruins, as a reprisal measure, as the Germans claimed that civilians there had fired on German troops. Damage was done to more than 400 buildings and chattels amounting to a total of 2.3 million kroner.
[Page 26]
B. CRIMES AGAINST NORWEGIAN PROPERTY
a. Wanton ravaging and destruction.
4. As a result of the advance of the Russian troops and the retreat of the German Army in Finnmark, October-November 1944, the Germans practised the "scorched earth" policy for the first time in Norway. Orders were issued that the civilian population was to evacuate and that all houses, transport and stores were to be destroyed
result of the advance of the Russian troops and the retreat of the German Army in Finnmark, October-November 1944, the Germans practised the "scorched earth" policy for the first time in Norway. Orders were issued that the civilian population was to evacuate and that all houses, transport and stores were to be destroyed. As a result of this about 30,000 houses were damaged, apart from 12,000 items of damage to chattels, amounting to a total of about 176 million kroner (Appendices 31 and 32).
[Page 62]
Appendix 31.
TO THE POPULATION:
The evacuation of a part of North Norway has been rendered a military necessity as a result of the treachery of a Finnish Government clique.
This evacuation necessitates the removal of the civilian population, as the enemy has proved that, in those territories occupied by him, he ruthlessly and brutally forces the civilian population to give him active assistance in achieving his aims.
This means that no shelter or means of existence of any kind can be left to the Bolshevisk enemy in the fighting zone. All such installations as housing accommodation, transport facilities and food stocks must be destroyed or removed.
The population in these districts will therefore be deprived of the basis for their existence so that in order to be able to survive they must evacuate to those Norwegian territories which are still protected by the German Wehrmacht.
For this reason, the German occupation authorities have declared themselves prepared to support, by all means at their disposal, the civil evacuation which the Norwegian authorities are carrying out.
In the interests of the people themselves all means by which they can effect their own evacuation are to be used to the greatest possible extent.
It is above all essential for a successful evacuation that all fishing smacks and other craft which are available in this area shall be fully employed
out. In the interests of the people themselves all means by which they can effect their own evacuation are to be used to the greatest possible extent. It is above all essential for a successful evacuation that all fishing smacks and other craft which are available in this area shall be fully employed. Owners of craft who try to evade evacuation must be prepared for severe counter-measures such as the shooting and sinking of craft and crew.
He who does not comply with these unequivocal instructions exposes himself and his family to possible death in the arctic winter without house or food.
(signed) Terboven.
Reichskommissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories.
(signed) Rendulic.
Colonel-General
Commander-in-Chief 20th Army.
Proclamation by Terboven and General Rendulic on the evacuation of Finnmark.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Document No. 1807-PS
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1807-PS
[EXTRACT FROM JODL'S DIARY.]
16.6.42.
The operational staff of the Navy [Skl], applied on the 29th May, for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The Skl considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture (a) because defence measures are still incomplete (b) because there is the possibility of achieving surprise and (c) because Brazil is to all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Document No. 1808-PS
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1808-PS
Address by the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Col. Gen. Jodl to the Officers and Officials of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. July 24, 1944:
19:30 hours, page 4.
Those making the attempt may have thought also that the men around Hitler were climbers and servile characters. But how did matters really stand? I, for example, was drawn in, even though I knew the movement before 1933 but little and could do nothing for it for the very reason that I was a soldier. Rather, I was against any relaxing of the discipline, bound as I was by my oath to the Reich President. Of course, my aims were, by and large, the aims of the movement, since my thinking was always nationalistic, social, and anti-Catholic, and since loyalty and obedience were the bases of life for me. And thus this train of thought is also disposed of.
Source:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946
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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Document No. 1809-PS Previous Document Volume IV Menu Next Document TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS General Jodl's Diary (Armed Forces Operational Staff) from 1 February to 26 May 1940 1 February 1940: The Fuehrer requests that Major Kieritz be sent from here in good time with special mission. Col. Schmundt and Capt. Deyhle are back from the West. Conclusion: 1. Morale and discipline-excellent 2. Tactical mobility is impossible because of the weather. One cannot withdraw more than 15 km. Army Group B, on the contrary, deems weather excellent to overcome floods. 3. In all divisions, formerly committed in the East, the automotive position is very bad. Up to 40% are missing-each of these 40 divisions should be provided with up to 100 vehicles. 1700 hours General Jeschonnek. 1. Attitude of parachute units. In front of the Hague, they have to be strong enough to break in even forcibly. The 7th division intends to drop units near the town. 2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action against the Dutch air force. 3. Walcheren Ioland will have to be occupied as soon as possible. 4. Immediate use requires some arrangements. To be eliminated: Commitment of K against Eben Emael against bridge C "Fieselor Stock" airplane in front of Army Group A. The ground Forces already will take up position at dusk, if possible. 7th Fl. Division is to be in readiness, but will not take up position without further orders. 5. Question about general intentions? Time. 6. Is it not possible to tackle H alone; that would already be a tremendous improvement in conducting aerial warfare. 7. The Air Force wants permission to attack every kind of commercial shipping in the 30-mile zone as well as everything anywhere making use of arms: French vessels, cargo boats. 2 February: Fuehrer is furious about presentation by Ordnance Bureau which needed 8 days to demonstrate to him-not by actual constructing but only theoretically-that the czech 4.7-cm anti-tank gun is not usable with armored car 3. Fuehrer decides as to Jeschonnek's questions of 1 February: a. one has to employ in the Hague [d.H.] forces of such strength that they will be able to take over command there. In order to achieve that, a landing can be made in the center