dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
follows: (i) Secret rearmament, including the training of military personnel, the production of war munitions, and the building of an air force; (ii) The creation of a military air force, announced by Goering on 10 March 1935; (iii) The law for compulsory military service, of 16 March 1935, fixing the peace-time strength of the German Army at 500,000; and (iv) The reoccupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 and the refortification of that area. These events are historical facts not requiring proof. Likewise, the impossibility of the Nazis' achieving these ends without cooperation by the Armed Forces is indisputable from the very nature of things. Events and circumstances during the period 1933-36 are discussed in Section 2 of Chapter IX. Chief among these were the secret expansion of the German Navy in violation of treaty limitations, under the guidance of Raeder; the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, adopted the same day that Germany unilaterally renounced the armament provision of the Versailles Treaty (2261-PS); von Blomberg's plan, 2 May 1935, for the reoccupation of the Rhineland (C-139); and von Blomberg's orders of 2 March 1936 under which the reoccupation was actually carried out (C-159). All these events clearly required the closest collaboration between the military leaders and the Nazis. The state of mind and objectives of the German military leaders during this early period are significant. The viewpoint of the German Navy on the opportunities which Naziism offered for rearmament so that Germany could achieve its objectives by force or threat of force, is reflected in a memorandum published by the High Command of the German Navy in 1937 entitled "The Fight of the Navy against Versailles, 1919-35" (C-156). This memorandum was compiled by a naval captain named Schuessler in the German Admiralty. The preface contains the following statements: "The object and aim of this memorandum is to draw a technically reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence of those who took part, of the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles." "This compilation makes it clearer however, that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if the concentrated
based on documentary records and the evidence of those who took part, of the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles." "This compilation makes it clearer however, that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition for an effective rearmament, in the coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the political, financial and spiritual powers, could the work of the soldier find its fulfillment. "The frameword of this Peace Treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united will." (C-156) Thus, the German Navy and the Nazis were in comradely agreement and full collaboration. Hitler was giving the military leaders the chance they wanted. Jodl stated the situation clearly in his speech to the Gauleiters on 7 November 1943 (L-172): "1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight [Wehrwillen] in nurturing fighting strength [Wehrkraft] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small Reichswehr would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Fuehrer aimed at-and has so happily been successful in bringing about-was the fusion of these two forces. "2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first place restoration of fighting sovereignty [Wehrhoheit] (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and rearmament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm." (L-172) Nor were the high-ranking German officers unaware that the policies and objectives of the Nazis were leading
place restoration of fighting sovereignty [Wehrhoheit] (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and rearmament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm." (L-172) Nor were the high-ranking German officers unaware that the policies and objectives of the Nazis were leading Germany in the direction of war. Notes made by Admiral Carls of the German Navy in September 1938 by way of comment on a "Draft study of Naval Warfare against England," read as follows: "A. There is full agreement with the main theme of the study. "1. If according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean. "2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding preparations for war. "3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a large number of countries overseas, in fact against one-half to one-third of the whole world. "It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean." (C-23) The German Air Force, during this prewar period, was developing even more radically aggressive plans for the aggrandizement of the Reich. A study prepared by the chief, Kammhuber, of a branch of the General Staff of the Air Force called the "Organization Staff", contained recommendations for the organization of the German Air Force in future years up to 1950 (L-43). The recommendations are based on certain assumptions, one of which was that by 1950 the frontiers of Germany would be as shown on the map which is attached as an inclosure to this study (Chart Number 10). On this map Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland are all included within the borders of the Reich.
one of which was that by 1950 the frontiers of Germany would be as shown on the map which is attached as an inclosure to this study (Chart Number 10). On this map Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland are all included within the borders of the Reich. Kammhuber also envisaged the future peacetime organization of the German Air Force as comprising seven "Group Commands." Four of these were to lie within the borders of Germany proper, at Berlin, Brunswick, Munich and Koenigsberg, but the three others are proposed to be at Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw. (L-43) The basic agreement and harmony between the Nazis and the German military leaders cannot be overemphasized. Without this agreement on objectives there might never have been a war. In this connection, an affidavit (3704-PS) by von Blomberg, formerly Field Marshall, Reich War Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces until February 1938, is significant: "From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr and Memel. "I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers, believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms. About ninety percent of the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the Polish question. A war to wipe out the desecration involved in the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to separated East Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity. This was one of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament which began about ten years before Hitler came to power and was accentuated under Nazi rule. "Before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler since he produced the results which they desired. After this time some generals began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of his judgment. However they failed as a group to take any definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their
which they desired. After this time some generals began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of his judgment. However they failed as a group to take any definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their positions. "Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in January 1938, Hitler asked me to recommend a successor. I suggested Goering, who was the ranking officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of patience and diligence. I was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces by no officer, but Hitler personally took over my function as Commander. Keitel was recommended by me as a Chef de bureau. As far as I know he was never named Commander of the Armed Forces but was always merely a 'Chief of Staff' under Hitler and in effect conducted the administrative functions of the Ministry of War. At my time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler and therefore was qualified to bring about a good understanding between Hitler and the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself desired and had furthered as Reichswehrminister and Reichskriegminister. To do the opposite would have led to a civil war, for at that time the mass of the German people supported Hitler. Many are no longer willing to admit this. But it is the truth. "As I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler's measures. He became a willing tool in Hitler's hands for every one of his decisions. "He did not measure up to what might have been expected of him." (3704-PS) This statement by von Blomberg is paralleled closely in some respects by an affidavit by Colonel General Blaskowitz (3706-PS). Blaskowitz commanded an army in the campaign against Poland and the campaign against France. He subsequently took command of Army Group G in southern France, and held command of Army Group H, which retreated beyond the Rhine at the end of the war. His statement is as follows: "* * * After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter of fact we
the war. His statement is as follows: "* * * After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter of fact we felt that, if political negotiations came to naught, the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not only with Poland herself, but also with the Western Powers. "When in the middle of June 1 received an order from the OKH to prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion was only strengthened by the Fuehrer's speech on 22 August 1939 on the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality. Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members of my staff who were engaged in preparations, participated in various discussions which went on between the OKH and the army group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical, strategic and general nature were discussed as had to do with my future position as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army during the planned Polish campaign. "During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he, as well as the Fuehrer, visited my headquarters. In fact it was common practice for commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their recommendations by telephone, teletype or wireless, as well as by personal calls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually became advisers to the OKH in their own field so that the positions shown in the attached chart embrace that group which was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the German Armed Forces." (3706-PS) It should be noted that General Blaskowitz, like Colonel General Halder and Field Marshall von Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy of the structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command group as described by the prosecution. It is, accordingly, clear beyond dispute that the military leaders of Germany knew of, approved,
that General Blaskowitz, like Colonel General Halder and Field Marshall von Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy of the structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command group as described by the prosecution. It is, accordingly, clear beyond dispute that the military leaders of Germany knew of, approved, supported, and executed plans for the expansion of the Armed Forces beyond the limits set by treaties. The objectives they had in mind are obvious from the affidavits and documents to which reference has been made. In these documents and affidavits we see the Nazis and the Generals in agreement upon the basic objective of aggrandizing Germany by force or threat of force, and collaborating to build up the armed might of Germany in order to make possible the subsequent acts of aggression. (a) Austria. Notes taken by Colonel Hossbach of a conference held in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on 5 November 1937 show that this conference, at which Hitler presided, was small and highly secret (386-PS). The only other participants were the four principal military leaders, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (von Neurath), and Hossbach acting as Secretary. The four chief leaders of the Armed Forces-Blomberg, who was then Reich Minister for War, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces, von Fritsch for the Army, Raeder for the Navy, and Goering for the Air Force-were present. Hitler embarked on a general discussion of Germany's diplomatic and military policy, and stated that the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia was an essential preliminary "for the improvement of our military position" and "in order to remove any threat from the flanks". (386-PS) The military and political advantages envisaged included the acquisition of a new source of food, shorter and better frontiers, the release of troops for other tasks, and the possibility of forming new divisions from the population of the conquered territories. Von Blomberg and von Fritsch joined in the discussion and von Fritsch stated: "That it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the
conquered territories. Von Blomberg and von Fritsch joined in the discussion and von Fritsch stated: "That it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications" (386-PS). In the following Spring, March 1938, the German plans with respect to Austria came to fruition. Entries in the diary kept by Jodl show the participation of the German military leaders in the absorption of Austria (1780-PS). As is shown by Jodl's diary entry for 11 February 1938, Keitel and other generals were present at the Obersalzberg meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler: "11 February "In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol". (1780-PS) Two days later Keitel and others were preparing proposals to be submitted to Hitler which would give the Austrian government the impression that Germany would resort to force unless the Schuschnigg agreement was ratified in Vienna: "13 February "In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval". (1780-PS) These proposals are embodied in a document 14 February 1938 and signed by Keitel (1775-PS). Portions of Keitel's proposals to the Fuehrer are as follows: "1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments. "2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria, "a. through V-men (V-Maenner) in Austria, "b. through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier, "c. through travelling agents." "4. Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich. "5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers
preparations against Austria, "a. through V-men (V-Maenner) in Austria, "b. through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier, "c. through travelling agents." "4. Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich. "5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the Mountain Troops near the frontier. "6. Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW." (1775-PS) As Jodl's diary entry for 14 February shows, these deceptive maneuvers and threats of force were very effective in Austria: "The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations." (1780-PS) About a month later armed intervention was precipitated by Schuschnigg's decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria. Hitler ordered mobilization in accordance with the preexisting plans for the invasion of Austria (these plans were known as "Case Otto") in order to absorb Austria and stop the plebiscite. Jodl's diary entry for 10 March 1938 states: "By surprise and without consulting the ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation. "Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering, General V. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General V. Schobert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District Leader [Gauleiter] Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General V. Viebahn, to give him the old draft. 'Prepare case Otto'." (1780-PS) In an order 11 March, initialed by Keitel and Jodl, Hitler laid down the general instructions for the invasion, and directed that the Army and Air Force be ready for action by 12 March (C-102). On the same evening Hitler ordered the invasion of Austria to commence at daybreak on 12 March. The order was initialed by Jodl. (C-182) The invasion of Austria differs
Hitler laid down the general instructions for the invasion, and directed that the Army and Air Force be ready for action by 12 March (C-102). On the same evening Hitler ordered the invasion of Austria to commence at daybreak on 12 March. The order was initialed by Jodl. (C-182) The invasion of Austria differs from the other German acts of aggression in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed in advance. This was so simple because the invasion was precipitated by an outside event, Schuschnigg's order for the plebiscite. But although for this reason the element of deliberately timed planning was lacking, the foregoing documents make abundantly clear the participation of the military leaders at all stages. At the small policy meeting in November 1937, when Hitler's general program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was outlined, the only others present were the four principal military leaders and the Foreign Secretary (386-PS). In February, Keitel, Reichenau, and Sperrle were present at Obersalzberg to help subject Schuschnigg to "the heaviest military pressure" (1780-PS). Keitel and others immediately thereafter worked out and executed a program of military threat and deception for frightening the Austrian Government into acceptance of the Schuschnigg protocol (1775-PS). When the actual invasion took place it was, of course, directed by the military leaders and executed by the German Armed Forces. Jodl has given a clear statement of why the German military leaders were delighted to join with the Nazis in bringing about the end of Austrian independence. In his lecture to the Gauleiters in November 1943 (L-172) Jodl explained: "The Austrian 'Anschluss', in its turn, brought with it not only fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack