dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Then I quote again from the last paragraph: "The question of the treatment of European problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful revision. Only after a change of the spirit on the part of the responsible powers can there be any real change in the relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by British diplomacy -- at any rate up to the present -- has, however, convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be any change in this respect in the future, nobody could be happier than I." On the 25th of August the formal Anglo-Polish Agreement of mutual assistance was signed in London. It is unnecessary to read the document. The Tribunal will be well aware of its contents where both Governments undertake to give assistance to the other in the event of aggression against either by any third power. I point to Document TC-73; it is Number 91 and it becomes GB-57. I shall refer to the fact of its signing again in a moment but perhaps it is convenient while we are dealing with a letter between the British Prime Minister and Hitler to refer also to a similar correspondence which took place a few days later between the French Prime Minister M. Daladier and Hitler. I emphasize these because it is desired to show how deliberately the German Government was set about their pattern of aggression. "The French Ambassador in Berlin has informed me of your personal communication," written on the 26th of August: "In the hours in which you speak of the greatest responsibility which two heads of the Governments can possibly take upon themselves, namely, that of shedding the blood of two great nations who long only for peace and work I feel I owe it to you, personally, and to both our peoples to say that the fate of peace still rests in your hands alone.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: "You cannot doubt but what are my own feelings towards Germany nor France's peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman has done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations not only peace but also sincere co-operation in their own interests as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world. Unless you credit the French people with a lower sense of honor than I credit to the German nation, you cannot doubt that France loyally fulfills her obligations toward other powers, such as Poland, which, as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace with Germany. These two convictions are fully compatible. "Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution of the international crisis with all honor and dignity for all nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides. "Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland's readiness, which she has always shown, to submit to the mutual application of a method of open settlement as it can be imagined between the governments of two sovereign nations. With the clearest conscience I can assure you that, among the differences which have arisen between Germany and Poland over the question of Danzig, there is not one which could not be submitted to such a method with a purpose of reaching a peaceful and just solution. "Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is nothing in France's clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies, which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state of mind. "In so serious an hour I sincerely believe that no high-minded human being could understand it if a war of destruction were started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace could, in all certainty, work for this aim without any prejudice to German honor.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I, who desire good harmony between the French and the German people, and who am, on the other hand, bound to Poland by bonds of friendship and by a promise, am prepared, as head of the French Government, to do everything an upright man can do to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion. "You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You knows, as I do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war have left in the conscience of the people without any regard to its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind's eye of your outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road of peace, toward the fulfillment of its task in the common work of civilization, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion. "If French and German blood should be shed again as it was shed 25 years ago in a still longer and more murderous war, then each of the two nations will fight believing in its own victory. But the most certain victors will be destruction and barbarity."
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will adjourn now until 2 o'clock. [A recess was taken until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
COLONEL ROBERT G.STOREY (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): If it please the Tribunal, with the consent of Lieutenant Colonel Griffith-Jones, may I make an announcement to the Defense Counsel. At 7:30 in the courtroom this evening, the remainder of the motion pictures which the United States will over in evidence will be shown for the Defense Counsel. We urge that all of them come at 7:30.
DR. DIX: I believe I can say on behalf of all members of the Defense that they do not consider it necessary that the films be shown to them before the proceedings, that is, shown to them twice. We fully and with gratitude appreciate the courtesy and readiness to facilitate our work; but our evenings are very much taken up by the preparation of our cases and by the necessary consultations with our clients. The question of films is on a level different from that of documents. Documents one likes to read in advance or simultaneously or later; but since we can hear and take note of the testimony of witnesses only during the main proceedings, we are, of course, to an even greater degree in a position and prepared to become acquainted with the felons submitted as evidence only during the proceedings. We believe the Prosecution need not take the trouble of showing every film to us on some evening before it is shown again in the proceedings. We hope this will not be construed as, shall I say, a sort of demonstration in some respect, for the reason really is that our time is so fully taken up by our preparations that all superfluous work might well be spared both the Prosecution and us. I repeat and emphasize that we fully and gratefully appreciate the Prosecution's manifest readiness to facilitate our work, and I ask that my words be understood in this light.
THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand that you think it will be unnecessary for the defendants' counsel to have a preview of the films, to see them before they are produced in evidence? Is that what you are saying?
DR. DIX: Yes, that is what I said.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I am not sure that you were here when Dr. Dix began his observation; but I understand that what he says is that in view of the amount of preparation which the defendants' counsel have to undertake, they do not consider it necessary to have a view of these films before they are produced in evidence, but at the same time he wishes to express his gratification at the co-operation of the Counsel for the Prosecution.
COL. STOREY: Very agreeable. It's all right with us. We were doing it for their benefit.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: When the Tribunal rose for the adjournment, I had just read the letter from M. Daladier to Hitler, of the 26th of August. On the 27th of August Hitler replied to that letter, and I think it unnecessary to read the reply. The sense of it was very much the same as that which he wrote to the British Prime Minister in answer to the letter that he had received earlier in the week. Those two letters are taken from the German White Book which I put in evidence as GB-58, so perhaps the Tribunal would treat both those letters as of the same number. After that, nobody could say that the German Government could be in any doubt as to the position that was to be taken up by both the British and French Governments in the event of a German aggression against Poland. But the pleas for peace did not end there. On the 24th of August President Roosevelt wrote to both Hitler and the President of the Polish Republic. I quote only the first few paragraphs of his letter: "In the message which I sent you on April the 14th, I stated that it appeared to be that the leaders of great nations had it in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that impended, but that, unless the effort were immediately made, with goodwill on an sides, to find a peaceful and constructive solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today that catastrophe appears to be very near at hand indeed. "To the message which I sent you last April I have received no reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world peace--which is the cause of humanity itself--rises above all other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you, with the hope that the war which impends, and the consequent disaster to all peoples, may yet be averted.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: "I therefore urge with all earnestness--and I am likewise urging the President of the Republic of Poland--that the Governments of Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any positive act of hostility for a reasonable, stipulated period; and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three following methods: "First, by direct negotiation; second, by the submission of these controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they can both have confidence; third, that they agree to the solution of these controversies through the procedure of conciliation." 6 Dec.45 I think it is unnecessary to read any more of that letter. As I have already indicated to the Tribunal, the answer to that was the order to his armed forces to invade Poland on the following morning. That document is Exhibit TC-72, Number 124, which becomes GB-59. I put in evidence also the next document, TC-72, Number 126, GB-60, which is the reply to that letter from the President of the Polish Republic, in which he accepts the offer to settle the differences by any of the peaceful methods suggested. On the 25th of August, no reply having been received from the German Government, President Roosevelt wrote again: "I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply to the message which I addressed to Your Excellency and to him last night." The text of the Polish reply is then set out. "Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable. "In his reply to my message the President of Poland has made it plain that the Polish Government are waling, up on the basis set forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by direct negotiation or the processor conciliation.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: "Countless human lives can yet be saved, and hope may still be restored that the nations of the modern world may even now construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too, will accept." But, My Lord, Germany would not accept, nor would she accept the appeals by the Pope which appear in the next document. I am sorry--the President of Poland's reply, TC-72 becomes Number 127, GB-61. They would not agree to those proposals, nor would they pay heed to the Pope's appeal, which is TC-72, Number 139 on the same date, the 24th of August, which becomes GB-62. I do not think it is necessary to read that. It is an appeal in similar terms. And there is yet a further appeal from the Pope on the 31st of August,TC-72, Number 14, which becomes GB-63. It is 141; I beg your pardon. It is TC-72, Number 141. I think the printing is wrong in the Tribunal's translation: "The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations may lead to a just pacific solution, such as the whole world continues to pray for." I think it is unnecessary to read the remainder of that.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If the Pope had realized that those negotiations to which he referred as the "pending negotiations" in the last days of August, which we are about to deal with now, were completely bogus negotiations, bogus insofar as Germany was concerned, and put forward, as indeed they were--and as I hope to illustrate to the Tribunal in a moment--simply as an endeavor to dissuade England either by threat or by bribe from meeting her obligations to Poland, then perhaps he would have saved himself the trouble in ever addressing that last appeal It will be seen quite clearly that those final German offers, to which I now turn, were no offers in the accepted sense of the word at all; that there was never any intention behind them of entering into discussions, negotiation, arbitration, or any other form of peaceful settlement with Poland. They were just an attempt to make it rather easier to seize and conquer Poland than appeared likely if England and France observed the obligations that they had undertaken. Perhaps I might, before dealing with the documents, summarize in a word those last negotiations. On the 22d of August, as we have seen, the German-Soviet Pact was signed. On the 24th of August, orders were given to his armies to march the following morning. After those orders had been given, the news apparently reached the German Government that the British and Polish Governments had actually signed a formal pact of non-aggression and of mutual assistance. Until that time, it will be remembered, the position was that the Prime Minister had made a statement in the House and a joint communiqué had been issued--I think on the 6th of April--that they would in fact assist one another if either were attacked, but no formal agreement had been signed.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, on the 24th of August after those orders had been given by him, the news came that such a formal document had been signed; and the invasion was postponed for the sole purpose of making one last effort to keep England and France out of the war--not to end the war, not to cancel the war, but to keep them out. And to do that, on the 25th of August, having postponed the invasion, Hitler issued a verbal communiqué to Sir Nevile Henderson which, as the Tribunal will see, was a mixture of bribe and threat with which he hoped to persuade England to keep out. On the 28th of August Sir Nevile Henderson handed the British Government's reply to that communiqué to Hitler. - That reply stressed that the difference ought to be settled by agreement. The British Government put forward the view that Danzig should be guaranteed and, indeed, any agreement come to should be guaranteed by other powers, which, of course, in any event would have been quite unacceptable to the German Reich. As I say, one really need not consider what would have been acceptable and not acceptable because once it had been made clear--as indeed it was in that British Government's reply of the 28th of August--that England would not be put off assisting Poland in the event of German aggression, the German Government really had no concern with further negotiation but were concerned only to afford themselves some kind of justification and to prevent themselves appearing too blatantly to turn down all the appeals to reason that were being put forward. On the 29th of August, in the evening at 7:15, Hitler handed to Sir Nevile Henderson the German Government's answer to the British Government's reply of the 28th. And here again in this document it is quite clear that the whole object of it was to put forward something which was quite unacceptable. He agrees to enter into direct conversations as suggested by the British Government, but he demands that those conversations must be based up on the return of Danzig to the Reich and also of the whole of the Corridor.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It will be remembered that hitherto, even when he alleged that Poland had renounced the 1934 agreement, even then he had put forward as his demands the return of Danzig alone and the arrangement for an extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad running through the Corridor to East Prussia. That was unacceptable then. To make quite certain, he now demands the whole of the Corridor; no question of an Autobahn or railway. The whole thing must become German. Even so, even to make doubly certain that the offer would not be accepted, he says: ". . . on those terms I am prepared to enter into discussion; but to do so, as the matter is urgent, I expect a plenipotentiary with full powers from the Polish Government to be here in Berlin by Wednesday, the 30th of August 1939." This offer was made at 7:15 p.m. on the evening of the 29th. That offer had to be transmitted first to London, and from London to Warsaw; and from Warsaw the Polish Government had to give authority to their Ambassador in Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible to get authority to their Ambassador in Berlin by midnight the following night. It allowed them no kind of opportunity for discussing the matters at all. As Sir Nevile Henderson described it, the offer amounted to an ultimatum. At midnight on the 30th of August at the time by which the Polish Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Neville Henderson saw Ribbentrop; and I shall read to you the account of that interview, in which Sir Nevile Henderson handed a further message to Ribbentrop in reply to the message that had been handed to him the previous evening, and at which Ribbentrop read out in German a two- or three-page document which purported to be the German proposal to be discussed at the discussions between them and the Polish Government. He read it out quickly in German. He refused to hand a copy of it to the British Ambassador. He passed no copy of it at all to the Polish Ambassador.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: So that there was no kind of possible chance of the Poles ever having before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously and magnanimously offering to discuss. On the following day, the 31st of August, Mr. Lipski saw Ribbentrop and could get no further than to be asked whether he came with full powers. When he did not--when he said he did not come with full powers, Ribbentrop said that he would put the position before the Fuehrer. But, in actual fact, it was much too late to put any position to the Fuehrer by that time, because on the 31st of August--I am afraid I am unable to give you the exact time--but on the 31st of August, Hitler had already issued his Directive Number 1 for the conduct of the war, in which he laid down H-Hour as being a quarter to five the following morning, the 1st of September. And on the evening of the 31st of August at 9 o'clock the German radio broadcast the proposals which Ribbentrop had read out to Sir Nevile Henderson the night before, saying that these were the proposals which had been made for discussion but that, as no Polish Plenipotentiary had arrived to discuss them, the German Government assumed that they were turned down. That broadcast at 9 o'clock on the evening of the 31st of August was the first that the Poles had ever heard of the proposals, and the first, in fact, that the British Government or their representatives in Berlin knew about them, other than what had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused to give a written copy, on the evening of the 30th. After that broadcast at 9:15, perhaps when the broadcast was in its course, a copy of those proposals was handed to Sir Nevile Henderson, for the first time. Having thus summarized for the convenience, I hope, of the Tribunal, the timing of events during that last week, I would ask the Tribunal to refer briefly to the remaining documents in that document book. I first put in evidence an extract from the interrogation of the Defendant Goering, which was taken on the 29th of August 1945.
DR. STAHMER: As defense counsel for the Defendant Goering, I object to the use of this document which is an extract from testimony given by the Defendant Goering. Since the defendant is present here in court, he can at any time be called to the stand and give direct evidence on this subject before the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that your objection?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not understand the ground of your objection, in view of Article 15 (c) and Article 16 (b) and (c) of the Charter. Article 15 (c) provides that the Chief Prosecutors shall undertake, among others, the duty of "the preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses and of the defendants"; and Article 16 provides that: "In order to ensure fair trial for the defendants, the following procedure shall be followed: . . . (b) During any preliminary examination . . . of a defendant he shall have the right to give any explanation relevant to the charges made against him; (c) A preliminary examination of a defendant. . . shall be conducted in, or translated into, a language which the defendant understands." Those provisions of the Charter , in the opinion of the Tribunal, show that the defendants may be interrogated and that their interrogations may be put in evidence.
DR. STAHMER: I was prompted by the idea that when it is possible to call a witness, direct examination in court is preferable, since the evidence thus obtained is more concrete.
THE PRESIDENT: You certainly have the opportunity of summoning the defendant for whom you appear to give evidence himself, but that has nothing to do with the admissibility of his interrogation--his preliminary examination.
T.T. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: This extract is TC-90, which I put in as GB-64. I quote from the middle of the first answer. It is at the end of the 7th line. The Defendant Goering says there: "On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland, the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether this was just temporary or for good. He said 'No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention."
THE PRESIDENT: Ought you not read the question before the answer?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I go back to the question: "When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty, at the end of March or the beginning of April 1939, was it not fairly obvious that a peaceful solution was impossible?"--answer--"Yes, it seemed impossible after my conviction"--I think that must be a bad translation--"according to my conviction."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.