dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
HERR BOEHM: I will ask the Court that you be given this opportunity. I would also like to inquire whether you were ever able to observe that members of the SA whom you ascertained were employed on supervisory duties, ever took any measures which were in line with the orders against Soviet soldiers.
LAHOUSEN: No, not personally.
HERR BOEHM: Thank you.
DR. STAHMER: I would like to ask the Court for a fundamental ruling on whether the defendant also has the right personally to ask the witness questions. According to the German text of the Charter , Paragraph 16, I believe this is permissible.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the point you have raised and will let you know later.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The United States Prosecution would desire to be heard, I am sure, if there were any probability of that view being taken by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better hear you now, Mr. Justice Jackson.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I think it is very clear that these provisions are mutually exclusive. Each defendant has the right to conduct his own defense or to have the assistance of counsel. Certainly this would become a performance rather than a trial if we go into that sort of thing. In framing this Charter, we anticipated the possibility that some of these defendants, being lawyers themselves, might conduct their own defenses. If they do so, of course they have all the privileges of counsel. If they avail themselves of the privileges of counsel, they are not, we submit, entitled to be heard in person.
DR. STAHMER: I would like to point out once more that Paragraph 16 (e) , according to my opinion, speaks very clearly for my point of view. It says that the defendant has the right, either personally or through his counsel, to present evidence, and according to the German text it is clear that the defendant has the right to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution. According to the German text there reference can be made only to the defendant-with respect to terms as well as to the contents. In my opinion it is made clear that the defendant has the right to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other German counsel, defendant's counsel, wish to cross-examine the witness?
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): I would only like to point out that in the written forms given to us by the Court, the defendant, as well as his counsel can make a motion. A place is left for two signatures on the questionnaire. I conclude, therefore, that the defendant himself has the right to speak on the floor.
THE PRESIDENT: What I asked was whether any other defendant's counsel wished to cross-examine the witness. [Herr Boehm approached the lectern]
THE PRESIDENT: What is it? Would you put the earphones on, please, unless you understand English. What is it you want to ask now? You have already cross-examined the witness.
HERR BOHM: Yes, I have cross-examined him, but he has given me to understand that he made a report about an incident which occurred during one of his visits of inspection, and that he has some written notes. As I am not yet able to release the witness, I should like to move that the Prosecution allow to be placed at the disposal of the witness any available notes or reports on the observations made by him at the time, so that he may find the evidence he wants.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must conclude your cross-examination now.
HERR BOEHM: Certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court thinks it would be better if you want to make any further application with reference to this witness, that you should make it in writing later.
HERR BOEHM: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, as no other defendant's counsel wishes to cross-examine the witness, the Tribunal will now retire for the purpose of considering the question raised by Dr. Stahmer as to whether a defendant has the right to cross-examine as well as his own counsel. [A recess was taken]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has carefully considered the question raised by Dr. Stahmer, and it holds that defendants who are represented by counsel have not the right to cross-examine witnesses. They have the right to be called as witnesses themselves and to make a statement at the end of the Trial. Do the Prosecutors wish to ask any questions of this witness in re-examination?
COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): Just one question, your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Let the witness come back here.
THE MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): He was taken away.
THE PRESIDENT: Taken away?
THE MARSHAL: That's right. He was taken away by some captain who brought him here for the Trial. They have sent after him now.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know how far he has been taken away?
THE MARSHAL: No, Sir, I do not. I will find out immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, are the questions that you wish to ask of sufficient importance for the Tribunal to wait for this witness or for him to be recalled on Monday?
COL. AMEN: I don't believe so, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well then. The Tribunal will adjourn, and it will be understood that in the future no witness will be removed whilst he is under examination, from the precincts of this Court except on the orders of the Tribunal.
COL. AMEN: I do not know how that happened Your Lordship, I understood he was still here. [The Tribunal adjourned until 3 December 1945 at 1000 hours]
THE PRESIDENT: I call on the prosecutor for the United States.
SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, it occurs to me that perhaps the Tribunal might be interested in a very brief outline of what might be expected to occur within the next week or two weeks in this Trial. I shall immediately proceed with the aggressive war case, to present the story of the rape of Czechoslovakia. I shall not perhaps be able to conclude that today. Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British chief prosecutor, has asked that he be allowed to proceed tomorrow morning with his opening statement on Count Two and I shall be glad to yield for that purpose, with the understanding that we shall resume on Czechoslovakia after that. Thereafter, the British prosecutor will proceed to present the aggressive warfare case as to Poland, which brought France and England into the war. Thereupon the British prosecutor will proceed with the expansion of aggressive war in Europe, the aggression against Norway and Denmark, against Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, against Yugoslavia and Greece. And in connection with those aggressions the British prosecutor will present to the Tribunal the various treaties involved and the various breaches of treaties involved in those aggressions. That, as I understand it, will complete the British case under Count Two and will probably take the rest of this week. Then it will be necessary for the American prosecuting staff to come back to Count One to cover certain portions which have not been covered, specifically, persecution of the Jews, concentration camps, spoliation in occupied territories, the High Command, and other alleged criminal organizations, particularly evidence dealing with individual responsibility of individual defendants. Roughly, I would anticipate that that would carry through the following week-two weeks. However, that is a very rough estimate. Thereupon, the French chief prosecutor will make his opening statement and will present the evidence as to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes under Counts Three and Four as to Western Occupied countries.
SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): Following that, the Russian chief prosecutor will make his opening statement and will present corresponding evidence regarding War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Eastern countries. That, in very rough outline, is what we have in mind to present. I turn now to the third section in the detailed chronological presentation of the aggressive war case: Aggression against Czechoslovakia. The relevant portions of the Indictment are set forth in Subsection 3, under Section IV (F) , appearing at Pages 7 and 8 of the printed English text of the Indictment. This portion of the Indictment is divided into three parts: (a) The 1936-38 phase of the plan; that is, the planning for the assault both on Austria and Czechoslovakia. (b) The execution of the plan to invade Austria; November 1937 to March 1938. (c) The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia; April 1938 to March 1939. On Thursday, last, I completed the presentation of the documents on the execution of the plan to invade Austria. Those documents are gathered together in a document book which was handed to the Tribunal at the beginning of the Austrian presentation. The materials relating to the aggression against Czechoslovakia have been gathered in a separate document book, which I now submit to the Tribunal and which is marked "Document Book 0." The Tribunal will recall that in the period 1933 to 1936 the defendants had initiated a program of rearmament, designed to give the Third Reich military strength and political bargaining power to be used against other nations. You will recall also that beginning in the year 1936 they had embarked on a preliminary program of expansion which, as it turned out, was to last until March 1939. This was intended to shorten their frontiers, to increase their industrial and food reserve, and to place them in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which they gourd launch a more ambitious and more devastating campaign of aggression.
SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): At the moment-in the early spring of 1938-when the Nazi conspirators began to lay concrete plans for the conquest of Czechoslovakia, they had reached approximately the half-way point in this preliminary program. The preceding autumn, at the conference in the Reich Chancellery on November 5, 1937, covered by the Hossbach minutes, Hitler had set forth the program which Germany was to follow. Those Hossbach minutes , you will recall, are contained in Document 386-PS as United States Exhibit Number 25, which I read to the Tribunal in my introductory statement a week ago today. "The question for Germany," the Fuehrer had informed his military commanders at that meeting, "is where the greatest possible conquest can be made at the lowest cost." At the top of his agenda stood two countries, Austria and Czechoslovakia. On March 12, 1938 Austria was occupied by the German Army, and on the following day it was annexed to the Reich. The time had come for a redefinition of German intentions regarding Czechoslovakia. A little more than a month later two of the conspirators, Hitler and Keitel, met to discuss plans for the envelopment and conquest of the Czechoslovak State. Among the selected handful of documents which I read to the Tribunal in my introduction a week ago to establish the corpus of the crime of aggressive war was the account of this meeting on 21 April 1938. This account is Item 2 in our Document Number 388-PS, as United States Exhibit Number 26. The Tribunal will recall that Hitler and Keitel discussed the pretext which Germany might develop to serve as an excuse for a sudden and overwhelming attack. They considered the provocation of a period of diplomatic squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead to an excuse for war. In the alternative-and this alternative they found to be preferable-they planned to unleash a lightning attack as the result of an incident of their own creation.
SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): Consideration, as we alleged in the Indictment and as the document proved, was given to the assassination of the German Minister at Prague to create the requisite incident. The necessity of propaganda to guide the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia and to intimidate the Czechs was recognized. Problems of transport and tactics were discussed, with a view to overcoming all Czechoslovak resistance within 4 days, thus presenting the world with a fait accompli and forestalling outside interventions. Thus, in mid-April 1938, the designs of the Nazi conspirators to conquer Czechoslovakia had already reached the stage of practical planning. Now all of that occurred, if the Tribunal please, against a background of friendly diplomatic relations. This conspiracy must be viewed against that background. Although they had, in the fall of 1937, determined to destroy the Czechoslovak State, the leaders of the German Government were bound by a treaty of arbitration and assurances freely given, to observe the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. By a formal treaty signed at Locarno on 16 October 1925 -Document TC-14, which will be introduced by the British prosecutor-Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed, with certain exceptions, to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice matters of dispute.
SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): I quote, they would so refer: "All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy." And the preamble to this treaty stated: "The President of the German Reich and the President of the Czechoslovak Republic equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences, which might arise between the two countries; declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations, is obligatory for international tribunals; agreeing to recognize that the rights of a state cannot be modified save with its consent, and considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause of divisions between states, have decided to embody in a treaty their common intention in this respect." That ends the quotation. Formal and categoric assurances of their good will towards Czechoslovakia were both coming from the Nazi conspirators as late as March 1938. On March 11 and 12, 1938, at the time of the annexation of Austria, Germany had a considerable interest in inducing Czechoslovakia not to mobilize. At this time the Defendant Goering assured Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, on behalf of the German Government that German-Czech relations were not adversely affected by the development in Austria and that Germany had no hostile intentions towards Czechoslovakia.
SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): As a token of his sincerity, Defendant Goering accompanied his assurance with the statement, "Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort (I give you my word of honor)." At the same time, the Defendant Von Neurath, who was handling German foreign affairs during Ribbentrop's stay in London, assured Masaryk, on behalf of Hitler and the German Government, that Germany still considered herself bound by the Arbitration Convention of 1925. These assurances are contained in Document TC-27, another of the series of documents which will be presented to the Tribunal by the British prosecutor under Count Two of the Indictment. Behind the screen of these assurances the Nazi conspirators proceeded with their military and political plans for aggression. Ever since the preceding fall it had been established that the immediate aim of German policy was the elimination both of Austria and of Czechoslovakia. In both countries the conspirators planned to undermine the will to resist by propaganda and by Fifth Column activities, while the actual military preparations were being developed. The Austrian operation, which received priority for political and strategic reasons, was carried out in February and March 1938. Thenceforth the Wehrmacht planning was devoted to "Fall Grun" (Case Green), the designation given to the proposed operation against Czechoslovakia. The military plans for Case Green had been drafted in outline from as early as June 1937. The OKW top-secret directive for the unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war-signed by Von Blomberg on June 24, 1937, and promulgated to the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the year beginning July 1, 1937-included, as a probable war-like eventuality for which a concentrated plan was to be drafted, Case Green, "War on two fronts, with the main struggle in the southeast." This document-our Number C-175, Exhibit USA-69-was introduced in evidence as part of the Austrian presentation and is an original carbon copy, signed in ink by Von Blomberg.
SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): The original section of this directive dealing with the probable war against Czechoslovakia-it was later revised-opens with this supposition. I read from the bottom of Page 3 of the English translation of this directive, following the heading II, and Subparagraph (1) headed "Suppositions": "The war in the East can begin with a surprise German operation against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition. The necessary conditions to justify such an action politically, and in the eyes of international law must be created beforehand." After detailing possible enemies and neutrals in the event of such action, the directive continues as follows: "(2) The task of the German Armed Forces " -and that much is underscored- "is to make their preparations in such a way that the bulk of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, and with the greatest force, while in the West the minimum strength is provided as rear-cover for this attack. "The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German Armed Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning and for the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base in Czechoslovakia.
SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): This must be done by the defeat of the enemy armed forces and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia." The introduction to this directive sets forth as one of its guiding principles the following statement-and I now read from Page 1 of the English translation, that is, the third paragraph following Figure 1: "Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness for war on the part of the German Armed Forces:" -and then- "(a) to counterattack at any time; (b) to make possible the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they occur." This directive ordered further work on the plan for "mobilization without public announcement." I quote: " . . . in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to be able to begin a sudden war which will take the enemy by surprise, in regard to both strength and time of attack." This is, of course, a directive for staff planning, but the nature of the planning and the very tangible and ominous developments which resulted from it, give it a significance that it would not have in another setting. Planning along the lines of this directive was carried forward during the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-38. On the political level, this planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the approval and support of Hitler in the conference with his military commanders on 5 November 1937, reported in the Hossbach minutes , to which I have frequently heretofore referred. In early March 1938, before the march into Austria, we find the Defendants Ribbentrop and Keitel concerned over the extent of the information about war aims against Czechoslovakia to be furnished to Hungary. On 4 March 1938, Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, enclosing for General Keitel's confidential cognizance the minutes of a conference with Sztojay, the local Hungarian Ambassador, who had suggested an interchange of views.
SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): This is Document 2786-PS, a photostat of the original captured letter, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-81. In his letter to Keitel, Ribbentrop said: "I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed about this. I would greatly appreciate it if you ;would notify me briefly whether any commitments were made here in any respect. With best regards and Heil Hitler." At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, the account of which I read last week and alluded to earlier this morning (Document 388-PS, Item 2), specific plans for the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed for the first time. This meeting was followed, in the late spring and summer of 1938, by a series of memoranda and telegrams advancing Case Green (Fall Grun). Those notes and communications were carefully filed at Hitler's headquarters by the very efficient Colonel Schmundt, the Fuehrer's military adjutant, and were captured by American troops in a cellar at Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. This file, which is preserved intact, bears out Number 388-PS, and is United States Exhibit Number 26. We affectionately refer to it as "Big Schmundt" -a large file. The individual items in this file tell more graphically than any narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators' planning to launch an unprovoked and brutal war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the Nazi leaders displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning Czechoslovakian armament and defense. With the leave of the Tribunal I shall refer to some of these items in the Big Schmundt file without reading them. The documents to which I refer are Item 4 of the Schmundt file, a telegram from Colonel Zeitzler, in General Jodl's office of the OKW, to Schmundt at Hitler's headquarters.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you proposing not to read them?
MR. ALDERMAN: I hadn't intended to read them in full, unless that may be necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid we must adhere to our decision.
MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I should simply wish to refer to the title or heading of Item 12, which is headed, "Short Survey of Armament of the Czech Army," dated Berlin, 9 June 1938, and initialed "Z" for Zeitzler, and Item 13, "Questions of the Fuehrer," dated Berlin, 9 June 1938, and classified "Most Secret." I should like to read four of the questions which Hitler wanted authoritative information about, as shown by that document, and I read indicated questions on Pages 23, 24, 25, and 26 of Item 13 of Document 388-PS. Question 1: Hitler asked about armament of the Czech Army. I don't think it necessary to read the answers. They are detailed answers giving information in response to these questions posed by Hitler. "Question 2: How many battalions, et cetera, are employed in the West for the construction of emplacements? "Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still occupied in unreduced strength? "Question 4: Frontier protection in the West." As I say, those questions were answered in detail by the OKW and initialed by Colonel Zeitzler of Jodl's staff. As a precaution against French and British action during the attack on Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi conspirators to rush the preparation of fortification measures along the western frontier in Germany. I refer you to Item 8, at Page 12 of the Big Schmundt file, a telegram presumably sent from Schmundt in Berchtesgaden to Berlin, and I quote from this telegram. It is, as I say, Item 8 of the Schmundt file, Page 12 of Document 388-PS: "Inform Colonel General Von Brauchitsch and General Keitel." And then, skipping a paragraph: "The Fuehrer repeatedly emphasized the necessity of pressing forward greatly the fortification work in the West." In May, June, July, and August of 1938 conferences between Hitler and his political and military advisors resulted in the issuance of a series of constantly revised directives for the attack on Czechoslovakia. It was decided that preparations for X-Day, the day of the attack, should be completed no later than 1 October.