dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
LT COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces to counter attacks at any time, and to enable the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities, should they occur." It then goes on to set out the preparations which are to be made, and I would particularly draw the Tribunal's attention to Paragraph 2b: . "The further working on mobilization without public announcement in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and time." On the next page, under Paragraph 4: "Special preparations are to be made for the following eventualities: Armed intervention against Austria; warlike entanglements with Red Spain." And thirdly, and this shows so clearly how they appreciated at that time that their actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia might well involve them in war: "England, Poland, and Lithuania take part in a war against us." If the Tribunal would turn over to Part 2 of that directive, Page 5 of that document: "For the treatment of probable warlike eventualities (concentrations) the following suppositions, tasks, and orders are to be considered as basic: "1. War on two fronts with focal point in the West. "Suppositions. In the West, France is the opponent. Belgium may side with France, either at once or later, or not at all. It is also possible that France may violate Belgium's neutrality if the latter is neutral. She will certainly violate that of Luxembourg." I pass to Part 3, which will be found on Page 9 of that Exhibit, and I particularly refer to the last paragraph on that page under the heading "Special Case-Extension Red-Green". It will be remembered that Red was Spain and Green was Czechoslovakia. "The military political starting point used as a basis for concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either England, Poland, or Lithuania . . . join the side of our opponents.
LT COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Thereupon our military position would deteriorate to an unbearable, even hopeless extent. The political leadership will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above-all England and Poland." Thereafter, it sets out the conditions which are to be the basis for the discussion. Before I leave that document, the date will be noted: June 1937; and it shows clearly that at that date anyway, the Nazi Government appreciated the likelihood, if not the probability, of fighting England, and Poland, and France, and were perfectly prepared to do so, if they had to. On the 5th of November 1937-the Tribunal will remember-Hitler held his conference in the Reich Chancellery, the minutes of which have been referred to as the Hossbach notes. I refer to only one or two lines of that document to draw the attention of the Tribunal to what Hitler said in respect to England, Poland, and France. On Page 1 of that Exhibit, the middle of the page: "The Fuehrer then stated: 'The aim of German policy is the security and preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space."' He then went on, you will remember, to discuss what he described "participation in world economy," and at the bottom of Page 2 he said: "The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and movements of nations." And at the end of that first paragraph on Page 3: "The history of all times, Roman Empire, British Empire, has proved that every space expansion can be effected only by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable. Neither formerly, nor today, has space been found without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the proprietor." My Lord, it is clear that that reference was not only . . .
THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing.] It has been read already.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My object was only to try to collect, so far as England and Poland were concerned, the evidence that had been given. I would welcome in actual fact if the Tribunal thought that it was unnecessary, I would welcome the opportunity to . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would wish you not to read anything that has been read already.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I would pass then to the next document in that part of your document book. I put that document in It was referred to by the Attorney General in his address yesterday, and it shows that on the same date the Hossbach meeting was taking place, a communique was being issued as a result of the Polish Ambassador's audience with Hitler, in which it was said in the course of the conversation that it was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet with difficulties because of the Danzig question. That Document is TC-73. I put it in as GB-27. On the 2d of January . . .
THE PRESIDENT: That hasn't been read before, has it?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It was read by the Attorney General in his opening.
THE PRESIDENT: In his opening? Very well.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On the 2d of January 1938 some unknown person wrote a memorandum for the Fuehrer. This document was one of the German Foreign Office documents of which a microfilm was captured by Allied troops when they came into Germany. It is headed, "Very confidential-personal only," and is called, "Deductions on the Report, German Embassy, London, regarding the Future Form of Anglo-German Relations": "With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a status quo in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an agreement will slowly disappear among Germanophile British politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arises: Will Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate camps and will they march once more against each other one day? To answer this question, one must realize the following: "A change of the status quo in the East in the German sense can only be carried out by force. As long as France knows that England, which so to speak, has taken on a guarantee to aid France against Germany, is on her side, France's fighting for her eastern allies is probable, in any case, always possible, and thus with it war between Germany and England. This applies then even if England does not want war. England, believing she must defend her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in automatically by France. In other words, peace or war between England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who could bring about such a war between Germany and England by way of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows, therefore, that war between Germany and England on account of France can be prevented only if France knows from the start that England's forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby France, to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-French coalition would never tolerate.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: "This position would arise for instance if England, through insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by a superior coalition of powers, for example, Germany, Italy, Japan, thereby tying down her military forces in other places, would not be able to assure France of sufficient support in Europe." The next page goes on to discuss the possibilities of a strong partnership between Italy and Japan, and I would pass from my quotation to the next page where the writer is summarizing his ideas. Paragraph 5: "Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us. "1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard to the protection of the interests of our friends. "2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say, a tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan, also the winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours directly or indirectly. "Close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats of the three great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way can we confront England, be it in a settlement or in war. England is going to be a hard and astute opponent in this game of diplomacy. "The particular question whether, in the event of a war by Germany in Central Europe . . ."-I am afraid the translation of this is not very good-"The particular question whether, in the event of a war by Germany in Central Europe, France, and thereby England, would interfere, depends on the circumstances and the time at which such a war commences and ceases, and on military considerations which cannot be gone into here." And whoever it was that wrote that document appears to be on a fairly high level, because he concludes by saying: "I should like to give the Fuehrer some of these points of view verbally." That document is GB-28. Well, I am afraid that the next two documents have gotten into your books in the wrong order.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you would refer to 2357-PS which is the one following our L-43-it will be remembered that document to the Fuehrer which I have just read was dated the 2d of January 1938. On the 20th of January 1938 Hitler spoke in the Reichstag.
THE PRESIDENT: February, the document said.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon-February 1938. That is 2357-PS, and will be GB-30. In that speech he said: "In the fifth year following the first great foreign political agreement with the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to state that in our relations with the state, with which we had had perhaps the greatest differences, not only has there been a detente, but in the course of these years there has been a constant improvement in relations. This good work, which was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that since the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new commissioner, the most dangerous spot from this point of view of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State respects the national conditions in this state, and both the City of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which beginning with Danzig has today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly co-operation. "To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of us-peace." I turn back to the next-to the document which was in your document books, the one before that, L-43, which will be GB-29. This is a document to which the Attorney General referred yesterday. It is dated the 2d of May 1938, and is entitled "Organizational Study of 1950." It comes from the office of the Chief of the Organizational Staff of the General Staff of the Air Force, and its purpose is said to be: "The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization of the Air Force.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The result gained is termed 'Distant Objective.' From this shall be deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the setting-up process in 1942. This will be called 'Final Objective 1942.' This in turn yields what is considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of the staffs of the Air Force group commands, air Gaue, air divisions, et cetera." The table of contents, the Tribunal will see, is divided into various sections, and Section I is entitled "Assumptions." If the Tribunal will turn over to the next page one finds the assumption under the heading "Assumptions I, frontier of Germany, see map, Enclosure 1." The Tribunal sees a reproduction of that map on the wall and it will be seen that on the 2d of May 1938, the Air Force were envisaging Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, all coming within the bounds of the Reich. The original map is here attached to this file and if the Tribunal will look at the original exhibit, it will be seen that this organizational study has been prepared with the greatest care and thoroughness, with a mass of charts attached as appendices. I would refer also to the bottom of the second page, to the Tribunal's copy of the translation: "Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in Section I: 1) Attack forces: Principal adversaries: England, France, Russia." And it then goes on to say if all the 144 Geschwader are employed against England, they must be concentrated in the western half of the Reich; that is to say, they must be deployed in such a way that by making full use of their range they can reach all English territory down to the last corner.
THE PRESIDENT: It is perhaps involved in the map. I think perhaps you should refer to the organization of the Air Force, with group commands at Warsaw and Konigsberg.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged. Under the paragraph "Assumptions," Sub-heading 2, "Organization of the Air Force in Peacetime," seven group commands: 1-Berlin, 2-Brunswick, 3-Munich, 4-Vienna, 5-Budapest, 6-Warsaw, and 7-Konigsberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged. And lastly, in connection with that document, on Page 4 of the Tribunal's translation, the last paragraph: "The more the Reich grows in area, and the more the Air Force grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have locally bound commands ...." I emphasize only the opening, "The more the Reich grows in area, and the more the Air Force grows in strength . . ." Now I would say one word on that document. The original, I understand, is signed by an officer who is not at the top rank in the Air Force and I, therefore, don't want to overemphasize the inferences that can be drawn from it, but it is submitted that it at least shows the lines upon which the General Staff of the Air Force were thinking at that date. The Tribunal will remember that in February 1938 the Defendant Ribbentrop succeeded Von Neurath as Foreign Minister. We have another document from that captured microfilm, which is dated the 26th of August 1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and it is addressed to him as "the Reich Minister via the State Secretary." It is a comparatively short document and one that I will read in whole: "The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem, might easily, but must not, lead to a conflict with the Entente."-TC-76 becomes GB-31-"Neither France nor England is looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she should, without direct foreign interference and through internal signs of disintegration due to her own faults, suffer the fate she deserves. This process, however, would have to take place step by step, and would have to lead to a loss of power in the remaining territory, by means of a plebiscite and an annexation of territory. "The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly. Germany cannot fix any definite time when this fruit could be plucked without too great a risk.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: She can only prepare the desired developments." I pass to the last paragraph on that page. I think I can leave out the intervening lines, Paragraph 5.
THE PRESIDENT: Should you not read the next paragraph "For this purpose . . ."?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: "For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at present of the right for autonomy of the Sudeten Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to now, is to be taken up gradually. The international conviction that the choice of nationality is being withheld from these Germans will do useful spadework, notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may not be finally speeded up by mechanical means as well. The fate of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet be clearly decided by this, but would nevertheless be definitely sealed. "This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of boundaries in the southeast and their transfer to the east and northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact is"-I put in an "is" because I think it is obviously left out of the copy that I have in front of me. "The fact is that after the liquidation of the Czech question, it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in turn. "But the later this assumption sinks in in international politics as a firm factor, the better. In this sense, however, it is important for the time being, to carry on the German policy, under the well-known and proved slogans of 'the right to autonomy' and 'racial unity.' Anything else might be interpreted as pure imperialism on our part, and provoke resistance by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically than our forces could stand up to." That was on the 26th of August 1938, just as the Czech crisis was leading up to a Munich settlement . While at Munich, or rather a day or two before the Munich Agreement was signed, Herr Hitler made a speech. On the 26th of September he said-I think Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has just read this document to the Tribunal. I'll refer.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: to only two lines of it: "I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved, there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe." And again, the last document in your book, which is another extract from that same speech, I will not read to the Tribunal unless the Tribunal desire, because the Attorney General did quote it in full in his address yesterday. These two documents are already in, TC-28 as GB-2, and TC-29, which is the second extraction of that same speech, as GB-32. My Lord, I would refer the Tribunal to one more document under this part which has already been put in by my American colleagues. It is C-23, now USA-49, and which appears before TC-28 in your document book. The particular passage of that exhibit, to which I would refer, is a letter from Admiral Carls, which appears at the bottom of the second page. It is dated some time in September, with no precise date, and is entitled, "Opinion on the 'Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England.' There is full agreement with the main theme of the study." Again, the Attorney General quoted the remainder of that letter yesterday, which the Tribunal will remember. "If, according to the Fuehrer's decision, Germany is to acquire a position of security as a world power she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean." That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich Agreement in September 1938 . The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the Nazi Government had hoped and had intended, and as a result, they were not prepared straight away to start any further aggressive action against Poland or elsewhere, but Your Lordships heard this morning, when Mr. Alderman dealt in his closing remarks with the advantages that were gained by the seizure of Czechoslovakia, what Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent occasions, that Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for the attack on Poland.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is, of course, obvious now that they intended and indeed had taken the decision to proceed against Poland as soon as Czechoslovakia had been entirely occupied. We know now, from what Hitler said in talking to his military commanders at a later date. The Tribunal will remember the speech where he said that from the first, he never intended to abide by the Munich Agreement but that he had to have the whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed in full force against Poland after September 1938, they did at once begin to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig. Until-as the Tribunal will see-until the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken in March, no pressure was put on; but immediately after the Sudetenland had been occupied, preliminary steps were taken to stir up trouble with Poland, which would and was to lead eventually to their excuse, or so-called justification for their attack on that country. If the Tribunal would turn to Part 3. . .
THE PRESIDENT: I think it is time to adjourn now until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. [The Tribunal adjourned until 6 December at 1000 hours.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received an urgent request from the defendants' counsel that the Trial should be adjourned at Christmas for a period of 3 weeks. The Tribunal is aware of the many interests which must be considered in a trial of this complexity and magnitude, and, as the Trial must inevitably last for a considerable time, the Tribunal considers that it is not only in the interest of the defendants and their counsel but of every one concerned in the Trial that there should be a recess. On the whole it seems best to take that recess at Christmas rather than at a later date when the Prosecution's case has been completed. The Tribunal will therefore rise for the Christmas week and over the 1st of January, and will not sit after the session on Thursday, the 20th of December, and will sit again on Wednesday, the 2d of January.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like, in justice to my staff, to note the American objection to the adjournment for the benefit of the defendants.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May it please the Tribunal, the tribunal will return to Part III of that document book in which included the documents relating to the earlier discussions between the German and Polish Governments on the question of Danzig. Those discussions, the Tribunal will remember, started almost immediately after the Munich crisis in September 1938, and started, in the first place, as cautious and friendly discussions until the remainder of Czechoslovakia had finally been seized in March of the following year. I would refer the Tribunal to the first document in that part, TC-73, Number 44. That is a document taken from the official Polish White Book, which I put in as Exhibit GB-27 (a). It gives an account of a luncheon which took place at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on the 24th of October, where Ribbentrop saw Mr. Lipski, the Polish ambassador to Germany: "In a conversation of the 29th of October, over a luncheon at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present, Von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement of issues between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an extraterritorial motor road and a railway line across Pomorze (northern part of the corridor).In exchange Von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an extension of  the Polish-German Agreement to 25 years and a guarantee of Polish-German frontiers." I do not think I need read the following lines. I go to the last but one paragraph: "Finally, I said to Von Ribbentrop that I could see no possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the substance of this conversation to you." I would emphasize the submission of the Prosecution as to this part of the case and that it is that the whole question of Danzig was indeed, as Hitler  has himself said, no question at all.