dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I am sorry to interrupt you but it is not quite clear, on the translation that has come through, whether you have deposited the original of this document and have given it an exhibit number, that is, if it has already been put in.
COL. POKROVSKY: All the documents presented by the Soviet Delegation are submitted by us to the Tribunal in Russian and they are then handed for translation to the international translators' pool, which is charged to serve the Tribunal with translation into all the other languages. This document is referred to by me in precise correspondence with its registration number-our Number USSR-271.
THE PRESIDENT: If the original document is not in Russian, it must be deposited with the Tribunal in its original condition. I do not know what the document is. It is about a conference, apparently, and I suppose the original is in German.
COL. POKROVSKY: The original document is in German.
THE PRESIDENT: If that is so, we would like to see the original in German.
COL. POKROVSKY: The photostatic copy of the original document, in the German language, is at present at the disposal of the Tribunal. May I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Is this the original?
COL.POKROVSKY: It is a photostat.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that we must' insist upon having the original.
COL. POKROVSKY: The original document is at the disposal of the Soviet Government and, if the Tribunal wishes, it can be sent for and presented to the Tribunal a little later. The photostat is certified.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid we must have the original documents. After the original documents have been produced and exhibit numbers given to them, they will remain in the hands of the Tribunal. Of course, the subject of the translations is quite a different one, but for the purpose of insuring that we get really genuine evidence we must have the originals deposited with the General Secretary.
COL.POKROVSKY: I note the wish of the Tribunal and we shall give instruction for the original documents to be submitted to the Tribunal, although in this case we have followed the established precedent where the Tribunal considers it sufficient to accept the certified photostats. We can submit the original, but we shall have to do it somewhat later, as not all the requisite material is in Nuremberg at the present time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, so long as you undertake to do it. But I do not think you are right in saying that it is the practice that has been already established, because we have been demanding the production of the original document from the French prosecutors, and they have been produced.
COL.POKROVSKY: We shall take the necessary measures so that the Tribunal will receive, although of course somewhat later, all the original documents from which the present photostats were taken. May I now continue? I now continue the quotation....
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I imagine that you Will be able to produce tomorrow the originals of the documents which were referred to today.
COL. POKROVSKY: I cannot promise that, because not all the originals are here. A considerable part of these documents are unique and consequently not kept in Nuremberg. Here we keep only a certain part of the originals.' All that I can do is to submit, in the future, the originals at our disposal. Those which we do not have here we shall request the Soviet Government to send over in exchange for the photostats. This we can do.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal had better adjourn for the purpose of considering this matter. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the matter of the deposition of original documents, and they wish the following procedure to be adopted: In the first place, they want original documents deposited with the General Secretary of the Tribunal, wherever possible. Secondly, where it is impossible for original documents to be deposited, or highly inconvenient, they will accept photostat copies of the original documents, provided that a certificate accompanies the photostat document that it is a true copy of an original document, and that the original is an authentic document, giving the origin of the original document and the place of its present custody. Thirdly, they will accept photostat copies for the present, on the undertaking of counsel that certificates, such as I have indicated, will be furnished as soon as possible. Is that clear, Colonel Pokrovsky?
COL.POKROVSKY: I would ask the Tribunal to explain one point to me. Do I understand that the Tribunal only confirms its former decision and practice, which was established in connection with the presentation of the document in evidence by my American and British colleagues, or is it something new that the Tribunal is introducing? I am asking this because a similar document to the one which caused the interruption in my presentation today has already been accepted as a photostat in the same Trial under Exhibit Number USA-95 or Document 2788-PS. Therefore, it is not quite clear to me whether I am dealing with a new decision or with the confirmation of an old practice.
THE PRESIDENT: I think what you have stated is true, that this particular document does not appear to have any certificate that it is a true copy. But the Tribunal expects that the United States will produce such a certificate that it is a true copy of an authentic document and will state the origin and the custody of the original document.
COL.POKROVSKY: Pray forgive me, but I consider that the question which I wish to elucidate is of equal interest to all the prosecutors. Am I, and with me all the representatives of the Prosecution, to understand the decision of the Tribunal to mean that we are to present supplementary documentation in support of all photostats, including the photostats previously accepted by the Tribunal, or does it only refer to documents which the Soviet Delegation will present in the future?
THE PRESIDENT: If a document had been accepted in photostatic form and there has been no certificate that it was a true copy of an authentic document, then such a certificate must be given. And we desire that the certificate should also show that the document was authentic, and the place of its present custody. And that applies equally to all the chief prosecutors. COL., POKROVSKY: Now, I understand that the Tribunal is confirming its former practice which means that we can present a photostat, but that they must be certified and that the originals should be presented whenever possible. Have I understood you correctly?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we desire originals, if possible. If it is impossible or if it is highly inconvenient, then we will accept photostats. And in the meantime, and for your convenience-because this practice has not been perhaps adequately stated before-we will accept photostat copies without certificate, on your undertaking that you will have the certificate later on. Is that clear?
COL. POKROVSKY: I understand. The former practice will continue in operation. If the Tribunal will permit me, I shall draw your attention to the paragraph the misunderstanding about which led to the interruption of my presentation. I have in mind the three last lines of Page 196 of the document book before you: "The final aim of the forthcoming negotiations between the Sudeten German Party and the Czechoslovakian Government is to avoid entering the Government by widening the scope of their demands and by formulating them with ever increasing precision. In the course of negotiations it must be pointed out very clearly that the sole partner in these negotiations with the Czechoslovakian Government is the Sudeten German Party, and not the Reich Government.... " Now I can omit a few lines and go on to Page 199: " . . . for purposes of further collaboration Konrad Henlein was advised to maintain the closest possible contact with the Reich Minister and with the leader of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, as well as with the German Minister in Prague, who was representing the Reich Foreign Minister there. The task of the German Minister in Prague was to uphold, unofficially, the Sudeten German Party's demands, especially in private discussions with Czechoslovakian statesmen, by referring to them as reasonable, but without exerting any direct influence on the scope of the Party's demands. "Finally, the question of the advisability of the Sudeten German Party's collaboration with the other national minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks, was discussed. The Reich Minister decided that 'the Party should be given a free hand to contact the other national groups with activities of a parallel nature which might be considered useful. Berlin, 29 March 1938.' " Mr. President, Your Honors, you will find on Page 200, Volume I, Part 1 of the document book, a list of those present at the conference of 29 March 1938, in Berlin.
COL. POKROVSKY: The part which I shall quote is marked with a red pencil: "Reichsminister Von Ribbentrop, State Secretary Von Mackensen, Ministerialdirektor Weizsacker, Minister Plenipotentiary to Prague Eisenlohr, Minister Stiebe, Legationsrat Von Twardovsky, Legationsrat Altenburg, Legationsrat Kordt (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Others of the group were SS Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz, Professor Haushofer (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle), Konrad Henlein, Karl Hermann Frank, Dr. Kuenzel, Dr. Kreisel (Sudeten German Party)." It is not difficult to draw the correct conclusions as to the genuine intentions of the fascist conspirators with respect to Czechoslovakia, if only from the sole fact that among those attending the conference were such people as the Defendant Ribbentrop, two ministers, two representatives of the so-called Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, including one Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS, the prospective Secretary of State of the Czecho-Moravian Protectorate, Karl Hermann Frank, and the leader of the so-called Sudeten German Party, Konrad Henlein, a paid factotum and agent provocateur of Hitler. German diplomatic missions directed the activities of Nazi Party branches abroad. For this purpose the leader of the AO, Gauleiter Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, was appointed State Secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. On 3 June 1938 two documents were prepared by SS-man Lorenz, a participant of the conference to which I have just called the attention of the Tribunal. I shall read both of them. The first one, referring to the interview with Ward Price, indicates that Henlein was under the direct control of the SS, and it was to the SS that he was responsible for his activities. This document also contains the direct threat to resort to a "radical operation" in order to bring about the solution of the so-called Sudeten German problem.
COL. POKROVSKY: I will read this short document into the Record under Document Number USSR-270 in full; it is on Page 202, Volume I, Part 1, of the document book: "Regarding the interview with Ward Price which appeared in the foreign press, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz requested an explanation from Henlein. Henlein stated about as follows: "Ward Price was present at the burial of those executed in the town of Eger-Heasked Henlein's collaborator, Sebekovsky, to arrange a meeting with Henlein for him. Henlein knew of the interview given by the Ffihrer to Ward Price. He had a talk with Ward Price over a cup of tea. There was no real interview. The conversation about the Sudeten German and the Czech problems took the form of a talk about appendicitis. In this connection Henlein said that one could suffer chronic attacks of appendicitis, but the best thing was a radical operation. Later on, when Ward Price published an account of this conversation, Henlein intended to disavow him. But at that moment, an order came through the Legation in Prague from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that Henlein should settle the matter with Ward Price amicably, since the latter was in the Fuehrer's confidence and was in no way to be insulted by Sudeten Germans When Henlein met W. P. again, he backed out, putting the blame on the members of the Sudeten German Party. For this reason, he wrote a letter to W. P., thus settling the matter. Lorenz." The second document, which is on Page 203, which is our Document Number USSR-268, shows that, upon direct orders of the - SS and the leaders of the Hitlerite conspiracy, Henlein negotiated with the Czech Government for the settlement of the Sudeten German question solely to create a provocation, and that these negotiations were closely followed by the leaders of the fascist conspiracy who guided Henlein's further steps.
COL. POKROVSKY: I would now like to quote from that document: "In his conversation with SS Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz, Henlein put the following question: 'What shall I do if Czechoslovakia, under foreign pressure, suddenly fulfills all my demands and as counter demand asks me to enter the Government?' "It was quite clear that this question at that moment would not be acute, and that further lengthy and painful negotiations were inevitable. Nevertheless he asked for instructions on his possible line of action regarding this problem, in case he were not able to communicate with Germany. "He himself suggested the following: If Czechoslovakia accedes to all my requests I will answer, 'Yes,' but I will insist upon the change of its foreign policy. This the Czechs would never accept. Henlein was promised that this question would be elucidated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Lorenz." A very brief excerpt from a top-secret document of state . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Isn't it time to break off? It is now a quarter past 5.
COL. POKROVSKY: May I continue with my statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, please.
COL. POKROVSKY: The end of the session prevented me yesterday from quoting a brief excerpt from a very secret, a very important state document, dated 22 September 1938. I propose to begin today's work as from this point, and to read into the record the first six lines of the document submitted as Exhibit Number USSR-267 (Document Number USSR-267), which you will find, Your Honors, in Volume I, Part 1, Page 202 of your document book. This brief excerpt shows with absolute clearness the questions about the meaning of the so-called Sudetendeutsche Freikorps, the existence of which was briefly referred to in former sessions. I quote the first six lines from notes made after a telephone conversation which took place in Berlin between one of the leaders of the so-called Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the Government in Berlin, at 1900 hours on 22 September 1938. Permit me to read these six lines into the record: "Herr Schmidt, from the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, telephoned at 1900 as follows: "The Command of the Sudetendeutsche Freikorps has just communicated the following: "First Lieutenant Kodbling transmitted the following Fuehrer order: 'Freikorps has to carry out the occupation of regions evacuated by the Czechs. Large-scale operations, however, may be executed only with the Fuehrer's personal approval."' The rest of this document, signed by Von Stechow, is of no interest and I will not read it into the record. As far as I can judge, the minutes of Hitler's reception of the Czech Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chvalkovsky, on 21 January 1939- that is shortly before the complete occupation of Czechoslovakia- are of great interest. Hitler's mendacious and pompous statements with respect to the independence of small nations, statements recorded in the document I am about to quote, are characteristic of his perfidious tactics.
COL. POKROVSKY: The document which I am going to read into the record as Exhibit Number USSR-266 (Document Number USSR-266) you will find, Your Honors, on Page 203, Part 1 of Volume I of our document book: "Chvalkovsky began by thanking the Fuehrer for having done his country the honor of receiving the Minister for Foreign Affairs twice within 3 months. He had come here to inform the Fuehrer that he had strictly fulfilled the promise made to him on 14 October although this had cost him a very great deal of trouble.... "The Fuehrer thanked him for his statements. The foreign policy of a people is determined by its home policy. It is quite impossible to carry out a foreign policy of type 'A' and at the same time a home policy of type 'B.' It could succeed only for a short time. From the very beginning the development of events in Czechoslovakia was bound to lead to a catastrophe. This catastrophe had been averted thanks to the moderate conduct of Germany. "Had Germany not followed the National Socialist principles which do not permit of territorial annexations the fate of Czechoslovakia would have followed another course. Whatever remains today of Czechoslovakia has been rescued not by Benes, but by the National Socialist tendencies." I omit a few sentences and continue: "For instance, the strength of the Dutch and Danish armies rests not in themselves alone but in realizing the fact that the whole world was convinced of the absolute neutrality of these states. When war broke out, it was well known that the problem of neutrality was one of extreme importance to these countries. The case of Belgium was somewhat different, as that country had an agreement with the French General Staff. In this particular case Germany was compelled to forestall possible eventualities. These small countries were defended not by their armies but by the trust shown in their neutrality." You will find a further part of this quotation on Page 207: "Chvalkovsky, backed by Mastny, again spoke about the situation in Czechoslovakia and about the healthy farmers there.
COL. POKROVSKY: Before the crisis, the people did not know what to expect of Germany. But when they saw that they would not be exterminated and that the Germans wished only to lead their people back home, they heaved a sigh of relief. "World propaganda, against which the Fuehrer had been struggling for so long a time, was now focused on tiny Czechoslovakia. Chvalkovsky begged the Fuehrer to address, from time to time, a few kind words to the Czech people. That might work miracles. The Fuehrer is unaware of the great value attached to his words by the Czech people. If he would only openly declare that he intended to collaborate with the Czech people-and with the people, themselves, not with the Minister for Foreign Affairs-all foreign propaganda would be utterly defeated. "The Fuehrer concluded the conversation by expressing his belief in a promising future." These notes are signed by Hewel. It would now be opportune to refer once again to a document which has already been mentioned in the Tribunal. I mean a socalled top-secret document, for officers only, of the 30th of May 1938. It bears the number OKW 42/38, and under Document Number 388-PS has already been presented to the Tribunal by my honorable colleagues of the United States Delegation. The Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. likewise referred to this document in his opening statement. Formulating the gist of the fascist conspiracy against Czechoslovakia, Hitler announced that it was his irrevocable decision to defeat Czechoslovakia in the immediate future and by one single military operation. He divided his task into two parts: political and military. Then, with his characteristic and unbounded cynicism, he declares-his quotation is to be found on Page 209 of Volume I, Part 1 of the document book: "The most favorable, both from the political and military standpoint, would be a lightning blow to be delivered under the pretext of some incident which will provoke Germany to abrupt action...." The document bears Hitler's signature.
COL. POKROVSKY: Such was the authentic program of Hitler and his accomplices concerning Czechoslovakia, drawn up for a long time in advance of the day when Chvalkovsky requested that criminal "to address from time to time a few kind words to the Czech people." Even if in his public utterances Hitler sometimes used what Chvalkovsky called "kind words," the line of the actual relations was developing in an entirely different direction. But even this is not all. We shall postpone the question of the provocative incident until the end. The notes to the report on Fall Grun of 24 August 1938 have already been read into the record in the most important part, as Document Number 388-PS. Here are two additional paragraphs which should be read. Your Honors will find on Page 214 of Volume I of the document book: "Fall Grun will start with the creation of an incident in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany a pretext for military intervention. "It is of the greatest importance to fix the exact day and hour for staging the incident. "This incident must be provoked under weather conditions favorable for our superior air force in carrying out the operation and it should be timed in such a way that the respective notification should authentically reach us by midday of X-1 Day. This will enable us to follow it up immediately by issuing the order X, on X-1 Day, at 1400 hours." The document concluded as follows-see Page 215 of your document book: "The purpose of these statements is to show how greatly interested the Armed Forces are in the incident, and that they should know well in advance the intentions of the Fuehrer, inasmuch as the organization of the incident will be entrusted, in any case, to the Abwehr." The document is signed by Jodl. These are not mere words. This is a plan of infamous provocation; a plan which, as we already know, has been carried into effect. Document Number 388-PS has already been accepted by you as evidence presented by the Delegation of the United States.
COL. POKROVSKY: I should like only to stress one point: The murderers and invaders not only develop in cold blood the plans of their crimes but are also anxious to put them into effect under the most advantageous conditions possible for themselves. They need fine weather and at least 24 hours for the final preparation. Moreover, they need an incident, provoked by themselves, to justify their foul crimes in the "eyes of at least some part of the world community." This latter fact demonstrates that the Hitlerites themselves were perfectly aware of the criminality of their actions. In passing, I wish to draw your attention to one point: OKW bears direct responsibility for the criminal character of these actions. They cannot plead, "We know not what we did." The agents provocateurs and aggressors, in the uniform of the highest ranks of the German Army, were the first to name themselves agents provocateurs and aggressors. Finally, I have to inform the Tribunal that one of the ultimate aims of the fascist invasion of Czechoslovakia was the liquidation of this historically constituted Slav state. On Page 36 of the official report of the Czechoslovak Government, the original of which was submitted to you yesterday, we can read the following quotation from a statement made by Hitler in the summer of 1932 in the presence of Darre, Rauschning, and other high fascist officials. I shall quote this excerpt, which is on Page 38 of the Volume I, Part 1 of your document book: "The Bohemian-Moravian Basin . . . will be colonized with German peasants. We shall transplant the Czechs to Siberia or the Volhynian district. They must get out of Central Europe ...." This statement by Hitler is quoted in the Czechoslovak report from Rauschning's book Hitler Speaks, Page 46. I consider it necessary to read into the record a passage from the Czechoslovak report, which immediately follows the above mentioned quotation-Page 36 of the Russian translation, the last paragraph at the end of the page.