dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
RAEDER: I met Hitler on 2 February 1933 when I saw him and talked to him for the first time. It was at an evening party arranged by General Von Blomberg at the home of General Von Hammerstein, the Chief of the Army Command Staff, at which Reich Defense Minister Von Blomberg intended to present to Hitler senior generals and admirals. I shall describe the proceedings later. Up to that time, I had had no connection whatsoever with National Socialism. I knew Admiral Von Levetzow only from the first World War. He was on the staff of Admiral Scheer whom I knew well and who had obviously met Hitler at a comparatively early date. It was through him, however, that I heard that Hitler took a very active interest in naval matters and was surprisingly well informed about them. On the other hand, I believe that Von Levetzow had also spoken to Hitler about the reputation of the Navy and his own opinion of the Navy at that time. But I had no connections beyond that.
DR. SIEMERS: What were your reasons for remaining in of lice in 1933, Grossadmiral, when you had no connection with National Socialism?
RAEDER: The Reich President, Field Marshal Von Hindenburg, at the same time Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, had appointed the leader of the largest party as Chancellor of the Reich. I think that, if I had gone to him and told him I wanted to resign-or intended to resign-because he had appointed a new Chancellor, he would quite certainly have taken it as an insult and would then really have dismissed me. I had not the slightest reason to ask my Supreme Commander to release me from my military post because he, in his capacity of Reich President, had appointed a new Reich Chancellor of whom I, perhaps, might not approve.
DR. SIEMERS: When and where did you first hear Hitler state his basic political principles?
RAEDER: I heard him for the first time on the afore-mentioned 2 February, after the dinner at General Von Hammerstein's home. I was introduced to him before dinner, and after dinner he made a speech. He was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herr Von Neurath. There were no other members of the Party present. In his speech, he first of all spoke of his career and of his social and national aims. He said that he wanted to regain equal rights for the German Reich and that he would try to rid the country of the shackles of the Versailles Treaty and restore to Germany her internal sovereignty; and he also discussed his social aims: the establishment of true community among the people, the raising of the workers' standard of living, assistance to be given to the farmers, and the promotion of agriculture, the establishment of a labor service, and the elimination of unemployment. He specially emphasized-and this was really the main point-that both domestic and foreign policy were to be left entirely in his hands, that the Wehrmacht was to have nothing at all to do with this, that the Wehrmacht was not to be used even to deal with unrest at home, and that he had other forces to deal with these affairs. He wanted to insure an undisturbed period of development for the Wehrmacht so that it could become the factor necessary to prevent the Reich from becoming the sport of other nations; and for that reason it would be necessary in the next few years for the Wehrmacht to devote its entire attention to the preparation of its main objective, training for the defense of the fatherland in the case of aggression. The Wehrmacht would be the sole bearer of arms, and its structure would remain unaltered. He spoke of no details. There was a comparatively large party assembled. As far as schemes for war were concerned-none was mentioned, and all those present were uncommonly pleased with this speech.
RAEDER: He spoke with particular respect of Reich President Von Hindenburg, the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and we had the impression that he would respect this much-revered personality. This speech was the only account of his basic principles which he gave me as Chief of the Naval Command Staff, as well as to the Chief of the Army Command Staff and others.
DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, when did you report to Hitler for the first time on the Navy; and what was Hitler's general attitude on this occasion-toward the Navy in particular?
RAEDER: The first naval report I gave was a few days later in the presence of General Von Blomberg, who in his capacity of Reich Defense Minister was my superior. I cannot give the exact date, but it was shortly afterwards. On this occasion, Hitler gave me a further account of the principles on which I was to command the Navy. I reported to Hitler first of all on the state of the Navy; on the rather slight degree to which the provisions of the Versailles Treaty had been carried out by the Navy, its inferior strength, the Shipping Replacement Plan, and incidents concerned with naval policy, such as the Treaty of Washington, the Treaty of London, 1930, the position of the Disarmament Conference. He had already been fully informed on all these matters. He said he wanted to make clear to me the principles on which his policy was based and that this policy was to serve as the basis of long-term naval policy. I still remember these words quite clearly, as well as those which followed. He did not under any circumstances wish to have complications with England, Japan, or Italy-above all not with England. And he wanted to prove this by fixing an agreement with England as to the strength to be allotted to the German Fleet in comparison with that of the English Navy. By so doing, he wanted to show that he was prepared to acknowledge, once and for all, England's right to maintain a navy commensurate with the vastness of her interests all over the world. The German Navy required expansion only to the extent demanded by a continental European policy. I took this as the second main principle on which to base my leadership of the Navy. The actual ratio of strength between the two navies was not discussed at the time; it was discussed later on. This decision of Hitler's afforded extreme satisfaction both to myself and to the whole of the Navy, for it meant that we no longer had to compete senselessly with the first sea power; and I saw the possibility of gradually building up our Navy on a solid foundation.
RAEDER: I believe that this decision was hailed by the whole Navy with joy and that they understood its significance. The Russian Pact was later greeted with the same appreciation, since the combination of the Russian Pact and the naval agreement would have been a guarantee of wonderful development. There were people-but not in the Navy-who believed that this amounted to yielding ground, but this limitation was accepted by the majority of Germans with considerable understanding.
DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, what were your personal relations with Hitler? How did you judge him in the course of the years, and what was Hitler's attitude toward you?
RAEDER: I welcomed this vigorous personality who was obviously most intelligent, had tremendous will power, was a master in handling people, and-as I myself observed in the early years-a great and very skillful politician whose national and social aims were already well known and accepted in their entirety by the Armed Forces and the German people...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this might be taken more shortly. We have heard it from so many of the others. DR. SIEMERS Yes. Is the defendant not to describe his relations with Hitler? Do the Tribunal consider them irrelevant?
THE PRESIDENT: He might do it shortly.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. Good. Grossadmiral, please do it shortly.
RAEDER: I would just like to say what I thought of Hitler in order to make clear my reasons for not at any time leaving him, which fact the Prosecution have raised very strongly against me. His first steps in both domestic and foreign policy undoubtedly called forth admiration for his political ability and awakened the hope that, since he had taken these first steps without bloodshed or political complications, he would be able to solve in the same way any problems which might arise later.
THE PRESIDENT: We have heard this as I have pointed out- this quality or power of Hitler's ability from nearly every one of the defendants and it is very cumulative, and if this defendant wishes to say he was greatly impressed by Hitler's qualities, that is quite sufficient. All of the rest is cumulative.
RAEDER: Very well. Then I shall only say that during the early years I had no reason to wonder whether I should remain in my position or not.
DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, we shall automatically come to the later complications at a later stage of the hearing. I come now to the German-British Naval Agreement and would like to ask you briefly how this Naval Agreement of 1935 came about. I am referring to Document Number Raeder-11, Document Book 1, Page 59, which contains the Naval Agreement in the form of a communication from the German Foreign Minister to the British Government. The actual content was fixed by the British, as the first few words show: "Your Excellency, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of to-day's date, in which you were so good as to communicate to me on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom the following": Then come the following statements by the British: "1. During the last few days the representatives of the German Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been engaged in conversations, the primary purpose of which has been to prepare the way for the holding of a general conference on the subject of the limitation of naval armaments. It now gives me great pleasure to notify your Excellency of the formal acceptance by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the proposal of the German Government discussed at those conversations, that the future strength of the German Navy in relation to the aggregate naval strength of the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations should be in the proportion of 35:100. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regard this proposal as a contribution of the greatest importance to the cause of future naval limitation. They further believe that the agreement which they have now reached with the German Government and which they regard as a permanent and definite agreement as from to-day between the two Governments..."
THE PRESIDENT: This is a well-known document, and the Tribunal will take judicial notice of it, of course. It is not necessary to read it all.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. I should nevertheless like to point out that, according to Point 2f of this document, the British Government recognized that, as far as submarines were concerned, Germany should be allowed the same number as Britain. At that time that amounted to about 52,000 tons, or rather more than 100 U-boats. The Government of the German Reich, however, voluntarily undertook to restrict itself to 45 percent of the total submarine tonnage of the British Empire. [Turning to the defendant.] Did you and the Navy regard such considerable restrictions as the basis for Germany's peaceful development, and was it received favorably by the Navy in general?
RAEDER: Yes, as I have already said, it was received with greatest satisfaction.
DR. SIEMERS: Since a judgment formed some years ago carries more weight than a declaration made now in the course of the Trial, I wish to submit Document Number Raeder-12, Document Book 1, Page 64. This document deals with a communication made by Grossadmiral Raeder for the information of the Officers' Corps. It is dated 15 July 1935, a month after the signing of the naval agreement. Raeder says-and I quote the second paragraph: "The agreement resulted from the Fuehrer's decision to fix the ratio of the fleets of Germany and the British Empire at 35:100. This decision, which was based on considerations of European politics, formed the starting point of the London conferences. In spite of initial opposition from England, we held inflexibly to our decision; and our demands were granted in their entirety. The Fuehrer's decision was based on the desire to exclude the possibility of antagonism between Germany and England in the future and so to exclude forever the possibility of naval rivalry between the two countries." A sentence on Page 66 is also important. I wish to ask the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of the rest of it: "By this agreement, the building-up of the German Navy to the extent fixed by the Fuehrer was formally approved by England." This is followed by individual statements as to tonnage. Then I should like to call attention to the final sentence, which is indicative of Raeder's attitude at the time: "This agreement represents a signal success in the political sphere since it is the first step towards a practical understanding and signifies the first relaxation of the inflexible front so far maintained against Germany by our former opponents and implacably demonstrated again at Stresa."
DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, were the lines of peaceful development laid down by you at that time followed in the next years?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I should like to submit Document Raeder-13. This is a document which enables me-in order to save time-to dispense with the testimony here in Court of Vice Admiral Lohmann. This document will be found in Document Book 1, Page 68, and is entitled, "The New Plan for the Development of the German Navy," and is a standard work. It is a speech made by Vice Admiral Lohmann in the summer of 1935 at the Hanseatic University in Hamburg. I ask the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of the essential points of this document; and as this is an authoritative work done at the request of the High Command, I may perhaps just quote the following. Admiral Lohmann sets forth first of all that since we now had the liberty to recruit and arm troops, the Navy was then free of restrictions, but that that was not Hitler's view. I now quote: "The Fuehrer, however, chose another way. He preferred to negotiate on German naval armament direct with Britain which, as our former adversary"-I beg your pardon; I am quoting from Page 70-"has tried for years to show understanding for our difficult position." And on Page 71 Lohmann speaks about misleading reports published in the press, et cetera , and continues literally: "All the more surprising, then, was the ratification of the treaty which expressed the full agreement of both governments and did not, like some armament treaties of former time, leave more embitterment than understanding in its wake. The sense of fairness which British statesmen have retained, despite the frequently dirty ways of higher politics, came through when confronted with the unreserved sincerity of the German declarations, the dignified firmness of the German representatives, and the passionate desire for peace inspiring the speeches and acts of our Fuehrer. Unlike former times, the speeches of the British leaders expressed respect and recognition. We have acknowledged this as a sign of honest willingness to understand.
DR. SIEMERS: The voices from the circles of British war veterans are hardly less valuable than the attitude of the official leaders. In November 1918, for instance, when the German Fleet was taken by British squadrons to be interned in Scapa Flow, the British Commander in Chief, Lord Beatty, the great foe of our Admiral Hipper, sent the famous signal, 'Do not forget that the enemy is a contemptible beast.' This Grand Admiral expressed his dislike for Germany on many occasions, but on 26 June this same Lord Beatty stated in the House of Lords, 'I am of the opinion that we should be grateful to the Germans. They came to us with hands outstretched, announcing that they agreed to the ratio of 35:100.' If they had submitted other proposals, we could not have prevented them. We may be truly grateful for the fact that there is at least one country in the world whose competition in regard to armament we do not need to fear." Then I should like to refer to Page 73, which limits battleships to 35,000 tons. This limitation plays a part in the Prosecution Document C-23. The fact that in this document next to the words "Panama Canal" are placed the words "battleships 35,000 tons" has a certain significance. The limitation to 35,000 tons is not so decisive and important as the Prosecution would like us to believe. This is the origin: The United States of America at that time wanted to limit the tonnage to 35,000 tons on account of the width and depth of the Panama Canal, for the Panama Canal would have had to be enlarged in order to admit ships of greater tonnage. I shall return to this point later since this limit of 35,000 tons was not maintained. Then as evidence of the basis for comparison with German U-boats, I should like to point to Page 76 where the figure mentioned is 52,700 tons. It is a historical fact-which is set down here-that France took no part in this limitation and at that time was the strongest U-boat power with her 96,000 tons, 96 ready and 15 under construction.
DR. SIEMERS: It is also a historical fact that Germany-and this is shown on the same page-had agreed to abolish submarines, having had to destroy 315 after the first World War. Grossadmiral, did this accord with the British Fleet apparent in these documents show itself on another, or on any particular occasion?
RAEDER: I tried to maintain this good understanding and to express these sentiments to the British Navy as, for instance, when I was informed of the death of Admiral Jellicoe through a phone call from an English news agency. He stood against us as the head of the English Fleet in the first World War, and we always considered him a very chivalrous opponent. Through this agency I gave a message to the English Fleet.
THE PRESIDENT: I doubt if this really has any effect on the issues we have to consider.
RAEDER: In any event, I tried to bring about a good understanding with the British Navy for the future and to maintain this good understanding.
DR. SIEMERS: On 17 July 1937 a further German-English Naval Agreement was signed. I am submitting this document as Document Raeder-14, Document Book 1, Page 81. This is a rather lengthy document only part of which has been translated and printed in the document book; and in order to understand the violation with which the Prosecution charge us, I must refer to several of the points contained in this document. The agreement concerns the limitation of naval armaments and particularly the exchange of information on naval construction. In Article 4 we find the limitation of battleships to 35,000 tons, which has already been mentioned; and in Articles ll and 12-which I will not read because of their technical nature but would ask the Tribunal to take note of-both governments are bound to report annually the naval construction program. This must be done during the first 4 months of each calendar year, and details about certain ships-big ships in particular-4 months before they are laid down. For a better understanding of the whole matter, which has been made the basis of a charge against the defendants in connection with the naval agreement, I may refer to Articles 24 to 26. The three articles show...
THE PRESIDENT: Can you summarize these articles?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I did not intend to read them, Your Honor. I just want to quote a point or two from them. These articles enumerate the conditions under which either partner to the agreement could deviate from it. From the start, therefore, it was considered permissible under certain conditions to deviate from the agreement, if, for instance, (Article 24) one of the partners became involved in war, or (Article 25) if another power, such as the United States or France or Japan, were to build or purchase a vessel larger than those provided for in the agreement. In this article express reference is made to Article 4-that is, to battleships of 35,000 tons-in the case of deviation, the only obligation was to notify one's partner. Article 26 states a very general basis for deviation from the agreement-namely, in cases where the security of the nation demands it such deviation is held to be justified. No further details are necessary at this point.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): My Lord, the deviation is subject to notification of the other party under Subarticle 2. It was just relevant in Article 26-any deviation is subject to notification to the other party of the deviation to be embarked on.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, of course. I believe...
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution say that this agreement was broken?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. With reference to the remarks just made by Sir David, I would like to say that I pointed out that such deviation was permitted under these conditions, but that there was an obligation to notify the other partners. Perhaps that did not come through before. [Turning to the defendant.] Was this agreement concluded, Admiral, in 1937, from the same point of view which you have already stated? Are there any other noteworthy facts which led to the agreement?
RAEDER: In 1936, as well as I remember, the treaties so far made by England with other powers expired, and England was therefore eager to renew these treaties in the course of 1936. The fact that we were invited in 1937 to join in a new agreement by all powers meant that Germany would henceforth be completely included in these treaties.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have accused you of violating this German-English Naval Agreement, and this charge is based on Document C-23, Exhibit USA-49, in the British Delegation's Document Book 10, Page 3. This document is dated 18 February 1938. It has been mentioned repeatedly in these proceedings and begins as follows, "The actual displacement of the battleships Scharnhorst , Gneisenau and F/G is in both cases 20 percent greater than the displacement stated to the British." Then we find a list which shows that the displacement of the Scharnhorst was given as 26,000 tons but was actually 31,300 tons, and that the draught stated one meter less than was actually the case. And the "F" class, that is, the Bismarck and Tirpitz , were listed as 35,000 tons but had an actual displacement of 41,700 and a difference of 80 centimeters in draught. Therefore, according to what we have seen, there is an evident infringement of the treaty. Grossadmiral, I am assuming that you do not dispute this violation of the treaty?
RAEDER: No, in no way.
DR. SIEMERS: Certainly, at the time of this document there were only four battleships in question: Scharnhorst , Gneisenau , Bismarck , and Tirpitz ...
THE PRESIDENT: It seems you are again stating these things to the Tribunal, making statements instead of asking questions of the witness.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Mr. President, that I was incorporating my documentary evidence in order to show the connection, so as to make clear what we are dealing with. I was about to put the question: Were the four battleships mentioned actually in commission when this document was drawn up?
RAEDER: No, they had not yet been commissioned.
DR. SIEMERS: None of these four battleships?
RAEDER: No.
DR. SIEMERS: If I am permitted to do so, I may say that the exact dates on which these ships were commissioned-dates which the defendant can hardly repeat from memory-can be seen from Point IV of Lohmann's affidavit, Document Number Raeder-2.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must prove them. You cannot state them without proving them.