dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal, whenever there were conferences, asked through me that he might participate. The Reich Marshal came more frequently than usual to the Fuehrer's headquarters, and he also said to me, "I will try everything to regain the right contact with the Fuehrer." He said that personally to me.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he was particularly careful after the spring of 1944 not to do anything that would offend the Fuehrer?
BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say anything more about the year 1945, because then I was no longer active. I had no further contact.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this bombing of German cities had become very troublesome from the point of view of the German people's criticism of the government, had it not, in 1944?
BODENSCHATZ: The German people suffered terribly under these bombing attacks, and I can only say one thing -- that Adolf Hitler suffered most from them. When at night the bombing of a German city was reported, he was really deeply moved, and likewise the Reich Marshal, because the horror of such a bombing was indescribable. I have experienced a few such bombings in Berlin myself, and whoever has lived through that, will never forget it as long as he lives.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And this was all becoming very embarrassing to Hitler and to the Reich Marshal, was it not, to explain to the German people why this was going on?
BODENSCHATZ: That did not have to be explained, because the German people felt it. No explanation was given. It was only said that all possible measures would be taken to master this peril.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew at that time, and the Reich Marshal knew, that no measures could be taken that would prevent it?
BODENSCHATZ: No, no, no. I emphasized before that it was a radio-technical war, and there were moments when, in the defense, we could counter the measures of the enemy while constantly discovering a new means to hit him.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you made the announcement to the German people that all means would be taken, you had then no means at your disposal, that you knew of, to use, did you, to prevent the bombing of the German cities?
BODENSCHATZ: Oh yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What were they, and why were they not used?
BODENSCHATZ: There were, for example, the following means: The most important areas were protected by antiaircraft guns. Then there were radio-technical means, jamming transmitters, which would have made it possible, and which partly did make it possible, to jam the radio sets in the enemy aircraft.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The movement to satisfy the German people under the bombing attacks was a matter of great concern to the Reich Marshal, was it not?
BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal was very anxious that the population should be informed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And see that the population was satisfied, was he not?
BODENSCHATZ: It is easy to say "satisfied." He could only assure the German people that he would do everything in his power to master these attacks.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, have you seen the Reich Marshal and Hitler when the reports came in of the bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdamand of Coventry?
BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember whether I was present when the reports came.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never saw any such reactions on their part on those bombings, I take it?
BODENSCHATZ: I only know that Warsaw was a fortress which was held by the Polish Army in very great strength, provided with excellent pieces of artillery, that the forts were manned, and that two or three times Adolf Hitler announced that civilians should be evacuated from the city. That was rejected. Only the foreign embassies were evacuated, while an officer with a flag of truce entered. The Polish Army was in the city defending it stubbornly in a very dense circle of forts. The outer forts were very strongly manned, and from the inner town heavy artillery was firing towards the outskirts. The fortress of Warsaw was therefore attacked, and also by the Luftwaffe, but only after Hitler's ultimatum had been rejected.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was Coventry a fortified city?
BODENSCHATZ: Coventry was no fortress. Coventry, however, was a city which housed the key industry of the enemy air force, in which the aircraft engines were built, a city in which, as far as I know, many factories were situated and many parts of these aircraft engines were manufactured. In any case, the Luftwaffe had at that time received orders to bomb only the industrial targets. If the city also suffered, it is understandable, considering the means of navigation at that time.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were interrogated in November of 1945, were you not, by Colonel Williams?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I was interrogated.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Colonel Williams asked you about certain fictitious incidents along the German-Polish border late in August of 1939, did he not?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, he asked me about that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And would you care to tell the Tribunal what you know about the fictitious incidents along the Polish border?
BODENSCHATZ: I do not know anything positive. I was asked by Colonel Williams whether I knew in advance about the incident of the Gleiwitz broadcasting section. I told him I knew nothing about it. It was only that the incidents on the Polish border were very similar to those which happened on the Czech border. It may have been presumed -- that was only my opinion -- that they were perhaps deliberate. But I had no positive proof that anything had been staged on our part.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you tell him on the 6th of November 1945, as follows: "I heard about it, but I personally at that time had the feeling that all these provocations that had taken place had originated from our side, from the German side. As I said, I had no real proofs of that, but I always had that feeling." Did you not say that?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I said that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that you had talked with people about this, from whom you got that feeling. Is that right?
BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember that very well now. I only know that the reports in the press gave me that suspicion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were asked, were you not, this question and gave this answer: "Question: But you are of the opinion that what appeared in the press and these incidents that were reported were not true, but done merely to cause an incident as an excuse for an invasion?" And did you not make this answer: "I had that feeling. I cannot prove it, but I definitely know I had a feeling that the whole thing was being engineered by us." Did you not make that answer to that question?
BODENSCHATZ: The minutes will show it. If it is in the minutes, I said it. At the moment I cannot remember the exact words.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not deny the fact, however?
BODENSCHATZ: I had that feeling, but it was a purely subjective opinion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it was your opinion?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now then, I ask you whether you were not interrogated about the Fuehrer's desire to make war on Poland, and whether you did not give this answer: "Gentlemen, this question is very hard to answer, but I can state under my oath that the Fuehrer actually wanted the war against Poland. I can prove that he actually wanted a war of aggression against Poland by the circle surrounding the Fuehrer and the remarks that were made. I was present during the night when Hitler gave Henderson his conditions that he wanted Danzig, and I concluded from all the conferences that the Fuehrer had with the Ambassador -- I had the impression that the Fuehrer did not really want the Poles to accept those conditions." And I ask you if you made those answers to Colonel Williams?
BODENSCHATZ: I can make the following answer to that: I was not present at the conference. If I said that, I did not express myself correctly. I was not at the conference that the Fuehrer had with Henderson, but I was standing in the anterooms with the other adjutants, and outside in the anteroom one could hear the various groups, some saying one thing, some another. From these conversations I gather that the conditions which Henderson received for the Poles in the evening were such, and that the time limit for answering these questions -- which was noon of the next day -- was so short, that one could conclude there was a certain intention behind it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, that is the impression that you received from being in the anteroom and talking with the people who were about Hitler that night?
BODENSCHATZ: There were adjutants, the Reich Press Chief, and the gentlemen who were waiting in the anteroom without taking part in the conference.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask you, in order to make this very clear, one more question about your interrogation on that subject. Were you not asked this question: "Then we can summarize your testimony this morning by saying that you knew in 1938, several months before Germany attacked Poland, that Hitler fully intended to attack Poland and wage an aggressive war against her; is that right?" And did you not make this answer: "I can only say this with certainty that from the night when he told Henderson that he wanted Danzig and the Corridor, from that moment, I was sure Hitler intended to wage an aggressive war." Were you asked that question, and did you make that answer?
BODENSCHATZ: If it is in the minutes, I said it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, if it were not in the minutes, it would still be your testimony now, would it not? It is a fact, is it not?
BODENSCHATZ: My definition is precisely this: From the handing over of Adolf Hitler's demands to Henderson and from the short time that Henderson was granted, I conclude that there was a certain intention. That is how I should like to define it precisely now.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that you be shown Document Number L-79, United States exhibit in evidence, Number USA-27. You have seen that before, witness?
BODENSCHATZ: A copy of this document was shown to me by Colonel Williams, and I told him that I myself could not remember having been present. But if my name is on the minutes, then I was there.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But your name is on the document, is it not?
BODENSCHATZ: Then I was there. I cannot remember the subject of this conference. I told Colonel Williams that that must have been discussed because Colonel Schmundt, whose handwriting I know -- I was shown a copy -- I told him that Colonel Schmundt was a man who was very conscientious in making his notes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all in his handwriting?
BODENSCHATZ: That is it as I see it here.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is signed by Colonel Schmundt?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, it is signed by Colonel Schmundt -- Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt. The corrections are not in his handwriting.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the body of the document is his handwriting?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, that is his own handwriting. I know it; yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you were asked about that by Colonel Williams, you took time to read it, and then you said, did you not: "I think that the thoughts are right as they are expressed here; these are the thoughts that the Fuehrer usually voiced to us in a small circle." You made that statement?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I did say that, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you said: "I cannot remember whether these things were expressed on that day. However, it is possible that the thoughts which are put down here are the thoughts of Adolf Hitler." You said that to Colonel Williams, did you not?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I said that to Colonel Williams.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all I care to ask about that, Sir. I now ask to have shown to you the original exhibit, Document Number 798-PS, Exhibit USA-29 in evidence.
BODENSCHATZ: As far as I know, a copy of this speech by the Fuehrer was also shown to me by Colonel Williams.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right. You said, did you not, that you did not recall whether you were present but that the thoughts that were expressed...
BODENSCHATZ: The thoughts expressed there are correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They are correct. That is all about that.
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, but I must say one more thing. I tried to speak to Colonel Williams again and could not reach him. Probably I attended this meeting.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will take that statement now and excuse you from looking for Colonel Williams. I ask to have shown to you Document 3474-PS, United States exhibit in evidence, Number USA-580. Is that your handwriting?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, that is my handwriting.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And signed by you?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is a note of a conference of the 2d day of December 1936, is it not?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You prepared this memorandum for your files; is that right?
BODENSCHATZ: I do not know to whom I gave this.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it says the notes for the files on that discussion; is that correct?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, that is a note for the files.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Goering was present at that conference; is that correct?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes. He must have conducted it. It states here, "Present: Generaloberst Goering."
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In fact, the note says he conducted it does it not?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there were also present Milch, Kesselring, and all of the others who are named in the list at the head of the note.
BODENSCHATZ: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you then recorded that Goering told -- oh, by the way, all of those men were men connected with the Armed Forces of Germany, were they not?
BODENSCHATZ: Those were all men from the Air Force, the leading men at the time. General Milch was concerned with armament; Lieutenant General Kesselring was, I believe, Chief of Staff; they were all officers who were in leading positions.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All concerned with the Air Force you say. And this meeting was held on the 2d of December 1936. Are we correct about that?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then Goering opened the conference by saying: "The press all over the world is excited about the landing of 5,000 German volunteers in Spain. Great Britain protests officially and takes up the matter with France." Refreshing your recollection, that is what occurred, is it not?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then Goering said, "The general situation is very serious," and that he took full responsibility, did he not?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes. The general situation was very serious. England was rearming intensively, and a state of readiness was desired.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, he next said, did he not, "Silence until 1941 is desirable. However, we cannot know whether there will be implications before. We are already in a state of war. It is only that no shot is being fired so far." Did he say that?
BODENSCHATZ: That is recorded in these minutes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he also said, did he not, that "beginning 1 January 1937, all factories for aircraft production shall run as if mobilization had been ordered."
BODENSCHATZ: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it is there in the text, is it not?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes, it is contained here in the minutes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you have testified that Goering had no prior knowledge of the action taken against the Jews on the night of November 9th and 10th of 1938.
BODENSCHATZ: I gathered that from the fact that on the next day he came to me and was very dismayed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was informed about them the next day?
BODENSCHATZ: The next day that was in the press, in the newspapers.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You said that he complained about the people who instigated them?
BODENSCHATZ: That I was told by Captain Wiedemann, who was here with me in captivity. He told me that a few days later Hermann Goering came to the Fuehrer with proof and complained about what had occurred.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whom did he complain about?
BODENSCHATZ: He did not tell me that. Wiedemann told me that Goering complained about Heydrich and Goebbels.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not get that answer.
BODENSCHATZ: Wiedemann told me -- this I did not learn myself from Hermann Goering, but Wiedemann told me he had complained about the instigators, and that the instigators were Heydrich and Goebbels.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Heydrich and Goebbels were both officials in Hitler's regime, were they not?
BODENSCHATZ: Dr. Goebbels was Reich Minister of Propaganda, and Heydrich was Chief of the Gestapo.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So, immediately following these pogroms Goering knew and complained to Hitler that they had been incited by officials of the Nazi regime?
BODENSCHATZ: I do not know the details as to what he said there. Captain Wiedemann knows about that and can testify to it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Goering was then at the height of his influence, both with the Fuehrer and with the country, was he not?
BODENSCHATZ: He had at that time the greatest influence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I understand you to say that he immediately called a meeting of Gauleiter?
BODENSCHATZ: The meeting of Gauleiter was a few weeks later. I heard about it from the former Gauleiter of Styria, Dr. Uiberreither, who is imprisoned here with me. This Gauleiter Uiberreither took part in that meeting.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How long did he wait before he called the meeting?
BODENSCHATZ: Dr. Uiberreither told me that it was a few weeks afterwards.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, did you know about his holding a meeting on the 12th of November 1938 at his offices in the Reich Ministry for Aviation? BODENSCHATZ. I cannot remember that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you remember that he had present at that meeting Heydrich, Goebbels, and many others? Is that the meeting to which you refer?
BODENSCHATZ: In this case it might be necessary to ask Dr. Uiberreither who was at that meeting. He told me that Dr. Goebbels was present as well as the Gauleiter.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was the custom of Goering to keep minutes of the meetings that he conducted?
BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Goering always had stenographers present, and these stenographers took minutes of such meetings.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you want us to understand that Goering was shocked and offended by what had happened to the Jews on the nights of the 9th and the 10th of November 1938?
BODENSCHATZ: He did not agree with it because, as I mentioned previously, he said it would be a great wrong; it would be unreasonable economically, and it would harm our prestige abroad. I was told by Dr. Uiberreither that Goering had spoken in these terms to the Gauleiter.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it known to you that on November the 12th, 2 days after those pogroms, Goering promulgated the order fining all of the Jews a billion Reichsmark, confiscated their insurance, and passed a new decree excluding them from economic life? Did you know about that?
BODENSCHATZ: I have heard of it, but I personally had nothing to do with the idea and with this decree, as I was only the military adjutant.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: These decrees were promulgated 2 days after this pogrom that you say he complained about, is that right?
BODENSCHATZ: I do not know the connection.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, 1 have only one matter which I want to make clear. You have referred to a meeting which took place in Schleswig-Holstein in July or August of 1939, at which Goering met a number of Englishmen, and you described those Englishmen, the first time you mentioned them, as members of the government, and the second time you mentioned them -- I think you mentioned them as economic specialists?
BODENSCHATZ: So far as I know now, they were English leading men in economics, not members of the government.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am obliged to you. Would it be correct to say that they were leading industrial and business gentlemen with no connection with the government whatsoever?
BODENSCHATZ: I do not know to what degree these gentlemen were influential. At any rate, Hermann Goering asked at the end that the gentlemen should exert their influence on the authorities in England in the interests of peace.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you know that that conference between Goering and those gentlemen took place at the instigation of Dahlerus? BODENSCHATZ Dahlerus is said to have brought about this meeting, but I first learned of that in a conversation with Defense Counsel Dr. Stahmer, who discussed the matter with me. Doctor Stahmer said he knew that Mr. Dahlerus had asked these gentlemen to come to Germany. It is only on the basis of this information that I assume Dahlerus asked these gentlemen to come.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And do you know that it was the object of Mr. Dahlerus that leading German and English personalities should meet, in order that they should understand one another's points of view?
BODENSCHATZ: Mr. Dahlerus later...he was again in Berlin after that meeting. On that occasion I met him in Berlin, and in conversations with him there I gained the impression that he was greatly interested in peace being maintained between Germany and England, and that he, assisted by Reich Marshal Goering, tried to establish this connection with influential British circles.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: One last question to you. Do you know that, in arranging that meeting and throughout the course of the negotiations thereafter, Dahlerus stressed the British point of view to Goering and in particular tried to impress Goering with the fact that the English were losing their patience with the policy of aggression being pursued by the German Government?
BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember having discussed with Dahlerus this line of thought which you mention now.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other questions to ask?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No.
DR. STAHMER: I have only one more question. [Turning to the witness.] In the minutes of 2 December 1936, which were shown to you before and which you have before you, there is one paragraph which has not been read entirely. In my opinion it is very important for the interpretation and for the purpose and meaning of that meeting. It says there: "The general situation is very serious. Russia wants war. England is rearming strongly. Therefore, the order is: 'From today on, highest degree of readiness, no consideration for financial difficulties.. Generaloberst assumes full responsibility.' " Was this order, "highest degree of readiness from today on," issued merely because Russia, as it says here, wants war and England is rearming strongly? Was that the motive?
BODENSCHATZ: What do you mean?
DR. STAHMER: Was the gravity of the general situation the motive for the order, "highest degree of readiness from today on"?
BODENSCHATZ: At any rate, there was no intention of attack involved, but a measure for defense.
DR. STAHMER: If it says here "Generaloberst assumes full responsibility," could that be understood to refer to the words "no consideration for financial difficulties" which would be a permissible literal interpretation?
BODENSCHATZ: That refers to financial difficulties, because the Reich Marshal had frequent controversies on that point with the Reich Finance Minister because the Luftwaffe had slightly exceeded its budget.
DR. STAHMER: Thank you. I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire. [The witness left the stand.]