dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. DIX: DIX: [Turning to the witness.] If I recall correctly, you were just about to tell us that now the policy of the conspirators' group changed from a revolt to an assassination. Is that correct? GISEVIUS: Yes. DR. DIX: Do you wish to state anything further? GISEVIUS You had asked me about the first step in this direction after Generaloberst Beck had given up all hope of being able to win over another general to a revolt. It was said at that time that there was now nothing left for us but to free Germany, Europe, and the world from the tyrant by a bomb attack. Immediately after 234 25 April 46 this decision, preparations were started. Oster spoke to Lahousen and Lahousen furnished the bombs from his arsenal. The bombs were taken to the headquarters of Kluge at Smolensk, and with every possible means we tried to bring about the assassination, which was unsuccessful only because at a time when Hitler was visiting the front, the bomb which had been put in his airplane did not explode. This was in the spring of 1943. DR. DIX: Now, an event took place in the Abwehr OKW, which as a result of further developments, strongly affected Schacht's further attitude and also your remaining in Germany. Will you please describe that? GISEVIUS: Gradually even Himmler could not fail to see what was happening in the OKW, and at the urgent request of SS General Schellenberg a thorough investigation of the Canaris group was now started. A special commissioner was appointed and on the first day of this investigation Oster was relieved of his post and a number of his collaborators were arrested. A short time afterwards Canaris was also dismissed from his post. I myself could no longer remain in Germany and thus this group, which until now had in a certain sense been the directorate of all the conspiracies, was eliminated. DR. DIX: During that time, that is January 1943, Schacht was also relieved of his position as Reich Minister without Portfolio. Did you meet Schacht after that time? GISEVIUS: Yes. By chance I was in Berlin on the day this letter of dismissal arrived.
DR. DIX: It was an unusually sharp letter and I remember that that night I was asked to the country house of Schacht, and as the letter had simply stated that Schacht was to be dismissed, we wondered whether he was also going to be arrested. DR. DIX: I would like to remind the Tribunal that I read this letter into the record when Lammers was examined and showed it to him. This letter-I mean Schacht's letter of dismissal signed by Lammers-has already been read into the record and is probably contained in my document book. [Turning to the witness.] You were in Switzerland at that time, but on 20 July you were in Berlin. How did that happen? THE PRESIDENT: You mean the 20th of July 1944? DR. DIX: Yes, the well-known day of the 20th of July. We are rapidly approaching the end now. GISEVIUS: A few months after the elimination of the Canaris Oster circle we formed a new group around General Olbricht. At that time Colonel Count Von Stauffenberg also joined us. He replaced Oster in all activities, and when after several months, and after many unsuccessful attempts and discussions, the time finally 235 25 April 46 arrived in July 1944, I returned secretly to Berlin in order to participate in the events. DR. DIX: But you had no direct connection with Schacht at this attempted assassination? GISEVIUS: No; I, personally, was in Berlin secretly and saw only Goerdeler, Beck, and Stauffenberg; and it was agreed expressly at this time that no other civilian except Goerdeler, Leuschner, and myself were to be informed of the matter. We hoped thus to protect lives by not burdening anyone unnecessarily with this knowledge. DR. DIX: Now I come to my last question. You know that Schacht had after all held high government positions under the Hitler regime. You, Doctor, as is shown by your testimony today were an arch enemy of the Hitler regime. Despite that you had, as can also be seen from your testimony today, special confidence in Schacht. How do you explain this fact which at first sight seems to be contradictory in itself?
DR. DIX: GISEVIUS: My answer can, of course, only express a personal opinion and I will formulate it as briefly as possible. However, I would like to emphasize that the problem of Schacht was confusing not only to me but to my friends as well; Schacht was always a problem and a puzzle to us. Perhaps it was due to the contradictory nature of this man that he kept his position in the Hitler government for so long. He undoubtedly entered the Hitler regime for patriotic reasons, and I would like to testify here that the moment his disappointment became obvious he decided for the same patriotic reasons to join the opposition. Despite Schacht's many contradictions and the puzzles he gave us to solve, my friends and I were strongly attracted to Schacht because of his exceptional personal courage and the fact that he was undoubtedly a man of strong moral character, and he did not think only of Germany but also of the ideals of humanity. That is why we went with him, why we considered him one of us; and, if you ask me personally, I can say that the doubts which I often had about him were completely dispelled during the dramatic events of 1938 and 1939. At that time he really fought, and I will never forget that. It is a pleasure for me to be able to testify to this here. DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now through with the questioning of this witness. THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants counsel want to ask questions of the witness? HERR GEORG BOEHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, yesterday you said that you were a member of the Stahlhelm. When and for how long were you a member? 236 25 April 46 GISEVIUS: I entered the Stahlhelm in 1929, I believe, and left that organization in 1933. HERR BOEHM: You know the mentality of the members of the Stahlhelm. You know that, almost without exception, they were people who had served in the first World War, and I would like to ask you now whether the internal and foreign political goals of the Stahlhelm were to be reached by its members in a legal or in a revolutionary mariner?
DR. DIX: GISEVIUS: To my knowledge the Stahlhelm always favored the legal way. HERR BOEHM: Yes. Was the fight of the Stahlhelm against the Treaty of Versailles which every organization with national tendencies took up, to be carried on by legal or revolutionary means, or means of force? GISEVIUS: It is very hard for me to answer for the entire Stahlhelm, but I can only say that I, and the members of the Stahlhelm organization with whom I was acquainted, knew that the Stahlhelm wanted to take the legal way. HERR BOEHM: Is it correct to say that in the year 1932 and 1933 hundreds of thousands, regardless of party and race, entered the Stahlhelm organization? GISEVIUS: That is correct. The more critical matters became in Germany, the more people went to the right. I myself having experienced this growth of the Stahlhelm as an official speaker at public meetings, from 1929 to 1933, I would describe it in this way: That those who did not want to join the NSDAP and the SA, deliberately entered the Stahlhelm so that within the German rightist movement there would be a counterbalance against the rising "brown" tide. That was the underlying reason of our recruitment for the Stahlhelm at that time. HERR BOEHM: You know, of course, that in the year 1933 the Stahlhelm organization as a whole was taken into the SA. Was it possible at that time for the individual member of the Stahlhelm to say "no," or to protest against being taken over into the SA? GISEVIUS: That was possible, of course, as everything was possible also in the Third Reich. HERR BOEHM: What would have been the possible consequences of such a step? GISEVIUS: The possible consequences would have been a violent discussion with the regional Party leaders or SA leaders. At that time I was no longer a member of the Stahlhelm and I can merely say that it undoubtedly must have been very difficult for many people, particularly those living in the country, to refuse being 237 25 April 46 transferred to the SA.
DR. DIX: After they had been betrayed by their leader, Minister Seldte, or as it was said at that time "sold" to the SA, refusal to transfer to the SA was naturally a sign of open distrust toward National Socialism. HERR BOEHM: I gather from my correspondence with the former members of the Stahlhelm, that these people who, as former members of the Stahlhelm, were taken into the SA, remained a foreign body in it and were in constant opposition to the NSDAP and the SA. Is that correct? GISEVIUS: As I myself no longer belonged to that organization, can only say that I assume that those members of the Stahlhelm felt very uneasy in their new surroundings. HERR BOEHM: Do you know whether the members of the Stahlhelm, before 1934 and from 1934, participated in Crimes against Peace, against the Jews, against the Church, and so forth? GISEVIUS: No, I know nothing about that. HERR BOEHM: Now I would also like to question you about the SA as far as you are able to give information. Yesterday at least you expressed yourself freely with regard to the SA leaders. I would like to ask you, in replying to a question I shall now ask, to confine yourself to a circle of SA members which lies between the simple SA man and the Standartenfuehrer or the Brigadefuehrer. Could you tell from the attitude and activity of the ordinary SA man and that of the Standartenfuehrer or Brigadefuehrer-and I do not go beyond that limit because I well remember the statements you made yesterday concerning the Gruppenfuehrer or Obergruppenfuehrer-that these people intended to commit Crimes against Peace? GISEVIUS: It is, of course, very difficult to answer such a general question. If you ask me about the majority of these SA men, I can only say no. HERR BOEHM: Witness, did you notice that SA men were arrested and that SA men were also put into concentration camps? GISEVIUS: I saw that many times.
DR. DIX: In 1933, 1934, and 1935, that was in the years when it was my official duty to deal with these matters, many SA men were arrested by the Gestapo, beaten to death, or at least tortured, and put into concentration camps. HERR BOEHM: Could a man, who was in the SA, or anyone outside for that matter, judge the SA as a whole from the activity of its members, or from individual cases, and gather that the SA intended to commit Crimes against Peace? GISEVIUS: No. When I consider what efforts even we in the High Command of the Wehrmacht had to make to try and discover 238 25 April 46 whether or not Hitler was planning a war, I naturally cannot attribute to a simple SA man knowledge of something which we ourselves did not know for certain. HERR BOEHM: The Prosecution asserted that the SA incited the youth and the German people to war. Did you observe anything of that nature? You were a member of the Gestapo and such activities could not have escaped your notice. GISEVIUS: That is another extremely general question, and I do not know to what extent certain songs, and other things, can be considered a preparation for war. At any rate I cannot imagine that the mass of the SA was of a different frame of mind than the mass of the German people in the years up to 1938, and the general trend of opinion beyond a doubt was that the mere thought of war was absolute madness. HERR BOEHM: Was there anything that made you think that the SA intended to commit Crimes against Peace, or that they had committed such crimes? GISEVIUS: As far as the ordinary SA man is concerned, I must say "no" again, and I say the same for the mass of the SA. I could not say to what extent the higher leaders were involved in plotting all the horrible things we have heard about here, but the majority undoubtedly did not know of such things and were not trained for them. HERR BOEHM: Witness, it cannot be denied that mistakes were made by a number of SA men, and criminal acts were committed for which these people certainly should be punished.
DR. DIX: You know the SA and know what took place during the revolutionary period and afterwards. Are you in a position to estimate or to give a proportional figure as to what percentage of the numerous members of the SA conducted themselves in a punishable manner? I call your attention to the fact that up to, perhaps 1932 or 1933, the SA... THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, Dr. Boehm. The Tribunal doesn't think that is a proper question to put to a witness, what percentage of a group of this sort, of hundreds of thousands of men, take a certain view. HERR BOEHM: However the explanation of this question would be very important for my case, Mr. President. Here is a witness who was outside the SA, who as a member of the Gestapo was perhaps one of the few people who could look into the activities of the SA, and actually did look into them, and he will certainly be believed by the Tribunal. He knew fairly well what criminal procedures were carried out and also-and that is what I want to say-the number of members of the SA, and he is one of the few 239 25 April 46 who are in a position to testify on this matter. I believe that if the witness is in a position to testify hereto, the testimony given by him will be of great importance to the Tribunal also. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that not only this witness, but other witnesses, are not in a position to give such evidence, and the question is denied. HERR BOEHM: Witness, do you know of cases in which SA members worked in opposition to the SA? GISEVIUS: I answered that question when I said that quite a number of SA members were arrested by the Gestapo. HERR BOEHM: Yes. Do you know what criminal proceedings were taken against the members of the SA, and possibly how many? GISEVIUS: Far too few, I am sorry to say, if you put it that way. HERR BOEHM: Yes. GISEVIUS: Unfortunately there were many who committed misdeeds in the SA and who went scot-free. I am sorry that I must answer in this way. HERR BOEHM: Certainly. And in what relation do they stand to the entire SA? GISEVIUS: Now we have come again to the question...
DR. DIX: THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question over again. HERR BOEHM: Do you know under what circumstances one could resign from the SA? GISEVIUS: In the same manner as one could resign from all organizations of the Party. That was, of course, a brave decision to make. HERR BOEHM: Thank you. I have no further question. DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in replying to a question of my colleague Dr. Dix, you told the Tribunal that after the defeat at Stalingrad a military revolt was to be organized. You testified on this point that discussions had already taken place, that preparations had been made, and that the execution of the military revolt was prevented because the field marshals in the East had deserted the group of conspirators. I ask you now to give us more details on this question so that I can understand why you came to the conclusion that the field marshals had deserted the conspiracy group. GISEVIUS: From the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck tried to contact one field marshal after another. He wrote letters and he sent messengers to them. I particularly remember the correspondence with General Field Marshal Von Manstein, and I saw 240 25 April 46 with my own eyes General Von Manstein's answer of the year 1942. To Beck's strictly military explanations that the war had been lost and why, Manstein could reply only: A war is not lost until one considers it as lost. Beck said that with an answer like that from a field marshal strategic questions could certainly not be raised. Several months later another attempt was made to win General Field Marshal Von Manstein. General Von Tresckow, also a victim of the 20th of July, went to the headquarters of Manstein. Oberstleutnant Count Von der Schulenburg also went to the headquarters of Manstein, but we did not succeed in winning Herr Von Manstein to our side. At the time of Stalingrad we contacted Field Marshal Von Kluge, and he, in his turn, contacted Manstein.
DR. DIX: This time discussions reached a point when Kluge definitely assured us that he would win over Field Marshal Von Manstein at a discussion definitely fixed to take place in the Fuehrer's headquarters. Because of the importance of that day, a special telephone line was laid by the General of the Signal Corps, Fellgiebel, between the headquarters and General Olbricht at the OKW in Berlin. I myself was present when this telephone conversation took place. Even today I can still see that paper which said, in plain language, that Manstein, contrary to his previous assurances, had avowed himself to be persuaded by Hitler to remain in office. And even Kluge expressed himself as satisfied at the time with very small military strategic concessions. This was a bitter disappointment to us, and, therefore, I would like to repeat again what Beck said at that time: "We were deserted." DR. LATERNSER: What further preparations had been made in this special connection? GISEVIUS: We had made definite agreements with Field Marshal Von Witzleben. Witzleben was the Commander-in-Chief in the West, and therefore he was very important for starting or protecting a revolt in the West. We had made further definite agreements with the Military Governor of Belgium, Generaloberst Von Falkenhausen. In addition, as on 20 July 1944, we had assembled a certain contingent of armored troops in the vicinity of Berlin. Furthermore, those commanders of the troops who were to participate in the action had been assembled in the OKW. DR. LATERNSER: All this happened after Stalingrad? GISEVIUS: At the time of the Stalingrad revolt. DR. LATERNSER: Please continue. GISEVIUS: We had made all other political preparations which were necessary. It is difficult for me to tell here the entire story of the revolts against the Third Reich. 241 25 April 46 DR. LATERNSER: Yes. What were the reasons why this intended military revolt was not carried through? GISEVIUS: What was that? DR. LATERNSER: Witness, what were the reasons why this revolt, which was intended by the group of conspirators, was not carried through?
DR. DIX: GISEVIUS: Contrary to all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus capitulated. This, as is known, was the first wholesale capitulation of generals; whereas we had expected that Paulus with his generals would issue, before his capitulation, a proclamation to the German people and to the East Front, in which the strategy of Hitler and the sacrifice of the Stalingrad army would be branded in suitable words. When this cue had been given, Kluge was to declare that in future he would take no further military orders from Hitler. We hoped with this plan to circumvent the problem of the military oath which kept troubling us more and more; the field marshals one after the other were to refuse military obedience to Hitler, whereupon Beck was to take over the supreme military command in Berlin. DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you just mentioned the military oath. Do you know whether Blomberg and Generaloberst Beck opposed, or tried to oppose, the pledge the Armed Forces took to Hitler? GISEVIUS: I know only that Beck up to the last day of his life considered the day he gave his pledge to Hitler as the blackest day of his existence, and he gave me an exact description of how completely taken unawares he had felt at the rendering of the oath. He told me that he had been summoned to a military roll call; and that suddenly it was announced that an oath of allegiance was to be given to the new head of State; that unexpectedly a new form of oath was to be used. Beck could never rid himself of the awful thought that at that time he perhaps should not have given his oath. He told me that while he was on his way home, he said to a comrade, "This is the blackest day of my life." DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in your testimony, you also mentioned that between the Polish campaign and the Western campaign, or with the beginning of the Western campaign, a further military Putsch was to be attempted, and that this Putsch failed because Halder and Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch shirked it. You used the term "shirked" previously in your testimony.
DR. DIX: Now I ask you to tell me on the basis of what facts did you arrive at this opinion that both these generals shirked... MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not raise an objection that this is harmful to us if we have plenty of time, but this evidence as to these Putsche, and threatened Putsche, and rumored Putsche, was 242 25 April 46 all admissible here in our view only as bearing on the attitude of the Defendant Schacht. We are not trying these generals for being in a Putsch or not being in a Putsch. For all purposes it is just as well as they should not be in a Putsch. I do not know what purposes this can have in doing it over again. I call the Tribunal's attention for the limited purpose for which this historical matter was admitted, and suggest that it is serving no purpose in this connection to review it. THE PRESIDENT: What is the answer to that, Dr. Laternser? DR. LATERNSER: Since the witness has talked about this matter and testified that Halder as well as Brauchitsch shirked, and I cannot establish whether the opinion expressed by this witness with "shirked" is correct on the basis of the facts, I think I am obliged to clarify this point. In a general sense I would like to add further that the Prosecution is also justified in going into this point. I refer to the contention of the French Prosecutor in which he stated that in the light of all these circumstances it was beyond comprehension why Halder, as well as the entire German nation, did not rise as one man against the regime. Therefore, if I start from the viewpoint of the Prosecution, then my question on this point, as I have just put it, is undoubtedly of importance, and I, therefore, ask that this question be permitted. THE PRESIDENT: The charge against the High Command is that they were a criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter; that is to say that they planned an aggressive war, or that they committed War Crimes or Crimes against Humanity in connection with an aggressive war.
DR. DIX: Well, whether or not they took part, or were planning to take part in a Putsch to stop the war does not seem very material to any of those questions. DR. LATERNSER: I agree with you entirely on this point, Mr. President, that it cannot actually be considered of special importance; but on the other hand. . . THE PRESIDENT: I did not say that it was not of special importance. I say that it was not material to the relevancy. The Tribunal does not think that any of these questions are relevant. DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw my question. I have one final question. [Turning to the witness.] Witness, can you tell me the names of those generals who participated on the 20th of July? THE PRESIDENT: Well, what has that got to do with any charge against the High Command? DR. LATERNSER: The General Staff is accused of having participated in a conspiracy. The question... 243 25 April 46 THE PRESIDENT: We are not here to consider the honor of the High Command. We are here to consider whether or not they are a criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter, and that is the only question with which we are going to deal as far as you are concerned. DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the General Staff and the OKW are accused of having participated in a conspiracy. If I prove, as I am trying to do with this question, that on the contrary, instead of participating in a conspiracy, part of the General Staff took part in an action against the regime, then the answer to this question on this point indicates that precisely the opposite was the case; and, for that reason, I ask that the question be permitted. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think what the General Staff did in July 1944, when the circumstances were entirely different to what they were in September 1939, has any relevancy to the question whether they took part, either before or in September 1939. DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I put myself in the place of the Prosecution, I must assume that the Prosecution assumes that the conspiracy continued.