dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR.KUBUSCHOK: I believe that I have made it sufficiently clear by these statements that Papen's collaboration in the formation of the Cabinet of 30 January does not constitute an attempt to place National Socialism in a position of exclusive power. The opposite has been proven by facts. With regard to the Defense, I have gone far beyond what would be necessary to obtain a verdict of not guilty. If, even at this stage, somebody had co-operated in really giving the National Socialist Party an exclusive influence, there still would not be proof in this of a preparatory action for the punishable crimes in the sense of the Indictment. The program laid down by the National Socialist Party and the statements of the Party leaders of that time-which in view of their propaganda value must be construed much more narrowly from an objective angle-can be misinterpreted as much as one likes, and one may read into them in retrospect any number of facts which became recognizable later, but one cannot see in all this the road to the crimes set out in the Charter. In Papen's activities as Vice Chancellor during the period from 30 January 1933 to 30 June 1934, the Prosecution think they can see a continuation of his efforts toward a conspiracy for the purpose of consolidating the powerful position to which he had helped to bring National Socialism. The Prosecution have charged him in this connection with collaboration in the various laws passed during this period by the Government, which, according to their opinion, merely served the afore-mentioned aims. I will demonstrate, however, how the work of the defendant developed in detail-that also in this respect he did not deviate from his original policy. The Prosecution deal with a number of laws passed by the Cabinet at the beginning of its activity which must be considered as a compromise between the demands of the National Socialists and the conservative ideas of the other members of the Cabinet. Problems are here touched upon which National Socialism made the subject of discussion and propaganda for years.
DR.KUBUSCHOK: The conservative members of the Cabinet were then facing the following situation: The strongest party and the Reich Chancellor could not entirely ignore these questions; they had to be solved in some form. The principle of every coalition cabinet entails a compromise for both parties. In compromising, the other party need not change its opinions. If, for example, in a coalition cabinet which is led by a labor party the program of the labor government, which perhaps contemplates a general socialization, is to be carried out in practice, the collaboration of the other members of the cabinet will consist in preventing a general extension of this measure and in limiting its effect to those cases which, in their opinion, deviate least from the course followed before. One cannot expect from the strongest party and from its leader, who occupies the constitutional position of Reich Chancellor, to continue the policy of his predecessors. The other members of the coalition must make sacrifices if any governmental activity is ever to be possible. Since in the framework of this Trial we do not have to judge considerations of political expediency and not even moral conceptions but only whether what happened was done with a criminal purpose in the sense of the Charter, the task set for the Defense is comparatively simple. In the legislation we see the ideological problems raised by National Socialism partly solved. We must concede that the non-National-Socialist cabinet members involved in considering these laws had in mind a final solution and not a temporary one. Their experience, based on the past, on the political life of all countries, taught them that a problem settled by law is normally concluded. It was unthinkable-for it was incompatible with a normal governmental activity and the maintenance of the authority of a legislative body-that after the issuance of a law, a problem already dealt with should continually be considered anew in the following years and each time given a more radical solution.
DR.KUBUSCHOK: Papen has proved that he carefully tried to keep the concessions made to the opponent within a more or less tolerable limit. The fact that in the laws of that time National Socialist doctrines appear only rarely and in moderate terms shows sufficiently that the composition of the Cabinet of that time had a retarding influence on the penetration of National Socialist ideas. Without this influence it would not be understandable why Hitler agreed to a relatively unpopular limitation of previously advocated aims of the Party. The restraining hand of the defendant which helped shape the individual laws is clearly discernible. The classic example for this is his endeavors in bringing about the Enabling Act. It was a necessary piece of legislation for that critical time. The preceding years had shown that, owing to time-consuming deliberations in the Reichstag, urgently needed legislation was not passed. Therefore, already in Bruening's time, almost all the legislative power was put in the hands of the Reich President in that important laws were issued in the form of emergency decrees by unilateral legislative acts of the Reich President. For these compelling reasons, the legislative power which could not in practice be left in the hands of the Reichstag, was transferred to the Cabinet and this constituted a compromise. As shown by the result of the Reichstag vote on the Enabling Act, none of the parties, including the Center Party, failed to recognize this. Then there was the question as to whether the rights of the Cabinet, in which according to the Constitution the Reich Chancellor had to establish the fundamental lines of policy, would be limited by the fact that the right of making laws was reserved for the Reich President. The personal State Secretary of the Reich President declared in a cabinet session that he did not think it necessary that Hindenburg be given the responsibility of making all laws because of the latter's right to proclaim them.
DR.KUBUSCHOK: Von Papen's direct intervention with Hindenburg immediately afterward remained without success, as stated by the witness Tschirschky. Mr. President, would this be an appropriate time for me to present the essential points of the questionnaire which was answered by Tschirschky?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can comment on it, but you aren't going to read the whole document, are you?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: With your approval, I will give a summary of it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This is Document Number Papen-103, which I submitted a while ago. I have already read Question 1. Question 3 concerns the controls just discussed. The witness says that they were surely intended to prevent Hitler and the NSDAP from carrying out their policy. In the next question the witness affirms the alleged aim of the conservative bloc Black-White-Red. In Question 5 the witness confirms the development, which I still have to present, toward an authoritative government by Hitler. The answer to Question 7 shows that Papen in the Cabinet strongly resisted the suggested legislation in many points. Question 10 concerns the attitude of Papen toward the Church. The last sentence is particularly important: "Von Papen believed that, by concluding the Concordat, Hitler and the NSDAP would be placed under such strong contractual obligations that the anti-Church attitude would be arrested." The next answer, 11: "I do not consider it possible that Von Papen himself participated in a later violation of the Concordat or that he even used his religious conviction for political trickery." Question 12 confirms what I shall say about the Marburg speech. The answer to Question 14 is significant: "It is not known to me that Von Papen expressed opinions to the effect that the Hitler Government would have to solve Germany's foreign political aims through war and aggression. In the years 1933 and 1934 such ideas would have been absurd." The answer to Question 15 is to the same effect. The answer to Question 18 confirms Papen's efforts after the events of 30 June to reach Hindenburg in order to effect a change.
THE PRESIDENT: In the answer to Question 14, does the answer begin "It is not known" or "It is known"?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: "It is not known to me."
THE PRESIDENT: In the translation it says "It is known."
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The answer to Question 16 confirms Papen's statement that he wanted to prevent Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations at all costs. I have already spoken of Question 18. From the answer to 18 it is also shown that Papen's firm attitude after 30 June was his insistence on resigning. Questions 19 to 23; here the second sentence of the answer is especially important: ". .. It is correct that Von Papen accepted the post of Ambassador Extraordinary to Vienna for the sole reason that he hoped to prevent the insane policy of Hitler and the NSDAP in Austria. It is correct that Von Papen made his acceptance of the mission at Vienna depend on Hitler's pledge to forbid any Party interference in Austrian matters, to call back Gauleiter Habicht at once, and to refrain from any aggressive action. It is true that these and still other stipulations were accepted by Hitler after lengthy protest and that they were then put down in writing." In the answer to 25, Tschirschky confirms the fact that during the witness' period of observation Papen steadfastly adhered to this policy. The answer to Question 26 refutes the contents of Messersmith's affidavit. Papen was not concerned with an aggressive policy in the southeastern area. The answer to Question 27 sums up the attitude of the witness to the effect that Papen did not strive for an Anschluss to be obtained by force. Continuing on Page 22 we see Papen again in the foreground when the problem of anti-Semitism had its first legal effect. At that time, the situation was the following: There were the broad masses who for years had been influenced in this direction, and there was a predominantly National Socialist group for whom anti-Semitism was an important plank in the Party platform. We saw the effects of propaganda on the masses which manifested themselves in the afore-mentioned individual actions during the first weeks after the formation of the Hitler Government. The conclusions to be drawn from this situation were clear.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: A problem which had been stirred up and which had already shown pernicious results had to be legally settled. It was clear that in this question National Socialism, through its exaggerated propaganda, had contracted a certain obligation toward its followers. It was difficult to determine the extent of the legal limitation, which for the incited people always had to be disappointing. The way out could only be a compromise. The settlement was directed to a field where a change in the hitherto existing situation seemed to be the least severe. Whereas in accordance with the contents of the Civil Service Law (Berufsbeamtengesetz) only those were dismissed from their position who occupied their position not on account of their professional qualification but due to their membership in a political party; all Jewish government employees who were appointed after 1918 were also dismissed. As a rule, a right of pension was maintained. Papen's successful endeavor aimed to limit numerically the effect on the Jewish government employees concerned. He remonstrated with Hindenburg, who favored the idea of protecting war veterans. Through Hindenburg's personal influence on Hitler, Jewish war veterans and dependents of fallen soldiers were then exempted from this law. Since an overwhelming part of the young government employees who had been employed since 1914 were war veterans, the number of those thus exempted was quite considerable. This is made especially clear by the official figures published concerning the conditions in the legal profession, which were presented in Defense Document Number Papen-33. Furthermore, the defendant is charged with the measures taken against the labor unions. First consideration must be given to the fact that the measures were not carried put by a regulation based on a Reich law. It is, moreover, important that under the changed circumstances the continuation of labor unions of a Social Democrat character might have appeared as an anachronism.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Papen's attitude with respect to the problem of labor unions is shown by his speech of 4 March 1933, Defense Document Number Papen-10. Here, too, it must be considered that at the time the measures were taken one could not have foreseen the extent of their further development. Considering its many rather sound ideas for the settlement of social questions, the German Labor Front at the time of its foundation did not merit the judgment it now deserves for the countless coercive measures taken at the end. The amnesty decree, as was shown during the hearing of evidence, is no novelty. Already in 1922, in order to put an end to a period of political unrest, an amnesty decree was issued, which also pardoned crimes punishable by the death sentence. The establishment of special courts was a measure of expediency to speed up the sentencing of political offenders, because longer normal proceedings did not have the desired element of intimidation. It is significant that the order concerning crimes of violence in the case of the Potempa murderers (Document Number Papen-1, Pages 6 and 7) was applied for the first time during Papen's Reich chancellorship, against National Socialists. Thus it is erroneous to see in the nature of those laws approbation of misdeeds or a promotion of the Nazi idea. The Prosecution, in criticizing Papen's legislative activity during this time, emphasize the Political Co-ordination Act for the States of 31 March 1933, thus touching first of all a question of domestic policy, which is really far outside of a field of discussion in the sense of the Indictment. If in this the Prosecution have the sole purpose of showing that Papen has in this respect changed the point of view he advocated previously, it must be said that political opinions are in general subject to alterations and often must be altered, and that from a change of conception with respect to political expediency measures one can by no means draw a conclusion as to a general change of opinion.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As a matter of fact, the first Statthalter Act was designed to eliminate a dualism between the Reich and the states, which Papen had always considered as disadvantageous. Papen has always advocated, especially with respect to Prussia, a solution as in Bismarck's time, when the office of President of the Prussian Council of Ministers and that of Reich Chancellor were united in one person. Thus, this question, which ought to be touched only in passing, hardly involves even a change of opinion, much less a proof of a change of sentiment. The following must be considered with respect to the legislative work of the Defendant Von Papen in the Cabinet: His position of Vice Chancellor was without an administrative province. The influence, even in general political questions, which the head of the regular ministry had in cabinet sessions, did therefore not exist in the case of Papen. He could only express misgivings or objections from a general point of view, without being able to base them on departmental grounds. Considering the small number of cabinet session protocols available-despite all my efforts I did not succeed in procuring the remaining ones-the extent of Papen's opposition and that of other ministers cannot be proved by documents. The fact that he voiced this opposition was revealed by the hearing of evidence. But, as admitted, his success was small. Thus it is the duty of the defense to investigate more deeply the reasons why Hitler's power gradually increased and why the influence of the non-National-Socialist ministers decreased; in short, why the guarantees which had been provided when the Government was formed on 30 January failed. At the beginning the course of the cabinet sessions did not deviate from the normal procedure. The questions which arose were made the subject of discussions. Hitler refrained from carrying through the bills which were rejected for good reasons. A clear description to that effect is given by the affidavit of the former Minister Hugenberg-Defense Document Number Papen-88.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The elections of 5 March, with the overwhelming success of the National Socialist Party, brought along a substantial change. Beyond their purely parliamentary repercussions, they strengthened Hitler in his conviction that he was the deputy of the German people. He thought that now the time had come for him to make use of his right, granted to him by Article 56 of the Constitution of the Reich, to determine in his capacity as Reich Chancellor the fundamental lines of policy, even when the ministers opposed such a course. With respect to the constitutional situation I refer to Document Number Papen-22, which shows that in questions of fundamental policy even a majority decision of the ministers was ineffectual against the decision of the Reich Chancellor. Now Hitler became inaccessible to any suggestions. Hitler took opposition to mean resistance and soon it became evident that objections made in the Cabinet were useless in changing Hitler's attitude. At the best one could hope, as the Defendant Von Neurath declared as a witness, to influence Hitler outside the Cabinet in a direct discussion. The most essential factors in Hitler's development into an autocrat were his increasingly strengthened position with regard to Hindenburg and his ever-increasing influence on the Reich Defense Minister, Von Blomberg. Hitler's first measures which, in Hindenburg's eyes, indicated a desire to restore order, had constantly improved Hitler's personal relations with Hindenburg. He skillfully adjusted himself to Hindenburg's mentality. Therefore he succeeded very soon in abolishing the original stipulation concerning the obligation of making joint reports. Thus, Papen was practically deprived of the chief means of influencing Hindenburg. The attitude of the War Minister, Von Blomberg, was the second decisive point in Hitler's further course. The Wehrmacht was a powerful factor.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Hitler knew that its men and officers were probably essentially unpolitical but that by no means-especially as far as its leadership was concerned-were they inclined to National Socialist ideas. A radical turn in the government might therefore always give rise to resistance on the part of the Armed Forces. It must be added that owing to his personality, Hindenburg listened willingly to reports coming from military circles. As long as the War Minister was not a disciple of Hitler, the latter was prevented from carrying out any radical ideas. It is not possible even today to gain a historically clear picture which would enable one to explain the reason for Hitler's influence on Blomberg. We must only state the fact that Blomberg very soon became an ardent admirer of Hitler and that on his part no sort of resistance could be expected against any extensive radical development whatsoever of Hitler's policy. The 30th of June 1943 was to prove this very clearly. In retrospect, the logical consequence of this development becomes clear. Hitler could only be impressed by actual power. The Wehrmacht at the beginning, especially with regard to the position of the Reich President Von Hindenburg, was a powerful factor with which even Hitler and his Party would not have been able to cope in a showdown. That is the reason for Hitler's endeavor to win Hindenburg's confidence, the reason for his comparatively cautious maneuvering during the time prior to Hindenburg's death, which by no means could envisage the intensified procedure later on. From the time of Hindenburg's death, Hitler appeared as a ruthless dictator especially in the domestic scene.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In addition to the legislative activity of the Cabinet, the Prosecution dealt with the question as to what extent Papen was responsible for the oppression of political opponents and for certain acts of violence which occurred during the period which the terminology of that time called "national revolution." During the cross-examination Papen was asked whether he knew about the arrest and mistreatment of individual Communist and Social Democrat personages named to him. Papen gave a generally negative answer. However, he knew that on the basis of the Decree for the Protection of People and State issued by the Reich President measures had been taken which suppressed the personal liberty of a great number of leftists. The decree was issued by the Reich President, outside Papen's responsibility, and by suppression of the relevant constitutional stipulations. It was established under the impression created by the Reichstag fire, an event which up to the present day has not been fully elucidated, but for which the official statement that Communist circles had been the instigators seemed to be entirely credible, especially since a search of the Liebknecht House, the Communist headquarters, had produced, according to Goering's declaration, very serious evidence concerning actions planned against the Reich Cabinet. The investigation proceedings were held by a judge of the Reichsgericht (Reich Supreme Court), a personality whose impartiality was beyond any doubt. . Therefore Papen could understand the legal security measures which the Ministry of the Interior thought necessary. But knowledge of the arrest of these politicians is by no means connected eo ipso with the knowledge of the details and of the extent of the measures taken at that time. During the years of the National Socialist regime he learned again and again that the knowledge of acts of violence remained restricted to the narrow circle of the direct participants. The measures taken to silence an internee before his release were evidently successful.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thus we see again and again that there was always only a small initiated circle from the immediate environment of returned internees. This explains the fact which sometimes amazes one afterward, namely, that wide circles were not informed of the kind and extent of the excesses committed. It is evident that close relatives and close friends of the politicians arrested at that time knew of what had happened to their people. The extent of the secrecy is shown best by the fact that the witness Gisevius assumes that the conditions in concentration camps did not become generally known to Gestapo officials until 1935. Thus it seems to me quite clear that Papen knew very little about the measures which, during the first months, were almost exclusively taken against political opponents of National Socialism coming from leftist circles. At any rate his knowledge did not go beyond the fact that in this respect arrests were made within the scope of the Decree for the Protection of People and State. It was a different matter, however, with the later encroachment on the rights of Church offices and organizations, which were closer to him and which he energetically tried to help. The same holds true for the measures in connection with 30 June 1934, which will be discussed later on. In any case it is a decisive fact that the measures, as far as they were outside the law, were subject to the jurisdiction of the Police and the Ministry of the Interior. The law itself is an emergency decree of Hindenburg's. It came about legally. The now broadened conception of protective custody does not in itself constitute a crime. With regard to anti-Jewish excesses the Prosecution accused Papen of having sent a telegram to the New York Times on 25 March 1933, describing the situation in Germany as quiet on the whole, and of having pointed out that individual actions had occurred but were now prohibited by an order from Hitler.