dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
England and France took up their policy of war expansion in another direction. In this respect, while the retreat in flight of the British troops from Norway was still going on, the England Prime Minister announced that, as a result of the altered situation in Scandinavia, England was once more in a position to go ahead with the transfer of the full weight of her Navy to the Mediterranean, and that English and French units were already on the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean now became the center of English-French war propaganda. This was partly to gloss over the Scandinavian defeat and the big loss of prestige before their own people and before the world, and partly to make to appear that the Balkans had been chosen for the next theater of war against Germany. "In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite another purpose. It was nothing but a diversion manoeuvre in grand style, to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next English-French attack. For, as the Reich Government has long been ware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the West, so to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr. "Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of Belgium and Holland, it being of course understood that these two countries in the event of a war of Germany against England and France would maintain the strictest neutrality. "Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition." (TC-57) The so-called ultimatum goes on to complain of the hostile expressions in the Belgian and the Netherlands press, and to allege attempts by the British intelligence to bring a revolution into Germany with the assistance of Belgium and the Netherlands. Reference is made to military preparation of the two countries, and it is pointed out that Belgium has fortified the Belgian frontier. A complaint was made in regard to Holland, that British aircraft had flown over the Netherlands country. Other charges were made against the neutrality of these two countries, although no instances were given (TC-57). The document continued: "In this struggle for
out that Belgium has fortified the Belgian frontier. A complaint was made in regard to Holland, that British aircraft had flown over the Netherlands country. Other charges were made against the neutrality of these two countries, although no instances were given (TC-57). The document continued: "In this struggle for existence forced upon the German people by England and France, the Reich Government is not disposed to await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow them to carry the war over Belgium and the Netherlands into German territory. It has therefore now issued the command to German troops to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the military means at the disposal of the Reich." (TC-57) It is unnecessary, in view of the documents previously adverted to, to emphasize the falsity of that statement. It is now known that for months preparations had been made to violate the neutrality of these three countries. This document is merely saying, "The orders to do so have now been issued." A similar document, similar in terms altogether, was handed to the representatives of the Netherlands Government; and a memorandum was send to the Luxembourg Government, which enclosed with it a copy of the document handed to the Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands. The second paragraph of the latter declared: "In defense against the imminent attack, the German troops have now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two countries * * *". (TC-60) The protest of the Belgium Government against the crime which was committed against her is contained in TC-59. LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST BELGUIM, THE NETHERLANDS AND LUXEMBOURG Document Description Vol. Page Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6(a)............I 5 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 5; V.............. I 2729 Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was received to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following
(*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was received to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court. *375-PS Case Green with wider implications, report of Intelligence Division, Luftwaffe general Staff, 25 August 1938. (USA 84)......... III 280 *440-PS Directive No. 8 signed by Keitel, 20 November 1939, for the conduct of the war. (GB 107)......... III 397 *798-PS Hitler's speech to Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 29)........... III 581 *1809-PS Entries from Jodl's diary, February 1940 to May 1940. (GB 88)......... IV 377 *2329-PS Order by Commander in Chief of the Army, 7 October 1939. (GB 105)...... IV 1037 *3054-PS "The Nazi Plan", script of a motion picture composed of captured German film. (USA 167)....... V 801 *C-10 OKW directive, 28 November 1939, signed by Keitel, subject: Employment of 7th Flieger Division. (GB 1808)...... VI 817 *C-62 Directive No. 6 on the conduct of war, signed by Hitler, 9 October 1939: directive by Keitel, 15 October 1939 on Fall "Gelb". (GB 106)...... VI 880 *C-72 Orders postponing "A" day in the West, November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109)...... VI 893 *L-52 Memorandum and Directives for conduct of war in the West, 9 October 1939. (USA 540)......... VII 800 *L-79 Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, "indoctrination on the political situation and future aims". (USA 27)....... VII 847 *TC-3 Hague Convention (3) Relative to opening of Hostilities. (GB 2).......... VIII 279 *TC-4 Hague Convention (5) Respecting Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land. (GB 2).......... VIII 282 *TC-13 Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium at Locarno, 16 October 1925. (GB 15)........ VIII 320 *TC-16 Convention of Arbitration and conciliation between Germany and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 20 May 1926. (GB 97)...... VIII 337 *TC-19 Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris. 1929 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part
VIII 282 *TC-13 Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium at Locarno, 16 October 1925. (GB 15)........ VIII 320 *TC-16 Convention of Arbitration and conciliation between Germany and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 20 May 1926. (GB 97)...... VIII 337 *TC-19 Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris. 1929 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 9, pp.97-101. (GB 18)......... VIII 359 *TC-20 Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Luxembourg, signed at Geneva, 11 September 1929. (GB 98)...... VIII 362 *TC-30 German assurance to Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands, 28 April 1939, from Documents of German Politics, Part VII, I, pp. 139, 172-175. (GB 78)...... 379 *TC-32 German assurance to Norway, 6 October 1939, from documents of German Politics, Vol. VII, p.350. (GB 80)........... VIII 381 *TC-33 German assurance to Belgium and the Netherlands, 30 January 1937, from Documents of German Politics, Part VI, pp.42-43. (GB 99)...... VIII 381 *TC-34 German Declaration to the Belgian Minister of 13 October 1937. (GB 100)........ VIII 381 *TC-36 Declaration made by Ambassador of Germany on 26 August 1939. (GB 102)...... VIII 382 *TC-37 German assurance to Belgium, 6 October 1939, from Documents of German Politics, Vol. VII, p.351...... VIII 383 *TC-40 Declaration of German Minister to the Netherlands, 26 August 1939. (GB 103)....... VIII 383 *TC-41 German assurance to the Netherlands, 6 October 1939, from Documents of German Politics, Vol. VII, p.351....... VIII 384 *TC-42 German assurance to Luxemburg, 26 August 1939. (GB 104)....... VIII 384 *TC-42-A German assurance to Luxemburg, 28 April 1939. (GB 101)........ VIII 385 *TC-57 German ultimatum to Belgium and the Netherlands, 9 May 1940, from Documents of German Politics, Part Viii, pp.142-150. (GB 112)........ VIII 416 *TC-58 "Belgium, the official account of what happened 1939-1940". (GB 111)......... VIII 421 *TC-58-A Secret instruction to the Commander of 2nd Luftflotte found in German Aeroplane of 10 January 1940. (GB 110)......... VIII 423 *TC-59 Protest from Belgium, 10 May 1940, following German aggression. (GB 111)......... VIII 429 *TC-60 German memorandum to Luxemburg, 9 May 1940, from Documents of German Politics, Part VIII, pp. 150-151. (GB 113)........ VIII 431 Affidavit H Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22
January 1940. (GB 110)......... VIII 423 *TC-59 Protest from Belgium, 10 May 1940, following German aggression. (GB 111)......... VIII 429 *TC-60 German memorandum to Luxemburg, 9 May 1940, from Documents of German Politics, Part VIII, pp. 150-151. (GB 113)........ VIII 431 Affidavit H Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November 1945............. VIII 643 **Chart No.12 German Aggression. (Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.)........... VIII 781 **Chart No.13 Violations of Treaties, Agreements and Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to Tribunal)...... VIII 782 11. AGGRESSION AGAINST GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA A. Treaties and Assurances Breached. The invasions of Greece and of Yugoslavia by the Germans, which took place in the early hours of the morning of 6 April 1941, constituted direct breaches of The Hague convention of 1899 on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. in the case of Yugoslavia, the invasion further constituted a breach of an express assurance by the Nazis. The assurance was originally given in a German Foreign office release made in Berlin on 28 April 1938 (2719-PS), but was subsequently repeated by Hitler himself on 6 October 1939 in a speech he made in the Reichstag. The German Foreign Office release on 28 April 1938 reads, in part: "Berlin, 28 April 1938. The State Secretary of the German Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Representatives. "As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich, we have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, by us as final and inviolable. On this point the following special declarations have been made:" "3. Yugoslavia. "The Yugoslav Government have been informed by authoritative German quarters that German policy has no aims beyond Austria, and that the Yugoslav frontier would in any case remain untouched. In his speech made at Graz on 3 April, the Fuehrer and Chancellor stated that, in regard to the reunion of Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the same attitude as Italy. We were happy to have frontiers there which relieved us of all anxiety about providing military protection for them." (2719-PS) In a speech made on the occasion of the dinner in honor of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia on 1 June 1939, Hitler
Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the same attitude as Italy. We were happy to have frontiers there which relieved us of all anxiety about providing military protection for them." (2719-PS) In a speech made on the occasion of the dinner in honor of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia on 1 June 1939, Hitler declared: "The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of the tragic confusion of the world war. The German soldier then learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent. I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural and economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness's present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and at the same time on that account we derive from it the hope that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop in the future and to grow ever closer. "In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange of views which, and of this I am convinced, in this sense can only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship of Germany to Yugoslavia, now that, owing to historical events, we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and countries, but can also represent an element of calm to our nerve-wracked continent. This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to perform really constructive work." (TC-92) As is now known this speech was made at the time when Hitler had already decided upon the European war. it occurred a week after the Reichschancellery conference recorded in the Schmundt note (L-79). The reference to "nerve-wracked continent" might perhaps be attributed to the war of nerves which Hitler had himself been conducting for many months. The German Assurance to Yugoslavia on 6 October 1939 was in these terms: "Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that, from now on, the frontier with this country would also be an unalterable one, and that we only
of nerves which Hitler had himself been conducting for many months. The German Assurance to Yugoslavia on 6 October 1939 was in these terms: "Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that, from now on, the frontier with this country would also be an unalterable one, and that we only desire to live in peace and friendship with her." (TC-43) B. Planning for Invasion: Collaboration with Italy and Bulgaria. Despite the obligation of Germany under the convention of 1899, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and under the foregoing Assurance which I have read, the fate of both Greece and Yugoslavia had, as is now known, been sealed ever since the meeting between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Ciano at Obersalzberg, 12 and 13 August 1939 (TC-77). The effect of the meeting was that Hitler and Ribbentrop, only two months after the dinner to the Prince Regent, were seeking to persuade Italy to make war on Yugoslavia at the same time that Germany was to commence hostilities against Poland, which Hitler had decided to do in the very near future. Ciano while evidently in entire agreement with Hitler and Ribbentrop as to the desirability of liquidating Yugoslavia, and while himself anxious to secure Salonika, stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general European war. Thus, despite all the persuasion which Hitler and Ribbentrop Exerted at the meeting, it became necessary for the Nazi conspirators to reassure their intended victim, Yugoslavia, since in fact Italy maintained its position and did not enter the war when Germany invaded Poland, and since the Germans themselves were not yet ready to strike in the Balkans. It was apparently for this reason that on 6 October, through Hitler's speech, the Nazis repeated the assurance they had made in April 1938. It is a matter of history that after the defeat of the Allied armies in May and June 1940, the Italian Government declared war on France and that subsequently, at three o'clock in the morning on 28 October 1940, the Italian Minister at Athens presented the Greek Government with a 3 hour ultimatum, upon the expiration of which Italian troops were already invading the soil of Greece. This event was reported by the British Minister at Athens in these words: "The president of the council
three o'clock in the morning on 28 October 1940, the Italian Minister at Athens presented the Greek Government with a 3 hour ultimatum, upon the expiration of which Italian troops were already invading the soil of Greece. This event was reported by the British Minister at Athens in these words: "The president of the council has assured himself an outstanding place in Greek history and, whatever the future may bring, his foresight in quietly preparing his country for war and his courage in rejecting without demur the Italian ultimatum when delivered in the small hours of that October morning, will surely obtain an honorable mention in the story of European statecraft. He means to fight until Italy is completely defeated and this reflects the purpose of the whole Greek nation." A letter from Hitler to Mussolini, which is undated but which-this is clear from the contents-must have been written shortly after the Italian invasion of Greece on 28 November 1940, contained these sentiments: "Jugoslavia must become disinterested, if possible however from our point of view interested in cooperating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without assurances from Jugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans. "Unfortunately, I must stress the fact that waging a war in the Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore, any threatening move towards Jugoslavia would be useless, since the impossibility of a materialization of such threats before March is well known to the Serbian general staff. Therefore, Jugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by other means and other ways." (2762-PS) It was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the offensive in the Spring of 1941, which included the invasion of Greece from the north. It was an integral part of those plans that Yugoslavia should be induced to cooperate in them or at least to maintain a disinterested attitude towards the liquidation of the other Balkan States. These facts are disclosed in a "Top Secret Directive" issued from the Fuehrer's Headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by Jodl, and dated 12 November 1940. This order reads, in part: "Directive No. 18. "The preparatory measures of Supreme HQ for the prosecution of the war in the near
of the other Balkan States. These facts are disclosed in a "Top Secret Directive" issued from the Fuehrer's Headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by Jodl, and dated 12 November 1940. This order reads, in part: "Directive No. 18. "The preparatory measures of Supreme HQ for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines. * * *" (444-PS) After sections dealing with operations against Gibraltar and an offensive against Egypt, the order continues: "Balkans "The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air force units against targets in the eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Rumanian oil area. "In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position. "So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted to me. "The commander-in-chief of the air force will make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations." (444-PS) the positions of the Italian invading forces in Greece in December 1940 may be summarized in the words in which the British Minister reported to Foreign Secretary Eden: "The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the highest, and our own naval and land successes at Tarento and in the Western Desert have done much to maintain it. With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not unworthy of the ancient tradition of their
done much to maintain it. With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not unworthy of the ancient tradition of their country and that they, like their distant forbears, are prepared to fight against odds to maintain their freedom." In fact, the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time that Hitler came to the rescue with the order for the German attack on Greece. This directive of 13 December 1940, which is Top Secret Directive number 20, dealing with Operation Marita, bears a distribution list which shows that copies went to the Commander of the Navy (Raeder), to the Commander of the Air Force (Goering), to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Keitel), and to the command Staff (Jodl). The first two paragraphs state: "The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the British endeavour be foiled to create air bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields. "My plan, therefore, is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next months. (b) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send the task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected." (1541-PS) The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and paragraph 4 deals with the operation Marita itself. Paragraph 5 states: "The Military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of all the necessary measures by the General Staff. The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported step by step by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission in Rumania. "Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification