dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has submitted an order, the subject of which was the branding of Soviet prisoners of war. The Defendant Keitel is held responsible for this order. He states that he spoke with you about this question at headquarters located at the time in Vinnitza; that he had to do it because all questions pertaining to prisoners of war also concerned the department for international law of the Foreign Office. Do you recall that in this connection Keitel asked you whether there were any objections from the point of view of international law to this branding which Hitler wished.
VON RIBBENTROP: The situation was this: I heard about the intention of marking prisoners of war and went to headquarters to speak with Keitel about this matter because it was my opinion that the marking of prisoners in such a way was out of the question. Keitel shared my opinion; and, so far as I recall, I believe he gave later orders that this intended form of marking was not to be used.
DR. NELTE: I have no further question.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUHLER (Counsel for Defendant Doenitz ): Witness, when did you make the acquaintance of Admiral Doenitz?
VON RIBBENTROP: I made his acquaintance after he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: That was in 1943?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe so.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did Admiral Doenitz before or after this time exert or try to exert any influence on German foreign policy?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have never heard that Admiral Doenitz tried to exert any influence on German foreign policy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you recall Marshal Antonescu's visit to the Fuehrer headquarters on 27 February 1944?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do recall the visit but not the date. Marshal Antonescu used to visit the Fuehrer frequently. I should say every six months or so; I believe you said at the beginning of 1944?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Yes, on 27 February 1944.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I think it is correct that he visited the Fuehrer at the beginning of 1944.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you recall whether Antonescu, at that time, attended the discussion of the military situation, as guest?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am quite certain, because this was usually the case when Antonescu came to see the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer always explained the military situation to him, that is, he invited him to the so-called noon discussion of the military situation. I do not recall exactly now, but there can be no doubt that Marshal Antonescu attended the discussion of the military situation in February.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Besides the military discussions were there also political discussions with Antonescu?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, every visit with Marshal Antonescu began by the Fuehrer's withdrawing either with the Marshal alone or sometimes also with me, but mostly with the Marshal alone, because he was the chief of state; a long detailed political discussion would ensue, to which I was generally called in later.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Did Admiral Doenitz take part in these political discussions?
VON RIBBENTROP: Certainly not, because the Fuehrer seldom invited military leaders to these political discussions with Marshal Antonescu. Later however, he did occasionally, but I do not recall that Admiral Doenitz took part in a discussion with Antonescu.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I have no further questions.
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder ): Witness, the Prosecution have submitted a document concerning a discussion between you and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on 29 March 1941. The document carries the Document Number 1877-PS, and is Exhibit Number USA-152. A part of this document was read into the record by the Prosecution, and on Page 1007 of the German transcript (Volume III, Page 379) can be found among other things, the following passage which concerns Grossadmiral Raeder: Witness, as the Defendant Raeder clearly remembers, you, as Foreign Minister, never spoke with him about strategic matters regarding Japan or even about the worth or worthlessness of American submarines. I should be obliged to you if you could clarify this point, whether there might be some confusion as to the person involved in this discussion.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is altogether possible. I do not recall that I ever spoke with Admiral Raeder about German-Japanese strategy. The fact was that we had only very loose connections with Japan on these questions. If at that time I said to Matsuoka what is written there, it is quite possible that I quoted the Fuehrer that he had said it to me. Naturally I could not have said it on my own initiative, because I did not know about it. I know that the Fuehrer spoke to me frequently about such points particularly with regard to Japan It is possible therefore that this did not originate with Admiral Raeder but the Fuehrer. I do not know who made this note. Is it a ...
DR. SEEMERS: The document is entitled, "Notes on the conference between the Reir-h Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka... "
VON RIBBENTROP: I have seen that here. It is possible that the Fuehrer said that to me. In fact, I consider that probable. It is possible that some mistake was made in the note; that I do not know.
DR. SIEMERS: Witness, did you inform the Defendant Raeder of such political discussions as you had with Matsuoka or Oshima?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not the case.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you ever speak with Grossadmiral Raeder about other political questions or have him present at political negotiations?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not our practice. Generally, the Fuehrer kept military and political matters strictly separate, so that I, as Foreign Minister, never had an opportunity to discuss military or strategic matters at my office; but when questions of foreign policy were to be discussed, this took place at the Fuehrer headquarters, but as I have seen from documents which I read for the first time here, matters were kept separate even there. In other words, if such discussions took place at all, a fact which I cannot recall at the moment, it could have been only at the Fuehrer headquarters.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, Steengracht, who was heard here as a witness, answered in the negative my question as to whether the high military leaders were regularly informed by him about current political matters. Now I ask whether you, as Foreign Minister, informed high military leaders about political matters?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must answer this question in the same way as I answered the previous one. That was not our practice. All political and military matters were dealt with exclusively by the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer told me what I had to do in the diplomatic and political field, and he told the military men what they had to do militarily. I was occasionally, but very seldom, informed about military matters by the Fuehrer, and whatever the military men had to know about political matters they never learned from me; but if they learned at all, it was from the Fuehrer.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
HERR GEORG BOHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, did you have an order or an instruction according to which you were to inform the SA leaders of the development and treatment of foreign political matters?
VON RIBBENTROP: The SA? No. There was no such order, and I had no such instructions.
HERR BOHM: Did the SA leadership have any influence on foreign policy at all?
VON RIBBENTROP: No.
HERR BOHM: And now I should like to ask a question for my colleague Dr. Sauter who is ill: Were you in 1943 witness to a conversation between Hitler and Himmler, in which the question was discussed as to whether Von Schirach , who was then Reichsleiter, should be summoned before the Volksgericht (People's Court)?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.
HERR BOHM: What consequences would such a trial before the Volksgericht have had for Schirach?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say exactly, of course. I do not know the details of this matter. I only know that Himmler, in my presence, made the suggestion to the Fuehrer that Schirach should be brought and tried before the Volksgericht for some reason or other. I do not know the details. I was not interested in them. I said to the Fuehrer that this, in my opinion, would make a very bad impression from the point of view of foreign policy and I know that Himmler received no answer from the Fuehrer; at any rate, he did not give the order. What consequences that would have had I cannot say, but when such a suggestion came from Himmler, the consequences were very serious.
HERR BOHM: How is it that you were witness to this conversation and how did you react to it?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was purely accidental; I have just stated that I told the Fuehrer as well as Himmler that it would make a very bad impression.
HERR BOHM: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other questions on behalf of the defendants' counsel?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, when you began to advise Hitler on matters of foreign policy in 1933, were you familiar with the League of Nations declaration of 1927?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know which declaration you mean.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don't you remember the League of Nations declaration of 1927?
VON RIBBENTROP: The League of Nations has made many declarations. Please tell me which one you mean?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It made a rather important one about aggressive war in 1927, didn't it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know this declaration in detail, but it is clear that the League of Nations, like everyone, was against an aggressive war, and at that time Germany was a member of the League of Nations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Germany was a member, and the preamble of the declaration was: Were you familiar with that when you ...
VON RIBBENTROP: Not in detail, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was rather an important matter to be familiar with if you were going to advise Hitler, who was then Chancellor, on foreign policy, wasn't it?
VON RIBBENTROP: This declaration was certainly important, and corresponded exactly with my attitude at that time. But subsequent events have proved that the League of Nations was not in a position to save Germany from chaos.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you continue to hold that as your own view?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you continue to hold the expression of opinion I have quoted to you from the preamble as your own view?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was as such my fundamental attitude, but on the other hand I was of the opinion that Germany should be given help in some way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So I gathered. Now, apart from that, if you were not familiar in detail with that resolution, were you familiar in detail with the Kellogg-Briand Pact?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was familiar with it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with the view expressed in the preamble and in the pact that there should be a renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes,
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to tell us how you carried that out. Let's take the first example. Are you telling this Tribunal that, as far as you know, no pressure or threats were made to Herr Von Schuschnigg?
VON RIBBENTROP: Do you mean in the discussions with Hitler at the Obersalzberg?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, on the 12th of February.
VON RIBBENTROP: At this discussion...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, answer the question first, and then you can give your explanation. Are you saying that no pressure or threats were put to Herr Von Schuschnigg on the 12th of February? Answer that "yes" or "no", and we will go into the explanation later.
VON RIBBENTROP: Not exactly, no. I believe that the dominating personality of the Fuehrer and the arguments that he presented made such an impression on Schuschnigg that he finally agreed to Hitler's proposals.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let's just look into that.
VON RIBBENTROP: May I continue? I personally had a conversation at that time with Herr Schuschnigg after his first talk with Adolf Hitler, in which his reaction to the first conference became very clear to me. This reaction was one of being deeply impressed by Hitler's personality and by the arguments which Hitler submitted to him. Schuschnigg told me in this conversation, which was extremely cordial, that he too -- and I believe these were his words -- regarded it as a historical mission to bring the two peoples closer together.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who were present, at the Berghof -- I don't say in the room, but in the building or about? Were there present Hitler, yourself, the Defendant Von Papen , the Defendant Keitel, General Sperrle, and General Von Reichenau?
VON RIBBENTROP: I think that is correct, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on the morning of the 12th, I think that Hitler and Von Schuschnigg were together for about 2 hours before lunch in the morning, isn't that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the time exactly. Anyway, they had a long conversation, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then, after lunch, Von Schuschnigg was allowed to have a short conversation with his own Foreign Minister, Guido Schmidt, isn't that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know exactly, but it is possible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, after that, Von Schuschnigg and Guido Schmidt were called before you and the Defendant Von Papen, isn't that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember that. I do not think so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don't you remember that? Just think again.
VON RIBBENTROP: Do you mean -- then I believe I did not understand the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I will put it again. After a conversation that Schuschnigg had with Guido Schmidt, he and Schmidt came before you and the Defendant Von Papen and they had a conversation with you, which I will put to you in a moment. Now, isn't it right that you and Von Papen saw Von Schuschnigg and Guido Schmidt?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not believe so. I do not believe that is true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don't you remember exhibiting to Von Schuschnigg a typewritten draft containing the demands made on Von Schuschnigg? Now, just think.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is absolutely possible. Hitler had dictated a memorandum, and it is possible that I gave it to Schuschnigg. I am not sure of the details now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the subject of that memorandum?
VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know; and in order to explain my ignorance about the entire conference I would like to state that at this time I was not at all informed about the Austrian problem because Hitler had handled these matters personally and I had become Foreign Minister only a few days before.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you hand someone a memorandum, at an occasion which you have described to him as a historic meeting, presumably you can give the Tribunal at any rate an outline of what the memorandum contained. What were the points in the memorandum?
VON RIBBENTROP: Curiously enough, I really do not remember that in detail. This meeting was one between the Fuehrer and Schuschnigg, and everything that was done and agreed upon there was either dictated by the Fuehrer himself or was suggested to the Fuehrer by someone else. I did not know the details. I only knew that it was primarily a question of bringing about better relations between Germany and Austria. Since many National Socialists had been arrested in Austria the relations between the two countries had been greatly troubled.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if I remind you, perhaps, it will bring it back. Were not they the three points for the reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet, including: The appointment of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart to the Ministry of Security in the Interior; second, a general political amnesty of Nazis convicted of crimes; and thirdly, a declaration of equal rights for Austrian National Socialists and the taking of them into the Fatherland Front? Are these the points that you were putting to Von Schuschnigg?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember exactly now but that may be about correct. At that time that corresponded with the vague notion and knowledge I had about Austrian affairs.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you tell Von Schuschnigg that Hitler had informed you that these demands which you were offering were the final demands of the Fuehrer and that Hitler was not prepared to discuss them?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall that, but it is possible that I told Von Schuschnigg something to that effect but at the moment I do not remember.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say, "You must accept the whole of these demands?"
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not think so, I did not say that. I exerted no pressure whatsoever on Schuschnigg, for I still remember that this conversation which lasted about an hour to an hour and a half was confined to generalities and to personal matters and that I gained from this conversation a very favorable impression of Schuschnigg's personality, which fact I even mentioned to my staff later on. I put no pressure on Schuschnigg.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told us that before, and I am suggesting to you that at this conversation you were trying to get Schuschnigg to sign the document containing these terms which you agree that you may have had. I want you to remember the answer'and remind you of that. Don't you remember Herr Von Schuschnigg turning to the Defendant Von Papen and saying, "Now, you told me that I would not be confronted with any demands if I came to Berchtesgaden," and Herr Von Papen apologizing and saying, "That is so. I did not know you were going to be confronted with these demands." Don't you remember that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that. That canno be quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will just see. Do you remember Von Schuschnigg being called back to speak to Hitler again and Guido Schmidt remaining with you to make some alterations in the document which you were putting?
VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite possible that changes were made; it is conceivable. I do not remember the details, though.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But did you hear that in this second conversation with Hitler, Hitler telling Schuschnigg that he must comply with these demands within 3 days?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I am hearing that for the first time today. I did not know that. I was not present at the second conversation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just be a little careful before you say you have heard that for the first time today, because in a moment I will show you some documents. Are you sure you did not hear that Hitler told Schuschnigg that he must comply within 3 days, or Hitler would order the march into Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that to be out of the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If he had said that, you will agree that that would be the heaviest military and political pressure? There could be no other heavier pressure than suggesting a march into Austria, could there?
VON RIBBENTROP: In view of the tense situation that existed between the two countries at that time, that, of course, would have been a pressure. But one thing must be taken for granted; and that is, that under no circumstances would it have been possible in the long run to find any solution between the two countries if there were no closer contact, and from the beginning -- I should like to state this here -- it was always my view that the two countries should form some sort of close alliance, and I visualized a customs and currency union ...
SIR DAVID MAXWELIFYFE: You've given that view about three times. Let us come back to this interview which I am putting back to you, that took place on the 12th of February. Don't you know that Schuschnigg said: "I am only the Bundeskanzler. I have to refer to President Miklas, and I can sign this protocol only subject to reference to President Miklas."
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that any more in detail.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don't you remember Hitler opening the door and calling Keitel?
VON RIBBENTROP: No; I only learned here that this is supposed to have happened. I have no knowledge whatsoever about that. I heard about it here for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know it is true, don't you?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know. I heard about it here for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don't you remember Keitel's going in to speak to Hitler?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I did not hear about that. I do not know, I cannot say.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Von Schuschnigg signed this document on the condition that within 3 days these demands would be fulfilled, otherwise Germany would march into Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it would be convenient if the witness had the German Document Book in front of him. I tried to get most of the pages agreeing.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps this would be a good time to break off. [A recess was taken.]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, will you look first at the Defendant Jodl 's diary, the entry of the 13th of February, it is the Ribbentrop Document Book, Page 9, Exhibit Number USA-72, Document Number 1780-PS. The entry is as follows: You were suggesting on Friday that the Defendant Jodl had go hold of some rumors or gossip thdt were going around the Berghof. That rumor or gossip was a definite order from his superior officer, General Keitel, wasn't it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I know absolutely nothing about military measures, therefore I cannot pass judgment on the value of this entry. The Fuehrer did not inform me about any milita measures regarding Austria.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal you were there, that you were taking part, handling the document and that Hitler never said a word to you about what he was arranging with the Defendant Keitel, who was also there?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at the next entry for the 14th of February: Are you telling this Tribunal that you know nothing about either these military measures or the effect on Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know anything about the military measures, but I consider it quite possible that the Fuehrer, in order to put more stress on his wishes, caused something to be done in this field...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Witness, just a moment!
VON RIBBENTROP: ... and that may have contributed in the end to the solution of the problem.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I quite agree. That is just why I am putting it to you that it did contribute. But surely you as Foreign Minister of the Reich, with all the channels available to a foreign minister, knew something about the effect in Austria, which General Jodl was remarking, that "the effect was quick and strong." -- the impression was "created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations." Are you telling the Tribunal, on your oath, that you knew nothing about the effect in Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to point out again that. I did not know anything about military measures and, if I had known, I would not have the slightest reason not to say here that it was not so. It is a fact, however, that in the days before and after the conversations between the Fuehrer and Schuschnigg, I was so busy taking over the Foreign Office that I treated the Austrian problem, at that time, merely as a secondary matter in foreign policy. I did not play a leading role in the handling of the Austrian problem...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We know you said that before, that you were engaged in the Foreign Office, and my question was perfectly clear -- my question was: Are you telling this Tribunal that you did not know anything about the effect in Austria -- you, as Foreign Minister of the Reich? Now answer the question. Did you or did you not know of the effect in Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know anything about that effect, and I did not observe it in detail either.