dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly this accusation is, so to speak, correct in part. With the prohibition of the political parties, most of the organizations of the free professions became impossible, since right down to the chessplayers' club everything in the Netherlands was organized on a political basis. In the interests of the occupational forces I had to create new supervisory bodies. Maybe it was due to lack of imagination that these organizations were, in part at least, very similar to their prototypes in the Reich. But I used these organizations only for purposes of supervision, and never asked them to co-operate politically. Not only did I refrain from making the exercise of a profession dependent on co-operation, but I did not even insist upon compulsory collection of membership fees. I admit that we made two mistakes from two errors of judgment: First of all, we had the mistaken impression that the order we imposed as occupational authorities was necessarily the right one-at least the better one; and secondly, that in an occupied country, an independent political will can develop. It was there that our policy failed.
DR. STEINBAUER: What institution did you then set up?
SEYSS-INQUART: I created a cultural association (Kulturkammer), a medical association (Arztekammer), a chemists' association (Apothekerkammer), and a board of agriculture (Landstand). Then there was a workers' front, but that was a voluntary organization. Members could leave it without any disadvantage to themselves whenever they wished.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then another charge is brought against you, that of "Germanization." What do you say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I must get something quite clear. In English, you say Germany, and in Russian you say Germanski. Both mean German (Deutsch). And when we spoke of Germanization then, we did not mean "making them into Germans"; we meant a political and cultural union of the so-called Germanic peoples, with reciprocal equal rights. That we did intervene in this way, I stated in a speech, Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-103. "Why do the Germans interfere with everything in the Netherlands?" Then I went on to say that in this total warfare there would be moments of tension...
THE PRESIDENT: page is that on?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is still Exhibit USA-708, which has not been translated' But the entire book has been presented.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number?
DR. STEINBAUER: Its document number is 3430-PS. It has been made Exhibit USA-708. It is a book entitled Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden , and it contains a collection of speeches made by the witness, several of which have been submitted by the Prosecution. The witness is now replying to them.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
SEYSS-INQUART: There are moments of tension when there is no longer any dividing dine between what is important to the military war effort and something which is private and a matter for civilians. I was quite aware of the fact that all public activities might be used for or against the occupational forces and that I had, therefore, to exercise control over them.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were there any attempts on the part of the NSDAP in the Reich to influence your administration for the interests of the Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Auslands-Organisation in the Netherlands made an alteration in its set-up which permitted it to support the policy of the Dutch National Socialist Party in every respect. It had, however, no particular influence of its own.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is the important thing. Now, let us turn to the administration proper. Who were the competent authorities in the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the civilian sector there was the Reich Commissioner; on a similar footing was the military commander and the Armed Forces, and the Police had a sector of its own. The military commander had special rights to intervene, and from July 1944 a part of the executive powers was transferred to him. The Police were merely placed at my disposal, but came under the Higher SS and Police Leader, who was suggested by Himmler and appointed by the Fuehrer. I was never asked about this beforehand. The Police reserved the right to investigate. That is to say, if I gave them an order they would investigate to see whether the order was in line with the instructions which Himmler had given directly to the Higher SS and Police Leader. Then there were the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor and the Armament Minister, who carried out the orders for the Four Year Plan.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes; and as another Reich organization, there was Rosenberg's Einsatzstab too-and Speer, to complete the picture?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, Speer was the Minister for Armaments. Then there were other smaller and separate assignments of a special nature.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that you were really nothing but a kind of executive organ for the superior Reich offices?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I was not an ordinary official. I bore the responsibility for the Reich in the civilian sector. Perhaps during the first few months departments in Berlin went straight ahead and ignored me, but I then concentrated the administration in such a way in my own hands that nothing occurred in the civilian sector to which I had not previously given my consent. The Fuehrer acknowledged this quite plainly on one occasion, and I should like to remark that you must not draw any conclusions from this with regard to other occupied territories. I am completely convinced that in the Eastern Territories and in the Government General the same centralization did not exist.
DR. STEINBAUER: What possibilities did you have, then, of setting up an administration?
SEYSS-INQUART: The initiative for, and the extent of, the demands made by the Reich came, of course, from the competent central offices in the Reich. I investigated the demands with my colleagues in consultation with the Dutch offices. We would then make counterproposals which seemed to us reasonable for the Dutch. And if the Reich still demanded more, then we made efforts not to exceed what could be expected. Until 1943 all demands were fulfilled by the Dutch authorities themselves. I gave my officials no authority to make such demands until after this period. Then the demands became so large, that I no longer expected the Dutch authorities to supply them.
DR. STEINBAUER: I come back to the question of the Police for a moment, which, as you said, stood directly under Himmler. . .
SEYSS-INQUART: You asked what possibilities I had?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: I had two possibilities: with the Queen of the Netherlands and the Government gone to England, I could have nominated a new Dutch Government, as in Norway, or conducted the administration of the country myself. I decided on the second solution.
DR. STEINBAUER: How did you organize the existing Dutch police force?
SEYSS-INQUART: Whereas the German Police were not in any way dependent on me, the Dutch police were under my orders; but it was a matter of course that I should transfer the supervision of the Dutch police to the Higher SS and Police Leader as well-that is, in the capacity as my Commissioner General for Security. The Dutch police were divided into three or four different branches. I think that we can safely say we were acting in the interests of the occupational power when we co-ordinated them as regards organization.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the Home Guard (Landwacht)?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Home Guard was a protection squad organized by the Dutch National Socialists. In 1943 there were serious cases of terror attacks on National Socialists some very cruel murders. There was the danger of the counterterror of which we had heard in Denmark and, in fact, several unfortunate incidents did happen. Consequently I had this Home Guard organized with orders to act as a regular disciplined auxiliary police force, and to control street traffic at night, and guard railways, et cetera. The result was that these acts of terror ceased almost entirely, and until the middle of 1944 no further difficulties arose.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, we now come to an exceptionally important chapter.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I just for a moment refer to Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-101? This document has been held against me by the Prosecution . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is 101 the right designation?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the speeches which the defendant is quoting have been sent down by me to be mimeographed. Although they are actually already before the Tribunal, the translation department did not quite catch up, as they wanted to translate all the affidavits too. So they are not here yet in the translation, but I hope to have them by tomorrow morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Hasn't it got a PS number, or any other designation?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is a book, Exhibit USA-708. The Prosecution have only quoted individual passages from it.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
SEYSS-INQUART: The Prosecution have quoted Page 167. On 1 August 1943 I made a speech announcing special measures which would bring difficulties and restrictions upon the Dutch, and the Prosecution believe that the shootings which took place later are connected with it. That is an error. The restrictions I spoke of in that speech concerned only an order forbidding Dutch people to stay in places outside their own provinces, so that bands of terrorists from the northwest could not get to the east. As this happened just during the vacation time, it really was a restriction for the Dutch.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to the next question. Did you change and possibly misuse the existing organization of the lower courts?
SEYSS-INQUART: I took over the organization of the Dutch courts entirely. The administration of justice in the Netherlands was of a commendably high standard. Only on two occasions did I supplement it. The Dutch judges showed little understanding of the economic situation. For instance, on one occasion a group of black market butchers, who had killed large numbers of cattle and brought them to the black market, were fined 200 Builders; so I installed special economic judges, Dutchmen, who had more understanding of these economic necessities. But the legal situation remained as it was. Of course, we also introduced our German courts, as every occupational power does.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that we had Dutch courts, German courts for Germans staying in the Netherlands, and the police courts?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but also for the Dutch who violated the interests of the German occupational forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, it is alleged in the proceedings that through these courts there were 4,000 executions, which have to be accounted for.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is completely false. If I take into account all the death sentences which were pronounced and actually carried out by the German courts, the police courts, and the military courts; and if I add to them the cases where Dutchmen lost their lives in clashes with the executive powers; then, according to a statement of the Higher SS and Police Leader, up to the middle of 1944 there were less than 800 cases in 4 years-that is to say, less than were caused by a bombing attack on the town of Nijmegen. The shootings came afterwards.
DR. STEINBAUER: You also exercised the rights to reprieve, for which you had a special reprieve department? SEYSS-INQUART Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I wish to refer to Document Seyss-Inquart-75, Page 190 in the document book. This is the affidavit of Rudolf Fritsch, who was a judge at the Prussian Supreme Court and reprieve expert for the Reich Commissioner. I should like to quote two paragraphs from this document, and I refer to the second paragraph on Page 3: "In exercising his right to reprieve, the Reich Commissioner proceeded from the standpoint that this was one of the most sacred rights of the head of a state, and that it was especially calculated to create a friendly, confidential atmosphere between the Germans and the Dutch. Therefore, in the beginning it was he himself who made the decision in every case, on the basis of case reports which were submitted to him together with a suggestion for a reprieve from the reprieve department. After about 2 to 3 months he delegated the exercise of the right to reprieve within his own organization to the chief of the Department for Reprieves. The latter was competent except in the following cases: 1) the cancellation of proceedings; 2) decision in case of death sentences; 3) decision in fundamental questions; 4) decision in isolated cases without precedent. . . "No sentence of death was carried out without there being an official examination of the question of a reprieve, even when a formal appeal for a reprieve was not submitted." Then I come to Page 5, the last paragraph: "Since co-operation with authorities in the Dutch courts proved that they could be trusted, the Reich Commissioner gradually delegated in the main the right of reprieve to the Dutch Minister of Justice. From the huge amount of mail which came in . . . I repeatedly learned of police actions staged by the Gestapo whereby regular jurisdiction was eliminated.... In such cases I would collect material and use it to take action in order to bring the persons involved before regular courts for judgment. And I was actually successful with such action.
DR. STEINBAUER: This was proof to me that the Reich Commissioner opposed the wild police methods of the Gestapo and was an adherent of regular legal procedure." I think that with this we can close this subject of justice and now come to the question of finance.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but the Fuehrer's order excluding courts is also very important.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well, if you wish to add something else.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, it is decisive. After the strike at Amsterdam, I proposed summary courtmartial procedure. That is not an invention of recent times; it is summary court procedure for special emergencies, such as you can find in the legislation of every country. The summary courts martial were subject to special precautionary provisions. First of all, a proper judge had to be there; secondly, the defense was allowed a counsel, who could be Dutch; thirdly, evidence had to be given in the proper manner, and if the question of guilt was not clearly determined, then the case had to be transferred to the ordinary courts. This summary court-martial procedure was only in force for 2 weeks at the time of the general strike in May 1943. The number of people shot later on cannot be traced back to these summary courts martial. Also they had been provided for the special emergency of the Netherlands again becoming a theatre of war. In the meantime, however, a decree came from the Fuehrer which had already been made public in an order from the High Command of the Armed Forces. I refer to 1155-PS-no, I beg your pardon, that is wrong-it is Document 835-PS. On 30 July 1944 the Fuehrer ordered that all non-German civilians ire occupied territories who were guilty of sabotage or terror actions were to be handed over to the Security Police. The Higher SS Leader and I both objected to this order, as we clearly realized what damaging effects it would have, especially in the Netherlands. Through such an order the Dutch would only be driven into illegal organizations. During a period of 4 to 6 weeks the Higher SS and Police Leader never carried out the order. But he then received a severe reprimand from Himmler, and from that time on he was obliged to deal with the Dutch who had been arrested for sabotage or illegal activities, and had to judge them according to his own jurisdiction, shooting them when necessary. One can account in this way for the shootings on a larger scale, but I do not believe that there were as many as 4,000.
SEYSS-INQUART: As often as I could, I urged the Security Police to be most careful in carrying out this order, but I never received any reports on the individual cases. I had the impression that there were perhaps 600 to 700.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understood you correctly, then this was a police affair, which was directly...
SEYSS-INQUART: At all events it no longer came under my authority or influence. But if, at that time, I gave the Security Police orders to check up on an illegal movement somewhere, I nevertheless had to realize that some Dutchman or other, who was discovered to be the leader of such a movement, would be shot by the Police without the courts or myself being able to investigate the case. But then I could not desist from safeguarding the security of the occupational authorities, because the Fuehrer decree had been issued.
DR. STEINBAUER: I now come to the chapter of finance. A document has been presented here where a certain Mr. Trip announces his resignation. Who was this gentleman?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Trip was the President of the Bank of the Netherlands-that is to say, the bank of issue-and he was also the General Secretary for Finance. I think he can readily be considered one of the world's leading banking experts. He is an outstanding personality and one of the men described today as a Dutch patriot.
DR. STEINBAUER: He was also General Secretary for Finance, was he not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Until March 1941 he was the General Secretary for Finance. In my first speech to the general secretaries I said that I would not ask any general secretary to do anything that was contrary to his conscience. If he thought that there was something he felt he could not do, then he could resign without any harm to himself. I said that all I asked was that he carry out my orders loyally as long as he remained in office. Mr. Trip was in office until March 1941, and then he resigned because there was something he refused to carry out. He did this without the slightest disadvantage to himself.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was his successor?
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to say that what Mr. Trip carried out until March 1941 is, in my opinion, justifiable in every respect. Otherwise he most certainly would not have done it. His successor was Mr. Rost van Tonningen. Rost van Tonningen was a League of Nations Commissioner in Austria who there had had tasks similar to those I gave him in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: What about the costs of occupation?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as the civilian administration was concerned, Mr. Trip and I agreed that I receive 3 million Builders a month. Then there was another 20 million in fines in addition to that. During the first 3 years I saved 60 million Builders, which remained in the Netherlands as a special bequest. As far as the cost of the military occupation was concerned, I had no authority to check that. The Armed Forces put in their demands to the Minister of Finance, and I then received orders to place the money at their disposal. During 1941, the Reich exacted indirect occupation costs. It took the point of view that not only the expenses which were incurred directly in the Netherlands should be paid for, but that the cost of preparations in the Reich should be borne too. Fifty million marks per month were demanded-partly in gold. Later this contribution was designated as voluntary assistance for the East...
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean marks, or do you mean guilders?
SEYSS-INQUART: Marks, 50 million marks. Later on this contribution was called voluntary assistance for the East, for political reasons, but of course it was not so. Later on, the Reich demanded that this sum be increased to 100 millions, but I refused.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. Trip retired as General Secretary for Finance because the foreign currency embargo, which still existed at the time between Germany and the Netherlands, was lifted?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is correct. I received a request by my administration for the purpose of intensifying economic exchanges between the Reich and the Netherlands-to lift the foreign currency embargo so that, without having recourse to banks of issues guilders could be exchanged for marks, and vice versa. The fundamental possibility of such exchanges had already been determined under Mr. Trip, but it was subject to the control of the bank of issue, that is to say, of the Netherlands Bank as well. Mr. Trip raised objections and I passed the matter on to Berlin Berlin decided that it was to be carried out and Mr. Trip resigned. I appointed Mr. Rost van Tonningen, President of the Bank of the Netherlands, and I published the decree. I wish to say that the President of the Reichsbank, Herr Funk, was against this procedure, and I can quote in explanation that at that time the effects could not be foreseen as turning out as catastrophic as they did later on. At that time the Netherlands were completely cut off, and the Reich had reached the height of its power. It was to be expected that the mark would become the leading currency in Europe, and that thereby the guilder would have been given the same importance. In February 1941, for instance, imports from the Reich into the Netherlands were greater than the exports from the Netherlands into the Reich. Reich Minister Funk always held the view that these were real debts, so that in the event of a different outcome of the war such debts which amounted to some 41/, billion would have had to be paid back to the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understood you correctly, it was your General Secretary for Finance, Dr. Fischbock, who suggested this matter contrary to the wishes of Trip.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know whether the suggestion came from Fischbock alone. I presume that he must have talked it over with other people; but it was he who put the matter to me.
DR. STEINBAUER: You have also been accused of imposing collective penalties in the form of fines, which is contrary to international law.
SEYSS-INQUART: Collective fines are prohibited under international law only in case of individual offenses. The large collective fine of 18 million guilders was imposed in connection with the general strike in Amsterdam, Arnhem, and Hilversum, in which the entire population took part. Later, I had collective fines paid back whenever it was discovered that definite individuals were responsible for the offense.
DR. STEINBAUER: Can you give us any example?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think witness Schwebel will be able to tell you that. It was in towns in the south of Holland where it happened.
DR. STEINBAUER: You are also accused by the Prosecution of responsibility for what happened in the hostage camp in Michelsgestel. What have you to say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I can take full and absolute responsibility for what happened in the hostage camp in St. Michelsgestel. It was not a hostage camp in the actual sense of the word: I took Dutchmen into custody only when they had shown themselves to be active in resistance movements. The camp at St. Michelsgestel was not a prison. I visited it. The inmates of the camp played golf. They were given leave, in the case of urgent family affairs or business matters. Not a single one of them was ever shot. I think the majority of the present Dutch Ministers were at St. Michelsgestel. It was a sort of protective custody to temporarily hinder them from continuing their anti-German activities.
DR. STEINBAUER: In addition to this you are said to have prohibited the reading of pastoral letters, and to have put Catholic priests and Lutheran ministers in concentration camps?