dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
which were subsequently given, had, however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate on a basis of this kind which would have been tolerable for Germany also. "The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland that she would render assistance to that country in all circumstances regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring, could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement thenceforward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German inhabitants living in Poland. "The atrocities which then have been taking place in that country are terrible for the victims, but intolerable for a great power such as the German Reich, which is expected to remain a passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has been guilty of numerous breaches of her legal obligations towards the Free City of Danzig, has made demands in the character of ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic strangulation." "Germany will not tolerate a continuance of the persecution of the Germans." "The German Reich government has received information to the effect that the British government has the intention to carry out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures other than those of a defensive character against England, or France, and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended, and does not in the future intend, to attack England, or France, it follows that this announcement, as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a contemplated act of menace directed against the Reich. I, therefore, inform your Excellency that in the event of these military announcements being carried into effect, I shall order immediate mobilization of the German forces." "The question of the treatment of European problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful
immediate mobilization of the German forces." "The question of the treatment of European problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of the responsible powers can there be any real change in the relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by British diplomacy-at any rate up to the present-has, however, convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be any change in this respect in the future, nobody could be happier than I." (TC-72 No. 60). On 25 August the formal Anglo-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance was signed in London. Each government undertook to give assistance to the other in the event of aggression against either by any third power. (TC-73 No. 91) A few days later the French Prime Minister Daladier addressed a letter to Hitler, which reads as follows: "The French ambassador in Berlin has informed me of your personal communication * * *. "In the hours in which you speak of the greatest responsibility which two heads of the governments can possibly take upon themselves, namely, that of shedding the blood of two great nations, who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to you personally, and to both our peoples to say that the fate of peace still rests in your hands. "You cannot doubt what are my own feelings towards Germany, nor France's peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman has done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations not only peace, but also sincere cooperation in their own interests, as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world. Unless you credit the French people with lower sense of honor, than I credit the German Nation with; you cannot doubt that France loyally fulfills her obligations towards other powers, such as Poland, which as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace with Germany. "These two convictions are fully compatible. "Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution of the international crisis, with all honor and dignity for all nations, if
loyally fulfills her obligations towards other powers, such as Poland, which as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace with Germany. "These two convictions are fully compatible. "Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution of the international crisis, with all honor and dignity for all nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides. "Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland's readiness, which she has always shown to submit to the mutual application of a method of open settlement, as it can be imagined between the governments of two sovereign nations. With the clearest conscience I can assure you that among the differences which have arisen between Germany and Poland over the question of Danzig, there is not one which could not be submitted to such a method, the purpose of reaching a peaceful and just solution. "Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is nothing in France's clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies, which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state of mind. "In so serious an hour, I sincerely believe that no highminded human being could understand it, if a war of destruction was started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace could in all certainty work for this aim, without any prejudice to German honor. I, who desire good harmony between the French and the German people, and who am on the other hand bound to Poland by bonds of friendship, and by a promise, am prepared, as head of the French government, to do everything an upright man can do to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion. "You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You know, as I do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war have left in the conscience of the peoples; without any regard to its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind's eye of your outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road of peace, towards the
war. You know, as I do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war have left in the conscience of the peoples; without any regard to its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind's eye of your outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road of peace, towards the fulfillment of its task in the common work of civilization, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion. "If French and German blood should be shed again, as it was shed 25 years ago, in a still longer and more murderous war, then each of the two nations will fight, believing in its own victory. But the most certain victors will be-destruction and barbarity." (TC-78) On 27 August Hitler replied to M. Daladier's letter of 26 August. The sense of it was very much the same as that which he wrote to the British prime Minister in answer to the letter which he had received from him earlier in the week. (TC-79) After the letters from Chamberlain and Daladier, the German Government could no longer be in any doubt as to the position of both the British and French Governments in the event of German aggression against Poland. But the pleas for peace did not end there. On 24 August president Roosevelt wrote to both Hitler and to the President of the Polish Republic (TC-72 No. 124). His letter stated in part: "In the message which I sent to you on the 14th April, I stated that it appeared to me that the leaders of great nations had it in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that impended, but that unless the effort were immediately made with good will on all sides to find a peaceful and constructive solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today that catastrophe appears to be very near at hand indeed. "To the message which I sent you last April I have received no reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world peace-which is the cause of humanity itself-rises above all other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you, with the hope that the war which impends and the consequent disaster to all peoples may yet be averted. "I therefore urge with all earnestness-and I am likewise urging the president of the Republic of
of humanity itself-rises above all other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you, with the hope that the war which impends and the consequent disaster to all peoples may yet be averted. "I therefore urge with all earnestness-and I am likewise urging the president of the Republic of Poland-that the Government of Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any positive act of hostility for a reasonable stipulated period, and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three following methods: "First, by direct negotiation; "Second, by the submission of these controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they can both have confidence; or "Third, that they agree to the solution of these controversies through the procedure of conciliation." (TC-72 No. 124). Hitler's answer to that letter was the order to his armed forces to invade Poland on the following morning. The reply to Mr. Roosevelt's letter from the President of the Polish Republic, however, was an acceptance of the offer to settle the differences by any of the peaceful methods suggested. (TC-72 No. 126) On 25 August, no reply having been received from the German Government, President Roosevelt wrote again: "I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply to the message which I addressed to your Excellency and to him last night." The Polish reply is then set out. "Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable. "In his reply to my message the president of Poland has made it plain that the Polish Government is willing, upon the basis set forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by direct negotiation or the process of conciliation. "Countless human lives can yet be saved and hope may still be restored that the nations of the modern world may even now construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too, will accept." (TC-72 No. 127) But Germany would not accept those
may even now construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too, will accept." (TC-72 No. 127) But Germany would not accept those proposals, nor would it pay heed to the Pope's appeal on the same date, 24 August (TC-72 No. 139). It is an appeal in similar terms. There was yet a further appeal from the Pope on 31 August: "The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations may lead to a just pacific solution such as the whole world continues to pray for." (TC-72 No. 141). Those negotiations, on the last days of August, to which the Pope referred as "pending negotiations", were unhappily, completely bogus negotiations insofar as Germany was concerned. They were put forward simply as an endeavor to dissuade England, either by threat or by bribe, from meeting her obligations to Poland. The final German "offers" were no offers in the accepted sense of the word. There was never any intention behind them of entering into discussions, negotiation, arbitration, or any other form of peaceful settlement with Poland. They were merely an attempt to make it easier to seize and conquer Poland than it would likely be if England and France were to observe the obligations they had undertaken. (6) Events of the Last Week in August, 1939. This was the progress of those last negotiations: On 22 August the German-Soviet Pact was signed. On 24 August, orders were given to the German armies to march the following morning. After those orders had been given, the news apparently reached the German Government that the British and polish Governments had signed a formal pact of non-aggression and of mutual assistance. Up until that time, the position was that the British prime Minister had made a statement in the House of Commons and a joint communiqué had been issued, on 6 April, that the two nations would in fact assist one another if either were attacked; but no formal agreement had been signed. Now, on 24 August, after the orders to march had been given by Hitler, the news came that such a formal document had been signed. The invasion was thereupon postponed for the sole purpose
on 6 April, that the two nations would in fact assist one another if either were attacked; but no formal agreement had been signed. Now, on 24 August, after the orders to march had been given by Hitler, the news came that such a formal document had been signed. The invasion was thereupon postponed for the sole purpose of making one last effort to keep England and France out of the war-not to cancel the war, but solely to keep England and France out of it. On 25 August, having postponed the invasion, Hitler issued a verbal communiqué to Sir Neville Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin, which was a mixture of bribe and threat, and with which he hoped to persuade England to keep out. On 28 August, Sir Neville Henderson handed the British Government's reply to that communiqué to Hitler. That reply stressed that the differences ought to be settled by agreement. The British Government put forward the view that Danzig should be guaranteed, and that any agreement reached should be guaranteed by other powers. Whether or not these proposals would have been acceptable or unacceptable to Germany are of no great matter. For once it had been made clear-as it was in the British Government's reply of 28 August-that England would not be put off assisting Poland in the event of German aggression, the German Government had no concern with further negotiation but was concerned only to afford itself some kind of justification and to prevent itself from appearing too blatantly to turn down all the appeals to reason that were being put forward. On 29 August, at 7:15 p. m. in the evening, Hitler handed to Sir Neville Henderson the German Government's answer to the British Government's reply of the 28th. It seems quite clear that the whole object of this letter was to put forward something which was quite unacceptable. Hitler agreed to enter into direct conversations as suggested by the British Government, but he demanded that those conversations must be based upon the return to the Reich, of Danzig and also of the whole of the Corridor. It will be recalled that hereto, even when he had alleged that Poland had renounced the 1934 agreement, Hitler had put forward as his demands the return of Danzig alone, Plus the arrangement for an
that those conversations must be based upon the return to the Reich, of Danzig and also of the whole of the Corridor. It will be recalled that hereto, even when he had alleged that Poland had renounced the 1934 agreement, Hitler had put forward as his demands the return of Danzig alone, Plus the arrangement for an extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad running through the Corridor to East Prussia. That demand was unacceptable at that time. To make quite certain of refusal, Hitler now demanded the whole of the Corridor. There was no question of an Autobahn or railway. The whole territory must become German. Even so, to make doubly certain that the offer would not be accepted, Hitler stated: "On those terms I am prepared to enter into discussion, but to do so, as the matter is urgent, I expect a plenipotentiary with full powers from the Polish Government to be here in Berlin by midnight tomorrow night, the 30th of August." This offer was made at 7:15 p. m. on the evening of the 29th. That offer had to be transmitted, first, to London; and from London to Warsaw; and from Warsaw the Polish Government had to give authority to their Ambassador in Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible, if indeed it were possible, to get authority to the Polish Ambassador in Berlin by midnight the following night. It allowed Poland no opportunity for discussing the matters at all. As Sir Neville Henderson described it, the offer amounted to an ultimatum. At midnight on 30 August, at the time by which the Polish Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Neville Henderson handed a further message to Ribbentrop in reply to the message that had been handed to him the previous evening. Ribbentrop read out in German a two- or three-page document which purported to be the German proposal to be discussed at the discussions between them and the Polish Government. He read it out quick?? in German. He refused to hand a copy of it to the British Ambassador. He passed no copy of it at all to the Polish Ambassador. So that there was no kind of possible chance of the Poles ever having before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously and magnanimously offering to discuss. On the following day,
to hand a copy of it to the British Ambassador. He passed no copy of it at all to the Polish Ambassador. So that there was no kind of possible chance of the Poles ever having before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously and magnanimously offering to discuss. On the following day, 31 August, Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, saw Ribbentrop, and could get no further than to be asked whether he came with full powers. When he replied that he did not, Ribbentrop said that he would put the position before the Fuehrer. But, in actual fact, it was much too late to put any position to the Fuehrer by that time, because on 31 August Hitler had already issued his Directive No. 1 for the conduct of war, in which he laid down H-Hour as being a quarter to five the following morning, 1 September. And on the evening of 31 August, at 9 o'clock, the German radio broadcast the proposals which Ribbentrop had read out to Sir Neville Henderson the night before, saying that these were the proposals which had been made for discussion, but that as no Polish Plenipotentiary had arrived to discuss them, the German Government assumed that they were turned down. That broadcast at 9 o'clock on the evening of 31 August was the first that the Poles had ever heard of the proposal, and it was the first that the British Government or its representatives in Berlin knew about them, other than what had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused to give a written copy on the evening of the 30th. After that broadcast, at 9:15-perhaps while the broadcast was still in its course-a copy of those proposals was handed to Sir Neville Henderson for the first time. This summary of events during that last week of August 1939 is based upon the contents of several documents which will now be alluded to. In a pre-trial interrogation on 29 August 1945, Goering was asked the question: "When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty at the end of March or the beginning of April, was it not fairly obvious that a peaceful solution was impossible?" (TC-90) This was Goering's answer: "Yes, it seemed impossible according to my conviction, but not according to the convictions of the
Minister in London brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty at the end of March or the beginning of April, was it not fairly obvious that a peaceful solution was impossible?" (TC-90) This was Goering's answer: "Yes, it seemed impossible according to my conviction, but not according to the convictions of the Fuehrer. When it was mentioned to the Fuehrer that England had given her guarantee to Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Rumania, but then when the Russians took Bessarabia nothing happened, and this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether this was just temporary or for good. He said, 'No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.' So then I asked him, 'Do you think that it will be any different within four or five days?' At this same time-I don't know whether you know about that, Colonel-I was in connection with Lord Halifax by a special courier outside the regular diplomatic channels to do everything to stop war with England. After the guarantee I held an English declaration of war inevitable. I already told him in the Spring of 1939 after occupying Czechoslovakia, I told him that from now on if he tried to solve the Polish question he would have to count on the enmity of England. 1939, that is after the Protectorate." (TC-90) The interrogation of Goering proceeded as follows: "Question: 'Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign against Poland were originally supposed to have been completed by the end of August 1939?' "Answer: 'Yes.' "Question: 'And that the final issuance of the order for the campaign against Poland came some time between the 15th and 20th of August 1939 after the signing of the treaty with Soviet Russia." [The dates obviously are wrong]. "Answer: 'Yes, that is true.' "Question: 'Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign was ordered for the 25th of August, but on the 24th of August in the