dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ROBERTS: No, I don't. I was going to summarize these charges. If your Lordship would be good enough to look at the bottom of the first page, you will see the so-called ultimatum complaining of the hostile expressions in the Belgian and Netherlands press; and then, My Lord, in the second paragraph over the page there is an allegation of the attempts of the British Intelligence to bring a revolution in Germany with the assistance of Belgium and the Netherlands. Then, My Lord, in Paragraph 3 reference is made to military preparation of the two countries; and in Paragraph 4 it is pointed out that Belgium has fortified the Belgian-German frontier. A complaint is made in regard to Holland in Paragraph 5 that British aircraft have flown over the Netherlands' country. There are, My Lord, other charges made against the neutrality of these two countries although no instances are given. I don't think I need refer to anything on Page 3 of the document. Page 4, My Lord-I would like, if I might, to read the middle paragraph: "In this struggle for existence, forced upon the German people by England and France, the Reich Government are not disposed to await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow them to carry the war over Belgium and the other Netherlands into German territory." And, My Lord, I just emphasize this sentence and then I read no further: "They have, therefore, now issued the command to German troops to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the military means at the disposal of the Reich;" My Lord, it is unnecessary, in my submission, to emphasize the falsity of that statement. The world now knows that for months preparations had been made to violate the neutrality of these three countries. This document is saying the orders to do so have now been issued. My Lord, a similar document, similar in terms altogether was handed to the representatives of the Netherlands Government; My Cord, TC-60 - that will be GB-113, which is the last document but one in the bundle.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, that is a memorandum to the Luxembourg Government, which enclosed with it a copy of the document handed to the Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands. My Lord, I only desire to emphasize the second paragraph of TC-60: "In defense against the imminent attack the German troops have now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two countries...." My Lord, the last document, TC-59; which I formerly put in, that is GB-111. My Lord, that is the dignified protest of the Belgian Government against the crime which was committed against her. My Cord, those are the facts supporting the charges of the violation of treaties and assurances against these three countries and supporting the allegation of the making of an aggressive war against them. My Lord, in the respectful submission of the Prosecution here the story is a very plain, a very simple one, a story of perfidy, dishonor, and shame.
COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, it is my task to present the evidence on the wars of aggression and wars in breach of treaties against Greece and Yugoslavia. The evidence which I shall put in to the Tribunal has been prepared in collaboration with my American colleague, Lieutenant Colonel Krucker. The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia by the Germans, which took place in the early hours of the morning of the 6th of April 1941, constituted direct breaches of the Hague Convention of 1899 on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 . Those breaches are charged, respectively, at Paragraphs I and XIII of Appendix C of the Indictment . Both have already been put in by my learned friend, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who also explained the obligation of the German Government to the Governments of Yugoslavia and Greece under those pacts. In the case of Yugoslavia the invasion further constituted a breach of an express assurance by the Nazis, which is charged at Paragraph XXVI of Appendix C . This assurance was originally given in a German Foreign Office release made in Berlin on the 28th of April 1938 but was subsequently repeated by Hitler himself on the 6th of October 1939 in a speech he made in the Reichstag, and it is in respect of this last occasion that the assurance is specifically pleaded in the Indictment. May I ask the Tribunal to turn now to the first document in the document book, which is Book Number 5. The first document is 2719-PS, which is part of the document which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-58. This is the ted of the German Foreign Office release on the 28th of April 1938, and I would read the beginning and then the last paragraph but one on the page: "Berlin, the 28th of April 1338. The State Secretary of the German Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Representatives. "As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich we have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Hungary. These frontiers are regarded by us as final and inviolable.
COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): On this point the following special declarations have been made ...." And then to the last paragraph: "3. Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government have been informed by authoritative German quarters that German policy has no aims beyond Austria, and that the Yugoslav frontier would in any case remain untouched. In his speech made at Grazon the 3rd of April of that year the Fuehrer and Chancellor stated that in regard to the reunion of Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the same attitude as Italy. We were happy to have frontiers there which relieved us of all anxiety about providing military protection for them." Then, if I may, I will pass to the second document in the book, TC-92, and offer that as Exhibit GB-114. This is an extract from a speech made by Hitler on the occasion of the dinner in honor of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia on June 1, 1939. I will read the extract in full: "The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of the tragic confusion of the World War. The German soldier then learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent. I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual respect finds codification in common political, cultural, and economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness' present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and at the same time, on that account we derive from it the hope that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop in the future and to grow ever closer. "In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange of views which-and of this I am convinced-in this sense can only be fruitful to our two peoples and States.
COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): I believe this all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship of Germany and Yugoslavia, now that owing to historical events we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and countries but can also represent an element of calm to our nerve-racked continent. This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to perform really constructive work;" As we now know this speech was made at the time when Hitler had already decided upon the European war. I think I am right in saying it was a week after the Reich Chancellery conference, known as the Schmundt note, to which the Tribunal has been referred more than once. The reference to "nerve-racked continent" might perhaps be attributed to the war of nerves which Hitler had himself been conducting for many months. Now I pass to a document which is specifically pleaded at Paragraph XXVI as the assurance breached; it is the next document in the bundle, TC-43 - German assurance to Yugoslavia of the 6th of October 1939. It is part of the document which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-80. This is an extract from the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik: "Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country would also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to live in peace and friendship with her." Despite the obligation of Germany under the Convention of 1899 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact and under the assurances which I have read, the fate of both Greece and Yugoslavia had, as we now know, been sealed ever since the meeting between Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and Ciano at Obersalzberg, on the 12th and 13th of August 1939. We will pass to the next document in the bundle, which is TC-77.
COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): That document has already been put in as GB 48; and the passages to which I would draw Your Lordship's attention already have been quoted, I think, by my learned friend, the Attorney General Those passages are on Page 2 in the last paragraph from "Generally speaking . . ." until ". . . neutral of this kind," and then again on Pages 7 and 8, the part quoted by the Attorney General and emphasized particularly by Colonel Griffith-Jones at the foot of Page 7 on the second day of the meeting, the words beginning "In general, however, success by one of the Axis partners . . ." to ". . . Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work against the West." Both of those passages have been quoted before; and if I might sum up the effect of the meeting as revealed by the document as a whole, it shows Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop, only 2 months after the dinner to the Prince Regent, seeking to persuade the Italians to make war on Yugoslavia at the same time that Germany commences hostilities against Poland, as Hitler had decided to do in the very near future. Ciano, while evidently in entire agreement with Hitler and Ribbentrop as to the desirability of liquidating Yugoslavia and himself anxious to secure Salonika, stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general European war. Despite all the persuasion which Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop exerted at the meeting, it became necessary for the Nazi conspirators to reassure their intended victim, Yugoslavia, since in fact Italy maintained her position and did not enter the war when the Germans invaded Poland, while the Germans themselves were not yet ready to strike in the Balkans. It was just for this reason that on the 6th of October through Hitler's speech they repeated the assurance they had given in April 1938.
COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): It is, of course, a matter of history that after the defeat of the Allied armies in May and June 1940 the Italian Government declared war on France and that subsequently at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 28th October 1940 the Italian Minister at Athens presented the Greek Government with a 3 hours' ultimatum upon the expiry of which Italian troops were already invading the soil of Greece. If I may quote to the Tribunal the words in which His Majesty's Minister reported that event, "The President of the Council has assured himself an outstanding . . ."
THE PRESIDENT: You have referred to a document?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not in any of my documents. It is merely carrying the story to the next document: "The President of the Council has assured himself an outstanding place in Greek history, and whatever the future may bring, his foresight in quietly preparing his country for war, and his courage in resisting without demur The Italian ultimatum when delivered in the small hours of that October morning will surely obtain an honorable mention in the story of European statecraft. He means to fight until Italy is completely defeated, and this reflects the purpose of the whole Greek nation." I turn now to the next document in the bundle. That is 2762-PS, a letter from timer to Mussolini, which I put in as GB-115. Although not dated, I think it is clear from the contents that it was written shortly after the Italian invasion of Greece. It has been quoted in full by the attorney General, but I think it would assist the Tribunal if I read just the last two paragraphs of the extract: "Yugoslavia must become disinterested if possible, however, from our point of view interested in co-operating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without assurances from Yugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans. "Unfortunately I must stress the fact that waging a war in the Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore any threatening move towards Yugoslavia would be useless since the impossibility of a materialization of such threats before March is well known to the Serbian General Staff. Therefore Yugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by other means and other ways." You may think the reference in the first two lines to his thoughts - having been with Mussolini for the last 14 days - probably indicates that it was written in about the middle of November, shortly after the Italian attacks.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you give us the date of the Italian attack?
COL.PHILLIMORE: 28th October 199~0. THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
COL. PHILLIMORE: As the Tribunal will see from the succeeding document, it was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the offensive in the spring of 1941, which included the invasion of Greece from the north. This letter shows that it was an integral part of those plans that Yugoslavia should be induced to co-operate in them or at least to maintain a disinterested attitude toward the liquidation of the other Balkan states. I pass now to the next document in the bundle, 444-PS, which becomes Exhibit GB-116. It is a top-secret directive issued from the Fuehrer's headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by the Defendant Jodl, and dated the 12th of November 1940. I will read the first two lines and then pass to Paragraph 4 on the third page: "Directive Number 18. The preparatory measures of Supreme Headquarters' for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines . . ." Omitting the serious dealings with operations against Gibraltar and an offensive against Egypt, I will read Paragraph 4 on the third page: "Balkans . . . The Commander-in-Chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German Air Force units against targets in the eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Romanian oil area. "In order to be able to face ad eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of 10 divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway leading through Yugoslavia for moving these forces into position.. ' "So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Romania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.
COL. PHILLIMORE: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force will make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the southeast Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria in accordance with the intended ground operations." I don't think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next document in the bundle, 1541-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit GB-117, is the directive issued for the actual attack on Greece. Before reading it, it might be convenient if I summarized the position of the Italian invading forces at that time as this is one of the factors mentioned by Hitler in the directive. I can put it very shortly. I again use the words in which His Majesty's Minister reported: "The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the highest, and our own naval and land successes at Taranto and in the western desert have done much to maintain it. "With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not unworthy of the ancient traditions of their country and that they, like their. distant forefathers, are prepared to fight against odds to maintain their freedom." In fact the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time that Hitler came to the rescue. Accordingly this directive was issued on 13 December 1940; it is top-secret Directive Number 20 for the Operation Marita. The distribution included, of course, the Commander of the Navy, that would, of course, be the Defendant Raeder; one to the Commander of the Air Force, which would be the Defendant Goering; one to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; and one to the Command Stay, which I take it, would be the Defendant Jodl I shall read the first two paragraphs and then summarize the next two, if I may: "The result in the battles of Albania is not yet decisive.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the British endeavor to create air bases under the protection of a Balkan front-which would be dangerous above all to Italy as wed as to the Romanian oil fields-be foiled. "My plan, therefore, is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in southern Romania within the next months (b) after the setting in R favorable weather-probably in March-to send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way of Bulgaria and, if necessary, to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected." The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and Paragraph 4 deals with the Operation Marita itself. Paragraph states: "The military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of all the necessary measures by the High Command. The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Romania will be reported step by step by the High Command of the Armed Forces and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission in Romania. Consultations with the Romanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent, also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties." I think I need not trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next document, 448-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-118, is again a topsecret directive carrying the plan a little further; it deals with decidedly different aspects, the direct support of the Italian forces in Albania. I read, if I may, the first short paragraph and then the paragraph at the foot of the page.
COL. PHILLIMORE: "The situation in the Mediterranean theater of operations demands German assistance for strategical, political, and psychological reasons due to employment of superior farces by England against our allies." And in Paragraph 3 after dealing with the forces to be transferred to Albania the directive sets out what the duties of the German forces will be: "a) To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case should new crises arise there. "b) To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim: "To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a far-reaching operation. "To open up the straits west of Salonika from the back in order to support thereby the frontal attack of Eist's army." That directive was signed by Hitler and, as can be seen on the original which I have put in, it was initialed by both the Defendant Keitel and the Defendant Jodl Here again, of course, a cop, went to the Defendant Raeder, and I take it that the copy sent to foreign intelligence would probably reach the Defendant Ribbentrop. I pass to C-134, the next document in the bundle, which becomes Exhibit GB-119. This records a conference which took place on the 19th and 20th of January between the Defendant Keitel and the Italian General Guzzoni and which was followed by a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at which the Defendants 3Ribbentrop, Keitel, and Jodl were present. I need not trouble the Tribunal with the meeting with the Italians, but if you would pass to Page 3 of the document, there is a paragraph there in the speech which the Fuehrer made, which is perhaps just worth reading - the speech by the Fuehrer on the 20th of January 1941, in the middle of Page 3. It sets out that the speech was made after the conference with the Italians and then shows who was present. On the German side I would call your attention to the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, and the Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff.
COL. PHILLIMORE: That is, of course, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel and Jodl; and on the Italian side, the Duce, Ciano, and then three generals. It is the last paragraph that I would wish to read: "The massing of troops in Romania serves a threefold purpose: "a. An operation against Greece; "b. Protection of Bulgaria against :Russia and Turkey; "c. Safeguarding the guarantee to Romania. "Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces; altogether, therefore, very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time. ~ "Desirable that this deployment is completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment." I pass to the next document, 1746-PS, which I offer as GB-120. That document is in three parts. It consists, in the first place, of a conference between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarians on the 8th of February. The second part and the third part deal with later events, and I will, if I may, come back to them at an appropriate time. I would read the first and the last paragraphs on the first page d this document: "Minutes of questions discussed between the representatives of the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German High Command-General Field Marshal List-in connection with the possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their commitment against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she should involve herself in the war." And then the last paragraph on the page shows the plan being concerted with the Bulgarians-Paragraph 3: "The Bulgarian and the German General Staffs will take all measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the operations and to assure in this way the most favorable conditions for the execution of the German operations as planned.
COL. PHILLIMORE: "The representatives of the two general staffs consider it suitable to inform their governments that it will advisable of necessity to take secrecy and surprise into consideration when the Three Power Treaty is signed by Bulgaria, in order to assure the success of the military operations." I pass then to the next document, C-59. I offer that as Exhibit GB-121. It is a further top-secret directive of the 19th of February. I need not, I think, read it. All that is set out of importance is the date for the Operation Marita. It sets out that the bridge across the Danube is to be begun on the 28th of February, the river crossed on the 2d of March, and the final orders to be issued on the 26th of February at the latest. It is perhaps worth noting that on the original which I have put in, the actual dates are filled in in the handwriting of the Defendant Keitel. It is perhaps just worth setting out the position of Bulgaria at this moment. Bulgaria adhered to the Three Power Pact on the 1st of March . . .
THE PRESIDENT: What year?