dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus bought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under those circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision-at a favorable moment, to make a clean breast of his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk. "Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed. "On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis. "Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier. "The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence. "Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan. "The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words. "Berlin, the 4th of April 1941. "(signed) SCHMIDT" (1881-PS) LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PLOTTING OF AGGRESSIVE W A R Document Description Vol. Page Charter of the International military Tribunal, Article 6 (a)........... I 5 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F): V................I 22,29 Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. Double (**) before a document was referred to during the trial but
I 5 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F): V................I 22,29 Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. Double (**) before a document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following e description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by court. *386-PS Notes on a conference with Hitler in the Reich chancellery, Berlin, 5 November 1937, signed by Hitler's adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. (USA 25)..III 295 *388-PS File of papers on Case Green (the plan for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept by Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant, April-October 1938. (USA 26) .....III 305 442-PS General Order No. 16 on the preparation of a landing operation against England, 16 July 1940, initialed by Jodl and Keitel...III 399 *446-PS Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl, Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, concerning the Invasion of Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31)...III 407 *789-PS Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, 23 November 1939, to which all Supreme Commanders were ordered. (USA 23)...572 *798-PS Hitler's speech to Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 29).......... III 581 *1014-PS Hitler's speech to Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August 1939. (USA 30)........IV 522 *1881-PS Notes on conference between Hitler and Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop in Berlin, 4 April 1941. (USA 33)....... IV 522 *2261-PS Directive from Blomberg to Supreme Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council for defense of the Reich. (USA 24)...IV 934 *2718-PS Memorandum "About the result of today's discussion with State Secretaries about Barbarossa", 2 May 1941. (USA 32) ...V 378 *D-660 Extracts from Hutchinson's Illustrated edition of Mein Kampf. (GB 128).....VII 164 **L-3 Contents of Hitler's talk to Supreme Commander and Commanding Generals, Obersalzberg, 22 August
Memorandum "About the result of today's discussion with State Secretaries about Barbarossa", 2 May 1941. (USA 32) ...V 378 *D-660 Extracts from Hutchinson's Illustrated edition of Mein Kampf. (GB 128).....VII 164 **L-3 Contents of Hitler's talk to Supreme Commander and Commanding Generals, Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 28) (Referred to but not offered in evidence) ... VII 752 *L-79 Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, "Indoctrination of the political situation and future aims". (USA 27)...VII 847 2. PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSION: 1933-1936 By 1933 the Nazi Party, the NSDAP, had reached very substantial proportions. At that time its plans called for the acquisition of political control of Germany. This was indispensable for consolidation, within the country, of all the internal resources and potentialities. As soon as there was sufficient progress along this line of internal consolidation, the next step was to become disengaged from some of the external disadvantages of existing international limitations and obligations. The restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development of strength in all the fields necessary if Germany were to make war. Although there had been an increasing amount of circumvention and violation from the very time that the Versailles Treaty came into effect, such operations under disguise and subterfuge could not attain proportions adequate for the objectives of the Nazis. To get the Treaty of Versailles out of the way was indispensable to the development of the extensive military power which they had to have for their purposes. It was as a part of same plan and for the same reason that Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. It was impossible for the Nazis to carry out their plan on the basis of existing international obligations or on the basis of the orthodox kind of future commitments. Every military and diplomatic operation undertaken by the Nazis was preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all participating forces. At the same time each event was part of a long prepared plan of aggression. Each represented a necessary step in the preparation of aggression. Each represented a necessary step in
undertaken by the Nazis was preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all participating forces. At the same time each event was part of a long prepared plan of aggression. Each represented a necessary step in the preparation of aggression. Each represented a necessary step in the preparation of the schedule of aggressions which was subsequently carried out. Three of the steps in preparation for aggression were first, the withdrawal from the Disarmament conference and the League of Nation; second, the institution of compulsory military service; and, third, the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Each of these steps was progressively more serious in the matter of international relations. In each of these steps Germany anticipated the possibility of sanctions being applied by other countries, and, particularly, a strong military action from France with the possible assistance of England. However, the conspirators were determined that nothing less than a preventive war would stop them, and they also estimated correctly that on one or combination of big powers would undertake the responsibility for such a war. The withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and from the league of Nations was, of course, conspiracy and the plan for aggression. The announcement action. It was a violation of the Versailles Treaty, but the Nazis got away with it, Then came outright military service was a more daring action. It was a violation the Versailles Treaty, but the Nazi got away with it, then came outright military defiance, with the occupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. A. Planning to Overthrow the Versailles Treaty. The determination and the plans of the Nazi conspirators to remove the restrictions of Versailles, started very early. This fact is confirmed by their own statements, their boasts of long planning and careful execution. Hitler, in his speech to all Supreme Commanders on 23 November 1939, stated that his primary goal was to wipe out Versailles (789-PS). And Jodl, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, delivered and address after four years of war, on 7 November 1943, which he traced the development of German strength (L-172).an address after four years of war, on 7
on 23 November 1939, stated that his primary goal was to wipe out Versailles (789-PS). And Jodl, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, delivered and address after four years of war, on 7 November 1943, which he traced the development of German strength (L-172).an address after four years of war, on 7 November 1943, in which he traced the development of German strength(L-172). The seizure of power to him meant the restoration of fighting sovereignty, including conscription, occupation of the Rhineland, and rearmament, with special emphasis on modern armor and air forces. In his speech, entitled " The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the 5th years of war," General Jodl gave a retrospective summary of the war for the benefit of the Reich and Gau leaders. He stated: "Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you a review today of the strategic position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War. "I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say openly what is. No one-the Fuehrer has ordered-may know more or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all in my mind, Gentlemen, but hat you need a great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your Gaus, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumours concentrate, that try to find themselves a plan among our people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or-as they call it-a political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use of to attack the natural sense of the people, that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncolored account of the state of affairs.
is the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncolored account of the state of affairs. This is nor forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by the force of arms but by the will of the whole people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home. Italy suffered not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected but-through the cowardice of these criminal traitors-a fate thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and date concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the people. "The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the danger which menaced us both from Poland and from the Western powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean, and in that of Russia-these also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war so log as we were successful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more than we could do and set out aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own explanatory activities is one of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts: 'I. A review of the most important development up to the present. "II. Consideration of the present situation. "III. The foundation of our morale and our confidence in victory. "In view of
own explanatory activities is one of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts: 'I. A review of the most important development up to the present. "II. Consideration of the present situation. "III. The foundation of our morale and our confidence in victory. "In view of my position as military advisor to the Fuehrer, I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this way be giving expression only to one side of events. "I. Review "1. The fact that the National Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National Socialist movement in reawakening the will to fight [Wehrwillen] in nurturing fighting strength [Wehrkraft] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small Reichswehr would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Fuehrer aimed at-and has so happily been successful in bringing about-was the fusion of these two forces. "2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first place restoration of fighting sovereignty [Wehrhoheit-conscription, occupation of the Rhineland] and rearmament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm. "3. The Austrian 'Anschluss' in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. "Its own strategic position had now become so
up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. "Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigour before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive. "This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the West Wall, which, in contra-distinction to the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear cover for an active policy in the East. "4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of the more or less favourable strategic premises. "This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland-in itself unavoidable-was favorably selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in doubt since the opponent-after all, not inconsiderable in himself-collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possibilities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course of the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said beyond that it proved in a measure which made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up till then had not been certain by any means; that is, the high state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Great Germany." (L-172). In this speech General Jodl identifies himself fully with the Nazi movement. His own words show that he was not a mere soldier. Insofar as he is concerned, his speech identifies the military with the political, it also shows the deliberation with which the Treaty of Versailles was abrogated by Germany and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was militarized and fortified. In one of
show that he was not a mere soldier. Insofar as he is concerned, his speech identifies the military with the political, it also shows the deliberation with which the Treaty of Versailles was abrogated by Germany and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was militarized and fortified. In one of Adolf Hitler's reviews of the six-year period between his ascendancy to power and the outbreak of hostilities, he not only admitted but boasted about the orderly and coordinated long-range planning. The minutes of conference of the Fuehrer kept by Schmundt, his adjutant, contain the following passage: "In the period 1933-1939 progress was made in all fields. Our military system improved enormously." "The period which lies behind us has, indeed, been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims." (L-79). B. Economic and Financial Preparations for Aggressive War. One of the most significant preparations for aggressive war is found in the Secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 (2261-PS). The law went into effect upon its passage. It stated at its outset that it was to be made public instant, but at the end of it Adolf Hitler signed the decree ordering that it be kept secret. General Thomas, who was in charge of War Armament Economy and for some time a high ranking member of the German High Command, refers to this law as the cornerstone of war preparations. He points out that, although the law was not made public until the outbreak of war, it was put into immediate execution as a program for preparations. These statements are made at page 25 of General Thomas' work, "A History of the German War and Armament Economy, 1923-1944." (2853-PS). This secret law remained in effect until 4 September 1939, at which time it was replaced by another secret defense law (2194-PS) revising the system of defense organization and directing more detailed preparations for the approaching status of "mobilization," which was clearly an euphemism for war. The covering letter, under which this second Reich Defense Law, was sent to the Ministry for Economy and Labor for Saxony in Dresden, on 6 December 1939, was classified Top Secret and read as follows: "Transportation Section, attention of
approaching status of "mobilization," which was clearly an euphemism for war. The covering letter, under which this second Reich Defense Law, was sent to the Ministry for Economy and Labor for Saxony in Dresden, on 6 December 1939, was classified Top Secret and read as follows: "Transportation Section, attention of Construction Chief Counsellor Hirches, or representative in the office of the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, received Prague, 5 September 1939, No. 274. "Inclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938 and a copy each of the decrees of the Reich Minister of Transportation, dated 7 October 1938, RL 10.2212/38, top secret, and of 17 July 1939, RL / LV 1.2173/39, top secret. For your information and observance, by order, signed Kretzchmar. 3 inclosures completed to Dresden, 4 September 1939, signed Schneider 3 inclosures. Receipt for the letter of 4 September 1939, with 3 inclosures, signed 5 September, 1939, and returned to construction Counsellor Kretzchmar." (2194-PS) Thus the second secret Reich Defense Law was transmitted under top secret cover. The general plan for the breach of the Treaty of Versailles and for the ensuing aggressions was carried out in four ways: (1) secret rearmament from 1933 to March 1935; (2) the training of military personnel (that includes secret or camouflage training); (3) production of munitions of war; (4) the building of an air force. The facts of rearmament and of secrecy are self-evident from the events that followed. The significant phase of this activity lies in the fact that it was necessary in order to break the barriers of the Treaty of Versailles and of the Locarno Pact, and to make ready for aggressive wars which were to follow. Those activities by their nature and extent, could only have been for aggressive purposes. The highest importance which the German government attached to the secrecy of the program is emphasized by the disguised methods of financing utilized both before and after the announcement of conscription, and the rebuilding of the army, on 16 March 1935. The point is illustrated by an unsigned memorandum by Schacht dated 3 May 1935, entitled, "The Financing of the Armament program, "Finanzierung der Ruestung." (1168-PS)