dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ALDERMAN: Most of the conversations transcribed and recorded in the volume I have offered, were conducted by the Defendant Goering, although at least one interesting one was conducted by Hitler. For purposes of convenience our staff has marked these telephone calls in pencil with an identifying letter running from "A" through "Z" and then to "AA." Eleven of these conversations have been determined by a screening process to be relevant to the evidence of this particular time. All the conversations which have been translated have been mimeographed and are included in the document books handed to the defendants. The original binder contains, of course, the complete set of conversations. A very extensive and interesting account of events with which we are much concerned can be developed from quotations from these translated conversations. I turn now to copies of the telephone conversations. The first group in Part A of the binder took place between Field Marshal Goering, who was identified by the letter "F" for Field Marshal, and Seyss-Inquart, who was identified as 'S". The transcript prepared by the Research Institute of the Air Ministry is in part in the language of these two persons and is in part a summary of the actual conversations. I quote from Part A of this binder, and because of the corroborated nature of this transcript and its obvious authenticity, I propose to quote this conversation in full. "F"-hereafter I shall use Goering and Seyss-Inquart- "F: How do you do, doctor? My brother-in-law, is he with you?' "Seyss-Inquart: 'No."' Hereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn: "Goering: 'How are things with you? Have you resigned or do you have any news?' "Seyss-Inquart: 'The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for Sunday, and therefore he has put S' "-Seyss-Inquart- " 'and the other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being ordered; among others, curfew at 8 p.
MR. ALDERMAN: m.' "Goering replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment he could not commit himself officially. Goering will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections he could see a postponement only, not a change of the present situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement. "Thereafter a conversation took place between Goering and the Fuehrer. Afterwards Goering again telephoned Seyss-Inquart. This conversation was held at 15:05. "Goering told Seyss-Inquart that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy any more the confidence of our Government because he had broken the Berchtesgaden Agreement, and therefore further confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently the national Ministers, Seyss-Inquart, and the others are being requested immediately to hand in their resignations to the Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. Goering added that if after a period of 1 hour no report had come through, the assumption would be made that Seyss-Inquart would no more be in a position to telephone. That would mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. Seyss-Inquart was then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon. As a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal President for Seyss-Inquart to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnigg's resignation." Thus you see that at 2:45 p.m. Goering told Seyss-Inquart over the telephone that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the elections; and 20 minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state that Schuschnigg must resign. That is your second ultimatum. When informed about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned he pointed out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head of the Cabinet. Shall I go into another one of these?
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn now until 2 o'clock. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, an hour later, following the conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart with which I dealt this morning, the Defendant Goering telephoned to Dombrowski in the German Legation in Vienna. I have reference to the telephone conversation marked "TT" on Page 2, Part C, of Document 2949-PS. In that conversation, in the first place, the Defendant Goering showed concern that the Nazi Party and all of its organizations should be definitely legalized promptly. I quote from Page 2 of the transcript: "Goering: 'Now to go on, the Party has definitely been legalized?' "Dombrowski: 'But that is-it is not necessary even to discuss that?' "Goering: 'With all of its organizations.' "Dombrowski: 'With all of its organizations within this country.' "Goering: 'In uniform?' "Dombrowski: 'In uniform. "Goering: 'Good.' "Dombrowski calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have already been on duty for one-half hour, which means everything is all right." In addition, Goering stated that the Cabinet-the Austrian Cabinet-must be formed by 7:30 p.m. and he transmitted instructions to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart as to who should be appointed to the Cabinet. I quote from Page 3 of the English text of the transcript of the conversation: "Goering: 'Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Fuehrer, and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One thing I have forgotten: Fischbodk must have the Department of Economy and Commerce.' "Dombrowski: That is understood.' "Goering: 'Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security and Bahr is to have the Armed Forces.
MR. ALDERMAN: The Austrian Army is to be taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the Justice Department.' "Dombrowski: 'Yes, yes.' "Goering: 'Give me the name.' "Dombrowski: 'Well, your brother-in-law, isn't that right?"' -That is Huber, the brother-in-law of the Defendant Goering.- "Goering: 'Yes.' "Dombrowski: 'Yes.' "Goering: 'That's right, and then also Fischböck."' And about 20 minutes later, at 5:26 p.m., Goering was faced with the news that Miklas, the President, was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, and he issued instructions as to the ultimatum that was to be delivered to Miklas. I quote from the telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart, in Part E of the folder, the part marked with capital R, Pages 1 and 2: "Goering: 'Now remember the following: You go immediately, together with Lieutenant General Muff, and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the frontier, will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lieutenant General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please inform us immediately about Miklas' position. Tell him there is no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we received before, action was delayed, but now the situation is such that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship."' -There follows in the transcript a sentence which is broken up.-" M." -I suppose that means Lieutenant General Muff.-" 'does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party with all its organizations.' " -There is again an interruption in the transcript.-" 'And then call out all the National Socialists all over the country.
MR. ALDERMAN: They should now be in the streets; so remember, report must be given by 7:30. Lieutenant General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4 minutes.' " An hour later, at 6:28 p.m., Goering had an extensively interrupted telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When he told Keppler that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Goering said-I read from Part H, about a third of the way down on the page: "Goering: 'Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him. Just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that S. I."' -Seyss-Inquart-" 'shall call on the National Socialist guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order."' After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed the Defendant Goering that Miklas was still sticking to his old viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to him, and there might be definite word in about 10 minutes. The conversation proceeded as follows-I quote from Page 2 of Part H. beginning about the middle of the page: "Goering: 'Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes back; then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich Chancery as usual, but it has to be done fast. I can hardly justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power. All right?' "Seyss-Inquart: 'But if he threatens?' "Goering: 'Yes.' "Seyss-Inquart: 'Well, I see; then we shall be ready.' "Goering: 'Call me via Blitz.' " In other words, Goering and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas retrained obdurate. The plan which was already discussed involved the use of both the National Socialist forces in Austria and the German troops who had been crossing the borders. Later that night Goering and Seyss-Inquart had another conversation at about 11 o'clock. This was after the ultimatum had expired.
MR. ALDERMAN: Seyss-Inquart informed Goering that Miklas was still refusing to name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as follows, and I quote from Part I of this folder: "Goering: 'OK' "-What's the German word for OK? Schön.-" 'I shall give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I shall tell you now. Everyone who offers resistance or organizes resistance will immediately be subjected to our court martial, the court martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?' "Seyss-Inquart: 'Yes.' "Goering: Including leading personalities; it does not make any difference.' "Seyss-Inquart: 'Yes, they have given the order not to offer any resistance.' "Goering: 'Yes, it does not matter; the Federal President did not authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.' "Seyss-Inquart: 'Yes.' "Goering: 'Well, now you are officially authorized.' "Seyss-Inquart: 'Yes.' "Goering: Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.' " I am sorry; that conversation took place at 8 o'clock instead of 11. I meant to say 8 o'clock. It is quite interesting to me that when the Defendant Goering was planning to invade a peaceful neighboring state, he planned to try what he referred to as major war criminals before German court martial, the leading personalities. So much for the conversation with respect to the plan of action for taking over power. Something else very significant was sent on that subject over the telephone, at least so far as those transcripts indicate. But there was another historical event which was discussed over the telephone. I refer to the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart sent to the German Government requesting the German Government to send troops into Austria to help Seyss-Inquart put down disorder. A conversation held at 8:48 that night between Goering and Keppler proceeded as follows-I read from Page 1 of Part L: "Goering: 'Well, I do not know yet.
MR. ALDERMAN: Listen, the main thing is that if Inquart takes over all powers of Government he keeps the radio stations occupied.' "Keppler: 'Well, we represent the Government now.' "Goering: 'Yes, that's it. You are the Government. Listen carefully. The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes: The provisional Austrian Government which, after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, considered it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request for support in its task of preventing bloodshed. For this purpose, it asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible.' "Keppler: 'Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets but everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the professional groups."' Now let us talk about sending German troops to put down disorder. The SA and the SS were marching in the streets, but everything was quiet. And a few minutes later, the conversation continued thus, reading from Page 2 of Part L: "Goering: 'Then our troops will cross the border today.' "Keppler: 'Yes.' "Goering: 'Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible.' "Keppler: 'Well, send the telegram to Seyss-Inquart in the office of the Federal Chancellor.' "Goering: 'Please show him the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are asking him-well, he does not even need to send the telegram. All he needs to do is to say, "Agreed." ' "Keppler: 'Yes.' . "Goering: 'He should call me at the Fuehrer's or at my place. Well, good luck. Heil Hitler."' Well, of course, he did not need to send the telegram because Goering wrote the telegram. He already had it. It must be recalled that in the first conversation, Part A, held at 3:05 p.m., Goering had requested Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon, but now the matter was so urgent that Goering dictated the exact wording of the telegram over the telephone. And an hour later, at 9:54 p.m. a conversation between Dr.
MR. ALDERMAN: Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went on as follows, reading from Part M: "Dietrich: 'I need the telegram urgently.' "Keppler: 'Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.' "Dietrich: 'This is marvelous. Thank you.' "Keppler: 'Listen to the radio. News will be given.' "Dietrich: Where?' "Keppler: 'From Vienna.' "Dietrich: 'So Seyss-Inquart agrees?' . "Keppler: 'Jawohl.' " Next the actual order to invade Austria. Communications with Austria were now suspended but the German military machine had been set in motion. To demonstrate that, I now offer in evidence captured Document C-182, offered as Exhibit USA-77, a directive of 11 March 1938 at 2045 hours, from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This directive, initialed by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, orders the invasion of Austria in view of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The directive reads: "Top secret; Berlin, 11 March 1938, 2045 hours; Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, OKW,"-with other symbols-"35 copies, 6th copy. C-in-C Navy"-pencil note-"has been informed. Re: Operation Otto. Directive No. 2. "1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian Government have not been fulfilled. "2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw before the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting. The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord. "3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to Directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3. "I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all forces to the full as quickly as possible." Signed Adolf Hitler; initialed by Jodl and by a name that looks like Warlimont. And then some interesting communications with Rome to avoid possibility of disaster from that source. At the very time that Hitler and Goering had embarked on this military undertaking, they still had a question mark in their minds, and that was Italy. Italy had massed on the Italian border in 1934 on the occasion of July 25, 1933-the Putsch.
MR. ALDERMAN: Italy had traditionally been the political protector of Austria. With what a sigh of relief did Hitler hear at 10:25 p.m. that night from Prince Phillipp von Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just come back from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. The situation can really be grasped by the rereading of the conversation. The record of the conversation shows the excitement under which Hitler was operating when he spoke over the telephone. It is a short conversation, and I shall read the first half of it from Part N of the transcript of 2949-PS. I am afraid your title Part N may be blurred on the mimeographed copy. "E" is Hessen and "F" is the Fuehrer. "Hessen: 'I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. Il Duce accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had been informed from Austria; Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had then said it would be a complete impossibility; it would be a bluff; such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus, and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that Austria would be immaterial to him.' "Hitler: 'Then please tell Mussolini I will never forget him for this.' "Hessen: 'Yes.' "Hitler: 'Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a quite different agreement with him.' "Hessen: 'Yes, I told him that, too.' "Hitler: 'As soon as the Austrian affair been settled, I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin; nothing matters.' "Hessen: 'Yes, my Fuehrer.' 'Hitler: 'Listen, I shall make any agreement, I am no longer in fear of the terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I forget that.' "Hessen: 'Yes, my Fuehrer.' "Hitler: I will never forget it, whatever will happen.
MR. ALDERMAN: If he should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even if the whole world were against him.' "Hessen: 'Yes, my Fuehrer.' The Tribunal will recall the reference in Jodl's diary to the letter which Hitler had sent to Mussolini. It is dated March 11. It may be found in the official publication Dokumente der Deutschen Politik , Volume 6, I, Page 135, Number 24-a. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of it, and you will find a translation of it appearing in our Document 2510-PS. In this letter, after stating that Austria had been declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote-and I quote: 'I have decided to re-establish order in my fatherland-order and tranquility-and to give to the popular will the possibility of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and by its own decision." He stated that this was an act of self-defense; that he had no hostile intentions towards Italy. And after the invasion, when Hitler was at Linz, Austria, he communicated his gratitude to Mussolini once more in the famous telegram which the world so well remembers. I again cite Dokumente der Deutschen Politik , Volume 6, Page 156, Number 29, the translation of the telegram being in our Document 2467-PS, and the document reads: 'Mussolini, I will never forget you for this." We now shift our scene from Vienna to Berlin. We have shifted our scene, I meant, from Vienna to Berlin. It may now be appropriate to come back to Vienna just long enough to recall that late in the evening of March 11, President Miklas did appoint Defendant Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart's appointment was made at 11:15 p.m. This is noted in Dokumente der Deutschen Politik , Volume 6, I, Page 137, Number 25-a, and a translation of the announcement is in our Document 2465-PS. Then something had to be done in London to smooth things over there and, accordingly, one more act played on the international scene is set down in the Air Ministry telephone transcript.
MR. ALDERMAN: On Sunday, March 13, 1938, the day after the invasion, Defendant Goering who had been left in Berlin in charge of the Reich by Hitler, who had gone to his fatherland, phoned Defendant Ribbentrop in London. I find this conversation very illuminating as to the way in which these defendants operated, using, if I may employ American vernacular, a kind of international "double talk" to soothe and mislead other nations. I quote from Part 1 of item W of Document 2949-PS: "Goering:"-speaking to Ribbentrop in London:-" 'As you know, the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the administration of the current government procedures (Fuehrung der Regierungsgeschäfte), and therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the radio.' "Ribbentrop: 'Yes, it is fantastic, is it not?' "Goering: 'Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely overshadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political things. Well, this story that we had given an ultimatum is just foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist Ministers and the representatives of the people (Volksreferenten) have presented the ultimatum. Later on more and more prominent people of the movement participated, and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist Ministers asked us to back them up so that they would not be completely beaten up again and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told them we would not allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, under any circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg's direct order or with his consent, the communists and the Reds had been armed and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed with "Heil Moskau" and so on. Naturally, all these facts caused some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Vaterländische Front would fight to the last man.
MR. ALDERMAN: One could not know that they would capitulate like that, and therefore Seyss-Inquart, who already had taken over the Government, asked us to march in immediately. We had already marched up to the frontier before this, since we could not know whether or not there would be a civil war. These are the actual facts which can be proved by documents.' " There the Defendant Goering was giving to the Defendant Ribbentrop the proper line that he should take in London as to how to explain what had happened in Austria. Of course, when the Defendant Goering said that his story about this matter could be proved by documents, I don't think he had in mind that his own telephone calls might constitute documents. Another rather interesting item begins on Page 3 of the English test of this Part W-still Goering talking to Ribbentrop in London. This is at the bottom of the page: "Goering: 'No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you had spoken already to these people. I want you once more, -but no, not at all once more, but generally speaking-tell the following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given an ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the ultimatum was presented to him by Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but that it also was given by the others, and as far as I know, just a military attaché came along, asked by Seyss-Inquart, because of a technical question."' -you will recall that he was a lieutenant general directed by Göring to go along-" die was supposed to ask whether, in case Seyss-Inquart would ask for the support of German troops, Germany world grant this request. Furthermore, I want to state that Seyss-Inquart asked us expressly, by phone and by telegram, to send troops because he did not know about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; because arms had been distributed there.