dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MAJ0R JONES: Skagen?" There is, in our possession, a document C-5, to find which it will be necessary for the Court to go back in the document book to the first of the C exhibits. This will be Exhibit GB-83. This is a memorandum written by the Defendant Doenitz on Norwegian bases. It presumably relates to the questionnaire of the Defendant Raeder which, as I have indicated, was in circulation at about that time. The document is headed, "Commander of the U-boat Fleet; Operations Division," and is marked "most secret." The subject is "Base in Norway." Then there are set out "suppositions," "advantages and disadvantages," and, over one page, "conclusions". I am proposing to read the last paragraph, III/P> "The following is therefore proposed: "(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including: "a) Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen, provisions; "b)Repair opportunities for normal overhaul work after an encounter; "c) Good opportunities for accommodating U boat crews; "d) Flak protection, L.A. antiaircraft armament, patrol and M/S units. "(2) Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in Narvik as an alternative." That is a Doenitz memorandum. Now, as the Tribunal saw in the report of Raeder to Assmann, in October 1939, Hitler was merely considering the Norwegian aggression and had not yet committed himself to it, although, as the Tribunal will see very shortly, Hitler was most susceptible to any suggestions of aggression against the territory of another country. The documents will show that the Defendant Raeder persevered in pressing his point of view with regard to Norway, and at this stage he found a powerful ally in the Defendant Rosenberg. The Nazi employment of traitors and the stimulation of treachery as a political weapon are now unhappily proven historical facts, but should proof be required of that statement it is found in the remarkable document which I now invite the Court to consider. I refer to Document 007-PS , which is after the TC and D series in the document book. That will be Exhibit GB-84.
MAJ0R JONES: That is headed on Page 1, "Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party"--Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP--"from 1933 to 1943." It reads: "When the Foreign Affairs Bureau"--Aussenpolitisches Amt-- "was established on the 1st of April 1933, the Fuehrer directed that it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency; but should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and suggestions. "Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude adopted by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning, the newly-established bureau devoted particular attention to internal conditions in the Soviet Union as well as to the effects of world Bolshevism, primarily in other European countries. It entered into contact with the most variegated groups inclining towards National Socialism in combatting Bolshevism, focussing its main attentions on nations and states bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one hand those nations and states constituted an insulating ring encircling the Bolshevist neighbor; on the other hand they were the laterals of German living space and took up a flanking position towards the Western Powers, especially Great Britain. order to wield the desired influence by one means or another"--and the Court win shortly see the significance of that phrase--"the bureau was compelled to use the most varying methods, taking into consideration the completely different living conditions, the ties of blood and intellect, and historical dependence of the movements observed by the bureau in those countries "In Scandinavia a progressively more outspoken pro-Anglo Saxon attitude based on economic considerations had become more dominant after the World War of 1914-18. There the bureau put the entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations with the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic Society in Lubeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of this society were attended by many outstanding personalities, especially from Finland.
MAJ0R JONES: While there were no openings for purely political co-operation in Sweden and Denmark, an association based on Greater Germanic ideology was found in Norway. Very close relations, which led to further consequences, were established with its founder." If the Court will turn to the end of the main part of the statement which is 4 pages forward--in the intervening pages, I may say, there is an account of the activity of Rosenberg's bureau in various parts of Europe, and indeed of the world, which I am not proposing to call the Tribunal's attention to at this stage--but if the Tribunal will look at the last paragraph of the main body of the report which bears the signature of the Defendant Rosenberg, The last two sentences read: "With the outbreak of war it was entitled to consider its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal connections in many lands can be resumed under a different guise." If the Tribunal will turn to the annex to the document , which is on the next page, the Tribunal will appreciate what "exploitation of personal connections" involved. Annex I to the document is headed, "Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943." It is headed, "The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of Norway during the War Years 1939-40," and it reads: "As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in Scandinavia only Nasjonal Sampling, led in Norway by the former Minister of War and retired major, Vidkun Quisling, deserved serious political attention. This was a fighting political group possessed by the idea of a Greater Germanic community. Naturally all ruling powers were hostile and attempted to prevent by any means its success among the population. The bureau maintained constant relation with Quisling and attentively observed the attacks he conducted with tenacious energy on the middle class, which had been taken in tow by the English. From the beginning it appeared probable that without revolutionary events which would stir the population from their forms.
MAJ0R JONES: attitude no successful progress of Nasjonal Samling was to be expected. During the winter1938-39 Quisling was privately visited by a member of the bureau. When the political situation in Europe came to ahead in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the convention of the Nordic Society in Lubes in June. He expounded his conception of the situation and his apprehensions concerning Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically decisive importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area and to the advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the Norwegian coast in case of a convict between the Greater German Reich and Great Britain. "Assuming that his statements would be of special interest to the Marshal of the Reich, Goering, for aero-strategical reasons, Quisling was referred to State Secretary Korner by the bureau. The Staff Director of the bureau handed the (Chief of the Reich Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the Fuehrer ...." In a later part of the document, which I shall read at a later stage of my presentation of the evidence, if I may, the Court will see how Quisling came into contact with Raeder. The Prosecution's submission with regard to this document is that it is another illustration of the close interweaving between the political and the military leadership of the Nazi State, of the close link between the professional soldiers and the professional thugs. The Defendant Raeder, in his report to Admiral Assmann, admitted his collaboration with Rosenberg; and I will invite The Court's attention once more to Document C-66, which is Exhibit GB-81. In the page headed "Weserubung," the second paragraph of the Raeder report reads as follows: "In the further developments, I was supported by Commander Schreiber, Naval Attache in Oslo, and the M-Chief personally--in conjunction with the Rosenberg organization. Thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin in the beginning of December and were taken to the Three by me--with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg...
MAJ0R JONES: ," I will later draw the attention of the Tribunal to the developments in December. The details of the manner in which the Defendant Raeder did make contact personally with Quisling are not very clear. But I would draw the Court's attention to the Document C-65, which precedes . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the end of that paragraph?
MAJOR JONES: With your Lordship's permission, I would like to revert to that in a later stage in my unfolding of the evidence. In the Document C-65, which will be Exhibit GB-85, we have a report of Rosenberg to Raeder in which the full extent of Quisling's preparedness for treachery and his potential usefulness to the Nazi aggressors was reported and disclosed to the Defendant Raeder. Paragraph 1 of that report deals with matters which I have already dealt with in reading Rosenberg's statement, 007-PS . But if the Court win look at the second paragraph of Exhibit GB-85, C-65, it reads as follows: "The reasons for a coup, on which Quisling made a report, would be provided by the fact that the Storthing"--that is to say the Norwegian parliament--"had, in defiance of the constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which is to become operative on January 12th. Quisling still retains in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former Minister of War the closest relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of a letter which he had received only a short time previously from the commanding officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this letter Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact that if things went on as they were going at present, Norway was finished." If the Court will turn to the next page of that document, The last two paragraphs, the details of a treacherous plot to overthrow the government of his own country, by the traitor Quisling in collaboration with the Defendant Rosenberg, will be indicated to the Court. "A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of a coup and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a purpose, being allotted their exact tasks and provided with experienced and die-hard National Socialists who are practiced in such operations. These trained men should then proceed with all speed to Norway where details would then require to be further discussed.
MAJOR JONES: Some important centers in Oslo would have to be taken over forthwith, and at the same time, the German Fleet together with suitable contingents of the German Army would go into operation when summoned specially by the new Norwegian Government in a specified bay at the approaches to Oslo. Quisling has no o doubts that such a coup, having teem carried out with instantaneous success, would immediately bring him the approval of those sections of the army with which he at present has connections; and thus it goes without saying that he has never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the King is concerned, he believes that he would respect it as an accomplished fact." How wrong Quisling was in that anticipation was shown, of course, by subsequent developments. The last sentence reads: "Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which accord with German calculations." The Tribunal may think that there are no words in the whole vocabulary of abuse sufficiently strong to describe that degree of treachery.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that document dated?
MAJOR JONES: That document does not bear a date.
THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now. [The Tribunal adjourned until 7 December 1945 at 1000 o'clock.7]
MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday afternoon when the Tribunal adjourned I was dealing with the stage of the Nazi conspiracy against Norway at which the activities of the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg converged. And the Court will remember that I submitted in evidence Document C-65, which was a report from the Defendant Rosenberg to Raeder regarding Quisling and ending with the infamous words, "Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which accord with German calculations." The Court has already received in evidence and has heard read material parts of Document C-66, which was the report of Raeder to Admiral Assmann Which disclosed how, in December of 1939, the Defendant Raeder did in fact meet Quisling and Hagelin. I now invite the Court to look at Document C-64 which, for the purpose of the record, will be Exhibit GB-86. The Court will observe that that is a report by Raeder of a meeting of the Naval Staff with Hitler on the 12th of December 1939, at 1200 hours, in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl, and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to Hitler. The report is headed "Norwegian Question," and the first sentence reads: "Commander-in-Chief, Navy"--who of course was the Defendant Raeder -- has received Quisling and Hagelin. Quisling creates the impression of being reliable." And then there follows, in the next two paragraphs, a statement of Quisling's views, views with which the Court is by now familiar because of my reading of extracts from the Document 007-PS ; but I draw the Court's attention to the fourth paragraph in Document C-64, beginning "The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a long while.
MAJOR JONES: Commander-in-Chief, Navy"--that is, of course, Raeder--"suggests that if the Fuehrer forms a favorable impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans with Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation: (a) By peaceful means--that is to say, German forces summoned by Norway; (b) to agree to do so by force." - That was the 12th of December, the meeting at which Raeder made this report to Hitler. If the Court will now look at Document C-66, which is Raeder's record of these transactions for the purpose of history, the Court will observe, in the last sentence of the second paragraph of the section of C-66 headed "(b) Weserubung," these words: ". . . thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December, and were taken to the Fuehrer by me with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg." And then the Court will observe a note at the end of the page: "At the crucial moment R" -- presumably Rosenberg -- "hurt his foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of the 14th December." That is, of course, Raeder's note; and it indicates the extent of his contact in this conspiracy. The report continues: "On the grounds of the Fuehrer's discussion with Quisling and Hagelin on the afternoon of the 14th of December 1939, the Fuehrer gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be made by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. "Until that moment the naval operations staff had taken no part in the development of the Norwegian question and continued to be somewhat skeptical about it.
MAJOR JONES: The preparations which were undertaken by Captain Krancke in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces were founded, however, on a memorandum of the naval war staff." The Court may well think that the note of the Defendant Raeder referring to the crucial moment was an appropriate one because the Court will see that on that day, the 14th of December, Hitler gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be begun by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. If the Court will now turn to Document 007-PS , which is further on in the document book and which the Court will remember is Rosenberg's report on the activities of his organization -- it is after the"D" documents--if the Court will turn to about 10 lines from the bottom of the first page of Annex I dealing with Norway, the Court Will see that there were further meetings between Quisling and the Nazi chiefs in December; and I am going to read now the section beginning: "As a result of these steps Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Fuehrer on the 16th of December, and once more on the 18th of December. In the course of this audience the Fuehrer emphasized repeatedly that he personally would prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway as well as of the whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the theater of war and to draw still other nations into the conflict." As I have said in opening the presentation of this part of the case, here was an instance where pressure had to be brought to bear on Hitler to induce him to take part in these operations. The report continues: "Should the enemy attempt"--there is a mix-translation here --"to extend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further throttling and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he would be compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking. In order to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity, the Fuehrer promised Quisling financial support of this movement, which is based on Greater Germanic ideology.
MAJOR JONES: Military exploitation of the question now raised was assigned to the special military staff which transmitted special missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs"-- that is to say, by Ribbentrop's organization--"the Minister for Foreign Affairs"--that is to say,Ribbentrop--"being kept continuously informed by the Foreign Affairs bureau"-- which, of course, was Rosenberg's organization. "Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was assigned to the Naval Attache in Oslo .... Orders were given that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy." Here again the Court will note the close link between the Nazi politicians and the Nazi service chiefs. The information that is available to the Prosecution as to the events of January 1940 is not full, but the Court will see that the agitation of the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg did bear fruit, and I now invite the Court to consider a letter of Keitel's, Document C-63, which for the purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-87. The Court will observe that that is an order--a memorandum--signed by the Defendant Keitel dated the 27th of January 1940.It is marked "Most secret, five copies; reference, Study 'N';" --which was another code name for the Weserubung preparations-- "access only through an officer." It is indicated that "C-in-C" of the Navy--that is to say, the Defendant Raeder--has a report on this." The document reads: "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Force wishes that Study 'N' should be further worked on under my direct and personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the general war policy. For these reasons the Fuehrer has commissioned me to take over the direction of further preparations.
MAJOR JONES: "A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces headquarters for this purpose, and this represents at the same time the nucleus of a future operational staff." Then, at the end of the memorandum: "All further plans will be made under the cover name Weserubung." I should like respectfully to draw the Tribunal's attention to the importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and to the date of this important decision. Prior to this date, the 27th of January 1940, the planning of the various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had been confined to a relatively smell group, whose aim had been to persuade Hitler of the desirability of undertaking this Norwegian operation. The issuance of this directive of Keitel's on the 27th January 1940 was the signal that the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, the OKW, had accepted the proposition of the group that was pressing for this Norwegian adventure, and turned the combined resources of the German military machine to the task of producing practical and co-ordinated plans for the Norwegian operation. The Court will observe that from January onward the operational planning for the In Denmark was started through the normal channels. And now I would refer the Court to some entries in the diary of the Defendant Jodl to see how the preparations progressed. That is Document Number 1809-PS, which will be for the purposes of the record Exhibit GB-88. That, the Court Will observe, is the last document in the document book. There is a slight confusion in the order in which the entries are set out in the diary because the first three pages relate to entries which will be dealt with in another part of the case. I invite the Court's attention to Page 3 of these extracts from Jodl's diary beginning at the bottom February the 6th.
MAJOR JONES: The entry under the date line of February the 6th 1940 starts, "New idea: Carry out 'H' and Weser Exercise only, and guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war." I would like to repeat that entry if I may be permitted to do so."New idea: Carry out 'H' and Weser Exercise only, and guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war." The next entry to which I invite the Court's attention is the entry of the 21st of February.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What does that mean, to "carry out 'H' "?
MAJOR JONES: That is a reference to another codeword,"Hartmut," which the Court will see disclosed in a subsequent document. That is another code word for this Norwegian and Danish operation. The entry of February 21st in Jodl's diary reads: "Fuehrer has talked with General Von Falkenhorst and charges him with preparation of Weser Exercise. Falkenhorst accepts gladly. Instructions issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces." Then the next entry, on the next page . . .
THE PRESIDENT: "Weser Exercise"--is that Norway too?
MAJOR JONES: That is Norway too, My Lord, yes. That is a translation of "Weserubung." The entry on the next page, under the date of February the 28th: "I propose first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Fuehrer that Case Yellow"--which as the Court knows is the code name for the invasion of the Netherlands--"and Weser Exercise"--the invasion of Norway and Denmark--"must be prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one another as regards both time and forces employed. The"Fuehrer completely agrees, if this is in any way possible." So that the Court will observe that the new idea of February the 6th that the neutrality of Belgium might be preserved had been abandoned by February the 28th. The next entry is of February the 29th--I am not troubling the Court with further entries of the 28th of February, which relate to the forces to be employed in the invasion of Norway and Denmark.February 29th, the second paragraph: "Fuehrer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copenhagen and a plan elaborated in detail showing how individual coastal batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont,Chief of Land Defense, instructed to make out immediately the order of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and Chief 'WZ' to make out a similar order regarding the strengthening of the staff." And for the moment, I wilI leave the entries in in diary and refer the Court to the vital Document C-174, which for the purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-89. The Court will see from that document that it is Hitler's operation order to complete the preparations for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. It bears the date of the 1st of March 1940, and it is headed, "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; most secret." Then "Directive for Case Weserubung": "The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces--Weser Exercise.