dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now until 2 o'clock. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, as I suggested earlier, the next phase of the aggression was the formulation and execution of the plan to attack Poland and with it the resulting initiation of aggressive war in Poland in September 1939. This is covered by Paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment appearing on Page 9 of the printed English text. Here again the careful and meticulous record-keeping of the Adjutant Schmundt has provided us with a document in his own handwriting, which lets the cat out of the bag. That may be a troublesome colloquialism to translate. I do not know. The document consists of minutes of a conference held on 23 May 1939. The place of the conference was the Fuehrer's study in the New Reich Chancellery. The Defendant Goering was present. [The Defendant Frick interrupted at this point and said: "This year is surely not correct." This statement in German was not translated.]
MR. ALDERMAN: I think one of the defendants indicated I had referred to the wrong year. My notes show 23 May 1939. That is shown by the original document.
THE PRESIDENT: Which is the document to which you are referring?
MR. ALDERMAN: That is Document L-79. As I said, the Defendant Goering was present. The Defendant Raeder was present. The Defendant Keitel was present. The subject of the meeting was, I quote: "Indoctrination on the Political Situation and Future Aims." This document is of historical importance, second not even to the political will and testament of the Fuehrer, recorded by Adjutant Hossbach. The original of this document when captured, found its way through the complicated channels across the Atlantic to the United States. There, it was found by members of the staff of the American Prosecution, by them taken to London, and thence to Nuremberg. The "L" on the identifying number indicates that it is one of the documents which was assembled in London and brought here from there. We think the document is of unquestioned validity. Its authenticity and its accuracy, as a record of what transpired at the meeting of 23 May 1939, stands admitted by the Defendant Keitel in one of his interrogations. As I say, the number is Document L-79 in our numbered series. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-27. This document also is of such great importance historically and as bearing on the issues now presented to the Tribunal, that I feel obliged to read most of it. At the top: "Top Secret (Geheime Reichssache). To be transmitted by officer only. "Minutes of a conference on 23 May 1939. Place: The Fuehrer's study, New Reich Chancellery. Adjutant on duty: Lieutenant Colonel (G. S.) Schmundt. "Present: The Fuehrer, Field Marshal Goering, Grand Admiral Raeder, Colonel General Von Brauchitsch, Colonel General Keitel, Colonel General Milch, General (of Artillery) Halder, General Bodenschatz, Rear Admiral Schniewindt, Colonel (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Colonel (G.S.) Warlimont, Lieutenant Colonel (G.S.) Schmundt, Captain Engel (Army), Lieutenant Commander Albrecht, Captain V. Below (Army). "Subject: Indoctrination on the Political Situation and Future Aims. "The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference: "1. Analysis of the situation; "2.
MR. ALDERMAN: Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from that situation; "3.Exposition of the consequences of those tasks; "4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from those consequences. Secrecy is the first essential for success. "The Fuehrer's observations are given in accordance with their meaning. Our present situation must be considered from two points of view: 1) The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939; 2) the permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies. "In the period 1933-39, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously. "Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same. "Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany. "This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as 'encroachments'. The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force. "A mass of 80 million people has solved the problems of ideals. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property. "Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years' time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that. "We are at present in a state of patriotic fervor, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan. "The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use.
MR. ALDERMAN: All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims. "After 6 years, the situation is today as follows: "The national political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions."-I suppose they were those in the concentration camps.-"Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood. "The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance. "The Pole is no 'supplementary enemy'. Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm. "Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thoroughgoing German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus. "There is no other possibility for Europe. "Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember: blockade. "If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be able to rely upon record harvests even less in time of war than in peace. "The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labor. "The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West. "Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia. "It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision; questionable too is the attitude of Poland. The Polish Government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.
MR. ALDERMAN: "There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision: To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity ".-That, if the Court please, is underscored in the original German text.- "We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be fighting. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive. "Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers (France and England). "If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France. "Fundamentally, therefore: Conflict with Poland, beginning with an attack on Poland, will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time. "The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics. "Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first, for various reasons, her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time. "Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer. "If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia against Germany, Italy, and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and death struggle.
MR. ALDERMAN: "What will this struggle be like?" -Underscored in the German original.- "England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr Basin as possible. French blood will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr Basin will determine the duration of our resistance. "The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed forces. Declarations of neutrality cannot be relied upon. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications in order finally to force them into cooperation. "Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure. "Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee. "The war with England and France will be a life-and-death struggle. "The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings. "Question: Short or long war? "Every country's armed forces or government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10 to 15 years' duration. "History has always shown that people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914 the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (for example Ruhr Basin). England has similar weaknesses. "England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power.
MR. ALDERMAN: "England is the driving force against Germany."-which translated literally means: "England is the motor driving against Germany." I suppose that is the French "force motrice." "Her strength lies in the following: "1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance, and gifted as organizers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and the bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher. "2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit. "3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force. "England's weakness: "If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had been begun in the morning, the British Fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of this war."-that war, I take it-"It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the Fleet. Landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible. "The moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and oil depends on the Fleet's protection. "If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the Fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result. "There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the Government to rely entirely on the element of surprise. "Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by: "1. Disclosure coming from a large circle of military experts concerned; "2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise; "3. Human failings; "4. Weather conditions.
MR. ALDERMAN: "The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible. "This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action. "1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow. Considerations of right and wrong or treaties do not enter into the matter. This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland. "2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the continent for England are eliminated. "The Army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured. "England can then be blockaded from western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines can extend the range of the blockade. "Consequences: "England will not be able to fight on the continent; daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines; time will not be on England's side; Germany will not bleed to death on land. "Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative: "1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different. "2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense counter measures. "3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential. "4.
MR. ALDERMAN: Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army's battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy. "The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack. "Study to this end is of the utmost importance. "The aim will always be to force England to her knees. "A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it. "This applies to gas, submarines, and air force. It would be true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available countermeasures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no countermeasures. "Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling." The rest of the document, if the Tribunal please, deals more in detail with military plans and. preparations. I think it unnecessary to read further. The document just read is the evidence which specifically supports the allegations in Paragraph 4 (a) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing on Page 9 of the printed English text, relating to the meeting of 23 May 1939. We think it leaves nothing unproved in those allegations.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps you ought to read the last page and the last five lines, because they refer in terms to one of the defendants.
MR. ALDERMAN: I didn't read these, Mr. President, simply because I am convinced that they are mistranslated in the English. I will be glad to have them read in the original German.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you are of that opinion.
MR. ALDERMAN: We could get it from the original German.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that the English translation is wrong?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better inform us then if it is wrong.
MR. ALDERMAN: Did you have reference to the last paragraph headed 'working principles' ?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the one after that.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Might I ask that the German interpreter read that, as it can be translated into the other languages. It is on Page 16 of the original.
BY THE INTERPRETER: "Page 16. Purpose: "1. Study of the entire problem; "2. Study of the events; "3. Study of the means needed; "4. Study of the necessary training. "Men with great powers of imagination and high technical training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with sober sceptic powers of understanding. "Working principles: "1. No one is to take part in this, who does not have to know of it. "2. No one can find out more than he must know. "3. When must the person in question know it at the very latest? No one may know anything before it is necessary that he know it. "On Goering's question, the Fuehrer decided that: a) The armed forces determine what shall be built; b) In the shipbuilding program nothing is to be changed; c) The armament programs are to be modeled on the years 1943 or 1944."-Schmundt certified this text.
MR. ALDERMAN: Mr. President, the translation was closer than I had anticipated.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: We think, as I have just said, that this document leaves nothing unproved in those allegations in the Indictment. It demonstrates that the Nazi conspirators were proceeding in accordance with a plan. It demonstrates the cold-blooded premeditation of the assault on Poland. It demonstrates that the questions concerning Danzig, which the Nazis had agitated with Poland as a political pretext, were not true questions, but were false issues, issues agitated to conceal their motive of aggressive expansion for food and "Lebensraum." In this presentation of condemning documents, concerning the initiation of war in September 1939, I must bring to the attention of the Tribunal a group of documents concerning an address by Hitler to his chief military commanders, at Obersalzberg on 22 August 1939, just one week prior to the launching of the attack on Poland. We have three of these documents, related and constituting a single group. The first one I do not intend to offer as evidence. The other two I shall offer. The reason for that is this: The first of the three documents came into our possession through the medium of an American newspaperman and purported to be original minutes of this meeting at Obersalzberg, transmitted to this American newspaperman by some other person; and we had no proof of the actual delivery to the intermediary by the person who took the notes. That document, therefore, merely served to alert our Prosecution to see if it could find something better. Fortunately, we did get the other two documents, which indicate that Hitler on that day made two speeches, perhaps one in the morning, one in the afternoon, as indicated by the original minutes, which we captured. By comparison of those two documents with the first document, we concluded that the first document was a slightly garbled merger of the two speeches.
MR. ALDERMAN: On 22 August 1939 Hitler had called together at Obersalzberg the three Supreme Commanders of the three branches of the Armed Forces, as well as the commanding generals bearing the title Commanders -in- Chief (Oberbefehlshaber) . I have indicated how, upon discovering this first document, the Prosecution set out to find better evidence of what happened on this day. In this the Prosecution succeeded. In the files of the DOW at Flensburg, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces), there were uncovered two speeches delivered by Hitler at Obersalzberg, on 22 August 1939. These are Documents Numbers 798-PS and 1014-PS, in our series of documents. In order to keep serial numbers consecutive, if the Tribunal please, we have had the first document, which I do not intend to offer, marked for identification Exhibit USA-28. Accordingly, I offer the second document, 798-PS, in evidence as Exhibit USA-29, and the third document, 1014-PS, as Exhibit USA-30. These are again, especially the first one, rather lengthy speeches, and I shall not necessarily read the entire speech. Reading from 798-PS, which is Exhibit USA-29, the Fuehrer speaks to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939: "I have called you together..."
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything to show where the speech took place?
MR. ALDERMAN: Obersalzberg.
THE PRESIDENT: How do you show that?
MR. ALDERMAN: You mean on the document?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: I am afraid the indication "Obersalzberg" came from the first document which I have not offered in evidence. I have no doubt that the defendants will admit that Obersalzberg was the place of this speech. The place is not very significant; it is the time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. MR. ALDERMAN [Reading]: "I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have insight into the individual element on which I base my decision to act, and in order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss military details. "It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring."-I interpolate, I think he is there referring to the May document, which I have already read, L-79. -"But I thought I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one's eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland, in order to fight first against the West, but this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be executed, since the essential points have changed. "It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a conflict with the West. "Poland wants access to the sea. "The further development became obvious after the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an inopportune moment. "I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two personal constitutions"-I suppose he means "personalities"; that probably is an inapt translation-"my own personality, and that of Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my existence, because of my political ability." I interpolate to comment on the tremendous significance of the fact of a war, which engulfed almost the whole world, depending upon one man's personality. "Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will probably never again be a man in the future with more authority than I have. My existence is, therefore, a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot. "The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also decisive.