dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. C-21 was not entirely translated by the Prosecution. This document may be found in my document book under Exhibit Number Raeder-69, and I should like to submit it herewith. It is in Document Book 3, Page 62.
THE PRESIDENT: Document Book 3 only goes to 64, is that not right? It must be Document Book 4.
DR. SIEMERS: There must be a mistake in the document book then. At first, due to an oversight, the table of contents was only completed as far as 64 by the Translation Section, but since that time it has been corrected and supplemented. It is in Document Book 4, Page 317. .
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Page 317, at the top.
DR SIEMERS: [Turning to the defendant.] Please comment on this document.
RAEDER: In the next but last paragraph, it says: "In complete agreement with this point of view, the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff is therefore also of the opinion that the most favorable solution would doubtless be the maintenance of the present situation which, if strictest neutrality is exercised by Norway, will permit the safe use of Norwegian territorial waters for the shipping vital to Germany's war effort without the attempt being made on the part of England to seriously endanger this sea lane." (Document Number Raeder-69) I maintained this point of view when reporting to Hitler. In that report I first mentioned the intelligence reports which we had at hand. Then I described the dangers which might result to us from a British occupation of bases on the Norwegian coast and might affect our entire warfare, dangers which I considered tremendous. I had the feeling that such an occupation would gravely prejudice and imperil the whole conduct of our war. If the British occupied bases in Norway, especially in the South of Norway, they would be able to dominate the entrance to the Baltic Sea from those points, and also flank our naval operations from the Helgoland Bight and from the Elbe, Jade and Weser. The second outlet which we had was also gravely imperiled, affecting the operations of battleships as well as the courses of our merchantmen. In addition to that, from their air bases in Norway, they might endanger our air operations, the operations of our pilots for reconnaissance in the North Sea or for attacks against England. Furthermore, from Norway they could exert strong pressure on Sweden, and that pressure would have been felt in this respect, that the supplies of ore from Sweden would have been hindered or stopped by purely political pressure. Finally, the export of ore from Narvik to Germany could have been stopped entirely, and it is known how much Germany depended on supplies of ore from Sweden and Norway.
RAEDER: They might even have gone so far-and we learned about this subsequently that such plans were discussed' as to attack and destroy the ore deposits at Lulea, or to seize them. All of these dangers might become decisive factors in the outcome of the war. Aside from the fact that I told Hitler that the best thing for us would be to have strict neutrality on the part of Norway, I also called his attention to the dangers which would result to us from an occupation of the Norwegian coast and Norwegian bases, for there would have been lively naval operations near the Norwegian coast in which the British, even after our occupation of bases, would try to hamper our ore traffic from Narvik. A struggle might ensue which we, with our inadequate supply of surface vessels, would be unable to cope with in the long run. Therefore, at that time I did not make any proposal that we should occupy Norway or that we should obtain bases in Norway. I only did my duty in telling the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht about this grave danger which was threatening us, and against which we might have to use emergency measures for our defense. I also pointed out to him that possible operations for the occupation of Norwegian bases might be very expensive for us. In the course of later discussions I told him that we might even lose our entire fleet. I would consider it a favorable case if we were to lose only one-third, something which actually did happen later on. There was, therefore, no reason for me to expect that I would gain prestige by such an enterprise-I have been accused of this ambition by the Prosecution. As a matter of fact, the exact opposite might easily result.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that these things may be seen in documents which date from the time of the war, one of which is Exhibit Number Raeder-69, of 13 January 1940, which has just been handed over. This document is a study, and it is claimed that this study is based on the consideration that if England were to have the bases in Norway, the situation would be impossible for the conduct of the war by Germany and such a situation could be prevented only if we forestalled England by occupying Norway ourselves. What the witness has just said is stated in exactly the same way in the War Diary. In the same connection, I should like to refer to the document of the Prosecution, Document C-66, GB-81, which may be found in British Document Book 10a, Page 35. This document is dated 10 January 1944. May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the fact that there, under the code name "Weseruebung" (Weser Maneuver)-that was the name covering this action-the substance of the statements the witness has just made is to be found. I do not wish to read all of them since we would lose valuable time thereby.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean C-66? That is about the Plan Barbarossa. Is that the one you mean?
DR. SIEMERS: The last page, under the heading "Weseruebung;" Page 39 of the English document book. Mention is made there of the letter by Admiral Carls, spoken of by the witness, and of his thoughts in connection with this matter. In the German original there is the heading, "Appendix 2." A clearer version is found in Document Raeder-69, since that dates from January 1940, 3 months later, and in the meantime new reports had come in. This, on the other hand, is a description dating from October 1939. [Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, I must once more refer to Document C-122, which you have already mentioned. The Prosecution, in that document, accuses you of saying: "The Chief of SKL deems it necessary to tell the Fuehrer as soon as possible of the ideas of the SKL on the possibility of expanding the sphere of operations in the North." They think they may conclude therefrom that your primary thought was to expand the operational sphere of the Navy.
RAEDER: I have already said that by the possibility of expansion of the operational zone to the North I meant an expansion of British operations and its consequences, and also the possibility of our forestalling this, thus gaining bases which would be of certain importance to us.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Hitler reply at this discussion on 10 October 1939?
RAEDER: Hitler had not yet concerned himself with this question. The question was very far from his mind, for he knew very little about matters of naval warfare. He always remarked that he did not have an over-all picture of these things, and therefore felt somewhat uncertain. He said that he would deal with this question and that I should leave the notes with him, which I had worked out on the basis of statements made by the SKL, so that he might use them as a basis for his deliberations on this problem. It was typical and really speaks very much against the character of the conspiracy, that on this occasion Hitler, when confronted with the problem of Norway, did not say a single word about the fact that previously, the last time evidently in the summer of that year, he had already dealt with Norwegian questions prompted by Rosenberg. I gather from a document which I saw for the first time here that on 20 June 1939, Rosenberg had submitted to the Fuehrer a comprehensive report about his connections with Norwegian political circles, but I heard of these connections for the first time on 1I December. It would have been a matter of course for me if the Fuehrer, who was dealing with Norwegian strategical matters, had told me on this occasion: "I have such and such information about Norwegian matters." But he did not do that-there was always a considerable lack of collaboration. The Fuehrer told me that we should await the arrival of further reports and that he would deal with these questions.
DR. SIEMERS: In the subsequent period of October and November, up until 11 December, did you discuss this question with Hitler again?
RAEDER: No, the question was not discussed at all during those months, but in September Korvettenkapitaen Schreiber, who had first been appointed assistant attache in Oslo and later, naval attache, gave me further reports at that time about conditions in Norway, and so did the intelligence service. He told me of reports which were circulating there about a possible British landing. Later on Kapitaen Schreiber was actually my chief collaborator in these Norwegian problems, and he showed a particular understanding of the whole situation.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-107, an affidavit of the naval attache who has just been mentioned, Richard Schreiber. This may be found in my Document Book 5, Page 464. According to that document, Schreiber was drafted on 7 September 1939 as a reserve officer and was sent to Oslo as a naval attache. He states that he held that post there since the autumn of 1939. With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to read a portion of this, under I, on Page 465, at the bottom.
THE PRESIDENT: We told you that we had read all these documents which were objected to. We let in this document, so it is not necessary for you to read it again.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then in this connection, may I refer to the first part of this affidavit, Part I? Mr. President, I should like to point out a small but misleading error in translation on Page 466. In the second paragraph, second line, the word "deutsch," (German) is missing: ". . . there were clear directives of the German Foreign Office that Norwegian neutrality should be particularly respected by the Germans. .." In the English text it says: "of the Foreign Office." It should read "of the German Foreign Office." I should be very grateful if this mistake would be rectified. [Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, you know the affidavit given by Schreiber?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Different reports are contained therein. You have already referred to them in part. Did any additional special reports come in during those 2 months? Was Narvik mentioned in addition to the other ports already mentioned?
RAEDER: As far as I remember it was Kapitaen Schreiber who expressly mentioned Narvik for the first time. Kapitaen Schreiber had very quickly made himself acquainted with conditions there. He had established good connections in Norwegian circles. A confirmation of all that I had known up to that point came on 11 December.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, would you please describe your meeting with Quisling on 11 December 1939?
RAEDER: May I first ask whether the Documents 004-PS and 007-PS, which I believe were submitted by the Prosecution, may be used in this connection? For example, the minutes of the conference of 11 and 12 December, an accompanying letter by Rosenberg referring to these minutes, and similar matters?
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I believe that you will be permitted to use these documents. But since they are known you only need to mention the points that you remember.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: On this occasion I should merely like to ask whether you did not know the documents by Rosenberg, 004-PS and 007-PS?
RAEDER: No, I did not know those documents.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you see them for the first time here?
RAEDER: I saw them for the first time here. But the reports contained in these documents were already known to us at that time as is proved by the dates of the documents.
DR. SIEMERS: Please tell us only what you heard at that time from Quisling.
RAEDER: Up until 11 December I had neither connections with Herr Rosenberg-except for the fact that I had seen him on occasion -nor, above all, did I have any connections with Quisling about whom I had heard nothing up to that time. On 11 December my Chief of Staff, Schulte-Moenting, reported to me that Major Quisling, a former Norwegian Minister of War, had arrived from Oslo. He was asking for an interview with me through a Herr Hagelin, because he wished to tell me about Norwegian conditions. Herr Hagelin had been sent to my chief of staff by Herr Rosenberg. Rosenberg had already known Hagelin for some time as I have mentioned before. Since reports from such a source on Norwegian conditions seemed to be of great value to me, I declared myself ready to receive Herr Quisling. He arrived on the same morning and reported to me at length about the conditions in Norway, with special reference to the relations of the Norwegian Government to England and the reports on the intention of England to land in Norway, and he characterized the whole situation as especially critical for, according to his reports, the danger seemed to be imminent. He tried to fix a date. He thought it should occur before 10 January, because then a favorable political situation would arise. I told him that I was not really concerned with the political situation, but I would try to arrange to have him give his information to the Fuehrer. I would be concerned only with the military and strategic situation, and in that connection I could tell him right away that it would not be possible to take any measures from 11 December until 10 January, first because the time was too short and secondly because it was winter. I considered his expositions to be of such importance that I told him I would try to arrange for him to report to the Fuehrer personally, so that these reports would reach and influence him directly.
RAEDER: Then on the 12th-that is on the next day-I went to Hitler and informed him of the conversation between Quisling and me, and I asked him to receive Quisling personally so that he might have a personal impression of Quisling. On this occasion I told him-and this is written down in one of the documents-that in cases of this kind one would have to be especially cautious, since one could not know to what degree such a party leader would try to further the interest of his party. Therefore our investigations would have to be especially careful. And I again called the attention of the Fuehrer to the fact that an attempt to occupy Norway would bring with it greatest risks as well as certain disadvantages for the future situation. In other words, I carefully presented both sides of the picture in a neutral manner. Hitler then decided to receive Quisling together with Hagelin on one of the following days. The two gentlemen then were obviously in touch with Rosenberg. I believe they stayed with him, and Rosenberg sent me, by letter, a record of a meeting which had apparently been drawn up by Quisling and Hagelin and also a description of Quisling's personality. In this letter, which is here as a document but which was not read by the Prosecution, it says specifically that Rosenberg knew what the political conditions were but that, of course, he would have to leave the military side entirely to me since I was the competent authority on that.
DR. SIEMERS: If it please the High Tribunal, in this connection I would like to submit Exhibit Raeder-67, to be found in my Document Book 4, Page 309. That is the letter from Rosenberg to Raeder dated 13 December 1939, which was not mentioned by the Prosecution. The Prosecution merely mentioned the appendix mentioned in the letter-that is, a note by Rosenberg, under Number C-65, the same as GB-85. According to its contents C-65 belongs to Exhibit Raeder-67.
THE PRESIDENT: You say there was another besides Raeder-67 which you were referring to?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes; I am referring to Raeder-67.
THE PRESIDENT: I got that. But you said some other document as well.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the document submitted by the Prosecution, C-65, and that is an appendix to this letter; the two belong together. The latter document, C-65, is to be found in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 33. If these two documents are taken together, it can be seen that the political side is not mentioned in either document; and this explains what the witness meant when he said that he was not concerned with the political side of the question but only with the military side. It is for that reason that Rosenberg had sent it to him.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it would be a good time to break off. [A recess was taken.]
MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the case of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, counsel and representatives of the Prosecution have been conferring with respect to his application for documents. We have agreed on a great number, but there are 20 upon which we are unable to agree.
THE PRESIDENT: 20?
MR. DODD: 20. I think we could do it in 30 minutes if the Tribunal will set some time aside; it might take a little more. Sir David has reminded me that the translators are waiting on us to go ahead with their translation work.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think the best thing would be to take it tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.
MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President. It has been suggested also that the case of Seyss-Inquart precede that of Defendant Von Papen. I understand that is the wish of the counsel, and it is very satisfactory to us as well.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SIEMERS: We have to refer briefly to Document 1809-PS, the Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. It is GB-88 in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 289. May I first ask when were the plans for the occupation of Norway drafted?
RAEDER: I may say that on the basis of the conference which Quisling had with the Fuehrer in my presence- on 14 December the Fuehrer ordered the OKW to deal with the matter and study it. The Fuehrer had two more conferences with Quisling on 16 and 18 December at which I was not present. The matter was then handled by the OKW according to the directives and an initial plan known as "North" was drafted. Document C-21, which I have mentioned before, shows that this Plan North was received by SKL on 13 January and then, in the course of January, the date 27 January was mentioned, the draft of a directive for the Plan North was made. That draft was made in the OKW in the usual way. Kapitaen zur See Krancke as expert for the Navy took part in it. The directive was completed on 1 March 1940, and was issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces. In the meantime, a large number of reports had been received, and it was possible to use these as a basis for the drafting of the directive. These reports besides coming from Kapitaen Schreiber now also came direct from Quisling, who sent them to the Fuehrer. They mentioned the preparatory work carried out by the English and the French-special mention was made of the Navy Attache Kermarrec-in Norwegian ports for finding out the possibilities of landing, measurements of quays, and the height of the bridges between Narvik and the Swedish border and similar things. These reports which reached us showed clearly that within a reasonable time a landing was intended. Also political reports reached us which Hagelin received through his connections in Norwegian circles, reports which in part came directly from members of the Storting-and from members of the Government and their entourage. All of these reports confirmed that the pretext of aid for Finland in the dispute between Finland and Russia played a certain role. The danger was discussed that England under pretext of aid for Finland would proceed to a bloodless occupation of Norway. The directive for the case Norway, therefore, was issued on 1 March.
RAEDER: In the further course of the month of March more reports were received. In the meantime, the Altmark incident had occurred, and it was observed by Hagelin too that the behavior of the Norwegian commander was a pretense, and it was clear that in the case of any encroachment on the part of Great Britain, the Norwegian Government would protest only on paper.
DR. SIEMERS: You said just now the directive is dated 1 March. This is correct. The Prosecution submitted a quotation of 5 March from Document 1809-PS. That is an entry in Jodl's Diary: "1500 hours big conference with the three commanders-in-chief regarding Weseruebung. Field Marshal, having no knowledge about plans, is furious." How is it possible, Admiral, that Reich Marshal Goering had not been consulted at a time when the directive was already issued?
RAEDER: I cannot explain that at all. I had no authority to speak about it and I cannot say why he was not consulted.
DR. SIEMERS: It is in the nature of conspiracy that the second man in the Reich would be informed about it from the beginning. Has he not ever spoken to you about that matter?
RAEDER: No, not that I remember, but that shows how little, especially in the Fuehrer's entourage, one can speak of a conspiracy. The Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, also was not present during any of the Quisling conferences or receptions and I had no authority to speak to him about these matters.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to know your position regarding Jodl's entry of 13 March, in which he stated: "Fuehrer does not give the order for 'W' (Weseruebung). He is still trying to find a justification." I ask you to explain these words to us as you understand them.
RAEDER: Yes. The English translation as far as I can remember says "Looking for an excuse." But he needed neither justification nor excuse, because in the first paragraph of the directive of 1 March -that is to say, 2 weeks before that-he had stated what circumstances made it necessary to occupy Norway and Denmark with certain forces of the Wehrmacht. British encroachments in Scandinavia and the Baltic were to be prevented thereby, our ore deposits in Sweden safeguarded, and the bases against England for the Navy and the Air Force were to be expanded.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that is the Document C-174; that is, GB-89, Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 113. That is the directive for case "Weseruebung" of 1 March 1940, which as the witness has mentioned, already contains the justification for it. May it please the Tribunal, to prove that the information received by the witness through the intelligence service of Admiral Canaris, through Kapitaen Schreiber and so on, is objective and in agreement with facts, may I be permitted to submit several documents-and that Exhibit Number Raeder-75 from the White Book dated 17 February 1940, which mentions the landing of British troops in Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik, and several appendices to it, which show the trends of thoughts at that time in regard to the Swedish ore; Document Exhibit Raeder-77...
THE PRESIDENT: This is 75, Pages 43 and 44?