dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
the army's operational plans having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical directive to the High Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air forces for Barbarossa-Directive No. 21-was issued (446-PS). This directive marks the first time the plan to invade the U.S.S.R. was specifically referred to in an order, although the order was classified Top Secret. It also marked the first use of the code word Barbarossa to denote the operation against the Soviet Union. One of the most significant passages in that directive is the opening sentence: "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign even before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa)." (446-PS) The directive continues: "Preparations requiring more time to start are-if this has not yet been done-to begin presently and are to be completed not later than 15 May 1941." "Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized." (446-PS) The directive then outlined the broad strategy on which the intended invasion was to proceed and the parts which the Army, Navy, and Air Forces were to play therein, and called for oral reports to Hitler by the Commanders-in-Chief. The directive concluded as follows: "V. I am expecting the reports of the Commanders-in-Chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions. "The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time." (446-PS) The directive is signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont, and one illegible signature. It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well as from its history, which has been outlined, that this directive was no mere staff planning exercise. It was an order to prepare for an act of aggression which was intended to occur and which actually did occur. The various services which received the order understood it as an order to prepare for action and did not view it as a hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in the basic directive. C. Military Planning and preparation for the
it as an order to prepare for action and did not view it as a hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in the basic directive. C. Military Planning and preparation for the Implementation of Barbarossa. The Naval War Diary for 30 January 1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive No. 21 (446-PS) which ordered progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. this entry in the War Diary contains a substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy's part in the coming campaign and the manner in which it was preparing itself to play that part (C-35). The following passage shows that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early date: "30 January 1941 7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the "Barbarossa" case to be submitted to the High Command of the Armed Forces". (C-35) ("Ia" is, in this case, the abbreviation for a deputy head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff.) Then follows a list of the Navy's objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter, many tasks for the Navy are listed, one of which is sufficiently typical to give an idea of all: "II. Objectives of War Against Russia. d. To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as: "1. Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea." (C-35) This document indicates the detailed thinking and planning which was being carried out to implement Barbarossa almost six months before the operation actually got underway. it is but another piece in the mosaic of evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of the Soviet Union was undeniably a premeditated attack. Similarly, the Naval War Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to the planning and preparation for the coming campaign (C-33). The entry for 19 February 1941 is typical: "In regard to the impending operation 'Barbarossa' for which all S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of some can
Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to the planning and preparation for the coming campaign (C-33). The entry for 19 February 1941 is typical: "In regard to the impending operation 'Barbarossa' for which all S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of some can only be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations." (C-33) On 3 February 1941 the Fuehrer held a conference to assess the progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa. The conference also discussed the plans for Sonnenblume, which was the code name for the North African Operation. Attending this conference were, in addition to Hitler, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Jodl; the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder; as well as several others including, Colonel Schmundt, Hitler's Adjutant (872-PS). During the course of this conference, the Chief of the Army General Staff gave a long report about enemy strength as compared with German strength, and about the general overall operational plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated at various intervals by comments from the Fuehrer. An extract from this report, although written in a semi-shorthand form, is at least sufficiently clear to disclose that elaborate timetables had already been set up for the deployment of troops, as well as for industrial operations: "The intended time period was discussed with a plan. 1st Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel) 2nd deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel) transfer now, Front-Germany-East from the middle of March will give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on, Attila [the code word for the operation for the occupation of unoccupied France] can be carried out only under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. Three deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained. [Felix is the code word
under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. Three deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained. [Felix is the code word for the occupation of Canary Islands, North Africa and Gibraltar.] "In industry the full capacity time-table is in force. No more camouflage. "From 25.IV-15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from the West. (Seeloewe [Seeloewe was the code word for the planned operation against England] can no longer be carried out). The strategic concentration in the East is quite recognizable. "The full capacity time-table remains. 8 Marita [Marita was the code word for the action against Greece] divisions complete the picture of the disposition of forces on the plan. "C-in-C Army requested that he no longer have to employ 5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for commanders in the West. "Fuehrer When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment." (872-PS) This much, when read with the conference conclusions, is sufficient to show that the Army as well as the Navy regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and were far along with their preparations even as early as February 1941-almost five months prior to 22 June, the date when the attack was actually launched. The conference report summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar as they affected Barbarossa, as follows: "Conclusions: "1. Barbarossa "a. The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that the main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad. "b. The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible. "c. Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldaw. "d. It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila (auxiliary measure). "e. The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged
taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldaw. "d. It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila (auxiliary measure). "e. The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary measure Marita." (872-PS) "Top Secret As the plans for the invasion became more detailed, involved, and complete, more and more agencies outside the Armed Forces had to be brought into the picture, let in on the secret, and assigned their respective parts. For example, early in March, 1941, Keitel drafted a letter to be sent to Reich Minister Todt, then Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions and head of the organization Todt. In this letter Keitel Explained the principles on which the camouflage for the operation was based and requested that the organization Todt follow the same line (874-PS). This letter illustrates the elaborate deceit with which the Nazi conspirators sought to hide the preparations for their treacherous attack: "The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. "Hq. of the Fuehrer 9 March 41 DRAFT "Honorable Reich Minister! (TODT) "For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the Armed Forces in the East, extensive measures for the diversion and deception of friend and foe are necessary prerequisites for the success of the operations. "The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued guiding rules for the deception in accordance with more detailed directives of the Fuehrer. These rules aim essentially at continuing preparations for the attack against England in an increasing degree. Simultaneously the actual preparations for deployment in the East should be represented as a diversionary maneuver to divert from plans which are being pursued for an attack against England. In order to insure success for these measures, it is indispensable that these same principles are being also followed on the part of the Organization Todt. "K. J. W." [Initials of Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont] (874-PS) On 13 March 1941 Keitel signed an operational supplement to Fuehrer Order #21 (446-PS), which was issued in the form of "Directives for Special Areas" (447-PS). This detailed operational order, which was issued
followed on the part of the Organization Todt. "K. J. W." [Initials of Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont] (874-PS) On 13 March 1941 Keitel signed an operational supplement to Fuehrer Order #21 (446-PS), which was issued in the form of "Directives for Special Areas" (447-PS). This detailed operational order, which was issued more than three months in advance of the attack, indicates how complete were the plans on practically every phase of the operation. Section I of the directive is headed "Area of Operations and Executive Power" and outlines who was to be in control of what and where. it states that while the campaign is in progress, the Supreme Commander of the Army has the executive power in territory through which the army is advancing. During this period, however, the Reichsfuehrer SS is entrusted with "special tasks." This assignment is discussed in paragraph 2b: "* * * b. In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS." (447-PS) The order then states that, in time, political administration will be set up under Commissioners of the Reich. The relationship of these officials to the army is discussed in paragraphs 2c and 3: "c. As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient dept, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these
occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer. "3. For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OWK) shall be in command. "The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a Territorial Commander and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks. "a. Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task. "b. Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4). (447-PS) The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administration of economy in the conquered territory. This provision is also contained in Section I, paragraph 4: "4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the 'Wi Rue Amt' with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi/Rue/Amt." (447-PS) The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and communication traffic. Section III of the order deals with the relations with certain other countries and states, in part, as follows: "III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland. 9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. in case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special
regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland. 9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. in case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW." (447-PS) The document closes with a section regarding Sweden: "IV. Directives regarding Sweden. 12. Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks. "The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces "signed: KEITEL" (447-PS) As was hinted in the original Barbarossa Order, Directive No. 21 (446-PS), the plan originally contemplated that the attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941. In the meantime, however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign in the Balkans and were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is found in a document (C-170) which has been identified by Raeder as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty files and contains file references to the papers which were the basis for each entry. This item dated 3 April 1941 reads as follows: "Balkan Operations delayed 'Barbarossa' at first for about five weeks. All measures which can be construed as offensive actions are to be stopped according to Fuehrer order." (C-170) By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out to permit the Fuehrer definitely to set D-Day as 22 June-more than seven weeks away. A "Top Secret" report of a conference with the Chief of the Section Landsverteidigung of the Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab on 30 April 1941 states, in the first two paragraphs: "1. Timetable Barbarossa: The Fuehrer has decided: Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas. "2.
on 30 April 1941 states, in the first two paragraphs: "1. Timetable Barbarossa: The Fuehrer has decided: Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas. "2. Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa: Sector North: German and Russian forces approximately of the same strength. Sector Middle: Great German superiority. Sector South: Russian superiority." (873-PS) Early in June, approximately three weeks before D-Day, preparations for the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This timetable (C-39) was prepared in 21 copies. The copy reproduced here was the third copy, which was given to the High Command of the Navy. Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal and reads as follows: "Top Military Secret "Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/Abt.L (I op) "Fuehrer's Headquarters (no date) "Top Secret (Chefsache) Only through officer "21 copies 3rd copy Ob. d. m. I op.00845/41 Received 6 June Enclosures:- "The Fuehrer has authorized the appended timetable as a foundation for further preparations for 'Barbarossa'. If alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be informed. "Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces signed: Keitel" (C-39) The document then proceeds to outline the state of preparations as of 1 June 1941. The outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that date under six headings: General; Negotiations with Friendly States; Army; Navy; Air Force, and Camouflage. The remainder of the document is in tabular form with six columns headed from left to right at the top of each page-Date; Serial No.; Army; Navy; OKW; Remarks. The item appearing under date 21 June and Serial No. 29, provides in the columns for Army, Navy, and Air Forces that, "Till 1300 hours latest time at which operation can be cancelled (spaetester Anhaltetermin)" (C-39). Under the column headed OKW appears the note: "Cancelled by code word 'Altona' or further confirmation of start of attack by code word:
21 June and Serial No. 29, provides in the columns for Army, Navy, and Air Forces that, "Till 1300 hours latest time at which operation can be cancelled (spaetester Anhaltetermin)" (C-39). Under the column headed OKW appears the note: "Cancelled by code word 'Altona' or further confirmation of start of attack by code word: 'Dortmund'" (C-39). In the Remarks column appears the statement that: "Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of main effort (schwerpunkt), concentration of armour and artillery must be reckoned with" (C-39). The entry for 22 June, under serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and OKW and provides as follows: "Invasion Day "H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces. 0330 hours." (C-39) In the Remarks column it is stated that: "Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting owing to weather on the part of the Air Force." (C-39) The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted and give great detail concerning the disposition and missions of the various components of the Armed Forces. On 9 June 1941 the order of the Fuehrer went out for final reports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941-8 days before "D-Day" (C-78). This order, signed by Hitler's Adjutant, Schmundt, reads as follows: "TOP SECRET only by Officer "Office of Wehrmacht Adjutant "at Berchtesgaden 9th June 1941 "To the Fuehrer Br. B. No. 7 Top Secret "Top secret "Re: Conference 'Barbarossa' "1. The fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces have ordered reports on 'Barbarossa' by the commanders of army Groups, armies, and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank. "2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin. "3. Time Table. "a. 11.00 hrs........"Silver Fox" "b. 11.00 hrs-14.00 hrs........ Army Group South "c. 14.00 hrs-15.30 hrs......Lunch party for all participants in conference "d. From 15.30 hrs.....Baltic, Army Group North, Army Group "Center" in this order. Participants see enclosed list of participants. (list of names, etc. follows) "(signed) Schmundt Colonel of the General Staff and Chief Wehrmacht Adjutant to the Fuehrer". (C-78) There is attached