dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But this system was set up openly and was well known, was it not, in every one of its details? As to organization, everybody knew what the Gestapo was, did they not? Goering: Yes, everyone knew what the Gestapo was.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what its program was in general, not in detail? Goering: I explained that program clearly. At the very beginning I described that publicly, and I also spoke publicly of the tasks of the Gestapo, and I even wrote about it for foreign countries.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And there was nothing secret about the establishment of a Gestapo as a political police, about the fact that people were taken into protective custody, about the fact that these were concentration camps? Nothing secret about those things, was there? Goering: There was at first nothing secret about it at all.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As a matter of fact, part of the effectiveness of a secret police and part of the effectiveness of concentration camp penalties is that the people do know that there are such agencies, isnt it? Goering: It is true that everyone knows that if he acts against the state he will end up in a concentration camp or will be accused of high treason before a court, according to the degree of his crime. But the original reason for creating the concentration camps was to keep there such people whom we rightfully considered enemies of the State.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, that is the type of government -- the government which we have just been describing -- the only type of government which you think is necessary to govern Germany? Goering: I should not like to say that the basic characteristic of this government and its most essential feature was the immediate setting up of the Gestapo and the concentration camps in order to, take care of our opponents, but that over and above that we had set down as our government program a great many far more important things, and that those other things were not the basic principles of our government.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But all of these things were necessary things, as I understood you, for purposes of protection? Goering: Yes, these things were necessary because of the opponents that existed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I assume that that is the only kind of government that you think can function in Germany under present conditions? Goering: Under the conditions existing at that time, it was, in my opinion, the only possible form, and it also demonstrated that Germany could be raised in a short time from the depths of misery, poverty, and unemployment to relative prosperity.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, all of this authority of the State was concentrated -- perhaps I am taking up another subject. Is it the intent to recess at this time?
THE PRESEDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
DR. STAHMER: The witness Dahlerus has been in Nuremberg for several days and is waiting to testify. He has informed me that he must be in Stockholm again by Thursday without fail. For this reason he requests, and I am asking the High Tribunal's permission, that he be called as a witness tomorrow morning, even if the cross-examination has not been completed. The Prosecution have all agreed to my proposal.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say the Prosecution had agreed to your proposal?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, My Lord. I contacted the four gentlemen involved and they have agreed to this.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you anticipate that the examination in chief of the witness will take? You cannot answer for the cross-examination.
DR. STAHMER: I believe that I will need half a day, that is, until tomorrow noon. I cannot say definitely, but it is quite probable it will last as long as that.
THE PRESIDENT: His evidence is relevant only to the few days before the 1st of September 1939?
DR. STAHMER: There are two additional questions, but these questions may be answered, very briefly. He seems to have made two further efforts after September, but those are very brief questions.
THE PRESIDENT: It appears to the Tribunal that half a day is a totally unnecessary time for the examination in chief of a witness who is going to speak about events during a few days before the war began.
DR. STAHMER: I would not say that, Mr. President. It is not just a few days. These negotiations started already at the end of June or the beginning of July. I should like to add further that I shall naturally limit myself to such questions as are necessary for the Trial, but these questions should be asked.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal agrees, if the Prosecution is willing for this evidence to be interposed. The Tribunal trusts that you will find it possible to make your examination in chief much shorter than you have indicated.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Witness, you have related to us the manner in which you and others co-operated in concentrating all authority in the German State in the hands of the Fuehrer, is that right? Goering: I was speaking about myself and to what extent had a part in it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there any defendant in the box you know of who did not co-operate toward that end as far as was possible? Goering: That none of the defendants here opposed or obstructed the Fuehrer in the beginning is clear, but I should like to call youi attention to the fact that we must always distinguish between different periods of time. Some of the questions that are being put to me are very general and, after all, we are concerned with a  period extending over 24 to 25 years, if a comprehensive survey is to be made.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to call your attention to the fruits of this system. You, as I understand it, were informed in 1940 of an impending attack by the German Army on Soviet Russia? Goering: I have explained just how far I was informed of these matters.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You believed an attack not only to be unnecessary, but also to be unwise from the point of view of Germany itself? Goering: At that particular time I was of the opinion that this attack should be postponed in order to carry through other tasks which I considered more important.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not see any military necessity for an attack at that time, even from the point of view of Germany? Goering: Naturally, I was fully aware of Russia's efforts in the deployment of her forces, but I hoped first to put into effect the other strategic measures, described by me, to improve Germany's position. I thought that the time required for these would ward off the critical moment. I well knew, of course, that this critical moment for Germany might come at any time after that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I can only repeat my question, which I submit you have not answered. Did you at that time see any military necessary for an attack by Germany on Soviet Russia? Goering: I personally believed that at that time the danger had not yet reached its climax, and therefore the attack might not yet be necessary. But that was my personal view.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were the Number 2 man at that time in all Germany? Goering: It has nothing to do with my being second in importance. There were two conflicting points of view as regards strategy. The Fuehrer, the Number 1 man, saw one danger, and I, as the Number 2 man, if you wish to express it so, wanted to carry out another strategic measure. If I had imposed my will every time, then I would probably have become the Number 1 man. But since the Number 1 man was of a different opinion, and I was only the Number 2 man, his opinion naturally prevailed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have understood from your testimony -- and I think you can answer this "yes" or "no," and I would greatly appreciate it if you would -- I have understood from your testimony that you were opposed, and told the Fuehrer that you were opposed, to an attack upon Russia at that time. Am I right or wrong? Goering: That is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you were opposed to it because you thought that it was a dangerous move for Germany to make; is that correct? Goering: Yes, I was of the opinion that the moment -- and I repeat this again -- had not come for this undertaking, and that measures should be taken which were more expedient as far as Germany was concerned.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And yet, because of the Fuehrer system, as I understand you, you could give no warning to the German people; you could bring no pressure of any kind to bear to prevent that step, and you could not even resign to protect your own place in history. Goering: These are several questions at once. I should like to answer the first one.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Separate them, if you wish. Goering: The first question was, I believe, whether I took the opportunity to tell the German people about this danger. I had no occasion to do this. We were at war, and such differences of opinion, as far as strategy was concerned, could not be brought before the public forum during war. I believe that never has happened in world history. Secondly, as far as my resignation is concerned, I do not wish even to discuss that, for during the war I was an officer, a soldier, and I was not concerned with whether I shared an opinion or not. I had merely to serve my country as a soldier. Thirdly, I was not the man to forsake someone, to whom I had given my oath of loyalty, every time he was not of my way of thinking. If that had been the case there would have been no need to bind myself to him from the beginning. It never occurred to me to leave the Fuehrer.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Insofar as you know, the German people were led into the war, attacking Soviet Russia under the belief that you favored it? Goering: The German people did not know about the declaration of war against Russia until after the war with Russia had started. The German people, therefore, had nothing to do with this. The German people were not asked; they were told of the fact and of the necessity for it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At what time did you know that the war, as regards achieving the objectives that you had in mind, was a lost war? Goering: It is extremely difficult to say. At any rate, according to my conviction, relatively late -- I mean, it was only towards the end that I became convinced that the war was lost. Up till then I had always thought and hoped that it would come to a stalemate.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, in November 1941 the offensive in Russia broke down? Goering: That is not at all correct. We had reverses because of weather conditions, or rather, the goal which we had set was not reached. The push of 1942 proved well enough that there was no question of a military collapse. Some corps, which had pushed forward, were merely thrown back, and some were withdrawn. The totally unexpected early frost that set in was the cause of this.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You said, "relatively late." The expression that you used does not tell me anything, because I do not know what you regard as relatively late. Will you fix in terms, either of events or time, when it was that the conviction came to you that the war was lost? Goering: When, after 12 January 1945, the Russian offensive pushed forward to the Oder and at the same time the Ardennes offensive had not penetrated, it was then that I was forced to realize that defeat would probably set in slowly. Up to that time I had always hoped that, on the one side, the position at the Vistula toward the East and, on the other side, the position at the West Wall towards the West, could be held until the flow of the new mass produced weapons should bring about a slackening of the Anglo-American air war.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, will you fix that by date; you told us when it was by events. Goering: I just said January 1945; middle, or end of January 1945. After that there was no more hope.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you want it understood that, as a military man, you did not realize until January of 1945 that Germany could not be successful in the war? Goering: As I have already said, we must draw a sharp distinction between two possibilities: First, the successful conclusion of a war, and second, a war which ends by neither side being the victor. As regards a successful outcome, the moment when it was realized that that was no longer possible was much earlier, whereas the realization of the fact that defeat would set in did not come until the time I have just mentioned.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: For some period before that, you knew that a successful termination of the war could only be accomplished if you could come to some kind of terms with the enemy; was that not true? Goering: Of course, a successful termination of a war can only be considered successful if I either conquer the enemy or, through negotiations with the enemy, come to a conclusion which guarantees me success. That is what I call a successful termination. I call it a draw, when I come to terms with the enemy. This does not bring me the success which victory would have brought but, on the other hand, it precludes a defeat. This is a conclusion without victors or vanquished.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you knew that it was Hitler's policy never to negotiate and you knew that as long as he was the head of the Government the enemy would not negotiate with Germany, did you not? Goering: I knew that enemy propaganda emphasized that under no circumstances would there be negotiations with Hitler. That Hitler did not want to, negotiate under any circumstances, I also knew, but not in this connection. Hitler wanted to negotiate if there were some prospect of results; but he was absolutely opposed to hopeless and futile negotiations. Because of the declaration of the enemy in the West after the landing in Africa, as far as I remember, that under no circumstances would they negotiate with Germany but would force on her unconditional surrender, Germany's resistance was stiffened to the utmost and measures had to be taken accordingly. If I have no chance of concluding a war through negotiations, then it is useless to negotiate, and I must strain every nerve to bring about a change by a call to arms.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: By the time of January 1945 you also knew that you were unable to defend the German cities against the air attacks of the Allies, did you not? Goering: Concerning the defense of German cities against Allied air attacks, I should like to describe the possibility of doing this as follows: Of itself ...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you answer my question? Time may not mean quite as much to you as it does to the rest of us. Can you not answer "yes" or "no"? Did you then know, at the same time that you knew that the war was lost, that the German cities could not successfully be defended against air attack by the enemy? Can you not tell us "yes" or "no"? Goering: I can say that I knew that, at that time, it was not possible.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And after that time it was wen known to you that the air attacks which were continued against England could not turn the tide of war, and were designed solely to effect a prolongation of what you then knew was a hopeless conflict? Goering: I believe you are mistaken. After January 1945 there were no more attacks on England, except perhaps a few single planes, because at that time I needed all my petrol for the fighter planes for defense. If I had had bombers and oil at my disposal, then, of course, I should have continued such attacks up to the last minute as retaliation for the attacks which were being carried out on German cities, whatever our chances might have been.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What about robot attacks? Were there any robot attacks after January 1945? Goering: Thank God, we still had one weapon that we could use. I have just said that, as long as the fight was on, we had to hit back; and as a soldier I can only regret that we did not have enough of these V-1 and V-2 bombs, for an easing of the attacks on German cities could be brought about only if we could inflict equally heavy losses on the enemy.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And there was no way to prevent the war going on as long as Hitler was the head of the German Government, was there? Goering: As long as Hitler was the Fuehrer of the German people, he alone decided whether the war was to go on. As long as my enemy threatens me and demands absolutely unconditional surrender, I flght to my last breath, because there is nothing left for me except perhaps a chance that in some way fate may change, even though it seems hopeless.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the people of Germany who thought it was time that the slaughter should stop had no means to stop it except revolution or assassination of Hitler, had they? Goering: A revolution always changes a situation, if it succeeds. That is a foregone conclusion. The murder of Hitler at this time, say January 1945, would have brought about my succession. If the enemy had given me the same answer, that is, unconditional surrender, and had held out those terrible conditions which had been intimated, I would have continued fighting whatever the circumstances.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was an attack on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944? Goering: Unfortunately, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And there came a time in 1945 when Hitler made a will in Berlin whereby he turned over the presidency of the Reich to your co-defendant, Admiral Doenitz. You know about that? Goering: That is correct. I read of this will here.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in making his will and turning over the Government of Germany to Admiral Doenitz, I call your attention to this statement: And by that will he expelled you and Himmler from the Party and from all offices of the State. Goering: I can only answer for myself. What Himmler did I do not know. I neither betrayed the Fuehrer, nor did I at that time negotiate with a single foreign soldier. This will, or this final act of the Fuehrer's, is based on an extremely regrettable mistake, and one which grieves me deeply -- that the Fuehrer could believe in his last hours that I could ever be disloyal to him. It was all due to an error in the transmission of a radio report and perhaps to a misrepresentation which Bormann gave the Fuehrer. I myself never thought for a minute of taking over power illegally or of acting against the Fuehrer in any way.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In any event you were arrested and expected to be shot? Goering: That is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in tracing the rise of power of the Party you have omitted some such things as, for example, the Reichstag fire of 27 February 1933. There was a great purge following that fire, was there not, in which many people were arrested and many people were killed? Goering: I do not know of a single case where a man was killed because of the Reichstag fire, except that of the incendiary Van der Lubbe, who was sentenced by the court. The other two defendants in this trial were acquitted. Herr Thalmann was not, as you recently erroneously believed, accused; it was the communist representative, Torgler. He was acquitted, as was also the Bulgarian Dimitroff. Relatively few arrests were made in connection with the Reichstag fire. The arrests which you attribute to the Reichstag fire are the arrests of communist functionaries. These arrests, as I have repeatedly stated and wish to emphasize once more, had nothing to do with this fire. The fire merely precipitated their arrest and upset our carefully planned action, thus allowing several of the functionaries to escape.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, you had lists of Communists already prepared at the time of the Reichstag fire of persons who should be arrested, did you not? Goering: We had always drawn up, beforehand, fairly complete lists of communist functionaries who were to be arrested. That had nothing to do with the fire in the German Reichstag.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They were immediately put into execution -- the arrests, I mean -- after the Reichstag fire? Goering: Contrary to my intention of postponing this action for a few days and letting it take place according to plan, thereby perfecting the arrangements, the Fuehrer ordered that same night that the arrests should follow immediately. This had the disadvantage, as I said, of precipitating matters.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You and the Fuehrer met at the fire, did you not? Goering: That is right.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then and there you decided to arrest all the Communists that you had listed? Goering: I repeat again that the decision for their arrests had been reached some days before this; it simply meant that on that night they were immediately arrested. I would rather have waited a few days according to plan; then some of the important men would not have escaped.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the next morning the decree was presented to President Von Hindenburg, suspending the provisions of the constitution which we have discussed here, was it not? Goering: I believe so, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was Karl Ernst? Goering: Karl Ernst -- whether his first name was Karl I do not know -- was the SA leader of Berlin.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was Helldorf? Goering: Count Helldorf was the subsequent SA leader of Berlin.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Heines? Goering: Heines was the SA leader of Silesia at that time.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it is known to you, is it not, that Ernst made a statement confessing that these three burned the Reichstag and that you and Goebbels planned and furnished the incendiary materials of liquid phosphorus and petroleum which were deposited by you in a subterranean passage for them to get, which passage led from your house to the Reichstag building? You knew of such a statement, did you not? Goering: I do not know of any statement by the SA leader Ernst. But I do know of some fairytale published shortly after in the foreign press by Rohm's chauffeur. This was after 1934.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But there was such a passage from the Reichstag building to your house, was there not? Goering: On one side of the street is the Reichstag building, and opposite is the palace of the Reichstag president, The two are connected by a passage along which the wagons run which carry the coke for the central heating.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, in any event, shortly after this, Ernst was killed without a trial and without a chance to tell his story, was he not? Goering: That is not correct. The Reichstag fire was in February 1933. Ernst was shot on 30 June 1934, because together with Rohm he had planned to overthrow the Government and had plotted against the Fuehrer. He, therefore, had a year and a quarter in which he could have made statements regarding the Reichstag fire, if he had wished to do so.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, he had begun to make statements, had he not, and you were generally being accused of burning the Reichstag building? You knew that, did you not? That was the ... Goering: That accusation that I had set fire to the Reichstag came from a certain foreign press. That could not bother me because it was not consistent with the facts. I had no reason or motive for setting fire to the Reichstag. From the artistic point of view I did not at all regret that the assembly chamber was burned; I hoped to build a better one. But I did regret very much that I was forced to find a new meeting place for the Reichstag and, not being able to find one, I had to give up my Kroll Opera House, that is, the second State Opera House, for that purpose. The opera seemed to me much more important than the Reichstag.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you ever boasted of burning the Reichstag building, even by way of joking? Goering: No. I made a joke, if that is the one you are referring to, when I said that, after this, I should be competing with Nero and that probably people would soon be saying that, dressed in a red toga and holding a lyre in my hand, I looked on at the fire and played while the Reichstag was burning. That was the joke. But the fact was that I almost perished in the flames, which would have been very unfortunate for the German people, but very fortunate for their enemies.