dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. NELTE: In addition to this, but planned to take effect only in case of mobilization, there was collaboration with the following subordinate ministries: a) Ministry of Economics, b) Ministry of Food, e) Ministry of Labor, d) Ministry of Finance, for foreign exchange and purchase of raw materials, e) Ministry of Forestry. This necessitated, from December 1935 onward, the participation of a GBW deputy for purposes of information in the Reich Defense Commission. Alter Dr. Schacht's retirement from the Reich Ministry of Economics, the GBW became only fiction, because the fun powers had been transferred to the Four Year Plan, that is to say, Goering. Only when the powers of the ministry Of armament and munitions were extended in August 1943, when it became known as the Ministry for Armament and War Production, was there a revival of the originally planned position of the GBW entailing fun powers in time of war, but he remained subordinate as regards organization to the Four Year Plan, with the Fuehrer as the general authority in reality at the top, owing to the failure of the Four Year Plan. II. In collaboration of the GBW with the War Economy Office in the OKW the "Mobilization Plan for Rearmament" had been set up, with General Thomas presiding. This "Mobilization Plan for Rearmament" acted on behalf of the Armed Forces and the GBW who supplied particulars of the industrial plants to be assigned from general production for reconversion to armament production in time of war. It was to attend to: (a) labor requirements, (b) raw material requirements, and (c) industrial equipment (special machinery for weapons, et cetera). The prerequisite of modern warfare is not so much the exploitation and organization of the manpower of a country into military formations, but it is essentially a problem of industrial capacity and of its appropriate utilization for the production of all necessary raw materials. This process must of necessity precede any rearmament, and requires expenditure of money and, even more, of time.
DR. NELTE: When Germany proclaimed her equal rights as regards defense -that is, military sovereignty-she did not possess the necessary resources for a material rearmament, as they had been taken away in the execution and recognition of the disarmament plan. It has been confirmed here during the Trial by various sources that first 10, then 7 to 8 years were allowed and anticipated for providing material equipment in the form of hitherto prohibited modern weapons and supplies, especially including munitions, for the peacetime Armed Forces which had been announced to the world with the proclamation of liberty for national defense in 1935. This becomes comprehensible if one considers that even the U.S.A. with its unlimited means, which were not impaired by the effects of war, required 1 to 5 years for the necessary conversion and rearmament in this war. Thus we see that rearmament, if it is intended to exceed the limits of defensive armament, can only be achieved gradually in the case of nations, which-like Germany in 1934-had no armaments. First stage: Procuring of essentials with regard to industries and raw materials for the production of war supplies. Second stage: Placing of orders with the armament industry for the first equipment of the peacetime strength of the Armed Forces and execution of these orders within the framework of the means provided by the annual budgets. Third stage: Procurement of the munition and weapon supplies to be stored for the equipment of a mobile Armed Forces which would be developed, in the case of war, from the permanent peacetime strength in accordance with the manpower capacity of a nation. Those supplies would include the necessary replacements during the war. If one considers that in 1934 Germany had no modern weapons, no submarines, and no military aircraft at her disposal, it can well be believed that any reasonable soldier had to assume under the given circumstances there could be no thought of a war, let alone a war of aggression.
DR. NELTE: Accordingly, the tasks which the Defendant Keitel assumed in his official capacity of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Department must be considered as purely preparatory and organizational. Keitel, of course, bears the responsibility for General Thomas, Chief of the Defense Economy Staff. The technical details and the extent of his activity can be seen from Document 2353-PS, which is correct in essence despite the fact that Thomas, in the declaration prefixed to this historical document, now wants it to look as if he had presented his original notes in an exaggerated way and given them a more favorable turn to please Hitler and avoid arrest. This does not correspond to the facts. What Thomas wrote proves, according to the Defendant Keitel's opinion, that a "war armament" with mobilization of the industrial capacity- and its conversion to war economy did not begin until early in October 1939. It further proves that the statements of the defendants who were examined here, as far as they were connected with this rearmament, and especially those of Dr. Schacht until 1937, are in complete agreement on the following point: At this period wars of aggression were not avowedly desired, and that in the light of the state of actual armament they must have appeared impossible. But rearmament in manpower also shows the same picture during this period. The evidence has demonstrated that up to the spring of 1938 only 27 peacetime divisions were scantily equipped and that 10 or 12 reserve divisions were in preparation; at that time the Wehrmacht had no other supplies or armaments at its disposal. If despite this fact, and operating without general mobilization, it succeeded by the autumn of 1938 in preparing an army of almost 40 divisions for the aggression against Czechoslovakia, at a time' when it had the poorest protection on its western border, one can see what the maximum war potential was in those days.
DR. NELTE: Under such circumstances, and with knowledge of the armament situation and war potentials of neighboring countries which were mutually united by alliances and assistance pacts, none of the generals of the old school could ever think of bringing about a war. The fact that already one year later, in 1939, the state of German armaments was substantially improved, must primarily be attributed to the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Finally it must be pointed out that during this period there was no strategic plan for any aggression whatsoever. General Jodl has declared on the witness stand that when in 1935 he came to the Armed Forces Department, no plan nor anything similar was in existence, except what was provided for in case of internal unrest. The occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland zone was not planned, but was improvised by Hitler. The Initial Assembly and Combat Directives of June 1937 is a general instruction for possible military conflicts. For the sake of completeness I must also call attention to Document EC-194. This is an order issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Von Blomberg, on the subject of aerial reconnaissance and the observation of submarine movements during the occupation of the Rhine. Keitel signed and forwarded this order. It is the only existent document of that period. The \Reichswehr had a permanent force of 100,000 men, as had been laid down by the Treaty of Versailles. It is indisputable that in view of the size of the Reich, its unprotected borders and the way East Prussia was cut off, this figure was absolutely inadequate for creating a feeling of internal security and the possibility of defense in the face of an attack from the outside world-an elementary right for any country and nation. This state of inadequacy, which had been created by the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, was the subject of reflection even before 1933 with a view to improving it without actually making use of soldiers for the purpose.
DR. NELTE: An examination was made and it was found that in case of mobilization a series of tasks could be taken over by the civil ministries. Here tasks of a purely defensive nature were concerned, which cannot be considered aggressive. They were tasks of national defense, and principally the following: I have enumerated them in my manuscript and, without reading them, I would like the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of these points. As it is quite clear these are matters for defense only. (1) Protection of the frontiers by reinforcement of the customs service; (2) Postal security by Reichspost agencies (repeater offices); (3) Railroad protection by Reichsbahn personnel; (4) Laying of cables instead of overhead telegraph lines; (a) Construction of railroad viaducts and elimination of level crossings on main traffic roads; (6) Construction of frontier fortifications in the East, Oder-Warthe line, Pomeranian line, Oder line (terrain expropriation); (7) Improvement of maritime traffic with East Prussia and of rail transit through the Corridor; (8) Fortifications in East Prussia; (9) Reinforcement of frontier protection in East Prussia; (10) Preparation by the Reichsbahn of mobile loading ramps; (11) Reinforcement of the coastal customs service; (12) Development by the Reichspost of the radio network (amplified transmitters and receivers); (13) Manning of permanent army signal stations with Reichspost personnel; (14) Relieving the Reichswehr from the charge of detaching soldiers for duties which can be carried out by civilian personnel; (15) Protection of frontier crossings by the local authorities (Landrate); (16) Co-ordination of motor vehicles, et cetera. The advisory body for these tasks and their execution was, up to 1933, the Committee of Experts. It consisted of experts coming from the different civil ministries, who after being accepted by the Minister of the Interior-Severing, up to the end of 1933-met for conferences at the Reich Defense Ministry. The Reichswehr Minister charged the then Colonel Keitel to direct these meetings.
DR. NELTE: At these meetings the experts received and discussed the desires of the Reich Defense Ministry as regards the afore-mentioned tasks, which the individual ministers could take over in case of a mobilization. During Minister Severing's time this co-operation worked without friction with the idea of satisfying as far as possible the wishes of the Reichswehr Minister, and it continued in the same way after 30 January 1933. The scope and content of the tasks remained the same. When, on 4 April 1933, a Reich Defense Council was established by a resolution of Hitler's new Reich Government, the committee was retained and only its name was changed: The Committee of Experts became the Reich Defense Committee. However, it did not change its field of action and was not given any new jurisdiction. It only grew in size as it went on developing, especially after the introduction of compulsory military service. Now, as before, the Reich Defense Committee was a body which had to give advice about those tasks of national defense concerning the civilian sector which had to be prepared and also partly taken over by the civil ministries. For this Count of the Indictment it must be made quite clear that after 4 April 1933 Keitel's position did not change either, and especially that he was not a member of the Reich Defense Council. The Reich Defense Council, which has taken up a lot of space in the statements of the Prosecution, may be considered as virtually nonexistent in the light of the evidence produced-later on I will come back to the time after 1938. In any case the Prosecution could not prove that there was any session of the Reich Defense Council during this period. The minutes submitted dealt without exception with the sessions of the Reich Defense Committee, and the members of this committee reported to their competent ministries, who in turn had an opportunity, within the framework of the cabinet, to translate into concrete form the suggestions and proposals discussed in the Reich Defense Committee.
DR. NELTE: Thus there were never any sessions of the Reich Defense Council whose existence was merely formal, so that witnesses could rightly say that the Reich Defense Council existed only on paper. Keitel, up to 30 September 1933, as colonel and section chief in the Reich Defense Ministry, and later from October 1935 as major general and Chief of Stay of the Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry, was a member of the Reich Defense Committee. Therefore, from 30 September 1933 to 30 September 1935 he was not in the War Ministry, and thus had no function connected with this Count of the Indictment. Neither did he during this time participate in sessions of the Reich Defense Committee, the minutes of which have been presented by the Prosecution as having special probative value. The session of 22 May 1933, described as the second session of the working Committee of Experts, was the last session in which Keitel participated before being transferred to serve with the troops. The first session after his transfer to the Reich War Ministry was held on 6 September 1935. It is put down as the 11th session of the Reich Defense Committee. Although in the examination of Keitel's responsibility one has to exclude the work done by the Reich Defense Committee during the two years between sessions 3 and 10, I will nevertheless make it the subject of my statements, as it is from these very minutes that one can see what the Reich Defense Committee was doing. Only the knowledge of these minutes makes it clear why an institution, which in this or some other form exists in every country and which serves the purpose of national defense as deemed legitimate by every country, has now been presented as an important factor in submitting evidence on plans and preparations for aggression. The minutes of the sessions- of the Reich Defense Committee in 1933, 1934, and 1935 reveal the character of the work as that of preparations for the event of war.
DR. NELTE: But it is likewise evident that it is a question of preparations intended to bring about a more perfect degree of readiness in national defense in case of mobilization. If the "political situation" is twice mentioned, these allusions indicate the fear of military sanctions from neighboring states. (Reference is made to the case of Abyssinia, which led to sanctions against Italy.) Everything is rooted in the thought of overcoming that state of military impotency which made it impossible to safeguard the open frontiers of the Reich. The recurring idea of obligation to secrecy can only be attributed to fear arising from the situation at the time lest the revelation of measures, however defensive, might produce preventive measures on the part of the victorious powers. That these suspicions were well-founded is shown by the intransigent attitude of certain states after the complete disarmament of Germany, and this question is important for Keitel's attitude, for he affirms that the conclusion drawn from the obligation to secrecy, namely, that secrecy is a proof of bad conscience, and. bad conscience is a proof of knowledge of illegality, is erroneous. The Reich Defense Committee never passed resolutions; it was an advisory body on matters of national defense insofar as the civilian sector was concerned with mobilization. At no time did it ever indulge in deliberations concerning rearmament as regards manpower or material, or concerning plans of aggression. The Prosecution has tried in one instance to show that the Reich Defense Committee was involved in plans for aggression. I do not wish to read the next few sentences. Here we deal with the well-known event of freeing the River Rhine for traffic, a question which was designated as the technical liberation of the Rhine River. This came up in Goering's testimony.
DR. NELTE: They pointed out Document Number EC - 05, the minutes of the Committee for Reich Defense, session of 26 June 1934, in which there is mention of "participation in preparing mobilization." In these minutes under (e) can be found: "Preparation for the liberation of the Rhine." From this the prosecuting authorities have drawn the conclusion that already on :6 June 1934 the Reich Defense Committee was contemplating the "liberation of the Rhine." The witness Reich Marshal Goering has stated during his hearing that, given the unequivocal wording of the German text, it is a question here of the technical freeing of the river Rhine, but not of any strategic or political matter. I am mentioning this manifest error by the prosecuting authorities, which can only have occurred through a gross mistake in translation, because it has led to an erroneous conception of the prosecution as to the competence of the Reich Defense Committee, and because it is the only ease which has come up in connection with this complex. The true nature of the Reich Defense Committee's activities is set out quite simply and clearly in the Manual of Mobilization for the Civilian Administration; Documents 1639-PS and 1639a-PS. It refers to the result of discussions between all the experts of the Reich Defense Committee, and is an appendix to the mobilization plan of the Armed Forces as well as to that of armaments. These three mobilization plans all taken together form the basis of your decision.
DR. NELTE: You may see from them whether the Prosecution is right in its assumption of a total planning for aggressive war, or whether the Defendant Keitel was right when he stated during his hearing: "What has been discussed and planned here is what every country is entitled to do and what the responsible agencies are bound to do, if they do not wish to violate their most sacred duty, namely the safeguarding of the security of their country." The decision of 4 February 1938 was fateful for General Keitel as well as for the German Wehrmacht: for Keitel who could not yet form an opinion on the newly-created office of the "High Command of the Armed Forces" (OKW); for the Armed Forces which on that day lost its relative independence. Hitler broke down the last barriers between himself and the Armed Forces-the nation in arms-by removing both the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the constitutionally responsible Reich War Minister. This truly portentous decision was fatal for Keitel and the German nation, though at the time of its occurrence this was not realized by the participants. That they must be blamed for not realizing it is easy to say now, in retrospect. At thee time everybody who was not an inveterate skeptic or pessimist had to base his judgment on the development of things in general and on the strength of the personalities involved. Neither the one nor the other could be clearly appreciated on 4 February 1938. It was not a personal decision of the Defendant Keitel who did not know Hitler personally in these days and who met him for the first time man to man in the preliminary. Hitler assigned him to the newly-created office of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Keitel accepted it. Even if we disregard entirely the human emotions connected with such a brilliant promotion there was no reasonable ground for the then Chief of the Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry to decline the offer, since Von Blomberg himself had recommended him. Hitler's ideas about this office could not be discerned by Keitel.
DR. NELTE: I shall pass to the next page... The decree gave Keitel a wonderfully impressive office name as "Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces." The historical foundation is the elimination of the commanding authority over the entire Armed Forces, which up to 4 February 1938 was in the hands of Field Marshal Von Blomberg, and on that day was taken over by Hitler himself. Hitler created at the same time the responsible Ministry of War, which up to that time had also been administrated by Field Marshal Von Blomberg. Dr. Rammers says the following about the origin of the Fuehrer's Decree of 4 February 1938: (Morning Session of 8 April 1946; Volume XI, Page 29.) "The Fuehrer informed me that the Reich Minister of War, Von Blomberg, is resigning his office and that he avails himself of this opportunity to make some other changes in the Reich Government, particularly since the Foreign Minister, Von Neurath, is going to retire, which will make a change; there is also a change in the High Command of the Army. In this connection the Fuehrer gave orders for a decree to be worked out regarding the Command of the Armed Forces. It was to be merged with the Ministry of War. As a directive the Fuehrer gave me the following instruction: "In the future I shall not have any War Minister; neither will I have in the future a Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to stand between me, as the Supreme Commander, and the other commanders-in-chief within the Armed Forces. "In accordance with this instruction the decree was formulated, by which the High Command of the Armed Forces was established as an Army Staff directly subordinate to the command of the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer did not want any independent office in this function, inserted between himself and the commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces branches. In consequence, General Keitel, now appointed Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, had no independent commanding authority over the different branches of the Armed Forces.
DR. NELTE: Such authority would not have been considered for other reasons as well." Field Marshal Von Blomberg declares in the affidavits I have submitted: To Question 24: "At our last discussion Hitler pointed out that he presumably would not fill my position again, and that he would thereby become himself the real Supreme Commander of the German Army... "He asked for a suggestion for the assignment of a Chef do Bureau who would direct and carry out current tasks under him and thus under Hitler's responsibility. PI named Keitel, who, under me, had administered this office very capably." In answer to Question 27: "I proposed Keitel as Chef do Bureau, believing that I had put him in the right job." In such a position he would not be a military adviser to Hitler. Whether and in how far Hitler ever asked for his advice, I do not know. Even so, Keitel's responsibility, in my opinion, would not thereby be established. Question 29: "Was it not Hitler's intention to create a tool for himself in the person of Keitel, whose capacity for organization and hard work seemed to him valuable, as an executive organ for his decisions and orders? "Answer: This question is emphatically confirmed by me. Hitler's original intention at that time was most certainly to have at his disposal a trustworthy subordinate organ, and in no way an adviser endowed with any responsibility." The decree of 4 February 1938 regarding leadership in the Armed Forces is known to the Tribunal. Therefore, I do not need to read it to you. One sees from this and from the hearing of witnesses regarding the position of the Defendant Keitel and questions of his competence and responsibility, that: (1) Hitler did not want either a responsible War Ministry or any other person but himself to exercise the commanding authority over the entire Armed Forces.