dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GEL. ZORYA: This order was signed by Field Marshal Keitel and initialed by General Jodl (or by General Warlimont on Keitel's instructions-I do not quite remember which.)" I am omitting two lines which are irrelevant to our case and read on: "It was pointed out in the order that for the purpose of delivering a lightning blow against the Soviet Union, Abwehr II, in conducting subversive work against Russia, with the help of a net of V men, must use its agents for kindling national antagonism among the people of the Soviet Union." I now request you to turn over the page and on Page 49 in the document book on Page 2 of the minutes of the interrogation, and to note the following passages in his testimony: "In carrying out the above-mentioned instructions of Keitel and Jodl, I contacted Ukrainian National Socialists who were in the German Intelligence Service and other members of the nationalist fascist groups, whom I roped in to carry out the tasks as set out above. "In particular, instructions were given by me personally to the leaders of the Ukrainian Nationalists, Melnik (code name 'Consul I' and Bandara, to organize immediately upon Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, and to provoke demonstrations in the Ukraine in order to disrupt the immediate rear of the Soviet armies, and also to convince international public opinion of alleged disintegration of the Soviet rear. "We also prepared special diversionist groups by Abwehr II for subversive activities in the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union." I must again request you to turn over the page. On Page 50 in the document book, beginning with the third line from the top you will find Stolze's testimony: "Apart from this, a special military unit was trained for subversive activities on Soviet territory, a special duty training regiment for special tasks, Brandenburg 800, under the immediate command of the head of Abwehr II, Lahousen.
GEL. ZORYA: Among the objects of this special unit, created in 1940, was the seizure of operationally important points, such as bridges, tunnels, and important military installations, and holding them till the arrival of the advance units of the German Army. "Contrary to the international rules governing the conduct of war, the personnel of this regiment, mainly composed of Germans from beyond the border, made extensive use of enemy uniforms and equipment in order to camouflage their operations. "During the course of preparations for Germany's attack on the U.S.S.R., the command of the Brandenburg Regiment also collected supplies of Red Army uniforms, equipment, and arms, and organized separate detachments of Germans acquainted with the Russian language." Your Honors, the testimonies of Stolze, Bentivegni, and Pieckenbrock, which I have presented in evidence, disclose the working methods of the German Intelligence Service in the preparation and execution of Plan Barbarossa. I shall not detain the Tribunal any further with these questions. But before proceeding to a further presentation, I should like to point out that the department of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner was likewise interested in intelligence work. I shall limit myself to submitting one document which is typical of the manner in which the Hitlerites, by exploiting their connections, created difficulties in Iran, through which country, as was known, the supply routes passed for the delivery to the U.S.S.R. of motor vehicles and war material of the most varied nature. The document, which I intend to submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-178 (Document Number USSR-178) was taken by us from the German Foreign Office archives, which fell into the hands of advance units of the Red Army. This document is the Defendant Kaltenbrunner's letter to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. The letter is typed on a sheet of note paper with the letterhead of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. In the document book before you, you will find this document on Page 52.
GEL. ZORYA: I read into the record the underlined extracts from this letter: "28 June 1943; top secret. "To the Foreign Minister Herr Von Ribbentrop; Berlin; Object: Elections to the Iranian Parliament. "Most honorable Herr Reich Minister: We have made direct contact with Iran and have received information on the possibilities of exercising German influence on the course of the imminent Iranian parliamentary elections." And a few lines further on it is stated: "In order to exercise a decisive influence on the results of the elections, bribery is necessary. For Teheran 400,000 tomans, and for the rest of Iran at least 600,000 tomans are necessary.... It should also be noted that nationally oriented Iranian circles expect the intervention of Germany. "I beg you to inform me whether it is possible to obtain one million tomans from the Foreign- Office. This money can be sent by the people whom we are sending there by airplane. "Heil Hitler. Yours devotedly, Kaltenbrunner, SS Obergruppenfuehrer." This document will help you to form an idea of the range of questions which interested the Reich Foreign Minister. Such a peculiar activity of the Foreign Office was not in the nature of a chance episode. In the course of time, the collaboration of the German Foreign Office and of the Reich Fuehrer SS waxed in strength and developed more and more. As a result, a very curious document appeared, which might be considered as an agreement between Himmler and Ribbentrop on the organization of espionage work. I submit this document as Exhibit Number USSR-120 (Document USSR-120), and request the Tribunal to accept it as documentary evidence. This document is on Page 53 and 55 of the document book before you. The text of this agreement will be read into the record with a few remarks. The text of the agreement reads: "By the order dated 12 February 1944, the Fuehrer has entrusted the Reich Fuehrer SS with the creation of a unified German Secret Intelligence Service.
GEL. ZORYA: The Secret Intelligence Service has as its purpose, so far as foreign countries are concerned, to get information in the political, military, economic, and technical spheres for the Reich. In addition, the Fuehrer has established that the direction of the Intelligence Service, insofar as foreign countries are concerned, must be conducted in agreement with the Foreign Minister. In this connection, the following agreement between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reich Fuehrer SS had been reached: "1. The Secret Intelligence Service of the Reich Fuehrer SS represents an important instrument for obtaining information in the sphere of foreign politics, and this instrument is placed at the disposal of the Foreign Minister. The first condition for this is close, comradely, and loyal co-operation between the Foreign Office and the main office of the Reich Security Service. The collection of information on foreign politics by the diplomatic service is not affected by this. "2. The Foreign Office places at the disposal of the main office of the Reich Security Service the information on the situation in the field of foreign politics necessary for the conduct of the Intelligence Service and the directive regarding German foreign policy. It hands over to the main office of the Reich Security Service its intelligence and other tasks in the sphere of foreign policy, which are to be performed by the organs of the Secret Intelligence Service. "3. Intelligence material in the field of foreign politics, obtained by the Secret Intelligence Service, is placed..."
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn't it be a sufficient summary of this document with which you are dealing to say that it is a document signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop and that it shows that there was a unification of the German Secret Intelligence Service. The details of that unification are not really a matter which very much concerns this Tribunal, and therefore, as we are directed by the Charter to be as expeditious as possible, it is not necessary to read all the details of this unification.
GEN. ZORYA: I summarize this document and would add that this agreement, signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop, created such a state of affairs that it became extremely difficult to differentiate prevailing conditions in fascist Germany or to distinguish where Himmler's Gestapo service ended and the Foreign Office activities of the Defendant Ribbentrop began. I shall now, with the permission of the Tribunal, proceed to the presentation of the next document. The document which I have just read-I am referring to the Himmler-Ribbentrop agreement concerning the conduct of intelligence work abroad-also justifies the assumption that under the name of German diplomatic representation in such countries which maintained normal diplomatic relations with Germany, a whole intelligence network of the Gestapo was actively functioning. If this summary, in the opinion of the Tribunal, corresponds to the contents of the document, I shall proceed to the following section of the report, "The Satellites of Germany." When Plan Barbarossa was read into the record in Court, there was one part of the entire case which, in my opinion, received comparatively little attention. I refer to Part II of Plan Barbarossa, Document Number 446-PS. This part bears the name of "Presumed Allies and Their Tasks." I should like, here and now, to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the questions touched on in this part. In the first place, I consider it essential to remind you of the contents of this part by repeating it. Document Number 446-PS, Plan Barbarossa, is on Page 14 of the bundle of documents submitted to the Tribunal. I consider it essential to read out Part II of this case: "1. On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia. "The Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces will, at the appropriate time, settle and lay down in what way the armed forces of the two countries will be subordinated to the German command on their entry into the war. "2.
GEN. ZORYA: Romania's task will be to tie up, in co-operation with the group of the armed forces advancing there, the enemy forces facing her, and, for the rest, to maintain the auxiliary services in the rear area. "3. Finland will have to cover the advance of the German northern landing group (units of Group XXI) due to arrive from Norway, and then operate together with it. In addition, it will be up to Finland to eliminate Hango. "4. It is possible to count upon the Swedish railways and coal being available for the movements of the German northern group not later than the beginning of the operation." In the speech of the Chief Prosecutor from the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko, attention was drawn to the opening sentence of this section: "On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia." This justified the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. in pointing out in his speech that on 18 December 1940, the date of the Barbarossa document, Romania and Finland were already following in the wake of the predatory policy of the Hitlerite conspirators. There is only one more document which was submitted by the United States Prosecution and which mentioned Germany's presumed allies in her aggression against the U.S.S.R. This document, numbered C-39, is entitled "Provisional Case Barbarossa." It is, as the Defendant Keitel pointed out in his covering letter, a timetable for The preparations of Plan Barbarossa after June 1941. This timetable was confirmed by Hitler. The text of this plan is on Page 57 of the document book. In Part II of this document, entitled "Negotiations with Friendly Powers," we read: <, "a) A request has been sent to Bulgaria not to reduce to any large extent the units stationed for security reasons on the Turkish frontier. "b) The Romanians have begun, at the instigation of the Commander-in-Chief of the German troops in Romania, a partial, camouflaged mobilization in order to be able to close their frontiers against a presumed attack by the Russians.
GEN. ZORYA: "c) Hungarian territory will be used for the deployment of Army Group South only insofar as it would be expedient for introducing German units to link up the Hungarian and Romanian forces. Until the middle of June, however, no representations on this subject will be made to Hungary. "d) five German divisions have been deployed in the eastern part of Slovakia; the next ones will be unloaded in the area of Prosov. "e) Preliminary negotiations with the Finnish general staff take place as from 25 May." Mr. President, in order to correlate the following documents with the testimony given by Paulus, I shall merely refer to the fact that this witness testified to the previous preparations for military aggression in that fortress which was Romania, thereby proving that corresponding measures for the reorganization of the Romanian Army, founded in the image and pattern of the German Army, were taken in September 1940 when a special military mission was sent to Romania. The chief of this mission was Cavalry General Hansen. His Chief of Staff was Major General Hauffe, his chief quartermaster Major Merk. Major General Von Rotkirch commanded the 13th Panzer Division. The task of this military mission was the reorganization of the Romanian Army and its preparation for the subsequent attack on the Soviet Union in the spirit of Plan Barbarossa. The preliminary trend of this task, as Paulus has testified, was given to Hansen and his Chief of Staff by Paulus and they got the last directives from the Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. General Hansen received directives from two sources: from the OKW where his military mission was concerned, and from the OKH in all questions dealing with the Army. Directives of a military and political nature were received only from the OKW. The military mission acted as liaison between the German and the Romanian general staffs. The form assumed by the agreement and, even more, the publication of the true aims of high ranking fascist leaders in the country, did not always suit the satellites.
GEN. ZORYA: I now present, as Exhibit Number USSR-233 (Document Number USSR-233), the minutes of a conversation between Ion Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop which took place on 12 February 1942. This document was taken from the personal archives of Marshal Antonescu which were captured by the advance units of the Red Army. This document, Your Honors, figures on Pages 59-62 of your document book. In connection with Ribbentrop's speech in Budapest on the subject of Transylvania, Antonescu makes the following annotation in the course of this speech-last paragraph, Page 2 of the Russian text of the document, Page 60 of the document book: 'Without hesitation, I stressed the point that as early as 6 September, when I took over the government of the country, supported only by Monsieur Mihai Antonescu, I declared, without asking the opinion of my people, that we must follow a policy of adherence to the Axis powers. I said that this was the only example in the history of nations when two persons dare to make an open declaration and to call upon their people to follow a policy which no doubt could only appear odious...." When making this cynical entry, Ion Antonescu could hardly have expected it to receive such wide publicity. Mr. President, I intend to read into the record a long document which will take considerable time.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you were going to recall the witness who was being called yesterday, Field Marshal Paulus, were you not, so that the defendants' counsel may have the opportunity of questioning him? Will you do that now?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, according to the wish of the Tribunal the witness is in the Palace of Justice. [The witness, Paulus, took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Field Marshal Paulus, I want to remind you that you should pause after the question that has been asked you before you answer it, in order that the translation shall get through Do you follow what I mean?
PAULUS: I have understood.
DR. NELTE: Witness, I should like to ask several questions. On 3 September 1940, you came as Chief Quartermaster I to the High Command of the Army; is that correct?
PAULUS: That is correct.
DR. NELTE: Who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time?
PAULUS: It will be very well known to you that at that time the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch.
DR. NELTE: I believe that the phraseology that you have used is not correct because I did not put this question for any other reason than just to explain the situation to the people who are assembled here. It is known to us but may not be known to the Tribunal. Who was at that time the Chief of Staff of the Army?
PAULUS: It was Generaloberst Halder.
DR.NELTE: Were you, as Chief Quartermaster I, the permanent representative of the Chief of Staff?
PAULUS: I was the deputy of the Chief of Stall! for those cases which he told me to supervise, and as for the rest I had to execute the tasks with which he charged me.
DR. NELTE: In this case were you especially charged with the adaptation of the plan which we later learned to know as Plan Barbarossa?
PAULUS: Yes, to the extent of which I told you yesterday.
DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Brauchitsch, your former Commander in-Chief and superior, in an affidavit presented by the Prosecution has made a statement about the treatment of military plans. Wit! the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to ask you to tell me whether this statement by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch is also your opinion. I quote: "When Hitler decided to use military pressure or force to achieve his political aims, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, if he was involved, first received orally a sort of orientation or a corresponding order." Is that your opinion also?
PAULUS: I have no knowledge of that.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst Halder, your immediate superior, in an affidavit which also has been submitted by the Prosecution, has said the following about the handling of such military operational things: "Special military affairs were the responsibility of those parts of the Wehrmacht, that is, Army, Navy, and Air Force, which were immediately under the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, that is to say, under the command of Hitler, who was at the same time the Chief of the Reich." Is that your opinion likewise?
PAULUS: I ask you please to repeat this once more because I could not understand exactly what you meant.
DR.NELTE: It is about the question: Who were the military persons responsible to Hitler in the forming of important plans? In respect to that, Von Brauchitsch said what you have just heard, and Halder said the following: "Special military affairs were the responsibility of those parts of the Wehrmacht, that is, Army, Navy, and Air Force, which were immediately under the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, that is to say, under the command of Hitler, who was at the same time the Chief of the Reich." Is that so?
PAULUS: We received the orders about military measures from the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Such was the Directive Number 21. I thought that those people held responsibility who were the first military advisers of Hitler in the High Command of the Wehrmacht.
DR.NELTE: If you have seen Directive Number 21, then you must also know who signed it. Who was that?
PAULUS: As far as I can remember, that was signed by Hitler; and Keitel and Jodl initialed it.
DR.NELTE: But, at any rate, signed by Hitler, like all directives-is that correct?
PAULUS: At any rate, most of the directives, unless they were signed by other people in his name.
DR. NELTE: In other words, I may conclude that the man who gave the orders was the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, that is to say, Hitler?
PAULUS: That is correct.
DR. NELTE: From the statements of Von Brauchitsch and Halder we can see, in my opinion, that the General Staff of the Army with its large machinery was to work out ideas which Hitler conceived, work them out in detail. Do you not believe that?
PAULUS: That is correct. It had to relegate the orders which were given it by the Supreme Command to the proper departments.
DR. NELTE: It is clear that these orders were given to the High Command, that is, the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. There was in all planning, as I can see from your statement also, in the execution of such aggressive plans a close collaboration between Hitler as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht and the General Staff of the Army. Is that correct?
PAULUS: This co-operation exists between the Supreme Command and all persons who are charged to carry out the orders of the Supreme Commander.
DR. NELTE: From your explanation I believe I can conclude that the incomplete plan which you found on 3 September 1940-that you have developed that, and that then, after you had achieved a certain measure of completeness, you presented it to the Supreme Commander, Hitler, personally, or through General Halder?
PAULUS: The detailed completion of the plan was presented by the Chief of the General Staff or by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army; then it was either accepted or rejected.
DR. NELTE: That is, it had to be accepted by HiMer or refused?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR.NELTE: Did I understand you correctly yesterday to say that you had already in the fall of 1940 understood that Hitler wanted to attack the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: I said yesterday that the preparation of that plan of operations was the theoretical preparation for an attack.
DR. NELTE: But already at that time you thought that that was Hitler's intention, didn't you?
PAULUS: From the way in which this task was started one could see that, after the theoretical preparation, a practical application would follow.
DR. NELTE: Furthermore, you said yesterday that no news of the Abwehr had been received which would prove that there were any intentions of the Soviet Union to attack.
PAULUS: Yes.
DR.NELTE: Did anybody in the circle of the General Staff of the Army ever speak about these m. alters?
PAULUS: Yes, these matters were discussed. They had serious misgivings about them, but no reports about any visible preparations for war on the side of the Soviet Union were ever made known to me.
DR. NELTE: So you were firmly convinced that it was a straight attack on the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: At any rate, the indications did not exclude that.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness must speak more slowly.
DR. NELTE: The witness has said, if I understood correctly, that there were signs which did not exclude these inferences.
PAULUS: The order for the execution of this theoretical study of the conditions for attack was considered not only by myself but also by other informed experts as the first step for the preparation for an attack, that is to say, an aggressive attack on the Soviet Union.
DR. NELTE: In realizing these facts, did you or the General Staff of the Army or the Commander-in-Chief of the Army make any protests to Hitler about it?
PAULUS: Personally, I do not know in what form or whether the Commander-in-Chief of the Army made any protests.
DR. NELTE: Did you, yourself, speak about having any doubts to Generaloberst Halder or to Commander-in-Chief Von Brauchitsch?