dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): My Lord, I have the following statement to make to the Tribunal. I understand that the application asks for the striking of the Pohl affidavit and the permission that Funk again take the stand. I should like to oppose the application to strike the Pohl affidavit. It seems to us that it is highly material in this case, and if anything-although I doubt very much even the necessity for recalling or calling Pohl for cross-examination-but if anything is necessary, that might be it. The Defendant Funk, it seems to. us, has had a rather full opportunity when he was on the stand. I asked him when he started to do business with the SS, if the Tri-bunal will recall, and I think I went rather fully into all possible phases at that time of relationships between the Defendant Funk and the SS, and there was a denial on the part of the Defendant Funk. Furthermore, he will have an opportunity, I assume, in the last statement to say something, if the Tribunal saw fit to permit it, with respect to anything new that might have arisen out of the Pohl affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the Pohl affidavit is entirely new, is it not?
IVIR. DODD: Well, Sir, it is new, but it really covers only one new matter and that is the matter of the textile business that we alleged went on between the SS and the Reichsbank and the Defend-ant Funk. The matter of the jewelry and all the other things I think were gone into.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not mean that it dealt with entirely new subject matter, but it is the evidence -of a new witness upon that subject matter.
MR.DODD: Yes, yes, it is.
THE PRESIDENT: And as to that the Defendant Funk has not had an opportunity to deny it upon oath; it may be that the Tribunal will think it right to grant him that opportunity. There are two quite distinct questions, first of all, as to whether Pohl's affidavit should be struck out, and secondly, whether Funk should be called.
MR. DODD: Well, I certainly do not feel that the Pohl affidavit should be struck out, because it seems to us to be material, highly materiaL As the Tribunal will recall, there was considerable con-tr.oversy about this relationship which we claimed between Funk and the SS. We called another witness, Pohl, and still another witness who was his subordinate, and I would assume that counsel would prefer to cross-examine Pohl. We are perfectly happy to have him do that; and then at a later date, if Funk has an opportu-nity, as I am sure he will, to make his statement, he could make his denial.  I don't know what more he could say except that it isn't so and I thought he had said that rather fully when he was on the stand and rather fully denied that he had really any relationship with Himmler or with the SS. I am also fearful, Mr. President, that if the Court permits this procedure in this case, there may have been some other instances where other defendants will want to be heard fully and the thing will go on with surrebuttal and I am afraid it will take much of the Tribunal's time. [Dr.Sauter indicated a desire to be heard.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr.Sauter, we have heard you fully upon the subject already.
DR.SAUTER: Mr. President, may I point out one fact? This witness Pohl arrived at the Nuremberg prison on 1 June, that is, the first day of the sixth month; he was questioned in preparation for the affidavit on 15 July, that is ...
TBE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, you have expressed yourself that you do not want to cross-examine him. What is the relevance of the fact that he arrived here at a certain time if you don't want to cross-examine him?
DR.SAUTER: Mr. President, my point of view is that on principle the Prosecution cannot be permitted to present further evidence against a defendant whose case is completely closed. The witness Pohl arrived here on I June; on 15 July, that is 6 weeks later, he was examined for the affidavit. That was the same day on which I made my final plea for the Defendant Funk. Again several weeks later, the affidavit was finally submitted. I do not believe that it is compatible with justice if after a defendant's case is completely closed, the Prosecution submit further evidence against the defendant, who at that stage no longer has an oppor-tunity of commenting on it from the witness stand. The Pohl affi-davit contains completely new allegations. For example, Pohl alleges that at a luncheon in the presence of 10 or 12 persons this gold teeth affair was discussed. That is something entirely new and, of course, completely improbable and that is why I ask, Mr. President, that you permit us to have the Defendant Funk examined on this point in the witness stand.
THE PRESIDENT: You must understand that it is a matter for the discretion of the Tribunal at what time they will end the evidence and it is necessary that the evidence should be ended at some time. The Tribunal has heard fully what you have had to say and they will now consider the matter.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the application by Dr. Sauter, the affidavit by Pohl will not be struck out. It will remain upon the record. But in view of the particular circum-stances of this case, the Defendant Funk may be recalled to give evidence upon the subject and he will be recalled after the evidence has been given on behalf of the organizations. With reference to the objection of Dr. Laternser to the use of the statement made by Major General Walter Schreiber, the Tri-bunal is not inclined to admit any evidence so late as this, or to reopen questions which have been gone into fully before the Tri-bunal; but on the other hand, in view of the importance of the statement of Major General Schreiber and its particular relevance not only to the case of certain of the individual defendants but also to the case of the High Command, the Tribunal will allow General Schreiber to be heard as a witness if he is produced before the end of the hearing of the case. Otherwise no use can be made of this statement. 'With reference to the time within which General Schreiber must be brought here if he is to be heard as a witness, the Tribunal thinks that it will be proper to order that he might be heard as a witness, if he is brought here at any time before the final speeches with reference to the organizations are concluded. And, of course, counsel for the organization would have an opportunity of com-menting upon any evidence which General Schreiber might give. That is all. The witness may retire. Dr. Laternser, will you call your other witness?
DR. LATERNSER: With the -approval of the Tribunal, I call as my last witness Field Marshal Von Rundstedt. [The witness Von Rundstedt took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
GERT VON RUNDSTEDT (Witness): Gert von Rundstedt.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, you are the senior officer of the former German Army. What was your last position?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I am the senior officer of the German Army and have been a soldier for over 54 years. My last position was Commander-in-Chief West, until 9 March 1945.
DR. LATERNSER: During what period were you commander--in-chief in Berlin?
VON RUNDSTEDT: From I October 1932 until 31 October 1938.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the military leaders towards domestic and foreign politics?
VON RUNDSTEDT: We generals did not concern ourselves with politics. We did not take par t in any political discussions, and we did not hold any political discussions among ourselves. I should like in this connection to quote the famous British Field Marshal Montgomery, who said: "As a servant of the nation, the Army is above politics, and that must remain so."
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Reichswehr in 1933 help Hitler to assume power?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the generals toward the Party and its methods?
VON RUNDSTEDT: The generals either rejected the Party or were indifferent. As for the methods regarding the Jewish question, they absolutely rejected them, particularly because many comrades were severely affected by the Aryan laws. The so-called master race is an absurdity. There is a mixture of Slav, Romanic, and Dinaric races in Germany. We also rejected the attitude in the Church question, and we succeeded in retaining chaplains in the Army up to the end.
DR. LATERNSER: Was this attitude also true of the younger generals who, in the course of the war, came into positions subject to the Indictment?
VON RUNDSTEDT: As far as my own close acquaintances are concerned, absolutely.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you, in 1934, as the senior officer, have an opportunity of doing anything to demand from Hitler punish-ment of the murderers of Schleicher?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No. In the first place, Reich President Von Hindenburg was still at the head of the State. In the second place, I was not the senior officer. We had a Commander-in-Chief of the Army and a Minister of War for things of that sort.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the troop maneuvers or the trips of the General Staff after 1935 indicate any intention or plan for wars of aggression?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No, in no way. The large-scale maneuvers and the General Staff or Fuehrer trips were always concerned with war in our own country.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you, as resident commander-in-chief in Berlin, consulted before the declaration of military sovereignty?'
VON RUNDSTEDT: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you know Generaloberst Von Fritsch well?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Very well; he was my subordinate for a time-
DR. LATERNSER: Did he tell you, as his official representative after 1937, of Hitler's intention to wage wars of aggression?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No, he could not do that, because there is such a thing as an official secret.
DR. LATERNSER: You deputized for him, did you not, when he went on prolonged leave to Egypt in the winter of 1937-1938? Did he on that occasion tell you of Hitler's intentions as contained in the minutes of the meeting of 5 November 1937?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I only deputized for Generaloberst. Von Fritsch; his official representative was the Chief of the General Staff, Beck. Generaloberst Von Fritsch did not give me any information at that time, nor did Generaloberst Beck.
DR. LATERNSER: What were the results of the measures which Hitler took on 4 February 1938, in the military field?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Hitler eliminated the Minister of War as. intermediary between himself and the Wehrmacht; thus he himself now had command over all three branches of the Wehrmacht. In addition, he took the opportunity of dismissing high military leaders who were unwelcome to him.
DR. LATERNSER: In February of 1938 you had a private con-ference with Hitler alone. What did he tell you about the attitude of the German generals?
VON RUNDSTEDT: He complained very bitterly about the supreme military leaders. He said that he alone had been the one who had forced rearmament through. The supreme leaders had always resisted and said it was going too fast. In the occupation of the Rhineland, he charged the leaders with a certain cowardice when they asked for withdrawal of the troops behind the Rhine, since France was not adopting a threatening attitude.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you in this talk discuss the question of a successor to Fritsch?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes. Hitler first suggested to me General Von Reichenau. That suggestion I turned down in the name of the Army. He then suggested General Von Brauchitsch, whose appoint-ment I entirely approved in the name of the Army.
DR. LATERNSER: When did you, as commander-in-chief in Berlin, learn of the planned march into Austria?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I was suddenly assigned to represent General Von Brauchitsch in Breslau, at a commemoration celebra-tion of the Iron Cross, and it was only there that I officially learned that the occupation of Austria had actually taken place.
DR. LATERNSER: How were the commanders-in-chief informed of existing intentions?
VON RUNDSTEDT: We were told of the intentions of the Supreme Command by our Commander-in-Chief, Von Brauchitsch, but he was only allowed to tell us what concerned us.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should now like to question the witness on Affidavits 3 and 5 of Field Marshal Von Blomberg and Generaloberst Blaskowitz. They are USA-536 and 537 (Docu-ments Numbers 3704-PS and 3706-PS), in the first volume of the docu-ment book of the Prosecution. In this connection I should like to call the attention of the Court to the fact that these affidavits, in the paragraphs in question, agree word for word, although they were made on different days by different persons. [Turning to the witness.] Field Marshal, the two affidavits of Field Marshal Von Blomberg and Generaloberst Blaskowitz say that the groups of German staff officers-that is the way in which it is put-considered the solution of the Polish question by war to be indispensable and that that was the reason for secret armament. Is that true?
VON RUNDSTEDT: In the first place, a group of German staff officers never existed ...
DR. LATERNSER: What is meant by staff officers?
VON RUNDSTEDT: A staff officer is an officer holding the rank of Major, Lieutenant Colonel, or Colonel, then come the Generals.
DR. LATERNSER: Please continue.
VON RUNDSTEDT: Even if the statement of Blomberg is in-tended to mean that a German war of aggression against Poland was indispensable, that is not true. On the other hand, if he means that we had to expect an attack from Poland at any time, I can say that in the first years after the World War, I also counted on this possibility. Hence the border protection and fortifications on the Eastern border of the Reich against Poland. But as I said, no sensible person thought of a war of aggression. We were in no, position to wage such a war.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst Blaskowitz, at the end of this Affidavit Number 5, USA Exhibit-537, says that the front com-manders-in-chief were the actual advisers in the OKW, and as an example he gives the battle of Kutno. Is this correct?
VON RUNDSTEDT: That is not correct. The commanders-in- chief never had an advisory role. Our Commander-in-Chief of the Army was the only one who had to hold council with the supreme authorities. As for the battle of Kutno, any advice to Hitler is absolute nonsense. The orders for the battle of Kutno were given by me as Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South, according to the instructions which I had from Herr Von Brauchitsch, and Herr Blaskowitz had only to obey and could not, have given any sort of advice to Hitler. No, no, that must be a mistake.
DR. LATERNSER: What impression did the discussion on 22 August 1939 at the Obersalzberg make on you, Field Marshal?
VON RUNDSTEDT: When we left the conference, we thought that this undertaking would end just like the so-called Sudeten war in 1938, primarily because Russia was on our side. When on 26 August the movement for the beginning of operations, which had been ordered, was suddenly stopped, and was to begin again on I September, we said, "Ali, that is the same kind of bluff which we had in 1938." We did not take the decision for war seriously.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you, after the conference of 22 August, talk to other commanders-in-chief and exchange ideas on the im-pressions gathered at this discussion?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I remember with certainty that I talked to Field Marshal Von Bock about it. I left Obersalzberg very quickly. With Manstein and later with my staff I exchanged the same views which I have just mentioned.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you have knowledge of the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No.
DR. LATERNSER: In 'what way did you learn of the intention of occupying Denmark and Norway?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I learned of the accomplished fact through official channels.
DR. LATERNSER: How about the entry into Yugoslavia and Greece?
VON RUNDSTEDT: It was the same.
DR. LATERNSER: You participated in the conference in March 1941, when Hitler spoke of the necessity of attacking the Soviet Union?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: What were you told about Soviet prep-arations?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Until a short time before that I had been in France, and I had no knowledge whatever of the ostensible prep-arations of the Russians. At the conference, to our surprise, we were told that the Russians were-very strongly armed, were con-centrating troops and preparing to attack us. If I am not mistaken, information from the Japanese Military Attach6 was referred to, and a map of the Russian distribution of forces on the borders of Poland was shown to us, so that we had to assume that these facts were actually true.
DR. LATERNSER: Was this impression confirmed after the entry into Russia?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes. The resistance at the border was not too great, but it grew continually as we advanced into the interior of the country. Very strong tank forces, tanks of a better type, far superior to ours, appeared; and an enormous number of airfields, troop camps, munitions dumps, and newly built roads through im-passable territory were encountered. Maps were also found, showing German territory as far as Silesia, so that we had the impression that Hitler must have been right.
DR.LATERNSER: At the conference in March 1941, Hitler an-nounced the Commissar Order. What was your attitude toward this order?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Our attitude was unanimously and abso-lutely against it. Immediately after the conference we approached Brauchitsch and told him that this was impossible. Our com-manders-in-chief of the armies were of the same opinion. The order was simply not carried out, and as I learned afterwards, it was later rescinded. General Von Brauchitsch, to make this order more or less ineffective, issued a very strict order to the troops on the correct conduct of German soldiers in the coming war. I know of no case in which this order was used in any way.
DR. LATERNSER: Was the intention to remove the Jewish popu-lation in the East announced at this conference?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No, Hitler would never have expressed_ such intentions to officers.
DR. LATERNSER: According to the Russian Prosecution 33,000 Jews were shot in November 1941 in Kiev. Where were the armies of Army Group South in November 1941?
VON RUNDSTEDT: My armies were on the line Rostov-Stalino, along the Donets, to the district east of Kharkov. The rear border between the army area and the Ukraine district under civil admin-istration followed a line east of Kiev along the Dnieper.
DR. LATERNSER: Then Kiev was not at that time in any opera-tional area of an army under your command?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the commanders-in-chief of the army groups of the armies in the East have any powers outside this area of operations?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Was the operational area kept as small or as large as possible?
VON RUNDSTEDT: The operational area of the army was kept as small as possible, first, in order to trouble the army as little as possible with affairs in the rear, and secondly, to make the Ukraine district, et cetera, which was under the civil administration, as large as possible and thus remove it from the influence of the Army.
DR. LATERNSER: And now for the Commando Order. What was your attitude toward the Commando Order?
VON RUNDSTEDT: We military commanders were absolutely opposed to, the Commando Order and in oral discussions among our staffs we agreed to make it ineffective.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you, as Commander-in-Chief West, receive a report of any case in which the order was applied?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Not a single case was reported to me, and my chief of staff, whom I asked about it here in Nuremberg, knew of no case either. I must assume that this Commando Order had an intimidating effect on the enemy, for I know of no Commando operation undertaken afterwards, aside from that on the island of Sark, where illegal acts did take place, but no prisoners were taken by us.
DR. LATERNSER: Illegal acts on whose part?
VON RUNDSTEDT: On the- part of those who had undertaken the Commando operation.
DR. LATERNSER: Now the invasion came, or was expected. Document Number 531-PS shows that you asked to have the Com-mando Order rescinded. For what reason?
VON RUNDSTEDT: During the invasion, strong air landings far behind the front, perhaps as far as Paris, had to be expected, and a distinction between Commando troops and fighting troops would no longer have been possible. Moreover, it was at least a good opportunity to do away with this order altogether, and the more since the majority of the new divisions did not even know it.
DR. LATERNSER: But you said in your request to have it rescinded that the order had been obeyed up to that time. How do you explain that?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I had to express it in that way. I had evaded the order, but I could not very well say: "Paragraph 1. 1 have not carried out the Commando Order." Some sort of pretence had to be kept up.
DR. LATERNSER: Now a few questions about the struggle against the Resistance movement in France. What agencies were responsible for peace and order in the occupied area in France?
VON RUNDSTEDT: The Military Commander was responsible for peace and order in occupied France. In Pétain's France -- shall I say -- that is, in the South of France, the Military Commander had a special general i1i Lyons who was to work in close co-operation with the Pétain Government. As the Resistance movement in southern France became ever stronger and developed into a tre-mendous threat to the troops fighting in the Mediterranean area -that was in the winter of 1943 and 1944-the Commander-in-Chief West was made responsible for the southern part of France. Thereupon I placed this general in Lyons under the Army Group "Gustav" which was at Toulon and was responsible for establishing order in the South of France.
DR. LATERNSER: Were the French Government and the French population warned?
VON RUNDSTEDT: The French Government was repeatedly warned and asked to oppose this movement with an its strength, for the sake of the inhabitants. We issued proclamations to the population which in a fair manner were always first submitted to the French Government for scrutiny. When the invasion threatened, i personally asked the old gentleman to warn his people on the radio and ask that in their own interests they should not do such -things. He promised to do so. Whether he did it, I do not know.
DR. LATERNSER: Were these warnings observed?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Unfortunately, no. Finally even the French Police, whom we had armed better to combat the movement, went over to the rebels.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Germans nevertheless fight against them with forbearance?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, as far as we possibly could. For example, never were entire towns destroyed from the air, but single planes were always sent out against particular places of resistance. Mass use of artillery or tanks did not take place. The fact that excesses such as those at Oradour took place, we all greatly regret-ted. At that time I immediately demanded a report, since I could not order a judicial investigation, and I also reported this un-fortunate occurrence to the OKW.
DR.LATERNSER: Why could you not order a judicial in-vestigation?
VON RUNDSTEDT: All the troop units of the SS were sub-ordinate only to Himmler. I had neither disciplinary power nor judicial power over them, I could not give them leave, or bestow awards. I was limited only to the tactical emp loyment of these divisions, much as if I were having an Italian, or Hungarian, or Slovakian division under my command.
DR. LATERNSER: Was the legality of the Resistance movement recognized?
VON RUNDSTEDT: General Eisenhower and De Gaulle declared via radio that it was legal. We inquired of the High Command of the Wehrmacht what should be done in the matter, and the decision received was negative. Later, after the Allied troops had landed on the Mediterranean coast, the legality of the new French Army is said to have been recognized and observed without argument.
DR. LATERNSER: What is your attitude toward illegal warfare?