dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September." (1780-PS) The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available which General Jodl referred to appears as Item 22 in the Schmundt file. In this order Keitel told the railroads to be ready by 28 September but to continue work on the western fortifications even after 20 September in the interest of camouflage. The first and fourth paragraphs of this order provide: "The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others." "However, in accordance with the Fuehrers directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as feasible even after 20 September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work of the Limes." (388-PS, Item 22) The penultimate stage of the aggression began on 18 September. From that day until the 28th a series of orders were issued advancing preparations for the attack. These orders are included in the Schmundt file (388-PS). On the 18th the commitment schedule for the five participating armies-the 2d, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th-was set forth (388-PS, Item 26). Hitler approved the secret mobilization of five divisions in the west to protect the German rear during Case Green (388-PS, Item 31). Further discussions were held between the Army and the Luftwaffe about the time of day for the attack. Conference notes initialed by Jodl and dated 27 September reveal the difference in views. These notes are Item 54 in the Schmundt file. The first three paragraphs read: "COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY. "As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day. "The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615. It also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front. "Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of
X Day. "The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615. It also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front. "Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria." (388-PS, Item 54) A satisfactory solution appears to have been arrived at. The last two paragraphs read: "Thus it is proposed: "Attack by the Army-independent of the attack by the air force-at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front. "The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them. (J)" (388-PS, Item 54) On the same day, 27 September, Keitel sent a most secret memorandum to Hess and the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, for the guidance of Nazi Party officials. This memorandum is Item 32 in the Schmundt file. It directs the Party officials and organizations to comply with the demands of the Army during the secret mobilization in such matters as turning over equipment and facilities. The first four paragraphs of this message read: "As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding codewords. "Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names. "The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities. "OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan." (388-PS, Item 32) Two additional entries from Jodl's
word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities. "OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan." (388-PS, Item 32) Two additional entries from Jodl's diary reveal the extent to which the Nazi conspirators carried forward their preparations for attack even during the period of the negotiations which culminated in the Munich Agreement. The entries for 26 and 27 September read: "26 September: "Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only. "In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions. "Question by Foreign office whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes. "1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer's opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th. "It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied. "A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs. "The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commander in chief who is to have priority. "The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague. "2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportspalast. "27 September: "1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to
priority. "The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague. "2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportspalast. "27 September: "1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September." (1780-PS) The order referred to by General Jodl in the last entry was also recorded by the faithful Schmundt. It appears as Item 33 of the file. It is the order which brought the Nazi armies to the jumping-off point for unprovoked aggression: "MOST SECRET "MEMORANDUM "At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from their exercise areas to their jumping-off points. "The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against 'Gruen' on September 30, the decision having been made one day previously by 1200 noon." (388-PS, Item 33) There follows a pencil note by schmundt: "This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major Schmundt." (388-PS, Item 33) H. The campaign Within Czechoslovakia. The military preparations for aggression against Czechoslovakia had not been carried out in vacuum. They had been preceded by a skillfully conceived campaign designed to promote civil disobedience to the Czechoslovak State. Using the techniques they had already developed in other ventures, the Nazi conspirators over a period of years used money, propaganda, and force to undermine Czechoslovakia. In this program the Nazis focused their attention on the persons of German descent living in the Sudetenland, a mountainous area bounding Bohemia and Moravia on the north, west, and south. The Czechoslovak government's official report for the prosecution and trial of German major war criminals, entitled "German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia," shows the background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue. (998-PS; 3061-PS) Nazi agitation in Czechoslovakia dated from the earliest days of the NSDAP. In the years following the First World War a German National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), which maintained close
entitled "German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia," shows the background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue. (998-PS; 3061-PS) Nazi agitation in Czechoslovakia dated from the earliest days of the NSDAP. In the years following the First World War a German National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), which maintained close contact with Hitler's NSDAP, was active in the Sudetenland. In 1932, ring-leaders of the Sudeten Volksport, an organization corresponding to the Nazi SA, openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler's program, the first of which demanded the union of all Germans in a Greater Germany. Soon thereafter they were charged with planning armed rebellion on behalf of a foreign power and were sentenced for conspiracy against the Czech Republic. Late in 1933 the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia forestalled its dissolution by voluntary liquidation, and several of its chiefs escaped across the frontier. For a year thereafter Nazi activity in Czechoslovakia continued underground. (998-PS; 3061-PS) On 1 October 1934, with the approval and at the urging of the Nazi conspirators, Konrad Heinlein, an instructor of gymnastics, established the "German Home Front" (Deutsche Heimatfront), which the following spring became the Sudeten German Party (Sudeten-deutsche Partei - SDP). Profiting from the experience of the Czech National Socialist Party, Heinlein denied any connection with the German Nazis. He rejected pan-Germanism, and professed his respect for individual liberties and his loyalty to "honest democracy" and to the Czech state. His party, none-the-less, was built on the basis of the Nazi Fuehrerprinzip, and he became its Fuehrer. By 1937, when the power of Hitler's Germany had become manifest, Heinlein and his followers were striking a more aggressive note, demanding, without definition, "complete Sudeten autonomy". The SDP laid proposals before the Czech Parliament which would, in substance, have created a state within a state. (998-PS; 3061-PS) After the annexation of Austria in March 1938 the Henleinists, who were now openly organized after the Nazi model, intensified their activity. Undisguised anti-semitic propaganda started in the Heinlein press; the campaign against "bolshevism" was intensified; terrorism in the Heinlein-dominated communities increased. A storm
annexation of Austria in March 1938 the Henleinists, who were now openly organized after the Nazi model, intensified their activity. Undisguised anti-semitic propaganda started in the Heinlein press; the campaign against "bolshevism" was intensified; terrorism in the Heinlein-dominated communities increased. A storm troop organization, patterned and trained on the principles of the Nazi SS, was established, known as the FS (Freiwilliger Selbstschutz, or Voluntary Vigilantes). On 24 April 1938, in a speech to the Party Congress in Karlovy Vary, Heinlein came into the open with his "Karlsbad Program". In this speech, which echoed Hitler in tone and substance, Heinlein asserted the right of the Sudeten Germans to profess "German political philosophy", which, it was clear, meant National Socialism. (998-PS; 3061-PS) As the summer of 1938 wore on, the Heinleinists used every technique of the Nazi Fifth Column. As summarized in the Czech official report, these included: (1) Espionage. Military espionage was conducted by the SDP, the FS, and by other members of the German minority on behalf of Germany. Czech defenses were mapped, and information on Czech troop movements was furnished to the German authorities. (2) Nazification of German Organizations in Czechoslovakia. The Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of the German population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and social and cultural centers gradually underwent "Gleichschaltung", i.e., "purification". by the SDP. Among the organizations conquered by the Henleinists were sport societies, rowing clubs, associations of ex-service men, and choral societies. The Henleinists were particularly interested in penetrating as many business institutions as possible and in bringing over to their side the directors of banks, the owners or directors of factories, and the managers of commercial firms. In the case of Jewish ownership or direction they attempted to secure the cooperation of the clerical and technical staffs of the institution. (3) German Direction and leadership. The Henleinists maintained permanent contact with the Nazi officials designated to direct operations within Czechoslovakia. meetings in Germany at which Henleinists were exhorted and instructed in Fifth Column activity were
of the clerical and technical staffs of the institution. (3) German Direction and leadership. The Henleinists maintained permanent contact with the Nazi officials designated to direct operations within Czechoslovakia. meetings in Germany at which Henleinists were exhorted and instructed in Fifth Column activity were camouflaged by being held in conjunction with Saenger Feste (choral festivals), gymnastic shows and assemblies, and commercial gatherings such as the Leipzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi conspirators needed incidents for their war of nerves, it was the duty of the Henleinists to supply them. (4) Propaganda. Disruptive and subversive propaganda was beamed at Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed in the German press. Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a "nest of Bolshevism" and spread the false report of "Russian troops and airplanes" centered in Prague. Under direction from the Reich the Heinleinists maintained whispering propaganda in the Sudetenland, which contributed to the mounting tension and to the creation of incidents. Illegal Nazi literature was smuggled from Germany and widely distributed in the border regions. The Heinlein press more or less openly espoused Nazi ideology to the German population. (5) Murder and Terrorism. The Nazi conspirators provided the Heinleinists, and particularly the FS, with money and arms with which to provoke incidents and to maintain a state of permanent unrest. Gendarmes, customs officers, and other Czech officials were attacked. A boycott was established against Jewish lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen. The Henleinists terrorized the non-Heinlein population, and the Nazi Gestapo crossed into border districts to carry Czechoslovak citizens across the border to Germany. In several cases political foes of the Nazis were murdered on Czech soil. Nazi agents murdered Professor Theodor Lessing in 1933 and the engineer Formis in 1935. Both men were anti-Nazis who had escaped from Germany after Hitler came to power and had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. (998-PS; 3061-PS) Some time afterwards, when there was no longer need for pretense and deception, Konrad Heinlein made a clear and frank statement of the mission assigned to him by the Nazi conspirators. This statement was made in a lecture by Konrad Heinlein quoted
and had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. (998-PS; 3061-PS) Some time afterwards, when there was no longer need for pretense and deception, Konrad Heinlein made a clear and frank statement of the mission assigned to him by the Nazi conspirators. This statement was made in a lecture by Konrad Heinlein quoted on page 29 of "Four Fighting Years", a publication of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this lecture, delivered by Heinlein on 4 March 1941 in the Auditorium of the University of Vienna under the auspices of the Wiener Verwaltungsakadamie, he discussed the "fight for the liberation of the Sudetens" in the following terms: "National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten Germans. Our struggle was of a different character from that in Germany. Although we had to behave differently in public we were, of course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist revolution in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The struggle for Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle could be waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National Socialism, persons who were true followers of our Fuehrer, whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought me out to be the leader of the national group in its final struggle. When * * * in autumn, 1933, the leaders of the NSDAP asked me to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans, I had a difficult problem to solve. Should the National Socialist Party continue to be carried on illegally or should the movement, in the interest of the self-preservation of the Sudeten Germans and in order to prepare their return to the Reich, wage its struggle under camouflage and by methods which appeared quite legal to the outside world? For us Sudeten Germans only the second alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of our national group was at stake. It would certainly have been easier to exchange this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than doubtful whether by this means we could have fulfilled the political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the alliance against the German Reich."
exhausting struggle for the heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than doubtful whether by this means we could have fulfilled the political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the alliance against the German Reich." (2863-PS.) I. Evidence Implicating Nazi Conspirators in Czechoslovak Agitation. The foregoing account of Nazi intrigue in Czechoslovakia is the outline of this conspiracy as it had been pieced together by the Czechoslovak government early in the summer of 1945. Since then captured documents and other information made available since the defeat of Germany have clearly and conclusively demonstrated the implication, which hitherto could only be deduced, of the Nazi conspirators in the Sudetenland agitation. A telegram sent from the German Legation in Prague on 16 March 1938 to the Foreign Office in Berlin, presumably written by the German Minister, Eisenlohr, proves conclusively that the Heinlein movement was an instrument of the Nazi conspirators (3060-PS). The Heinlein party, it appears from this telegram, was directed from Berlin and from the German Legation in Prague. It could have no policy of its own; even the speeches of its leaders had to be coordinated with the German authorities. This telegram reads as follows: "Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out matters with Heinlein, who recently had shunned me, and with Frank separately and received following promises; "1. The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by the German legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied with implicitly. "2. Public speeches and the press will be coordinated uniformly with my approval. The editorial staff of "Zeit" (Time) is to be improved. "3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which in the end might lead to political complications and adopts a line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests. The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the protection of nationalities (Volksschutzgesetze) and 'territorial autonomy' are no longer to
and adopts a line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests. The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the protection of nationalities (Volksschutzgesetze) and 'territorial autonomy' are no longer to be stressed. "4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or desired before Heinlein issues important statements on his program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the Mission. "5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German agencies is to be transmitted through the legation. "6. Heinlein will establish contact with me every week, and will come to Prague at any time if requested. "I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control, as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in the interest of foreign policy. Please inform ministries concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) and request them to support this uniform direction of the Sudeten German Party." (3060-PS) The dressing-down administered by Eisenlohr to Heinlein had the desired effect. The day after the telegram was dispatched from Prague, Heinlein addressed a humble letter to Ribbentrop, asking an early personal conversation (2789-PS). This letter, dated 17 March 1938, and captured in the German Foreign Office files, states: "Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs: "In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our Fuehrer. "I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the sincere thanks of the Sudeten Germans herewith. "We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by doubled efforts in the service of the Greater German policy. "The new situation requires a reexamination of the Sudeten German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the opportunity for a very early personal talk. "In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled for 26th and 27th of March, 1938, for 4 weeks. "I would appreciate if the Minister, Dr. Eisenlohr, and one of my closest associates would be