dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [Continuing.]. . . but not according to the convictions of the Fuehrer. When it was mentioned to the Fuehrer that England had given her guarantee to Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Romania, but then when the Russians took Bessarabia, nothing happened; and this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland, the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether this was just temporary, or for good. lie said, 'No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.'So, then I asked him, 'Do you think that it will be any different within 4 or 5 days?' At this same time--I do not know whether you know about that, Colonel--I was in communication with Lord Halifax by a special courier, outside the regular diplomatic channels, to do everything to stop war with England. After the guarantee, I held an English declaration of war inevitable. I already told him in the spring of 1939, after occupying Czechoslovakia, I told him that from now on, if he tried to solve the Polish question, he would have to count on the enmity of England--1939, that is, after the Protectorate. "Question: 'Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign against Poland were originally supposed to have been completed by the end of August 1939?' "Answer: 'yes.' "Question: 'And that the final issuance of the order for the campaign against Poland came sometime between the15th and 20th of August 1939, after the signing of the treaty with Soviet :Russia?"'--The dates obviously are wrong there.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: "Answer: 'Yes, that is true.' "Question: 'Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign was ordered for the 25th of August but on the24th of August in the afternoon it was postponed until September the 1st in order to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the English Ambassador?' "Answer: 'Yes.' " My only comment upon that document is in respect to the second paragraph where Goering is purporting not to want war with England. The Court will remember how it was Goering, after the famous speech of the 22d of August to his commanders-in-chief, who got up and thanked the Fuehrer for his exhortation and assured him that the Armed Forces would play their part. I omit the next document in the document book, which carries the matter a little further, and we go on to Hitler's verbal communique, as it is called in the British Blue Book , that Remanded to Sir Nevile Henderson on the 25th of August , after he had heard of the signing of the Anglo-Polish agreement, in an endeavor to keep England from meeting her obligations. He states in the first paragraph, after hearing the British Ambassador, that he is anxious to make one more effort to save war. In the second paragraph, he asserts again that Poland's provocations were unbearable; and I quote Paragraph 2: "Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish these Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier and, what is more, to do so in the interests of quiet and order and also in the interests of European peace. "The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved. The British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and incalculable war between Germany and England. Such a war would be bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In contrast to the last war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts."--One sees the threats, veiled threats, appearing in this paragraph--"Agreement with Russia was unconditional and signified a change in foreign policy of the Reich which would last a very longtime. Russia and Germany would never again take up arms against each other. Apart from this, the agreements reached with Russia would also render Germany secure economically for the longest possible period of war. "The Fuehrer had always wanted Anglo-German understanding. War between England and Germany could at best bring some profit to Germany, but none at all to England." Then we come to the bribe: "The Fuehrer declared the German-Polish problem must be solved and will be solved. He is, however, prepared and determined, after the solution of this problem, to approach England once more with a large, comprehensive offer. He is a man of great decisions; and in this case also, he will be capable of being great in his action."--and then, magnanimously--"He accepts the British Empire and is ready to pledge himself personally for its continued existence and to place the power of the German Reich at its disposal on condition that his colonial demands, which are limited, should be negotiated by peaceful means .... His obligations to Italy remain untouched." Again he stresses irrevocable determination never to enter into war with Russia. I quote the last two paragraphs: "If The British Government would consider these ideas, a blessing for Germany..."
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you not read the first few lines of Paragraph 3?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes; I did summarize it--Paragraph 3: "He also desired to express the irrevocable determination of Germany never again to enter into conflict with Russia."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I quote the last two paragraphs:"If the British Government would consider these ideas, a blessing for Germany and also for the British Empire might result. If they reject these ideas, there will be war. In no case will Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war proved it. The Fuehrer repeats that he himself is a man of far-reaching decisions by which he is bound, and that this is his last offer...."
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn and then the matter can be investigated. [A recess was taken.]
LT. CON. GRIFFITH-JONES: I had just finished reading the offer from Hitler to the British Government, which was TC-72, Number 68, and which becomes GB-65. The British Government were not, of course, aware of the real object that lay behind that message; and, taking it at its face value and desirous to enter into discussions, they wrote back on the 28th of August saying that they were prepared to enter into discussions. They agreed with Hitler that the differences must be settled, and I quote from Paragraph 4: "In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, a reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and Poland 6 Dec.45 could and should be effected by agreement between the two countries on lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland's essential interests; and they recall that in his speech of the 28th of April, the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these interests to Poland. "But, as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the German Chancellor of the 22d of August, His Majesty's Government consider it essential for the success of the discussions, which would precede the agreement, that it should be understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by other powers. His Majesties Government would be ready, if desired, to make their contribution to the effective operation of such a guarantee." I go to the last paragraph on that page, Paragraph 6: "His Majesty's Government have said enough to make their own attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor will not think that, because His Majesty's Government are scrupulous concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to use all their influence to assist the achievement of a solution which may commend itself both to Germany and to Poland." That, of course, knocked the German hopes on the head.
LT. CON. GRIFFITH-JONES: They had failed by their tricks and their bribes to dissuade England from observing her obligations to Poland, and it was now only a matter of getting out of their embarrassment as quickly as possible and saving their face as much as possible. me last document becomes GB-66. And I put in also Sir Nevile Henderson's account of that interview, TC-72, Number 75, which becomes GB-67.During that interview, the only importance of it is that Sir Nevile Henderson again emphasized the British attitude and that they were determined in any event to meet their obligations to Poland. One paragraph I would quote, which is interesting in view of the letters that were to follow, paragraph 10: "In the end I asked him two straight questions: 'Was he willing to negotiate directly with the Poles?' and Divas he ready to discuss the question of an exchange of population?' He replied in the affirmative as regards the latter, although there I have no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a rectification of frontiers. As regards the first, He said he could not give me an answer until after he had given the reply of His Majesty's Government the careful consideration which such a document deserved. In this connection he turned to Ribbentrop and said, 'We must summon Field Marshal Goering to discuss it with him.' " Then in the next paragraph, again Sir Nevile Henderson finally repeated to him very solemnly the main note of the whole conversation, so fat as he was concerned. I pass to the next document, which is TC-72, Number 78, which becomes GB-68. The German reply, as I outlined before, was handed to Sir Nevile Henderson at 7:15 p.m. on the 29th of August. The reply sets out the suggestion submitted by the British Government in their previous note; and it goes on to say that the German Government are prepared to enter into discussion on the basis that the whole of the Corridor, as well as Danzig, are returned to the Reich.
LT. CON. GRIFFITH-JONES: I quote particularly the next to the last paragraph on the first page of that document: "The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the revision of the Versailles Treaty , which has always been recognized as being necessary, in regard to this territory, namely: return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the safeguarding-of the existence of the German national group in the territories remaining to Poland." It is only just now, as I emphasized before, that that right has been recognized for so long. On the 28th of April his demands consisted only of Danzig, of an Autobahn, and of the railway. The Tribunal will remember the position which he is trying to get out of now' He is trying to manufacture justification by putting forth proposals which under no possible circumstances could either Poland or Great Britain accept. But, as I said before, he wanted to make doubly certain. I go to the second page, and start with the third paragraph: "The British Government attach importance to two considerations:. (1) That the existing danger of an imminent explosion, should be eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiations; and (2) that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded in the economic and political sphere by means of international guarantees. "On this subject the German Government make the following declaration: "Though skeptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome, they are nevertheless, prepared to accept the English proposal and to enter into direct discussion. They do so, as has already been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made upon them by the written statement received from the British Government that they, too, desire a pact of friendship in accordance with the general lines indicated to the British Ambassador." And then, to the last but one paragraph: "For the rest, in making these proposals, the German Government have never had any intention of touching Poland's. vital interests.
LT. CON. GRIFFITH-JONES: or questioning the existence of an independent Polish State." These letters really sound like the letters of some common swindler rather than of the government of a great nation. "The German Government; accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept the British Government's offer of their good offices in securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary with full powers. Hey count on the arrival of this Emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August 1939. "The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator." That was at 7:15 in the evening of the 29th of August and as I have explained, it allowed little time in order to get the Polish Emissary there by midnight the following night. That document was GB-68. The next document, Sir Nevile Henderson's account of the interval, summarizes what had taken place; and I quote particularly paragraph 4: "I remarked that this phrase"--that is the passage about the Polish Emissary being there by midnight the following night--"sounded like an ultimatum, but after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and-Herr Von Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress the urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilized armies were standing face to face." That was the interview on the evening of the 29th of August. The last document becomes GB-69. Again the British Government replied, and Sir Nevile Henderson handed this reply to Ribbentrop at the famous meeting on midnight of the 30th of August at the time the Polish Emissary had been expected. I need not read at length. The British Government reciprocate the desire for improved relations They stress again that they cannot sacrifice the interest. of other friends in order to obtain an improvement in the situation. They understand, they say, that the German Government accept the condition that The settlement should be subject to international guarantee.
LT. CON. GRIFFITH-JONES: Whey make a reservation as to the demands that the germane put forward in their last letter and they are informing the Polish Government immediately; and lastly, they understand that the German Government are drawing up the proposals. That Document TC-72, Number 89, will be GB-70. For the account of the interview, we go to the next document in the Tribunal's book, TC-72, Number 92, which becomes GB-71. It is not a very long document. It is perhaps worth reading in full: "I told Herr Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty's Government found it difficult to advise the Polish Government to accept the procedure adumbrated in the German reply and suggested that he should adopt the normal contact, 'i.e. that when German proposals were ready, to invite the Polish Ambassador to call and to hand him proposals for transmission to his Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations. I added that if this basis afforded prospect of settlement, His Majesty's Government could be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw to temporize negotiations. "Ribbentrop's reply was to produce a lengthy document which he read out in German, aloud, at top speed. Imagining that he would eventually hand it to me, I did not attempt to follow too closely the 16 or more articles which it contained. Though I cannot, therefore, guarantee the accuracy, the main points were ...."--and I need not read out the main points. I go to Paragraph 3: "When I asked Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in accordance with undertaking in the German reply of yesterday, he asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had not arrived in Berlin by midnight. "I observed that to treat the matter in this way meant that the request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on the 30th of August constituted in fact an ultimatum, in spite of what he and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he denied, saying that the idea of an ultimatum was a figment of my imagination.
LT. CON. GRIFFITH-JONES: Why then, I asked, could he not adopt the normal procedure and give me a copy of the proposals, and ask the Polish Ambassador to call on him just as Hitler had summoned me a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to the Polish Government? In the most violent terms Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted that if the, Polish Ambassador asked him for interview it might be different. I said that I would, naturally, inform my Government so at once. Whereupon he said, while those were his personal views, he would bring all that I had said to Hitler's notice. It was for the Chancellor to decide. "We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Von Ribbentrop's demeanor during an unpleasant interview was aping Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against the Polish mobilization, but I retorted that it was hardly surprising since Germany had also mobilized as Herr Hitler himself had admitted to me yesterday." Nevertheless, Sir Nevile Henderson did not know at that time that Germany had also already given the orders to attack Poland some days before. The following day, the 31st of August at 6:30in the evening, Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, had an interview with Ribbentrop. This document, the next Document TC-73, Number 112, becomes GB-72, and is a short account in a report to Mr. Beck: "I carried out my instructions. Ribbentrop asked if I had special plenipotentiary powers to undertake negotiations. I said, 'No'. He then asked whether I had been informed that on London's suggestion the German Government had expressed their readiness to negotiate directly with a delegate of the Polish Government, furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to have arrived on the preceding day, the 30th of August. I replied that I had no direct information on the subject. In conclusion, Ribbentrop repeated that he had thought I would be empowered to negotiate. He would communicate my demarche to the Chancellor." As I have indicated already, it was too late.
LT. CON. GRIFFITH-JONES: The orders had already been given on that day to the German Army to invade. I turn to C-126. It is already in as GB-45. Other portions of it were put in, and I refer now to the letter on the second page, for the order (most-secret order). It is signed by Hitler and is described as his "Directive Number 1 for the Conduct of the War," dated. 31st of August 1939. Paragraph 1: "(1) Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by peaceful means of a situation on the eastern frontier, which is intolerable for Germany, are exhausted, I have determined on a solution by force. "(2) me attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with the preparations made for Case White with the alterations which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions. "Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged. "The date of attack: 1st of September 1939; time of attack:4.45"--inserted in red pencil--"this time also applies to the Operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and-the Dirschau Bridge."'(3) In the West it is important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England and France. At first, purely local action should be taken against insignificant frontier violations." There it sets out the details of the order which, for the purpose of this Court, it is unnecessary to read. That evening at 9 o'clock the German radio broadcast the terms of the German proposals about which-they were so willing to enter into discussions with the Polish Government. It sets out the proposals at length. It will be remembered that by this time neither Sir Nevile Henderson nor the Polish Government nor their Ambassador had yet been given their written copy of them, and it is indeed a document which is tempting to read--or to read extracts of it simply as an exhibition or an example of pure hypocrisy.
LT. CON. GRIFFITH-JONES: I refer to the second paragraph Document TC-72, Number 98, exhibit GB-39: "Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding available to the British Government by the time the Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin." Now, we have heard the manner in which they did that. They then say that: "Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of authorized Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the- Reich received of their readiness for an understanding was the news of the Polish mobilization; and only toward-12 o'clock on the night of the 30th of August 1939, did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness to help .towards the commencement of negotiations. "Although the fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the Government of the Reich did not arrive removed the necessary conditions for informing His Majesty Government of the views of the German Government as regards a possible basis for negotiation, since His Majesty's Government themselves had pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop-gave the British Ambassador, on the occasion of the presentation of the last British note, precise information as to the text of the German proposals which will be regarded as a basis of negotiation in the event of the arrival of the Polish Plenipotentiary." And, thereafter, they go on to set out the story, or rather their version of the story, of the negotiations over the last few days. I pass to the next but one document in the Tribunal's book, TC-54, which becomes GB-73. On the 1st of September when his armies were already crossing the frontier and the whole of the frontier, he issued this proclamation to his Armed Forces: "The Polish Government, unwilling to establish good neighborly relations as aimed at by me, want to force the issue byway of arms. "The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody terror and driven from their homes.
LT. CON. GRIFFITH-JONES: Several acts of frontier violation, which cannot be tolerated by a great power,-show that Poland is no longer prepared to respect the Reich's frontiers. To put an end to these mad acts, I can see no other way but from now onwards to meet force with force. "The German Armed Forces will with firm determination take up the struggle for the honor and the vital rights of the resuscitated German people. "I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do his duty to the last. "Remember always and in any circumstances that you are the representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany. "Long live our people and the Reich." And so we see that at last Hitler had kept his word to his generals. He had afforded them their propagandistic justification; and at that time, anyway, it did not matter what people said about it afterwards. "The victor shall not be asked later on, whether he told the truth or not." Might is what counts--or victory is what counts and not right. On that day, the 1st of September, when news came of this violation of Polish ground, the British Government in accordance with their treaty obligations sent an ultimatum to the German Government in which they stated--I quote from the last-paragraph: "I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty's Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland." By the 3rd of September no withdrawal had taken place, and so at g o'clock--the document, TC-72, Number 110, I have just referred to will be GB-74 at 9 o'clock on the 3rd of September, a final ultimatum was handed to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs.