dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
KESSELRING: In Germany such subsumption was not indicated and for various reasons was not even admissible. Neither did the commanders-in-chief form a collective body to act in any way as a war council or as a similar assembly with definite tasks. They were not even, individually or collectively, members of the Reich Defense Council, but were only appointed ad hoc commanders of a front or a command post. To set up the commanders-in-chief as a collective body for any specific purpose was in my opinion quite impossible, for the simple reason that they were under the commander-in-chief of the Army, the Luftwaffe, or the Navy or under the High Command of the Armed Forces. Moreover, some were 100 percent under the German Supreme Command; others were 100 percent under Axis command. Some of them were under two different commands, some were independent commanders-in-chief, others were army commanders-in-chief subordinate to an army group.
DR. LATERNSER: You are speaking too fast. Had the commanders-in-chief only to work out military problems set before them, or did they themselves draw up plans and submit them to Hitler for consideration?
KESSELRING: The commanders-in-chief were purely military leaders, responsible only for the task allotted to them. Within the scope of this task they could submit suggestions or improvements, et cetera , to the OKW or to the OKH, but their activities in the sense of collaboration were limited to these suggestions.
DR. LATERNSER: You just mentioned improvements and modifications. Did this mean that the commanders-in-chief were expected to suggest modifications of a plan only from the military-technical aspect, or also to submit suggestions as to whether or not a plan should be carried out at all?
KESSELRING: Generally it meant suggestions for modifications from the military-technical aspect only. In matters of minor importance they had a say also as to policy. If, however, the highest authority had made a decision, the others kept silent.
DR. LATERNSER: We will revert to this later. Did the "General Staff" group as presented here ever meet collectively?
KESSELRING: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Were there any rules providing for the organization of this group?
KESSELRING: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Did any members of this group ever suggest a departure from the rules of international law?
KESSELRING: I do not think so; rather the contrary.
DR. LATERNSER: Was there a frequent reshuffle of the holders of the offices which make up this group, or did they hold the offices for a long period?
KESSELRING: In the course of the later years the commandersin-chief and commanders were rather frequently reshuffled.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the conferences Hitler held with high-ranking military leaders?
KESSELRING: There were two kinds of conferences. First, an important address before a campaign to the higher leaders taking part in it. The object of the address was generally to inform the leaders of the situation and to brief them. In view of the Fuehrer's persuasive rhetoric it was hardly possible for us to take any stand in the matter, particularly as we were not informed about all the details. At such conferences discussions did not take place; they were not allowed. There sometimes followed military-tactical consultations, and every leader had the chance of putting forward and stressing his views and requests. As I have said, we had no say in political questions. We were, as is known, faced with the accomplished fact, which we as soldiers had to accept.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you attend a conference held by Hitler on 22 August 1939, that is, shortly before the Polish campaign started?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Was it not made known at the end of this conference that we had concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union?
KESSELRING: At the end, after the address, we were all called together again and informed that the message had just been received that Russia would adopt benevolent neutrality.
DR. LATERNSER: What impression did this message have on you and the other high military leaders?
KESSELRING: It was a tremendous relief to me and to the others. Otherwise we could not have dismissed the possibility of an extension of the war toward the East. Now that Russia was going to hold herself aloof, the Luftwaffe at least -- I speak as an army commander -- had a superiority which guaranteed a rapid and decisive success, and which over and above this, in my opinion, would possibly prevent the expansion of the war.
DR. LATERNSER: In any case, the message was a great relief to you?
KESSELRING: Yes, very great.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, can you tell me whether members of the General Staff and OKW group ever met and had discussions with leading politicians and Party men?
KESSELRING: If I may speak for myself, I was operating both in the Mediterranean area and in the West. In the Mediterranean area I had to work with the Gauleiter Rainer and Hofer and then in the West with ...
DR. LATERNSER: That was not the point of the question. I wanted to know whether the high military leaders ever met and discussed any political plans with leading politicians.
KESSELRING: No, no. That I can definitely say was not the case. We as soldiers generally did not bother about politics. Political decisions were made by the politicians and we had to carry them out.
DR. LATERNSER: Among military leaders, as a result of their many years of experience in the Wehrmacht, which foster the principle of giving the soldier a nonpolitical education, this attitude is customary, is it not?
KESSELRING: This policy has been developed in the German Army since the 18th century.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether the higher military leaders had any contact with the Fifth Column?
KESSELRING: The military leadership had nothing to do with the Fifth Column. This was beneath us.
DR. LATERNSER: What was your impression of the conference Hitler held with the higher military leaders before the Eastern campaign started? Was the situation presented to you in such a way that war had to be considered unavoidable?
KESSELRING: I had the definite impression that the purpose of the address to the leaders was to convince them of the necessity of the war as a preventive war; and that it was imperative to strike before the building up and the mobilization of the Russian armed forces became a danger to Germany.
DR. LATERNSER: Could you state the reasons for your impression?
KESSELRING: As I have already said, the purpose of the address was to give us a convincing picture of the general situation; of the military situation and its time schedule -- and it did convince us. In connection with the Russian campaign I should like to say that up to the last day of August I had no doubt...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you go more slowly please and have some consideration for the interpreters.
DR. LATERNSER: Would you please repeat the last answer.
KESSELRING: I had still less reason to doubt Hitler's words because, up to the last moment, I, as Commander-in-Chief of Air Fleet 2, was engaged in operations against England and had had neither time nor the means to form a well-founded judgment of my own on the Russian situation. I had to confme myself...
DR. LATERNSER: This Trial has shown that the commandersin-chief are being made responsible for what is bound to happen in a war. I should like you to describe the daily routine of a commander-in-chief of an army group, an army, or an air fleet.
KESSELRING: The daily routine depended of course on the personality of the individual leader. If I may speak of myself...
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I ask you to be very brief.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness -- Dr. Laternser, surely, that is cumulative to what the witness has already been saying, and likely to be very long. About the description of the day of a commander, this witness already said the commander had nothing to do with politics and nothing to do with the staff. Why should we be troubled with what the commander's day consists of?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I attach particular importance to this question for the following reasons: In view of the range of a commander-in-chief's activities, especially at the front, not every report can reach him because even reports from his own sector have to be dealt with by the respective officers. Thus, only those reports come to him which are of particular importance and of a decisive nature and which have a direct bearing on the conduct of the action.
THE PRESIDENT: Give it in that way then, rather than giving the witness a full day to describe.
DR. LATERNSER: Very well, I shall put it that way. Witness, in view of the range of your activities as commanderin-chief did every report reach you, or only those which, after having been studied by the respective officers, were found to be of such importance that they had to be submitted to the commander-in-chief?
KESSELRING: Especially when an action was in Progress all reports could not reach the commander-in-chief. In my particular case this was still less possible as I spent 50 to 70 percent of my time at the front. The staffs of the armies, air fleets, and navy units had to retain a responsibility of their own within their competence.
DR.ILATERNSER: Did the many activities of a commander-in-chief allow all reports on violations of international law, even of a minor nature, to be submitted to him?
KESSELRING: This had to be aimed at. I doubt, however, for the afore-mentioned reasons, whether this was possible in every case.
DR. LATERNSER: In this matter, therefore, the commander-in-chief had to rely on his staff, had he not?
KESSELRING: Yes; 100 percent.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you commander-in-chief of an air fleet on the Eastern front from June to November 1941?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you hear anything about the extermination of Jews in the East?
KESSELRING: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you hear anything about the Einsatzgruppen of the SS?
KESSELRING: Nothing. I did not even know the name of these units.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you get to know anything about the regrettable order that Russian commissars were to be shot after their capture?
KESSELRING: I heard of this order at the end of the war. The air fleet, not being engaged in ground fighting, had actually nothing to do with this question. I think I can safely say the Luftwaffe knew nothing whatsoever about it. Though I very frequently had personal dealings with Field Marshal Von Bock, with commanders of armies and armored units, none of these gentlemen ever told me of such an order.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you know about the Commando Order?
KESSELRING: Yes, I did.
DR. LATERNSER: And what did you think of this order?
KESSELRING: I considered such an order, received by me as commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, where I held a double post, as not binding for me, but as the outline of an order which left me a free hand in its application. On this question I held the view that it was for me, as commander-in-chief, to decide whether a Commando action was contrary to international law'or whether it was tactically justified. The view adopted more and more by the army group, which view was directed by me, was that personnel in uniform who had been sent out on a definite tactical task were to be treated and considered as soldiers in accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention for land warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: The Commando Order was consequently not applied within your command?
KESSELRING: In one case, yes, it was certainly applied.
DR. LATERNSER: Which case do you mean?
KESSELRING: I mean the case of General Dostler.
DR. I.ATERNSER: The case of General Dostler has already been mentioned in this Trial. Did you know about this case when it was pending?
KESSELRING: As a witness under oath I have stated that I cannot remember this case. I think there are two reasons why I was not informed of it. Firstly, after a conversation with my chief, who spoke to another commander about it, it appeared that none of us knew anything. Secondly, because of the gigantic operations on the Southern Front, I was more often absent than not from my headquarters.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, if you had been called upon to make a decision on the Dostler case, how would you have decided?
KESSELRING: I am not well enough acquainted with the case. I know it only from hearsay.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not think we can try Dostler's case, or that this witness should give his conclusions, inasmuch as Dostler's case has been tried by a competent court and that issue is disposed of. I have no objection to any facts that inform this Tribunal, but his conclusion as to the guilt of his fellow officer is hardly helpful.
TBE PRESIDENT: Particularly as he said he cannot remember.
DR. LATERNSER: I withdraw the question. Witness, can you quote other cases where the Commando Order was not applied in your area?
KESSELRING: Small scale landings behind the lines at Commazzio, south of Venice, also airborne landings north of Albenda in the region of Genoa and minor actions in the Lago di Ortona district. I am convinced the troops adopted this general view and acted accordingly.
DR. LATERNSER: You were commander-in-chief of an air fleet in the East. What can you say about the treatment of the Russian civilian population during the campaign?
KESSELRING: I was in Russia until the end of November and I can say only that the population and the troops were on the best of terms, and that the field kitchens were used everywhere for the benefit of the poor and the children; also that the morality of the Russian woman, which, as is known, is on a high level, was respected by the German soldiers to a remarkable extent. I know that my doctors, during the hours of attendance, were frequently consulted by the Russian population. I remember this, because the doctors spoke to me about the fortitude they showed in enduring pain. The war passed so quickly over the plains as far as Smolensk that the whole area presented quite a peaceful aspect; peasants were at work, fairly large herds of cattle were grazing, and when I visited the area I found the small dwellings intact.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you hear of any excesses committed by German soldiers in the East? Whenever cases of violations of international law were reported to you, did you take action with all the means at your disposal?
KESSELRING: I at least tried to do so, if only for the sake of maintaining the reputation of the German Wehrmacht and also in the interests of the relations of the Wehrmacht with our Italian allies. I therefore thought it expedient to deal severely with any German soldier who committed an offense. As I was mindful of the fact that war is a brutal business and the longer it lasts the more brutal it becomes, particularly if the leaders and subordinates are no longer able to cope with their tasks, I had recourse to preventive measures. The preventive regulations, which I am sure were seen at many places by the Allied Forces during their advance through Italy, my various announcements of the penalties imposed which became generally known, are the best proof of what I just said. As a preventive measure I ordered whole towns, or if this was not possible, their centers to be cleared of military and administrative offices and soldiers, and barricaded off. Furthermore, as far as air raid precautions allowed, the soldiers were garrisoned and billeted in confined areas. I also ordered detached individual soldiers, who are usually the cause of such trouble -- for instance soldiers going on and returning from leave-to be grouped together, and nonmilitary vehicles to form convoys. For control purposes I had cordons drawn by military police, field police, gendarmes, with mobile courts and flying squads attached to them. The buying-up of Italian goods, which was partly the cause of the trouble, was to be restricted by establishing stores, in cooperation with the Italian Government, along the return routes, and here the soldiers could buy something to take home. This was enforced by penalties. German offenders reported to me by the Italians, I had prosecuted or I myself took proceedings against them. Whenever local operations prevented my personal intervention, as for instance at Siena, I notified the Wehrmacht that I would have the case dealt with by court-martial at a later date.
KESSELRING: In other cases, when the situation was critical, I declared an emergency law and imposed the death penalty for looting, robbery, murder, et cetera . The death penalty was, however, rarely found to have a deterrent effect. I took action against officers who, naturally disposed to shield their men, had shown too great leniency. I understand all files are available here, so that all details can be seen from the marginal notes on the reports sent in by the military police.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you also know of any violations of international law by the other side?
KESSELRING: During my many visits to the front I did, of course, come across a large number...
GEN. RUDENKO: I protest against this question. In my opinion, the witness is not the person to make any statement as to whether Germany's enemies have violated international law. I think this question should be omitted.
DR. LATERNSER: May I explain my point? I am interested in an answer to this question because I want to follow it with the further question to the witness, whether after he heard of violations of international law by the other side, he became more lenient concerning violations of international law by his own men. That is why I am anxious to have this question answered.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know exactly ,vhat your question is and why you say it is competent.
DR. LATERNSER: The exact wording of the question is as follows: I asked the witness, "Do you also know of any violations of international law by the other side?" According to his answer I intend to put the further questions to the witness, whether, in view of such violations of international law by the other side, he either did not punish at all or dealt more leniently with violations of international law by his own men. From the answer to this latter question I want to ascertain the attitude of the witness as a member of the group, and that is why I consider the answer to the first question to be important.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear what Counsel for the United States says about it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor please, I believe it is a well-established principle of international law that a violation on one side does not excuse or warrant violations on the other side. There is, of course, a doctrine of reprisal, but it is clearly not applicable here, on any basis that has been shown. In the second place, even if the treatment of the subject matter were competent, I think it is being improperly gone into in this manner. Here is a broad question, "Did you hear of violations of international law?" It would at least, even if the subject were proper, require that some particularity of a case be given. A broad conclusion of a charge -- a violation of international law -- would hardly be sufficient to inform this Tribunal as to the basis on which this witness may have acted. If there were some specific instance, with credible information called to his attention, there might be some basis; but surely the question as asked by counsel does not afford a basis here. It seems to me we are getting far afield from the charges here and that this is far afield from anything that is involved in the case. I do not know what particular atrocities or violations of international law are to be excused by this method. There must have been atrocities committed, on the basis of which there is sought to be excused atrocities committed by somebody else. Who else committed them, why they were committed, is a subject we might have to try if we went into this subject. It seems to me that the inquiry is quite beside the point, and even if it were not, if there were any way that it is within the point, it is improperly put in this manner.
DR. STAHMER: This question, which is of fundamental importance, was argued before this Tribunal some time ago. This was when I applied for permission to be given to produce White Books containing reports on atrocities. I think it was during the sitting of 25 February. At that time Professor Exner defined his attitude to this question and the Tribunal then permitted me to produce these White Books, with the proviso that I would still have to state what I intended to present from these books. Already on that occasion attention was drawn to the importance of the question of whether atrocities were committed by the other side as well, because this very point may contribute to a more just and possibly to a more lenient judgment of German behavior. The motive of an act has always a decisive bearing on the findings, and the view will be taken here that an act on the German part will be judged differently if the other side has not really, shown entirely correct behavior. Furthermore it is an important question whether measures taken may have been reprisals. On the strength of these considerations I hold that this important question should be admitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have considered the questions which Dr. Laternser proposed to put to the witness and have also considered the objections made by General Rudenko and Mr. Justice Jackson, and they hold the questions are inadmissible.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I assume that I am allowed to put the following question. [Turning to the witness.] Witness, did you either not punish at all or deal more leniently with violations of international law by your own men when violations of this law by the other side were reported to you?
THE PRESIDENT: That seems to me to be putting in one question what before you put in two.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, this question is not meant to cause the witness to give instances of violations of international law by the other side. From the answer, I merely want to ascertain the fundamental attitude of the witness, namely whether he, as commander-in-chief, dealt most severely with violations of international law by his own men even if violations on the other side were reported to him. I withdraw the question.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would see no objection in your asking the witness whether he was anxious to avoid violations of international law; if you wish to put that question to him there will be no objection to that question. The question which you have suggested putting is really identical with the questions you put before.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, during this Trial severe accusations have been made because of atrocities committed by German soldiers. Was not every soldier sufficiently enlightened and instructed about the regulations of international law?
KESSELRING: I answer this question in the affirmative. The many talks given by me and the commanders under me always contained such admonitions and instructions.