dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GISEVIUS: Yes; until the 20th of July I was continuously in the civil service.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, in the beginning of 1939 you were posted to the Ministry of the Interior and attached to Potsdam?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on; after that?
GISEVIUS: When war broke out the difficulty arose that I had no mobilization order and, on the other hand, my friends wanted to have me in the OKW. From the date of the outbreak of the war until 1 October 1940 I had only a forged mobilization order, and every day I expected to be found out. At which time I would have had to take the consequences. After the fall of Paris I stated to Canaris and Oster that I would have to ask them now to release me from that somewhat complicated situation. At that time the position of Canaris, temporarily, was so strong that he placed me in an intelligence position with the Consulate General in Zurich. There I received the title of a Vice Consul with the Consulate General in Zurich, and I stayed there as a counterintelligence man, without belonging to the Abwehr formally, until 20 July. After 20 July I was dismissed from all posts, and I do not know whether I was not even deprived of citizenship. I have found out nothing about that.
THE PRESIDENT: Between the time you went to Zurich and 20 July, were you returning to Germany from time to time?
GISEVIUS: During that time I was mainly in Germany, and only from time to time Oster and Canaris sent me to Switzerland as a courier, on travel orders. Schacht was still quite helpful to me at that time in getting me a Swiss visa, through the Swiss Legation.
THE PRESIDENT: During the time that you were in the Gestapo, from August to December 1933, what was your actual job or function?
GISEVIUS: When I received my first civil service position I was only in training, and I was attached to the then Chief of the Executive Department, Oberregierungsrat Nebe, for training. After the warrant for arrest was issued, at the end of October 1933, I was sent to Leipzig as a reporter for the Reichstag Fire trial.
THE PRESIDENT: You spoke yesterday very often of a man whose name I am not clear about, Nebe, I believe it was.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What was his position?
GISEVIUS: Nebe was a well-known criminologist at the Berlin Police headquarters before 1933. As a National Socialist he was called into the Gestapo in July 1933 and until the beginning of 1934; he was promoted there to Oberregierungsrat. Then we were successful, with the aid of the Defendant Frick, in having him transferred for some time to the Ministry of the Interior. And then he became the founder and Chief of the Reich Office of Criminology. On the day of the appointment of Himmler as Chief of Police of the Reich he was put into the new Reich Security Main Office. In the course of time he was taken over into the SS; he became an SS Gruppenfuehrer, SS General, and, until 20 July, he was one of the closest subordinates of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Gestapo as well as the Criminal Police and the Information Service. So that thereby Nebe became a subordinate of Kaltenbrunner and received continuously official orders from him, just like the Gestapo Chief Mueller.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you wish to ask any questions, Dr. Dix?
DR. DIX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better do that after the adjournment at a quarter past 2. [The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.]
DR. DIX: The Soviet Prosecutor put a question to you in connection with the annexation of Austria. While answering the question you were interrupted. You had just said, I quote "But the form..." Would you please complete your answer now?
GISEVIUS: What I wanted to say was that Schacht was undoubtedly opposed to the Anschluss in this form.
DR. DIX: Then I have one last question, which concerns the so-called incident of yesterday. I discussed this incident with you yesterday and explained the situation as regards my colleague Dr. Stahmer. I also gave you permission to make use of this explanation at any time. I now request you to give this explanation to the Tribunal.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I interpose an objection. I think that is a most irregular way to inform the Tribunal, if there is anything the Tribunal should be informed about, that Dr. Dix should tell the witness what the witness should tell the Tribunal. Now, I have no objection to the witness' relating to the Tribunal anything that he knows from his own knowledge. I do object to the witness' being asked to relate what Dr. Dix has told him he may tell the Tribunal. I think that is a most irregular way of clarifying it.
DR. DIX: That is not the case. I made a remark about Dr. Stahmer to Dr. Gisevius. That is a matter between the witness and myself; I consider it important that this remark of mine be related and testified to by the witness. It is an incident which he observed, and I prefer that the witness should confirm the fact that I explained this to him. I cannot see anything irregular about this procedure, and I ask for a decision by the Tribunal. Otherwise I should make the explanation myself, but I consider it better for the witness to say what I told him immediately after that incident.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you may properly put the question to the witness.
DR. DIX: I have already put the question, and you may answer it at this time.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not quite sure now what your question was, but the Tribunal thinks that you may put the question. Was there anything in connection with the incident which the witness has not already told us, which he wishes to say?
DR. DIX: Yes. The question relates to a conversation between the witness and myself. [Turning to the witness.] Witness, what did I tell you yesterday?
GISEVIUS: You told me immediately that, in your opinion, your colleague Dr. Stahmer did not wish to put undue pressure upon me but that this undue pressure came rather from the Defendant Goering.
DR. DIX: I have no further questions.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, were you, during the war. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, are you attempting to re-examine?
DR. SEIDL: I wanted to put a single question . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I was not thinking of the time which you would take up, but the question of whether you ought to be allowed to put any question. Yes, go on, Dr. Seidl.
DR.SEIDL: Witness, during the war were you at any time active in the intelligence service of a foreign power?
GISEVIUS: At no time.
DR. SEIDL: It is also not correct . . .
THE PRESIDENT: That is not a question which you ought to put to this witness in re-examination.
DR. SEIDL: But, Mr. President, it is a question affecting the credibility of this witness. If it should turn out that this witness, who is or was a citizen of the German Reich, had been active in the intelligence service of a foreign power, that fact would have an important bearing on the credibility of the witness.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to be heard on that. In the first place, I do not think that this witness should be subjected to any attacks. In the second place. I respectfully submit that it does not militate against the credibility of the witness that he should have opposed this kind of an organization. I think that the attack upon the credibility of this witness, if there were one to be made-he is sworn on behalf of the defendants and is not the Prosecution's witness-the attack is not timely, is not a proper attack, and the substance of it does not go to credibility.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow you to put the question.
DR. SEIDL: Please answer my question and remember your oath.
GISEVIUS: Mr. Attorney, it is not at all necessary for you to remind me of my oath. I have said that I was never in the intelligence service of a foreign power. I was in the service of a good, clean German cause.
DR.SEIDL: During the war did you receive funds from any power at war with Germany?
GISEVIUS: No.
DR SEIDL: Do you know what the three letters OSS mean?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR.SEIDL: What do they stand for?
GISEVIUS: They stand for an American intelligence service.
DR. SEIDL: You had nothing to do with that organization?
GISEVIUS: I had friendly and political contacts with several members of this organization.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: I hope the defendants' counsel will remember that they have all had a free opportunity to cross-examine this witness already and have not...
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): The person of Herr Von Papen was not mentioned until the cross-examination by the American prosecutor. Therefore I could not ask questions before. Witness, you replied in the negative to a question put by the American chief prosecutor yesterday as to whether the Defendant Von Papen at any time protested. Of course, you modified this by pointing out that some written communication by Von Papen had not been addressed to the Ministry of the Interior. In order to clarify this problem, I should like to know whether this assertion of yours refers only to the Ministry of the Interior. On Page 133 of your book you pointed out that one of the Defendant Von Papen's main activities as Vice Chancellor consisted in handing in protests and that he addressed these protests above all to Hindenburg and Goering.
GISEVIUS: I again emphasized the latter point yesterday or today. I have no official knowledge of any protest made by Von Papen to the competent police minister after 30 June 1934. I can say only that it would greatly have strengthened the position of the ministry of police if a protest of that nature, describing in detail the murder of Von Papen's closest co-workers, had reached the Ministry of the Interior. In that case, it is unlikely that this rumor about the suicide or rather the suspicious death of Von Bose and Jung would have reached the public.
DR KUBUSCHOK: Do you not think that it is understandable, especially considering the position held by Frick, the comparatively insignificant and uninfluential position held by Frick, that one should make such protests to higher authorities if it is possible to do so?
GISEVIUS: At the very moment when the ministers took the position that they could apply only to higher authorities, that is, the dictator himself, they, of their own accord, shattered the constitutional competency of the individual ministries and the Cabinet. It would have meant a great deal if Herr Von Papen at that time had used the prescribed channels.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In agreement with your book, you do not dispute the fact that Von Papen made many protests to these higher authorities in respect to other questions as well?
GISEVIUS: No; he did protest frequently.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yesterday, within the scope of your general statements you gave an unfavorable characterization of the Defendant Von Papen. This character sketch coincides with the one you gave in your book. In your book you pay special attention to certain details and draw your conclusions from them. Since the Defendant Von Papen only occupies a comparatively small amount of space in your book and you probably had nothing to do with him in your official capacity, you must have had to base your statements on second-hand information. Since all these statements, as far as they refer to Von Papen, are incorrect, I refer to them briefly. First, you proceed from the assumption that, in spite of the events of 30 June, Von Papen did not resign. On the contrary, it is historically significant that Papen did send in his resignation after the suppressor of his Marburg speech, that negotiations about this resignation were pending between Hitler and Hindenburg, and that Hitler accepted Papen's resignation immediately after the latter's release on 3 July, when it was again tendered, but did not intend to make it public until a later date, in spite of Papen's request to the contrary. Is it possible, Witness, that you were not correctly informed of this internal event?
GISEVIUS: It is perfectly possible for me not to have known of internal events. I should like, however, to stress the fact that a minister or vice chancellor is under an obligation to give a certain amount of publicity to his opinion and to his decisions; and I can say only that, whatever Papen may have said to Hitler in private, he contrived with consummate skill to conceal from the German people the fact that he intended to resign-or had already resigned; and that is the point.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Are you aware that this same Defendant Von Papen had had a very bad experience a few weeks earlier, when the press was forbidden to publish his speech at Marburg, which contained a frank statement of his opinions, and warning was given that persons found circulating it would be punished?
GISEVIUS: I am aware of it because we were appalled that a Vice Chancellor of the German Reich allowed himself to be silenced in such a way. I believe that the 30th of June would not have involved such a heavy death-roll for the middle classes if Vice Chancellor Von Papen had given a manly "no"-a definite "no" at the proper time.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Your answer makes no reference to the point which I raised before, that Von Papen had actually resigned because the publication of his Marburg speech had been prohibited. Secondly, you make the assumption that Von Papen took part in the Cabinet session of 3 July, in which the law was passed that the measures involved by 30 June were legal as emergency measures for the protection of the State. Is it known to you that Yon Papen did not participate in this session, that he had just been released and went into the Chancellery while the session was in progress, that Hitler asked him to go from the session-room into the adjoining room, that Von Papen again tendered his resignation, which Hitler accepted, and that he left the Chancellery immediately afterwards, without participating in the session at all?
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether it is possible for the witness to follow your questions, but they are so long and contain so many statements of fact that it is very difficult for anybody else to follow them; it is very difficult for the Tribunal.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The gist of my question was that Von Papen did not attend the Cabinet session on 3 July. My question to the witness...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, why do you not ask the witness whether he knows whether he did participate or not? If that is the question you want to ask why do you not ask it?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: My question is simply an attempt to find out whether the assertion to the contrary which appears in his book can also be explained by an error in information obtained from a third party.
GISEVIUS: It can be explained by false information, which, through the silence of Herr Von Papen, became known to the public and by which I myself was misled.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thirdly, you go on with the statement that Von Papen, although he went to see Hindenburg afterwards, did not make a sufficiently strong protest against the measures taken. Is it known to you that Von Papen did everything in his power to reach Hindenburg but was kept away from him and he did not reach Hindenburg's estate at Neudeck until after the 30th of June, after Hindenburg's death? Can the assertion to the contrary contained in your book be traced back to an error in information?
GISEVIUS: Yes, if you tell me that even in his capacity of Vice Chancellor of the Reich he did not have access to the President of the Reich and still remained in office, in spite of the fact that there were foreign journalists, the foreign diplomatic corps, and even a large number of Germans who heard of this attitude of a German vice chancellor.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: But, Witness, you are forgetting that he was a retired vice chancellor and had already been out of office for several weeks. Fourthly, you start with the premise that Von Papen attended the Reichstag session at which the measures taken on 30 June were justified. Do you know that Von Papen did not attend that session in spite of Hitler's summons to him to do so? Is it possible that you could have been informed incorrectly on that point, too?
GISEVIUS: I believe you have already asked me that.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, this is not the Cabinet session; this is the Reichstag session.
GISEVIUS: Yes, then I must be misinformed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you. [Dr. Laternser approached the lectern.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, it seems to me that the Defense has had every opportunity to interrogate this witness. After the witness was examined by the Prosecution, after his cross-examination, the Defense makes again an application to cross-examine the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks, at any rate, that it is perfectly able to manage its own proceedings without any interruptions of this sort. We can deal with Dr. Laternser when he makes his application to cross-examine.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to say that we would like to shorten the duration of the proceedings as much as possible, and the Prosecution would like the Defense to consider that the same way.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have several further questions to put to the witness, arising from his cross-examination; I assume that the Tribunal have no objection to my questioning him.
THE PRESIDENT: No, if they arise out of the cross-examination of him.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, yesterday, in answer to a question of the American prosecutor, you expressed the opinion that a Putsch against the then existing regime would have been possible only with the co-operation of the generals but that the many discussions which took place did not achieve this co-operation. I should like to ask you, Witness, to which generals you spoke personally about the existing plans for a Putsch on the part of your group?
THE PRESIDENT: You are not concerned with every general in the German Army; you are only concerned with those who are charged with being a criminal group.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Your question must be addressed to them, or with reference to them.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. Then I ask the Court's permission to describe to the witness the OKW and General Staff circle so that he can answer my question.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can put to him, I think, whether he had contact with any members of the General Staff who are charged with being a criminal group. You know who the generals are.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I should like to make a few preliminary remarks to the witness and then put the question. Witness...
THE PRESIDENT: Now, what is the question you want to put?
DR. LATERNSER: So that the witness can answer the question within the limits prescribed by the Tribunal, I should like to give the witness a brief explanation as to the circle of persons actually belonging to this group and then ask him with which of these persons he talked personally in order to win them over for the Putsch intended by his groups. Otherwise...
THE PRESIDENT: If you do it shortly.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the group General Staff and OKW is held to include the holders of certain appointments from February 1938 to May 1945. These appointments are as follows: The Commanders-in-Chief of the various branches of the Armed Forces . . .
THE PRESIDENT: You are not going through the whole lot, are you, 130 of them?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the list is really quite short and otherwise I cannot restrict my question as desired by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you mean. What I said was, are you proposing to go through the whole 130 generals or officers?
DR. LATERNSER: No, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.
DR. LATERNSER: The group includes those holding certain appointments; briefly, all those who were commanders-in-chief during the period February 1938 to May 1945. Now, I ask you, with which generals of this group did you personally discuss the subject of Putsch plans, in order to obtain their co-operation in a Putsch, if such were made?
GISEVIUS: You mean commanders-in-chief of groups?
DR. LATERNSER: Of armies, of army groups, branches of the Wehrmacht, and General Staff chiefs of the Wehrmacht branches.
GISEVIUS: I have already mentioned Halder and Brauchitsch.
DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness; did you discuss with Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch an intended Putsch against the regime or only against the Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: I discussed both with him; and in both cases he answered in the affirmative and acted in the negative. I spoke to Balder and Witzleben. I knew Kluge well from the old times. I do not know at what period he entered the category to which you refer. At any rate my connection with Kluge was never broken off. I may have talked to other individuals falling within this category.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes',but to discuss Putsch plans with a high-ranking military leader is an event of some importance; if you had had a discussion of this kind with a field marshal you would surely remember it.
GISEVIUS: It was not such an important event as all that, Mr. Attorney. Field marshals were not such important people in the Third Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the fact that these generals were spoken to and refused to join a Putsch is not a crime within the meaning of the Charter.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, yesterday I explained that this point is very important because it would exclude the assumption of a conspiracy.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid, Dr. Laternser, it is no good answering me that a point is very important. What I asked you was, how is it relevant to show that these generals discussed a revolt against the regime? That, I am putting to you, is not a crime within the meaning of the Charter.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but this circumstance would exclude the assumption of the conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: But does it preclude the possibility of a conspiracy to make aggressive war? It has nothing to do with it.
DR. LATERNSER: I did not quite understand that.
THE PRESIDENT: The question of a revolt against the regime in Germany is, it seems to me, not necessarily connected with the conspiracy to carry out aggressive war; therefore, anything which has to do with a revolt against the regime in Germany is not relevant to the question which you have to deal with.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the conspiracy is assumed precisely in connection with the wars of aggression; and if the high military leaders turned against the regime to such an extent that they discussed and even attempted a Putsch, there would be no question of conspiracy.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal think the proper way of putting the question, which they understand you want to put, is to ask which of the generals were prepared to join in a revolt. You may put that question.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, in order to decide how far the circle as a whole was willing to take part I must ask the witness how many of them he spoke to and how many of those declared themselves ready to act with him.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you might put that to him-how many. Ask him how many.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, that was the question I asked at the beginning.
THE PRESIDENT: I said you may put it.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. [Turning to the witness.] Witness, with how many generals of this group did you discuss the matter?
GISEVIUS: In the course of years it may have been a dozen or several dozen, but I should like to say that it was the task of Generaloberst Beck and Oster or Canaris to talk to these gentlemen rather than mine. As regards names, I cannot give you much of the information you want; on the other hand I can shorten your question by saying that, unfortunately, very few of the leading generals in the appointments referred to by the Prosecution ever seriously declared their intention of helping to overthrow the system.