dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
as regards fuel and rubber in the case of a major action in the East, on the basis of the demands made by the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Gen. Qu. of the Airforce, which will be discussed later on. Included in the processing of the Russian problem were matters of war economic nature connected with the Balkans and Africa. Balkans While the preparations for the Russian Campaign could be completed as planned, the measures for the action in the Balkans had to be improvisioned on account of the unsuccessful revolutionary outbreak in Yugoslavia. Only Colonel Wendt, as VO was sent to AOK-12 in Roumania at the beginning of January as planned, and given charge of T. B. 13. The preparations were arranged for an entry into Greece only. When the revolt in Yugoslavia started, the preparations had to be altered. Department IV of VO AOK-12 was divided, the one half under Colonel Wendt to follow the assault of AOK-12, direction Belgrad, the other half under Captain v. Illberg to accompany the forces attacking towards Greece. Half a battalion each of T.B. 13 was put at the disposal of Colonel Wendt and Capt. v. Illberg, respectively. With the arrival of the second army Col. Fach was installed VO in charge of T. B. 6 and 8. Furthermore he had specialists at his disposal, familiar with the economy of Yugoslavia and Greece. Dr. Pook of the Wi Rue Office was dispatched to manage copper mines at Bor. Details of operations and results of the war economy units during the action in the Balkans; (see report of OKW (Wi Rue Bureau) No. 27438/41 secret, of June 4, 1941, Appendix XXI, 10). Even during the operations, organization of a war Economy Staff Serbia with a Wi. Commando at Belgrade was ordered, the staff was closely connected with Consul General Neuhausen charged with the Economic Administration of Serbia, by the Reichmarshal. Also a. a war economy officer Agram for the territory of Croatia and b. a Rue-commando Klagerfurt for the Yugoslavian territories turned over to the Reich, were appointed (see Appendix XXI, 11). The war economy staff Serbia quickly became of great importance for supplying the troops operating in the Balkans, and later on deserved much credit for the
for the territory of Croatia and b. a Rue-commando Klagerfurt for the Yugoslavian territories turned over to the Reich, were appointed (see Appendix XXI, 11). The war economy staff Serbia quickly became of great importance for supplying the troops operating in the Balkans, and later on deserved much credit for the utilization and securing of the Yugoslavian raw materials, important for German armaments and by organizing the transport of these raw materials. The seizing of the still usable factories in Serbia and Croatia for assimilation into the German Armament Industry had already been started in April (s. Wi Rue bureau No. 22-261/62 of April 29, 41. Appendix XXI, 12 and XXI, 13) and represented useful support for the W. T. especially for repair work but also for the manufacture of material of all kinds. The concerns processing raw material could be built up in the course of time to form a valuable support for the German war economy, the deliveries of copper, bauxite, tin, chromium, asbestos and mica were of considerable importance. As the territory of Greece, by order of the Fuehrer (see appendix, Wi Rue bureau No. 22-263/41 2 of May 29, Appendix XXI, 14) was ceded to the Italians for economic exploitation, war economy offices were only installed in Greece where needed by the Army or for the security of transportation. There was one Wi Kdo each established in Salonica and Athens. At the same time the confiscation and utilization was ordered of the factories, in the areas of Salonica and Athens occupied by German troops, necessary for war economy and armament (see Wi Rue Bureau, No. 22-263/41 s. file XXI, 15). The factories in Athens were especially important as repair plants for the air force. but also by the delivery of oil and tobacco to the army and to the homeland the war economy offices rendered considerable service. [Pages 380-381] The compilation was the result of the deliberations concerning the planned operation in the East, ordered by the Reich Marshall in November 1940. The Office of Economy and Armament [Wi Rue Amt] had taken pains to give a completely objective picture of the situation regarding Defense and armament economy [wehr-und Ruestungswirtschaftliche Lage] of the
concerning the planned operation in the East, ordered by the Reich Marshall in November 1940. The Office of Economy and Armament [Wi Rue Amt] had taken pains to give a completely objective picture of the situation regarding Defense and armament economy [wehr-und Ruestungswirtschaftliche Lage] of the USSR and had held it necessary, to refer to the points which might cause difficulties for a military operation. The result of this work completed carefully on the basis of safely proved facts is summed up at the end as follows: "Any operation leading to the occupation of the European part of USSR (without the Ural territory), will bring the following results: I. During the first months Germany will be relieved in the field of nutrition and raw materials, if a quick seizure should succeed in a. Preventing the destruction of stocks b. capturing the mineral oilfields of the Caucasus undestroyed and c. solving the problem of transportation. II. For longer duration of the war an effective relief is dependent on the following pre-requisites: a. in all fields: 1. on the solution of the transportation problem, 2. On the staying [verblieb; translator's note: may also mean: "whereabouts"] of the people (population) and winning them over to collaborate. b. in the field of agriculture: 1. on preventing destruction of the "M.T.S." and the possibility of replacing their pool of tractors and machines by taking up production again in the USSR. 2. on the possibility of fuel supply. c. in the industrial field: 1. on the capture of powerworks undestroyed or on their fast restoration. 2. on securing the delivery of raw materials not existing in the European part of the USSR to the industry. III. The supplying of Germany with India-rubber tungsten, copper, platinum, tin, asbestos and manila hemp remains unsolved until communication with the Far East will be established. IV. The territory south of the mouth of Volga and Don inclusive of the Caucasus must be included in the operation. The Caucasion fuel supply is indispensable for the exploitation of the occupied territories. V. In the field of just the armament-industry it will lead to taking possession of about 75% of the total Russian armament
and Don inclusive of the Caucasus must be included in the operation. The Caucasion fuel supply is indispensable for the exploitation of the occupied territories. V. In the field of just the armament-industry it will lead to taking possession of about 75% of the total Russian armament industry and almost 100% of the precision tool-manufacturing and optical industry. The USSR will keep about 25% of the mere armament and scarcely 1% of the precision tool-manufacturing and optical industry. [Pages 404-406] In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June 1941 the negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of attention. The Fuehrer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians only made grain deliveries, when the Germans delivered orders placed by the Russians, and since in the case of individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill orders for the German armed forces, it was necessary for the Wi Rue office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate Russian orders with those of the German from the standpoint of priority. In accordance with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry was instructed to accept all Russian orders, even if it were impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for manufacture and delivery. Since, in May especially, large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed to allow the equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour during its transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack. As a result of the visit of the Hungarian Minister, Excellence Bartha, the trade in war material with Hungary came once more into the foreground. Above all, the Hungarians demanded German help in equipping their air force, as well as anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, and listening devices, tanks, artillery and communications equipment, and heavy guns. For this they offered free facilities for the manufacture of gauges and fuses, artillery equipment, trucks and tank trucks. The Hungarians were promised help in almost all
their air force, as well as anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, and listening devices, tanks, artillery and communications equipment, and heavy guns. For this they offered free facilities for the manufacture of gauges and fuses, artillery equipment, trucks and tank trucks. The Hungarians were promised help in almost all fields, however, not until the summer of 1942, because it was thought that by this time the campaign in the East would have come to an end. Technical help for the saving of raw material with the issuing of licenses was offered them immediately. The shifting of German orders to Hungary was put into effect. The negotiations with Roumania and Finland covered more ground, because both states made considerable demands for the improvement of the equipment of their units designed to fight against Russia. First of all, the Roumanians asked for anti-aircraft equipment, prime movers, and trucks for the motorization and artillery equipment of all kind; moreover, they asked that they artillery and munition orders placed in France and with the Boehler works be executed. The Finns demanded long-range guns, anti-aircraft guns, fuses, airplanes and help in carrying out motorization. In accordance with the directive from the Fuehrer, the Roumanians were promised help as much as possible, while the Finns were to be put off until later. When the operations opened in the East, the demands became greater and more urgent; the Finns, especially, called for raw materials and fuel. These demands were met in the case of both these countries as much as possible. Bulgarian wishes lay, particularly, in the field of motorization and communications and in the delivery of armoured reconnaissance cars and tanks. Only small deliveries could be made; in general the Bulgarians were instructed that these states, which were actually in the battle, must receive first delivery. Moreover, the negotiations with Turkey were of special importance. The office of Wi Rue was instructed to specially cultivate these negotiations, and to offer as much war material to the Turks as possible, on the one hand for military-political reasons, on the other hand, in order to force the Turks to make deliveries of chromium. Since the Foreign Office wanted in full to assure the treaty for deliveries of Turkish
cultivate these negotiations, and to offer as much war material to the Turks as possible, on the one hand for military-political reasons, on the other hand, in order to force the Turks to make deliveries of chromium. Since the Foreign Office wanted in full to assure the treaty for deliveries of Turkish chromium for the year 1942/43, more deliveries of war material, which partly constituted former Turkish orders, were promised for 1942. [Page 479] History will know only a few examples of cases where a country has directed even in peacetime all its economic forces so deliberately and systematically towards the requirements of war as Germany was compelled to do in the period between the two world wars. [Page 38] In the (Reich Defense) Law the appointment of a General Plenipotentiary for the Economy was provided for, a post for which Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht was contemplated. He was to have the right to give directions on economic questions to all ministries concerned with economic problems. He was charged with the preparation of all economic war measures with the exeception of the armament industry which was to be handled by the Army High Command. [Page 59] If it is said for example, that "not the economy, but politics represents fate", this principle should be recognized only with the reservation that politics may receive its decisive impulse from the economic necessities of a nation. The fundamental urge to expand a nation which does not find the basis for its food production in its own soil, is an imperative for the shaping of policy. [Page 84] If it was possible in a few years to develop the thirty-two monopoly factories of the Treaty of Versailles into an armament industry sufficient for our large army, this is due very largely to the work of the offices of the Military Economy Organization. [Page 127] In spite of the limitations in rearmament ordered by the Minister of War in 1937, the demands of the Army for steel remained so high that the Minister of Economics announced his misgivings regarding the economy as a whole. The War Minister stated that, in view of the existing foreign exchange situation, the condition of the whole economy, and thereby of rearmament,
of War in 1937, the demands of the Army for steel remained so high that the Minister of Economics announced his misgivings regarding the economy as a whole. The War Minister stated that, in view of the existing foreign exchange situation, the condition of the whole economy, and thereby of rearmament, was jeopardized by a continuous fall of exports, and consequently he requested the introduction of raw material quotas, by means of which the management of rearmament and of other important programs was to be accomplished. [Page 145] Complaints about excessive loads of works at factories and about continuous modifications of order schedules were received all the time from industry. By means of the spreading of orders and the admission of new firms, the Military Economy Organization and the armament offices succeeded in carrying out the armament programs more or less according to plan and to fulfill the demands of the leaders. [Pages 173-174] The enlargement of gunpowder and explosives production was started as a large scale action. At the suggestion of the Economy Staff, Field Marshal Goering ordered the drafting of a plan for the manufacture of gunpowder and explosives in 1938 and charged General-Director Krauch of I. G. Farben with the execution of this plan. The plan was set up on July 12th, 1938, as the so-called "Karinhall" plan and scheduled the creation of a capacity of 12,000 tons of gunpowder per month, 19,000 tons of explosives, and 4,000 tons of poison gas until October 1st, 1940. By October 1st the capacity was to be Gunpowder 18,000 tons, Explosives 24,000 tons, Poison gas 8,000 tons, per month. In view of numerous difficulties, particularly due to the lack of foreign exchange for the purchase of machines, due further to a smaller allocation of raw materials and shortage of workers, the speed of production contemplated by Dr. Krauch could not be maintained; Consequently the scheduled figures could not be reached by the time of the outbreak of war. [pages 181-182] The course of German mobilization in 1939 was greatly influenced by the development of the military-political situation and was guided by the idea of a surprise of the enemy. The experiences made during the operations against
figures could not be reached by the time of the outbreak of war. [pages 181-182] The course of German mobilization in 1939 was greatly influenced by the development of the military-political situation and was guided by the idea of a surprise of the enemy. The experiences made during the operations against Austria, Sudetenland, and Czechoslovakia, which led to a partial and camouflaged mobilization, formed the basis of the measures to be taken. The tension existing between Germany and Poland since July was used in order to prepare all measures necessary for a surprise attack against Poland. Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946 Previous Document Volume IV Menu
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Document No. 2354-PS Previous Document Volume IV Menu Next Document PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2354-PS ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP [Organisationsbuch der NSDAP] 5th, 6th and 7th Edition, Central NSDAP Press, 1938, Munich [Fifth Edition, Pages 367-371a] Training of the S.A. In order to obtain uniform training, a systematical arrangement of three major groups is provided: a ideological education and training b general training c active service These groups comprise essentially the following individual fields: Group a: 1. Education and training according to the doctrines and aims of the Fuehrer as they are set forth in the "Kampf" and in the party program for all phases of our lives and our National Socialist ideology. 2. The teachings of the history of the German people for the tasks of our time. 3. Exercise of the National Socialist doctrine of duty. Group b: 1. Security police service, 2. Physical exercises, 3. Marching exercises, 4. Terrain service, 5. Small-caliber shooting practice, 6. Gas and air-raid protection, 7. Service of special units, (Maritime, Communications, Engineers, and Cavalry units). Group c: 1. Assemblies and demonstrations 2. Contests and performance examinations for S.A. sport insignia 3. Security service 4. Home service (catastrophe service, etc.) The training of leaders is the prerequisite for the total training. The suitability of the SA leaders for their positions was first established through examinations. Leaders designated as suitable will be educated and trained step by step according to the previously mentioned points of view and according to the special educational guidance of the Office of the Chief of Storm Troops [Oberste SA-Fuehrung]. The SA Sport Insignia [Page 369] The new state demands a resistant, hardened generation. In addition to the ideological education of the mind, a fighting training of the body must be required by means of simple, useful, and natural body exercises. In order to create increased incentive and aims for the endeavors of youth, I re-establish the SA Sport Insignia for the entire SA and for all its former branches, which is earned by means of a performance test after a conscientiously executed period of training. In
useful, and natural body exercises. In order to create increased incentive and aims for the endeavors of youth, I re-establish the SA Sport Insignia for the entire SA and for all its former branches, which is earned by means of a performance test after a conscientiously executed period of training. In order to give conscious expression to the fostering of a valiant spirit in all parts of the German people, I further decide that this SA Sport Insignia can also be earned and worn by persons who are not members of the movement, inasfar as they comply racially and ideologically with the National Socialist requirements. Enforcement regulations are decreed by the Chief of Staff. Berlin, 15 February 1935. Chief of Storm Troops [Der Oberste SA-Fuehrer] Signed: Adolf Hitler The performance test includes three groups of exercises: Body exercises, Military sports, Topographical (naval) services. Group I Body exercises: 100-meter race, Broad jump, shot-put, Throwing of hand grenades, 3000-meter race. Group II Military sports: 25-Kilometer march with pack, Firing of small-caliber arms, Aimed throwing of hand grenades, 200-meter cross-country race with gas masks over 4 obstacles, Swimming or bicycle riding, Basic knowledge of first aid in case of accidents. Group III Terrain service: Orientation, Terrain observation, Estimate of terrain, Estimate of distance, Camouflage, Observing and reporting, Utilization of terrain and general behavior in terrain service. Special regulations for SA naval units: Group I Body exercises: Unchanged Group II Military sports: 15-kilometer march with pack instead of 25-kilometer Group III Naval service: 25 minutes of long-distance rowing in cutter seamanship In and on the boat, throwing of lines, knotting and splicing, signaling and transmitting of Morse code messages, compass, designation of navigable water, navigation lights, rules on turning aside, general seamanlike behavior while in naval service. [Sixth Edition, Pages 359, 364a, 364b, 365] Structure of the S. A. 1. S.A. Units The S.A. extends over the whole Reich territory. It is organized according to political and local [Landsmannschaftlich] viewpoints into S.A. groups as follows: S.A. Group-Alpenland S.A. Group-Bavarian Ostmark (Govt. Dist. lower Bavaria, upper Palatinate and upper Franconia)
365] Structure of the S. A. 1. S.A. Units The S.A. extends over the whole Reich territory. It is organized according to political and local [Landsmannschaftlich] viewpoints into S.A. groups as follows: S.A. Group-Alpenland S.A. Group-Bavarian Ostmark (Govt. Dist. lower Bavaria, upper Palatinate and upper Franconia) S.A. Group-Berlin-Brandenburg (Province Mark Brandenburg and Greater Berlin) S.A. Group-Danube S.A. Group-Franconia (Govt. Dist. central and lower Franconia) S.A. Group-Hansa (Free City of Hamburg and Mecklenburg) S.A. Group-Hesse (Parts of the Free State of Hesse, upper Hesse, the Province of Hesse, and Hesse-Nassau) S.A. Group-Highland (Hochland) (Govt. Dist. upper Bavaria and Swabia) S.A. Group-Palatinate (Govt. Dist. Rhenish Palatinate, Saar, and Rhenish Hesse) S.A. Group-Middle (Province of Saxony and Free State of Anhalt) S.A. Group-Lower Rhine (Parts of Rhine Province and the Ruhr District) S.A. Group-Lower Saxony (Parts of Province of hannover and Free State of Brunswick) S.A. Group-Nordmark (Province of Schleswig-Holstein, Free City of Luebeck) S.A. Group-North Sea (parts of Province of Hannover and Westphalia, Free State of Oldenburg, Free City of Bremen) S.A. Group-Ostland (Province of East Prussia and Free State of Danzig) S.A. Group-Ostmark (Province of Grenzmark) S.A. Group-Pomerania (Province of Pomerania and parts of Grenzmark) S.A. Group-Saxony (Free State of Saxony) S.A. Group-Silesia (Province of upper and lower Silesia) S.A. Group-Sudeten S.A. Group-Suedmark S.A. Group-Southwest (Free State of Baden and Wurttemberg) S.A. Group-Thuringia (Free State of Thuringia) S.A. Group-Warthe S.A. Group-Vistula S.A. Group-Westphalia (Province of Westphalia) S.A. Group-Westmark (Rhine Province and part of the Province of Hesse-Nassau) 2. Special Units [Identical with corresponding passage-in 5th and 7th editions] In order to comply with the manifold demands on the services of the S.A. during demonstrations, assemblies, catastrophes, and accidents, as well as to preserve the efficiency of S.A. men, S.A. members have been organized into special and technical units. There are: Marine, Mounted, Communications, Engineer and Medical units. Their organization into companies, battalions, and so forth, and their subordination are variously regulated