dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
LAHOUSEN: First of all, Canaris had a short tale with Ribbentrop, in which the latter explained the general political aims with regard to Poland and in connection with the Ukrainian question. The Chief of the OKW took up the Ukrainian question in subsequent discussions which took place in his private carriage. These are recorded in the files which I immediately prepared on Canaris' order. While we were still in the carriage of the Chief of the OKW, Canaris expressed his serious misgivings regarding the proposed bombardment of Warsaw, of which he knew. Canaris stressed the devastating repercussions which this bombardment would have in the foreign political field. The Chief of the OKW, Keitel, replied that these measures had been agreed upon directly by the Fuehrer and Goering, and that he, Keitel, had had no influence on these decisions. I quote Keitel's own words here-naturally only after re-reading my notes. Keitel said: "The Fuehrer and Goering are in frequent telephone communication; sometimes I also hear something of what was said, but not always." Secondly, Canaris very urgently warned against the measures which had come to his knowledge, namely the proposed shootings and extermination measures directed particularly against the Polish intelligentsia, the nobility, the clergy, and in fact all elements which could be regarded as leaders of a national resistance. Canaris said at that time-I am quoting his approximate words: "One day the world will also hold the Wehrmacht, under whose eyes these events occurred, responsible for such methods." The Chief of the OKW replied-and this is also based on my notes, which I re-read a few days ago-that these things had been decided upon by the Fuehrer, and that the Fuehrer, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, had let it be known that, should the Armed Forces be unwilling to carry through these measures, or should they not agree with then, they would have to accept the presence at their side of the SS, the SIPO and similar units who would carry them through.
LAHOUSEN: A civilian official would then be appointed to function with each military commander. This, in outlines, was our discussion on the proposed shooting and extermination measures in Poland.
COL.AMEN: Was anything said about a so-called "political housecleaning"?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, the Chief of the OKW used an expression which was certainly derived from Hitler and which characterized these measures as "political housecleaning". I recall this expression very clearly, even without the aid of my notes.
COL.AMEN: In order that the record may be perfectly clear, exactly what measures did Keitel say had already been agreed upon?
LAHOUSEN: According to the Chief of the OKW, the bombardment of Warsaw and the shooting of the categories of people which I mentioned before had been agreed upon already.
COL.AMEN: And what were they?
LAHOUSEN: Mainly the Polish intelligentsia, the nobility, the clergy, and, of course, the Jews.
COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was said about possible cooperation with a Ukrainian group?
LAHOUSEN: Canaris was ordered by the Chief of the OKW, who stated that he was transmitting a directive which he had apparently received from Ribbentrop since he spoke of it in connection with the political plans of the Foreign Minister, to instigate in the Galician Ukraine an uprising aimed at the extermination of Jews and Poles.
COL.AMEN: At what point did Hitler and Jodl enter this meeting?
LAHOUSEN: Hitler and Jodl entered either after the discussions I have just described or towards the conclusion of the whole discussion of this subject, when Canaris had already begun his report on the situation in the West; that is, on the news which had meanwhile come in on the reaction of the French Army at the West Wall.
COL.AMEN: And what further discussions took place then?
LAHOUSEN: After this discussion in the private carriage of the Chief of the OKW, Canaris left the coach and had another short talk with Ribbentrop, who, returning to the subject of the Ukraine, told him once more that the uprising should be so staged that all farms and dwellings of the Poles should go up in flames, and all Jews be killed.
COL.AMEN: Who said that?
LAHOUSEN: The Foreign Minister of that time, Ribbentrop, said that to Canaris. I was standing next to him.
COL.AMEN: Is there any slightest doubt in your mind about that?
LAHOUSEN: No. I have not the slightest doubt about that. I remember with particular clarity the somewhat new phrasing that "all farms and dwellings should go up in flames". Previously there had only been talk of "liquidation" and "elimination."
COL.AMEN: Was there any note in Canaris' diary which helped to refresh your recollection on that point also?
LAHOUSEN: No.
COL.AMEN: What, if anything, was said on the subject of France?
LAHOUSEN: On the subject of France a discussion took place in the carriage of the Chief of the OKW, in which Canaris described the situation in the West on the basis of Abwehr reports, and said that in his opinion a great attack was being prepared by the French in the sector of Saarbruecken. Hitler, who had entered the room in the meantime, intervened, took charge of the discussion, rejected in a lively manner the opinion which Canaris had just expressed, and put forward arguments which, looking back now, I must recognize as factually correct.
COL.AMEN: Do you recall whether, in the course of this conference, Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews?
LAHOUSEN: During the conversation, which was taking place in the private coach of the Chief of the OKW, Ribbentrop was not present.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall whether at any time in the course of the conferences Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews?
LAHOUSEN: I repeat, in this discussion, which took place in the coach, no.
COL.AMEN: For purposes of keeping the record straight, whenever you have referred to the Chief of the OKW, you were referring to Keitel?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
COL.AMEN: Was the Wehrmacht ever asked to furnish any assistance for the Polish campaign?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
COL.AMEN: Did that undertaking have any special name? LAHOUSEN As is recorded in the diary of my division the name of this undertaking which took place just before the Polish campaign, was "Undertaking Himmler".
COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal the nature of the assistance required? LAHOUSEN The affair on which I am now giving testimony is one of the most mysterious actions which took place within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr. A few days, or sometime before-I believe it was the middle of August-the precise date can be found in the diary of the division-Abwehr Division I, as well as my division, Abwehr Division II, were given the task of providing Polish uniforms and equipment such as identification cards and so on, for an Undertaking Himmler. This request, according to an entry in the diary of the division which was kept not by me, but by my adjutant, was received by Canaris from the Wehrmacht Operations Staff or from the National Defense Department. I believe the name of General Warlimont is mentioned.
COL. AMEN: Do you know where this request originated?
LAHOUSEN: Where the request originated I cannot say, I can only say that it reached us in the form of an order. It was, to be sure, an order on which we, the divisional chiefs concerned, already had some misgivings without knowing what, in the last analysis, it meant. The name Himmler, however, spoke for itself, and that is also evident from entries of the diary which record my question why Herr Himmler should come to receive uniforms from us.
COL.AMEN: To whom was the Polish material to be furnished by the Abwehr?
LAHOUSEN: These articles of equipment had to be kept in readiness, and one day some man from the SS or the SD-the name is given in the official war diary of the division-collected them.
COL. AMEN: At what time was the Abwehr informed as to how this Polish material was to be used?
LAHOUSEN: The real purpose was unknown to us then; we do not know its details even today. All of us, however, had the reasonable suspicion that something entirely crooked was being planned; the name of the undertaking was sufficient guarantee for that.
COL. AMEN: Did you subsequently find out from Canaris what in fact had happened?
LAHOUSEN: The actual course of events was the following: When the first Wehrmacht communiqué spoke of the attack of Polish units on German territory, Pieckenbrock, holding the communiqué in his hand, and reading it aloud, observed that now we knew why our uniforms had been needed. On the same day or a few days later, I cannot say exactly, Canaris informed us that people from concentration camps had been disguised in these uniforms and had been ordered to make a military attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. I cannot recall whether any other locality was mentioned. Although we were extremely interested, particularly General Oster, to know details of this action, that is, where it had occurred and what had happened-actually we could well imagine it, but we did not know how it was carried out-I cannot even today say exactly what happened.
COL. AMEN: Did you ever find out what happened to the men from the concentration camps who wore the Polish uniforms and created the incident?
LAHOUSEN: It is strange. This matter has always held my interest, and even after the capitulation I spoke about these matters with an SS Hauptsturmfuehrer-he was a Viennese in the hospital in which both of us were staying, and I asked him for details on what had taken place. The man-his name was Birckel -told me: "It is odd, that even our circles heard of this matter only very much later, and then only by intimation." He added: "So far as I know, even all members of the SD who took part in that action were put out of the way, that is, killed." That was the last I heard of this matter.
COL.AMEN: Do you recall attending a meeting in 1940 at which the name of Weygand was under discussion?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
COL.AMEN: Do you happen to recall the particular month in which this discussion took place?
LAHOUSEN: The discussion took place in the winter of 1940, either in November or December, as far as I recall I have recorded the precise date in my personal notes, with the knowledge and desire of Canaris.
COL.AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, who was present?
LAHOUSEN: The three divisional chiefs and the Chief of the Ausland Division, Admiral Buerckner, were present nearly every day during the daily conference on the situation.
COL.AMEN: What were you told at this meeting by Canaris?
LAHOUSEN: In this discussion Canaris revealed to us that already for some considerable time Keitel had put pressure on him to arrange for the elimination of the French Marshal, Weygand; and that naturally I-that is my division-would be charged with the execution of this task.
COL.AMEN: When you say "elimination", what do you mean?
LAHOUSEN: Killing.
COL.AMEN: What was Weygand doing at this time?
LAHOUSEN: Weygand was, so far as I recall, in North Africa at that time.
COL.AMEN: What was the reason given for attempting to kill Weygand?
LAHOUSEN: The reason given was the fear that Weygand together with the unconquered part of the French Army might form a center of resistance in North Africa. That, in the main, was the reason, as far as I remember today; it may be that there were other contributing factors.
COL.AMEN: After you were so informed by Canaris, what else was said at this meeting?
LAHOUSEN: This request which was first put to the military Abwehr so openly and in such an undisguised form by a representative of the Armed Forces, was decidedly and indignantly rejected by all those present. I, myself, as the person most involved, since my division was expected to carry out this task, indicated flatly before all present that I had not the slightest intention of executing this order. My division and my officers are prepared to fight but they are neither a murderers' organization nor murderers.
COL. AMEN: What then did Canaris say?
LAHOUSEN: Canaris said: "Calm down. We'll have a word together later," or something to that effect.
COL.AMEN: Did you then talk it over later with Canaris?
LAHOUSEN: When the other gentlemen had left the room, I spoke with Canaris alone and he told me immediately: 'It is quite obvious that this order will not only not be carried out, but it will not even be communicated to anybody else," and that, in fact, happened.
COL.AMEN: Were you subsequently questioned as to whether you had carried out this order?
LAHOUSEN: On one occasion when Canaris was reporting to Keitel, and I was present, Keitel mentioned the subject to me, and asked me what had happened or what had been done in this matter up to now. The date of this incident was recorded in my notes, on Canaris' suggestion and with his knowledge.
COL.AMEN: What reply did you make to Keitel?
LAHOUSEN: I cannot, of course, recall my precise words, but one thing is certain; I did not answer that I had no intention of carrying out this order. That I could not tell him, and did not tell him; otherwise, I would not be sitting here today. Probably, as in many similar cases, I replied that it was very difficult but everything possible would be done, or something of that sort. Naturally, I cannot recall my precise words.
COL. AMEN: Incidentally, are you the only one of this intimate Canaris group who is still alive today?
LAHOUSEN: I believe I am at least one of the very few. Possibly Pieckenbrock is still alive; perhaps Bentivegni, who, however, did not belong to the inner circle. Most of the others were liquidated as a result of the events on July 20.
COL.AMEN: I have another subject to take up now. In 1941 did you attend a conference at which General Reinecke was present?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Who was General Reinecke?
LAHOUSEN: General Reinecke was at that time Chief of the General Wehrmacht Department, which was part of the OKW.
COL.AMEN: Do you recall the approximate date of that meeting?
LAHOUSEN: It was roughly in the summer of 1941, shortly after the beginning of the Russian campaign; approximately in July.
COL.AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, will you state exactly who was present at that conference?
LAHOUSEN: At this conference, which is also recorded in the notes taken for Canaris, and in which I participated as his representative, the following were present: General Reinecke as the presiding officer, Obergruppenfuehrer Mueller of the RSHA, Colonel Breuer representing the Prisoners of War Department, and I, as the representative of Canaris, of Ausland-Abwehr.
COL.AMEN: Will you explain who Mueller was and why he was at this meeting?
LAHOUSEN: Mueller was a division chief in the Reich Central Office of Security (RSHA), and took part in the session because he was responsible for putting into practice the measures for the treatment of Russian prisoners of war, that is, responsible for carrying out the executions.
COL.AMEN: Will you explain who Colonel Breuer was and why he was there?
LAHOUSEN: Colonel Breuer was the representative of the Prisoners of War Department. I do not know of which organization this department was a part at that time. At any rate, he was responsible in the OKW for questions relating to prisoners of war.
COL.AMEN: What was the purpose of this conference?
LAHOUSEN: The purpose of this conference was to examine the orders issued for the treatment of Russian prisoners of war, to comment on them, to explain and account for them on reasonable grounds.
COL.AMEN: Did you learn from the conversation at this conference what the substance of these orders under discussion was?
LAHOUSEN: These orders dealt with two groups of measures which were to be taken. Firstly, the killing of Russian commissars, and secondly, the killing of all those elements among the Russian prisoners of war who, under a special selection program of the SD, could be identified thoroughly bolshevized or as active representatives of the Bolshevist ideology.
COL. AMEN: Did you also learn from the conversation what the basis for these orders was?
LAHOUSEN: The basis for these orders was explained by General Reinecke in its outlines as follows: The war between Germany and Russia is not a war between two states or two armies, but between two ideologies-namely, the National Socialist and the Bolshevist ideology. The Red Army soldier must not be looked upon as a soldier in the sense of the word applying to our western opponents, but as an ideological enemy. He must be regarded as the archenemy of National Socialism, and must be treated accordingly.
COL.AMEN: Did Canaris tell you why he was selecting you to go to this conference?
LAHOUSEN: Canaris gave me two or perhaps three reasons and motives for ordering me to this conference although he himself was in Berlin. Firstly, he wanted to avoid a meeting with Reinecke, for whom, as the prototype of the ever-compliant National Socialist general, he possessed strong personal dislike. Secondly, he told and directed me to attempt through factual argument- that is, through appeals to reason-to have this brutal and completely senseless order rescinded or at least mitigated in its effects as far as possible. He also selected me for tactical reasons since he, as department chief, could by no means be as outspoken as I, who, thanks to my subordinate position, could use much stronger language. Thirdly, he was well acquainted with my personal attitude, especially in this question, an attitude which I manifested wherever possible during my many journeys and trips to the front where I witnessed ill-treatment of prisoners of war. This is also clearly recorded in my notes.
COL. AMEN: Did Canaris and the other members of your group have a particular name for Reinecke?
LAHOUSEN: Not only among our group but also in other circles, he was known as the "little Keitel" or the "other Keitel".
COL. AMEN: Prior to your going to this conference, did Canaris make any other comment on these orders?
LAHOUSEN: Even at the time when these orders were issued, Canaris expressed strong opposition to them in our circles-when I say our circles, I mean mainly the divisional chiefs-and had a protest made through the Ausland Division, that is, through Buerckner. I no longer remember whether it was made in writing or whether Buerkner made it orally to Keitel directly; I think it was done in both ways. Buerckner should be well informed about this.
COL.AMEN: When you say "protested through Buerckner," what do you mean?
LAHOUSEN: When I say Buerckner, I mean his division, or a group, or perhaps even a representative in his office, where questions of international law were dealt with by Count Moltke who, incidentally, also among the circle...
COL.AMEN: Will you repeat that?
LAHOUSEN: This protest or this counter-argument on the question of the treatment of Russian prisoners of war was for. warded by Canaris through the Ausland Division, that is, through Buerckner. The Ausland Division included a section which dealt with questions of, international law, and the competent authority in that section was Count Moltke who was a member of Oster's inner circle, and who was executed after the 20th of July.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Until 2 o'clock. [A recess was taken until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Amen. [Witness Lahousen resumed the stand]
COL.AMEN: Prior to the luncheon recess you were testifying about a conference in 1941 with Reinecke and others. Prior to that conference did Canaris tell you what kind of appeal to make to those present at the meeting?
LAHOUSEN: Before the discussion Canaris said, as I have already pointed out, that I should use factual arguments in order to have this order withdrawn or at least to weaken its effects, but that otherwise I should not take it into my head to use arguments of a humanitarian nature lest I make a fool of myself.
COL.AMEN: And now will you explain to the Tribunal, to the best of your recollection, exactly what happened and what was said in the course of that conference?
LAHOUSEN: The discussion was opened by General Reinecke, and he explained these orders in the manner in which I described them before the recess. He said that these measures were necessary and that it was essential that this idea should also be made clear to the Wehrmacht, and particularly to the officers' corps, since they apparently were still entertaining ideas which belonged to the Ice Age and not to the present age of National Socialism.
COL.AMEN: What views did you present at this conference?
LAHOUSEN: According to instructions I held the view of the Amt. Ausland Abwehr-that is of Canaris-and in the main I pointed out, first of all, the most unfavorable effect of such measures on the troops, namely on the front troops, that they would never understand such orders, particularly not the simple soldier. Besides, we had reports that the executions were sometimes carried out before their eyes. Secondly, I brought forward the objections of my office in regard to activities of the office itself, the unfavorable effect of these measures on the enemy, that is, the virtual hindering of Russians, who were surrendering to the last man without resistance, from deserting; and furthermore, the great difficulties which beset the Abwehr Division in acquiring agents, that is, people who, for various reasons, had voluntarily declared themselves ready to help the Germans.
COL. AMEN: In order that this may be clear on the record, because I think there was quite a bit of confusion in the translation, I want to point out one or two of those arguments again. What did you say at this conference about the effect of the execution of these orders on Russian soldiers?
LAHOUSEN: I pointed out, first of all, that through these orders some elements among the Russian soldiers who were inclined to surrender were prevented from doing so. Secondly, that people who for any reason would have offered their services to the Abwehr would also be hindered by these measures. And that, in summa , an effect opposite to that which they had desired would result and the resistance of the Red Army soldiers would be increased to the utmost.
COL. AMEN: And in order that we may be perfectly clear, what did you say about the effect of the execution of these orders on the German troops?
LAHOUSEN: I said, that from several reports we had from the front, the effect on the morale and on the discipline of the troops was devastating.
COL. AMEN: Was there any discussion about international law at this conference?
LAHOUSEN: No. In this connection there was no discussion of international law. The manner of selection of the prisoners of war was particularly stressed. It was completely arbitrary apart from the general order in itself.
COL.AMEN: We will get to that in a moment. Were your views accepted at this conference?
LAHOUSEN: My views which were the views of the Amt Abwehr, which I was representing, were opposed in the sharpest possible manner by Mueller, who with the usual cliches rejected the arguments that I had produced, and who made the sole concession that the executions, out of consideration for the feelings of the troops, should not take place before them but at a place some distance apart. He also made a few concessions in the question of the selection, which was completely arbitrary, and was just left to the Kommando leaders or to the prejudice of the Kommando leaders.
COL.AMEN: And subsequent to this conference did you learn whether an order was issued with respect to having these killings take place outside the sight of the German troops?
LAHOUSEN: Except for Mueller's promise, which I have just mentioned, I heard no more about it at the time. I found a confirmation of the results of this conference and the promises then made to me in an order which was submitted to me only now.
COL.AMEN: Was there a conversation at this conference about the manner in which these orders for the killings were being executed?