dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SCHACHT: In this connection I recall a conversation with Ambassador Bullitt in November 1937. This conversation with Ambassador Bullitt has already been mentioned in some other connection, and Ambassador Bullitt's memorandum has been presented in evidence to the Tribunal by the Prosecution. I merely refer to the sentence which refers to me, and I quote: "He"-that is to say Schacht-"prefaced his remarks- by saying that he himself today was 'completely without influence on that man"'-meaning Hitler. "He seemed to regard himself as politically dead and to have small respect for 'that man.'" That was said in November 1937. But if I am permitted to add to this, I want to point out that my foreign friends were kept constantly informed about my position and my entire activity as regards the directing of public affairs in Germany, as I have already mentioned once before. This will be seen on later occasions when various instances are mentioned.
DR. DIX: This morning I submitted Exhibit Number Schacht-22, Page 64 of the English text. [Turning to the defendant.] And now a few special questions regarding your position as Minister of Economics. You have already made statements regarding the obtaining of foreign raw materials, that is, you have quoted appropriate passages. Could these not be substituted by home products in your opinion?
SCHACHT: A portion of such raw materials could certainly be replaced by home products. We had learned in the meantime how to produce a large number of new materials which we did not know about before...
DR. DIX: Please be brief.
SCHACHT: . . . to produce them synthetically. But a considerable part could not be replaced in that way and could be obtained only through foreign trade.
DR. DIX: And what was your attitude towards the question of self-sufficiency?
SCHACHT: As far as self-sufficiency was concerned I believe that, if at a reasonable cost, without undue expenditure, which would have meant a waste of German public funds and German manpower, certain synthetic materials could be produced in Germany, then one should do so, but that apart from this the maintenance of foreign trade was an absolute necessity for economic reasons, and that it was even more necessary for reasons of international cultural relations so that nations might live together. I always regarded the isolation of nations as a great misfortune, just as I have always regarded commerce as the best means of bringing about international understanding.
DR. DIX: Who was the exponent in the Reich Cabinet of the self-sufficiency principle?
SCHACHT: As far as I know, the whole idea of self-sufficiency, which was then formulated in the Four Year Plan, originated with Hitler alone; after Goering was commissioned with the direction of the Four Year Plan, then Goering too, of course, represented that line of thought:
DR. DIX: Did you express your contradictory views to Goering and Hitler?
SCHACHT: I think it is clear from the record that I did so at every opportunity.
DR. DIX: One incidental question: You will remember that Goering exclaimed, "I should like to know where the 'No men' are." I want to ask you now, do you claim this honorary title of "No man" for yourself? I remind you particularly of your letter of November 1942.
SCHACHT: On every occasion when I was no longer in a position to do what my inner conviction demanded, I said, "No." I was not content to be silent in the face of the many misdeeds committed by the Party. In every case I expressed my disapproval of these things, personally, officially, and publicly. I said "No" to all those things. I blocked credits. I opposed an excessive rearmament. I talked against the war and I took steps to prevent the war. I do not know to whom else this honorary title of "No man" might apply if not to me.
DR. DIX: Did you not swear an oath of allegiance to Hitler?
SCHACHT: I did not swear an oath of allegiance to a certain Herr Hitler. I swore allegiance to Adolf Hitler as the head of the State of the German people, just as I did not swear allegiance to the Kaiser or to President Ebert or to President Hindenburg, except in their capacity as head of the State; in the same way I did not swear an oath to Adolf Hitler. The oath of allegiance which I did swear to the head of the German State does not apply to the person of the head of the State; it applies to what he represents, the German nation. Perhaps I might add something in this connection. I would never keep an oath of allegiance to a perjurer and Hitler has turned out to be a hundredfold perjurer.
DR. DIX: Goering has made extremely detailed explanations regarding the Four Year Plan, its origin, its preparation, technical opposition by you, and the consequences you took because of this opposition. Therefore we can be brief and deal only with new material, if you have something new to say. Have you anything to add to Goering's statements or do you disagree on points which you remember or about views held?
SCHACHT: I gather from Goering's statements that he has described conditions perfectly correctly and I myself have nothing at all to add unless you have something special in mind.
DR. DIX: According to your impressions and the experience you had, when did Hitler realize that you were an obstacle in the way of a speedy and extensive rearmament? Did he acknowledge your economic arguments? Was he satisfied with your policy or not?
SCHACHT: At that time, in 1936, when the Four Year Plan was introduced in September I could not tell what Hitler's inner attitude to me was in regard to these questions of economic policy. I might say that it was clear that after my speech at Konigsberg in August 1935 he mistrusted me. But his attitude to my activities in the field of economic policy was something which I was not yet sure of in 1936. The fact that I had not in any way participated in the preparation of the Four Year Plan but heard about it quite by surprise during the Party Rally and that, quite unexpectedly, Hermann Goering and not the Minister of Economics was appointed head of the Four Year Plan, as I heard for the first time at the Party Rally in September 1936-these facts naturally made it clear to me that Hitler, as far as economic policy with reference to the entire rearmament program was concerned, did not have that degree of confidence in me which he thought necessary. Subsequently, here in this prison, my fellow Defendant Speer showed me a memorandum which he received from Hitler on the occasion of his taking over the post of Minister and which, curiously enough, deals in great detail with the Four Year Plan and my activities, and is dated August 1936. In August 1936 Hitler himself dictated this memorandum which has been shown to me in prison by my fellow Defendant Speer, and I assume that if I read a number of brief quotations from it with the permission of...
DR. DIX: I just want to give an explanation to the Tribunal. We received the original of this memorandum about three weeks ago from the Camp Commander of the Camp Dustbin through the kind mediation of the Prosecution. We then handed it in for translation so that we might submit it now. But the translation has not yet been completed. I shall submit the entire memorandum under a new exhibit number when I receive it.
THE PRESIDENT: Has any application been made in respect to it?
DR. DIX: No application has been made as yet. I wanted . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Which memorandum? Who drew it up?
DR. DIX: It is a Hitler memorandum of the year 1936, of which there exist three copies; and one of them was in the Camp Dustbin. This copy arrived here a fortnight or three weeks ago after we had discussed our document books with the Prosecution. I intended to submit the translation of the Hitler memorandum today and at the same time to ask that this be admitted in evidence, but unfortunately I am not in a position to do so because the translation is not yet ready. My colleague, Professor Kraus, was in fact told that it has been mislaid.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, let the defendant go on, and you can submit the document in evidence and a translation afterwards.
DR. DIX: Very well. The defendant has a copy and he will quote the most important, very brief passages.
SCHACHT: I shall quote very brief passages. Hitler says in this memorandum, among other things, and I quote: "It is, above all, not the task of State economic institutions to rack their brains about methods of production. This does not concern the Ministry of Economics at all." The Ministry of Economics was under me, and this is therefore a reproach for me. A further quotation: "It is furthermore essential that German iron production be increased to the utmost. The objection that we are not in a position to produce the same cheap raw iron from German ore, which has only 26 percent of iron content, as from the 45 percent Swedish ores, is unimportant . . . The objection that in this case all the German smelting works would have to be reconstructed is also irrelevant; and, in any case, this is none of the business of the Ministry of Economics." As is apparent from the statement, I had explained that from 26 percent ore one could produce steel only at costs twice or three times those at which one could produce steel from 45 percent ore. And I explained further that, in order to use 26 percent ore, one would have to have completely different plants from those using 45 percent ore. Herr Hitler states that this is none of the business of the Ministry of Economics, and that, of course, means Herr Schacht. There is one last, very brief quotation. I quote: "I want to emphasize in this connection that in these tasks I see the only possible economic mobilization and not in the curbing of the armament industry..." That statement, too, is directed, of course, against my policy.
DR. DIX: We have now reached the stage of tension of technical differences between you and Goering, the tension between you and Hitler regarding your functions as Minister of Economics. What were your thoughts at the time about resigning from your office as Minister of Economics? Was it possible for you to resign? Please do not repeat anything that Lammers and other witnesses have already told us about the impossibility of resigning. Please talk only about your own special case and what you yourself did.
SCHACHT: First of all, I tried to continue my own economic policy, in spite of the fact that Goering as head of the Four Year Plan tried, of course, as time went on to take over as many of the tasks concerned with economic policy as possible. But the very moment Goering encroached on my rights as Minister of Economics I used it as an opportunity to force my release from the Ministry of Economics. That was at the beginning of August 1937. At the time I told Hitler very briefly the reason, namely, that if I was to assume responsibility for economic policy, then I would also have to be in command. But if I was not in command, then I did not wish to assume responsibility. The fight for my resignation, fought by me at times with very drastic measures, lasted approximately two and a half months until eventually Hitler had to decide to grant me the desired release in order to prevent the conflict from becoming known to the public more than it already was.
DR. DIX: When you say "drastic measures" do you mean your so-called sit-down strike? In this connection I want to submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number Schacht-40 of my document book, an affidavit from another former colleague of Dr. Schacht in the Reich Ministry of Economics, Kammerdirektor Dr. Asmus. On Page 180 of the English version of this long affidavit there is a brief passage. I quote: "When this was found to be unsuccessful"-it means his fight-"and when developments continued along the course which he considered wrong, he"-Schacht-"in the autumn of 1937, long before the beginning of the war, acted as an upright man and applied for release from his office as Reich Minister of Economics and thereby from his co-responsibility. "He was obviously not able to resign his office in the normal way, because for reasons of prestige the Party required the use of his name. Therefore, in the autumn of 1937, he simply remained away from the Ministry of Economics for several weeks. He started this sit-down strike, as it was humorously called in the Ministry, and went in his official capacity only to the Reichsbank..."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to trouble the Tribunal with all this detail? There is no dispute that he did resign, and the only thing that he has got to explain is why he continued to be a Minister. The Prosecution have given evidence about his resignation and about the conflict between him and the Defendant Goering. What is the good of going into all the detail of it, as to this sit-down strike and that sort of thing? That doesn't interest the Tribunal:
DR. DIX: He did not remain a Minister at that time. He resigned as Minister.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought he had remained a Minister until 1943.
DR. DIX: Minister without Portfolio, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn't say Minister with Portfolio, I said Minister.
DR. DIX: Yes, but there is a difference, but I shall come to that later. I understood you to mean an active Minister, but I shall not go into that now. It was a misunderstanding. Anyway, I have already finished that. I was merely trying to show how difficult it was to resign. [Turning to the defendant.] We now come to the manner in which you were released. Have you anything to add to the statements made by Lammers in this connection or not?
SCHACHT: I think we should inform the Tribunal of one matter about which I also learned here in prison from my fellow Defendant Speer. He overheard the argument between Hitler and myself on the occasion of that decisive conference in which I managed to push through my resignation. If the Tribunal allow, I shall read it very briefly. There are two or three sentences. Herr Speer informed me of the following: "I was on the terrace of Berghof on the Obersalzberg, and I was waiting to submit my building plans. In the summer of 1937 when Schacht came to the Berghof..."
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: [Interposing.] Speer is present in the room. For one defendant to testify as to a conversation with another defendant is a very convenient way of getting testimony without access to cross-examination, but it seems to me that it is a highly objectionable method. I object to this on the ground that it has no probative value to testify to a conversation of this character when the Defendant Speer is in the courtroom and can be sworn and can give his testimony. He sits here and is available.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the subject of the conversation?
DR. DIX: The subject of this conversation is a matter which concerns the Defendant Schacht. It is a statement of Hitler regarding Schacht; it is not a matter which concerns the Defendant Speer. Therefore I consider it expedient for him, since it is a matter which concerns Schacht, to be able to make a statement about it. I would, of course, consider it more appropriate that he should not read something which Speer has written to him, but that he should give his own account of what happened between Hitler and Schacht and merely say, "I heard that from Speer." That appears to be better than...
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may give that.
DR. DIX: [Turning to the defendant.] Will you please not read, then, but tell of this incident and say you got it from Speer?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is even more objectionable to me than to have a written statement from Speer. If we are to have Speer's testimony, it at least should be Speer's and not a repetition of a conversation between the two defendants. If Speer has made a written statement, it can be submitted to us in the ordinary course. This is the second document that we have not had the privilege of seeing before it has been used here; and it seems to me that if this is a document signed by Speer-which I don't understand it to be-if it is, that is one thing. We can then see it and perhaps it can be used. If it is a conversation, I should prefer Speer's version.
DR. DIX: May I add something? The question of procedure is not of basic importance for me here. In that case it can be discussed when Speer is examined. However, I do not know whether Speer is going to be called; probably he will be. Actually it would be better for us to hear it now, but I leave it to the Tribunal to decide. It is not a question of great importance to me.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow the evidence.
DR. DIX: [Turning to the defendant.] Well then, without reading, please describe the incident.
SCHACHT: The gentlemen on the terrace, among them Speer, heard this discussion, which was conducted in very loud tones. At the end of the discussion Hitler came out on the terrace and...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. [There was a brief pause in the proceedings.] Very well, Dr. Dix, go on.
SCHACHT: Hitler came out on the terrace after this conference and said to those present, among them Speer, that he had had a very serious argument with Schacht, that he could not work with Schacht, and that Schacht was upsetting his financial plans.
DR. DIX: Well then, after you had left your position as Minister of Economics you were still left authority as Reichsbank President. Were you approached by Hitler or the Minister of Finance in your capacity as President of the Reichsbank and asked for credit?
SCHACHT: After the Reichsbank had discontinued giving credits, on 31 March 1938, the Reich Minister of Finance of course received more urgent demands for money and toward the end of that year he found himself in the awkward situation of not being able to pay even the salaries of the civil servants from the treasury. He came to me and asked me to grant him a special credit. According to its charter and laws the Reichsbank was entitled and to a certain extent obliged, but actually only entitled, to advance to the Reich up to 400 million marks per annum. The Reich Minister of Finance had received these 400 million marks and he was asking, over and above that, for further credits; the Reichsbank refused to give him these credits. The Reich Minister of Finance had to go to the private banks and all the large banks together gave him a credit of a few hundred million marks. However, the Reichsbank did not participate in this credit.
DR. DIX: If you as President of the Reichsbank turned down those credits, then it seems there was nothing for it but to print more notes. Did Hitler or anyone else suggest to you that the note printing presses should be set in motion?
SCHACHT: After the events of November 1938 I paid one more visit to London, in December, to attend a conference regarding the financing of the Jewish emigration from Germany in an orderly manner-a thing which I myself had suggested. On that occasion I also talked with Prime Minister Chamberlain. On 2 January 1939 I arrived at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden to report to Hitler about these matters. On that occasion we, of course, also got to talk about the financial needs of the Reich. I still refused to give credit to the Reich, and pointed out the very difficult financial situation which called for, or should have called for, a reduction of State expenditure and thus of armament expenditure. In particular, I pointed out that at the beginning of December the first instalment of the so-called Jewish fine-which had been imposed on the Jews after the murder of Herr Vom Rath in Paris and which had been collected to the extent of 250 million marks at the beginning of December-that this first instalment of 250 million marks had not been received entirely in the form of cash, but that the Reich Minister of Finance had had to agree to accept a considerable part of it "in kind," as the English say, because it was not possible to make liquid the cash necessary for this payment. Hitler replied: "But we can circulate notes on the basis of these goods. I have looked into the question of our future financial policy very carefully and when I get back to Berlin in a few days I shall discuss my plans with you and the Minister of Finance." I saw at once that it was Hitler's intention to resort to the printing of notes to meet this expenditure with or without the necessary cover, but at any rate against certain securities. The danger of inflation was now definitely imminent.
SCHACHT: And since I realized at once that this was the point where I and the Reichsbank had to say "stop," I replied to him, "Very well, in that case I will get the Reichsbank to submit a memorandum to you, setting out the attitude of the Reichsbank to this problem and which can be used at the joint meeting with the Finance Minister." After that I went back to Berlin and informed my colleagues in the Reichsbank Directorate. We saw, to our personal satisfaction, that here was an opportunity for us to divorce ourselves definitely from that type of policy. The memorandum dated 7 January which the Reichsbank Directorate then submitted to Hitler has, I think, also been submitted as evidence by the Prosecution. In order to explain the statements which the Reichsbank Directorate made to Hitler in this decisive moment regarding further State expenditure and especially armament expenditure, I ask permission to read only two very brief sentences from this memorandum. It says, and I quote: "Unrestrained public expenditure constitutes a definite threat to our currency. The unlimited growth of government expenditure defies any attempts to draw up a regulated budget. It brings State finances to the verge of ruin despite a tremendous increase in taxes, and it undermines the currency and the issuing bank." Then there is another sentence, and I quote: ". . . if during the two great foreign political actions in Austria and the Sudetenland an increase in public expenditure was necessary, the fact that after the termination of these two foreign political actions a reduction of expenditure is not noticeable and that everything seems rather to indicate that a further increase of expenditure is planned, makes it now our absolute duty to point out what the consequences will be for our currency. "The undersigned Directors of the Reichsbank are sufficiently conscious of the fact that in their co-operation they have gladly devoted all their energy to the great aims that have been set, but that a halt must now be called."
DR. DIX: This memorandum has already been submitted by the Prosecution under the Document Number EC-369, but it is being submitted again as Exhibit Schacht-24 in our document book, Page 70 of the English text, and Page 63 of the German text. I shall have to put various questions to Dr. Schacht on that memorandum, but I think that perhaps there is not time now and that I should do so tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: If you must, Dr. Dix; but do you think that is very important? At any rate, you had better do it tomorrow, if you are going to do it at all.
DR. DIX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, can you inform us whether those extracts are the same as the extracts which were refused in the case of the Defendant Ribbentrop?
DR. SIEMERS: I have made a comparison, and I can hand it to the Tribunal in writing. Some documents are the same, some do not tally, and some are missing. I have done that in writing.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. The Tribunal will adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 2 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]