dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR.SIEMERS: Rather, as I will show, was the situation such that Germany anticipated an Anglo-French landing; in other words, she decided on countermeasures in anticipation of the imminent danger which threatened. Another legal question arises therefrom: Assuming the same conditions, are countermeasures by a belligerent permitted only after the opposing belligerent has proceeded to violate neutrality, or is a reaction permitted beforehand in view of the imminently threatening violation of neutrality, in order to head off the enemy's attack which can be expected at any moment? According to the well-founded opinion of Dr. Mosler preventive countermeasures are permissible; and an impending violation of neutrality, which can be expected with certainty, is considered equal to a completed violation of neutrality. The well-known English specialist on international law, Westlake, states with regard to the question of measures: "Such a case in character resembles one where a belligerent has certain knowledge that his opponent, in order to gain a strategic advantage, is just about to have an army march through the territory of a neutral who is clearly too weak to resist; under the circumstances it would be impossible to refuse him the right to anticipate the attack on the neutral territory." The justification for such a preventive measure, according to Westlake, lies in the right of self-defense, which applies equally against a threatening violation of neutrality. Any other concept would fail to meet the facts of life and would not correspond to the character of the society of nations as an aggregation of sovereign states with an as yet incompletely developed common code of law. In the domestic law system of every civilized country the prevention of an immediately threatening attack is a permissible act of defense, although in such a contingency even the help of the state against the law-breaker is available.
DR.SIEMERS: In the community of international law, where this is not the case-at any rate not at the beginning of and during the second World War-the viewpoint of self-defense must apply to an even greater extent. In keeping with this concept, the British Government during this war also considered the preventive measure justified when it occupied Iceland on 10 May 1940. The British Government justified this measure 17 July~46 clearly and correctly in accordance with international law in an official announcement of the Foreign Office, as follows: "After the German occupation of Denmark it has become necessary to count on the possibility of a sudden German raid on Iceland. It is clear that the Icelandic Government, in case of such an attack, even if it were only carried out with very small forces, would be unable to prevent the country from falling completely into the hands of the Germans." The preventive measure was carried out by Britain, although Iceland expressly protested by a note against the occupation. I also ask to note that the United States agreed with this standpoint of law, as is proved by the well-known message from the President of the United States to Congress of 7 July 1941, and the subsequent occupation of Iceland by armed forces of the American Navy. In accordance with these basic principles of law, the facts at hand must be examined. I have tried to clarify the facts in the presentation of evidence, and I would like to summarize the major factors which actually indicated a closely impending violation of neutrality on the part of the Allies by a partial occupation of Norway, and thereby justified the German campaign in Norway.
DR.SIEMERS: At the end of September and early in October 1939, Admiral Raeder, as the evidence has shown, received various items of information through the regular reports of Admiral Canaris as chief of intelligence and through Admiral Carls, which gave reason to believe in the danger of the Allies' proceeding to occupy bases in Norway, in accordance with their plans to encircle Germany in order to put a stop, in particular, to ore imports from Scandinavia. British flying personnel camouflaged in civilian clothing had been seen in Oslo; and survey work by Allied officers on Norwegian bridges, viaducts, and tunnels up to the Swedish border had been identified. Furthermore, the quiet mobilization of Swedish troops, owing to the danger to Swedish ore territories, had become known. Raeder was justified in considering himself obliged to report these facts to Hitler and to point out to him the danger which would arise for Germany if British and French armed forces were to gain a foothold in Scandinavia. The dangers were clear. They consisted of the cutting-off of all imports from the industrial areas of Scandinavia, in particular of the ore imports, as well as in the fact that the Allies would obtain a favorable base for air attacks, and last but not least, in the fact that the German Navy would be threatened on its flank and its operational potentialities would be limited. The blockade of the North Sea and Baltic would have had strategically disastrous consequences. As the information did not yet allow of a final over-all picture, Raeder did not suggest immediate occupation, but only pointed out the dangers, intending to await further developments for the time being. Neither did Hitler make a final decision during this discussion of 10 October 1939 but agreed to wait. Similar information was received during the months of October and November, this time also from the naval attache, Korvettenkapitan Schreiber, who had in the meantime been sent to Oslo, whose affidavit (Document Raeder-107) I would like to cite.
DR.SIEMERS: It shows that the Norwegian shipping association had made tanker tonnage of about one million tons available to Britain with the consent of the Norwegian Government (Document Number Raeder-68). In the winter of 1939-40, information took on a more definite form concerning espionage missions given by the British and French Secret Service to Norwegian agents and British harbor consulates for the purpose of reconnoitering landing facilities and examination of Norwegian railroads with regard to their capacity, particularly the Narvik line, and missions concerning information about land and sea airports in Norway. From the fact that the information from two different sources, namely, the naval attache in Oslo and Admiral Canaris, checked and became more and more certain during the period from October to December 1939, the danger indicated appeared to keep increasing. In addition, in December 1939 Quisling and Hagelin sent to Rosenberg-entirely independently of the sources of information which had existed up to that time-the same and similar information concerning the landing intentions of the Allies. This did not go to Raeder for the sole reason that Raeder did not know either Quisling or Hagelin at that time. Since the question involved was a purely military-strategic one, Rosenberg asked Raeder to discuss things with Quisling so that Raeder could examine the military-technical possibilities in consideration of the fact the aggression by the Allies in Scandinavia must be expected according to the information received. This is evident from the letter from Rosenberg to Raeder of 13 December 1939, which I submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-67. Raeder considered it his duty from the purely military point of view to inform Hitler, with whom he had not discussed this question in the meantime, that coinciding information had since been received from Canaris, the naval attache in Oslo, and Quisling.
DR.SIEMERS: Hitler asked to speak with Quisling personally, whereupon he decided, in order to meet the threat, to make the necessary preparations for an eventual preventive measure, namely, the occupation of Norway (Document C-64, Exhibit Number GB-86). The final decision was still deferred, and further information was awaited as to whether the danger appeared to increase. This caution and delay will readily be understood in the case of Raeder. As I have already observed, Raeder would have preferred to see the neutrality of Norway maintained, especially since he was against any conquest just for the sake of conquest. He knew, on the other hand, that an occupation required the commitment of the whole Navy, thus involving the fate of the entire Navy, and that the loss of at least a third of the whole fleet had to be reckoned with. It must surely be clear how difficult, from such political and strategic viewpoints, such a decision was for a responsible man and soldier. Unfortunately, during the first months of the year 1940, the reports multiplied and kept becoming more certain. In March 1940 uncommonly many English-speaking persons could be seen in Oslo, and Raeder received very serious and credible information about impending measures by the Allies against Norway and Sweden. As far as landing intentions were concerned, Narvik, Trondheim, and Stavanger were mentioned. In this manner the military planning actually was not undertaken until February and March 1940, and final instructions were issued to the Wehrmacht only in March 1940. In addition, numerous violations of neutrality occurred in March 1940, which have been collected in the War Diary (Documents Raeder-81 and 82), and also the mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters at the beginning of April.
DR.SIEMERS: The Prosecution has put in only a few documents against this comprehensive informative material, according to which the German Minister in Oslo, Breuer, did not look upon the danger as being so great but believed that British activities, which he also reported, tended merely to provoke Germany into opening war operations in Norwegian waters (Documents Number D-843, Exhibit GB-466; D-844, Exhibit GB-467; D-845, Exhibit GB-486). Baron Weizsacker's point of view in cross-examination was that at first he did not consider the danger so great either; but he admitted that later on the facts proved that he and Breuer were wrong, while Raeder had been right in his apprehension. This objective accuracy of the opinion of Admiral Raeder, and of the information on which he based his opinion, is shown in the various documents submitted by me and accepted by the Court. Since 16 January 1940, the French High Command had been working on a plan which had in view, among other things, the occupation of harbors and airfields on the west coast of Norway. The plan provided, in addition, for an eventual extension of operations to Sweden and occupation of the mines of Gallivare (Document Number Raeder-79). Efforts have been made to justify this plan by stating that it was elaborated solely to help Finland against the Soviet Union. To begin with, it might be argued in contradiction to this that an action in support of Finland does not justify any occupation of Norwegian territory. Moreover, the documents show that it was not only a question of altruistic measures in favor of Finland. During the inter-Allied military conferences on 31 January and 1 February, which preceded the meeting of the Supreme Council on 5 February, the question of direct help for Finland was relegated by the British to second place; they showed themselves to be determined supporters of an enterprise against the mines of northern Sweden.
DR.SIEMERS: This is confirmed by General Gamelin in a note of 10 March 1940 (Document Raeder-79), and he adds that this opinion obtained the majority vote in the Supreme Council and that preparations for the Scandinavian expedition should be started immediately. And so it came about that the Franco-British fighting forces had been ready for transportation since the first days of March; according to Gamelin, the leadership of the proposed operations in Scandinavia was in the hands of the British High Command. Gamelin adds finally that the Scandinavian plans must be resolutely pursued further in order to save Finland-I quote, '`or at least to lay hands on the Swedish ore and the northern harbors." Lord Halifax informed the Norwegian Minister on 7 February that Britain wished to obtain certain bases on the Norwegian coast in order to stop German transports of ore from Narvik (Document Raeder-97). By mid-February, British and French General Staff officers were, in agreement with the Norwegian authorities, inspecting landing places (Document Raeder-97). According to a report by the German Legation in Stockholm, dated 16 February 1940, British intentions in this respect were to land troops simultaneously at Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. On 21 February 1940 Daladier communicated to the French Ambassador in London, Corbin, that the occupation of the most important Norwegian ports and the landing of the first body of the Allied fighting forces would give Norway and Sweden a feeling of security; and he goes on to say that this operation must be planned and executed at shortest notice, "independently of Finland's call for assistance." In the event of this demarche meeting with refusal by Norway, which was likely, the British Government was to take note of the Norwegian attitude and immediately seize control of the bases it needed for the safeguarding of its interests, doing so in the form of a "surprise operation." Whether Sweden would refuse passage through to Finland did not appear important; what is being emphasized is rather-and I quote: ". .
DR.SIEMERS: .the advantage of having secured a dominating position against Germany in the North, interrupted the sea transport of Swedish ore, and brought the Swedish ore districts within range of our aviation" (Documents Raeder-97 and 80). On 27 February 1940, Churchill declared in the House of Commons that he was "tired of considering the rights of neutrals" (Document Raeder-97). It is interesting to note that unanimity was achieved in the sixth session of the Supreme Council on 28 March 1940-I quote: "Every endeavor on the part of the Soviet Government to obtain from Norway a position on the Atlantic coast runs counter to the vital interests of the Allies and results in appropriate counteraction" (Document Raeder-83). The view thereby adopted by the Supreme Council with reference to the vital interests of the Allies coincides exactly with the legitimate notions of the "right of self-defense" as presented by me and is in complete contradiction to the interpretation of international law propounded by the Prosecution. The ultimate execution of the operation in Norway, that is, the landing and the construction of bases, was decided on 28 March 1940 between the authoritative British and French offices. This date was indicated at a session of the French War Council by the French Prime Minister (Document Raeder-59); and General Gamelin added that he had, on 29 March, impressed upon General Ironside the necessity of having everything ready for a swift occupation of the Norwegian ports. He said he had also informed Mr. Churchill to the same effect on the occasion of a visit to Paris. One day later, 30 March, Churchill declared on the radio-I quote, "It would not be just if, in a life-and-death struggle, the Western Powers adhered to legal agreements" (Document Raeder-97). On 2 April 1940 at 1912 hours, London notified Paris by telegram that the first transport was "to sail on J. 1. day," and that J. 1. day was in principle 5 April (Document Raeder-85).
DR.SIEMERS: On 5 April, Earl de la Warr stated that neither Germany nor the neutrals could be certain that "England would allow her hands to be tied behind her back in complying with the letter of the law" (Document Raeder-97). The British Minister of Labor, Ernest Brown, on 6 April 1940 declared that neither Germany nor the neutrals could count on "the Western Powers' adhering to the letter of international law" (Document Raeder-97). On the same day-this was one day after the laying of mines by British combat forces in Norwegian territorial waters-a secret British operational order was given "concerning preparations for the occupation of the northern Swedish ore field from Narvik" (Document Racder-88). In this order it was specified that the mission of the "Avon" Force consisted first of all in "securing the port of Narvik and the railway to the Swedish border." It was added that it was the intention of the commander "to advance into Sweden and to occupy the Gallivare ore fields and important points of that territory as soon as an opportunity occurs," a formulation strikingly reminiscent of the words in the Prosecution Document L-79, "to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity." The original plan of dispatching the first transport to Norway on 5 April was changed; for on the evening of 5 April the British High Command informed the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy that-I quote: ". . . the first British convoy could not depart before 8 April which with respect to the time schedule established would mean that the first French contingent would leave its embarkation port on 16 April" (Document Raeder-91). To complete the story it may be mentioned that the Norwegian operation was designated by the Allies by the camouflage name of "Stratford Plan," while the German Norwegian operation was referred to by the camouflage name of "Weser Exercise" (Weserubung) (Document Raeder-98). All these facts go to show that, since the autumn of 1939, preparations for possible action in Norway were made by studying landing possibilities, et cetera.
DR.SIEMERS: As from January and February 1940 the danger of an occupation of bases in Norway by the Allies was imminent. In March 1940 the execution of the scheme was ultimately decided upon and the departure of the first convoy was scheduled for 5 April. Simultaneously, mine-laying was carried out in the Norwegian territorial waters and troops were at the same time concentrated in British and French ports for the Norwegian operation. Thus factual evidence of imminent neutrality violations existed from the point of view of international law; and neutrality violations had indeed been already committed to a certain extent, as by mine-laying. This was the point where Germany, in accordance with the international concept of the right of self-defense, was entitled to resort to equivalent countermeasures, that is, to occupy Norway in order to prevent the impending occupation by other belligerent states. It was, in fact, as was shown later, high time; for Germany forestalled the Allies only because the British High Command had postponed the departure of the first convoy, originally scheduled for 5 April. The German operation in Norway must therefore be considered as legitimate according to the principles of international law. I have the firm conviction that the High Tribunal, in view of the circumstances just presented in connection with existing international law, will conclude that Admiral Raeder, with regard to the occupation of Norway, acted from purely strategic points of view and in due consideration of international legal standards, and accordingly will acquit him of the charge made by the Prosecution. With reference to Norway, the Prosecution has moreover charged against Raeder-and also against Doenitz-that a violation of international law is involved in the fact that, according to an order dated 30 March 1940, the Naval Forces were to fly the British ensign until the troops had been landed (Documents C-151, Exhibit GB-91; C-115, Exhibit GB-90). This too is an error of the Prosecution as regards international law in sea warfare.
DR.SIEMERS: The Hague Regulations on Land Warfare do expressly forbid the misuse of flags. In sea warfare, on the other hand, the answer to this question according to prevailing international law is definitely that, until hostilities begin, ships may sail with their own or with enemy or neutral flags or with no flags at all. I take the liberty, in this respect, of availing myself of Dr. Mosler's juridical treatment of the question in his opinion (Document Raeder-66), appearing under Item 7, and in particular of his references to legal literature on the subject, according to which the use of a foreign flag is universally considered as a legitimate ruse of war and is allowed and especially condoned by British practice; this is in accordance with the historical precedent when Nelson, in the Napoleonic wars, flew the French flag off Barcelona to lure Spanish ships. This- dispute is, however, superfluous in the present case, because actually these orders to fly the British flag were according to documentary evidence canceled on 8 April, that is to say, prior to the execution of the Norway operation (Document Raeder-89). In conclusion I wish to emphasize, with reference to the subject of Norway, that after the occupation of Norway Raeder and the German Navy did everything they could to give a friendly character to the relations with Norway, to treat the country and the people decently during the occupation, and to spare them every unnecessary burden. Raeder and the commanding admiral in Norway, Admiral Bohm, moreover endeavored to conclude a peace with Norway guaranteeing Norwegian national interests. Their efforts were frustrated through the creation by Hitler and Himmler of a so-called civil administration under Reich Commissioner Terboven which, unlike the Armed Forces, was linked with the Party, the SS, SD, and Gestapo (Documents Number Raeder-107 and 129).
DR.SIEMERS: As confirmed by B5hm in his affidavit, Raeder repeatedly intervened with Hitler in favor of treating the Norwegian people well and for an early conclusion of peace and, together with Bohm, proceeded with the utmost vigor against Terboven. Here again, the tragic fact is that the Armed Forces, despite its utmost efforts, was neither able to oppose Hitler's dictatorial methods nor the dictatorial methods employed, with Hitler's knowledge, by such a mediocre Reich Commissioner as Terboven. The Norwegian people who had to suffer under the occupation know-and this is the only gratification for Raeder-that the Navy was not the cause of these sufferings. On the other hand, it is interesting to know that the differences which cropped up between Hitler and Raeder with reference to Norway are precisely among the chief motives which ultimately caused Raeder to insist upon his resignation in September 1942. Other motives were that Raeder also had differences with Hitler over France, because here again Raeder urged the conclusion of peace, while Hitler, with his extreme nature, was opposed to conciliatory steps of that kind in occupied territories. Raeder also had differences with Hitler regarding Russia, because he was in favor of observing the German-Russian treaty, and declared himself opposed to breaking the Treaty and going to war with Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. [A recess was taken.]