dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LUDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Mr. President, to begin with, I should like to make some remarks regarding the limit imposed upon our time. If we are limited to 14 days, then that means approximately 4 hours per defendant for our final speeches. But in reality these 4 hours are not 4 hours, since, because of the technical arrangements in this courtroom, we are forced to speak much more slowly than we would speak in a direct final speech, in a free statement. That is to say, from the 4 hours left to us on an average, we must deduct the time which we lose through having to speak more slowly. In my opinion, 4 hours would in reality amount to only 3 hours. Mr. President, I believe that if you consider these facts you will agree with us that in these 3 hours we cannot possibly do justice to all the material available for every defendant, and thus fulfill that purpose which the final address is intended to fulfill. The main purpose of this Tribunal, which is unique in history, is to establish the truth; but we cannot establish the truth by merely making an arbitrary selection of individual actions. Our main task must be to show what led to these individual actions. Accordingly, it is for me in my capacity as defense counsel for the Defendant Von Neurath, who Divas the responsible leader of the foreign policy of the Reich until 1938, to show that all the actions of which my client is accused were logically and unavoidably the outcome of the circumstances as they developed. This sequence of historical events explains everything that happened up to the day when my client handed in his resignation. But I can make that clear only if I am able to present the different stages of development, at least in broad outline. Moreover, Gentlemen, if you take into consideration that I still have to deal with the activities of my client as a Reich Protector, which for legal reasons is not altogether as simple as it might appear, you will no doubt admit that I cannot possibly do that in a period which is tantamount to only 3 hours.
DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LUDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): I want to say to the statement of the American prosecutor, that we are not before an American court here. I have just been trying to make inquiries about this, and there is no information to the effect that in international tribunals, such as, for instance, the Hague Courts, or the courts in Egypt, a limitation has ever been imposed upon the duration of the final speeches of the defense. That is why I beg to take into consideration that we are not before an American court here but that this is an international tribunal and that this International Tribunal goes far beyond anything that has existed before. It also goes far beyond the task of any military tribunal in Germany which has up to now dealt with small particles of this tremendous complexity, and never have the military tribunals imposed a time limit upon the defense when making their final speeches. Gentlemen, if you take all this into consideration, then I hope you will allow me to ask you once more to reconsider your decision and not have us give the impression that we are not able to do our duty in presenting our cases for our clients.
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I will only add very little to what my colleague Mr. Dodd has already said. The penal code of our country admits the right of the tribunal to impose limitations upon both the prosecution and the defense in their final plea. I believe that the argument of the Defense, to the effect that this decision of the Tribunal is putting limits on their rights and is unjust, is unfounded. In practice the Defense is already submitting evidence now in the case of their clients and has every opportunity to give a complete presentation. I believe, Gentlemen of the Tribunal that justice does not consist in the endless conduct of the present Trial. I therefore uphold the argument of Mr. Dodd and consider the decision of the Tribunal quite just.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, will you please permit me to make a brief statement? At no stage of the proceedings can the duration of a trial be foreseen. At the beginning one cannot foresee the time required and therefore one cannot limit the time which the taking of evidence will require. Neither can the following stages of the proceedings, the length of the statements presented by the Defense, be forecast and cannot therefore be limited. The value of the Defense-and, after all, that is the only reason why a defense is included ire these proceedings at all-is that a man who is given that professional task and who possesses the necessary qualities must be able to put before the Tribunal all the material which, after long hours of work and intimate conversations with his client, he has found worthy of presentation. That must be done through such an intermediary; and to what extent he should state his case is something that he, as an expert, must be able to decide. Nobody participating in the proceedings, whether of the Tribunal or of the defendant's counsel, can even approximately foresee what might be necessary in this connection. That is why I believe that no dates should be fixed for the case for the Prosecution or the hearing of evidence or the case for the Defense. During the other stages of this Trial we have had to contend with the same difficulties. In limiting the proceedings as to time we can only be guided by what is relevant and expedient. Thus in this Court we have witnessed again and again how the President has steered the proceedings with skill and benevolence, always keeping them within the necessary limits. I cannot understand why the same procedure should not be applied to the final speeches, and I believe that the self-discipline which naturally every experienced counsel applies to himself, will keep the speeches within suitable limits.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: But I honestly believe that no one, with the exception of the immediate participant, and he probably only after all the evidence has been heard, can anticipate how much time will be required; and this, in my opinion, precludes the imposing of a time limit at this stage. If the statement made by the Tribunal should be considered as a suggestion to limit our speeches-and in this connection we are particularly grateful for the indication given as to the way the evidence should be handled- then by following the Tribunal's suggestion we shall most certainly be able to impose upon ourselves a limitation which will do justice to all parties.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't propose to go fully or at all into the argument which led the Tribunal to make the announcement which I made this morning, but I think it would be desirable for Counsel for the Defense, before they make any formal objection to that announcement, to study it. But I do desire to say on behalf of the Tribunal that that announcement was not made without consultation both with Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense and that was done in closed session; and we heard both Counsel for the Prosecution and counsel whom we understood to be representative counsel for the Defense, and they made the suggestion which they thought right to us at that time, and we fully considered it. We intimated to them that they should draw the attention of their brethren to what passed at that hearing in closed session. Therefore, it is entirely inaccurate to say, as Dr. Nelte did, that the announcement was made without hearing Counsel for the Defense. I only desire to add to that that in the circumstances the Tribunal will give further consideration to the matter, but the suggestion made in the announcement was that the 14 days, which the Tribunal thought sufficient for the speeches for the defendants, should be apportioned voluntarily among counsel. Those 14 days are full days and will not be taken up at all by any argument on the organizations; and until the defendants' counsel have attempted to make that apportionment, it must be obviously impossible for them to know whether they will be able to make their speeches, which are not speeches that are necessarily detailed examinations of the evidence but are arguments drawing the attention of the Tribunal to the main points which they desire to draw the attention of the Tribunal to. It will not be possible for them to know whether they can make their speeches satisfactorily within the 14 days.
THE PRESIDENT: The Counsel for the Defense ought, therefore, to go into the matter together, as the Tribunal understood they were doing, and see whether they can satisfactorily present their speeches within that time. All the arguments which have been presented to us this morning were fully presented to us by Counsel for the Defense who appeared before us at the closed session, one of whom has addressed us this morning. Now the Tribunal will go on with the hearing of the case. [The witness Rainer resumed the stand.]
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, in answer to the last question put by the American prosecutor yesterday you stated that you wrote your letter with a certain purpose, and I now ask you what that purpose was?
RAINER: Some time after the Anschluss there were hostile activities, intrigues against Dr. Seyss-Inquart and some other people. They came from dissatisfied radical elements in Austria and the Reich. They took advantage of Dr. Seyss-Inquart's hesitant attitude on 11 March, his clinging to the revolutionary line and to the principles of the two agreements between the two States, to accuse him of being a separatist or even worse...
DR. STEINBAUER: Perhaps, Witness, you can be a little more brief.
RAINER: These people seemed to be dangerous, because Burckel and, I believe, Heydrich too, were behind them. I considered these attacks to be unfair and therefore I brought out certain facts and arguments and worded my report in such a way that the addressees would understand it and be calmed down.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that, if I have understood you correctly, in this letter you sought to stress the merits of the Party on the one hand, and to claim indulgence for Seyss-Inquart on the other hand?
RAINER: Yes. That is how I would express it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, my second question. In this letter you mentioned that Seyss-Inquart had taken a letter of ultimatum to Schuschnigg. Have you any recollection to the effect that he himself dictated it and had this letter written in his office?
RAINER: Dr. Steinbauer, you mean the letter of ultimatum written in the afternoon of 11 March?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, that is the one.
RAINER: I believe that that letter was written in his of lice and I also believe I participated in writing it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you go on to say, in the letter put to you by the prosecutor, that, through the collaboration of Dr. Jurv and Dr. Leopold, Seyss-Inquart had become State Councillor. I ask you whether Dr. Jury and Dr. Leopold had any influence at all on Schuschnigg?
RAINER: No, that cannot have been the intention.
DR. STEINBAUER: The prosecutor, in support of his statement yesterday, submitted a second document. It was a speech which you had made as Gau speaker in Carinthia. Do you remember that?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was that a typical Gau speech? I mean, from the point of view of the propaganda of Goebbels? A speech which gives prominence to one's own merits and disparages one's opponents?
RAINER: I would not say that. It was a comradely meeting of the Old Guard on the occasion of the 11th of March. We drank beer and there was music and I described events rather like telling a stole; I spoke for a very long time; in fact, it was the longest speech I ever made. I spoke more than 3 hours. I spoke suite freely and without any notes, and the shorthand record which is submitted here appears to me not to tally with my statements on every point.
DR. STEINBAUER: You mean, therefore, that it was more your intention to procure an effect upon the members of the Party than to write history?
RAINER: Yes, of course.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you very much. That is enough for me and I have no further questions.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: During the cross-examination yesterday it was mentioned that on one occasion you were with Von Papen at Garmisch. What did you talk about to Von Papen at the time, and how did that conversation come about at all?
RAINER: Dr. Seyss-Inquart and I had been invited to Garmisch by the Reich Sport Leader. The German-Austrian Alpine Club was to be discussed. Together with Von Tschammer we were watching the bobsled races at the Riesser Lake and there we met Von Papen. Herr Von Papen, Seyss-Inquart, and I then walked from there to Garmisch, and on the way we discussed the political situation and the . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you don't need to give the details of it. I suppose the point of the question is that the conversation was not political. Is that the point of the question?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The conversation was political, but it is a question of the type of political conversation it was. Perhaps, Witness, you can confine yourself to the facts. You just said it was an accidental meeting. You were coming back from the bobsled track. What did you talk about?
RAINER: We talked about the situation in Austria, about the pacification of the country; and while we did not exhaust the subject, we did discuss other matters which interested us and which dealt with the immediate future.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: So that nothing was discussed which could not have been put before the Austrian public?
RAINER: No.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were these matters in keeping with the July Agreement?
RAINER: Yes, of course they were.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: But then, in the course of the speech which has already been mentioned, you said that you had been with others in Von Papen's apartment on the evening of 9 March 1938. I should like to know whether that was a prearranged meeting or whether it was a more or less chance meeting?
RAINER: It was just a casual meeting. I do not remember who arranged it. The conversation dealt, naturally, with the situation arising out of Schuschnigg's plan for the plebiscite, which was an entirely new and most surprising move, so that we had to think it over from every point of view and clarify it by discussion.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What stand did Von Papen take during that conference?
RAINER: I remember that Von Papen, who just happened to be in Vienna that evening, acted in a reserved way. I think he considered that an affirmative vote would have met the situation perfectly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What reason had you for thinking he considered that an affirmative vote was plausible and necessary? Was it for practical reasons or was it due to the plebiscite which the Austrian Government had suggested?
RAINER: It was because of the plebiscite.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Once again, my question is: Would the matters which were discussed have led one to believe it was a specially called conference, or rather was it a social gathering I48 during which political questions cropped up and this topical matter came up for discussion?
RAINER: It was a casual meeting which had been improvised because Von Papen's presence in Vienna coincided with the new political situation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were any resolutions passed?
RAINER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. [The witness left the  stand.]
DR. STEINBAUER: With the permission of the Tribunal I shall now call the witness Dr. Guido Schmidt. [The witness Schmidt took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.
GUIDO SCHMIDT (Witness): Dr. Guido Schmidt.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what positions did you hold in the Austrian Republic?
SCHMIDT: I was a diplomat by profession. I was in the Austrian Foreign Service under Dr. Seipel and for about 6 years I was a member of the Austrian Legation in Paris. In 1936 I was recalled and assigned to the Austrian State for service with the diplomatic corps and the Foreign Office. In 1936 I became State Secretary under Dr. Schuschnigg, and later Foreign Minister. I was a member of the Schuschnigg Government until his resignation by violence. From that time on, I had no political activity.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what were the reasons in regard to foreign policy and economics which led to the Agreement of 11 July 1936?
SCHMIDT: At the beginning of 1936, the situation of Austria with regard to foreign policy had changed to Austria's disadvantage. After the events of July 1934, England, France, and Italy drew up a three-power declaration at Stresa concerning the maintenance of Austrian independence. Over and above the international obligations existing up to that time, the three powers now set up a new guarantee for the maintenance of Austria, the Stresa Front, which during the whole year of 1935 gave protection to Austria. The collapse of the Stresa Front, as a result of Mussolini's Abyssinian enterprise, meant for Austria the loss of the only practical international guarantee, and for Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg the creation of a completely new situation. According to his conception of foreign policy, Austrian independence should rest not only on the shoulders of Italy, but if possible on other shoulders as well, that means of England and France. Then there were difficulties resulting from the developments of the situation in Europe from 7 March 1936, the day on which Adolf Hitler started his surprise tactics by occupying the Rhineland without encountering serious resistance from the Western Powers. This gave the Austrian Government cause for anxiety and fear lest some day the Austrian question as well might be solved by surprise or, as we later saw, by violence. These are the reasons we must give if we are asked about the considerations on which the agreement was based. There was also the rapprochement between Rome and Berlin which began at this time and was due to the sanctions policy of the League of Nations. Austria, lying between Italy and Germany, had to expect that one day that Austrian-Italian friendship, which had existed since the time of Dollfuss, would fall victim to the closer relationship between Rome and Berlin. For this reason and for other considerations, Dr. Schuschnigg sought a means to improve relations, that is, to restore relations, between Austria and the German Reich.
SCHMIDT: It would perhaps be useful in this connection to give a few of the guiding rules of Austria's foreign policy. The underlying idea was the maintenance of Austrian independence. Austrian foreign policy was furthermore based on the knowledge of the extremely difficult and delicate geographical situation of the country between two totalitarian states, at the crossroad of European ideologies. Therefore, it had to be the task of Austrian foreign policy to reach an understanding with her big neighbor, the German Reich. The foreign policy further had to be based on the determination to avoid everything that could lead to a conflict with the German Reich, to avoid everything that could antagonize the Reich, in order to prevent any violent action which, after 7 March, was to be feared. There were reasons in practical politics which were decisive in this determination to restore relations with the German Reich, to the ethnographic area of which we belonged, relations which had been unnaturally interrupted. Apart from the reasons of foreign policy, there were also economic considerations. Because of Austria's economic constitution, which, although alive, was nevertheless extremely weak, the world economic crisis had affected Austria very seriously. This can be understood only if we look back to the beginnings of this young state. From the very start, all Austria's neighbors had carried on an economic policy of egotism, of chauvinistic self-interest, and in no case had it been possible to reach really close co-operation of all the Danube countries. It is true that some separate agreements had been reached, such as the Rome Protocols; but the mutual distrust which all had brought from their former home, their common home, the Austrian Monarchy, continued to exist and obstructed any healthy development. From 1931, the beginning of the world economic crisis, there were a number of attempts to relieve the situation. I will mention them one after the other.
SCHMIDT: It begins with the attempt of the Government to create a customs union, which failed because of the resistance of the League of Nations. In 1932, there was an attempt by France to bring Austria and Hungary into the Little Entente and to reach economic co-operation here. Germany and Italy opposed this. England was also against it. In 1933, the economic crisis was aggravated by the internal struggle against National Socialism. That also had its effect on the economic life of Austria) because the economic life of Austria was also used as a weapon in the internal struggle.
THE PRESIDENT: This is undoubtedly interesting, but it has rather a remote bearing, perhaps, upon the questions which the Tribunal has to decide. I don't know whether the witness has dealt with it sufficiently for your purposes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this presentation of the facts I wanted to show that from the economic and foreign policy point of view the situation was such that the role of the defendant was forced into the background; but we can continue now. Witness, will you speak quite briefly.
SCHMIDT: An this led to the breaking off of economic relations with the German Reich, and now Austria's life and death struggle for economic existence entered upon a very serious phase. Because of these considerations, that is, for economic reasons, too, Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg attempted to reach an agreement with the German Reich and to restore economic relations which had been completely broken off, to remove the "1,000 mark blockade," to restore tourist traffic, to restore the flow of economic goods, to silence the complaints which were coming from the provinces in Austria because of the lack of a market for agricultural products, wood, grain, cattle and so forth. These were, generally speaking, the main considerations.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I now ask you: Did Dr. SeyssInquart help in preparing or concluding this Agreement of July 1936?
SCHMIDT: No. The Chancellor worked with Glaise-Horstenau who represented the so-called National Opposition.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid there is a defect in the sound equipment, so we had better adjourn. [A recess was taken.]
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, in the spring of 1937 Seyss-Inquart entered politics, and presumably you met him then.
SCHMIDT: Yes, I met him first in the summer of 1937.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I shall go on, and I should like to ask you what reasons in domestic and foreign policy led to the well-known meeting between Adolf Hitler and Dr. Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden.
SCHMIDT: This question calls for a detailed answer. I ask for permission to express myself in somewhat more detail. By New Year 1938, the Austrian foreign policy situation had become worse. Italy had entered into an engagement in Spain in favor of Franco, which reduced still further her military and political influence in Central Europe. What we called "The Watch at the Brenner" had in effect ceased to exist, and Germany had more or less a free hand with regard to Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal has common knowledge of the history of this time. It is not necessary, really, to go into it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I should like to ask you to tell me if you were present at the Obersalzberg at that time.