dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, speaking for myself and for some other members of the Tribunal, we think it is a far better way to deal with a document, to deal with it, if possible, once and for all, and not to be coming back to it. It not only wastes time by the fact that the Tribunal have got to turn back and forth, back and forth, to the document; but you get a much fairer idea of the document if it is dealt with once and for all, although it may cover more than one subject. I say that although it may be impossible for you to do that now in consonance with the preparations that you have made; but those who follow you may be able to alter their course. If it is possible, when you get a document with a variety or a number of paragraphs in it which you want to quote, you should quote them all at the same time. Do you follow what I mean?
LT. BRYSON: I follow you, Your Honor. We have so organized our materials that we have directed our evidence to specific points, and since the points are separated, we had to separate our quotations.
THE PRESIDENT: I realize that it may be difficult for you.
LT. BRYSON: In September of 1934 Ambassador Dodd made a record in his diary of a conversation with Sir Eric Phipps at the British Embassy in Berlin. If the Court please, I will pass over this document, because in response to a question from the Tribunal, I read an excerpt from the document which covers the same point that I was about to direct myself toward. I had just pointed out that Schacht has acknowledged to Ambassador Dodd in September 1934 his knowledge of the war purposes of the Nazi Party; and we had already shown that in 1935 Schacht had stated that Germany would, if necessary, acquire colonies by force. He must then have known to what length Hitler was prepared to go. After attending a meeting of the Reich ministers on 27 May 1936 in Berlin, Schacht must have known that Hitler was contemplating war. Your Honors may recall, as has been earlier shown, that at this meeting the Defendant Goering, who was very close to Hitler, stated that all measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging of war and that waiting for new methods is no longer appropriate. I refer the Tribunal to Document 1301-PS, from which I will not read, as the quotation is already in evidence in Exhibit Number USA-123. On 31 August 1936 the War Minister, Von Blomberg, sent to Schacht a copy of Von Blomberg's letter to the Defendant Goering. I refer the Tribunal again to 1301-PS, previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-123, and read from the middle of Page 19 of the document. The page numbers, if the Court please, on this document are found in the upper lefthand corner: "According to an order of the Fuehrer the setting up of all Air Force units is to be completed on 1 April 1937. Therefore considerable expenditures have to be made in 1936, which at the time when the budget for 1936 was made were planned for later years only." This intensification of the air force program certainly revealed to Schacht the closeness to war which Hitler must have felt.
LT. BRYSON: I also offer in evidence Document EC-416, Exhibit USA-635, consisting of minutes of the Cabinet meeting of 4 September 1936 which Schacht attended. I read the statement by Goering found at the top of Page 2 of this document: "The Fuehrer and Reichskanzler has given a memorandum to the Colonel General and the Reich War Minister which represents a general instruction for the execution of this task. "It starts from the basic thought that the show-down with Russia is inevitable." Schacht thus knew that Hitler expected war with Russia. He also knew of Hitler's ambitions towards the east. It must have been plain to him, therefore, that such a war would result from Russian opposition to German military expansion in that direction; that is, Schacht must have known that it would be a war of German aggression. In January 1937, the Tribunal will recall, Schacht stated to Ambassador Davies in Berlin that he had "been authorized by his government" to submit certain proposals to France and England which, in fact, amounted to a bid for colonies under threat of war. If Schacht was acting under instructions from Hitler, he was necessarily familiar with Hitler's aggressive intentions at that time. In November of 1937 Schacht knew Hitler was determined to acquire Austria and at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia and that Hitler also had designs on the Polish Corridor. I refer the Tribunal to Document L-151, already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-70, this being a letter containing a memorandum of a conversation between Schacht and Ambassador Bullitt, dated 23 November 1937. I quote the last paragraph on Page 2: "Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia.
LT. BRYSON: At the present moment he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor, and in his" - Schacht's - "opinion it might be possible to maintain the Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany." To digress for just a moment, Schacht here was really speaking for himself as well as for Hitler. We have seen from his speech of 29 March 1938 in Vienna his enthusiasm for the Anschluss after the event. He was even working hard for its achievement. In this connection I refer the Tribunal to Pages 506 and 507 of the transcript (Volume II, Page 373) for evidence of Schacht's having subsidized the Nazis' preliminary agitation in Austria. In addition to the foregoing direct evidence, the Tribunal is asked to take into consideration the fact that to such a man as Schacht the events of the period certainly bespoke Hitler's intention. Schacht was a close collaborator of Hitler and a member of the Cabinet during the period of the Nazi agitation in Austria, the introduction of conscription, the march into the Rhineland, the overthrow of the Republican Government in Spain, the ultimate conquest of Austria, and the acquisition of the Sudetenland by a show of force. During this period the Reich's debt tripled under the stress of mounting armaments, the expenditures from 750,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1932 to 11,000,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1937, and 14,000,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1938. During the entire period 35,000,000,000 Reichsmarks were spent on armaments. It was a period in which the burning European foreign policy issue was the satisfaction of Germany's repeated demands for additional territory. Hitler, committed to a policy of expansion, was taking great risks in foreign policy and laying the greatest stress upon utmost speed in preparation for war. Certainly, in this setting Schacht did not proceed in ignorance of the fact that he was assisting Hitler and Germany along the road toward armed aggression.
LT. BRYSON: We turn now to our last line of proof with respect to Schacht's loss of power in the Hitler regime. In November 1937, Schacht resigned his offices as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy. At that time he accepted appointment as Minister without Portfolio and he also continued as President of the Reichsbank. Our evidence will show: (a) This change in position was no more than a clash between two power-seeking personalities, Goering and Schacht, in which Goering, being closer to Hitler, won out; (b) their policy differences were concerned only with the method of rearming; and (c) Schacht's loss of power in no sense implies an unwillingness to assist armed aggression. There was an issue of policy between Goering and Schacht, but it was concerned only with the method and not the desirability of war preparations. Schacht emphasized foreign trade as a necessary source of rearmament material during the transitory period until Germany should be ready to strike. Goering was a proponent of complete self-sufficiency. Hitler supported Goering; and Schacht, his pride wounded and bitterly resenting Goering's intrusion in the economic field, finally stepped out. I refer the Tribunal to Document 1301-PS, previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-123, containing notes of a conversation between Schacht and Thomas on 2 September 1936. These are found on Page 21 of the document, from which I quote: "President Schacht called me to him at 1300 hours today and requested me to forward the following to the Minister of War: Schacht returned from the Fuehrer with the greatest anxiety, since he could not agree to the economic program planned by the Fuehrer. "The Fuehrer wants to speak at the Party convention about economic policy and wants to emphasize there that we now want to get free from foreign countries with all our energy by production in Germany.
LT. BRYSON: "Schacht requests urgently that the Reich Minister of War warn the Fuehrer from this step." And three paragraphs farther down: "If we now shout out abroad our decision to make ourselves economically independent, then we cut our own throats, because we can no longer survive the necessary transitory period." Nevertheless, Hitler announced the Four Year Plan of self-sufficiency a few days later in Nuremberg, and against Schacht's wishes Goering was named Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan. At this point I refer the Tribunal again to the interrogation of Schacht on 16 October 1945, being Exhibit Number USA-636; and I wish to read beginning near the bottom of Page 9 of the document: "Q: 'And the Four Year Plan came in when?' "A: 'It was announced in September '36, on the Party Day.' "Q: 'Do you say that from the time that the Four Year Plan came in in September 1936, you were ready to rid yourself of your economic duty?' "A: 'No. At that time I thought that I might maintain my position even against Goering.' "Q: 'Yes, in what sense?' "A: 'That he would not interfere with affairs which I had to manage in my ministry.' "Q: 'As a matter of fact, his appointment was not met with favor by you?' "A: 'I would not have ever appointed a man like Goering who didn't understand a bit about all these things."' Schacht and Goering immediately became embroiled in a conflict of jurisdiction. On 26 November 1936 Goering issued a directive regarding raw and synthetic material production. I offer in evidence Document EC-243, Exhibit Number USA-637, consisting of a copy of this directive. It shows that Goering's Office for Raw and Synthetic Materials pre-empted control over large economic areas previously in the hands of Schacht.
LT. BRYSON: As an example, I will quote from Paragraph V of the directive on Page 4 of the document: "The planning and determination of objectives, as well as the control over the execution of the tasks which must be accomplished within the framework of the Four Year Plan, are the responsibility of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, which supersedes the authorities which have heretofore been in charge of these tasks." On 11 December 1936 Schacht found it necessary to order all supervisory offices in the Ministry of Economics to accept instructions from him alone. I offer in evidence Document EC-376, Exhibit Number USA-638, consisting of a circular letter from Schacht to all supervisory of flees under date of 11 December 1936, and I quote from the second paragraph: "The supervisory offices are obliged to accept instructions from me alone. They must answer all official inquiries for any information of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials in order to give any information at any time to the fullest extent." And a little further down ". . . I herewith authorize the supervisory of offices to take the necessary measures for themselves. In case doubts should result from requests of the above offices and these doubts. cannot be cleared by oral negotiations with the experts of these offices, I should be informed immediately. I will then order in each case the necessary steps to be taken." The military sided with Schacht, who had rearmed them so well. I of offer in evidence Document EC-420, Exhibit Number USA-639, consisting of a draft of a memorandum by the Military Economic Staff, dated 19 December 1936. I wish to read from Paragraph 1: "(1) The direction of war economy in the civilian sector in case of war can be handled only by the person who in peacetime has borne the sole responsibility for the preparations for war. "Upon recognizing this fact a year and a half ago Reichsbank President Dr.
LT. BRYSON: Schacht was appointed Plenipotentiary General for War Economy and an operations staff was attached to his office." And then Paragraph Number 2: "(2) The Military Economy Staff does not deem it compatible with the principle laid down in Number 1, Paragraph 1, if the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy is now placed under the Minister President General Goering's command." In January 1937 the Military Weekly Gazette published an article warmly praising Schacht's achievements in rearmament. Without reading it I offer in evidence Document EC-383, Exhibit Number USA-640, containing this article, a pertinent quotation from which already appears in the transcript for 23 November at Page 296 (Volume II, Page 233). Shortly thereafter Schacht attempted to force a show-down with Goering by temporarily refusing to act in his capacity as Plenipotentiary. I offer in evidence Document EC-244, Exhibit Number 641, consisting of a letter from Von Blomberg, the Minister of War, to Hitler under date of February 22, 1937. I read the second paragraph of this letter as follows: "The President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, has notified me that he is not acting in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the time being, since in his opinion there exist discrepancies regarding the powers conferred upon him and those of Colonel General Goering. Because of this the preparatory mobilization steps in the economic field are delayed." Schacht obviously was using his importance to the war preparations as a lever.
THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, does the Defendant Schacht admit in his interrogation that the reason for his giving up his office was the difference of opinion between him and the Defendant Goering?
LT. BRYSON: He does, Sir, and the Defendant Goering so states in his interrogation.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into the details of their quarrel?
LT. BRYSON: If the Court will be satisfied that this was the cause of Schacht's resignation
THE PRESIDENT: If they both say so....
LT. BRYSON: . . . and that the cause was not his unwillingness to go along with the aggressive intentions of the Nazis at that time, I shall be perfectly satisfied to confine our evidence to the interrogations of Schacht and Goering.
THE PRESIDENT: Does he suggest that in his interrogation? that that might have been the reason?
LT. BRYSON: I will find out, Sir, but our case against Schacht is premised upon conspiracy.
THE PRESIDENT: If the Defendant Schacht wants to set up such a case as that, you could apply to be heard in rebuttal.
LT. BRYSON: Well, we shall be satisfied then to eliminate a number of our items of evidence, including the controversy between Goering and Schacht, and satisfy ourselves with the interrogations.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, we are almost at the time of the break. Perhaps during the break we can arrange our evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we will adjourn now for 10 minutes. [ A recess was taken.]
PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): We agree that the question of the disagreement between the Defendants Goering and Schacht need not be discussed further at this time. But we shall come back to and deal in detail with the question as to how far these disagreements had any bearing on the plan for an aggressive war.
LT. BRYSON: If the Tribunal please, we have eliminated part of our proof. I would simply like to put in a letter from Goering and an interrogation of Schacht which will finish up the question of the disagreement. Under date of 5 August 1937 Schacht wrote a critical letter to Goering, who replied with a 24-page letter on 22 August 1937. Goering's letter reviews their many differences in detail. I offer it as Document EC-493, Exhibit Number USA-642, and I wish to read simply one statement found in the middle of Page 13: "In conclusion I should like to refer to remarks which you made in a paragraph of your letter entitled 'The Four Year Plan' about your general attitude toward my work in regard to the economic policy. I know and I am pleased that at the beginning of the Four Year Plan you promised me your most loyal support and co-operation and that you repeatedly renewed this promise even after the first differences of opinion had occurred and had been removed in exhaustive discussions. I deplore all the more having the impression recently, which is confirmed by your letter, that you are increasingly antagonistic toward my work in the Four Year Plan. This explains the fact that our collaboration has gradually become less close...." Schacht and Goering were reconciled by written agreement on 7 July 1937 but subsequently again fell into disagreement, and Hitler finally accepted Schacht's resignation as Minister of Economics on 26 November 1937, simultaneously appointing him Minister without Portfolio, and later Schacht's resignation was extended to his position as Plenipotentiary for War Economy. Without reading it, I offer in evidence Document EC-494, Exhibit Number USA- 643, as proof of this fact.
LT. BRYSON: Now, finally, I wish to refer the Tribunal to the interrogation of Schacht, under date of 16 October 1945, Document 3728-PS, Exhibit Number USA-636, and I wish to read from Page 12 of the document near the bottom: "A: 'It may amuse you if I tell you that the last conversation"' this is Schacht speaking "'that I had with Goering on these topics was in November 1937, when Luther for 2 months had endeavored to unite Goering and myself and to induce me to cooperate further with Goering and maintain my position as Minister of Economics. Then I had a last talk with Goering; and at the end of this talk Goering said, "But I must have the right to give orders to you." Then I said, "Not to me, but to my successor." I have never taken orders from Goering; and I would never have done it because he was a fool in economics, and I knew something about it, at least.' "Q: 'Well, I gather that was a culminating, progressive personal business between you and Goering. That seems perfectly obvious.' "A: 'Certainly."' In all this abundant and consistent evidence there is not the slightest suggestion that Schacht's withdrawal from these two posts represented a break with Hitler on the ground of contemplated military aggression. Indeed, Hitler was gratified that Schacht would still be active in the Government as President of the Reichsbank and as Minister without Portfolio. I offer in evidence Document L-104, Exhibit Number USA-644, consisting of a letter to the United States Secretary of State from Ambassador Dodd, under date of 29 November 1937, enclosing a translation of Hitler's letter of 26 November 1937 to Schacht. I quote the last two sentences of Hitler's letter, found on Page 2 of the document: "If I accede to your wish it is with the expression of deepest gratitude for your so excellent achievements and in the happy consciousness that, as President of the Reichsbank Directorate you will make available for the German people and me for many years more your outstanding knowledge and ability and your untiring energy.
LT. BRYSON: Delighted at the fact that in the future, also, you are willing to be my personal adviser, I appoint you as of today a Reich Minister." Schacht did continue, obviously still in full agreement with Hitler's aggressive purpose. He was still President of the Reichsbank at the time of the taking of Austria in March 1938. In fact, the Reichsbank took over the Austrian National Bank. On this point I refer the Tribunal to Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Part I, Page 254, and ask that judicial notice be taken thereof. Further, Schacht even participated in the planning of the absorption of Austria. In this connection I introduce into evidence Document EC-421, Exhibit Number USA-645, consisting of excerpts from minutes of a meeting of the staff of General Thomas on 11 March 1938 at 1500 hours. I quote therefrom as follows: "Lieutenant Colonel Huenerm reads directive of the Fuehrer of 11 March concerning the 'Action Otto' and informs us that 'The Economy War Service Law' has been put in force. He then reads Directives 1 and 2 and gives special orders to troops for crossing the Austrian borders. According to that, at Schacht's suggestion, no requisitions should be made but everything ought to be paid for at the rate of 2 schillings to 1 Reichsmark." On the conversion of the Austrian schilling the Tribunal is asked also to take judicial notice of Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Part I, Page 405. The Tribunal, of course, is already familiar with the public approval by Schacht of the Anschluss in his Vienna speech of 21 March 1938, and Your Honors will also recall Schacht's pride in Hitler's use of the rearmed Wehrmacht at Munich, as expressed in his speech of 29 November 1938. Both speeches were subsequent to his resignation in November 1937. We come now to the removal of Schacht from the presidency of the Reichsbank in January 1939. The reason for this development is quite clear. Schacht lost confidence in the credit capacity of the Reich and was paralyzed with the fear of a financial collapse.
LT. BRYSON: He felt that the maximum level of production had been reached, so that an increase in banknote circulation would only cheapen money and bring on inflation. In this attitude he ceased to be useful to Hitler, who was about to strike and wished to tap every ounce of available Government credit for military purposes. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-369, which I have previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-631. This document is a memorandum from the Reichsbank directorate to Hitler, under date of 7 January 1939, in which Schacht reviews in detail his fears of inflation. The seriousness of the situation may be seen generally from the entire text. I wish to quote several of the more crucial statements, one from the last paragraph on Page 3, the second sentence: "We are, however, faced with the fact that approximately 3 billion Reichsmark of such drafts cannot now be paid, though they will be due in 1939." I quote from the upper half of Page 4: "Exclusive of. the Reichsbank there are approximately 6 billion Reichsmark mefo drafts which can be discounted against cash payment at any time at the Reichsbank, which fact represents a continuous danger to the currency." And I quote finally from the concluding paragraph of the memorandum: "We are convinced that the effects on the currency caused by the policy of the last 10 months can be mended and that the danger of inflation again can be eliminated by strict maintenance of a balanced budget. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor himself has publicly rejected, again and again, an inflation as foolish and fruitless. "We therefore ask for the following measures: "(1) The Reich as well as all the other public offices must not incur expenditures or assume guaranties and obligations that cannot be covered by taxes or by those funds which can be raised through loans without disturbing the long term investment market. "(2) In order to carry out these measures effectively, full financial control over all public expenditures must tee restored to the Reich Minister of Finance.