dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you to reply to this question briefly, "yes" or "no." I think it is possible to reply to the question briefly. Once more I say, in November 1940, more than half a year before the attack on the Soviet Union, plans were already prepared, with your participation, for the attack on the Soviet Union. Can you reply to this briefly? Goering: Yes, but not in the sense in which you are presenting it.
GEN. RUDENKO: It seems to me that I have put the question quite clearly, and there is no ambiguity here at all. How much time did it take to prepare Case Barbarossa? Goering: In which sector, air, land, or sea?
GEN. RUDENKO: If you are acquainted with all phases of the plan, that is concerning the Air Force, the Army and the Navy, then I would like you to answer for all phases of Case Barbarossa. Goering: Generally speaking, I can only answer for the air, where it took a comparatively short time.
GEN. RUDENKO: If you please, just how long did it take to prepare Case Barbarossa? Goering: After so many years I cannot give you the exact time without referring to the documents, but I answered your question when I told you that as far as the Air Force was concerned, it took a comparatively short time; as for the Army, it probably took longer.
GEN. RUDENKO: Thus, you admit that the attack on the Soviet Union was planned several months in advance of the attack itself, and that you, as chief of German Air Force and Reich Marshal, participated directly in the preparation of the attack. Goering: May I divide your numerous questions. Firstly, that was not several months ...
GEN. RUDENKO: There were not too many questions asked at once. It was only one question. You have admitted that in November 1940 Case Barbarossa was prepared and developed for the Air Force. I ask you in your capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the German Luftwaffe. Goering: That is right.
GEN. RUDENKO: You have answered already the first part of my question. Now the following part: You admit that as chief of the German Air Force and Reich Marshal you participated in preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union? Goering: I once more repeat that I prepared for the possibility of an attack, mainly because of Hitler's assumption that Soviet Russia was adopting a dangerous attitude. In the beginning the certainty of an attack was not discussed, and that is stated clearly in the directive of November 1940. Secondly, I want to emphasize that my position as Reich Marshal is of no importance here. That is a title and a rank.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do not deny-- rather, you agree -- that the plan was already prepared in November 1940? Goering: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: It appears to me that the question has already been covered in such detail before the Tribunal that we need not talk too much about Case Barbarossa, which is quite clear. I shall go on to the next question: Do you admit that the objectives of the war against the Soviet Union consisted of invading and seizing Soviet territory up to the Ural Mountains and joining it to the German Reich, including the Baltic territories, the Crimea, the Caucasus; also the subjugation by Germany of the Ukraine, of Bielorussia, and of other regions of the Soviet Union? Do you admit that such were the objectives of that plan? Goering: That I certainly do not admit.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not admit that! Do you not remember that during the conference at Hitler's headquarters on the 16th of June 1941, at which you were present, as well as Bormann, Keitel, Rosenberg, and others, Hitler stated the objectives of the attack against the Soviet Union exactly as I have stated them? This was shown by the document submitted to the Tribunal. Have you forgotten that document? Have you forgotten about that? Goering: I can remember the document exactly, and I have a fair recollection of the discussion at the conference. I said the first time that this document, as recorded by Bormann, appears to me extremely exaggerated as far as the demands are concerned. At any rate, at the beginning of the war, such demands were not discussed; nor had they been discussed previously.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do admit that there are minutes of such a conference? Goering: I admit it because I have seen them. It was a document prepared by Bormann.
GEN. RUDENKO: You also admit that according to the minutes of this meeting, you participated in that conference. Goering: I was present at that conference, and for that reason I question the record.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you remember that in those minutes the tasks were formulated which were in connection with developing conditions? I shall remind you of various parts of the minutes. It is not necessary to read them in full. Goering: May I ask to be shown a copy of that record.
GEN. RUDENKO: You would like a copy of the minutes of the meeting? Goering: I ask to have it.
GEN. RUDENKO: If you please. Would you like to read the document? Goering: No, only where you are going to quote it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Page 2, second paragraph, Point 2, about the Crimea: "We emphasize" -- can you find the place? Do you have it? Goering: Just a moment, I have not found it yet. Yes, I have it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Have you found the place? Goering: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: "A province of the Reich," it says. Goering: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I want to draw your attention to the end of the minutes. It says here: "The Fuehrer stresses the fact that the whole of the Baltic States must become Reich territory." Have you found the place, "The Fuehrer stresses the fact"? Goering: You mean the very last bit?
GEN. RUDENKO: That is right. Goering: "Finally, it is ordered..."?
GEN. RUDENKO: A little higher up. Goering: "The Fuehrer stresses..."?
GEN. RUDENKO: That is right. The Fuehrer then says something about the Ukrainians ... Go on further; skip one paragraph. Have you not found the place where it mentions Leningrad and Finland? Goering: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: These are the minutes of the conference at which you were present on the 16th of July 1941, 3 weeks after Germany attacked the Soviet Union. You do not deny that such minutes exist, do you? It is Document Number L-221. Goering: Just a moment, you are mistaken in the date. You said 3 days; that is not correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: Three weeks, not 3 days. Goering: Oh, 3 weeks; I see.
GEN. RUDENKO: Three weeks after Germany attacked the Soviet Union on the 22d of June, and the conference took place at Hitler's headquarters on the 16th of July at 1500 hours, I think. Is it correct that such a conference took place? Goering: That is quite right. I have said so all along, but the record of this is not right.
GEN. RUDENKO: And who took the minutes of the meeting? Goering: Bormann.
GEN. RUDENKO: What was the point of Bormann's taking the minutes incorrectly? Goering: In this record Bormann has exaggerated. The Volga territory was not discussed. As far as the Crimea is concerned, it is correct, that the Fuehrer ...
GEN. RUDENKO: Well, let us be a little more precise. Germany wanted the Crimea to become a Reich territory, correct? Goering: The Fuehrer wanted the Crimea, yes, but that was an aim fixed before the war. The same applies to the three Baltic States, which had previously been taken by Russia. They, too, were to go back to Germany.
GEN. RUDENKO: Pardon me. You say that the question of the Crimea arose even before the war, that is, the question of acquiring the Crimea for the Reich. How long before the war was that? Goering: No, before the war the Fuehrer had not discussed territorial aims with us, or, rather which territories he had in mind. At that time, if you read the record, I myself considered the question premature, and I confined myself to more practical matters during that conference.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to be still more precise. You state that with regard to the Crimea, there was some question about making the Crimea Reich territory. Goering: Yes, that was discussed during that conference.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, with regard to the Baltic provinces, there was talk about those, too? Goering: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. With regard to the Caucasus, there was talk about annexing the Caucasus also? Goering: It was never a question of its becoming German. We merely spoke about very strong German economic influence in that sphere.
GEN. RUDENKO: So the Caucasus was to become a concession of the Reich? Goering: Just to what degree obviously could not be discussed until after a victorious war. You can see from the record what a mad thing it is to discuss a few days after a war has broken out the things recorded here by Bormann, when nobody knows what the outcome of that war will be and what the possibilities are.
GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore by exaggeration you mean that the Volga territory for instance was not discussed. Goering: The exaggeration lies in the fact that at that time things were discussed which could not be usefully discussed at all. At the most one might have talked about territory which one occupied, and its administration.
GEN. RUDENKO: We are now trying to establish the facts, namely, that those questions had been discussed, and these questions came up at the conference. You do not deny that, do you? Goering: There had been some discussion, yes, but not as recorded in these minutes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to draw just one conclusion. The facts bear witness that even before this conference, aims to annex foreign territories had been fixed in accordance with the plan prepared months ago. That is correct, is it not? Goering: Yes that is correct, but I would like to emphasize that in these minutes I steered away from these endless discussions, and here the text reads: I just wanted to reduce the whole thing to a practical basis.
GEN. RUDENKO: Just so. You have contradicted yourself, inasmuch as in your opinion, the most important thing was the food supply. All the other things could follow later. It says so in the minutes. Your contradiction does not lie in your objection to the plan itself but in the sequence of its execution. First of all you wanted food and later territory. Is that correct? Goering: No, it is exactly as I have read it out, and there is no sequence of aims. There is no secret.
GEN. RUDENKO: Please read it once more and tell me just where you disagreed. Goering: At the time I mentioned railways, et cetera , that is, I wanted to bring this extravagant talk -- such as might take place in the first flush of victory -- back to the purely practical things which must be done.
GEN. RUDENKO: It is understandable that the securing of food supplies plays an important part. However, the objection you just gave does not mean that you objected to the annexation of the Crimea or the annexation of other regions, is that not correct? Goering: If you spoke German, then, from the sentence which says, "opposing that, the Reich Marshal emphasized..." you would understand everything that is implied. In other words, I did not say here, "I protest against the annexation of the Crimea," or, "I protest against the annexation of the Baltic States." I had no reason to do so. Had we been victorious, then after the signing of peace we would in any case have decided how far annexation would serve our purpose. At the moment we had not finished the war, we had not won the war yet, and consequently I personally confined myself to practical problems.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand you. In that case, you considered the annexation of these regions a step to come later. As you said yourself, after the war was won you would have seized these provinces and annexed them. In principle you have not protested. Goering: Not in principle. As an old hunter, I acted according to the principle of not dividing the bear's skin before the bear was shot.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand. And the bear's skin should be divided only when the territories were seized completely, is that correct? Goering: Just what to do with the skin could be decided definitely only after the bear was shot.
GEN. RUDENKO: Luckily, this did not happen. Goering: Luckily for you.
GEN. RUDENKO: And so, summing this up on the basis of the replies which you gave to my question, it has become quite clear, and I think you will agree, that the war aims were aggressive. Goering: The one and only decisive war aim was to eliminate the danger which Russia represented to Germany.
GEN. RUDENKO: And to seize the Russian territories. Goering: I have tried repeatedly to make this point clear, namely, that before the war started this was not discussed. The answer is that the Fuehrer saw in the attitude of Russia, and in the lining up of troops on our frontier, a mortal threat to Germany, and he wanted to eliminate that threat. He felt that to be his duty. What might have been done in peace, after a victorious war, is quite another question, which at that time was not discussed in any way. But to reply to your question, by that I do not mean to say that after a victorious war in the East we would have had no thoughts of annexation.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not wish to occupy the time of the Court in returning to the question of the so-called preventive war, but nevertheless, since you touched on the subject, I should like to ask you the following: You remember the testimony of Field Marshal Milch, who stated that neither Goering nor he wanted war with Russia. Do you remember that testimony of your witness, Field Marshal Milch? Goering: Yes, perfectly.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do remember. In that case why did you not want war with Russia, when you saw the so-called Russian threat? Goering: Firstly, I have said already that it was the Fuehrer who saw the danger to be so great and so imminent. Secondly, in connection with the question put by my counsel, I stated clearly and exactly the reasons why I believed that the danger had not yet become so imminent, and that we should take other preparatory measures first. That was my firm conviction.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do not deny the testimony of your witness Milch? Goering: Milch held a somewhat different opinion from mine. He considered it a serious danger to Germany because it would mean a war on two fronts. He was not so much of the opinion that Russia did not represent a danger, but he held that in spite of that danger one should take the risk and not use attack as a preventive measure against that danger. I too held the same opinion, but of course at a different time.
GEN. RUDENKO: On the basis of your replies to questions during several sessions, it appears there was no country on earth which you did not regard as a threat. Goering: Most of the other countries did not represent a danger to Germany, but I personally, from 1933 on, always saw in Russia the greatest threat.
GEN. RUDENKO: Well, of course, by "the other countries" you mean your allies, is that right? Goering: No, I am thinking of most of the other countries. If you ask me again I would say that the danger to Germany lay, in my opinion, in Russia's drive towards the West. Naturally, I also saw a certain danger in the two western countries, England and France, and in this connection, in the event of Germany being involved in a war, I regarded the United States to be a threat as well. As far as the other countries were concerned, I did not consider them to be a direct threat to Germany. In the case of the small countries, they would only constitute a direct threat, if they were used by the large countries, as bases in a war against Germany.
GEN. RUDENKO: Naturally the small countries did not represent the same threat because Germany already occupied them. That has often enough been established by the Tribunal. Goering: No, a small country as such does not represent a threat, but if another large country uses the small one against me, then the small country too can become a danger.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not want to discuss the thing further as it does not relate to the question. The basic question here is Germany's intentions with regard to the territory of the Soviet Union, and to that you have already answered quite affirmatively and decisively. So I will not ask you any more questions on this subject. I shall go on to the next question. Do you admit that as the Delegate for the Four Year Plan you were in full charge of the working out of the plans for the economic exploitation of all the occupied territories, as well as the realization of these plans? Goering: I have already admitted that I assumed responsibility for the economic policy in the occupied territories, and the directions which I had given for the exploitation of those territories.
GEN. RUDENKO: Can you tell me how many million tons of grain and other products were exported from the Soviet Union to Germany during the war? Goering: I cannot give you the figures. How could I know that from memory? But I am sure it is by no means as large as it was stated here.
GEN. RUDENKO: On the basis of your own documents I have the figures, but we will pass on to that question later. I would like to return to the same conference which has already been mentioned. You remember the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution, concerning the conference of the 6th of August 1942, Exhibit Number USSR-170, Document Number USSR-170? On 6 August 1942, there was a conference of commissioners of the occupied regions and of the representatives of the military command. This conference took place under your direction. You spoke at this conference -- and I would like to remind you of some of the things you said. Goering: May I have a look at these minutes?
GEN. RUDENKO: You want to see the minutes of the meeting? Certainly. It is quite a long document. I do not intend to read the whole thing, but only the relevant passages. I will ask you to look only at Page 111 of this stenographic record -- the place is marked with pencil -- especially the citations which I am going to quote here. On Page 111, it states: Goering: Just one moment. Are you not omitting "under the Four Year Plan"?
GEN. RUDENKO: Evidently the translation has not reached you. I mentioned the Four Year Plan. Is it correct you were given such exclusive rights and prerogatives as mentioned in the citation? Goering: When the Four Year Plan was formulated I received extraordinary general powers. For the first time unlimited powers were given in the economic sphere, I received authority to issue directives and instructions to the highest Reich departments, to the higher offices of the Armed Forces and the Party. During the war these powers were extended to the economic structure of the occupied countries.
GEN. RUDENKO: In that case I have stated and interpreted correctly, what you stated at the conference. Goering: Absolutely, in spite of its being wrongly translated into German.
GEN. RUDENKO: With regard to your special prerogatives and rights, I am going to cite the instructions which you gave, as well as the orders you issued to some of the members who took part in a conference held on the 16th of August, and which were binding upon them. Goering: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, when you used such expressions as "squeeze out," "get everything possible out of the occupied territories," such sentences in the directives issued became orders for your subordinates, is that not correct? Goering: Naturally, they were then put into their proper form. These were the words used in direct speech, and the language was not so polite.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand. Goering: You are referring to the passage -- may I repeat it:
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. Goering: Do you mean that passage?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Page 112. It states here, I shall read it: Goering: You have left out a sentence, "... 	so that the German nation may live ..."
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, that is right. Goering: One minute -- "... extracting everything, so that the German nation may live. That is what I expect from you." Before that it states, however, and this is the sentence I would like to read: The sentence follows then.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that these are your own words: Goering: You have to read that in connection with the preceding part. I do not deny that I said that.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you deny your own words as stated here? Goering: No, I am telling you that I did say that. What I do object to is the way you pick out certain things, whereas they should be taken with their context.
GEN. RUDENKO: These phrases in the document are very expressive. They require no comment. I draw your attention to the following extract on Page 113, which is also underlined. Here are some of your orders: Do you see that extract? Is it correct that this is what you said at the conference? Goering: That quotation has not been translated by the interpreter as it is written down here in the original. The interpreter who is translating your words into German is using many strong expressions which are not contained in this document. Squeeze out ...
GEN. RUDENKO: Please read your original. Goering: It says here "to get from and obtain." Between "to get from and obtain," and "to squeeze out," there is a vast difference in German.
GEN. RUDENKO: To "get out" and to "squeeze out" is about the same thing. And what about the phrase, "I will set up agencies which will squeeze it out of you." What have you got? Goering: "Get from" and not "squeeze out of."
GEN. RUDENKO: "Get from"? Did you have any cause not to trust the Reich commissioners? You refer to them as "special agencies." Goering: Not only were the Reich commissioners of the Eastern territories present, but also the commissioners of all territories. It was a question of the contribution in foodstuffs which the separate countries had to make, to enable us to deal with the whole food question in all those areas in Europe occupied by us. Before the conference I had been told that it was to be expected, as is always the case in such a situation, that everyone would hold back and get the other fellow to deliver first. In other words, I did not want these fellows to let me down. I knew they would offer me only half and I demanded 100 percent. We could then meet somewhere half way.
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you -- these demands which you made to those present at the conference, did they not mean a ruthless plundering of the occupied territories? Goering: No, the main question at this conference was more food.
GEN. RUDENKO: But I am talking about plunder. Plunder can mean plundering of food from the occupied territories? Goering: I have just said I was responsible for the feeding of practically the whole territory. Some of it was territory which had to be provided with food, and some had a surplus, and it had to be equalized. At this meeting the contribution to be made by each Reich commissioner was for the most part fixed at 90 percent, and I in no way deny that in making my demands at the meeting I was worked up and used strong words. Later on the exact figures for the deliveries were laid down, and this was the net result of the meeting.
GEN. RUDENKO: I want to draw your attention to Page 118. Here it states as follows, I quote your words, Page 118, please; have you found the place? Goering: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Here, it says: Have you found the sentence? Goering: Yes, I have found it, and that was exactly what I said at that conference. I emphasize that again
GEN. RUDENKO: I just wanted to ascertain that you really said that. Goering: I did say that, and now I should like to give you the reason. In making that statement I meant that in former times war fed on war. Today you call it something different, but in practice it remains the same.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. I draw your attention to Page 119. There, addressing those present at the meeting you state: Have you found that place? Goering: Yes, I have found it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you say that? Goering: I certainly assume that I did say it; yes.