dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE PRESIDENT: You asked him about these photographs, and he says that they were all true-in his opinion-true pictures; and he didn't take them. He doesn't know anything about them, and anything that he can say upon them appears to us to be argument.
DR. LATERNSER: I will withdraw that question. Generaloberst, was Louvain captured in the manner as testified by the witness Van der Essen? The witness Van der Essen said that Louvain was taken without fighting.
JODL: I have ascertained that the Armed Forces communiqué of, I think, 18 May contains the sentence, "Louvain taken after heavy fighting." But I do not believe...
THE PRESIDENT: What was the place that you are asking about?
DR. LATERNSER: I asked the witness in what way Louvain was captured: whether it was only evacuated by the enemy, and then occupied, or whether the town had to be fought for. The witness has stated that there was no fighting for Louvain, and that therefore it was a particularly despicable act.
THE PRESIDENT: How did it affect the General Staff?
DR. LATERNSER: Well, in that case, Mr. President, I do not know who should be blamed for this event. I cannot see any connection with any one of the defendants; and if nobody can be blamed for it, we must strike out the whole event.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it one of the events which is charged in the Indictment?
DR. LATERNSER: No, the Indictment does not refer to it.
THE PRESIDENT: And the evidence, did the evidence deal with it?
DR. LATERNSER: There is no reference to it in the Indictment; but in the evidence, a witness was produced who stated that the University of Louvain was willfully destroyed by the German artillery although there was no reason to fire on the town.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn't catch the place-but go on.
JODL: I know that the Armed Forces communiqué of 18 May 1940 contained the sentence, "Louvain captured after heavy fighting." Even though the German Armed Forces communiqué was silent on some things, it certainly never stated deliberate untruths. I can say that because I edited it.
DR. LATERNSER: You already spoke yesterday about the case of Oradour. I merely wanted to ask you what Field Marshal Von Rundstedt did about this event-when it was reported to him.
JODL: Many weeks afterwards I learned that an investigation had been started by Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and that there was correspondence about the case of Oradour between Field Marshal Keitel, the Armistice Commission, and Field Marshal Von Rundstedt.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Commander, West begin court-martial proceedings?
JODL: He must have done so, because I read a statement of an SS court in connection with this event.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the outcome of those proceedings?
JODL: I cannot say.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I come to the last points. How many conferences were there before the Ardennes Offensive in December 944?
JODL: There were four conferences about the Ardennes Offensive.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you attend all of them?
JODL: I took part in all of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Was there ever any request for an order, or was an order ever issued at one of these conferences to shoot prisoners during this offensive?
JODL: No. And I can also add that not once during any one of those conferences was a single word mentioned which did not deal with purely operational considerations. There was no talk at all about the conduct of the troops.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, would you have known if such an order had been issued by-let us assume-Field Marshal Von Rundstedt?
JODL: There can be no question of such an order. It never could have been issued through the military channels. It could have been issued only through the Police-that is to say, Himmler or the SS.
DR. LATERNSER: But then it would not have been binding on the units of the Armed Forces-that is, of the Army?
JODL: It is quite out of the question that any commanding general of the Army would even have accepted such an order; and I know of no order of the Fuehrer which was directed against ordinary prisoners in this way.
DR. LATERNSER: I merely put that question because the witness Van der Essen also stated in this courtroom that, judging by the way the prisoners were treated, he had to draw the conclusion that it was the result of an order from a higher level. That is why I asked that question. Do you know the case-the Commando case?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had put your last question. You said that was your last question.
DR. LATERNSER: The last questions. Mr. President, I shall be through in about 5 minutes. I ask you to take into consideration the fact that Generaloberst Jodl is a member of the indicted group, and that he is the officer who is best informed, and that an hour and a half for such an examination is not an excessive amount of time. [Turning to the defendant.] Do you know the Commando case in which the son of the British Field Marshal Alexander was a participant?
JODL: Yes, I know the case.
DR. LATERNSER: Please tell us about it.
JODL: I heard about this affair through a report-I cannot quite remember whom it came from. I discussed it with Field Marshal Keitel, and I expressed the view that it was not necessary to take court proceedings against a lieutenant just because he was wearing a German cap during an action of this kind. Court proceedings were in progress against him, and Field Marshal Keitel gave the order that these proceedings be discontinued.
DR. LATERNSER: And the proceedings were discontinued?
JODL: Yes, they were.
DR. LATERNSER: Well now, regarding the extent of the group, two more questions: What was the jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff?
JODL: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff- I would say-directed, in practice, the general staff work of my entire staff, from which, of course, I was separated to a certain extent because I was in the so-called Security Circle Number 1, and my staff was in Security Circle Number 2-that is to say, outside; and the whole of this general staff work within the inner staff was directed by him, and if necessary, he acted, of course, as my deputy.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have stated that the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff was responsible for strategic planning. Is that correct?
JODL: No. I was primarily responsible.
DR. LATERNSER: Is the significance of the position of this Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff equal to the significance of the other positions which are comprised in the indicted group?
JODL: No, it is far below that. He did not have the position of a commanding general of an army, nor the position of a General Staff chief.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much; I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant's counsel want to ask any questions.
DR. STAMMER: Were you present, Generaloberst, when toward the end of March 1944 Himmler reported to Hitler, during the situation conference, that about 80 Royal Air Force officers had escaped from the camp, Stalag III, at Sagan?
JODL: At the moment when Himmler reported this fact, I was not in the big hall of the Berghof. I was in the next room telephoning. Hearing a very loud discussion, I went over to the curtain to hear what was going on. I heard that they were talking about the escape of the English airmen from the Sagan Camp.
DR. STAMMER: Was Reich Marshal Goering present at this situation conference?
JODL: The Reich Marshal was not present at this situation conference. I am absolutely certain about that.
DR. STAMMER: In later talks with the Reich Marshal, did you find out what he thought of the shooting of some of the escaped officers?
JODL: From talks with the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, I learned that the Reich Marshal was indignant at this shooting, and I knew that particularly in situations such as these the former officer in him who did not approve of such incredible acts came to the surface. One must give him his due. There were repeated arguments over this between him and the Fuehrer, which I witnessed personally.
DR. STAMMER: I have no more questions.
HERR GEORG BOHM (Counsel for SA): With the permission of the Court, I will ask the witness a few questions. Witness, you were Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and the units at your disposal were known to you. The Prosecution assert that you expected to find in the SA a fighting unit in the first days of aggressive war on the basis of the so-called Commando unit (Kommandotruppe). Now I should like to ask you if the term Commando unit is known to you in connection with the use of the SA by the Wehrmacht.
JODL: No, that is not known to me. I heard the word Commando unit for the first time in connection with the undertakings of the English Ranger battalions. We never used this term.
HERR BOHM: There can be no question then that the SA was used as a Commando unit behind the regular troops in the entry into Austria or in the occupation of the Sudetenland?
JODL: I know of no case where formations of the SA co-operated in the occupation of another country-with the exception of the Henlein Free Corps; but that, however, consisted primarily of Sudeten-German refugees. In the Henlein Free Corps there were, I believe, a few SA leaders who had formerly been officers.
HERR BOHM: Was the Feldherrnhalle Regiment used as an SA unit or as a Wehrmacht regiment in the war?
JODL: The Feldherrnhalle Regiment was definitely a Wehrmacht regiment. I should like to say that it embodied the traditions of the SA, and it was recruited primarily from the SA, but it had nothing whatever to do with the Supreme SA Command. It was a Wehrmacht regiment in every sense of the word.
HERR BOHM: Do you know anything about the fact that in 25 group schools, and in 3 Reich leader schools of the SA, 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders were trained annually for the front, and that these 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders were used as such in the Wehrmacht?
JODL: I know nothing about this, and I consider it impossible that the Wehrmacht had its leaders and assistant leaders trained by anyone else than by its own personnel.
HERR BOHM: Would not the position be that all the SA members were drafted into the Wehrmacht as ordinary soldiers, and had to rise from the ranks in the same way as any Wehrmacht soldier?
JODL: The SA were drafted into the Wehrmacht the same as any other German. I know of many cases where high SA leaders started their service in the Wehrmacht in the very lowest positions as soldiers or as noncommissioned officers.
HERR BOHM: Then, the Prosecution also assert that after 1934 the SA trained not only 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders, but that 25,000 of ricers, commissioned and noncommissioned, were trained by the SA for the Wehrmacht. Do you know anything about this?
JODL: What I said before about assistant leaders is true to an even much greater extent among the officers. The officers were trained only in the military schools of the Army and nowhere else.
HERR BOHM: The Prosecution assert further-and I ask whether you know anything about this-that in the course of extending the war effort, 86 percent of the professional leadership corps were made available.
JODL: I cannot give a binding answer to that. I do not know about that.
HERR BOHM: And the Prosecution assert further that the SA sent 70 percent of its millions of members straight to the Wehrmacht. It may be that 70 percent of the SA members did their military service. I want to ask you whether these 70 percent were taken straight from the SA or whether they were called up in the ordinary groups which applied to the able-bodied male population?
JODL: No importance whatsoever was attached to the SA when men were drafted into the Army. The SA man was drafted like any other German who was called up for military service. Whether or not a man had been in the SA previously, did not matter in the slightest.
HERR BOHM: Did the Wehrmacht ever take SA signal units (Sturme), engineer units, or cavalry units, or medical units, and use them in action inside or outside a division of the Wehrmacht?
JODL: I personally knew of no case where any SA unit appeared in action outside Germany during the war.
HERR BOHM: Did the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff have a liaison man with the SA?
JODL: No. From time to time an officer came to me from the Supreme SA Command, and he generally inquired as to the fate and well-being of the Feldherrnhalle Regiment, which had come primarily from the SA, or was composed mainly of members of the SA, and later, about a Panzer formation which also continued the tradition of the Feldherrnhalle of the SA.
HERR BOHM: The Prosecution have submitted a newspaper which shows that on the occasion of the mustering of SA members, Field Marshal Brauchitsch was present. They want to show from this the close connection between the training of the SA and the Wehrmacht. Can you explain this photograph?
JODL: I believe it can be explained by the fact that Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch accompanied the Chief of Staff Lutze once when the latter inspected an ordinary SA unit, and he was accompanied by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch because, as I have already said, after the Rohm Putsch we no longer had any cause for conflict with the SA. At the outbreak of war the SA placed all their equipment, including all tent squares, at the disposal of the Wehrmacht. I remember very clearly.
HERR BOHM: Could this visit of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, when he inspected the SA members, be part of the official activity of the Field Marshal?
JODL: No, in my opinion that was an act of courtesy.
HERR BOHM: From the point of view of conspiracy with which the SA is charged here, do you know that it was said to have always been the task of the SA, especially in the years 1933 to 1939, to prepare Germany, and especially the youth, for a difficult war of conquest by instilling, increasing, and maintaining a warlike spirit in Germany, especially among the youth? Do you know anything in this connection from personal observations?
JODL: I do not know anything about that. That the SA, as a branch of the Party, also endeavored to foster the patriotic spirit within its ranks, to carry on physical training, is a matter of course. As to preparing for wars of aggression, no one ever did that.
HERR BOHM: But that was asserted here in regard to the SA. You are of the opinion that it is not true?
JODL: I have no reason to think that it is true.
HERR BOHM: I have no more questions.
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Generaloberst, the 26th of August 1939 was fixed as X-Day for the attack on Poland. Is it true that on 25 August the order to attack was withdrawn upon the urgent request of Ribbentrop because, according to the communication which reached the Foreign Office, Great Britain had ratified the Treaty of Alliance concluded with Poland on 6 April 1939, and Ribbentrop told the Fuehrer that the advance of German troops would therefore mean war with Great Britain?
JODL: I cannot answer the whole of your question, but I do know something about it. When, on the 25th, to our great surprise we received the order, "The attack fixed for the 26th will not take place," I telephoned to the then Major Schmundt-Field Marshal Keitel was not there-and asked him what was the matter. He told me that shortly before the Reich Foreign Minister had reported to the Fuehrer that Britain had concluded a pact-a mutual assistance pact-with Poland, and for that reason he could expect British intervention in the war with Poland. For this reason the Fuehrer had withdrawn the order for attack. That is what I learned at that time.
DR. HORN: In the spring of 1941, after the Simovic Putsch, the Fuehrer held a conference with the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht and the Defendant Von Ribbentrop was called in to this conference later. Is it true that at this conference .Von Ribbentrop represented the point of view that before military action was taken, an attempt should be made to settle the differences with Yugoslavia by diplomatic means? How did Hitler react to this suggestion?
JODL: I recall this incident especially well because about 1 hour before I had said the same thing to the Fuehrer, that we should clear up the situation with an ultimatum. An hour later, without knowing about this, the Reich Foreign Minister made the same remark, and he fared considerably worse than I did. The Fuehrer said: "Is that how you size up the situation? The Yugoslavs would swear black is white. Of course, they say they have no warlike intentions, and when we march into Greece they will stab us in the back." I recall that statement very exactly.
DR. HORN: Generaloberst, is it true that the Foreign Office from the very outbreak of the Russian war was completely eliminated from Eastern questions, that Ribbentrop complained personally and through his liaison man, Ambassador Ritter, and that he had no success with his suggestions to the Fuehrer?
JODL: I know that Ambassador Ritter, who came to see me very often, repeatedly complained in private talks about having such a large part of its field of activity taken away from the Foreign Office, and I must assume that that was not only the opinion of Ambassador Ritter but also the opinion of the whole Foreign Office as well as of the Foreign Minister.
DR. HORN: In your testimony you have already mentioned the fact that the Wehrmacht was against Hitler's intention to renounce the Geneva Convention. Do you know that Ribbentrop also energetically opposed Hitler's intention, and that after the objections of the Wehrmacht had been rejected at the beginning, Ribbentrop then succeeded in inducing Hitler to give up his intention?
JODL: Put that way, I cannot confirm it fully. One thing I know for certain: the Foreign Office informed me in writing of its unfavorable attitude toward this suggestion or idea of the Fuehrer. For me that was conclusive proof that the Reich Foreign Minister held this point of view. I recorded this unfavorable attitude of the Foreign Office-together with the unfavorable attitude of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe-in a short memorandum, and submitted it to the Fuehrer. To what extent the Reich Foreign Minister personally remonstrated with the Fuehrer about the matter, I cannot say with certainty.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Von Ribbentrop spoke against the chaining of English prisoners of war as reprisal for the chaining of German prisoners of war, and in agreement with the OKW induced Hitler to discontinue this measure?
JODL: That is true. The Reich Foreign Minister, the Foreign Office, repeatedly remonstrated with the Fuehrer to withdraw the order concerning the chaining of Canadian prisoners, and it must be assumed that these many objections, which were also supported by the OKW, finally succeeded in having the order withdrawn.
HERR BOHM: In the Tuesday afternoon session you discussed the question of terror-fliers. In this connection you stated that by making inquiries and observations you wanted to prevent the cause for the decision regarding the intended treatment of this question. The Prosecution submitted two documents on this question. One was the record of an alleged talk between Ribbentrop, Goering, and Himmler at Klessheim, the other an opinion by Ambassador Ritter, who has already been mentioned. I would like to hear from you as to whether you know anything about Ribbentrop's attitude toward the handling of the question of terror-fliers, especially whether Ribbentrop advocated that this question be dealt with according to the Geneva Convention, and whether he thought that it was possible to deviate from this Convention only if decisive military necessities demanded it, and even in that case only by expressly indicating beforehand to the protective powers that it intended to depart from the Geneva Convention?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, can't you put that question more shortly; what does he know about it?
DR. HORN: Is it true, Generaloberst, with regard to the question of terror-fliers, that Von Ribbentrop, in the same way as the Wehrmacht, was against departing from the Geneva Convention, and he put this view to Hitler?
JODL: To this I can say-again from talks with Ambassador Ritter-that I knew that the Reich Foreign Minister advocated official procedure, that is, official notice that we could no longer consider certain acts of terror as belonging to regular warfare. That was the original point of view of the Foreign Office. To this I said at the time that the Fuehrer would probably not be interested as I had concluded from his oral instructions. As it turned out, the suggestion, such as the Reich Foreign Minister intended to make, was never put forward, or at least I never saw it.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything of a peace feeler by English officers on behalf of General Alexander, backed up by the English Government, in 1943?
JODL: I know very well that at that time, in Athens, an Englishman-I believe it was an English captain-established contact with us. This captain said that he came from English headquarters in the southeastern area. I was present when the Reich Foreign Minister reported to the Fuehrer about this matter, and I know he suggested that this contact be tried to see what results it might bring. That was done; the Fuehrer agreed; but I heard nothing more about the matter, and apparently nothing came of it.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything about any further peace attempts of Ribbentrop, especially after the Polish campaign, after Dunkirk and 1943?
JODL: I only knew of the attempts and intentions after the Western campaign. At that time the Fuehrer spoke quite openly and frankly with everyone. I myself, as well as the Reich Foreign Minister, heard the Fuehrer agree that peace would be concluded with England at any time only if part of our former colonies were given back to us.
DR. HORN: Is it true that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop suggested to Hitler that Hungarian Jews, insofar as they wished to do so, be permitted to emigrate?
JODL: I recall that too. Shortly after the occupation of Hungary by our troops, at about the beginning of May 1944, there was a conference at the Berghof, at which a decision was to be reached. The Fuehrer wanted to hear our views as to whether the Hungarian Agony be dissolved, or whether it should be left as it was. At the end of this discussion, which was of a purely military nature, the Reich Foreign Minister said to the Fuehrer, "Can we not send all the Hungarian Jews by ship to some neutral country?" The Fuehrer answered, "That is easier said than done. Do you think that is possible? No one would take them. Besides, it is technically impossible." That is my recollection of this talk.
DR. HORN: You spoke yesterday of the expulsion of the Danish Jews, and you said that this expulsion took place on Himmler's orders. An affidavit by a Colonel Mildner has been submitted to me, in which it is asserted that this expulsion took place on the orders of the Reich Foreign Minister. Is that statement true?