dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
JUETTNER: One can give a whole series of circumstances, which do not excuse such excesses, but perhaps might explain them: (1) Before 1933, especially under the government of Schleicher, the police took especially severe measures, and one-sided measures, against the SA. The result was distrust of the police. Conditions were such that in the year 1933 riots and civil war threatened in the interior of the country. Thus it is quite understandable, although not excusable, that many a man felt that he, rather than the police who were considered unreliable, was responsible for the protection of his new State, and in that way let himself become involved in excesses. (2) Before 1933 a campaign of wild hatred against the SA was conducted. Almost all other political parties participated in this campaign of hate. There were demands to commit violence, posters with the slogan, "Beat the Fascists where you can find them," groups were organized which shouted in chorus "Down with the SA," SA members were molested at their places of work, the children of SA members were annoyed at school; there were boycotts of businesses whose owners were SA members, and there were attacks on individual SA men and also on Stahlhelmer. For example, in my home district of Halle, where I still was at that time, 43 from the ranks of the Stahlhelmer and SA men were killed. All these circumstances caused a certain amount of anger and indignation, which was understandable, and so many a man believed himself entitled to square old accounts with political opponents after 1933. As a third reason or circumstance which led to these excesses, I must state the fact that after 1933 there was a rush to join the SA. The fundamental decency of all these individuals could of course not be established and, as has been proved, dark elements and provocateurs sneaked in with the intention of damaging the reputation of the SA. The excesses, therefore, were not just the final note of the political conflict before 1933, but rather in many cases were committed by just such provocateurs.
JUETTNER: The organization as such is not guilty in that respect. It disapproved of such evildoers, and the leadership strongly condemned such cases when they were reported to them.
HERR BOEHM: Now tell us, what did the SA leadership do in order to prevent such excesses as occurred throughout the year 1933?
JUETTNER: The SA leadership in Prussia worked together with the Prussian Minister for the Interior and his deputies in order to prevent such excesses. Chief of Staff Röhmmade people available for the auxiliary police and selected men from the SA for the Feldj5ger Corps, which was first established in Prussia and proved ,exceptionally useful. Secondly, the SA leadership, in order to gain and justify confidence, devoted itself to ridding its own ranks of provocateurs. Those dismissed from the police and auxiliary police were at the same time removed from the SA. Anyone who was proved guilty of any excesses was punished. The SA leadership of its own accord further set up an SA Patrol Service in order to watch the deportment of its men in the streets and in public life. And finally it was always the main concern of the SA leadership to have the great number of unemployed put to work, to take them off the streets and put them in proper jobs. The numerous social measures of the SA leadership, such as for example the many institutions for professional re-conversion, the projects for the cultivation of swamps, and similar things were directed toward the same end.
HERR BOEHM: Was the number of the excesses or misdeeds that took place and for which SA members were responsible, a large one?
JUETTNER: In comparison with the strength of the SA, these misdeeds that were ascertained were infinitesimally rare, and in addition to that, another point should not be forgotten. In all of these excesses the SA was always accused, for at that time everyone in a brown shirt was taken for an SA man, regardless of whether he was a member of the SA or not. All that was of necessity bound to create in world opinion a distorted picture of the SA. It was bound to create prejudices detrimental to the SA, because the SA was blamed for many excesses in which SA members did not in the slightest participate.
HERR BOEHM: Is it known to you that s teps were taken to quash proceedings before civil courts against SA men for such excesses?
TUTTMER: As far as I know, no such steps to quash legal proceedings before civil courts were undertaken by the SA leadership. On the occasion of a general amnesty the SA leadership naturally demanded the pardoning of its own members too.
HERR BOEHM: After the action against the Jews in November of 1938, the Supreme Party Court, however, opposed the conviction of SA members who had participated in the shooting of Jews. Do you know about this request?
JUETTNER: I do not know this request, but I have heard about it here in custody.
HERR BOEHM: And what is your position toward this request?
JUETTNER: If I remember the contents quite clearly, the Supreme Party Court demanded that first of all the man who was responsible for this action be called to account.
HERR BOEHM: Do you consider this attitude of the Supreme Party Court correct?
JUETTNER: I agree with this demand wholeheartedly.  It is only to be regretted that the Supremem Party Court did not prevail.  But the demand that men who had shot others should go scot-free, that is, escape being sentenced by regular courts, cannot be justified under any conditions.
HERR BOEHM: Well, was such a demand ever made by the SA leadership or by members of the SA?
JUETTNER: The guiding principle of the SA leadership, especially in these actions of November 1938, was that those who had been found guilty were to be punished, not only by the SA but also by the regular courts. As far as Chief of Staff Lutze learned of such cases he always, to my knowledge, advocated such procedure and initiated the necessary steps. The SA even had an agreement with the judicial authorities that if an SA man committed a misdeed and was to be brought before a court, the SA leadership would be notified so that they could suspend this man from service at once and, as the case might be, could prohibit him from wearing the SA uniform and even punish him on their own initiative. This principle was favored and, applied in the action of November 1938 by, Chief of Staff Lutze.
HERR BOEHM: What was the opinion *and the attitude of the SA on the Jewish question?
JUETTNER: The SA demanded that the influence of the Jews in national affairs, in the economy, and in cultural life, be reduced in accordance with their position as a minority in Germany. It advocated a numerus clausus.
HERR BOEHM: And what was the reason for this demand or this attitude?
JUETTNER: This demand, which was not only that of the SA, became general in Germany when after the first World War, in 1918 and 1919, great numbers of Jewish people emigrated from Poland to Germany and entered into the economic and other spheres of life, where they gained considerable influence in an undesirable manner. Through certain large judicial proceedings all this profiteering and this disintegrating influence had become known, and it caused much ill-will and resulted in a movement of opposition. Even Jews who had lived in Germany for a long time, and societies of German citizens of the Jewish faith, took position against these influences in a decided manner. So one can readily see that the demand of the SA was well-grounded.
HERR BOEHM: Did the SA incite others to active violence against the Jews?
JUETTNER: No, in no way. Never did, the Chiefs of Staff, Röhm, Lutze, or Schepmann treat the Jewish question in their speeches, or issue any directives in that respect, much less incite others to violence. The concept of a so-called "master race" was never fostered in the SA; that would have been quite contrary to reason, for the SA received its replacements from all strata. The extermination of a people because of its type was never given any support by the SA, and actions of violence against Jews were not favored by the SA. Quite the contrary, the leadership always objected most strongly to actions of that kind.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that will be a convenient time to break off. How long do you think you are going to be with this witness?
HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, I believe I will need another hour to interrogate the witness, perhaps an hour and a half.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 14 August 1946 at 1000 hours.]
HERR BOEHM: Witness, yesterday we left off in your examination with the manner in which the Jewish question was handled by the SA. Now I should like to ask you how the participation of members of the SA in actions against the Jews in November 1938 can be explained?
JUETTNER: The participation of SA members in this action consisted of irresponsible actions by individuals which were in gross contradiction to the directive of Staff Chief Lutze's executives. Staff Chief Lutze was in Munich in the old city hall. There, in connection with the speech made by Dr. Goebbels, he immediately assigned the chief of the administrative office, Obergruppenfuehrer Matthes, to go to the Hotel Rheinhof, where a part of the SA leaders present had already retired, in order to give these SA leaders strict orders not to participate in any action against the Jews. About an hour later, when he received the news that the synagogue in Munich had been set on fire, Lutze, in my presence, repeated this order to the SA leaders who were still present in the Munich city hall and, said that it was to be passed on to all units immediately. This was actually done, which is confirmed by the fact that in many places no actions were carried out at all, and numerous SA men state under oath that they received this order.
HERR BOEHM: Then how did it come about that, in spite of that, members- of the SA participated in the destruction of Jewish establishments?
JUETTNER: As was ascertained afterwards, certain individuals let themselves be misled by agencies which were undoubtedly under the influence of Dr. Goebbels. As an actual fact, compared with the SA, relatively few real members of the SA participated in this action, although public opinion later blamed the SA for this entire action. And here again it so happened that'everyone in a brown shirt was considered an SA man. That the SA was in no way the sponsor of this action may also be seen from the fact that, as I have read in the press in the last few months, in certain trials, for example, in Bamberg, Stuttgart, and, I believe, in Hof, people were convicted who had destroyed synagogues and yet did not belong to the SA. The fact also that in many places SA men upon instructions from the leadership offered to afford protection to Jewish installations against plundering by shady elements, et cetera, created a popular impression that the SA had committed these misdeeds. In any event, Staff Chief Lutze one or two days later gave voice to his indignation to Dr. Goebbels about the action itself and the unjustified accusation against the SA, and strongly condemned the irresponsible way in which the SA men had been incited to commit these misdeeds. Soon after he issued an order that in the future SA men were not to place themselves at the disposal of other agencies for any tasks or actions unless he himself had given express approval. Staff Chief Lutze punished the guilty ones whom he discovered, and if the case warranted it, they were turned over to the regular courts for judgment.
HERR BOEHM: Had things been different up to that time when Lutze took this particular line? Was the Political Leadership in a position to use SA members for its own purposes?
JUETTNER: The Political Leadership only had authority to use the SA for certain tasks, which included the following: participation in Gau and Kreis rallies; demands for the use of the SA in cases of disaster, and also for propaganda purposes; for collection drives for the Winter Relief, for collecting clothing and the like. These were the usual demands which the Political Leadership made on the SA in the course of the year. So far as I know, at no time did the Political Leadership make any other demands of an illegal nature of the SA. But Lutze issued this order to prevent those offices which were under Dr. Goebbels' influence from leading SA men astray in the future.
HERR BOEHM: Very well. Now, the Prosecution has submitted a document in this Trial, under Number 1721-PS. This is a report from Brigade 50 to Group Kurpfalz. I should first like to show this document to you, and then I should like to ask you whether you made any official inquiries about this matter. [A document was handed to the witness.]
JUETTNER: We made official inquiries after the action. No. actions and misdeeds such, as are indicated in the report were communicated to us from the area of Group Kurpfalz. Moreover, I consider it quite out of the question that these matters which are reproduced here are in accord with the facts.
HERR BOEHM: Now I must put a number of questions to you which would have been superfluous if the witnesses Lucke and rust could have been interrogated in this Court. Lucke is the person who made this report, and Fust is the one to whom it is supposed to have been sent. Is it customary in the SA, when making reports of action completed, to repeat in the report the order which is being reported as executed?
JUETTNER: In my entire activity as chief of the main office of the Higher SA Leadership and as permanent deputy of the Chief of Staff of the SA, I have never observed that in reports on action taken the original orders were repeated verbatim, as has been done in this alleged report. Moreover, I should like to say that the leader of this group, who was Obergruppenfuehrer Fust, at the time he allegedly gave this order, which is repeated here, was in Munich in the old city hall, and then in the Hotel Rheinhof. He received this prohibition from Staff Chief Lutze and transmitted it to his group by telephone in the presense of Obergruppenfuehrer Matthew.  Fust is an uncommonly decent and disciplined man.  When he returned to Mannheim he convinced himself, as I know, of the fact that this order had been transmitted and that in accordance with his instructions SA men had been furnished to guard Jewish installations. Moreover, the head of the leadership division of this Group Kurpfalz, a certain SA leader by the name of Zimmermann, confirms that the Gruppenfuehrer gave the order to do exactly the opposite of that which is contained in this document as a group order, and that he, too, saw SA men acting as guards for Jewish establishments; and SA men at present in internment camps, who headed units in this group, testify that they never received an order like the one which is here alleged to have been given by the group.
HERR BOEHM: Was it customary in SA phraseology to say "Jewish synagogues"?
JUETTNER: No, there was no expression like that. If one spoke of Jewish churches one said "synagogues." The concept "Jewish" was included, just as when you speak of a mosque the concept "Mohammedan!' is inseparable from it. In the same way in our terminology, if you speak of synagogues, you do not say "Jewish synagogues" but just "synagogues."
HERR BOEHM: And in the order there is mention of an "Aryan population." Was that possible or was it customary in this connection?
JUETTNER: This, too, is completely pointless. If this order had been given, one would not have said "adjoining houses which are inhabited by Aryan people," but one would undoubtedly have said "those houses which are inhabited by Germans or persons of German blood," but "Aryan people" would never have been used in this connection.
HERR BOEHM: Does it sound probable or credible that in the year 1938, at a time when National Socialist power was consolidated 100 percent, an order should be given that riots and plundering were to be prevented?
JUETTNER: This speaks quite clearly against the authenticity of the report submitted here. To assume an occasion for plundering and riots in such a connection would have been quite inexplicable, and moreover there was no reason at all for mentioning that here.
HERR BOEHM: Would it have been possible that the group, in an order to the brigade, might have ordered that a report of action taken be sent to the brigade leader?
JUETTNER: That would have been quite senseless. The brigade could not send a report of action taken to itself.
HERR BOEHM: But that is expressed in the report or rather in the repetition of the report.
JUETTNER: Yes, -and that speaks against the authenticity of this report which is reproduced here.
HERR BOEHM: And for that reason what would you gather from the way in which the order is set up?
JUETTNER: I conclude from it, to put it briefly, that this order ,vas never given, and that the man who invented it had no idea of the wording used in commands by the SA.
HERR BOEHM: Was it customary and in accord with the transmission of orders in the SA that orders were not transmitted through official channels, but that matters were handled in the way stated here, according to which the Standartenfuehrer would have been alerted, following which they would have been given very exact instructions and a report would have been made when they started to carry out the order?
JUETTNER: Quite apart from the fact that a report on action taken would never have been made in the form presented here, it was customary with us for orders to be transmitted through official channels; then action was taken. It is absolutely pointless to emphasize especially, or to report, that the execution of the order has begun, because every order involves its own execution. A report would have to be given only if certain difficulties were encountered in executing the order.
HERR BOEHM: And what do you conclude from the improbable, and in part impossible, style of this photostat of 11 November 1938, as a whole?
JUETTNER: It is 1721-PS. USA-425.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you not think we have heard enough about it now? We have heard considerable argument that it is not authentic.
HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, the point is that since the two, witnesses who would have been competent in this matter could not be brought here, the matter must be clarified in such a way that there is no doubt about this forgery. For if this report of action taken were true and correct, the SA would be tremendously incriminated by it.
THE PRESIDENT: I know that, but the witness has been telling us that for the last 10 minutes.
HERR BOEHM: In connection with Document Number 1721-PS, an order of the Supreme SA Leadership was submitted as a document under the same number, an order which is signed by you and which says: "L-1 connection with the actions against the Jews originating among the people, valuable objects had to be safeguarded here -and there by the offices of the Party and its branches for the protection, of German public property. I order that such objects be turned over without delay to the nearest office of the Secret State Police and receipts be given therefore. "If, in connection with these actions, the offices of the Party and their branches should become aware, or have been aware, of thefts which unfortunately may have occurred, a report is to be submitted without delay to the nearest police station. The same procedure is to be observed upon the appearance of suspicious objects. The offices of the Police ire to be aided to the fullest possible extent in the performance of their duties." Because of this order, you are charged with having known that the objects which are mentioned herein were to be turned over to a certain place from which they were never to return to their legal owners. Now, I ask you: What was the origin of this order? Could one or can one gather from the contents of this order, which emphasizes that the offices of the Police are to be aided as much as possible in carrying out their assignment, that it was your intention not to return stolen property to Jews?
JUETTNER: I already became acquainted with this order, which was just read to me, in the preliminary interrogations before the Commission. According to my memory, it dates from 29 November. At that time, on 29 November, I knew exactly that Adolf Hitler, but above all Hermann Göring, Rudolf Hess, and also Lutze, condemned this action of November 1938 very,severely. The order which bears my signature is not contested by me. It is a copy of a directive of the office of the Fuehrer's Deputy, Rudolf Hess, and therefore is traceable to him. Since I knew that Rudolf Hess himself, as a truly law-abiding person, condemned this action very strongly, I had to assume from his order that its purpose was to restore the stolen property to its original owners, namely, the Jews. Any other assumption was entirely out of the question for me, and it was also obvious to me that this property was to be given up to the police offices immediately as trustees, for the Police represented the guardians of law and order, at least in my eyes, and not offices which were called upon to withhold or steal other people's property from them.
HERR BOEHM: Now I should like to turn to a different subject. The witness Schellenberg has alleged that in 1943 and 1944 the SA leadership tried to take over not only the guarding of concentration camps, but also of work camps -and prisoner-of-war camps. What have you to say to that?
JUETTNER: May I ask in what year that was supposed to have been?
HERR BOEHM: In 1943 and 1944.
JUETTNER: In the year 1943, from May to August, I led the A as deputy of the Chief of Staff. During this period, as before, never tried to put tasks into the hands of the SA which were incumbent on other agencies, such as the Reichsfuehrer SS, and specially not tasks of a police nature. I neither aspired to take over tasks of this sort, nor did I have negotiations carried out for this purpose. Moreover, after I learned of this charge against the SA from the Indictment during my imprisonment, I discussed this matter with Herr Schellenberg. Herr Schellenberg told me that the transcript of his testimony must rest on a misunderstanding. He had meant to say conversations between the SA and the Reichsfuehrung SS about questions of municipal and country guards. Conversations of that nature are not disputed by me. They dealt with the apportionment of time in service, so that there would be no conflict should members of the SA, who were obliged on a legal basis to serve in the municipal and country guard~ have to perform SA service at the same time. This adjustment of schedule was the reason for these conversations. The SA had absolutely nothing to do with taking over the guarding of concentration camps, or later the guarding of prisoner-of-war camps and work camps either, nor did I ever learn that individual SA men were legally conscripted for tasks of that nature.
HERR BOEHM: Please comment on the question of how the SA stood toward the Church.
JUETTNER: On the Church question, the SA left the individual complete freedom of choice.  Staff Chief Röhm was a Church member.  Moreover, I recall that in 1934 he issued an order to the SA in which he prohibited SA men from taking sides in any Church controversies, for the reason that this might possibly disturb the solidarity of the SA.  I personally was always a member of the Protestant Church and still am a member today.  As deputy of the Chief of Staff I was a Church member also. The great majority of the SA men were Church members. Many members of the SA-in any case not merely isolated members-were active in Church councils even up to the end, a fact well known to us, which we never tried to prevent. Staff Chief Lutze issued an order everywhere that SA duty was not to be performed when religious services were being held.
HERR BOEHM: Can one say that the SA adopted the principle of positive Christianity as its own?
JUETTNER: I believe I can answer that absolutely in the affirmative.
HERR BOEHM: The beginning of the war in 1939 has been con nected with the activities of the SA. What reasons can you give to prove that the work of the SA did not serve as a preparation for war?