dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GEN. NIKITCHENKO: On 11 August 1939, he entered, into an agreement with Keitel under which the Hitler Jugend agreed to carry out its premilitary activities under standards laid down by the Wehrmacht, and the Wehrmacht agreed to train 30,000 Hitler Jugend instructors each year. The Hitler Jugend placed particular emphasis on the military spirit, and its training program stressed the importance of return of the colonies, the necessity for Lebensraum, and the noble destiny of German youth to die for Hitler. Despite the warlike nature of the activities of the Hitler Jugend, however, it does not appear that Von Schirach was involved in the development of Hitler's plan for territorial expansion by means of aggressive war, or that he participated in the planning or preparation of any of the wars of aggression. Crimes against Humanity In July 1940, Von Schirach was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna. At the same time he was appointed Reich Governor for Vienna and Reich Defense Commissioner, originally for Military District 17, including the Gaue of Vienna, Upper Danube, and Lower Danube and, after 17 November 1942, for the Gau of Vienna alone. As Reich Defense Commissioner, he had control of the civilian war economy. As Reich Governor he was head of the municipal administration of the City of Vienna and, under the supervision of the Minister of the Interior, was in, charge of the governmental administration of the Reich in Vienna. Von Schirach is not charged with the commission of War Crimes in Vienna, only with the commission of Crimes against Humanity. As has already been seen, Austria was occupied pursuant to a common plan of aggression. Its occupation is, therefore, a "crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal," as that term is used in Article 6(c) of the Charter. As a result, "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts" and "persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds" in connection with this occupation constitute a Crime against Humanity under that Article.
GEN. NIKITCHENKO: As Gauleiter of Vienna, Von Schirach came under the Sauckel decree dated 6 April 1942, making the Gauleiter Sauckel's plenipotentiaries for manpower with authority to supervise the utilization and, treatment of manpower within their Gaue. Sauckel's directives provided that the forced laborers were to be fed, sheltered, and treated so as to exploit them to the highest possible degree at the lowest possible expense. When Von Schirach became Gauleiter of Vienna the deportation of the Jews had already been begun, and only 60,000 out of Vienna's original 190,000 Jews remained. On 2 October 1940, he attended a conference at Hitler's office and told Frank that he had 50,000 Jews in Vienna which the Government General would have to take over from him. On 3 December 1940, Von Schirach received a letter from Lammers stating that after the receipt of the reports made by Von Schirach, Hitler had decided to deport the 60,000 Jews still remaining in Vienna to the Government General because of the housing shortage in Vienna. The deportation of the Jews from Vienna was then begun and continued until the early fall of 1942. On 15 September 1942, Von Schirach made a speech in which he defended his action in having driven "tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the ghetto of the East" as "contributing to European culture." While the Jews were being deported from Vienna, reports, addressed to him in his official capacity, were received in Von Schirach's office from the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, which contained a description of the activities of Einsatzgruppen in exterminating Jews. Many of these reports were initialed by one of Von Schirach's principal deputies.
GEN. NIKITCHENKO: On 30 June 1944, Von Schirach's office also received a letter from Kaltenbrunner informing him that a shipment of 12,000 Jews was on its way to Vienna for essential war work and that all those who were incapable of work would have to be kept in readiness for "special action." The Tribunal finds that Von Schirach, while he did not originate the policy of deporting Jews from Vienna, participated in this deportation after he had become Gauleiter of Vienna. He knew that the best the Jews could hope for was a miserable existence in the ghettos of the East. Bulletins describing the Jewish extermination were in his office. While Gauleiter of Vienna, Von 'Schirach continued to function as Reichsleiter for Youth Education and in this capacity he was informed of the Hitler Jugend's participation in the plan put into effect in the fall of 1944 under which 50,000 young people between the ages of 10 and 20 were evacuated into Germany from areas recaptured by the Soviet forces and used as apprentices in German industry and as auxiliaries in units of the German Armed Forces. In the summer of 1942, Von Schirach telegraphed Bormann urging that a bombing attack on an English cultural town be carried out in retaliation for the assassination of Heydrich which, he claimed, had been planned by the British. Conclusion The Tribunal finds that Von Schirach is not guilty on Count One. He is guilty under Count Four.
MR. BIDDLE: SAUCKEL Sauckel is indicted under all four Counts. Sauckel joined the Nazi Party in 1923, and became Gauleiter of Thuringia in 1927. He was a member of the Thuringian legislature from 1927 to 1933, was appointed Reichsstatthalter for Thuringia in 1932, and Thuringian Minister of the Interior and head of the Thuringian .State Ministry in May 1933. He became a member of the Reichstag in 1933. He held the formal rank of Obergruppenfuehrer in both the SA and the SS. Crimes against Peace The evidence has not satisfied the Tribunal that Sauckel was sufficiently connected with the common plan to wage aggressive 'war or sufficiently involved in the planning or waging of the aggressive wars to allow the Tribunal to convict him on Counts One or Two. War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity On 21 March 1942, Hitler appointed Sauckel Plenipotentiary General for the 'Utilization of Labor, with authority to put under uniform control "the utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers recruited abroad and of prisoners of war." Sauckel was instructed to operate within the fabric of the Four Year Plan, and on 27 March 1942, Goering issued 'a decree as Delegate for the Four Year Plan transferring his manpower sections to Sauckel. On 30 September 1942, Hitler gave Sauckel authority to appoint commissioners in the various occupied territories and "to take all necessary measures for the enforcement" of the decree of 21 March 1942. Under the authority which he obtained by these decrees, Sauckel set up a program for the mobilization of the labor resources available to the Reich. One of the important parts of this mobilization was the systematic exploitation, by force, of the labor resources of the occupied territories. Shortly after Sauckel had taken office, he had the governing authorities in the various occupied territories issue decrees establishing compulsory labor service in Germany.
MR. BIDDLE: Under the authority of these decrees Sauckel's commissioners, backed up by the police authorities of the occupied territories, obtained and sent to Germany the laborers which were necessary to fill the quotas given them by Sauckel. He described so-called "voluntary" recruiting by "a whole batch of male and female agents just as was done in the olden times for shanghaiing." That real voluntary recruiting was the exception rather than the rule is shown by Sauckel's statement on I March 1944, that "out of five million foreign workers who arrived in Germany not even 200,000 came voluntarily." Although he now claims that the statement is not true, the circumstances under which it was made, as well as the evidence presented before the Tribunal, leave no doubt that it was substantially accurate. The manner in which the unfortunate slave laborers were collected and transported to Germany, and what happened to them after they arrived, has already been described. Sauckel argues that he is not responsible for these excesses in the administration of the program. He says that the total number of workers to be obtained was set by the demands from agriculture and from industry; that obtaining the workers was the responsibility of the occupation authorities, transporting them to Germany that of the German railways, and taking care of them in Germany that of the Ministries of Labor and Agriculture, the German Labor Front, and the various industries involved. He testifies that insofar as he had any authority he was constantly urging humane treatment. There is no doubt, however, that Sauckel had over-all responsibility for the slave labor program. At the time of the events in question he did not fail to assert control over the fields which he now claims were the sole responsibility of others. His regulations provided that his commissioners should have authority for obtaining labor, and he was constantly in the field supervising the steps which were being taken.
MR. BIDDLE: He was aware of ruthless methods being taken to obtain laborers and vigorously supported them on the ground that they were necessary to fill the quotas. Sauckel's regulations also provided that he had responsibility for transporting the laborers to Germany, allocating them to employers and taking care of them, and that the other agencies involved in these processes were subordinate to him. He was informed of the bad conditions which existed. It does not appear that he advocated brutality for its own sake, or was an advocate of any program such as Himmler's plan for extermination through work. His attitude was thus expressed in a regulation: "All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure." The evidence shows that Sauckel was in charge of a program which involved deportation for slave labor of more than 5,000,000 human beings, many of them under terrible conditions of cruelty and suffering. Conclusion The Tribunal finds that Sauckel is not guilty on Counts One and Two. He is guilty under Counts Three and Four.
M. DE VABRES: JODL Jodl is indicted on all four Counts. From 1935 to 1938 he was Chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command. After a year in command of troops, in August 1939 he returned to become Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces. Although his immediate superior was Defendant Keitel, he reported directly to Hitler on operational matters. In the strict military sense, Jodl was the actual planner of the war and responsible in large measure for the strategy and conduct of operations. Jodl defends himself on the ground he was a soldier sworn to obedience, and not a politician; and that his staff and planning work left him no time for other matters. He said that when he signed or initialed orders, memoranda, and letters, he did so for Hitler and often in the absence of Keitel. Though he claims that as a soldier he had to obey Hitler, he says that he often tried to obstruct certain measures by delay, which occasionally proved successful as when he resisted Hitler's demand that a directive be issued to lynch Allied "terror fliers." Crimes against Peace Entries in Jodl's diary of 13 and 14 February 1938 show Hitler instructed both him and Keitel to keep up military pressure against Austria, begun at the Schuschnigg conference, by simulating military measures, and that these achieved their purpose. When Hitler decided "not to tolerate" Schuschnigg's plebiscite, Jodl brought to the conference the "old draft," the existing staff plan. His diary for 10 March shows Hitler then ordered the preparation of "Case Otto," and the directive was initialed by Jodl. Jodl issued supplementary instructions on 11 March, and initialed Hitler's order for the invasion on the same date. In planning the attack on Czechoslovakia, Jodl was very active, according to the Schmundt notes. He initialed Items 14, 17, 24, 36, and 37 in the notes.
M. DE VABRES: Jodl admits he agreed with OKH that the "incident" to provide German intervention must occur at the latest by 1400 hours on X-1 Day, the day before the attack, and said it must occur at a fixed time in good flying weather. Jodl conferred with the propaganda experts on "imminent common tasks" such as German violations of international law, exploitation of them by the enemy, and refutations by the Germans, which "task" Jodl considered "particularly important." After Munich, Jodl wrote: "Czechoslovakia as a power is out.... The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a world war have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak, and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way." Shortly after the Sudeten occupation, Jodl went to a post command and did not become Chief of the Operations Staff in OKW until the end of August 1939. Jodl discussed the Norway invasion with Hitler, Keitel, and Raeder on 12 December 1939; his diary is replete with later entries on his activities in preparing this attack. Jodl explains his comment that Hitler was still looking for an "excuse" to move meant that he was waiting for reliable intelligence on the British plans, and defends the invasion as a necessary move to forestall them. His testimony shows that from October 1939 Hitler planned to attack the West through Belgium, but was doubtful about invading Holland until the middle of November. On 8 February[13]) 1940, Jodl, his deputy Warlimont, and Jeschonnek, the air forces planner, discussed among themselves the "new idea" of attacking Norway, Denmark, and Holland, but guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Many of the 17 orders postponing the attack in the West for various reasons, including weather conditions, until May 1940, were signed by Jodl. He was active in the planning against Greece and Yugoslavia. The Hitler order of 11 January 1941 to intervene in Albania was initialed by Jodl.
M. DE VABRES: On 20 January, 4 months before the attack, Hitler told a conference of German and Italian generals in Jodl's presence that German troop concentrations in Romania were to be used against Greece. Jodl was present on 18 March when Hitler told Raeder all Greece must be occupied before any settlement could be reached. On 27 March, when Hitler told the German High Command that the destruction of Yugoslavia should be accomplished with "unmerciful harshness," and the decision was taken to bomb Belgrade without a declaration of war, Jodl was also there. Jodl testified that Hitler feared an attack by Russia and so attacked first. This preparation began almost a year before the invasion. Jodl told Warlimont as early as 29 July 1940 to prepare the plans since Hitler had decided to attack; and Hitler later told Warlimont he had planned to attack in August 1940 but postponed it for military reasons. He initialed Hitler's directive of 12 November 1940 that preparations verbally ordered should be continued and also initialed "Case Barbarossa" an 18 December. On 3 February 1941, Hitler, Jodl, and Keitel discussed the invasion, and he was present on 14 June when final reports on "Case Barbarossa" were made. War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity On 18 October 1942 Hitler issued the Commando Order, and a day later a supplementary explanation to commanding officers only. The covering memorandum was signed by Jodl. Early drafts of the order were made by Jodl's staff, with his knowledge. Jodl testified he was strongly opposed on moral and legal grounds but could not refuse to pass it on. He insists he tried to mitigate its harshness in practice by not informing Hitler when it was not carried out. He initialed the OKW memorandum of 25 June 1944 reaffirming the order after the Normandy landings. A plan to eliminate Soviet commissars was in the directive for "Case Barbarossa." The decision whether they should be killed without trial was to be made by an officer.
M. DE VABRES: A draft contains Jodl's handwriting suggesting this should be handled as retaliation, and he testified this was his attempt to get around it. When in 1945 Hitler considered denouncing the Geneva Convention, Jodl argued the disadvantages outweighed the advantages. On 21 February he told Hitler adherence to the Convention would not interfere with the conduct of the war, giving as an example the sinking of a British hospital ship as a reprisal and calling it a mistake. He said he did so because it was the only attitude Hitler would consider, that moral or legal arguments had no effect, and argues he thus prevented Hitler from denouncing the Convention. There is little evidence that Jodl was actively connected with the slave labor program, and he must have concentrated on his strategic planning function. But in his speech of 7 November 1943 to the Gauleiter he said it was necessary to act "with remorseless vigor and resolution" in Denmark, France, and the Low Countries to compel work on the Atlantic Wall. By teletype of 28 October 1944, Jodl ordered the evacuation of all persons in northern Norway and the burning of their houses so they could not help the Russians. Jodl says he was against this, but Hitler ordered it and it was not fully carried out. A document of the Norwegian Government says such an evacuation did take place in northern Norway and 30,000 houses were damaged. On 7 October 1941, Jodl signed an order that Hitler would not accept an offer of surrender of Leningrad or Moscow, but on the contrary he insisted that they be completely destroyed. He says this was done because the Germans were afraid those cities would be mined by the Russians as was Kiev. No surrender was ever offered. His defense, in brief, is the doctrine of "superior orders," prohibited by Article 8 of the Charter as a defense. There is nothing in mitigation.
M. DE VABRES: Participation in such crimes as these has never been required of any soldier and he cannot now shield himself behind a mythical requirement of soldierly obedience at all costs as his excuse for commission of these crimes. Conclusion The Tribunal finds that Jodl is guilty on all four Counts.
THE PRESIDENT: VON PAPEN Von Papen is indicted under Counts One and Two. He was appointed Chancellor of the Reich on I June 1932, and was succeeded by Von Schleicher on 2 December 1932. He was made Vice Chancellor in the Hitler Cabinet on 30 January 1933, and on 13 November 1933, Plenipotentiary for the Saar. On 26 July 1934, he was appointed Minister to Vienna, and was recalled on 4 February 1938. On 29 April 1939, he was appointed Ambassador to Turkey. He returned to Germany when Turkey broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in August 1944. Crimes against Peace Von Papen was active in 1932 and 1933 in helping Hitler to form the Coalition Cabinet and aided in his appointment as Chancellor on 30 January 1933. As Vice Chancellor in that Cabinet he participated in the Nazi consolidation of control in 1933. On 16 June 1934, however, Von Papen made a speech at Marburg which contained a denunciation of the Nazi attempts to suppress the free press and the Church, of the existence of a reign of terror, and of "150 percent Nazis" who were mistaking "brutality for vitality." On 30 June 1934, in the wave of violence which accompanied the, so-called Roehm Purge, Von Papen was taken into custody by the SS, his office force was arrested, and two of his associates, including the man who had helped him work on the Marburg speech, were murdered. Von Papen was released on 3 July 1934. Notwithstanding, the murder of his associates, Von Papen accepted the position of Minister to Austria on 26 July 1934, the day after Dollfuss had been assassinated. His appointment was announced in a letter from Hitler which instructed him to direct relations between the two countries "into normal and friendly channels" and assured him of Hitler's "complete and unlimited confidence." As Minister to Austria, Von Papen was active in trying to strengthen the position of the Nazi Party in Austria for the purpose of bringing about the Anschluss.
THE PRESIDENT: In early 1935 he attended a meeting in Berlin at which the policy was laid down to avoid everything which would give the appearance of German intervention in the internal affairs of Austria. Yet he arranged for 200,000 marks a month to be transmitted to "the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria." On 17 May 1935, he reported to Hitler the results of a conference with Captain Leopold, the leader of the Austrian Nazis, and urged Hitler to make a statement recognizing the national independence of Austria, and predicting that the result might be to help the formation of a coalition between Schuschnigg's Christian Socialists and the Austrian Nazis against Starhemberg. On 27 July 1935, Von Papen reported to Hitler that the union of Austria and Germany could not be brought about by external pressure but only by the strength of the National Socialist movement. He urged that the Austrian Nazi Party change its character as a centralized Reich German Party and become a rallying point for all national Germans. Von Papen was involved in occasional Nazi political demonstrations, supported Nazi propaganda activities, and submitted detailed reports on the activities of the Nazi Party, and routine reports relating to Austrian military defenses. His Austrian policy resulted in the agreement of 11 July 1936, which nominally restored relations between Germany and Austria to "normal and friendly form," but which had a secret supplement providing for an amnesty for Austrian Nazis, the lifting of censorship on Nazi papers, the resumption of political activities by Nazis, and the appointment of men friendly to the Nazis in the Schuschnigg Cabinet. After the signing of this agreement Von Papen offered to resign but his resignation was not accepted. Thereafter he proceeded to bring continued pressure on the Austrian Government to bring Nazis into the Schuschnigg Cabinet and to get them important positions in the Fatherland Front, Austria's single legal party.
THE PRESIDENT: On 1 September 1936, Von Papen wrote Hitler advising him that anti-Nazis in the Austrian Ministry of Security were holding up the infiltration of the Nazis into the Austrian Government-and recommended bringing "slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime." On 4 February 1938, Von Papen was notified of his recall as Minister to Austria, at the same time that Von Fritsch, Von Blomberg, and Von Neurath were removed from their positions. He informed Hitler that he regretted his recall because he had been, trying since November 1937 to induce Schuschnigg to hold a conference with Hitler, and Schuschnigg had indicated his willingness to do so. Acting under Hitler's instructions, Von Papen then returned to Austria and arranged the conference which was held at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Von Papen accompanied Schuschnigg to that conference, and at its conclusion advised Schuschnigg to comply with Hitler's demands. On 10 March 1938, Hitler ordered Von Papen to return to Berlin. Von Papen was in the Chancellery on 11 March when the occupation of Austria was ordered. No evidence has been offered showing that Von Papen was in favor of the decision to occupy Austria by force, and he has testified that he urged Hitler not to take this step. After the annexation of Austria Von Papen retired into private life and there is no evidence that he took any part in politics. He accepted the position of Ambassador to Turkey in April 1939 but no evidence has been offered concerning his activities in that position implicating him in crimes. The evidence leaves no doubt that Von Papen's primary purpose as Minister to Austria was to undermine the Schuschnigg regime and strengthen the Austrian Nazis for the purpose of bringing about the Anschluss. To carry through this plan he engaged in both intrigue and bullying. But the Charter does not make criminal such offenses against political morality, however bad these may be. Under the Charter Von Papen can, be held guilty only if he was a party to the planning of aggressive war.