dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. ROBERTS: It is the 2d of February. It deals with Reich Commissioner Terboven's report to the Fuehrer. It says: Those responsible for attempts to murder and to carry out sabotage are the illegal elements within Norway with a bourgeois-national majority and a communist minority, as well as individual groups which came direct from England or Sweden.... "The bourgeois-national majority was opposed to the communist minority in conception of sabotage and murder, and in particular with regard to their extent and nature. This resistance has. . . become progressively weaker during the course of the past year. "Official departments of the exile government, as for instance the Crown Prince Olaf, as so-called Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces, and various others, have called upon the population in speeches and orders to carry out sabotage. As a result, there is a particularly good possibility here of stamping every supporter of the exile government as an intellectual instigator or accomplice. "The aim of the coming measures must therefore be: a) to strengthen the power and will to turn once more against sabotage by threatening the very influential class of leaders in the bourgeois camp; b) thereby to exacerbate more and more antagonism between the bourgeois and Communists...." And then, "Suggestions." These are suggestions from your of lice, apparently: "1. Particularly influential representatives of the explicitly anti-German and anti-National Socialist class of industrialists to be shot without trial on the accusation that they are intellectual instigators or accomplices and stating that they were convicted within the framework of police investigations. "2. Similar men from the same circle to be sent to Germany to work on fortifications. "3. In cases where the circumstances are particularly suitable, proceedings to be taken before the SS and Police Court, with the execution of the sentence of death and suitable publicity." There are other suggestions which I need not read.
MR. ROBERTS: And then the last paragraph but one: "The Fuehrer has agreed to these proposals only in part. Especially in connection with efforts at protection against acts of sabotage he has rejected taking hostages. He has rejected the shooting of influential Norwegian representatives without trial"-which is underlined in blue pencil. Is that your blue pencil?
JODL: No, it is not mine.
MR. ROBERTS: You see, it is a remarkable document, Witness, because that is one instance where your department is suggesting a course of what I submit is brutal action, which for once the Fuehrer rejects.
JODL: I believe, Mr. Roberts, you are somewhat mistaken. No proposal at all is being made here, but the Armed Forces Operations Staff is advising the military commander in Norway of what Reich Commissioner Terboven has told the Fuehrer. He reported to the Fuehrer first about the general situation and then be made the proposals mentioned here; and the Armed Forces Operations Staff which obviously had a representative at this meeting-I was not there-immediately advised the military commander of the handsome proposals of his friend Terboven. . That is what happened and these proposals went beyond-they were too much even for the Fuehrer. But they were not our proposals.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, Witness, I hear your answer, and the Court will consider it. It may be accepted. The document speaks or itself.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you read the first-the subject description "Orientation about Reich Commissioner Terboven's Report to the Fuehrer"?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. That is the first-that is the subject, is it not, beginning, Witness, "Orientation about Reich Commissioner Terboven's Report"? Whose orientation? Your department's?
JODL: Orientation of the Mountain Army, that is, of General Bohm. General Bohm as commanding general of the Mountain Army, High Command 20, is advised of the report made to the Fuehrer by Reich Commissioner Terboven, so that he would know what his friend Terboven was proposing. It is no more than information on what Terboven said to the Fuehrer. I cannot tell you who was present; I was not there. The entire thing did not originate with me; I have never seen it.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, the second document, this is from Terboven to Bormann on the 28th of October 1944. That is with regard to the evacuation east of Lyngen. I do not think I need read that. Then, the next document, maybe the second document, it is a teleprint of the 6th of April 1945, from Oberfuehrer Fehlis, SS Oberfuehrer to the Operations Staff, and it says: "In accordance with the instructions of the OKW (WFSt)... dated 29 March 1945, members of the Norwegian resistance movement who appear in organized units and who are easily recognizable as combatants by arm bands or other insignia are to be treated as prisoners of war." And then the SS Oberfuehrer says: "I consider this order completely intolerable. I explained this clearly to Lieutenant Colonel Hass and Major Benze from the Armed Forces Operations Staff, who stayed here. There have been isolated appearances of uniformed groups in Norway, but there has been no fighting as yet. Inquiries were made at the defense headquarters in London as to whether armed resistance should be offered in case of German or Norwegian police action. As yet no partisan or other fighting in Norway. On one occasion, captured members of the military organization in uniform claimed the right to be treated as prisoners of war. If this demand were met at the present moment, the result would be that active fighting on the part of the military organization would be set going. Please obtain cancellation of the order of the Armed Forces Operations Staff." And you, you voted for the exemption being removed, did you not? "The objection is justified. Norway has a government in its own country. Whoever fights against it in the country is a rebel. It is another question in the case of Norwegian troops who were taken to England and from there brought into the struggle under England's order." That is your note?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And you stick to that, do you? I mean you-that is your opinion today?
JODL: Yes, indeed. I am of the opinion, from the point of view of international law, that members of a resistance movement against their own Norwegian government are certainly not to be considered as normal troops but as constituting an uprising, a rebellion. But if Norwegian troops come to Norway from England, then they are regular soldiers. And that, today, is still my opinion on the basis of international law.
MR. ROBERTS: What do you call their own Norwegian government, the puppet government which was set up by the Germans?
JODL: In any event, there was the government of Quisling at the time; and in any event, speaking now from the point of view of international law, we were occupying the country, and therefore, according to international law, were justified in issuing laws and enforcing them. That is accepted under international law, and resistance against it has been considered all over the world as rebellion. The same applies to us in Germany today.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want to -deal quite shortly with three other matters, and then I have finished. I want to deal first of all with what you have said with regard to Hitler's suggestion to revoke the Geneva Convention. You say you were instrumental in preventing him from renouncing that Convention?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Would you look at a document which has already been put in, C-153, which is GB-209. I think you have loose copies for it; it is not in a document book. This was put in with regard to the case against Doenitz. It is headed, "Extracts from Minutes of the Hitler Conference on the 19th of February 1945...": "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy was present on 19 February 1945. "The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention. As not only the Russians but also the Western Powers are violating international law by their actions against the defenseless population and the residential districts, it appears expedient to adopt the same course in order to show the enemy that we are determined to fight with every means for our existence, and also to urge our people to resist to the utmost. The Fuehrer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to consider the pros and cons and to state his own opinion." Then, further down, My Lord-Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on the Hitler conference of the 20th of February: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy informed Generaloberst Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and the representative of the Foreign Office at the Fuehrer's headquarters, Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to Germany's possible renunciation of the Geneva Convention. From a military standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as the conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages; even from a general standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that this measure would bring no advantages. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning and at all costs to save face with the world. The Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and Ambassador Hewel are in full agreement." You were saying there, were you not, that you agreed with Raeder when he said, "Break the Geneva Convention, but do not tell the world that we are doing so."
JODL: Grossadmiral Doenitz.
MR. ROBERTS: Doenitz, right. I beg your pardon. That is what you were saying, is it not?
JODL: No. The whole thing, as I have said, is a notice of Admiral Wagner on a conference from which one can gather only that Grossadmiral Doenitz disapproved, and that he is supposed to have made this remark at the end. I can hardly account for that remark today, because the only reason given to us by the Fuehrer at that time was that the tremendous number of German soldiers in the West must be prevented from deserting as a consequence of enemy propaganda about good treatment. I cannot explain this remark, and in my written draft which I submitted to the Fuehrer and which contains the attitude of the Navy that sentence was not included, but only advantages and disadvantages were compared. The disadvantages were overwhelming; the whole thing was completely impracticable and impossible, and so it was not carried out. More I cannot say. Witnesses will confirm my statement.
MR. ROBERTS: I am now going to put to you your own Document D-606. My Lord, that has not yet been exhibited. I offer it as 492-GB. GB-492. [Turning to the defendant.] Now that is signed by you, is it not? It deals with the subject of the breach of the Geneva Convention. If you would say first if it is signed by you? Is it signed by you? Please answer my question: Is it signed by you?
JODL: Yes; my signature is at the end.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, that is where one usually finds the signature. Now, it is dated 21 February 1945, and it is written on your letterhead notepaper. And then, "Notes on report submitted to the Fuehrer on 23 February through the Chief of the Operations Staff. The following questions were to be examined." My Lord, I do not propose to read it all, or anything like that. If the witness would follow me, I will read anything he wants. But it is a discussion as to the various advantages and disadvantages of repudiating the various international agreements, and I think I am not doing the witness an injustice if I say from a utilitarian rather than a moral point of view.
JODL: Yes, quite correct. For my only aim was to succeed with the Fuehrer, and this document was worded accordingly.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I want to read the last paragraph. My Lord, it is the last page but one of Your Lordship's document, right at the bottom: "C. Proposal of the OKW: "At the present moment the disadvantages of repudiating the agreements which have been kept up to now in any case outweigh the advantages by far. "Just as it was a mistake in 1914 that we ourselves solemnly declared war on all the states which had for a long time wanted to wage war on us, and through this took the whole guilt of the war on our shoulders before the outside world, and just as it was a mistake to admit that the necessary"- note the word "necessary"-"passage through Belgium in 1914 was our own fault, so it would be a mistake now to repudiate openly the obligations of international law which we accepted and thereby to stand again as the guilty party before the outside world. "Adherence to the accepted obligations does not demand in any way that we should have to impose on ourselves any limitations which will interfere with the conduct of the war. For instance, if the British sink a hospital ship, this must be used for propaganda purposes, as has been done to date. That, of course, in no way prevents our sinking an English hospital ship at once as a reprisal and then expressing our regret that it was a mistake in the same manner as the British do." That is not very honorable, is it?
JODL: I can only say in reply that this was the sole method which achieved success with the Fuehrer, and by its use success was, in fact, achieved. If I had come to him with moral or purely legal arguments, he would have said, "Leave me alone with this foolish talk," and he would have proceeded with the renunciation of the Convention; but these things compelled him to reconsider the step and, in consequence, he did not carry it through. You must after all grant me that at the end of 51/z years I knew best how to achieve good results with him and avoid bad ones. My aim was to achieve success, and I achieved it.
MR. ROBERTS: But, you see, you were deploring it there, the fact that you told the world the truth in 1914. In 1914 you said that you regarded treaties only as a scrap of paper. You are saying now, "What a pity we told the world the truth in 1914. We ought to have told them something untrue, and then we should have, possibly, had a better world reputation."
JODL: That was an argument which the Fuehrer used frequently. If one repeated his arguments in that form again and again he was more inclined to read and accept one's suggestions. One had to prevent his flinging our proposals to the ground in a fit of rage and immediately decreeing renunciation. That was the approach one had to follow. If one cannot do good openly, it is better to do it in a roundabout way than not at all.
MR. ROBERTS: I am now coming to quite another point: Were you an admirer of the principles of the Nazi Party?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: Were you of the opinion that there was a successful fusion between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht, which brought about the rejuvenation, the resurrection of Germany after 1933?
JODL: It would have happened, and I hoped for a long time that it would happen; indeed, on the whole the relationship improved somewhat in the course of the years and especially during the war. At first, it was poor, very poor.
MR. ROBERTS: You wrote-please, I am reading now from your speech, L-179. It is Page 290 of Document Book 7, and it is Page 6 of your lecture notes, Page 290 of Document Book 7 and 203 of the German: "The fact that the National Socialist movement in its struggle for internal power was the preparatory stage to the outer liberation from the shackles of the dictate of Versailles I need not enlarge upon in this circle. I should like, however, to mention how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National Socialist movement in reawakening the will to fight, in nurturing fighting strength, and in rearming the German people. Despite all its inherent virtues this small Reichswehr could never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Fuehrer aimed at and has luckily been successful in bringing about was a fusion of these two forces." Did that represent your honest opinion or not?
JODL: Yes, that is historical truth, indisputable historical truth. The Movement did bring that about; that is certain.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Then, I now want to put to you the last document but one that I put in. My Lord, it has not been exhibited. It is 1808-PS. I offer it as GB-493. [Turning to the defendant.] You made a speech, did you not, after the attempt on Hitler's life, to your staff? And are these the notes of your speech on 24 July?
JODL: I have never seen this document before; I am seeing it for the first time now. I did not know that any notes were made about the speech.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, let us go by stages. Did you make a speech to your staff shortly after the attempt on Hitler's life-on 24 July 1944?
JODL: Yes, even while my head was still bandaged.
MR. ROBERTS: Secondly, is that document which you have in front of you, is that a document which comes from your files? Look at the cover, if necessary.
JODL: I assume so. It is headed: "Armed Forces Operations Staff War Diary." Most likely these are notes of Major Schramm.
MR. ROBERTS: Let me begin at the beginning of those notes. Just see if you can remember what you said. Did you begin by saying: "The 20th of July . was the blackest day which German history has seen as yet, and will probably remain so for all times"?
JODL: Yes, that is quite possible.
MR. ROBERTS: Why was it such a black day for Germany? Because somebody tried to assassinate a man whom you now admit was a murderer?
JODL: Should I-at a moment when I am to be blown up in a cowardly, insidious manner by one of my own comrades, together with many opponents of the regime-should I perhaps approve of it all? That was to me the worst thing that happened. If the man with a pistol in his hand had shot the Fuehrer and had then given himself up, it would have been entirely different. But these tactics I considered most repulsive to any officer. I spoke under the impression of those events, which are actually among the worst I know, and I maintain today what I said then.
MR. ROBERTS: I do not want to argue with you, but do you think it is any more dastardly than shooting those 50 American soldiers who landed in the north of Italy to destroy a military target, shooting them like dogs?
JODL: That also was murder, undoubtedly. But it is not the task of a soldier to be the judge of his commander-in-chief. May history or the Almighty do that.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I have only about three more questions to ask you. My Lord, I am going to read from Page 2 of that document, about 10 lines from the top. It begins, "The Fuehrer..."~ [Turning to the defendant.] If I read this slowly, perhaps see if you can recognize it. "The Fuehrer ignored this and other things, and now the would-be assassins wished to do away with him, as a 'despot'." Do you remember saying that or something like that? Can you find the place? "The Fuehrer ignored this and other things, and now the would-be assassins wished to eliminate him as a 'despot'." Do you remember that? "And yet, they themselves experienced how the Fuehrer did not come to power by force, but borne up by the love of the German people." Do you remember saying that?
JODL: Yes, and that is true. He caveats power, borne up by the love of the German people. I had tremendous experiences in that respect. He was almost overwhelmed by this love of the people and of the soldiers.
MR. ROBERTS: Borne up by-I beg your pardon, have you finished? I did not mean to interrupt you.
JODL: Yes, I have dealt with that point.
MR. ROBERTS: Borne up by the love of the German people. You have forgotten the SS, the Gestapo, and the concentration camps for political opponents, have you not?
JODL: I have told you how unfortunately little I knew of all these things, almost nothing. Of course, with a knowledge of these things, all this takes a different aspect.
MR. ROBERTS: I take your answer, and I put my last document to you. My Lord, this is a new document) 1776-PS; I offer it as GB-494. [Turning to the defendant.] Just have a look; see if it is signed by you, will you?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: So it is signed by you. Now, you have told this Court that you were opposed to terror attacks. Just see what this document says. Now, note the date first, the 30th of June 1940. That is just after the temporary fall of France? "Chief WFA. "The Continuation of the War against England. "If political means are without results, England's will to resist must be broken by force: "a) by making war against the English mother country. "b) by extending the war on the periphery. "Regarding Point a) there are three possibilities: "1) Siege.... "2) Terror attacks against English centers of population. "3) Landing of troops...." And now I read this as an example of historical prophesy: "Germany's final victory alto over England is only a question of time." Then I go down several paragraphs: "Together with propaganda and temporary terror attacks-declared to be reprisal actions-this increasing weakening of English food supply will paralyze the will of her people to resist and finally break and thus force its government to capitulate...."-Signed-';Jodl." "Terror attacks against English centers of population"-would you like to say anything to justify that sentence?
JODL: Yes, a few remarks. This proposal, which actually is only a compilation of notes, proves three things: First of all, that on 30 June 1940 I did not know of any intention or of the possibility of entering into a war with Russia, otherwise I would not have written: "Germany's final victory over England is only a question of time." Secondly, I admit having voiced a thought which was later carried into practice with such perfection by the Anglo-American Air Force. Thirdly, this thought came to me only after the attack on the civilian population had been started and continued by the English Air Force, despite months of efforts and repeated warnings on the part of the Fuehrer. It is a historical fact, confirmed by many documents, that the Fuehrer tried to the utmost to avoid this form of aerial war against the population But it was already clear at that time, that he would not be able to succeed.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I have finished, Witness. You will notice that of all the documents I have put, except for that one American report, they were all German documents, originating at the time of these events about which I have been cross-examining. In the face of those documents, do you still say that you are an honorable soldier and a truthful man?
JODL: Not only do I still affirm that, but I also think that the submission of these documents has actually and quite specifically proved it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 7 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at ~ o'clock to sit in closed session. The Tribunal will sit tomorrow in open session from 1000 to 1300.
COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): You have testified that you were the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. That was the chief department of the OKW, was it not?
JODL: I did not quite understand the last part of your question.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was the Armed Forces Operations Staff the chief department of the OKW?
JODL: Because of the significance of the activity, one can certainly say that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was one of the most important departments of the OKW.
COL. POKROVSKY: Is that the reason why you deputized for Keitel in his absence?
JODL: In the majority of cases I was the deputy only in operational matters. As for war ministerial questions, it was the senior chief, as a rule, Admiral Canaris, who deputized.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you deny that you were Keitel's deputy?
JODL: When Keitel was not at headquarters, then, as a matter of course, whenever the Fuehrer had anything to say to the OKW, he talked first with me, as I was the next officer by seniority.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you remember the testimony of the witness Wagner to the effect that either you or Keitel usually represented the OKW at all important staff meetings at which this witness, Admiral Wagner, was also present? Do you remember that testimony?
JODL: I did not quite understand that question on account of translation difficulties.