dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Mosler, a specialist on international law, an opinion on the Norway action in very compressed form, as the Tribunal will surely admit. The Tribunal will also concede that in my defense of the Norway action I must speak at length about the underlying principles of international law. The underlying principles of international law are not an altogether simple matter. I have nothing against presenting this myself in all necessary detail. I was merely guided by the thought that the Tribunal have asked again and again that we save time. I believe that we can save considerable time if this statement of opinion is granted me, so that I shall not have to cite numerous excerpts and authors in detail in order to show the exact legal justification. I could then perhaps deal with the legal questions in half an hour, whereas without this statement of opinion it is utterly impossible for me to treat such a problem in half an hour. If the Prosecution do not object to more time being taken up, then l do not object if the document is denied me. I will merely have to take the consequences. Number 76 has meanwhile been crossed out, that is, it is granted me by the Prosecution. Numbers 93 to 96 are excerpts on statements of the official Moscow papers, Isvestia and Pravda . These statements prove that, at least at that time, Soviet opinion regarding the legality of the German action in Norway coincided with the German opinion of that time. If the Tribunal think that these very brief quotations should not be admitted as documents, I would not be too insistent, since at this point in the proceedings I shall in any case be compelled to discuss it The Tribunal will remember that at that time Germany and Russia were friends, and Soviet opinion on a purely legal problem should, at any rate, be considered as having a certain significance. Then, Number 101; I beg your pardon, Sir David, but if I am not mistaken Dr. Braun said an hour and a half ago that Number 101 is to be rejected. Very well, then, Numbers 101 to 107.
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): The action against Norway, as I have already said, involved a problem of international law. It involves the problem of whether one country may violate the neutrality of another country when it can be proved that another belligerent nation likewise intends to violate the neutrality of the afore-mentioned neutral state. When presenting my evidence I shall show that Grossadmiral Raeder, in the autumn of 1939, received all sorts of reports to the effect that the Allies were planning to take under their own protection the territorial waters of Norway, that is, to land in Norway, in order to have Norwegian bases. When I deal with the Norway documents, I shall return to this point. I should like to say at this point that it is necessary to explain and to prove that the legal attitude taken by the Allies to the question of the possible violation of the neutrality of a country was in the years 1939 and 1940 entirely the same as the attitude of the Defendant Raeder in the case of Norway at the same time. Therefore it is necessary not only to deal with Norway; but also to show that this was a basic conception, which can readily be proved by reference to parallel cases on the strength of these documents. These parallel cases deal in the first place with the plans of the Allies with respect to the Balkans, and secondly with the plans of the Allies with respect to the Caucasian oil fields. Your Honors, it is by no means my intention, as Sir David has suggested, to use these documents from the tu quoque point of view, from the point of view that the defendant has done something, which the Allies have also done or wanted to do. I am concerned only with a judgment of the Defendant Raeder's actions from the legal point of view. One can understand such actions only when the entire matter is brought to light. It is my opinion-and in addition to this I should like to refer to the statement of Dr. Mosler's opinion, Exhibit Raeder-66-that this cannot be made the subject of an accusation.
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): We are concerned, Your Honors, with the right of self-preservation as recognized in principle by international law. In this connection I should like...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we don't want to go into these matters in great detail, you know, at this stage. If you state what your reasons are in support and state them shortly, we shall be able to consider the matter.
DR. SIEMERS: I am very sorry that I have to go into these details, but if through the objection of the Prosecution the principles . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not wish to hear you in detail. I have said that the Tribunal do not wish to hear you in detail.
DR. SIEMERS: I merely ask that the Tribunal take into consideration the fact that this concerns the principle of international law laid down by Kellogg himself in 1928, namely, the right of self-preservation, or "the right of self-defense." For that reason l should like to adduce these documents showing that just as the Allies acted quite correctly according to this principle, so also did the Defendant Raeder. Document Number 22 is next. I have given various statements of principle which apply to a large number of the remaining documents, so that I can refer to the statements I have already made. These statements also apply to Documents Numbers 22 and 39. As far as Documents Numbers 63 and 64 are concerned, I should like to point out that these documents deal with Greece; and not only these two, but also a later group of perhaps 10 or 12 documents, with which I should like to deal very briefly. As far as Greece is concerned, the situation is as follows: I must admit that I was more than surprised that the Prosecution objected to these documents, about 14 in all. In Document Number C-12, Exhibit Number GB-226, the Prosecution accuse Raeder of having decreed on 30 December 1939; and I quote, "Greek merchantmen in the prohibited area declared by the United States and England are to be treated as enemy ships." The accusation would be justified, if Greece had not behaved in such a manner that Raeder had to resort to this order. If the documents concerning Greece which show that Greece did not strictly keep to her neutrality are struck out, then I cannot bring any counterevidence. I do not believe that it is the intention of the Prosecution to restrict my presentation of evidence in this way. These are all documents which date back to this time and which show that Greece put her merchantmen at the disposal of England who was at war with Germany. Therefore they could be treated as enemy ships.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like to say that I should have told the Tribunal I would make no objection to Documents Numbers 53 and 54, because they do deal with the chartering of Greek steamers by the British Government.
THE PRESIDENT: But you made no objection to them; you didn't object to Numbers 53 or 54.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to make clear that I don't object to them.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no objection on the paper. What you are dealing with, Dr. Siemers, is 63 and 64, not 53 and 54? Oh, I beg your pardon, I see it further on. Yes, I see; will you please strike that out.
DR. SIEMERS: There is no objection to Numbers 53 and 54?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no objection. My Lord, my friend was dealing with the Greek fleet.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I beg your pardon, I misheard.
DR. SIEMERS: The same things, as I have already stated regarding Documents Numbers 101 to 107, apply also to Document Number 71. Number 99 belongs really to Group 6, to the Norwegian documents; and I should like to refer to these collectively and then refer again later to Number 99. All these documents concern Norway, that is, the planning by the Allies with respect to Norway. These documents deal positively with the planning of the landing in Narvik, the landing in Stavanger, the landing in Bergen, and the absolute necessity of having Norwegian bases. The documents mention that Germany should not be allowed to continue getting ore supplies from Sweden. They also deal in some measure with Finland. There are likewise documents which support the same plan after the Finnish-Russian war had already been concluded. I should like to quote from these documents to prove their relevancy. Since the Tribunal has told me that I cannot do that, I ask that these brief references be considered sufficient. The facts contained in these documents agree, point for point, with those reports which Grossadmiral Raeder received from September 1939 until March 1940 from the Intelligence Service of the German Wehrmacht headed by Admiral Canaris. These plans agree with the information which Raeder received during the same 6 months through the Naval Attache in Oslo, Korvettenkapitan Schreiber, and with the information which he received in a letter from Admiral Carls at the end of September 1939. The information from these three sources caused the Defendant Raeder to point out the great danger involved were Norway to fall into the hands of the Allies, which would mean that Germany had lost the war. It is, therefore, a purely strategic consideration. The occupation of Norway did not, as contended by the British Prosecution, have anything to do with the prestige or desire for conquest but was concerned solely with these positive pieces of information. I must therefore prove, first of all, that the Defendant Raeder did receive this information and, secondly, that these reports were objective.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you are dealing with Document Number 99, are you not?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, 99, and all of Group 6.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't know what you mean by Group 6; 99 is in Group B.
DR. SIEMERS: The group under the letter "F." which Sir David called Group 6, the last on the page.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection of the Prosecution to that document was that it was a document of the 27th of April 1940, at a time after Germany had invaded Norway. You haven't said anything about that.
DR. SIEMERS: I wanted to avoid dealing with each document singly, because I believe that these can be treated generally. However, in this specific case...
THE PRESIDENT: I don't want you to deal with each document separately. I thought you were dealing with Document Number 99. If you can deal with them in groups, by all means do so. However, you are taking up a great deal of the Tribunal's time.
DR. SIEMERS: This Document Number 99 is the Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Supreme Council, that is, the military operational staff of England and France. on 27 April. The heading shows beyond doubt that it was after the occupation of Norway. However, that is only a formal objection. The contents of the document show that at this session the participants discussed the happenings during the period before the occupation, and the most important leaders of the Allies took part in this meeting. Chamberlain, Halifax, Churchill, Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir Alexander Cadogan, et cetera and, on the French side Reynaud, Daladier, Gamelin, and Darlan were present; and these gentlemen discussed the previous plans which, I admit, had misfired because of the German occupation of Norway. But they did discuss about how necessary it was that the iron ore deposits in Sweden should fall into the hands of the Allies and what was to be done now to prevent Germany's getting this ore and how the destruction of these iron-ore deposits could be brought about. I believe, therefore, that though this happened at a later date, the train of thought I have presented is of significance. Then we turn to Document Number 100. This deals with the session of the French War Committee of 9 April 1940, which concerns the same problem: what the Allies had planned and what could've planned now that the report had just come in about the action on the part of Germany. Documents Numbers 102 to 107 have already been dealt with. For Document Number 110 the same statements apply as for Documents 101 to 107. Document Number 112 is a document which shows that Churchill, as early as May 1940, expected active intervention on the part of America. I wanted to present this in connection with the accusation raised against the Defendant Raeder, that in the spring of 1941 he was instrumental in bringing about a war against the United States by way of Japan. For me this document is not nearly so important as those basic documents which I have referred to at greater length.
DR. SIEMERS: Therefore, I leave this completely to the discretion of the Prosecution or the Tribunal. The next group consists of documents which were turned down in the case of Ribbentrop. I should like to point out that I did not have the opportunity in the Ribbentrop case to define my position as to the justification and relevancy of these documents. Therefore I consider it insufficient simply to state that these documents were refused in the case of Ribbentrop, that the charges against Ribbentrop . . .
THE PRESIDENT: We have already carefully considered the arguments and have decided those documents were inadmissible.
DR. SIEMERS: I believed that the decision applied only to the Ribbentrop case, since no other point of view was discussed during those proceedings, namely, that of the charges raised against Raeder in which connection it is expressly said in Document C-152 that Raeder brought about the occupation of the whole of Greece. That is an accusation that was not made against Ribbentrop but only against Raeder. How can I refute this accusation if these documents are denied me?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal know the documents and know the charges against Raeder, and they don't desire to hear any further argument on it. They will consider the matter.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg the pardon of the Tribunal. Under these circumstances I am compelled to see whether all these documents were covered in Ribbentrop's case. My notes, as I told the Prosecution this morning, do not agree with the statements of the Prosecution. Perhaps after the session, if I am unable to do so at the moment, I might point out whether or not the documents are identical. It is really a fact that in Ribbentrop's case these documents were not presented in their entirety and that the Tribunal therefore does not know, them in their entirety. Whether Dr. Horn had marked exactly the same passages as I wish to use, I am not able to say as far as each individual document is concerned. I know only that in the large majority of cases Dr. Horn did not present the entire document because he was presenting it only from the point of view of the Ribbentrop case.
THE PRESIDENT: Presumably you have submitted your extracts to the Prosecution. The Prosecution tell us that those extracts are the same ones that were rejected in Ribbentrop's case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have only a list of those documents so far. We haven't seen the extracts. [There was a pause in the proceedings while the Prosecution conferred.] My Lord, I am sorry. I spoke too quickly. We have seen the extracts in German and we haven't had them translated. We have done the best we could in German.
THE PRESIDENT: 24 and 25, at any rate, are both speeches in English.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, some of them are. I am sorry, My Lord; these are. Your Lordship is quite right.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, as I understand it, Dr. Siemers says that these are not the same passages of evidence, or suggested evidence, as were rejected in Ribbentrop's case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did not do the actual checking myself, but Major Barrington, who checked the Ribbentrop documents, went through these and compared the two, and he gave me that which forms the basis of our note. That is the position. I can't tell Your Lordship that I have actually checked these myself.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers is telling us that that is untrue?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As I understood Dr. Siemers, he was saying that he didn't know whether they were the same extracts . . .
DR. SIEMERS: May I just make one remark in connection with that, please? I am not quite certain that I can say in each specific case which extracts were contained in the Ribbentrop case, but they are not the same. I know for certain that they are not the same because in order to relieve the work of the Translation Division I compared the numbers and in the few cases in which they were the same I told the Translation Division that these documents were identical so that they would not be translated a second time. But I am sorry to say that a large number of the documents were not the same, as they were asked for by Dr. Horn and Ribbentrop from a completely different point of view. I might also point out that the numbers under Group D which are enumerated here as Ribbentrop Documents Numbers 29, 51, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, although I made every effort to find them, could not be found in the Ribbentrop Document Book. And the list does not show which numbers they should be in the Ribbentrop Document Book.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is not suggested. What is said is that they are in the same series which deals with the same subject-that is, the question of Greece and the Balkans- as those documents which the Tribunal ruled out in the case of Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, I think the best course would be for you to go through these documents this afternoon under the heading "C" and find out whether they are the same ones rejected in Ribbentrop's case; and if they are not, indicate exactly in what they differ from the documents rejected in Ribbentrop's case, so as to show they have some relevance to your case; and we shall expect to have that by 5 o'clock. Now will you go on with the others?
DR. SIEMERS: May I perhaps make one remark about what Sir David said regarding group "D"? They were not objected to because they have already been mentioned in Ribbentrop's case; but only because they deal with the same subject matter, that is true. The same subject matter, namely, Greece, is dealt with; and I can only reply that the Prosecution have charged the Defendant Raeder in Document C-152 with having aimed at, and brought about, the occupation of the whole of Greece. The facts concerning this statement of three lines I can present only if I am allowed some documents referring to Greece and only if these are not refused on the grounds that the documents concerning Greece were turned down quite generally in Ribbentrop's case. Now, I come to group "E" which begins with Document 26. The same statements apply which I have already set forth in regard to Documents Numbers 101 to 107. The attacks planned by the Allies on the oil regions in neutral Romania and in the neutral Caucasus-as I should like to remark in parenthesis-have already keen dealt with in these proceedings. The Tribunal will remember that I asked Goering during his examination about entries in Jodl's diary pertaining to this question and he has given information about the reports received by Germany, on Pages 6031 and 6033 of the transcript of 18 March (Volume IX, Pages 402-404). This testimony too concerns only the subjective side, that is, what was known by Germany. I must prove that the objective side, the fact that this had actually been planned, agrees exactly with the subjective side, that is, with these reports. These documents, Numbers 26, 30 to 32, 36, 37, 39, 40 to 44, are to prove that. Then comes Number 99 which has already been dealt with, which seems to be here in duplicate; Number 101, and Number 110 which also seem to be duplicates. I turn now to Group 6, which is supposed to be irrelevant, dealing with the attack on Norway. I have already, on principle, set forth my reasons and I beg the Tribunal not to deny me these documents under any circumstances.
DR. SIEMERS: If I am not granted these documents, I shall simply not be in a position to present evidence in a reasonable manner without telling everything myself. I can present proof in regard to a question of such importance only if documents are granted me just as they are granted the Prosecution. But if all the documents, practically all the documents concerning this question are refused, then I do not know how I am to treat such a question. And I believe that the Tribunal will wish to assist me in this matter. I am requesting this especially for the following reasons: When I gave my reasons for wanting to present this particular evidence, I asked that those files of the British Admiralty be brought in, which dealt with the preparations and planning regarding Scandinavia, that is, Norway. Sir David did not object at that time but said he would have to consult the British Admiralty. The Tribunal decided accordingly and granted my application. In the meantime the British Admiralty has answered, and I assume that Sir David will agree to my reading the answer which has been put at my disposal. This answer is as follows-it concerns, if I may say that in advance . . .
THE PRESIDENT: We have had the answer, I think, have we not? We have had the answer and transmitted it to you.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. From this reply it can be seen that the files will not be submitted, that I cannot get the necessary approval. It can also be seen that certain facts which will be important for my presentation of evidence will be admitted by the British Admiralty; but in reality I am not in a position to prove anything by means of documents. Since I am unable to make use of this evidence, I ask at least to be allowed the other means of presenting evidence, that is, the documents contained in the German White Books. These are documents recognized as being correct. In all cases they are facsimiles. They can be carefully examined and I believe...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we are dealing with your application for particular documents. We are not dealing with any general argument or general criticism that you have to make. We are only hearing you in answer to certain objections on behalf of the British Prosecution.
DR. SIEMERS: Your Honor, unless I am very much mistaken-in which case you will please correct me-Sir David, with a few exceptions, defined his position regarding these documents under "F"- this is a large number, from 59 to 91 with some omissions-as a whole and not his position regarding each individual document. But I have to say the same thing to practically each document and asked only that I be granted those documents as a whole, for I cannot make headway without these documents...
THE PRESIDENT: You were not referring to these documents. You were referring to the fact that the British Admiralty was not prepared to disclose its files to you. It has nothing to do with these documents at all.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe I have been misunderstood, Your Honors. I have already stated very clearly why I need these documents for my presentation of evidence regarding the Norway action. Beyond that I said merely that if these documents are not granted me, then I cannot present any evidence. I am deprived of it. I asked the Tribunal merely to take into consideration the fact that the documents from London, which I had originally counted on, are not at my disposal. And I do not know why this request, which I am submitting to the Tribunal and which is only in explanation of my previous statements, is being taken amiss by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say?
DR. SIEMERS: I have now finished, Your Honors. It is not at all my intention to read all these documents or to spend too much time on them. I believe that if I am granted these documents, the presentation of evidence will be much easier, for these are groups of documents which show the chronological development of certain plans; and if I have the 5th, 6th or 7th document, then I need not read each one. But if I am granted just one document, I will be put in an extremely difficult position and will have to speak in greater detail than I would if I could simply refer to these documents.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider it. Now, Dr. Dix.