dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask any questions of the witness?
DR. NELTE: Witness, during your activities and during this terrible matter, were you in touch with the OKW or the defendant, Field Marshal Keitel, in any way?
WIELEN: No, neither with the OKW nor with Field Marshal Keitel, nor with any of the other high officers.
DR. NELTE: Did I understand you correctly when you stated that the order that we are talking about here, so far as you know, went through the following channels: From Hitler to Himmler, to the Reich Security Main Office, and then the other offices?
WIELEN: Yes, that is the correct organizational path.
DR. NELTE: By whom was the list of which you spoke demanded, the list that was to contain the names of those who were the disturbing element?
WIELEN: That was asked for by the Reich Security Main Office.
DR. NELTE: In the second half of what was read just now, a sentence is contained that reads: "The camp commander must have been informed through military officers of the intended shooting ahead of time." Would you, with regard to this sentence. . .
WIELEN: Well, I should not like to repeat that here so strongly. It is possible, since shootings might have been discussed in the camp, or the fact that more ready use of firearms in general would be taken towards English officers if escapes continued; but in this connection I know nothing more specific, namely, in the connection in which this remark was made.
DR. NELTE: Then you do not want to insist on the fact that we are here dealing with remarks that were made before the escape?
WIELEN: Well, at least not so far as these shootings are concerned; at least not in direct relationship to this particular escape.
DR. NELTE: But it is not possible to know ahead of time if someone is going to escape. For that reason I ask you whether this remark is related to some discussion that took place subsequent to the flight of these officers and which perhaps was directed toward the future prevention of escapes?
WIELEN: That is altogether possible because at Sagan attempts to escape were made daily.
DR. NELTE: Then would you like to clarify the statement, according to which Colonel Lindeiner is said to have stated that military officers stood behind these measures and had been previously informed of them? That is how...
WIELEN: I do not believe that I expressed myself just that way. Could you please repeat that?
DR. NELTE: According to my notes, you said that Colonel Lindeiner stated that military officers stood behind this measure and had been informed of it ahead of time.
WIELEN: I do not think that I could have made such a statement.
DR. NELTE: Then do you want to say that you cannot state that Colonel Lindeiner made such an assertion?
WIELEN: I never had the impression that Lindeiner was personally informed in this matter. At any rate, I have not the slightest reason to believe so.
DR. NELTE: No further questions, thank you.
DR. STAHMER: Witness, according to the minutes, you stated that the Criminal Commissioner Absalon had informed you even before your departure for Berlin that he had heard in Camp Sagan that shootings were to take place.
WIELEN: I just spoke in connection with this same matter, yes.
DR. STAHMER: Is that what you just . . .
WIELEN: That is the same matter.
DR. STAHMER: Another question: During the discussion that you had with General Nebe in Berlin, General Nebe said to you that the military offices were informed, and stated more precisely what military offices were concerned?
WIELEN: No, that was not told to me. Nor do I know whether this intention was at all realized, because the military offices were actually not to be informed, and this whole matter was to be regarded as secret and was to be kept secret.
DR. STAHMER: In your testimony here, you mentioned Reich Marshal Goering. Have you any documentary proof that Reich Marshal Goering knew of these shootings, or is that merely conjecture on your part?
WIELEN: No, please consider from what was said and the way it was said, that I wanted to leave that question entirely open. Therefore, I also said that I did not know it positively, and had no evidence for it; but since it concerned a Luftwaffe camp I ask or propose that the Reich Marshal be heard, since he should be able to give information about it.
DR. STAHMER: In other words, it was only a suggestion on your part to interrogate the Reich Marshal as to whether he was informed?
WIELEN: Because I had to leave this matter open, I made the suggestion only in order to proceed further in the matter at all.
DR. STAHMER: That is all.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you stated that the order had been given by Kaltenbrunner and Muller. Now I ask you, was this order in the form of a teletype or a telegraphic communication, or did you see the order with the original signature?
WIELEN: I believe I can state definitely that it was a teletype communication.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know for sure it was not an original signature?
WIELEN: It was not an original signature. In fact I felt doubts about this later. You can very well imagine that I thought about it hundreds of times, wondering whether it were not entirely possible . . .
DR. KAUFFMANN: Speak more slowly.
WIELEN: ...that it was Himmler's signature; but from the organizational point of view it would have had to be Kaltenbrunner who signed it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: So, if I understood you correctly, you can also not state definitely that the teletype really had Kaltenbrunner's signature under it, but rather you simply assume that from your knowledge of the organization.
WIELEN: I was so impressed by the contents of the communication, by the results, and by the necessity to prepare the working out of the whole affair that I paid little attention to the mechanical matters, that is, the externals involved. As a result, they did not imprint themselves on my memory in such a way that I could make a statement about them with definite reliability.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.
MR. ROBERTS: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. Dr. Nelte, does that close the case for the Defendant Keitel?
DR. NELTE: As far as witnesses are concerned, that closes the case for Keitel. I have a few further remarks to make with regard to the presentation of evidence. The Tribunal have approved an affidavit by Krieger by its ruling of 6 April 1946. I ask the Tribunal to permit me to put this affidavit in evidence as Document Keitel-15. I have the German original here and I should like to read only that part of the affidavit that describes the relations between Hitler and Keitel. This involves three short paragraphs: "The relations between Hitler and former Field Marshal Keitel were officially correct and, on Hitler's part, appeared confiding as a whole, springing from appreciation of or respect for a zealous coworker. Keitel's attitude was upright and soldierly. There was, however, no further friendly or confidential note between them. Apart from official receptions, and so forth, Keitel, as far as could be ascertained, hardly took part with Hitler in informal conversations nor shared any meals with him. Also, summons to discussions with Hitler outside the official conferences, when there were no stenographers present, were not observed. "In preparing decisions or in formulating orders, Keitel gave expression to his own opinions, even if they happened to differ, in an unbiased, clear, soldierly manner. He apparently knew exactly, from many years of collaboration with Hitler, the limits of possibility as far as influencing his opinions or decisions or changing his mind was concerned. For that reason he generally accepted Hitler's decisions as orders in a soldierly manner. In individual cases he tried and succeeded by emphatic reasoning in changing decisions, or at least in delaying them in order to have them further examined. "That Hitler, at least at times, did not trust Keitel completely I believe I can conclude from one of Hitler's remarks . . . "
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it appears to the Tribunal that it is not really necessary to read this. Keitel has already said it, it is cumulative to him, and the document itself is in evidence so we can read it ourselves.
DR. NELTE: It is not necessary, but it simply corroborates what has been testified to here. Therefore, I can. ..
THE PRESIDENT: It is sufficient that you tell us that.
DR. NELTE: I have further received the answers to several interrogatories that were permitted by the Tribunal. First, there is the answer to the interrogatory by Herr Romilly. I can put this sworn interrogatory in evidence before the Tribunal and can forego any reading of it. The same is true of the answers teethe interrogatory submitted to the witness Rotraud Roemer as to the question of the branding of Russian prisoners of war. The interrogatories of Professor Naville and Ambassador Scarpini are not yet at hand. I shall submit them as soon as they arrive. There remains...
THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution had these documents?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you given numbers to these? You gave Document Keitel-15 to the last affidavit. You ought to number the others.
DR. NELTE: Romilly is Document Keitel-16, and Roemer is Document Keitel-17. I have now only the affidavit of the late Field Marshal Von Blomberg. As ruled by the Tribunal on 26 February, it was allowed that he be interrogated. I have sent the original to the Prosecution and I ask to be allowed to put in evidence the sworn answers of Von Blomberg. It is in Document Book 1 and is known both to the Tribunal and to the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: That concludes my case.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you-Now, Dr. Horn, I think-Dr. Nelte, you are lodging these original documents that are numbered Keitel-16, 17, and la, you are lodging them with the General Secretary?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Have they been translated?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Dr. Nelte, we have not seen a translation of Keitel-16, but you are sure that it has been translated, are you?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have seen an English translation of it.
THE PRESIDENT: You have?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was shown to me when it came in. I am quite sure I remember reading it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, perhaps the General Secretary's department will see that we are furnished copies of it. Yes, I think that is the one. That is Keitel-16.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, I think Romilly is Keitel-16. I have seen it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Dr. Horn, do you remember that we read these documents at the time that we approved of their admissibility?
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: So perhaps it won't take you long to introduce them in evidence?
DR. HORN: I shall limit myself to a minimum, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. HORN: I should like to ask the Tribunal first to take judicial notice of Document Ribbentrop-75, contained in Volume III, on Page 191, of Ribbentrop's document book. It is a question here of an agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and Poland of the year 1919. This agreement defines the rights of the German minority in Poland. In Article 12 of this Treaty, which is on Page 3 of this document, it is said that Poland agrees that insofar as the provisions of the above article apply to persons of racial, religious, or linguistic minorities, these provisions form the basis for obligations of international interest and are placed under the supervision of the League of Nations. In subsequent years Poland repeatedly violated this Treaty. That can be seen from the two following documents, Document Ribbentrop-82, on Page 208 of Document Book Number 4. This is a legal judgment by the Permanent International Court. It is of 10 September 1923. In order to save time I might just read the conclusion, where it is said: "The Court is of the opinion that the attitude of the Polish Government defined under Points 'a' and 'b' does not stand in accord with Poland's international obligations." I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, as well as the next document, Document Ribbentrop-84, which is on Pages 212 and 212a of the Ribbentrop Document Book Number 4. This, too, is a statement on the part of a judicial committee of the League of Nations on minority questions. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this report. Immediately after the Government had been taken over by Hitler, this Government attempted to establish a good relationship with Poland. As evidence for this, I refer to Document Ribbentrop-85, which is on Page 213 of the document book. I am reading from Page 2 of that document.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Is that Ribbentrop Document Book 4?
DR. HORN: It is Ribbentrop Document Book 4, Mr. President, Page 213. I am reading from Page 214, center of the last paragraph, as follows: Concerning this conference, two official communiqués were issued by request of the Polish Ambassador. This is Document Ribbentrop-86, which is the German communiqué, and I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it and also the next document, Document Ribbentrop-87, on Page 216 of the document book, which is the Polish communiqué. So as to save time, I do not propose to read these communiqués. On 15 July 1937 considerable parts of the German-Polish pact which was signed in Geneva in 1922, regarding Upper Silesia, expired. The necessity arose, therefore, to create a new pact between the two countries, particularly since difficulties again arose due to the question of minorities and the treatment of German minorities. As evidence for this I refer to Document Ribbentrop-117, on Page 257 of the document book, and I should like to read the second paragraph where it says: "The Reich Minister also pointed out to the Polish Ambassador that the rigorous Polish point of view regarding the expulsion of those who had indicated a preference for Germany could not be accepted by us."
THE PRESIDENT: I could not see that on Page 254.
DR. HORN: Page 257, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see it.
DR. HORN: The result of those conferences between Poland and Germany is the pact which has been submitted as Document Ribbentrop-12a, on Page 263 of the document book. This is a coordinated declaration by the Polish and German Governments regarding the protection of their respective minorities, which was published on 5 November 1937. So as to save time, I can point out that the German minorities were given those rights which are usual between civilized states in similar cases. May I also point out that this agreement does not contain anything which can be considered the sanctioning of any wrong previously committed in this field, a point of view which was recently presented by the Prosecution. So as to remove the difficulties between the Free City of Danzig and the Polish Government which had arisen with regard to minorities and economic matters, an agreement was reached on 5 August 1933, which is Document Ribbentrop-127 and found on Page 270 of the document book. May I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, too? Since, in spite of these treaty agreements on the question of minorities and the problem of the Free City of Danzig, difficulties between the two nations continued to arise, Hitler gave the order to the Defendant Ribbentrop, after the solution of the Sudeten-German question in October 1938, to commence negotiations regarding the Danzig and Corridor questions as well as the question of minorities. For this reason the then Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, was invited to come to Berchtesgaden. The discussions which took place on that occasion between Hitler and the Polish Foreign Minister are contained in Document Ribbentrop-149, on Page 301 of Ribbentrop Document Book Number 5. May I quote from Page 2 of the document to explain what the main features of this conference were?
DR. HORN: On Page 6, it says: "For Germany there was not only the Memel question, which would be settled in a manner consonant with German views- for it looked as if the Lithuanians would be willing to cooperate in finding a reasonable solution-but within the direct German-Polish relationship there was also the problem of Danzig and the Corridor to be solved, which, from the point of view of sentiment, was very serious for Germany." On Page 3 of the same document, last line of the next to the last paragraph, it says Foreign Minister Beck promised that "he would, however, be glad to give calm consideration to the problem." With that Germany considered that negotiations regarding this problem had begun. On 24 January, that is to say the following day, the then Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop had another discussion with the Polish Foreign Minister Beck during which the question of minorities was once more touched on. That discussion is contained in Document Ribbentrop-150, on Page 304. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. By invitation of the then Foreign Minister Beck, Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop went to Warsaw on 24 January 1939. Once more the entire problem was discussed there. On 21 March, after the Czech question had been settled, a reorganization in the East became necessary. The then Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, therefore, asked the Polish Ambassador on 21 March 1939 to come to visit him. The account of that conference is contained in Document Ribbentrop-154, on Page 310 of the document book. May I quote the third paragraph, Page 2, which is the leading point regarding that conference: "Generally, the decision on the Corridor was considered the heaviest burden put on Germany by the Versailles Treaty." A few lines later the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop explained: "A prerequisite for this was, however, that the purely German city of Danzig should return to the Reich, and that an extraterritorial motor road and railway connection be established between the Reich and East Prussia.
DR. HORN: "He promised that Germany would in exchange guarantee the Corridor. "Ambassador Lipski promised to inform M. Beck accordingly and then to give an answer." May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document as well? Although the German Government at that time expected that on the strength of these discussions the question of the minorities and the question of Danzig and the Corridor would find some solution, these discussions had the opposite effect. It appears from Document Ribbentrop-155, on Page 313, and Document Ribbentrop-156, on Page 314 of the document book, that Poland at that time ordered partial mobilization. That partial mobilization could have been directed only against Germany. Moreover, the settling of the Czechoslovakian question on 15 March 1939 had led to a change of attitude on the part of Britain. The then Prime Minister, Chamberlain, under pressure from the opposition, had opened consultations with various European states. As evidence of this fact, I refer to Document Ribbentrop 159, which is Page 317 of the document book. This is a conversation of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, Von Ribbentrop, with the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, in Berlin on 26 March 1939. May I quote the beginning, which is as follows: "On 21 March the British Government proposed first in Warsaw, as well as in Paris and Moscow, that a 'formal declaration' by the British, French, Russian, and Polish Governments shall be made." I shall then skip a few lines and quote further as follows-Line 7 from bottom: "The Polish Government, which ordered partial mobilization on 23 March, was in no way satisfied with this British proposal for negotiations but rather demanded far more concrete commitments from England on behalf of Poland.
DR. HORN: Therefore, also on 23 March, Foreign Minister Beck instructed the Polish Ambassador in London, Count Edward Raczynski, to submit to the British Government the following proposal for an Anglo-Polish union: "'Referring to the English proposal"'-it says further on- "'of 21 March, I request you to ask Lord Halifax if: (1) In view of the difficulties and the unavoidable complications and ensuing loss of time..,."'
MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I see no reason-if I may say so with greatest respect-for reading any part of any of these documents. They are all in evidence, or will be, I assume. All that needs be done, it seems to us, is to give them numbers. I know that eve read and commented at the time we put in the Prosecution's case, but the compelling reasons for that system are not present now and cannot apply as far as these defendants are concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal would like to know what the compelling reasons were that you were referring to.
MR. DODD: Yes, I shall be glad to. At that time it was physically impossible for the Prosecution to have its material all translated in the four languages, or the three languages in addition to the one in which the original was written. Now the defendants do have those facilities. Had we been able to have our papers all translated, we would have submitted them and we would not have commented; but the necessity for comment seemed very real to us, because we had to read everything that we wanted into the record over the speaking system, and if we read a lot of disjointed excerpts from documents we could not have presented any reason of evidence before this Tribunal. But I say that now the Defense can do so, it can submit the whole document, and later on, as I understand the rules and the Charter, Counsel will have an opportunity to argue and comment about it as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: But you will remember that this matter was argued-I think it was a week or so ago. And if I remember rightly, Dr. Dix argued in favor of the defendants' counsel being still entitled to read such passages as they wanted, and with short connecting remarks; and we adhered to that rule.
MR. DODD: I did not understand that Your Honors had already ruled. I remember Dr. Dix's statement. One of his principal reasons was that he wanted an opportunity to make this information available to the press or the public. If that is still his reason, they are all available; the press can have them without having them read over this microphone. However, I won't press the matter if the Court has already ruled.
THE PRESIDENT: I think so.
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I would like to say a few words on the subject of Mr. Dodd's proposal. I fully support...
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, I just pointed out to Mr. Dodd that we have made a specific ruling upon this subject, and, in the opinion of the Tribunal, Dr. Horn has been performing his task with great discretion.
GEN. RUDENKO: I still would like to be permitted to make a few remarks in regard to Mr. Dodd's proposal. As the Tribunal will remember, just before the start of the questioning of the Defendant Keitel the Defense gave full documentation for Keitel, and the Tribunal looked into the matter of what document was to be accepted as evidence and what was to be declined. . .
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if you are repeating, you are repeating the very words I used to Dr. Horn when he began, and, as I say, in the opinion of the Tribunal Dr. Horn has met the views of the Tribunal and has made his reading of these documents reasonably short.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to remark that the Soviet Prosecution consider that Dr. Horn's comments are superfluous as the defendant has already given us too many comments on the subject.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I am sure you will continue to use every possible means of cutting it short as much as you can.
DR. HORN: I hope, Mr. President, that I have convinced the Tribunal that I will be as brief as possible and that I shall read as little as possible, only that which is Necessary make understandable why I am presenting the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now? [A recess was taken.]