dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. LATERNSER: Did you, as commander of an army group, spare art treasures and churches as far as possible?
KESSELRING: I regarded it as a matter of course as my duty to spare centers of art and learning and churches, and I gave orders accordingly, and acted accordingly myself in all my operations and tactical measures.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the treatment of prisoners of war who had fallen into German hands?
KESSELRING: Prisoners of war were treated according to international law. Wherever inspections ordered by me revealed any neglect, I had it redressed and reprimanded the commandant in charge.
DR. LATERNSER: I have still three more questions. Were you, as Field Marshal, informed that Italy would enter the war?
KESSELRING: No, I had not been informed about that. As far as I know, the entry of Italy into the war was so spontaneous that even the political leaders were surprised.
DR. LATERNSER: And were you informed that war would be declared upon America?
KESSELRING: No. I cannot say anything about this question.
DR. LATERNSER: And now the last question. What was the position regarding the resignation of military leaders during the war?
KESSELRING: Resignation from the Wehrmacht of one's own free will, or an application for permission to resign from the Wehrmacht, was not allowed. In 1944 there was an order prohibiting this under threat of the severest penalties. The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht reserved for himself the exclusive right to make changes of personnel in the leading positions.
DR. LATERNSER: Was there a written order to this effect?
KESSELRING: Yes, I think so.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, you said before that the commanders-in-chief had, in military matters, the right and the opportunity to present their demands and views to Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. Did I understand that correctly?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you personally have differences of opinion with Hitler?
KESSELRING: Considerable differences about operational and tactical questions.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did it come to a real clash?
IMSSELRING: "Clash" is perhaps putting it too strongly; rather a divergence of opinion on either side.
DR. JAHRREISS: Shall we say disputes? Were they frequent?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: After all we have heard, here, Adolf Hitler must have been a rather difficult customer.
KESSELRING: That must be admitted. On the other hand, I found him -- I do not know why -- understanding in most of the matters I put to him.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you yourself settle these differences of opinion with Hitler?
KESSELRING: In critical cases Colonel General Jodl called me in if he could not carry his point.
DR. JAHRREISS: If you could not carry the point?
KESSELRING: No, if Jodl could not carry the point.
DR. JAHRREISS: If Jodl could not carry the point, you were called in?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Jodl's opinions, too, differ from Hitler's?
KESSELRING: On the various occasions when I attended for reporting I observed very definite differences of opinion between the two gentlemen, and that Jodl -- who was our spokesman at the OKW -- put his point of view with remarkable energy and stuck to it right to the end.
DR. JAHRREISS: What do you mean, he was your spokesman? Whose spokesman?
KESSELRING: My theaters of war, speaking as a general in the Wehrmacht, were so-called OKW theaters of war, and the East was an Army theater of war. The East was an Army theater of war, whereas the others were OKW war theaters.
DR. JAHRREISS: Had the OKW no say regarding the Army theaters of war in the East?
KESSELRING: No.
DR. JAHRREISS: And the Army had no say regarding the OKW theater of war?
KESSELRING: No.
DR. JAHRREISS: I think not everybody will be able to understand this difference.
KESSELRING: It would be asking too much, because I myself cannot understand it.
DR. JAHRREISS: So, you were in an OKW theater of war?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: What does OKW mean in this connection?
KESSELRING: Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, I know that.
KESSELRING: It meant that the commander-in-chief was directly under Adolf Hitler, and headquarters under Jodl's operations staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: In a previous interrogation you spoke of orders from the OKW, did you not?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Who is the OKW? Who gave orders?
KESSELRING: Orders of a fundamental nature were issued by one person only, and that was Adolf Hitler. All the others were only executive officers. This did not prevent these executive officers from holding views of their own or sharing the views of the army groups under them. They presented these views energetically to Adolf Hitler.
DR. JAHRREISS: What you are saying now rather surprises me, since the opinion had been voiced that Jodl, who you say was a kind of spokesman for the commanders-in-chief, was a willing tool of Adolf Hitler.
KESSELRING: I think the one does not exclude the other. I cannot imagine any marriage of 6 years standing without both partners having tried to understand each other. On the other hand, I can very well imagine that even in the happiest marriage serious quarrels occur.
DR. JAHRREISS: But in the average marriage the husband does not necessarily have to be a willing tool.
KESSELRING: Here the situation is still a little bit different. As with all comparisons, this comparison with marriage does not go the whole way. In addition to this, in the army there is the principle of unquestioning subordination.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but what you have just told us, about Jodl's position as spokesman for the commanders-in-chief, sounds as if Jodl acted as an intermediary, does it not?
KESSELRING: Jodl represented our interests in an outstanding way and thus acted as an intermediary for all of us.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did he also pit his opinions against those of Adolf Hitler when Adolf Hitler, in one of his famous fits of rage, had issued an order?
KESSELRING: I can state only that, on the occasion of my few visits to headquarters, I saw Colonel General Jodl grow red in the face, if I may say so, and in expressing his views he went very near the limit of what is permissible for a military man.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 13 March 1946 at 1000 hours.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has made an order with respect to further proceedings on the charge against organizations and the applications of members thereof. I do not propose to read that order, but the order will be posted on the Defense Counsers information board and will be communicated to them and to the Prosecution. Dr. Jahrreiss, had you finished your examination?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Does any other of the Defense Counsel wish to examine the witness? [The witness Kesselring resumed the stand.]
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, have you any recollection when the Defendant Kaltenbrunner first came into the public eye?
KESSELRING: I have no knowledge of Kaltenbrunner's becoming particularly prominent in the public eye. I heard the name Kaltenbrunner for the first time when he appeared as successor to General Canaris.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you any recollection of him being made the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office in January 1943?
KESSELRING: I may have heard of it, but I have no certain recollection of it.
DR KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner states that in April 1945 he tried to save the country of Austria from further acts of war. Have you by chance any recollection of that?
KESSELRING: I merely heard that Kaltenbrunner was one of those persons who were working for an independent Austria, but I have no definite, accurate knowledge of the situation. DR. KAUFFMANN, Furthermore, Kaltenbrunner states that he, on the basis of an agreement with the Red Cross at Geneva, had arranged for the return of civilian internees to their homeland through the firing line. He had communicated a request to your office -- not to you personally -- to the effect that a gap should be created in the fighting line to let these civilian internees go home. Do you happen to remember that?
KESSELRING: It, is quite possible that such a request was actually submitted. It did not come to my personal knowledge, because I was away from my office a great deal.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, have you any recollection when concentration camps were first established in Germany?
KESSELRING: Yes. It was in 1933. 1 remember three concentration camps, but I do not know exactly when they were established: Oranienburg, which I often passed by and flew over; Dachau, which had been discussed vehemently in the newspapers; and Weimar-Nora, Weimar, a concentration camp which I flew over quite frequently on my official trips. I have no recollection of any other concentration camps; but perhaps I may add that, as a matter of principle, I kept aloof from rumors, which were particularly rife during those periods of crisis, in order to devote myself to my own duties which were particularly heavy.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Regarding the internees in the concentration camps, did you have any definite idea as to who would be brought to these concentration camps?
KESSELRING: I had an idea, without knowing where I got it from, which seemed plausible to me; namely, that the National Socialist Revolution should be achieved without the loss of life, and that political opponents should be detained until the founding of the new State had given sufficient security for them to return to public life. That is my knowledge of the situation, from which I conclude, in order to answer your question, that these people must, for the most part, have been persons who were opposed to the National Socialist ideology.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you ever thought what the treatment in these concentration camps would be like according to your idea? What was your conception of the treatment of the prisoners in the camps? There may perhaps be a difference according to whether you think of the earlier or the later years?
KESSELRING: I know nothing about the methods of treatment in the camps. During the earlier years, when I was still working in Germany, rumors were heard to the effect that treatment was normal. In the later years I was abroad, that is to say, in theaters of war outside Germany; and I was so far away that I knew nothing whatsoever of these incidents and did not ask for any information about them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it right therefore to assume that as far as the atrocities were concerned which did actually occur, you had no positive knowledge?
KESSELRING: No, I did not have any positive knowledge, not even in March 1945, when I became Supreme Commander in the West. Even then the occurrences in the concentration camps were completely unknown to me. This I attributed to two reasons: First, the personal attitude which I expressed earlier, that on principle I concerned myself only with my own business -- which in itself was sufficiently extensive, and secondly, that within the State a police state had developed which had hermetically sealed and closed itself off from the rest of the world.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you any proof that there was more knowledge in your officers' circles than what you have just described with regard to yourself?
KESSELRING: I was in very close contact with my officers and I do not believe that there can have been a large number of officers who knew more about these things. Of course I cannot give information regarding individuals.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know that Hitler had decided to eliminate the Jewish people physically?
KESSELRING: That was absolutely unknown to me.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you not have frequent opportunities to discuss ideological questions with Hitler?
KESSELRING: Whenever I was at headquarters only military and similar questions concerning my theater of war were discussed during the official part of the conversation. When I was invited to a meal, then historical matters or matters of general interest were usually discussed, but acute political problems or ideological questions never came up for discussion. I personally cannot remember any instance when Hitler influenced me, or any of the other generals, in any way whatsoever with regard to professing themselves active National Socialists.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you believe in Hitler's personality in the sense that Hitler was determined to lead the German people to a better Germany, with consideration for personal freedom and respect for human dignity? What was your conception about that?
THE PRESIDENT: What is the relevancy of a witness' belief upon a subject of that sort? What relevancy has it got to do with any part of the case of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner? The Tribunal considers this sort of question a waste of the Tribunal's time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it correct that in the absolute leadership state which existed in Germany any opposition by a human being to a superior order was impossible?
KESSELRING: In that form I would not deny that. One could certainly represent one's own views against another view. But if one's own views were rendered invalid by a decision, absolute obedience became necessary, and its execution was demanded and ensured under certain circumstances by the application of penal law. Resistance to that order, or an order, was, according to our knowledge of the personality and attitude of Adolf Hitler, out of the question and would have achieved nothing.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Would not a person attempting to resist a finally issued order have to consider whether he might not be risking his life?
KESSELRING: During the later years that was an absolute certainty.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you at any time think the war could not be won, and if so, when?
KESSELRING: In 1943, the possibility had to be considered that a victorious peace might not be achieved. I emphasize expressly that one had to consider that possibility, for by observing certain organizational or operational measures, the situation might still have been reversed.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you ever discuss this question with someone of importance -- the misgivings which you may have had about the continuance of the war?
KESSELRING: At various times when I discussed my own military sector, I referred to certain difficulties which might influence the outcome of the war in general; however, as representative of one military sector, I considered myself in no way entitled to judge the entire military situation, since I could not, from my limited viewpoint, judge the situation regarding production and the organization of manpower reserves. And as I said before, I refused, as an amateur, to make any statement about a situation, which under certain circumstances might have been regarded as official as it would have had the signature of Field Marshal Kesselring.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly explain to the Tribunal what relevancy the last two or three questions have to the case of Kaltenbrunner?
DR. KAUFFTMANN: The same applies to Kaltenbrunner, that he could not as he says, resist an order. It would have meant the loss of his life.
THE PRESIDENT: You asked the witness whether at any time during the war he thought how long the war would last. What has that got to do with Kaltenbrunner?
DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution accuses several defendants of having continued the struggle in spite of the fact that they knew it was hopeless, and of having prolonged the war. That is the problem I wish to clarify in my last question.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it was put specifically against Kaltenbrunner. If it is your last question you may put it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: If I understand you correctly, Witness, what you are trying to explain is that the leading motive of your continuing to fight was also your duty towards your country?
KESSELRING: That is a matter of course. I had other motives too. One was that the possibility of a political termination of the war was denied, at least officially; but that I believed in it, and I am still convinced of it today, may be proved by the fact that I personally, together with Obergruppenfilhrer Wolff, undertook negotiations through Switzerland with an American, in order to prepare the ground for a political discussion to that end.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other Counsel for the Defense?
HERR PELCKMANN: Witness, Dr. Kauffmann asked you whether the officers' corps had any knowledge of the conditions and the establishment of concentration camps. Do you know that within the Armed Forces so-called national-political instruction courses were held?
KESSELRING: Yes, I know of that.
HERR PELCKMANN: May I ask you whether you know that during one of the Armed Forces national-political courses of instruction, which were held from 15 to 23 January 1937, and I am referring now to Document Number 1992(a)-PS concerning the establishment of concentration camps, Himmler, the SS Leader, in the presence of the assembled officers, made a speech more or less to this effect: "Naturally, we make a difference between inmates who may be there for a few months for educational purposes, and those who will be there for a long time." I skip a few sentences, and come to the ones I consider important: "The order begins by insisting that these people live in clean barracks. This can, in fact, only be achieved by us Germans, for there is hardly any other nation which would act as humanely as we do. Linen is frequently changed. The people are instructed to wash twice a day, and the use of tooth brushes is advised, a thing which is unknown to most of them." Do you know that the Armed Forces were given instructions of this kind, which, as we know today, do not correspond to conditions as they really were?
KESSELRING: As I said earlier, we did not concern ourselves with such questions at all, and this lecture by Himmler is unknown to me.
HERR PELCKMANN: Unknown. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions? Then the Prosecution may cross-examine.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You understand, Witness, in giving your testimony, as to the definition of the High Command and the General Staff, as that definition is included in the Indictment, you are accused as a member of that group, do you not?
KESSELRING: I understand.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that you are testifying here virtually as one of the defendants?
KESSELRING: I understand.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have spoken of the establishment in Germany of a police state by the National Socialist Party, and I want to ask you whether it is not a fact that the police state rested on two institutions very largely, first, the Secret State Police, and secondly, the concentration camps?
KESSELRING: The assistance by the police is an established fact to me. The concentration camp was, in my opinion, a final means to that end.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And both the secret police and the concentration camp were established by Hermann Goering, is that not a fact known to you?
KESSELRING: The Secret State Police was created by Hermann Goering. Whether it was formed by Himmler...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your lectures will be reserved for your own counsel, and I shall ask to have you so instructed. Just answer my questions. Was not the concentration camp also established by Hermann Goering?
KESSELRING: I do not know.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not know that. Did you favor the police state?
KESSELRING: I considered it as abnonnal according to German conceptions that a state had been formed within a state thus keeping certain things away from public knowledge.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you ever do anything or can you point to anything that you did in public life to prevent that abnormal condition coming to Germany?
KESSELRING: I cannot remember anything, except that during conversations with my superiors I may have brought the point up for discussion. But I emphasize expressly that in general I confined myself to my own sphere and my own tasks.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you want this Tribunal to understand that you never knew that there was a campaign by this state to persecute the Jews in Germany? Is that the way you want your testimony to be understood?
KESSELRING: A persecution of the Jews as such was not known to me.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that Jewish officers were excluded from your army and from your command?
KESSELRING: Jewish officers did not exist.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that certain officers of your army, certain officers of the Luftwaffe, took steps to Aryanize themselves in order to escape the effect of Goering's decrees? Did you know about that?
KESSELRING: I heard rumors to that effect.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Any Aryanizing, where the father was suspected of Jewish ancestry, consisted in showing that the normal father was not the actual father, did it not?
KESSELRING: I admit that. Naturally there are other cases as well.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. It might be that the mother was suspected of Jewish ancestry?
KESSELRING: That in certain exceptional cases certain facts were overlooked.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Did you know anything about the Jewish riots, anti-Jewish riots of November 9th and 10th in Germany in 1938?
KESSELRING: Are you talking about the "Mirror Action" (Spiegelsache)? I am not sure which day you are talking about.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am talking about the riots in which synagogues were burned, which made Goering so very angry. Did you not hear about that in 1938?
KESSELRING: No, I did not hear anything about it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where were you in 1938?
KESSELRING: In 1938 I was in Dresden.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In November?
KESSELRING: In November I was in Berlin as Chief of the Air Force.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In Berlin. And you never heard about the anti-Jewish riots of the 9th and 10th of November 1938?
KESSELRING: I only heard about the so-called "Mirror or Glass Campaign (Spiegel- oder Glas-Campagne)."
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was that? You have me down. I do not know anything by that name.
KESSELRING: That was the smashing of shop windows and more, which assumed rather large proportions in Berlin.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did hear, then, about the anti-Jewish riots?
KESSELRING: About those, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you hear that Hermann Goering issued a decree confiscating the insurance that was to make reparations to those Jews who owned shops? Did you hear about Goering's action in that respect?
KESSELRING: I did not quite understand. May I ask to have it repeated?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you hear about the decree passed by Hermann Goering a few days later, November 12th, to be exact, confiscating the insurance of the victims of those raids and fining the Jewish community a billion Reichsmark?
KESSELRING: It is possible that I heard about it at the time, but I now have no certain recollection.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you did hear about it. You did not regard those things as persecution?
KESSELRING: Naturally I must regard this "Glass Campaign" as an excess against the Jews.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have stated, as I understand you, based on your experience with Hitler, that it was permissible for officers to differ with him in opinion so long as they obeyed his orders. Is that what you want understood?
KESSELRING: I have to apologize, but I did not quite understand the last half of that sentence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have understood from your testimony this morning that you felt perfectly free to disagree with Hitler and to make suggestions to him and give him information, but that, after his mind was made up and an order issued, it had to be obeyed. That is to say...
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is to say, an officer was at all times at liberty to go to Hitler and give him technical information, such as the state of the preparedness of his branch of the service?
KESSELRING: Generally speaking, no. For that purpose the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces concerned were the only people admitted.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So the only channel through which information as to the state of the Air Force would reach Hitler was through Hermann Goering, is that a fact?
KESSELRING: Hermann Goering and, from time to time, State Secretary Milch, deputy of the Reich Marshal.