dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
to the Nazi cause. A captured memorandum of the German Foreign Office, dated Berlin, 29 November 1939-eight months after the conquest of Czechoslovakia-throws a revealing light both on Karmasin and on the German Foreign Office: "On the question of payments to KARMASIN "Karmasin receives 30,000 Marks for the VDA (Peoples' League for Germans Abroad) until 1 April 1940; from then on 15,000 Marks monthly. "Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial Germans (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle) has deposited 300,000 marks for Karmasin with the German Mission in Bratislava (Pressburg) on which he could fall back in an emergency. "Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart; for the present it has been impossible to determine what amounts had been involved, and whether the payments will continue. "Therefore it appears that Karmasin has been provided with sufficient money; thus one could await whether he would put up new demands himself. "Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign Minister. "/s/ WOERMANN" (2794-PS). This document shows the complicity of the German Foreign Office in the subsidization of illegal organizations abroad. More important, it shows that the Germans still considered it necessary to supply their under-cover representatives in Pressburg with substantial funds even after the declaration of the so-called independent State of Slovakia. Some time in the winter of 1938-1939 Goering conferred with Durcansky and Mach, two leaders in the Slovak extremist group, who were accompanied by Karmasin. The Slovaks told Goering of their desire for what they called "independence," with strong political, economic, and military ties to Germany. They promised that the Jewish problem would be solved as it had been in Germany and that the Communist Party would be prohibited. The notes of the meeting report that Goering considered that the Slovak efforts towards independence were to be supported, although his motives were scarcely altruistic. The undated minutes of this conversation between Goering and Durcansky, captured among the files of the German Foreign Office, are jotted down in somewhat telegraphic style: "To begin with DURKANSKY (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out declaration. Contents: Friendship for the Fuehrer; gratitude, that through the Fuehrer
scarcely altruistic. The undated minutes of this conversation between Goering and Durcansky, captured among the files of the German Foreign Office, are jotted down in somewhat telegraphic style: "To begin with DURKANSKY (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out declaration. Contents: Friendship for the Fuehrer; gratitude, that through the Fuehrer autonomy has become possible for the SLOVAKS. The SLOVAKS never want to belong to HUNGARY. The SLOVAKS want full independence with strongest political, economic and military ties to Germany. BRATISLAVA to be capital. The execution of the plan only possible if the army and police are SLOVAK. "An independent SLOVAKIA to be proclaimed at the meeting of the first SLOVAK Diet. In the case of a plebiscite the majority would favour a separation from PRAGUE. Jews will vote for Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the MARCH, where a large SLOVAK population lives. "The Jewish problem will be solved similarly to that in Germany. The Communist party to be prohibited. "The Germans in SLOVAKIA do not want to belong to Hungary but wish to stay in SLOVAKIA. "The German influence with the SLOVAK Government considerable; the appointment of a German Minister (member of the cabinet) has been promised. "At present negotiations with HUNGARY are being conducted by the SLOVAKS. The CZECHS are more yielding towards the Hungarians than the SLOVAKS. "The Fieldmarshal considers; that the SLOVAK negotiations towards independence are to be supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy. "Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for use against the East." (2801-PS) In mid-February 1939 a Slovak delegation journeyed to Berlin. It consisted of Tuca, one of the Slovaks with whom the Germans had been in contact, and Karmasin, the paid representative of the Nazi conspirators in Slovakia. They conferred with Hitler and Ribbentrop in the Reichs Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12 February 1939. The captured German Foreign Office minutes of that meeting read as follows: "After a brief welcome Tuca thanks the Fuehrer for granting this meeting. He addresses the Fuehrer with 'My Fuehrer' and he voices the opinion that he, though only a modest
and Ribbentrop in the Reichs Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12 February 1939. The captured German Foreign Office minutes of that meeting read as follows: "After a brief welcome Tuca thanks the Fuehrer for granting this meeting. He addresses the Fuehrer with 'My Fuehrer' and he voices the opinion that he, though only a modest man himself, might well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech courts and prison gave him the right to make such a statement. He states that the Fuehrer had not only opened the Slovak question but that he had been also the first one to acknowledge the dignity of the Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will gladly fight under the leadership of the Fuehrer for the maintenance of European civilization. Obviously future association with the Czechs had become an impossibility for the Slovaks from a moral as well as economic point of view." (2790-PS) It is noteworthy that Tuca addressed Hitler as "My Fuehrer". During this meeting the Nazi conspirators apparently were successful in planting the idea of insurrection with the Slovak delegation. The final sentence of this document, spoken by Tuca, is conclusive: "I entrust the fate of my people to your care." (2790-PS) It is apparent from these documents that in mid-February 1939 the Nazis had a well-disciplined group of Slovaks at their service, many of them drawn from the ranks of Father Hlinka's party. Flattered by the personal attention of such men as Hitler and Ribbentrop, and subsidized by German representatives, these Slovaks proved willing tools in the hands of the Nazi conspirators. In addition to the Slovaks, the Nazi conspirators made use of the few Germans still remaining within the mutilated Czech republic. Kundt, Heinleins deputy who had been appointed leader of this German minority, created as many artificial "focal points of German culture" as possible. Germans from the districts handed over to Germany were ordered from Berlin to continue their studies at the German University in Prague and to make it a center of aggressive Naziism. With the assistance of German civil servants, a deliberate campaign of Nazi infiltration into Czech public and private institutions was carried out, and the Henleinists gave full cooperation with Gestapo agents from the Reich who appeared on Czech soil. The
in Prague and to make it a center of aggressive Naziism. With the assistance of German civil servants, a deliberate campaign of Nazi infiltration into Czech public and private institutions was carried out, and the Henleinists gave full cooperation with Gestapo agents from the Reich who appeared on Czech soil. The Nazi "political activity" was designed to undermine and to weaken Czech resistance to the commands from Germany. In the face of continued threats and duress on both diplomatic and propaganda levels, the Czech government was unable to take adequate measures against these trespasses on its sovereignty. (998-PS; 3061-PS) In early March, with the date for the invasion of Czechoslovakia already close at hand, fifth column activity moved into its final phase. In Bohemia and Moravia the FS, Heinleins equivalent of the SS, were in touch with the Nazi conspirators in the Reich and laid the groundwork for the events of 14 and 15 March. An article by SS-Gruppenfuehrer Karl Hermann Frank, published in Boehmen and Maehren, the official periodical of the Reichs Protector of Bohemia and Moravis, March 1941, pate 79, reveals with considerable frankness the functions which the FS and SS served and the pride the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these organizations: "The SS on March 15, 1939 "A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable without political troops. To these are allotted the special task of being the advance guard of the political will and the guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German folk-groups, which have their home in some other people's state. Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes (Freiwilliger Selbstschutz), called 'FS' for short. This troop was trained essentially in accordance with the principles of the SS, so far as these could be used in this region at that time. That troop was likewise assigned here the special task of protecting the homeland; actively, if necessary. It stood up well in its first test in this connection, wherever in the fall crisis of 1938 it had to assume the protection of the homeland, arms in hand. "After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau, the tasks of the FS were transferred essentially to the German student
the homeland; actively, if necessary. It stood up well in its first test in this connection, wherever in the fall crisis of 1938 it had to assume the protection of the homeland, arms in hand. "After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau, the tasks of the FS were transferred essentially to the German student organizations as compact troop formations in Prague and Brunn, aside from the isolated German communities which remained in the second republic. This was also natural because many active students from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the FS. The student organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other Germans, during the crisis of March 1939 * * * " "In the early morning hours of March 15, after the announcement of the planned entry of German troops in various localities, German men had to act in some localities in order to assure a quiet course of events, either by assumption of the police authority, as for instance in Brunn, or by corresponding instruction of the police president, etc. In some Czech offices, men had likewise, in the early hours of the morning, begun to burn valuable archives and the material of political files. It was also necessary to take measures here in order to prevent foolish destruction * * *. How significant the many-sided and comprehensive measures were considered by the competent German agencies, follows from the fact that many of the men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even though the Reichsfuehrer SS himself or through SS Group Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these men were thereby designated as accomplished in the interest of the SS. "Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here placed themselves at once at their further disposition and became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators. * * *" (2826-PS) The background of the German intrigue in Slovakia is outlined in two British diplomatic despatches (D-571, D-572) and excerpts from despatches sent by M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin to the French Foreign Office between 13 and
and became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators. * * *" (2826-PS) The background of the German intrigue in Slovakia is outlined in two British diplomatic despatches (D-571, D-572) and excerpts from despatches sent by M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin to the French Foreign Office between 13 and 18 March 1939, and published in the French Yellow Book. (2943-PS) In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day the Czechoslovakian government dismissed those members of the Slovak Cabinet who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them Prime Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within 24 hours the Nazis seized upon this act of the Czech government as an excuse for intervention. On the following day, 11 March, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. It is related in the report of the British Minister in Prague to the British government: "Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart and five German generals came at about 10 P.M. on the evening of Saturday, the 11th March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress at Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor (the prime Minister) showed hesitation, Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czecho-Slovakia definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her independence because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this information, but said that he must discuss the situation with the Government at Prague." (D-571) Events were now moving rapidly. Durcansky, one of the dismissed ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal. Arms and ammunition were brought from German Offices in Engerau, across the Danube, into Slovakia where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guard to create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as an excuse for military action. The situation at Engerau is described in an affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks: "I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows- "1. From 1934 to 1941 I was a member of the SD. In the winter of 1939
of the type required by the Nazis as an excuse for military action. The situation at Engerau is described in an affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks: "I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows- "1. From 1934 to 1941 I was a member of the SD. In the winter of 1939 I was stationed in Berlin, working in Amt VI, Chief Sector South East. Early in March, four or five days before Slovakia declared its independence, Heydrich, who was chief of the SD, ordered me to report to Nebe, the chief of the Reich Criminal Police. Nebe had been told by Heydrich to accelerate the production of explosives which his department was manufacturing for the use of certain Slovak groups. These explosives were small tins weighing approximately 500 grams. "2. As soon as forty or fifty of these explosives had been finished, I carried them by automobile to a small village called Engerau, just across the border from Pressburg in Slovakia. The Security Police had a Service Department in this village for the handling of SD activities. I turned over the explosives to this office and found there a group of Slovaks, including Karmasin, Mach, Tuka and Durcansky. In fact, three of these people then present later became ministers in the new Slovak government. I was informed that the explosives were to be turned over to the Hlinka Guards across the border in Slovakia and were to be used in incidents designed to create the proper atmosphere for a revolution. "3. I stayed in Engerau for a day and a half and then returned to Berlin. "4. One or two weeks later I met in Berlin the same Slovak delegation, including Mach, Tuka, Durcansky and Karmasin, which I had seen in Engerau. They had flown to Berlin for a conference with Goering. Heydrich asked me to look after them and to report to him what developed during the conference with Goering. I reported this conference in detail to Heydrich. It dealt principally with the organization of the new Slovak state. My principal recollection of the conference is that the Slovaks hardly got a word in because Goering was talking all the time. "The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at NURNBERG,
Slovak state. My principal recollection of the conference is that the Slovaks hardly got a word in because Goering was talking all the time. "The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at NURNBERG, Germany this 20th day of November 1945. "(Signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks "ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS" (3030-PS) At this time the German press and radio launched a violent campaign against the Czechoslovak government. And, significantly, an invitation from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava. Tiso, the dismissed prime minister, was summoned by Hitler to an audience in the German capital. A plane was awaiting him in Vienna. (998-PS; 3061-PS; 2943-PS) M. Occupation of Czechoslovakia Under Threat of Military Force. At this point, in the second week of March 1939, preparations for what the Nazi leaders liked to call the "liquidation" of Czechoslovakia were progressing with a gratifying smoothness. The military, diplomatic, and propaganda machinery of the Nazi conspirators was moving in close coordination. As during Case Green of the preceding summer, the Nazi conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in the attack. It appears from a letter Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, wrote to Hitler on 13 March 1939, which was captured in the German Foreign Office files, that Horthy was flattered by the invitation: "Your Excellency, "My sincere thanks. "I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region-I dislike using big words-is of vital importance to the life of Hungary. "In spite of the fact that our recruits have only been serving for 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will take place which will be followed by the big blow on Saturday. "I shall never forget this proof of friendship and your Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times. "Your devoted friend. "(Signed) HORTHY" "Budapest. 13.3.1939." (2816-PS) From this letter it may be inferred that the Nazi conspirators had already informed the Hungarian government of their plans for military action against Czechoslovakia. As
friendship and your Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times. "Your devoted friend. "(Signed) HORTHY" "Budapest. 13.3.1939." (2816-PS) From this letter it may be inferred that the Nazi conspirators had already informed the Hungarian government of their plans for military action against Czechoslovakia. As it turned out, the timetable was advanced somewhat. On the diplomatic level Ribbentrop was active. On 13 March, the same day on which Horthy wrote his letter, Ribbentrop sent a cautionary telegram to the German minister in Prague, outlining the course of conduct he should pursue during the coming diplomatic pressure: "Telegram in secret code "With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today. "In case you should get any written communication from President HACHA, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take any other action on them but pass them on here by cipher telegram. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the Embassy to make a point of not being available if the Czech government wants to communicate with you during the next few days. "(Signed) RIBBENTROP". (2815-PS) On the afternoon of 13 March, Monsignor Tiso, accompanied by Durcansky and by Karmasin, the local Nazi leader, arrived in Berlin in response to the summons from Hitler. Late that afternoon Tiso was received by Hitler in his study in the Reichs Chancellery and was presented with an ultimatum. Two alternatives were given him: either to declare the independence of Slovakia or to be left, without German assistance, to the mercies of Poland and Hungary. This decision, Hitler said, was not a question of days, but of hours. The captured German Foreign Office minutes of this meeting between Hitler and Tiso on 13 March show that in the inducements Hitler held out to the Slovaks Hitler displayed his customary disregard for truth: "* * * now he [Hitler] had permitted minister Tiso to come here in order to make this question clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests east of the Carpathian mountains. it was indifferent to him what happened there. the question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. he did not wish for anything from Slovakia. he would not pledge his people or even a single soldier
clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests east of the Carpathian mountains. it was indifferent to him what happened there. the question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. he did not wish for anything from Slovakia. he would not pledge his people or even a single soldier to something which was not in any way desired by the Slovak people. he would like to secure final confirmation as to what Slovakia really wished. he did not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preserving something which did not wish to be preserved at all. he took a liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication of interior instability. he would not tolerate it, and he had for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. it was not a question of days, but of hours. he had stated at that time that if Slovakia wished to make herself independent he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. he would stand by his word so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence. if she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events, for which he was no longer responsible. in that case he would only intercede for German interests and those did not lie east of the Carpathians. Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. she had never belonged to Germany. "The Fuehrer asked the Reich Foreign Minister if he had any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in this case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He showed the Fuehrer a message he had just received which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Fuehrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself." (2802-PS) Those present at this meeting included Ribbentrop, Keitel, State Secretary Dietrich, State Secretary Keppler, and Minister of State Meissner. While in Berlin, the Slovaks also conferred separately with Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials. Ribbentrop solicitously handed Tiso a copy, already