dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
RAEDER: I was appointed Chief of the Naval Command Staff by Reich President Field Marshal Von Hindenburg. I did not join that group by doing so; rather I became Chief of the Navy. One was not aware of any group.
DR. LATERNSER: Joining and remaining in this group the Prosecution maintains was voluntary. Was there any possibility at all for military leaders to apply for any vacant posts?
RAEDER: No, there was nothing of the sort.
DR. LATERNSER: In other words, military accomplishments were the decisive factor?
RAEDER: It was a military order. There was no question of its being voluntary.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you know the various members of the group at the time when you belonged to it?
RAEDER: No, I certainly did not know all individuals from the other branches. Of course, I knew a large number.
DR. LATERNSER: Within the purely military leadership was there ever a conference about a plan which had as its purpose the launching of aggressive wars?
RAEDER: No, there was never such a conference. Frequently it has been mentioned here how the various enterprises came about-the political decision of the Fuehrer, a directive issued by him, and then the working out of the final order.
DR. LATERNSER: Admiral, I do not mean now by this question the meetings which took place under Hitler's leadership. I mean meetings of purely military officers.
RAEDER: Do you mean within the various branches of the Armed Forces?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, within the various branches.
RAEDER: Of course, within the Naval Operations Staff there were meetings about various questions, but not about aggressive wars.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, my questions referred only to that. The Prosecution asserts, furthermore, that this indicted group was first established by the National Socialist Regime. Is that correct?
RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. There was no group at all, but the organization was such as has frequently been described.
DR. LATERNSER: And such as has always existed in all armies of the world?
RAEDER: Yes, as has always existed.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has furthermore asserted that, after the seizure of power by Hitler, the high military leaders had the choice either of co-operating or of accepting the consequence that the new regime would establish new armed forces, that is armed forces of their own, and that on the basis of this situation the generals decided to co-operate. Is that assertion by the Prosecution correct?
RAEDER: No. It is not true that thereupon any joining of forces took place. I know that such tendencies existed. For instance, once in 1934 I reported to the Fuehrer that I had been informed that SA GruppenFuehrer Killinger, who had formerly been in the Navy and had advanced to prominence (in the SA), had the intention of becoming the Chief of Naval Operations Staff. But I was not aware of any further efforts. But above all, there was no coalition of the generals for defensive action against such an intention.
DR. LATERNSER: So the assertion made by the Prosecution is not correct?
RAEDER: No, not correct. That was not in the least a method which would have been in accordance with the sentiments of the soldier-that such a coalition be formed to avert something.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution furthermore asserts that the group, above all, the generals, let themselves be won over by the regime because of the chance of conquest. Is that assertion correct?
RAEDER: That is an absolutely incorrect and farfetched assertion.
DR. LATERNSER: Was the effort of the Party to acquire for itself supreme authority ever supported or promoted by the military?
RAEDER: I do not know that that ever happened. Do you mean the seizure of power?
DR. LATERNSER: After the seizure of power was the Party supported by military leaders, as far as you know, in its efforts to attain sole domination in Germany?
RAEDER: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday, in reply to the question of your counsel, you described how you came to swear your oath to Hitler. If such an intention had existed in the mind of one of the commanders-in-chief, would it have been possible for him to refuse the oath?
RAEDER: That I cannot say, but I believe that not one of us saw any necessity for refusing that oath.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has further asserted that the high military chiefs agreed completely with the principles and aims of National Socialism. Is that correct?
RAEDER: I explained here yesterday how far one could agree with the principles of National Socialism and to what extent one trained one's soldiers according to these principles. Anything that went beyond that was rejected and found no acceptance in the Navy. Here I can speak only for the Navy.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the officers who were subordinate to you and who were in the group ever have an insight into the political situation and Hitler's intention so that one could speak about participation or membership in the plan?
RAEDER: No. There was an absolute prohibition on speaking to anyone about speeches in which Hitler mentioned intentions and possible developments. The officers below the rank of Armed Forces commander were informed only when things had gone so far that the directive was to be issued.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution further asserts . . .
RAEDER: I have to qualify that. That directive was first worked out by the High Command of the Army and the Navy. Thus they received information as soon as the directive of the individual branches of the Armed Forces was issued and that always happened sometime later.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution also asserts that the high military leaders were not military experts but that they knew Hitler's intentions of aggression and willingly co-operated. Can you name any military leaders who, before they had received orders, took a positive attitude toward any aggressive action?
RAEDER: I cannot answer that. I explained yesterday how Admiral Carls pointed out to me the danger imminent in Norway; but he did not do anything more than give me the information, point out the danger, and elucidate the situation there.
DR. LATERNSER: The attitude of' the former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Von Fritsch, and of the Chief of the General Staff Beck to the question of a war is known. I just wanted to ask you, did the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, have the same attitude concerning the war?
RAEDER: I believe so, yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Concerning the conference on 5 November 1937, you have already made detailed statements yesterday. I would like . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you have been putting this class of question to every naval and military witness who has been called, and what the Tribunal desires me to point out to you is that there has been no cross-examination by any member of the Prosecution challenging any of these points, so this evidence is entirely repetitive and cumulative and is not bound to be put by you to every military and naval witness who comes into the witness box, and it is simply a waste of time to the Tribunal. When questions are answered by a witness and are not cross-examined to by the other side, it is the practice to assume that the answers are accepted.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for me this is an extremely important question which has just been touched upon, namely, the question of whether a question is inadmissible because in the opinion of the Court it is cumulative. I should like to make a few statements concerning whether or not a question is cumulative.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Laternser, you can understand what the Tribunal has said to you, that it is now desired, in view of the directives of the Charter, that this Trial should be as expeditious as it can reasonably be; and it does not desire to have the same evidence adduced to it over and over again. Is that not clear?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I can assume that the Tribunal accepts as true these proofs which I want to bring by means of my question, then I can of course forego these questions. But I cannot determine whether that is the case unless I know that I have succeeded in bringing definite proof ...
THE PRESIDENT: What I wanted to point out to you was that you asked the same question of a great number of witnesses and that those questions have not been cross-examined, and in such circumstances you can assume that answers given by the witnesses are accepted.
DR. LATERNSER: If I am justified in drawing this conclusion, then of course I shall dispense with such questions in the future. I have only a few more questions, Mr. President. [Turning to the defendant.] In support of the Indictment of the group of the General Staff and the OKW two affidavits have been presented by the Prosecution, one by Field Marshal Von Blomberg and one by Generaloberst Blaskowitz. In these two affidavits both generals state that as a whole, within the circle of generals before the war, the opinion existed that the question of the Corridor would have to be decided unconditionally and, if necessary, with force. Is that opinion stated by the two generals correct? Was that the general attitude at that time?
RAEDER: I never heard of such an opinion. In my presence General Von Blomberg never made any statement of that kind. The Polish question was discussed by us in the Navy only to the extent already mentioned here during the last few days, namely that an attack on Poland by Germany would have to be prevented under all circumstances. The political treatment of this question...
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant says he has never heard of this suggestion.
DR. LATERNSER: That was the reason why I put the question to the witness.
RAEDER: After 1933 political questions were handled and decided by Hitler exclusively, and he said that he made all policies.
DR. LATERNSER: It is therefore correct that this opinion which Blomberg and Blaskowitz have mentioned does not apply for the circle of generals?
RAEDER: Well, at any rate, I have never heard it expressed by the generals. It did not exist in the Navy.
DR. LATERNSER: You were present at the conferences of 23 November 1939?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put one supplementary question concerning those conferences. Admiral, do you remember that in the course of these conferences Hitler reproached the generals because they still had old-fashioned ideas of chivalry and that these ideas had to be rejected?
RAEDER: That I cannot say with certainty. I believe that I can recall having once heard it said that Hitler was of that opinion.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question concerning the document which your defense counsel already put to you in the course of your examination. It is Document C-66 submitted by the British Prosecution under GB-81. It is in Document Book 10, on Page 13, or 10a, Page 35. On Page 5, in the last paragraph of that page, you said the following and I quote: "It can be seen from my statements and plans that the Fuehrer reckoned with a definite conclusion of the eastern campaign in the fall of 1941, whereas the High Command of the Army (General Staff) was very skeptical." Admiral, I wanted to ask you of what this skepticism consisted?
RAEDER: As far as I know, the High Command of the Army was of the opinion that it was impossible to conclude such a tremendous campaign in so short a time; and many others shared that opinion, whereas the Fuehrer believed that because of the new weapons and his strategy he could conclude that campaign very quickly.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about whether the High Command of the Army had any fundamental objections before the beginning of the Russian campaign?
RAEDER: As far as I know, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was very much against it; but that too, I cannot say definitely.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no more questions. PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Representing Dr. Von Luedinghausen, Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Admiral, in the course of the proceedings it has been testified, I believe by the Codefendant Goering, that Field Marshal Von Hindenburg had expressly desired that Herr Von Neurath become Foreign Minister. Do you know anything about that?
RAEDER: I learned at the time that Hindenburg had expressed that wish, and it caught my attention because Field Marshal Von Hindenburg until that time had always considered merely the appointment of the Minister of Defense and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy as his privilege in the Reich Government. This was the first time that he expressed such a wish in the case of a Foreign Minister.
DR. KRAUS: So it was not the practice of the Field Marshal to make any suggestions regarding the appointments of Ministers?
RAEDER: No. He had merely acted according to his own wish to appoint the Defense Minister, even in the previous Social Democratic, Democratic, and other cabinets.
DR. KRAUS: What may have been the reason for Field Marshal Von Hindenburg's making that exception in the case of Neurath?
RAEDER: He probably wanted to make sure under all circumstances that the peaceful policies which had prevailed in Germany up to that time would be continued. He was sure that Herr Von Neurath would continue these policies in the same direction.
DR. KRAUS: So he had particular confidence in Herr Von Neurath's attitude up to that time?
RAEDER: Yes, beyond a doubt.
DR. KRAUS: You knew Von Neurath very well, and you were informed about his political principles, weren't you? What were the main lines of his policies?
RAEDER: Herr Von Neurath wanted to see the gradual recovery of the German people to normal conditions and he wanted to strive with peaceful means for equal rights for the German Reich. Above all, he wanted to have good relations with England, which was also in conformity with Hindenburg's intentions, and on this very point both of us agreed completely.
DR. KRAUS: So one can say that you considered Von Neurath an exponent of a policy of understanding with England and a peaceful policy of compromise.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. KRAUS: Then I have a second question for you, Admiral. A Fritz Wiedemann, who was Hitler's adjutant from 1935 to 1939, has submitted an affidavit. The Prosecution has submitted that affidavit under 3037-PS. In this affidavit Herr Wiedemann states that on 28 May 1938 a conference took place in the winter garden of the Reich Chancellery with all important people of the Foreign Office, the Army, and the Operational Staffs present, a meeting so large that one almost doubts whether all these people could get into the winter garden. And here, he says, in addition to Goering, General Beck, General Keitel, and Von Brauchitsch, there were also present Von Neurath, Von Ribbentrop, and yourself. In this meeting Hitler spoke among other things about Czechoslovakia and stated that it was his unshakeable intention that Czechoslovakia must disappear from the map. Do you know anything about that meeting?
RAEDER: Although I can otherwise recall every large or more important meeting, I do not have the slightest recollection of this meeting at that time. The list of those present also seems very unlikely. I have never seen Herr Von Neurath and Herr Von Ribbentrop together at the same meeting. I should also doubt whether Herr Von Neurath at that time was in Berlin at all. He was quite definitely not present at that meeting. But I also do not remember any meeting at which Von Ribbentrop was present as Foreign Minister when military matters were discussed. I think this Herr Wiedemann is mistaken because I believe also that I have never seen him at a meeting in which such matters are supposed to have been discussed. The Fuehrer always sent this personal adjutant of his out of the room beforehand. I believe there is some mistake.
DR. KRAUS: Such an important statement by the Fuehrer you would doubtless have remembered.
RAEDER: Yes. During that summer the Fuehrer's opinions fluctuated greatly. I believe that at the end of May a mobilization took place in Czechoslovakia, or something of the sort-I do not remember exactly what. But I attended no meeting, as far as I know, at which such a statement was made.
DR. KRAUS: Thank you. I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions? [There was no response.] Sir David, it seems scarcely worthwhile starting the crossexamination.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, I entirely agree. [The Tribunal adjourned until 20 May 1946, at 1000 hours.]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dr. Horn wishes to ask some questions.
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): With the permission of the Tribunal I should like to put a few more questions to the witness. Admiral, is it true that on 24 April 1941 the so-called neutrality patrol of North American warships was extended past the 300-mile limit to a distance of at least 1,000 miles?
RAEDER: I cannot remember the date, but such an extension did take place at some time.
DR. HORN: Is it true that at the beginning of June 1941 a law was passed in the United States confiscating foreign ships immobilized in North American harbors as a result of the war and including 26 Italian and 2 German ships?
RAEDER: Here again I cannot tell you the date for certain. It happened in the summer of 1941. The ships were mostly Italian, with a few German ships. I cannot swear to the exact figures.
DR. HORN: In June 1941 the United States publicly declared its willingness to give the Soviet Union every possible aid. Did you discuss this with Hitler, and what was his attitude towards it?
RAEDER: Yes, that is correct. There were some questions of a loan without interest, or some such thing. Very probably I did speak to Hitler about it, but I cannot tell you what his attitude was. I can say only that all these measures at that time in no way deterred us from the course we had pursued until then. In June I had the conversation with Hitler at which I explained to him that up to that time we had allowed American warships to go completely unmolested, and that we would continue to do so in spite of the considerable disadvantages entailed which I mentioned recently.
DR. HORN: In 1941 the American Secretary of War Mr. Stimson and the Secretary of the Navy Mr. Knox, as well as Secretary of State Mr. Hull, repeatedly advocated in public the use of the United States fleet to safeguard English transports of war material to Great Britain. On 12 July 1941, Secretary of the Navy Knox informed the representatives of the press of Roosevelt's order to shoot at German ships. How did Hitler and you react to these actions, which were contrary to neutrality?
RAEDER: Your facts are correct. They will go down in the annals of history. Hitler did subsequently issue an express order that we were in no circumstances to open fire of our own accord, but only in self-defense. This situation actually did arise later in the case of the two destroyers Greer and Kearny .
DR. HORN: Thank you. I have no further questions.
MARSHAL: Your Honor, the report is made that Defendant Goering is absent this morning.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you had read at the time of its publication the book by Captain Schuessler, The Fight of the Navy against Versailles , had you not?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at it on Page 26 of Document Book 10, Page 123 of the German document book? Captain Schuessler had told you that he was going to write such a work, had he not?
RAEDER: Yes. And I might add that this book was written because we in the Navy had been accused by National Socialist circles of not having done enough to strengthen the Navy in the period previous to 1933. That is why all these things were mentioned in that book. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE And the book was circulated among senior officers in the Navy, was it not?
RAEDER: Yes; at any rate, any of the senior officers who wanted it could have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you just turn to Page 127, or to Page 27 of the English book, which gives the preface? You will see at the end of the first paragraph it says that it is to give a reliable picture of the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And in the third paragraph: "This memorandum is also meant to distinguish more clearly the services of those men who, without being known to wide circles, were ready to accept extraordinary responsibility in the service of the fight against the peace treaty."
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree, Defendant, that that preface represents generally but accurately the feeling of the Navy with regard to invading the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles?
RAEDER: Yes, as regarding circumventing the Versailles Treaty as far as necessary to improve our defenseless position, for reasons which I explained recently here. To do this was a matter of honor for every man.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just turn over-it is Page 28, My Lord, and it is Page 126 of your copy. [Turning to the defendant.] It gives a summary of contents. You see, it is in four sections. The first section deals with the first Defensive actions against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles, and then enumerates what they were. Don't trouble about that. The second is independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and legislative bodies.
RAEDER: In both cases it says: From the end of the war until taking over the Ruhr in 1923; from 1923 until the Lohmann case in 1927. I had nothing to do with either case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see. From 1922 to 1924 you were inspector of naval training at Kiel, were you not?
RAEDER: Inspector of the training system; the schools, the further training of officer candidates, the complete training of assistants of the Chief of Staff, that is, chief-of-staff assistants, a sort of general staff officer, and similar matters. I had nothing to do with affairs of the front.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what you were asked. You were asked whether you were inspector of training. The answer was "yes," was it not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As inspector of training, are you telling the Tribunal that you did not have a very complete knowledge of the weapons available for your service?
RAEDER: No, no. It was not a question of weapons visible for all to see. As I explained to you recently, that was a matter of setting up gun platforms and transferring guns from the North Sea to the Baltic. This was done by a special command, which worked under the direct order of the Chief of Navy; among others, there was this Kapitaenleutnant Raenkel, for instance, who was the specialist dealing with all gunnery questions at the time. I myself was in Kiel, and there were no guns or anything of the kind in Kiel and its neighborhood.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Take the next period from 1923 to 1927. From 1925 to 1928 you were Chef der Marine Station der Ostsee, were you not?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not know about the independent armament measures taken behind the back of the Reich Government?
RAEDER: No; I had nothing at all to do with these affairs. I have already said that was done by the Chief of the Naval Command Staff. I knew in a general way...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you whether you ever had to do with them, I am asking you whether you are saying that you did not know about them. You knew all about them, did you not?
RAEDER: I knew it in a general way, that such measures were being taken.