dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SEYSS-INQUART: At 2 o'clock I went to the Federal Chancellor's office with Minister Glaise. We had a talk with Dr. Schuschnigg; he rejected a postponement. At that moment I was called to the telephone; Field Marshal Goering was on the phone, and the conversation between us is reproduced here under the Exhibit Number USA-76, Document Number 2949-PS. And then followed demands and concessions. When I told Field Marshal Goering that Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg rejected the postponement, he declared, in the name of the Reich, that he had to ask for Schuschnigg's resignation, because he had broken the agreement of 12 February and the Reich had no confidence in him. Dr. Schuschnigg was then ready to adjourn, but not to resign. Thereupon Field Marshal Goering demanded not only Schuschnigg's resignation, but my appointment as Federal Chancellor. During a conference with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg at 3:30 in the afternoon, the Chancellor said that he would hand to the Federal President the resignation of the whole Cabinet. When I was informed of this, I left the Federal Chancellor's office, because I considered my function as a middleman concluded in the meaning of the agreement of 12 February; and I did not want in any way to advocate or promote my own appointment as Federal Chancellor.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection may I refer to my Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-58, Page 134 (Document Number 2949-PS). This is an excerpt from the telephone conversations of Goering; Goering is listening to reports, and Seyss-Inquart is speaking of the relationship between Germany and Austria. It says here: "Yes, he means that Austrian independence will be preserved...." Now, that was on 11 March, in the late afternoon?
SEYSS-INQUART: In these telephone conversations it was also suggested that the Party formation, the emigrant Legion, should come to Austria. From the same telephone conversation it is obvious that I opposed this and wanted rather an election or a plebiscite held before the entry of any formation into Austria. In the course of that afternoon State Secretary Keppler came to Vienna and requested information from me. And so I again went to the Federal Chancellor's office. Berlin repeatedly asked me to intervene with the Federal President in order to effect my own appointment as Federal Chancellor. I always refused to do that.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what did the Austrian NSDAP do at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Party in Austria began demonstrations. Party members left their houses, filled the streets, and as Party members or sympathizers took part in a demonstration against the system and for the National Socialists, a demonstration which assumed enormous proportions.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the feeling in the Federal provinces?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had no contact with the Federal provinces but learned quite late during that night or on the next day that there, even on a larger scale than in Vienna, big demonstrations of very large crowds had taken place against the Fatherland Front and for the National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: What attempts did Federal President Miklas make to solve this situation?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot say anything about that from my own observation, for until 8 o'clock in the evening no one at all approached me on these matters. No one spoke to me about the Federal Chancellorship; no other possibility of a solution was discussed with me. I heard that the Federal President wanted to make Dr. Ender, of Vorarlberg, Chancellor and me Vice Chancellor. I believe that suggestion would have been completely practicable. But I could not discuss it-least of all with Berlin-because no one had said anything to me about it.
DR. STEINBAUER: And when events reached a climax and Schuschnigg offered his resignation, did you compile a Cabinet list?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the course of the evening it became clear that Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg would resign and that the Reich would not tolerate any other than a National Socialist Government. Therefore, in order to avoid being taken by surprise, I considered it my task to study whom I should take into a Cabinet. The suggestions mentioned in the telephone conversations were not transmitted by me at all. I chose my colleagues quite independently -naturally after consultations with Austrian National Socialists- and they included also people with strong Catholic ties, such as Professor Mengin, Dr. Wolf, and others. I asked Foreign Minister Schmidt to enter the Cabinet. He asked me for a reason, and I told him: I want to keep Austria autonomous and independent, and I need a foreign minister who has connections with the Western Powers. Schmidt refused, remarking that Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg had introduced him into politics and that he would remain loyal to him.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit some documents now: Document Number Seyss-Inquart-50, Page 115, from Zernatto's book on Seyss-Inquart's position; then, on Page 125, Document Number Seyss-Inquart-54, also from Zernatto's book, where it says: ". . . he"-Seyss-Inquart-"no longer has developments in his hands." Then Document Number Seyss-Inquart-62, Page 149, in white Zernatto quotes from a conversation with Dr. Seyss-Inquart: "He says that there are two main points on which he will not compromise. The first is Austria's independence and the second, the possibility for the conservative Catholic element to develop its own life." [Turning to the defendant.] Now we come to a very important question. You then made a radio speech in which you called yourself a Minister, although Schuschnigg had already resigned.
SEYSS-INQUART: The situation was as follows: The resignation of the whole Cabinet was not accepted by the Federal President; and we, including myself, remained Ministers. When Dr. Schuschnigg made his farewell speech, he did not speak of the resignation of the whole Cabinet. He only said, "We yield to force." Dr. Schuschnigg and Federal President Miklas had agreed at that time that I would not actually be appointed Federal Chancellor, but that with the entry of German troops executive power should be passed to me. Therefore, in my opinion, I was de facto Minister of the Interior and Foreign Minister.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution assert that you yourself exerted pressure on Federal President Miklas to appoint you Chancellor.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not see Federal President Miklas at all until 9 or 10 o'clock in the evening, after Schuschnigg's speech "We yield to force."
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit to the Court this speech of Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg of 11 March under Document Number Seyss-Inquart-53, Page 122; in it he says: "The Federal President has commissioned me to inform the Austrian people that we are yielding to force. Since we are at all costs determined not to spill German blood, even in this grave hour, we have given orders to our Armed Forces to withdraw without resistance, if the invasion of Austria is carried out, and to await the decision within the next hours." The Prosecution, Witness, sees evidence of this pressure also in the fact that SS units were called to the Federal Chancellor's of lice at that time. What can you say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe it was after Schuschnigg's farewell speech, when I saw in the anterooms 10 or 15 young men in black trousers and white shirts, that was the SS. I had the impression that they were doing messenger and orderly duty for State Secretary Keppler and the others. As they approached the rooms in which Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg and President Miklas were, I ordered guards of the Austrian Guard Battalion to be placed at their doors. I may mention that these were selected men of the Austrian Army who according to Austrian standards were very well armed, while these SS men-40 at most-possibly carried pistols. Moreover, 50 steps from the Federal Chancellor's office were the barracks of the Guard Battalion, with a few hundred picked and well-armed anew. If Federal President Miklas and Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg had not been concerned with things other than those which happened in the Federal Chancellor's office and on the street outside it, they could easily have put an end to this situation by calling out the Guard Battalion.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution has submitted an affidavit of the Gauleiter of Upper Austria, Eigruber, which states that even before you became a Federal Chancellor, you ordered the seizure of power in the various Austrian Federal provinces.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is completely incorrect, and the Gauleiter of Upper Austria also does not claim to have talked to me. I believe he says that he had received a telegram signed by me. I did not send a telegram, and I did not give oral instructions to any Gauleiter or to anyone else for the seizure of power. Later I heard from Globocznik that he had carried out the seizure of power. He told me of that in these words: "You know, I seized power for you and acted as the government; but I did not tell you anything about it, because you would have been against it."
DR. STEINBAUER: You say you would have been against it. Was the population against it, too, against the marching in, which had meanwhile taken place, that is, the invasion as described by the Defendant Goering?
SEYSS-INQUART: One cannot call it an invasion; it was a stormy, loudly cheered entry of German troops. There were no villages-even those with an orthodox Catholic population-and no workers' districts which did not burst out in stormy jubilation. Moreover, both Dr. Schuschnigg and I were completely clear about this; once in 1937 he had agreed with me when I said that the entry of German troops into Austria could not be impeded by anything but the ovations of the population.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to a Document Number Seyss-Inquart-37, Page 86. This is a quotation from the book by Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision , describing a conversation between him and the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, and it says: "Before the occupation of Austria, Dr. Schuschnigg came to Rome. He admitted to me frankly that, if Germany occupied Austria, the majority of Austrians would support the occupation and, if Italy sent troops into Austria to prevent the occupation, the Austrians as one man would join with the Germans to fight Italy." Now, Witness, we come to the next day, to 12 March. Did you not at that time have a telephone conversation with Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; I called the Fuehrer in connection with the entry of troops. I should like to repeat and explain that on the day before, at about 7 o'clock, the negotiations suddenly came to a stop. Everybody waited. At half past 7 State Secretary Skubl came with the news that the entry of German troops had actually begun, according to a report from one of the frontier posts; indeed Field Marshal Goering had repeatedly said that it would take place. Thinking that the entry was actually in progress, Schuschnigg then made his farewell speech. And with that the government of the Fatherland Front had resigned from office. And I state expressly, up to this moment I did nothing which in any way furthered the taking over of control in Austria or to express it more correctly, which intentionally furthered the establishment of the National Socialists and the seizure of power. I only acted as an intermediary within the meaning of the Treaty of 12 February. But from the moment when the system of the Fatherland Front came to an end, I considered it my responsibility to take action. First I made a radio speech, but not the one which had been prescribed for me in the morning. For I did not speak of a provisional government, but referred to myself as Minister of the Interior. Only then did I call on the SA and the SS to act as auxiliary police; and like Schuschnigg, I gave the order to offer no resistance to the entry of German troops. Subsequently I was appointed Federal Chancellor, and my Cabinet was approved. On the same night I drove Dr. Schuschnigg home in my car, because I was afraid something might happen to him at the hands of provocateurs; and I asked Dr. Keppler to call up the Fuehrer and ask him not to give the order for the entry of troops. Reich Marshal Goering spoke about that here.
SEYSS-INQUART: In the morning I called up again; then I met the Fuehrer at the airport in Linz, and, as the entry of the troops was in full progress, I asked him whether it would not be possible to have Austrian troops march into the German Reich, so that, symbolically at least, equal rights would be maintained. The Fuehrer agreed; and Austrian troops actually marched into Munich, Berlin, and other cities, in Austrian uniform DR. STEINBAUER. How, in your capacity as newly appointed Federal Chancellor, did you envisage the further development of the situation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Since the system of the Fatherland Front had broken down, I could no longer entertain my idea of a coalition government. It was clear to me that a National Socialist government with a very strong Catholic tendency would control developments not in the form of an immediate Anschluss but rather-by carrying out appropriate elections and a plebiscite-in the form of an economic and possibly a military union with the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this connection, I should like to submit an extremely important document, which shows in an entirely new way how the Anschluss Law came about. It is a sworn statement of the former State Secretary of the Interior, Dr. Stuckart, who is imprisoned here. I submit it to the Court and should like to establish the following from this testimony... '17~; PRESIDENT: Where is the document?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is not in the document book because I received it later. The translation of it has not yet been completed. I will read from the witness' testimony only briefly to establish the connection-I have submitted the original to the Court...
THE PRESIDENT: You are giving it a number, are you?
DR. STEINBAUER: Document Number Seyss-Inquart-92. The witness says in it that Hitler would probably have incorporated the presidency of Austria in his own person, that he, the witness, was told by Frick to draft a law to that effect, but that he was then suddenly ordered to Linz...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait just a minute, Dr. Steinbauer.
DR. STEINBAUER: In the Dutch matter also, there are a few affidavits which have not yet arrived or which have just come in. Perhaps it would be more expedient to submit these documents when they have been translated.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will have the affidavit, I suppose?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, the Prosecution already have the affidavits. If I may continue, he says that to his surprise he was told by Hitler in Linz to draft a law providing for the direct, total Anschluss, that is, providing for Austria's status as a province, a Land, of the German Reich, like Bavaria and the other German Lander. He worked out this law, as he had been instructed to do, flew to Vienna, and submitted it for approval to the ministers who were assembled there. I should like to establish in three documents the impression which the Anschluss made on the population. First, Document Number Seyss-Inquart-30. This is the celebration at which the Viennese welcomed the Fuehrer in the biggest square in Vienna, the Heldenplatz. On that occasion, on 15 March, the witness welcomed the Fuehrer and said: "The goal for which centuries of German history have battled, for which untold millions of the best Germans have bled and died, which has been the final aim of fierce struggle, the last consolation in the bitterest hours-has today been reached. Austria has come home." Hitler now ordered that this Anschluss Law subsequently be sanctioned by a plebiscite of the Austrian population. Documents showing the results of this plebiscite have already been submitted to the Court. I should just like to point out, in addition, the attitude of the Catholic bishops toward the plebiscite-that is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-32, Page 73-and the attitude at that time of the present Federal President, Dr. Karl Renner-that is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-33, Page 76. On the attitude of the other powers to the Anschluss question I shall quote from testimony of the witness Schmidt, who as the then Foreign Minister was the qualified man; but I should like to submit one document on it, namely Document Number Seyss-Inquart-38, Page 89. That is the House of Commons speech of Chamberlain, who was Prime Minister at the time. In reply to a question regarding the Anschluss he said: ". . .
DR. STEINBAUER: nothing could have stopped this action by Germany unless we and others had been ready to use force to prevent it." [Turning to the defendant.] Now Austria has been incorporated, it is a part of the Greater German Reich, with Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. Did you remain Federal Chancellor or did you receive another state function after the seizure of power?
SEYSS-INQUART: On the 13th during the night, I reported on the Anschluss Law to the Fuehrer; and I took the opportunity of discussing three questions with him immediately. That was, however, not at all easy, for the Fuehrer was deeply moved and wept. First, I asked that the Austrian Party might retain relative independence and be headed by an Austrian as the provincial leader; second, that Austria as a state might also enjoy a certain degree of independence. To the first request the Fuehrer said, "Possibly"; to the second he said, "Yes"; Austria would receive her own governor, a Reichsstatthalter. I then rose and asked the Fuehrer that I be allowed to return to my private practice as a lawyer. As a third request, I asked that the unjust exchange rate of 2 schillings to 1 mark be altered to 1.50. The Fuehrer agreed to that also. On 15 March, on the occasion of the celebration which has already been mentioned here, the Fuehrer told the radio announcer, "Announce that Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart will now speak." That to me was actually the first news of my appointment as Reichsstatthalter. I held that post until the end of April 1939.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who really directed policy in Austria after the Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: Burckel was sent to Austria immediately with the task of reorganizing the Party and preparing the plebiscite. The interference of. Burckel and his collaborators, and various plans somewhat strange and adverse to Austrian conceptions, caused me, on 8 April, in Burckel's presence, to call the Fuehrer's attention to this sort of co-ordination and in my hearing the Fuehrer said to Burckel: "Burckel, you must not do that, otherwise the enthusiasm of the Austrians for the Anschluss will change to dissatisfaction with the Reich." Nevertheless, a few weeks later he made Burckel Reich Commissioner for the Reunion. He controlled the Party and politics and propaganda, including church policy, and he had the right to give me instructions in state matters.
DR. STEINBAUER: You know that the Prosecution make charges against you in connection with the policy in Austria shortly after the Anschluss. The first charge is with regard to the Jewish question, namely, that you participated in this grievous treatment of the Jewish population, or that you were responsible for it. What can you say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot at all deny it; for certainly, as chief of the civil administration, I issued orders along that line in my field of authority, though Burckel claimed that the Jewish question as such was part of his field; and in a document which has been submitted here, he called the Jewish question a matter arising as a consequence of the Anschluss.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I, in this connection, refer to two documents. One is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-64, a decree on Page 154. It is the decree of the Fuehrer on the appointment of Burckel as Reich Commissioner for the Reunion of Austria with the Reich. I emphasize here especially Article 4, which gives Burckel the detailed authority to issue orders to the witness. The second document is Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-67, Page 163; the Court already has it; it is Document Number 2237-PS. With this long document, I only want to demonstrate that the entire solution of the Jewish problem, particularly in November 1938, was a matter with which the defendant had nothing to do. The defendant's own attitude I should like to show by submitting an affidavit which came to me unsolicited from Australia. This is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-70, Page 175. I am fully aware of the Tribunal's view that it is not very weighty evidence that some defendants have submitted letters from Jews; "One swallow does not make a summer," as the proverb says. The reason for my submitting this document is Paragraph 12 on Page 4, in which the witness, Dr. Walter Stricker, who comes from a highly respected Jewish family in Linz, says the following: "After my departure from Austria, I heard of other cases in which Dr. Seyss gave similar help to Jews and that in May 1938, when persecutions of Jews became particularly severe, he protested to the Gauleiter Burckel." It is therefore quite clear that the defendant did not participate but rejected this radical policy. Witness, you know from the trial brief that you are charged with having played a double game. What was the attitude of the Party toward you after the Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know that this charge is made against me and has been made against me before. Radical circles of the Party made the same accusation against me, and I will admit openly that I can understand why it was made. I attempted to bring together two groups which, as history has shown, simply could not be brought together; and since this could not be anticipated at the time, the radical elements of both groups must have come to the conclusion that the man who attempted it was not honest in his attempt. But more important is something else. The final solution of the Austrian question was not my solution at all, but the solution of the radical elements in the Party. I myself, however, from 11 March at 8 o'clock in the evening, participated in that solution. As a result, it is easy for people to say that I participated in it beforehand and prepared for it; but that is not true. Only at 8 o'clock in the evening, after Schuschnigg and the Fatherland Government had resigned, did I too adopt this point of view, because under the given political conditions there was no other possibility. For there was no political power in Austria other than that of the National Socialists; the alternative was civil war. I myself welcomed the Anschluss Law, and my decision also determined that of my colleagues. On 13 March, of course, I welcomed the opportune moment. At most, there might have been some sort of hesitation as to whether the Anschluss should actually then be carried through. I considered that, but as I saw it, there was no need for misgivings from the foreign political point of view; because, according to all reports, everything would pass quietly. Domestically, there had never been so much enthusiasm in Austria. I felt that no Austrian statesman, no man in a position of responsibility, ever had the whole population behind him as much as I. But the Anschluss Law was valuable and useful, insofar as in any case the Reich would in reality have had the authority, and thus it was certainly better it had full responsibility outwardly too.