dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
for the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa. "3. Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in East Asia." (1882-PS) Here again, in the portions just quoted, Ribbentrop is seen pursuing the same tack previously noted: Germany has already won the war for all practical purposes. Japan's entry will hasten the inevitable end. And Japan had better get the positions she wants during the war. Ribbentrop's assurances, (1877-PS) that Japan likewise had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union if Japan entered the conflict, and his continual references to the weakness of the United States scattered throughout his conversations, were other means used to hurry along the Japanese. The success of the Nazi methods is shown in a top secret report, dated 24 May 1941, from the German Military Attaché in Tokyo to the Intelligence Division of the OKW. The last sentence in paragraph 1, states: "The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila Stand." (1538-PS) The fact appears from this sentence that the German military were keeping in close touch with the Japanese operational plans against Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators had fostered. (2) Exhortations to Japanese Aggression Against the U.S.S.R. The Nazi conspirators also directed their efforts to induce a Japanese "stab in the back" against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here again Ribbentrop appears as a central figure. For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration with Japan (C-75), the Nazi conspirators had been preparing "Fall Barbarossa", the plan for attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic Order No. 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese "must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation". (C-75) In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on 29 March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24, Ribbentrop
plan for attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic Order No. 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese "must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation". (C-75) In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on 29 March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24, Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the largest part of the German Army was on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich fully prepared to open the attack at any time. Ribbentrop then added that, although he believed that the U.S.S.R. would try to avoid developments leading to war, nevertheless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not probable, would have to be considered possible. (1877-PS) Whatever conclusions the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in April 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed their aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of Ribbentrop's remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July 1941, Ribbentrop despatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo (2896-PS). Pertinent passages in that telegram read as follows: "Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be convenient if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up, I would like to say: I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the Japanese Policy, and in the Japanese Foreign Minister, first of all because the present Japanese government would really act inexcusably toward the future of its nation if it would not take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure for all time its expansion to the South and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse, a report which coincides with our own observations as far as we are able to judge at the present war situation, it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military preparations are completed." "However, I ask you to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan's entry into the war against Russia at the soonest possible date, as I have
it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military preparations are completed." "However, I ask you to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan's entry into the war against Russia at the soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better it is. The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on the Trans-Siberian railroad, before winter starts. After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power Pact states in the world will be so gigantic, that the question of England's collapse or the total destruction of the English islands, respectively, will only be a matter of time. An America totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the British Empire which are important for the Three Power Pact countries. I have the unshakable conviction that a carrying through of the new order as desired by us will be a matter of course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I ask you to report in the near future as often as possible and in detail on the political situation there." (2896-PS) Ott's reply to this telegram (2897-PS), dated 13 July 1941, was as follows: "Telegram (Secret Cipher System) "Tokyo 14 July 1941 0230 hrs. Arrived 14 July 1941 1120 hrs. As fast as possible! "#1217 dated 13.7 for Minister for Foreign Affairs. Answer to telegram 10, #108 Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Arrived Tokyo 12 July 1941 "I am trying with all means to work toward Japan's entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible. Especially using arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram cited above, to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the Foreign Office, Military elements, Nationalists and friendly business men. I believe that, according to military preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest obstacles against which one has to fight thereby is the disunity among Activist groups which, without unified command,
as well as the Foreign Office, Military elements, Nationalists and friendly business men. I believe that, according to military preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest obstacles against which one has to fight thereby is the disunity among Activist groups which, without unified command, follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the changed situation. Ott." (2897-PS) On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations to induce the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. Three documents, covering July of 1942 and March and April of 1943, record these exhortations. The first discussion occurred between Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. As a matter of background, it may be noted that at that time German armies were sweeping forward in the U.S.S.R. and the fall of Sevastapol had just been announced. The discussion proceeded as follows: "Notes concerning the discussion between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Oshima at Steinort, on 9 July 1942. "He, the German Foreign Minister, had asked to see the Ambassador at this time when the situation was as described, because now a question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint conduct of the war: if Japan felt itself sufficiently strong militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably now. He thought it possible that, if Japan attacked Russia now, it would lead to her (Russia's) final moral collapse; at least it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In any case, never again would Japan have such an opportunity as existed at present, to eliminate once and for all the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia. He had discussed this question with the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer was of the same opinion, but he wanted to emphasize one point right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at the halfway mark, and we do not want to urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profitable." (2911-PS) Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima had another conference on 6 March 1943. It is noted, again for background, that the strategic military situation in the broad expanses
be allowed to bog down at the halfway mark, and we do not want to urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profitable." (2911-PS) Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima had another conference on 6 March 1943. It is noted, again for background, that the strategic military situation in the broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat. In the previous month, February 1943, the Soviet Armies had completely defeated the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted severe losses. To the north and west their winter offensive had recovered large areas from the hands of the invaders. In addition, combined U. S. and British forces had already landed in North Africa. The tone of Ribbentrop's argument reflects the changed military situation. The familiar Japanese refrain of "so sorry please" likewise appears to have crept in. It is noted, in this regard, that the month of February 1943 had also seen the end of organized Japanese resistance on the island of Guadalcanal. The conference went as follows: "Ambassador Oshima declared that he had received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his government to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (RAM) the following: The suggestion of the German Government, to attack Russia, was the subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: the Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the danger which threatens from Russia, and completely understands the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the War. It is rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question. "The Japanese Government has the intention to become aggressive again in the future on other fronts. "The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the Ambassador, of how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in Tokyo. At present, Germany wages the war against the common enemies, England and
"The Japanese Government has the intention to become aggressive again in the future on other fronts. "The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the Ambassador, of how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in Tokyo. At present, Germany wages the war against the common enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia together. It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot overstrain the German national strength. He has worried silently that certain forces work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion and who propagate it, that Germany would come through the fight victoriously, and that therefore Japan should consolidate itself further at first, before it makes further and utmost efforts." "Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight on the Burma front as well as in the South is actually more of a maritime problem, and on all fronts-except those in China-there are mostly very few ground forces committed. Therefore the attack on Russia is primarily an army affair, and he asked himself whether the necessary forces would not be ready for that". (2954-PS) Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about three weeks later, on 18 April 1943. The top secret notes of this conference reveal the following: "The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that without any doubt this year presented the most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the moment." (2929-PS) (3) Nazi Preparations and Collaboration with the Japanese Against the United States. The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the Japanese against the United States present a twofold aspect: one of preparations by the Nazis themselves for attack from across the Atlantic; the other of the fomenting of war in the Pacific. In the previous discussion of the Nazi exhortations to the Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., reference has been
a twofold aspect: one of preparations by the Nazis themselves for attack from across the Atlantic; the other of the fomenting of war in the Pacific. In the previous discussion of the Nazi exhortations to the Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., reference has been made to certain documents relating to the United States. Those documents will be taken up again, in their relevant passages, to show their particular application. In the treatment of Ribbentrop's urging the Japanese to war against the U.S.S.R., documents have been introduced chronicling conferences which took place after the dates of 7 December and 11 December 1941 when the Japanese and German Governments, respectively, initiated and declared aggressive war against the United States. These documents have indicated that Nazi awareness and acceptance of the direction in which their actions were leading, as well as the universal aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with the Japanese. (a) Preliminary Nazi Preparations Against the United States. The Nazi conspirators' intentions against the United States must be viewed in the focus of both their over-all plan and their immediate commitments elsewhere. That their over-all plan involved ultimate aggressive war against the United States was intimated by Goering in a speech on 8 July 1938, when the Nazi conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria and were perfecting their plans for occupation of Czechoslovakia. This speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft industry and the copy which the prosecution has obtained was transmitted as the enclosure to a secret memorandum from Goering's adjutant to General Udet, who was then in Charge of experimental research for the Luftwaffe (R-140). The statement in the covering memorandum notes that the enclosure is a "copy of the shorthand minutes of the conference". In the course of his long speech, Goering called for increased aircraft production and referred to the necessity for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. He continued: "I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies with 5 tons of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to stop somewhat
to the necessity for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. He continued: "I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies with 5 tons of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there." (R-140) Goering's fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization at that time, either technically or in the face of the Nazi conspirators' schedule of aggression that has already been outlined. During the period of their preparation for and waging of aggressive war in Europe, up through the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R., it is only reasonable to believe that the Nazi conspirators were not disposed to involve the United States in war-at that time. Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940, the prosecution of war against the United States of America at a later date was on the military agenda. This is clearly shown in a document which was found in the files of the OKL, the German Air Force (376-PS). This memorandum is marked "Chefsache"-the German designation for Top Secret-and is directed from a Major von Falkenstein to an unspecified General, presumably a Luftwaffe General. Falkenstein, who was a Major of the General Staff, was at that time the Luftwaffe liaison Officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, which was the staff headed by Jodl. His memorandum, which he characterizes as a "brief resume of the military questions current here", is dated 29 October 1940. It covers several questions. Paragraph 5 states: "5. The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present:- "a. No operational commitment "b. Portuguese neutrality "c. Support of France and Spain "A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF. "Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from Ic Kurfurst (C. in C. GAF Rear Hq.). I would like to ask Colonel Schmidt to arrange that
neutrality "c. Support of France and Spain "A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF. "Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from Ic Kurfurst (C. in C. GAF Rear Hq.). I would like to ask Colonel Schmidt to arrange that he be supplied with the information he desires." (376-PS) The Nazi Military interest in the United States is further indicated by paragraph 7: "7. General von Boetticher has made repeated reference, especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the fact that in his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I pointed out that the matter was a specifically GAF one, but have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own merits." (376-PS) Again in July 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting from early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the Fuehrer signed an order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the United States. This top secret order, found in files of the German Navy, reads: "By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive No. 32, for the further conduct of the War, I lay down the following principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material supplies: "1. In general: The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia will enable the strength of the Army to be considerably reduced in the near future. AS far as the reduced strength of the Army will allow, the Armoured units will be greatly increased. "Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which have a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England and, should the case arise, against America. "The main effort in armament will be shifted to the Air Force, which must be greatly increased in strength." (C-74) (b) Collaboration with the Japanese Against the United States. From the documents just quoted, it appears that the Nazi conspirators were making at least preliminary military plans of their own against the Unites States. The Nazi over-all plan with regard to the United States, however, was a complex one, involving in addition collaboration with
with the Japanese Against the United States. From the documents just quoted, it appears that the Nazi conspirators were making at least preliminary military plans of their own against the Unites States. The Nazi over-all plan with regard to the United States, however, was a complex one, involving in addition collaboration with the Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations to the Japanese to undertake an assault against British possessions in the Pacific-Far East, they again considered war against the United States. It will be recalled that in Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration with the Japanese (C-75), which was issued on 5 March 1941, the Nazi policy was stated in subparagraph 3a as aiming at "forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war". Nevertheless the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated within the framework of that policy the possibility of the United States' entry into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were instigating. This could result from an attack by Japan on United States' possessions practically simultaneously with the assault on the British Empire (as actually happened). Other possibilities of involvement of the United States were also discussed. Thus, Basic Order No. 24 stated in subparagraph 3 (c): "c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany." (C-75) The order continues, in the unnumbered paragraph immediately below subparagraph 3 (d): "In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power-extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented-will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia)." (C-75) In these passages there is a clear envisionment of U.S. involvement, as well as a clear intent to attack. The vital threat to United States' interests if Japan were to