dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right; tell us when you started. Goering: After all the proposals of disarmament which the Fuehrer made were refused, that is, shortly after our withdrawal from the disarmament conference he made several proposals for a limitation; but, since these were not taken seriously or discussed, he ordered a complete rearmament. At the end of 1933 already certain slight preparations were started by me personally, to the extent that I had made some inconsiderable preparations in regard to the air and had also undertaken a certain militarization of the uniformed police. But that was done by me personally; I bear the responsibility.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, then, the militarization of the police auxiliary was not a state affair. It was your personal affair. What do you mean by that? Goering: Not the auxiliary police, but the municipal police; that is, there was one uniformed police force which had simply police duty on the streets, and a second which was grouped in formations and was at our disposal for larger operations -- not created by us, let it be understood; but existing at the time of the seizure of power. This municipal police, which was grouped in units, uniformed, armed, and housed in barracks, I formed very soon into a strong military instrument by taking these men out of the police service and having them trained more along military lines and giving them machine guns and such things, in addition to their small arms. This I did on my own responsibility. These formations were taken into the Armed Forces as regular Army units when the Armed Forces Law was declared.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want to ask you some questions from your interrogation of the 17th day of October, 1945. 1 will first read you the questions and answers as they appear in the interrogations and I shall then ask you whether you gave those answers, and then you can make the explanations if you desire, and I assume you do. The interrogation reads: Were you asked those questions and did you give these answers, in substance? Goering: More or less; generally speaking that is correct. I have these remarks to make: Firstly, I was asked when rearmament had been discussed, not when it had been started. It had, of course, been discussed already in the year 1933, because it was clear at once that our government had to do something about it, that is to say, to demand that the others should disarm, and, if they did not disarm, that we should rearm. These things required discussion. The conclusion of the discussion and the formulation into a definite order followed after the failure of our attempts to get other countries to disarm. As soon as we, or rather the Fuehrer, saw that his proposals would not be accepted under any circumstances, a gradual rearmament, of course, began to take place. There was no reason whatsoever why we should inform the world about what we were doing in the way of rearmament. We were under no obligation to do that, nor was it expedient. Herr Schacht, in the year 1933 at the very beginning, could not raise any funds because at the start he held no office. He was able to do this only at a later date. And here it was understandable that the funds had to be raised through the Minister of Finance and the President of the Reichsbank according to the wishes and the orders of the Fuehrer, especially as we had left no doubt that, if the other side did not disarm, we would rearm. That had already been set down on our Party program since 1921, and quite openly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that on the 21st of May 1935, by a secret decree, Schacht was named Plenipotentiary for the War Economy? Goering: The date -- if you will kindly submit the decree to me, then I can tell you exactly. I have not the dates of decrees and laws in my head, especially if they do not have anything to do with me personally; but that can be seen from the decree.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At any event, shortly after he was named, he suggested you as Commissioner for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency, did he not? Goering: If Herr Schacht made this suggestion shortly after his appointment, then that appointment could not have taken place until 1936, because not until the summer of 1936 did Herr Schacht, together with the Minister of War, Von Blomberg, make the proposal that I should become Commissioner for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I ask you if you did not give this answer to the American interrogator on the 10th day of October 1945, referring to Schacht: How did you give that answer, and is that information correct? Goering: Will you please repeat.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Referring to Schacht, the record shows that you said: Goering: That is absolutely correct, with the exception of the word "Reichstagsprasident;" that ought to be President of the Reichsbank.
MR-TUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. That is the way I have it. Goering: It sounded like "Reichstagsprasident" over the earphones.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Goering: That I said the other day quite clearly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, from that time on you and Schacht collaborated for some time in preparing a rearmament program, did you not? Goering: From that time on I worked together with Schacht in economic matters and covered the whole field of German economy, including the armament program, which of course was a sine qua non for the reassumed German military sovereignty.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you and he had some jurisdictional differences and executed an agreement settling your different spheres of authority, did you not? Goering: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was in 1937 on the 7th of July, right? Goering: On that day a certain proposal for a settlement was made, but this did not lead to anything final being accomplished. That was because of the nature of the two posts and our personalities. Both of us, I, as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, and Herr Schacht, as Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, were able to exercise very great influence on German economy. As Herr Schacht also had a very, strong personality and felt his position keenly, and I likewise was not inclined to hide my light under a bushel, whether we were friends or not we could not help getting in each other's way because of this question of authority, and one of us had finally to give in to the other.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And there came a time when he left the Ministry and the Reichsbank? Goering: First he resigned from the Reich Ministry of Economy in November 1937, and, as far as I know, he resigned as President of the Reichsbank at the end of 1938, but I cannot be certain about that date.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was no disagreement between you and him that the program of rearmament should be carried through, was there? You disagreed only in the methods of doing it. Goering: I assume that Herr Schacht also, as a good German, was, of course, ready to put all his strength at the disposal of Germany's rearmament, in order that Germany should be strong; and therefore differences could have occurred only in regard to methods, for neither Herr Schacht nor I was arming for a war of aggression.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And after he left the rearmament work he remained as a Minister without Portfolio and sat in the Reichstag for some time, did he? Goering: That is correct. The Fuehrer wished it because, I believe, he wanted in this way to express his recognition of Herr Schacht.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you recall the time when you considered the calling up of 15-year-olds, the conscription of 15-year-olds? Goering: During the war you mean? MR. JUStICE JACKSON: Yes. Goering: It was a question of Air Force auxiliaries, that is correct. They were 15- or 16-year-olds, I do not remember exactly which, and were called in as Air Force auxiliaries.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that you be shown Document Number 3700-PS and ask you whether you received from Schacht the letter of which that is a carbon copy. [The document was handed to the witness.] Goering: Yes, I certainly did receive that letter. The year is not given here; that is missing in the copy.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Could you fix, approximately, the date of its receipt? Goering: It says here 3rd of November, but from the incidents described on the other side, I assume it must be 1943. On this copy the year, strangely enough, is not given, but I believe it was in the year 1943, 1 received this letter.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you reply to Document 3700-PS? Did you reply to this letter? Goering: I cannot say that today with certainty -- possibly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the Four Year Plan had as its purpose to put the entire economy in a state of readiness for war, had it not? Goering: I have explained that it had two tasks to fulfill -- 1) to safeguard German economy against crises, that is to say, to make it immune from export fluctuations, and, as regards food, from harvest fluctuations, as far as possible; and 2) to make it capable of withstanding a blockade, that is to say, in the light of experiences in the first World War, to put it on such a basis that in a second World War a blockade would not have such disastrous consequences. That the Four Year Plan in this respect was a basic prerequisite for the entire building-up and expansion of the armament industry goes without saying. Without it the rearmament industry could not have been shaped in this way.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To get a specific answer, if possible, did you not say in a letter to Schacht, dated the 18th day of December 1936, that you saw it to be your task, using these words, "within 4 years to put the entire economy in a state of readiness for war"? Did you say that or did you not? Goering: Of course I said that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, do you recall the report of Blomberg in 1937 in which -- and you may examine if you wish Document Number C-175 -- in which he starts his report by saying: Goering: That may have been quite possible at that moment. I took a most reassuring view of the German situation in 1937. It was after the Olympic games and at that time the general situation was extraordinarily calm. But that had nothing to do with the fact that I felt obliged, quite apart from passing fluctuations from a calmer to a more tense atmosphere, to make German economy ready for war and proof against crises or blockades, for exactly I year later incidents of a different nature occurred.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now, does not Blomberg continue: That was the situation in 1937, was it not? Goering: That is the way Herr Von Blomberg saw the situation. Concerning the readiness for war in Russia, Herr Von Blomberg, in the same way as all those representatives of our Reichswehr mentality, was always really mistaken in contrast to the opinion expressed in other quarters with regard to Russian armaments. This is merely the opinion of Herr Von Blomberg -- not the Fuehrer's, not mine, and not the opinion of other leading people.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That, however, was the report of 'the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the 24th of June 1937, was it not? Goering: That is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You organized, 1 month later, the Hermann Goering Works? Goering: Right.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Hermann Goering Works were concerned with putting Germany in the condition of readiness for war, were they not? Goering: No, that is not right. The Hermann Goering Works were at first concerned solely with the mining of German iron ore in the region of Salzgitter and in a district in the Oberpfalz, and, after the annexation, with the iron ore works in Austria. The Hermann Goering Works first established exclusively mining and refining plants for this ore and foundries. Only much later steel works and rolling mills were added, that is to say, an industry.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Hermann Goering Works were a part of the Four Year Plan, were they not? Goering: That is right.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you have already said that the Four Year Plan had as its purpose to put the economy in a state of readiness for war; and the Hermann Goering Works were organized to exploit ore mining and iron smelting resources and to carry the process through to completed guns and tanks, were they not? Goering: No, that is not correct; the Hermann Goering Works had at first no armament works of their own, but merely produced, as I again repeat, the basic product, steel, crude steel.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, at all events, you continued your efforts and on the 8th of November 1943, you made a speech describing those efforts to the Gauleiter in the Fuehrer building at Munich, is that right? Goering: I do not know the exact date, but about that time I made a short speech, one of a series of speeches, to the Gauleiter about the air situation, as far as I remember, and also perhaps about the armament situation. I do not remember the words of that speech, since I was never asked about it until now; but the facts are correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, let me remind you if you used these terms, refreshing your recollection: Goering: That is entirely correct; I certainly did say that, and what is more, I acted accordingly. But in order that this be understood and interpreted correctly, I must explain briefly: In these statements I dealt with two separate opinions on air strategy, which are still being debated today and without a decision having been reached. That is to say: Should the air force form an auxiliary arm of the army and the navy and be split up, to form a constituent part of the army and the navy, or should it be a separate branch of the armed forces? I explained that for nations with a very large navy it is perhaps understandable that such a division should be made. From the very beginning, thank God, we made the correct, consistent decision to build up a strong -- I emphasize the word "strong" -- and independent Air Force along with the Army and the Navy; and I described how we passed from a tentative air force to an operative air force. As an expert I am today still of the opinion that only an operative air force can have a decisive effect. I have also explained, in regard to two- and four-engine bombers, that at first I was quite satisfied with the two-engine bombers because, firstly, I did not have four-engine bombers; and secondly, the operational radius of the two-engine bombers was wide enough for the enemy with whom we had to deal at that time. I further pointed out that the main reason for the swift ending of the campaign in Poland and in the West was the effect of the Air Force. So that is quite correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I remind you of the testimony of the witness Milch, swom. on your behalf, as to a subject on which I have not heard you express yourself. He said: Do you remember that? Goering: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And was it true or false? True or mistaken, perhaps, I should say. Goering: No, I did not want a war and I thought the best way to avoid a war was to be strongly armed according to the wellImown adage, "He who has a strong sword has peace."
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you are still of that opinion? Goering: I am of that opinion today, now that I see the entanglements more than ever.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is true, as Milch said, that you were worried that Hitler's policies would lead to war at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland? Goering: Excuse me, I just understood you to ask whether it is also my opinion today that only a nation that is strongly armed can maintain peace. That is what I meant to answer with my last statement. If you are connecting this question to the statement of Milch, that I was worried lest the policy of the Fuehrer might lead to war, I should like to say that I was worried lest war might come; and if possible I wanted to avoid it, but not in the sense that the policy of the Fuehrer would lead to it, because the Fuehrer also desired to carry out his program by agreements and diplomatic action. In regard to the occupation of the Rhineland I was somewhat worried at the time about the reactions; all the same, it was necessary.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when nothing happened, the next step was Austria? Goering: The one has nothing to do with the other. I never had any misgivings about Austria leading to a war, as I had with the Rhineland occupation, for in the case of the Rhineland occupation I could well imagine that there might be repercussions. But how there could be any repercussions from abroad over the union of two brother nations of purely German blood was not clear to me, especially since Italy, who always pretended that she had a vital interest in a separate Austria, had somewhat changed her ideas. It could not have mattered in the least to England and France, nor could they have had the slightest interest in this union. Therefore I did not see the danger of its leading to a war.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask you just a few questions about Austria. You said that you and Hitler had felt deep regret about the death of Dollfuss, and I ask you if it is not a fact that Hitler put up a plaque in Vienna in honor of the men who murdered Dollfuss, and went and put a wreath on their graves when he was there. Is that a fact? Can you not answer that question with "yes" or "no"? Goering: No, I cannot answer it with either "yes" or "no," if I am to speak the truth according to my oath. I cannot say, "Yes, he did it," because I do not know; I cannot say, "No, he did not do it," because I do not know that either. I want to say that I heard about this event here for the first time.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in June of 1937, Seyss-Inquart came to you and State Secretary Keppler, and you had some negotiations. Goering: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was Seyss-Inquart's desire to have an independent Austria, was it not? Goering: As far as I remember, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Keppler was the man who was sent by Hitler to Vienna at the time of the Anschluss and who telegraphed to Hitler not to march in, do you recall? Goering: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the telegram that you characterized as impudent and senseless from the man who was on the spot, and who had negotiated earlier with Seyss-Inquart, do you recall that? Goering: I did not characterize the telegram with this word which has just been translated to me in German, that is "impudent." I said that this telegram could no longer have any influence and was superfluous, because the troops were already on the move and had their order; the thing was already underway.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You had demanded that Seyss-Inquart be made Chancellor? Is that right? Goering: I did not desire that personally, but it arose out of the circumstance that at that time he was the only man who could assume the Chancellorship because he was already in the Government.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor of Austria with the understanding that he was to surrender his country to Germany, or did you lead him to believe that he would be independent, have an independent country? Goering: I explained the other day that even at the time when he left by plane the next morning, the Fuehrer himself had still not made up his mind as to whether the union with Austria should not be brought about by means of a joint head of state. I also said that I personally did not consider this solution far-reaching enough and that I was for an absolute, direct, and total Anschluss. I did not know exactly what Seyss-Inquart's attitude was at this time. Nevertheless I feared that his attitude was rather in the direction of continued separation with co-operation, and did not go as far as my attitude in the direction of a total Anschluss. Therefore I was very satisfied when this total Anschluss crystallized in the course ofthe day.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I respectfully submit that the answers are not responsive, and I repeat the question. Did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor of Austria with an understanding that he would call in the German troops and surrender Austria to Germany, or did you lead him to believe that he could continue an independent Austria? Goering: Excuse me, but that is a number of questions which I cannot answer simply with "yes" or "no." If you ask me, "Did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor according to Hitler's wishes and yours?" -- yes. If you then ask me, "Did he become Chancellor with the understanding that he should send a telegram for troops to march in?" -- I say, "No," because at the time of the Chancellorship there was no question of his sending us a telegram. If you ask me, thirdly, "Did he become Chancellor on the understanding that he would be able to maintain an independent Austria?"  -- then I have to say again that the final turn of events was not clear in the Fuehrer's mind on that evening. That is what I tried to explain.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not true that you suspected that he might want to remain as independent as possible, and that that was one of the reasons why the troops were marched in? Goering: No. Excuse me, there are two questions: I strongly suspected that Seyss-Inquart wanted to be as independent as possible. The sending of troops had nothing at all to do with that suspicion; not a single soldier would have been needed for that. I gave my reasons for the sending of the troops.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it was never intimated to Seyss-Inquart that Austria would not remain independent until after -- as you put it -- the Fuehrer and you were in control of Austria's fate? Is that a fact? Goering: That was certainly not told him beforehand by the Fuehrer. As far as I was concerned, it was generally known that I desired it, and I assume that he knew of my attitude.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you have stated that you then, in conversation with Ribbentrop in London, stressed that no ultimatum had been put to Seyss-Inquart, and you have said that. legally that was the fact. Goering: I did not say "legally," I said "diplomatically."
THE PRESIDENT: Is that a convenient time to break off?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Your Honor. [The Tribunal adjourned until 19 March 1946 at 1000 hours.]
DR. STAHMER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall call as witness the civil engineer, Birger Dahlerus of Stockholm. [The witness Dahlerus took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name?
BIRGER DAHLERUS (Witness): Birger Dahlerus.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God -- the Almighty and Omniscient -- that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth -- the whole truth -- and nothing but the truth -- so help me God. [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. Dahlerus, would you please tell the Court how you, as a private person and a Swedish citizen, came to work for an understanding between England and Germany?
DAHLERUS: I knew England very well, since I had lived there for 12 years, and I also knew Germany very well. I had been able to observe the first World War from both sides, as I stayed both in Germany and in England during that time. During a visit to England at the end of June 1939, I traveled around a number of cities, Birmingham, Coventry, Manchester, and London, and I found everywhere an absolute determination that the British would tolerate no further aggressive acts on the part of Germany. On 2 July I met some friends in the Constitutional Club. We discussed the current situation and they gave a pretty clear picture of public opinion in Great Britain. As this summary of public opinion in Great Britain was the basis for my discussions afterward with Goering, I think I should quote it. Then follows Statement Number 2, about Lord Halifax's speech: