dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then there is another reference in Count Ciano's diary which also has not been read and which makes this point quite clear. Again, if the Tribunal will take it as set out in the trial brief, I will read it, as it has not been read before: "I have collected the conference records of verbal transcripts of my conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler. Here I shall note only some impressions of a general nature. Ribbentrop is evasive every time I ask him for particulars of the forthcoming German action. He has a guilty conscience. He has lied too many times about German intentions towards Poland not to feel embarrassment now over what he must tell me and what he is preparing to do. "The will fight is unalterable. He rejects any solution which might satisfy Germany and prevent the struggle. I am certain that even if the Germans were given everything they demanded they would attack just the same, because they are possessed by the demon of destruction. "Our conversation sometimes takes a dramatic turn. I do not hesitate to speak my mind in the most brutal manner. But this doesn't shake him in the least. I realize how little weight this view carries in German opinion. "The atmosphere is icy. And the cold feeling between us is reflected in our followers. During dinner we do not exchange a word. We distrust each other. But I at least have a clear conscience. He has not." Whatever other defects there may have been about Count Ciano, there cannot be an appreciation of the situation which is more heavily corroborated by supporting documents than his diagnosis of the situation in the summer of 1939. Then we come to the next stage in the German plan, which was sharp pressure on the claim for Danzig shown immediately after Czechoslovakia had been finally dealt with on the 15th of March. It is shown how closely it followed the completion of the rape of Prague. The first sharp raising of the claim was on the 21st of March, as shown in Exhibit GB-38, Document TC-73, Number 61. And that developed, as the Tribunal has heard from Colonel Griffith-Jones.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then we come to the last days before the war, and one interesting side light is that Herr Von Dirksen, the German Ambassador at the Court of St. James, returned from London on the 18th of August 1939; and I put in the extract from the interrogation of the Defendant Ribbentrop, which is Document D-490. I put that in as GB-138. I do not intend to read it to the Tribunal because it can be summarized in this way: That the Defendant Ribbentrop has certainly no recollection of ever having seen the German Ambassador to the Court of St. James after his return. He thinks he would have remembered him if he had seen him and he accepts the probability that he did not see him. And there is the point, when it was well known that war with Poland would involve England and France, that either he was not sufficiently interested in opinion in London to take the trouble to see his ambassador or else, as he rather suggests, that he had appointed so weak and ordinary a career diplomat to London that his opinion was not taken into account, either by himself or by Hitler. In either case, he was completely uninterested in anything which his ambassador might have to tell him of opinion in London or the possibility of war. And I conceive myself speaking with great moderation in putting it this way' That in the last days before the 1st of September 1939 this defendant did whatever he could to avoid peace with Poland and to avoid anything which might hinder the incursion of the war which we know he wanted. He did that, well knowing that war with Poland would involve Great Britain and France. These details were given in full by Colonel Griffith-Jones; I am not going through them again. But I have, for the convenience of the Tribunal, referred to the transcript at Pages 1000 to 1059 (Volume III, Pages 219 to 261 ), and M. Lipski summarized all that took place in his report of the 10th of October 1939, which is Document TC-73, Number 147, which is Exhibit GB-27. Now these are the actions of this defendant in the Polish matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am glad to inform the Tribunal that with regard to the other countries they are very much shorter than with regard to Poland. I now come to Norway and Denmark. I remind the Tribunal of the fact, if it cares to take cognizance thereof, that on the 31st of May 1939 the Defendant Ribbentrop, on behalf of Germany, signed a non-aggression pact with Denmark which provided that "the German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark will under no circumstances go to war or employ force of any other kind against one another." This is Exhibit GB-77, Document TC-24. And just to fix the date, the Tribunal will remember that on the 9th of April 1940 the German Armed Forces invaded Denmark and at the same time they invaded Norway. With regard to Norway there are three documents which show that this defendant was fully informed of the earlier preparations for that act of aggression. The Tribunal will remember that my friend, Major Elwyn Jones, did indicate with some particularity the relations between Quisling and the Defendant Rosenberg. But Rosenberg in this case also required the help of the Defendant Ribbentrop and, if the Tribunal would be good enough to turn to Document 957-PS, which I am putting in as GB-139, they will see the first of the documents which connect this defendant with the earlier Quisling activities. The first one, Document 957-PS, is a letter from Defendant Rosenberg to this defendant and it begins: "Dear Party Comrade Von Ribbentrop: "Party Comrade Scheidt has returned and has made a detailed report to Geheimrat Von Grundherr, who will address you on this subject. We agreed the other day that 200,000 to 300,000 Reichsmarks would be made immediately available for the said purpose. Now it turns out that . . . Grundherr states that the second instalment can be made available only after 8 days. But as it is necessary for Scheidt to go back immediately, I request you to make it possible that this second instalment be given to him at once. With a longer absence . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: the connection with your representatives would also be broken up, which just now, under certain circumstances, could be very unfavorable. "Therefore I think it is in everybody's interest, if Party Comrade Scheidt goes back immediately." That was the 24th of February. Now the next document, 004-PS, is a report from Rosenberg to Hitler, and if the Tribunal will be good enough to turn to Page 4- this is on the Quisling activities-they will find that that passage is sufficient to show how this defendant was connected with it. This is a report from Rosenberg to Hitler: "Next to a financial support which was paid by the Reich in foreign currency, Quisling, as further help, was at the same time promised deliveries of goods which were urgently needed by Norway, such as coal and sugar. The shipments were to be conducted under cover of a new trade company, to be established in Germany, or through specially selected existing firms while Hagelin was to act as consignee in Norway. Hagelin had already conferred with the respective Ministers of the Nygaardsvold Government, as, for instance, the Minister of Supply and Commerce, and had been assured permission for the import of coat At the same time the coal transports were to serve possibly to supply the technical means necessary to launch Quisling's political action in Oslo with German help. It was Quisling's plan to send a number of selected, particularly reliable men to Germany for a brief military training course in a completely isolated camp. They were then to be detailed as area and language specialists to German special troops, who were to be taken to Oslo on the coal barges to accomplish a political action. Thus Quisling planned to get hold of his leading opponents in Norway, including the King, and to prevent all military resistance from the very beginning. Immediately following this political action and upon an official request of Quisling to the Government of the German Reich, the military occupation of Norway was to take place. All military preparations were to be completed previously.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Though this plan contained the great advantage of surprise, it also contained a great number of dangers which could possibly cause its failure. For this reason it received a quite dilatory treatment, while at the same time it was not disapproved as far as the Norwegians were concerned. "In February, after a conference with General Field Marshal Goering, Reichsleiter Rosenberg informed the Ministerial Director in the office of the Four Year Plan, Wohl that, only of the intention to prepare coal shipments to Norway to the named confidant Hagelin. Further details were discussed in a conference between Wohl that, Staff Director Schickedanz, and Hagelin. Since Wohl that received no further instructions from the General Field Marshal, Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop-after a consultation with Reichsleiter Rosenberg- consented to expedite these shipments through his office. Based on a report of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Fuehrer it was also arranged at this conference to pay Quisling through Scheidt as liaison 10,000 English pounds per month for the next 3 months, commencing on the 15th of March, to support his work." This was paid through Scheidt, the man who was mentioned before. Now the other document, D-629, is a letter from Defendant Keitel to the Defendant Ribbentrop, dated the 3rd of April 1940. I need trouble the Tribunal only with the first paragraph. The Defendant Keitel says: "Dear Herr Von Ribbentrop: "The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been, by command of the Fuehrer, long in preparation by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the Wehrmacht has therefore had ample time to occupy itself with all the questions connected with the carrying out of this operation. The time at your disposal for the political preparation of this operation is, on the contrary, very much shorter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I believe myself, therefore, to be acting in accordance with your ideas in transmitting to you herewith, not only these wishes of the Wehrmacht which would have to be fulfilled by the Governments in Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm for purely military reasons, but also I include a series of requests which certainly concern the Wehrmacht only indirectly but which are, however, of the greatest importance for the fulfillment of its task." Then he proceeds to ask that the Foreign Office get in touch with certain commanders. The important point for which I read it to the Tribunal-as far as I know, for the first time-is that there we have the Defendant Keitel saying quite clearly that the military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been long in preparation. And it is interesting when one looks back to the official life of Ribbentrop, which is contained in the archives and is Document D472. I am quoting a sentence only because of the interesting contrast: "With the occupation of Denmark and Norway on the 9th of April 1940 only a few hours before the landing of British troops in these territories, the baffle began against the Western Powers." Then it goes on to Holland and Belgium. It is quite clear that, whoever else had knowledge or whoever else was ignorant, this Defendant Ribbentrop had been up to his neck in the Quisling plottings, and it is made clear to him well a week before the invasion started, that the Wehrmacht and the Defendant Keitel had long been preparing this particular act of aggression. I think, My Lord, that is really all the evidence on the aggression against Norway because, again, the story was put forward fully by my friend, Major Elwyn Jones.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. [The Tribunal adjourned until 9 January 1946 at 1000 hours.]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): If the Tribunal please, when the Tribunal adjourned I had just dealt with the last of the two Norway documents, which I now put in as Exhibits GB-140 and GB-141. Their numbers are 004-PS and D-629. My Lord, for convenience the first document, to which I shall refer in a few minutes, will be Document Number 1871-PS.
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): I have that here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, before I come to that, I just want to say one word about the aggression against the Low Countries-Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The facts as to the aggression against these countries, during the period when this defendant was Foreign Minister, were stated in full by my friend Mr. Roberts, and I think if I give the Tribunal the reference to the transcript at Pages 1100 to 1125 (Volume III, Pages 289 to 307), I do not need to detain the Tribunal on that part of the case. I only remind the Tribunal that the action of this defendant as Foreign Minister to which attention may be called is the making of a statement on the 10th of May 1940 to representatives of the foreign press with regard to the reasons for the German invasion of the Low Countries; and these reasons were, in my respectful submission, demonstrated to be false by the evidence called by Mr. Roberts, which appears in that part of the transcript. My Lord, I then proceed to the aggression in southeastern Europe against Greece and Yugoslavia, and the first moment of time in that regard is the meeting at Salzburg in August 1939, at which the Defendant Von Ribbentrop participated, when Hitler announced that the Axis had decided to liquidate certain neutrals. That is Document 1871-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-142, and the passage to which I should like to refer the Tribunal is on Page 2 of the English version, two-thirds down the page in the middle of the fifth paragraph, six lines from the top. Your Lordship will find the words "Generally speaking."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I desire to quote from there: "Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the pseudo neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, as the latter finishes off one of the uncertain neutrals. Italy may consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent Paul he (the Fuehrer) suggested, particularly with regard to Italy, that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude towards the Axis by a gesture. Me had thought of a closer connection with the Axis and the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the latter. Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reassurance from the Western Powers. The same thing was repeated that happened in the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the aims of the Western Democracies. Afterwards it was learned that he had later assumed a contrary standpoint in England. Among the Balkan countries the Axis can completely rely only on Bulgaria, which is, in a sense, a natural ally of Italy and Germany." Then missing a sentence: "At the moment of a turn for the worse for Germany and Italy, however, Yugoslavia would join the other side openly, hoping thereby to give matters a final turn to the disadvantage of the Axis." That demonstrates the policy with regard to uncertain neutrals. Then, as early as September 1940 this defendant reviewed the war situation with Mussolini. This defendant emphasized the heavy revenge bombing raids in England and the fact that London would soon be in ruins. It was agreed between the parties that only Italian interests were involved in Greece and Yugoslavia and that Italy could count on German support. Then Von Ribbentrop went on further to explain to Mussolini the Spanish plan for the attack on Gibraltar and Germany's participation therein and that he was expecting to sign the protocol with Spain, bringing the latter country into the war, on his return to Berlin.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is Document 1842-PS, which is the next document in the book to the one at which the Tribunal has just been looking, and the passage with regard to Greece and Yugoslavia occurs in the middle of the first page-if I might just read a very short extract: "With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia the Foreign Minister stressed that it was exclusively a question of Italian interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone and in which Italy would be certain of Germany's sympathetic assistance." I don't think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, member for the United States): I think you had better read the next paragraph.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "But it seemed to us to be better not to touch on these problems for the time being, but instead to concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces. Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern German districts (Norway, et cetera), and this was acknowledged by the Duce." I am very grateful to you, Your Honor. That I put in as Exhibit GB-143. A month or two later, in January 1941, at the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, in which this defendant participated, the Greek operation was discussed. Hitler had stated that the German troops in Romania were for use in the planned campaign against Greece. That document is C-134, which was put in as Exhibit GB-119, and therefore I do not propose to give it again but to give the Tribunal the reference to the points which are mentioned at the foot of Page 3 of the English text. With regard to that meeting there is a cross-reference in Count Ciano's diary, Count Ciano having attended as Italian Foreign Minister, and he recalls his impression of that meeting in the diary for the 20th and 21st of January by saying: "The Duce is pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am less pleased. Above all, because Ribbentrop, who had always been so boastful in the past, told me, when I asked him outright how long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of its ending before 1942." Despite that somewhat pessimistic statement to Count Ciano, a short time later, 3 weeks later, when it was a question of encouraging the Japanese, this defendant took a more optimistic line. On the 13th of February 1941 he saw Ambassador Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, and that conversation appears in Document 1834-PS, which is Exhibit USA-129. That was read previously, and again I simply give the reference on Page 3 of the English version. The second from the last paragraph dealt with the optimistic account of the military position and the position of Bulgaria and Turkey. I do not think I need read it further, but I will give the Tribunal the reference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then after that, in March, this defendant put forth his efforts to get Yugoslavia to join the Axis, and on the 25th of March the defendant, in a note to the Prime Minister Cvetkovic-and this is Document 2450-PS, which is Exhibit GB-123-gave the assurance: "The Axis-Power Governments, during this war, will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of troops through the Yugoslav state or territory." After that, it is only fair to point out that there was the coup d'etat in Yugoslavia. General Simovic took over the government; and two days after the assurance which I just read, at the meeting of the 27th of March 1941, at which this defendant was present, Hitler outlined the military campaign against Yugoslavia and promised the destruction of Yugoslavia and the demolition of Belgrade by the German Air Force. That is contained in Document 1746-PS, which is Exhibit GB-120; and that was read by my friend, Colonel Phillimore at an earlier stage so I do not need to read it again. The final action of this defendant with regard to Yugoslavia was that after the invasion of Yugoslavia Von Ribbentrop was one of the persons directed by Hitler to draw up the boundaries for the partition and division of Yugoslavia. The preliminary directive for that is Document 1195-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-144. We now come to the aggression against the Soviet Union, and the first...
THE PRESIDENT: Has that been read, 1195?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, it has not. I am much obliged, Your Lordship. I will now read the relevant sentence with regard to this. On Page 2, Section 2, Your Lordship will see the words "the drawing up of boundaries." And in Paragraph 1 it says: "Insofar as the drawing up of boundaries has not been laid down in the above Part I, it will be carried out by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign Office," that is this defendant "the Delegate for the Four Year Plan," the Defendant Goering "and the Reich Minister of the Interior."
THE PRESIDENT: Who is the Reich Minister of the Interior?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think the Defendant Frick.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think it is.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am grateful to Your Lordship. I had forgotten that had not been read before. Now then, as I say, we come to the aggression against the Soviet Union; and the first document which has not been put in so far, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-145, is TC-25, the German Soviet Non-aggression Pact . On 23 August 1939 this defendant had signed the German Soviet Non-aggression Pact . Now the first point at which this defendant seems to have considered special problems of aggression against the Soviet Union was just after the 20th of April 1941, when the Defendant Rosenberg and this defendant met or communicated to consider the problems which were expected to arise in Occupied Eastern Territory. This defendant appointed his Counselor, Grosskopf, to be his liaison man with Rosenberg and also assigned a consul general called Brautigam, who had many years experience in the U.S.S.R., as collaborator with Rosenberg. That is shown in Document 1039-PS, which is already Exhibit USA-146. I did not propose to read it again, as it had been read. But the passage to which I have referred is the first paragraph on the top of Page 2, beginning, "After notification to the Reich Foreign Minister." It is that paragraph which I have just mentioned. That was in April 1941. The following month, on 18 May 1941, the German Foreign Office prepared a declaration setting forth operational zones in the Arctic Ocean; the Baltic and the Black Seas, to be used by the German Navy and the Air Force in the coming invasion of the Soviet Union. That is the next document, C-77, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-146, and it is very short. Therefore I think I should quote it; it has not been read before: "The Foreign Office has prepared for the use in 'Barbarossa' the attached draft of a declaration of operational zones.