dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Herr Von Bose and Jung were killed, Von Tschirschky was arrested, and two other gentlemen were also arrested? Did you hear about that?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I did, through Herr Von Papen.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you regard the blood purge of the 30th of June as just another element in the necessary cleaning up of public life?
VON NEURATH: To the extent that it was carried out with all the outrages and murders of innocent people, most certainly not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you go on in a government that was using murder as an instrument of political action?
VON NEURATH: I have already told you twice that in the case of such revolutions such mishaps cannot be avoided, most unfortunately.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now, let us take just another of your 1934 experiences. You knew about the terroristic acts that were going on in Austria in May and June of 1934, did you not? And by "terroristic acts?'-don't let us have any doubt about it-what I mean is causing explosions in Austrian public utilities and railways and things like that. I mean dynamite. I don't mean anything vague. You knew that such acts were going on in Austria in May and June 1934, did you not?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I heard about it, and I always opposed that sort of thing because I knew that it was done by Nazis; and let me say once more, mostly by Austrian Nazis.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What position did Herr Kopke have in your Ministry on the 31st of May 1934?
VON NEURATH: He was the Ministerial Director.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Ministerial Director: Quite a responsible position, was it not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Herr Kopke reporting to you on the 31st of May 1934, on a visit of Baron von Wachter?
VON NEURATH: No, I cannot remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just think; you know. Baron von Wachter was one of the leaders of the Putsch against Dollfuss 6 weeks later on the 25th of July. Don't you remember Herr Kopke making a report to you and you passing it on to Hitler? VON NEURATH: No, I cannot remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let's refresh your memory if you don't remember it. Would you look at Document D-868? It will become Exhibit GB-515. Just look at it. I will read it over, but just look at the signatories carefully; and if you will be good enough to look at the top, I think you will find on the original, there are your own initials; and on the left hand side there is a note: "The Reich Chancellor has been informed 6/6." That is on the 6th of June. That is initialed "L" by Lammers-Dr. Lammers. Then there is a note below that: "From the Reich Chancellor on 6th June," also initialed by Lammers I think. And on the other side you will see there is 'a note which is certainly initialed "rammers." "Habicht is coming today...L 6/6." And this memorandum comes back from the Reich Chancellor to the Foreign Office on the same day. Now just let's see what report you were getting from Austria and passing on to Hitler. We will omit, unless you want it particularly, a description of Baron von Wachter's fresh, youthful appearance in Paragraph 1; but it goes on to say: "His statements were obviously made in full consciousness of serious responsibility. His estimation of the affairs and personalities that came under review was clear and definite. Herr Von Wachter drew up for me, too, a picture of the situation in Austria which was, in some of its colors, even darker and more serious than it had appeared to us here up till now. The extremist tendencies of the National Socialists in Austria were constantly on the increase. Terrorist acts were multiplying. Regardless of who actually undertook the demolitions and other terrorist acts in individual cases, each such act provoked a new wave of extremism and also of desperate acts. As Herr Von Wachter repeatedly and sadly stressed, uniformity of leadership was lacking. The SA did what it wanted and what it, for its part, considered necessary. The political leadership at the same time introduced measures which sometimes meant the exact opposite.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thus the great terrorist action, as the result of which the railway lines leading to Vienna were blown up, was by no means committed by Marxists but by the Austrian SA and indeed against the wishes of the political leadership which, as he believed, did not participate in any way either in the act or its preparation. Such is the picture as a whole. In detail, in individual provinces and districts, the confusion was, if possible, even greater." Then he says that the main seat of unrest is Carinthia, and where conditions were worst. And then he says: "Herr Von Wachter thought that here improvements must be introduced most speedily, that is, by means of the centralization of all forces active in the interests of National Socialism both in and outside Austria. Personal questions should play no part here. The decisive word in this connection could; of course, be given only by the Fuehrer himself. He, Wachter, was in complete agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters. As far as he knew, Herr Habicht had already succeeded in having a brief conversation with the Reich Chancellor today." Now just let's pause there for a moment. Herr Habicht was appointed about that time press attaché at the German Embassy in Vienna. The appointment of Herr Habicht as press attaché would be done either by you or with your approval, would it not? It was under your department?
VON NEURATH: Right now I no longer know if Herr Habicht- Herr Habicht was the National Socialist leader (Landesleiter) for · Austria in Munich and whether or not he went to Vienna as press attaché I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you can take it that he went to Vienna as press attaché at this time, at the end of May 1934; and what I am asking you is, was it not either at your order or with your approval that he was given a post which gave him diplomatic immunity in the middle of his plottings?
VON NEURATH: If Herr Habicht was really there, this happened neither with my knowledge nor with my approval; but presumably it was arranged by the Ministry of Propaganda to whom these press men were subordinated. SIR, DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you will agree with me, Defendant, that this is not a very pleasant document; it does not describe a very pleasant state of affairs. Let me remind you, this came from your Ministerial Director to you and went on to the Fuehrer and came back from Dr. Lammers with a note: "Habicht is coming today." Surely as...
VON NEURATH: To the Fuehrer?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, yes.
VON NEURATH: Besides, Mr. Prosecutor, I want to point out to you that here only the Austrian National Socialists are being discussed. With them I had nothing at all to do.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am pointing out to you is that the document, this Foreign Office document goes to the Reich Chancellery; it comes back on the 6th of June with a note from Dr. Lammers saying, "Habicht is coming today." You must have known all about Habicht on the 6th of June. It is mentioned in this report.
VON NEURATH: Not at all. I have this note from Lammers which means that Habicht was coming to see the Reich Chancellor. And this report from my Ministerial Director I immediately passed on to the Reich Chancellor to show him what the conditions were in Austria. That was the reason.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you remember Herr Von Papen giving evidence a few days ago; and when I asked him who were the leading Reich German personalities who influenced the Putsch in Austria in July 1934, he thought for a long time and the only leading Reich German personality that he could remember as influencing the Putsch was this very Herr Habicht?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then, what I am putting to you is-and pausing there to get it-that you knew very well, on the 6th of June 1934, that Herr Habicht, this leading Reich personality according to the Defendant Von Papen, was organizing revolution in Austria, didn't you?
VON NEURATH: Whatever makes you suppose a thing like that? Herr Habicht never came to see me. He went to see the Reich Chancellor.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You saw this report. This is a report of your Ministerial Director. I have just read what Von Wachter thought.
VON NEURATH: There is not one word about Herr Habicht in it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I just read that to you. May I remind you: "The decisive word in this connection could of course be given only by the Fuehrer himself. He, Wachter, was in complete agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters." In other words, what Wachter is putting to the Foreign Office were the views of Habicht no less than himself.
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is certainly in there. Well, all these terrorist acts and all these disturbances which are described in this document were brought to the attention of the Reich Chancellor by myself.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look what the report says at the foot of the page: "But when nothing happened in the meantime, and on the other hand the countermeasures of the Austrian Government grew more brutal and severe from day to day, the radical elements made themselves felt once more and came forward with the statement that the Chancellor had issued his order only for tactical reasons and was inwardly in agreement with every manly act of opposition and had in view, as his own political aim, merely the weakening of Dollfuss' hateful system, though in a way which should be as unobtrusive as possible to the outside world. They are now working with this argument." Listen to the next bit, his suggestion to you, the nearest warning of trouble which any Foreign Minister ever heard of: "One constantly stumbles on this idea during discussions and it is secretly spreading. A change must be made soon and a uniform leadership created. Otherwise, as Herr Von Wachter concluded his impressive description, a disaster may occur any day which would have the worst possible consequences in foreign policy, not only for Austria alone, but above all for Germany herself." And then, dramatically, in the middle of the conversation, Herr Von Wachter receives a telephone message that he had better not go back to Vienna or he will be arrested on his arrival; and within 6 weeks he had started the Putsch and Chancellor Dollfuss had been shot. Do you remember now? Did you not appreciate, at the beginning of June 1934, that there was the greatest danger of an uprising and-trouble in Austria?
VON NEURATH: Yes, quite definitely so. That is the very reason why I sent, the report to the Chancellor. I could not interfere in Austria.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps you can tell me, on the question on which the Defendant Von Papen was unable to specify, who, in your opinion, were the other prominent Reich German personalities who were behind the Dollfuss Putsch in Austria? You say you were not. Who, in your opinion, were these personalities that Herr Von Papen mentions as being behind the Dollfuss Putsch?
VON NEURATH: I know absolutely none. I know only Habicht, and him I knew only as a person against whom I protested to Hitler because of his inflammatory actions. Apart from him I did not know any Reich Germans. The others were all Austrian National Socialists who have been mentioned innumerable times during the Trial but whom I did not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not mentioning them. I am mentioning the Defendant Von Papen's prominent Reich German personalities, and I am trying very hard to find out who they were Are you taking the same line, that the only one you can remember is the press attaché, Herr Habicht? Is that all you can help the Tribunal in this matter?
VON NEURATH: I have already said-and that will have to suffice-I do not know anyone.
SIR DAVID MAXELL-FYFE: Is it your opinion that your Minister, Dr. Rieth, knew nothing about this, despite what Mr. Messersmith says on that point? Do you think Dr. Rieth knew nothing about the Putsch?
VON NEURATH: I cannot tell you to what extent Herr Rieth was informed. You know, however, that when he acted ostentatiously later on that I recalled him right away. Apart from that, I always forbade the ministers to meddle in such matters.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You haven't any doubt in your own mind that Dr. Rieth knew all about the impending Putsch, have you?
VON NEURATH: Oh yes, I have considerable doubts that he knew all about it. I do not believe so because his whole character was not at all like that
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, at any rate, you knew on the 25th of July that the Austrian Nazis had made this Putsch and had murdered Dollfuss?
VON NEURATH: That is not exactly a secret.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I know it. A lot of these things were not secrets. What I am interested in was your knowledge-when you found out.
VON NEURATH: Afterward, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But didn't that give you any qualms about remaining in a government which had extended its policy of murder from at home to abroad, through the Party elements in Austria?
VON NEURATH: If I were responsible for every single murderer, for every single German murderer who was active abroad, then I would have had a lot of work to do, would I not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew, Herr Von Neurath- and I shall remind you how in a moment-you knew that the Austrian NSDAP was in close touch with, and acting under, the orders of Hitler all the time when Hitler was head of your Government; you knew that perfectly well, didn't you?
VON NEURATH: He was the chief of the NSDAP. It is quite natural that they were collaborating with him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now there is just one other point . . .
VON NEURATH: Yes. I want to tell you another thing: I continuously remonstrated with Hitler, together with Herr Von Papen, about the fact that this Herr Habicht was doing the things he was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take that up in a moment. I just want to get one point of fact. Does this accord with your recollection: I have been through all the reports of the Defendant Von Papen; and apart from three personal reports, two dealing with Herr Von Tschirschky and one dealing with abuse of Hitler, which is of no political significance, we have 28 reports. Nineteen of these reports are marked as being copies to the Foreign Office. Is that in accord with your recollection, that three out of four of Herr Von Papen's reports would come to you to be seen by you?
VON NEURATH: That I cannot tell you at this late day.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are quite right, Herr Von Neurath. You wouldn't know how many went to you, but you say you saw a considerable number of Herr Von Papen's reports. I think there were 19; I am sure you can take it that they are marked-I9 are marked, "Passed the Foreign Office".
VON NEURATH: I do believe you, yes; but the question is how many were submitted to me, for I did not receive every individual report from every ambassador or minister abroad. Otherwise, I would have been drowned in paper.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I quite agree; but what I asked you was, did you receive these from Herr Von Papen, who was supposed to be in a rather special position dealing with a very difficult problem? Did you receive a considerable number of reports from Herr Von Papen to Hitler as passed to you?
VON NEURATH: I can tell you only that I received some reports but certainly not all. I cannot tell you more than that today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, perhaps this would be a convenient time to break off.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to get two or three facts clear about 1935 before I put some questions to you. On the 10th of March Germany announced the establishment of an air force and on the 16th of March I think you, among others, signed the law introducing compulsory military service. You explained all that to us; I don't want to go over it again, but I just want to ask you about the Secret Reich Defense Law of the 21st of May 1935. Would you look at General Thomas' comment on it. My Lord, it is at Page 52 of Document Book 12. It is about Page 71 of the German document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Number 12a or b?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Number 12, My Lord. That is the original one; Page 52, My Lord. "The Central Directorate of the supreme Reich authorities, ordered in case of war, has influenced the development and the activity of the war economy organization to such an extent that it is necessary to discuss this matter in detail. The foundations had already been laid for the central organization of the supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war prior to 1933 in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when the National Socialists came into power, and especially by the death of Reich President Von Hindenburg. The latest orders were decreed in the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, supposed to be published only in case of war but already declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As this law fixed the duties of the Armed Forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization." (Document 2353-PS) And you will remember that on the same day the Defendant Schacht had been made Plenipotentiary for War Economy. Did you appreciate at the time, Defendant, that that law was the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization?
VON NEURATH: Yes, but only in case of a war, that is, in case of mobilization.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see that the point that I am putting to you is that it had already been declared valid for carrying out war preparations. Didn't you understand that it was a big step forward for war preparations?
VON NEURATH: Not at all. It was not a big step forward' at all. It was only the establishing of the necessary measures in case of a war. In every country you have to guarantee the co-operation of the various offices in the event of an attack.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your view. Now, at this time, up to May 1935, is it correct that the German Foreign Office was still staffed by diplomats or Foreign Office officials of the older school and had not yet been invaded by the products of the Bureau Ribbentrop?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you receive any warnings from your own staff as to the happenings in Austria, or the rearmament, the declaration of the air force, and the conscription?
VON NEURATH: I was advised about happenings in Austria, as can be seen from the report which you submitted to me. The reestablishment of the Armed Forces was a decision which was made in the Cabinet, and of course I knew about that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but-I am sorry, probably I did not put the proper emphasis on the word. When I said warning I meant a real warning from your officials that these happenings were making Germany regarded abroad as being bloodthirsty and warmongering. Did you get any warnings from your officials?
VON NEURATH: Certainly not, for that was not the case, and if any assertions like that were being made abroad, they certainly were not true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you look at Document 3308-PS, the affidavit of the interpreter Paul Schmidt. My Lord, it is Page 68 of Document Book 12a, and it is Page 65 or 66 of the German version, Paragraph 4. [Turning to the defendant.] Now, just let me read you Paragraphs 4 and 5, as to what Herr Paul Schmidt says: "4. The attempted Putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss on 25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of the Foreign Office because these events discredited Germany in the eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the Putsch had been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted Putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi methods, both in foreign and in domestic policy. This concern over the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of 5 December 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis." Defendant, let's take that. In these three points, is it correct, as Herr Schmidt says, that the attempted Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss seriously disturbed the career personnel in the Foreign Of lice?
VON NEURATH: Not only the career personnel of my office were disquieted over this but I, of course, was also disquieted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And taking the last sentence: "This concern"-that is the disturbance by the Putsch-"over the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes"-blood purge and the Putsch-"were of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of December 5, 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning..." Is that correct, that among your staff the concern was heightened by recognizing that the blood purge and the Putsch had alarmed France and the Soviet Union as to the position of Germany and led to the consultative pact?
VON NEURATH: No, that is a personal opinion of the interpreter Schmidt.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, with respect to you, Defendant, it is not. What interpreter Schmidt is saying is that that was the opinion of your experienced staff in the Foreign Office and that is what I am platting to you. Is he not right in saying that your experienced staff were concerned that these events had had their effect on the consultative pact?
VON NEURATH: Not in the least.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, at any rate. . .
VON NEURATH: I can only repeat, the two things had no connection with each other.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is he correct in his last statement that that arrangement was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis?
VON NEURATH: That I cannot say; I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Welt now, just look at the next paragraph. "The announcement in March of the establishment of a German Air Force and of the introduction of conscription was followed on 2 May 1935 by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the Foreign Office regarded this as a further very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy, but the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude toward the Western Powers, declaring that they were not going to be intimidated. At this time the career officials at least expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these expressions of concern to Hitler." Now, just let us take that. Did-do you agree that the career personnel of the Foreign Office regarded the Franco-Soviet pact as a further very severe, very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy?
VON NEURATH: I do not know in the name of which personnel Herr Schmidt is making these statements. But I, at any event, heard nothing to the effect that my career personnel had expressed these opinions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well,- here is Herr Schmidt saying, "The career officials, at least, expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath." That is you.
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you saying that Herr Schmidt, who after all was a career official although he was an interpreter for a great deal of the time-are you saying that Herr Schmidt is not stating what is accurate when he says that your permanent officials expressed their concern to you?
VON NEURATH: But quite decidedly. How could Herr Schmidt, who was only an insignificant civil servant at that time, know what my career personnel told me and in addition, how could Schmidt judge this? And I should also like to add that Schmidt said here, before this Court, that this affidavit, or whatever it may be, was submitted to him after a serious illness and that he personally knew absolutely nothing more about the contents. That now . . .