dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. KAUFFMANN: Finally, the Prosecution hold you responsible for the fact that you, as Chief of the Security Police and the SD, tolerated the persecution of the church, particularly the Catholic Church, by the Gestapo. I recall to you in this connection that the Department B2 of Amt III was concerned with education and confessional questions, and Department 1 of Amt IV with political Catholicism. Do you know anything regarding the fact that within that department there was a twofold policy regarding the churches with a so-called "immediate goal" and a "distant goal"? By "immediate goal" they meant that the churches would not be allowed to regain a single inch of ground; "distant goal" signified the final destruction of the churches in Germany at the end of the war. What do you know about these aims?
KALTENBRUNNER: All I can say to these theoretical statements is that they were completely unknown to me. The church policy of the Reich, as I had to recognize in 1943, was different. In 1943, to maintain Hitler's policy meant to achieve a covert truce with the churches, at least for the duration of the war; that is, to refrain as much as possible from attacks and to proceed only against individual misdemeanors by the clergy, if express authorization had been forthcoming.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I interrupt you? I am asking you: Did you in the spring of 1943...
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I want to come to that.
DR. KAUFFMANN: . . . did you undertake anything with Hitler, and what was the result?
KALTENBRUNNER: Well, I just wanted again to give you a picture of the state of affairs which I found. In spite of Hitler's policy, I found that Bormann was actively continuing the fight against the churches. Therefore as early as March, I think, I wrote to Hitler, and later requested verbally a full clarification of the. church policy. I asked him to alter it with a view to effecting a rapprochement. Above all I wanted to bring about a different policy toward the Vatican.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not think there is any need for you to go into too much detail.
KALTENBRUNNER: But I was blocked. First of all, Himmler opposed the idea to Hitler, and, secondly, I had the very strong resistance of Bormann against me. He even went so far as to undermine completely the reputation of the German representative to the Vatican, Weizsacker, by sending a man to shadow him.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough about that. Mr. President, do you want me to go on, because it is now 5?
THE PRESIDENT: If you can finish in a short time, we would like you to go on. How long are you going to be?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I would say it would take me about another hour, since I must discuss those documents which have been submitted by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Before we adjourn, I will say the Tribunal will sit on Saturday in open session until 1 o'clock. [The Tribunal adjourned until 12 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, yesterday the case of Sagan was dealt with by the defendant, but regarding his own participation he said only a few sentences. The Prosecution are assuming that he was an immediate participant even before the fliers had been shot. The two witnesses, Westhoff and Wielen, in my opinion, produced evidence in favor of the defendant, and I am now asking the Tribunal to tell me whether the defendant may have permission to speak in detail regarding the manner in which he was actively involved in the affair, or whether the Tribunal is satisfied with the treatment this problem has been given.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that if the defendant has knowledge of the facts connected with it, he had better give them. He need not give them in any greater detail than is necessary, but in view of the evidence of the witness Wielen, I think he ought to deal with it. DR. KAUFFMANN. [To the defendants] You stated yesterday that you heard about the Case Sagan for the first time after the event had taken place. Do you maintain that position today?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In what manner did you become acquainted with the Case Sagan later on, and what did you do about it?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was never officially informed of Case Sagan, but roughly 6 weeks after this event I received knowledge of it. At the time these fliers escaped and at the time the orders were given-which in my opinion went this way: Hitler-Himmler-Muller-Nebe, or possibly Himmler-Fegelein-Nebe-I do not know, as at the time I was not present in Berlin but was in Hungary and, with a number of stops, finally finished up in a visit to Minister Speer in Dahlem. On 2 or 3 April I returned to Berlin. Up to that time, no one had informed me of it. The first time I heard of the affair was when the Foreign Office made complaints, or rather, demanded from Nebe and Muller that the case should be clarified so that they could answer a note which, I believe, had been sent to the Foreign Office by the protecting power. The description of the witness General Westhoff is, in my opinion, misleading. I think he said something about mentioning the Case Sagan approximately 4 weeks after the shooting, during another conversation with me. I think that it was at least 6 weeks afterwards. It should be possible to ascertain when the Foreign Office made that inquiry. Then it would be possible to ascertain the exact date.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Later on, when you talked to Muller and Nebe, what was devised as a camouflage for this matter and what was thought of?
KALTENBRUNNER: No camouflage was devised nor discussed in our office, but when Muller and Nebe said that they would have to reply to the Foreign Office's inquiry and in that connection informed me of that dreadful order for the first time, I asked them who had given that order and they replied, "Himmler." I told them that they ought to get in touch with this superior immediately and ask him how the case should be dealt with further. I refused to have any connection with that matter. It had been unknown to me up to that time, and I considered it a dirty affair.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But was it not mentioned fin that connection that it would be said that the fliers had lost their lives through bombs or that they had been shot while trying to escape? What do you know in that respect? The witness Schellenberg has stated that there were such conversations.
KALTENBRUNNER: Such words may have been said, yes. It has been described here how the large-scale searches were handled; and in connection with these manhunts, there were shootings. Even Germans were shot in that connection. An SS Oberfuehrer in Alsatian territory was shot when he did not answer a stop signal at a road block which had been erected in the course of this search. Two or three of the fliers were killed by bombs, as I was told. I think that was along the Baltic coast in Kiel or Stettin, and I understand that two Criminal Police officials also lost their lives in this accident. Their widows received pensions subsequently. That is something that ought to be ascertainable. In this connection bombing and losses through bombing were certainly mentioned, but a camouflage of the whole affair was not discussed in our office; in any case the answer was prepared by Muller, Nebe, and Himmler, in Himmler's headquarters. I know that immediately after the inquiry from the Foreign Office these two left by air for Himmler's headquarters.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Are you trying to say then that the statement according to which these fliers had lost their lives by bombs, or had been shot while escaping, did not originate from you?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, certainly not; it did not originate from me.
DR. KAUFFMANN: With reference to the church policy of Department IV, the Prosecution are charging you with the following: So-called Bibelforscher, or International Bible Students, had often been sentenced to death on the strength of their inner convictions, only because they refused to serve in the war in any way. My question to you is this: Do you know of this state of affairs, and in what manner did you participate in that matter?
KALTENBRUNNER: German jurisdiction used as a basis for proceedings against this sect of International Bible Students was the law for the Protection of the Defense of the German Nation. Under this law any one who was interfering with German defense strength by refusing to serve in the forces could be penalized with detention or death. According to this law, military as well as civilian courts pronounced even the death sentence also against these International Bible Students. Death sentences, of course, were not pronounced by the Secret State Police. In this connection it was often spoken of as an unjust harshness against the attitude dictated to these sectarians by their creed. I approached the Party Chancellery as well as the Ministry of Justice and Himmler and Hitler during my reports, and pointed out these facts to them; during several conferences with Thierack I demanded that this kind of jurisdiction should be discontinued. As a result two things were done. On the occasion of the first conference, after Thierack had made an inquiry at the office of Bormann and Hitler whom he evidently did not see personally, a directive was at once issued to the Public Prosecutors' of flees stating that sentences which had already been pronounced were to be stayed. During a further conference another step was taken, which was that the public prosecutors in general were given instructions not to demand the death sentence any longer. The third step was that International Bible Students were no longer brought before the court. I consider it a definite success of my personal intervention with Thierack-which later had been discussed with Hitler himself-that this jurisdiction against these sects was completely abolished.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now submitting a Document 1063 . . .
KALTENBRUNNER: May I supplement my statement by saying the following: These developments and this alteration of German law became also known abroad at that time. I remember quite well that a very well-known Swedish medical man thanked me personally and stated that this deed had been well received in Sweden.
THE PRESIDENT: This really is an unnecessary detail about what happened with some Swedish person outside of Germany, as to what they thought of his actions.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes. I am now coming to Document 1063(d)PS, Exhibit Number USA-219. This is a directive from the Chief of the Security Police and SD, dated 17 December 1942. It is a secret letter, and it is addressed to all commanders of the Security Police and SD; and it goes for information to Pohl, to the Higher SS and Police Leaders, and the inspectors of concentration camps. It is a directive according to which at least 35,000 persons capable of work are to be transferred to concentration camps by the end of January 1943 at the latest. The letter is signed by Muller. I am asking you, do you know of this letter, or do you know of any such affair at all?
KALTENBRUNNER: I neither know the letter, nor do I know about the affair.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the number again?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Document 1063(d)PS, Exhibit USA-219.
KALTENBRUNNER: From the date of the letter, it becomes apparent that this was written before I came into office. It was not made known to me afterwards either. The signature is "Muller," who acted on Himmler's behalf, as is shown from Line 2. It is a typical case, which proves how unlimited Muller's authority was and the extent to which he enjoyed confidence, if he could issue a decree like this. I gather from the whole content of this letter-it refers to a day at the end of January 1943-that it is impossible that this affair had been reported to me.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution hold you responsible in the following connection: There was an agreement between the former Minister of Justice Thierack and Himmler, dated 18 September 1942, according to which Jews, Poles, and so forth, were to be subjected to penal police proceedings Instead of being dealt with by ordinary law courts. I ask you: Did you know of this agreement; and, if so, what attempt did you make so as to reinstate ordinary law proceedings so far as that was possible?
KALTENBRUNNER: Such an agreement between Thierack and Himmler is not known to me. As you said, it was made in the autumn of 1942, I believe. But repeatedly, again and again, I worked towards the end and submitted proposals that all police courts should be done away with in favor of proper law proceedings. I am legally trained, and for that reason I have more respect for the courts than Himmler. This was one of the main reasons why we never understood each other, and it was one of the main reasons for differences which cropped up even during our first discussions in 1942 at Berchtesgaden. I cannot understand Thierack either, his making such an agreement with Himmler, because later on, as I know myself, he repeatedly spoke against the police court system.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the question of whether you had knowledge of the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, which was carried out in 1943. A report is available on this from the SS and Police Leader in Warsaw, whose name was Stroop. The report is addressed to the General of the Police Kruger, and refers to the so called solution of the Jewish question in Galicia. Now I ask you: When did you hear of this solution of the Jewish problem in Galicia, and did you exhaust every possibility so as to possibly prevent that solution?
KALTENBRUNNER: First of all, in this connection, I must state that I perhaps did not know enough about the tremendous instrument of power which Himmler had created by putting under his direct command the Higher SS and Police Leaders, in the occupied territories. For SS and Police Leaders, Stroop in this case, were subordinated to the Higher SS and Police Leaders-in this connection for instance, General Kruger in the Government General. No department in the Reich was informed of or participated in any action, neither before nor afterwards, which was ordered by Himmler through Kruger to Stroop. Certainly, Berlin did not know anything of such an order in advance. Afterwards-I cannot tell you how long afterwards-they wrote and talked regarding the Warsaw Ghetto both in this country and abroad. Most serious accusations were made in foreign countries. Yesterday, I started to state here that in this connection I had delivered to Reichsfuehrer Himmler the first file documents which I had in my possession on his measures and policies. I did that after reporting to the Fuehrer in November 1943. On that occasion I certainly talked to him about Warsaw, too, since for one thing, he and his "final solution of the Jewish question" were being criticized abroad.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When was the date of that report in comparison to that action against the Jews in Galicia?
KALTENBRUNNER: I cannot remember when that action was. My reports, first to Hitler and a day later to Himmler, were in November 1943.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to a document which has already been mentioned by the Prosecution, Document L53, Exhibit Number USA-291. The Prosecution hold the defendant, as Chief of the Security Police and SD, responsible for the cleansing-as it is put- at Security Police and SD camps and concentration camps. This document is a letter from the Commander of the Security Police and SD at Radom, dated 21 July 1944, according to which the Commander of the Security Police and SD in the Government General had ordered that all the prisons which are mentioned must be cleansed and that their inmates must be liquidated. Look at this document, sender and signature, and then make a statement in this connection particularly regarding the question of whether you knew of these events.
KALTENBRUNNER: I draw your attention to what I have just said. This channel of command falls into the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and Police Leader for an occupied territory. The channel for orders-Himmler, Higher SS and Police Leader, his expert, Commander-in-Chief and commander of the Security Police and SD-that channel has nothing whatever to do with the centralized channel of orders coming from Berlin.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, you want to say that these Higher SS and Police Leaders were immediately subordinate to Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, indeed.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you also want to say that you as Chief of the RSHA had no possibility of interfering with orders and directives of such Higher SS and Police Leaders?
KALTENBRUNNER: It was out of the question for they were immediately subordinate to Himmler. There was no other way for opposing such men, as is quite obvious from the interrogation of the Defendant Frank. Repeatedly I have of course received information about wrongdoings and crimes committed through these channels of orders. For instance, Kruger in the Government General was most violently attacked by me. It was due to me, too, that Kruger was removed from his position in Krakow, a fact which must also be shown by Frank's diary.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now turn to another document-Number 1573-PS, Exhibit USA-498. The Prosecution are holding the defendant as Chief of the RSHA responsible that, under alteration of existing methods, slave workers had been used in the armament industry. This document before us is a secret order, which once again is signed by Muller. It is addressed to all police service departments. The date is 13 June 1941. The order refers to measures against emigrants and civilian workers from Russian territories. It states that for the prevention of their unauthorized return and any interference on their part, the persons concerned will be arrested if the occasion arises. Until further notice these people cannot change their place of residence unless they receive permission from the Security Police; and if they leave their place of work without this permission they will be arrested. Were such events known to you?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. In this respect, too, I can only point out that this is an order from Muller which was given 1 1/2 years before my appointment. Muller, receiving orders from Himmler directly and enjoying tremendous power and authority, saw no reason to inform me of this, even later on.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How can you explain it that Muller was in a position to exercise such power, and that even during your term of office, 194345, this state of affairs continued without your having the possibility of stopping the man? Therefore I now ask you: Was it generally known to you that Muller had this power? In this connection, will you tell the Tribunal what the size of Department IV of the Secret State Police was and how it might be explained that you were not informed about those hundreds or even thousands of orders and instructions?
KALTENBRUNNER: Muller was the Chief of the Secret State Police Department. I do not know when he was appointed, but I must assume that it must have been in 1933, 1934, or at the latest 1935. But much earlier, as I know today, he had the closest contact with Himmler and later with Heydrich. He came from the Bavarian Landespolizei, where Himmler met him. He had his personal confidence for at least 12 or 15 years. He participated in and carried out, with him, every action which in the domain of State Police Himmler ordered in his eagerness for power or in pursuance of his aims as Chief of the German Police. This confidence I might say was continually Increased for 12 or 15 years and remained unshaken to the very last days of the war. Muller also remained in Berlin after he had the order to remain with Himmler. Himmler relied on him as his blind and trustworthy instrument.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, the question that you have put to him, or the questions which you put-you put several-he does not seem to be answering. The main question was whether he knew of these actions of Muller. He is giving us a long speech now about how much confidence Himmler had in Muller. He has not said anything else yet.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I think that this question particularly ought to be dealt with at some length, because what the Gestapo and Muller are being accused of, is what Kaltenbrunner is accused of as Chief of the Gestapo.
THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out to you was that you had asked him several questions in one, and the main part of the question was whether he knew that Muller had these powers and was exercising them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Answer that question right now briefly and clearly.
KALTENBRUNNER: The relations between Himmler and Muller were so direct that there was no cause for him to give me any reports. I had no knowledge, and as early as December 1942 Himmler stated clearly that the chiefs of Departments IV and V were his immediate subordinates, as had been the case since Heydrich's death.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now It is going to be put to you that, based on certain statements of witnesses and other evidence, it must be assumed that conferences of department chiefs must have taken place between you and Muller, and that it appears improbable that you were not aware in general of the things which Muller decreed. Is that accusation justified?
KALTENBRUNNER: It appears to be justified, but it is not. What is called a conference of department chiefs here, was a joint luncheon which was not taken every day but let us say three or four times a week, a joint luncheon of adjutants, department chiefs, and any guests who might have been in Berlin at the time. That personal atmosphere alone made it impossible that internal or rather secret events might have been discussed in front of all these people.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In 1943 and the following years, were you always in Berlin-or I think I had better say-were you mostly resident in Berlin? Or did your work as Chief of the intelligence service make it necessary for you to leave Berlin often?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was frequently absent from Berlin. I think I can say that half of all the working time was spent away from Berlin. I was constantly in Berlin only from the moment the headquarters were transferred there.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When was that?
KALTENBRUNNER: That was in the months of February and March 1945. I was not in Berlin even in April 1945 in two long periods from 28 March until 15 April, then from 19 April until the last day of the war. During the years l943 and 1944 I did not come to Berlin until May 1943, because up to that time I had my own services in Vienna to reorganize so that they could be transferred to Berlin. I think only once during the first or second week in February 1943 did I stay in Berlin so as to pay visits, and from the middle of February 1943 to February 1945 I was away on trips for at least half the time. I have covered more than 400,000 kilometers by plane and car in my duties.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What were your activities when you were absent from Berlin? Did you have no direct contact with Muller during that time?
KALTENBRUNNER: Certainly not with Muller. During all these journeys of mine in the entire Reich, I never entered one single service department of the Secret State Police. An exception is the Secret State Police office in Linz where my family was living for a short while and from where I could send teleprints to Berlin; taking advantage of the Local State Police office for purely technical reasons. I had no other teleprint facilities there.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now going to discuss an affair of which you are accused by the Prosecution. In a few words, these are the facts concerned: During the suppression of the revolt in Warsaw in 1944, inhabitants of the city of Warsaw were taken to concentration camps. The Prosecution put the figure at about 50,000 to 60,000. Further deportations are supposed to have ceased due to an intervention of the Defendant Frank with Himmler, you personally having been involved by the fact that Defendant Frank and his State Secretary, Buhler, had asked you to get these people out of the concentration camps and return them to their homes. To begin with, I ask you, did such a conference on that subject take place in your office?