dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. LATERNSER: They were in exactly the same situation as the Russian army commanders who entered Poland a few days later upon orders from Stalin. Once the war had begun, the words of Napoleon carried weight with the military leaders: "You must remember, Gentlemen, that in war obedience comes before courage." However, the Prosecution holds the military leaders responsible not only for the outbreak of the war, but also for its prolongation and for its conduct in general. The political and military reasons which have led to the prolongation and the shaping of the events of the war have been so often and so fully examined in this Trial that I must refrain at this juncture--particularly in view of the limited time at my disposal--from reopening this matter for a general survey. As regards the military leaders, the political background of the second World War presents itself clearly as the consequence of the conditions created by the Treaty of Versailles. Thus it seemed to them that in the last analysis the German action against Poland was morally justified. The war in the West was the last thing which the German generals desired. When Britain and France declared war, this was certainly not a move which was welcomed by the German military leaders. The prolongation and extension of the war can no longer be considered as resulting from free decisions or preconceived plans. The necessities arising from a life-and-death struggle, once a war has broken out, dictate to, every nation the road which it has to follow. Under the circumstances, a soldier is nothing but the sword which must strike and the shield which must receive the blows in order to prevent the death of his own nation. The evidence produced in Raeder's case has made clear beyond doubt the considerations that guided the group of officers who prepared the occupation of Denmark and Norway. We know that in this case Germany forestalled an Allied action by a very narrow margin.
DR. LATERNSER: If the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy himself was convinced that it as absolutely necessary to avert the very serious dangers which threatened Germany, how, in these circumstances, could the troop commanders who are members of the so-called "group" have been persuaded that there was no reason to fear such grave danger? Would the Allied chiefs of, General Staffs and field commanders have had a right or an opportunity to refuse to embark their troops, which was done for the same purpose before the German action was undertaken? Moreover, only a limited number of military leaders had any knowledge of this action at all. All the other officers covered by the Indictment only heard on the radio that the operation had been undertaken. How can they be accused of taking part in planning aggression against these countries? The reasons for the Western campaign and its prerequisites have also been discussed conclusively. The attitude which the generals adopted in this case constitutes a particularly striking refutation of the assumption made by the Prosecution. The Army High Command itself strongly objected to Hitler's decision to launch an attack in the West, particularly because of the intended violation of neutrality. The clash with Hitler was so serious that in his address to the commanders-in-chief on 23 November 1939 he directed exceptionally bitter attacks against his generals; he accused them of being ignorant of foreign political questions and referred to them as an "obsolete upper class which had already failed in 1914." That very evening the Commander-in-Chief of the Army sent in his resignation which, however, was not accepted. Thus the Army High Command sharply opposed Hitler's plans. There were serious clashes between Hitler and his generals, and finally the Commander-in-Chief of the Army asked for his release. What else could have been expected of the generals? Ought they to have decided upon mutiny in the face of the enemy?
DR. LATERNSER: Even such an action would have failed completely to produce any effect, owing to the strong position which the victorious Hitler occupied at that time in the German nation. Beyond that, the Army High Command, still hoping that there might be possibility of peace, delayed the beginning of the attack until the spring of 1940. Although from the legal point of view the advance through Belgium and Holland constituted an objective violation of neutrality, the military leaders were bound to consider this action as necessitated by the requirements of war and as justified by the information they had received concerning the threat of violation of neutrality on the part of the Allies. This was all the more true because they had no general knowledge of the political situation and no influence at all on the decisions to invade these countries. The reasons which led to the German action against Yugoslavia and Greece have been sufficiently clarified in the evidence obtained from Goering, Keitel, and Jodl. The war against Greece was a logical consequence of the action which Italy had taken on her own; the war against Yugoslavia was a result of the sudden coup d'etat in Belgrade. As to the military leaders, they did not even consider a war in the Balkans, much less assume responsibility for it. The military leaders had not contemplated the possibility of an entanglement with Soviet Russia in any way at the beginning of the war; nor did they make any preparations for such an eventuality. The Army High Command did not even possess the necessary maps! When Hitler subsequently induced them to make such plans, he justified this by the necessity to forestall a threatened intervention by Russia. Russia's action against Finland, the Baltic states, and Bessarabia appeared to confirm the correctness of this opinion. Reliable information about strong Russian troop concentrations were to them a further indication of a threatening danger.
DR. LATERNSER: The evidence given by Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and General Winter shows that the German attack ran into strong Russian preparations for deployment, which contributed substantially towards confirming in the minds of the military leaders the conviction that Hitler had been right in saying that they were engaged in a genuine preventive war. The ground organization of the Soviet Air Force had been advanced so close to the frontier that this fact alone necessarily led to the conclusion that it was Russia's intention to attack. 10,000 Soviet tanks, 150 Soviet divisions, and an increase from 20 to 100 air fields in Eastern Poland alone were reported at the time. If the military leaders under these circumstances considered that Hitler's decision to wage a preventive war was justified from the military point of view, then their participation in this war in the execution of their duties as soldiers was certainly no crime. The military plan known by the code word "Barbarossa," which the Prosecution considers as a plan for a war of aggression, had been contemplated until the last moment merely as a possibility, as a precautionary measure in case the Soviet Union should change her attitude. Even after February 1941--apart from the high-ranking officers of the OKW and OKH and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force-only 18 out of the 129 indicted military leaders had heard of this plan at all, and then only as a plan to be used if the need arose. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, had warned Hitler with regard to this possibility by referring to serious military objections; but the majority of the officers concerned only learned of it immediately before the beginning of the war-when the die had already been cast-through the orders given them. How could the 18 officers who heard of this plan have effectively and successfully opposed Hitler's intentions? The reasons indicated by Hitler justified the war.
DR. LATERNSER: To wait until the Soviet threat became a real attack, would necessarily have led to the destruction of the Reich as far as could be judged from the military point of view. The other military leaders had no possibility at all of rejecting Hitler's decision. The beginning of the war against the United States has also been discussed already. War was declared without previously obtaining the opinion of the supreme military leaders. If even the Army High Command was confronted with the accomplished fact, how could the other military leaders have had any knowledge of Hitler's intention to begin this war? As regards the Navy, which could only play a part in waging this war as long as the land or air forces of the United States did not intervene in Europe or Africa, it is a fact that hostilities had practically been opened before the declaration of war by Roosevelt's order to fire, although the German forces strictly respected the 300-mile limit, unjustified though it was under international law. Evidence in the case of Raeder and Doenitz has clearly shown that all directives emanating from the High Command of the Navy were intended to avoid a conflict with the United States under all circumstances. I am now coming to the conclusion of this chapter: What responsibility have the 129 indicted officers as a group in the extension of the war? I believe that they have no other responsibility than that which is borne by every soldier who fights in a war for his country on the spot where he is ordered to fight.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes only. [ A recess was taken. ]
DR. LATERNSER: I now come to the chapter "Crimes against the Rules of War and against Humanity." The accusation that the military leaders concerned took part in the planning and the execution of a criminal total war, in particular also in crimes against enemy armies and against prisoners of war, as well as against the population in the occupied territories, affects the German generals with particular severity. These generals are not concerned with minimizing any possible guilt of their own, but with establishing the historic truth. If we wish to form a just opinion of the terrible events of the last World War, we must realize that actions and deeds of individuals and nations are not merely the outcome of a free will or of bad or good faith. They are the result, on the contrary, of the mental and spiritual forces at work in our epoch, and no one can avoid these influences. As early as the beginning of the 19th century the nations had to face the problem of power in all its forms. The various doctrines, the materialistic conception which generally prevailed after the second half of the 19th century, and finally the excessive nationalism noticeable on all continents, were phenomena which -- irrespective of whether they were good or bad -- did not fail to influence the attitude and actions of the nations. Although these ideas did not necessarily have to lead to the results with which we are faced today, they are in the last analysis the intellectual starting point from which originated the second World War with all its consequences. There is another aspect which must not be overlooked in any just evaluation of the general trend of events, in particular as regards the formidable sacrifices of human lives, and that is the de-personalization of men, which is due to a development noticeable in all civilized nations, and which has been called "massification." The more the nations multiplied, the lower, unfortunately, did the value of the individual sink. But, above all, technical progress contributed considerably to this de-personalization.
DR. LATERNSER: If modern technology supplies man with the means of, destroying tens of thousands of human lives in one blow, if air raids cause 200,000 deaths in one single night, as at Dresden, if one or two atom bombs are sufficient to kill a hundred thousand men, the value of men must. necessarily sink. The same phenomenon made its appearance in the first World War as in the Russian Revolution and in the Spanish Civil War. The German military leaders struggled against this development, but as children of their epoch it was just as impossible for them to avoid the influence of the spirit of that epoch as it was for the soldiers of the other countries. The second World War, however, was not only a purely military war, but in addition it was in its effects predominantly an ideological war. In any clash of ideologies the struggle becomes a struggle of annihilation, a total war. Ideological wars have always demanded streams of blood and were accompanied by unimaginable atrocities. The religious wars and the sacrifices and cruelties of the great: revolutions are outstanding examples. Thus the second World War as a conflict of ideologies was conducted on both sides with such vigor and perseverance that it finally led to the full utilization of human and material resources of every nation. In other words, it produced "total war" in the truest sense of the word. If, beyond that, the term "total war" was extended by the politicians on both sides to mean the total destruction of enemy ideology, this shows what an ideological conflict involves. What was the attitude of the generals to this problem? The group, of generals covered by the Indictment consisted exclusively of men who had chosen a soldier's profession as their career. They were mature men, with experience of life, who had not put on a soldier's uniform only under the National Socialist regime; but it is precisely the mature man who has a stronger sense of tradition, justice, and law, than a younger one.
DR. LATERNSER: Thus, soon after the outbreak of war it became manifest also, in this instance that the military leaders did not in any way agree with Hitler's revolutionary ideas on the methods of warfare and, refused to make these ideas their own. The generals were firmly resolved to conduct the war according to the old traditions, which implied strict observance of the rules of warfare. The reproach directed against the generals by Hitler in November 1939 in regard to their "obsolete conception of chivalrous warfare," is quite significant. That this attitude of the generals did not change subsequently is shown by the fact that in the later course of the war a great number of the indicted generals were relieved of their functions on account of this attitude, in spite of their military successes. Three Meld Marshals have appeared as witnesses before the Tribunal. Did anyone gain the impression that these men were criminals and had committed crimes against the rules of war and against humanity? Those officers knew from their experience during the first World War that any violation of the rules of war would ultimately always turn against the soldiers of their own army. Until the last moment they conducted the war against the armed forces of the enemy in accordance with the rules of war. The generals took the same attitude in regard to the civilian population and the administration of the occupied countries. The military leader who is responsible for operations at the front has one primary concern, namely, that quiet and peace should reign in the rear areas. This alone will induce him to avoid anything that may cause unrest among the population. He knows only too well that all unnecessary measures of compulsion only lead to hostile reactions which in turn bring about intensified reprisals which can only produce rebellion.
DR. LATERNSER: If one has no faith in the soldierly honor and in the Christian mentality of the military leaders, one might at least believe that sound reason caused them to treat the population of the occupied territories in accordance with international law, to spare their private property and to assist them as far as possible in their peaceful work. On the other hand it is obvious that open resistance in the rear of an army cannot be tolerated, and that in such cases the military leaders must take appropriate countermeasures. The threat of severe punishment by the Allied Military Governments in the case of any rebellion or possession of arms in Germany, even now after the end of the struggle, also proves this. As a consequence of the double aspect of the second World War--the military on the one hand, and the ideological on the other--the conduct of the war, from the highest levels immediately below Hitler down to the lowest executive organs, was sharply separated. The Armed Forces were concerned with the purely military conduct of the war, while anything connected with the parallel ideological and political struggle was entrusted to political agencies and their executive organs. Thus, contrary to former custom, those parts of the enemy country which had been conquered by the Armed Forces were, as a matter of principle, withdrawn from the territorial control of the commander-in-chief immediately after occupation, and placed under the authority of the representatives of the political leadership. Therefore, anything in the nature of possible crimes which may have been committed in territories not under the territorial control of the indicted group of persons must be excluded in this Trial as far as the question of the responsibility of the so-called "group" is concerned.
DR. LATERNSER: The Protectorate, the Government General of Poland, Norway, Belgium, and Northern France, the remainder of occupied France, Luxembourg and Alsace-Lorraine, Croatia, Yugoslavia and Greece, Slovakia, Hungary, and Italy were not placed under the territorial authority of the military leaders. In the Soviet Union, the area of operations had from the very outset been limited as narrowly as possible by Hitler's order and therefore it comprised only the territory within the immediate sphere of military operations until finally territorial control was limited to the immediate combat zones, that is to say, to the area roughly 10 kms. behind the first front line. Outside this strip of land the territories were placed under the administrative authority of political agencies. Charges directed against the "military commanders" or "Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber" appointed in the individual countries and territories are irrelevant in this connection, because these officers are not included in the Indictment. This organization of the administration shows that Hitler, as a result of his distrust for the military leaders because of their attitude to the questions of warfare and humanity, had quite consistently entrusted the execution of the ideological and political struggle to the political agencies and their executive organs. The commanders-in-chief, therefore, held territorial authority locally only insofar and as long as any particular area in enemy territory was part of the area of operations, and consequently their responsibility was limited in accordance. But even inside the operational areas, all tasks not immediately connected with the operations themselves were withdrawn from the influence of the Wehrmacht and put under the responsibility of completely independent political agencies. This included, for instance, all measures of a political and police character, the economic exploitation of the occupied territories, measures pertaining to the realm of culture, and manpower problems.
DR. LATERNSER: Apart from the purely military operations on the front line there remained therefore as the task of the commanders-in-chief only military security and the establishment of local administration within the areas of operation. Moreover, they were kept so busy in the areas of operation with the tasks connected with the conduct of operations, the supplying of their troops, and military security, that it was hardly possible for them to concern themselves with other tasks. It was their duty to be with the units under their command in the area of operation. Their planning and their care had to be devoted first and foremost to the unceasing struggle, and to their troops. Those facts supply the simple explanation of why it was possible to keep so many things and measures connected with other non-Army agencies a secret even in the areas of operation, and why they did not come to the knowledge of the military commanders. The Waffen-SS units were subordinated to the commanding authorities of the Wehrmacht as combat units, exclusively for fighting purposes and as regards their supplies. Regarding their organization and personnel, both from the point of view of discipline and jurisdiction Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler alone had authority to give orders. All other organizations of Hitler, such as the Einsatzgruppen, Police, SD, Organization Todt, et cetera , received their instructions and directives exclusively from their own superior authorities, not from the commander-in-chief of the operational sector. This regulation of authority and division of responsibility practically limited the commanders-in-chief to directing the troops under their command in the area of operations. After having thus clarified the sphere of responsibility of the military commanders, I now propose to turn to some special topics, and by way of introduction I might say, concerning the documents used by the Prosecution, that extracts from German directives taken from their context often fail to reveal the real meaning of the directives and lead to wrong conclusions.
DR. LATERNSER: Other documents, in particular some of those presented by the Russian Prosecution, represent findings of certain commissions. No one can check the figures contained in these documents, for instance concerning murders, particularly since all specifications concerning the exact time when these crimes were committed and other substantial data are missing. The actual number of dead does not, in itself, prove that these dead were murdered by Germans. Thus the seemingly crushing evidence of the Prosecution melts away upon closer inspection, particularly when we consider that these data were collected by numerous commissions, in all countries, and from hundreds of witnesses, over a period of several months, and that they include events which occurred not in one small area placed under the authority of a commander-in-chief, but in vast territories and over long periods. In spite of great difficulties which the Defense had to overcome in the collection of their evidence, I was able to submit to the Tribunal very comprehensive Defense evidence together with observations and comments which I made so far as I was given an opportunity. As I am again working under a time limit, it is impossible for me to exploit fully even part of this counterevidence. I therefore propose to select only a few individual cases to which I attribute special importance. There is the Commissar Order, which plays an important part, and which provided for the immediate shooting of political commissars. When Hitler first orally announced this order which he alone had planned, in March 1941, he at once met with the strongest inner opposition on the part of all the generals present, arising out of their soldierly and human attitude.
DR. LATERNSER: When all endeavors by the generals, the Army High Command, and the Armed Forces High Command to prevent the issuing of this order by Hitler had failed, and the Commissar Order was issued some time later in writing, the commanders-in-chief of the army groups and armies either did not pass this order on to their troops at all, or ordered on their own authority that it should be circumvented. They did so in full consciousness of the danger that they might be heavily punished for open disobedience in war to an order of the Supreme Commander. The order on the preservation of discipline issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in pursuance of the Commissar Order, had the desired effect. It gave the commanders-in-chief at the front a loophole to actin accordance with their own conception. Thus the military leaders achieved the result that the Commissar Order was not generally executed within the army groups and the armies. Ultimately, it was rescinded upon the energetic representations of the Chief of the General Staff, Zeitzler.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any evidence in writing of that rescinding?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. That part of the evidence is contained in the affidavits which I have presented, and the last paragraph I read can be proved by Document 301-B.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that there was, in writing, an order by Chief of General Staff Zeitzler rescinding the order?