dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
RAEDER: Yes. There was at that time a rather severe conflict between Hitler and the commanders-in-chief of the Army, and also a difference of opinion with the leading generals concerning the offensive in the West. The Fuehrer assembled all the leaders in order to give them his opinion about this whole matter. He stated -and I was present myself-that up to that time he had always been right in his decisions and that he would also be right in the opinion that the western offensive had to be undertaken in the fall if possible. Toward the end he used very harsh words; in the third from the last paragraph of the document he states: "I shall not be afraid of anything and I shall destroy everyone who is against me." That was directed against the generals. Actually the western offensive did not take place until the spring because the weather conditions delayed them.
DR. SIEMERS: We have heard details of that during previous proceedings, and I believe we do not have to go into that now. In this connection we come to the last document, that is C-126, which you also have in front of you, GB-45. It is in Document Book 10a on Page 92. With regard to the preparation of the war against Poland, the Prosecution has submitted this document of the High Command of the Armed Forces dated 22 June 1939 and signed by Keitel, because that document contained a timetable for "Case White"; that is, the case of Poland. Did that document or that directive indicate to you a definite aggressive intention?
RAEDER: No. Not a definite intention of aggression at all. In all cases certain long-range questions had to be cleared up, such as, for instance, whether our training ships which used to put to sea in summer should leave, or whether they should wait. This decision, however, was only to be made in the beginning of August. In connection with that order I issued the order of 2 August also pertaining to that document, to the individual higher Naval offices, namely, an operational directive for the use of Atlantic submarines in the Case White. May I be permitted to read the first lines, because the wording is important: "Attached is an operational directive for the employment of U-boats which are to be sent out into the Atlantic by the way of precaution in the event that the intention to carry out Case White should remain unchanged. F.d.U. (Commander of the U-boat fleet) is to hand in his operation orders to SKL by 12 August. The decision regarding the sailing of U-boats for the Atlantic will probably be made before the middle of August. "If the operations are not carried out, this directive must be destroyed by 1 October 1939 at the latest." (Document C-126, Exhibit GB-45) Thus it was not definite that such operations would take place. It was rather a precautionary measure which had to be taken under all circumstances in connection with the Case White.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have said that Hitler assured you repeatedly, particularly when you spoke to him personally, that there would not be a war?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Particularly there would be no war against England?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, then, on 3 September 1939 war did start with England. In connection with this did you speak to Hitler about that question-and if so, when?
RAEDER: On the 3 September in the morning, I believe between 10 and 11 o'clock-I cannot remember the exact hour-I was called into the Reich Chancellery. The SKL had already informed me that the ultimatum had been received from England and France. I came into the study of the Fuehrer where a number of persons were assembled. I only remember that Deputy of the Fuehrer Hess was present. I could not say who else was there. I noticed that Hitler was particularly embarrassed when he told me that despite all his hopes, war with England was imminent, and that the ultimatum had been received. It was an expression of embarrassment such as I had never noticed on Hitler.
DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the charge made by the Prosecution that you, Admiral, agreed with National Socialism and strongly supported it. May I be permitted to ask the Tribunal to look at Document D-481, which is GB-215 in Document Book 10a, Page 101. This deals with the oath of civil servants and the oath of soldiers. [Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution, with reference to this document, has stated that on 2 August 1934, in a special ceremony, you took an oath to Adolf Hitler, and not to the fatherland. In the transcript, of 15 January 1946, Page 2719 (Volume V, Page 262), we read, "The Tribunal will see that Raeder" -in his oath-"put Fuehrer in the place of fatherland." I do not understand this and I will ask you to explain, whether it is correct that you had any part in changing the oath from "fatherland" to "Hitler."
RAEDER: No. I cannot understand that accusation at all. The entire matter was not particularly a ceremony. I do not know who is supposed to have observed it so that he could make such a statement. The Commander-in-Chief, Von Blomberg, and the three commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces were called to Hitler on the morning of 2 August. We were in his study and Hitler asked us to come to his desk without ceremony or staging. There we took the oath which he, as Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, read to us. We repeated that oath. None of us participated in the writing of that oath and no one had asked us to do so. That would have been quite unusual. The oath referred to the person of Hitler. No previous oath had ever been rendered to the fatherland as far as the words were concerned. Once I took an oath to the Kaiser as Supreme War Lord, once to the Weimar Constitution, and the third oath to the person of the Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces- Hitler. In all three cases I took the oath to my people, my fatherland. That is a matter of course.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when you were ordered to that meeting on 2 August, did you know before what it was to deal with?
RAEDER: Well, I would assume that his adjutant informed my adjutant that I was to come in connection with the taking of the oath. I could not speak with certainty now, but I assume so.
DR. SIEMERS: It was the morning after the death of Hindenburg?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: On the day after the death of Hindenburg?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you know about the wording of the oath?
RAEDER: No, but the oath was written on a piece of paper and I assume that we were informed of the wording before, at the desk, there.
DR. SIEMERS: May I say at this time, Mr. President, that the wording is contained in the document that I have mentioned and represents a Reich law. [Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution asserts that on 30 January 1937 you became a Party member by virtue of the fact that you received the Golden Party Badge. Will you answer briefly to this point, which has been discussed previously in other cases?
RAEDER: When the Fuehrer gave me the Golden Party Badge he said, specifically, that this was the highest decoration which he could give at the time. I could not become a Party member at all because it had been stated that soldiers could not be members of the Party. That was generally known, and for this reason that assertion likewise is incomprehensible.
DR. SIEMERS: The membership of soldiers was prohibited by the Constitution?
RAEDER: Yes, prohibited. May I say one more thing to prevent any misunderstanding? It was prohibited both by the Weimar Constitution and the decrees which Hitler had issued.
DR. SIEMERS: Were you in opposition to the Party because of your staunch Christian and Church attitude, which was generally known? Briefly, how did it work out? Did you have any difficulties with the Party because of it?
RAEDER: In general I had no great difficulties with the Party, which I think is best explained by the fact that the Navy had considerable prestige in the Party, as it did in all Germany. I always had the higher officers, at least the chiefs of bases and fleet commanders, settle any friction which occurred in the lower echelons, through the proper authorities. If they were more important they were brought to my attention and I took care of them; if they dealt with matters of principle I passed them on to the OKW. Since I never let anything slip through, in case of incitement by the Party, the entire relations soon became very smooth and I could prevent all sorts of friction, so that before long they rarely occurred. In that respect we had the advantage in the Navy because there were no territorial matters to administer. We were concerned with the sea and only worked in the coastal cities where actually everything concerned the Navy. I did have difficulties because of Heydrich, whom I had removed from the Navy in 1928 or 1929 after a court of honor had sentenced him for unscrupulous treatment of a young girl. He was very resentful toward me for a long time and he tried on various occasions to denounce me to the leadership of the Party or to Bormann and even to the Fuehrer. However, I was always able to counteract these attacks so that they had no effect on my situation in general This attitude of Heydrich communicated itself in some way to Himmler, so that here also, from time to time, I had to write a strongly worded letter; but it was precisely the strong wording of those letters which was of help in most cases. I should not like to waste any time by mentioning various instances, such as the one with the SD; however, there were no direct attacks because of my position in regard to the Church. There was only the statement made by Goebbels, which I learned of through my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche, that I was in disfavor with the Party on account of my attitude toward the Church; but, as I have said, I was not made to feel it in a disagreeable way.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe I do not need to ask you to waste any time in explaining the importance which you placed on religious matters in the Navy. I will submit an affidavit to this effect without reading it. It was made by Chief Navy Chaplain Ronneberger, whom you have known for many years and who described the situation and thus clarified everything. In that connection, however, may I put one question: Did you emphasize repeatedly to Hitler that a religious attitude was necessary for the soldiers and the Navy?
RAEDER: Yes, that happened frequently, and I kept to this course in the Navy until the end without hesitation.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, Mr. President, I might submit Exhibit Number Raeder-121 (Document Raeder-121). It is in my Document Book Raeder Number 6, Page 523. I should not like to take the time of the Tribunal by asking questions about the contrasting views between the Party and the Navy in matters of the Church. I believe that this document makes it sufficiently clear that a bond between Church and National Socialism was not possible. In this field Bormann is the most outstanding figure, and I should Like to read only the first paragraph of the expose which I have submitted: "National Socialistic and Christian concepts are incompatible. Christian churches are built on the ignorance of man and are at pains to sustain the ignorance of as large a part of the population as possible, for only in this way can the Christian churches maintain their power. In contrast to this, National Socialism rests on scientific foundations." In the second paragraph, the last sentence: "If therefore in the future our young people do not learn anything more about Christianity, the teachings of which are far inferior to our own, then Christianity will disappear of itself." And, on the second page at the end: "Just as the harmful influence of astrologers, soothsayers, and other swindlers are eliminated and suppressed by the State, so the possibilities for the Church to exert its influence must also be entirely removed. Only when this has happened will the State leadership have full influence over the individual citizen. Only then will the existence of the people and the Reich be guaranteed for all time." Since the religious and Christian attitude of the defendant is generally known, I believe this is enough to show the contrast between the Party and the defendant in these matters. [Turning to the defendant.] Concerning the conspiracy, the Prosecution has also accused you of being a member of the Secret Cabinet Council and the Defense Council.
DR. SIEMERS: Will you please answer quite briefly, because these questions have been discussed so often that I assume that no one in this Court wishes to hear anything further about these things. Were you a member of the Reich Government?
RAEDER: No.
DR. SIEMERS: According to Document 2098-PS, which is GB-206, Document Book 10, Page 39, a decree of the Fuehrer of 25 February 1938, you and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army were made equal in rank to the Reich Ministers. The Prosecution asserts that therefore you were a member of the Cabinet and were permitted to and did participate in the meetings. Is that correct?
RAEDER: No. I was not a Reich Minister but only equivalent in rank. The reason for that was, I believe, that General Keitel was made equal in rank with the Reich Ministers because, in administering the affairs of the War Ministry, he was frequently in contact with them and had to be on the same level in order to negotiate with them. And since Brauchitsch and myself had seniority over General Keitel we also received the same rank. I was not a member of the Cabinet at all, but the decree states that on the order of the Fuehrer I could participate in a Cabinet meeting. It was probably intended that I was to come to the Cabinet when technical matters had to be explained. However, that never occurred, since after that time there were no Cabinet meetings.
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that in Paragraph 2 of that decree by Hitler it states: "The commanders-in-chief... on my orders shall participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet."
RAEDER: Yes. And as far as the Secret Cabinet Council is concerned I need only confirm that, as Hitler told me himself the Secret Cabinet Council had only been formed in order to honor the retiring Foreign Minister, Von Neurath, in order to give the impression abroad and at home that Von Neurath would still be consulted on foreign policy in the future. However, that Secret Cabinet Council never met.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution has made the charge that on 12 March 1939, on the day commemorating the heroes, you made a speech and that in that speech you came forth with a ruthless challenge to fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry. May I state, if it please the Court, that unfortunately the speech was entered in the document book by the Prosecution only from an excerpt which was selected from a certain point of view; and I believe that it would be well to know the context of the entire speech. Of course, I shall not read it, but I should like to submit it as Exhibit Number Raeder-46. The sentence is in my Document Book Number 3, Page 235, the page from which the Prosecution took the quotation. Will you please briefly express your opinion of that.
RAEDER: May I in doing so read a few short sentences which will characterize the entire speech?
DR. SIEMERS: I have no doubt that the Tribunal will permit that. I only ask you to use only a few significant sentences, just as the Prosecution have done.
RAEDER: On Page 7, Line 6, it says. . .
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is on Page 235, the same page which contains the quotation of the Prosecution.
RAEDER: Shortly before the quotation of the Prosecution we read on Line 6: "He has given back self-confidence and confidence in their own ability to the German people, and thereby enabled them to retake, by their own strength, their sacred right refused to them during the time of their weakness and, beyond that, to approach the tremendous problems of the times with courage, and to solve them. Thus the German people and the Fuehrer have done more for the peace of Europe and the world than some of our neighbors are able to realize today." (Document Number Raeder-46) Then we come to the sentence where I speak about the announcement of the fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry which has been quoted by the Prosecution. I should like to state briefly in connection with it that after the experiences of the years 1917 to 1919, communism and international Jewry had destroyed the resistance of the German people to a considerable degree and had gained an excessively large and oppressive influence in German affairs, in affairs of state as well as in economic affairs, as for example also in the legal field. Therefore, in my opinion, one could not be surprised that the National Socialist Government tried to loosen and, as far as possible, remove this large and oppressive influence. Although in pursuing this course the National Socialist Government took rather severe steps which led to the Nuremberg Laws-the exaggerations of which I regretted, of course-nevertheless, in the course of the speech which I made in public at the orders of the Reich Government, I could not find it compatible with my conscience to express my personal opinions, which were basically different. It must also be considered that such a speech had to fit into a general framework. That, however, was only one short sentence, whereas other points were considerably more in the foreground.
RAEDER: In that connection I ask for permission to read two more short sentences: "And this is the reason for the demand for equal rights and equal respect with all other nations which alone can guarantee that the nations will live peacefully together on this earth." Then the last sentence, on Page 235: "Within the bounds of German national community the Fuehrer has assigned us our tasks as soldiers to protect our homeland and our peaceful national reconstruction and to train the young manhood, fit for military service, which was entrusted to us and which has to pass entirely through our hands." The next sentence was quoted by the Prosecution, because there I spoke of the fact that we should not only train these young people technically in the sense of the technical use of arms but also educate them in the sense of National Socialist ideology and philosophy, and I stated that we had to march shoulder to shoulder with the Party. I have always taken the view that the Armed Forces should not be a completely extraneous body in the State. It would be impossible to have a republican armed force in a monarchist state or an armed force with monarchist tendencies in a democratic state. Thus our Armed Forces would have to be incorporated into the National Socialist State to the extent necessary to create a real people's community, and it would be the task of the commanders of the Armed Forces to educate their branches of the forces in such a way that they would recognize and live up to the good national and socialist ideals of the National Socialist State. This would be done in the same way as I did it as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. In this way it was possible to incorporate the Armed Forces in an orderly manner, to keep them from all exaggeration and excesses, and at the same time to form a people's community within the State. And then on the bottom of Page 236: "This nation needed a new, a true peace, the peace of justice and honor, peace without hatred. The world also needs peace.
RAEDER: Because a weak Germany could not obtain peace, a strong one has won it for herself. It is the proud task of the German Wehrmacht, to secure this peace for the German nation against everybody." And quite at the end of the document, the 11th or 12th line from the bottom of the page: "But the soldier over there, whom we respect as the valiant representative of his country, may accept a soldier's word: What Germany needs and wants is peace. These are not just words but it has been proved by practical examples. The construction work of Germany requires many years of quiet development." I think that this is sufficient...
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient. May I point out to the High Tribunal that in the English translation, on Page 236, as far as I remember, one sentence was underlined. That is: "The Wehrmacht and Party are one indivisible entity." The Prosecution has submitted that. Apart from that, nothing is underlined. I wish to say in passing that in reality, in the original, many other passages are underlined, particularly those sentences which Admiral Raeder has just read which deal with peace. [Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, the Prosecution has accused you with having connections with all the political activities of National Socialism. Therefore I am compelled to ask you briefly concerning your participation in actions in those countries where participation by the Navy is certainly surprising. In what way were you connected with the measures concerning the annexation of Austria?
RAEDER: The Navy had nothing to do with the Anschluss of Austria at all and did not take part in any way.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you make any preparations?
RAEDER: No. In the case of Austria, no preparations were needed. The case of Austria was mentioned in Document C-175, but that dealt only with the directive of 1 July 1937 for the unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war.
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that C-175 is USA-69, in the Document Book of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 117. [Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution considers this document important and therefore I should like you to say a few words about it.
RAEDER: It deals with a statement, which, according to my knowledge, is made in every state for every year and in which, according to the political situation, such cases are mentioned which may arise in the course of the year and for which, of course, certain preparations have to be made. For the Navy, however, that document had no sequel as far as Austria was concerned.
DR. SIEMERS: So it is a document which numerous...
THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we have the reference to that right. It came through, I thought, C-157, USA-69, 10a, and then I did not get the page.
DR. SIEMERS: Page 117.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that C-157 or 175?
DR. SIEMERS: C-175. [Turning to the defendant.] Does this concern strategic preparations for various eventualities?
RAEDER: Yes; various cases are mentioned here, for instance, the "Case Red" and the special "Case Extension Red-Green." All these had to be dealt with but they did not necessarily lead to any consequences.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection I wanted to submit various documents, Raeder exhibits, from which it can be seen that the same type of preparations, since they are necessary for military and strategic reasons, were also undertaken by the Allies-only to show their necessity. At this moment I should like to forego that because I cannot determine so quickly which of these documents are admitted and which have been rejected. Perhaps I may therefore submit the connected documents at the end in order that no misunderstanding may occur now by my quoting the wrong figures. [Turning to the defendant.] In what way did you and the Navy participate in measures concerning the Sudetenland?
RAEDER: In a directive...
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. May I ask you to look at the document of the Prosecution 388-PS. It is USA-126-no, excuse me-USA-26. It is in the Document Book of the British relegation, 10a, Page 147. It is a draft for the new directive "Gruen" of 20 May 1938.