dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
HERR BOEHM: I gather from my correspondence with the former members of the Stahlhelm, that these people who, as former members of the Stahlhelm, were taken into the SA, remained a foreign body in it and were in constant opposition to the NSDAP and the SA. Is that correct?
GISEVIUS: As I myself no longer belonged to that organization, can only say that I assume that those members of the Stahlhelm felt very uneasy in their new surroundings.
HERR BOEHM: Do you know whether the members of the Stahlhelm, before 1934 and from 1934, participated in Crimes against Peace, against the Jews, against the Church, and so forth?
GISEVIUS: No, I know nothing about that.
HERR BOEHM: Now I would also like to question you about the SA as far as you are able to give information. Yesterday at least you expressed yourself freely with regard to the SA leaders. I would like to ask you, in replying to a question I shall now ask, to confine yourself to a circle of SA members which lies between the simple SA man and the Standartenfuehrer or the Brigadefuehrer. Could you tell from the attitude and activity of the ordinary SA man and that of the Standartenfuehrer or Brigadefuehrer-and I do not go beyond that limit because I well remember the statements you made yesterday concerning the Gruppenfuehrer or Obergruppenfuehrer-that these people intended to commit Crimes against Peace?
GISEVIUS: It is, of course, very difficult to answer such a general question. If you ask me about the majority of these SA men, I can only say no.
HERR BOEHM: Witness, did you notice that SA men were arrested and that SA men were also put into concentration camps?
GISEVIUS: I saw that many times. In 1933, 1934, and 1935, that was in the years when it was my official duty to deal with these matters, many SA men were arrested by the Gestapo, beaten to death, or at least tortured, and put into concentration camps.
HERR BOEHM: Could a man, who was in the SA, or anyone outside for that matter, judge the SA as a whole from the activity of its members, or from individual cases, and gather that the SA intended to commit Crimes against Peace?
GISEVIUS: No. When I consider what efforts even we in the High Command of the Wehrmacht had to make to try and discover whether or not Hitler was planning a war, I naturally cannot attribute to a simple SA man knowledge of something which we ourselves did not know for certain.
HERR BOEHM: The Prosecution asserted that the SA incited the youth and the German people to war. Did you observe anything of that nature? You were a member of the Gestapo and such activities could not have escaped your notice.
GISEVIUS: That is another extremely general question, and I do not know to what extent certain songs, and other things, can be considered a preparation for war. At any rate I cannot imagine that the mass of the SA was of a different frame of mind than the mass of the German people in the years up to 1938, and the general trend of opinion beyond a doubt was that the mere thought of war was absolute madness.
HERR BOEHM: Was there anything that made you think that the SA intended to commit Crimes against Peace, or that they had committed such crimes?
GISEVIUS: As far as the ordinary SA man is concerned, I must say "no" again, and I say the same for the mass of the SA. I could not say to what extent the higher leaders were involved in plotting all the horrible things we have heard about here, but the majority undoubtedly did not know of such things and were not trained for them.
HERR BOEHM: Witness, it cannot be denied that mistakes were made by a number of SA men, and criminal acts were committed for which these people certainly should be punished. You know the SA and know what took place during the revolutionary period and afterwards. Are you in a position to estimate or to give a proportional figure as to what percentage of the numerous members of the SA conducted themselves in a punishable manner? I call your attention to the fact that up to, perhaps 1932 or 1933, the SA...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, Dr. Boehm. The Tribunal doesn't think that is a proper question to put to a witness, what percentage of a group of this sort, of hundreds of thousands of men, take a certain view.
HERR BOEHM: However the explanation of this question would be very important for my case, Mr. President. Here is a witness who was outside the SA, who as a member of the Gestapo was perhaps one of the few people who could look into the activities of the SA, and actually did look into them, and he will certainly be believed by the Tribunal. He knew fairly well what criminal procedures were carried out and also-and that is what I want to say-the number of members of the SA, and he is one of the few who are in a position to testify on this matter. I believe that if the witness is in a position to testify hereto, the testimony given by him will be of great importance to the Tribunal also.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that not only this witness, but other witnesses, are not in a position to give such evidence, and the question is denied.
HERR BOEHM: Witness, do you know of cases in which SA members worked in opposition to the SA?
GISEVIUS: I answered that question when I said that quite a number of SA members were arrested by the Gestapo.
HERR BOEHM: Yes. Do you know what criminal proceedings were taken against the members of the SA, and possibly how many?
GISEVIUS: Far too few, I am sorry to say, if you put it that way.
HERR BOEHM: Yes.
GISEVIUS: Unfortunately there were many who committed misdeeds in the SA and who went scot-free. I am sorry that I must answer in this way.
HERR BOEHM: Certainly. And in what relation do they stand to the entire SA?
GISEVIUS: Now we have come again to the question...
THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question over again.
HERR BOEHM: Do you know under what circumstances one could resign from the SA?
GISEVIUS: In the same manner as one could resign from all organizations of the Party. That was, of course, a brave decision to make.
HERR BOEHM: Thank you. I have no further question.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in replying to a question of my colleague Dr. Dix, you told the Tribunal that after the defeat at Stalingrad a military revolt was to be organized. You testified on this point that discussions had already taken place, that preparations had been made, and that the execution of the military revolt was prevented because the field marshals in the East had deserted the group of conspirators. I ask you now to give us more details on this question so that I can understand why you came to the conclusion that the field marshals had deserted the conspiracy group.
GISEVIUS: From the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck tried to contact one field marshal after another. He wrote letters and he sent messengers to them. I particularly remember the correspondence with General Field Marshal Von Manstein, and I saw with my own eyes General Von Manstein's answer of the year 1942. To Beck's strictly military explanations that the war had been lost and why, Manstein could reply only: A war is not lost until one considers it as lost. Beck said that with an answer like that from a field marshal strategic questions could certainly not be raised. Several months later another attempt was made to win General Field Marshal Von Manstein. General Von Tresckow, also a victim of the 20th of July, went to the headquarters of Manstein. Oberstleutnant Count Von der Schulenburg also went to the headquarters of Manstein, but we did not succeed in winning Herr Von Manstein to our side. At the time of Stalingrad we contacted Field Marshal Von Kluge, and he, in his turn, contacted Manstein. This time discussions reached a point when Kluge definitely assured us that he would win over Field Marshal Von Manstein at a discussion definitely fixed to take place in the Fuehrer's headquarters. Because of the importance of that day, a special telephone line was laid by the General of the Signal Corps, Fellgiebel, between the headquarters and General Olbricht at the OKW in Berlin. I myself was present when this telephone conversation took place. Even today I can still see that paper which said, in plain language, that Manstein, contrary to his previous assurances, had avowed himself to be persuaded by Hitler to remain in office. And even Kluge expressed himself as satisfied at the time with very small military strategic concessions. This was a bitter disappointment to us, and, therefore, I would like to repeat again what Beck said at that time: "We were deserted."
DR. LATERNSER: What further preparations had been made in this special connection?
GISEVIUS: We had made definite agreements with Field Marshal Von Witzleben. Witzleben was the Commander-in-Chief in the West, and therefore he was very important for starting or protecting a revolt in the West. We had made further definite agreements with the Military Governor of Belgium, Generaloberst Von Falkenhausen. In addition, as on 20 July 1944, we had assembled a certain contingent of armored troops in the vicinity of Berlin. Furthermore, those commanders of the troops who were to participate in the action had been assembled in the OKW.
DR. LATERNSER: All this happened after Stalingrad?
GISEVIUS: At the time of the Stalingrad revolt.
DR. LATERNSER: Please continue.
GISEVIUS: We had made all other political preparations which were necessary. It is difficult for me to tell here the entire story of the revolts against the Third Reich.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. What were the reasons why this intended military revolt was not carried through?
GISEVIUS: What was that?
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, what were the reasons why this revolt, which was intended by the group of conspirators, was not carried through?
GISEVIUS: Contrary to all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus capitulated. This, as is known, was the first wholesale capitulation of generals; whereas we had expected that Paulus with his generals would issue, before his capitulation, a proclamation to the German people and to the East Front, in which the strategy of Hitler and the sacrifice of the Stalingrad army would be branded in suitable words. When this cue had been given, Kluge was to declare that in future he would take no further military orders from Hitler. We hoped with this plan to circumvent the problem of the military oath which kept troubling us more and more; the field marshals one after the other were to refuse military obedience to Hitler, whereupon Beck was to take over the supreme military command in Berlin.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you just mentioned the military oath. Do you know whether Blomberg and Generaloberst Beck opposed, or tried to oppose, the pledge the Armed Forces took to Hitler?
GISEVIUS: I know only that Beck up to the last day of his life considered the day he gave his pledge to Hitler as the blackest day of his existence, and he gave me an exact description of how completely taken unawares he had felt at the rendering of the oath. He told me that he had been summoned to a military roll call; and that suddenly it was announced that an oath of allegiance was to be given to the new head of State; that unexpectedly a new form of oath was to be used. Beck could never rid himself of the awful thought that at that time he perhaps should not have given his oath. He told me that while he was on his way home, he said to a comrade, "This is the blackest day of my life."
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in your testimony, you also mentioned that between the Polish campaign and the Western campaign, or with the beginning of the Western campaign, a further military Putsch was to be attempted, and that this Putsch failed because Halder and Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch shirked it. You used the term "shirked" previously in your testimony. Now I ask you to tell me on the basis of what facts did you arrive at this opinion that both these generals shirked...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not raise an objection that this is harmful to us if we have plenty of time, but this evidence as to these Putsche, and threatened Putsche, and rumored Putsche, was all admissible here in our view only as bearing on the attitude of the Defendant Schacht. We are not trying these generals for being in a Putsch or not being in a Putsch. For all purposes it is just as well as they should not be in a Putsch. I do not know what purposes this can have in doing it over again. I call the Tribunal's attention for the limited purpose for which this historical matter was admitted, and suggest that it is serving no purpose in this connection to review it.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the answer to that, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: Since the witness has talked about this matter and testified that Halder as well as Brauchitsch shirked, and I cannot establish whether the opinion expressed by this witness with "shirked" is correct on the basis of the facts, I think I am obliged to clarify this point. In a general sense I would like to add further that the Prosecution is also justified in going into this point. I refer to the contention of the French Prosecutor in which he stated that in the light of all these circumstances it was beyond comprehension why Halder, as well as the entire German nation, did not rise as one man against the regime. Therefore, if I start from the viewpoint of the Prosecution, then my question on this point, as I have just put it, is undoubtedly of importance, and I, therefore, ask that this question be permitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The charge against the High Command is that they were a criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter; that is to say that they planned an aggressive war, or that they committed War Crimes or Crimes against Humanity in connection with an aggressive war. Well, whether or not they took part, or were planning to take part in a Putsch to stop the war does not seem very material to any of those questions.
DR. LATERNSER: I agree with you entirely on this point, Mr. President, that it cannot actually be considered of special importance; but on the other hand. . .
THE PRESIDENT: I did not say that it was not of special importance. I say that it was not material to the relevancy. The Tribunal does not think that any of these questions are relevant.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw my question. I have one final question. [Turning to the witness.] Witness, can you tell me the names of those generals who participated on the 20th of July?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what has that got to do with any charge against the High Command?
DR. LATERNSER: The General Staff is accused of having participated in a conspiracy. The question...
THE PRESIDENT: We are not here to consider the honor of the High Command. We are here to consider whether or not they are a criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter, and that is the only question with which we are going to deal as far as you are concerned.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the General Staff and the OKW are accused of having participated in a conspiracy. If I prove, as I am trying to do with this question, that on the contrary, instead of participating in a conspiracy, part of the General Staff took part in an action against the regime, then the answer to this question on this point indicates that precisely the opposite was the case; and, for that reason, I ask that the question be permitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think what the General Staff did in July 1944, when the circumstances were entirely different to what they were in September 1939, has any relevancy to the question whether they took part, either before or in September 1939.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I put myself in the place of the Prosecution, I must assume that the Prosecution assumes that the conspiracy continued. It cannot be inferred, from testimony by the Prosecution or from anything that has been submitted, that the conspiracy was to have stopped at a certain period of time. So that the answer to this question would be of importance, I believe of decisive importance. I would like to supplement my statement, Mr. President . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER: I would like to add that it is precisely for the members of the group I represent that the period of time between 1938 and May 1940 is considered decisive.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the group changed; therefore, they might be different in 1944?
DR. LATERNSER: I wish to add that a particularly large number of the members of this group only joined it in the course of 1944 because of their official positions, and I do consider this point important.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, my question was: Can you give me the names of those generals who participated in the attempted assassination of the 20th of July 1944?
GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Beck, General Field Marshal Von Witzleben, General Olbricht, General Hoeppner.
DR. LATERNSER: One question: General Hoeppner was previously commander-in-chief of an armored army?
GISEVIUS: I believe so; General Von Haase, and certainly a large number of other generals whom I cannot enumerate offhand. Here I have mentioned only the names of those who were at Bendlerstrasse that afternoon.
DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness: Do you know whether Field Marshal Rommel also participated on the 20th of July 1944?
GISEVIUS: I cannot answer by merely saying "yes," for it is a fact that Rommel, as well as Field Marshal Von Kluge, did participate. However, it would give a wrong picture if Field Marshal Rommel were suddenly to appear in the category of those who fought against Hitler. Herr Rommel, as a typical Party general, sought to join us very late, and it gave us a very painful impression when suddenly Herr Rommel in the face of his own military catastrophe, proposed to us to have Hitler assassinated, and then, if possible, Goering and Himmler as well. And, even then, he did not want to join in at the first opportunity, but wanted to stay somewhat in the background in order to allow us to profit by his popularity later on. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to know whether these gentlemen, when they joined our group, came as the fallen might. as people who wished to save their pensions, or as people who, from the beginning, stood for decency and honor.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you yourself ever speak to Field Marshal Rommel about this?
GISEVIUS: No. I never considered it worth while to make his acquaintance.
DR. LATERNSER: A further question: Did officers of the General Staff participate in the 20th of July?
GISEVIUS: Yes, a great number.
DR. LATERNSER: About how many would you say?
GISEVIUS: I cannot give you the number, for at that time I was not informed of how many of the General Staff Stauffenberg had on his side. I do not doubt that Stauffenberg, Colonel Hansen, and several other stout-hearted men had discovered a number of clean, courageous officers among the General Staff, and that they could count on the support of very many decent members of the General Staff, but whom they naturally could not initiate into their plans beforehand.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that will be sufficient for this point. Another question has occurred to me. You mentioned General Von Tresckow previously. Did you know General Von Tresckow personally?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about the fact that, after he learned that the commissar decree had been issued, General Von Tresckow remonstrated with Rundstedt and that these remonstrances contributed to the fact that the commissar decree was not passed on in General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt's sector?
GISEVIUS: Tresckow belonged to our group for many years. There was no action which made us so ashamed as this one, and from the very start he courageously called the attention of his superiors to the inadmissibility of such terrible decrees. I remember how at that time we learned of the famous commissar decree at first through hearsay, and we immediately sent a courier to Tresckow to inform him simply of the intention of such an outrage, and how after the decree had been published, Tresckow, at a given signal, remonstrated with General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt in the way you described.
THE PRESIDENT: You said a while ago that you were just going to ask your last question.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am sorry I could not keep to that. A number of questions arose from the testimony of the witness, but this was my last question.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions of the witness? [There was no response.] Then do the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I have a few questions to put to you, Dr. Gisevius, and if you will answer them as nearly as possible, "yes" or "no," as you are capable of giving a truthful answer, you will save a great deal of time. The Tribunal perhaps should know your relations with the Prosecution. Is it not a fact that within 2 months of the surrender of Germany I met you at Wiesbaden, and you related to me your experiences in the conspiracy that you have related here?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were later brought here, and after coming here were interrogated by the Prosecution as well as by the counsel for Frick and for Schacht?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, your attitude and viewpoint are, as I understand you, those of a German who felt that loyalty to the German people required continuous opposition to the Nazi regime. Is that a correct statement of your position?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had a very large experience in police matters in Germany.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If your Putsche or other moves to obtain power in Germany were successful, it was planned that you would be in charge of the police in the reorganization, was it not?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Either as Minister of the Interior or as Police Commissioner, whatever it might be called.
GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you represented the belief that it was not necessary to govern Germany with concentration camps and with Gestapo methods; is that correct?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you found all of the ways of presenting your viewpoint to the German people cut off by the Gestapo methods which were used by the Nazi regime; is that a fact?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that there was no way open to you to obtain any change in German policy except through revolt or assassination, or means of that kind?
GISEVIUS: No. I am convinced that until 1937 or the beginning of 1938 the position could have been changed in Germany by a majority of votes in the Reich Cabinet or through pressure by the Armed Forces.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you fix 1937 as the time when it ceased to be possible by peaceful means to effect a change in Germany; is that correct?
GISEVIUS: That is how I would judge it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was not until after 1937 that Schacht joined your group; is that not a fact?