dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
JODL: All German officers who officially or unofficially came into contact with Japanese officers were to be told exactly what the aims of German policy were, namely, to attack England even in the Far East and precisely thereby to keep America out of the war.
DR. EXNER: In Paragraph 3, Subparagraph a, of this directive we read: . "It must be emphasized that the common aim in this war is to crush England as soon as possible and thereby keep the United States out of the war."
JODL: Such a directive was necessary in order that careless statements on the part of German officers should not be used by officers of the Japanese Army and Navy for their own political purposes. For this reason the Foreign Office also received a copy, as is shown in the distribution list on the bottom of Page 96. This would never have happened in the case of an operational order. Also that is why the Fuehrer did not sign it.
DR. EXNER: The objectives of the German Navy are also stated on the top of Page 96. They read as follows: "Moreover, attacks on other British bases-on American naval forces only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented-are capable of shattering enemy forces in those places." And so we again find the endeavor to prevent the entry of the United States into the war and to attack them only if nothing else should prove possible.
JODL: I should like to add that the purpose of this document was not to exert influence on Japan, as that would have been a political action; it was merely a directive for all officers telling them what to say in such a case.
DR. EXNER: Grossadmiral Raeder has already told us by what naval orders he had endeavored to keep the United States out of the war. Have you anything to add to that?
JODL: Only one point, which the Grossadmiral did not mention. It comes from Document C-119 and Exhibit Jodl-37. It can be read on Page 98 of Document Book Number 1.
DR. EXNER: Page 98 of Volume I, Exhibit Jodl-37, which we submit. There we find: "Special regulations on deportment during the occupation of Denmark and Norway." And then...
JODL: Only the last sentence need be read.
DR. EXNER: Please read it.
JODL: "All warships and merchant vessels under the U.S.A. flag, as well as aircraft, are excepted from the prohibition to sail or take off."
DR. EXNER: And that is the last sentence at the bottom of Page 98. The paragraph speaks of prohibiting warships, merchant vessels, aircraft, et cetera, from leaving port, with the exception of the Americans.
JODL: And so, in all the war measures of the Naval Operations Staff, America was granted an exceptional position for a long time.
DR. EXNER: Before Japan's attack on America, did you have any official dealings with Japanese officers?
JODL: No, not before.
DR. EXNER: None at all?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Did you expect the attack on Pearl Harbor?
JODL: The attack came as a complete surprise. It was a complete surprise to me, and I had the feeling it was also a surprise for the Fuehrer; for he came, in the middle of the night, to my map room in order to give the news to Field Marshal Keitel and myself. He was completely surprised.
DR. EXNER: Now, I should like you to clear up an erroneous interpretation of this letter of Falkenstein's. It is Page 81, Volume I, of our document book. A letter, Document 376-PS, Exhibit USA-161, can be found there. There is a letter from Falkenstein to yourself, I believe?
JODL: No, no.
DR. EXNER: No?
JODL: No, to General Von Waldau, of the Air Force Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: It states. ' With a view to a future war against America, the Fuehrer is considering the question of the occupation of the Atlantic islands." That can be interpreted to mean that he intended to attack America: "With a view to a future war against America, the Fuehrer is considering. . ." What is meant by that, and how did you interpret it?
JODL: That is perfectly obvious. At that time consideration was actually being given to the occupation of the Atlantic islands, a thing the Fuehrer had always wanted to do.
DR. EXNER: For what purpose?
JODL: As a certain security base, thus an outpost in case of American intervention; and so we had to take this idea into consideration. Although the Navy as well as the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces definitely rejected it, we had to consider these matters in theory at least; and this is what he tells General Von Waldau in this letter. Furthermore, the same thing was then written in a document, later in an order, Document 444-PS, exactly as written here.
DR. EXNER: Did we have any interest at all in extending the war?
JODL: I, personally, none. I can only say that the expanse from the North Cape to Tobruk, and from Brest to Rostov-on-the-Don was too great for my liking.
DR. EXNER: And were we interested in having Japan at war with America?
JODL: No, we would have much preferred a new and powerful ally without a new and powerful enemy.
DR. EXNER: Did we drag Italy into the war?
JODL: I do not know what was done politically; but after the collapse of France, when Italy also wished to take an active part in the war, we tried to prevent this, we soldiers in the OKW. But we only succeeded in delaying her intervention by 4 to 6 days; the Fuehrer could not refuse altogether. But during the whole of the war Italy was of no help to us, rather only a burden; and this will be confirmed by subsequent histories of the war.
DR. EXNER: As to all the accusations concerning Crimes Against Peace, I should like to refer to the relevant documents which have been submitted by Goering, Ribbentrop, Raeder, and Doenitz. I do not know whether such a reference is at all necessary according to the rules of procedure. Now one final question. The Prosecution has represented this whole series of campaigns as a long premeditated and concerted plan of conquest which you, as a conspirator, both instigated and carried out. What have you to say to this?
JODL: I believe I have already corrected this completely distorted picture by my testimony. The war against Poland broke out without my having taken any part in its preparation. It developed into a World War contrary to the hopes of all soldiers. Everything had to be improvised for this war. There was nothing ready except the plan of attack against Poland. There were neither enough bombs nor enough ammunition. At that time not a single soldier thought about Norway, Belgium, Holland, Yugoslavia, Greece, or even Russia. No military agreements had been reached with Italy or with Japan. I acknowledge the statement of the American Chief of General Staff, General Marshall, to be absolutely correct in almost every point.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' counsel want to ask any questions? DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): General, as Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, you were for many years the leading General Staff officer of the German Armed Forces?
JODL: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: In the course of your military activity you were also for a fairly long time a teacher at the War Academy?
JODL: Not exactly at the War Academy but at the General Staff courses which preceded the War Academy and which at that time were held at the individual district headquarters.
DR. LATERNSER: As all our higher military leaders came from the professional class of General Staff officers, I ask you to tell us briefly how these officers were trained at the War Academy. Please confine yourself exclusively to the following points: How was, or rather how much time was allotted to instruction on attack; then for propaganda for wars of aggression; and the attitude toward international law and politics?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this question is completely irrelevant.
DR. LATERNSER: If the Court considers these questions to be irrelevant, I will dispense with the answers to these questions. Generaloberst, you know the standpoint of the Prosecution, that the military leaders are supposed to have formed a group with the aim of unleashing wars of aggression and, in the course of these wars, committing crimes against military law and the laws of humanity. Please explain to the Tribunal your attitude toward this point, particularly as to whether the higher military leaders ever actually formed such a group.
JODL: I never understood the idea of Such a group, and I never shall understand it. It is just as if the passengers of a passenger ship were to meet on an ocean liner and there form a unit-or be obliged to form a unit-under the authority of the captain. This so-called group of high-ranking officers might possibly have existed in imperial times as an absolute entity, but not entirely even then. But here, after the National Socialist revolution, these groups broke up completely in all spheres of life, politically, philosophically, and ideologically. The goal that united them was the military profession and the necessary obedience.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn at this time. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] 399\ Afternoon Session
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, before the occupation of Czechoslovakia there was a meeting on 10 August 1938 at the Berghof between Hitler and the military leaders, at which you were also present. Up to now that conference has not yet been discussed here, and I want to ask you what was the subject of that conference.
JODL: During that conference, the Fuehrer spoke to General Staff officers only, and gave them a talk that lasted for about two and a half hours on the whole military and political situation. In particular, he dealt with the Sudeten-German problem, and said that it would have to be solved no matter what happened. He described the various possibilities and, in particular, made it clear that he intended to solve the question without interference from France and England and was confident he would succeed.
DR. LATERNSER: That was the subject of that conference?
JODL: Yes, that in the main was the subject.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know for what reason the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces and their chiefs were not there?
JODL: I know the reason because the Chief Adjutant, Major Schmundt, informed me of it before the conference. He told me that it was the Fuehrer's intention to speak directly to the senior General Staff officers at a time when they would not be under the influence of their too-critical Commanders-in-Chief and thus not inclined to balk or criticize.
DR. LATERNSER: But then, during that conference there was, nevertheless, considerable criticism on the part of those officers, was there not?
JODL: I could not say that there was criticism; but one of the generals believed that he could or should draw the Fuehrer's attention to the possibility that France and England might interfere after all, if he did something against Czechoslovakia. That was General Von Wietersheim.
DR. LATERNSER: Did Hitler later on again follow the principle of excluding the highest military leaders from such conferences?
JODL: The Fuehrer did that quite often. I would say that he did it on principle. For instance, after our unsuccessful attack on the bridgehead at Nettuno, southwest of Rome, he ordered the junior officers, who were taking part in these battles, from the regimental commanders down to the company commanders, to come to the Fuehrer's headquarters. For days he personally interrogated each one of them alone without their superiors being present. He did the same thing very, very often with Air Force officers, whom he interrogated without the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force present.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you were present during most of the Hitler conferences on the situation. Could the commanding generals present at the Fuehrer's headquarters at the time take part in such conferences without difficulties?
JODL: As long as during these orientation conferences on the situation only things which had already happened were discussed, the Fuehrer was very generous about who took part in them; but as soon as something was discussed which dealt with future operations-for instance, the attack on Russia in 1942-commanding generals of an army group from the Western Front could not take part; nor was it possible the other way round, so that so far as his intentions were concerned, he would only initiate such officers as had to be informed for official reasons.
DR. LATERNSER: In such cases then, the so-called "smallest circle" was summoned to a situation conference?
JODL: That is right. And so it was that the chief adjutant would announce, on behalf of the Fuehrer, that a discussion among the smallest circle would now take place in which only such and such officers could take part.
DR. LATERNSER: During such situation discussions, did you often hear energetic remonstrances on the part of the commanding generals of an army group? Who made these remonstrances, and on what occasion? Please limit yourself to the most important instances.
JODL: I can only give you a very short answer to that question; otherwise, I would have to speak about it for an hour. I can say that not a single conference took place without the old traditional conceptions, if I may call them so, regarding operations coming into conflict with the revolutionary conceptions of the Fuehrer. Therefore, apart perhaps from single operations during the first part of the war, I can state that whenever such a report was made by a commanding general of an army group, there was a clash of opinions. I could mention the names of all the commanding generals of army groups who ever held a post. I know of none to whom this would not apply.
DR. LATERNSER: Of course, you knew all the commanding generals of army groups, did you not? . JODL: During the first half of the war I knew all the commanding generals down to, and including, commanding generals of army groups. During the second half of the war, there were commanding generals of army groups in the East whom I did not know. For the most part they did not come from the General Staff, but were line officers, so that I did not know some of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, could, for instance, a commanding general of an army group report for a discussion with Hitler without difficulties?
JODL: The commanding general of an army group could not do that. The commanding general of an army group would, first of all, have to ask the Commander-in-Chief of the Army as long as there was one. When the Commander-in-Chief of the Army no longer existed, the commanding generals of army groups then applied to the military adjutant's office, or they applied to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army for permission to make a report, which the commanding generals could not do themselves.
DR. LATERNSER: So that, if a commanding general of an army group intended to protest against some measure which he did not consider right, then he had to go to the commander-in-chief of his army group, who in turn would have to go to the commander-in-chief of the particular branch of the Armed Forces; so that this was practically the only channel through which objections could be made to Hitler in the normal official way?
JODL: That is perfectly correct. All military departments did that, and it had been done for a number of years.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about Himmler's attempt to set Hitler against the generals? When I say "generals" I mean the ones who are of the "group."
JODL: I have perhaps already answered that in part when I complained that we were not in a position to prevent military reports and news of irresponsible sources from reaching the Fuehrer. It was a standing rule that police circles particularly continually used the opportunity through Himmler to criticize the traditional, or-as they called it-the reactionary, humanitarian, chivalrous attitude of the higher military leaders, so that the severe orders of the Fuehrer for brutal action-as he called it-might be stayed. This was a constant state of affairs. All of them were by no means involved and it was not directed against all the commanding generals, but it was against quite a few.
DRY LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you still have not quite answered my question. I asked you whether you knew anything about Himmler's attempt to make Hitler hostile, for reasons which I hope you will tell me.
JODL: Well, the outcome of what I have just described was that Himmler went to the Fuehrer and reported to him, privately of course. He complained about certain commanding generals, all of them of the Army; and we knew about it, because the following day the Fuehrer suddenly began to raise some objections to some commanding general without our knowing why, and would cause bad feeling.
DR. LATERNSER: How were the relations between the OKW and the OKH?
JODL: Before the war and during the first part of the war the relationship between the High Command of the Armed Forces and the High Command of the Army was made difficult by considerable tension. The reason, however, was exclusively an internal military one. Because in the creation of the High Command of the Armed Forces a general staff group had come into being which was outside the jurisdiction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and which was, I should say, even above the General Staff of the Army and gave orders to them. This constellation was, of course, regarded with a great deal of distrust by the General Staff of the Army. I might add, however, that Field Marshal Keitel and I, and many reasonable officers, succeeded in completely overcoming this tension as the war went on.
DR. LATERNSER: I think, Generaloberst, that that is enough on that point. The military leaders are accused of having delayed the end of a hopeless war unnecessarily. What do you know about the efforts of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and Rommel after the invasion had succeeded?
JODL: I remember a conference with these two commanding generals when the Fuehrer and I flew to the headquarters which had been prepared north of Reims. That was about July 1944. During that conference, both Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and particularly Rommel described in an unmistakable manner the seriousness of the entire situation in France, characterized by the tremendous superiority of the Anglo-Saxon Air Force, against which ground operations were powerless. I remember quite clearly that Field Marshal Rommel asked the Fuehrer at the end, "My Fuehrer, what do you really think about the further development of the war?" The Fuehrer was rather angry at this remark, and he answered curtly, "That is a question which is no part of your duty. You will have to leave that to me."
DR. LATERNSER: Did you read the letter which Field Marshal Von Kluge wrote to Hitler shortly before he died?
JODL: I stood next to the Fuehrer when he received this letter. He opened the envelope, read the letter, and then gave it to me to read. It said exactly the opposite of what I had expected. Field Marshal Von Kluge began his letter with fulsome praise for the Fuehrer's personality and steadfastness in the conduct of the war. He said that he was much more in sympathy with his ideals than the Fuehrer assumed. He had begun his task in the West full of confidence. But as the promised support of our own Air Force had not been given he was now convinced that the situation was hopeless, and his dying counsel was to make peace now. That briefly, was what the letter contained.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, can you give further examples regarding the efforts of the commanding generals to end the hopeless war?
JODL: No commanding general could touch upon the political question, because the ending of a war is not a military but a political decision. But indirectly I must say that there was not one officer in a responsible position who did not tell the Fuehrer soberly, honestly, and openly what the military situation was and describe it as hopeless-as indeed it turned out to be at the end. I, myself, too, expressed this view in writing in a memorandum to the Fuehrer.
DR LATERNSER: I have a few questions regarding the various campaigns. What was the attitude of the High Command of the Army, particularly Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, regarding the Austrian campaign?
JODL: The evening before the march into Austria, at about 2 o'clock in the morning, I was with Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. I found him in a dejected mood. I saw no reason for it; but apparently he was convinced that this march into Austria might possibly lead to a military conflict either with Italy or with Czechoslovakia. Or perhaps from a political point of view he was not quite pleased about this impending increase of the south German element in the Reich. I do not know. But at any rate he was most dejected.
DR. LATERNSER: What were the reasons for the tension which existed between Hitler on the one hand and the military leaders on the other after the Polish campaign?
JODL: The conflict was particularly serious at that time because the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and many of the higher generals held the view I described this morning-namely, that we should remain quiet in the West to end the war. As this again was a political argument, which they could not use, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army presented a military argument to the Fuehrer at that time. This argument was that considering the conditions in which our Army was at the time, it would not be in a position to defeat the French Army, strengthened by the British Army, in an offensive. That made the Fuehrer extremely bitter, and this bitterness expressed itself repeatedly in every speech to the commanding generals. The entire speech of 23 November, the entire memorandum which he wrote on 10 October can only be explained in the light of that conflict.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution, as a basis for the Indictment of the group, have presented a number of affidavits. I should like to ask you to state your views in connection with Affidavit Number 12, Document 3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, which was made by Walter Schellenberg. There on Page 1 Schellenberg testifies that in the front zone the SD special task groups were entirely under the command of the armies-that is to say, tactically, technically, and from the point of view of troop service, as he says in his affidavit. Is that true, Generaloberst?
JODL: It is only true to a very limited extent. I must start my answer by saying I was not familiar with the idea of the Einsatzgruppe and Einsatzkommando until I came here to Nuremberg. I must say that quite openly, even at the risk of being called a "Parsifal," but it is a fact. I only knew about the Police. The operational territory of the Army was divided into three sectors. The front line was called the fighting zone, and that went back approximately as far as the enemy artillery could fire. In that sector everything, that was anything at all, was in all respects subordinate to the Army. But in that sector there was no Police-except the Secret Field Police, who were in any case completely under the jurisdiction of the Army.
DR. LATERNSER: The Secret Field Police were actually a part of the division, were they not?