dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
JODL: No, at the time he retired from active service General Thomas was under Minister Speer, but Minister Speer no longer cared to work with him and requested the Fuehrer that he be dismissed from the armament office which Minister Speer had taken 435. over. And that was done by the Field Marshal on the order of the Fuehrer.
DR. NELTE: I can therefore establish . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, how is the evidence about General Thomas relevant to the case of Keitel-how is the question of whether General Thomas was acting against the supposed interests of Germany or not relevant to the cases of either Keitel or Jodl? The evidence of Gisevius was relevant to the case of the Defendant Schacht. It seems to me-and I think, to the Tribunal-to be entirely irrelevant to the case of either the defendant whom you represent or the case of the Defendant Jodl. What does it matter to us whether General Thomas was acting in order to try and overthrow Hitler or not?
DR. NELTE: The question which concerns the Defendant Keitel is whether Field Marshal Keitel submitted and supported the reports handed in by Thomas. The witness Gisevius said here, referring to Thomas as a source of information, that these reports of Thomas were kept from Hitler. Therefore this evidence. . .
THE PRESIDENT: We went into that yesterday and now the Defendant Jodl has said that the reports of Thomas were submitted to the Fuehrer. But what I was pointing out to you was that the question whether Thomas was making his reports honestly or not is a matter which is entirely irrelevant.
DR. NELTE: Not as to the credibility of Gisevius' sources of information, in my opinion; but I will withdraw this question. However, in this connection I must ask one more question with regard to the other source of information, Canaris. [Turning to the defendant.] Canaris was a regular and frequent guest in the Fuehrer's headquarters and a guest of yours. What were the relations of Field Marshal Keitel to his oldest of lice chief?
JODL: The relations between Field Marshal Keitel and Canaris from the first day to the last were remarkably friendly, and unfortunately one of too much blind confidence.
DR. NELTE: May I ask what the relations were after the 20th of July?
JODL: I know that even after the 20th of July Field Marshal Keitel did not believe the charges against Canaris and that after the arrest of Canaris he supported his family with money.
DR. NELTE: ow were the relations between Canaris and Heydrich?
JODL: I mentioned that once before. Canaris always tried to maintain especially good relations with Himmler and Heydrich so that they would not distrust him.
DR. NELTE: What can you say about the attitude of Field Marshal Keitel to Hitler's plan in October 1939, the plan to attack in the West?
JODL: I know that Field Marshal Keitel was apparently strongly impressed by the attitude of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the General Staff of the Army and also raised a warning voice against this attack in the West. I know it, although I did not experience it personally; but Schmundt told me about it later-I know that during this time he also had a controversy with the Fuehrer which led to the first request to resign. This is what I can report according to what Schmundt told me; I did not witness it myself, nor did Field Marshal Keitel tell me about it personally then.
DR. NELTE: In Document 447-PS, which the Prosecution submitted-these are the guiding principles for special tasks issued with Directive Number 21-under I, 2b, is the now famous paragraph according to which, in the operational area of the Army, the Reichsfuehrer SS is given special tasks on behalf of the Fuehrer in connection with the preparation of a political administration, resulting from the inevitable conflict between two opposing political systems. So much for the brief citation. I will not hand the document to you since you are certainly well acquainted with it, and to make the matter brief I will only ask you to tell the Court how Field Marshal Keitel reacted to the issuing of this order.
JODL: The claim of the Fuehrer to infringe upon the sovereignty of the Army in its operational area with Himmler and the Police led to days of bitter disputes with the Fuehrer. The same disputes had already taken place when Terboven was appointed in Norway. One need only read my entries in my diary, 1780-PS. Of course I know today why the Fuehrer insisted on this point of view under all circumstances and why he forced the Police, under Himmler, into the operational area. It was against all our rules. It was against all previous agreements with the Police and with Himmler, but in the end the Fuehrer put this measure through in spite of resistance all along the line.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution asserted here that in 1940 Field Marshal Keitel gave the order to kill General Weygand, at that time Chief of the General Staff of the French Army. This statement is based essentially on testimony of the witness General Lahousen. I have a few brief questions to put to you on this matter. Was Field Marshal Keitel competent to order the killing of a general?
JODL: No. Any death sentence at all had to be confirmed by the Fuehrer.
DR. NELTE: Well, I naturally do not mean a death sentence-in this connection.
JODL: Well. No one at all has the authority to order murder to be committed.
DR. NELTE: I ask this because Lahousen's testimony made it appear as if this order had been given by Field Marshal Keitel to Admiral Canaris. If we assume that such an order was issued by Hitler, this would have been a politically highly important act considering the importance of Weygand.
JODL: Undoubtedly.
DR. NELTE: Would it not also have been a foolish act in terms of policy?
JODL: It would first of all have been a crime. ..
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, this is all argument, and you are putting your questions in an entirely leading form. The real objection to it is that it is argumentative. Go on.
DR. NELTE: If such an order had been given, could it have remained unknown to you?
JODL: I cannot imagine that Field Marshal Keitel, charged with the ordering of the murder, would not have spoken about it to me.
DR. NELTE: What exactly did you hear about the Weygand case?
JODL: I never heard a single word about the Weygand case. I heard only one thing when Himmler reported to the Fuehrer in my presence: "I have given Weygand a very nice villa in Baden. He is completely provided for there in such a way that he can be satisfied." That is the only thing I ever heard in which the name of Weygand figured.
DR. NELTE: The witness Lahousen was also heard in the case of General Giraud. Did you also know anything of this case of Giraud which attracted much attention?
JODL: I heard a little more about the Giraud case. Shortly after the successful flight of Giraud, Field Marshal Keitel told me once in a conversation that he was having Giraud watched by Canaris so that he would not, as the Fuehrer always feared, go to North Africa and there direct the formation of the Colonial Army against us or, so that he could be arrested in the event that he should rejoin his family in the territory actually occupied. That is what he told me. Several months later he said to me again, "I have now withdrawn this assignment to Canaris because the Fuehrer has given it to Himmler. If two agencies are concerned with it there will only be difficulties and differences." The third time I heard about the Giraud case was when Field Marshal Keitel told me that a deputy of Giraud-I believe it was about the end of 1943 or in the spring of 1944-approached the counterintelligence service and said that Giraud, who could not agree with De Gaulle in North Africa, asked whether he might not return to France. I told Field Marshal Keitel then that we absolutely must agree to that immediately because that was extremely favorable for us politically. That is the only thing I ever heard about the Giraud case. Nothing else.
DR. NELTE: The day before yesterday you spoke about the talks tin the Fuehrer's train in September 1939, at which General Lahousen was also present. In this connection you said, "I have no objections to Lahousen's statement." But to avoid misunderstandings, I should like you to say whether you mean by that that all the testimony of Lahousen, which also referred to Giraud and Weygand, is credible and correct, or only the part regarding your presence in the Fuehrer's train?
JODL: Of course, I meant only those statements of Lahousen which he made about me. As for the other statements which were made here, I have my own opinion, but perhaps that is not appropriate here.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday, in answer to a question by Dr. Stahmer, you spoke about the dispute on the occasion of the 80 RAF officers who escaped. In order to clarify this question, which weighs heavily against Field Marshal Keitel, I should like to know the following: Did you hear that Keitel objected violently because the recaptured RAF officers were turned over to Himmler, that is, to the Gestapo?
JODL: When I stood at the curtain for those 1 or 2 minutes, I heard the Fuehrer say first of all: "That is unheard of. That is the tenth time that dozens of officer prisoners have escaped. These officers are an enormous danger. You don't realize"-meaning Keitel-"that in view of the 6 million foreign people who are prisoners and workers in Germany, they are the leaders who could organize an uprising. That is the result of this careless attitude of the commandants. These escaped Air Force officers are to be turned over to Himmler immediately." And then I heard Field Marshal Keitel answer: "My Fuehrer, some of them have already been put back into the camp. They are prisoners of war again. I cannot turn them over." And the Fuehrer said, "Very well, then they can stay there." That is what I heard with my own ears at that moment, until a telephone conversation called me away again.
DR. NELTE: Afterwards did you speak again with Field Marshal Keitel about this incident?
JODL: We drove back to Berchtesgaden together from the Berghof. Field Marshal Keitel was beside himself, for on the way up he had told me that he would not report the escape of these fliers to the Fuehrer. He hoped that on the next day he would have them all back. He was furious with Himmler, who had immediately reported it to the Fuehrer. I told him that if the Fuehrer, in view of the total situation in Germany, saw such a great danger in the escape of foreign officers, then England should be notified so that the order might be rescinded-all officers who were prisoners had to make an attempt to escape. I must say openly that at this moment neither of us had any thought that these recaptured fliers might be shot. For they had done nothing except escape from a camp, which German officers also done dozens of times. I imagined that he wanted to remove them from the disciplinary action of the Army, which certainly, in his opinion, would be far too lenient, and wanted to have them work as punishment for some time in a concentration camp under Himmler. That is what I imagined.
DR. NELTE: In any case, in your presence and in your hearing, Hitler's orders to Himmler to shoot these officers were not issued?
JODL: I know that with absolute certainty for I know how I felt when I suddenly received the news that they had been shot.
DR. NELTE: Now I should like to ask you a few brief concluding questions. The Tribunal asked the Defendant Keitel on the witness stand whether he had submitted written applications asking for his resignation. You were present. What can you tell the Court about Keitel's efforts to resign from his position?
JODL: The first case that I mentioned a while ago must have been in the spring of 1940, because of the Western campaign. Schmundt told me about it, but I did not see it myself. The second case about which I know exactly, was in 1941, November, when there was an enormous controversy between the Fuehrer and Field Marshal Keitel; and the Fuehrer chose to use the expression, "I am only dealing with blockheads."
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want the details. I mean, if he can tell us when Keitel attempted to resign. . .
JODL: This second case was in the fall of 1941. After the controversy, Field Marshal Keitel wrote his request for his resignation. When I entered the room his pistol lay before him on his desk, and I personally took it away from him.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I have told you that the Tribunal does not want the details, and now we are being told about details about the resignation, about the way in which it was made.
DR. NELTE: Can it be of no importance to the Court to know how serious the matter was to the Defendant Keitel that he even wanted to use his pistol?
THE PRESIDENT: He is going into details about the particular desk on which the document was put, or something of that sort. He made his efforts to resign in writing. That is of importance.
DR. NELTE: You can testify about this case when Field Marshal Keitel handed in his resignation in writing?
JODL: I myself saw him writing it, and I read the introduction.
DR. NELTE: If things like this occurred frequently, as you have stated in the course of your testimony, and went as far as the pistol incident indicates, how did it happen that Keitel always remained?
JODL: Because the Fuehrer would not separate from him under any circumstances. He absolutely refused to let him go. I believe that various attempts were made in this direction from other sources, too; but the Fuehrer did not let him go. In the second place, of course our mutual attitude was that we were, after all, engaged in a war for existence in which an officer, in the long run, could not stay at home and knit stockings. Over and over again it was the sense of duty that won the upper hand and caused us to bear all the difficulties.
DR. NELTE: You will understand that one must hold up to the generals "loyalty unto loyalty" and that duty can only go to the point where it does not injure human dignity. Have you ever thought of that?
JODL: I have thought a lot about it.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is not a question for counsel to put. It is an argument, is it not? It is argument, not evidence. It is not a proper question to put.
DR. NELTE: I have finished.
DR. THOMA: Witness, is it true that Rosenberg, in the middle of January 1943, gave you and General Zeitzler the draft of a proclamation to the peoples of eastern Europe?
JODL: That is true. It was after the discussion on the situation. Rosenberg was present in headquarters. He asked me and Zeitzler to step into the next room for a moment and said that he wanted to report to the Fuehrer a proclamation to the Eastern peoples and that he would like to submit it to us first. I recall that.
DR. THOMA: Do you still recall the contents?
JODL: It was a very extensive concession in regard to the sovereignty of these individual eastern states. It was an outspoken attempt, through a policy of reconciliation, to combat unrest and antagonism to the German system.
DR. THOMA: Did you express to Rosenberg your pleasure at this proclamation?
JODL: We said then that this had always been our idea, but that we had doubts whether it was not already too late.
DR. THOMA: What was the success of this memorandum?
JODL: As Rosenberg told me after the conference, the Fuehrer, as he often did, pigeonholed the matter; that is, he did not reject it, but he said, "Put it aside."
DR. THOMA: Did you have the impression that Rosenberg's suggestions arose from concern about the dangers caused by Koch's methods?
JODL: Undoubtedly it was an attempt to counteract these methods which were gradually used by Himmler and particularly by Koch.
DR. THOMA: Thank you, I have no more questions.
DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for SS): Was the strategic assignment of the divisions of the Waffen-SS under you?
JODL: The divisions of the Waffen-SS, in regard to assignment, were generally treated like the divisions of the Army.
DR. HAENSEL: How many Waffen-SS divisions were there, according to your recollection? Please mention the number of Wehrmacht divisions also so that we have a means of comparison.
JODL: At the beginning of the war, I believe, we began with three SS divisions. The number increased until the end of the war to an estimated 35 to 37 divisions, as against a number of Army divisions which varied, but which one can give approximately as about 280, 290, 300.
DR. HAENSEL: What was the procedure in setting up new divisions? Who decided whether such a new division would be a Waffen-SS division or a Wehrmacht division?
JODL: As soon as the Fuehrer had ordered the establishment of a new series of divisions he said, after consulting Himmler, that so-and-so many divisions were to be set up and so-and-so many Waffen-SS divisions. He determined the number.
DR. HAENSEL: Was there a certain standard, or was that done arbitrarily?
JODL: I had the impression that in setting up the SS divisions, the Fuehrer wanted to go as far as he absolutely could.
DR. HAENSEL: And what do you consider-when you say "could," what do you consider the limit?
JODL: The limit was in the fact that the soldiers of these Waffen SS divisions were to be volunteers; and the time came very soon when Himmler had to report, "I do not get any more replacements for the divisions;" and from that time on the situation arose that, when the men came for military duty, the cream of the crop was taken by the SS, and these people, even if they were strict Catholic peasants' sons, were drafted into the SS divisions. I myself received bitter letters from peasants' wives about this.
DR. HAENSEL: In connection with this drafting into the Waffen SS that you have just described, were political viewpoints taken into account? Was a recruit first questioned politically in some way before he was over to the Waffen-SS, or was no consideration taken of this?
JODL: No, the decisive thing was that the fellow was big, looked healthy, and promised to become a good soldier. That was the decisive thing.
DR. HAENSEL: You said yesterday that in the drafting of recruits no consideration was given to whether a man belonged to the SA or not. Is the same thing true of membership in the General SS? I mean in this sense, was no consideration given to whether the recruit belonged to the General SS, either in drafting, in training, or in promotion?
JODL: Not to such a pronounced extent as in the case of the SA. I believe that the majority of the men in the General SS came to the Waffen-SS and volunteered. But I also know that very many did not do that and were drafted in the normal way by the Army, so that they were treated in the Army just like any other German.
DR. HAENSEL: If I understand you correctly then, there were many members of the General SS on the one hand who served in the Army; and on the other hand, there were many who belonged neither to the Party nor to the SS but served in the Waffen-SS?
JODL: That is true; it does not apply to the very beginning of the war, but it is absolutely true for the second half of the war.
DR. HAENSEL: And this second half of the war contained the greater number?
JODL: Undoubtedly, that-the second half-I always call that part after the big losses in the first Russian campaign of 1941.
DR. HAENSEL: How strong was the total Waffen-SS at the end of the war, approximately?
JODL: About 480,000 men.
DR. HAENSEL: And the losses, that is the dead and captured, would be added to this number?
JODL: Yes, they would be added.
DR. HAENSEL: And do you have any figures in mind about that?
JODL: It is hard to give an estimate in regard to the SS.
MR. ROBERTS: Witness, you told the Tribunal 2 days ago that you had soldiering in the blood, is that right?
JODL: Yes, this is true.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. And you said yesterday that you were here to represent the honor of the German soldier, is that right?
JODL: Yes, I do that to a high degree.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, yes. And you put yourself forward as an honorable soldier.
JODL: With full consciousness, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And you put yourself forward as a truthful man.
JODL: I represented myself as such a man, and I am.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Because of the things you say you have been made to do in the last 6 or 7 years, do you think your honor has become at all soiled?
JODL: My honor was certainly not soiled, for I guarded it personally.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, you say your honor is not soiled. Have you-during the last 6 or 7 years, when causing to be said the things which you say you had to circulate-has your truthfulness remained at the same high standard? [There was no response.] Can't you answer that question?
JODL: I believe I am too dull for that question.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, then if you are too dull, I won't persist in it; I will go on. I will leave the question and I will go on. In 1935 you were lieutenant colonel at the head of the Home Defense Department of the Wehrmacht, is that right?
JODL: Absolutely right.
MR. ROBERTS: That is Department L, Landesverteidigung, is that right?
JODL: Yes, that is correct.
MR. ROBERTS: And was Field Marshal Von Blomberg your superior?
JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg was not my direct superior, but one of my superiors.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you work a good deal with Field Marshal Von Blomberg?
JODL: On various occasions I reported to him personally, of course not nearly so much as the Chief of the Armed Forces Department.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you attend staff talks with him?
JODL: I did not attend large conferences with Blomberg. I believe that there were seldom more persons than General Keitel and I and perhaps one other chief of a department.
MR. ROBERTS: And would they be called staff talks?
JODL: Nor those conferences took place in the Office of the Chief of the Armed Forces Department.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you go to staff talks?
JODL: Of course, since I belonged to the staff.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good; I thought that. Now, will you please look at the Document C-139, Exhibit USA-53. First look at the signature, will you. That is signed by Blomberg, is it not?
JODL: That is signed by Blomberg, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, that is dealing with '`Operation Schulung." Do you remember what Operation Schulung was? [There was no response.] That is the reoccupation of the Rhineland, isn't it? [There was no response.] Can't you answer me?
JODL: I can answer you as soon as I have read that.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the question was whether you remember what Operation Schulung was. It isn't necessary to read the document in order to answer that question.
JODL: According to my recollection-I do not know whether it comes from studying the documents here in Nuremberg-the term Schulung meant preparations for the occupation of the Rhineland after evacuation of the West Rhine territories in the case of French sanctions...
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, I agree.
JODL: But-there is more to be said in that connection.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, wait a moment. That is then dealing with the reoccupation of the Rhineland; do you agree with that?
JODL: No, that does not deal with the reoccupation of the Rhineland. That is absolutely false, but it...
MR. ROBERTS: Now, just let us look at this document together and see what it says. Now, first of all, it is dated the 2d of May 1935. "For the operation . . ." I am reading it to you if you will follow it, and might I make this point first: It is apparently so secret that it couldn't be entrusted to a stenographer, isn't it? The whole document is written in manuscript, handwriting, isn't it? [There was no response.]
MR. ROBERTS: You can answer that question surely. Can't you see whether it is in handwriting or not?
JODL: It is in handwriting, yes.