dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. JAHRREISS: I ask that for a definite reason: Jodl leaves the OKW. He knows that if the necessity arises he will become chief of the future so-called Armed Forces Operations Staff, that is to say, a rather important position. He goes on active service, as you say. One should think that then he would not only receive a private letter once from you but would be kept informed by you regularly.
KEITEL: That was certainly not done by me and, according to my personal opinion, every general staff officer who goes on active service is very happy if he is not bothered with such things any longer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but fate does not grant us everything which would make us happy. It could be that somebody received the official order for instance, to keep this gentleman informed.
KEITEL: I certainly did not do it. I do not believe that it happened, but I do not know for sure whether or not somebody tried to do it.
DR. JAHRREISS: During the period when Jodl was in Vienna and Brunn, that is, away from Berlin, was he repeatedly In Berlin in order to get information?
KEITEL: I did not see him and he did not come to see me. I believe it is very unlikely because if such were the case he would have visited me.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have to understand from what you say, that when he came to Berlin shortly before the beginning of the war, in response to a telegram, he first had to be informed as to what was going on?
KEITEL: Yes, and that was the first thing done between him and myself.
DR. JAHRREISS: You informed him?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Another thing, Field Marshal. You remember, perhaps, the somewhat stormy morning in the Reich Chancellery after the Simovic Putsch; that was 27 March 1941, was it not?
KEITEL: Yes, Yugoslavia.
DR. JAHRREISS: If one reflects on the politics and the history of the wars of the last 200 years in Europe, one asks: Was there nobody at that conference in the Reich Chancellery who might have suggested that instead of attacking immediately, it would be better to march to the borders of a state whose attitude was completely uncertain and then clarify the situation by an ultimatum?
KEITEL: Yes, during all these pros and cons under turbulent conditions in that morning session, Jodl, himself, to my knowledge, brought that point up in the debate. Proposal: To march and to send an ultimatum; that is about the way it was.
DR. JAHRREISS: If I am correctly informed, you were in the East in October 1941 for the purpose of an inspection or a visit to Army Group North; is that correct?
KEITEL: Yes, in the autumn of 1941 I frequently went by plane to Army Group North in order to get information for the Fuehrer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was Field Marshal Von Leeb the commander of Army Group North?
KEITEL: Yes, he was.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Von Leeb tell you about particular worries which he had at that time?
KEITEL: I think it was my last or the next to the last visit to Von Leeb where the questions of capitulation, that is to say, the question of the population of Leningrad, played an important role, which worried him very much at that time because there were certain indications that the population was streaming out of the city and infiltrating into his area. I remember that at that time he asked me to make the suggestion to the Fuehrer that, as he could not take over and feed 1 million civilians within the area of his army group, a sluice, so to speak, should be made towards the east, that is, the Russian zone, so that the population could flow out in that direction. I reported that to the Fuehrer at that time.
DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did the population turn in any other direction?
KEITEL: Yes, especially to the south into the Southern forests. According to Von Leeb a certain pressure exerted by the population to get through the German lines made itself felt at the time.
DR. JAHRREISS: And that would have impeded your operations?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Field Marshal, you are aware, I suppose, since it has been mentioned this morning, of the order issued by the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander about the Commandos, dated 18 October 1942, that is Document Number 498-PS which has been submitted here. It had been announced publicly beforehand that an order of that kind would be issued. Do you know that?
KEITEL: Yes; the item in question was included in one of the daily communiques of the Wehrmacht.
DR. JAHRREISS: We are dealing with the Wehrmacht communique of 7 October 1942, which, below the usual report, states with reference to what has happened, "The High Command of the Armed Forces therefore considers itself obliged to issue the following orders." The first item is of no interest here, and then, at the second item appears the following sentence: Field Marshal, who drafted this wording?
KEITEL: The Fuehrer personally. I was present when he dictated and corrected it.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like to continue at the point which was last mentioned by Professor Jahrreiss. The order about Commandos, Document Number 498-PS, was discussed. In this order on Commandos, under Number VI, Hitler threatened that all commanders would be court-martialed if they did not carry out this order. Do you know what considerations prompted Hitler to include this particular passage in the order?
KEITEL: Yes, they are actually quite clear; I should think that the purpose was to put emphasis on the demand that this order should actually be carried out, since it was definitely considered by the generals and those who were to carry it out, as a very grave order; and for that reason compliance was to be enforced by the threat of punishment.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I should like to ask you several questions concerning the nature of the so-called Groups of the General Staff and the OKW. What do you understand to be the German General Staff?
KEITEL: By the General Staff I understand those officers who are especially trained to be assistants to the higher leadership.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already spent a very long time in explaining the difference between the OKW and the staff of the various commands, and the Prosecution have defined specifically and quite clearly what the group is, which they are asking the Court to declare as criminal; and therefore, I do not see what relevance any further evidence on the subject can have. What are you trying to show by asking him now about what he understands by the General Staff?
DR. LATERNSER: This question was purely preparatory. I intended to connect this question with another one; and, by the answer to the second question, I wanted to prove that under the alleged group, a group has been accused under a wrong name.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not see how it matters if it is a wrong name if the group is specified. But, anyhow, the defendant has already told us what he understands by the General Staff. Will you put your second question.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, if the higher military leaders are considered collectively to form one group which is designated as General Staff and OKW, do you consider this designation to be correct or misleading?
KEITEL: According to our German military concepts this designation is misleading, because to us the General Staff always means a body of assistants, whereas the commanders of armies and army groups and the commanding generals represent the leadership corps.
DR. LATERNSER: The military hierarchy has been discussed sufficiently in this Trial. I want to know only the following from you: Was the relation of these echelons to each other that of military superiors and subordinates or did there exist an additional organization involving these ranks which went beyond purely professional military duties?
KEITEL: No, the General Staff, that is to say, the General Staff officers as assistants to the leaders, could be recognized by their uniforms as such. The leaders or so-called commanders themselves had no relation to each other through any interoffice channels or through any other organizations of any kind.
DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday the affidavit made by Generaloberst Halder was put to you. I would like to discuss now the last sentence of that affidavit; I shall read it to you, "That was the actual General Staff and the highest leadership of the Armed Forces." Is the statement in that sentence correct or incorrect?
KEITEL: I understand it this way, that Halder wanted to say that those few officers who had General Staff positions were the ones who did the real work in the General Staff of the Army, while the rest of the far more than 100 General Staff officers in the OKH had nothing to do with these matters. That is what I think he wanted to say, a small group which was concerned with these problems.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know of a single incident where Hitler ever consulted a military leader on a political matter?
KEITEL: No, that did not happen.
DR. LATERNSER: I assume that you were present at most of the conferences with Hitler when the situation was discussed. Could you tell me anything about protests made, with or without success, by any commanders who had come from the front and who happened to be present?
KEITEL: As a rule front commanders who were present were silent listeners at the general discussion of the situation; and afterwards, according to circumstances, such commanders used to make a special report to Hitler about their respective areas. Then there was also an opportunity, as I believe was already mentioned by Kesselring, to discuss these things personally and to advance opinions. But otherwise nobody had anything to say in these matters.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, were you ever present when particularly emphatic objections were raised, by any commander, to Hitler?
KEITEL: During the discussion of the situation?
DR. LATERNSER: No, I mean, whatever the occasion may have been.
KEITEL: I was not, of course, present at every conference which Hitler had with high ranking commanders in his quarters, but I do not know of any such incidents. I have related in detail those cases which played a role in this war, namely the opposition of the generals in the West, before the beginning of the war, and I understood your question to mean whether I knew of any cases beyond that.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
KEITEL: I have related all that and must emphasize once more that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time went to the limit of anything which could be justified from the military viewpoint.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of Hitler toward the General Staff of the Army?
KEITEL: It was not a good one. One may say that he held a prejudice against the General Staff and thought the General Staff was arrogant. I believe that is sufficient.
THE PRESIDENT: We have heard all this once, if not more than once.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do not believe that this witness has been asked about that. As far as I remember, this particular witness has not been asked about these points.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks he has been asked about it.
DR. LATERNSER: I would have paid special attention to this point and would have crossed off this question already if one of my colleagues had put it before. [To the defendant.] Would Hitler in case an application for resignation was tendered by one or more front commanders have been willing to take back an order which he had once given....
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, nearly every officer who has come and given evidence to this Court has spoken about that subject, certainly many of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, does your objection refer to the question I have put now?
THE PRESIDENT: Nearly all the officers who have been examined in this Court have told us it was impossible to resign. That is what you are asking about, isn't it?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I will be glad to forego that question, if I can assume that the Tribunal accepts those facts which I wanted to prove, as true.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is cumulative; whether they accept its truth or not, is a different question.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to say something also to this question. I do not believe that it can be considered cumulative, since as has already been pointed out by my colleague, Dr. Dix, the same question when put to two different witnesses is in each case a different question, because the subjective answer of the individual witness to this particular point is desired. But I will forego that question.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other question you want to ask?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I have a few more questions. [Turning to the defendant.] Witness, to what extent was the headquarters of the Fuehrer protected against attacks during the war?
KEITEL: There was a special guard detachment of the Army and also I believe one company of the Waffen-SS. Very thorough security measures had been taken with every kind of safety device such as fences, obstacles, and similar things. It was very well secured against any surprise attack.
DR. LATERNSER: Were there several zones?
KEITEL: Yes, there was an inner zone and an outer zone and several areas which were fenced in separately.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. You have already stated that the commanders of the army groups and armies in the East did not have any authority outside their area of operation. Was there a tendency to keep that operational area as small as possible, or as large as possible?
KEITEL: Originally the tendency definitely was to have large areas of operation in order to assure the greatest possible freedom of movement in the rear of the armies and army groups. The Fuehrer was the first who, by drastic means, caused the limitation of these zones to make them as small as possible.
DR. IATERNSER: For what reasons?
KEITEL: As he said, in order to free military officers from administrative measures and get them out of the extended space they had sought for their equipment and to concentrate them into narrowly limited areas.
DR. LATERNSER: You mentioned during your interrogation, units of the Waffen-SS which were assigned to the Army for operational, that is, for combat purposes. I am particularly interested in getting that point clear because, as far as I see, there still prevails some confusion. Did the forces of the SD have anything to do with the units of the Waffen-SS which were subordinated to army units for the purpose of operational assignments?
KEITEL: No, the formations of the Waffen-SS within divisions were incorporated as such into the armies and had nothing to do with anything else. They were in that case purely Army Forces.
DR. LATERNSER: Was it possible for a commander to punish an SS man for any offense?
KEITEL: If the man was caught in the act I believe no commander would have hesitated; but apart from that, the last resort for disciplinary measures and jurisdiction was the ReichsFuehrer Himmler, and not the commander of the army.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the executives of the Einsatzgruppen of the SD have to report to the commanders of the armies upon what they did on Himmler's orders?
KEITEL: This question has been dealt with here in great detail by the witness Ohlendorf, and I am not informed about the connections which existed between the commanders and the Einsatzgruppen and commands. I was not involved and took no part in it.
DR. LATERNSER: I wanted to know from you whether the Einsatzgruppen of the SD, according to your knowledge of the regulations, were obliged to report to the military commanders in whose rear areas they operated.
KEITEL: I do not believe so; I do not know the orders which were in force in this respect; I have not seen them.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether the higher military commanders at any time were informed of the intention of Hitler or Himmler to kill the Jews?
KEITEL: According to my opinion, that was not the case, since I personally was not informed either.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have only one more question, on the subject of the prisoners of war. It had already become known during the war that the conditions relating to the food supply of Soviet Russian prisoners of war during the first period of the eastern campaign were miserable. What was the reason for these conditions which prevailed during that first period?
KEITEL: I can base my statement only on what the Commander-in-Chief of the Army said during the situation report conferences. As I recall, he repeatedly reported that it was clearly a problem of large masses which required extraordinary efforts of organization to provide food supply, housing, and security.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, these conditions were without doubt actually chaotic during a certain period of time. I am thinking of a particular reason which existed, and in order to refresh your memory, Witness, I would like to mention the following: The Army had already prepared camps in the homeland for the future prisoners of war, because it was planned in the beginning that these prisoners should be transferred to the homeland. In spite of these preparations, however, as has been stated here, this was stopped by a sudden order from Hitler which prohibited the transfer of these Russian prisoners into the homeland.
KEITEL: I explained that this morning; and I said that during a certain period until September, the transfer of Soviet Russian prisoners of war into the Reich was prohibited and only after that the transfer into the home camps was made possible in order to utilize the manpower.
DR. LATERNSER: And the deficiencies which appeared during this first period could not be remedied by the means at the disposal of the troops?
KEITEL: That I do not know. I am not informed about that. Only the OKH, which had the exclusive responsibility, would know that.
DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions about the position of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. When was that position set up?
KEITEL: I believe in 1942.
DR. LATERNSER: 1942. What was the rank connected with that position?
KEITEL: It could be a colonel or a general.
DR. LATERNSER: What I mean is whether it was about the same as the position of a commander of a division?
KEITEL: Well, I would say it was equal to the position of the commander of a brigade or a division, a section chief.
DR. LATERNSER: How many section chiefs were there in the OKW?
KEITEL: I could not say that at present from memory. By way of estimate I had eight department chiefs, each of which had one, two, three or four sections. Therefore there would have been about 30 or 35 section chiefs.
DR. LATERNSER: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff was one of the eight or of the 30 section chiefs?
KEITEL: No, I would not like to say that definitely. We had among the department chiefs so-called department group chiefs, who combined several small sections. That was about his position.
DR. LATERNSER: What were the official duties connected with that position?
KEITEL: Naturally the supervision and direction of all the work of that part of the Armed Forces Operations Staff which was attached to the Fuehrer's headquarters. It was his task to direct that work in accordance with the directives given by Jodl, the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
DR. LATERNSER: Was the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff responsible for the strategic planning to a particularly high degree, as is maintained by the Prosecution?
KEITEL: He was, of course, not responsible for that in this capacity, but as a matter of fact he belonged to the small group of high ranking and outstanding general staff officers who were concerned with these things, as Halder has pointed out.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question. Was, therefore, the position of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, not equal in importance to the other positions which are included in this group or alleged group of the General Staff and the OKW?
KEITEL: I said chief of a group of departments in the Armed Forces Operations Staff and co-worker in the small group of those who had to deal with operational and strategical questions, but subordinate to General Jodl and director of the work supervisor in the Arbeitsstab.
DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, I believe that the question which I have put to you was not completely answered. I have asked you whether the importance of that position was equal to or even approached equality with that of the other offices which are included In the group of the general staff and the OKW.
KEITEL: No, certainly not, because in the group of the General Staff and the OKW there were the commanders-in-chief, the supreme commanders, and the chiefs of the general staff. He certainly did not belong to those.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you.
HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS): Witness, you have said in your Affidavit Keitel-12 that the SS, at the beginning of the war, became the champions and standard bearers of a policy of conquest and force. In order to exclude any misunderstandings, I should like to clarify the following: What did you mean by SS in this case?
KEITEL: I can say to that, that what has been read here by my counsel was a short summary of a much longer affidavit. If you read the latter you would find for yourself the answer to your question. To state it in a more precise way: It concerned the Reich SS Leadership under Himmler and under those functionaries within his sphere of command, police and SS, who appeared and were active in the occupied territories. The concept of the so-called general SS in the homeland had nothing to do with that. I hope that makes it clear.
HERR BABEL: Yes, thank you.
DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann ): Witness, the Prosecution in their trial brief have charged the Defendant Bormann also with his activity in the so-called Volkssturm. In that connection, I would like to put a few questions to you. Was an offensive or defensive activity planned for the Volkssturm as it was formed by decree of the Fuehrer of 18 October 1944?
KEITEL: To that I can only say that Reichsleiter Bormann refused to give the military authorities any advice, any co-operation, and any information on the Volkssturm.
DR. BERGOLD: You mean to say that you were not at all informed of the purpose of the Volkssturm.?
KEITEL: Only that I saw it as the last levy of men to defend their own homesteads.
DR. BERGOLD: That means that, within the framework of the Wehrmacht, the Volkssturm was not designed for any offensive purpose?
KEITEL: No, but all services of the Wehrmacht which encountered the Volkssturm units in their areas, either incorporated them or sent them home.
DR. BERGOLD: Did I understand you correctly that you wanted to say that that institution, the Volkssturm, was a product of Bormann's brain or did it originate with Hitler?
KEITEL: I do not know that, perhaps from both.
DR. BERGOLD: Hitler did not tell you about it, either?
KEITEL: No, he spoke only about the Volkssturm and similar things, but military authorities had nothing to do with it.
DR. BERGOLD: Did Bormann report any other military matters to the Fuehrer besides the odd things about the Volkssturm?
KEITEL: He has often accused the Wehrmacht of all sorts of things; I can conclude that only from what I was told, and assume that it originated with Bormann. I do not know it.
DR. BERGOLD: Thank you.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, after his return from Moscow in August 1939, on account of the changed foreign political situation -- the guarantee pact between England and Poland had been ratified -- advised Hitler to stop the military measures which had been set in motion?
KEITEL: I had the impression at that time that the orders given to me by Hitler were based upon a conversation between him and his foreign minister. I was not present at that conversation.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop, just like the other ministers with portfolio, was as a rule not informed about the strategic plans?