dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
PAULUS: No, in that form I have never known of this.
DR. LATERNSER: Were not the first divisions from West to East transferred only after very strong Soviet forces already were standing along the Eastern border?
PAULUS: About the relationship of troop movements from West to East-the practical execution of the plan-I do not know anything, because I had nothing to do with the practical execution. First of all, in the months of April and May, because of other duties, I was present in the High Command of the Army for only a very short time:
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you said yesterday that at the end of March 1940 there was a conference at the Reich Chancellery, and there Generaloberst Halder gave you several points as a reason for the intended attack on Yugoslavia. You mentioned first the elimination of danger to the flank; second, the taking possession of the rail line to Nish, and you stressed the fact that in case of an attack against Russia the right flank would be free to move.
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Were the reasons for this attack not different ones? Were not there reasons which were more important than those you mentioned?
PAULUS: I do not know of any others.
DR. LATERNSER: As to this attack upon Yugoslavia, was not that also to be done to relieve the Italians?
PAULUS: Yes, of course. That was the initial reason why an operation against Greece was considered, and why that menace to the flank had to be eliminated if we were to push forward into Greece from Bulgaria.
DR. LATERNSER: Was not there at that time some concern about co-operation between Yugoslavia and Greece, which would have put England into the position of being able to land on the Greek coast and thereby gain a way to reach the Romanian oil fields?
PAULUS: Yes, but it would also have been impossible to carry out the Plan Barbarossa, which would have been menaced on its right flank and unprotected.
DR. LATERNSER: I have received different information. In the decision to attack Yugoslavia the Plan Barbarossa did not play the important role which you said yesterday it did.
PAULUS: The Plan Barbarossa could not have been carried out if the area of Greece and Serbia, after reinforcement by the British landing, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we can adjourn. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that the interpreters, using the words "question" and "answer" before the question and answer, assist the shorthand writers and the press, and therefore the interpreters may continue to say "question" and "answer" before the question and answer is given. That only makes it more obvious that the real remedy for the difficulties which arise is for the counsel and witnesses to pause after the question has been asked and after the answer has been given, and it seems to the Tribunal that counsel and witnesses ought to be able to hear when the translation of the question has been given, and the witness can then give his answer. And when the translation of the answer has been given, which counsel can hear, he should then put a further question. Is it clear what I mean?
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you were just speaking of the attack on Yugoslavia. If I understood you correctly, you said that this attack had to be carried out before the Plan Barbarossa could be undertaken, as otherwise there would have been a serious threat to the flanks. Did I understand you correctly?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: You said yesterday that the overthrow of the government in Yugoslavia was the cause for Hitler's attack on Yugoslavia. Do you know whether any plans for such an attack existed even before the revolution in Yugoslavia?
PAULUS: That is not known to me.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you happen to know that particularly the plan of attack against Yugoslavia came at a very inconvenient time, and that it caused a delay of the attack against the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: That is exactly what I said yesterday. It caused a postponement of the attack on Russia, which had originally been planned for the middle of May, the weather permitting.
DR. LATERNSER: But then there is a sort of contradiction here, if you say that Me attack against Yugoslavia took place at that time although it was inconvenient, as the attack against Russia was to be made.
PAULUS: I do not see any contradiction in that. As I saw the situation then, the Yugoslavian Government had made an agreement with us which placed the railway line from Belgrade to Dish at our disposal, and that after that agreement was concluded, a revolution took place in Yugoslavia which created a different policy. Therefore, this plan of attack was believed necessary to eliminate a danger. In other words, I do not see that the decision to attack Yugoslavia and to delay Barbarossa form a contradiction. I merely see that one is a prerequisite for the execution of the other.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, were you present at a conference of the General Staff on the Obersalzberg on 3 February 1941?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Are you aware of the fact that at that time the strength of the Soviet Russian deployment was estimated at 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry divisions, and 30 mechanized divisions, and that this was reported by Generaloberst Halder?
PAULUS: I cannot remember that. Nor am I sure whether Generaloberst Halder was actually present during that conference.
DR.LATERNSER: But, witness, such a conference must have been an unusual one?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR.LATERNSER: And I believe that that conference must at least have given the impression that a very strong concentration of troops on the Eastern Front was in question.
PAULUS: I myself have at least no recollection of any such impression.
DR. LATERNSER: At the beginning of that attack against the Soviet Union, were you still Chief Quartermaster?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR.LATERNSER: As far as I have in the meantime been informed, it is part of the tasks of that service department to make positive suggestions regarding military operations on land, is that correct?
PAULUS: That was once the case during a different division of tasks. At the time when I was Chief Quartermaster I did not get that task as part of my job. The operational department was not under my control but immediately under the personal control of the Chief of the General Staff. The General Staff Department, first of all, gave me the task of running the training department and then the organization department, and that was in autumn 1941. Therefore, it was not part of my sphere of activities to make suggestions to the Chief of the General Staff regarding operations which were in progress, or any other operations. I merely had to carry out the special tasks which were given to me.
DR.LATERNSER: Witness, can you give information on the subject of how German prisoners of war were treated in the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: That question, about which such an incredible amount of propaganda has been made, which led to the suicide of so many German officers and enlisted personnel in the cauldron of Stalingrad, I have obligated myself to consider in the interest of truth. . .
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Cross-examination is questioning on questions which are either relevant to the issues which the Tribunal has to try or questions relevant to the credibility of the vastness. Questions which relate to the treatment of prisoners in the Soviet Union have got nothing whatever to do with any of the issues which we have got to try, and they are not relevant to the credibility of the witness. The Tribunal, therefore, will not hear them.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I give a reason why I ask that question? May I make a short statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put that question for the reason that I could ascertain how, actually, prisoners of war were treated, so that a large number of German families, who are extremely worried on that subject, could in that manner be given information on the subject, so that their worries would cease.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of opinion that that is not a matter with which the Tribunal is concerned.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions to ask the witness.
DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): Witness, do you know the Defendant Fritzsche?
PAULUS: Yes, I do.
DR. FRITZ: Are you aware of the fact that during the summer and autumn of 1942 he was with your army?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. FRITZ: Witness, in the course of this Trial there was a discussion about the command of the OKW which, as I hear, was also sharply criticized by you, according to which all the captured commissars of the Russian Army were to be shot. Are you aware of that order?
PAULUS: Yes. It came to my knowledge.
DR. FRITZ: Do you recollect that the Defendant Fritzsche, after he had become aware of that order in the course of his duties in the East, made a proposal to you and your I.C. officers, according to which that order should be cancelled as far as your army zone was concerned?
PAULUS: I cannot recollect that incident. I think it is perfectly possible that Herr Fritzsche did discuss that question with my staff, but when I took over that army on 20 January 1942, that order was not carried out in my zone. As far as I know, this order, which in practice did not become operative, was in fact cancelled later on.
DR. FRITZ: Perhaps, so as to refresh your memory, I might ask another question: Do you recollect, perhaps, that Fritzsche suggested to you or your I.C. officers the scattering of pamphlets with a corresponding content over the Russian front?
PAULUS: I personally cannot recollect that, but I consider it perfectly possible that such a discussion with the I.C. officer who was responsible for that sort of thing took place.
DR. FRITZ: Then one last question: As far as you know the character of the Defendant Fritzsche, would you consider it entirely possible and probable that he made this proposal?
PAULUS: Yes, indeed I do.
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party): Witness, in your position you supported Hitler right to the very end, despite the fact that you knew that an aggressive war was being waged. How much could the political leaders know of this?
PAULUS: I cannot answer that question, because it is out of my knowledge.
DR. SERVATIUS: What do you understand by political leaders?
PAULUS: May I ask another question in return? What does the defendant's counsel understand by political leaders, concerning whom he asks the question?
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the organization of the Party does not seem to be clear to you. There is an organization of political leaders which is indicted in this Trial. They are to be declared criminal to this extent that, from the Reichsleiter to the Blockleiter, they may be punished because of their participation in the conspiracy to commit all the acts which are being tried here. This organization of political leaders is composed in such a way that g3 percent are local group leaders with their staffs and all their subordinates.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you can ask this witness about this. He does not know anything about it. He is not concerned with the charge against the political leadership. I do not think that is proper cross-examination at all.
DR.SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I was going to ask him to what extent these political leaders might have had knowledge, and then I was going to ask a second question, whether he was aware that he, as a witness, has contributed materially to the fact that these people, the political leaders, supported Hitler because they believed in the facade which the witness himself had assisted in setting up.
THE PRESIDENT: I have already answered you that he did not know to what extent the political leaders had been informed.
DR.SERVATIUS: I am also appearing for the Defendant Sauckel, who was responsible for the labor supply. [Turning to the witness] Have you any knowledge as to whether German prisoners of war were used in Russian armament industries?
PAULUS: I have no authentic or personal information on that subject. The prisoners of war whom I myself have seen, in the camps where I have been, worked for the immediate requirements of the camp or fin the near vicinity of the camp. They worked at agriculture or forestry, and I know from the papers that some German units of workers, who had voluntarily formed groups and were working in industry, were proud of the results of their work. But I do not know in what branches of industry these people worked.
DR.SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to put to this witness.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): A statement made by you yesterday has already been discussed once more today, namely, how much knowledge did individual members of the German Government have regarding important decisions? I gathered from your reply that you did not consider the Reich Government, regarding its personalities, one homogeneous body. In this Trial the difficulty repeatedly arises that normal conditions are assumed. One is especially prone to the conception that most important political and military decisions, as is otherwise customary, are made within a government body of important persons or within the military supreme command; in other words, that questions are discussed and decided within a group to which belongs a larger number of personalities. Witness, from the knowledge you have gained in your high military rank, could one assume this to be true of Adolf Hitler's Government? Has Adolf Hitler, in his personality and methods, to speak politely, as a man of an unusual type, chiefly employed a completely different procedure here? Did he not always make his decisions independently or, at most, in closest consultation with a very few assistants, and can we not derive from that that leading personalities in political and military fields had no knowledge of impending events?
PAULUS: I must say to that that my military service in the General Staff of the Army did not give me an insight into the methods of the leadership of the State and of the Reich Government. My concept of a governing body of a nation is that of a united group who, regardless of the methods the state intends to use, have such a sense of responsibility toward the people for the deeds of the government, that they will not allow just anything to be done by even the head of the state-in this case Hitler with his usual brutal and autocratic ways-but, even if not required to do so, would themselves intervene in time with the necessary measures, at the very latest as soon as it was clear to the whole world that this government was being led by an insane criminal.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, you belong to the second circle of people which you mentioned. It is an established fact that you have not intervened, and, surely, you would have had important reasons for that. I believe that it would be better if, as far as other personalities are concerned, you would not pass judgment, but would answer my questions as far as actual facts are concerned. My question was whether, according to your knowledge gained not only in your military position but also in your particular and leading position-whether they were right or wrong is unnecessary for establishing the fact-you knew what the methods in military and political matters were and what they were not. According to your knowledge, were resolutions made by a large body of military and political personalities who met and passed these resolutions, or were decisions generally made and resolutions passed in a very much smaller circle of people, probably sometimes only by Hitler alone?
PAULUS: How decisions of the Reich Government were made is not known to me. Therefore, in my previous answer, I have merely given you my general conception of this question and I believe that I have answered it therewith. I cannot imagine that one man alone could have done everything that was done. In order to exert his influence in a small circle he finally needed the cooperation of his immediate assistants. In other words, it was quite impossible for him to achieve his aims otherwise.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As to the co-operation of his closest assistants, do you believe that some trained minister, a minister of labor or some other minister who was specially trained, was ever consulted by Hitler about his plans for aggression?
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, the witness has already said that he does not know how the decisions of the Reich Government were arrived at. What he may think about it is really not relevant. He does not know.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, is it your impression that plans for aggression were made by Hitler many years in advance, or are you of the opinion that they were made to meet certain circumstances, on the basis of the intuition which you say he always had?
PAULUS: That is entirely outside my knowledge. My observations began on 3 September 1940 and continued from that time until January 1942. What I observed during that period is something I explained yesterday. About the time prior to that I am not informed.
DR.MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Witness, you said just now that you were a member of a body which had the aim of saving Germany from disaster. My question is: What possibilities to carry out these intentions were at the disposal of yourself and the other members of that group?
PAULUS: We had the possibility of making ourselves heard and understood by the German people, and believed it our duty to make known to the German people our view, not only of military events but also of the events of 20 July, and to tell them .of the convictions we had since gained; In this regard the initiative came chiefly from the ranks of the army I had led to Stalingrad. There we experienced how, through the orders of those military and political leaders against whom we were now taking a stand, more than 100,000 soldiers died of hunger, cold, and snow. There we experienced in concentrated form the horrors and terrors of a war of conquest.
DR. HORN: Did you have any other possibility apart from propaganda?
PAULUS: Apart from the possibility of making propaganda through radio and those newspapers which we had created, apart from that propaganda to the German people, we had no other facilities.
THE PRESIDENT: What has the Tribunal got to do with this?
DR. HORN: I merely wanted to ascertain what conclusions I could draw on the credibility of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: I cannot see that it has any bearing on his credibility.
DR. HORN: It is perfectly possible that we have knowledge of other possibilities which were available, which the witness has not mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that what the witness thought or did when he was a prisoner of war in Russian hands has got nothing to do with his credibility, at least as far as the questions that you have asked are concerned, and they will not allow the questions to be put.
DR. HORN: May I have permission to ask the witness one more question?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
DR. HORN: Did you, during the time you were a prisoner, have an opportunity to place your military experiences in any way at the disposal of anybody else?
PAULUS: In no way, in no case.
THE PRESIDENT: Then I understand that that concludes the cross-examination. Does the Soviet Prosecutor wish to ask any more questions? GEN. RU1}ENKO: No, Mr. President. We consider that the questions have been comprehensively explained.
THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): General, you said that when you became Quartermaster General of the Army on 3 September 1940, you found an unfinished plan for an attack against the Soviet Union. Do you know how long that plan had been in preparation before you saw it?
PAULUS: I cannot say exactly how long the period of preparation lasted, but I would estimate that it lasted 2 to 3 weeks.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know who had given the orders for the preparation of the plan?
PAULUS: I assume that they originated from the same source, namely, the OKW the High Command of the Army. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army had given to Major General Marx the same documents that he had given me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): At the conferences on the Plan Barbarossa how many members of the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces were usually present?
PAULUS: The departments concerned, the Operational Department, the Department for Foreign Armies, the General Quartermaster for Supplies, and the Chief of Transportation. Those were generally the chief departments which were involved.
THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr.Biddle): How many members of the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces were familiar with the orders and directives as they were being signed?
PAULUS: In the course of time, that is, up to December, while the actual marching orders were being prepared, more or less, all General Staff officers had knowledge of the plan. Just how many had been informed previously, in the individual periods, is something which I can no longer say exactly.
THE TRIBUNAL (major General I.T. Nikitchenko, Member for the U.S.S.R.): What exactly did the General Staff of the German Army represent? Did it deal exclusively with the elaboration of technical questions, was it the apparatus elaborating technical problems according to instructions of the Supreme Command, or, again, was the General Staff an organization which prepared, elaborated, and submitted its findings to the Supreme Command independently?
PAULUS: It was a technical executive body which had the task of carrying out existing instructions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Therefore the General-Staff was merely a "ethical apparatus?
PAULUS: That is how it was in practice. The General Staff, as such, was an advisory organization to the Supreme Commander of the Army, and not an executive body.
THE TRIBUNAL: (Gen. Nikitchenko): To what extent did the General Staff conscientiously carry out the instructions received from the Supreme Command?
PAULUS: They carried out these instructions absolutely.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did any conflict exist between the General Staff and the Supreme Command?
PAULUS: It is a known fact that certain differences of opinion did exist, although I am unable to explain that in detail. At any rate, I know through my immediate superior that he had frequently had differences of opinion with the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Could such officers remain? Did they, in fact, remain in the service of the General Staff if they disagreed with the policy of the Supreme Command?
PAULUS: Political questions did not arise in that connection. Generally speaking, political questions were not discussed in the circle of the Army Supreme Command.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not speaking of political questions in the narrow sense of the word. I am speaking of the policy of planning for war, of the policy of preparations and aggression. That is what I had in mind. Was it intended, in case you know about it, to transform that part of the Soviet Union, occupied by the German Forces?
PAULUS: I never did know what the itemized plans were. My knowledge is restricted to a knowledge of such plans as were contained in the so-called Green Folder for the exploitation of the country.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What do you mean by exploitation?