dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON RUNDSTEDT: My point of view is the following, based on quite understandable patriotic feeling: Disorderly, irregular warfare behind the front of the enemy army must bring very great misery to the population of the country affected. No army in the world can tolerate such conditions for any length of time, and in the interests of the security and protection of its own troops, it must take sharp, energetic measures. But this should, of course, be done in a correct and soldierly manner. Excesses such as those in Oradour were strongly condemned by myself and by all army leaders. We very much disliked seeing the attempt made on the German side to set up this Werewolf movement at the last mo-ment. If it had been put into practice, it would have brought untold misery to our fatherland, and justly so. I would consider it fortunate for humanity if through international agreements such illegal wars could in future be made impossible. That is my point of view.
DR. LATERNSER: What measures did you introduce to relieve the position of the French population during the occupation?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I would not like to give all the details here. I can only say that I did everything to help Marshal Pétain, with whom I was on terms of great confidence. I asked Hitler to define at last what position France was to have in the future Europe. I assisted Marshal Pétain to raise his Guards and tried to create a new French Army for him, though it did not grow into more than a regiment. I succeeded in obtaining more rations for the fine French railroad men who managed all our transports, and I tried to have their relatives who were prisoners of war returned to them, in the same' way in which Hitler had approved after the Dieppe raid that the relatives of those in Dieppe, could return. We did what we could to supply the great city of Paris with coal and food, though the transport situation for the German Army was almost unbearably poor. Those are the main points.
DR. LATERNSER: One intermediate question: on one of the last few days, a witness said that from 1944 on the concentration camps were guarded by soldiers of all branches of the Wehrmacht. How do you explain that?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I know nothing about that. Since Himmler was Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve Army after the attempted assassination of the Fuehrer, he could probably issue such an order. If he did issue it, my feeling is that he wanted to charge the Army also with all these occurrences in connection with the con-centration camps.
DR. LATERNSER: Now a few questions about the Ardennes offensive. Was- an order to shoot prisoners ever issued before or during this offensive?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Such an order was not issued by Hitler. On the contrary, he considered it most important to take as many prisoners as possible in the offensive. I consider it impossible that a subordinate military command issued such an order, which would contradict our training and our ideas.
DR.LATERNSER: Did you not oppose this offensive?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I opposed the offensive for the following reasons: The operational idea as such can almost be called a stroke of genius, but all, absolutely all conditions for a possible success of such an offensive were lacking. Therefore, Field Marshal Model and I suggested that we should be satisfied with less and should attack the Allied troops east of Aix-la-Chapelle from several sides. These suggestions remained unheeded. The offensive had to start with completely inadequate forces on the ground and in the air and, as predicted, could only fail.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you oppose Hitler on other occasions also?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Not personally, because I had no oppor-tunity of doing so; but to his staff I frequently objected to meas-ures ordered from above; especially in the case of the Normandy invasion, the Ardennes offensive, after it had failed, and the con-duct of operations in Holland. But it was all in vain.
DR. LATERNSER: When did you consider the war lost?
VON RUNDSTEDT: In my opinion the war could not be won after the fall of Stalingrad. I considered the war lost when the Allies had succeeded in establishing a strong bridgehead on French soil. That meant the end.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you or other commanders-in-chief attempt to stop the continuation of the war when you regarded it as lost?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Both Field Marshal Rommel and I twice attempted to persuade Hitler to change the conduct of the war and especially to withdraw the front to the German borders. But as was to be expected, these suggestions were not heeded.
DR. LATERNSER: Since Hitler refused to listen to such advice, did you not consider causing a violent overthrow?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I would never have thought of such a thing; that would have been base, barefaced treachery, and could not have changed the situation. The Army and the people still believed in Hitler at that time, and such an overthrow would have been quite unsuccessful. Even if I, perhaps with the aid of the Allies, had brought about an overthrow, the fate of the German people, according to the famous statement of the Big Three, would have been exactly what it is now, and I would have emerged and been considered for all time as the greatest traitor, to my fatherland.
DR. LATERNSER: You lost your position three times during the war. What were the reasons?
VON RUNDSTEDT: In 1941 a quite impossible order of a tech-nical nature was issued from above, and would have led to the destruction of the entire Kleist Panzer Army near Rostov. I ob-jected to it, I demanded that the order be withdrawn, and said that otherwise I would be compelled to consider it a lack of confidence in my leadership, and I would ask that another commander-in--chief be selected. Thereupon, I was removed from my post that same night, on 1 December, at my own request, as it was put. That was the first case. The second case was on 2 July 1944, when by a very cordial letter, I was replaced by another commander-in-chief because of the impaired state of my health. The third case was on 9 March 1945. Then I could no longer be expected as an old gentleman to continue performing the exact-ing duties of Commander-in-Chief West. Those were the three cases.
DR.LATERNSER: And in none of these cases did you resign against the will of Hitler?
VON RUNDSTEDT: In the first case one might say so. But he did not hold it against me in any way, for already in the following March I was made Commander-in-Chief in France.
DR. LATERNSER: Now I come to the last question. You know, Field Marshal, that the Prosecution have asked that the body of military leaders be declared criminal. As the senior officer of the German Army, you know the attitude of these leaders toward military and international law. Would you please tell the Court about it briefly?
VON RUNDSTEDT: The rules of warfare and of international law as set down in the Geneva Convention and the Hague Rules on Land Warfare were always binding for us older leaders. Their strict observance by the troops was demanded, and very severe measures were taken in case of excesses, which in war can probably take place in all armies. The court-martial records of the various divisions can give information on this point. Property of the in-habitants was ordered to be respected. Severe punishment for plundering had to be meted out, if only in the interests of main-taining discipline amongst our own troops. Raping of women and other inhuman acts were also subject to severe punishment. What we could do to support the inhabitants of enemy countries affected by the war was done as far as was possible. The wounded or con-qu6red enemy was no longer considered as such, but had a claim to decent treatment. We ordered that the battle itself was to be fought chivalrously. We old officers who lived through the time of cavalry battles and of infantry bayonet attacks, witnessed the increasing mechanization of warfare with regret. Today the bravest men and the best troops are helpless against the force of sheer material. All the more did we leaders believe that where there was fighting on land, the old soldierly decent forms of battle should be maintained, and that they should be impressed on the troops again and again. As senior soldier of the German Army, I will say this: We accused leaders were trained in the old soldierly traditions of decency and chivalry. We lived and acted according to them, and we endeavored to hand them down to the younger officers.
DR.LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
COMMANDER PETER CALVACORESSI (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): Field Marshal, in time of war, the military commander must keep in close touch, must he not, and know the opinions of his immediate subordinates, is that right?
VON RUNDSTEDT: That is not necessary to that extent. My subordinates only had to know my operational and tactical views. For the rest, they were free as army leaders within their sphere.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I want to quote to you one sentence from the evidence which has been given by your former commander-in-chief. The translators already have it. It is on Page 2 of Affidavit Number 4: "During operations, the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with army groups by means of telephone, radio, and courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the commanders of army groups, armies, and lower echelons by means of personal visits to them." Is that, generally speaking, correct?
VON RUNDSTEDT: That is absolutely correct as far as the conduct of the war, operations, and tactical actions are concerned. Such an exchange did take place from the army groups up to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I shall read you one more sentence from the evidence that has been given by Generaloberst Blaskowitz. He has said-and I want you to tell me whether you agree with this-that it was common practice for the commanders of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of a situation, and for their recommendations, by tele-phone, teletype, or wireless, as well as by personal records.
VON RUNDSTEDT: It is not correct that they had to give such estimates. They could do so.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Now I have some questions on the Russian campaign. You yourself at a conference with Hitler and your Army colleagues raised a question of a gap which existed between your army group and that of Field Marshal Von Bock. Is that right?
VON RUNDSTEDT: That is correct.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And you knew from your former experience that although on the map that gap was shown as swamp land, it could be used by troops; and you therefore advised about the steps that should be taken to prevent its exploita-tion by the enemy?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I pointed out that according to my ex-periences in the last war against Russia, the Russians could operate freely'1n this swamp area, and that it would therefore be practical if German troops also could be moved through this area. This suggestion was not accepted. As the operations later showed, the Russians had strong forces in the area, and from there they con-stantly threatened the left Rank of my army group.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Yes. I am not concerned with whether the advice was listened to or not. But you agree that you offered it?
VON RUNDSTEDT: It was not advice; it was a question which occurred to me as I described the plan of the operation to the Fuehrer. It was not advice.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I am not going to quarrel with you on that. I want to mention one other conference about which we have already heard a certain amount, and that was the meeting which took place-I think it was in the office of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch-May 1938, when there was a question of seizing the Sudetenland. Is it not a fact that at that conference Von Brauchitsch asked for the opinion of you and your fellow- officers on the proposals which Hitler had laid before you?
VON RUNDSTEDT: At that time, a memorandum was read which the Chief of the General Staff, Beck, had drawn up, and which warned against a war over the question of the Sudetenland. It was to be submitted to Hitler by Von Brauchitsch. We were asked for our opinion on this memorandum, and we unanimously agreed that war should not be waged.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: You were unanimously agreed with General Beck that the sort of war that was likely to happen at that time, if Hitler had his way, should not be waged at that time in that way? this war if France, England, and America were likely to join the enemy side. That was the fundamental idea of the memo-randum. We could probably have dealt with Czechoslovakia alone, although certainly not if the countries just mentioned had come to her aid. And against that Hitler was to be warned.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Then it is fair to say, is it not, that in order to support himself in the objections which he proposed to make to Hitler, Brauchitsch assembled a circle of leading generals who were of the same opinion as himself? That strengthened his hand, did it not?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes; one might say that.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: You all agreed in giving similar advice to the advice which had been given by General-oberst Beck?
THE PRESIDENT: Is this a convenient time to break off?
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Yes, My Lord. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session [The witness Von Rundstedt resumed the stand.]
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: You have given evidence, Field Marshal, to the effect that you had little or no knowledge of such moves as the occupation of the Rhineland or the seizure of the Sudetenland, is that correct?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I had no previous knowledge of the occupa-tion of the Rhineland, just as little as I knew anything of the occupation of the Sudetenland in 1939. 1 was inactive at the time, retired.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: What was the highest post you held when you were in service between 1933 and the outbreak of the war in 1939?
VON RUNDSTEDT: As I stated earlier, from 1 October 1932 until 31 October 1938 I was Commander-in-Chief of Group I, Berlin. Then I retired,
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Therefore, during the period up to the outbreak of the war, during such time as you held the post, and when you received little or no information about what was going on, you were not a member of the indicted group, as defined in this Indictment?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No, I was not a member of that group.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And as far as the invasion of Norway is concerned, you were at that time active in a different theater of war, is that right?
VON RUNDSTEDT: At the time when the Norway enterprise began I was Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A, stationed at Coblenz, in the West.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And in any case, the Nor-wegian invasion was not the affair of the OKH, but of the OKW?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I cannot tell you whether it was an affair of the Navy or of the OKW.
COMMANDIRR CALVACORESSI: Now, in general, before the war, you would say your picUire is: the generals were left alone to occupy themselves with training exercises and the training of relatively small details and units. Is that a 1air summary of the evidence you gave before the Commission?
VON RUNDSTEDT: That probably is a misunderstanding. The smaller training exercises were a matter for the divisional com-manders and commanding generals, and only General Von Fritsch asked of the commanders-in-chief that they too should concern themselves with smaller details occasionally.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Anyhow, during this period when the bouridaries of Germany were rapidly expanding, you say that the problem of defense came first in the minds of the military leadership of Germany?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I did not quite understand that. Did you say the borders of Germany were expanding? They did not do that. It was only in 1938 through the Sudeten affair and until...
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I mean from the beginning of the period of the Anschluss until the outbreak of the war with Poland?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, quite. COMMANDER, CALVACORESSI: And you said this morning the exercises which were held at that time were defensive exercises, defensive maneuvers?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I did not hold any maneuvers any more. After the Sudeten war in 1938 1 was pensioned. Whether and to what extent maneuvers were carried out in 1939 is beyond my knowledge.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And you referred this morn-ing to prewar maneuvers prior to 1939 ', and as I understand it, you spoke of these maneuvers as simply defensive exercises?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes. Those were the maneuvers in 1936 and 1937. During the latter I myself, as an army commander, was leading a party in Pomerania against an enemy attack on Germany-
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Would you also describe as defensive exercises those which were held with stukas and other weapons at Guernica in Spain?
VON RUNDSTEDT: About that I cannot give you any infor-mation. When rearmament had been decided upon in 1935, or 1936, I think, the Air Force introduced stukas too. But I do not know that. At any rate, I considered that at that time any type of weapon was justified within the rearmed Army.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: We will pass on to another point. You told us that German officers were severely aloof from politics?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Is it not the case that this policy is very closely associated with the name of General Von Seeckt?
VON RUNDSTEDT: General Von Seeckt took the greatest care in the Reichswehr to see that no officer concerned himself with political matters. What he himself did politically is another story, and about that I cannot give you any information.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Is it not true to say that the reason why General Von Seeckt, was determined to keep the Army out of politics is the fact that at the time when he took over there had just been the Kapp Putsch?
VON RUNDSTEDT: That I do not believe. It is a very ancient Prussian tradition that an officer does not concern himself with politics. And General Von Seeckt, was just as loyal to the Right-in the Kapp Putsch-as to the Left-the Communist revolt in the Ruhr, for example-always supporting the constitution of the Weimar Government. That was our general attitude.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I have no doubt that all that is perfectly true, but I suggest to you that this whole Prussian policy was revised and insisted upon by Von Seeckt because, as a result of the Kapp Putsch, he saw how important it was to keep the Army out of entanglements with incompetent politicians.
VON RUNDSTEDT: That is entirely my view too. All the more since the Hitler Putsch in 1923 placed the Army in a very difficult position because the Bavarian division was commencing to detach itself from Seeckt.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Now, Kapp was a failure, wasn't he? He tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the Republic?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No. Seeckt, never tried to overthrow the Republic.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I said Kapp.
VON RUNDSTEDT: I beg your pardon then; I misunderstood you.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I will repeat that Kapp was a failure, wasn't he? He tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the Republic?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Kapp was a failure and a very stupid one at that, a Putsch which could never succeed.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: But after 1933 or 1934 Hitler was not a failure, was he?
VON RUNDSTEDT: I shall have to state that Hitler, under Hindenburg's Government, was called into the Government by legal means, namely, by the majority of the people, as the leader of the strongest party. That was a perfectly democratic way in keeping with the constitution, not by means of a Putsch.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I am not concerned with the forms of democracy or anything like that. I was only asking you whether, after 1933-1934, it was plain that Hitler was not a failure; he was doing very well, wasn't he?
VON RUNDSTEDT: He had the majority of the people behind him.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: That is an assent to success from which we will pass on. Generaloberst Reinhardt has said that there was not a single officer who did not back up Hitler in his extraordinary successes. Do you agree with that?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Von Blomberg has said that you and your colleagues in the Army had at that time no reason to oppose Hitler, because he produced the results you desired. Do you disagree with that, too?
VON RUNDSTEDT: That is not quite correct. We did our duty because Hitler had legally been made Chancellor by Hindenburg, and because, after his death, he appeared as the Fuehrer on the basis of the testament.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, the answer is, no, you don't agree with the Field Marshal.
VON RUNDSTEDT: I have never agreed with Field Marshal Von Blomberg at any time.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Have you at any time agreed with Generaloberst Blaskowitz?
VON RUNDSTEDT: How am I to understand that? He was one of my subordinates; but I cannot accept what he has said in the affidavits in that form.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, I am only putting to you the fact that when Hitler's power was assured and there was no more danger of his being a failure, the nonpolitical opponents began to disappear.
VON RUNDSTEDT: No, we always remained nonpolitical. Of course there were active National Socialists, like Reichenau and Blomberg, in the Army, but the bulk were politically quite indifferent.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Surely it is common ground, isn't it, that there was a lot in common between Hitler's policy and the general aspirations of you and your colleagues immediately after 1933?
VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes; that is to say the equality aimed at by Hitler and achieved by him was welcomed by us, and that which was good in the National Socialist movement, as I have already emphasized, and which was mostly taken over from old Prussian traditions, we of course welcomed also; but we all disapproved of the excesses which I have mentioned earlier, the older generation at any rate.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: When you say that there was a certain amount that was good in National Socialist ideas and that that was taken over from the old Prussian times, are you not saying that Hitler revived the old Prussian policy of nationalistic expansion and that you were glad about it?
VON RUNDSTEDT: That had very little to do with politics as such. The principles are important: care for the worker, just as under Bismarck, social welfare, common good which takes pre-cedence over all personal interest-those are the things I am refer-ring to.
COMMANDER CALVACORBSSI: Now, before the war, did you and your colleagues at the head of the Army discuss the question of the neutrality of Belgium, for instance?
VON RUNDSTEDT: To my knowledge, no. We were not thinking of Belgium. We always believed, as I said earlier today, that Poland would some day attack Germany.
COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Didn't you say before the Commissioner that you used to have discussions about the neutrality of Belgium?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No, that must be a mistake. Answering the question put by the American Prosecutor I only replied that a march through Belgium into the Ruhr was considered possible by us.