dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, the point that I am putting-and I do not want to waste time on it-is this: That on the 5th of November Hitler said that he was going to get Austria in 1943 to 1945 at the latest, and earlier if an opportunity arises. Four months later, in March 1938, he takes Austria after having got rid of the people who threw cold water on his plans. But if you did not know about it, we shall not waste time, but shall look at Czechoslovakia, because there you did get the decree. You will find that on Page 163 of Document Book 10a, Page 276 of the German document book. That is the distribution of the directive for operations against Czechoslovakia. It is bringing up to date the one of the 24th of June, and you will see that its execution must be assured as from the 1st of October 1938, at the latest, and Copy Number 2 goes to you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Now, if you will turn over the page to the actual directive, 146 of the English document book, 277 to 278, you see the first sentence of Paragraph 1, "Political Prerequisites": "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically or militarily suitable moment."
RAEDER: May I ask where it is? I do not seem able to find it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The first sentence in the directive, Paragraph 1, Political Prerequisites-Sentence 1: "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future."
RAEDER: The numbering is confused here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very sorry. Page 277, 278.
RAEDER: Yes. Now I have found it. What was the date? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE 28th of May 1938, that is approximately six months after the meeting which you had attended at which Hitler had said he would attack Czechoslovakia at the earliest opportunity that he could. Didn't that make you think that Hitler's speech in November was not merely froth but was stating his plans?
RAEDER: No, because he kept on changing his decisions all the summer. He made a fresh decision every month. That can be seen from Document 388-PS. And it was like this, I believe: on 10 September troops began to assemble and on the same day negotiations were started. On 1 October the peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland took place, after the other powers had agreed to that at Munich. After the Munich negotiations...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We all know that. The point is perfectly clear...
RAEDER: I should like to finish.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In May, here were the plans, and the Fuehrer had mentioned-in his speeches he had expressed this: that it was his determination at the end of May to smash Czechoslovakia by military action. Are you telling the Tribunal that you read that directive and still took the view that Hitler had not got aggressive intentions? That is the question.
RAEDER: Yes, at the end of May.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why, what more proof could you want than his own determination to smash it? What clearer proof could you want?
RAEDER: He frequently said that he intended to smash something and then did not do it. The question was peacefully solved then. I should like to add that on 30 May-I believe that was the date-after mobilization had just been carried out in Czechoslovakia, and that had led him to use such stern words then, and from this-I think he was justified in doing so, for this mobilization could only be directed against Germany, and as I said, he changed his opinion at least three or four times in the course of the summer, saying again and again that he would reserve his decision and-or that he did not wish to use military force.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Tribunal have gotten the whole of the 388-PS document in mind. I won't argue it. You say that didn't convince you. When Hitler went into Prague on the 15th of March 1939, did it then occur to you that there might be something in what he said in the interview on the 5th of November 1937 when he occupied the Slav part of Bohemia and Moravia and broke his own rule about keeping Germany for the Germans? Did it then occur to you that he might not then have been joking or merely talking froth in November? Did it?
RAEDER: He had issued a directive saying that the aims for that year were: 1) The defense of Germany against outside attack. 2) The settlement of the rest of Czechoslovakia in case she adopted a line of policy hostile to Germany. I heard nothing at all about his negotiations with Hacha and his decision following them to occupy Czechoslovakia. I only knew that he wanted to take action against Czechoslovakia according to his directive, in case Czechoslovakia should adopt a line of policy hostile to Germany; and according to the propaganda at that period, that actually did occur. I had nothing at all to do with the occupation of Czechoslovakia; nor with the occupation of the Sudeten area, because the only service which we could have rendered in these operations was our small Danube Flotilla which was subordinated to the Army for this purpose so that I had nothing at all to do with it. There were no other military orders.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your answer that even when Hitler went into Prague on the 15th of March 1939, you still thought he had no aggressive intentions? Is that what you want the Tribunal to believe from you? Is that right?
RAEDER: Yes, I ask the Tribunal to do so because I believe that he did not want to fight a war, to conduct a campaign against Czechoslovakia. By means of his political measures with Hacha he succeeded so far that war did not break out.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, you heard the Defendant G5ring give his evidence that he told President Hacha that his armed forces would bomb Prague if he didn't agree. If that is not war, it is next door to it, isn't it?
RAEDER: It is very close to it. Yes, a threat.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let's go further on for another 2 months. If you didn't see it, on March-on the 23rd of May-when you came to the Reich Chancellery there were six high-ranking officers, of which you were one. And Hitler said that he would give you an indoctrination on the political situation. And his indoctrination was that, "We are left with a decision to attack Poland at the first opportunity." When you heard him say that on the 25th of May, did you still think he had no aggressive intentions?
RAEDER: I thought so for a long time after that. Just as Generaloberst Jodl said, since he had solved the Czech problem by purely political means, it was to be hoped that he would be able to solve the Polish question also without bloodshed; and I believed that up to the last moment, up to 22 August.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just take one glance-I shan't keep you long-at Document L-79, which you will find on Page 74, I think it is, of Document Book 10. I am sorry. Page 298 of the German document book. I beg your pardon. I am not going to ask you about the document because the Tribunal has dealt with that. I want you to look at the people who were there-298 in the German document book.
RAEDER: I know the people who were there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let's look: Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt; he was afterwards General, Hitler's principal adjutant, and killed on the 20th of July, 1944, isn't that right? Then the Defendant Goering, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; yourself as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; Colonel General Von Brauchitsch who was Commander-in-Chief of the Army; General Keitel who was head of the OKW; General Milch who was Goering's Deputy; Halder who was Chief of Staff; Schniewind who was your Chief of Staff; and Jeschonnek who was I think a Chief of Staff or a high...
RAEDER: Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. And Colonel Warlimont, who was General Jodl's assistant. Now, what do you think Hitler got these high-ranking generals for, and told them, "We are left with a decision to attack Poland at the first opportunity," if he hadn't any aggressive intentions? What were these people there for if it wasn't to develop a war?
RAEDER: I have already explained that the main purpose of that speech, as may be seen from the last part of it, was to give a purely academic lecture on the conduct of war, and on the basis of that lecture to create a special study staff, a project which the chiefs of the Armed Forces had so far strongly opposed. I also explained at the start that his explanations were at first the most confused that I have ever heard regarding the matter, and that he issued no directives in regard to them but that the last lines read: "The branches of the Wehrmacht determine what will be built. There will be no alteration in the shipbuilding program. The armament programs are to be fixed for 1943 or 1944." When he said that, he could certainly not have intended to solve the Polish question by a war in the near future.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that when he said, "We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair; further successes cannot be obtained without the shedding of blood," you paid no attention to it at all? You are seriously telling the Tribunal that you paid no attention to that?
RAEDER: No, I certainly did not at all, because by this time I was getting to know Hitler and was familiar with the exaggerations contained in his speeches.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At this time you had already had the directives for a surprise attack on Danzig, in November 1938. You had had the directive on the 3rd of April for the Fall Weiss, and you know this whole matter was en train . Are you seriously, Defendant, telling the Tribunal that you had any doubt after the 23rd of May that Hitler intended war against Poland and was quite prepared to fight England and France, if they carried out their guarantee? I mean, seriously, I give you this chance before we adjourn: Do you say that you had any doubt at all?
RAEDER: Of course; I have surely explained that even in August I was still doubtful. For instance, in estimating this speech, I must compare it, as has already been done here, with the speech which Hitler had made a few weeks earlier at the launching of the Bismarck , where he spoke only of the peace of true justice. Those speeches were decisive for me. I did not base my conclusions on this particular speech which is reproduced in such an extremely confused manner; and that I proved by the fact that during the whole of the summer I never said a word to the Navy to suggest that war might break out in the autumn. Confirmation of that was given here; and anybody can give further confirmation. I thought very highly of Hitler's political ability and even on 22 August, when we were informed of the pact with Russia, I was still convinced that we should again be able to find a peaceful solution of the problem. That was my definite conviction. I may be accused of faulty judgment, but I thought I had formed a correct estimate of Hitler.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I understand you to say that even on the 22nd of August you didn't think that Hitler had any aggressive intentions. Do you really mean that?
RAEDER: Yes, and there is a perfectly good reason for it, because there was every prospect of our forming an alliance with Russia. He had given all sorts of reasons why England and France would not intervene; and all those who were assembled there drew from that the sincere hope that he would again be successful in getting out of the affair without fighting.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will this be a convenient time to adjourn, My Lord? [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am most anxious not to take up unnecessary time. With regard to the meeting of the Ad of August, Your Lordship may remember that Dr. Siemers raised a point as to the two accounts of the meeting, one in Documents 1014-PS and 798-PS and the other in the account by Admiral Boehm. I have had a comparison made out in English and German showing the points which are similar to both, and I thought it would be more convenient just to put that in. Let Dr. Siemers see the German copy and make any suggestion at the appropriate time rather than spend any time in cross-examining the witness as to any differences in the accounts. My Lord, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will put that in now and hand Dr. Siemers a copy so that he can draw the Tribunal's attention to any points at a convenient stage.
THE PRESIDENT: Did not Admiral Boehm make the accounts?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution's account is in two documents, 798-PS and 1014-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There was another document which was mentioned by my friend, Mr. Alderman, but not put in. It was an account by a journalist which was the first account the Prosecution had had, but when they got the two accounts from the OKW files, they did not use their first one; so I had only taken the two accounts from the OKW files and Admiral Boehm's account.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. But does not that make three documents in all, apart from the one which has been left out?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, and I have taken each of the two and compared it with Admiral Boehm's.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So, on that I shall not pursue this interview. I thought that it would save time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I'd like you, therefore, Defendant, to look at Document Number 789-PS, which is at Page 261 of Book 10a and Pages 438 to 440 of the German book- 438 to 440. This is the note, Defendant, of a conference on the 23d of November 1939 with Hitler, to which all Supreme Commanders were ordered. Do you see that at the beginning, Pages 438 to 440? Do you see what it says, "to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered"? Were you present?
RAEDER: Yes, it is the conference during the war on 23 November 1939.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Were you present?
RAEDER: I was present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who were the other commanders-in-chief who were present?
RAEDER: The commanders-in-chief of the Army, the Air Force, and a considerable number of generals of the Army.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The "Oberbefehlshaber"?
RAEDER: Yes, but in the Army.. .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, I want you to look at a passage. The paragraph begins: "One year later, Austria came. This step also was considered very hazardous." Do you see that? Do you see that paragraph?
RAEDER: Yes, I have got it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Much obliged. Now, I just want you to look at the next few sentences. "It brought about a considerable strengthening of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. But this step was not to be accomplished in one move. First of all, the West Wall had to be finished in the West. It was not possible to reach the goal in one bound. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. It was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the establishment of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the conquest of Poland was laid, but I was not yet clear at that time whether I should start first against the East and then against the West or vice-versa. Moltke often had to ponder over the same things in his time. Of necessity it came to a fight with Poland first. I shall be accused of wanting to fight and fight again; in struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does not want to go under. The increasing population requires a larger living space. My goal was to create a logical relation between the population and the living space." Whatever you had understood up to that time, you appreciated then, that Hitler himself had had a consistent and clear aim of aggression throughout these matters that I put to you this morning; did you not?
RAEDER: Yes, but now we were already in the middle of a war and he was looking at these things retrospectively. Also, he wanted to make it clear to the generals, with whom he had a conflict at that time, that he had always been right in his political conceptions. That is the reason why he quoted all these detailed points again.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you turn over to Pages 445-448, which is Page 264 of the English document book, German document book Pages 445-448. Have you got that?
RAEDER: Perhaps you would be good enough to read, I have here a...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the paragraph that begins: "We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr."
RAEDER: I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look about halfway down that paragraph. You will see: "England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines off the English coasts will bring England to her knees." Have you got that passage?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. Now, if you would just listen. "However, this"-that is bringing England to her knees-"can only occur when we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. Nobody has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work at stake. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory, the greatest historical choice-to be compared with the decision of Frederick the Great before the first Silesian War. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man." And there is some more about Frederick the Great and Bismarck: "My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment. Violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is unimportant. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not give such idiotic reasons for the violation of neutrality as were given in 1914. If we do not violate the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously." Now, do you remember, Defendant, that this was just 3 weeks after the plans for "Fall Gelb," that is plans for the attack on Holland and Belgium, had been issued on 10 November? Do you remember that?
RAEDER: I know that this was discussed here. But we were already at war with England, therefore at that stage it was no longer necessary to discuss an attack against England and France and . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were not at war with Holland and Belgium, were you?
RAEDER: Please, I would like to finish.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, I thought you had finished.
RAEDER: Here it says: "If the French Army marches into Belgium to attack us, then it will be too late for us. We must be first." Hitler at that time stated that he had received definite news that Belgium would not respect her neutrality and that he also had hews already that certain preparations for the reception of French and British troops et cetera had already been made. For that reason, he wanted to forestall an attack from Belgium against us. Apart from that, in his speech of 22 August 1939, he had made a statement entirely to the opposite effect. He had said that Belgium and Holland would not break their neutrality.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with what he said, that the "Violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is unimportant. No one will question that when we have won." Did you agree with that view?
RAEDER: No, it is not exactly my opinion, but I had no cause on my part to raise any objection against that statement of his at that moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The view of the Naval War Command was put up to him a month later with regard to U-boat warfare, was it not? Do you remember that on 30th December you had a meeting with Hitler, at which Colonel General Keitel and Fregattenkapitaen Von Puttkamer were present?
RAEDER: Yes, I was with him on 30 December.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like you to look at the new document, which is Document Number C-100, Exhibit Number GB-463.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought not this document be identified?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship, of course, is right. I think we had perhaps better give them two numbers, one for each of the original PS documents. My Lord, the comparison. ..
THE PRESIDENT: 1014-PS has a number already, has it not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. That has a number.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought perhaps the comparative document ought to have a number.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. Shall we call one comparison Exhibit Number GB-464, the comparison of Document Number 798-PS; and the comparison of Document Number 1014-PS, Exhibit Number GB-465?
THE PRESIDENT: I have only got one here, as far as I can see.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am going to get some more done. I am afraid I have passed out only a limited number at the moment, but I will have some more run off. 464, 798; GB-465 will be 1014-PS. It will be the comparison of Document Number 798-PS with the Raeder Document, and Exhibit Number GB-465 will be the comparison of Document Number 1014-PS in the Raeder document book. I am very much obliged to Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Now you are going to give us Document Number C-100?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: C-100, My Lord, yes. Defendant, I will be grateful if you will turn over a few pages to where it comes to a report, the date of 30 December 1939, and then after that there is an enclosure to the report to the Fuehrer of 30 December 1939. Would you look at Paragraph IV, which says: "With regard to the form and the moment for the commencement of further intensification of the war at sea, the decision of the supreme war command to begin the general intensification of the war with an offensive in the West is of decisive importance." Have you got that, Paragraph IV?
RAEDER: Page?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am afraid the paging is different.
RAEDER: "With regard to the form"-yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "With regard to the form and the moment for the commencement of further intensification of the war at sea, the decision of the supreme war command to begin the general intensification of the war with an offensive in the West is of decisive importance. "I. Possibility: The decision of the Fuehrer is made in favor of a Western offensive, beginning very shortly, within the framework of the instructions issued for this to date, by violating the neutrality of other states: "In this case the intensified measures for the war at sea will in their political effect only represent a small part of the entire intensification of the war. The gradual change-over to the intensified form of waging the war at sea within the American restricted zone, with the ultimate aim of a ruthless employment of all means of warfare to interrupt all commerce with England, is therefore proposed with the start of the offensive. "Immediate anticipation of individual intensified measures for the war at sea is not necessary and may be postponed until the start of the general intensification of the war. The benevolent neutrals Italy, Spain, Japan and Russia as well as America, are to be spared as far as possible." Isn't that right, that you contemplated that Hitler's violation of the neutrality. of the Low Countries would cover, by being a more important matter, your adopting the most ruthless methods of war at sea? Isn't that right?
RAEDER: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What does that mean if it does not mean that? What does that mean if it does not mean what I have put to you?