dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
VON WEIZSAECKER: Raeder informed me that no German U-boat could have been involved. He may also have mentioned details, concerning the distance of the U-boats from the point where the ship went down, but I cannot today tell you about this with any certainty.
DR. SIEMERS: During this conversation with Raeder, did you declare that everything should be done to avoid war with the United States, referring particularly to incidents like the sinking of the Lusitania in the previous war?
VON WEIZSAECKER: That I certainly and emphatically did, for at that time the recollections of similar past incidents during the first World War were still very vivid in my mind. I am sure I drew his attention to the urgent necessity of avoiding all naval operations which might cause a spreading of the war and-as I used to say in those days-decrease the "neutral substance."
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder share your opinion?
VON WEIZSAECKER: To the best of my recollections-yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Are you convinced, Herr Von Weizsaecker, that Raeder gave you truthful answers in this report about the Athenia ?
VON WEIZSAECKER: Of course.
DR. SIEMERS: Now U-boat Number 30 returned from her combat mission on 27 September 1939, that is-about three weeks after the sinking of. the Athenia , and her commander reported that he had inadvertently sunk the Athenia . He had not noticed the fact at the time but was apprised of the incident later by various wireless messages. Raeder heard about it at the end of September, and discussed the matter with Hitler in order to decide what attitude should be adopted. Hitler issued an order enjoining silence. All this has already been discussed here. I would like you to tell me if you were informed of the fact, subsequently established, of the sinking by a German U-boat.
VON WEIZSAECKER: No, certainly not.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you hear of Hitler's order enjoining silence?
VON WEIZSAECKER: I naturally did not hear of that either.
DR. SIEMERS: I shall now have Document Number 3260-PS handed to you and I must ask you to have a look at it. It is an article entitled "Churchill Sinks the Athenia ," taken from the Voelkischer Beobachter of 23 October 1939. Do you remember this article?
VON WEIZSAECKER: Yes. Perhaps I may look through it.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I inform you, in order to assist the Tribunal, that this is GB-218 in the British Document Book Number 10a, Page 97, to be correct-Page 99. [Turning to the witness.] Herr Von Weizsaecker, you have read this article. May I ask you to tell me whether you recall having read this article at the time of its appearance?
VON WEIZSAECKER: I do recall that such an article did appear at that time.
DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you further what your attitude was at the time when you heard about this article?
VON WEIZSAECKER: I considered it a perverted fantasy.
DR. SIEMERS: Then you condemned this article?
VON WEIZSAECKER: Naturally.
DR. SIEMERS: Even though at the time you did not know yet that it was a German U-Boat?
VON WEIZSAECKER: The question of whether it was a German U-boat or not could in no wise influence my opinion of the article.
DR. SIEMERS: Then you considered this article objectionable, even if it had not been a German U-boat?
VON WEIZSAECKER: Of course.
DR. SIEMERS: Now the Prosecution asserts that Admiral Raeder had instigated this article and is reproaching him very gravely on moral grounds for this very reason, and the reproach is all the graver since, as we have seen, Raeder at this time-unlike yourself -knew that it was a German U-boat which had sunk the Athenia . Do you consider such an action possible on Raeder's part? That he could have instigated this article?
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Siemers, you can only ask the witness what he knew and what he did. You cannot ask him to speculate about what Raeder has done.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I believed that, according to this morning's affidavit, it would be possible to voice an opinion; but I shall, of course, retract my question.
THE PRESIDENT: What affidavit are you talking about?
DR. SIEMERS: The affidavit in which I suggested the expunging of any expression of opinion, Dietmann's affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: That is a perfectly different matter.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsaecker, did you at that time hear that Raeder had instigated this article?
VON WEIZSAECKER: No, I did not hear that; I would never have believed it either. I consider it entirely out of the question that he could have instigated an article of that sort or that he could have written it himself.
DR. SIEMERS: To your knowledge, could this article be traced exclusively to the Propaganda Ministry?
VON WEIZSAECKER: I can only answer this question in the negative; not to Raeder and not to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsaecker, are you in a position to judge whether grave points were involved in the historically-known violations committed by the Navy against the Treaty of Versailles?
VON WEIZSAECKER: I can only answer that question indirectly. The details are unknown to me. But I can scarcely consider it possible that grave or important violations could have occurred, for it is precisely in naval matters that the observance of contract agreements is particularly easy to control. Ships cannot be built without being seen. I must therefore assume that these infringements were of an insignificant nature.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsaecker, in your opinion, did the Defendant Raeder prepare a war of aggression or do you know of any case from which Raeder's attitude...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is the very charge against the Defendant Raeder which the Tribunal has got to decide.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsaecker, in February 1939, when you traveled by train from Hamburg to Berlin with Admiral Raeder, did you converse with him? And what was the occasion and what did you discuss?
VON WEIZSAECKER: Yes. It is quite trite that I met Admiral Raeder on the train from Hamburg to Berlin, after the launching of a ship at Hamburg. On this occasion the Admiral told me that he had just made a report to Hitler in which he said he had made it quite clear that the size of the Navy would preclude any war against England for years to come. I presume that this is the reply to the question which you wished to receive from me.
DR. SIEMERS: That was in February 1939?
VON WEIZSAECKER: It was the launching of the Bismarck .
DR. SIEMERS: Then it is known to the Tribunal, for the launching of the Bismarck is entered in the records.
VON WEIZSAECKER: It must have been in the spring-in February or March.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder's declaration at that time have a calming influence on you?
VON WEIZSAECKER: I heard Raeder's declaration on the subject with very great pleasure because there could be no other. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we do not care whether it had a calming influence on him or not.
DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, and to the best of your knowledge, did Raeder-either as a politician or as a naval expert- exercise any influence over Hitler?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the witness can tell us what Raeder said, but he really cannot tell us in what capacity he was speaking, whether as a politician or an admiral. If you want to know whether he had his uniform on...
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsaecker, did you have any conversations with Raeder or with any other high-ranking personages?
VON WEIZSAECKER: About what?
DR. SIEMERS: About Raeder's influence on Hitler.
VON WEIZSAECKER: It was a well-known fact that political arguments expressed by soldiers scarcely influenced Hitler at all, although military arguments of a technical nature certainly did carry weight with him, and in this sense Raeder may have exercised some influence over Hitler.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsaecker, in the winter of 1938 to 1939, the usual large diplomatic dinner party took place in Berlin and you, as far as I know, were present at this dinner. On this occasion Raeder spoke to Sir Nevile Henderson about the probable return of Germany's colonies...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, why do you not ask him instead of telling him. You are telling him what happened.
DR. SIEMERS: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you are.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; this was a conversation between Raeder and Sir Nevile Henderson, not between Herr Von Weizsaecker and Henderson. I am now asking you, Herr Von Weizsaecker, did you have a conversation to this effect with Sir Nevile Henderson or with other British diplomats? And do you know anything about their attitude?
VON WEIZSAECKER: I cannot recall having spoken personally with any British diplomats about the question of the colonies. On the other hand, I do know that between 1934 and 1939 the question of the colonies was repeatedly handled by the British Government either officially, unofficially or semiofficially, and their attitude was expressed in a friendly and conciliatory manner. I believe I can remember reading a report on the visit of two British ministers to Berlin and that on this occasion the question of the colonies was also discussed in a conciliatory manner.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsaecker, can you tell us anything about the behavior or the reputation of the Navy during the Norwegian occupation?
VON WEIZSAECKER: An occupational force always finds it difficult to be popular anywhere. But with this one reservation I should like to state that the Navy, as far as I heard, enjoyed a good, even a very good, reputation in Norway. This was repeatedly confirmed to me during the war by my Norwegian friends.
DR. SIEMERS: You made these Norwegian friendships at the time you were Minister in Oslo? When was that?
VON WEIZSAECKER: I was Minister in Oslo from 1931 to 1933.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question. A document, D-843, was submitted yesterday, signed by Breuer who was with the Oslo Legation in March 1940. May I submit this document to you?
VON WEIZSAECKER: Am I to read the entire document?
DR. SIEMERS: I think it would suffice if you were just to glance through it, especially over the middle part of the document. [Turning to the President.] Mr. President, it is GB-466 and the document was submitted yesterday. [Turning to the witness.] According to this document Breuer stated that the danger of a British landing in Norway was not so great as was assumed by the other side, and he speaks of measures only by which Germany might be provoked. What can you ten us about these statements of Breuer's? Are these statements correct?
VON WEISS SICKER: Breuer was not with the Legation-he was the Minister himself-and I take it for granted that he reported correctly on the subject from an objective or rather, if I may say so, subjective point of view. Whether this was really correct from an objective point of view or not, is quite another question. To put it in plain German, whether Breuer was correctly informed of the intentions of the enemy forces is another question.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsaecker, according to the information you subsequently received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, were Raeder's misgivings justified or was the picture, as painted by Breuer, correct?
VON WEIZSAECKER: I must confess that my personal opinion tallied with the opinion of Breuer, although both our opinions subsequently proved to be incorrect and the conjectures of the Navy were justified, or-at least-more justified than the opinion voiced by the Minister.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much indeed.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask any questions of this witness?
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hess): Witness, on 23 August 1939, a nonaggression pact was concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union. Were any other agreements concluded on that day by the two governments, outside of this pact of nonaggression?
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the USSR): Mr. President, the witness is called upon to answer certain definite questions which are set forth in the application of counsel for the defendant, Dr. Siemers. I consider that the question which is being put to him at this moment by the defense counsel Seidl has no connection with the examination of the case in hand and should be ruled out.
THE PRESIDENT: You may ask the" question, Dr. Seidl, that you were going to ask.
DR. SEIDL: I ask you again, Herr Von Weizsaecker, whether on 23 August 1939, other agreements had been reached between the two governments, which were not contained in the nonaggression pact?
VON WEIZSAECKER: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Where were these agreements contained?
VON WEIZSAECKER: These agreements were contained in a secret protocol.
DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself read this secret protocol in your capacity of State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
VON WEIZSAECKER: Yes.
DR.SEIDL: I have before me a text and Ambassador Gaus harbors no doubt at all that the agreements in question are correctly set out in this text. I shall have it put to you.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, what document are you putting to him?
DR. SEIDL: The secret addenda to the protocol of 23 August 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that not the document-what is this document that you are presenting to the witness? There is a document which you have already presented to the Tribunal and which has been ruled out. Is that the same document?
DR. SEIDL: It is the document which I submitted to the Tribunal in my documentary evidence and which was refused by the Tribunal, presumably because I refused to divulge the origin and source of this document. But the Tribunal granted me permission to produce a new sworn affidavit by Ambassador Gaus on the subject in question.
THE PRESIDENT: You have not done it? You have not done it?
DR. SEIDL: No, but I should, Your Honor, like to read this text in order to stimulate the memory of the witness, and to ask him whether in connection therewith, as far as he can remember, the secret agreements are correctly reproduced in this document.
GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors! I would like to protest against these questions for two reasons. First of all, we are examining the matter of the crimes of the major German war criminals. We are not investigating the foreign policies of other states. Secondly, the document which defense counsel Seidl is attempting to put to the witness has been rejected by the Tribunal, since it is-in substance-a forged document and cannot have any probative value whatsoever.
DR. SEIDL: May I in this connection say the following, Mr. President. This document is an essential component of the nonaggression pact, submitted by the Prosecution in evidence as GB-145. If I now submit the text to the witness. . .
THE PRESIDENT: The only question is whether it is the document which has been rejected by the Tribunal. Is it the document which has been rejected by the Tribunal?
DR. SEIDL: It was rebutted as documentary evidence per se.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then the answer is "yes."
DR. SEIDL: But it seems to me that there is a difference as to whether this document may be put to the witness during the hearing of his testimony. I should like to answer this question in the affirmative since the Prosecution when cross-examining can put the document in their possession to the witness, and on the basis of his testimony we should then see which is the correct text or whether these two texts harmonize at all.
THE PRESIDENT: Where does the document which you are presenting come from?
DR. SEIDL: I received this document a few weeks ago from a man on the Allied side who appeared absolutely reliable. I received it only on condition that I would not divulge its origin, a condition which seemed to me perfectly reasonable.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you say that you received it a few moments ago?
DR. SEIDL: Weeks ago.
THE PRESIDENT: It is the same document that you say just now that you presented to the Tribunal and the Tribunal rejected?
DR.SEIDL: Yes, but the Tribunal also decided that I might submit another sworn affidavit from Ambassador Gaus on this subject, and this decision only makes sense. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but you have not done so. We do not know what affidavit Dr. Gaus has made.
DR. SEIDL: Ambassador Gaus' sworn affidavit, the new one, is already in my possession, but it has not yet been translated.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I certainly join General Rudenko in objecting to the use of this document. We now know that it comes from some anonymous source. We do not know the source at all, and anyway it is not established that this witness does not remember himself what this purported agreement amounted to. I do not know why he can not ask him, if that is what he wants to do.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl you may ask the witness what his recollection is of the treaty without putting the document to him. Ask him what he remembers of the treaty, or the protocol
DR. SEIDL: Witness, please describe the contents of the agreement insofar as you can remember them.
VON WEIZSAECKER: It is about a very incisive, a very far-reaching secret addendum to the nonaggression pact concluded at that time. The scope of this document was very extensive since it concerned the partition of the spheres of influence and drew a demarcation line between areas which, under given conditions, belonged to the sphere of Soviet Russia and those which would fall in the German sphere of interest. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Eastern Poland and, as far as I can remember, certain areas of Romania were to be included in the sphere of the Soviet Union. Anything west of this area fell into the German sphere of interest. It is true that this secret agreement did not maintain its original form. Later on, either in September or October of the same year, a certain change, an amendment was made. As far as I can recall the essential difference in the two documents consisted in the fact that Lithuania, or-at least-the greater part of Lithuania, fell into the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union, while in the Popish territory the line of demarcation between the two spheres of interest was moved very considerably westwards. I believe that I have herewith given you the gist of the secret agreement and of the subsequent addendum.
DR.SEIDL: Is it true that in case al a subsequent territorial reorganization, a line of demarcation was agreed upon in the territory of the Polish State?
VON WEIZSAECKER: I cannot tell you exactly whether the expression "line of demarcation" was contained in this protocol or whether "line of separation of spheres of interest" was the actual term.
DR. SEIDL: But a line was drawn.
VON WEIZSAECKER: Precisely the line which I have just mentioned, and I believe I can recall that this Line, once the agreement became effective, was adhered to as a general rule with possible slight fluctuations.
DR. SEIDL: Can you recall-this is my last question-if this secret addendum of 23 August 1939 also contained an agreement on the future destiny of Poland?
VON WEIZSAECKER: This secret agreement included a complete redirection of Poland's destiny. It may very well have been that explicitly or implicitly such a redirection had been provided for in the agreement. I would not, however, like to commit myself as to the exact wording.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, did you see the original of the secret treaty?
VON WEIZSAECKER: I saw a photostat of the original, possibly the original as well. In any case I had the photostatic copy in my possession, I had a photostatic copy locked up in my personal safe.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you recognize a copy of it if it was shown to you?
VON WEIZSAECKER: Oh, yes, I definitely think so. The original signatures were attached and they could be recognized immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has been considering whether it ought to put to the witness the document in the possession of Dr. Seidl, but in view of the fact that the contents of the original have been stated by the witness and by other witnesses and that it does not appear what is the origin of the document which is in Dr. Seidl's possession, the Tribunal has decided not to put the document to the witness. The Tribunal will now adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 22 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think yesterday we got to the stage whether any of the other defendants' counsel wished to ask any questions.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, indeed; I believe Dr. Von Ludinghausen wishes to examine the witness.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Witness, I should like to put a few questions to you about the activity of Herr Von Neurath in his capacity as Foreign Minister. You were at that time Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Office. What were the dates?
VON WEIZSACKER: I believe from late autumn of 1936, as a deputy, and from the spring of 1937 until the spring of 1938 with full capacity.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: But before then you had already had occasion to work with Herr Von Neurath? In the autumn of 1932 were you not together now and then at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva?
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What tendencies did Herr Von Neurath follow, and what attitude did Von Neurath adopt at the Disarmament Conference?
VON WEIZSACKER: The attitude of Herr Von Neurath was dictated by the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations which provided for disarmament. He followed those lines.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In that he followed the same policy which his predecessors had followed at the Disarmament Conference?
VON WEIZSACKER: It was always the same.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, all the previous governments pursued a policy aimed at peace and unity, or understanding; and Herr Von Neurath continued this policy wholeheartedly, is that not correct?
VON WEIZSACKER: I never noticed anything to the contrary.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you at that time-that is in 1932-notice in any way that he had National Socialist tendencies or that he was at all in sympathy with the National Socialists?
VON WEIZSACKER: I had the impression that there was no common ground between him and National Socialism.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Can you quite briefly summarize Herr Von Neurath's views with respect to foreign politics? Could he have been at that time in favor of belligerent action, or was he the representative, the acknowledged representative, of a policy of understanding and peace?
VON WEIZSACKER: I should say that Herr Von Neurath pursued a policy of peaceful revision, the same policy that had been carried on by his predecessors. His aim was good neighborliness with all, without binding himself politically in any special direction. I never noticed any bellicose tendencies in his policies.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Was there any change in Herr Von Neurath's views in the year 1936, when you became one of his closest collaborators, or did they always remain the same?
VON WEIZSACKER: They were always the same.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: He was especially interested in bringing about an understanding with England, but also with France; is that right?
VON WEIZSACKER: I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath wanted to bring about an understanding with all sides.