dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: "Every ship sailing this zone runs the risk of being destroyed not only by mines but also by other combat means. For that reason the German Government issues a fresh and most urgent warning against sailing in the danger zone." At the end of the note, the German Government refuses to assume any responsibility for damage or loss incurred in this area. I produce as the next document, on Page 214, with the new Exhibit Number Doenitz-105, an official German statement made on the occasion of the announcement of the total blockade of 17 August 1940. I only want to mention it. I now come to several documents dealing with the treatment of neutrals outside the declared danger zones. As the first document, I submit, on Page 226, an excerpt of the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-196. It is a standing war order from the Commander of U-boats which was also issued before May 1940. I read the first sentences: "Not to be sunk are: "(a) All ships readily recognized as neutral so long as they do not (1) move in any enemy convoy, (2) move into a declared danger zone." The next Document, Doenitz-76, Page 227, shows the concern of the Naval Operations Staff that the neutrals should really be recognizable as such. I read the first sentences of the entry of 10 January 1942: "In view of the further extension of the war, the Naval Operations Staff has asked the Foreign Office to point out again to the neutral seafaring nations, with the exception of Sweden, the necessity of carefully marking their ships in order that they shall not be mistaken for enemy ships." The next Document, Doenitz-77, on Page 228, is an entry dated 24 June 1942, from the War Diary of the Flag Officer of U-boats: "All commanders will again be given detailed instructions as to their conduct toward neutrals." I have already submitted Doenitz-78-excuse me, it has not been submitted. Doenitz-78, Page 229, contains examples of the consideration which the Commander of U-boats showed to neutrals.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The entry of 23 November 1942 shows that a submarine was ordered to leave one area solely because there was a great deal of neutral traffic in that area. The second entry of December 1942 specifies that Portuguese naval tankers had to be treated in accordance with directives, in other words, allowed to proceed. On Page 230 there is a document which I have already mentioned. It contains an account of court-martial proceedings taken against a commanding officer who had torpedoed a neutral by mistake. The next document, Doenitz-79, on Page 231, is an order decreeing the manner of treating neutrals which remained in force up to the end of the war. I do not think I have to read it. It again stresses the necessity of neutral ships being easily recognizable as such and refers to shipping agreements which have been made with a number of countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the correct date of it? You said...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: August 1944, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: That is on the original...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The original date was 1 April 1943. The order was revised on 1 August 1944 on the basis of the revisions necessitated by the shipping agreements. So far I have dealt with the general principles which have been attacked by the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-l91 and GB-224. Now I should like to submit several documents on individual points contained in the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-l91. Mention is made there of a speech by Adolf Hitler ending with the words: "Every ship, with or without escort, which comes within range of our torpedo tubes will be torpedoed." I now wish to present as Doenitz-80, on Page 232, an excerpt from that speech. It shows that in that context the Fuehrer's statement only applied to ships carrying war materials to England. I now come to two examples mentioned in GB-l91 as characteristic examples of illegal German naval warfare. The first is the case of the Danish steamer Vendia. The Prosecution's document says: "On 30 September 1939 the first sinking of a neutral ship by a submarine took place without a warning signal having been given. On that occasion some people lost their lives. The ship was the Danish steamer Vendia." With reference to this I am submitting Doenitz-83, on Page 235. That is the War Log of Submarine U-3, which sank the Vendia. I should like to read parts of it on account of its importance. I begin with the second sentence: "The steamer turns away gradually and increases speed. The boat comes up only very slowly. Obvious attempt to escape. The steamer is clearly recognizable as the Danish steamer Vendia. Boat reduces speed and uncovers her machine-gun. Several warning shots are fired across the steamer's bow. Thereupon the steamer stops very slowly; nothing more happens for a while. Then some more shots are fired. The Vendia lies into the wind. "For 10 minutes nothing is visible on deck to remove suspicion of possible intended resistance; at 1124 hours I suddenly see bow waves and screw movements. The steamer swings sharply round toward the boat. The officer on watch and the first mate agree with my view that this is an attempt at ramming.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: For this reason I turn in the same angle as the steamer. A torpedo is fired 30 seconds later; point of aim, bow; point of impact, extreme rear of stern. The stern is torn off and goes down. The front part remains afloat. "By risking the loss of our own crew and boat (heavy sea and numerous floating pieces of wreckage) six men of the Danish crew are rescued, among them the captain and helmsman. No further survivors can be seen. In the meantime the Danish steamer Swawa approaches and is stopped. She is requested to send her papers across in a boat. She is carrying a mixed cargo from Amsterdam to Copenhagen. The six persons rescued are transferred to the steamer for repatriation." I read the second to the last sentence on the next page: "After the crew of the steamer had been handed over, it was learned that the engineer artifices of the steamer had told the stoker Blank that the captain had intended to ram the submarine." The document on Page 237, an excerpt from the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-82, shows that the Vendia case formed the subject of a protest by the German Government to the Danish Government. I shall deal now with the sinking of the City of Benares on 18 September 1940. In this connection I should like first to read several sentences from the Prosecution's document, because in my opinion it is characteristic of the probative value of the entire Exhibit GB-l91. I read from the British Document Book, Page 23, starting at the passage where the Prosecution stopped reading. The Tribunal will remember that the City of Benares had children on board. The Foreign Of lice report says here: "The captain of the U-boat presumably did not know that there were children on board the City of Benares when he fired the torpedoes. Perhaps he did not even know the name of the ship, although there the evidence suggests strongly that he had been dogging her for several hours before torpedoing her. He must have known, however, that this was a large merchant ship, probably with civilian passengers on board, and certainly with a crew of merchant seamen.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: He knew the state of the weather, and he knew that they were six hundred miles from land and yet he followed them outside the blockade area and deliberately abstained from firing his torpedo until after nightfall when the chances of rescue would be enormously reduced." The next document I submit is Doenitz-84, Page 238, the War Log of U-boat 48, which sank the City of Benares. I read the entry of 17 September 1940: "Time 1002. Convoy sighted. Course about 240 degrees, speed 7 nautical miles. Contact maintained, since underwater attack is no longer possible because of the heavy swell. No escort can be seen with the convoy." I will summarize the entry of 18 September 1940. It describes the firing of a torpedo on a ship belonging to that convoy-the City of Benares. A few minutes later, at 0007 hours, the submarine attacked a second ship in the convoy, the British steamer Marina. Both ships sent wireless messages. Twenty minutes later the submarine again had an artillery combat with a tanker from the convoy. That is the true story of the City of -Benares. I reproduce the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-192 again on Page 240. It concerns the sinking of the Sheaf Mead. In this connection I should like to point out that that ship was heavily armed and that it probably was no merchant vessel but a submarine trap. The Prosecution's Exhibit GB-195, which was dealt with in yesterday's hearing, contains an order issued by the Fuehrer in July 1941 concerning attacks on United States merchant vessels in the blockade zone which had been declared around England. On the basis of this document, the Prosecution charges Doenitz with conducting a cynical and opportunistic warfare against neutrals. My next document is Doenitz-86, Page 243. It shows the efforts which were made to avoid a conflict with the United States. I read the entry, dated 5 March 1940, from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff: "With reference to the conduct of economic warfare, orders are given to the Naval Forces that U.S. ships are not to be stopped, seized, or sunk.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The reason is the assurance given by the Commander-in-Chief to the American Naval Attache, whom he received on 20 February, that German submarines had orders not to stop any American ships whatsoever. All possibility of difficulties arising between the U.S.A. and Germany as a result of economic warfare are thereby to be eliminated from the start." This order means, therefore, that prize law measures were renounced. The next document, Doenitz-87, Page 244, shows the practical recognition of the American zone of neutrality. It reads: "4 April 1941. The following WIT message is directed to all ships at sea: "American neutrality zone from now on to be observed south of 20° North only at a distance of 300 nautical miles from the coast. For reasons of foreign policy, the hitherto existing limitation will for the time being continue to be observed north of the above-mentioned line." That means full recognition of the neutral zone. The next document, Doenitz-88, shows President Roosevelt's attitude to the question of neutrality toward Germany in that war. It is an excerpt from the speech of 11 September 1941 and is well known: "Hitler knows that he must win the mastery of the seas if he wants to win the mastery of the world. He knows that he must first tear down the bridge of ships which we are building over the Atlantic and over which we constantly transport the war material that will help, in the end, to destroy him and all his works. He has to destroy our patrols on the sea and in the air." I should like to say a few words about the view also expressed in Exhibit GB-191, namely, that the crews of enemy merchant ships were civilians and noncombatants. On Page 254 of the document book I have reproduced part of Document Doenitz-67, which I have already submitted. It is an excerpt from the confidential Admiralty Fleet Orders and deals with gunnery training for the civilian crews of merchant ships.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I only wish to refer to the first page of these orders which say that, as a general rule, there should be only one navy man at a gun, all the rest being taken from the crew of the ship. I read from the paragraph headed "Training," Section (d): "In addition to the gunlayer and the men specially trained for serving guns, five to seven men more-depending on the size of the gun-are needed to complete the gun crew and to bring ammunition from the magazine." This is followed by regulations for training in port and gunnery drill for the crews. The next document, re-numbered Doenitz-106, is a circular decree issued by the French Minister for the Merchant Marine on 11 November 1939. It deals with the creation of a special badge for men serving on merchant ships who are liable for military service. That is on Page 256. I should like to point out that this decree was signed by the head of the Military Cabinet, a rear admiral. The character of the order is demonstrated by the second to the last paragraph: "This armband may only be worn in France or in the French colonies. In no case may men issued the armband wear it in foreign waters." I come now to several documents dealing with the question of the rescue of survivors. These documents can be found in Document Books 1 and 2.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, do you not think it would be sufficient if you were to refer to these documents and give us the numbers without reading from them? They are all dealing, as you say, with rescue.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I believe I can do this with most of them. On Page 9 there is reproduced the Hague Convention regarding the application of the Geneva Convention to naval warfare. Page 10 is Document Doenitz-8, the order of 4 October 1939 concerning the sinking of armed merchantmen. It contains the order already read, namely, that rescues should be effected wherever possible without endangering their own ship. Doenitz-9, Page 12, gives examples of exaggerated rescue measures by German submarines which even let enemy ships pass without attack while so engaged. Doenitz-10 deals with the same subject and gives a further example. The collection of statements made by commanding officers in Doenitz-13 can be found on Pages 19 to 26. I should like to deal with it along with War Order 154, which is the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-196. These statements contain numerous examples, taken from all the war years, of rescue measures on the part of German submarines. One of these statements is supplemented by photographs- Page 21-which are included in the original. The facts stated in these statements are confirmed by Document Doenitz-14, Page 27, where there is a report on rescue measures in the war diary of a submarine; and at the end we find the sentence: "Taking British airmen on board is sanctioned." It is signed by the Commander of U-boats. The next document, Doenitz-15, is again an excerpt from the war diary, giving an example of rescue measures after a battle with a convoy on 21 October 1941. It is on Page 28. The next two documents concern the Laconia order. The Tribunal has permitted me to use Standing War Orders 511 and 513 in cross-examining Mohle. They deal with the capture of captains, chief engineers, and air crews. I submit them as Doenitz-24 and 25, and they can be found on Pages 46 and 47. I should like to point out that both orders explicitly state that capture should only be effected as far as is possible without endangering the boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Document Doenitz-24 explains that the British Admiralty, on their part, had issued orders to prevent the capture of British captains by German submarines. The next excerpt, on Page 48, cites an example showing that this British order was carried out and that a U-boat searched in vain among the lifeboats for the captain.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, could you inform the Tribunal what Paragraph 2 on Page 46 refers to and means?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The paragraph refers to Standing War Order Number 101, that is, the order specifying which neutral ships can be sunk. That is, of course, in the blockade area.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it mean that those officers have to be sunk with the ship, or what?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: No, Mr. President. That means that captains and ships' officers of neutral ships might be left in the lifeboats and need not be taken aboard the submarine from the lifeboats. The fact that it was actually much safer in the lifeboats than on the submarine is seen from the English order instructing captains to remain in the lifeboats and hide from the U-boats.
THE PRESIDENT: What if they do not have lifeboats?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I believe, Mr. President, that that case has not been ruled on here. I know of no case where a ship did not have lifeboats, especially in 1943, in which year the order originated. Every ship was provided not only with lifeboats but also with automatically inflating rafts. Figure 2 refers only to the question of capture of neutral captains. May I continue, please?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: A number of instances showing that captains were rescued after these orders were issued are quoted in the statements by commanders reproduced on Pages 22, 25, and 26, under Exhibit Number Doenitz-13. I now come to the case of Submarine U-386, which figures very largely in Korvettenkapitan Mohle's statement. The Tribunal will remember that this case was the decisive reason for the way in which Mohle interpreted the Laconia order. With reference to this case, I submit Exhibit Number Doenitz-26, the affidavit made by Captain Witt. I should like to read a few paragraphs from that.
THE PRESIDENT: What page?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: On Page 50, Mr. President. "In November 1943, in the course of my official duties as a member of the staff of Commander of U-boats, I had to interview Lieutenant Albrecht, commander of U-boat U-386, on his experiences during the action which had just terminated. Albrecht reported to me that in the latitude of Cape Finisterre he had sighted in daylight a rubber boat with shipwrecked British airmen in the Bay of Biscay. He did not take any steps to rescue them because he was on his way to a convoy in process of formation. He could only reach his position by continuing without a stop. Besides he was afraid..."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, is it necessary to go into the details of each particular case? I mean; they all depend upon their own particular circumstances. You need not read the documents very carefully. It is not necessary at this stage of the case.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Very well, Mr. President, I shall only report. The affidavit states briefly that the commander has been informed that he should have brought the airmen back. That is, in other words, the opposite of what Mohle has said in this courtroom. The correctness of Captain Wit's statements is confirmed by the next document, Doenitz-27, which is the U-boat's war log and contains the comments of the Commander of U-boats expressing disapproval of the fact that the Englishmen floating on the raft were not taken aboard. The fact that Admiral Doenitz' attitude toward rescues was not based on cruelty but on military expediency is shown by Page 53 of the following document, Doenitz-28. He is considering the rescue of our own personnel and comes to the conclusion that military considerations may forbid such a rescue. The following Document Doenitz-29 deals with the statement made by witness Heisig. It is on Page 54 and the following. It begins with an affidavit made by the Adjutant, Kapitanleutnant Fuhrmann, who describes the general ideas on which Admiral Doenitz' talks were based. At the end he stresses the fact that he was never, in connection with Admiral Doenitz' pronouncements, approached by young officers, who expressed any doubts as to the treatment of shipwrecked persons. On Page 56 there is a statement made by Lieutenant Kress, who was present at the same lecture as Heisig. He says that neither directly nor indirectly did Admiral Doenitz order the survivors to be killed. That is confirmed by Lieutenant Steinhoff's statement on Page 59. The considerations which weighed with the Naval Operations Staff at that time in the question of fighting the crews are illustrated by the following document, Doenitz-30, which is reproduced on Pages 60 and 61. Here again, no mention is made of the killing of survivors. It is the record of a conference with the Fuehrer on 28 September 1942, which was attended by Admiral Raeder and Admiral Doenitz. The Tribunal will remember Exhibit GB-200 which describes rescue ships as desirable targets.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The same document states that they have the significance of submarine traps. For that reason I have reproduced on Page 63 Standing War Order Number 173, dated 2 May 1940. That order states that, in accordance with instructions from the British Admiralty, U-boat traps are employed in convoys. Document Doenitz-34, on Page 67 of Document Book 2, shows that the treatment of rescue ships has nothing to do with the sanctity of hospital ships. It is the last of the Standing Orders referring to hospital ships and is dated 1 August 1944. It begins with the words, "Hospital ships must not be sunk." My next document, Doenitz-35, is meant to show that the Naval Operations Staff actually went beyond the provisions of international law in regard to the sanctity of hospital ships, for, as the entry of 17 July 1941 proves, the Soviet Government on its part rejected the hospital ship agreement, basing its action on violations of international law committed by Germany on land. According to Article 18 of the hospital ship agreement, this meant that the agreement was no longer binding on any of the signatories. In Document Doenitz-36, Pages 69 and following, I submit the only known instance of a U-boat commander's actually firing on means of rescue. This is the interrogation of Kapitanleutnant Eck, carried out on 21 November 1945 by order of this Tribunal. That was 10 days before he was shot. According to the wish of the Tribunal, I shall confine myself to a summary. After sinking the Greek steamer Peleus, Eck tried to sink the lifeboats and wreckage by means of gunfire. The reason he gave was that he wanted in this way to get rid of the debris and avoid being detected by enemy aircraft. He states that he had the Laconia order aboard, but that this order had no influence whatsoever upon his decision. In fact, he had not even thought of it. He had received his instructions from Mohle but had heard nothing about the killing of survivors which is alleged to have been desired; and he knew nothing about the instance of U-386.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: At the end of his examination, Eck states that he expected his action to be approved by Admiral Doenitz. A further reference was made in cross-examination yesterday to the question of whether Admiral Doenitz...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, we will adjourn now for a few minutes-only for a short time.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Very well. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal, as you know, was going to deal with the applications for documents and witnesses, but if you could finish your documents in a short time, they would like to go on with that and get them finished, if you can.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I believe that even at my present speed, I shall need about an hour. I should like to ask you, therefore, for permission to continue on Monday morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Kranzbuehler, if you think it will be as long as that, of course we must put it off to Monday morning, but the Tribunal does hope that you would not take anything like so long as that, because going in detail into these documents does not really help the Tribunal. They have all got to be gone into again in great detail, both in your speeches and in further consideration by the Tribunal.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I shad confine myself to making clear the connections, Mr. President, but in spite of that, I think it would be better if I did so on Monday morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, yes. Then the Tribunal will now deal with the applications. Yes, Sir David.