dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
COL. STOREY: You come down to the next square or the next state showing 136,421 were put in their coffins; and then in the next area, near Minsk and just above Minsk, there were 41,828 put in their coffins.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you sure they were put in their coffins, the 136,000?
COL. STOREY: I beg your pardon, Sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Are you sure that they were executed, the 136,000?-because there is no coffin there.
COL. STOREY: No, Sir-the bottom statement-here are the totals from the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: These photostatic copies are different from what you have got there. In the area which is marked 136,421 there is no coffin.
COL. STOREY: Well, I am sorry. The one that I have is a true and correct copy of theirs.
THE PRESIDENT: Mine has not got it and Mr. Biddle's has not got it. COL. STOREY [Turning to an assistant.] Will you hand this to the President, please?
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose the document itself will show it.
COL. STOREY: I will turn to the original and verify it. Let me have the original, please. Apparently there is a typographical error. If Your Honor pleases, here it is: 136,421, with the coffin.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Parker points out it is in the document itself, too.
COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, it is in the document itself. There is an error on that. The 128,000 at the bottom shows at that time there were 128,000 on hand, and the literal translation of the statement, as I understand, means, "still on hand in the Minsk area." I next refer to Document 1104-PS, Volume 2, Exhibit USA-483, which I now offer in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, did you tell us what the document was? There is nothing on the translation, is there, to show what the document is.
COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, it is a report of the special-purpose Group A, a top-secret report-or the Einsatz group in other words-making a record of their activities in these areas, and this chart was attached showing the areas covered.
THE PRESIDENT: Special group of the Gestapo?
COL. STOREY: The special group that was organized of the Gestapo and the SD in that area. In other words, a Commando group. As I mentioned, Your Honor, they organized these special Commando groups to work in and behind the armies, as they consolidated their gains in occupied territories, and Your Honor will hear from other reports of these Einsatz groups as we go along in this presentation. In other words, "Einsatz" means "special action" or "action groups," and they were organized to cover certain geographical areas behind the immediate front lines.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but they were groups, were they, of the Gestapo?
COL. STOREY: The Gestapo and the SD.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is part of the Gestapo.
COL. STOREY: There were some of the Kripo in it too. Now the next document is 1104-PS, dated October 30, 1941. This document shows on that date the Commissioner of the territory of Sluzk wrote a report to the Commissioner General of Minsk, in which he severely criticized the actions of the Einsatzkommandos of the Sipo and the SD operating in his area for the murder of the Jewish population of that area, and I quote from the English translation, on Page 4 of that document, beginning at the first paragraph after the colon: "On 27 October, in the morning at about 8 o'clock, a first lieutenant of the Police Battalion Number 11, from Kovno, Lithuania, appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant of the battalion commander of the Security Police. The first lieutenant explained that the police battalion had received the assignment to effect the liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk within 2 days. The battalion commander with his battalion in strength of four companies, two of which were made up of Lithuanian partisans, was on the march here and the action would have to begin instantly. I replied to the first lieutenant that I had to discuss the action in any case first with the commander. About half an hour later the police battalion arrived in Sluzk. Immediately after the arrival a conference with the battalion commander took place according to my request. I first explained to the commander that it would not very well be possible to effect the action without previous preparation, because everybody had been sent to work and that it would lead to terrible confusion. At least it would have been his duty to inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to postpone the action 1 day. However, he refused this with the remark that he had to carry out this action everywhere in all towns and that only 2 days were allotted for Sluzk. Within those 2 days the town of Sluzk had by all means to be cleared of Jews." That report was made to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories through Gauleiter Hinrich Lohse, at Riga.
COL. STOREY: Your Honors will recall that he was referred to in another presentation. Now skipping over to Page 5, the first paragraph-I would like to quote it: "For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must point out, to my deepest regret, that the latter almost bordered on sadism. The town itself during the action offered a picture of horror. With indescribable brutality on the part both of the German police officers and particularly of the Lithuanian partisans, the Jewish people, and also with them White Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard, and in different streets the corpses of Jews who had been shot accumulated. The White Ruthenians were in the greatest anguish to free themselves from the encirclement. In addition to the fact that the Jewish people, among whom were also artisans, were barbarously maltreated in sight of the White Ruthenian people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also beaten with clubs and rifle butts. It was no longer a question of an action against the Jews. It looked much more like a revolution." And then I skip down to the next to the last paragraph on that same page, quoting: "In conclusion, I find myself obliged to point out that the police battalion looted in an unheard-of manner during the action and that not only in Jewish houses but equally in those of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use, such as boots, leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, was taken away. According to statements of the troops, watches were torn off the arms of Jews openly on the street and rings pulled off their fingers in the most brutal manner. A disbursing officer reported that a Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately 5,000 rubles to have her father released.
COL. STOREY: This girl is said actually to have run about everywhere to obtain the money." There is another paragraph, with reference to the number of copies, on the third page of the translation, to which I would like to call Your Honors' attention-the last paragraph on Page 3 of the translation, quoting: "I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort. To have buried alive seriously wounded people, who then worked their way out of their graves again, is such extreme beastliness that this incident as such must be reported to the Fuehrer and the Reich Marshal. "The civil administration of White Ruthenia makes every effort to win the population over to Germany, in accordance with the instructions of the Fuehrer. These efforts cannot be brought into harmony with the methods described here."- Signed by the Commissioner General for White Ruthenia. And then, on the 11th of November 1941, he forwards it on to the Reich Minister for occupied countries, in Berlin.
THE PRESIDENT: Who was that at that time?
COL. STOREY: The Reich Minister, I believe-at that time at least-for the eastern occupied countries was the Defendant Rosenberg. I think that is correct. On the same date, by separate letter, the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia reported to the Reich Commissioner for the eastern countries that he had received money, valuables, and other objects taken by the police in the action at Sluzk and other regions, all of which had been deposited with the Reich Credit Institute for the disposal of the Reich Commissioner. On 21 November 1941 a report on the Sluzk incident was sent to the personal reviewer of the permanent deputy of the Minister of the Reich with a copy to Heydrich, who was the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. That is shown on the first page of Document Number 1104-PS. The activities of the Einsatz groups continued throughout 1943 and 1944 under Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD. Under adverse war conditions, however, the program of extermination was, to a large extent, changed to one of rounding up slave labor for Germany. I nest refer to Document 3012-PS, which has heretofore been introduced as Exhibit USA-190. This is a letter from the headquarters of one of the Commando groups, a section known as Einsatz Group C, dated 19 March 1943. This letter summarizes the real activities and methods of the Gestapo and SD, and I should like to refer to additional portions to those previously quoted, on Page 2 of Document 3012-PS; and I believe I will read the first page, beginning with the first paragraph: "It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security Service"-SD-"to discover all enemies of the Reich, and fight against them in the interest of security, especially the security of the Army in the zone of operations. Besides the annihilation of active, avowed opponents, all other elements who by virtue of their convictions or their past might under favorable conditions actively appear as enemies are to be eliminated through preventive measures.
COL. STOREY: The Security Police carries out this task according to the general directives of the Fuehrer, with all required severity. Energetic measures are especially necessary in territories endangered by the activity of partisan bands. The competence of the Security Police within the zone of operations is based on the 'Barbarossa' decrees."-The Tribunal will recall the famous "Barbarossa" code-name decrees that were issued in connection with the invasion of Russia-"I deem the measures of the Security Police, carried out on a considerable scale during recent times, necessary for the two following reasons: "1. The situation at the front in my sector had become so serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians and Italians who were streaming back in confusion, were openly opposing us. "2. The strong expeditions by partisan bands, coming chiefly from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides that, other partisan groups formed from the population were appearing like mushrooms in all districts. The procurement of arms evidently provided no difficulties at all. It would have been inexcusable if we had observed this whole activity without taking measures against it. It is obvious that all such measures are accompanied by severity. "I want to take up the significant points of these severe measures: "1) The shooting of Hungarian Jews; 2) the shooting of agriculturalists; 3) the shooting of children; 4) the burning to the ground of villages; 5)"-the shooting, quoting-`'while trying to escape, of Security Service (SD) prisoners. . "Chief of Einsatz Group C confirmed once more the suitability of the measures executed and expressed his appreciation for the drastic steps taken. In consideration of the current political situation, especially in the armament industry in the fatherland, the measures of the Security Police are to be subordinated to the greatest extent to the recruiting of labor for Germany.
COL. STOREY: In the shortest possible time the Ukraine has to place at the disposal of the armament industry 1 million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our territory daily." If Your Honor pleases, I believe the numbers have been quoted before by Mr. Dodd. I refer on the next page to the first order, in 1 and 2-Subparagraphs: "1. Special treatment is to be kept to a minimum. "2. The listing of communist functionaries, activists, and so on, is to take place only by roster for the time being, without arrests. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to arrest all the close relatives of a member of the Communist Party. Likewise members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested only if they were active in leading positions." The next subparagraphs have been read into evidence, 3 and 4, in a previous presentation. "5. The reporting of partisan bands as well as drives against them is not affected hereby. I point out, however, that all drives against those bands are to take place only with my approval. "6. The prisons are to be kept empty as a rule. We must be aware of the fact that the Slavs interpret all soft treatment on our part as weakness and that they will act accordingly, right away. If we restrict our harsh Security Police measures through the above orders for the time being, it is done only for the following reason: the most important thing is the recruiting of workers. No check of persons to be sent into the Reich will be made. There are therefore no written certificates of political reliability or the like to be furnished."-Signed-"Christensen, SS Sturmbannfuehrer and Commanding Officer." I understood that Your Honor wanted to adjourn at 4 o'clock, and I believe that I can introduce one more statement. It was the Einsatz Groups of the Security Police and SD that operated the infamous death vans. Previously, Document 501-PS, which was received as Exhibit USA-288, referred to this operation. The letter from Becker, which is a part of this exhibit, was addressed to Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff at Berlin. We now refer to Document L-185.
COL. STOREY: I simply refer to Document 501-PS as a reference to the death vans. Document L-185, Exhibit USA-484, is the one I now offer in evidence, Page 7 of the English translation-L-185. It will be observed that the chief of Amt II D of the RSHA in charge of technical matters was Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff. Mr. Harris advises me that the only point to be proved by that is that the chief of Amt II D of the RSHA, who made this report on technical matters, was the Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff; and then he refers in the same connection to Document 2348-PS, which is Exhibit USA-485. The previous one was to identify Rauff, and then to offer his affidavit which is 2348-PS, second volume. Reading from the beginning of the affidavit-it was made on 19 October 1945 in Ancona, Italy-quoting: "I hereby acknowledge the attached letter, written by Dr. Becker... on the 16 May 1942 and received by me on the 29 May 1942, as a genuine letter. I did on 18 October 1945 write on the side of this letter a statement to the effect that it was genuine. I do not know the number of death vans being operated and cannot give an approximate figure. The vans were built by the Saurer Works, Germany, located, I believe, in Berlin. Some other firms built these vans also. Insofar as I am aware, these vans operated only in Russia. Insofar as I can state, these vans were probably operating in 1941; and it is my personal opinion that they' were operating up to the termination of the war." If Your Honor pleases, I do not believe that we will have time to go into the next exhibit. THE PRESIDENT Very well Then the Tribunal will now adjourn until Wednesday, the 2d of January.
Judgement : The Invasion of Austria
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THE PRESIDENT: I will now ask M. Donnedieu de Vabres to continue the reading of the judgment.
THE INVASION OF AUSTRIA
M. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES:
The invasion of Austria was a pre-meditated aggressive step in furthering the plan to wage aggressive wars against other countries. As a result Germany's flank was protected, that of Czechoslovakia being greatly weakened. The first step had been taken in the seizure of " Lebensraum"; many new divisions of trained fighting men had been acquired; and with The seizure of foreign exchange reserves, the re-armament programme had been greatly strengthened.
On the 21st May, 1935, Hitler announced in the Reichstag that Germany did not intend either to attack Austria or to interfere in her internal affairs. On the 1st May, 1936, he publicly coupled Czechoslovakia with Austria in his avowal of peaceful intentions; and so late as the 11th July, 1936, he recognised by treaty the full sovereignty of Austria.
Austria was in fact seized by Germany in the month of March, 1938. For a number of years before that date, the National Socialists in Germany had been cooperating with ,the National Socialists of Austria with the ultimate object of incorporating Austria into the German Reich. The Putsch of July 25th, 1934, which resulted in the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss, had the seizure of Austria as its object; but the Putsch failed, with the consequence that the National Socialist Party was outlawed in Austria. On the 11th July, 1936, an agreement was entered into between the two countries, Article 1 of which stated:
" The German Government recognises the full sovereignty of the Federated State of Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements of the German Fuehrer and Chancellor of the 21st May, 1935."
Article 2 declared:
" Each of the two Governments regards the inner political order (including the question of Austrian National Socialism) obtaining in the other country as an internal affair of the other country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence."
THE INVASION OF AUSTRIA
of the 21st May, 1935." Article 2 declared: " Each of the two Governments regards the inner political order (including the question of Austrian National Socialism) obtaining in the other country as an internal affair of the other country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence."
The National Socialist movement in Austria however continued its illegal activities under cover of secrecy; and the National Socialists of Germany gave the Party active support. The resulting " incidents " were seized upon by the German National Socialists as an excuse for interfering in Austrian affairs. After the conference of the 5th November, 1937, these " incidents " rapidly multiplied. The relationship between the two countries steadily worsened, and finally the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg was persuaded by the defendant von Papen and others to seek a conference with Hitler, which took place at Berchtesgaden on the 12th February, 1938. The defendant Keitel was present at the conference, and Dr. Schuschnigg was threatened by Hitler with an immediate invasion of Austria. Schuschnigg finally agreed to grant a political amnesty to various Nazis convicted of crime, and to appoint the Nazi Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and Security with control of the Police. On the 9th March, 1938, in an attempt to preserve the independence of his country, Dr. Schuschnigg decided to hold a plebiscite on the question of Austrian independence, which was fixed for the 13th March, 1938. Hitler, two days later, sent an ultimatum to Schuschnigg that the plebiscite must be withdrawn. In the afternoon and evening of the 11th March, 1938, the defendant Goering made a series of demands upon the Austrian Government, each backed up by ,the threat of invasion. After Schuschnigg had agreed to the cancellation of the plebiscite, another demand was put forward that Schuschnigg must resign, and that the defendant Seyss-Inquart should be appointed Chancellor. In consequence, Schuschnigg resigned, and President Miklas, after at first refusing ,to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, gave way and appointed him.
THE INVASION OF AUSTRIA
to the cancellation of the plebiscite, another demand was put forward that Schuschnigg must resign, and that the defendant Seyss-Inquart should be appointed Chancellor. In consequence, Schuschnigg resigned, and President Miklas, after at first refusing ,to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, gave way and appointed him.
Meanwhile Hitler had given the final order for the German troops to cross the border at dawn an the 12th of March and instructed Seyss-Inquart to use formations of Austrian National Socialists to depose Miklas and to seize control of the Austrian Government. After the order to march had been given to the German troops, Goering telephoned the German Embassy in Vienna and dictated a telegram in which he wished Seyss-Inquart to send to Hitler to justify the military action which had already been ordered.
It was:
" The provisional Austrian Government, which, after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, considers its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible."
Keppler, an official of the German Embassy, replied:
" Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but everything is quiet."
After some further discussion, Goering stated:
" Please show him (Seyss-Inquart) the text of the telegram, and do tell him that we are asking him- well, he doesn't even have to send the telegram. All he needs to do is to say 'Agreed'."
Seyss-Inquart never sent the telegram; he never even telegraphed " Agreed."
It appears that as soon as he was appointed Chancellor, some time after 10 p.m., he called Keppler and told him to call up Hitler and transmit his protests against the occupation. This action outraged the defendant Goering, because "it would disturb the rest of the Fuehrer, who wanted to go to Austria the next day." At 11.15 p.m. an official in the Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin telephoned the German Embassy in Vienna and was told by Keppler: " Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees."
THE INVASION OF AUSTRIA
the defendant Goering, because "it would disturb the rest of the Fuehrer, who wanted to go to Austria the next day." At 11.15 p.m. an official in the Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin telephoned the German Embassy in Vienna and was told by Keppler: " Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees."
At daybreak on the 12th March, 1938, German troops marched into Austria, and met with no resistance. It was announced in the German press that Seyss-Inquart had been appointed the successor to Schuschnigg, and the telegram which Goering had suggested, but which was never sent, was quoted to show that Seyss-Inquart had requested the presence of German troops to prevent disorder. On the 13th March, 1938, a law was passed for the reunion of Austria in the German Reich. Seyss-Inquart demanded that President Miklas should sign this law, but he refused to do so, and resigned his office. He was succeeded by Seyss-Inquart, who signed the law in the name of Austria. This law was then adopted as a law of the Reich by a Reich Cabinet decree issued the same day, and signed by Hitler and the defendants Goering, Frick, von Ribbentrop and Hess.
It was contended before the Tribunal that the annexation of Austria was justified by the strong desire expressed in many quarters for the union of Austria and Germany; that there were many matters in common between the two peoples that made this union desirable; and that in the result the object was achieved without bloodshed.
These matters, even if true, are really immaterial for the facts plainly prove that the methods employed to achieve the object were those of an aggressor. The ultimate factor was the armed might of Germany ready to be used if any resistance was encountered. Moreover, none of these considerations appear from the Hossbach account of the meetings of the 5th November, 1937, to have been the motives which actuated Hitler; on the contrary, all the emphasis is there laid on the advantage to be gained by Germany in her military strength by the annexation of Austria.