dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SEYSS-INQUART: I assume so on the basis of the gold cover or the reserves of gold currency. In fact the gold cover was higher than the amount of notes issued. The Netherlands Bank had more gold and more gold currency, than it had notes issued.
M. DEBENEST: And what was the position at the time of the German capitulation?
SEYSS-INQUART: There were several thousand million Builders in paper money in circulation, and perhaps another 23 million in gold Builders.
M. DEBENEST: But, above alp Reichsmarks?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I said 23 million guilders in gold. The rest of the coverage might have been bills from the Reich.
M. DEBENEST: Was it not you who ordered the abolition of the "Currency Frontier"? Will you answer?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Were you absolutely in agreement with the necessity for abolishing these frontiers?
SEYSS-INQUART: The proposal originated in my office. I took it over. Mr. Trip protested. I sent it to Berlin. In Berlin the Reich Marshal decided in its favor. The Reich Minister Funk was against it; I carried out the proposal which I had made and which had been approved by the Reich Marshal.
M. DEBENEST: But personally you agreed with it?
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean exactly by the Currency Frontier that you are dealing with now? We merely want to understand what you are talking about.
M. DEBENEST: I mean the free circulation of German currency in Holland. [Turning to the defendant.] Did not Holland also have to pay large sums in the form of so-called voluntary contributions, among other things, for the war against Bolshevism?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe I have explained this matter quite clearly. The Reich demanded during a certain period of time, as direct occupation costs, 50 million marks for the defenses of Holland. In Holland we called this a "voluntary contribution" for obvious political reasons. In reality it was a demand of the Reich which would have had to be paid one way or another, and I would not lay it to the charge of any Dutchman that he paid this contribution voluntarily.
M. DEBENEST: You agreed to these measures, did you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: What were the economic and financial consequences of all these measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: The financial consequences were a greatly increased circulation of bank notes, and extremely large banking accounts which remained the same in the Reich as in all occupied countries. We applied one system in Holland, another in France, and in view of the collapse of the Reich, the financial consequences were the same. If Germany had not lost the war, Holland would have had a claim of more than 4,500 million guilders against a sovereign Germany.
M. DEBENEST: Good. Will you then look at Document 997-PS, which you had in your hands yesterday. I will read to you what you thought of these measures. It is Page 14 of the French text 12 June 41; and Page 12 of the German text. It is the big Seyss-Inquart report, RF-122, 997-PS. You write there-and I am reading from the sixth line: "This regulation goes far beyond all similar regulations which have been introduced so far with the national economics of neighboring countries, including the Protectorate." Page 12 of the German text, 14 of the French: "It actually represents the first step toward a currency union. In consideration of the significance of the agreement, which almost affects the independence of the Dutch State..." And then you add: "...it is of decisive importance that the president of the bank, Trip, who is very well known in western banking and financial circles, signed this agreement of his own free will in the above sense." That was your impression of these measures, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true, but I must admit today that the opinion I held at that time was wrong. Otherwise I would incriminate the bank president, Herr Trip, too deeply. What is written down here is not yet the situation as it existed later when the Currency Frontier was abolished. This was only the agreement between the two issuing banks concerning the unlimited acceptance of bank notes. I should also like to refer to the statements which I made about the qualities of Herr Trip. The fact that he gave his approval does, in my eyes, establish the admissibility under international law.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not state that it affected the independence of the occupied country?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was an exaggerated optimism in my presentation of the facts.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, the Tribunal will judge as to that. On the other hand, you contemplated the suppression of customs barriers?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not understand your question.
M. DEBENEST: You do not wait until you have had the translation. How can you expect to understand? I said: Did you not contemplate the suppression of the customs barriers?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Were there not in the Netherlands certain agencies which were charged with the looting of art objects?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot call it looting, but at any rate the administration and care of them, and so forth.
M. DEBENEST: That is your opinion. At any rate there were several agencies?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You are particularly well acquainted with the agency of Dr. Muhlmann?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Who called him to the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: I sent Muhlmann to the Netherlands ahead of me so that he could arrange for premises for my offices.
M. DEBENEST: But it was only to set up your of fines?
SEYSS-INQUART: At that time, only to set up the offices.
M. DEBENEST: But later?
SEYSS-INQUART: Muhlmann then left and some time after he returned as an agent of the Four Year Plan, for the safeguarding of works of art. It was similar to what took place in Poland.
M. DEBENEST: What do you understand by "safeguarding"?
SEYSS-INQUART: In point of fact-I do not want to talk a lot about it-but actually he had to determine whether there were any works of art in the confiscated fortunes and then he had the task of reporting these works of art to the various Reich offices.
M. DEBENEST: Only to report them?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, because the purchasing was taken care of by these various offices themselves. I assume-that is, I know- that he also dealt privately in works of art, as an intermediary.
M. DEBENEST: Did you also obtain some pictures for yourself through his mediation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Not for myself, but for the purposes that I described yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Yes. You also stated yesterday that you had placed in safekeeping a large number of works of art, particularly pictures. What was your purpose in doing this?
SEYSS-INQUART: Many works of art I secured only in the sense that when the decree about confiscation of enemy and Jewish property came out, they were secured and liquidated. I bought perhaps three or four pictures which, as I mentioned, were to be presented as gifts to the Museum of Art History in Vienna.
M. DEBENEST: No, no, I asked you for what purpose you placed these works of art in safety.
SEYSS-INQUART: The confiscation of Jewish and enemy property had, as its primary purpose, sequestration; but in time it became clear that these art treasures were being bought by the Reich. These three or four pictures I purchased with the immediate purpose of giving them to certain Reich institutions, the Museum of Art History in Vienna, for instance.
M. DEBENEST: But there was not only Jewish property there. SEYSS-INQUART: I said enemy property as well, but that was not enemy property in general, but only in cases where a specially hostile attitude towards the Reich was proved. Such property was confiscated also.
M. DEBENEST: Very welt That is what you wrote in a document which has already been submitted to the Tribunal, and which you certainly know. It is Document F-824, submitted under Number RF-1344. You know that document. It is a letter which came from you and is addressed to Dr. Lammers. This letter concerns the acquisition of pictures, which was done for the Fuehrer. In Paragraph 3 of this document, in the French text, you write as follows: "From the list which had been submitted to me I deduce that in this manner a comparatively large number of valuable pictures has been secured which the Fuehrer was able to acquire at prices which, according to investigations which I have made in the country, must be described as extraordinarily low." Then you add that Rembrandt's self-portrait had been found again, thanks to Muhlmann. Consequently, the placing in security of works of art was clearly a means of allowing the Reich authorities to take them into Germany; isn't that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: There is no doubt about that. Regarding the Rembrandt picture, I should only like to say that it had come into Holland illegally; and therefore it was confiscated.
M. DEBENEST: And it was taken to Germany by legal means? SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that in the case of the Rembrandt picture there was no question at all, because in this case a German regulation had been violated.
M. DEBENEST: In addition to paintings, you also procured for yourself a large number of works of art and diamonds, precious stones, and so on?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that.
M. DEBENEST: You know nothing about that, but do you know that you have a house in Vienna at Untergasse, Number 3?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that is Iglauer Strasse 15. However, that may be true, yes.
M. DEBENEST: Had you not deposited a certain number of works of art which had come from the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I will pass on to something else. Who ordered the confiscation of the property of the Royal House?
SEYSS-INQUART: I personally.
M. DEBENEST: Therefore you took the initiative in this matter?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, not only was I the instigator, but I decided to do that and I carried the decision through.
M. DEBENEST: So you only carried it through?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I also carried it through.
M. DEBENEST: I did not ask if you also carried it through. I asked quite clearly if you only executed this order?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I stated very clearly yesterday the reasons why I decided to confiscate the royal property. I also carried out the confiscation.
M. DEBENEST: You maintained that it was the result of a speech made by the Queen. Isn't that what you stated yesterday?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: I will show you Document F-828, which I submit under Number RF-1533. This document is a letter from Reichsleiter Martin Bormann to Reich Minister Dr. Lammers of 3 July 1941. At the beginning of the letter Bormann discusses the speech of the Queen of Holland; and in the last paragraph, which is the one which is important to me, he writes: "The Fuehrer has therefore given permission to confiscate the property of the Netherlands Royal House, for which the Reich Commissioner had already applied at an earlier date." Do you still maintain that it was because of the speech made by the Queen?
SEYSS-INQUART: I beg your pardon. There was a hitch in the sound apparatus.
M. DEBENEST: Yes, there was, but in any case you have the document in your hands.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I know what the question is here.
M. DEBENEST: Of course you know it.
SEYSS-INQUART: It had escaped my memory entirely, that I might have asked for that permission at an earlier date. I really cannot remember. Perhaps I discussed the question as to whether this property was to be confiscated or not, but the only thing I do remember is my suggestion at the time this speech was made. After all, that was not the first speech made by the Queen of the Netherlands. She had spoken in the same manner previously.
M. DEBENEST: That is an explanation, and the Tribunal will take note of it. Now, in regard to the looting of the Netherlands and the attempt to nazify and germanize that country-were these not the actions of the civil government of which you were the head?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes and no. It is quite obvious to me that from the economic point of view the Dutch people considered our conduct as looting. Seen from the legal point of view I do not think it was. I did not germanize the Netherlands in any way.
M. DEBENEST: Will you take Document 997-PS, Page 26 of the French text and Page 22 of the German text? I refer to the section of your report entitled "Remarks." Have you got it? I will read the remarks which you made concerning your own activities. That vitas on 18 July 1940: "2) The administration is at present sufficiently under the direction and control of the German authorities and will be increasingly so in the future. "3) The national economy and communications have been set in motion again and adapted to a state of war. Plans are on foot for large-scale reconversion geared to the continental economy, and practically everything is ripe for this changeover. Stocks in the country have been placed at the disposal of the Reich war economy. Nearly all the financial resources"- that is in 1940-"have been made available and placed under the control of the Reich, all this on the basis of extensive co-operation by the Netherlanders." Isn't that exactly what you wrote? Isn't that exactly what you thought?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, and I believe that any occupation power would fully understand Point 2, and Point 3 was a constructive conception of a new Europe.
M. DEBENEST: That is an opinion which the Tribunal will judge. I would like to return briefly to the Jewish question. You stated yesterday that you protested against the deportation of 1,000 Jews to Mauthausen or Buchenwald and that there had been no more deportations to these camps. But why did you not protest against the transports to Auschwitz? Did you think that this camp was Vera different from the other two?
SEYSS-INQUART: Naturally, because Mauthausen and Buchenwald were concentration camps, whereas I was informed the Auschwitz was an assembly camp in which the Jews were to remail until such time as the war would be decided or some other decision would be made.
M. DEBENEST: Before coming to the Netherlands you had beer adjutant to the Governor General of Poland?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not adjutant, but the deputy.
M. DEBENEST: All the better. Consequently you had heart about this camp, had you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: At that time Auschwitz did not even exist
M. DEBENEST: But did you not know that the ashes of thou 1,000 Jews who had been sent to Buchenwald or Mauthausen were sent back to their families against payment of 75 Builders? This happened in 1941. That did not prevent you later on from taking other measures against the Jews, measures which necessarily led to their being deported?
SEYSS-INQUART: Because to my thinking this measure, which was first of all called an evacuation, is something completely different from a deportation or removal to a concentration camp.
M. DEBENEST: But after all you knew the fate of these Jew who were transported to a camp in this manner?
SEYSS-INQUART: Most people, the great majority, did not know of this fate as it is known to us today; and I testified yesterday as to my misgivings.
M. DEBENEST: That is an opinion. You spoke yesterday of reprisals taken against the newspaper in The Hague...
THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing.] Is this something you cross examined about yesterday?
M. DEBENEST: These are questions which were handed to me this morning as a result of statements made yesterday by the defendant. Otherwise I have finished.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks you should not go over this matter again.
M. DEBENEST: Then I have finished, since all of the questions concern either hostages or- There is still one question which I would like to ask, if the Tribunal permit; it is a question about the flooding. All the other questions I had in mind concern hostages; and if the Tribunal so wishes, I will not ask them. However, may I be permitted to ask a question concerning the flooding?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you went over the flooding yesterday. I don't know.
M. DEBENEST: Then I have finished, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4:45 in order to sit in closed session.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have noticed that counsel for the Defendant Kaltenbrunner is here this morning. I understood there was to be some cross-examination of this defendant by counsel for Kaltenbrunner, and I thought we might save time if he preceded us and finished his cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President, I beg to apologize for having incurred the Tribunal's displeasure yesterday by not being here. But I had a very special reason, for circumstances are sometimes stronger than the will. If I may say this, I have been through a serious illness in the last few years and I did not feel well, although I firmly intended to be present at the session yesterday and had prepared everything. I respectfully beg to be excused.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Kauffmann, the Tribunal accepts your explanation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you very much. Witness, since when have you known the Defendant Kaltenbrunner?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was either 1935 or at the beginning of 1936 that I met Dr. Kaltenbrunner, in connection with the "Langot" relief work for National Socialist families who were in need. This was a form of support tolerated by the police.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What part did Kaltenbrunner play in Austria before the Anschluss in March of 1938? Did he belong to the radical elements or was he a moderate?
SEYSS-INQUART: At the time I was told that Kaltenbrunner was closely connected with the SS, but he was not the leader of the illegal SS. That was an engineer from Styria.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was it the engineer named Leopold?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. I spoke several times to Zernatto about Kaltenbrunner. We called him the "policeman of the 11th of July" in the Party; that is to say, it was due to his influence that radical elements were dissuaded from excesses, such as those of July 1934.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then Kaltenbrunner became an under state secretary in Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was the suggestion for his appointment as an under state secretary made by Austrian circles, or did it come from Himmler and Hitler or the Defendant Goering?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as I know, it was only made by Austrians. I myself did not receive or accept any suggestions from the Reich regarding my own Ministry. The Party in Austria drew my attention to Kaltenbrunner because we wanted also to have a man in the police organization.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What were his actual tasks as an under state secretary?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think that as an under state secretary he did nothing at all. After Skubl retired, the President nominated him state secretary. In that capacity he had administrative and economic functions. He could not intervene in the actual executive. For instance, if I wished a man to be released from custody, then Kaltenbrunner would have had to get in touch with the commander of the Security Police; and if he said "no," then we would have had to go to Heydrich. . DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, it has been established that in 1943 Kaltenbrunner was appointed head of the Reich Security Main Office. He has testified here that he repeatedly tried not to accept that post. Can you say anything about that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I only know that I was at headquarters at the end of November or the beginning of December, 1942. On that occasion I also visited the field headquarters of Himmler; and one of the adjutants, I think it was Wolff, told me that the Reichsfuehrer wanted to have Kaltenbrunner for the Reich Security Main Of lice and that Kaltenbrunner was reluctant to accept. He was now to be ordered to appear at field headquarters and remain there for 4 weeks, where he would be handled in such a way that he would take over the post.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you any proof that the actual reason for the appointment of Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Reich Security Main Office was that he was to organize and direct a political and military intelligence service?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know certain things which go to prove that he did not have control of Security Police matters to the same extent as Heydrich, and I had definite facts regarding his intelligence work. In Heydrich's time the commander of my Security Police, when he wished to get a decision from Berlin, only talked about Heydrich. When Kaltenbrunner came into office, I do not remember his mentioning Kaltenbrunner; but he talked about the Reich Security Main Office, and sometimes mentioned Muller. I myself, as far as I can remember, only discussed Security Police matters with Kaltenbrunner on two occasions. One was about Dr. Schuschnigg's further fate, and Dr. Kaltenbrunner has already told you about that. The second time was when a relative of mine was to be taken to a concentration camp. I went to Kaltenbrunner because he was the only man I knew in the RSHA and I assumed he had some say there. I knew nothing about the line drawn between the various functions. On that occasion Kaltenbrunner telephoned to Muter in a manner such as a superior would never adopt when talking to a subordinate official. I have positive proof of his activities, because since 1944 I worked closely with Kaltenbrunner in that respect. I placed at his disposal foreign currency for his foreign intelligence service, that is, I obtained it for him from the departments concerned; everything was done in conjunction with the appropriate department in the Reich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Just now you mentioned Muller. Do you mean Gestapo Chief Muller?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have the impression that this man really held the reins as far as Security Police matters were concerned ?
SEYSS-INQUART: I can only say that I know that in the course of that telephone conversation Kaltenbrunner said to Muller: "What will you decide in this case?"
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then you received military and political reports directly from Kaltenbrunner? Is that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, quite often. Those were the very secret reports of which only four copies were made, I believe.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was this the case before Kaltenbrunner's nomination?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. Kaltenbrunner only introduced these reports at the end of 1943 or 1944, if I remember rightly.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the difference between those reports and the reports formerly prepared by Canaris?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about the Canaris reports, or very little. I know them from the former Reich Security Main Of lice.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that the reports made by Kaltenbrunner were noted for their particularly sharp and open criticism of all public measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that too. Kaltenbrunner's reports were, above all, really objective; and not prepared reports serving certain ends. ,,
DR. KAUFFMANN: How big were these reports?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think these reports generally ran into 40 to 60 pages, sometimes more; and they probably were issued every three or four weeks, as far as I know; but there must have been special reports as welt