dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
M. DUBOST: It is after the 16th of September 1941. We do not have the exact date. The document is appended to another document, the date of which is illegible; but it is after Keitel's order since it gives an account of the executions of hostages, carried out in compliance with that order. It points out that after the execution of the hostages the culprits were found; that the effect was deplorable and aroused the resentment of some of the population. You will find also in this Document Number 1587-PS-but this time an extract from the monthly report of the Commander of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands-the report for the month of August 1942, a new warning to Keitel: "B. Special events and the political situation: "On the occasion of an attempt against a train of soldiers on furlough due to arrive in Rotterdam, a Dutch railway guard was seriously wounded by touching a wire connected with an explosive charge, thus causing an explosion. The following repressive measures were announced in the Dutch press: "The deadline for the arrest of the perpetrators, with collaboration of the population, is fixed at 14 August, midnight. A reward of 100,000 florins will be made for a denunciation, which will be treated confidentially. If the culprits are not arrested within the time appointed, arrests of hostages are threatened; railway lines will be guarded by Dutchmen. "Since, despite this summons, the perpetrator did not report and was not otherwise discovered, the following hostages, among whom some had already been in custody for several weeks as hostages, were shot on the order of the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer." I will pass over the enumeration of the names. I omit the next paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you read the names and the titles?
M. DUBOST: "Ruys, Willem, Director General, Rotterdam; Count E.O.G. Van Limburg-Stirum, Arnhem; M. Baelde, Robert, Doctor of Law, Rotterdam; Bennenkers, Christoffel, former Inspector General of the Police at Rotterdam; Baron Alexander Schimmelpennink Van der Oye, Noordgouwe (Seeland)." One paragraph further on: "Public opinion was particularly affected by the execution of these hostages. Reports at hand express the opinion that, from the beginning of the occupation, no stroke inflicted by the Germans was more deeply felt. Many anonymous letters, and even some signed ones, sent to the Commander of the Wehrmacht, who was considered as responsible for this ,unheard of event,' show the varied reactions of the mass of the Dutch people. From the bitterest insults to apparently pious petitions and prayers not to resort to extremes, no nuance was lacking which did not in one way or another indicate, to say the least, complete disapproval and misunderstanding, first of the threat, and secondly of the actual execution of the hostages. Reproaches for this most severe infraction. of law (which were based on serious argument and often gave rise to thought), and also cries of despair from idealists who, in spite of all that had occurred in the political sphere, had still believed in German-Dutch understanding but now saw all was at an end-all this was found in the correspondence. In addition, the objection was raised that such methods were only doing the work of the Communists, who as the real instigators of active sabotage must be very glad to couple with their achievements the pleasure of the elimination of such hostages. "In short, such disapproval even in the ranks of the very few really pro-German Dutch had never before been noticed, so much hatred at one time had never been felt."-signed-Schneider, Captain." Despite these warnings proffered by conscientious subordinates, neither the General Staff nor Keitel ever gave any order to the contrary. The order of 16 September 1941 always remained in force.
M. DUBOST: When I have shown you examples of executions of hostages in France, you will see that a number of facts which I shall utilize are dated 1942, 1943 and even 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] Afternoon Session
MARSHAL: If Your Honor please, the Defendants Kaltenbrunner and Streicher will continue to be absent during this afternoon's session.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dubost, the Tribunal had some difficulty this morning in following the documents that you were citing; and also, the Tribunal understands the interpreters had some difficulty because the document books, except the one that is before me, have no indications of the "PS" or other numbers; and the documents themselves are not numbered in order. Therefore it is extremely difficult for members of the Tribunal to find documents, and it is also extremely difficult for the interpreters to find any document which may be before them. So, this afternoon, it will be appreciated if you will be so kind as to indicate what the document is, and then give both the interpreters and the Tribunal enough time in which they may find the document, and then indicate exactly which part of the document you are going to read, that is to say, whether it is the beginning of the document, or the first paragraph, or the second, and so on. But you must bear with us if we find some difficulty in following you in the documents.
M. DUBOST: , Very well, Your Honor. I had finished this morning presenting the general rules which prevailed during the five years of occupation in the matter of the execution of numerous hostages in the occupied countries of the West. I brought you the evidence, by reading a series of official German documents, that the highest authorities of the Army, of the Party, and of the Nazi Government had deliberately chosen to practice a terroristic policy through the seizure of hostages. Before passing to the examination of a few particular cases, it seems to me to be necessary to say exactly wherein this policy consisted, in the light of the texts which I have quoted. According to the circumstances, people belonging by choice or ethnically to the vanquished nations were apprehended and held as a guarantee for. the maintenance of order in a given sector; or after a given incident of which the enemy army had been the victim. They were apprehended and held with a view to obtaining the execution by the vanquished population of acts determined by the occupying authority, such as denunciation, payment of collective fines, the handing over of perpetrators of assaults committed against the German Army, and the handing over of political adversaries; and these persons thus arrested were often massacred subsequently by way of reprisal. An idea emerges from methods of this kind, namely, that the hostage, who is a human being, becomes a special security subjected to seizure as determined by the enemy. How contrary this is to the rule of individual liberty and human dignity. All the members of the German Government are jointly responsible for this iniquitous concept and for its application in our vanquished countries. No member of the German Government can throw this responsibility on to subordinates by claiming that they merely executed clearly stated orders with an excess. of zeal.
M. DUBOST: I have shown you that upon many occasions, on the contrary, the persons who carried out the orders reported to the chiefs the moral consequences resulting from the application of the terroristic policy of hostages. And we know that in no case were contrary orders given. We know that the original orders were always maintained. I shall not endeavor to enumerate in their totality all the cases of executions of hostages. For our country, France, alone, there were 29,660 executed. This is proved in Document Number F-420, dated Paris, 21 December 1945, the original of which will be submitted under Exhibit Number EF-266 to your Tribunal. It is at the beginning of the document book, the second document. There in detail, region by region, the number is given of the hostages who were executed. "Region of: Lille, 1,143; Laon, 222; Rouen, 658; Angers, 863; Orleans, 501; Reims, 353; Dijon, 1,691; Poitiers, 82; Strasbourg, 211; Rennes, 974; Limoges, 2,863; Clermont-Ferrand, 441; Lyons, 3,674; Marseilles, 1,513; Montpellier, 785; Toulouse, 765; Bordeaux, 806; Nancy, 571; Metz, 220; Paris, 11,000; Nice, 324; total, 29,660." I shall limit my presentation to a few typical cases of executions which unveil the political plan of the General Staff which prescribed these executions-plans of terror, plans that were intended to create and accentuate the division between Frenchmen, or, more generally, between citizens of the occupied countries. You will find in your document book a file quoted as F-133, which I submit as Exhibit* Number RF-288. This is called "Posters Concerning Pans." At the head of the page you will read, Pariser Zeitung supplement. This document reproduces a few of the very numerous posters and bills, some of the numerous notices inserted in the a press from 1940 to 1945 announcing the arrest of hostages in Paris, in the Paris district, and in France. I shall read only one of these documents, which you will find on the second page, entitled Number 6, 19 September 1941.
M. DUBOST: You will see in it an appeal to informers, an appeal to traitors; you will see in it a means of corruption, which systematically applied to all the countries of the West for years; all tended to demoralize them to an equal extent: "Appeal to the population of occupied territories. "On 21 August a German soldier was fired on and killed by cowardly murderers. In consequence I ordered on 23 August that hostages be taken, and threatened to have a certain number of them' shot in case such an assault should be repeated. "New crimes have obliged me to put this threat into execution. In spite of this, new assaults have taken place. "I recognize that the great majority of the population is conscious of its duty, which is to help the authorities in their unremitting effort to maintain calm and order in the country in the interest of this population." And here is the appeal to informers: "But among you there are agents paid by powers hostile to Germany, Communist criminal elements who have only one aim, which is to sow discord between the occupying power and the French population. These elements are completely indifferent to the consequences, affecting the entire population, which result from their activity. "I will no longer allow the lives of German soldiers to be threatened by these murderers. I shall stop at no measure, however rigorous, in order to fulfill my duty. "But it is likewise my duty to make the whole population responsible for the fact that, up to the present, it has not yet been possible to lay hands on the cowardly murderers and to impose upon them the penalty which they deserve. "That is why I have found it necessary, first of all for Paris, to take measures which, unfortunately, will hinder the everyday life of the entire population. Frenchmen, it depends on you whether I am obliged to render these measures more severe or whether they can be suspended again. "I appeal to you all, to your administration and to your police, to co-operate by your extreme vigilance and your active personal intervention in the arrest of the guilty.
M. DUBOST: It is necessary, by anticipating and denouncing these criminal activities, to avoid the creation of a critical situation which would plunge the country into misfortune. "He who fires in ambush on German soldiers, who are doing only their duty here and who are safeguarding the maintenance of a normal life, is not a patriot but a cowardly assassin and the enemy of all decent people. "Frenchmen! I count on you to understand these measures which I am taking in your own interests also."-Signed "Von Stulpnagel." Numerous notices follow which all have to do with executions. Under Number 8 on the following page you will find a list of twelve names among which are three of the best known lawyers of the Paris Bar, who are characterized as militant Communists, Messrs. Pitard, Hajje and Rolnikas. In file 21 submitted by my colleague, M. Gerthoffer, in the course of his economic presentation, you will find a few notices which are similar, published in the German official journal VOBIF. You will observe, in connection with this notice of 16 September announcing the execution or rather, the murder, of M. Pitard and his companions, that the murderers had neither the courage nor the honesty to say that they were all Parisian lawyers. Was it by mistake? I think that it was a calculated lie, for at this time it was necessary to handle the elite gently. The occupying power still hoped to separate them from the people of France. I shall describe to you in detail two cases which spread grief in the hearts of the French in the course of the month of October 1941 and which have remained present in the memory of all my compatriots. They are known as the "executions of Chateaubriant and of Bordeaux." They are related in Document Number F-415 in your document book, Which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-285. After the attack on two German officers at Nantes on 20 October 1941 and in Bordeaux a few days later, the German Army decided to make an example. You will find, on Page 22 of Document Number F-415, a copy of the notice in the newspaper Le Phare of 21 October 1941.
M. DUBOST: "Notice. Cowardly criminals in the pay of England and of Moscow killed, with shots in the back, the Feldkommandant of Nantes on the morning of 20 October 1941. Up to now the assassins have not been arrested. "As expiation for this crime I have ordered that 50 hostages be shot to begin with. Because of the gravity -of the crime, 50 more hostages will be shot in case the guilty should not be arrested between now and 23 October 1941 by midnight." The conditions under which these reprisals were exercised are worth describing in detail. Stulpnagel, who was commanding the German troops in France, ordered the Minister of the Interior to designate prisoners. These prisoners were to be selected among the Communists Who were considered the most dangerous (these are the terms of Stulpnagel's order). A list of 60 Frenchmen was furnished by the Minister of the Interior. This was Pucheu. He has since been tried by my compatriots, sentenced to death, and executed. The Subprefect of Chateaubriant sent a letter to the Kommandantur of Chateaubriant in reply to the order which he received from the Minister of the Interior: "Following our conversation of today, I have the honor of confirming to you that the Minister of the Interior has communicated today with General Von Stulpnagel in order to designate to him the most dangerous Communist prisoners among those who are now held at Chateaubriant. You will find enclosed herewith the list of 60 individuals who have been handed over this day." On the following page is the German order: "Because of the assassination of the Feldkommandant of Nantes, Lieutenant Colonel Hotz, on 20 October 1941, the following Frenchmen, who were already imprisoned as hostages in accordance with my publication of 22 August 1941 and of my ordinance to the Plenipotentiary General of the French Government of 19 September 1941, are to be shot." In the following pages you will find a list, of all the men who were shot on that day. I leave out the reading of the list in order not to lengthen the proceedings unduly.
M. DUBOST: On Page 16 you will find a list of 48 names. On Page 13 you will find the list of those who were shot in Nantes. On Page 12 you will find the list of those who were shot in Chateaubriant. Their bodies were distributed for burial to all the surrounding communes. I shall read to you the testimony of eyewitnesses as to how they were buried after having been shot. On Page 3 of this document you will find the note of M. Dumenil concerning the executions of 21 October 1941, which was written the day after these executions. The second paragraph reads: "The priest was called at 11:30 to the prison of La Fayette. An officer, probably of the GFP, told him that he was to announce to certain prisoners that they were going to be shot. The priest was then locked up in a room with the 13 hostages who were at the prison. The other three, who were at les Rochettes, were ministered to by Abbe Theon, professor at the College Stanislas. "The Abbe Fontaine said to the condemned, 'Gentlemen, you must understand, alas, what my presence means.' He then spoke with the prisoners collectively and individually for the two hours which the officers had said would be granted to arrange the personal affairs of the condemned and to write their last messages to their families. "The execution had been fixed for 2 o'clock in the afternoon, half an hour having been allowed for the journey. But the two hours went by, another hour passed, and still another hour before the condemned were sent for. Certain of them, optimists by nature, like M. Fourny, already hoped that a countermanding order would be given, in which the priest himself did not at all believe. "The condemned were all very brave. It was two of the youngest, Gloux and Grolleau, who were students, who constantly encouraged the others, saying that it was better to die in this way than to perish uselessly in an accident. "At the moment of leaving, the priest, for reasons which were not explained to him, was not authorized to accompany the hostages to the place of execution. He went down the stairs of the prison with them as far as the car.
M. DUBOST: They were chained together in twos. The thirteenth had on handcuffs. Once they were in the truck, Gloux and Grolleau made another gesture of farewell to him, smiling and waving their hands that were chained together. "Signed: Dumenil, Counsellor attached to the Cabinet." Sixteen were shot in Nantes. Twenty-seven were shot in Chateaubriant Five were shot outside the department. For those who were shot in Chateaubriant. we know what their last moments were like. The Abbe Moyon, who was present, wrote on 22 October 1941 the account of this execution. This is the third paragraph, Page 17 of your document: "It was on a beautiful autumn day. The temperature was particularly mild. There had been lovely sunshine since morning. Everyone in town was going about his usual business. There was great animation in the town for it was Wednesday, which was market day. The population knew from the newspapers and from the information it had received from Nantes that a superior officer had been killed in a street in Nantes but refused to believe that such savage and extensive reprisals would be applied. At Choisel Camp the German authorities had, for some days, put into special quarters a certain number of men who were to serve as hostages in case of special difficulties. It was from among these men that those who were to be shot on this evening of 22 October 1941 were chosen. "The Cure of Bere was finishing his lunch when M. Moreau Chief of Choisel Camp presented himself. In a few words the latter explained to him the object of his visit. Having been delegated by M. Lecornu, the subprefect of Chateaubriant. he had come to inform him that 27 men selected among the political prisoners of Choisel were going to be executed that afternoon; and he asked Monsieur Le Cure to go immediately to attend them. The priest said he was ready to accomplish this mission, and he went to the prisoners without delay. "When the priest appeared to carry out his mission, the subprefect was already among the condemned.
M. DUBOST: He came to announce the horrible fate which was awaiting them, asking them to write letters of farewell to their families without delay. It was under these circumstances that the priest presented himself at the entrance to the quarters." You will find on Page 19 the "departure for the execution," Paragraph 4: "Suddenly there was the sound of automobile engines. The door, which I had shut at the beginning so that we might be more private, was abruptly opened and French constables carrying handcuffs appeared. A German officer arrived. He was actually a chaplain. He said to me, 'Monsieur le Cure, your mission has been accomplished and you must withdraw immediately."' At the bottom of the page, the last paragraph: "Access to the quarry where the execution took place was absolutely forbidden to all Frenchmen. I only know that the condemned were executed in three groups of nine men, that all the men who were shot refused to have their eyes bound, that young Mocquet fainted and fell, and that the last cry which sprang from the lips of these heroes was an ardent 'Vive la France." On Page 21 of the same document you will find the declaration of Police Officer Roussel. It is also worth reading: "The 22 October 1941 at about 3:30 in the afternoon, I happened to be in the Rue du 11 Novembre at Chateaubriant and I saw coming from Choisel Camp four or five German trucks, I cannot say exactly how many, preceded by an automobile in which was a German officer. Several civilians with handcuffs were in the trucks and were singing patriotic songs, the 'Marseillaise,' the 'Chant du Depart,' and so forth. One of the trucks was filled with armed German soldiers. "I learned subsequently that these were hostages who had just been fetched from Choisel Camp to be taken to the quarry of Sabliere on the Soudan Road to be shot- in reprisal for the murder at Nantes of the German Colonel Hotz. "About two hours later these same trucks came back from the quarry and drove into the court of the Chateaubriant.
M. DUBOST: where the bodies of the men who had been shot were deposited in a cellar until coffins could be made. "Conning back from the quarry the trucks were covered and no noise was heard, but a trickle of blood escaped from them and left a trail on the road from the quarry to the castle. "The following day, on the 23rd of October, the bodies of the men who had been shot were put into coffins without any French persons being present, the entrances to the chateau having been guarded by German sentinels. The dead were then taken to nine different cemeteries in the surrounding communes, that is, three coffins to each commune. The Germans were careful to choose communes where there was no regular transport service, presumably to avoid the population going en masse to the graves of these martyrs. "I was not present at the departure of the hostages from the camp nor at the shooting in the quarry of Sabliere, as the approaches to it were guarded by German soldiers armed with machine guns." Almost at the same time, in addition to these 48 hostages who were shot, there were others-those of Bordeaux. You win find in your document book, under Document Number F-400, documents which have been sent to us by the Prefecture of the Gironde, which we submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-286. One of them comes from the Bordeaux Section of Political Affairs, and is dated 22 October 1941, Document F-400(b). "In the course of the conference, which took place last night at the Feldkommandantur of Bordeaux, the German authorities asked me to proceed immediately to arrest 100 individuals known for their sympathy with the Communist Party or the Gaullist movement, who will be considered as hostages, and to make a great number of house searches. "These operations have been in process since this morning. So far no interesting result has been called to my attention.