dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States): "When labor is being regrouped, it is important-and with specialists even essential-that the workers are retrained for their work in the new factory, in order to avoid setbacks in the initial months of the war. After a few months have passed even the replacement of most of the specialists must be possible." I pass to the Point V: "The Plenipotentiary General for Economy, Reich Minister of Economy Funk, stated his opinion on the fluctuations of the schedule of manpower, from the viewpoint of the carrying on of industry. "24. a. In accordance with the verbal agreements made with the OKW, the regulations regarding indispensable personnel have been laid down and the certificates of indispensability issued." I shall pass to Point Number 25 on Page 15: "In reply to the request by the speaker that when withdrawing workers for the naval dockyards, more consideration should be shown for the important sections of industry, particularly export and newspaper concerns, the President pointed out the necessity of carrying out the naval building program as ordered by the Fuehrer in full." I pass to the large heading VI: "The Plenipotentiary General for Administration, Reich Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick, dealt with the saving of labor in the public administration. "27. The task is primarily a problem of organization. As can be seen from the surveys, which were submitted to those attending the conference, showing how the authorities, economic and social services are organized, there are approximately 50 different kinds of officials in the district administration, each quite independent of the other-an impossible state of affairs. Formerly there were in the State two main divisions, the state civil service and the Wehrmacht. After the seizure of power, the Party and the permanent organizations (Reichsnahrstand, et cetera) were added to these, with all their machinery from top to bottom. In this way the number of public posts and officials was increased many times over. This makes public service more difficult. "28.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States): Since the war tasks have increased enormously."-The context makes it clear that that is the preceding war.-"The organizing of total war naturally requires much more labor, even in the public administration, than in 1914. But it is an impossibility that this system should have increased its numbers 20 to 40 fold in the lowest grade alone. For this reason, the Reich Ministry of the Interior is striving for uniformity of administration." A small conference-small commission was created. I offer Number 29 in connection with Goering's testimony that they ceased to function: "Instead of further discussions before the whole assembly, the forming of a small commission which will make definite proposals is recommended. Extensive preparatory work has been undertaken." And a note by the committee that the committee had been functioning. Point 30: "The President requested that the commission's proposals be submitted. It was an important section for the preparation for war." I shall pass to the large subdivision C which relates to increasing the efficiency of the communications service, starting with the receipt of a report from the Army General Staff. "31. Eighteen months ago the result of the examination of the plan for strategic concentration showed that the transport service could not meet all the demands made on it by the Armed Forces. The Minister of Transport confirmed this statement. The 1938 part of the Four Year Plan will presumably be completed in August 1939. "32. Shortly after this program was drawn up demands were made on the Wehrmacht which had changed completely compared with the traditional use of the Wehrmacht at the beginning of a war. Troops had to be brought to the frontier, in the shortest possible time, in numbers which had until then been completely unforeseen. The Wehrmacht was able to fulfill these demands by means of organizational measures but transport could not. "33.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States): In the field of transportation Germany is at the moment not yet ready for war." I offer the detail which follows, in contradiction of the statements repeatedly made by a number of witnesses that the movements of the Wehrmacht in the Rhineland, the Anschluss, and all the rest of it, even Czechoslovakia, were surprise movements. "a. In the case of the three operations in 1938/1939 there was no question of an actual strategic concentration. The troops were transported a long time beforehand near to the area of strategic concentration by means of camouflaged measures. "b. This stop-gap is of no use whatever when the time limit cannot be fixed or is not known a long time beforehand, but when an unexpected and almost immediate military decision is required. According to the present situation transport is not in a position, despite all preparations, to bring up the troops." "a" is unimportant for my purposes, "a" on Page 18. "b" and "c" represent steps to be taken to meet the deficiency. On Page 19 I shad not bother to read the statements on 38,~ showing the preparation of highways from east to west and from north to south. I read Number 39, if I may: "The President remarked that even in peacetime certain vital supply stores of industry and the Armed Forces are to be transferred to the war industrial centers to economize in transport later on." I shall pass to Point Number 41 on Page 20: "To sum up, the President affirmed that all essential points had been cleared up at this meeting." The American branch of the Prosecution has some additional documents which Mr. Dodd will submit, if it is agreeable to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. [A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you have got some other papers to put in?
MR. DODD: I would like to offer, Mr. President, Document 4006-PS, which is the bulletin of the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition; and it is a matter that the Tribunal, in our judgment, may take judicial notice of. It is an official publication, but it will be quite helpful in connection with the labor program as between Sauckel and Speer; and it is offered for that purpose, to clear up some of the doubts that may have arisen after the Speer and Sauckel testimony. I think there is no necessity to read it at all but simply to offer it. And it would become Exhibit USA-902. And then I would like to offer Document 1452-PS. This is a report of a conference of the chiefs with the chief of the department of the Economic Armament Office, and I would just like to read a short excerpt from it. It is Document 1452-PS, dated the 24th of March 1942. It says: "Conferences of the chiefs with the chief of the department. Report of the chief of the department on the conference on the 23d of March with Milch, Witzell, Leeb, in Minister Speer's office. The Fuehrer looks upon Speer as his principal mouthpiece, his trusted adviser in all economic spheres. Speer is the only one who has something to say today. He can interfere in any department. He already disregards all other departments." The remainder of the document we do not wish to quote, I do not think it is necessary because the text is not changed any by what we have quoted from it. That becomes Exhibit USA-903. Now, we also have here some photographs, Mr. President; and these are offered with respect to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. They were turned over to us by our colleagues of the French Prosecution. And the first one is Document F-894, which becomes Exhibit USA-904. That is a picture showing Himmler congratulating someone, Kaltenbrunner immediately to his rear.
THE PRESIDENT: How are they identified?
MR. DODD: I will submit it-well, these are all captured documents, of course, but-you mean in the picture, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I mean by capture or any other way. Where do they come from?
MR. DODD: Well, I assume them to be all captured documents. Oh, I see now-there are affidavits attached to each one which explain their source. Here, this first one is a man by the name of Francois Boix, who says that he is a photographer and was interned at Mauthausen and so on; and he attests that this photograph was taken, and so forth. I think that is sufficient-I assume it is-to identify the picture. I believe that each one of them has a similar statement. Now the next one is Document F-896, which becomes Exhibit USA-905. And this as well on the back of the original bears an affidavit by Francois Boix. The next one is Document F-897, which becomes Exhibit USA-906. And this as well, bears the affidavit of Francois Boix and shows Kaltenbrunner and Himmler and other SS officials. And then, lastly, Document F-895, which becomes Exhibit USA-907; and this picture we particularly call to the Tribunal's attention. It, as well, bears the certificate of Francois Boix. Kaltenbrunner is there in the second row, Himmler and Hitler in the immediate center between Kaltenbrunner and, apparently, Martin Bormann, taken at a concentration camp, which appears from the picture of the inmates on the left side. Then we wish to offer a very short affidavit, which is Document 4033-PS and we offer as Exhibit USA-907-no, 8, 908. It is the deposition of Oswald Pohl, P-o-h-l, dated the 28th of May 1946. The affidavit-the substance of the affidavit reads as follows: "I can say with absolute certainty that while on official business at Mauthausen I saw and spoke to SS Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner . . ."
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Was Pohl called as a witness?
MR. DODD: No, Sir, he was not, he was not called. That was Puhl, P-u-h-l. The names are similar. ". . . I saw and spoke to SS Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner there at the officers' mess on the right-hand side of the camp entrance either in the autumn of 1943 or the spring of 1944. I took lunch with him there at the mess table." And then another affidavit, Document 4032-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-908-no, 909. I think it is unnecessary to read this; it has been translated. It is the deposition of one Karl Reif, R-e-i-f, in which he states that he saw Kaltenbrunner either in May or June, about midday, in 1942 in the camp at Mauthausen. That is an we have to offer, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the other members of the Prosecution wish to offer any other evidence? [There was no response.] Then now we can pass to evidence to be called on behalf of Bormann. Dr. Bergold, will you call the witnesses you wish to call- Kempka.
DR. BERGOLD: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I shall call the witness Kempka. [The witness Kempka took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
ERICH KEMPKA (Witness): My name is Erich Kempka.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, in what capacity were you employed near Hitler during the war?
KEMPKA: During the war I worked for Adolf Hitler as his personal driver.
DR. BERGOLD: Did you meet Martin Bormann in that capacity?
KEMPKA: Yes, I met Martin-Reichsleiter Martin Bormann in this capacity at that time as my indirect superior.
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, on what day did you see the Defendant Martin Bormann for the last time?
KEMPKA: I saw the Reichsleiter, the former Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, on the night of 1-2 May 1945 near the Friedrichstrasse railroad station, at the Weidendammer Bridge. Reichsleiter Bormann-former Reichsleiter Bormann-asked me what the general situation was at the Friedrichstrasse station, and I told him that there at the station it was hardly possible...
THE PRESIDENT: You are going too fast. He asked you what?
KEMPKA: He asked me what the situation was and whether one could get through there at the Friedrichstrasse station. I told him that was practically impossible, since the defensive fighting there was too heavy. Then he went on to ask whether it might be possible to do so with armored cars. I told him that there was nothing like trying it. Then a few tanks and a few SPW (armored personnel carrier) cars came along, and small groups boarded them and hung on. Then the armored cars pushed their way through the antitank trap and afterwards the leading tank-along about at the middle of the tank on the left-hand side, where Martin Bormann was walking- suddenly received a direct hit, I imagine from a bazooka fired from a window, and this tank was blown up. A flash of fire suddenly shot up on the very side where Bormann was walking and I saw. ..
THE PRESIDENT: You are going too fast. You are still going much too fast. The last thing I heard you say was that Bormann was walking in the middle of the column. Is that right?
KEMPKA: Yes, at the middle of the tank, on the left-hand side. Then, after it had got 40 to 50 meters past the antitank trap, this tank received a direct hit, I imagine from a bazooka fired from a window. The tank was blown to pieces right there where Martin- Reichsleiter Bormann-was walking. I myself was flung aside by the explosion and by a person thrown against me who had been walking in front of me-I think it was Standartenfuehrer Dr. Stumpfecker-and I became unconscious. When I came to myself I could not see anything either; I was blinded by the flash. Then I crawled back again to the tank trap, and since then I have seen nothing more of Martin Bormann.
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, did you see Martin Bormann collapse in the flash of fire when it occurred?
KEMPKA: Yes, indeed, I still saw a movement which was a sort of collapsing. You might call it a flying away.
DR. BERGOLD: Was this explosion so strong that according to your observation Martin Bormann must have lost his life by it?
KEMPKA: Yes, I assume for certain that the force of the explosion was such that he lost his life.
DR. BERGOLD: How was Martin Bormann dressed at that time?
KEMPKA: Martin Bormann was wearing a leather coat, an SS leader's cap, and the insignia of an SS Obergruppenfuehrer.
DR. BERGOLD: Do you therefore believe that if he had been found wounded on that occasion he would have been immediately identified, by this clothing, as being one of the leading men of the Movement?
KEMPKA: Yes, indeed.
DR. BERGOLD: You said that another man was walking either beside or ahead of Martin Bormann, namely a Herr Naumann of the Propaganda Ministry?
KEMPKA: Yes, it was the former State Secretary, Dr. Naumann.
DR. BERGOLD: Was he approximately at the same distance from the explosion?
KEMPKA: No, he was about 1 or 2 meters ahead of Martin Bormann.
DR. BERGOLD: Have you seen anything of this State Secretary Naumann subsequently?
KEMPKA: No, I have not seen him again either, nor Standartenfuehrer Dr. Stumpfecker.
DR. BERGOLD: Then you crawled back, did you not?
KEMPKA: Yes.
DR. BERGOLD: And nobody else followed you?
KEMPKA: Certainly. Always, when you passed this antitank trap, you would run into defensive fire; a few only would remain lying on the spot while the rest always retreated. But those on that tank I have never seen again.
DR. BERGOLD: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I have no further questions for this witness.
MR. DODD: I have no questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Defense Counsel want to ask him any questions? [There was no response.] [Turning to the witness.] How many tanks were there in this column?
KEMPKA: That I cannot say at the moment-possibly two or three. There may have been four, but there were more SPW cars, armored personnel carriers.
THE PRESIDENT: How many were there of them? 449~
KEMPKA: More and more came up, and then some of them drove away again. They tried to break through at that point. Possibly one or two tried. The others withdrew after the tank was blown up.
THE PRESIDENT: Where did the column start from?
KEMPKA: That I do not know. They came quite suddenly- there they were, I assume that they were tanks which had withdrawn into the middle of the town and were also trying to break out in a southerly direction.
THE PRESIDENT: When you say they were there suddenly, where do you mean they were? Where did they pick you up?
KEMPKA: I was not picked up. I left the Reich Chancellery.. .
THE PRESIDENT: Well, where did they join you? Where did you first see them?
KEMPKA: At the Weidendammer Bridge, behind the Friedrichstrasse station. They turned up there during the night.
THE PRESIDENT: Where was it that Bormann first asked you whether it would be possible to get through?
KEMPKA: That was at the tank barrier behind the Friedrichstrasse station at the Weidendammer Bridge.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that you met him in the street?
KEMPKA: Yes. Martin Bormann was not present when we left the Reich Chancellery; he did not appear at the bridge until between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning.
THE PRESIDENT: You met him there just by chance, do you mean?
KEMPKA: I only met him by chance, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Was there anybody with him?
KEMPKA: State Secretary Dr. Naumann from the Ministry of Propaganda was with him, as wed as Dr. Stumpfecker who had been the last doctor who was with the Fuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: How far were they from the Reich Chancellery?
KEMPKA: That is-are-up to-from the Reich Chancellery to the Friedrichstrasse station is approximately a quarter of an hour's walk under normal circumstances.
THE PRESIDENT: And then you saw some tanks and some other armored vehicles coming along, is that right?
KEMPKA: Yes, yes indeed.
THE PRESIDENT: German tanks and German armored vehicles?
KEMPKA: Yes, German armored cars.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you have any conversation with the drivers of them?
KEMPKA: No, I did not talk to the drivers. I think State Secretary-former State Secretary Dr. Naumann did.
THE PRESIDENT: And then you did not get into the tanks or the armored vehicles?
KEMPKA: No, we did not get in-neither State Secretary Dr. Naumann nor Reichsleiter Bormann.
THE PRESIDENT: You just walked along?
KEMPKA: I just walked along, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And where were you with reference to Bormann?
KEMPKA: I was behind the tank, about the left-hand side behind the tank.
THE PRESIDENT: How far from Bormann?
KEMPKA: It was perhaps 3 or 4 meters.
THE PRESIDENT: And then some missile struck the tank, is that right?
KEMPKA: No, I believe the tank was hit by a bazooka fired from a window.
THE PRESIDENT: And then you saw a flash and you became unconscious?
KEMPKA: Yes, I suddenly saw a flash of fire and in the fraction of a second I also saw Reichsleiter Bormann and State Secretary Naumann both make a movement as if collapsing and flying away. I myself was thrown aside with them at that same moment and subsequently lost consciousness.
THE PRESIDENT: And then you crept away?
KEMPKA: When I recovered I could not see anything and then I crawled away and crawled until I bumped my head against the tank barrier.
THE PRESIDENT: Where did you go to that night?
KEMPKA: I waited there for a while, and then I said farewell to my drivers, some of whom were still there; and then I stayed in the ruins of Berlin, and on the following day I left Berlin.
THE PRESIDENT: Where were you captured?
KEMPKA: I was captured at Berchtesgaden.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How near were you to the tank when it exploded? .
KEMPKA: I estimate 3 to 4 meters.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And how near was Bormann to the tank when it exploded?
KEMPKA: I assume that he was holding on to it with one hand.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you say you assume it. Did you see him or did you not see him?
KEMPKA: I did not see him on the tank itself. But to keep pace with the tank I had done the same thing and had held on to the tank at the back.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you see Bormann trying to get on the tank just before the explosion?
KEMPKA: No, I did not see that. I did not see any effort on Bormann's part which indicated that he wanted to climb onto the tank.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How long before the explosion were you looking at Bormann?
KEMPKA: All this happened in a very brief period. When I was still talking to Bormann the tanks turned up and we passed the tank trap right away and after 30 or 40 meters the tank was hit.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What do you call a brief period?
KEMPKA: Well, while we were talking, that was perhaps a few minutes only.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And how long between the conversation and the explosion? ,
KEMPKA: I cannot tell you the exact time, but surely it was not a quarter of an hour, or perhaps rather not half an hour.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Had you been in the Chancellery just before this?
KEMPKA: I left the Reich Chancellery in the evening about 9 o'clock.
THE TRIBUNAL (or. Biddle): Have you ever told this story to anyone else?
KEMPKA: I have been interrogated several times on this subject and have already made the same statement.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And who took your interrogation, some officers?
KEMPKA: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of what army, what nations?
KEMPKA: I have been interrogated by various officers of the American Army, the first time at Berchtesgaden, the second time at Freising, and the third time at Oberursel.
MR. DODD: As a result of the Court's inquiry there are one or two questions that occur to me that I think perhaps should be brought out which I would like to ask the witness, if I may.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
MR. DODD: You were with Bormann, were you, at 9 o'clock in the bunker in the Reich Chancellery on that night?
KEMPKA: Yes, indeed. I saw him for the last time about 9 o'clock in the evening. When I said farewell to Dr. Goebbels, I also saw Martin Bormann down in the cellar; and then I saw him again during the night about 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning.
MR. DODD: Well, maybe you said so, but I did not get it if you did. Where did you see him at 2 or 3 in the morning prior to the time that you started to walk with him along with the tank?
KEMPKA: Before that I saw him at the Friedrichstrasse station between 2 or 3 in the morning, and before that I saw him for the last time at 21 hours in the Reich Chancellery on the preceding evening.
MR. DODD: Well I know you did. But did not you and Bormann have any conversation about how you would get out of Berlin when you left the Reich Chancellery bunker at about 9 o'clock that night?
KEMPKA: I took my orders from the former Brigadefuehrer Milunke. I was not receiving direct orders from Reichsleiter Bormann any more.
MR. DODD: I did not ask you if you got an order from him. I asked if you and Bormann had not-and whoever else was there- had not discussed how you would get out of Berlin. It was 9 o'clock at night and the situation was getting pretty desperate. Did you not talk about how you would get out that night? There were not many of you there.
KEMPKA: Oh yes, there were about 400 to 500 people in all still in the Reich Chancellery and those 400 or 500 people were divided into separate groups, and these groups left the Chancellery one by one.
MR. DODD: I know there may have been that many in the Chancellery. I am talking about that bunker that you were in. You testified about this before, have you not? You told people that you knew that Hitler was dead as well as Bormann. And you must have been in the bunker if you know that.
KEMPKA: Yes, I have already testified to that effect.
MR. DODD: Well, what I want to find out is whether or not you and Bormann and whoever was left in that bunker talked about leaving Berlin that night before you left the bunker?