dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
PAULUS: The economic exploitation of the country, so that by utilizing its resources one could bring the war in the West to a close and also to guarantee future supremacy in Europe.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did the nature of the exploitation differ from the economic exploitation applied inside Germany?
PAULUS: In that respect I have no personal impressions, since l only led that army in Russia for three-quarters of a year; and I was captured early, in January 1943.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What did you know of the directives issued by Government organizations in Germany and by the Supreme Command, concerning the treatment of the Soviet population by the Army?
PAULUS: I remember that instructions did appear, but I cannot recollect the date at the moment. In those instructions definite rules were given for the manner of conducting the war in the East. I believe that this principal decree was included in that so-called Green Folder, but there may have been separate and special orders to the effect that no particular consideration should be shown the population.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What do you mean by "not to show particular consideration"-or perhaps the translation is not quite correct?
PAULUS: That meant that only military necessities should be considered a basis for all measures that were taken.
THE PRESIDENT: Were there any divisions under your command consisting entirely of SS troops?
PAULUS: During the time I led the Army I had no SS troops at all under my command, as I remember. Even in the cauldron at Stalingrad, where I had 20 German infantry, armored, and motorized divisions, and two Romanian divisions, there were no SS units.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the SA did not form units, did they? The SA?
PAULUS: I have never heard of SA units, but the existence of SS units is a known fact.
THE PRESIDENT: And did you have any branches of the Gestapo attached to your army?
PAULUS: No, I did not have those either.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, I did ask you whether you had any questions to ask, and you said no, I take it.
GEN.RUDENKO: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. [The witness left the stand, and Gen. Zorya approached the lectern.]
THE PRESIDENT: Please, go on, General.
GEN. ZORYA: Yesterday, I stopped at the questions connected with the relations between the fascist conspirators and the Romanian aggressors. It seems to me that now is the most opportune moment to read into the Record the testimony of Ion Antonescu, which the Soviet Prosecution has at its disposal. The interrogation of Ion Antonescu was conducted in conformance with the laws of the Soviet Union and I present to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-153 (Document Number USSR153) the record of his deposition, which is of exceptional importance in making clear the characteristics of the relationship between Germany and her satellites. I consider it necessary to read the greater part of these depositions, beginning with the second paragraph on Page 1 of the record. It corresponds to Pages 63 and 64 of the document book. I quote: "Throughout the entire period during which I held office in Romania"-testifies Ion Antonescu-"I followed the policy of strengthening the alliance with Germany and resorted to her help for retraining and rearming the Romanian army. For this purpose I had several meetings with Hitler. The first meeting with Hitler took place in November 1940, soon after I became the head of the Romanian State. This meeting took place on my initiative, in Berlin, at Hitler's official residence, in the presence of the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, and Hitler's personal interpreter, Schmidt. The conversation with Hitler lasted over 4 hours. "I assured Hitler that Romania remained true to the previously concluded agreement regarding Romania's adherence to the Tripartite Pact . "In reply to my assurances of loyalty to the pact with Germany, Hitler declared that the German soldiers would guarantee the frontiers of Romania. "At the same time, Hitler told me that the Vienna arbitration should not be considered as final and thus gave me to understand that Romania could count on a revision of the decision previously taken in Vienna, on the question of Transylvania.
GEN. ZORYA: "Hitler and I agreed that the German Military Mission in Romania should continue its work of reconstructing the Romanian Army on German lines. "In the same way I also concluded an economic agreement, in accordance with which the Germans would at a later date supply Romania with Messerschmidts 109, tanks, tractors, antiaircraft and antitank guns, automatic rifles, and other armaments, while they, in return, would receive from Romania wheat and oil for the needs of the German armies. "To the question put to me as to whether this, my first conversation with Hitler, could be regarded as the beginning of my agreement with the Germans concerning the preparations for war against the Soviet Union-I replied in the affirmative. There is no doubt that Hitler had this fact in mind, when he elaborated his plans for the attack on the Soviet Union. "In January 1941, through the offices of the German Minister in Romania, Fabricius, I was invited to Germany and had my second meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. The following persons were present: Ribbentrop, Fabricius, and the newly appointed German Minister to Bucharest, Killinger. Besides these, Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl were also present as representing the German Armed Forces. "At the beginning of the conversation Hitler introduced Killinger to me, emphasizing that the latter was one of his closest friends. After this, Hitler described the military situation in the Balkans and declared that Mussolini had appealed to him for help in connection with the Italian failures in the war against Greece, and that he, Hitler, intended to give this help to Italy. "While on this subject Hitler asked me to allow the German troops concentrated on Hungarian territory to pass through Romania, so that they could render speedy assistance to the Italians. "Knowing that the passage of German troops through Romania to the Balkans would constitute an unfriendly act towards the Soviet Union, I asked Hitler what, in his opinion, would be the subsequent reaction of the Soviet Government.
GEN. ZORYA: "Hitler reminded me that at our first meeting, in November 1940, he had already given appropriate guarantees to Romania and had taken upon himself the obligation of protecting Romania by force of arms. "I expressed my fears that the passage of German troops through Romania might serve as a pretext for military operations on the part of the Soviet Union, and that Romania would then be in a difficult position since the Romanian Army had not been mobilized. "Hitler announced that he would give orders for some of the German troops intended for participation in the operations against Greece to be left in Romania. Hitler also stressed that, according to the information at his disposal, the Soviet Union did not intend to fight either Germany or Romania. "Satisfied with Hitler's declaration, I agreed to the passage of German troops through Romanian territory. "General Jodl, who was present at this conference, described to me the strategic situation of the German Army and stressed the necessity for an attack against Greece launched from Bulgaria. "My third meeting with Hitler took place in Munich in May 1941. "At this meeting at which, in addition to ourselves, there were present Ribbentrop and Hitler's personal interpreter, Schmidt, we reached a final agreement with regard to a joint attack on the Soviet Union. "Hitler informed me that he had decided on an armed attack on the Soviet Union. 'Once we have prepared this attack,' said Hitler, 'we must carry it out without warning, along the entire extent of the Soviet frontier, from the Black to the Baltic Seas.' "The unexpectedness of the military attack-Hitler went on to say-would in a short time give Germany and Romania a chance to liquidate one of our most dangerous adversaries. "As a result of his military plans, Hitler suggested the use of Romanian territory for concentrations of German troops, and, at the same time, he requested me to participate directly in the attack on the Soviet Union.
GEN. ZORYA: "Hitler stressed the point that Romania must not remain outside this war, for, if she wished to have Bessarabia and North Bukovina returned to her, she had no other alternative but to fight on Germany's side. At the same time he pointed out that, in return for our assistance in the war, Romania would be allowed to occupy and administer other Soviet territories, right up to the River Dnieper. "Since Hitler's offer to initiate a joint campaign against the U.S.S.R. corresponded to my own aggressive intentions, I announced my agreement to participate in the attack on the Soviet Union and pledged myself to prepare the necessary number of Romanian troops and, at the same time, to increase deliveries of the oil and food required by the German armies. "Before Hitler and I took the decision to attack Russia, I asked Hitler whether he had any understanding with Hungary regarding her participation in the war. "Hitler replied that the Hungarians had already given their consent to participate in the war against the U.S.S.R. in alliance with Germany. When, exactly, the Germans had agreed on this joint attack with the Hungarians, Hitler did not specify. "On my return from Munich to Bucharest I began active preparations for the coming campaign." Antonescu concludes his testimony in the following manner-I refer to Page 67 in the document book, the last paragraph of the testimony. "After the Romanian troops under my supreme command had invaded the Soviet territory Hitler sent me a letter in which he expressed his gratitude to me and to the Romanian army for the assistance given. "Signed, Marshal Antonescu." The date of the beginning of Romanian preparations for war against the U.S.S.R. can be established from the depositions furnished by the former Vice Minister, Mihai Antonescu, who was also interrogated by the Soviet authorities upon the request of the Soviet Prosecution: I now submit his testimony as Exhibit Number USSR-152 (Document Number USSR-152).
GEN. ZORYA: I shall not quote these depositions in detail since their greater part is a repetition of some of the facts described already in the testimony of Ion Antonescu. I shall only refer to a few paragraphs. I would refer you to Page 1 of the testimony which is translated into Russian, Paragraphs 1, 2, and 5. This corresponds to Page 68 of the document book: "In November 1940 Marshal Antonescu, accompanied by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince Studza, left for Germany, where he had a meeting with Hitler. "During the negotiations with Hitler, Marshal Antonescu signed the agreement for Romania's adherence to the Tripartite Pact and received Hitler's promise for the later revision, in favor of Romania, of the decisions of the Vienna Arbitration Treaty. "The first journey of Marshal Antonescu was the initial step of a policy which subsequently led to a joint German and Romanian attack on the Soviet Union." Your Honors, the evidence of the witness, Paulus, as well as the testimonies of Ion Antonescu and Mihai Antonescu, which have just been submitted to the Tribunal, justify the Soviet Prosecution in making the following statement: 1. The decision to send to Romania a military mission of the German General Staff for the reorganization of the Romanian Army, in order to prepare for and subsequently to attack the U.S.S.R., was taken no later than September 1940, that is, no less than 9 months prior to the attack on the U.S.S.R. 2. In November of the same year, Romanian war preparations had been fully developed.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break off. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.] To
GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, at a further stage in my statement I had intended presenting to the Tribunal a statement of General Buschenhagen, general of the former German Army. I do not, however, intend to do so now, since the Soviet Prosecution has the possibility of examining this witness in court during the session. I, on my part, request your permission to have this witness brought to the court for examination.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish to call him now?
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, that would be convenient, in view of several technical reasons, and would facilitate the task of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. [The witness, Buschenhagen, took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
ERICH BUSCHENHAGEN (Witness): Erich Buschenhagen.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: "I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing." [The witness repeated the oath in German.]
GEN. ZORYA: Witness, will you tell the Tribunal when and where you were born?
BUSCHENHAGEN: I was born on 8 December 1895 in Strasbourg, in Alsace.
GEN. ZORYA: Will you name your last military rank, please.
BUSCHENHAGEN: I was general in the infantry in the German Army. My last position was that of Commanding General of the 52d Army Corps.
GEN. ZORYA: Will you tell us please, did you on 26 December 1945 appeal to us with a statement in connection with the Helsinki trials?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you confirm this statement now?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes, I do.
GEN. ZORYA: Will you please tell us what you know about the preparations made by fascist Germany for attacking the Soviet Union?
BUSCHENHAGEN: At the end of December 1940, in my position as Chief of the General Staff of the German forces in Norway, I was called to the OKH, where the then Chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst Halder, had a conference with the chiefs of general staffs of the army groups and of the independent armies, one of which was mine. At this conference we were informed of the OKW's Directive Number 21, the Plan Barbarossa, which was issued on 18 December 1940. We were given in lectures the basic reasons for the intended operations against Soviet Russia. From this directive I learned that troops of my army also would take part in this operation. Therefore, I was especially interested in one speech made by the Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, who was then also with the OKH. He spoke at that time about the military actions in the winter war between Finland and the Soviet Union. He drew a picture of the methods of warfare and the fighting value of the Soviet Army and also of the Finnish troops. General Heinrichs also had conferences with Generaloberst Halder at that time, in which I did not take part myself, but I assume that they were concerned with possible co-operation between the Finnish and German troops in case of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union. There existed since the fall of 1940 a military cooperation between Germany and Finland, and the German Air Force had made arrangements with the Finnish General Staff for through traffic from northern Norway to the Finnish harbors in the transport of men and material. As the result of conferences, which the German military attaché had held in Helsinki by order of the OKW, this through traffic was extended in the winter of 1940 to a general through traffic of the German Wehrmacht from northern Norway to the Finnish Baltic seaports. In order to carry out this traffic, a German Army administration center was set up in the main city of Lapland, Rovanjemi, and a German army transport unit was transferred to the Arctic Strait of Rovanjemi and Petsamo-Rovanjemi.
BUSCHENHAGEN: Furthermore, offices for supply were installed along this Arctic Sea route and along the railroad which led from Rovanjemi to ports on the Finnish south coast. In December to January 1940-41, I had, with the OKW, discussions about details of the participation of troops from Norway together with Finnish troops in attacks against the Soviet Union.
GEN. ZORYA: Didn't you also have conferences with the Finnish General Staff about joint operations against the Soviet Union?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes, I did.
GEN. ZORYA: Tell us, who instructed you to negotiate with the Finnish Government and what course did these negotiations follow?
BUSCHENHAGEN: I had orders and authorizations from the OKW, which was the immediate superior of myself and my army. In February 1941 I received-after the basic facts had been cleared in regard to the participation of the troops from Norway based in Finland-I received the order to travel to Helsinki and to get in touch there, personally, with the Finnish General Staff and to discuss with them these operations from middle and northern Finland. On 18 February 1941 I reached Helsinki and on the 2 following days, I had conferences with the Finnish Chief of General Staff, General Heinrichs, his deputy, General Airo, and the Chief of the Operations Detachment of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola. In these conferences we discussed the possibilities for operations from middle and northern Finland, especially from the area around Kuusamo and Rovanjemi; also from the area of Petsamo. These conferences led to an agreement of the different opinions. After these conferences I travelled, together with the Chief of the Operation Detachment of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola, to middle and northern Finland in order to study the area of Urinsalmo-Kuusamo, the area east of Rovanjami-Petsamo, the terrain, the possibilities for deployment and billeting, and for operations from that sector. For these reconnaissance trips the local Finnish commanders were present. The trip ended on 28 February in Torneo, on the Finnish-Swedish border. In a final conference it was determined that an operation from the area of Kuusamo and Helsinki and an operation from the area east of Rovanjemi in the direction of Basikamo would prove successful; that, on the other hand, the operations from Petsamo towards Rovanjemi would have considerable difficulty with the terrain. That was the end of my first series of conferences with the Finnish General Staff. As a result of these discussions there was worked out by the German High Command of Norway a plan of operations for an operation from the Finnish areas. The operational study was presented to the OKW and found its approval.
BUSCHENHAGEN: It then received through the High Command of Norway the name of "Blauluchs." In May, that is, on 24 May, I met the Finnish Chief of Staff Heinrichs, who had been invited to the Fuehrer's headquarters at Brandenburg and flew with him to Munich, where I had with him and his chief of the Operational Department of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola, a discussion in preparation for another conference at Salzburg. On the 25th there was at Salzburg a conference between the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl on the one side, and on the other, Lieutenant General Heinrichs and Colonel Tapola, at which the basic plans for co-operation between German and Finnish troops were laid down. After this conference I travelled, together with General Heinrichs, to Berlin. There we had further conferences at the Economic Armament Office of the OKW, as to the delivery of material to the Finnish Army. There were also conferences with the General Staff of the Air Force concerning joint questions of the air war and the reinforcement of the Finnish Air Force with materiel. General Heinrichs, after these discussions, also had a meeting with Generaloberst Halder, in which I did not participate. For the third time I met the Finnish General Staff on 2 June. In my statement of 26 December I said that this conference took place at the end of April or the beginning of May; that was a mistake. As a matter of fact, it took place on 2 June.
BUSCHENHAGEN: At these conferences, which again took place between General Heinrichs, General Halder, and Colonel Tapola, the details of this collaboration were worked out, such as the timetable, the schedule, measures of secrecy as to the Finnish mobilization; there it was decided that the Finnish mobilization should first take the form of reinforcement of the border patrols, and then the form of further enlistments for the military training of reservists and reserve officers; a decision was also reached about the deployment and formation of German-Finnish forces in such a way that the main Finnish forces, under the command of Field Marshal Mannerheim in the south, should operate together with the German Army Group North, coming from East Prussia, in the direction of Leningrad and also towards the east of Lake Ladoga. The other Finnish forces were to be under the command of Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst north of the Rivers Ulo and Ulojoki. For this army of Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst there were three directions of attack; a southern group from the area of Kuusamo through Kerskienski against the Murmansk railroad; the middle group east of Rovanjemi through Salla Kandalaksha and finally, a northern group starting from around Petsamo against Murmansk. There was complete agreement on all these questions and also there were details discussed about exchange of information, about the use of Finnish means of transportation and by representatives of the Air Force about joint questions of air warfare and about the use of Finnish airports by the German Air Force. After these discussions I returned to Germany in order to work out their results and put them into action on behalf of Germany. Then again, on 12 or 13 July I flew to Helsinki for the purpose of conferring with Lieutenant General Erfurt, who was the German liaison officer with the Finnish Armed Forces. We met General Heinrichs at Helsinki and gave him a memorandum on the points which we had agreed upon in previous conferences.
BUSCHENHAGEN: He agreed to these points, except for a minor details Then I turned over my duties as liaison officer with the Finnish General Staff to Lieutenant General Erfurt, to take up my activities as Chief of General Staff of the German Army in Lapland.
GEN. ZORYA: I should like to ask you a last question. If it is not too difficult for you, will you please indicate what was the exact character of these preparations of the OKW and the Finnish General Staff7 More especially, at the planning of these operations was the necessity of defense taken into consideration?
BUSCHENHAGEN: All agreements between the OKW and the Finnish General Staff had as their sole purpose from the very beginning the participation of the Finnish Army and the German troops on Finnish territory in the aggressive war against the Soviet Union. There was no doubt about that. If the Finnish General Staff, to the outside world, always pointed out that all these measures had only the character of defense measures, that was just camouflage. There was-from the very beginning-no doubt among the Finnish General Staff that all these preparations would serve only in the attack against the Soviet Union, for all the preparations that we made pointed in that same direction, namely, the plans for mobilization; above all, the objectives for the attack. Nobody ever reckoned with the possibility of a Russian attack on Finland. Since, for cogent military reasons, the operations for attack from Finnish territory could start only 8 to 10 days after the beginning of the attack against Russia, certain security measures were taken during and after the attack, but the whole formation and lining-up of the troops was for offensive and not defensive purposes. I believe you can see sufficiently from that the aggressive character of all these preparations.
GET. ZORYA: I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the French prosecutor wish to ask any questions?
FRENCH PROSECUTOR: No questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the United States Prosecution wish to ask any questions?
UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do defendants' counsel wish to cross-examine?