dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. JAHRREISS: They had declared that they were ill-treated by enraged members of the population, threatened with death, and probably would have been killed if German soldiers had not released them and taken them under their protection.' "Bormann further pointed out to the Fuehrer in a few words that this confirmed that soldiers in such cases intervene against the population. "b) Hitler turned angrily to me and said excitedly: " 'I have already issued one order that bomber crews which bail out are not to be protected against the population. These people only murder German women and children. It is unheard of that German soldiers should take measures to protect them against our own population, which is acting on motives of justifiable hate. Why are my orders not carried out?' "Surprised by this attack I replied something like this: " 'I know nothing about any such order; and it would in any case be a practical impossibility.' "Hitler turned to me and said very loudly and sharply: " 'The reason why my orders are not carried out is only the cowardice of the Air Force, because the gentlemen of the Air Force are cowards, and are afraid that something might happen to them too. The whole thing is nothing more than a cowardly pact between the Air Force and the British and American airmen.' "Hitler then turned also to Kaltenbrunner, who happened to be present in the background, and went on, addressing him but sometimes not looking at him: " 'I hereby order that all bomber crews who bailed out in the last few months, as well as all bomber crews bailing out in future, are to be turned over immediately by the Air Force to the SD, and are to be liquidated by the SD. Anyone failing to carry out my orders, or taking action against the population, is liable to the death penalty and is to be shot.' "Hitler then further expressed in general terms his indignation and his views on the matter. The assembled officers gave the impression of general surprise and disapproval.
DR. JAHRREISS: "c) After the situation discussion with the Fuehrer I requested an interview with Kaltenbrunner in the side passageway. Essential points: "Koller: 'It is impossible to carry out those orders. The Air Force will have nothing more to do with them, nor I myself in any way whatsoever-and I can say as much for the Reich Marshal. It is entirely out of the question that the Air Force will agree to this in any way, shape, or form.' "Kaltenbrunner: 'The Fuehrer has completely mistaken ideas. The duties of the SD are also constantly misunderstood. Those things are no concern of the SD. Moreover, no German soldier does what the Fuehrer demands. That is not in the German soldier's line. He does not kill prisoners. If individual fanatical Party followers of Herr Bormann try to do so, the German soldier intervenes. The Fuehrer has a completely false idea of the views held by our soldiers. Moreover, I myself will do nothing in the matter either. I have no intention of doing anything. We must just take care that we get out of it again, otherwise we will be the first to get shot. We must gain time. I am again leaving Berlin at once for a fairly long time anyway.' "Koller: 'Then we are agreed on the main point. Your leaving Berlin is favorable. But we must have another way out as far as the Fuehrer is concerned, for it is possible that he may again refer to his order tomorrow. Later on if it becomes extreme, we will have to see how we can put a stop to the business, or what is going to happen to us?' "The following was decided at my suggestion: "No order along the lines decreed by the Fuehrer will be issued by the Air Force or the SD. "Surrenders to the SD-none. "In case the Fuehrer should refer to his order again, then, first of all, prevent further action through explanations of the following kind: All members of air crews previously captured, not in the hands of the Air Force but dispersed under the control of the Replacement Army Commander (BdE). Time of capture not known to a central office.
DR. JAHRREISS: Therefore a lengthy and difficult process to determine the number of air personnel captured during the last few months. "Also, preparations must be made in detail for getting them out without attracting attention. The newly captured crews go automatically to interrogation centers. These are in process of transfer owing to operations. Communications are bad. "Detailed discussions and agreements with the SD necessary. In order to preserve the appearance of discussion, the I-c officer of the High Command of the Air Force (I-c of OKL) should go to a delegate of Kaltenbrunner who, however, would first have to be appointed. "d) After the situation discussion with the Fuehrer, I spoke to Field Marshal Keitel at the entrance of the air-raid shelter, and said: " 'The Fuehrer's order is insane.'-Keitel affirmed, 'It certainly is'-'The Air Force must keep its escutcheon clean. The order cannot be carried out. I am convinced that the Reich Marshal is entirely of my opinion. To issue such an order-and verbally-and moreover with such threats of punishment. He must sign an order of this kind with his own name. It may or may not be carried out-but not by the Air Force. Nor by the SD, either; I have spoken to Kaltenbrunner.' "Field Marshal Keitel: 'He will not sign such orders then, and everything is always placed on the shoulders of the OKW. But I'll be damned if I issue such an order.' "Koller: 'The Air Force cannot join in this in any circumstances. We will not assume such a responsibility.' "Field Marshal Keitel: 'You are right; neither can I. I must think over what I can do about it, and how I can do it.' "The conversation was interrupted because Keitel was called to the telephone. Keitel was very indignant and annoyed about the Fuehrer's order. "e) After refreshments in a side room of the air-raid shelter, I had to cross the antechamber of the conference room again to reach the cloakroom and exit. Hitler happened to come out of the room to give an order to an orderly, and he called me as I was passing.
DR. JAHRREISS: The door leading to the conference room was open, and Ley was sitting at the table. Hitler said to me: " 'I must come back to my order once more. You must all help me, for matters cannot go on like this any longer. The Air Force-or at least defense of the Reich-has failed. What am I to do against the frightful bombing terror which is murdering German women and children?' "Koller: 'The Air Defense and our crews do what they can and what is humanly possible. Our neglect of air armament and the enemy's present technical and numerical superiority cannot be eliminated or remedied overnight. When the searchlight units get stronger, the air situation over Germany will be more in our favor.' "Hitler: 'I cannot wait for that. I can no longer be responsible to the German people for the continuation of this situation in the air. If those fliers realize that they will be liquidated as terrorists, they will think twice about flying here.' "Koller: 'That will certainly not improve the situation in the air. On the contrary, it will make it worse.' "Hitler: 'No; the Japanese method is the best.' "Hitler's manner was now calm again, in comparison with what it had been at the situation discussion. He appeared more approachable. Experience had shown that it was better to tank to him alone than in the presence of others. I thought it was a good opportunity to attack the whole problem and stated: " 'If I may state my point of view, I think that this will not do. Measures of this kind are in such crass opposition to the education, feelings, and way of thinking of all soldiers, that they cannot be carried out. One cannot train soldiers on the regulations governing warfare and decent conduct, and then order actions which are repulsive to everyone. You must not forget, my Fuehrer, that enemy airmen also carry out orders, and do their duty just as ours do. If they are shot down or make forced landings, they are defenseless and unarmed prisoners. What would the world think of us? And the first thing the enemy would do would be to treat our air crews in the same way.
DR. JAHRREISS: That is something for which we cannot answer to our men and their relatives. All their willingness to serve and their discipline would collapse at one blow.' "Up to that point the Fuehrer had not interrupted me. After his first glance at me he looked away again and seemed to be lost in thought. He had been Listening, however, and at that point he interrupted me and said quietly and earnestly: "'So the Air Force is afraid after all. That is all very well. But I am responsible for the protection of the German people and have no other means except this.' "Hitler turned away, and went back into the conference room. "I) my arrival at the Air Force headquarters (Kurfurst) I told Colonel Von Brauchitsch what had happened, and ordered him to report it to the Reich Marshal as soon as possible. I myself could not contact the Reich Marshal at the moment. During our conversation Brauchitsch also expressed disapproval of the Fuehrer's order. "g) An hour or two later the Reich Marshal called me, and began with the following words, 'Tell me, has he gone quite mad now?' "It was quite clear who was meant. I myself reported the principal happenings and the conversation with Kaltenbrunner to the Reich Marshal again, and added: " 'I will not carry out this order or anything connected with it. I will endeavor to handle the situation so as to gain time now, in any case, and will do everything in my power to protect any of us from disastrous consequences. Perhaps after the last conference the Fuehrer will not refer to his order again. If he does, however, a very difficult situation will arise, and you will have to go to the Fuehrer yourself. What the Fuehrer has ordered must in no case be allowed to happen.' "The Reich Marshal expressed strong disapproval of Hitler's attitude and agreed with me in every point.
DR. JAHRREISS: He ordered me to act as I had suggested, to inform him immediately when necessary, and ended the interview with these words, 'This is all insane and cannot be done.' "h) Measures against Allied airmen on the basis of the abovementioned Fuehrer's order were taken neither by the Air Force nor by the SD. This order did not become known, in my opinion, to the Replacement Army Command (BdE), or its offices, as the Replacement Army Command was not present at the Fuehrer's meeting, and the order was not transmitted by the Armed Forces High Command (OKW). "Hitler made no further reference to his order, either to the Reich Marshal or to myself or my representative or, I think, to Kaltenbrunner. To be sure, I never spoke to the latter again about this matter. "I cannot judge whether Hitler deliberately let the matter drop or whether he forgot about it under the pressure of events. "i) I know that about two or three weeks later an OKW directive was issued-I think a teletype-in which, as I recall, mention was made of the correspondent's report that occasioned it. It disclosed the fact that the Fuehrer had expressed his displeasure that German soldiers had taken action against their own people. "No mention was made of the main point of Hitler's order.. If I remember correctly, the directive was signed by Keitel, and must be regarded as an attempt to cover himself as far as the Fuehrer was concerned. "In my opinion, General Joel had nothing to do with the affair at all." Witness, as far as you were present at this meeting, is the picture presented by General Koller correct?
BUCHS: I remember personally something like the following formulation by the Fuehrer, "This results from the fact that in the Air Force war is based on a mutual life insurance policy of, 'Don't hurt me; I won't hurt you.' " That was the sentence which impressed me most strongly, which emphasizes what was said...
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Then I need not ask you any further questions on this point.
THIS PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, we will adjourn now. [A recess was taken.]
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, I assume that you can still recollect how the offices of the Fuehrer's headquarters were furnished.
BUCHS: Yes, I can still remember.
DR. JAHRREISS: In the offices occupied by the Fuehrer, the Field Marshal, the General, and yourself, were there maps on the wall?
BUCHS: Yes, and also in East Prussia-particularly the headquarters-the Fuehrer had a topographic map of Germany, as well as a political map of Europe, and there were similar maps in the various other rooms.
DR. JAHRREISS: Were maps of Germany hanging there, too?
BUCHS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: And the neighboring territories on which concentration camps and penal institutions were indicated with a red or blue ring?
BUCHS: No. Neither in the headquarters in East Prussia nor in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, nor at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden, have I ever seen such a map.
DR. JAHRREISS: At 1230 hours on 11 May 1946, the Munich radio station broadcast a letter from a painter asserting that he had seen maps in the Fuehrer's headquarters which could only be intended to show the location of concentration camps. Is that possible?
BUCHS: That is quite out of the question.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was there any more detailed statement about . . .?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need go into the broadcast from Munich. We have no evidence of a broadcast from Munich.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am afraid I was misunderstood. I did not ask him whether he heard it, but I wanted to illustrate how the public had come to believe that there were such maps. Thank you, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out was that it ought not be referred to, as it is not in evidence. The fact which you alleged, that there was a broadcast, ought not to be referred to.
DR. STAHMER: Major Buchs, during the time you spent as commanding officer attached to Fuehrer headquarters, were you regularly present at the daily discussions of the situation?
BUCHS: Yes, I participated in the daily military situation discussions.
DR. STAHMER: Do you still remember whether you attended the situation discussion of 27 January 1945, at which the fate of the 10,000 air force officers imprisoned in the Sagan Camp was discussed?
BUCHS: I can remember something like this: Fegelein must have raised the question of evacuating that camp on the approach of the Russian troops. These captured officers were asked whether they wished to remain in the camp and be handed over to the Russian Army, or whether they wanted to be taken away in the course of the evacuation of Silesia. As far as I remember, they definitely decided on the latter alternative-that is to say, to be taken away; and I believe that the only question still to be decided was how their transport was to be arranged. .
DR. STAHMER: Can you still remember the suggestions that were made regarding that transport, and who made them?
BUCHS: No. I believe, at that time, the Fuehrer only said in general terms that these imprisoned officers could not receive better treatment than our own people. It was just at the time of the evacuation of Silesia, and our traffic situation did not permit the transport of even our own people by means of railway trains or in large columns, and the population had to tramp along the roads even in winter. And I think I remember that, at the time, the Fuehrer said, "If these officers wish to be taken along on a transport, they will have to march just like the German civilian population."
DR. STAHMER: May I, Mr. President, in connection with this statement, refer to an error, in the record. During the crossexamination of the Defendant Goering on 20 March 1946, Document 3786-PS, Exhibit USA-787 was presented. In the German record, Page 6249, after a discussion of how they should be transported, there is a statement that the Fuehrer said, "They will have to go even if they march in 'Dreck' (mud)." The actual text is, "They will have to go even if they trek (Treck) on foot." That is quite a different thing. I do not know how the word is translated in the English text; but that, of course, would give it a very different and entirely wrong meaning. As the witness has just said, the Fuehrer said, "They have got to go even if they have to trek"-that is to march in a column, on foot.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Now, the Tribunal think that the best way to deal with these questions of translation is to take it up with the General Secretary, and get it submitted to the Translation Division.
DR. STAHMER: I merely wanted to establish the fact. [Turning to the witness.] A remark is supposed to have been made in the course of that conference, during the discussion on transport, "Take off their boots and trousers so that they cannot walk in the snow." Do you remember who made that remark?
BUCHS: No, I cannot remember; and I think it is quite impossible.
DR. STAHMER: You do not remember any such remark, or by whom it was made?
BUCHS: It is perfectly possible that Fegelein made such a suggestion in some connection or other; I do not know.
DR. STAHMER: According to the record, Reich Marshal Goering is supposed to have made such a remark.
BUCHS: I think that is quite out of the question. In this connection may I just mention that it was extremely difficult to take notes of the proceedings. Four to six people frequently spoke at once during these conference and much more rapidly than usual. The stenographers could only take down what they heard. They could neither look up nor make certain who actually made such and such a remark at such and such a moment. There was a table around which there were often some 30 people standing; and that interfered with the work of the stenographers.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, at this point of the Trial I feel obliged to make a statement. I wanted to ask this witness some important questions, but I am not in a position to do so because of the decision announced by the Tribunal today. I state that through that decision I...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you will have full opportunity to put the questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I please complete my statement. I have explained that as a result of the decision announced today, I am not in a position to put my questions, and that I must submit to that decision. I wish to state, however, that I consider this decision...
THE PRESIDENT: But it is inaccurate to say you are not in a position to put your questions. You are not able to put your questions now to the witness, but it is not true to say that you are not in a position to put your questions without further qualification. You are in a position to put your questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Nevertheless, Mr. President, I feel there is an impediment for the defense, constituted by the fact that the defense of the organizations is thus not in a position to present its evidence directly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has announced its decision.
DR. LATERNSER: I only regret, Mr. President, that that decision was announced without the Defense having first been notified.
DR. MARTIN LOFFLER(Counsel for the SA): I should like to add in connection with the statements of my colleague Laternser that I must emphasize them because...
THE PRESIDENT: On what point, Dr. Loffler?
DR. LOFFLER: On the point that the witnesses caned today cannot be questioned by defense counsel for the organizations, as has been the custom until now, and that is, therefore, a disadvantage to the defense because for all practical purposes we lose these witnesses altogether. rim; PRESIDENT: Dr. Loffler, you and Dr. Laternser seem not to have read Article 9 of the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard. That is with reference to the organizations. The Tribunal, after very great trouble, have brought to Nuremberg a very large number of witnesses and have set up commissions for the purpose of examining those witnesses, and they are going to hear some witnesses from among those witnesses at a future date in this Court. The Tribunal have given the matter full and it doesn't desire to hear any further arguments from you or from any other of the counsel for the organizations.
DR. LOFFLER: Mr. President, we appreciate the Tribunal's grounds, but we feel obliged to point out from the point of view of the defense that these reasons are justified in theory, but entail in practice the loss of that witness. I ask permission, therefore, to give you a very brief explanation so that the Tribunal will understand why we lose those witnesses. You, Mr. President, have said that the witnesses can be heard before this Commission. These witnesses cannot be heard before the Commission because the number...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Loffler, the Tribunal, as I have told you, have already considered this matter, and it may be that they will consider it further, but they don't desire to hear any further argument about it. It is a matter entirely within their discretion, and they have been at very great pains to provide that the applicants who wish to be heard in respect to these organizations shall be fully and thoroughly heard. The Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage.
DR. LOFFLER: May I give one explanation . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Did you, hear what I said? I said the Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage.
DR. LOFFLER: Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have only a few questions. [Turning to the witness.] Your memory of that conference doesn't seem to be entirely clear.
BUCHS: May I ask which conference?
MR. ROBERTS: The conference that you last mentioned, with regard to the evacuation of the prisoners of Sagan.
BUCHS: I am not aware that it was incorrect in any point.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, but you say that you don't remember any mention being made of the prisoners having to walk through the snow without their boots on.
BUCHS: Yes, that is what I said.
MR. ROBERTS: And you know that it is-I can't find the actual place; I had no idea this exhibit was going to be referred to- but you know that that is in the actual stenographer's notes, do you not?
BUCHS: So it was said.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And you would agree with me that the stenographer could hardly put that remark down unless it was said?
BUCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: But you didn't hear the remark; therefore, you don't know who said it?
BUCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: That is all I ask on that. I just ask on one other matter: In April of 1945 did Fegelein attain the status of Hitler's brother-in-law, when Hitler got married?
BUCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And two days afterwards, was Fegelein shot on the orders of his new-found brother-in-law?
BUCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: That is all.
DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further question to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. [The witness left the stand.]
DR. JAHRREISS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the witness Professor Dr. Schramm. [The witness Schramm took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
PERCY ERNST SCHRAMM (Witness): Percy Ernst Schramm.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you working in the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the war?
SCHRAMM: Yes. From March 1943 onwards, I was working in the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: Until the end?
SCHRAMM: Until the end-that is to say, the beginning of May 1945.
DR. JAHRREISS: What functions did you have in the Armed Forces Operations Staff?
SCHRAMM: During my entire time in the Armed Forces Operations Staff I kept the War Diary of that staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was there a special reason why you received that task?