dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
Judgement : The Invasion of Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxemburg
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The plan to seize Belgium and the Netherlands was considered in August 1938, when the attack on Czechoslovakia was being formulated, and the possibility of war with France and England was contemplated. The advantage to Germany of being able to use these countries for their own purposes, particularly as air bases in the war against England and France, was emphasised. In May of 1939. when Hitler made his irrevocable decision to attack Poland, and foresaw the possibility at least of a war with England and France in -consequence, he told his military commanders:
" Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied.... Declarations of neutrality must be ignored."
On August 22nd in the same year, he told his military commanders that England and France, in his opinion, would not " violate the neutrality of these countries." At the same time he assured Belgium and Holland and Luxemburg that he would respect their neutrality; and on the 6th October, 1939, after the Polish campaign, he repeated this assurance. On the 7th October General von Brauchitsch directed Army Group B to prepare " for the immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if the political situation so demands." In a series of orders, which were signed by the defendants Keitel and Jodl, the attack was fixed for the 10th November, 1939, but it was postponed from time to time until May of 1940 on account of weather conditions and transport problems.
At the conference on the 23rd November, 1939, Hitler said:
so demands." In a series of orders, which were signed by the defendants Keitel and Jodl, the attack was fixed for the 10th November, 1939, but it was postponed from time to time until May of 1940 on account of weather conditions and transport problems. At the conference on the 23rd November, 1939, Hitler said:
" We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger.... Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed. England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England.... If the French Army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us. We must anticipate them.... We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland . . . My decision is unchangeable; I shall attack France and England at the most favourable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack, the war is not to be ended victoriously."
On the 10th May, 1940, the German forces invaded the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. On the same day the German Ambassadors handed to the Netherlands and Belgian Governments a memorandum alleging that the British and French armies, with the consent of Belgium and Holland, were planning to march through those countries to attack the Ruhr, and justifying the invasion on these grounds. Germany, however, assured the Netherlands and Belgium that their integrity and their possessions would be respected. A similar memorandum was delivered to Luxemburg on the same date.
of Belgium and Holland, were planning to march through those countries to attack the Ruhr, and justifying the invasion on these grounds. Germany, however, assured the Netherlands and Belgium that their integrity and their possessions would be respected. A similar memorandum was delivered to Luxemburg on the same date.
There is no evidence before the Tribunal to justify the contention that the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg were invaded by Germany because their occupation had been planned by England and France. British and French staffs had been cooperating in making certain plans for military operations in the Low Countries, but the purpose of this planning was to defend these countries in the event of a German attack.
The invasion of Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg was entirely without justification.
It was carried out in pursuance of policies long considered and prepared, and was plainly an act of aggressive war. The resolve to invade was made without any other consideration than the advancement of the aggressive policies of Germany.
Judgement : Bormann
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Bormann is indicted on
Counts One
,
Three
, and
Four
. He joined the National Socialist Party in 1925, was a member of the Staff of the Supreme Command of the SA from 1928 to 1930, was in charge of the Aid Fund of the Party, and was Reichsleiter from 1933 to 1945. From 1933 to 1941 he was Chief of Staff in the Office of the Fuehrer's Deputy and, after the flight of Hess to England, became Head of the Party Chancellery on 12th May, 1941. On 12th April, 1943, he became Secretary to the Fuehrer. He was political and organisational head of the Volkssturm and a General in the SS.
Crimes against Peace
Bormann, in the beginning a minor Nazi, but then steadily rose to a position of power and, particularly in the closing days, of great influence over Hitler. He was active in the Party's rise to power and even more so in the consolidation of that power. He devoted much of his time to the persecution of the churches and of the Jews within Germany.
The evidence does not show that Bormann knew of Hitler's plans to prepare, initiate or wage aggressive wars. He attended none of the important conferences when Hitler revealed piece by piece these plans for aggression. Nor can knowledge be conclusively inferred from the positions he held. It was only when he became Head of the Party Chancellery in 1941, and later in 1943 secretary to the Fuehrer when he attended many of Hitler's conferences, that his positions gave him the necessary access. Under the view stated elsewhere which the Tribunal has taken of the conspiracy to wage aggressive war, there is not sufficient evidence to bring Bormann within the scope of Count One.
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
By decree of 29th May, 1941, Bormann took over the offices and powers held by Hess; by the decree of 24th January, 1942, these powers were extended to give him control over all laws and directives issued by Hitler. He was thus responsible for laws and orders issued thereafter. On 1st December 1942, all Gaus became Reich Defense districts, and the Party Gauleiters responsible to Bormann were appointed Reich Defense Commissioners. In effect, this made them the administrators of the entire civilian war effort. This was so not only in Germany, but also in those territories which were incorporated into the Reich from the absorbed and conquered territories.
the Party Gauleiters responsible to Bormann were appointed Reich Defense Commissioners. In effect, this made them the administrators of the entire civilian war effort. This was so not only in Germany, but also in those territories which were incorporated into the Reich from the absorbed and conquered territories.
Through this mechanism Bormann controlled the ruthless exploitations of the subjected populace. His order of 12th August, 1942, placed all party agencies at the disposal of Himmler's programme for forced resettlement and denationalisation of persons in the occupied countries. Three weeks after the invasion of Russia, he attended the conference of 16th July, 1941, at Hitler's field quarters with Goering, Rosenberg and Keitel, Bormann's report shows that there were discussed and developed detailed plans of enslavement and annihilation of the population of these territories. And on 8th May 1942, he conferred with Hitler and Rosenberg on the forced resettlement of Dutch personnel in Latvia, the extermination programme in Russia, and the economic exploitation of the Eastern Territories. He was interested in the confiscation of art and other properties in the East. His letter of 11th January 1944, called for the creation of a large-scale organisation to withdraw commodities from the occupied territories for the bombed-out German populace.
Bormann was extremely active in the persecution of the Jews, not only in Germany but also in the absorbed and conquered countries. He took part in the discussions which led to the removal of 60,000 Jews from Vienna to Poland in co-operation with the SS and the Gestapo. He signed the decree of 31st May, 1941, extending the Nuremberg Laws to the annexed Eastern Territories. In an order of 9th October, 1942, he declared that the permanent elimination of Jews in Greater German territory could no longer be solved by emigration, but only by applying "ruthless force " in the special camps in the East. On 1st July, 1943, he signed an ordinance withdrawing Jews from the protection of the law courts and placing them under the exclusive jurisdiction of Himmler's Gestapo.
in Greater German territory could no longer be solved by emigration, but only by applying "ruthless force " in the special camps in the East. On 1st July, 1943, he signed an ordinance withdrawing Jews from the protection of the law courts and placing them under the exclusive jurisdiction of Himmler's Gestapo.
Bormann was prominent in the slave labour programme. The Party Leaders supervised slave labour matters in the respective Gaus, including employment, conditions of work, feeding and housing. By his circular of 5th May, 1943, to the Leadership Corps, distributed down to the level of Orstgruppenleiters, he issued directions regulating the treatment of foreign workers, pointing out they were subject to SS control on security problems, and ordered the previous mistreatment to cease. A report of 4th September, 1942, relating to the transfer of 500,000 female domestic workers from the East to Germany showed that control was to be exercised by Sauckel, Himmler and Bormann. Sauckel by decree of 8th September, directed the Kreisleiters to supervise the distribution and assignment of these female labourers.
Bormann also issued a series of orders to the Party Leaders dealing with the treatment of prisoners of war. On 5th November, 1941, he prohibited decent burials for Russian Prisoners of war. On 25th November 1943 he directed Gauleiters to report cases of lenient treatment of prisoners of war. And on 13th September, 1944, he ordered liaison between the Kreisleiters with the camp commandants in determining the use to be made of prisoners of war for forced labour. On 29th January, 1943, he transmitted to his leaders OKW instructions allowing the use of firearms, and corporal punishment on recalcitrant prisoners of war, contrary to the Rules of Land Warfare. On 30th September, 1944, he signed a decree taking from the OKW jurisdiction over prisoners of war and handing them over to Himmler and the SS.
Bormann is responsible for the lynching of Allied airmen. On 30th May, 1944, he prohibited any police action or criminal proceedings against persons who had taken part in the lynching of Allied fliers. This was accompanied by a Goebbels' propaganda campaign inciting the German people to take action of this nature and the conference of 6th June, 1944, where regulations for the application of lynching were discussed.
police action or criminal proceedings against persons who had taken part in the lynching of Allied fliers. This was accompanied by a Goebbels' propaganda campaign inciting the German people to take action of this nature and the conference of 6th June, 1944, where regulations for the application of lynching were discussed.
His counsel, who has laboured under difficulties, was unable to refute this evidence. In the face of these documents which bear Bormann's signature it is difficult to see how he could do so even were the defendant present. Counsel has argued that Bormann is dead and that the Tribunal should not avail itself of
Article 12 of the Charter
which gives it the right to take proceedings in absentia. But the evidence of death is not conclusive, and the Tribunal, as previously stated, determined to try him in absentia. If Bormann is not dead and is later apprehended, the Control Council for Germany may, under
Article 29 of the Charter
, consider any facts in mitigation, and alter or reduce his sentence, if deemed proper.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Bormann is not guilty on Count One, but is guilty on Counts Three and Four.
Judgement : The Invasion of Denmark and Norway
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The PRESIDENT: Now I shall ask M. Falco to continue the reading of the judgment.
M. Falco:
The aggressive war against Poland was but the beginning. The aggression of Nazi Germany quickly spread from country to country. In point of time the first two countries to suffer were Denmark and Norway.
On the 31st May, 1939, a Treaty of Non-Aggression was made between Germany and Denmark, and signed by the defendant Ribbentrop. It was there solemnly stated that the parties to the Treaty were "firmly resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and Germany under all circumstances."Nevertheless, Germany invaded Denmark on the 9th April, 1940.
On the 2nd September, 1939, after the outbreak of war with Poland, Germany sent a solemn assurance to Norway in these terms:
"The German Reich Government is determined in view of the friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under no circumstance to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of Norway, and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In making this declaration the Reich Government naturally expects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches of Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur. Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party occurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate."
On the 9th April, 1940, in pursuance of her plan of campaign, Norway was invaded by Germany.
The idea of attacking Norway originated, it appears, with the defendants Raeder and Rosenberg
be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate." On the 9th April, 1940, in pursuance of her plan of campaign, Norway was invaded by Germany. The idea of attacking Norway originated, it appears, with the defendants Raeder and Rosenberg. On the 3rd October, 1939, Raeder prepared a memorandum on the subject of "gaining bases in Norway," and amongst the questions discussed was the question: "Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting' " Despite this fact, three days later, further assurances were given to Norway by Germany, which stated:
"Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the Northern States, and neither has she any to-day."
Three days later again, the defendant Doenitz prepared a memorandum on the same subject, namely, bases in Norway, and suggested the establishment of a base in Trondheim with an alternative of supplying fuel in Narvik. At the same time the defendant Raeder was in correspondence with Admiral Karls, who pointed out to him the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. On the 10th October, Raeder reported to Hitler the disadvantages to Germany which an occupation by the British would have. In the months of October and November Raeder continued to work on the possible occupation of Norway, in conjunction with the "Rosenberg Organisation." The "Rosenberg Organisation" was the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the NSDAP, and Rosenberg as Reichsleiter was in charge of it. Early in December, Quisling, the notorious Norwegian traitor, visited Berlin and was seen by the defendants Rosenberg and Raeder. He put forward a plan for a coup d'etat in Norway. On the 12th December, the defendant Raeder and the naval staff, together with the defendants Keitel and Jodl, had a conference with Hitler, when Raeder reported on his interview with Quisling, and set out Quisling's views. On the 16th December, Hitler himself interviewed Quisling on all these matters
coup d'etat in Norway. On the 12th December, the defendant Raeder and the naval staff, together with the defendants Keitel and Jodl, had a conference with Hitler, when Raeder reported on his interview with Quisling, and set out Quisling's views. On the 16th December, Hitler himself interviewed Quisling on all these matters. In the report of the activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the NSDAP for the years 1933-1943, under the heading of "Political preparations for the military occupation of Norway," it is stated that at the interview with Quisling Hitler said that he would prefer a neutral attitude on the part of Norway as well as the whole of Scandinavia, as he did not desire to extend the theatre of war, or to draw other nations into the conflict. If the enemy attempted to extend the war he would be compelled to guard himself against that undertaking; however he promised Quisling financial support, and assigned to a special military staff the examination of the military questions involved.
On the 27th January, 1940, a memorandum was prepared by the defendant Keitel regarding the plans for the invasion of Norway. On the 28th February, 1940, the defendant Jodl entered in his diary:
"I proposed first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Fuehrer that "Case Yellow " (that is the operation against the Netherlands) and Weser Exercise (that is the operation against Norway and Denmark) must be prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one another as regard both time and forces employed."
On the 1st March Hitler issued a directive regarding the Weser Exercise which contained the words:
"The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces. This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain . . . The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously . .
Forces. This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain . . . The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously . .. It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures."
On the 24th March, the naval operation orders for the Weser Exercise were issued, and on the 30th March the defendant Doenitz as Commander-in-Chief of U-boats issued his operational order for the occupation of Denmark and Norway. On the 9th April, 1940, the German forces invaded Norway and Denmark.
From this narrative it is clear that as early as October, 1939, the question of invading Norway was under consideration. The defense that has been . made here is that Germany was compelled to attack Norway to forestall an Allied invasion, and her action was therefore preventive.
It must be remembered that preventive action in foreign territory is justified only in case of "an instant and overwhelming necessity for self-defense leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation." (The Caroline Case, Moore's Digest of International Law, II, 412)". How widely the view was held in influential German circles that the Allies intended to occupy Norway cannot be determined with exactitude. Quisling asserted that the Allies would intervene in Norway with the tacit consent of the Norwegian Government
deliberation." (The Caroline Case, Moore's Digest of International Law, II, 412)". How widely the view was held in influential German circles that the Allies intended to occupy Norway cannot be determined with exactitude. Quisling asserted that the Allies would intervene in Norway with the tacit consent of the Norwegian Government. The German Legation at Oslo disagreed with this view, although the Naval Attache at that Legation shared it.
The War Diary of the German Naval Operations Staff for 13th January 1940, stated at the Chief of the naval Operations Staff thought that the most favourable solution would be the maintenance of the neutrality of Norway, but he harboured the firm conviction that England intended to occupy Norway in the near future relying on the tacit agreement of the Norwegian Government.
The directive of Hitler issued on 1st March, 1940, for the attack on Denmark and Norway stated that the oration "should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic."
It is, however, to be remembered that the defendant Raeder's memorandum of the 3rd October, 1939, makes no reference to forestalling the Allies, but it is based upon "the aim of improving our strategical and operational position."
The memorandum itself is headed "Gaining of Bases in Norway." The same observation applies mutatis mutandis to the memorandum of the defendant Doenitz of 9th October, 1939.
Furthermore, on the 13th March, the defendant Jodl recorded in his diary:
"Fuehrer does not give order yet for ' W ' (Weser Exercise). He is still looking for an excuse." (Justification?)
On the 14th March, 1940, he again wrote:
"Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give for 'Weser Exercise '."
On the 21st March, 1940, he recorded the misgivings of Task Force XXI about the long interval between building up readiness positions and the close of the diplomatic negotiations, and added:
"Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America