dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
GEN. ZORYA: The next document, which I am submitting to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-183 (Document Number USSR-183), concerns the Transylvanian question and the Defendant Ribbentrop. It is the record of a conference between Antonescu and Von Dornberg, Chief of Protocol of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which took place at the frontier on 10 February 1942. I am asking the Tribunal to accept this record as evidence. This document, taken from the personal archives of Marshal Antonescu, was captured by the advancing Red Army. I do not consider it necessary to read the entire document into the record, and I shall merely confine myself to a few excerpts. Will you please open your document book on Page 116, where there is a record of the conference between Antonescu and Von Dornberg of 10 February 1942. I quote: "He openly introduced the subject of the Order of Charles the First which Herr Von Ribbentrop was claiming for himself through various German official channels in our country, as well as through the Romanian officials accredited to the German Government." I pass to the next page, Page 117 of the document book. I quote: "I told Herr Von Dornberg that I would not be able to grant this award until Herr Von Ribbentrop, at the very first opportunity, made a public declaration also to Romania, a declaration which would bolster up the faith of the Romanian people in their struggle for the cause of justice and for their legitimate claims in the Europe of the future. I would, therefore, grant him this award on condition that it be made public only after he had made this declaration. "Herr Von Dornberg asked for time to reflect on the matter. "Next day, before entering the railway coach, he asked me to hand him the decoration, telling me that Von Ribbentrop wanted it and requesting me not to divulge our conversation to Ribbentrop, since he now promised to make the award public only upon the fulfillment of my conditions.
GEN. ZORYA: On this condition I gave him the decoration, without the appropriate certificate." Thus Ribbentrop was prepared to disclaim his Budapest statement on receipt of the Romanian order. I have also at my disposal a record of a conference between Antonescu and Goering. Will you kindly turn to Page 118 of the document book. Unfortunately, this document, discovered together with other documents in Antonescu's personal files, previously mentioned by me, is undated. We submit this document as found. I present it as Exhibit Number USSR-238 (Document USSR-238), and I am reading one excerpt only. I quote: "During the conversation at Karinhall, Marshal Goering was very reticent on the problem of Transylvania. On the way, in the car, he said to the Marshal"-that is to Antonescu: " 'After all, why do you quarrel with Hungary about Transylvania, which is actually more German than Romanian or Hungarian.' " We may, presumably, agree that on this occasion Goering had expressed the viewpoint of the fascist conspirators on the problem of Transylvania with a sufficient degree of truthfulness. With a view to concluding the clarification of Germany's mutual relations with her vassal, Romania, I should like to emphasize the subject of crude oil. In this field, Romania was one of Germany's principal suppliers. Both before and during the war the Hitlerites extracted oil from Romania by all possible means. Antonescu, by the way, refers to this in one of his letters which has already been read into the record. I shall now submit two documents which sufficiently prove how important this question was to Germany, and how significant it was considered by the Hitlerites themselves. As Exhibit Number USSR-244 (Document Number USSR-244), I present an urgent telegram from the Defendant Keitel, addressed to Marshal Antonescu and received by the latter on 31 October 1942. I shall not explain in detail how this document was taken from the personal archives of Antonescu, in the same way as the previous one.
GEN. ZORYA: I now read this telegram into the record and would ask you to accept it as evidence-to be found on Page 119 of the document book: "Telegram to the German Mission for direct transmission to Marshal Antonescu. "Herr Marshall In the name of the Fuehrer I approach Your Excellency with a request for your personal intervention in the matter of accelerating, as far as possible, the delivery of the maximum possible quantity of fuel to the Italian Fleet, which is absolutely essential to the latter for the continuance of military operations in the Mediterranean. "The absence and lack of all means of transport for further operations have resulted in a critical situation in North Africa, 12 Feb. 4E and the transport of supplies depends entirely on the delivery of adequate quantities of fuel. "I beg Your Excellency to increase to the maximum degree those deliveries of fuel to Italy, which are exclusively reserved for supplying the fleet called upon to maintain important positions in the Mediterranean for the purpose of the joint warfare. "I have chosen this method of direct appeal to you because I am sure that your personal intervention will result in the assistance required. "Yours in comradely esteem, signed Keitel, Field Marshal." Allow me now to submit the telegram which Antonescu sent in reply to Keitel. Please turn to Page 120 of the document book, Exhibit Number USSR-244(a), (Document Number USSR-244(a)).
THE PRESIDENT: Could you summarize the contents of this document.
GEN. ZORYA: I can summarize the contents of that telegram in two sentences. In reply to the Defendant Keitel's tearful appeal to increase to the maximum degree the fuel supplies, Antonescu replied, in a wire addressed to Keitel, that he would meet his engagements in full, but that the supplies previously requested by the German officials had already been delivered and that it was impossible to send any more. If something could eventually be saved from the quantities used inside Romania then perhaps, somehow or other, Romania might be able to help her allies. On the whole, Antonescu begged General Keitel to accept his expressions of regard and high esteem, but would not give him any more oil. Allow me to remind you, Your Honors, that in October and November 1942 Rommel's fate was being decided in North Africa, and that at the same time the Red Army was barring Germany's advance on the Grozny and Baku oil fields on the borders of Mozdok. It is obvious that the Germans lacked sufficient quantities of crude oil. I shall read one extract from the minutes of a conversation which took place on 12 February 1942, between Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop, which has not, as yet, been read into the record. I have previously submitted to the Tribunal the record of this conversation as Exhibit Number USSR-233. I ask you to turn to the end of Page 51 and to Page 52 of the document book, which corresponds to Page 4 of the Russian text. There you will find the following lines. In reply to Ribbentrop's question on the subject of crude oil, Antonescu stated: "As for crude oil, Romania has contributed the maximum which it was in her power to contribute; she can give no more. The only way out of the situation would be to seize territories rich in oil." We should note here that Antonescu was not at all original in his idea of seizing other people's territories, rich in oil. I am asking Your Honors to refer to Pages 121-129 of the document book.
GEN. ZORYA: There is one document taken from the private office of the Defendant Rosenberg, which is entitled, "About the Organization of the Caucasus." I submit this document to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-58 (Document Number USSR-58), and I would ask you to accept it as evidence. In July 1941 the Defendant Rosenberg formulated the German opinion on this question-Page 122 of the document book as follows: "Germany is interested in creating a stable position in the entire Caucasus in order to secure the safety of continental Europe, that is, to safeguard for herself the link with the Near East. It is only this link with the oil fields that can make Germany and the rest of Europe independent, in the future, of any coalition of maritime powers. The aim of German policy is to control the Caucasus and the adjoining lands to the south, both politically and militarily." Will you please turn to Page 124 of the document book as well as to Page 4 of the Russian text of the document from which I am quoting. The same idea is formulated there by the Defendant Rosenberg with extreme clarity. I quote, "Economically, the German Reich must take all oil into its hands." Your Honors, I shall not dwell in detail on the relations between the fascist conspirators and their other satellite, Finland, inasmuch as the witness, Buschenhagen, offered sufficiently conclusive evidence on this question; and the Tribunal has probably already got some definite ideas on the subject. I just want to remind the Tribunal that according to Paragraph 3, Section 2, of Plan Barbarossa, Finland was to cover the advance of the German landing of Group North, consisting of units of the 21st Group, which was due to arrive from Norway, and then to operate jointly with that group. According to Plan Barbarossa, the liquidation of the Russian forces at Hango was also assigned to Finland.
GEN. ZORYA: I would also like to remind the Tribunal that Section 2 of the temporary Plan Barbarossa, which has been presented to the Tribunal by the American Prosecution as Document Number C-39, mentions Finland's participation in the war; as I have already reported to the Tribunal, the following sentence is to be found in this section, which corresponds to Page 52 of the document book. 'The preliminary negotiations with the Finnish General Staff have been under way since 25 May." I should also like to invite your attention to the following paragraph of the same document, Page 58 of the document book: "Provision has been made for transportation from the Reich to Norway of one security division and 18 artillery battalions, and for transportation to Finland of one reinforced infantry division complete with army corps units. Of the units, one infantry division, two mountain divisions and the SS Group North are designated for Case Silver Fox. "It has been planned, on the outbreak of military operations, to bring by rail, through Sweden, a further division for the attack on Hango." I consider that I am now justified in stating that the date of 25 May 1941, indicated in the temporary Plan Barbarossa as the date on which the negotiations with the Finnish General Staff were opened, was incorrect. The indication of this date, which did not correspond to reality, was an attempt to disguise the preparations for aggression, presenting them to the outside world as preparations for a so-called preventive war. In addition to the testimony of the witness, Buschenhagen, already given to the Tribunal, I shall now present, as Exhibit Number USSR-229 (Document Number USSR-229), the depositions of a former colonel of the German Army, Kitchmann, which I beg you to accept as evidence. Kitchmann held the office of military attaché in the German Embassy at Helsinki since 1 October 1941. You will find this testimony on Page 130 of the document book.
GEN. ZORYA: I shall read a very short extract therefrom into the record: "A long time before 22 June 1941, the German Government and the High Command of the German Armed Forces jointly carried out secret negotiations with the Finnish Government and the General Staff of the Finnish Army and prepared the attack on the Soviet Union. I learned about the preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union by the German and Finnish Armies under the following circumstances: On my arrival at Helsinki in October 1941, as acting German military attaché, I had numerous conversations with Major Von Albedill, the aide of the German military attaché who formerly served in the Military Attaché's Department in the OKH, General Staff of the Army. "Albedill acquainted me with the situation in Finland and its military and political background, since Major General R8ssing, the military attaché, was seriously ill and receiving treatment at the health resort of Merano in the Tyrol. In the course of these conversations Albedill told me that already in September 1940, Major General Bossing, acting on an order of Hitler and of the German General Staff, had organized the visit of Major General Taloela, Plenipotentiary of Marshal Mannerheim, to the Fuehrer's headquarters in Berlin. During this visit an agreement was reached between ape German and Finnish General Staffs for joint preparations for the attack and for warfare against the Soviet Union. "In this connection General Taloela told me, during a conference at his staff headquarters in Aunus in November 1941, that he, acting on Marshal Mannerheim's personal orders, had-as far back as September 1940-been one of the first to contact the German High Command with a view to joint preparation for a German and Finnish attack on the Soviet Union.'' I ask your permission to conclude herewith the presentation of the documents concerning the relations between fascist Germany and her satellite, Finland, since-I repeat-Buschenhagen's testimony has relieved me of this necessity.
GEN. ZORYA: I should like to make one brief resume: Buschenhagen's testimony disposes of all attempts to assert that the war waged by Finland was a separate war and was disassociated from the war aims of fascist Germany. Mainlands entry into the war had been envisaged in the war plans of the fascist conspirators and corresponded to the aggressive intentions of the Finnish rulers. The Finns, like the other satellites of Germany, waged war in the hope of gaining whole regions and republics of the Soviet Union. At the conference of 16 July 1941 Hitler spoke of the Finnish claims to Eastern Karelia, the Leningrad region, and the city of Leningrad. In proof of this fact I refer to Document Number L-221 presented by the United States Prosecution. The extracts quoted from this document will be found on the corresponding page of the document book, Page 141. Romania and Finland were two German satellites discussed in full detail in Plan Barbarossa. The part these countries played in the plans of German fascism was determined not only by the desire to utilize their war potential-which without doubt was of some importance-but also by their geographical position as operational bases on the flanks of the Soviet Union. The documents presented to the Tribunal bear witness to the fact that the inclusion of these countries in the preparation for attack against the U.S.S.R. had been carefully plotted by the fascist conspirators, in the same way as were all the preparations connected with Plan Barbarossa. The third satellite of Germany, Hungary, is not mentioned at all in Plan Barbarossa. However, this certainly cannot be taken to mean that the participation of Hungary in the aggression against the Soviet Union had not been planned by the fascist conspirators. I ask permission to refer to the testimony of Paulus-although he has already testified before the Tribunal-which formulates very clearly . . .
THE PRESIDENT: You aren't going to give us Paulus' affidavit over again, are you? We have already had Paulus' evidence in full.
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, I have already mentioned that this is on Page 182. It is the record of the interrogation of Paulus by General Rudenko. A copy of this record may be produced before the Tribunal now and, furthermore, it is on Page 143 of the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: We have got his actual oral evidence; we don't want his interrogation.
GEN. ZORYA: But I really need one particular paragraph of his testimony in order to show the connection between the subsequent documents relating to Hungary and the contents of my statement. It is just a few lines.
THE PRESIDENT: It must surely be cumulative, is it not?
GEN. ZORYA: That which was presented to the Tribunal, I could express in my own words, in two sentences.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it in any way different from what Paulus has already said?
GEN. ZORYA: Yes. Do forgive me! I have just been told that Colonel Pokrovsky has already read that extract into the record. I shall therefore merely give a very brief summary of the extract and then pass on to a further subject and shall not repeat myself. I have in mind, on the one hand, those paragraphs of Paulus' affidavit which state that the leading factor of Hungary's policy was the full recognition of Germany's leading rule and that it was determined by two basic factors, that is, the aspiration to territorial conquests with the help of Germany and the fear of the growing popover of Romania as Germany's ally; and, on the other hand, I have in mind that passage where Paulus states that Hitler was far more prudent in disclosing his plans to Hungary than to the other satellites, because he considered the Hungarians as garrulous. It is true that Paulus immediately adds, on Page 2 of his affidavit, that: "The essential reason was Hitler's unwillingness to give Hungary a chance of seizing the oil fields in the Russian oil district of Dragovitch." Following the opening of the offensive against the Soviet Union, the Supreme Command of the Army, the OKH, issued an order to the 17th Army to seize Dragovitch prior to the arrival of the Hungarians. Further, Paulus describes the circumstances of his negotiations with the Hungarians regarding armament supplies. This-all this- has already been mentioned by Colonel Pokrovsky. I wish only to refer to the fact that this testimony of Paulus' has undoubtedly lifted a corner of the veil of mystery shrouding the mutual relations between the German and Hungarian aggressors. In this connection, I consider it imperative to return to the depositions by Ruszliczay-Ruediger which are already at the disposal of the Tribunal. This document has been presented as Exhibit Number USSR-294. Touching on the occupation by Hungary of the Transcarpathian Ukraine in 1939, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger testified-see Page 2, Paragraph 3 of the Russian text of the depositions which can be found on Page 101 of the document book.
GEN. ZORYA: I quote the following-the quotation is underlined: "This took place not long before the outbreak of the German-Polish war. It then appeared as if economic advantages and a new liberation from the Trianon Treaty were, for Hungary, the primary objectives. `'But from the time when the region of the Transcarpathian Ukraine acquired a common boundary with Soviet Russia, we began to attach a perfectly different significance to this region by military preparations concerning this area. It was clear to us, the high-ranking officers, that the political leadership both of Germany and Hungary also considered this region strategically important for future military operations against Soviet Russia." On Page 9, Paragraph 2 from the bottom, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger tells us of a conference which took place at the end of March 1941, in the course of which the Hungarian Minister of War, Bartha, outlined the objectives of the war with Yugoslavia. Among these objectives Bartha pointed directly to the necessity of eliminating Yugoslavia as a possible ally of the Soviet Union. However, a more complete picture of Germano-Hungarian relations, which were determined by the preparation of an attack against the Soviet Union, is contained in the statement by the Hungarian Major General, Esteban Ujsaaszy. From 1 May 1939 to 1 July 1942, Ujszaszy was Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the Hungarian General Staff. In his official capacity during these years, he had inside information on the secrets which shrouded this preparation. Some of the things which he knew, he communicated to us in the document which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-155 (Document Number USSR-155). I ask you to accept this document as evidence. I will read into the record that part of Ujszaszy's statement which may clarify the question at issue.
GEN. ZORYA: Beginning from Page 2 of the Russian text-this corresponds to Page 149 of the document book-we find Section 2 entitled, "Preparation of Germany and Hungary for War against Soviet Russia." Paragraph 1 of this section is devoted to "Harder's letters." I quote: "In November 1940 the German military attaché in Budapest, Colonel Gunther Krappe of the German General Staff, was received in audience by the Chief of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, Henry Werth. Krappe brought a letter from the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, Generaloberst Halder. "In that letter Halder informed Werth that in the spring of 1941, 'Yugoslavia would have to be compelled, if necessary by force of arms, to adopt a definite position in order to exclude, at a later date, the menace of a Russian attack from the rear. In this preventive war, possibly against Yugoslavia and definitely against Soviet Russia, Hungary would have to participate if only in her own interests. "' Werth replied that he agreed with Halder's concept but drew attention to the lack of equipment in the Hungarian Army, which, at that time, was not ready for war against Soviet Russia. His request, on the whole, was for the completion, by Germany, of Hungary's armaments. He was informed of Halder's letter and Werth's reply thereto, by General Werth in person. After that a Hungarian armament commission was invited to Berlin. It consisted of officer-specialists from the Main Ordinance Supply Division of the Royal Hungarian Ministry of Defense, and in December 1940 the commission left for Berlin. The Hungarian requests were as follows . . .
THE PRESIDENT: General, couldn't you pass on to December 1940, where Field Marshal Keitel invites the Hungarian Minister of Defense to come to Berlin. It is just a few sentences down.
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, I am passing on to this paragraph: "In December 1940, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed forces (OKW), Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, invited the Hungarian Minister of Home Defense, General Carl Bartha, to come to Berlin in order to: a) discuss personally the problem of armaments; b) elaborate a plan of military and political collaboration between Germany and Hungary for the spring of 1941. "This invitation was transmitted to Budapest through the Royal Hungarian Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel in the General Staff Alexander Homlok. At the same time, I received a similar invitation from Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Foreign and Defense Sections of the OKW." I omit a long list given by Ujszaszy of persons who accompanied Bartha on his trip, and I read further from Page 151 of the document book: "The information which we received follows: "In the spring of 1941 the position of Yugoslavia will be clarified, the menace of a Russian Soviet attack in the rear eliminated .... For this purpose the Hungarian Honved Army, reinforced by the delivery of 10-centimeter field howitzers and with up-to-date tanks for a 'Mobile Brigade' will be ready for action. For the war against Russia, Hungary must make available 15 operational units (including 3 mobilized, cavalry, and Panzer units); she must also complete, by 1 June 1941, the erection of fortifications in Transcarpathian Russia, assist the advance of the German troops in the area adjacent to the Hungarian-Yugoslav and the Hungarian-Soviet frontiers and facilitate the deployment and the passage of supplies for the troops through Hungary. The details for the operational preparation will be determined later by representatives of the German General Staff about to be sent to Hungary.