dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be convenient? Would it not be better to put it after the Defendant Raeder-I do not know, they are rather connected cases?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If the Tribunal would prefer that, we could make it after Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether Dr. Kranzbuehler and Dr. Siemers would prefer that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you could arrange that with them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: That is to say, we would take Puhl's evidence as soon as convenient, either after the evidence on behalf of the Defendant Domtz or after the evidence on behalf of the Defendant Raeder, whichever you prefer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship prefers, we will do that.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to inform the Tribunal that my colleague Dr. Stahmer's applications for the Defendant Goering, which were made with a view to clarifying the Katyn case, are also of interest to me with reference to my clients. I gathered from the application made by the Russian prosecutor that this complex, too, was submitted to implicate the General Staff and the OKW, although no evidence has been submitted to suggest that these events took place either by order or with the approval of the General Staff and the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Does this not, perhaps, interest all the defendants?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. But I only wish to inform the Tribunal that I am interested in my colleague Dr. Stahmer's applications, and that I also request you to allow them. We have agreed to share the task, and that is my colleague Dr. Stahmer's reason for making the application. I wanted first to inform the Tribunal of that arrangement. I should also like to remind the Tribunal that some time ago, when my colleague Dr. Nelte, acting on behalf of the Defendant Keitel, forfeited the examination of the witness Halder, I pointed out to the Tribunal that this action encroached upon my privileges, and that the witness Halder must be allowed- for cross-examination by the Russian Prosecution. At that time, I was told that the witness Halder would probably appear for examination, and I have checked it in the record. When I referred to the point during that session. the Tribunal said that it would announce its decision in a few days. Although some considerable time has elapsed since then, no announcement has been made. I merely draw the attention of the Tribunal to this point.
THE PRESIDENT: Your witnesses have not been dealt with yet, have they? You have not applied for your witnesses yet? They have not been proffered? The matter has not been dealt with?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, this is a repetition of the misunderstanding which arose when I pointed out to you at that time that the forfeiture of the witness Halder constituted an infringement of my rights. The situation at the time was that the Russian Prosecution submitted an affidavit made by General Halder, and when the Defense objected, which at that time was done in my name too, the Tribunal decided that the witness Halder would have to appear for examination here. I have the right to cross-examine him, and therefore this is the proper time to call that to the attention of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the convenient time is the question. You will have the opportunity to cross-examine him. But the question is when. You want to cross-examine him yourself on behalf of the High Command?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that, Dr. Laternser. The Tribunal will now adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 13 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal I would like to submit my remaining documents, and then call Admiral Wagner as my first witness. Dokamente der Deutschen Politik on the Altmark case. I do not propose to read it. It concerns a report of the captain of the Altmark, which shows how the sailors of the Altmark were shot at while trying to escape by water and across the ice. There were seven dead. It can be found, Mr. President, on Page 78 of Volume II; from Page 79 it can be seen that this action on the whole found full recognition in spite of the casualties which no doubt were regretted by the Admiralty too. The next document, Doenitz-39, has partly been read by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe during cross-examination. It can be found on Page 81 and the following pages. It deals with the question of reprisals following a report received regarding the shooting of survivors of the German mine-layer film. On Page 83 there is a summary regarding the incidents which had been reported to the Naval Operations Staff at that time and which contained examples dealing with cases where survivors were shot at by Allied naval forces. I am not so much interested in these 12 actual examples as in the attitude adopted by the Naval Operations Staff in transmitting these examples to the OKW. It is so important that I would like to read the three sentences. They are on Page 83, at the top. "The following accounts deal with incidents which have already been reported, and in making use of them it must also be considered that: "a) some of these incidents occurred while fighting was still going on; "b) shipwrecked persons swimming about in the water easily think that shots which missed their real target are directed against them; "c) so far no evidence whatsoever has been found that a written or oral order for the shooting of shipwrecked persons has been issued." The idea of reprisals did not only occur to the Command, but it also occurred to the personnel serving on the ships at the front.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Now, we come to Document Doenitz-41, which is on Page 87 and deals with a conversation between Admiral Doenitz and a commander. The conversation took place in June 1943, and it is dealt with in an affidavit made by Korvettenkapitan Witt. Following descriptions of attacks made by British fliers on shipwrecked German submarine crews, the opinion was expressed by the crews that in reprisal the survivors of enemy ships should also be shot at. The affidavit also says in the third paragraph: "The Admiral sharply declined the idea of attacking an enemy rendered defenseless in combat; it was incompatible, with our way of waging war." In connection with the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-205 I shall submit a document of my own which deals with the question of terroristic actions. It is an extract from Exhibit GB-194 of the Prosecution, and it can be found on Page 91. It deals with the question of whether the crews of scuttled German ships should be rescued or not. The French press tends to say they should not, in view of the pressing need of the Allies for freight space. The same entry contains a report according to which British warships also had special instructions to prevent further scuttling of German ships. I now shall try to prove that the principle according to which no commander undertakes rescue actions if he thereby endangers a valuable ship is justified. For that purpose I refer to Document Doenitz-90, which is in the Volume IV of the document book, Page 258. It is an affidavit of Vice Admiral Rogge, retired. Me reports that in November 1941 his auxiliary cruiser was sunk from a great distance by a British cruiser and that the survivors had taken to the boats. They were towed away by a German submarine to a German supply ship and this supply ship too, a few days later, was sunk from a great distance by a British cruiser. Once again the survivors took to the boats and to floats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The affidavit closes with the words: "At both sinkings no attempt was made, presumably due to danger involved for the British cruiser, to save even individual crew members." The principle that a valuable ship must not risk rescue actions to save even members of its own crew is expressed with classical clarity and severity in the British Admiralty Orders which I have already submitted as Doenitz-67. The extract is printed on Page 96. There it says: "Aid to ships attacked by submarines: No British ocean-going merchant ship should aid a ship attacked by U-boats. Small coastal ships, fishing steamers, and other small ships with little draught should give all possible aid." The next document I submit is Doenitz-44, which is on Page 97. It is a questionnaire for Vice Admiral Kreisch who, according to a decision by the Tribunal, was interrogated in a British camp for prisoners of war. From January 1942 to January 1944 he was the officer in charge of submarines in Italy, which means that he was responsible for submarine warfare in the Mediterranean. According to his statements he knows of no order or suggestions regarding the killing of survivors. He advised his commanders that rescue measures must not endanger the task and safety of their own ships. In connection with the question whether Admiral Doenitz was a member of the Reich Government I should like to ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the 'German Armed Forces Law of 1935 which can be found on Page 105 of Volume II of my document books. Paragraph 3 will show that there was only one Minister for the German Armed Forces and that was the Reich Minister of War. On the following page in Paragraph 37 it is shown that this one Minister was assigned the right to issue legislative orders. On Page 107 I again have the decree which has been submitted to the Tribunal as Document 1915-PS, in which, dated 4 February, the post of the Reich Minister of War is abolished and the tasks of his Ministry are transferred to the Chief of the OKW. No new Ministry for the Army or the Navy is established.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The Prosecution has described Admiral Doenitz as a fanatical follower of the Nazi Party. The first document to prove this statement is dated 17 December 1943; it is Exhibit GB-185. Considering the time factor, I shall refrain from reading a few sentences from it to show that anything that Admiral Doenitz may have said about political questions was said from the point of view of the unity and strength of his sailors. May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, which again appears on Pages 103 and 104 of Volume II. I only want to draw your attention to the last paragraph on Page 104. It deals with the handing over of Navy shipyards to the Ministry of Armament in the autumn of 1943. It is an important question, important for the responsibility regarding the use of labor in the shipyards, and has been touched upon repeatedly in this Court. This sole tendency toward unity becomes clear from yet another document of the Prosecution from which I propose to read one sentence. It is Exhibit GB-186. In the British trial brief it is on Page 7. I shall only read the second and third sentences: "As officers we have the duty to be guardians of this unity of our people. Any disunity would also affect our troops." The following sentence deals with the same thought at greater length.
THE PRESIDENT: British trial brief, Page 7? Mine has only five pages. You mean the document book?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: It is the British document book; not the trial brief, but the document book, second and third sentences on Page 7, which I have read, Mr. President. The fact that Admiral Doenitz was not a fanatical follower of the Party but on the contrary fought against a political influence exercised upon the Armed Forces by the Party is shown in my following document, Doenitz-91. It is on Page 260 of Document Book 4. It is an affidavit from the chief of the legal department in the High Command of the Navy, Dr. Joachim Rudolphi. The Soviet Prosecution has already used this document during its cross-examination. I should like to give a brief summary of the contents: In the summer of 1943 Reichsleiter Bormann made an attempt through the Reich Minister of Justice to deprive the Armed Forces courts of their jurisdiction in so-called political cases. They were to be transferred to the Peoples' Court and other courts. The attempt, however, failed. It failed due to a report which Admiral Doenitz made verbally to the Fuehrer on this subject and during which he violently opposed the intentions of the Party. After the assassination attempt on 20 July, Bormann renewed his attempt. Again Admiral Doenitz raised objections,- but this time without success. A decree was issued on 20 September 1944 which deprived the Armed Forces courts of their jurisdiction regarding so-called political perpetrations. This decree, which was signed by Adolf Hitler, was not carried out in the Navy by explicit order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I shall read the last paragraph but one of   the affidavit, which says: "This attitude of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy made it possible for the Navy, as the only branch of the Armed Forces until the end of the war, not to have to transfer to the Peoples' Court or to a special court any criminal procedures of political coloring." On page 113 in Volume II of my document book I have included a lengthy extract from Exhibit GB-211, a document of the Prosecution; and this is an application by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy addressed to the Fuehrer and asking for supplies for the construction and repair of naval and merchant ships. During the interrogation and cross-examination of Admiral Doenitz this document has already been referred to. I should merely like to point out that this is a memorandum containing more than 20 pages; the Prosecution took up two points contained therein. The origin of the document is dealt with in Document Doenitz-46, Page 117 and the following pages. This is an affidavit from the officer who had drafted this memorandum. I can summarize the contents. The memorandum is concerned with measures which did not actually come within the sphere of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. It arose on the basis of a discussion which took place between all departments taking part in the construction and repair of war and merchant vessels. All these measures are summarized in this memoranda. The point objected to in particular by the Prosecution as amounting to a suggestion in favor of punitive measures against sabotage in shipyards is dealt with in detail on Page 119. I should like to point out particularly that at that time seven out of eight ships under construction were destroyed by sabotage. It was not a question of terror measures but of punitive measures entailing the forfeiting of certain advantages and, if necessary, the concentration of workers in camps adjoining the shipyards, so as to cut them off from any sabotage agents.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Following Exhibit GB-209 of the Prosecution, which deals with the alleged renunciation of the Geneva Convention, I submit Doenitz-48, which is on Page 122 and the following pages. It will show the model treatment afforded Allied prisoners of war in the only prisoner-of-war camp which was under the jurisdiction of Admiral Doenitz as the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. To begin with, the document contains an affidavit from two officers who dealt with prisoner-of-war affairs in the High Command of the Navy. This statement is to the effect that all the suggestions of the International Red Cross regarding these camps were followed. The next extract is a report by the last commandant of that camp, Korvettenkapitan Rogge, and I should like to read the second paragraph from that report: "In the camp Westertimke there were housed at my time about 5,500 to 7,000, at the end 8,000, prisoners of war and internees of different nations, mainly members of the British Navy. The camp had a good reputation, as was generally known. It was the best in Germany. This was expressly stated at a congress of British and other prisoner-of-war physicians of all German camps, which took place in Schwanenwerder near Berlin at the villa of Goebbels about December 1944. This statement was confirmed by the British chief camp physician in Westertimke, Major Dr. Harvey' British Royal Army, whom I am naming as a witness." I shall also read the last paragraph on Page 126: "As I was deputy commandant I stayed at the camp up to the capitulation and gave up the camp in the regular way to British troops who were quite satisfied with the transfer. Squadron Leader A. J. Evans gave me a letter confirming this. I enclose a photostat of this letter." This photostat copy appears on the following page, and it says: "Korvettenkapitan W. Rogge was for 10 months chief camp officer at the Marlag Camp at Westertimke.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Without exception all the prisoners of war in that camp have reported that he treated them with fairness and consideration." Then follows another affidavit from the intelligence officer in that camp. I should like to point out that this officer was born in February 1865 and that his age alone would, I think, exclude the use of any terror measures. I shall read from Page 129, the third from the last paragraph: "No means of pressure were employed at Dulag Nord. If a man told falsehoods he was sent back to his room and was not interrogated for 2 or 3 days. I believe I can say that no blow was ever struck at Dulag Cord." I should now like to refer briefly to the accusation raised against the defendant according to which he as "a fanatical Nazi" prolonged a hopeless war. I submit Doenitz-50, which contains statements made by Admiral Darlan, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr. Churchill in 1940. They will be found on Pages 132 and 133 of the document book and they will show that the afore-mentioned persons also considered it expedient in a critical situation to call upon the nation-partly with success and partly without-to render the utmost resistance. During his examination Admiral Doenitz gave as the reason for his views that he wanted to save German nationals in the East. As evidence for this I draw your attention to Exhibit GB-212, which can be found on Page 73 of the British document book. It is a decree of 11 April 1945, and I shall read two sentences under heading 1: "Capitulation means for certain the occupation of the whole of Germany by the Allies along the lines of partition discussed by them at Yalta. It also means, therefore, the ceding to Russia of further considerable parts of Germany west of the river Oder. Or does anyone think that at that stage the AngloSaxons will not keep to their agreements and will oppose a further advance of the Russian hordes into Germany with armed forces, and will begin a war with Russia for our sake?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The reasoning, 'Let the Anglo-Saxons into the country; then at least the Russians will not come,' is faulty, too." I shall also quote from Exhibit GB-188, which is on Page 10 of the document book of the Prosecution-I beg your pardon, Page 11. It is an order to the German Armed Forces dated 1 May 1945. I shall quote the second paragraph: "The Fuehrer has designated me to be his successor as head of State and as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. I am taking over the Supreme Command of all branches of the German Armed Forces with the will to carry on the struggle against the Bolsheviks until the fighting forces and hundreds of thousands of families of the German eastern areas have been saved from slavery and destruction." This, Mr. President, is the end of my documentary evidence. Two interrogatories are still outstanding. One is that of Kapitan zur See Rosing and the other of Fregattenkapitan Suhren. Furthermore-and this is something I particularly regret-the interrogatory from the Commander-in-Chief of the American Navy, Admiral Nimitz, has still not been received. I will submit these documents as soon as I have received them. And now, with permission of the Tribunal, I should like to call my witness, Admiral Wagner.
MR.DODD: Mr. President, while the witness is being called in, I would like to raise one matter with the Tribunal. On Saturday I understand that the question of when the witness Puhl would be called was raised before the Tribunal. And as I understand it from the record, it was left for counsel to settle the matter as to whether he should be called before the Raeder case comes on or after the Raeder case. I should like to say that we have some reasons for asking that he be called before the Raeder case, and there are two: First of all, he is here in the prison under a kind of confinement different from that under which he has been held by the French in the French territory; and secondly, the officer, Lieutenant Meltzer, who has been assisting in the Funk case, is very anxious-for compelling personal reasons-to return to the United States, and of course he will not be able to do so until we have concluded the Funk case. And, Mr. President, it will not take very long in my judgment to hear this witness. Me is only here for cross-examination on his affidavit and we would appreciate it if he could come on at the conclusion of the Doenitz case.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Dodd, he can be brought for cross-examination after the Doenitz case. [The witness Wagner took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
GERHARD WAGNER (Witness): Gerhard Wagner.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing. [The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral, when did you join the Navy?
WAGNER: On 4 June 1916.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Which positions did you hold in the High Command of the Navy, and at what time?
WAGNER: From summer 1933 until the summer of 1935 I was adviser in the operational department of the High Command. I was Kapitanleutnant and then Korvettenkapitan. In 1937, from January until September, I had the same position. From April 1939 until June 1941 I was the head of the operational group, known as "IA," in the operations section of the Naval Operations Staff. From June 1941 until June 1944 I was the chief of the operations section of the Naval Operations Staff. From June 1944 until May 1945, I was admiral for special tasks attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: So that during the entire war you were a member of the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: Yes, that is so.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What were the general tasks of the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: The tasks of the Naval Operations Staff included all those involved in naval warfare, both at sea and in the defense of the coasts, and also in the protection of our own merchant shipping. As far as territorial tasks were concerned, the Naval Operations Staff did not have any, neither at home nor in the occupied territories.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was the Naval Operations Staff part of the High Command of the Navy, the OKM?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff was part of the High Command of the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: What was the relationship between the Naval Operations Staff and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the OKW?
WAGNER: The OKW passed on the instructions and orders of Hitler, who was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, regarding the conduct of the war; usually, as far as naval warfare particularly was concerned, after examination and review by the Naval Operations Staff. General questions of the conduct of the war were decided without previous consultations with members of the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In which manner were the preparations of the High Command of the Navy for a possible war carried out?
WAGNER: Generally speaking, they consisted of mobilization preparations, tactical training, and strategic considerations for the event of a possible conflict.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff during your time receive an order to prepare for a definite possibility of war?
WAGNER: The first instance was the order for "Case White," the war against Poland. Before that, only tasks regarding security measures were given us.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were plans elaborated for the naval war against England?