dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. NELTE: Up to now I have explained Keitel's position as Chief of the OKW. In statements on Page 74 and the following pages I wanted to explain to you that the Prosecution, and others as well, have talked about the OKW: and "OKW" is a word which has three different types of significance. Mr. President, if you will be good enough to permit me to submit this in its written form, and if you would consider it as having been presented in Court, then I am willing to leave out the pages up to 77 and submit them to you. In any case, it appears to me to be an important part of the explanation regarding the interpretation of the word "OKW," and the fact that this is not identical with Keitel is particularly important. May I do that? [The President nodded his assent.] In that case, then, I shall continue at Page 77. In order to clarify the Defendant Keitel's responsibility and competence it is necessary to analyze the concept of OKW. I ask that this statement be not considered a theoretical and therefore superfluous discussion. The very fact that the Prosecution makes a Weeping and fundamental assertion, and that the French Prosecution undertakes a pointedly legal examination of the question as to the office in which each defendant was active with regard to the counts he is charged with, makes it my duty to clear up a mistake made by the Prosecution. However, this mistake is an the more excusable, because not only foreign countries but large groups at home, even within the Armed Forces, did not know what OKW meant. It became a popular collective term for the supreme command of the Armed Forces without anybody taking the trouble to find out who and what was behind the three words "Oberkommando der Wehrmacht." This corresponds to the law of inertia governing the association of human beings, to the almost pathological mania to abbreviate titles of military commands.
DR. NELTE: Since, furthermore, the communiqués of the High Command of the Armed Forces were published daily, and all announcements referring to war events began with the words: ``The High Command of the Armed Forces announces," not only did these words become impressed upon the public's mind, but also the conception that the "High Command of the Armed Forces" was the supreme military command. The conception would be correct had the words OKW not been translated with Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command of the Armed Forces) but rather as Supreme Commander (Oberkommandierender) of the Armed Forces. It was Hitler alone, as "Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,,, who was the incarnation of what everybody imagined the OKW to be, namely, the central military planning and command and thus the supreme command and executive headquarters for all military matters. In this respect the OKW was synonymous with Hitler as "Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces," which was his official title. If, in naming the headquarters of the supreme commander, it was desired to avoid the title "Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces" which was in accordance with the prevalent Leadership Principle, the title "Oberkommando der Wehrmacht" was bound to be used. This headquarters comprises the supreme commander himself, that is, Hitler, and his assistants, his staff. The Fuehrer Decree of 4 February 1938 bearing the heading: "Decree concerning the Command of the Armed Forces" resulted, through the unfortunate and vague nature of its wording, in an interpretation that the "Chief OKW" mentioned therein was the chief in the sense of director, of the High Command of the Armed Forces. It is true that it follows from the decree that "Chief OKW" is to mean "Chief of Staff OKW," that is chief of Hitler's bureau in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
DR. NELTE: But since then, every time that people have spoken and speak of the OKW, everybody thinks of Keitel without examining whether the expression means: OKW-Oberkommandierender (supreme Commander) of the Armed Forces, OKW-Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, or OKW-Staff of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Prosecution makes no distinction in this respect, just as the German agencies were unaware of the exact difference, or at any rate paid no attention to it. They, just like the Prosecution now, thought it right to claim the OKW's jurisdiction and responsibility for anything having a connection with the Armed Forces or members of the Armed Forces. From this viewpoint to claiming Keitel's personal jurisdiction by virtue of the title "Chief OKW" there is only a short step. For Germans and foreigners the recollection of the first World War was a contributing factor in forming this opinion, which was not based on an examination according to constitutional law. The relationship between Hitler and Keitel prompted the comparison with the relationship between the Kaiser and Von Hindenburg. This comparison had results for the Defendant Keitel which are shown at this Trial. Without thinking of the fundamental differences between Von Hindenburg as Chief of the Great General Staff which existed until 1918, and Keitel as the chief of Hitler's military executive staff, and without knowing the field of Keitel's jurisdiction and what possibilities Keitel had as regards Hitters plans and measures by virtue of the functions assigned to him, comparisons were made which gave rise to doubts about him. When furthermore-after the catastrophe had set in-Keitel once again came to play an outwardly similar part as representative of the Armed Forces when he had to execute the signature for unconditional surrender, this comparison also turned out to his disadvantage. People do not ask about jurisdiction when things go badly, but look for a guilty person and the guilty person is judged by external appearances.
DR. NELTE: Quite naturally the great attention Paid to Keitel's person at this Trial can largely be traced to the fact that after Hitler's death Keitel came into the public eye. In order to see clearly what part Keitel really played, and what share he had in what happened, I now wish-after investigating his legal competencies-to examine what actual influence he had upon the development and carrying-out of the measures, the effects of which constitute the subject of this Trial. From everyday experience we know that it does not matter so much what a person is supposed to be in a particular position, but what he has made of that position by virtue of his personality I believe I may say that in the course of this Trial the personality of no other defendant has been judged in such varying and contradictory ways as that of the Defendant Keitel. Decisive for Keitel's material responsibility is his actual position in the tug-of-war with and around Hitler, his effective influence upon that group, and thus on those circumstances as a whole which could have influenced the operations of Hitler's headquarters in the military field. I shall deal with this fundamental topic when taking up the charges made by the Prosecution against Keitel and other defendants on the strength of the cross-examination of Dr. Gisevius, in other words, after the presentation of evidence for Keitel has been completed. In view of the comprehensive scope of Justice Jackson's questions and the answers given thereto by Dr. Gisevius, the testimony of Dr. Gisevius has become of tremendous importance in the case of the Defendant Keitel. Had Dr. Gisevius' statements about Keitel been true-that is, statements made by him on the basis of information, in most instances in terms of conclusive findings-the Defendant Keitel could not have told the truth during the presentation of evidence. The importance of that fact becomes evident when it is considered that a negative opinion on truthfulness would of necessity destroy Keitel's defense, which in its essence draws on the subjective aspect of facts as a whole.
DR. NELTE: In view of this fact and the importance of the testimony of Dr. Gisevius also for other defendants, it becomes my duty to explain the contrast between Keitel's answers and the testimony of the witness Gisevius. Experience teaches us that dead witnesses are the best witnesses, because their purported utterances cannot be directly refuted. Evidence on the strength of information belongs-to another group of statements which. almost defy refutation. The testimony of Gisevius combines both possibilities, in that he bases his testimony primarily on information obtained from witnesses who are dead. Justice Jackson used Dr. Gisevius as star witness in his comprehensive attack on the Defendant Keitel. After the completion of the presentation of evidence against Keitel, he did not bring forward One individual circumstance, but an Indictment on all Counts and a general judgment on Keitel's answers. The counterevidence is concerned with proving the objective incorrectness of facts based upon information obtained-from certain individuals and further, with establishing proof of the unreliability of the information. I call to mind the words which the Defendant Keitel said under oath upon completion of his direct examination by me while in the witness box: "One may hold it against me that I was wrong and made mistakes, that my attitude toward the Fuehrer Adolf Hitler was wrong and weak, but it should not be said of me that I was a coward, that I was untruthful, and that I was disloyal." I sum up in condensed form the charges made against the Defendant Keitel during interrogation by the Prosecution, as follows: (1) Keitel built an impenetrable ring round Hitler so that the latter could be told nothing. (2) Keitel failed to pass on to Hitler reports he had received from Canaris whenever they concerned atrocities, crimes, and the like, or he gave orders to modify them. (3) Keitel had a tremendous influence on the OKW and the Army.
DR. NELTE: (4) Keitel threatened his subordinates, when they made political statements, that he would not protect them; he even said that he would turn them over to the Gestapo. Dr. Gisevius says in one part of his statement that Keitel had no influence over Hitler. He exonerates Hitler by explaining that Keitel had formed a ring round Hitler, in order that the latter should be told nothing. The British and American Prosecution in their Indictment called Keitel a powerful staff officer who had exerted great influence over Hitler; the French Prosecution described Keitel as a willing tool of Hitler; the German generals called him a `'yes man" who could not carry anything through; and now Keitel grows, according to the statement of Dr. Gisevius, into a real handyman and butler for Hitler, who hid from the latter anything bad, who submitted to him only what he saw fit, and permitted no one to approach Hitler. To assert that Keitel blocked access to Hitler, can only be maintained by somebody who did not know the conditions prevailing around Hitler. Before the war Keitel worked in Berlin in Bendler Strasse, while Hitler was in Wilhelmstrasse. Keitel came perhaps once a week to report, or on special order. At that time, on account of the distance, it was in fact impossible for Keitel to exert any influence over access to the Fuehrer. It was equally impossible when Hitler was at the Berghof near Berchtesgaden for weeks at a time, while Keitel remained in Berlin. . At the beginning of operations, Keitel was with Jodl and the Armed Forces Operations Staff at the Fuehrer's headquarters. Here also they were separated. Keitel did not sit in Hitler's anteroom, but rather in other buildings or barracks. He came from time to time with General Jodl to the conference on the situation, in which, besides Hitler, some 15 or 20 officers of all three branches of the Armed Forces took part. Apart from the conferences on the situation there was no personal contact. When Hitler wanted Keitel for anything he sent for him.
DR. NELTE: Personally and individually there was closer contact in Berlin between Hitler and his adjutants, the Chief of the Party Chancellery, the Chief of the Presidential Chancellery, and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. Keitel not only could not decide who should see Hitler, he also could not possibly prevent anybody going to Hitler. Hitler's sources of information were the responsible heads of each department; it was occasionally not clear whence Hitler obtained his information, as I have already stated. Gisevius did not know these conditions from his own experience; he himself was never near Keitel, who never saw or spoke to him and did not know his name. When he gave his opinion here, he could only base on information given him by Canaris, Thomas, and Oster. General Jodl has been heard regarding this question. He certainly is the best witness in this matter, since he, as well as Keitel, lived in direct proximity to Hitler and therefore could form his own judgment. He stated concerning this matter: "Unfortunately, it was impossible to keep things from Hitler. Many channels of information led directly to Hitler." Upon my interrogation, at the suggestion of the Tribunal, Jodl fully confirmed that what Keitel had testified was quite correct, and that what witness Gisevius stated in this respect was, in general, merely figures of speech. The Codefendants, Admirals Raeder and Doenitz, have confirmed that the allegation of the witness Gisevius that Keitel was able to keep the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces away from Hitler is false. If, however, this was not the case, it follows that the way from the branches of the Armed Forces to the Fuehrer was open at any time. Through the hearing of witnesses it was also established that apart from Jodl, the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Stan, Canaris in particular had direct access to Hitler. Thus, the accusation of the witness Gisevius that Keitel had formed a ring round Hitler is proved false.
DR. NELTE: The witness Gisevius has declared that reports were submitted to Keitel by Canaris about atrocities in connection with deportations, extermination of Jews, concentration camps, the persecution of the Church, and the killing of insane persons, all of which Keitel withheld from Hitler. The same is alleged about the reports of General Thomas, Chief of the War Economy Office, the purpose of which was to inform Hitler about the war potential of the enemy and make him listen to reason. Concerning Admiral Canaris' reports, it must be said that as chief of espionage and counterintelligence he naturally delivered regular reports which concerned the conduct of the war, including the conduct of economic warfare. It is affirmed that reports were submitted on subjects which belonged neither to the jurisdiction of the Counterintelligence Office nor to that of the OKW. It has been proved that Hitler took strict care that every worker confined himself to his own special field, and it was particularly forbidden for military offices to concern themselves with political affairs. Keitel has declared under oath that he knew nothing about the atrocities, and especially the extermination of the Jews and the concentration camps. This is in absolute contradiction to the assertion of the witness Gisevius that Canaris submitted reports to the Defendant Keitel on the above-mentioned subjects. One can assert that reports of any kind whatsoever were delivered to Keitel without fear of being contradicted, especially when one has no fear that these reports will be found. For if they are not delivered they cannot be found, because they do not exist Now Gisevius has declared that he collected documents from the beginning which contained incriminating material. Is it not remarkable, under these circumstances, that up to now none of these reports have been produced? As far as they were available at the OKW, they have been used in the accusation and as evidence.
DR. NELTE: Can it be sufficient under these circumstances for a witness to declare that he knows from third parties that such reports were submitted to Keitel? Canaris, because of his particular activity, which took him constantly to foreign countries on personal secret errands for Hitler, had access to Hitler at all times. He would thus have had an opportunity to go to Hitler immediately if he had had such serious misgivings of conscience, as Gisevius has declared he had. Why did he not do so? Now, Gisevius, who in general has pronounced comprehensive and damning accusations, has, luckily for Keitel, at one point of his deposition made a positive declaration that permits of objective verification. I quote: ". . . I believe that I have still two examples to mention, which to me are particularly characteristic: First, the attempt was made by all possible means to induce Field Marshal Keitel to warn Hitler against the invasion of Holland and Belgium, that is, to inform Hitler that the information submitted by Keitel about alleged violations of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was false. The Counterintelligence Office was to prepare Reports incriminating the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral Canaris at that time refused to sign these reports. I request that this be verified. He told Keitel repeatedly that this report which was ostensibly made by the OKW was false. This is an instance where Herr Keitel did not transmit to Hitler what he was supposed to have transmitted..." I have submitted to General Jodl, here on the witness stand, Document 790-PS, which refers to the case of the White Paper concerning violations of neutrality by Holland and Belgium. Jodl testified literally, and I quote: ". . . I understand the question, and would like very briefly to state the facts how it was possible-if disgust does not choke me. I was present when Canaris came to the Field Marshal in the Reich Chancellery with these report notes and laid before him the draft of the Foreign Office's White Paper.
DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Keitel then looked it through, above all paying attention to the comments which Canaris had made at the request of the Foreign Office, namely, that the reports were perhaps still somewhat in need of improvement, that he should confirm the fact that a military operation against Holland and Belgium was absolutely necessary, and that, as is expressed here, a final really striking violation of neutrality was still lacking. Before Canaris had said a word, Field Marshal Keitel threw the book on the table and said: 'I refuse to do this, why should I take any responsibility at all for a political decision? In this White Paper there appear word for word, true and correct, the very same reports that you, yourself, Canaris, brought to me.' To this Canaris said: 'I am entirely of the same point of view. It is, in my. opinion too, entirely superfluous to have this document signed on the part of the Armed Forces, and the reports that we have here are altogether quite sufficient to prove the violations of neutrality which have taken place in Holland and Belgium.' And he advised Field Marshal Keitel not to sign it at all. That is the way it happened. The Field Marshal then took the paper with him and I do not know what happened subsequently..." Keitel did not sign the White Paper. Therefore in the only verifiable case a clear proof is obtained of  the incorrectness of Gisevius' testimony. According to the statement of the witness Gisevius, Keitel exerted a tremendous influence on the OKW and the Army. These words, without any presentation of concrete facts, are only a phrase in the mouth of a man who had no contact whatsoever with Keitel. They are refuted by the statements of Reich Marshal Goering, Admiral Doenitz, and Admiral Raeder. Jodl has defined this statement as merely a figure of speech. Insofar as the witness speaks of his tremendous influence on the OKW, it must appear questionable what he really means.
DR. NELTE: Naturally, Keitel as Chief of Staff had influence in the OKW, influence which resulted from his position, which I have already discussed. His position in relation to his subordinates will be taken up later. The important thing, however, is whether Keitel had a decisive and culpable influence on what happened. That this was not the case has even been confirmed by Gisevius, and also the fact that he had no decisive influence on the branches of the Armed Forces; it has also been established by the results of the testimony. A particularly damaging charge against the Defendant Keitel was "that instead of placing himself in front of his subordinate officers to protect them, he threatened to hand them over to the Gestapo." In contradiction to this it has been established that no chief of office in the OKW was dismissed in the years up to 1944; furthermore, until 20 July 1944, the day of the attempt on Hitler's life and the transfer of the judicial power in the home Army to Himmler, no officer of the OKW was turned over to the Police. Admiral Doenitz has confirmed that the branches of the Armed Forces and the OKW were very scrupulous in maintaining the privileges of the Armed Forces in relation to the Police. The Court has also seen here how General Jodl spoke about his relationship to the Defendant Keitel. I think this remark has a special importance, not only because Keitel lived on companionable and friendly terms with his official subordinate, General Jodl, during their long years of co-operation. As natural as that may appear, the less natural it is if one reflects that Jodl, in spite of his officially subordinate position, in reality became more and more Hitler's sole strategic adviser. What this means, considering the preponderance of the operational tasks in the war, has been convincingly demonstrated here by General Jodl.
DR. NELTE: If Keitel accepted this without jealousy, freely acknowledging the superiority of his subordinate Jodl in this domain this proves that Keitel possessed a trait of character which refutes the information derived from obscure sources by the witness Gisevius. The proven fact that Keitel lived on friendly and companionable terms with his subordinate Chief of Office, Canaris, is also in contrast with the assertion to the contrary by the witness Gisevius. In this connection it is necessary to refer to the fact, not submitted by Keitel but testified to by Jodl without Keitel's consent, that the latter supported and helped Canaris' family after his arrest. I only refer to this to refute the perhaps most serious personal reproach, according to which Keitel did not behave decently toward his subordinates and abused his superior position-which was especially powerful in military life-even to the point of threatening them with violence. In reality, according to Gisevius' evidence, Admiral Canaris not only played a double role officially, but also with respect to the Defendant Keitel; in exploiting the friendship shown to him he 8 July 46 ~ expressed a similar attitude, whereas among his own group he openly spoke in a spiteful way about Keitel. Finally, in this connection reference must still be made to the evidence of the witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels (Session of 8 May 1946) from which it is clear that Keitel always treated the officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff kindly. The witness mentions a quarrel between himself and Lieutenant Colonel Ziervogel on the one hand and Himmler on the other, in which Keitel, to whom the incident was reported, immediately and energetically intervened in writing to protect his subordinates against Himmler. The affidavit of the Chief of Office in Canaris' office, Admiral Burckner, to which I refer, testifies in the same way to Keitel's kindly attitude toward his subordinates.