dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it was Schmalz at this time. Now, the Hermann Goering Division had been concerned in a number of three -- I call them incidents; I would not say -- what I mean by incidents is the sort of thing which I have been describing at Civitella. Let me remind you of one or two. Do you remember at Stia, on the 13th to the 18th of April, 137 civilians were killed, including 45 women and children; do you remember that incident? Civitella, that was on the 29th of June. And do you remember Buchini on the 7th and 9th of July; do you remember an incident at Buchini?
KESSELRING: It is possible, but I would have to study the details first.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps you will remember this. I will put it to you generally, Witness, because it is a perfectly general course of conduct, and there were a number of these incidents in which the Hermann Goering Division was engaged. Do you remember that?
KESSELRING: There were many incidents like that on both sides, and I would first have to study the exact details of the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, this is what I really want you to apply your mind to. Is it correct that the Hermann Goering Division was only under General Herr and General Von Vietinghoff for tactical purposes, and reported each day to Berlin to Reich Marshal Goering as to what they were doing?
KESSELRING: The Hermann Goering Division was under the General Command and the Army for tactical purposes, but I must assume that, in these questions, subordination to the General Command and the Army actually did exist. Whether there were any matters operating outside that, I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will put the words exactly, and you can see where I have the words from the way I put them: "The 1st Airborne Division and the Hermann Goering Division came under the army commanders only as regards tactics; for all other questions, on the other hand, directly under the Reich Marshal, to whom they had to send daily reports. They were not permitted to receive orders from the army commanders concerning criminal proceedings, nor to report the results of such proceedings. Thus they carried on the war against guerrillas according to principles which to some extent deviated from those of the Army." Is that a correct statement?
KESSELRING: That conception is correct, but the question is, perhaps, that the word "tactics" can, of course, be understood in a somewhat wider or narrower sense.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The word what?
KESSELRING: Tactics. That this tactical subordination can be understood either in a wider or a narrower sense.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, that is why I read the whole thing to you, because it is quite clear what the person's statement I am reading means there, is it not? He says that they were not permitted to receive orders from the army commanders on criminal proceedings or to report the results, and that they carried on the war against guerrillas according to principles which deviated from those of General Von Vietinghoff, did they not?
KESSELRING: This is the first time that I have heard of this, but if another officer has said so then I must assume it is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, are you sure it is the first time that you have heard about it? It is very difficult to remember every incident. Please, do not think that I want to be offensive, but I want you to try to remember. Did not General Herr make numerous complaints to you about this anomalous position with regard to the Hermann Goering Division, and did you never give any official reply to General Herr's reports?
KESSELRING: Numerous reports certainly did not arrive from General Herr. There may have been verbal consultations ...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In your command post?
KESSELRING: Yes. And may I add once more that such definitions of attitude were definitely in existence within the army group. With regard to the case concerned, I must say that I do not know whether this comes under the heading "tactics" or belongs to another function.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not really putting the point to you quite clearly. What I am suggesting is this: If you disagree with "numerous," will you accept "some," that on some occasions General Herr reported to you that he was in difficulties through this anomalous position of the Hermann Goering Division?
KESSELRING: That I can assume.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Chief of Staff at this time was General Roettiger, was he not?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From the 10th of June onwards, just over this time, did not General Roettiger also talk to you about the position of the Hermann Goering Division being under the special protection of Reich Marshal Goering in Berlin?
KESSELRING: Yes. We discussed that subject quite a lot.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, as far as the particular incident, in which the Hermann Goering Division was involved, is concerned they took their orders from the Defendant Goering, who is sitting at the dock, did they not, as to how they were to treat the partisans?
KESSELRING: I could not tell you that. Those channels bypassed me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; they bypassed you. They bypassed General Herr, they bypassed Vietinghoff, they bypassed you, and went straight to Berlin. That is right, is it not?
KESSELRING: Yes, certainly. That was the special channel for the SS and for the Hermann Goering Division.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. You see, at the moment the Tribunal is dealing with the case of the Defendant Goering. That is why I ask you these questions. Now, just one or two short points. You remember Dr. Laternser asking you one or two questions about the High Command and the General Staff. Do you remember Dr. Laternser asking you some questions?
KESSELRING: Yes, I am aware of that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I wanted just to clear one part out of the way altogether. You must have realized, Witness, that the body that is mentioned in this case has nothing to do with the Staff Corps of the German Army. I think you made that clear yourself yesterday.
KESSELRING: With what did you say?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With the staff corps. You had, both in the Army and the Air Force, a corps of officers who had gone through the Military Academy and were staff officers of all ranks, I suppose down to captain, had you not?
KESSELRING: The question is not quite clear to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry. You had in both the Army and the Luftwaffe a staff corps of officers who had been to Military Academy and were thereafter staff officers. And they had, I think, the right of reporting directly to the Chief of Staff if they wanted to? Is that not so? Is that right or wrong?
KESSELRING: That is not correct, except, as I said yesterday, as far as education was concerned. As far as the general attitude was concerned, the General Chief of Staff had the right to influence General Staff officers directly; but the other way around, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that corps went right down, I suppose, to captain or lieutenant, did it not?
KESSELRING: No, captain.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought that was it. May I tell you, we are not interested in that corps at all. The Prosecution are not interested in that corps at all. Now, with regard to the persons who are named in the Indictment, you know there are nine commander-in-chief or staff positions named, and then the Oberbefehlshaber, who commanded in certain areas or commanded certain fleets of the Luftwaffe. You have looked at that, I suppose, have you?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am trying to put it shortly, Witness, so that we would not take time. I just want you to consider this. Are not these people who are mentioned -- that is, the heads of the OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL, and their deputies and the Oberbefehlshaber -- the officers in the German Armed Forces who would have had most to do with the policy and planning of wars?
KESSELRING: The commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces were of course the advisory organs of the Supreme Head of the State in all mifitary-political questions. The commanders-in-chief of Army Groups had no influence whatever.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would like you to take the case of two examples. I think you were present at both of these. Before the attack on Poland there was a meeting on the 22d of August, which has been mentioned here before. Did that consist of these higher officers that I mentioned, the heads of the various branches, and also of the Oberbefehlshaber?
KESSELRING: It consisted of the commanding officers of the war in that theater.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, at that time the sector which was going to be the subject of war was Poland. At that time the main purpose was considering the Polish campaign, was it not? The main purpose of that meeting, I suppose, was to consider the Polish campaign with the possibility of a campaign against the Western Powers if they came in?
KESSELRING: About that I can give you no information. Generally speaking we discussed only Polish questions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Tribunal has heard about that meeting so often I am not going to ask about it. I am only getting from you the people who were there. Now, let me remind you of another meeting. On the 9th of June 1941 there was a conference -- Barbarossa -- for the attack on the Soviet Union. Do you remember that? Berchtesgaden.
KESSELRING: Whether it was on the 9th of June, I do not know. But I did take part in one conference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there, and again, before the Russian campaign, the people who were there were the holders of these supreme positions and the Oberbefehlshaber, were they not?
KESSELRING: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Including those that had territorial commands, like, for example, General Von Falkenhorst, who was the Army High Commander in Norway at that time? He was there?
KESSELRING: General Von Falkenhorst?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
KESSELRING: It is quite possible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Stumpf of Air Fleet 5, and, if I may, I do not know what the ranks were so I just give the names. Rundstedt, Reichenau, Stulpnagel, Schubert, Kleist, and of course Bock, Kluge, Guderian, Halder, Kesselring?
KESSELRING: The latter were certainly there. As for Stumpf and Falkenhorst, I cannot say.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that before a campaign it was customary for the holders of these high positions to meet, was it not -- to meet the Fuehrer?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to help me on one other small point. Do you remember saying yesterday to Dr. Laternser that the members of this alleged group were far too concerned with high matters of strategy to have anything to do with Fifth Columnists? Do you remember saying that, words to that effect?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not know if you know, but outside Germany the name Quisling has become an ordinary word of use as an alternative to Fifth columnist. Did you know that? You talk about a Quisling meaning a Fifth Columnist. You have not heard that?
KESSELRING: No, I did not know that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know who Quisling was?
KESSELRING: Yes, indeed I do.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would just like you to listen to this, because it concerns your service. The Defendant Rosenberg in January 1940 wrote to the Fuehrer as follows: "Assuming that his" -- that is, Quisling -- "statements would be of special interest to the Marshal of the Reich, Goering, for aero-strategical reasons, Quisling was referred to State Secretary Korner by the Foreign Affairs Office." Did he come to you at all for aero-strategical reasons?
KESSELRING: No, that is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you know that the Defendant Raeder introduced Quisling to Hitler in December 1939? Did you know that?
KESSELRING: No, that is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that the head of the German Air Force and the head of the German Navy are important members of this group of commanders-in-chief, are they not?
KESSELRING: Supreme commanders, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If they were dealing with the typical columnist, perhaps members of the group had more to do with Fifth Columnists than you knew.
KESSELRING: Yesterday I merely spoke from the point of view of the supreme commanders on the front and our tasks were in a different sphere.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I think I have finished, but perhaps your Lordship would allow me just over the adjournment to see if there is any small point. My Lord, the other thing is this. I think we ought to put in these documents to which I have referred, because the Defense may want to deal with them later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if they have not already been put in.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think some of the orders have not been put in. I have read part of them into the record, and I will put them in.
THE PRESIDENT: They must be put in and marked then. [The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you direct your attention to the text after the bomb plot in Rome on 23 March 1944. Do you remember what I have in mind -- the bomb plot in Rome? Remember? At that time your Chief of Staff was General Westphal, and he reported the plot directly to General Buettler? Perhaps you will help me as to the pronunciation?
KESSELRING: Winter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELI-FYFE: General what?
KESSELRING: General Winter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn't he report to a General Buettler, spelled B-u-e-t-t-l-e-r?
KESSELRING: Von Buttlar.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Von Buttlar?
KESSELRING: That was his predecessor.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Von Buttlar informed your Chief of Staff that he would have to report the matter to the Fuehrer, is that right?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And he got in touch with the Defendant Jodl, and the Defendant Jodl and the Defendant Keitel reported the matter to the Fuehrer?
KESSELRING: That is probably correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Fuehrer gave an order that either 20 or 10 -- you aren't quite sure which, but you rather think 20 -- Italians should be killed?
KESSELRING: I believe that that is a report from Westphal, which I must assume is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you remember, Witness, whether it was 20 or 10 now?
KESSELRING: I assume 10, 1 do not know the exact number.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You do not know the exact number?
KESSELRING: I assume 10.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take it as 10 for the moment. The competent authority for Rome was General Von Mackensen, was it not?
KESSELRING: General Mackensen was Commander-in-Chief of the 14th Army, and the commander of Rome was subordinate to him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the person, to use your words, who advised him on this matter was a man called Kappler, wasn't he?
KESSELRING: Kappler, of the Security Service.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was he? An ObergruppenFuehrer or something like that?
KESSELRING: ObersturmbannFuehrer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember, after some comments in the Osservatore Romano you had an inquiry directed into the incident by your intelligence officer whose name was Zolling, don't you?
KESSELRING: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you also got a report from Kappler himself, did you not?
KESSELRING: Kappler merely had a brief report relayed to me by telephone to the effect that he had a corresponding number of condemned men available.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn't Kappler tell you that he had executed 382 people?
KESSELRING: The execution lay in the hands of the 14th Army and I finally received merely the news of its being carried out without any further explanation, and had no direct conversation with Kappler.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you sure of that?
KESSELRING: At the end -- I expressly emphasize this once more -- I conversed with him briefly by telephone, after I had arrived at my command post and this report had been given me, as I said earlier. Otherwise I can recall no further direct communication. I do remember that perhaps 8 or 10 days later I met him and I told him that I was to a certain extent grateful to him that this very distasteful matter had been settled in a way which was legally and morally above reproach.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us see what you had to be grateful for. You were interrogated about this on the 8th of January. Do you remember being asked this question? "Then Zolling didn't tell you that all this number that was executed had previously been convicted of some crime punishable by death?" And you answered, "Yes, I said that already. Yes, he did that.. Even Kappler had told me that."
KESSELRING: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So the explanation which you say was given to you was that they took a number of people, 382 1 suggest, who had been guilty of other crimes and executed them as a reprisal for the bomb plot, isnt that right?
KESSELRING: That is correct, on the assumption that these people had been sentenced to death.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This has already been put to you. This is Kappler's account -- that of the 382, 176 had committed acts punishable by death; 22 were people whose cases were marked "closed"; 17 had been sentenced to terms of labor; 4 had actually been condemned to death; 4 had been arrested near the scene of the crime. That made 223. Didn't Kappler say to you, "Later the number of victims rose to 325 and I decided to add 57 Jews?" Didn't Kappler give you these figures?
KESSELRING: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you agree with this, that a large number of persons were executed in consequence of the order to kill 10 Italians, or maybe 20 Italians, for one German who had been killed?
KESSELRING: I admit that, on the assumption, as I have already stated, that these were people who had already been convicted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it didn't make any difference to you whether they had been convicted for the bomb outrage or for any other offense?
KESSELRING: The situation was as follows: The Garigliano battle had begun to rage on the Southern Front. At that time a bomb attack was made on a police company by people of Rome, who had been treated with unparalleled mildness until then. The excitement on the German side was such that I, as well as the officers under my command, including Embassy Counsellor Moellhausen, had to do anything we could to calm the agitation. Therefore on the one side, and on the other, something had to be done -- something which seemed to me the most expedient measure for preventing such incidents, namely a public humiliation, a notification that nothing could be undertaken against the German Army without consequences being faced. For me that was the essential point; whether X or Y was involved in this outrage was for me a question of small importance. This alone was of primary importance -- that public opinion should be quieted in the shortest possible time, on the Roman as well as on the German side.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your prior point was to take a third attitude, or some people might say, "terrorize" the population, so that they would not repeat or do anything against the German Army.
KESSELRING: I do not know -- this expression comes from the Rotterdam examination. As far as I know and believe I did not use this expression. I have to repeat that I stood, if I may say so, on ideally friendly terms with the Italians - for this very reason I was called to Italy -- and that I had the most compelling reason to win friendship and not to sow enmity; and I intervened there, and certainly in a decisive way, only because it was a matter of cutting off the root of this evil growth within a short time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I asked you various questions about your acts of friendship to the Italians this morning and I am not going back to them. I only want to ask you one other point about which perhaps you will be able to relieve my mind. On the 2d of November 1943 were you the commanding general in Italy, that is, after you became ...
KESSELRING: May I add something to the first point?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You must come on to this point, and I want you to tell whether you were the commanding general in Italy on the 2d of November 1943? Were you?
KESSELRING: Since November, since 2 November 1943?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember sending a telegram to the OKW that three British Commandos taken prisoner near Pescara were to be given special treatment? That means murder, "special treatment"; it means that they were killed by the SS.
KESSELRING: No. I beg your pardon.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What do you mean by "special treatment"?
KESSELRING: That these people at Pescara, as I have already mentioned once today, were not shot, but rather the wounded were taken to a hospital and, as far as I recall, the unwounded to a prisoner-of-war camp.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There were nine others who were taken to a hospital and three, according to your telegram got "special treatment" and nine others were taken to hospitals. I was going to ask you about those taken to hospitals. What did you do with people who came under the Commando Order who were taken to hospitals?
KESSELRING: As I have already stated before, they were treated according to the principles of the Hague Convention as generally practiced.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not going to argue with you whether the Commando Order was in accordance with the Hague Convention. We know what the Commando Order was, that people taken in Commandos were to be shot. What I am asking you is, supposing some Commandos had the misfortune to be wounded, what happened to them?
KESSELRING: According to the text of this order they would have to be shot. I stated b,efore that this order in this case -- I assume with the collaboration of General Jodl -- was carried out in the normal fashion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is heard evidence in this Court that in Vilna it was the practice of the SS to kill offhand newborn Jewish babies in hospitals. Can you give me your assurance that Commando troops who were wounded and taken to hospitals were not killed offhand.
KESSELRING: I assure you that I was not informed of any execution of this sort and would also not have tolerated it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish any further crossexamination? Then, Dr. Stahmer, do you wish to re-examine?
DR. STAHMER: The British Prosecution has just submitted new facts which were not known until now, especially about the shooting of hostages, which was carried out in Italy by the Hermann Goering Division in connection with the combating of partisans and for which the Defendant Goering apparently is to be made responsible. In this connection new documents were submitted. At the moment I am not in the position to answer these facts and these serious charges, and to put pertinent questions to the witness. After a careful examination of the material, I shall submit the appropriate motions and I ask for the opportunity to make a statement as to whether I need further witnesses and have to recall the witness Kesselring. I shall of course limit myself to submitting only absolutely necessary requests for evidence within the framework of the accusations just made, in order to prevent an unnecessary prolongation of the trial.