dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBOHLER: May I first remind the Tribunal that the Prosecution Exhibits GB-224 and GB-191 contain the same general accusations against U-boat warfare as are referred to in many of my following documents. The documents dealing with these general accusations are in Document Books 3 and 4. First, I submit Document D5nitz-54 which contains the German declaration of adherence to the London Submarine Protocol. I do not need to read it because it has already been mentioned repeatedly. Then, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the German Prize Ordinance, an excerpt of which can be found on Page 137. I should like to point out that Article 74 agrees word for word with the regulations of the London Protocol. May I point out at the same time that, as shown on Page 138, this Prize Ordinance was not signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. That is a contribution to the question as to whether the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy was a member of the Reich Government. He had no authority to sign this ordinance. The next document which I submit is D6nitz-55. That is the order of 3 September 1939, with which the U-boats entered the war. I do not know whether these documents are so well known to the Tribunal that I need merely sum them up or whether it is better to read parts of them.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you might mention them together, really, specifying shortly what they relate to.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. The order of 3 September directs the boats to pay strict attention to all the rules of naval warfare. It orders the war to be conducted according to the Prize Ordinance. Furthermore, it provides for a preparatory order for the intensification of economic warfare, because of the arming of enemy merchant ships. This order is on Page 140. Since I shall refer to that later when examining a witness, I need not read it now. I should like to read to the Tribunal from an English document, to show that the boats were really acting according to these orders. It is Exhibit Number GB-l91. It is in the original on Page 5, Mr. President. That sentence is not in the English excerpt, and that is why I will read it in English from the original: "Thus the Germans started with the Ordinance which was, at any rate, a clear, reasonable, and not inhuman document. "German submarine commanders, with some exceptions, behaved in accordance with its provisions during the first months of the war. Indeed, in one case, a submarine had ordered the crew of a trawler to take to their boat as the ship was to be sunk. But when the commander saw the state of the boat, he said: 'Thirteen men in that boat! You English are no good, sending a ship to sea with a boat like that.' And the skipper was told to re-embark his crew on the trawler and make for home at full speed, with a bottle of German gin and the submarine commander's compliments." That is an English opinion taken out of a document of the Prosecution. My next document is Doenitz-56, an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff of 9 September 1939, on Page 141. "English information office disseminates the news through Reuters that Germany has opened total U-boat warfare." Then, as Doenitz-57, on Page 143, I should like to submit to the Tribunal an account of the experiences which the Naval Operations Staff had in U-boat warfare up to that date. It is an entry of 21 September 1939 in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I read under Figure 2: "The commanders of U-boats which have returned report the following valuable experiences: ". .. (b) English, partly also neutral steamers, sharp zigzags, partly blacked-out. English steamers, when stopped, immediately radio SOS with exact position. Thereupon English planes come in to fight U-boats. "(c) English steamers have repeatedly tried to escape. Some steamers are armed, one steamer returned fire. "(d) Up to now no cases of abuse by neutral steamers." The document on Page 144 of the document book is already in evidence. It is an excerpt from Exhibit GB-222, war diary of the U-boat U-30, of 14 September. I will only read a few sentences from the beginning: "Smoke clouds. Steamer on sharp zigzag course. Easterly course. Ran towards her. When recognized, turns to countercourse and signals SOS. "English steamer Fanad Head, 5200 tons, bound for Belfast. "Pursued at full speed. Since steamer does not react to order to stop, one shot fired across her bows from a distance of 2,000 meters. Steamer stops. Crew takes to the boats. Boats pulled out of the danger zone." I summarize the following: It shows how the U-boat, as a result of the wireless message from the steamer, was attacked by airplanes, what difficulties it had in getting the prize crew on board again, and how, in spite of the bombing attacks of the planes, it did not sink the steamer until two English officers who were still on deck had jumped overboard and had been rescued by the U-boat. The depth charge pursuit lasted for ten hours. The next document, Doenitz-58, shows that merchant ships acted aggressively against U-boats; and that also is an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. I read the entry of 24 September: "Commander, Submarine Fleet, reports that on 6 September the English steamer Manaar, on being told to stop by U-38 after a warning shot, tried to escape. Steamer sent wireless message and opened fire from rear gun.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Abandoned ship only after four or five hits, then sank it." Then, another message of 22 September: "English reports that, when the English steamer Akenside was sunk, a German U-boat was rammed by a steam trawler." From the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-193, which is copied on Page 147, I should only like to point out the opinion from the point of view of the Naval Operations Staff as to radio messages. I read from Figure 2, two sentences, beginning with the second: "In almost every instance English steamers, on sighting U-boats, have sent out wireless SOS messages and given their positions. Following these SOS messages from the ship, after a certain time English airplanes always appeared which makes it clear that with the English it is a matter of a military measure and organized procedure. The SOS call together with the giving of the position may therefore be considered as the giving of military information, even as resistance." The next document, Doenitz-59, shows the approval of the entry submitted by the Commander of the Submarine Fleet that ships which used their wireless when stopped should be sunk. I read the entry of 24 November 1939. It is quite at the bottom, Figure 4: "On the basis of the Fuehrer's approval, the following order is given to Groups and Commander, Submarine Fleet: "4) Armed force should be employed against all merchant vessels using wireless when ordered to stop. They are subject to seizure or sinking without exception. Efforts should be made to rescue the crew."
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. [The Tribunal adjourned until 11 May 1946, at 1000 hours.]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I continue to submit documents concerning naval warfare. My next document is printed on Page 149 of Document Book Number 3. It is a declaration of 26 September 1939 by the British First Lord of the Admiralty concerning the arming of the British merchant fleet. In this declaration he announces that within a 'short time the entire British merchant fleet will be armed. Then he speaks about the training of the crews, and in conclusion he thanks his predecessors for the care with which they prepared that work before the beginning of the war. I submit Document Doenitz-60. Doenitz-60 is a large collection of documents concerning laws of naval warfare. It contains altogether 550 documents. In accordance with the request of the President, I have given special numbers to the later documents. I come now to some documents which deal with the treatment of ships which acted suspiciously and were for that reason attacked by U-boats. The first document of this series is Doenitz-61, Page 150. It is a warning to neutral shipping against suspicious tactics. That warning was sent in a note to all neutral missions. At the end it points out that ships should avoid being mistaken for enemy warships or auxiliary cruisers, especially during the night. There is a warning against all suspicious tactics, for instance, changing course, use of wireless on sighting German naval forces, zigzagging, blacking-out, not stopping upon demand, and the acceptance of enemy escort. That warning is repeated in Document Doenitz-62, which is on Page 153, a renewed note of 19 October 1939 to the neutral governments. Document 63 is an example of how a neutral government, namely the Danish Government, in accordance with the German notes, warned its merchant shipping against suspicious conduct. It is found on Page 154. I should like to remind you again that the first warning was given on 28 September. My next Document, Doenitz-64, shows that on 2 October the order was issued to the submarines to attack blacked-out vessels in certain operational areas close to the British coast.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That order is particularly significant in view of the cross-examination of yesterday where the question was put as to whether an order of that kind had been issued at all, or whether that subject was transmitted to the commanders orally with instructions to falsify their logs. I read the order of 2 October 1939 on Page 155. "Order by the SKL (Naval Operations Staff) to the Front: "Inasmuch as it must be assumed that blacked-out vessels encountered on the English and French coasts are warships or auxiliary warships, full armed action is authorized against blacked-out vessels in the following waters." An area around the British coast follows. The excerpt under it is taken from the War Diary of Commander of Submarines of the same date and shows the transmission of this order to the submarines. The readiness of British merchant shipping to commit aggression against German submarines is motivated or furthered by the next document which I am going to show. It is numbered Doenitz-101 and is on Page 156. The old number was Doenitz-60, Mr. President. It is an announcement by the British Admiralty, which I will read: "The British Admiralty circulated the following warning to the British merchant marine on 1 October: "Within the last few days some German U-boats have been attacked by British merchant marine vessels. In this connection the German radio announces that the German U-boats have so far observed the rules of international law in warning the merchant marine vessels before attacking them. "Now, however, Germany intends to retaliate by considering every British merchant marine vessel as a warship. While the first-mentioned fact is absolutely untrue, it may indicate an immediate change in the policy of German submarine warfare. "Be prepared to meet it. Admiralty." On Page 157 there is a second report of the same date. "The British Admiralty announces that German submarines are pursuing a new strategy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: English boats are called upon to ram every German submarine." The next document, Doenitz-65, contains orders issued as a result of the armament of, and armed resistance by, merchant vessels. I read the order of 4 October 1939, which was issued by the SKL to the Front. "Immediate attack in any manner available is permitted submarines against enemy merchant vessels which are obviously armed or have been proclaimed as such on the basis of conclusive evidence received by the Naval Operations Staff. As far as circumstances permit, measures are to be taken to save the crew after every possibility of danger for the submarine 11 May 4B has been eliminated. Passenger ships not used to transport troops are still not to be attacked, even if armed." The excerpt below shows the transmission of the order to the submarines. The experiences gained in the war up to that period are summarized in a document on Page 159, which is an excerpt from the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-196, "Standing War Order 171," by Commander of Submarines. I should only like to read from Paragraph 4, the first sentence: "Tactics of Enemy Merchant Vessels. The following instructions have been issued for British shipping . . ."
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this document?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The document was issued before May 1940. I shall have to call on a witness to give the correct date, Mr. President; I assume it was in October 1939: "The British Merchant Navy has received the following instructions: "(a) To fight every German submarine with all the means at hand, to ram it or attack it with depth charges, if equipped to do so." Further details follow. Experiences drawn from the entire operations of the British Merchant Service are summarized in the next document in an order. It has been numbered Doenitz-66, and is on Page 161. I shall read the order, which is dated 17 October 1939: "At 1500 hours the following order was issued to Commander of Submarines: "Submarines are permitted immediate and full use of armed force against all merchant vessels recognizable with certainty as being of enemy nationality, as in every case attempts to ram or other forms of active resistance may be expected. Exceptions to be made as hitherto in the case of enemy passenger boats." On Page 162 I have reproduced another part of Document Doenitz-62, which has been submitted already. It is a note to the neutral countries dated 22 October 1939, defining conduct on the part of ships which is, according to German opinion, incompatible with the peaceful character of a merchant ship. I read from the long paragraph, the second sentence: "According to previous experiences such tactics may be expected with certainty from English and French boats, particularly when sailing in convoys: inadmissible use of wireless, sailing without lights, and in addition armed resistance and aggressive action." In the next, the German Government warns neutral nations against the use of enemy ships for this reason. The German orders were issued in consequence of the experiences gained by our U-boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I have already submitted the next document, Doenitz-67, on Page 163 et sequentes and I only wish to explain on the basis of a report made by the British Admiralty, which is on Page 163, that the orders for merchant shipping were published in the Handbook for the Defense of Merchant Ships of January 1938-they were issued before the war. Now I come to several documents dealing with the treatment of passenger ships. They have an important bearing on the Athenia case, since the Athenia was a passenger ship. Document Doenitz-68 presents some evidence on the treatment of passenger ships. First comes an order issued on 4 September 1939, which I should like to read: "On the Fuehrer's orders, no hostile action is to be taken against passenger ships for the time being, even when in convoy." The next excerpt from the same page contains reports on the use of passenger ships as troop transports. I will now read an excerpt from the Directives for the Conduct of the War against Merchant Shipping, from October to the middle of November 1939, Page 3. As the fullest possible use was made of enemy passenger boats for the transport of troops, it was no longer possible to justify their being spared, at least when they were sailing in convoy. The following order was issued on 29 October: I will read the order, which is dated 29 October. It is at the bottom of the page: "Passenger liners in enemy convoys may be subjected to immediate unrestricted armed attack by U-boats." The next document, Doenitz-69, on Page 170, is to show that in November and December the German press issued a warning against the use of armed passenger ships by publishing lists of these ships. The next document is Doenitz-70, on Page 171. It is an order issued on 7 November 1939 by the SKL to Commander of U-boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I read the order: "U-boats are permitted to attack immediately with all weapons at their command all passenger ships which can be identified with certainty as enemy ships and whose armament is detected or is already known." That was about 6 weeks after permission to attack other armed ships had been given. Doenitz-71 shows that the U-boats were also not permitted to attack blacked-out passenger ships until as late as 23 February 1940, 5 months-no, 4 months-after they were given permission to attack other ships. Now I come to the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-224, which is reproduced on Pages 199 to 203 in Volume 4 of my document book. I should like to emphasize again that the object of this document was to incriminate Admiral Raeder in particular; and that it was described by the Prosecution as a cynical denial of international law. I should like to point out, to begin with, that according to the tine it concerns deliberations by the Naval Operations Staff on the possibilities of intensifying economic warfare against England. I shall read a few paragraphs, or give a short account of them, to show that a very thorough investigation of international law was made. The first paragraph is headed "War Aims." "The Fuehrer's proposal to restore a just and honorable peace and establish a new political order in Central Europe has been rejected. The enemy powers want war, with Germany's destruction as the goal. In the struggle in which Germany is now forced to defend her existence and rights, Germany must employ her weapons ruthlessly while fully respecting the rules of soldierly conduct in warfare." Then there follows a paragraph in which it is stated that the enemy is also ruthless in carrying out his plans. On the next page, Page 200, there are a few sentences of basic importance which I should like to read.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I read from the paragraph "Military Requirements" the fourth sentence: "It is still desirable to base military measures in the existing principle of international law; but military measures recognized as necessary must be taken if they seem likely to lead to decisive military successes, even if they are not admitted by international law. For that reason, the military weapon which effectively breaks the enemies powers of resistance must on principle be given a legal base, even if new rules of naval warfare have to be created for the purpose. "After weighing political, military, and economic considerations with regard to the war as a whole, Supreme War Command must decide on the military procedure and legal rules of warfare to be applied." Then there are a number of excerpts to show the way in which the Naval Operations Staff investigated the legal aspect of the situation; that is to say, the present legal aspect of the situation, the situation which would arise in the case of a siege of England or a blockade against England. The end, which is on Page 203, emphasizes the political character of the final decision. I shall read it: "The decision as to the form to be taken by the intensification of economic warfare and the time fixed for changing over to the most intensified and therefore final form of naval warfare in this war is of far-reaching political importance. It can be made only by the Supreme War Command, which will weigh the military, political, and economic requirements against each other." I should like to add that this document is dated 15 October 1939. At the end of November 1939 the Naval Operations Staff took the consequent...
THE PRESIDENT: In our document it is 3 November. You said just now it was some date in October.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: 15 October, Mr. President. It is a memorandum dated 15 October, which was submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I thought you were dealing with Exhibit GB-224. That is the one you have been reading just now.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That is headed on our Page 199, 3 November 1939.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President. The 3rd of November is the date on which the memorandum was distributed to the High Command of the Armed Forces and to the Foreign Office. I have just been told that in the English text, above the word ''Memorandum,'' the date is apparently not printed. In the original it says, right above the word "Memorandum," ''Berlin, 15 October 1939."
THE PRESIDENT: Very welt
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I have already submitted Document Doenitz-73, on Page 206, in which neutrals are warned against entry into the zone which corresponds to the American combat zone declared by President Roosevelt on 4 November. The German point of view, that entry into this zone constitutes a danger to all neutrals by their own action, was also published in the press. Therefore, I submit Document Doenitz-103 on Page 210. It is an interview given by Admiral Raeder to a representative of the National Broadcasting Company, New York, on 4 March 1940. I should like to read a few sentences from that document. In the second paragraph Admiral Raeder points out the danger existing for neutral merchant ships if they act in a warlike manner and are consequently taken for enemy ships. The last sentence of that paragraph reads: "The German standpoint may be concisely expressed by the formula: Whoever depends on the use of arms must be prepared for attack by arms." I shall read the two last paragraphs: "In discussing the possibility that there might be frequent differences of opinion, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy mentioned President Roosevelt's order prohibiting American shipping in the dangerous zones around England. He said, 'This prohibition is the best proof against England's practice of forcing neutrals to sail through these zones without being able to guarantee their security. Germany can only advise all neutrals to imitate the policy of your President.' "Question: 'Thus, according to this state of affairs, there is no protection for neutral shipping in the war-endangered zones?' "Answer: 'Probably not, so long as England adheres to her methods...."' With the collapse of France, the entire U.S.A. combat zone was declared a German blockade area. That is shown by the next document, Doenitz-104, Page 212. I read from the middle of the long paragraph on that page: "The entire sea area around England has thus become a theater of operations. Every ship sailing this zone runs the risk of being destroyed not only by mines but also by other combat means...."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, did you call that Exhibit Doenitz-60 or...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That was originally also one of the documents from Doenitz-60, Mr. President, to which I have now given a new number. It is now Doenitz-104.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.