dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
Statement by Justice Jackson on War Trials Agreement; August 12, 1945
There are some things I would like to say, particularly to the American people, about the agreement we have just signed.
For the first time, four of the most powerful nations have agreed not only upon the principles of liability for war crimes of persecution, but also upon the principle of individual responsibility for the crime of attacking the international peace.
Repeatedly, nations have united in abstract declarations that the launching of aggressive war is illegal. They have condemned it by treaty. But now we have the concrete application of these abstractions in a way which ought to make clear to the world that those who lead their nations into aggressive war face individual accountability for such acts.
The definitions under which we will try the Germans are general definitions. They impose liability upon war-making statesmen of all countries alike. If we can cultivate in the world the idea that aggressive war-making is the way to the prisoner's dock rather than the way to honors, we will have accomplished something toward making the peace more secure.
This, too, is the first time that four nations with such different legal systems have tried to knit their ideas of just criminal procedure into a cooperative trial. That task is far more difficult than those unfamiliar with the differences between continental and Anglo-American methods would expect. It has involved frank and critical examination by the representatives of each country of the other's methods of administering justice. Our discussions have been candid and open-minded.
The representatives of the United Kingdom have been headed by the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney General. The Soviet Republic has been represented by the Vice President of its Supreme Court and by one of the leading scholars of Soviet jurisprudence
justice. Our discussions have been candid and open-minded. The representatives of the United Kingdom have been headed by the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney General. The Soviet Republic has been represented by the Vice President of its Supreme Court and by one of the leading scholars of Soviet jurisprudence. The Provisional Government of France has sent a judge of its highest court and a professor most competent in its jurisprudence.
It would not be a happy forecast for the future harmony of the world if I could not agree with such representatives of the world's leading systems of administering justice on a common procedure for trial of war criminals.
Of course, one price of such international cooperation is mutual concession. Much to which American lawyers would be accustomed is missing in this instrument. I have not seen fit to insist that these prisoners have the benefit of all of the protections which our legal and constitutional system throws around defendants.
To the Russian and French jurist, our system seems unduly tender of defendants and to be loaded in favor of delay and in favor of the individual against the state. To us, their system seems summary and to load the procedure in favor of the state against the individual.
However, the continental system is the one the Germans themselves have employed and understand. It does not seem inappropriate that a special military commission for the trial of Europeans in Europe, for crimes committed in Europe, should follow rather largely although not entirely the European procedures. The essentials of a fair trial have been assured.
Another price of international cooperation is slow motion. No doubt Russia acting alone, or the United States, or any one country acting alone, could try these defendants in much shorter time than we can do it when we consult with each other and move along together
procedures. The essentials of a fair trial have been assured. Another price of international cooperation is slow motion. No doubt Russia acting alone, or the United States, or any one country acting alone, could try these defendants in much shorter time than we can do it when we consult with each other and move along together. Our associates, for example, have a claim as good as ours to have the trial proceed in a language which they understand.
This requires a trial rendered into four languages-German, Russian, French, and English. This will be a dreary business, and there is no use trying to dodge that fact. It is a tedious prospect for me and for representatives of all the governments which will engage in it.
But I do not think the world will be poorer even if it takes a month or so, more or less, to try these men who now are prisoners and whose capacity for harm already has been overcome.
I do think the world would be infinitely poorer if we were to confess that the nations which now dominate the western world hold ideas of justice so irreconcilable that no common procedure could be devised or carried out.
The danger, so far as the moral judgment of the world is concerned, which will beset these trials is that they come to be regarded as merely political trials in which the victor wreaks vengeance upon the vanquished. However unfortunate it may be, there seems no way of doing anything about the crimes against the peace and against humanity except that the victors judge the vanquished.
Experience has taught that we can hardly expect them to try each other. The scale of their attack leaves no neutrals in the world. We must summon all that we have of dispassionate judgment to the task of patiently and fairly presenting the record of these evil deeds in these trials.
We must make clear to the Germans that the wrong for which their fallen leaders are on trial is not that they lost the war, but that they started it
the world. We must summon all that we have of dispassionate judgment to the task of patiently and fairly presenting the record of these evil deeds in these trials. We must make clear to the Germans that the wrong for which their fallen leaders are on trial is not that they lost the war, but that they started it. And we must not allow ourselves to be drawn into a trial of the causes of the war, for our position is that no grievances or policies will justify resort to aggressive war. It is utterly renounced and condemned as an instrument of policy.
I therefore want to make clear to the American people that we have taken an important step forward in this instrument in fixing individual responsibility of war-mongering, among whatever peoples, as an international crime. We have taken another in recognizing an international accountability for persecutions, exterminations, and crimes against humanity when associated with attacks on the peace of the international order.
But I want to be equally clear that to make these advances fully effective through international trials is a task of difficulty and one which will require some public patience and some understanding of the wide gulf which separates the judicial systems of the nations which are trying to cooperate in the effort.
Source:
United States Department of State Bulletin.
August 12, 1945
Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1945.
1.
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.
2.
The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.
3.
The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.
4.
The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury.
5.
No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
6.
should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury. 5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects. 6.
The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
7.
Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.
8.
The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
9.
During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible.
10.
During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.
Source:
Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10,
Vol. 2,.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949
Nuremberg Trials Final Report Appendix E : Royal Warrant - Regulations for the Trial of War Criminals THE WAR OFFICE, 18th June, 1945. ROYAL WARRANT 0160/2498 A. O. 81/1945 Regulations for the Trial of War Criminals GEORGE R. I. WHEREAS WE deem it expedient to make provision for the trial and punishment of violations of the laws and usages of war committed during any war in which WE have been or may be engaged at any time after the second day of September, nineteen hundred and thirty-nine; OUR WILL AND PLEASURE IS that the custody, trial and punishment of persons charged with such violation of the laws and usages of war as aforesaid shall be governed by the Regulations attached to this Our Warrant Given at Our Court at St. James's, this 14th day of June, 1945, in the 9th year of our Reign. By His Majesty's Command, P. J. GRIGG Regulations for the Trial of War Criminals 1. In these Regulations if not inconsistent with the context and subject to any express provision to the contrary the following expressions have the following meanings namely:- "War Crime" means a violation of the laws and usages of war committed during any war in which His Majesty has been or may be engaged at any time since the 2nd September, 1939. Any expression used in these Regulations has the same meaning as in the Army Act or the Rules of Procedure made pursuant thereto. "Military Court" means a Military Court constituted and held under these Regulations. 2. (a) The following officers shall have power to convene Military Courts for the trial of persons charged with having committed war crimes and to confirm the findings and sentences of such Courts namely:- (i) Any officers authorized so to do by His Majesty and His Warrant (ii) Any officers authorized so to do by delegation under the Warrant of any officer referred to under (i) above whom His Majesty has authorized to make such delegation by His Warrant. (b) Any such Warrants may he addressed to an officer by name or by designation of an office and may be subject to such restrictions, reservations, exceptions and conditions as may seem meet to His Majesty or any such delegating officer as aforesaid. (c) An officer having authority to confirm the finding and sentence of a
may he addressed to an officer by name or by designation of an office and may be subject to such restrictions, reservations, exceptions and conditions as may seem meet to His Majesty or any such delegating officer as aforesaid. (c) An officer having authority to confirm the finding and sentence of a Military Court may reserve confirmation of the finding and sentence or of the sentence to any superior authority competent to confirm the findings and sentences of the like kind of military court convened under these Regulations. 3. Except in so far as herein otherwise provided expressly or by implication the provisions of the Army Act and the Rules of Procedure made pursuant thereto so far as they relate to Field General Courts-Martial and to any matters preliminary or incidental thereto or consequential thereon shall apply so far as applicable to Military Courts under these Regulations and any matters preliminary or incidental thereto or consequential thereon in like manner as if the Military Courts were Field General Courts-Martial and the accused were persons subject to military law charged with having committed offences on active service. Sections 49, 61, 54 (1) (d) and (7) and 57 (2) and (4) and 57 (A) of the Army Act, and Rules of Procedure 3, 34, 35 (D) [Army Order 127, 1945], 52 (B) [Army Order 108, 1947], 56, 63 (C) [Army Order 108, 1947], 110, 118 (A) and (B), 63 (E) [Army Order 108, 1947] and l20 (C), (D) and (E) made pursuant thereto shall not apply. Notwithstanding the provisions of Rule of Procedure 63 (E) a Court may after his arraignment, proceed with the trial of an accused in his absence, if satisfied that so doing involves no injustice to such accused. [Army Order 8, 1946] 4. If it appears to an officer authorized under the Regulations to convene a Military Court that a person then within the limits of his command has at any place whether within or without such limits, committed a war crime he may direct that such person if not already in military custody shall be taken into and kept in such custody pending trial in such manner and in the charge of such military unit as he may direct. The commanding officer of the unit having charge of the accused shall be deemed to be
such limits, committed a war crime he may direct that such person if not already in military custody shall be taken into and kept in such custody pending trial in such manner and in the charge of such military unit as he may direct. The commanding officer of the unit having charge of the accused shall be deemed to be the commanding officer of the accused for the purposes of all matters preliminary and relating to trial and punishments. But such commanding officer shall have no power to dismiss the charge or deal with the accused summarily for a war crime. He shall without any such preliminary hearing as is referred to in Rule of Procedure 3 either cause a Summary of Evidence to be taken in accordance with Rule of Procedure 4 or an abstract of evidence to be prepared as the Convening Officer may direct. The accused shall not have the right of having a Summary taken or of demanding that the evidence at the Summary shall be taken on oath or that any witness shall attend for cross-examination at the taking of the Summary. 5. A Military Court shall consist of not less than two officers in addition to the President, who shall be appointed by name, but no officer, whether sitting as President or as a member, need have held his commission for any special length of time. If the accused is an officer of the naval, military or air force of an enemy or ex-enemy Power the Convening Officer should, so far as practicable, but shall be under no obligation so to do, appoint or detail as many officers as possible of equal or superior relative rank to the accused. If the accused belongs to the naval or air force of an enemy or ex-enemy Power the Convening Officer should appoint or detail, if available, at least one naval officer or one air force officer as a member of the Court, as the case may be. In default of a person deputed by H. M. Judge Advocate General to act as Judge Advocate, the Convening Officer may by order appoint a fit person to act as Judge Advocate at the trial. If no such Judge Advocate is deputed or appointed, the Convening Officer should appoint at least one officer having one of the legal qualifications mentioned in Rule of
Judge Advocate General to act as Judge Advocate, the Convening Officer may by order appoint a fit person to act as Judge Advocate at the trial. If no such Judge Advocate is deputed or appointed, the Convening Officer should appoint at least one officer having one of the legal qualifications mentioned in Rule of Procedure 93 (B) as President or as a member of the Court, unless, in his opinion, such opinion to be expressed in the Order convening the Court and to be conclusive, no such officer is necessary [Army Order 24,1946] Notwithstanding anything in these Regulations the Convening Officer may, in a case where he considers it desirable so to do, appoint as a member of the Court, but not as President, one or more officers of an Allied Force serving under his command or placed at his disposal for the purpose, provided that the number of such officers so appointed shall not comprise more than half the members of the Court, excluding the President. 6. The accused shall not be entitled to object to the President or any member of the Court or the Judge Advocate or to offer any special plea to the jurisdiction of the Court. 7. Counsel may appear on behalf of the Prosecutor and accused in like manner as if the Military Court were a General Court-Martial, and Rules of Proceedure 88-93 shall in such cases apply accordingly.: In addition to the persons deemed to be properly qualified as Counsel under Rule of Procedure 93 any person qualified to appear before the Courts of the Country of the accused and any person approved by the Convening Officer the Court shall be deemed to be properly qualified as Counsel for the Defence. 8. (i) At any hearing before a Military Court convened under these regulations the Court may take into consideration any oral statement or any document appearing on the face of it to be authentic, provided the statement or document appears to the Court to be of assistance in proving or disproving the charge notwithstanding that such statement or document would not be admissible as evidence in proceedings before a Field General Court-Martial, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing in particular:- (a) If any witness is dead or is unable to attend
assistance in proving or disproving the charge notwithstanding that such statement or document would not be admissible as evidence in proceedings before a Field General Court-Martial, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing in particular:- (a) If any witness is dead or is unable to attend or to give evidence or is, in the opinion of the Court, unable so to attend without undue delay, the Court may receive secondary evidence of statements made by or attributable to such witness (b) any document purporting to have been signed or issued officially by any member of any Allied or enemy force or by any official or agency of any Allied, neutral or enemy government, shall be admissible as evidence without proof of the issue or signature thereof (c) the Court may receive as evidence of the facts therein stated any report of the "Comite International de la Croix Rouge" or by any representative thereof, by any member of the medical profession or of any medical service, by any person acting as a "man of confidence" (homme de confiance) or by any other person whom the Court may consider was acting in the course of his duty when making the report; (d) the Court may receive as evidence of the facts therein stated any depositions or any record of any military Court of Inquiry or (any Summary) of any examination made by any officer detailed for the purpose by any military authority (e) the Court may receive as evidence of the facts therein stated any diary, letter or other document appearing to contain information relating to the charge; (f) if any original document cannot be produced or, in the opinion of the Court, cannot be produced without undue delay, a copy of such document or other secondary evidence of its contents may be received in evidence; It shall be the duty of the Court to judge of the weight to be attached to any evidence given in pursuance of this Regulation which would not otherwise be admissible. (ii) Where there is evidence that a war crime has been the result of concerted action upon the part of a unit or group of men, then evidence given upon any charge relating to that crime against any member of such unit or group may be received as prima facie evidence of the
otherwise be admissible. (ii) Where there is evidence that a war crime has been the result of concerted action upon the part of a unit or group of men, then evidence given upon any charge relating to that crime against any member of such unit or group may be received as prima facie evidence of the responsibility of each member of that unit or group for that crime. In any such case all or any members of any such unit or group may be charged and tried jointly in respect of any such war crime and no application by any of them to be tried separately shall be allowed by the Court [Army Order 127, 1945]. (iii) The Court shall take judicial notice of the laws and usages of war. (iv) Unless the Convening Officer otherwise directs a finding of guilty and the sentence shall be announced in Open Court by the President, who shall at the same time state that such finding and sentence are subject to confirmation. If such announcement is not made in Open Court the President shall notify the accused of the finding and sentence under sealed cover at the termination of the Proceedings and record in the Proceedings that this has been done. A finding of acquittal, whether on all or some of the offences with which the accused is charged, shall not require confirmation or be subject to be revised and shall be pronounced at once in Open Court, but the Court shall not thereupon release the accused, unless otherwise entitled to be released. (v) The sittings of Military Courts will ordinarily be open to the public so far as accommodation permits. But the Court may on the ground that it is expedient so to do in the national interest or in the interests of justice, or for the effective prosecution of war crimes generally, or otherwise, by order prohibit the publication of any evidence to be given or of any statement to be made in the course of the proceedings before it, or direct that all or any portion of the public shall be excluded during any part of such proceedings as normal take place in Open Court, except during the announcement of the finding and sentence pursuant to paragraph (iv) above. (vi) A record shall be made of the Proceedings of every Military Court. 9. A person found guilty by a Military Court of