dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
DR. DIX: Furthermore, I should like to ask him to state whether, considering the great democratic principle of the right of self-determination of nations and considering the history of the annexation movement in Austria itself -- and I remind him of the plebiscite of 1919 when this Anschluss was demanded by, one may safely say 100 percent of the Austrian population -- he as a politician would consider a political party or a political program criminal which aimed at reaching this goal in a peaceful fashion. And here I should like to stress again in order not to be misunderstood, that the later development and everything which actually happened and anything which might not have happened in accordance with the Party program is to be left out of consideration and only the Party program as such taken into consideration. Upon that, of course, the sense of his answer depended when he said, "Yes, the Party program is the basis of the criminal character." Now, finally, to come to the end, it would be consistent with the logical course of my explanations, to wait until Sir David has decided on this question, an answer to which I should like to request from Sir David and also from Mr. Justice Jackson, who is not here today...
THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing.] Dr. Dix, the Tribunal will, of course, consider anything that you have said insofar as it refers to matters of principle, but they do not think that this is the proper time for Counsel for the Defense to pose questions to counsel for the Prosecution. The matter has already been fully dealt with, and the Tribunal do not propose to ask any further questions of the Prosecution unless the Prosecution wish to say anything in answer to what you have to say.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, that was what I took the liberty of saying at the beginning. I realize that it is Sir David's free will and decision as to whether he cares to comply with my request to add to his answer to the questions posed by Mr. Justice Jackson. That I have to leave to him. I have only a short question, which is intended to prevent our misunderstanding each other. It is always well not to be misunderstood. I remember -- but I may be mistaken, and that is why I wish to ask Sir David what Mr. Justice Jackson declared as his opinion -- that he did not consider the Party program, as such, criminal. As I have said, this is what I remember. I did not take any notes on it, because it did not strike me particularly at that time, since I considered it self-evident. Therefore I may be mistaken. But if my memory is correct, I should like to ask Sir David to state whether there is any uniform attitude on the part of the Prosecution toward this point.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal asked the Prosecution to present their arguments in principle on the question of these Organizations, and they wished also to hear counsel for the organizations in order that these matters should be cleared up, with a view to any possible evidence which might have to be given. They have heard counsel for all four prosecutors. They have asked them questions which they thought right to ask them in order to clear up any points. They have heard counsel for all the organizations and they have heard Counsel for the Prosecution in reply. They do not propose to ask any further questions of the Prosecution at this stage. Of course Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense will be fully heard at a later stage.
DR. DIX: I have come to the end of my statement. I leave it to the Court and Sir David as to whether he wants to answer these questions now.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I should like to give a short explanation to the question as to which of the indicted organizations the Defendant Frank belonged. Is that possible at this moment?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal do not think this is an appropriate time for any of the counsel for individual defendants to go into matters connected with the charges against the organizations. They will, of course, be heard in the course of their own defense, but this is not the appropriate time. This is only a preliminary discussion for the purpose of clarifying the issues which relate to the organizations.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, but I should like to use this opportunity to clarify a mistake which slipped in the day before yesterday. The day before yesterday I protested against the statement that the Defendant Frank was a member of the SS and this seems to have been translated incorrectly.
THE PRESIDENT: But Dr. Seidl, won't it appear in the shorthand notes? You have not seen the shorthand notes yet?
DR. SEIDL: I have not seen the transcript yet, but I believe that by error "SS" was translated as "SA." The Defendant Frank has never denied that he was an SA ObergruppenFuehrer. What I wanted to point out is only that the statement in the Indictment that he was an SS general is not correct and also that the statement in Annex B about the nature of the criminal element is not pertinent, because it is said there that he was an SS general. But I attach importance to the fact that the Defendant Frank has never denied that he was an SA ObergruppenFuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, but you will have an opportunity to develop the whole case of Frank when your turn comes.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, but the question is merely this, as to whether the Defendant Frank was a member of the SS or not. As long as the Prosecution do not present any definite proof of the membership of the Defendant Frank in the SS, I have to contradict this statement. I do not believe that it is the task of the Defense to prove that the Defendant Frank was not a member of the SS. I am convinced that, on the other hand, this is one of the tasks of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; I have heard what you said.
DR. SERVATIUS: Dr. Servatius, for the Leadership Corps. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, the Tribunal are prepared to hear counsel for the organizations very shortly in the rebuttal, but only very shortly, as otherwise the may go on interminably.
DR. SERVATIUS: I do not want to make a speech, but merely to speak for about 5 minutes, in order to define my attitude towards a few matters of evidence. First, I have two questions to ask concerning the limitation of the proceedings to certain groups of members. I should be grateful if the Prosecution could give a statement as to whether the exception of certain parts of the organizations, as has taken place, is a final one or whether other procedures and steps are being held in reserve. This was stated originally in reference to the Leadership Corps. Concerning the limitation of the proceedings to certain groups of members in reference to the Leadership Corps, I do not wish to make any further motion inasmuch as that limitation has already been effected. I should be glad, however, if a decision could still be reached concerning the women. The female technical aides who were employed in the offices cannot, in my opinion, be included in the staffs. At any rate, they do not belong to the Leadership Corps, although they worked with the staffs. These women themselves are of this opinion, and also the officers in the camps shared this opinion. Accordingly not a single application for leave to be heard has been made by any woman in the British zone. I presume it is known that women, as a matter of principle, were kept away from politics in the National Socialist State; and therefore, they can hardly be connected with the crimes stated in Article 6. Now I should like to speak about two points concerning questions of evidence. As every profession creates the tools which it needs, so the jurist creates concepts to solve his problems. These concepts are not created for their own sake; thus the concept of the criminal organization shall serve to call guilty persons to account who would otherwise possibly evade this responsibility of theirs. In establishing the Charter the procedure was this, that one did away with the traditional structure of the state in order to reach the individual organs.
DR. SERVATIUS: But in order to be able to seize these organs, one brought them together again through the concept of the guilt of conspiracy. In this way, however, only a relatively small circle can be reached, since its members would have to be bound to each other by means of an agreement. In order to enlarge this circle by means of legal technique, the concept of a criminal group or organization was created. This organization is involved in the agreement of conspiracy only at the very top, while the members automatically, without their own knowledge, are included in the conspiracy. Such a definition of the concept of a criminal organization is justifiable only insofar as it is useful fin getting hold of the really guilty persons and only the guilty ones. In order to define the limits of this concept, I should like to discuss two further points concerning the determination of guilt and therefore necessarily relevant to the question of admissibility of evidence. First, there is the question of the members' lack of knowledge of this criminality -- the lack of knowledge resulting from secrecy -- and then the attitude of the members after they had recognized the offenses being committed. In my opinion, the examination of guilt cannot be dismissed by pointing to the alleged knowledge of foreign countries about the real conditions. In foreign countries a propaganda was effective which exaggeratedly brought these things to light. In Germany all these facts remained secret, since because of their very nature they had to be secret -- for instance, what was going on in the extermination camps -- and because they had to be kept secret for political reasons. Moreover, the things which have become known here were so unimaginable that even in Germany one could not have believed them, had they become known during the war. It must be relevant to determine not whether a single individual member had no knowledge, but that 99 percent of the individual members acted in good faith. In this case, the organization is not criminal, but there could have keen a criminal in it.
DR. SERVATIUS: If this is determined, then the legal construction of the criminal organization is superfluous and thereby false. The legal concepts existing until now will then be sufficient for bringing the guilty to trial. The next viewpoint: The criminal nature or the criminal character of which the Charter speaks shows that that must be something which concerns the entire organization, and that it must be a continuous state of affairs. Individual acts which were rejected as wrong by the organization or the overwhelming majority of its members cannot establish the criminal character of the organization. The attitude of all the members to the incriminating acts is therefore of decisive importance and thus of evidentiary relevancy. We do not need the concept of the criminal organization in order to punish individual criminals whose acts were rejected by the majority. Among such individual cases, in organizations which comprise millions of members, there may be cases in which smaller or even larger groups or merely certain local districts took part. I believe that it is really a major task of the Tribunal to define, with the objectivity of the judge, the nature of this guilt as applied to the entire organization. I am of the opinion that the points I have mentioned, the secrecy of these facts and the attitude of the members after gaining knowledge, must form the basis for the collecting of evidence.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I want to ask some questions. Dr. Servatius, I would like to ask you -- and I will ask other counsel for the organizations -- whether in general you accept the definition of criminal organizations suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson, which is found on Pages 19 and 20 of his statement? You will remember that he made five general tests. Now, in order to determine what evidence should be taken, we must determine what is relevant. Now, the test of what is relevant depends on a general definition of what is common to all organizations for that purpose. Now, do you or could you now say whether in a general way you accept those tests for the purpose of taking evidence?
DR. SERVATIUS: I have not yet thought about that and have not had a chance to discuss it with my colleagues. I should be grateful if we would be given such an opportunity. Perhaps this afternoon a representative of the Defense Counsel for the organizations could report to the Court about this.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Let me ask you another question. What, in your mind, are the tests that should be applied for the purpose of taking evidence?
DR. SERVATIUS: I did not quite understand the question.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I said that Mr. Justice Jackson had suggested a definition from which the relevancy of certain evidence could be established. Now, have you got any suggestion to offer for that same purpose?
DR. SERVATIUS: I should not like to commit myself without having spoken to my colleagues. It is a question of great importance which I should not like to deal with by myself.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes, but it is the basis of this entire argument. The very purpose of the argument was to develop that.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the course of yesterday's debate the problem was discussed as to whether the task set before the Tribunal by the Charter can be considered a legislative act. The question was brought up as to whether, if we answer the preliminary question in the affirmative, the Court has the possibility of giving any binding instructions to the national court which has to try individuals, according to Law Number 10. That concerns, above all, the extent of the examination of the guilt of the individual member and the limitation of the scope of punishment for minor cases. I believe that if we follow up this deliberation we shall be led from a play upon words into a labyrinth when it comes to the practical application. Actually the task given the Court is not a legislative act. It is not a procedural innovation, if the national court in subsequent proceedings is bound by the previous decision of this Tribunal. Such cases are quite plausible and legally admissible. If elsewhere in criminal procedure a criminal court is bound by a previous decision, say of an administrative court, we consider these cases quite in order and unobjectionable. Likewise a criminal court could, for instance, be bound in judging a case of embezzlement to wait for the previous decision of the civil court as to whether the object embezzled was the property of somebody else. Here, too, nobody would think that the civil judge was undertaking an act of legislation. That another court's decision is binding on the criminal court and is the premise for its sentence does not in any way mean that the author of the criminal code has not completed his legislative task and that this has now to be done by the court which takes the preceding decision. In my opinion we therefore do not have to consider this point any further, for Article 9, Paragraph 1, of the Charter demands of the Tribunal a clear and unequivocal decision of the question whether the organization is criminal or not. More cannot be read either into the Charter or into Law Number 10.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yesterday Sir David defined his attitude to the five points which were submitted by me for consideration as to relevancy of evidence. In regard to the two last points he raised the objection that they were to be dealt with in the subsequent trials envisaged by Law Number 10. It was a question of the grounds for exonerating persons -- for instance, coercion, deception, et cetera . I want to avoid repetition and point out only the following: It is quite correct that the question of coercion and deception and other reasons for the exoneration of persons be discussed in subsequent trials. In connection with this, Sir David also called the attention of the Court to a really noteworthy problem -- that is, the problem of a deception by the state, that is, a problem of mass suggestion. This is really a very important problem. It affects many members, as far as their joining is concerned. But it leads to the broadest deduction as to the guilt of the entire membership and the character of the total organization. We have therefore to pay particular attention as to how the problem of deception on the part of the state affected the member and thereby was characteristic of the organization. All grounds for the exoneration of persons are therefore also to be examined by the Tribunal in judging the question of the character of the organization. Furthermore, evidence must be taken on the broadest basis. If the Tribunal were to make any limitation now, there would be the possibility that later, at the end of the Trial, in contrast to its present opinion, it might consider as relevant material now excluded. In yesterday's debate the importance of the question was discussed, in regard to the proposed declaration of criminality, as to what should be considered as constituting knowledge on the part of the single member. Sir David here applied the standard of a person of average intelligence and wants to consider as guilty anybody who was above that standard.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I have already recently explained that in regard to laws threatening such a severe punishment as in this case, all systems of penal law require that willful intent on the part of the perpetrator be proved. Offenses of negligence are punishable only in exceptional cases, and then only with minor penalties. At any rate in a case of an offense by negligence it must be clear to the offender that he is under an obligation to examine his action from the point of view of penal law. Law Number 10 -- and now in connection with it the proposed verdict of this Court -- represents an ex post facto law. In the case of the main defendants the Prosecution have justified the deviation from the generally recognized principle nulla poena sine lege on the ground that they themselves did not act in accordance with this principle and cannot, therefore, base themselves on it now. This, however, does not in any way apply to the organizations, quite apart from the question whether this argument can be accepted at all. At any rate, however, in considering the element of negligence one should also not overlook the fact that the obligation to exercise attention differs in the case of ex post facto laws from what it should be in the case of existing laws. In this connection I should like to refer to the fact that the question of whether the statutes of the Party organizations were illegal or not has often been examined already, even earlier, at the time of the Weimar Republic. Political considerations definitely favored such a declaration. Apparently, legal considerations at that time did not let the carrying out of such a procedure seem practical. What measure should we then apply to the individual member's ability to judge such matters, if the legal problem is so difficult and lends itself so very much to discussion? The Prosecution has restricted the motion so as to exclude the auxiliary workers in the case of the Gestapo. The reason for this can only have been that in the case of these members knowledge cannot be assumed to be self-evident.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I ask that the conclusions drawn in this individual case be applied to the members of other organizations. Should not the individual member of an organization comprising millions who had far less contact with the executive organ than did an auxiliary worker of the Gestapo -- should not this member be judged much more favorably, as far as knowledge is concerned, than this group which has been excepted? Are we not in particular obliged to use the best methods possible to inform ourselves as to the knowledge or lack of knowledge of the individual member? Sir David, in discussing the problem of negligence, suddenly spoke of an ostrich policy. But here we have to consider that the person who sticks his head into the sand in order not to see has actually seen something and therefore does not want to see any more. It is quite different in the case of this member who from the sources at his disposal can gain no knowledge of individual actions; who, in particular, has no knowledge of whether possibly only...
THE PRESIDENT: Forgive my interrupting you, but the Tribunal have already heard and listened with attention to your interesting argument, and the argument that they now are prepared to listen to is only a very short argument in rebuttal. As I have already pointed out, it seems to me that the greater part of what you are now saying is what you have already said. We cannot go on hearing these arguments at great length.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Since I have arrived at the end of my remarks, I should like in conclusion just to introduce one point of view which concerns the defense of the Reich Cabinet. The number of members of the Reich Cabinet is very limited. One half are in the defendants' dock. Is it really necessary to consider the other half cumulatively as an organization, since the small number of those concerned makes possible an individual trial, with all the legal guarantees given therein? To this extent I should like to refer to the remarks made by my colleague, Dr. Laternser, who mentioned the provision of the Charter that the Tribunal is not compelled to reach a decision but that for reasons of expediency it can refrain from doing so.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Biddle wants to ask you some questions
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I have just one question. Will you listen to this very carefully? If the Tribunal find that an organization was being used for a criminal purpose, and certainly, with respect to some organizations' there is ample evidence that might justify such a finding, why, then, would the Tribunal not be justified in holding that organization as a criminal organization insofar as it was composed of persons who had knowledge that it was being so used and voluntarily remained members of the organization? In other words, the definition would state that it consisted of members who had actual knowledge that the organization was engaged in the commission of crime.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The organization cannot be separated from the total number of its members. The declaration of criminality in connection with Law Number 10 is to affect each individual member. The task of the Tribunal would not be fulfilled if it limited that task and excluded from the organization unspecified individuals. In the task which I have mentioned we cannot overlook the practical purpose, and that will not be guaranteed if such a limitation is made.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I will ask just one more question. I do not think you have answered my question. I will put it very simply again. How would that definition be unfair to any individual?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: If only a limited circle of persons in connection with the organization is branded as criminal, this necessarily results in an injustice to the other members of the organization. The declaration naturally affects the name of the entire organization, and, therefore, the declaration of criminality affects each individual member, even if one tries to limit the definition.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: I think in view of the time we had better adjourn for 10 minutes. [A recess was taken.]