dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
M. HENRY DELPECH (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): The execution of the regulations was ensured by a series of texts promulgated by the Belgian authorities in Brussels. They issued in particular a decree dated 3 September 1940, by virtue of which Belgian organizations took over again the offices which the Germans gave up. These offices were to experience various vicissitudes. Although originating from the Belgian Ministry of Economics, they were closely controlled by the German military command. In this way, the seizure of Belgian production was completed by the appointment of "Commissioners of Enterprises," under the ordinance of 29 April 1941, submitted as Document Number RF-166. Article 2 of this text defines the powers of the commissioners: "The duty of the Commissioner is to set or keep in motion the enterprise under his charge, to ensure the systematic fulfillment of orders, and to take all measures which increase the output." The decline of the commodity control offices began with an ordinance dated 6 August 1942, establishing the principle providing for the prohibition of manufacturing certain products or for ordering the use of certain raw materials. This ordinance is to be found in the document book under Document Number RF-167. Supervision of the commodity control offices was soon organized by the appointment to each of them of a German Commissioner, selected by the competent Reichsstelle. From the last months of 1943 on, the "Rustungsobmann" Office of the Armament and War Production Ministry (Speer), acquired the habit of passing its orders direct, without having recourse to the channel of the commodity control offices. Even before this date measures had been taken to prevent any initiative that was not in accord with the German war aims. Further and even before the above ordinance of 6 August 1942, the ordinance of 30 March 1942 should be mentioned, which made the establishment or extension of commercial enterprises subject to previous authorization by the military commissioner.
M. HENRY DELPECH (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): In the-report of the military administration in Belgium that has already been cited, the chief of the administrative staff, Raeder, specifies in Exhibit Number RF-169 (Document Number ECH-335) that for the period of January to March 1943 alone, out of 2,000 iron works, 400 were closed down for working irrationally or being useless to the war aims. The closing of these factories seems to have been caused less by the concern for a rational production than by the cunning desire to obtain cheaply valuable tools and machines. In this connection, it is appropriate to point to the establishment of a Machine Pool Office. The above quoted report of the military administration in Belgium, in the 11th section, Pages 56 and following, is particularly significant in this respect. Here is an extract from the German text, the last lines of the last paragraph of Page 56, in the French translation, the last lines . . .
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): That passage you read about the Defendant Raeder, was that from Document 169 or 170?
M. DELPECH: Mr. President, I spoke yesterday of the chief of the administration section, Raeder. He was section chief in Brussels. He has no connection with the defendant here.
THE PRESIDENT: I see, very well.
M. DELPECH: Exhibit Number RF-171 (Document Number ECH-10), second paragraph of the French text. The paragraph concerns the Machine Pool transactions: "Proof may be seen by a brief glance at the pool operations dealt with and actually carried out. Altogether 567 demands have been dealt with, to a total value of 4.6 million Reichsmark." Raeder then gave a number of figures. I shall pass over these and I come to the end of the first paragraph, Page 57 in the German text: "The legal basis for the requisition of these machines was the Hague Convention of 1907 , Articles 52 and 53 . The formulation of the Hague Convention which provides for requisitions only for the benefit and the needs of the occupying power, applied to the circumstances of the year 1907, that is, to a time when war actions were confined within narrowly restricted areas and practically the military front alone was involved in war operations. In view of such space restrictions for war, it was evident that the provisions of the Hague Convention , stipulating that requisitions be made solely for the needs of the occupying power, were sufficient for the conduct of operations. Modern war, however, which by its expansion to total war is no longer bound by space but has developed into a general struggle of peoples and economies, requires that while the regulations of the Hague Convention should be maintained, there should be a sensible interpretation of its principles adapted to the demands of modern warfare." I pass to the end of this quotation: "Whenever, in requisitioning, reference was made to the ordinance of the military commander of 6 August 1942, this was done in order to give the Belgian population the necessary interpretation of the meaning of the principle of the requisition regulations of the Hague Convention." Such an interpretation may leave jurists wondering, who have not been trained in the school of National Socialism. It cannot in any case justify the pillage of industry and the subjugation of Belgian production.
M. DELPECH: These few considerations show how subtle and varied were the methods employed by the Germans to attain their aims in the economic sphere. In the same way as the preceding statements on clearing operations and the utilization of occupation costs, they make it possible to specify the methods employed for exacting heavy levies from the Belgian economy. Whereas in certain spheres, as in agriculture and transport, it has been possible to assess the extent of economic pillage with a certain exactitude, there are, however, numerous industrial sectors where assessments cannot yet be made. It is true that a considerable part of the industrial losses correspond to the clearing" operations, particularly through requisition of stocks. It will therefore be necessary to confine ourselves to the directives of the policy practiced by the Germans. We may examine briefly the way in which economic spoliation took place in three sectors: industry, agriculture, and transport. First the industrial sector: The clearing statistics, in the first place, give particulars of the total burdens imposed upon the various industrial branches. The report of the military administration in Belgium, to which I shall refer constantly, gives the following details, briefly summarized: From the very beginning of the occupation the Germans demanded an inventory of supplies on which they were to impose considerable levies, notably textiles and non-ferrous metals. I shall confine myself to some brief remarks on textiles and nonferrous metals. The example of the textiles industry is particularly revealing: On the eve of the invasion, the Belgian textile industry, with its 165,000 workers, was the second largest industry in Belgium after the metal industry. Under the pretext of avoiding the exhaustion of the very important supplies then still available, an ordinance of 27 July 1940 prohibited the textile industry to work at more than 30 percent of its 1938 capacity. For the period from May to December 1940 alone requisitions were not less than 1,000 million Belgian francs.
M. DELPECH: They particularly affected nearly half of the wool stock available in the country on May 10, 1940, and nearly one-third of the stock of raw cotton. On the other hand, the forced closing down of factories constituted for the Germans an excellent excuse for taking away, on the pretext of hiring, unused equipment, unless it was requisitioned at a cheap price. The ordinance of 7 September 1942, which is to be found in the document book under Document Number RF-174, laid down the manner in which factories were to be closed in execution of the right accorded to the occupation authorities; and it also gave the right to dissolve certain business and industrial groups and to order their liquidation. Consolidation of enterprises was the pretext given. In the month of January 1944, 65 percent of the textile factories had been stopped. I shall not go into the details of these operations and I shall pass on to Page 58. The report of the German military administration quoted above gives particularly significant figures as to production. Of a total output of the wool industry of 72,000 tons for the entire period May 1940 to the end of June 1944, representing a value of about 397 million Reichsmark, the distribution of the deliveries between the German and Belgian markets is the following: The German market, 64,700 tons, 314 million Reichsmark; the Belgian market, 7,700 tons, 83 million Reichsmark. The whole spoliation of the textile industry is contained in these figures. Belgian consumption obviously 4ad to suffer a great deal from the German policy of direction of the textile market. The same report of the military administration furnishes details, stating that in 1938 the needs in textile products amounted in Belgium to a monthly average of twelve kilos. The respective figures for the occupation years are the following: 1940 to 1941-2.1 kilos per head, 1941 to 1942-1.4, 1942 to 1943-1.4, 1943 to 1944-0.7. The diminution of Belgian consumption under the Germans is contained in these two figures; twelve kilos per head in 1938; 0.7 kilo at the end of the occupation.
M. DELPECH: - On the other side, the Belgian Government gives the following details on the pillage of this produce. Compulsory deliveries to Germany during the occupation amounted to: Cotton yam, about 40 percent of the production; linen, 75 percent; rayon, 15 percent. Finally, out of the textile stocks remaining in Belgium a great percentage was still taken away by the Germans through purchases on the Belgian markets, purchases of finished or manufactured products. The equivalent of these forced deliveries can generally be found in the clearing statistics, unless it is placed under misrepresented occupation costs. I have finished with textiles. As to the non-ferrous metal industry, Belgium was in 1939 the largest producer in Europe of non- ferrous metals, of copper, lead, zinc, and tin. The statistics included in the report of the military command, which are to be found in Exhibit Number RF-173 (Document Number ECH-11), will furnish the evidence for the Tribunal. On the 18th of February 1941, in connection with the Four Year Plan, the Reich Office for Metals and the Supreme Command of the Army worked out a "metal" plan which provided for Belgian consumption; the carrying out of German orders; exports to the Reich. These various measures did not satisfy the occupying authorities so they ran a certain number of salvage campaigns which were called "special actions" (Sonderaktionen) in accordance with the method they applied in all the countries of Western Europe. I shall not go into the details of these actions which are described on Page 63 and following of the report; the salvage campaigns for bells, for printing lead, for lead and copper-from information given by the Belgian Government, Document Number RF-146, Page 65 of the report. In other fields, but without admitting it, the Germans pursued a policy intended to eliminate or to restrict Belgian competition, so that in case of a German victory the economic branches concerned would have had to restrict themselves to the Belgian market, which would then have remained wide open to German business.
M. DELPECH: These attempts at immediate or future suppression of competition were clearly evident in the case of foundries, glass works, textile industries, construction works, car assembling, construction of material for narrow-gauge railroads, the leather industry, and especially shoe-manufacturing, for which reconstruction of destroyed factories was systematically prohibited. But in addition, in the textile industry as well as in numerous sectors, especially in the iron-smelting industry, the weakening of the economy cannot be measured only by the scale of the compulsory deliveries but in relation to the policy practiced by the occupying power. Belgian industry, especially coal and iron, suffered considerable losses as a result of directives imposed to finance the war needs at a cheaper rate. I shall pass over the question of prices of coal. The control of the coal industry was assured by the appointment of a plenipotentiary for coal and by centralization of all sales in the hands of a single organism, the "single seller," under Belgian direction but with a German commissioner. I am referring to the Belgian coal office, one seller to a single purchaser, "Rheinisch Westhilisches Koblensyndikat," which ordered deliveries to be made to the Reich, to Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg. According to the same German report, Page 67, in spite of the rise in the price of coal agreed to on 20 August 1940, 1 January 1941, and I January 1943, the coal industry showed considerable losses in the course of the occupation years. In February 1943, the coal office having agreed to an increase of the sales price, the price per ton for the Belgian coal was higher than on the German home market. The German commissioner for the mining industry forced the Belgian industry to pay the difference in rate when exporting to the Reich by means of premiums. From the figures indicated in Exhibits Numbers RF-176 (Document Number ECH-35) and 178 (Document Numbers ECH-26 and 27), the Tribunal may gather information as to the financial losses caused by exploitation.
M. DELPECH: The report of the military administration gives in its eleventh section details regarding the iron-smelting industry: It suffered as greatly as had the coal industry during the occupation. In the Thomas smelting works in particular, the losses resulted from the increase in the cost price and from price fluctuations in respect to certain elements pertaining to the manufacture. In this one sector, according to the memorandum of the Belgian Government, the respective losses may be assessed at 3,000 million Belgian francs. Still, according to the same report, out of a total production of 1,400,000 tons, 1,300,000 tons of various products were exported to Germany not including the metal delivered to Belgian factories working exclusively for Germany. According to information furnished by the Belgian Government, the Germans removed in bulk and transported to Germany material of very great value. The total industrial spoliation is estimated by the Belgian Government at a sum of 2,000 million Belgian francs, at the 1940 rate, of course. These removals constitute a real material loss; and from the fragmentary indications given to the Tribunal, this sum of 2,000 million Belgian francs is the figure which I ask the Tribunal to note. In view of the information available at present it is not easy to estimate the extent of the levies made on industry; it is even more difficult to evaluate it in the agricultural sphere, which I shall briefly present. Apart from the admissible needs of the occupation troops, the German authorities made an effort to obtain a supplement to the food levies in Belgium for the purpose of increasing the food of the Reich and other territories occupied by its troops. After having employed direct methods of levying, the Germans used the services of unscrupulous agents whose job it was to purchase at any price on the illicit markets; and the black market in this field assumed such proportions that the occupying authorities were frequently alarmed and in 1943 had to suppress it.
M. DELPECH: Apart from the damage to livestock and' to the woods and forests, which play an important part in Belgium, the damage resulting from abnormal cutting in the forests brought about an excess in deforestation reaching a figure of 2 million tons; the damage to capital caused by this premature cutting can be estimated at about 200 million Belgian francs. The military operations proper caused damage to an extent of 100 million Belgian francs; and according to the memorandum of the Belgian Government, the total damage caused to forestry reaches a figure of 460 million Belgian francs. Taking into account the damage caused by abnormal cutting in the forests and by the establishment of airfields, the Belgian Government estimates at approximately 1,000 million Belgian francs the losses suffered by its agriculture during the occupation. It must be noted, without going further into this subject, that these are net losses in capital, constituting a veritable exhaustion of substance and a consequent reduction and real consumption of the nation's resources. With this I have concluded my presentation concerning agriculture, and I pass on to transport. The conduct of war led the Germans to utilize to the utmost the railroad network and the canal and river system of Belgium. The result was that the railroads and river fleet are included in those branches of Belgian economy which suffered most from the occupation and the hostilities which took place on Belgian soil. German traffic was simultaneously a traffic of personnel as demanded by military operations and a traffic of merchandise, coal, minerals, pit- props, foodstuffs, not to speak of the considerable quantities of construction material required for the fortification of the coast of the North Sea. Railroads: The report of the Belgian Government shows that the damages suffered by the railroads consisted of losses in capital as well as of losses in revenue.
M. DELPECH: Losses in capital resulted first and principally from requisitions and removals, to which the Germans proceeded in a wholesale fashion from the moment of their entry into Belgium. Thus in particular they immediately drained the stock of locomotives under the pretext of recovering German locomotives surrendered to Belgium after the war of 1914-1918 as a means of reparation. In addition to seizures of locomotives, the Belgian National Railroad Company was subjected to numerous requisitions of material, sometimes under the form of rental; these requisitions are estimated at 4,500 million francs at the 1940 value. Against the losses in capital, losses in revenue (Page 77) resulted principally from the free transportation service required by the Wehrmacht, also from the price policy pursued by the occupying power. These levies and these exceptional costs could be borne by the organizations concerned only by making large drains on the treasury. Regarding automobiles, I shall say hardly anything (Page 79). The losses amount to about 3,000 million Belgian francs, out of which individuals received as compensation for requisition approximately 1,000 million (at the 1938 value). We come now to river transport: The carrying out of the plan for the economic spoliation of Belgium presented the occupying power with serious transportation problems, to which I have already called attention. In this sphere the German military administration imposed upon Belgian river shipping very heavy burdens. According to the report of the Belgian Government, the losses suffered by the Belgian river fleet took three forms: Requisitions and removals by the Germans; partial or total damage through military operations; excessive deterioration of material. These three forms of damage amount to 500 million francs, of which only 100 million are represented in clearing.
M. DELPECH: Damage to waterways (Page 81), rivers, streams, and canals, can be evaluated at between 1,500 million to 2,000 million francs, at the 1940 value, especially with respect to requisitions and removals of public or private harbor installations. Fishing boats were requisitioned for marking the river Scheldt and then disappeared without leaving any trace. Others suffered damage through requisitions or hire for military maneuvers. Before closing this chapter concerned with levies in kind, the question of removal of industrial material may be briefly mentioned (Page 82). It has already been pointed out that the policy of production and reorganization as pursued by the military administration had as a result the closing of numerous enterprises, thus enabling the Germans to seize a great number of machines under the pretext that they were out of use. There are no branches of industry which were not despoiled in this way. The metal industry seems now to be one of those that suffered most. Though we do not wish to try the patience of the Tribunal, it seems particularly pertinent to draw its attention briefly to the actual technique used in the organization of the levies, details which were decided upon even before the entry of German troops into the territories of Western Europe, organization putting into play military formations, organization emanating from the economy bureau of the General Staff of the Army and hence from the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW. The existence of these military detachments, veritable pillaging detachments, is proved by various German documents. Under the name of economic detachments, "Wirtschaftstrupps," or special commandos, these pillaging crews carried out nefarious and illegal activities in all the countries of Western Europe. The secret instructions for the "economic detachment J," stationed at Antwerp, are found in the file under Document Number RF- 183.
M. DELPECH: They constitute a very important, irrefutable document on the German intention to pillage and an additional proof of the contempt of the National Socialist leaders for the rules of international law. These instructions date from the last days of May 1940. 1 should like to read a few excerpts of these instructions to the Tribunal (Document Number RF-183, Page 1). "The economic detachments are formed by the office for economic armament of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. They are placed at the disposal of the High Command of the Army for employment in the countries to be occupied." I shall skip to the bottom of Page 1 of the German document. "It is their task to gain information quickly and completely in their districts of the scarce and rationed goods (raw materials, semi- finished products, mineral oil, et cetera) and machines of most vital importance for the purposes of national defense and to make a correct return of these stocks. "In the case of machines, the requisition will be effected by means of a label, in the case of scarce and rationed goods, both by labelling and by guarding. "Furthermore, the economic detachments have the duty of preparing and, upon order of the Army Group, of carrying out the removal of scarce and rationed goods, mineral oils, and the most important machines. These tasks are the exclusive responsibility of the economic detachments. "The economic detachments are to commence their activities in newly occupied territories as early as the battle situation permits." Machines and raw materials having thus been found and identified, the new organizations went into action to dismantle and put to use these machines and raw materials in Germany. The above quoted document RF-183 gives precise and very curious information on the formation and the strength of detachment "J" at Antwerp. The eight officers are all reserve officers, engineers, wholesale dealers, directors of mines, importers of raw materials, engineering consultants. Their names and their professions are mentioned in the document.