dtufail/nuremberg-trials-corpus huggingface dataset:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Foreign Office, however, has reserved the decision as to the date when the declaration will be issued as well as the discussion of particulars." These last two documents show quite clearly that this defendant was again implicated in the preparation for this act of aggression. Then, on the 22d of June 1941, this defendant announced to the world that the German armies were invading the U.S.S.R., as was seen by the Tribunal in the film shown on the 11th of December. And how untrue were the reasons given is shown by the report of his own Ambassador in Moscow who said that everything was being done to avoid a conflict. The Tribunal will find the reference to that in the speech of my learned friend, the Attorney General, the transcript at Page 888 (Volume III, Page 143). We now come to the aggression which involved Japan and was directed against the United States of America. And there the initial document is 2508-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-147. That shows that on the 25th of November 1936, as a result of negotiations of this defendant as Ambassador-at-large, Germany and Japan had signed the Anticomintern Pact. I do not think that has been read, but if I might just read the introduction, the recital that gives the purposes of the agreement: "The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist International, known as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and subdue existing states by all the means at its command, convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist International in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being but is also a menace to the peace of the world, desirous of co-operating in the defense against Communist subversive activities, have agreed as follows...." And then there follow the effective terms of the agreement under which they will act together for 5 years. It is signed by this defendant.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On the 27th of September 1940 this defendant, as Foreign Minister, signed the Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy, thereby bringing about a full-scale military and economic alliance for the creation of a "New Order" in Europe and East Asia. That is 2643-PS, Exhibit USA-149,. and has been read. Then, on the 13th of February of 1941-that is a month or two later-this defendant was urging the Japanese to attack British possessions in the Far East. And that is shown in Document 1834-PS, which is Exhibit USA-129 and which has already been read by my friend, Mr. Alderman. That was February. Then, in April of 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Matsuoka, representing Japan, at which this defendant was present, Hitler promised that Germany would declare war on the United States in the event of war occurring between Japan and the United States as a result of Japanese aggression in the Pacific. That is shown in Document 1881-PS, Exhibit USA-33, which has already been read and which I did not intend to read again. Then the next document which reinforces that point is 1882-PS, which is Exhibit USA-153. If I might trouble the Tribunal with just two short paragraphs of that; it is interesting, showing the psychological development of this defendant and his views at that time. They are the first two paragraphs that are quoted, under the heading "Pages 2 and 3," where it begins "Matsuoka"; it is on the first page of the document: "Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany, referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig. works. He expressed his regret that developments in Japan were not yet as far advanced as in Germany and that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable influence. "The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, some of whom are parasites, anyway."
THE PRESIDENT: It is "most," according to my document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, "most"; I beg Your Lordship's pardon, it is completely my fault, it should be "most," "most of whom are parasites, anyway." "A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must give them up. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had already started their pernicious activities when National Socialism put a stop to these doings; they will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected with certainty." Then it continues on the usual lines. That last document was on the 5th of April. Then, the next stage: Within a month after the German Armies invaded the Soviet Union, the 22d of June 1941, Ribbentrop was urging his Ambassador in Tokyo to do his utmost to cause the Japanese Government to attack the Soviet in Siberia; and that is proved by two documents which have already been put in 2896-PS, which is Exhibit USA-155, a telegram to the German Ambassador, in Tokyo, one Ott; and 2897-PS, USA-156, which is the reply from Ambassador Ott. Both of these were read by my friend, Mr. Alderman, and I won't trouble the Tribunal again. But the next document, which is D-656, is a new document which I put in as GB-148. That was captured from the Japanese, and it is a message-intercepted-which was sent by the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin just before the attack on the United States. If I might just read one short extract from this defendant's speech; on the 29th of November 1941, that is roughly a week before Pearl Harbor, this defendant was saying-it is in Paragraph 1, and I will read it all because it is new: "Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any reports regarding the Japanese-United States negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word. "Ribbentrop: 'It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Japan hesitates at this time and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States wit be concentrated against Japan. "'As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-United States negotiations being concluded successfully because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front. "'If this is indeed the fact of the case and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself."' Then the Ambassador replied: "'I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and the United States?"' The Defendant Ribbentrop: "'Roosevelt's a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he would do."' Then: "Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops, and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech as well as that of Ribbentrop's, I feel that the German attitude toward the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary." Then- the next part, Section 2, is an extremely optimistic prognosis of the war against the Soviet Union. I do not think, in view of the date in which we are reading it, that I need trouble the Tribunal with that. There are then a few remarks about the intended landing operations against England, which is also vieux jeu at this time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If the Tribunal would go to Part 3, there again we get the international attitude of mind of this defendant-at the foot of Page 2, Part 3; and I am quoting: "'In any event Germany has absolutely no intention of entering into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever in international affairs. The island empire of Britain may remain, but all of her other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United quote: States and Japan. In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share of the African colonies. Germany desires, above all else, to control European Russia."' And after hearing this defendant, the Ambassador said; and I "'I am fully aware of the fact that Germany's war campaign is progressing according to schedule smoothly. However, suppose that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only Great Britain as an actual enemy but also all of those areas in which Britain has influence, and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual enemies, as well. Under such circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?"' The Defendant Ribbentrop: " 'We would like to end this war during next year."' that is, 1942 "'However, under certain circumstances it is possible that it will have to be continued into the following year. "'Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States . . ."'
THE PRESIDENT: You are going a little bit too fast.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, I am sorry. I will go back to the paragraph I have just finished. The Defendant Ribbentrop-and I am still quoting: "'We would like to end this war during next year. However, under certain circumstances it is possible that it will have to be continued into the following year. "'Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point."' That document associates this defendant with the aggression by Japan against the United States in the closest possible way. Another new document, which is also an intercepted Japanese diplomatic message, is the next one, D-657, which I put in as Exhibit GB-149; and if I might read the first two sentences that show what it is-and I quote-the Japanese Ambassador says: "At 1:00 p. m. today" the 8th of December "I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters, discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he could to have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th" that is before the declaration of war "Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them. "It goes without saying that this is only for your secret information." Then, as a matter of fact, as the Tribunal are aware, on the 11th of December 1941 this Defendant Ribbentrop, in the name of the German Government, announced a state of war between Germany and the United States. The next stage concerns his attempt to get Japan to attack the Soviet Union.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In Ribbentrop's conversations with Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, in July 1942 and in March and April 1943, he continued to urge Japanese participation and aggression against the Soviet Union. This is shown in Document 2911-PS, which has been put in as Exhibit USA-157 and already read, and Document 2954-PS, which I now put in as GB-150. That is a new document; and if I might just indicate the effect of it by a very short quotation-it is a discussion between the Defendant Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima. It begins: "Ambassador Oshima declared that he has received a telegram from Tokyo; and he is to report, by order of his Government, to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: "The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the object of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The outcome is the following: The Japanese Government thoroughly recognize the danger which threatens from Russia and completely understand the desire of their German ally that Japan on her part also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter the war. They are rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government will never lose sight of the Russian question." And then, in the middle of the next paragraph, this defendant returns to the attack. The third sentence-it begins on the fourth line-says: "However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the Three Power Pact, would combine their forces to strike together at not only England and America, but also Russia. It is not good if one part must fight alone." Then the pressure on Japan to attack Russia is shown again in the next document, 2929-PS, which was put in as Exhibit USA-159.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, if I might just close this part of the case, if I might read that it is very short: "The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that without any doubt this year presented the most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had sufficient antitank weapons at her disposal to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak as at the moment" the moment being 18 April 1943. If the Tribunal please, that concludes my evidence on the second allegation dealing with aggressive war; and I submit that that allegation in the Indictment is more than amply proved. The third allegation is that the Defendant Ribbentrop authorized, directed, and participated in War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. Of course, I am considering this from the point of view of planning these crimes only. The execution of the crimes will be dealt with by my friends and Soviet colleagues, but it is relevant to show how this defendant participated in the planning of such crimes. I deal, first, with the killing of Allied aviators; secondly, with the destruction of peoples in Europe; and thirdly, with the persecution of the Jews. First, the killing of Allied aviators: With the increasing air raids on German cities in 1944 by Allied Air Forces, the German Government proposed to undertake a plan to deter Anglo-American fliers from further raids on the Reich cities. In a report of a meeting at which a definite policy was to be established, there is stated what was the point of view that this Defendant Ribbentrop had been urging. That is in Document 735-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-151. That is a discussion of a meeting at the Fuehrer's headquarters on the 6th of June 1944.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If I might read the first paragraph: "Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner informed the Deputy Chief of Operations Staff"-WFSt-"in Klessheim on the afternoon of the 6th of June that a conference on this question had been held shortly before by the Reich Marshal" the Defendant Goering "the Reich Foreign Minister"-the Defendant Von Ribbentrop "and the Reichsfuehrer SS.V-Himmler- "Contrary to the original suggestion made by the Reich Foreign Minister, who wished to include every type of terror attack on the German civilian population, including bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed in the above conference that merely those attacks carried out with aircraft armament aimed directly at the civilian population and their property should be taken as the standard for the evidence of a criminal action in this sense. Lynch law would have to be the rule, there was no mention of trial by court-martial or handing over to the police." That is, this defendant was pressing that even where there was an attack on a German city, the airmen should be handed over to be lynched by the crowd. The others were saying that that should be restricted to cases where there were attacks by machine guns, and the like, on the civilian population. I do not think we need trouble with Paragraph (a) of the statement of the Deputy Chief of WFSt. The importance of (a) goes because Kaltenbrunner says that there were no such cases as were mentioned. If you look at (b): "The Deputy Chief of the WFSt. pointed out that, besides the lynch law, a procedure must be worked out for segregating such enemy aviators who are suspected of criminal action of this kind by sending them to the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel and, if the suspicion was confirmed, handing them over to the SD for special treatment." As I understand that, it is that if they were not lynched under the first scheme, by the crowd, then they were to be kept from prisoners of war, where they would, of course, be subject to the protecting power's intervention.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD to be killed. Then in Paragraph 3 we have what was decided to justify the lynch law. Paragraph 3 says: "At a conference with Colonel Von Brauchitsch (Colonel of the Air Force) on the 6th of June, it was settled that the following actions are to be regarded as terror actions justifying lynch law: "Low-level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian population, single persons as well as crowds. "Shooting in the air our own (German) men who had bailed out. "Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains in the public service. "Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals, hospitals, and hospital trains, which are clearly marked with the red cross." These were to be the subject of lynching and not, as this defendant had suggested, a case where there was the bombing of a city. Then on the next page, the last page of this document, we have a somewhat curious comment from the Defendant Keitel: "Remarks by the Chief of the OKW on the agenda dated 6 June 1944." The number is that of the document at which the Tribunal has just been looking. "Most secret; Staff officers only. "If one allows the people to carry out lynch law, it is difficult to enforce rules. "Ministerial Director Berndt got out and shot the enemy aviator on the road. I am against legal procedure. It doesn't work out."-Signed-"Keitel" Then the Defendant Jodl's comment appears: "This conference is insufficient. The following points must be decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Of Office: "1. What do we consider as murder? Is the Foreign Office in agreement with point 3b? "2. How should the procedure be carried out? a. By the people? b. By the authorities? "3. How can we guarantee that the procedure will not be also carried out against other enemy aviators? "4.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?" Signed-"Jodl." It is important, I respectfully submit, to note that this defendant and the Foreign Office were fully in on these breaches of the laws and usages of war, and indeed the clarity with which the Foreign Office perceives that there were breaches of the laws and usages of war, is shown by the next document, which is 728-PS, which I now put in as GB-152. That is a document from the Foreign Office, approved of by the Defendant Ribbentrop and transmitted by one of his officials called Ritter; and the fact that it is approved by this defendant is specifically stated in the next Document 740-PS, which I put in as GB-153. I do not think this Document 728-PS has been read before, and therefore, again, I would like to read just one or two passages in it. It begins: "In spite of the obvious objections, based on international law and foreign policy, the Foreign Of Office is basically in agreement with the proposed measures. "In the examination of the individual cases a distinction must be made between the cases of lynching and the cases of special treatment by the SD. "I. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the facts involving punishment, according to points 1 through 4 of the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the German authorities are not directly responsible, since the death will have occurred before a German official becomes concerned with the case. Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will be such, that it will not be difficult to represent the case in an appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of lynching it will be of primary importance correctly to handle the individual case upon publication. "II. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the SD, including subsequent publication, would feasible only if Germany would at the same time openly repudiate the commitments of international law, at present in force and still recognized by Germany.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When an enemy aviator is seized by the Army or by the Police and is delivered to the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel, he has acquired by this very fact the legal status of a prisoner of war. "The Prisoner-of-War Agreement of 27 July 1929 established definite rules for the prosecution and sentencing of prisoners of war and the execution of the death penalty, as for example in Article 66: Death sentences may be carried out only 3 months after the Protecting Power has been notified of the sentence. In Article 63: A prisoner of war will be tried only by the same courts and under the same procedure as members of the German Armed Forces. These rules are so specific that it would be futile to try to cover up any violation of them by clever wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the other hand, the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion a formal repudiation of the Prisoner-of-War Agreement. "An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected enemy fliers from ever attaining a legal prisoner-of-war status, that is, that immediately upon capture they be told that they are not considered prisoners of war but criminals, that they would not be turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over prisoners of war, hence not go to a prisoner-of-war camp, but that they be delivered to the authorities in charge of the prosecution of criminal acts, and that they be tried in summary proceedings. If the evidence at the trial should reveal that the special procedure is not applicable to a particular case, the fliers concerned may subsequently be given the status of prisoner of war by transfer to the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel. "Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the possibility of Germany's being accused of violation of existing treaties or even the adoption of reprisals upon German prisoners of war.